Kevin C. Rupert

712 Carrollwood Road

Baltimore, Maryland 21220

April 20, 2015

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of Regulations and Interpretations, 

Employee Benefits Security Administration, 

Attn: Conflict of Interest Rule, Room N-5655 

200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20210.

RE: RIN 1210-AB32

The proposed rule provides a workable compensation model consistent 

with a fiduciary obligation for providers of retirement advice. In my opinion, 

if a professional provider cannot operate in accordance with the rule 

proposal, that provider should seek a job in a non-professional capacity. 

Advice received under a fiduciary obligation will almost always be better 

than, and at a minimum equal to, advice received under a suitability 

standard. Thus, there is simply no reason to disadvantage any advice 

recipients by permitting any standard other than that of a fiduciary. 

Making retirement advisers subject to a fiduciary obligation will reduce 

inefficiencies in the market. Efficient market theory implies rational behavior 

by investors with respect to their own profit motives. If retirement advisers 

operate on anything less than a fiduciary standard, it would seem to me that 

their behavior might add an input into the market quite different from what 

efficient market theory might suggest, thereby creating market distortions

and inefficiencies. 

Most importantly, the costs of this rule are nominal relative to the 

benefits provided to Americans. Indeed, what some might view as costs of 

this rule proposal will actually be larger gains that accrue for retirement 

investors. In other words, lesser income for advice providers necessarily 

means increased income for retirement investors. Thus, any costs

associated with the rule proposal are hardly costs at all! Therefore, the 

increasing costs and income reductions for retirement advisers will, in large 

part, correspondingly increase gains for retirement investors. Moreover, it is 

the hallmark of a true profession to place the interests of its clients above 

the interests of industry participants. This rule proposal, with its reasonable 

conflict disclosure provisions, is consistent with that professional standard. 
Indeed, by definition, this rule proposal must be of great benefit to 

retirement investors. 

The proposed rule will go far in curbing the potential exploitation of the 

majority of Americans. Americans are generally unsophisticated in finance 

matters. Americans simply do not have the academic and financial ability to 

exercise adequate supervision and control over a financial professional 

engaged in their retirement affairs, absent a fiduciary standard. When 

Americans see a physician, we don’t expect them to be medical experts; 

likewise, when Americans seek retirement advice, we should not expect 

them to be financial and retirement experts. The burden of professional 

responsibility must always be placed on the person with the professional 

knowledge. In sum, this rule proposal recognizes the inability of retirement 

investors to professionally manage their own affairs and serves to protect 

virtually all Americans from possible financial exploitation, at little or no cost.

Secretary Perez said “[u]nder the proposed rule, retirement advisers 

can be paid in various ways, as long as they are willing to put their 

customers' best interest first." This standard meets the needs of the 

American public and it permits retirement advisers to receive reasonable 

compensation with adequate disclosure. The rule proposal simply requires 

prudent and unbiased advice. It should be adopted. 

Kevin C. Rupert