SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1551-18T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PHILLIP G. COLSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted March 4, 2020 – Decided March 13, 2020

Before Judges Haas, Mayer and Enright. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 6219.

Levow DWI Law, PC, attorneys for appellant (Evan M. 

Levow, of counsel and on the brief).

Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Timothy Mark Ortolani, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Phillip G. Colson appeals from the November 1, 2018 Law 

Division, Criminal Part order directing him to install an ignition interlock device 

based on his guilty plea to refusing to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50.4a. We affirm.

On November 29, 2017, defendant was charged with driving while 

intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; refusal to submit to breath testing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50.4a; and reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. On April 18, 2018, he entered a 

guilty plea in municipal court to the refusal to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 

39:4-50.4a. All other charges were dismissed based on the defendant's 

negotiated plea agreement. 

On May 1, 2018, defendant was sentenced by a municipal court judge to 

seven months' loss of driving privileges in New Jersey and installation of an 

ignition interlock device for thirteen months. Defendant also was ordered to 

attend 12 hours at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, pay a $306 fine, as 

well as $100 in Drunk Driving Enforcement Fund (DDEF) assessments and $33 

in court costs. The municipal court judge rejected defense counsel's argument 

that installation of an ignition interlock device did not apply to out-of-state 

drivers. 
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On May 18, 2018, defendant appealed from the municipal court's 

sentence, challenging only the imposition of the ignition interlock device. A

Law Division, Criminal Part judge in Union County rejected defendant's claim 

that he was not required to install the device and on November 1, 2018, the judge 

imposed the same sentence the municipal court judge imposed.1 

On appeal defendant renews his argument that it was error for the 

sentencing court to impose the requirement of an ignition interlock device based 

on his conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, because he is a licensed 

Pennsylvania driver. We disagree. 

"When an appellate court reviews a trial court's analysis of a legal issue, 

it does not owe any special deference to the trial court's legal interpretation." 

State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 303-04 (2012). "'[A]ppellate review of legal 

determinations is plenary.'" Id. at 304 (quoting State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 

(2011)). Here, defendant raises an issue involving the interpretation of a statute. 

Therefore, our review is plenary. 

1

 In doing so, the Law Division, Criminal Part judge stated that it "sees no 

reason to deviate from the previously imposed sentence." However, the judge 

inadvertently failed to mention the mandatory $100 DDEF assessment in his 

ruling. Accordingly, the order of November 1, 2018 must be amended to reflect 

this mandatory assessment.
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When the interpretation of a statute is at issue, we must first consider the 

plain language of the statute. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 499 (2010). "We 

apply common sense in deducing the meaning of the Legislature's chosen 

language, drawing inferences based on the statute's structure and composition." 

In re J.S., 444 N.J. Super. 303, 308 (App. Div. 2016). 

"If a plain-language reading of the statute 'leads to a clear and 

unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over.'" State v. Hupka, 203 

N.J. 222, 232 (2010) (quoting Richardson v. Board. of Trs., Police & Firemen's 

Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195-96 (2007)). Still, if we discern an ambiguity in the 

statutory language, we look to extrinsic evidence. Ibid. Sources for such 

evidence include "the statute's purpose, legislative history, and statutory context 

to ascertain the legislature's intent." State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567 (quoting 

Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323 (2000)). 

By statute, "[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle on any public road, 

street or highway or quasi-public area in this State shall be deemed to have given 

his consent to the taking of samples of his breath . . . to determine the content 

of alcohol in his blood . . . ." N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. Any refusal to consent to said 

breath test is criminalized pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. A reading of this 

statute plainly confirms that if the refusal is in connection with a first offense, 
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"[t]he . . . court shall order [the] person . . . to forfeit the right to operate a motor 

vehicle over the highways of this State until the person installs an ignition 

interlock device in one motor vehicle owned, leased, or principally operated by 

the person . . . ." N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a(a).

Defendant asserts there "is nothing in the language of the statute that 

expressly addresses the application of the interlock mandate to out[-]of[-]state 

drivers." Relying on N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c), he argues the Legislature intended to 

differentiate between out-of-state drivers and New Jersey drivers when 

imposing a sentence for a refusal conviction. This statute provides:

Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court 

shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver’s license 

or licenses of the person so convicted and forward such 

license or licenses to the chief administrator . . . . In the 

event that a person convicted under this section is the 

holder of any out-of-State driver’s license, the court 

shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith 

the chief administrator, who shall, in turn, notify 

appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The 

court shall, however, revoke the nonresident’s driving 

privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State, in 

accordance with this section.

[N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c).]

Because N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c), involving the administrative treatment of a 

license, distinguishes between a license suspension and the revocation of driving 

privileges, defendant claims the ignition interlock device requirement applies 
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only when a driver's license is suspended, but not when driving privileges are 

revoked. We are not persuaded.

Defendant's interpretation does not comport with a plain reading of this

statute and runs contrary to the stated intent of the Legislature to curb drunk 

driving. As set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.16:

a. This State’s penalties for drunk driving, including 

the mandatory suspension of driver’s licenses and 

counseling for offenders, are among the strongest in the 

nation. However, despite the severity of existing 

penalties, far too many persons who have been 

convicted under the drunk driving law continue to 

imperil the lives of their fellow citizens by driving 

while intoxicated.

b. Ignition interlock devices, which permit a motor 

vehicle to be started only when the driver is sober, offer 

a technically feasible and effective means of further 

reducing the incidence of drunk driving . . . .

c. The judicious deployment of ignition interlock 

devices, as provided under this act, will enhance and 

strengthen this State’s existing efforts to keep drunk 

drivers off the highways.

Our Legislature clearly prioritizes the safety of its citizens and makes no 

distinction between in- and out-of-state drivers when addressing the wisdom of 

utilizing ignition interlock devices to "keep drunk drivers off the highways." 

Furthermore, the plain language of the refusal statute does not exempt outof-state drivers from the requirement to install an ignition interlock device. 
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Rather, the statute explicitly states the court "shall order any person who, after 

being arrested for a violation of [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50] . . . refuses to submit [to a 

breath test] . . . to forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways 

of this State until the person installs an ignition interlock device . . . ." N.J.S.A. 

39:4-50.4a (emphasis added). The straightforward wording of the refusal statute 

does not carve out an exception for out-of-state drivers who violate the law but 

instead punishes "any person" who violates the refusal statute. 

Our Supreme Court has provided guidance on interpretation of the phrase, 

"any person," explaining:

"Any," as commonly defined, means one out of a group, 

without differentiating among the group's members. 

Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 97 (1971). When 

"any" is used in conjunction with "person," as in the 

eluding statute, the phrase embraces all natural persons, 

including the defendant. See State v. Constantino, 129 

N.J. Super. 111, 113 (App. Div. 1974) (concluding that 

words "any person" in statute governing issuance of 

revolver permits and firearms purchaser identification 

cards did not exclude anyone, even defendant chief of 

police, from its coverage). 

[State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 543 (2004).]

"'[T]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its 

enactments.'" Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 575 (2014) (quoting DiProspero v. 

Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 494 (2005)). Therefore, our Legislature is presumed to be 
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aware that it did not exempt out-of-state drivers who are convicted under the 

refusal statute from the requirement that they must install an ignition interlock 

device. Accordingly, we are satisfied the Law Division, Criminal Part judge 

properly subjected defendant to the requirement of installing an ignition 

interlock device. 

Affirmed. We remand for correction of defendant's sentence to include a

$100 DDEF assessment, which must be imposed following a conviction under 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a). We do not retain jurisdiction.