### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 20-1779

P AULA M C A LLISTER , Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

I NNOVATION V ENTURES, LLC, doing business as Living Essential Defendant-Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. No. 17-CV-00867 — Jon E. DeGuilio , Chief Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED N OVEMBER 13, 2020

— D ECIDED D ECEMBER 30, 2020

____________________

Before F LAUM, R OVNER, and B RENNAN , Circuit Judges

. F LAUM, Circuit Judge . Plainti ff Paula McAllister su ff ered serious injuries in a car accide nt in June 2016. In the following months, her treating physicians repeatedly concluded shecould not yet return to work for her employer, defendant Innovation Ventures, LLC. Innovation provided her with medical leave and short-term disability bene fi ts while she sought treatment. Once it became clear that McAllister likely could2 No. 20-1779

not return to work until at le ast February 2017, Innovation terminated McAllister. McAllister sued Innovation. As relevant on appeal, she claimed Innovati on failed to accommodate her during the summer of 2016 in vi olation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Because weagree with the district court that McAllister was not a “qualifi ed individual” under the ADA, we a ffi rm. I. Background McAllister worked for Innovation, the producer of the popular liquid dietary supplement 5-hour ENERGY. Through
a sta ffi ng agency, McAllister began working as an assembly worker in October 2014. She soon directly applied to and was hired by Innovation as an a ssembly worker, which sometimes entailed “rework,” 1 and she later became a machine operator. On June 10, 2016, an unfortunate automobile accident leftMcAllister with serious head and back injuries. At the hospital, spinal surgeon Dr. Je ff rey Kachmann performed spinal surgery on McAllister and treated her for several injuries: aherniated disc, spinal cord compression, central cord syndrome (which often weakens motor and sensory functioning), a closed-head injury, and a “c omplex,” “multi-direction laceration.”Shortly after her injury, McAllister sought short-term disability bene fi ts and medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq . Dr. Kachmann s o ffi ce submi tt ed an FMLA certi fi cation indicat1 “Rework,” also known as “reprocessing,” was a periodic duty that Innovation assigned its employees, but itwas not an independent job. McAllister s rework required her to conduct quality checks on certain products.No. 20-1779 3

ing that McAllister had “central cord syndrome” and a “signi fi cant head injury” with “some pos tt raumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage and some possible pos tt raumatic super fi cial brain contusion.” On the certi fi cation, where asked what job functions McAllister “[was] unable to perform,” Dr.Kachmann wrote she could not perform “any & all” functions. He estimated that McAllis ter could not return to work until September 8, 2016. McAllister also sought short-term disability bene fi ts. Guardian, Innovation s bene fi ts provider, granted these bene fi ts partially based on Dr. Kachmann s view that she was “totally disabl ed (unable to work)” and his estimate of a September return.

McAllister asked Innovations human resources department whether she could return to work before receiving acomplete medical clearance, as her doctors had imposed restrictions on how much she could lift. According to McAllister, Innovation refused, telling her that “all restrictions had to be lifted before [she] could return to work because that was the policy that the company had used.” Thereafter, McAllister fell into a frustrating cycle wherein her doctors would examine her, predict she could return towork in some number of weeks, then later elongate their prediction at a follow-up visit. On August 24, 2016, as her expected September 8 return approached, she met with April Christlieb, Dr. Kachmann s physician assistant. Christlieb wrote a report that she faxed to Innovation indicating that McAllister may be ge tt ing a “li tt le bit be tt er” but that she had hip and knee pain, foot swelling, some balancing issues, and post-concussion symptoms. Christlieb concluded, “I don t feel at this time she is quite ready to go back to work.”4 No. 20-1779

On October 3, 2016, McAllister again met with Dr. Kachmann s o ffi ce, which sent Innovation a work status report restating that McAllister still could not return to work. Despite her desire to return, McAllister recalled experiencing balance, dizziness, and memory loss issues, and some “di ffi

culty ge tt ing words out.” Her doctors told Innovation that McAllister needed a neuropsychological evaluation before they could clear her and estimated that would take at least six more weeks. In the interim, Innovation s human resources departmentreached out to McAllister because her FMLA leave had expired. At an October 26, 2016 meeting, McAllister noti fi ed the department that she still could not return to work. Innovation told her that, per its policy, anemployee unable to return to work after six months of leav e would be terminated. McAllister noti fi ed Innovation that she scheduled her neuropsychological evaluation with another doctor, Dr. Paul Roberts. Considering this upcoming evaluati on, Innovation granted her request for additional leave, set to expire at the time of her follow-up appointment with Dr. Kachmann on November 14. By the time of that appointment, however, Dr. Roberts had not completed McAllister s testing. Dr. Kachmann s o ffi ce sent another work status report to In novation, this time estimating that McAllister could not return to work until February 2017 to allow Dr. Roberts to fi nish his testing. McAllister again spoke with the human resources department, but Innovationdeclined to extend her leave any further and instead terminated her on December 14, 2016. After her termination, McAllis ter continued her treatment and applied for long-term disability bene fi ts and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) bene fi ts. After completing herNo. 20-1779 5

testing, Dr. Roberts opined that “most all of her mental functions were within the normal range or almost above normal range.” He believed that McAllister could gradually return to work, and by June 2017, she wo uld have no restrictions. She applied for long-term disability bene fi ts with Guardian in February 2017. In her ap plication, she recounted her di ffi culties with memory, balance, arm and hand tremors, neck and muscle pain, basic household tasks, and numbness in her foot. Guardian granted McAllister long-term disability bene fi ts until it terminated them in October 2018 when it determined she no longer had “functional de fi cits ... that would support an inability to return to work” as a machine operator. In addition to long-term disability bene fi ts, McAllister applied for SSDI bene fi ts in September 2017. In her application she asserted that “I BECAME UNABLE TO WORK BECAUSE OF MY DISABLING CONDITION ON June 10, 2016. I AM STILL DISABLED.” She identi fi ed several ailments that affl icted her: brain injury, cervical vertebrae injury, tremors in right arm, head shakes, “can t raise arms above my head,” “unsteady on my feet when up and down stairs,” and “right foot and leg numbness.” She furth er listed that her injuries adversely a ff ected her ability to: lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit, kneel, talk, climb stai rs, recollect, complete tasks,concentrate, use her hands, and get along with others. The Social Security Administration granted her SSDI bene fi ts in February 2018, to apply retroactively to the date of her accident.

McAllister sued Innovation in November 2017, alleging that Innovation failed to accommodate her under the ADA as well as bringing several causes of action for discrimination. Innovation fi led a motion for summary judgment on all of McAllister s claims. McAllister only defended her failure-to-6 No. 20-1779

accommodate ADA claim. The district court granted Innovation s motion in full. With respect to the contested ADA claim, the court found that McAllister was not “quali fi ed” under the ADA. Alternatively, the distri ct court found that McAllister was equitably estopped from arguing she was “quali fi ed” because she received disability bene fi ts premised on contradictory representations about he r inability to work. McAllister timely appealed.

II. Discussion

We review a district court s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing a ll reasonable inferences in that party s favor. James v. Hya ttRegency Chi., 707 F.3d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 2013). The moving party, in this case Innovation, is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a ma tt er of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Thus, to survivesummary judgment, the nonmoving party must present evidence su ffi cient to establish a triable issue of fact on all essential elements of its case.” Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. , 561 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catre tt, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).“The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for a quali fi ed individual with a disability.” TaylorNovotny v. Health A ll. Med. Plans, Inc. , 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014). McAllister “bears the bu rden of proving that she is a ‘quali fi ed individual with a disability —that is, a person‘who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of her job.” Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp. , 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C.No. 20-1779 7

§ 12111(8)). “Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable or not is a highly fact-speci fi c inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002). If McAllister proves she was a quali fi ed individual, then Innovation “has the burden to establish that the accommodation would have created an undue hardship on its business.” Taylor-Novotny, 772 F.3d at 493.McAllister argues on appeal that she can satisfy the preliminary showing that she was ab le to perform the essential functions of her position wi th or without accommodation, and therefore she is a quali fi ed individual under the ADA. Speci fi cally, she fi rst contends that between August and September 2016 she could have pe rformed her machine operator job with accommodations. Next, she argues she could haveperformed rework or an assembly job without accommodations during that same period . Failing that, she then asserts that Innovation should have granted her additional leave, which she argues would have been reasonable.

A. Machine Operator First, McAllister argues that had she “received the same accommodations available to employees with work-relatedinjuries, McAllister[] could have returned to work as a machine operator in August and September 2016.” McAllister urges that she could have continued working but forInnovation s unwillingness to accommodat e her lifting restrictions. McAllister s threshold problem is that her contentions that she could work that summer as a machine operator directly contradict her doctors orders.8 No. 20-1779

“At summary judgment, it is the plainti ff s burden to provide evidence such that a rational jury could fi nd her to be a quali fi ed individual,” meaning the plainti ff “is one who ‘can perform the essential functions of the employment position either ‘with or without reasonable accommodation. ” Kotaska v. Fed. Express Corp. , 966 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Once an em ployee is evaluated by a doctor, an “employer is entitled to rely on a physicians recommendation that the employee is no t able to safely perform an essential function of his job.” Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr. , 788 F.3d 276, 294 (7th Cir. 2015) (c itation and internal quotation marks omi tt ed). Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, a doctor s view that an employee cannot “return to work ... in any position” means an employee cannot “establish that she is a ‘quali fi ed individual with a disability under the ADA.” Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp. , 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc. , 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996).

McAllister s doctors made clear that she could not work asa machine operator during the summer of 2016, even with reasonable accommodation. Dr. Kachmann told Innovation on June 16, 2016, that McAllister was “totally disabled” and thatshe was unable to perform “any & all” job functions until September 8, 2016. Then, on August24, 2016, Christlieb, on behalf of Dr. Kachmann, noti fi ed Innovation that she did not “feel atthis time [McAllister] is quite ready to go back to work,” estimating yet another six weeks before she could return. Even though McAllister now argues she was then fi t to work, herdoctors at that time thought otherwise, reporting serious lingering physical and mental symptoms: central cord syndrome, a closed-head injury, “dizziness and vertigo,” and memory and speech di ffi culties. During the relevant periodNo. 20-1779 9

between August and September 2016, her doctors never found (nor noti fi ed Innovation) that McAllisters condition had improved enough to allow her to return to work; they maintained throughout that she had not improved. It would defy common sense to demand that Innovation disregard these well-documented medical opinions and allow its employees,like McAllister, to prematurely return to work, thereby jeopardizing their safety. Instead, Innovation was “entitled to rely on [these] recommendation[s] that [McAllister was] not able to safely perform an essential function of [her] job.” Stern , 788 F.3d at 294. Therefore, “[t]he undisputed facts establish that [McAllister was] unable to perform the essential functions of her position,” Weiler, 101 F.3d at 525, and was thus not a quali fi ed individual under the ADA.

McAllister a tt empts to sidestep this analysis by pointingto how Innovation treated its employees injured in the workplace because “if an employer has a policy of creating lightduty positions for employees who are occupationally injured, then that same bene fi t ordinarily must be extended to an employee with a disability who is not occupationally injured unless the company can show undue hardship.” Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. , 872 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2017). Thisargument misses the mark. Whether other employees received accommodations (reasonable or not), McAllister cannot escape the unfortunate realit y that her doctors wholly precluded her from returning to work during the summer of 2016 in the fi rst place.

McAllister then a tt empts to contradict her doctorsstatements and bolster her claim that she could return to work in August and September through the testimony of her sister10 No. 20-1779

and boyfriend. In Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Center, we affi rmed summary judgment because a plainti fffailed to present “non-speculative, non-conclusory evidence that a proposed accommodation or treatment would have allowed him to adequately perform the essential functions of his job.” 788 F.3d at 289. We held that even the statements of the plainti ff  spsychiatrist were “too conclusory and uninformative” to satisfy the plainti ff  s burden. See id . (citing Weigel v. Target Stores , 122 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)). McAllister cites lay testimony from her sister, Kim Raderstorf, and her former supervisor and boyfriend to show that she could perform the duties of her machine operator job. Based on their knowledge of Innovation s operations, they testi fi ed, in McAllister s view, that she could have returned with accommodations. In her a ffi davit, Raderstorf discussed how she regularly observed McA llister engaging in physical activity during summer 2016, including “regular walks” and “shopping trips,” and “mental ac tivity, such as calculating bills and communicating with others.” It follows, accordingto McAllister, that with accommodations akin to those received by others, she could have resumed working.

Raderstorf s lay testimony does not contradict the doctorstestimony to create a genuine dispute about whether McAllister could return as a machine op erator because it lacks foundation and is con fl icting. “[W]here deposition testimony and

an a ffi davit con fl ict, the a ffi davit is to be disregarded unless it is demonstrable that the statem ent in the deposition was mistaken.” See Dunn v. Menard, Inc. , 880 F.3d 899, 910 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omi tt ed). Raderstorf made comments in her depo sition that she had a “lackNo. 20-1779 11

of knowledge” to state, as she did in her a ffi davit, that McAllister could have “returned months prior to December[] 2016,” admi tt ing she “shouldn t have put that in there.” See Stern , 788 F.3d at 287 (reasoning plainti ff s administrative assistant lacked knowledge of his duties to su ffi ciently “rebut[] [the doctor s] professional opinion that [plainti ff ] was ‘not believed to be fi t for duty ”). Raderstorf also admi tt ed that McAllister did not return to shopping until spring 2017 and that their walks only bega n a month after McAllisters rehabilitation. Raderstorf s deposition statements here undercut her a ffi davit statements—and McAllister s characterization of them. In light of the lack of fo undation for and inconsistencies between Raderstorf s deposition and her a ffi davit statements, her testimony is insu ffi cient to create a material issue of fact to “rebut [Dr. Kachmann and Christlieb]s professional opinion that” McAllister was unable to work. Stern , 788 F.3d at 287.

To the extent the statements of McAllister s boyfriend are not similarly tainted by contrad ictions elsewhere, those statements alone are far too “conclusory and uninformative” to present a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 289. In Stern we rejected even medical opinions that were too speculative. Id. Here, the boyfriend s “conclusory and untested opinion/hope that the proposed treatment/accommodation would enable [McAllister] to perform the essential functions of [her] job[],” viewed in contrast to the opinio ns of the medical professionals speci fi cally charged with determining her physical and mental capacities, are insu ffi cient. See id. at 288 (“[Plainti ff ]fails to lay an adequate foundation establishing that [plainti ff  s wife]—who describes her educational degrees as being ‘in painting —is competent to rebut [the plainti ff  s doctor s]12 No. 20-1779

professional opinion.”). We cannot accept McAllisters boyfriend s post hoc opinions alone to take precedence over those learned views. McAllister has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment that she could “perform the essential functions” of her machine operator job during August and September 2016, even with accommodations. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Given this failure to demonstrate a capability to perform the essential functions asked of a machine operator, McAllister is not a quali fi ed individual under the ADA.

B. Other Jobs Second, McAllister argues that beyond her view that shecould have worked as a machine operator with accommodations she could also have worked in other capacities. In particular, she argues she “could have performed the light-duty job of rework in August and September of 2016” and she could have “ fi lled a vacant assembly position.” The samethreshold problem described above remains: her doctors precluded her from working in any capacity, even a desk job. Thus, the post hoc assertions that she could have performed in these roles ring hollow. She again places too much reliance on lay testimony, this time from her other sister who believed McAllister could have performed the assembly worker job during the summer. To downplay the e ff ect of her doctors orders, McAllister argues that had Innovation o ff ered to accommodate her, her doctors would have cleared her to work. This argument relieson the faulty assumption that her doctors would have allowed her to return to work under any circumstances. TheNo. 20-1779 13

statements of her doctors made clear that not only could McAllister not work as machine operator, but she could also not work at all. Dr. Kachmann noti fi ed Innovation that McAllister could not perform “any & all” functions and, when deposed, suggested she could not even perform an o ffi ce or deskjob. So even if Innovation bent over backwards to accommodate her, there were no accommodations—short of paying her to not work—that could have mitigated McAllisters sweeping limitations. In this vein, McAllister suggests that because her doctors never knew what her job entailed they never had the opportunity to adequately assess her ability to work. Even if true, the fact that her doctors (without knowing any detailsof her job) ordered her not to return to work could just as easily imply that the severity of he r injuries meant she could not work in any capacity.

McAllister then turns around to argue the contrary: not only did her doctors know of the details of her job but their orders that she not work were rooted in those very details and Innovation s alleged unwillingness to accommodate her. Butsupport on the record for this claim is wanting. McAllister alleges that Christlieb instructed he r not to return to work only“after assessing [her] medical condition and unaccommodated job requirements, includ ing lifting restrictions.” Yet Christlieb testi fi ed that she only had a “brief” discussion with McAllister about her job and had no recollection of her duties. This testimony alone is too weak to support McAllister s view that her doctors ordered that she stay home because Innovation refused to accommodate her. McCallister accordingly failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact that she could perform another job withor without accommodations; the record establishes the opposi te is true, that she could not14 No. 20-1779

work in any role at Innovation. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgement.

C. Extended Medical Leave Third, a tt acking from a slightly di ff erent angle, McAllister argues that even if no other accommodations were available, Innovation could have granted her additional leave, which would have been reasonable. Inparticular, she argues that if Innovation permi tt ed her to return to work during some period in August or September 2016 (which, again, Innovation could not because of her doctors orders), then McAllister would not have needed the mo nthslong leave that she requested and would only have only requested “a few weeks.” As already stated, to be “quali fi ed” under the ADA, an individual must be able to “perform the essential functions” of her job “with or without reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Inability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA.” Byrne v. Avon Prod., Inc. , 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003). ByOctober 2016, however, Innovation already knew that McAllister had been unable to “perfo rm the essential functions” of her job for months and would no t be cleared to work for several more months still.

In Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. , we expanded on Byrne, holding that a “multimonth leave of absence is beyond the scope of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” 872 F.3d at 479. We said:[A] long-term leave of absence cannot be a reasonable accommodation. As we noted in Byrne , “[n]ot working is not a means to perform theNo. 20-1779 15

jobs essential functions.” Simply put, an extended leave of absence does not give a disabled individual the means to work; it excuses his not working. Accordingly, we held in Byrne that “[a]n inability to do the job s essential tasks means that one is not ‘quali fi ed ; it does notmean that the employer must excuse the inability.”

Id. at 481 (citations omi tt ed). 2

McAllister instead a tt empts to analogize her situation to Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. , 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998), which concerned a plainti ff  s request for additional leave of two to four weeks after already receiving two weeks of leave and two weeks of a reduced schedule, id. at 595. We held “there was su ffi cient evidence from which a reasonablejuror could conclude that the second medical leave, as requested, would have been a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 601.Even assuming McAllister worked in August and September 2016, Innovation would have needed to grant McAllisterleave from October 2016 until February 2017 (when her doctors expected to clear her), fo r a total of four months. McAllister s claim that she would have “only requested a few weeks leave in October” is thus unsupported by the record.

2 Of course, we do not eliminate “the possibility that a brief period of leave to deal with a medical condition could be a reasonable accommodation in some circumstances.” Severson , 872 F.3d at 481. Such an accommodation is particularly apt for “intermittent conditions,” Byrne, 328 F.3d at 381, distinguishable from the more sustained condition from which McAllister suffered.16 No. 20-1779

The four months of leave she would have required would have been on top of the two an d a half months of leave Innovation gave her between June and August 2016. Far from a modest two to four weeks of leave, see Haschmann , 151 F.3d at 595, four months (or six and a ha lf months if we include the initial two and a half months) is plainly not a reasonable accommodation, see Severson , 872 F.3d at 479. A ff ording McAllister such prolonged leave e ff ectively excuses her inability to work, which the ADA does not require of employers. See id.McAllister anchors her argument about the reasonableness of requesting additional leave to her related argumentthat Innovation “obstruct[ed] or delay[e]d the interactive process” in bad faith. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents , 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996). In her view, Innovation s alleged refusal to engage in an interac tive process prevented her from

“ fi nding and requesting a reasonable accommodation.” Sherepeats that “[t]here were reasonable accommodations available to McAllister in August and September 2016.”

McAllister s contention that Innovation refused to engage in the interactive process fails because Innovation could not have engaged in an interactive process when her doctors had already barred her from working, fi nding she could not perform “any & all” functions. “[F]ailure to engage in the interactive process alone is not an independent basis for liability,” although “it is actionable if it prevents identi fi cation of an appropriate accommodation for a quali fi ed individual.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc. , 739 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omi tt ed). As already discussed, McAllister never clearly asked for an “appropriate accommodation.” See id. She now argues that “the doctors would have reached a di ff erent conclusion” had InnovationNo. 20-1779 17

engaged in the interactive process. Beyond cherry-picked statements from Dr. Kachmann about how his opinion depended on what she did for Innovation, there is no evidence her doctors premised their opinio ns on such details. In fact, Dr. Kachmann elsewhere implied she could not even perform at a desk job, let alone a machine operator job. McAllister suggests Christlieb s testimony forge tt ing or not knowing the details of McAllister s job “further pro[ves] that Innovation s conduct in fl uenced and obstructed the conversation.” The logical leap makes li tt le sense. Although we must “draw[] all reasonable inferences in [McAllisters] favor,” James , 707 F.3d at 779, McAllister must still “present affi rmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). This ga p in the record does not qualify as a ffi rmative evidence of what McAllister discussed with Christlieb nor can McAllister rely on that gap to meet her burden of presenting a genuin e issue that she was denied a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed her to resume working. See id. at 252 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plainti ff  s position will be insu ffi cient; there must be eviden ce on which the jury could reasonably fi nd for the plainti ff .”). Because she was not “quali fi ed” to do her job due to her doctors orders, “this case falls into the category of cases in which an employer s alleged failure to adequately engage in the interactive process is immaterial.” Stern , 788 F.3d at 293; see also Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc. , 714 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Even if an employer fa ils to engage in the required process, that failure need not be considered if the employee fails to present evidence su ffi cient to reach the jury on the18 No. 20-1779

question of whether she was ab le to perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.”). Accordingly, the district cour t correctly found that any request for additional leave was not “reasonable,” and therefore, McAllister did not establish a genuine issue that she was a quali fi ed individual under the ADA. Having decided McAllister does not qualify as a disabled individual under the ADA, we decline to reach the district court s conclusions about equitable estoppel.

III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.