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77–362PDF 2012

THE DEVASTATING CRISIS IN EASTERN CONGO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 11, 2012

Serial No. 112–191

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 10

Mr. Steve Hege (former member United Nations Group of Experts on the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo) ..................................................................... 32

Mr. John Prendergast, co-founder, The Enough Project ...................................... 47

Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, Peter J. Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University ................................................................... 58

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: 

Letter submitted to President Obama, dated December 10, 2012, from 

Members of Congress ....................................................................................... 5

Letter submitted to President Obama, dated December 10, 2012, from various organizations ............................................................................................. 8

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement ........................................... 14

Mr. Steve Hege: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 36

Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement .......................................................... 51

Mr. Mvemba Dizolele: Prepared statement ........................................................... 62

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 82

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 83

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights: Statement from World Relief .............................. 84

(1)

THE DEVASTATING CRISIS IN EASTERN 

CONGO 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:16 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. I apologize for the lateness in starting. Today’s hearing will 

examine U.S. policy regarding the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This conflict was exacerbated by Rwanda’s 

intervention in neighboring Eastern Congo as documented by the 

release of three United Nations reports this year. These reports 

confirmed Rwanda’s support of militia who have ravaged and continue to plague this region. The State Department was unavailable 

to testify at our September 19th hearing on this issue, and the subcommittee promised at that time the follow-up when State was 

available to testify. 

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, successive U.S. administrations have turned a blind eye to reports of Rwandan plundering 

of resources from the DRC and support for rebels who have devastated Eastern Congo and its people. It seems that guilt over the 

Clinton administration’s colossal failure responding effectively, as 

they did not, to the genocide in Rwanda, has led to subsequent U.S. 

administrations being reluctant to criticize the Government of 

Rwanda. 

With these U.N. reports on the government’s behavior in the 

DRC, we must overcome our regret over what happened 18 years 

ago. As an NGO letter to President Obama points out, the United 

States is now out of step with our European allies, who have cut 

aid to Rwanda because of their interference in the DRC, as recommended by the U.N. Group of Experts in their recent reports. 

The Group of Experts also recommended imposing sanctions on responsible Rwandan officials, including the Defense Minister. 

Additionally, the Government of the DRC has failed to ensure 

that its military adequately provides security for its citizens. In 

fact, the National Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

is alleged to be a perpetrator of human rights violations in the 

East. Security sector reform is critical in the DRC, and the United 

Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, or 

2

MONUSCO, has not been able to completely train military elements that too often terrorize their own people instead of protecting them. 

At this point, it is vital to understand what the administration 

intends to do about the U.N. reports on Rwanda’s violations of the 

arms embargo, on nonstate groups in Eastern DRC, and how this 

impacts U.S. relations with Rwanda. Furthermore, we must know 

how the administration intends to deal with the DRC Government 

in light of its deficiencies in security sector reform. This hearing 

will also take a comprehensive look at who was responsible for the 

insecurity in Eastern Congo beyond the two governments and the 

militias. 

Most attention is being paid to the M23 rebel movement in Eastern Congo, and justifiably so, in light of their recent seizure of territory and overall destructive impact on the people of Eastern 

Congo. However, there are reportedly as many as two dozen armed 

groups terrorizing Congolese in this region. According to a November 2012 report from Oxfam, Commodities of War, nine of these militias are believed to be the most prominent. They range from those 

with a focus on Rwanda or Uganda to those that were formed in 

response to the flight of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the DRC, or those singly focused on the DRC itself. 

Whatever the reason for their founding, these militias have terrorized the people of Eastern Congo and the DRC as a whole. We 

must identify their support base and then the flow of arms and 

other aid that enables their ongoing reign of terror. 

According to the U.S. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs, insecurity in Eastern Congo has displaced approximately 

2.4 million people nationwide, especially in the East. Despite longstanding conflict in Eastern Congo, the OCHA estimates that the 

majority of displaced persons typically return to their areas of origin within 6 to 18 months of their initial displacement and require 

minimal return assistance. While that may be true, it does not account for the kind of life Congolese will have once they return to 

their homes. Women continue to be targeted for gross abuse in the 

DRC. A study that recently appeared in the American Journal of 

Public Health concluded that an average of 48 women and girls are 

raped every hour in the country. 

So as with our February 2nd and September 19th hearings on 

the DRC this year, more than 100 females in DRC will have been 

raped before our hearing today ends. Their rejection by their families, husbands, and communities casts a cloud over their future effort to recreate communities destroyed by the militias in the DRC. 

This is an issue that must be addressed by the Congolese themselves, of course, with any help that can be provided from the outside, sooner rather than later. 

Since our hearing in September, M23 has made significant gains 

in territorial control, occupying Goma for 10 days while moving 

southward potentially toward the South Kivu town of Bukavu. 

However, international pressure played a major role in the group 

ending its advance southward and withdrawing from Goma by 

early December. DRC President Joseph Kabila’s government and 

the M23 rebels reportedly have agreed to peace talks in Kampala 

sponsored by the Government of Uganda. There have been peace 

3

talks and peace accords in the DRC before, and they didn’t hold, 

as we all know. Will this effort achieve a lasting peace? 

The DRC is home to an abundant mineral wealth, including 70 

percent of the world’s coltan used to make vital components of cell 

phones and other electronic equipment, 30 percent of the world’s 

diamond reserves, and vast deposits of cobalt, copper, and bauxite. 

Unfortunately, these natural resources have attracted international 

looters and fueled civil war. Now oil has been discovered in Eastern 

Congo. Can a way be found to prevent the DRC’s blessings from 

being turned into curses? 

The tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994 has had lasting repercussions in the DRC, but since the 1880s resentment over the perceived influx of people considered foreigners in Eastern DRC has 

contributed to conflict in this region, including two regional wars. 

Various leaders of the region have used this antipathy for political 

purposes, pitting their supporters against their perceived opponents. Can the interethnic problems in the DRC and its neighbors 

be finally resolved so that a lasting peace among all the people of 

the DRC can be achieved? 

Our witnesses today are well positioned to address questions regarding a path forward toward sustainable peace in the DRC and 

the obstacles that lie in that path. It is time now to find a way to 

bring an end to the horrific suffering of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I yield to my friend and colleague Ms. 

Bass for her opening. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for 

your leadership on this issue and also for holding this important 

hearing. While this committee held a hearing on the DRC not too 

long ago, recent events in Eastern Congo motivate a closer examination of this current crisis. I want to especially thank Assistant 

Secretary, Ambassador Carson, and our other witnesses for offering 

testimony at today’s hearing. 

I would also like to commend many of you sitting in the audience 

for your tireless work toward peace and justice for those affected 

by the past and current crises. Your concerns have been heard, and 

this committee will continue to elevate the status of the DRC so it 

receives the international attention needed to bring about lasting 

peace and stability. Myself, members of this committee, and our 

colleagues in the Senate are deeply concerned with on-the-ground 

reports of human rights violations, forced rape, the recruitment of 

child soldiers, and the involvement of DRC’s neighbors in the Eastern region. 

I want to stress that there is a great need for the international 

community to work in common interest toward the resolution of a 

crisis that goes well beyond the M23. We must not look at the current M23 crisis in some civil, political, or military vacuum. For a 

credible, reasonable, and long-standing stability to take hold, I 

urge that transparent and accountable processes be put in place 

that can address reforms at all levels. 

I want to be clear on this point. If we are to see an end to the 

violence and instability, then holistic reforms are desperately needed at all levels, including politically and economically. We must 

also see a dramatic reevaluation of the social constraints to reforms 

in civic engagement. The results of the deeply flawed 2011 election 

4

lay bare the significant challenges that must be addressed if we are 

to see a dramatic and positive change of course. 

Ambassador Carson, I will be interested to hear what new steps 

the State Department will take to address these very serious challenges that remain unaddressed. 

Let me remind the committee what is at stake. Continued failure 

to achieve stability has torn families apart and shown clearly the 

base actions of those who have no concern for life and have not 

been brought to justice. For too long, the DRC has been ravaged 

by instability and war. For two decades, Eastern Congo has been 

under siege by armed groups. Yesterday it was the National Congress for the Defence of the People, today it is M23. What will it 

be tomorrow? Will we stand by and allow a fragile peace to be held 

together by empty promises? The violence, the rapes, the child soldiers, the murders must be brought to an end. 

What is most troubling about this recent conflict is the documented involvement by neighboring governments and the DRC’s 

territorial integrity. While the Rwandan and Ugandan Governments vehemently deny such involvement, a growing body of evidence raises questions that suggest otherwise. I close these remarks where I began, urging that all efforts be put toward establishing mechanisms that lay the foundation for lasting peace, not 

only in the DRC, but throughout the region. I ask that a letter 

being sent to President Obama be submitted for the record. Circulated by Representative McDermott, this letter calls for the establishment of a special U.S. envoy, U.S. Envoy, and U.N.—and African Union envoy. The purposes of these roles should be clear, to 

present a group of international stakeholders that can provide critical and balanced political pressure toward a unified policy to address all aspects of this regional crisis. 

Also worth mentioning is a second letter to be sent to President 

Obama and Secretary Clinton signed by organizations, including 

Africa Faith and Justice Network, The Enough Project, Global Witness, Open Society Foundations, Refugees International, among 

many others. 

[The letters referred to follow:]

5


77362e-1.eps

(ttOtlg't't£iS of tbt Wnittb ~tatt£' 

mn%billlltoll, :lll( 20515 

President Barack Obama 

The White House 

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

December 10, 2012 

We are following the unfoldlog conflict In Eastern Congo with deep concern. The State Department's 

diplomatic team has done an admirable job In helping secure M23's pullback from Goma and other 

towns of North Kivu while negotiations proceed. 

We write to you to address a common concern that you have noted foryaars -that M23's formation 

and advance on Goma highlights the fact that Central Africa will not be able to reach 11$ potential until 

the cycle of poor governance, Violence, and proxy Wars in Eastern Congo and Ihe bordering areas In 

Ugonda, Rwanda and Burundi come to an end and a lasting economic and security architecture are put 

In place. 

M23's formation and Inexcusable military advance, supported by Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda, 

Is ~nly the latest chapter In Central Africa's conflict. We feel the systemic problems that drive the cyclical 

fighting can be broken - but only If the political leaders of Central African country governments take 

decisive and sustained action and the International community maintains a heavy focus on these issues 

with sustained high level leadership. 

We believe the Incremental steps now being taken by outside leadership must be pushed to a higher 

level with ongoing dally leadership from the: International community. The U.S. should appoint its own 

Presidential Envoy and, at the United Nations, advocate s\(ongly for the appointment of a U.N. Envoy to 

Central Africa and Eastern Congo as well as encourage the African Union to appoint an envoy. These 

envoys ~hould work together on leading the creation of a sustaInable economic and security 

architecture that ensures peace In the region. 

The U.N. Envoy should be a former head of state with the security and economic experience required 

and should be prepared for sustained engagement. 

In addition to finalizing the end of the M23 rebellion, we beileve It Is Imperative that these three envoys 

work on several concrete steps ilnd not relent until they are accomplished. The U.N. envoy should Icad 

this effort and the approach should be Inclusive with governments, International organizations, civil 
6


77362e-2.eps

society, religious and .ethnlc groups all participating, each with proportional representation from 

women. These groups should work to accomplish the following: 

Carrying out justice for those Individuals under Indictment by the International Criminal 

Court (ICC). Without the arrests of Indicted International crIminals, there will not be peace In the 

region. This has been avoided to date because of some perceiVed coll.teral consequences of 

arrests - years later, these ICC-Indicted criminals are leading new war Insurgencies. It Is time 

they were arrested and faced justice. 

Levying full-time pressure on the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(ORC) and nelghborlnggolfernments to carry out systemic security sector reform. The elements 

of "SSR" have been discussed for years. Some steps have been taken In the DRC with positive 

results. Security sector reform should be Instituted with the full energies of the DRC and 

neighborlng governments and fully supported-with expertise, training and funds-from the 

International community. 

Securing the borders between the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. 

Disbanding militias in the Eastern Congo and bordering countries and addressing 

countries' eXistential concerns by faCilitating a process the ensures the respect and safety of all 

minorities in the DRC that meet International standards. 

Ending the black market for natural resources within the region, Indudlng conflict 

mlnorals, a large portion of which are transiting through Rwanda with Rwanda's assistance. 

Establishing a forum for ongoing dialogue and communications between MONUSCO and 

the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to rebuild a relationship of trust and respect, the lack of 

Which has been so damaging to regional progress towards peace. 

Formalizing a single forumto coordinate International aid and require aid accountabllltya forum that includes not only traditional donor countries, but also less traditional donors like 

China and Angola, as well as the IMF, World Bank and others. Coordinated and transparent aid is 

critical for success. 

Finally, we ask you to frankly and thoroughly communicate to the Rwandan government the 

responsibilities of the U.S. State Department to accurately classify military organl~atlons that take on 

certain activities as "armed groups" In your Annual Human ~Ights Report. The participation of parts of 

the Rwandan Defense Forces In mlner~1 smuggling and Rwanda's ongoing support of non-state militias 

not only violates International law but also puts the whole Rwandan economy at risk. 

Manv think such a classification of parts or all of the RDF as an armed group is well-documented and 

Justified. If such a determinatiOn were made It would have severe consequences for the Rwandan 

economy. The black market for smuggled minerals and other natural resources Is well known to be 

trafficked by groups within the Rwandan military, and this black market Is destabiliZing Eastern Congoand creating a security and livelihood risk for neighboring countries and all Rwandans. 
7


77362e-3.eps

We ~ppreclate the State Department's excellent work In facilitating the. retreat of M23 from Goma and 

. continuing to push for solutions to the Immediate security situation. 

We 106k forward to your attention to this matter and your response, 

Sinceroly, 

Karen Bass 

Member of Congress 

Earl Blumenauer 

Member of congress 

~~~~~ " 

Su nne Bonamlcl 

Member of Congress 

t::M~i~Ch:La~el£'c:::::lapt:!u&a~no:Li.---'~~:PV'W Member of Congress ~ ~ 

~ 

~ 

~er of c~ngress 

. Brad Miller 

Member of Congress 

Adam Smith 

Member of Congress 

3 
8


77362f-1.eps

A-

~) 

f) ~t!<:!lJ!h __ ._ 

II 

"" I , .. ~ Ctl! 

December lV, 2012 

President .Harack Obama 

The White House 

~, 

~,l?>1 

GL(lBALCfJlTRE 

f(:a THE RESPONSI81LlTY 

To-PROT~CJ 

~ OPEN SOCIETY .. fOUNDATIONS 

1600 Pet?-nsylvarua Avenue N\V 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear [vIr. President: 

.. ~~~.\~;~~:~,T,~~~~ i 

G ~!lIJM'~Jl{fD 

=. Il~]JUil;n] CHilDREN globaTwltness 

RI':FUG!:i;S (E; RES(:i)LVE UNITED TO [ill)] lNT~RNATIONAL I!rnI1IID.'ill 

As the situation -ance again dramatically deteriomtes jn eastern Congo, the U.S. response to the crisis has patently failed 

and is out of step with other \Vestern nations. The United States must mke immediate steps to lolJJ1'eS~ lueaIl:ingfutty one 

of the greatest ongoing humanitarian crises of our generntion, \Y/e (:~II on you to appoint 2: Presidential Envoy to lead a 

coordinated U.S. response to the crisis, to support the appointment of a U.N, Envoy to t1~e Great Lakes, to support the 

imposition of sanctions. ag~ifl!jt vidiltor~ ()fthe Uniled Nations anl1S embargo on nRC:, and, finally, to cut nIl milit:uy 

assistance and suspend other non-humanitarian aid to the g'overnment of Rwanda for: its support of the ~,f23 insurgency. 

Silence Regarding RwandaJs Involvement ExaCCibatiog the Problem 

Over the P:lst 15 rearS;t U,S. efforts to prioritize quie~ diplomacy to address R\\randatl involvement in c:astem Congo 

have f:ailed to deter R\~'IU1d~'s continucd hl.l.;ursiof1~ ,HlJ use of P!oxy armed groups in the c:a:;t, \Vhile Rw:and:a has 

legitimate security and economic concerns, these alone do not justify the .repftLted violation of DRC sovereignty, the 

egrcgious human tights auust$ of lheir arn:t.ies and pLOxy forces, and the countlt:ss violations of the UN arm5 cmbilLgo. 

Since the M23 was created in the spting of2012, U,S. officials continued to place fait11 in engaging.Rw:anda jn a 

constructiv-:e dialogue, 'l'his approach has clearly failed to change Rwanda's policy, as evidenced by the direct 

jnvol'ii'ement of the Rwandan army in the recent takeover of Goma, as documented hy the United Nations Group of 

Expeds . 

. Failure to Build Democratic Institutions in DRC 

At the same time, the government ofDRC has continued to demonstrate an inability to bring security to its eastern 

region:!;, lil.rgely a consequence .of its fallure: to U{"Jdertil.ke nec::c:o:>sary securiLy sector ilnd governance reform:;;, .t\ny new 

strategy to bring stability to t11e region must ensure tangible progress in building DRC's democra~c institutions and the 

.rule of law, irtduulllg in the c.r:ucial ar:C(lS of eleetoml refC)l'rTl~ army reform, and the tr:'il.dc in oatl.1t.'"al f'C$C)ur<.:t::,~. 

ICGLR P.t:Ocess Insufficient for Durablr! Peace 

\Ve welcome the efforts uf the Jrilcmalio[lal CC:o!1fc!cnec on the Great I.iths l~oI;':giorl (ICGLR), and the .involvcmcnt of 

regional actors in finding a solution to the crisis. \Y/e also recognize, however) that the ICGLR's stopgap approach and 

reliance on mllir-.uy suluLio[~s will not bting sustainable peace to the n:gion. Al besL, the CUfLcnt cli.;110guc bet\vccn the 

government of DRC and the ld23 h likely to result in the reintegration of war criminals into tl~e CongoLese army and the 

continuation of violence and ~nstabillty in the region, Efforts to achieve a durable peace must be led not by those who 

.(!ontiml'(! to pC'rpCt1.1ate the conflict hut rather by a credible interoar(onally f1dlitated process. 
9


77362f-2.eps

RccommcndatiQns 

\Y./e. strongly f"(~(:omm<~nd that the United St<l.tes urg~ntly tak.:;= the. following [Otlr' Mep£: 

Appoi.ut a P:l:esidcotial Envoy: The Envoy would be i1. high-level hHlivid\l,d with <~xp~rien(:~ <l.nd rda!lnJl'Ships 

in the region who ,"vould be resp onsible for developing a unified policy t~v.'ard the regional crisis. Yopr Envoy 

would levt:rage .£\.rnerka\. tCOIWnuc, palilk:::!l, and military irtl1uence to ensure lha t all parties fully c09pemtc 

with an international political p.fOcess, and 2:150 work closely with the proposed UN Envoy. 

Call for a UN Envoy to the Great Lakes: The United States should urge the UN to appoint a high-level 

envoy to lead:3. credible international politiC:ill process that Rddrcsses the continual cycles ofviolcn(".c and 

regional jnter~erence. This Envoy wO'Llld work in conjunction with the·African Union :and other regional-and 

sub .regional srnkcholdcts. 

Support robust UN Sanctions; As a responsible supporter of the UN sanctions .:regime, the United States 

shuuld push to impose sam.:Lions Orl ~ll irH.Hviuu;tls iutrH:.i.ueu in the UN Group of Exp~rts final report, 

including seruor RW<l.ndan government offidals, and those jndividuals and ~ntitie.s supporting criminal networks 

through the trade in na~ral resources. 

Suspenu :-\Hd l:ut t)ffJirntled U.S. :.HiF.iisll:l.I1Ce In R\"at1d~l: The United St-ates should cut all military asslstancc 

. and suspend other non-humanitarian aid to the R,">;''andan govemment~ while publicly condemning Rwanda's 

Sl..lppott [or the 1123. Such a step is crucial to encourage aU parcies to engage constructivc\y in a Cf.lmprl;:h.~fldve 

political process. 

Absent serious and susttined action, the DRC faces a new period of pro!onged violence or even collapse and 

. disintegration. t-!ost importantly, thousftnds of lives and livelihoods arc at stake. In. this moment of c.cisis, the United 

States has an opportunity to honor not only its .... "lues for the respect of human rights and international1aw but also to 

meet its interests in the long-term stability of the Great Lakes region. 

Signed : 

Africa Europe .Paith and JustiC"e Net\5mrk 

.Africa Faith and Justice Network 

A tma [7oulld~tio~ 

The Enough l'roject 

Falling Whisrlcs 

Freedom House 

Global CenLte [or rl,e Responsibility to Protect 

Global Witness 

cc: Secretary of St8te Hillary Clinton 

Human.ity U1l.1(ed 

Invisible Ch.Hd(en 

Jewish World Watch 

Open Society Foundutions 

Refugecs. Intcmational 

Resolve 

United to End C cnoddc 
10

Ms. BASS. In addition to calling for special envoys, this group 

boldly calls for global leadership to engage constructively in a comprehensive political process. Thank you, and I look forward to today’s testimonies. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, my friend, Ms. Bass. Any 

other panelists like to make an opening comment? Ms. Buerkle? 

Yes, Mr. Turner? 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just I would like to 

raise a point. Throughout the conflict, the mines remain open, minerals, gems, rare earth provide the financing for the conflict, I 

think the motivation for a great deal of it. Who is buying this material, and what do we know about the chain of both dollars and 

material on an international basis? And is there anything that we 

or the U.N. or the African Union are doing to choke this off? That 

is it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Turner, thank you very much. I now introduce 

our witness from the U.S. Department of State, Ambassador 

Johnnie Carson, serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs, a position he has held since May 2009. Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in public service, over 37 years in the foreign service, including time as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Ambassador Carson 

has also served as the staff director of this subcommittee many, 

many years ago, and as a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is the recipient of numerous awards for his service 

from the U.S. Department of State. Mr. Ambassador, the floor is 

yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members 

of the committee, thank you for the very kind invitation to testify 

before the subcommittee today on the crisis unfolding in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the DRC. 

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the 

Congo is the most volatile in Africa today. An estimated 5 million 

people have died in the years since the second regional war began 

in that country in 1997–1998, and millions more have been forced 

to flee their homes. The people of North and South Kivu provinces, 

in particular, have faced repeated cycles of conflict and shocking 

atrocities. The November 20th fall of Goma to the M23 rebel group 

provided a stark reminder that in spite of the international community’s major investments in humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, 

the underlying causes of the recurring conflicts in the Eastern DRC 

remain unresolved. 

The Congolese Government has failed to provide effective security, governance, and services in the Eastern provinces, and political and economic tensions persist between the DRC and its eastern 

neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Since the M23 rebellion erupted 

last spring, the United States has worked closely with international and regional partners to mobilize a comprehensive response aimed at preventing a further deterioration of the situation. 

Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and Under Secretary Wendy 

11

Sherman have spoken or met with senior Congolese, Rwandan, 

Ugandan, and U.N. officials to advocate for a rapid and peaceful 

resolution to this crisis. 

In the U.N. Security Council, we have taken action to ensure 

that five of the M23’s most abusive commanders are now under 

targeted sanctions. We have also stressed the need to hold accountable all of those who commit human rights abuses and atrocities, 

and I myself traveled to the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda between 

November 24 and 28 with my British and French counterparts to 

deliver a clear and common message that the Congolese, Rwandan, 

and Ugandan Governments must work together to stop this crisis 

and to work toward a sustainable resolution of underlying issues. 

All three governments reiterated to us their commitment to these 

goals. We also stressed that there should be no impunity for senior 

M23 leaders who are under ICC indictment or international sanctions for human rights abuses. The M23 would not be the threat 

that it is today without external support, and we will continue to 

discourage outside parties from providing any assistance to the 

M23 movement. There is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the Group of Experts report concerning Rwandan Government support to the M23, including military, logistical, 

and political assistance. 

The British Government has recently indicated that it shares 

this assessment. We do not have a similar body of evidence that 

Uganda has a government policy of support for the M23. Based on 

this evidence, we have repeatedly pressed Rwanda to halt and prevent any and all forms of support to Congolese armed groups. 

Looking forward, we expect all parties, including Rwanda, to 

cease any support to M23 and other armed groups, abide by the 

Kampala Accords of November 21 and 24, and to work constructively with its neighbors and the international community and take 

affirmative steps to end impunity for M23 commanders responsible 

for human rights abuses in order to reach an acceptable political 

agreement. 

We ask the Government of Uganda to also ensure that supplies 

to the M23 do not originate in or transit through Ugandan territory, including from individual officials who might be acting on 

their own. The Department continues to monitor closely all potential sources of external support, and we will continue to respond 

appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance to deter this 

support as the situation develops. 

We are taking a number of other steps in concert with other 

international partners as a part of our comprehensive response to 

the current crisis. First and foremost, we are monitoring humanitarian needs and mobilizing an appropriate response. The humanitarian situation in the Eastern Congo remains deplorable, as it has 

been for years, but recent attacks by the M23 and other armed 

groups have displaced hundreds of thousands and left some areas 

of North and South Kivu inaccessible to humanitarian response. 

The United States provided more than $110 million in humanitarian assistance for Congolese refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict-affected civilians in Fiscal Year 2012, and at the 

U.N., we have urged donors to respond to the U.N.’s consolidated 

appeal for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

12

Second, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 

known as the ICGLR, the African Union, and the Security Council 

have all demanded that the M23 refrain from further offensive operations, and to remain out of Goma. While the Congolese Government has agreed to hear the grievances of the M23 in discussions 

that are now taking place in Kampala, we continue to call for accountability for the M23’s most abusive leaders, and we will continue to speak out against the forcible recruitment of children and 

the other crimes of the M23’s soldiers and rebels. 

Third, we believe that Presidents Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni 

must continue to engage in direct talks to address the underlying 

causes of instability in the region as well as the potential drivers 

of progress. We support the appointment of a U.N. Special Envoy 

to facilitate a long-term solution of these problems, and we will 

consult with the U.N. Secretary General about this. We will work 

to ensure that any agreement between the parties is transparent, 

sustainable, and enjoys support and commitment of the region. 

Fourth, more must be done to protect civilians in the Eastern 

DRC. We and our fellow Security Council members and troop-contributing countries are reviewing options for improving the U.N.’s 

ability to protect civilians and help implement defined aspects of a 

potential regional political settlement. 

Fifth, the DRC Government has the primary responsibility for 

protecting its territory and all, all of its citizens. We are urging 

President Kabila to take clear and bold measures to ensure that 

the soldiers of the Congolese army are professionally trained, adequately paid and supported, and respectful of their citizens and of 

international human rights norms. The extension of effective governance combined with legitimate provincial elections would also 

help to underpin a lasting peace. 

We believe that the time has come for the region’s leaders and 

the international community to break the cycle of violence and impunity that has existed for far too long in the Eastern DRC. We 

and, most importantly, the region’s political leaders must ensure 

that the national security and territory, integrity of the DRC, 

Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi are protected. We must help build 

a future for people who have seen more conflict than peace over the 

past 2 decades. We must help turn the vast mineral and agricultural wealth of the Eastern DRC into a source of economic pride 

and progressThe Honorable Johnnie Carson, assistant secretary, 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of StateMr. John 

Prendergast, co-founder, The Enough ProjectMr. Steve Hege 

(former member United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo)Mr. Mvemba Dizolele, Peter J. 

Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University benefiting the people of the region and not contributing to conflict. 

The leaders of the region must establish nonviolent means of addressing their political, security, economic, and border differences. 

As Secretary Clinton noted when she visited Goma in 2009, the 

Congolese people are courageous and resilient, and there are reasons for hope across the entirety of the DRC, including progress toward paying soldiers through electronic and mobile banking, and 

13

building the capacity to provide justice in response to mass atrocities and human rights violations. 

We need to build on these steps, which have been gravely set 

back by the current M23 rebellion. The decisions taken today, the 

decisions taken now will have a direct impact on what happens 

over the next several months as well as the next several years. 

They will affect the behavior of other militias in the Kivus, the success of reforms to promote the conflict-free trade and mineral resources, and the ability to sustain operations against the vicious 

Lord’s Resistance Army of Joseph Kony that has operated in the 

northern part of the DRC and in the Central African Republic. 

Today’s crisis is a tragedy, but it also offers a genuine opportunity to help the Congolese people set a more sustainable course 

toward peace and stability in their own country as well as with 

their neighbors. The framework for action at the national, regional, 

and international levels that I have outlined today could help enable the peoples of the region to escape the recurring cycles of conflict which have hampered progress in the Eastern Congo for nearly 2 decades. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I 

have a longer submission for the record which you may have. I look 

forward to answering any of your questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. Without objection, your full statement and the letters referenced by Ms. Bass before will be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

14


77362a-1.eps

Testimony 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson 

Bureau of African Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights 

"The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo" 

Tuesday, December 11,2012 

Chainnan Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members of the Committee. 

Thank you for the invitation to testify before the Subcommittee on the crisis 

unfolding in the eastern Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, or DRC. 

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the Congo is the 

most volatile in Africa today. An estimated five million people have died in the 

years since the second regional war began in 1998, and millions more have been 

forced to flee their homes. The DRC is also the site of one ofthe world's longestmnning and most expensive peacekeeping operations, having hosted a UN 

peacekeeping presence for several years after its independence in 1960, in addition 

to the more recent UN missions starting in the late 1990s. The people of North and 

South Kivu provinces in particular have faced repeated cycles of conflict, 

atrocities, and displacement. An unthinkable number of women, men, and children 

have experienced sexual violence or rape at the hands of soldiers and armed 

groups. 

The November 20 fall of Goma to the M23 rebel group provided a stark 

reminder that, even as the international commlllity has made major investments in 

humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, the underlying causes ofthe recurring 

conflicts in eastern DRC remain unresolved. The Congolese government has 

tailed to provide effective security, governance, and services in the eastern 

provinces, and political and economic tensions persist between the DRC and its 

eastern neighbors, particularly Rwanda. The current crisis has been fueled and 

exacerbated by outside support to rebel groups operating in the Kivu provinces. 

The M23 is one of many armed groups operating in the eastern DRC. Most 

of its officers were at one time nominally integrated into the Congolese army, a 

concession they extracted after nearly capturing Goma as part of a precursor 

insurgency in 2008. Once integrated, these officers operated in a parallel chain of 

command and enjoyed impunity for their human rights abuses and illegal 

exploitation of the COllltry'S mineral wealth. When the Congolese government 
15


77362a-2.eps

appeared poised earlier this year to challenge these arrangements, several ofthese 

officers mutinied and constituted themselves tmder a new name, the M23. The 

commanders ofthe M23 represent a "who's who" of notorious hmnan rights 

abusers in the eastem DRC. They include Bosco Ntaganda, who faces an 

Intemational Criminal Court arrest warrant for sexual violence and other crimes 

against humanity and continues to play an active role in the militia. 

Since the M23 rebellion erupted last spring, the United States has worked 

closely with intemational and regional partners to mobilize a comprehensive 

response aimed at preventing a further deterioration of the situation, securing an 

end to hostilities, and maintaining hmnanitarian assistance. In September, 

Secretary Clinton met with Congolese President Kabila and Rwandan President 

Kagame at the UN General Assembly to urge them to engage in a more 

constructive dialogue. In the UN Security Council, we proposed and supported 

new actions to ensure that five of the M23's top commanders are now tmder 

targeted sanctions. We have also stressed the need to hold accom1table all ofthose 

who commit human rights abuses. Ambassador Rice has remained directly 

engaged with senior UN officials throughout the crisis, as we believe it is critical 

that the UN continue to playa key mediating role. In early November, Under 

Secretary of State Wendy Shemmn traveled to the region to meet with key heads of 

state to urge a rapid and peaceful resolution to this crisis. 

In response to the M23 's offensive on Goma last month, I traveled to 

Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala between November 24 and 28 with my British and 

French counterparts. During meetings with senior Ugandan, Rwandan, and 

Congolese officials, we delivered a clear and common message: as agreed in the 

November 21 and 24 Kampala communiques, there must be an immediate 

cessation of hostilities and M23 must withdraw from Goma; the Congolese, 

Rwandan, and Ugandan govemments should ensure the implementation ofthese 

commitments; and any outside support to the M23 is unacceptable and must stop. 

We also urged top officials in the Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments 

to work together toward a sustainable resolution of underlying issues. All three 

govemments reiterated to us their commitment to these goals. So far, the cessation 

of hostilities between Congolese forces and the M23 appears to be holding. Most 

M23 forces appear to have withdrawn from Goma, though many remain much 

closer to the city than the Kampala agreements called for. 

We also stressed that, while the DRC govemment has agreed to hear the 

political grievances of the M23, there should be no impunity for senior M23 

2 
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77362a-3.eps

leaders who are under TCC indictment or intemational sanctions for human rights 

violations. 

The M23 would not be the threat it is today without external support, and we 

will continue to discourage outside parties from providing any assistance to the 

M23. There is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key tindings ofthe 

Group of Experts' reports - including evidence of signiticant military and 

logistical support, as well as operational and political guidance, from the Rwandan 

government to the M23. The British government has recently indicated that it 

shares this assessment. We do not have a similar body of evidence that Uganda 

has a government-wide policy of support to the M23. 

Based on this evidence, we continue to press Rwanda to halt and prevent any 

and all fOTIllS of support to Congolese arnled groups. As required by law, the 

Department suspended Foreign Military Financing funds to Rwanda this year. 

Looking forward, we expect all parties, including Rwanda, to cease any support to 

M23 and other arnled groups, abide by the November 21 and 24 agreements, and 

to work constructively with neighbors and the international commlllity and take 

atllnnative steps to end impunity for M23 commanders responsible for hmnan 

rights abuses in order to reach an acceptable political agreement. We ask the 

govemment of Uganda to ensure that supplies to the M23 do not originate in or 

transit through Ugandan territory, including from individual otllcials that may be 

acting on their own. The Department continues to closely monitor reports of 

external support and we will continue to respond appropriately, including by 

reviewing our assistance, to deter this support as the situation develops. 

We are taking a number of other steps, in concert with our international 

partners, as part of our comprehensive response to the current crisis. 

First and foremost, we are monitoring hmnanitarian needs and mobilizing a 

response. The humanitarian situation in the eastern Congo remains deplorable, as 

it has been for years, with more than two million Congolese currently displaced 

internally or to neighboring cmlltries. The recent attacks by M23 and other armed 

groups have displaced some 500,000 more. The re-opening ofthe Goma airport on 

December 5 was an important step toward ensuring that vulnerable populations 

receive the emergency assistance they need. UN otllcials report that hlllmnitarian 

organizations currently maintain sutllcient capacity to respond to illlillediate 

humanitarian needs in and around Goma, but some areas of North and South Kivu 

are still not accessible to humanitarians because of insecurity. The United States 

provided more than $110 million in humanitarian assistance for Congolese 

3 
17


77362a-4.eps

refugees, intemally displaced persons, and contlict-affected civilians in Fiscal Year 

2012, including a $5 million supplemental contribution for the increased needs in 

the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda as a result of displacements caused by the M23 

rebellion. At the UN, we have urged donors to respond to the UN's consolidated 

appeal for the DRe. 

Second, the Intemational Conference on the Great Lakes Region, or ICGLR, 

the African Union, and the Security Council have all demanded that the M23 

refrain from further offensives and stay out of Goma. in the iCGLR talks, the 

Congolese govemment agreed to hear the grievances of the M23. We are calling 

on the DRC, neighboring governments, and the broader international community to 

ensure accOlU1tability for M23 leaders who have committed serious human rights 

abuses. And we will continue to speak out against the forcible recruitment of 

children and the other crimes the M23 continues to commit against Congolese 

civilians. We also calion govemments to enforce the terms of the travel ban and 

asset freeze imposed by UN sanctions. 

Third, we believe that Presidents Kabila, Kagame, and Museveni must 

continue to engage in direct talks to address the underlying causes of instability in 

the region. These include contlict over land, tensions in areas where refugees have 

retumed or may seek to return, armed rebel groups and their support networks, and 

the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The govemments ofthe DRC, 

Rwanda, and Uganda also have opportunities to discuss potential drivers of 

progress, including new agreements and concrete initiatives on economic 

integration and peace and security issues. We encourage the UN SecretaryGeneral to appoint a UN Special Envoy to engage on a sustained basis to facilitate 

ongoing discussions toward a long-term solution ofthese long-standing problems. 

We need such a high-level Special Envoy to be dedicated to the hard work of 

helping develop this long-teml solution with all of the relevant stakeholders and to 

ensure that the solution is implemented over the long nU1, especially when the 

world's attention tums to the next crisis. We intend to continue working with our 

European, African, and UN partners to support this dialogue. We will work to 

ensure that any agreement is transparent, sustainable, and enjoys the support and 

commitment of the region, including Congolese civil society and civilian 

communities. 

Fourth, we appreciate the brave service of peacekeepers from several dozen 

countries operating in very difficult, often dangerous conditions. Yet more must 

be done to protect civilians in the Eastem DRC. We and our fellow Security 

COlU1Cil members and troop contributing countries are reviewing options for 

4 
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77362a-5.eps

improving the UN's ability to protect civilians and help implement defined aspects 

of a potential regional political settlement. We must remain realistic about what 

MONUSCO can be expected to achieve to protect civilians across a large expanse 

ofDRC territory. We are also following the regional Great Lakes proposal to 

develop an effective regional fighting force in the Kivus that would confront the 

M23 and other armed groups. We are strongly encouraging our partners to ensure 

these efforts are coordinated with, and perhaps even integrated into, UN 

peacekeeping efforts. 

Fifth, the DRC government has the primary responsibility for protecting its 

territory and all its citizens. We are urging President Kabila to undertake a 

credible etfort to professionalize and refornl the Congolese security forces. This 

will take time, but the Congolese government needs to take clear and bold 

measures to ensure that its soldiers are professionally trained, adequately paid and 

supported, and respectful of international human rights norms. We also tind very 

disturbing, and recognize the need to address, the abuses conunitted by the 

Congolese military, including recent reports of rapes and looting in North Kivu. 

At the same time, we are making clear that the Congolese government must 

accelerate its efforts to deploy and strengthen state institutions and provide needed 

public services in the Kivus. The extension of effective governance, combined 

with legitimate provincial elections, is necessary for a lasting peace. 

We believe that the time has come for the region's leaders and the 

international commlllity to break the cycle of violence and implllity in the region. 

We, and most importantly, the region's political leaders, must ensure that the 

national security and territorial integrity of the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda are 

protected; must help build a future for people who have seen more conflict than 

peace over the last two decades that is rooted in strong and credible institutions, the 

transparent and legitimate use ofthe East's vast mineral wealth for economic 

development and not personal gain, and respect for hllllllil rights; and must 

establish non-violent mellilS of addressing their differences. It is for this reason 

that even as we tackle the immediacy of the current crisis, we are also focused on 

the equally urgent need for a long-term and lasting solution. 

As Secretary Clinton noted when she visited Goma in 2009, the Congolese 

people are courageous and resilient. There are reasons for hope in the DRC. The 

Congolese army has begun implementing a program to pay its soldiers through 

electronic and mobile banking and has committed to removing the last vestiges of 

the use of child soldiers. Thousands of combatants and dependents from the 

genocidaire militias have been demobilized and returned to civilian society. And 

5 
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for the first time, a horrific mass rape in January 2011 was followed with swift 

criminal justice for the perpetrators and the officers who directed them. 

We need to build on these steps, which have been gravely set back by the 

M23 rebellion and the violence committed by other arnled groups. The decisions 

taken now will set the trajectory of the next several years. Other abusive militias 

in the Kivus are watching to see if violent behavior is an effective path to power 

and influence. Refornlers who are promoting a conflict-free trade in mineral 

resources are watching to see if insecurity will be allowed to continue and prolong 

the conditions favorable to illegal smuggling. The FDLR militia is still active in 

the Kivus. The vicious Lord's Resistance Army of Joseph Kony, which operates 

hundreds of miles away on the DRC's northern borders, is watching to see if 

insecurity in the Kivus will undernline regional efforts to deny it a safe haven. 

And the world is watching to see whether the eastern Congo can transcend its 

history as a theater for proxy contlict and tinally have the chance to move toward 

peace. 

lfwe are to stop the recurring lethal violence, rape, humanitarian 

emergencies, and cross-border contlict in the eastem DRC that have cost millions 

of lives and billions of dollars, we must move beyond short-tenn fixes. Today's 

crisis is a tragedy, but it also offers a real opportunity to help the Congolese people 

set a more sustainable course toward peace. The framework for action at the 

national, regional, and international levels that I have outlined today could help 

enable the peoples ofthe region to escape the recurring cycles of contlict. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. T look forward to answering 

your questions. 

6 
20

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, a couple hours ago, at least online, 

the Guardian newspaper posted an article, the title of which is, 

‘‘Obama accused of failed policy over Rwanda’s support of rebel 

group,’’ and it points out the letter that we all are aware of, signed 

by 15 organizations, takes the administration to task for its policy. 

The article begins, ‘‘Leading campaign groups and thinktanks have 

written to Barack Obama accusing him of a failed policy over 

Rwanda’s support for rebels in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, and calling on the President to impose sanctions.’’ The letter says in pertinent part, ‘‘As the situation once again dramatically deteriorates in Eastern Congo, the U.S. response to the crisis 

has patently failed and is out of step with other western nations. 

Since M23 was created in the spring of 2012, U.S. officials continue 

to place faith in engaging Rwanda in a constructive dialogue. This 

approach has clearly failed to change Rwanda’s policy, as evidenced 

by the direct involvement of the Rwandan army in the recent takeover of Goma as documented by the United Nations Group of Experts.’’ The Rwandans say that the report is fabricated and ‘‘The 

U.N. group’s report says: ‘Rwandan officials co-ordinated of creation of the rebel movement as well as its major military operations’ as well as providing troops and arming the group.’’

It recommends imposing sanctions against Rwandans officially. 

You have just testified there is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the Group of Experts reports, including 

evidence of significant military and logistical support as well as 

operational and political guidance from the Rwandan Government 

to the M23. You also point out that we do not have a similar body 

of evidence that Uganda has a government-wide policy of support 

to M23. 

Now, as we all know, and I on the House side pushed very hard 

to get this legislation passed, a bill that was authored by then-Senator Barack Obama called the Democratic Republic of Congo Relief 

Security and Democratic Promotion Act of 2006. It calls on the U.S. 

Government to withhold assistance to any foreign country taking 

action to destabilize the DRC. 

I wonder if you could tell us, do the actions of Rwanda merit a 

withdrawal of funding? Does it not rise to, given the corroboration 

of evidence, as you pointed out, to withholding aid to Rwanda until 

they change? 

Mr. CARSON. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I reject the headline 

that the administration has failed to speak out against the M23 

and against those——

Mr. SMITH. That is not what they said, with all due respect. They 

talked about a failed policy, not that we didn’t speak out against 

M23, so just be clear. 

Mr. CARSON. I think that what we say and do is a part of the 

policy effort, and I reject that notion, and I must reject it pretty 

soundly. First and foremost, we have been engaged on this issue 

since the M23 rebellion began in April of this year. Since April up 

until yesterday, we have at all levels of the U.S. Government, senior levels of the U.S. Government been working to advance greater 

peace and stability, an end to the current fighting, a current withdrawal of M23 from Goma, and discussions between the leaders in 

the region. 

21

Let me just give you a quick catalog. Certainly between April 

and September, I and Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, were in contact on numerous occasions telephonically with leaders in the region. I also met with leaders about 

this issue at the African Union summit in June. 

In September of this year, Secretary Clinton invited the Presidents of Rwanda and of the DRC to meet with her on the margins 

of the U.N. General Assembly to try to find ways to end the current 

rebellion. We participated in September as well in Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s special meeting on the Great Lakes Region. In 

addition, Under Secretary Wendy Sherman traveled to the region 

in October, met with Presidents Kagame, Kabila, and Museveni, 

and this was one of the most important of her sets of meetings out 

there. She met with President Kagame for over 5 hours in Kigali 

on that visit. 

Shortly after that we actually did take some action. Because we 

had information that we believed indicated Rwandan support, we 

cut off our foreign military financing to the Rwandan Government, 

one of the first such public acts by any government. And I can say 

that I traveled to the region for several days just after Thanksgiving and traveled to Kampala, to Kigali, and to Kinshasa to meet 

with the leaders of all three countries. I also traveled with my British and French counterparts. In addition, we have sanctioned M23 

leaders. We are about to sanction more M23 leaders and officials, 

and we have continued to advance our diplomacy as well as speak 

out against what has been happening in the region. 

So, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, anyone who would suggest that we have been inactive would be——

Mr. SMITH. Again, Mr. Secretary, or Mr. Ambassador, you are 

both, no one is suggesting inactivity. It is the policy itself that is 

under scrutiny and being criticized by those 15 organizations, 

and—I mean, let me ask you this: Are there sanctions contemplated or have there been any sanctions imposed upon any 

Rwandese officials or military? 

Mr. CARSON. No. But we have, as I pointed out, implemented 

sanctions which have cut off foreign military financing to the 

Rwandan Government and to the Rwandan military. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary——

Mr. CARSON. I think those are sanctions, and I think they are 

very public, and they have been terminated. 

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned support for U.N. envoy. How about a 

U.S. envoy? 

Mr. CARSON. We actually have a U.S. Envoy for the Great Lakes 

Region. His name is Ambassador Barrie Walkley. He has been on 

the job for nearly a year. Ambassador Walkley is infinitely qualified to serve as our envoy there. He has served in two francophone 

African countries as Ambassador and he has previously served as 

deputy chief of mission in the DRC. He travels to the region quite 

frequently, and so there is an envoy out there already. One may 

quibble with the level, but the existence is there. He is active, and 

he is working hard on this issue along with other officials. 

Mr. SMITH. Understood. But the gravitas of a Presidential envoy 

I believe would send, perhaps, a stronger message to those that are 

part of the peace process. 

22

Let me ask you, if I could, John Prendergast, in his statement, 

very strongly says, ‘‘By global standards the international effort to 

construct a credible peace process for Congo is manifestly derelict, 

condemning that country to further cycles of devastating conflict. 

When the curtain is pulled back, when one looks behind the occasional United Nations Security Council resolution calling simply for 

an end to the violence, the international diplomatic response is revealed to be shockingly ineffective, perhaps even violating the Hippocratic Oath, ‘first do no harm.’ ’’ Then he goes on from there. How 

do you respond to that? 

Mr. CARSON. Well, I think I don’t need to respond for the entire 

international community. All I do is respond for the U.S. Government. I know Mr. Prendergast, we have been long-time colleagues 

and friends. He has a great deal of knowledge and expertise on the 

region, but I would submit that the actions that we have taken reflect a high degree of interest in this situation. 

Mr. SMITH. Would troops recently pledged by the South African 

Development Community comprise a credible force to protect the 

DRC-Rwanda border? 

Mr. CARSON. Last week, the SADC countries met in Dar es Salaam, and there they agreed to send in some 4,000 troops into the 

Eastern DRC to serve as an international or, I should say, a neutral international force; 1,000 troops were pledged by Tanzania, the 

other 3,000 were going to be drawn from a southern African standby force. I do not know the capacity or the ability of the countries 

in the region to pull those troops together, but what I would say 

is that the U.N. currently has the largest peacekeeping force in the 

world in the DRC, and if there is an interjection of a new force, 

it should be done very carefully in cooperation and collaboration 

with the United Nations. It should be well thought out and well 

resourced, and one should consider whether it is not better to augment and integrate those new forces into an expanded and more 

assertive U.N. force than to create a new force that would be operating in the area in which there are already a large number of 

military and rebel forces. It could create some concerns about operational effectiveness and operational overlaps. 

Mr. SMITH. I, too, have been in Goma myself a few years back, 

and know how unbelievably unstable that area is. Part of the problem, I believe, is that there are insufficient troops deployed, even 

under the large U.N. deployment there, and then there is always 

the question of the rules of engagement. 

Let me ask you one final question before I yield to my friend, Ms. 

Bass. There are rumors, maybe they are just rumors, that the administration sought to delay the U.N. Group of Experts report on 

the DRC this past summer and attempted to soften criticism of 

Rwandan involvement with M23. Can you speak to that? 

Mr. CARSON. I reject that as out of hand. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And one final question, the Rwandans join the 

U.N. Security Council next year. Does that have any bearing on 

what our policy will be, particularly when it comes to sanctions, 

since they will be on the Security Council? 

Mr. CARSON. No, it does not. I would just hope that the 

Rwandans, when they join the Council, will carry out their duties 

23

in a responsible and thoughtful way just as the other 15 members 

of the Security Council do. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Ambassador Carson. I want to change the 

subject a little bit and wanted to ask if you could speak to some 

of the background of the M23. I mean, I do understand, you know, 

when they started and why, but I just wanted to know if you had 

any further insight as to what their ultimate aim is, what is the 

motivation for them to continue, and also, the idea—you mentioned 

that there wouldn’t be impunity to the commanders of the M23 to 

be reintegrated back into the DRC’s Armed Forces, but how do you 

reintegrate any of them? How big is the M23? How many soldiers 

are there? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me speak to the first question of aim and motivation. I believe that the current group of M23 rebels want to be 

able to maintain themselves as consolidated military units in the 

eastern part of the DRC. I think they see themselves as guardians 

of the Tutsi population in the East. I suspect that some of them 

have political ambitions and would seek to try to be able to be the 

top officials in local administrations in the East. 

Beyond that, I don’t know what their aims and motivations are. 

I know that when this rebellion started back in March and April 

there was a clear desire on the part of the now constituted M23 

rebels not to be moved from the eastern part of the DRC into other 

parts of the country, and their officers did not want to leave the 

military commands in which they had been assigned to take on different commands. 

Impunity, I think there should not be impunity for those M23 

leaders who fall into three categories—those who are clearly ICC 

indictees, those for whom there are international and binational 

sanctions already, and thirdly, for those where there is evidence or 

a growing body of evidence that they have, in fact, committed 

atrocities and war crimes and rapes throughout the last 7 or 8 

months. I don’t have an exact figure for the number of M23 rebels. 

Initially when they broke away in April of this year, the number 

was probably no more than 1,000. Today that number has probably 

swelled for a lot of reasons, but it is not a legion of people. 

Ms. BASS. You know, when you were saying previously that what 

the President, one of the things that led to the recent rebellion was 

the President trying to scatter the troops, because how can you 

ever have peace if, even if you did have sanctions against the top 

commanders, how can you have an army when you have a faction 

that wants to separate and operate independently? I don’t know 

how that works. 

Mr. CARSON. It doesn’t work very well. But let me say that there 

have been a number of countries that have effectively integrated 

rebel groups into their militaries and in the process, have made 

those militaries stronger and more consolidated. Here I think there 

was an effort by the M23 not to leave the Kivus, not to be reassigned to other parts of the DRC, and for their leaders, not to move 

out of the areas in which they called home. I don’t think you can 

effectively operate a military in which you have a reintegrated 

rebel group deciding what it wants to do rather than what the military command and the government wants it to do. 

24

Ms. BASS. Right. Exactly. You also talked previously about the 

ongoing tension on the border of Rwanda and the DRC, and you 

mentioned the U.N. peacekeeping forces, and also the possibility of 

troops coming from South Africa to secure that border. Where are 

the peacekeeping troops? Are they all over? Aren’t they already on 

that border? 

Mr. CARSON. No, they aren’t. I think that the MONUSCO troops 

are scattered throughout the eastern part of North and South 

Kivus. They are there largely to protect civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons. They are not, in fact, monitoring or 

working and observing along the border, but are near and in towns, 

villages, near refugee camps and displaced-persons camps to respond to crises and to help the FARDC, the Congolese military, 

when they are called upon to do so. 

Ms. BASS. Could you speak to the impact that conflict minerals 

might be playing, the role conflict minerals might be playing, especially in providing resources to the M23? 

Mr. CARSON. Let me say that conflict minerals have always been 

a factor in providing resources to rebel groups in the eastern part 

of the Congo, but quite honestly as serious as conflict minerals are, 

they are probably not the primary reason for the current crisis. 

They are one of the, you know, underlying systemic reasons why 

the crisis can continue, but I think that the current crisis is to be 

found in what are the so-called grievances and in discipline of the 

M23 and the support that they have received from outside of the 

country. 

Ms. BASS. And then finally, how would you assess the U.S. Government’s response to the humanitarian crisis in the eastern region 

of the DRC, if you could describe it? 

Mr. CARSON. I think, as I noted in my testimony, we have given 

in excess of $110 million in humanitarian assistance. 

Ms. BASS. Maybe you could explain what some of those dollars 

are for? 

Mr. CARSON. These dollars are used to provide food to displaced 

persons throughout both North and South Kivus, it is to provide 

food and assistance to refugee populations who are there, it is to 

provide shelter, shelter material and blankets, it is also to provide 

clean and potable water, and also to provide prophylaxis for malaria and also the medicines for dealing with issues of cholera and 

hygiene. 

Ms. BASS. And, I am sorry, just one final question. What more 

would you like to see from Congress? How can we be helpful in this 

situation? 

Mr. CARSON. Congresswoman Bass, I think your hearings, hearings such as this one give us downtown an opportunity to indicate 

to you what we are doing. They also give us an opportunity to hear 

from you what things you think we haven’t been doing that might 

be useful to do to improve the situation. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, a statement from World Relief will 

be made a part of the record. I yield to Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, for 

being here today. 

Mr. Ambassador, my research shows me that the United States, 

perhaps with some assistance from other countries in Europe, have 

25

given about $1 billion over the last 10 years to Rwanda and not 

quite that much to Uganda. Can you explain if we have reduced 

any amount given to either of those countries and how much? 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Congressman, we have certainly in the last 6 

months reduced our foreign military financing to Rwanda by some 

$200,000. This would have been monies that the Rwandan military 

could have used for the financing and purchasing of equipment. We 

have not reduced any of our development assistance money to 

Rwanda, and I might say here that Rwanda does a remarkably 

good job of utilizing its foreign assistance resources probably more 

effective than most countries across Africa. They do a very good job 

in using that money to provide health care, agriculture, education 

to their people, and they do get very high marks for that. We have 

not touched any of their development assistance money. 

Mr. MARINO. How do you draw the distinction between where 

the—did you say $200,000? That is a drop in the bucket, $200,000. 

And I think the remark from the Prime Minister or the General 

was $200,000 was nothing, it doesn’t bother us at all. So it doesn’t 

seem that we are very serious about this, blatantly not very serious 

about this, and how is the so-called remainder of the billion over 

the 10 years less the $200,000, how is that disbursed and who disburses it? 

Mr. CARSON. I am not sure what the billion is that you are referring to? 

Mr. MARINO. The billion dollars that my research shows that the 

U.S., with some assistance from Europe, has given Rwanda over 

the last decade. Now, you say that has been reduced at least this 

year, I am assuming this year by $200,000, so if you break that billion over a 10-year period, still $200,000 is nothing over an annual 

basis, and how can we guarantee that even though there is a reduction of $200,000, and you say, I believe you say to the military, 

and correct me if I am wrong, it is all fungible. 

Mr. CARSON. It is not fungible. Let me, first of all, say that in 

Fiscal Year 2012 that has just concluded, we provided Rwanda 

with some $195 million in assistance. This money went primarily 

into health and to agricultural programs. Rwanda has used its development assistance dollars extraordinarily well. As I said, probably better than most other African countries and most other developing countries. 

Mr. MARINO. How do you——

Mr. CARSON. Moreover, we do not provide them with direct budgetary support. We are not providing them with a check or with 

cash. We work through NGOs, through international development 

organizations and agencies, and there is a high degree of accountability for all of the funding that we have given to the Rwandan 

Government. Their utilization of foreign assistance in an effective 

manner really is not at question nor at issue because in that regard, we have to be both frank and honest, and they do a very good 

job. We don’t give them cash, we don’t write them a check, but the 

monies that they get through the international partners is effectively utilized for the purposes it is intended for. We are pretty——

Mr. MARINO. I have understood through my research and contacts that there has been a great deal of hijacking of these resources by groups such as M23 and using it for their own purposes 

26

or selling that to buy weapons. Do you have any information on 

that? 

Mr. CARSON. Not—I am not aware of that whatsoever. 

Mr. MARINO. Has the U.S. had any contact, directly or indirectly, 

with M23 leaders? 

Mr. CARSON. No. I am not aware of any direct contact between 

U.S. officials and M23 leaders. There have been two meetings in 

Kampala between leaders of the M23 and members of the DRC 

Government along with other diplomats. We have been in the room 

as observers when those sessions have been public, but we have 

had no direct contact of which I am aware with any, and I underscore any M23 leaders. 

Mr. MARINO. Are there any plans to get more directly involved 

for whatever reason by the Department of State with M23? 

Mr. CARSON. Well, I think—no, not at the—no, not that I am 

aware of. Certainly not. 

Mr. MARINO. You stated that numbers have increased with M23, 

they have swelled over the last several months. For what reasons? 

Mr. CARSON. Defections from the FARDC, recruitment of individuals in the communities that they have captured and taken over, 

the forced recruitment of young men, all of these have contributed 

to an expansion of their numbers. 

Mr. MARINO. You started explaining a little bit the reason for the 

crises, but can you expand upon your answer as what you see the 

cause, the direct cause of the crisis that is taking place, particularly with M23’s origination? 

Mr. CARSON. Well, M23 rose out of the—an organization called 

the CNDR which was integrated into the Congolese army back in 

March 2009. Most of these individuals were from North and South 

Kivu, they were a part of a rebel movement. Most of them were 

Rwandaphones and Tutsis in origin. In order to bring an end to a 

previous rebellion by this group, the Government of the DRC 

brought them in to the military, integrated them in, and attempted 

to make them a part of the army. They broke away in April of this 

year. I might add that not all of the CNDR members from 2009 

and before broke away. Some of them remained in the army. But 

the principal reasons for their decision to bolt and run, they claim, 

was a failure of the DRC Government to live up to the agreement 

of March 23, 2009, but other things that are clear is that the DRC 

Government wanted to move units, some of these integrated CNDR 

units to other parts of the country. They resisted this. They wanted 

to move some of the leadership to other parts of the country. They 

resisted this. 

President Kabila also did something that disturbed the CNDR, 

and he announced that he would try to arrest one of the most notorious of the CNDR leaders who had been integrated into the army, 

and that was Bosco Ntaganda, who was an ICC indictee, and so all 

of these reasons that have a lot to do with disgruntlement within 

this integrated rebel faction are the background to the current crisis. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Ambassador, you stated that the aid that we 

are supplying to Rwanda via NGOs, how can we guarantee that 

any of that aid is not going into regions controlled by M23. 

27

Mr. CARSON. Again, I want to separate both the DRC from Rwanda. We have no evidence, no proof that any of the aid that we have 

given to Rwanda has been misused or mischanneled into the hands 

of any rebel group. As I said before, the issue here really is not 

about the effective utilization of aid and aid resources. Rwanda has 

a high level of credibility with respect to the way it uses its resources. That is not at issue. I have no doubt that they are using 

their resources well. 

So it is not funneling across the border, and it is not direct assistance, so we work with NGOs and international organizations. 

We audit what we give, and they use it efficiently. It is not being 

misused. 

And in the areas of the DRC, we are providing only humanitarian support and assistance. And that humanitarian support and 

assistance is going through organizations, mostly U.N. organizations, World Food Programme, or through UNHCR, or through the 

development assistance arm of the international—of the United 

Nations, or through Caritas or Save the Children or ICRC. 

Mr. MARINO. Is that an audit that the State Department conducts or is that an audit based on information that the NGOs give 

the State Department? 

Mr. CARSON. We can provide you with a full answer to this, but 

USAID conducts routine audits of all of its assistance programs. I 

cannot tell you when they did the last ones with respect to these 

programs. But they conduct routine audits to ensure that there is 

accountability. Again, that is not at issue here. 

Mr. MARINO. How do you get the attention of a country like 

Rwanda and Uganda from supporting M23 by not stopping aid to 

the country, whether it is for humanitarian needs or not? How do 

you get their attention? 

Mr. CARSON. By engaging them continuously, diplomatically, at 

a high level, and by doing such things as indicating that we, as we 

have done, that we will cut off their foreign military financing if 

they persist in carrying on. 

Mr. MARINO. I don’t mean to be facetious, but this may be more 

rhetorical than a question you have to answer, but how is that negotiating going? 

Mr. CARSON. It is like any set of negotiations, sometimes much 

longer than any of us would like, but we know that persistence 

over the long run pays off. 

Mr. MARINO. So is it your position that the U.S. keep the plan 

that they have in operation right now and continue trying to negotiate this? At what point do you stop? How many people have to 

die before you stop the negotiations and get serious about this? 

Mr. CARSON. We can’t stop. We continue, and we will continue 

to persist. This is not in our hands alone. We can only facilitate. 

We can only encourage. We can only prod, cajole, and push peace, 

and the effort to bring about peace and stability is always in the 

hands of those who are adversaries. Our desire is to get them to 

see reason, and to see it sooner rather than later, and to understand that the persistence of conflict and violence only means 

greater loss of life and hurt for people. 

28

But it is not simply in our hands. We can only do as much as 

we can to bring people to the table and encourage them to see reason. 

Mr. MARINO. And in closing, this is more of a statement than it 

is a question, from my reading of the research, it seems that this 

situation is not getting the attention that I think is required from 

the United Nations as well. 

Thank you, Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Without objection, the audit information requested by Mr. 

Marino and promised by Ambassador Carson will be made a part 

of the record. So we look forward to receiving it. 

Chair recognizes Chairman Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Chairman Smith. 

Let me just ask Ambassador Carson a couple of questions. One, 

just going to MONUSCO’s mandate, I think the force there of M23, 

that militia is probably about 2,500 people from at least the press 

accounts. And I know the French have a perspective here that the 

ability to secure the safety of the civilian population could be addressed by a more robust authorization that would allow them to 

come to the defense of the civilian population. And I was going to 

ask you that question. 

And the second question I was going to ask you goes to the issue 

of naming Rwanda for its involvement here with M23, and I know 

there was that debate in the Security Council over whether or not 

we would expressly name them. And as I recall, the U.S. position 

was not to do so at the time. But I think in light of events since 

then, we have now sort of taken the position, or it seems that the 

administration has taken the position that we are pointing to 

Rwanda’s engagement here. So de facto maybe we have named 

them. Just a couple of—just your observations on those two points, 

Ambassador. 

Mr. CARSON. Chairman Royce, thank you very, very much for 

both of those questions, and also thank you for your continued interest in Africa. Let me respond to the second question first and 

repeat a part of my testimony that you may have missed at the beginning. 

I said that the M23 would not be the threat that it is today without external support. And we will continue to discourage outside 

parties from providing any assistance to the M23. There is a creditable body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the Group 

of Experts reports concerning Rwandan Government support to the 

M23, including military, logistical, and political assistance. 

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, I think you put that very, very well. My 

only question was, we hadn’t put it in the resolution, in Resolution 

2076, and perhaps it should have been there. But you couldn’t be 

more explicit than you just were, and I thank you for that. 

And let me just ask you about the proposed alternatives to ensure more civilian safety with respect to the mandate. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, the current MONUSCO mandate is 

for some 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers. Currently, that mandate is 

undersubscribed by approximately 2,000 individuals. I think 

MONUSCO today has a force level of approximately 17,700 individuals. 

29

Certainly, it would be desirable to see the full complement of the 

mandate met. It certainly would help to allow the MONUSCO to 

carry out its responsibilities. Following in the aftermath of the current situation in Goma, and the Eastern Congo, I think I also made 

reference to in my statement, to the fact that it would be useful 

for a reexamination of the effectiveness of the force and whether 

the mandates and other responsibilities are being met and whether 

there are adequate resources to meet them. But the force is undersubscribed by approximately 2,000 people. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. The last question I will ask 

you just goes to this group, the Allied Democratic Forces/National 

Army for the Liberation of Uganda, which has been around for a 

while, and it goes to this issue of rebel groups increasingly joining 

forces beyond their national borders. This particular group has 

done some work with al-Shabaab, and a bombing, for example, July 

11, 2010, in Kampala, which killed, I think, over 70 people. 

And so you have this nexus. If we look at the leader of this 

group, he got his training, I think he is a converted Catholic, Jamil 

Mukulu, who converted to radical Islam probably while he was in 

Sudan. But in Sudan, he met Osama bin Laden, and through the 

initial work with these radical organizations put together his own 

little vision of how he could create change, and including a lot of 

mayhem, but none of it that spectacular until al-Shabaab began to 

give him the wherewithal, you know, to carry out attacks like this 

one. 

And I was going to ask you about that phenomenon. You have 

these organizations where part of his support network come from 

disaffected Congolese, and here is Ugandans in the operation as 

well and, you know, people from throughout the region who join a 

cause that becomes sort of transnational, and begin working, in 

this case they suspect him of working with al-Qaeda as well. 

Ambassador Carson, just anything you can do to bring me up to 

speed in terms of organizations like this that, frankly, he is based 

right now in eastern Kivu. So, you know, we have got the—in 

North Kivu. So we have got the same phenomenon spreading, apparently. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, three quick points on that. First of 

all, it is absolutely essential that all the states in the region agree 

and commit themselves not to harbor, not to support, not to defend, 

not to provide equipment, or sustenance, or training to rebel groups 

operating against the leaders of a neighboring state. This is one of 

the problems that we face today with the M23. It is also a problem 

that we face with the Allied Democratic Forces. This is incumbent 

upon all of them, incumbent upon every state in the Great Lakes 

to do this. If we could get that, we could cut off a lot of the support 

for rebel groups. 

With respect to the Allied Democratic Forces, indeed, they have 

been operating in the eastern part of North Kivu against the Ugandans. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

needs to do everything that it possibly can to not allow groups like 

this to continue to operate out of and from their territory. I am not 

in any way accusing them of aiding and abetting, but the mere fact 

that they don’t have security and control of the territory effectively 

allows this to go on. But it needs to stop, clearly needs to stop. 

30

Third point, with respect to the leader of the Allied Democratic 

front, Mr. Mukulu, we have, in fact, sanctioned him. We have imposed both visa travel and financial sanctions on him in response 

to the very criminal things that we know that he is responsible for 

doing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, thank you very much, and thank you 

for all your work on the ground in Africa with these groups. I know 

that as things were unfolding in Eastern Congo you were there trying to influence the course of events, and we appreciate that. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Let me ask just two final questions. 

And, Ms. Bass, if you have a final question, please fire away. 

Again, you have in your testimony made it very clear that there 

is a credible body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the 

Group of Experts, including evidence of significant military and 

logistical support, as well as operation and political guidance from 

the Rwandan Government to the M23. I know on your most recent 

trip you were precluded the opportunity to meet with Paul 

Kagame, the President of Rwanda. Did the officials with whom you 

met with, did they dispute that, and when Under Secretary Sherman met with President Kagame some months back, several weeks 

back, did she get a report back from him? Did he tell her that this 

is all rubbish, not true, or did he admit to anything? 

Secondly, one of my most disappointing takeaways today, and 

Mr. Marino, I think, drew you out further on the suspension of foreign military financing, that we are talking about $200,000 when 

the 2006 Act at least envisioned a more robust and credible sanction against a country that is aiding and abetting a nefarious organization like M23. So if you could speak to whether or not additional sanctions are under consideration, at least against Rwanda, 

and specific individuals as well. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, let me answer the first question. 

You are correct. As I stated earlier, I and my British and French 

colleagues met in Kampala for several hours with President 

Museveni, and in Kinshasa we met for an extended period of time 

with President Kabila, as well as his Foreign Minister and his 

Prime Minister. 

In Kigali, it is regrettable that President Kagame chose not to 

meet with us. The message about our concerns, again, not just 

those of the United States, but Britain, and France, we traveled 

there as the P3, the three permanent members of the Security 

Council who have worked together on many, many issues, but we 

did speak with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Louise 

Mushikiwabo, plus some of her colleagues. Again, we raised the 

issue of the need to end outside support. 

As in previous discussions, the Rwandan Government strongly, 

vehemently denies that it is providing any assistance to the M23, 

and it has not taken the steps of publicly denouncing on a bilateral 

basis the M23. So we have raised this, and it is important that we 

continue to monitor this, as others in the international community 

do, on a very, very close basis. 

With respect to your second question, about international support to, or at least our bilateral support to the Rwandan GovernVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:47 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\121112\77362 HFA PsN: SHIRL
31

ment, I start with what I said to Congressman Marino earlier, is 

that they utilize their international assistance, not only from us in 

particular, but others, very, very effectively. And they use it with 

great integrity. People get it. We are not providing any cash or 

check transfers. It all goes through international organization and 

donor groups that work with the government. We don’t think there 

is a level of fungibility, and we do not believe that the money is 

being misused or misdirected. We focused on the military because 

that is where the issue and the problem derives. 

I know that a number of European governments have suspended 

large amounts of funding to the Rwandan Government, but they 

handle their resources differently. In most instances, they are making budgetary transfers that are cash payments and checks into 

the government. We don’t do that. So it is a very, very different 

thing. Our desire is not to hurt the Rwandan people. Our desire is 

not to cut them off from essential support for agricultural, education, or health programs. Our real desire is to get a change in 

the regional policy. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, but sanctioning individuals within 

the Rwandan Government would not in any way hurt individuals. 

And frankly, the argument you are making, I serve in this panel 

and began my service on this panel in my second term, in 1983, 

and voted in favor of sanctioning South Africa, and there were people who said you will hurt innocent people if you do so. But sometimes the egregious harm is so compelling that a very strong statement needs to be made. But minimally, I would think we would 

want to sanction individuals in the Rwandan Government. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman, I have heard your request and your 

concerns. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. 

I would like to now ask our second panel to make their way to 

the witness table, beginning first with Steve Hege, who has worked 

on the Eastern DRC, where he has served with three consecutive 

mandates as the armed groups expert for the United Nations 

Group of Experts on the DRC. He investigated and coauthored six 

public reports submitted and presented to the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions committee. During the group’s recently expired 2012 

mandate, he was also the coordinator of the six-member team 

working under Security Council Resolution 2021. Prior to joining 

the U.N. Group of Experts, Mr. Hege worked with several humanitarian and peace-building organizations. 

We will then hear from John Prendergast, who is a human rights 

activist, a bestselling author, and co-founder of The Enough 

Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes against humanity. 

He has worked for the Clinton administration, the State Department, and in Congress. He has also worked for the National Intelligence Council, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, the International 

Crisis Group, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has helped fund 

schools in Darfurian refugee camps and helped launch the Satellite 

Sentinel Project with George Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked 

for peace in Africa for well over a quarter of a century. 

Then we will hear from Mvemba Dizolele, who is a visiting fellow 

at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and professor, lecturer 

in African studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of AdVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:47 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\121112\77362 HFA PsN: SHIRL
32

vanced International Studies. Mr. Dizolele has testified several 

times before the Congress. His work has appeared frequently in 

many major news publications and he is a frequent commentator 

on African affairs on television and radio. He has served as an election monitor in the DRC in 2006, and again in 2011, and has also 

been embedded with United Nations peacekeepers as a reporter 

there. In addition, he is a veteran of the United States Marine 

Corps. 

Thank you for your service. And I would like to now go to Steve 

Hege. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEVE HEGE (FORMER MEMBER UNITED 

NATIONS GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO) 

Mr. HEGE. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human 

Rights, thank you for this invitation to testify at this hearing on 

the current crisis in Eastern Congo. I have been working in the 

Congo for over 8 years, including the past three as a member of 

the United Nations Group of Experts. The Group of Experts’ mandate recently expired on 30 November, during which I served as 

the coordinator of our six-member team. As such, I am no longer 

affiliated with the United Nations, and the views I share today do 

not reflect those of the organization or that of the Group of Experts, but rather strictly my personal perspectives. 

The Group of Experts is a Security Council-mandated body which 

reports to the Council’s sanctions committee. Its role is to investigate, document, and inform the sanctions committee of violations 

of the United Nations’ arms embargo on non-state actors in the 

DRC, as well as related issues such as the illegal trade in natural 

resources and serious violations of international law, including the 

recruitment and use of child soldiers. During the course of the previous mandates, the group found that since the very outset of the 

M23 rebellion, the Government of Rwanda had provided direct 

military support to M23, facilitated recruitment, encouraged desertions from the Congolese Army, and delivered arms and munition, 

political advice, and intelligence to the rebels. 

At the strategic level, Rwanda has also spearheaded fundraising 

and membership drives for the political cadres, even nominating 

the movement’s political leadership and directly instructing them 

of their demands to be made before the Congolese Government. 

The Rwandan Army has not only set up an elaborate recruitment 

network within Rwanda to ensure a steady supply of new troops 

to M23, including children, but they have also integrated their own 

officers and trainers within M23’s chain of command on the ground 

in North Kivu. During all major military operations, the Rwandan 

Army has deployed thousands of additional troops to reinforce M23 

in their principal attacks, such as the recent offensive on Goma. 

While members of the international community have expected 

Rwanda to diminish its support in light of diplomatic and financial 

pressure, the group has found that such direct involvement has 

only increased with time, precisely because M23’s de facto chain of 

command culminates with the Minister of Defense of Rwanda, General James Kabarebe. Nevertheless, the Government of Rwanda 

33

continues to deny any involvement. In annex 3 of our final report, 

we thoroughly responded to each of their criticisms. However, when 

its substantive arguments proved unconvincing, Rwanda turned to 

attacking the Group of Experts, claiming bias and even orchestrating a media campaign defending that I was a sympathizer of 

the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the FDLR and a denier of the Rwandan genocide. 

Nevertheless, Rwanda had previously recognized my objectivity 

through the group’s extensive detailed investigations on the support networks and financing of the FDLR in recent years. 

In addition to Rwandan backing to M23, in our final reports the 

group documented support for the rebels from important networks 

within the Government of Uganda. Senior Ugandan officials provided the rebels with direct troop reinforcements in Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice, and facilitation of external relations. They also supported the creation and expansion of the political branch of M23 

permanently based in Kampala even before President Kabila had 

ever authorized any interaction with the rebels. A Ugandan Government representative acknowledged this type of support was indeed taking place in an official meeting of the Group of Experts in 

early October. 

Throughout our mandates, the question most often posed to us 

was quite natural and logical: Why? Why would Rwanda undertake 

such a risky and politically dangerous endeavor? Though it is not 

the work of the Group of Experts to establish causes or drivers of 

conflicts, I will humbly attempt to analyze some of the stated motives behind this war, beginning with M23’s key demands. 

Since the rebellion’s initial stages, M23 has presented an assortment of demands and justifications. First, the rebels have claimed 

that the government reneged on the 23 March 2009 peace agreements. Nevertheless, in reality, this accord was essentially an 

afterthought to formalize a bilateral deal between Kinshasa and 

Kigali which was predicated on the affording the latter with immense influence in the Kivus, in exchange for arresting CNDP 

Chairman Laurent Nkunda and forcing the rest of the CNDP to 

join the national army under the leadership of Bosco Ntaganda. 

For many within the CNDP and the Rwandan Government, the 

integration of the CNDP into the Congolese Army was merely a 

tactical move, but never constituted a fundamental alteration of 

their objectives. The short-term deal, nevertheless, was immensely 

generous to Rwanda, the Congolese officers of the CNDP, particularly Ntaganda and his loyal officers, who took control over much 

of the army in Eastern Congo. 

Paradoxically, the rebels have also complained of the pervasive 

corruption within the Congolese Army. Nevertheless, as the most 

powerful commanders in the Eastern DRC, they were some of the 

worse perpetrators of salary theft and racketeering. Moreover, the 

rebels have claimed discrimination of Tutsi officers within the 

army and the killing of those former CNDP officers who had been 

redeployed outside of the Kivus. 

While certain historical animosities cannot be denied, dozens of 

Tutsi senior officers and over four-fifths of the ex-CNDP have chosen not to join the rebellion. In recent months, M23 has increasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:47 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\121112\77362 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

ingly claimed that they want a review of the discredited 2011 Presidential elections in an attempt to attract sympathies of a broader 

constituency. Nevertheless, the CNDP political party had in fact 

joined the President’s electoral alliance and many top M23 commanders orchestrated massive fraud on his behalf. 

Now, if it is not really the claims of the March 23rd, 2009 agreements, or good governance, human rights, then what does Rwanda 

really want in this crisis? Despite the extremist paranoia about 

Balkanization, which has been so prevalent for many years 

amongst the Congolese population traumatized by multiple foreign 

invasions, only one of the rebel demands has any lasting explanatory power, and that is federalism. Rwandan orchestration of the 

M23 rebellion becomes more comprehensible when understood as a 

determined and calculated drive to spawn the creation of an autonomous federal state for the Eastern Congo. There has been speculation over whether Rwandan involvement was driven by security interests, economic interests, or cultural ties, but a federal state for 

the Eastern Congo would encapsulate all of these issues. 

Prior to the November 2011 elections, one of the most senior 

Rwandan intelligence officers argued that because the Congo was 

too big to be governed by Kinshasa, Rwanda should support the 

emergence of a federal state for the Eastern Congo. He told me, 

Goma should relate to Kinshasa in the same way that Juba was 

linked to Khartoum in reference to Sudan. 

During our official meetings with the Rwandan Government in 

Kigali in July, the Rwandan delegation consistently stated that our 

investigations were simply a distraction from reaching a definitive 

solution for governance in the Eastern Congo. When pushed further, several representatives did not hide the fact that the only solution they had in mind was indeed federalism. 

Not surprisingly, Rwanda has openly aided and abetted self-declared Congolese secessionists so as to set the bar high enough to 

position federalism eventually as an acceptable compromise. During several internal meetings of M23 for mobilization, senior government officials, including the Minister of Defense’s special assistant, openly affirmed that establishing this autonomous state was 

in fact the key goal of the rebellion. One M23 spokesperson recently stated to the New York Times, ‘‘We want more than decentralization, we want federalism,’’ and ‘‘The eastern parts of the 

Congo’s interests are in eastern Africa.’’

Even senior Ugandan security officials also acknowledge that 

this was the aim of the Rwandans in this M23 war. One officer who 

was himself involved in supporting M23 in cooperation with the 

Rwandans told us, ‘‘they’re thinking big . . . you need to look at 

South Sudan.’’

This objective also explains why Rwanda has consistently sought 

to depict all armed groups in the Eastern DRC as one single, 

united, credible front against Kinshasa, and repeatedly calling the 

Congo a big black void in the Congolese state as fictitious. A federal autonomous state for the Eastern Congo would cement and 

guarantee Rwanda’s already extensive influence over military, political, economic, and cultural aspects of life. 

The Government of Rwanda, to its great credit, since the horrific 

events of the genocide in 1994 has exhibited unparalleled ambition 

35

to rebuild its country with unmatched progress. However, that 

same determination has led Rwanda’s leaders to erroneously adopt 

this inherently destabilizing long-term geopolitical strategy for the 

Eastern DRC. 

So if Rwanda’s geopolitical aspirations are indeed as I suspect so 

ambitious, then what can we expect from current negotiations, particularly when Rwanda has demonstrated in recent weeks that it 

has the upper hand on the battlefield? For his part, President 

Kabila feels very strongly about negotiating the March 23rd agreement, but talks will inevitably falter unless the key issue of federalism is put front and center on the negotiating agenda. 

Will the U.S. and others in the international community support 

a federal solution for the Eastern Congo with full knowledge that 

this was likely Rwanda’s primary objective in the first place? 

Stepping back from the current dynamics, federalism in and of 

itself is neither inherently a good or bad proposition, but when 

driven by a neighboring state which would benefit enormously from 

it federalism can be problematic to say the least. Diplomats commonly affirm that Rwanda can and must be a part of a solution. 

Which solution, I would ask. The Rwandan solution for this crisis 

appears to have been identified well before the shots were even 

fired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share the findings of the group and my perspectives on the crisis. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hege follows:]

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Steve Hege 

"The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo" 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Hnman Rights 

II December 2012 

Fonner Coordinator of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo (DRC) 

Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Bass, and Members of the Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Health, and Human Rights Thank you for this invitation to testify at this hearing on the 

current crisis in the eastern OR Congo. 

I have been working on the Eastern Congo for over eight years, including the past three as a 

member of the United Nations Group of Experts on the ORe. Previously, I worked with 

humanitarian organizations, research institutes and foundations as well as the United Nations 

peacekeeping mission in the ORe. The Group of Experts 2012 mandate recently expired on 30 

November, during which I served as the as the Coordinator of our six-member team under 

Security Council resolution 2021. As such, I am no longer affiliated with the United Nations and 

the views I share today do not reflect those of the organization or that of the Group of Experts 

but rather strictly my personal perspectives, currently, as an independent observer. 

The Group of Experts is a Security Council-mandated body which reports to the Council's 

Sanctions Committee. Its role is to investigate, document, and inform the Sanctions Committee 

of violations of the United Nations arms embargo on non-state actors in the DRC as well as 

related issues such as the illegal trade in natural resources and serious violations of international 

law, including the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Group also provides the Sanctions 

Committee with a confidential list of names and entities to be considered for targeted sanctions 

on the basis of specific criteria flowing from the anns embargo. The Group is also responsible 

for monitoring the implementation of the measures imposed by targeted sanctions, notably an 

assets freeze and a travel ban for designated individuals and entities. 

As a purely apolitical, independent, fact-finding mechanism of the United Nations, the Group of 

Experts seeks to avoid analyzing motivations or causes of the arms embargo violations and 

armed group financing which it documents. However, today, having stepped away from the UN, 

in addition to summarizing our key findings this year, in my personal capacity, I would like to 

share my understanding of the likely drivers of the Government of Rwanda's involvement in this 

conflict and subsequently examine several implications for the current quest for a political 

solution to the crisis. 

Group of Experts' Findings 

During the course of this previous mandate, The Group of Experts submitted several confidential 

communications along with two public reports to the Security Council's Sanctions Committee, 

an interim and a final. The latter became available on 21 November 2012, while the Security 

Council published the fonner on 21 June followed by a special Addendum on 27 June, which 

focused on Rwandan violations of the arms embargo in conjunction with the then nascent M23 

rebellion. 
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We found that since the very outset of the M23 rebellion, the Government of Rwanda has 

provided direct military support to M23, facilitated recruitment, encouraged desertions from the 

Congolese army, and delivered arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice to the rebels. 

Our investigations concluded that Rwanda, in fact, orchestrated the creation ofM23 when a 

series of mutinies led by officers formerly belonging to M23's predecessor, the Congres national 

pour la defense du people, or CNDP, were suppressed by the Congolese armed forces in early 

May. At the strategic level, Rwanda has also spearheaded fund-raising and membership drives 

for political cadres, even nominating the movement's political leadership and directly instructing 

them of their demands to be made before the Congolese government. 

The Rwandan army has not only set-up an elaborate recruitment network within Rwanda to 

ensure a steady supply of new troops to M23, including children and even recycled former Hutu 

rebels of the FDLR but they have also integrated their own officers and trainers within the M23 

chain of command on the ground in North Kivu. Furthermore, they have deployed Rwandan 

army units on a permanent basis alongside M23 positions making the two forces nearly 

indistinguishable. During major offensive and military operations, the Rwandan army has 

deployed thousands of additional troops to reinforce M23 in their major attacks, such as the 

recent offensive on Goma. 

While members of the international community have expected Rwanda to diminish its support in 

light of diplomatic and fInancial pressure, we found that such direct involvement had only 

increased with time. This is because, in essence, the rebels have become an extension of the 

Rwandan defense forces. M23's de facto chain of command culminates in the Minister of 

Defense of Rwanda, General James Kabarebe. To a considerable degree, the reality of the 

relation between M23 and the Rwandan army goes far beyond simple external support, as M23 

does not exist separately from Rwanda as an autonomous entity. 

In its efforts to depict a wide-ranging revolution against the Congolese government, Rwandan 

support to M23 also extended to many other Congolese armed groups, including those who had 

previously been anti-Rwandophone such as Raia Mutomboki. During the supposed cease-fire 

from August to October, Raia Mutomboki groups, on orders from M23 's Colonel SuIt ani 

Makenga, carried out brutal ethnically motivated attacks, burning more than 800 homes and 

killing hundreds of civilians from Congolese Hutu communities in Masisi territory, whose 

militias refused to ally themselves with M23. In addition to the Hutu community in North Kivu, 

the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge community in South Kivu has also widely resisted recruitment 

efforts by M23, in large part because they understand so intimately the level of Rwandan control 

over the rebellion. 

Nevertheless, the Government of Rwanda continues to deny any involvement, despite its open 

advocacy on behalf of the rebellion. Rwanda has also repeatedly claimed that it was not 

consulted or given a right of reply to our investigations. This is not true. Despite the Government 

of Rwanda's refusal to receive us for any substantive meetings during our official visit to Kigali 

in May, we purposefully delayed the publication of the addendum to our interim report in order 

provide the Rwandan Minister of Foreign AtTairs an additional opportunity to comment on or 

provide any clarifications for the information the Group had gathered. However, not only did she 

decline to do so in a formal meeting explicitly requested by the Sanctions Committee, but later 

that same day, she proceeded to claim that her government was not privy to our findings. 

Following the publication of the addendum, we did meet again with the Government of Rwanda 

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in Kigali and took into consideration its written response to our interim report. However, we 

found no substantive element of our previous findings that we wished to alter. 

We also thoroughly responded to each issue raised by the Government of Rwanda in a formal 

communication to the Sanctions Committee, which we later published as annex 3 of our final 

report. Most of the elements of the Rwandan rebuttal were not credible. For example, while in 

Kigali, they showed us a pile of demolished AK-47 rifles as proof that they had not provided 75 

mm canon rounds to the rebels. Also, we easily observed open fields and grounds more than 

sufficient for sporadic training at Kanombe military base, something they claimed would have 

been impossible. We also confirmed the veracity of radio intercepts implicating Rwandan 

officers via commercial radios used by both the rebels and the Rwandan army, which according 

to Kigali would have been incompatible. 

When Rwanda's substantive arguments in its defense were unconvincing, they turned to 

attacking the Group of Experts, claiming bias against Rwanda and even orchestrating a 

diplomatic and media campaign defending that I was a sympathizer of the Rwandan Hutu rebels 

of the FDLR and a denier of the Rwandan genocide. I later discovered that Rwandan otlicials in 

the Office of the Presidency had also concocted false testimonies with current FDLR officers 

promising rewards for media statements about my alleged involvement in providing the rebels 

with weapons. Nevertheless, the Government of Rwanda had previously recognized the 

objectivity of the Group's extensive detailed investigations on the support networks and 

financing of the FDLR in recent years. As the Coordinator this year, I personally oversaw the 

Group's cooperation with the ongoing trials of the President and Vice-President of the FDLR in 

Germany. 

Rwanda has also claimed that the Congolese army has been supporting the FOLR. However, the 

Rwandan hutu rebels, at historically low numbers, have become further isolated from external 

support and are focused on self-protection in the face of attacks by the Congolese armed forces 

and M23 allies. While some criminal networks within the Congolese armed forces continue to 

sell small amounts of ammunition to the rebels, there is, however, no evidence of strategic 

cooperation between the FDLR and the Government. 

In addition to Rwandan backing to M23, in our final report, we also thoroughly documented 

support for the rebels from important networks and individuals within the Government of 

Uganda. Senior Ugandan officials provided the rebels with direct troop reinforcements in 

Congolese territory, weapons deliveries, technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and 

facilitation of external relations. They also supported the creation and expansion of the political 

branch ofM23 permanently based in Kampala even before President Kabila had ever authorized 

any interaction between the rebels and the Government of Uganda. 

The Ugandan government otlicially acknowledged this support was indeed taking place in a 

meeting with the Group of Experts in early October. An appointed senior police offIcer stated 

that they would take actions to investigate and arrest those involved. The DRC government is 

fully aware of this support by individuals within the Government of Uganda, but has chosen not 

to denounce out of the hopes of convincing the Ugandans they have more to gain by working 

with Kinshasa than with Kigali in this current crisis. 

Tn the light of the serious nature of our findings regarding external support from the Government 

of Rwanda and individuals within the Ugandan security services, we adopted elevated 

methodological standards for these investigations. Since early April 2012, the Group interviewed 

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over 100 M23 deserters including 57 claiming Rwandan nationality. During field visits, we 

privileged our own observations and research in conflict zones and along the borders. 

Furthermore, we also analyzed M23 's weapons and military equipment found in anns caches and 

on the battlefield, satellite imagery of supply routes between M23 and Rwandan army posts, and 

intercepts of radio communications. Though, we consulted dozens of senior Congolese military 

commanders and intelligence officials as well as political and community leaders with intricate 

knowledge of regional developments, the ORC government was never the starting point of any 

of our information-gathering. Ouring the initial stages of the rebellion government officials 

sought to even impede our access to key information about Rwandan involvement, preferring to 

deal with such issues discretely with Kigali themselves. Moreover, we communicated regularly 

with many active participants of the M23 rebellion and other armed groups, as well as current 

and former security officials and civil authorities within Uganda and Rwanda. 

The Security Council and the Sanctions Committee have consistently supported the Group and 

our findings about external support to M23. Various African and western intelligence services, as 

well as independent inquiries by investigative journalists and research organizations have also 

confirmed the Group's conclusions concerning Rwandan violations of the embargo. 

M23's Principal Demands 

Throughout our work, the question most often posed to us was quite natural and logical: why? 

Why would Rwanda undertake such a risky and politically dangerous endeavor? Though, as I 

stated at the outset, it is not the work of the Group of Experts to establish causes or drivers of 

conflict, in the spirit of the great ambitiousness of my Rwandan colleagues, I will humbly 

attempt to analyze some of the stated motives behind this war, beginning with M23's key 

demands. 

Since the rebellion's initial stages, the rebels have presented an assortment of demands and 

justifications for their rebellion. Many are characterized by varying degrees of inconsistencies, 

improvisation, and opportunism. When international journalists have interviewed Makenga, 

many observed that he had little grasp for any of the ideas he was supposed to be fighting for. I 

once sat through an hour-long speech by M23 's spokesman about how it was, in fact, the western 

Congolese officers in the army who were actually discriminated against and not the Tutsis. 

However, many of these demands are clearly inconsistent with the reality of the identities and 

past histories ofM23's top leadership. While all armed groups construct political demands based 

on conjunctural analysis of what will bring them the greatest popular sympathies, the difference 

with M23 is that first, the contradictions are so glaring and second, the analysis and post-facto 

pretexts have largely been constructed by the Government of Rwanda itself. For the most part, 

Rwanda has sought to grasp at any idea or problem which might resonate with the Congolese 

population and which would give M23 a degree oflegitimacy. 

As per their name, first and foremost, the rebels have claimed that the government reneged on 

the 23 March 2009 peace agreements. However, this accord was merely an after-thought to 

fonnalize a bilateral deal between Kinshasa and Kigali which was predicated on the affording the 

latter with immense influence in the Kivus in exchange for arresting CNDP Chairman, Laurant 

Nkunda, and forcing the rest of the CNOP to join the national army under the leadership of 

Bosco Ntaganda. For many within the CNDP and the Rwandan government, the integration of 

the CNOP into the Congolese army was merely a tactical move, but never constituted a 

fundamental alteration of objectives. Some fonner CNDP officers have repeated that when 

4 
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Rwandans convinced them to join the army, they told them that "be patient, we will arrive at the 

objective, trust us." 

The short-term deal, nevertheless, was immensely generous to Rwanda, the Congolese officers 

of the CNDP, particularly Ntaganda and his loyal officers, who took control over much of the 

army in the eastern Congo. Kabila's appeasement of the rebels lead to near-preferential treatment 

for these officers and Rwandan influence in the eastern Congo reached unparalleled levels at the 

end of2011 through, for example, massive smuggling of minerals into Rwanda in collaboration 

with senior Rwandan army commanders. 

Paradoxically, the rebels have also complained of the pervasive corruption within the Congolese 

army. Nevertheless, as some of the most important commanders in the eastern DRC, they were 

some of the worst perpetrators of salary theft, racketeering, and sale of national assets for private 

gain. When any efforts were made by the Congolese Military Prosecutor's otllce to reign in these 

ro6'1.le otlicers, including Ntaganda and Makenga, ex-CNDP officers attacked prisons and 

assassinated opponents, intimidating Kabila with threats of returning to war. The original 

mutiny back in April was sparked, at least superficially, with the ex-CNDP officers refusing to 

take part in seminars in Kinshasa on the reform of the anny. 

Moreover, the rebels have claimed discrimination for Tutsis otllcers within the army and the 

killing of those former CNDP officers who had been re-deployed outside of the Kivus. While 

certain historical animosities cannot be denied, little credible evidence exists to support these 

assertions. On the contrary, former CNDP officers have been re-deployed to other provinces 

without any significant incidents and dozens of senior Tutsi officers within the Congolese army, 

including two regional commanders and over four-fifths of the ex-CNDP, have chosen not to 

join M23. 

M23 has also made many claims about human rights, even though nine of its members and 

associates have been designated for sanctions by both the U.S. government and the UN's 

Sanctions Committee, most for egregious violations of international law. During the current M23 

rebellion, these same officers have recruited and trained hundreds of child soldiers, often killing 

those who attempt to escape. When they previously dominated the military command in the 

eastern DRC, M23 officers oversaw numerous mafia networks exploiting natural resources 

through forced labor as well as partaking in widespread violent land grabs. 

Nevertheless, M23 similarly demands good governance, though, they have attacked and 

appropriated numerous state assets provided by donors, including recently, 33 vehicles 

previously donated to the Congolese police. Government institutions within rebel-controlled 

territory have also been systematically looted, including the electoral commission's equipment 

for voter registration. 

M23 also claims they are fighting for the 50,000 Tutsi refugees who remain in Rwanda. A 

rebellion which displaces over 500,000 can hardly defend the rights of 50,000 refugees. The 

glaring contradiction with the nearly 500,000 newly displaced persons as a result oftheir 

offensives, however, has led M23to de-emphasize this demand recently. Moreover, in 2011, 

former CNDP officers told me that it was indeed Rwanda who did not want these refugees to 

return home so that they would remain "a card to play in future negotiations with Kinshasa." 

In recent months, M23 has increasingly claimed that they want a review ofthe discredited and 

fraudulent 2011 Presidential elections, in an attempt to attract the sympathies of a broader 

5 
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constituency and further weaken Kabila. Nevertheless, the CNDP party was part of the 

President's electoral alliance and many top M23 commanders orchestrated massive fraud on his 

behalf. Ironically, while President Kabila was tremendously popular in the eastern Congo during 

his 2006 elections, it was precisely his peace deal with Rwanda and the CNDP, including all of 

the extra privileges and special treatment that they received while within the army, which 

bolstered opposition to his government in the Kivus. Though he was advised to accept made this 

sacrifice of his popularity in hopes oflong-term peace with Rwand, with enormous 

encouragement and praise from members of the international community including the UN 

peacekeeping mission, today's contexts reveals that was a critical strategic error. 

Finally, Rwanda and M23 have stated that the Congolese army's military operations against the 

Rwandan Hutu rebels of the FDLR have failed and the group remains a threat. However, not 

only did the Rwandan Minister of Defense recently state that the FDLR could never threaten 

Rwanda, but the rebels are currently at all-time low numbers after thousands have been 

demobilized by the UN. Further demonstrating that this is not about the Hutu rebels, M23 has 

even incorporated splinter groups of the FDLR and recycled FDLR soldiers amongst its ranks. 

While still in the army, many ofM23 's oflicers consistently prioritized seeking control over 

mines and timber over substantive operations against the Hutu rebels. Furthermore, covert 

operations by the Rwandan army using Congolese proxy militias who would later become 

proxies ofM23 physically eliminated dozens of key rebel commanders. Combined with the UNbacked operations in South Kivu, in early 2011, the FDLR was largely defeated and on the run. 

Objectively, the greater security threat to Rwanda is represented by Tutsi political opponents 

who have fallen out with President Kagame in recent years. 

Rwanda's Regional Strategy 

Now, if it's not really about the claims and demands of the March 232009 agreements, or 

genuine good governance, development, human rights, the FDLR, refugees etc. then what does 

Rwanda really want? It appears that it is not a pretext or justification invented after the fact that 

caused this war, but rather I suspect Rwanda's regional strategic objectives are driving their 

involvement. 

Despite the extremist paranoia about "balkanization" which has been so prevalent for many years 

amongst the Congolese traumatized by multiple foreign invasions, only one of the rebel demands 

has any lasting explanatory power and that is federalism. 

Rwandan involvement and orchestration of the M23 rebellion becomes more comprehensible 

when understood as a determined and calculated drive to spawn the creation of an autonomous 

federal state for the eastern Congo. There has been speculation over whether Rwandan 

involvement was driven by security interests, or its economic interests, or ethnic/cultural ties, but 

a federal state for the eastern Congo would encapsulate all of these issues. Any negotiations 

should avoid other distracting smokescreen issues and focus on tackling this extremely 

challenging one. 

Prior to the November 201 I elections, one of the most senior intelligence officers within the 

Rwandan government discussed with me several possible scenarios for the secession of the 

eastern Congo. Reflecting the thinking of many of his colleagues, he asserted that because the 

Congo was too big to be governed by Kinshasa, Rwanda should support the emergence of a 

federal state for the eastern Congo. He said, "Goma should relate to Kinshasa in the same way 

that Juba was linked to Khartoum," prior to the independence of South Sudan. 

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During our official meetings with the Rwandan government in Kigali in July, the Rwandan 

delegation consistently stated that our report was simply a distraction and would slow down the 

process of reaching the definitive solution for the infinite problems of the Congo. When pushed 

further, several representatives did not hide the fact that the only solution they had in mind was 

indeed: federalism. Not surprisingly, the Rwanda has openly aided and abetted self-declared 

Congolese secessionists such as Jules Mutebutsi, Akim Muhoza, and Xaviar Ciribanya so as to 

set the bar high enough to position federalism eventually as an acceptable compromise. On the 

day that M23 reached Goma, Rwandan government media surrogates began demanding the 

"right of self-determination." 

During several internal meetings ofM23 for mobilization, senior government officials, including 

the Minister of Defense's special assistant openly affirmed that establishing this autonomous 

state was in facrt the key goal of the rebellion. Several M23 commanders and allies have also 

openly confirmed is interviews I conducted as part of the Group of Experts. Numerous 

journalists have also contirmed that M23 commanders are increasingly putting this objective at 

the top of their agenda. One spokesperson recently stated to the New York Times, "We want 

more than decentralization, we want federalism," and "The eastern parts of Congo's interests are 

in eastern Africa." 

Even senior Ugandan security officials also acknowledged that this was the aim of the Rwandans 

in this M23 war. One officer, who was himself involved in supporting M23 in cooperation with 

the Rwandans, told us, "they're thinking big ... you need to look at South Sudan." The objective 

ot'federalism also helps to explain in part, the involvement trom individuals within the Ugandan 

government. If Rwanda achieves its goal, then Ugandan would need to ensure that their own 

cultural, security, and economic interests in the eastern DRC were not jeopardized. 

Rwanda's deeply ingrained federalist vision is born out of the geopolitical regional strategy 

adopted by Kigali's leadership. A federal autonomous state for the eastern Congo would cement 

and guarantee Rwanda's already extensive influence over military, political, economic, and 

cultural aspects of life, similar to that Syria in parts of Southern Lebanon. The Government of 

Rwanda, to its great credit, since the horrific events of the genocide in 1994, has exhibited 

unparalleled ambition and determination to rebuild its country and has achieved remarkable 

advancements in human development. However, that same ambition and determination has lead 

Rwanda's leaders to erroneously adopt this inherently destabilizing long-term geopolitical 

strategy based on undermining the reconstruction and stabilization ofthe eastern Congo in the 

hopes that perpetual instability would engender radical governance reforms. 

This objective also explains why Rwanda has consistently sought to depict all armed groups in 

the eastern DRC as one single united front against Kinshasa. Although, building this coalition is 

a lot more difficult in practice, in our meetings with them, the Rwandan Minister of Defence and 

Head of the Army both justified and advocated on behalf of all armed groups in the eastern DRC, 

including the extremely brutal Raia Mutomboki. 

Furthermore, the Rwandans have undertaken every effort to depict the Congo as a "big black 

void" playing on Colonial portrayals of Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness calling the 

Congolese State "fictitious." Rwandan diplomats have incessantly stated that "the Congo has 

always been a mess, it's a lost cause" and insinuated that radical structural change would be 

required to salvage it. 

TIMING OF THE REBEELlON 

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The next question then would be: why now" Early 2012 was indeed a ripe moment to make a 

definitive push for Rwanda's strategic objective for several reasons. 

First, nearly everyone, including the Rwandans, expected that following what was likely going to 

be a discredited 2011 electoral process, that there would be widespread chaos and protest, not 

only in Kinshasa but in other parts of the Congo as well, thereby presenting an window for the 

emergence of eastern uprising against Kinshasa. As Kabila had built up close ties with Rwanda 

in the interest of peace, he had become dramatically less popular in the eastern Congo which had 

previously been his base. The challenge for Rwanda would be how to channel that animosity 

away from Kigali and towards Kinshasa, playing on decades of weak central government 

leadership in the eastern Congo. On top of this, there was a serious political rival in the form of 

Vital Kamerhe, the first real eastern-based opposition leader Kabila's was now facing two 

fronts of opposition, including the lingala-speaking west which had already been extremely 

hostile towards him, often calling him a "Rwandan imposter" Even in Kabila's lone remaining 

stronghold, pre-electoral popular support for secessionist movements had increased in mineralrich Katanga province to the south of the Kivus. 

Secondly, the greater stability in the eastern DRC, following a second Presidential term, could 

accelerate the development of state capacity and institutions in the eastern Congo which would 

progressively diminish the chances of a dramatic push for radical governance refonn. 

Furthermore, the Rwandans grew weary that the Congolese would adopt measures of economic 

independence of the eastern Congo through, for example, the establishment of a mineral smelter 

in Kisangani, which would dramatically shift the Kivu mineral trade away trom Rwanda. 

"Congo fatigue" amongst the donor community footing a hefty annual bill for MONUSCO also 

would be fruitful ground for proposing more radical and definitive solutions to the eastern 

Congo. Reflecting this sentiment, in the midst of the crisis, a western diplomat asked me 

sincerely "is the eastern Congo, after so many years of violence, really a viable entity? Maybe 

we should start thinking of more definitive and lasting arrangements for it" This sense of 

desperation and hopelessness for the Congo reaches such levels that even recently the New York 

Times published an op-ed advocating for letting the country fall apart. 

Fourthly, prior to M23, there had been increasingly less willingness to accept Bosco Ntaganda 

abuses and impunity as well as greater pressure to restrict the ex-CNDP's parallel chains of 

command. IfNtaganda had been ever arrested, as demanded by human rights organizations, this 

would have significantly curtailed and diminished Rwandan int1uence and military power in the 

eastern DRC. Furthermore, after fifteen years there is decreasing receptivity for endless cycles of 

the integration of former rebels, thus rendering more vital the achievement of the objective 

sooner rather than later. 

Moreover, many former CNDP officers would vehemently resist any efforts by the Congolese 

government to re-deploy them outside of the Kivus and reign in their wide-spread mafia and 

racketeering networks. This inevitably reconciled latent divisions amongst Tutsi commanders 

forming a common tront willing to work with Rwanda in order to protect their own personal 

business interests, despite previous overtures from some of these officers to back Rwandan 

dissidents like General Kayumba Nyamwasa. 

Finally, the Rwandan role in the integration process of the ex-CNDP provided them with a 

particular opportunity to position themselves as the peacemaker in such a crisis whereby they 

could push for the adoption of a pre-conceived solution, such as federalism. From the very 

8 
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beginning of this crisis, Rwanda has been clamoring for "political negotiations about 

governance," I suspect for these very reasons. 

IMPLlCA nONS FOR NEGOTlA nONS 

So, what does this mean for the current negotiations? If Rwanda's geopolitical aspirations are so 

ambitious, then what can we expect from negotiations, particularly when it has demonstrated in 

recent weeks that it has the upper hand on the battletield? Without addressing federalism, all 

other issues could be solved, but the likelihood that the war would subside would appear to be 

very low, if this is indeed the Rwanda's principal objective. Many observers repeat calls for 

addressing root causes to cycles of violence in the eastern DRC and yet there is little mention of 

Rwanda's strategic objectives for the eastern DRC, in and of themselves, as constituting a critical 

root cause. For his part, Kabila feels very strongly about negotiating the March 23 agreement, 

but talks will inevitably falter unless the key issue of federalism is put front on center on the 

negotiating agenda. 

Rwanda has argued that its national interests are best served by regional stability and crossborder trade with the eastern DRC. Certainly, this is the case in the long term, but if they do 

achieve an autonomous federal state for the eastern Congo in the short term despite massive 

instability, from a strategic perspective, this will have more than compensated for the loss of 

some donor assistance and the life-line the FOLR are currently experiencing 

This conclusion begs several questions Will federalism be truly negotiable in Kampala, or ever? 

Will the US and others in the international community support a federal solution for the eastern 

Congo with full knowledge that this was likely Rwanda's primary objective in the tirst place. 

Will Rwanda be rewarded for its persistence? How could the foreign-driven birth of a federal 

state, stopping just short of secession, be considered legitimate internationally? Can objective 

negotiations take place on this issue when the talks are being framed by both Rwanda and 

Uganda? Will the examples of South Sudan and northern Mali impact discussions? Diplomats 

commonly affirm that Rwanda can and must be part of a solution. The Rwandans also 

incessantly complain oftinger-pointing and defend that they are part of the solution to the 

current crisis and not the problem. Which solution though, should be the question? 

The "solution" for this crisis appears to have been identitied before first shots were fired 

Rwanda knew what the solution they wanted to propose and therefore needed to orchestrate a 

crisis which would be expansive enough to justify such a solution. When the Congolese state and 

its security force actually performed well and defeated the initial ex-CNDP mutiny, the 

Rwandans had to step in overtly and drive the crisis more directly, defying international pressure 

when this involvement became extremely evident. 

Stepping back from the current dynamics, federalism in and of itself is neither, inherently, a good 

or bad proposition, but when driven by a neighboring state which would benetit enormously 

from it, federalism can be problematic to say the least. It should be born out a democratic 

political debate within the ORC and exclusively amongst Congolese and not through political 

negotiations orchestrated and facilitated by Rwanda and some of its allies within Uganda. 

The international community appears willing to overlook Rwanda's involvement and the horrific 

human rights records of some ofM23 , s commanders in order to help usher in a hurried solution 

to "put out the tire" and immediately halt the immense humanitarian cost of this war. More so 

now that Rwanda has shown that it will consistently deploy its troops across its border to ensure 

9 
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that M23 will always prevail on the battlefield. Militarily, the Congolese army proved more than 

capable of defeating the original mutineers, but since Rwanda established M23 and has 

repeatedly deployed its own anny alongside the remnants of the mutineers, a military solution is 

likely off the table. Furthermore, MONUSCO has shown it is not willing to deploy troops to 

fight foreign armies. 

Now that M23 has recently re-positioned itself just north of Goma in order to exert leverage on 

the negotiations, it is unlikely that Rwanda will accept a face-saving "out" strategy as in 2009. 

Rwanda is determined to win. They know that this may be their last chance as well. As such, 

Rwanda is likely to continue its war until they have obtained what they sought out to achieve. 

The costs have already been too high for Rwanda to settle for anything less now. 

CONCLUSION 

At this current juncture, the key question should be what solution will Rwanda deem to 

sufficiently fulfill its strategic objective which could leave the window open to gradually reverse 

their progress towards those ends through the strengthening of the independence of the 

Congolese state in the eastern Congo. 

Could more regional economic integration satisfy Rwanda in the short term? Regional 

integration is objectively very positive, but it must be predicated on States with equal standing 

and mutual respect. Recent history proves that allowing for economic integration without first 

building up the Congolese state, whose officials hold the primary responsibility, will not deter 

Rwanda from pursuing its strategic goal. The 2009 "rapproachment" between the DRC and 

Rwanda was praised internationally because it openly recognized and accepted the reality of 

Rwandan influence in the Kivus. The logic was that if Rwanda was allowed to establish crossborder economic projects above the table, then it would no longer need to go under the table. 

However, Rwandan strategists likely saw these initiatives as stepping stones towards the 

achievement of their ultimate objectives and not as ends in and of themselves. 

Consequently, if federalism is indeed the key issue at stake then there is a clear need for a 

process which examines decentralization as an alternative. Decentralization is foreseen as part of 

the Congolese Constitution, including the expansion in the overall number of provinces. 

Potentially, a negotiated agreement which accelerated the decentralization process and made it 

appear as if it would lead to real federalism could constitute a reasonable compromise. This is, if 

we are willing to accept that there is no real military option which definitively deters Rwanda's 

detennination to obtain its objectives. However, a process whereby the Congolese State is not 

built up first and then deconcentrated to the various provinces with autonomous institutions 

could yield disastrous results. As such, the key challenge, in such a compromise would the close 

donor accompaniment of such a decentralization process in order to insulate initially weak local 

institutions from external influence or cooptation. 

Furthermore, any decentralization process in the DRC must equally prioritize the strengthening 

of the presence of central government throughout the country. The vast majority of Congolese in 

the eastern Congo identify strongly with the Congo as one a nation. Many do not want their own 

governance to be out sourced to neighboring states. They want Kinshasa to govern the eastern 

Congo proactive, fairly, efficiently, and in a balanced respectful fashion. 

Another key aspect of deterring against Rwandan cooptation of a Congolese decentralization 

process, seeking to transform it into federalism, would be to aggressively back large-scale 

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infrastructure and industrial projects which would enhance the DRC' s economic independence 

standing vis-it-vis its neighbors, in the short term. One such example of these types of projects 

would be the remodeling of the Goma airport to international standards, allowing free movement 

of goods and people from the eastern Congo directly to global commercial hubs. 

With time, Rwanda could confront a tipping point where its economic incentives would begin to 

favor treating the DRC on an equal footing as other neighbors such as Kenya or Tanzania. While 

this will not resolve Rwanda's cultural and security concerns in the eastern DRC, addressing the 

economic sphere will go a long way to re-molding the Rwandan geopolitical strategy for the 

Great Lakes region. 

In short, the best case scenario for the current bleak situation is for the DRC to seize upon 

current negotiations to address head-on Rwanda's desire for a federal state in the eastern Congo 

by convincing Kigali that it may achieve that aim through the Congo's pre-existing 

decentralization legislation. Then, the international community must robustly support the DRC's 

central and provincial institutions and economic infrastructure to slowly diminish unfettered 

external control and meddling. Local elections, which had been scheduled to take place this year, 

could provide the framework for such discussions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share with the findings of the Group of Experts and my 

perspectives on Rwanda's role in the crisis. I would welcome any questions. 

11 
47

Mr. SMITH. And now Mr. Prendergast. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, THE 

ENOUGH PROJECT 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks very much, Representatives Smith 

and Bass and Marino and Turner, for your extraordinary commitment to the people of the Congo. It is deeply appreciated by everyone in this room, I can tell you. 

I want to begin, though, by echoing something you said, Congressman Smith, earlier in the hearing. No one is questioning the 

hard work and the dedication and the decades-long commitment 

that key administration officials have exhibited on behalf of peace 

in Congo. I would particularly point out for special commendation 

Ambassador Johnnie Carson, and Ambassador Susan Rice at the 

U.N. I am particularly saddened by the personal attacks we have 

seen against Ambassador Rice in the press and the blogosphere 

over the last couple weeks over issues related to the Congo. The 

Washington shark cage has been fully activated and I guess some 

people see blood in the water. But knowing Johnnie and Susan and 

working with them over the past 16 years, I can tell you from personal experience that they have worked tirelessly for peace in the 

Great Lakes. 

Reasonable people, however, can disagree over tactics and over 

strategy, and it is in that spirit that I deliver my testimony today. 

I am going to focus my remarks on issues related to the Congolese 

peace process in the interest of a division of labor amongst my colleagues here at the table. 

Throughout the latest Congolese conflagration and previous cycles of conflict there, the root causes of war have not been addressed, leaving these peace processes, the endless peace processes 

to focus on flimsy power-sharing deals and arrangements that have 

undermined the sovereignty of the Congolese State and the professionalism and neutrality of its armed forces. This, in turn, has left 

the civil population of Eastern Congo subjected to globally unparalleled violence, perdition, and impoverishment. 

Another unrepresentative agreement between powerful interest 

with the biggest guns that we may see coming out of these Kampala talks might ease open fighting momentarily, but it lays a 

deeper foundation for further devastation and state deconstruction 

down the road. The United States should not be a party to such 

a short-term and destructive approach and must alter its policy to 

help avert an outcome that simply sows the seeds for further war. 

This hearing and your leadership, I believe here in Congress, will 

be an important building block for the kind of step-change that we 

are seeking from the administration and the broader international 

community. 

Here is the crux of it. The lack, I think, of a credible and effective and internationally mandated and leveraged peace process addressing these issues in Eastern Congo is becoming a major reason 

for that war’s continuation. The current negotiation in Kampala between the Government of Congo and the M23 rebels is already 

making the same mistakes as its predecessor processes and will 

likely result in the same kind of short-term deal that keeps the 

Congolese Government in power, reduces international pressure on 

48

Rwanda and Uganda for backing the M23, and redivides the spoils 

of war. The root causes of structural violence will remain 

unaddressed and any agreement will lack the involvement of political parties, of representative civil society elements, including 

women and religious leaders and local armed groups representing 

the diverse voices and interests of Eastern Congo. 

The time has come finally for a real international peace effort, 

the kind that actually has a chance of ending the deadliest war 

globally since World War II, and the U.S. needs to help make that 

happen because if it is left solely to the combatants and their regional sponsors, it will not. 

We believe that two key pieces of the solution are missing now. 

For a lasting peace, a process needs to address those fundamental 

root causes, rooted in economic and political drivers of war. 

First the economic. A shared framework for the future must be 

agreed upon, in which the entire subregion of Central Africa, Congo 

first and foremost and at the center, can benefit much more from 

peaceful, legal natural resource development rather than the violent illegal extraction that exists today. Section 1502 of the DoddFrank bill, which this Congress heroically passed in the face of a 

lot of industry money and lobbying, a nascent regional certification 

effort, initiatives by some of the forward-leaning companies, electronics companies who have started working in support of real progressive change, and then new OECD guidelines, these are all catalyzing movement in the right direction, but more must be done to 

change the economic incentives from war to peace, just as cleaning 

up the blood diamond trade helped incentivize peace in West African countries. 

Coupled with strong international investment, these efforts will 

create the conditions, I think, for transparent and effective governing institutions. Dealing with the economic roots of war not only 

removes the main driver for the conflict today, but creates the 

main engine for state reconstruction. 

Second, the politics. A political framework for Congo must be 

agreed upon that restores public confidence and brings back the viability of the Congolese State while ensuring that further rebellion 

does not ensue. President Kabila faces a political crisis as a result 

of the failures of the army and of the elections last year, and the 

talks with M23 alone will only erode his authority and provide further insult and injury to the Congolese people. 

It is now time for a wider inter-Congolese dialogue in which leaders from the government, from political parties, and from throughout civil society across Congo actively participate and decide on a 

national consensus on reforms on key issues such as the political 

framework for the country, decentralization, protection of minorities, the return of refugees, and other issues that would be put on 

the table by the Congolese themselves. 

I have five recommendations for strengthening U.S. policy, some 

of which are echoing some of the good points that you all at the 

congressional table raised earlier. The first one, and foremost, I 

think, is the need to appoint this Presidential envoy, and I say 

Presidential because it needs to have that kind of rank. The current U.S. policy structure simply doesn’t allow the United States to 

exercise its latent leverage, its creativity, and the international coVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:47 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\121112\77362 HFA PsN: SHIRL
49

ordinating function with respect to supporting peace in Congo that 

we should be planning. If you appoint a Presidential envoy, that 

helps to rectify those problem. The envoy should be a high-level individual with experience and relationships in the region who will 

be responsible for developing a unified policy, the step-change we 

are talking about, toward the regional crisis and be able to fully 

invest in helping to deepen this political, this peace process to address its current gaping deficiencies. Such an envoy, we hope, 

would leverage America’s economic, political, and military influence 

to ensure that all parties fully cooperate with the international political process and work closely with the AU and the U.N. and the 

ICGLR. 

The second recommendation is one that everyone seems to be for, 

but it is not happening. That is to get a U.N. envoy out there as 

soon as possible. Everyone is saying that they want this, including, 

we just heard, from Ambassador Carson very encouragingly. But it 

wasn’t in the United Nations Security Council resolution last week. 

The congressional letter that Congresswoman Bass referred to earlier couldn’t be better timed in that regard. Both of these envoys 

will be appointed only, I think, if the Congress stays on this case 

and demands that we see these kinds of things happen. 

The third recommendation—again, I am echoing—we want to 

support robust United Nations sanctions against key people. The 

international community I think is—and this is terribly important 

for the peace process and for forward movement—we are leaving a 

huge reservoir of leverage on the table by not following the recommendations of the U.N. Group of Experts and others. There 

must be accountability for those who have restarted Congo’s war 

and for those who are orchestrating or funding crimes against humanity and war crimes. 

As a responsible supporter of the United Nations sanctions regime, the United States should be compelled to push, to impose 

sanctions on all individuals identified in the U.N. Group of Experts 

final report, and those individuals and entities that are supporting 

the criminal networks, the mafia networks through the trade and 

natural resources. This won’t happen, I do not believe, if Congress 

doesn’t continue to pound away on this issue. So I think progress 

is, in part, in your hands. 

The fourth recommendation I would put forward is the importance, and this was well articulated in the discussion I think between Ambassador Carson and the congresspersons on the panel, 

we need to suspend certain U.S. assistance to any government supporting conflict and obstructing peace. That is military assistance 

for sure, but there are certain categories of bilateral non-military 

assistance, and particularly multilateral assistance, non-humanitarian aid to governments, whoever they are, who are supporting 

a conflict in Eastern Congo. 

Now, for example, if Rwanda and Uganda are found to be continuing their support for M23 and are supporting M23 efforts to obstruct a peace process, progress at the peace table, then corresponding measures should be taken by the U.S., other partner 

governments, and multilateral organizations to which the U.S. contributes huge amounts of American taxpayers’ dollars. Let’s be 

clear about this aid. We don’t want health and education and 

50

microenterprise, the kind of small-scale assistance that goes to the 

people of Rwanda to be stopped. That aid should continue, I believe. But it is the budget support and military assistance, those 

two categories of aid that are critical. And it is the World Bank, 

the World Bank has $135 million on the table right now in budget 

support for the Rwandan Government. That should not be disbursed until we get clear forward movement on the peace process 

in Congo. 

Fifth, and finally, and this one hasn’t been discussed yet, but we 

would call for a high-level summit on responsible investing in the 

Great Lakes. The United States, in partnership with the European 

Union, the African Union, could facilitate an international investment conference on investing in peace mines rather than the conflict minerals that exist today, in order to help expand the pie in 

the region for conflict resolution and for development in which all 

the people of the subregion can benefit, particularly and at the center, the people of the Congo. 

The summit could focus on developing market-based opportunities for responsible investment in Congo and the region. Again, we 

have got to turn those incentives away from illegal, extractive, violent mining, to peaceful, legal development that goes into the tax 

treasury, into the treasury, and funds development in Eastern 

Congo. 

Bob Hormats, an Under Secretary of State in the administration, 

could be a kind of person who could help spearhead that as someone who has helped build this public-private alliance that involves 

companies and the United States Government and civil society, trying to help promote responsible investment, spurred on by 1502 

from the Dodd-Frank law. 

Conclusion, my bottom line is this, in two sentences. A credible, 

internationally driven peace process that deals with the root causes 

and includes broader Eastern Congolese civil society won’t absolutely guarantee peace, but its absence, however, absolutely guarantees war. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Prendergast. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

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77362b-1.eps

Testimony of John Prendergast 

Co-Fonnder, Enongh Project 

House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights 

December 11,2012 

Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass for the opportunity to testify at a 

crucial moment for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

The crisis in eastern Congo continues to deteriorate, threatening to spiral out of control 

into an all-out war involving several neighboring countries. Throughout the latest 

explosion and previous cycles of contlict, the root causes of war are not being and have 

not been addressed, leaving "peace processes" to focus on flimsy power-sharing 

arrangements that have undermined the sovereignty of the Congolese state and the 

professionalism and neutrality of its armed forces. This in tum has left the civil 

population of eastern Congo subjected to globally unparalleled violence, predation, and 

impoverishment Another unrepresentative agreement between powerful interests with 

the biggest guns might ease open fighting momentarily, but it lays a deeper foundation 

for further devastation and state deconstruction. The United States should not be a party 

to such a short-term and destructive approach, and must alter its policy to help avert an 

outcome that simply sews the seeds for further war. 

Drivers of Congolese War Unaddressed 

The lack of a credible, effective, internationally mandated and leveraged peace process 

addressing the escalating war in Congo is becoming a major reason for that war's 

continuation. The current negotiation between the government of the Congo and the M23 

rebels is already making all of the same mistakes as its predecessor processes, and will 

likely result in the same kind of short-term deal that keeps the Congolese government in 

power, reduces international pressure on Rwanda and Uganda for backing the M23, and 

re-dividing the spoils of war. The root causes of structural violence will remain 

unaddressed, and any agreement will lack the involvement of political parties, 

representative civil society elements including women and religious leaders, and local 

armed groups representing the diverse voices and interests of eastern Congo. 

This is the latest chapter of a long story involving competing mafia-like networks 

controlled by leaders in the capitals of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, all of whom wrap 

themselves in national security concerns to mask economic and political interests. 

Sometimes these competing elites tight and sometimes they cooperate for control of 

lucrative land, livestock, mineral, and timber resources. 

The opportunity that the current rebel withdrawal from Goma opens up should not be 

squandered by leaving the resolution of the cont1ict solely to these three governments and 

the anned rebellion that two of them support, ignoring the root causes and the real 

representatives of eastern Congo. The time has come, finally, for a real international 

peace effort, the kind that actually has a chance of ending the deadliest war globally since 

World War ll. 
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77362b-2.eps

The fundamental drivers of conflict are never on the table at the peace talks, and the basic 

recipe of conflict resolution - coming to agreement based on the parties' underlying 

interests - has been missing. It is time to place these issues openly on the table and agree 

on a joint plan to deal with them in a transparent way that leaves room only for peaceful 

development, not war. Getting the parties to agree to discuss these normally taboo issues 

- control of the minerals trade, a political framework, etc. - will also require significant 

outside leverage and the right mediation process. 

Two key pieces of the solution are missing 

First, a shared framework for the future must be agreed upon in which the sub-region -

Congo first and foremost - can benefit much more from peaceful, legal natural resource 

development, rather than violent, illegal extraction. Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank bill, 

a nascent regional certification efJort, initiatives by forward-leaning companies, and new 

OECD guidelines are catalyzing movement in the right direction, but more must be done 

to change the economic incentives from war to peace, just as cleaning up the blood 

diamond trade helped incentivize peace in West Mrican countries. Coupled with strong 

international investment, these efforts will create the conditions for transparent and 

effective governing institutions that tax revenues from legitimate economic operations 

can help build more than foreign aid ever could. Dealing with the economic roots of 

war not only removes the main driver for the conflict but creates the main engine 

for state reconstruction. 

Second, a political framework for Congo must be agreed upon that restores public 

confidence and brings back the viability of the Congolese state, while ensuring that 

further rebellion does not ensue. President Kabila faces a political crisis as a result of the 

failures of the army and the elections, and talks with M23 alone will only erode his 

authority and provide further insult and injury to the Congolese people. It is now time for 

a wider inter-Congolese dialogue, in which leaders from the government, political parties, 

and civil society across Congo actively participate and decide on a national consensus on 

reforms on key issues such as a political framework, decentralization, protection of 

minorities, and the return of refugees. Security sector reform, which is an inherently 

political issue, should also be a central part of the equation, and there are ways of 

beginning it which are low-cost once political agreement and buy-in have been reached. 

Ifhe does not construct such a platform, Kabila may not survive politically. Legitimate 

grievances of M23 negotiators will also be brought in, but should not allow integration of 

wanted war criminals into state institutions, further eroding the rule of law. The initiative 

should be buttressed by also allowing civil society and political parties to help set the 

agenda and put fundamental issues fClf\vard for discussion and agreement. The process 

should be based on key lessons and shortcomings of the first inter-Congolese dialogue. 

By global standards the international effort to construct a credible peace process for 

Congo is manifestly derelict, condemning that country to further cycles of devastating 

conflict. When the curtain is pulled back and one looks behind the occasional United 

Nations Security Council resolution calling simply for an end to violence, the 
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77362b-3.eps

international diplomatic response is revealed to be shockingly ineffective, perhaps even 

violating the Hippocratic Oath: "First, do no harm." Harm has been done through 

agreements that integrate groups led by internationally indicted war criminals into the 

Congolese army, that do not address the exploitative economic arrangements that benefit 

elites in Kigali, Kampala and Kinshasa, and that ignore the broken political institutions 

and processes in eastern Congo that leave the politics of the region totally militarized. 

How the Congo Peace Process Has Been Fatally Flawed 

An entire semester's curriculum could be constructed on Congo as a case study for how 

not to run a peace process. Every item on any cont1ict resolution 101 checklist has been 

violated or neglected. Though there are more, seven of the deadliest sins of Congo's 

peace process follow. 

First, a non-transparent peace initiative has been largely left to the three actors who have 

benefited most from the absence of the rule of law: the leaders of Congo, Rwanda and 

Uganda. Second, in the past these backroom deals have led to short term security 

arrangements which address none of the root causes, with that pattern repeating itself in 

the current effort as the drivers of violence remain untouched. Third, none of the diverse 

stakeholders from civil society, political parties, or even other armed groups have a role 

in the negotiations, effectively silencing the voices of grassroots Congolese. 

Fourth, there is no credible senior mediator who has the gravitas and international 

backing to introduce an agenda that would go beyond short-term deals cut by those with 

the biggest guns. Fifth, there are no expert teams to support what must be protracted 

negotiations over the tough issues, drawing in best practices from other peacemaking 

eiforts around the world. Sixth, there is no internationally coordinated leverage to 

compel intransigent parties to consider compromises, and no effective approach to 

creating real accountability for committing, orchestrating, or funding crimes against 

humanity. Seventh, there are no senior special envoys of the United Nations and United 

States, the absence of which helps widen the vacuum of diplomatic leadership and 

corrode any chance for peace. 

There is no excuse for this sorry state of aifairs. Rectification does not require huge 

amounts of money or wrenchingly divisive moves within the UN Security Council. It 

requires leadership - from the African Union, from the UN Secretary General, and from 

President Obama, who has a strong history of clarity on Congo going back to his days in 

the U. S. Senate when he sponsored legislation that - had it been implemented then -

would have addressed many oftoday's deficiencies. 

The answers to this diplomatic train wreck lie within the lessons of successful peace 

processes that have ended previous African wars. A highly respected senior UN envoy 

should be appointed to work with the African Union envoy in crafting and leading a 

transparent and inclusive peace process. Beyond the Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan 

governments, the initiative should involve anned and unanned representatives from 

throughout eastern Congo, in particular civil society and political party officials, to 
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77362b-4.eps

ensure that any agreement might have the buy-in of a wide swathe of stakeholders. Key 

regional governments such as South Africa and Angola must also be involved to help 

build leverage for a solution. A senior US Special Envoy should be appointed to support 

the mediation and better organize international leverage opportunities, including UN 

sanctions and war crimes accountability. 

Time for a Credible Internationally Supported Congo Peace Process 

A peace process for Congo must be constructed in which - for the first time ever - root 

causes are addressed and the broad and diverse constituencies and interests of eastern 

Congo have a voice in the solutions. Creative approaches to incentivizing the peaceful 

and legal development of Congo's natural resource sector that draw upon best practices 

from successful cases should be at the basis of any agreement, along with political 

arrangements that are more inclusive and decentralized than anything that has come 

before. 

A credible international process doesn't guarantee peace. Its absence, however, 

guarantees further war. 

The United States has an opportunity to help break the cycle of viol ence that has 

devastated eastern Congo and destabilized the wider Great Lakes region for the last 15 

years, but it will require far greater attention from senior policymakers, a step-change in 

our diplomatic engagement in the region, and concentrated focus on areas of US 

leverage, especially efforts to transform the trade in natural resources from a driver of 

violence into a catalyst for regional peace. 

Therefore, I strongly recommend that the United States urgently take the following 

actions in support of peace in the Congo: 

Appoint a Presidential Envoy: The current US. policy structure does not allow 

the U.S. to exercise fully its latent leverage, creativity and coordinating function 

with respect to supporting peace in Congo. Appointing a Presidential Envoy 

would help rectify that. The Envoy should be a high-level individual with 

experience and relationships in the region who would be responsible for 

developing a unified policy toward the regional crisis and be able to fully invest in 

helping to widen and deepen the peace process to address its gaping deiiciencies. 

Such an Envoy would leverage America's economic, political, and military 

int1uence to ensure that all parties fully cooperate with an international political 

process, and also work closely with the current AU Envoy and a proposed UN 

Envoy. 

Call for a UN Envoy to the Great Lakes: The current peace initiative sponsored 

by ICGLR lacks internationally coordinated leverage and strong external voices 

that can help ensure that the real drivers of cont1ict are eventually addressed 

within a political framework. The UN should playa major role in this. 

Therefore, the United States should work within the UN Security Council to 
55


77362b-5.eps

ensure the appointment of a high-level envoy to work with the TCGLR and the 

AU to build a credible international political process that addresses the continual 

cycles of vi 01 ence and regional interference. 

Support robust UN Sanctions: The international community is leaving a huge 

reservoir ofleverage on the table by not following the recommendations of the 

UN Group of Experts and others. There must be accountability for those who 

have restarted Congo's war, and those who are orchestrating or funding war 

crimes and crimes against humanity. As a responsible supporter of the UN 

sanctions regime, the United States should push to impose sanctions on all 

individuals identified in the UN Group of Experts final report and those 

individuals and entities supporting criminal networks through the trade in natural 

resources, one of the main but unspoken drivers and motivations of the current 

round of conflict. 

Suspend certain U.S. assistance to any government supporting conflict and 

obstructing peace: The United States should cut all military assistance and 

suspend certain categories of bilateral and multilateral non-humanitarian aid to 

any government continuing to support conflict in eastern Congo. For example, if 

the Rwandan and Ugandan governments are found to be continuing their support 

for M23 and are supporting M23 efforts to obstruct progress at the negotiating 

table, then corresponding measures should be taken by the U.S., other partner 

governments, and multilateral organizations to which the US. contributes 

substantial American taxpayer dollars. Such steps are crucial to encouraging all 

parties to engage constructively in a comprehensive political process. 

Call a high-level summit on responsible investment in the Great Lakes 

region. As part of any comprehensive peace deal that addresses root causes, the 

US. could be very helpful in ensuring implementation. In that regard, the United 

States, in partnership with the European Union, could facilitate an international 

investment conference on "Investment in peace mines in the Great Lakes: an 

engine for development," in order to help expand the pie in the region for conf1ict 

resolution and development. The summit would focus on developing marketbased opportunities for responsible investment in Congo and the region. 

Critically, it would involve investors, who have been missing from the 

discussions on building a responsible minerals trade in Congo. 

Removing the Economic Fuel for War 

There will be no peace in Congo as long as ruthless interests can make immense profits 

from the extraction of minerals and other natural resources with the connivance of 

regional governments. Corrupt Congolese ot1icials have no interest in justice or army 

refoTIn because they reap windfalls from mafia-like smuggling and land grabbing. It will 

take an effort to change market incentives similar to the one that ended the blood 

diamonds wars elsewhere in Mrica. 
56


77362b-6.eps

Rwanda's post-genocide economic miracle has benetited from huge exports of smuggled 

Congolese tin and tantalum. Influential Ugandans enrich themselves through major illicit 

Congolese gold exports. This ensures that eastern Congo remains at the mercy of armed 

groups and their criminal business partners allied with Kinshasa, Kigali or Kampala. As 

with all matias, sometimes these competing groups fight, sometimes they cooperate. 

After the passage of the Dodd-Frank legislation that requires companies to disclose 

whether they source minerals from contlict areas, war profits from the 3 T minerals have 

decreased by 65 percent, as it has become increasingly difficult to sell untraceable 

minerals on the global marketplace. Several reforms by Congo and industry have also 

emerged, including the Great Lakes region developing a certification process for minerals 

and Congo kicking out several Chinese companies that were smuggling minerals. But 

much of these processes are nascent, and the vested interests in the rotting status quo 

remain strong. 

A new cooperative framework betw·een regional states is not about rewarding aggressors 

with the spoils of war, as in former French President Nicholas Sarkozy' s earlier plan. 

Instead, it is about expanding the economic pie through negotiating a framework and a 

forum for greatly increased investment in Congolese development. Congo's resources 

would still be Congo's, and Rwanda's would still be Rwanda's, but cross-border 

cooperation will need to be better defined, and new mine and oil concessions would be 

opened up under a new, transparent framework for both international and regional 

investors, and requirements would be put in place to have the resources processed in the 

region in order to add value for all parties, especially the Congolese. This way, there 

would be both regional and private sector buy-in to Great Lakes resources as an engine 

for peace. Based on lessons from cases such as Nigeria-Sao Tome, each country would 

benefit much more from a transparent, certified trade that would also build each country's 

capacity for adding value to minerals and oil through processing. This investment has 

suddenly become a new possibility because of the vastly increased corporate spotlight on 

the region following recent regional and international minerals transparency reforms. 

In addition to the sanctions and international investment conference outlined above, there 

is a need to close the smuggling loopholes that allow contlict minerals to filter through, 

albeit in lower amounts. To that end, the U.S. should strongly urge Congo and Rwanda to 

finalize an Independent Mineral Chain Auditor to act as an independent monitor on 

minerals trading and support the Auditor's team. 

From the perspective of the Enough Project, reducing violence and enacting political and 

military reform in Congo is not possible without stamping out the illegal trade in contlict 

minerals and the environment of impunity for those involved. The United States, as 

home to the largest end-user companies of contlict minerals and as a powerful diplomatic 

actor in Africa's Great Lakes region, has a choice whether to exercise leadership and help 

further efforts to legitimize Congo's mineral sector in the east of that country. 

Internationalizing the Peace Process 
57


77362b-7.eps

Tn September 2012, the United Nations held a special high level meeting on the crisis in 

the Great Lakes on the sidelines of the General Assembly that was chaired by Secretary 

General Ban Ki-moon and attended by both heads of state from Congo and Rwanda. This 

meeting resulted in the UN. recommending the exploration of joint UN and A.U 

initiative to address the contlict in eastern Congo. The African Union has recently 

appointed a new Special Representative to the Region, former head of the A.U mission 

to Somalia, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, of Mali. 

In light of the spike in international engagement in the region, the current situation 

presents a new opportunity to bring conf1icting parties and stakeholders together to 

embark on a broader process that seeks to address the roots of conf1ict in the region. 

Given the long history of violence and mistrust among the core states, it is dit1icult to see 

a solution reached through only regional mechanisms such as the ICGLR, particularly 

while Uganda holds the rotating chair. Therefore, regional efforts to resolve this conflict 

must be coupled with international efforts from ajoint UN. and A.U. initiative that can 

draw conflicting parties to the negotiating table in good faith and sustain a process that 

addresses both the short term and long term issues that perpetuate the cycle of conflict in 

eastern Congo. 

In a region so shaped by the personas of its leaders-some of whom have been in power 

for decades-finding the right person and process to engage reluctant parties is critical. 

One path towards a viable process might be to create a mediating mechanism, 

spearheaded by both the newly appointed U.N. Envoy and the existing A.U envoy. 

Another idea might be to create a panel similar to the A.U. High Implementation Panel, 

or AlJHIP, on Sudan, currently working to facilitate negotiations relating to South 

Sudan's independence from Sudan in July 2011 over oil, security, citizenship, assets, and 

their common border. 

However, the first and arguably most important step is to find an individual who has the 

trust and relationships with the key leaders in the region. This U.N. Envoy must have the 

skills and stature to bring these parties to the table and move them toward a durable 

agreement. He or she should have a deep understanding of the regional history and 

dynamics in play, and the time and ability to work with the lCGLR and the AU to direct a 

process that in all likelihood could take years to oversee to completion. 

Conclusion 

One of the most important factors in creating peace will be the international mediation 

process mandated with ending the war. How the process is structured and the identity of 

the mediator who will help lead it will determine whether there is a chance for lasting 

peace. Significant decisions await the international community. A more active 

international role will rume regional feathers and have no guarantee of success. But 

without such a robust effort, there can be no chance at achieving a lasting peace. 
58

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Dizolele. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MVEMBA DIZOLELE, PETER J. DUIGNAN 

DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, 

STANFORD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

members of the Subcommittee on Africa, thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee. I come before you 

as a Congolese and concerned U.S. citizen. The views I express 

today in the statement are mine and mine alone. 

This important hearing comes at yet another critical time for the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and I would like to commend 

you for your interest in my home country. 

Congo is too big to fail, and the U.S. should care today for the 

same strategic and security reasons it did during the Cold War. 

With its mineral and other natural wealth, DRC is the equivalent 

of the world’s breadbasket of critical resources. At this time of Chinese scramble for resources, we cannot stand idle and let Uganda 

and Rwanda destabilize the heart of Africa. Measured in human 

lives, the cost of their military adventurism, which has indirectly 

killed over 6 million Congolese, now rivals King Leopold’s holocaust. Ironically, Rwandan President Paul Kagame blames King 

Leopold for the current crisis. 

Substantial U.S. military assistance to Rwanda and Uganda, and 

Washington’s reluctance to denounce and stop the support for these 

regimes, makes the U.S. an accomplice to the tragedy. 

Today the greatest challenge and obstacle to resolving the crisis 

in Congo is neither the confusing alphabet soup of militia names, 

nor the lack of engagement of the international community. Rather, 

it is the lack of understanding of the drivers and dynamics of the 

conflict that stands between policymakers like yourselves and the 

right prescriptions. 

For two decades the policy discourse on DRC has been defined 

by a narrative that focuses on the ramification of the problem, such 

as ethnic identity, citizenship issues, sexual violence, looting of natural resources, but ignores the root causes of the crisis. While the 

problem is often viewed as a humanitarian disaster, which it is, 

DRC is paralyzed by a political crisis which requires political solutions and that is where you can have the greatest impact. 

Congo has been muddling through a series of crises for nearly 

two decades. The causes, of course, are well known: An inept government with a weak leadership, no articulated vision, no legitimacy after the botched 2011 election, lack of capacity to resist or 

contain predatory designs of neighbors, i.e., Rwanda, Uganda, and 

Angola, proliferation of armed groups, and an underachieving and 

over-politicized U.N. peacekeeping mission. 

This cocktail of problems is topped by an apathetic diplomatic 

community motivated by short-term interests of the countries it 

represents, rather than the long-term stabilization of Congo and 

Central Africa. 

The M23 rebellion is to be understood through this optic. As the 

M23 crisis enters a new phase with the withdrawal of the rebels 

from the battered city of Goma, the people of North Kivu and their 

fellow Congolese citizens everywhere wonder whether the storm 

59

has passed or the rebels’ retreat represents the quiet before a super 

storm. Either way, telltale signs and history indicate that the conflict will continue unless appropriate deterring measures are taken. 

M23—like its precursor, the CNDP of Laurent Nkunda—and the 

dozen armed groups roaming the hills of eastern provinces, expose 

Congo as a dysfunctional state with weak political leadership and 

lacking a competent army and security institutions. With the failing of the state, old latent community grievances stemming from 

land disputes, demographic pressure, ethnic tensions, and control 

of resources and trading routes has turned Eastern Congo into a 

tinderbox. This means that ambitious war entrepreneurs and 

demagogues only need a cause and find a sponsor—it can be a community, a business, political elite or a state—to start a militia. 

The M23, which is primarily a Tutsi mono-ethnic armed group, 

sought to exploit these dormant grievances, citing discrimination 

against Tutsis as one reason for the rebellion, but they failed to 

generate support from important Tutsi communities, such as the 

Banyamulenge who have so far refused to join M23. Instead, the 

Banyamulenge are serving with the DRC Army and fighting the rebellion. 

The rebellion had also threatened to take over Goma and march 

on Kinshasa and liberate the DRC. But when Goma fell to M23 elements, spontaneous protests broke out in Bukavu, in Kisangani, 

and Kinshasa, denouncing Kinshasa’s failure to protect the city and 

exposing even a greater ire against the rebellion and the United 

Nations Stabilization Mission, MONUSCO. 

While it may be too early to draw meaningful conclusions, M23’s 

failure to rally other Tutsis who had previously presented a common front may signal the beginning of a new era of trust building 

between ethnic groups. After two Presidential and legislative elections that empowered the Congolese to seek change through the 

ballot instead of at the barrel of the gun, M23 has no popular appeal. 

But the highly controversial and contested 2011 Presidential and 

legislative elections eroded the legitimacy of President Kabila, 

making it impossible for the government to mobilize the masses in 

this time of crisis. 

M23 rebellion further exacerbated the legitimacy crisis by exposing the state’s inability to protect its citizens. The government has 

failed to build a professional army, perhaps the single most important element in ensuring Congo’s territorial integrity, and the security of its citizens and coveted natural resources. 

Without such a competent military, DRC is unable to stop the 

proliferation of militias. Instead, the Government of DRC has chosen to compromise with militiamen and co-opt them into the army 

with no disruption of their ranks and files. The lack of an adequate 

military integration program has resulted in the establishment of 

parallel commands and structures in the national army. This 

means that the militias who join the national army remain in their 

areas of control and keep their command nearly intact. This arrangement allows the former militiamen to perpetrate abuses on 

the civilian populations and keep their access to local resources, all 

under the protection of the Congolese military uniform. This integration model enabled disgruntled ex-CNDP elements stationed in 

60

North and South Kivu to mutiny and launch M23 when DRC ironically sought to arrest their commander, General Bosco Ntaganda. 

The predatory designs of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda also 

fuel the volatile situation as we have heard before. Both Rwanda 

and Uganda invaded Congo twice, with continued incursions into 

Eastern Congo where they still support militias. Several U.N. reports, as we heard Steve Hege say a few minutes ago, have linked 

both countries to Congolese militias and the looting of resources. 

And of course, now they are linked to M23. 

Both countries have denied the charges and insist that they are 

wrongfully accused and used as scapegoats for the DRC Government’s failures. Their denial and deceit, however, undermine the 

chances for lasting peace. It is impossible to solve the crisis when 

the parties to the conflict refuse to assume their share of responsibility. When you invade your neighbor twice, arm militias, support 

rebellions, loot its resources, and indirectly cause the death of over 

6 million Congolese, you are not a scapegoat. You are a serious 

problem. 

So we know the primary supporters of the militias, and whether 

they be in Congo or in neighboring countries or overseas. We also 

know the primary routes of the illicit export routes, and which 

neighbors profit from. So what should the U.S. do? I think that is 

probably what is of most interest to you. Number one, we need to 

unequivocally support security sector reform for the reasons we 

have heard today, from my colleagues and from the Assistant Secretary. Reform is long overdue. But reform means serious commitment to rebuilding a new army, and not cobbling together old militias and new units. Millions of dollars have been invested in training, but not enough attention has been devoted to the reconstruction of the military. 

Unfortunately, these initiatives amount to very expensive window-dressing. For instance, the Belgian-trained elite units that 

fought M23 early in the spring did not receive the institutional 

support they needed to succeed in their mission. U.S. AFRICOM 

has also trained a unit which could have made a positive contribution in North Kivu in another context, had the leadership and the 

structure been different. 

The current broken military structure cannot absorb newly 

trained units effectively. Real military reform requires that we 

break down the old decrepit foundation and build a new army from 

scratch. And such a reform process will phase out and discharge 

top commanders who came from militias, as well as former militiamen who now fill the ranks. We cannot put new wine in old vases. 

They will break. 

So, number two, we need to implement U.S. law. The Congolese, 

like many other people in the world, look up to the U.S. as a beacon of principles and leadership. There is a law passed by thenSenator Barack Obama, we have mentioned that already, called 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act. This bill includes provisions on conflict minerals, sexual violence, sanctions on armed groups and their state 

sponsors, and so far, we have hardly scratched the surface of this 

law. It still baffles people. It definitely baffles the Congolese. 

61

Number three, we need to activate the State Department Reward 

to Justice Program. I think we need to encourage associates of militias who are trying to get out of the system to turn on their colleagues who are keeping them in the system. It is very much like 

a gang mentality where once you are in, it becomes very difficult 

to get out, especially if that is based on ethnic affiliation. 

Number four, we need to apply sanctions against individuals and 

institutions identified in the reports. I commend the U.S. Government and the Congress for the recent initiative to sanction leaders 

of M23, but it will not serve the intended purpose. If we sanction 

Makenga, we sanction Bosco Ntaganda or anybody else and will 

not sanction the backers in Rwanda or Uganda or where else they 

may be, then the game will continue. If Makenga becomes a burden, he will be replaced. When Nkunda became a burden, he was 

arrested and replaced with Bosco. So tomorrow it will be somebody 

else, and I think we cannot act like we are doing something 

impactful when in fact we are just, again, doing window dressing 

like with security sector reform. 

And then number five, we need to push for the completion of the 

electoral process and opening of the political space. We have talked 

about Rwanda and Uganda, but the big elephant really is 

Kinshasa. Eastern Congo often is discussed as if it were a country. 

Eastern Congo is not a country, it is part of a larger country called 

Congo. The crisis that is taking place in the Kivus in Eastern 

Congo has its roots in Kinshasa, in the failure of that leadership. 

For the last 5 years, from 2006–2011, the Congolese have been 

emboldened by the electoral process. We have not stood, we, meaning the international community, have not stood up with the Congolese to fight that. 

We need to open that process so that the botched electoral system would move forward. We need to support the holding of the 

municipal and provincial elections. At this point, both the national 

senate and the Electoral Commission are serving without any mandate. So until that happens, we have a system that has no legitimacy. 

Then last, we need to insist on the restructuring of the Independent National Electoral Commission. They are part of the problem. We looked the other way when the system was botched. We 

cannot move on without this change. This is why President Kabila 

cannot really speak with the backing of his people. This is why 

when people riot against M23, they also automatically riot against 

Kabila, and that cannot continue. 

Then, finally, I would like simply to say that this conflict has 

gone on too long. It has gone on too long. It challenges now our 

morals and principles as a country. We cannot talk about democracy, we cannot be outraged about sexual violence when, in fact, we 

are not taking the steps to stop this. In Congo, armed groups and 

their international and local backers are the enemies. But there is 

an even greater enemy, and the greater enemy is the Congolese 

Government in its failures. It is also the Congolese army, which 

itself is a big tapestry of different militias. When you are in Congo 

and you see, if you want to talk about insecurity, I define insecurity as the feeling you get in your gut when you see somebody in 

uniform in front of you. Thank you very much. 

62

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Dizolele, thank you so very much for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]


77362d-1.eps

The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo 

The United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights 

Testimony by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele 

Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace 

Tuesday, December 11,2012 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass and Members of the 

Subcommittee on Africa: 

Thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee. I 

come before you as a Congolese and concerned U.S. citizen. The views 

expressed in this statement are mine, and mine alone. 

This important hearing comes at yet another critical time for the 

Democratic Republic of Congo and I commend you for your interest in my 

home country. 

Congo is too big to fail and the U.S. should care today for the same 

strategic and security reasons it did during the Cold War. With its mineral 

and other natural wealth, DRC is the equivalent of the world's breadbasket 

of critical resources. At this time of Chinese scramble for resources, we 

cannot stand idle and let Uganda and Rwanda destabilize the heart of 

Africa. Measured in human lives, the cost of their military adventurism, 

which has indirectly killed over 6 million Congolese, now rivals King 

Leopold's holocaust. Ironically, Rwandan President Paul Kagame blames 

King Leopold for the current crisis. Substantial U.S. military assistance to 
63


77362d-2.eps

Rwanda and Uganda, and Washington's reluctance to denounce and stop 

its support to these regimes, make the u.s. an accomplice to the tragedy. 

Today the greatest challenge and obstacle to resolving the crisis in Congo is 

neither the confusing alphabet soup of militia names nor the lack of 

engagement of the international community. Rather it is the lack of 

understanding of the drivers and dynamics of the conflict that stands 

between policymakers and the right prescriptions. 

For the past two decades, the policy discourse on DRC has been defined by 

a narrative that focuses on the ramifications of the problem, such as ethnic 

identity, citizenship, sexual violence and the looting of natural resources, 

but ignores the root causes of crisis. As we fail to define the Congo crisis 

correctly, it becomes nearly impossible to solve the problem. While the 

problem is often viewed as a humanitarian disaster, DRC is paralyzed by a 

political crisis, which requires political solutions. That is where you can 

have the greatest impact. 

Congo has been muddling through a series of crises for nearly two 

decades. The causes are well-known: An inept government with a weak 

leadership, no articulated vision and no legitimacy after the botched 2011 

election, lack of capacity to resist or contain predatory designs of neighbors 

(Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola), proliferation of armed groups, and an 

underachieving and over-politicized U.N. peacekeeping mission. This 

cocktail of problems is topped by an apathetic diplomatic community 

motivated by short-term interests of the countries it represents, rather than 

the long-term stabilization of Congo and Central Africa. 

The M23 rebellion is to be understood through this optic. As the M23 crisis 

enters a new phase with the withdrawal of rebels from the battered city of 

Goma, the people of North Kivu and their fellow Congolese citizens 

everywhere wonder whether the storm has passed or the rebels' retreat 

represents the quiet before a super storm. Either way, telltale signs and 

2 
64


77362d-3.eps

history indicate that the conflict will continue unless appropriate deterring 

measures are taken. 

The M23 (like its precursor, Laurent Nkunda's Congn?s National pour la 

Defense du Peuple (CNDP)) and the dozen armed groups roaming the hills 

of the eastern provinces expose Congo as a dysfunctional state with weak 

political leadership and lacking a competent army and security institutions. 

For the past decade, DRC government has failed to restore state authority 

over its territory, enabling the proliferation of armed groups, which recruit 

children, systematically rape women, and loot mineral resources. As was 

the case with CNDP, M23 receives material support from Rwanda and 

Uganda. To-date the conflict, which is the subject of new reports by a 

United Nations Group of Experts, has displaced nearly two million 

civilians both internally and outside the DRC. 

With the failing of Congolese state power, old, latent community 

grievances stemming from land disputes, demographic pressures, ethnic 

tensions, and control of resources and trading routes has turned eastern 

Congo into a tinderbox. Ambitious war entrepreneurs and demagogues 

only need to embrace a cause and find a sponsor - a community, business 

or political elite or a state - to start a militia. 

M23, which is primarily a Tutsi mono-ethnic armed group, sought to 

exploit these dormant grievances, citing discrimination against Tutsis as 

one reason for the rebellion. But they failed to generate support from 

important Tutsi communities, such as the Banyamulenge who have so far 

refused to join M23. Instead the Banyamulenge are serving with DRC army 

and fighting the rebellion. The rebellion had threatened to take over Goma, 

march on to Kinshasa and liberate DRC. But when Goma fell to M23 

elements, spontaneous protests broke out in Bukavu, Kisangani and 

Kinshasa, denouncing Kinshasa's failure to protect the city and expressing 

ire against the rebellion and the United Nations Stabilization Mission 

(MONUSCO). 

3 
65


77362d-4.eps

While it may be too early to draw meaningful conclusions, M23's failure to 

rally other Tutsis, who had previously presented a common front may 

signal the beginning of a new era of trust-building between ethnic groups. 

After two presidential and legislative elections that empowered the 

Congolese to seek change through the ballot, M23 has no popular appeal. 

But the highly controversial and contested 2011 presidential and legislative 

elections eroded the legitimacy of President Kabila, making it impossible 

for the government to mobilize the masses in this time of crisis. M23 

rebellion further exacerbated the legitimacy crisis by exposing the state's 

inability to protect its citizens. The government has failed to build a 

professional army, perhaps the single most important element in ensuring 

Congo's territorial integrity and the security of its citizens and coveted 

natural resources. 

Without such a competent professional military, DRC is unable to stop the 

proliferation of militias. Instead, the government of DRC has chosen to 

compromise with militiamen and co-opt them into the national army with 

no disruption of their ranks and files. The lack of an adequate national 

integration program has resulted in the establishment of parallel 

commands and structures within the national army. This means that the 

militias who join the national army remain in their areas of control and 

keep their command nearly intact. This arrangement allows the "former" 

militiamen to perpetrate abuses on the civilian populations and keep their 

access to local resources all under the protection of a Congolese military 

uniform. This integration model enabled disgruntled ex-CNDP elements 

stationed in North and South Kivu to mutiny and launch M23 when DRC 

sought to arrest their commander General Bosco Ntaganda in early spring. 

The predatory designs of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda also fuel the 

volatile situation. Both Rwanda and Uganda have invaded Congo twice, 

with continued incursions into eastern Congo where they still support 

4 
66


77362d-5.eps

militias. Several UN reports have linked both cOW1tries to Congolese 

militias and the looting of resources. Recent reports document their 

support to M23. 

Both coW1tries have denied the charges and insist they are wrongfully used 

as escape goats for DRC government failures. Their denial and deceit, 

however, W1dermine the chances for lasting peace. It is impossible to solve 

the crisis when the parties to the conflict refuse to assume their share of 

responsibility. When you invade your neighbor twice, arm militias and 

support rebellions, loot its resources and indirectly cause the death of over 

6 million Congolese, you are not an escape goat, you are a serious problem. 

We know the primary supporters of militias, whether in Congo, in 

neighboring cOW1tries or overseas. We also know the primary illicit export 

routes and which neighbors profit from this trade. 

What should the U.S. do? 

1. Unequivocally Support Security Sector Reform: 

This reform is long overdue. The Congolese people want and deserve 

peace. We should empower them to that end. DRC government's inability 

to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on 

everything else. A competent, professional military - organized, resourced, 

trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, 

recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic 

growth or the trade in conflict minerals. 

Reform means a serious commitment to rebuilding a new army and not 

cobbling together old militias and new units. Millions of dollars have been 

invested in training, but not enough attention has been devoted to the 

reconstruction of the military. UnfortW1ately, these initiatives amoW1t to 

very expensive window-dressing. For instance, the Belgian-trained elite 

units that fought M23 early in the spring did not receive the institutional 

support they needed to succeed in their mission. U.S. Africom has also 

5 
67


77362d-6.eps

trained a unit, which could have made a positive contribution in North 

Kivu in another context. The current broken military structure cannot 

absorb new professionally-trained units effectively. Real military reform 

requires that we break down the old, decrepit foundation and build a new 

army from scratch. Such a reform process will phase out and discharge top 

commanders who came from militias as well as former militiamen who 

now fill the ranks. 

In partnership with DRC, the U.S. should lead the coordination efforts 

among donors to generate greater political will to reflect the international 

community's commitment to real reform within the year 2013. Most 

importantly, U.S. technical know-how and assistance are needed in 

training commanders and non-commissioned officers. 

2. Implement U.S. law: 

As a senator, earlier in his career, and a member of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, President Barack Obama worked successfully with 

Republicans to pass the Democratic Republic of Congo Relief, Securihj and 

Democracy Promotion Act that was signed into law by President George W. 

Bush. 

The bill includes specific proVISIOns on conflict minerals and sexual 

violence; sanctions on armed groups and their state-sponsors; and support 

for democracy. Section 105 of the Obama law authorizes the secretary of 

state to withhold some assistance from a foreign country if she determines 

that the foreign government is taking actions to destabilize the DRC. 

Obama's six-year-old law is still the only official policy the U.S. has on the 

books for dealing with the Congo crisis. 

3. Activate the State Department Reward to Justice Program: 

This is an effective way to encourage the arrest of individuals who are 

wanted by the international justice for crimes committed in DRC. Knowing 

6 
68


77362d-7.eps

that they could be turned in to law enforcement by their associates for a 

bounty would increase pressure on criminals. 

4. Apply sanctions against individuals and institutions identified in 

reports: 

The current sanction regime singles out militia leaders, but leaves their 

backers and sponsors free to pursue their criminal enterprises. The 

Treasury Department, State Department and other relevant entities should 

apply sanctions against those officials and entities that are mentioned as 

primary planners, supporters or instigators of militias and rebellions in 

DRC, regardless of nationality or affiliation. 

5. Push for Completion of Electoral Process and Opening of Political 

Space: 

Political space has been restricted as a result of the botched 2011. 

Municipal and provincial elections have been delayed, adding to the 

legitimacy crisis. Provincial assembly members who were elected in 2006 

are now serving with no mandate. Members of the national senate are in 

similar situation as they are elected by provincial assemblies. Without these 

elections, members of the national senate and provincial assemblies will 

continue to serve unconstitutionally as their mandate expired in March 

2012. 

6. Insist on the Restructuring of the Independent National Electoral 

Commission: 

Opposition parties and international election observer missions have asked 

that the commissioners be dismissed as they contributed to the current 

crisis and lack credibility. The lack of commitment to a fair, transparent 

and credible process on the part of international community contributed to 

the 2011 electoral fiasco. The Electoral Commission in its current form and 

7 
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composition remains an obstacle to the resolution of the legitimacy crisis. 

Donors, such as the U.S., should insist on this change as it is one of the first 

steps to restoring the credibility of the electoral system. 

This conflict has gone on for too long, and challenges our principles and 

ideals. As we struggle to solve this calamity we would be better served by 

looking into Congo's early history. 

Between 1885 and 1924, Congo, then known as Congo Free State or the 

private estate of Belgium's King Leopold II, was the theater of yet another 

holocaust driven not by mineral exploitation, but by the world's hunger for 

a commodity. The industrial revolution demanded rubber and more of it. 

Business' insatiable need for rubber and King Leopold's immeasurable 

greed pushed the Belgians to design one of the world's most repressive 

forced-labor structures. 

The King's agents established a quota system, which required that each 

village produce a specific amount of rubber over a time period. Force 

Publique troops were then used to enforce the quota and demand taxes of 

the population. Failure to meet the quota or tax requirements led soldiers 

to chop off limbs of the unlucky Congolese who fell below the mark. 

Villages were torched, women raped and the people left to starve to death 

or die of diseases. By 1924, nearly 10 million Congolese had perished under 

the yoke of the Leopoldian regime. 

The similarity to the current situation is eerie. Like the conflict minerals, 

which are primarily exploited in the east, rubber was only exploited in 

some areas of the Congo Free State. Both problems were symptoms of 

larger systemic and regime perversions that subjugated an entire country. 

But there is a big difference between the approach the activists took to 

expose and denounce King Leopold's crimes and the way we choose to 

deal with the calamity today. 

8 
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77362d-9.eps

At a time when there was no computer, no internet, no fax and the 

telephone was still a curious invention, a shipping clerk in Liverpool 

decided to expose the mighty king and launched a campaign that would 

not end until Leopold relinquished possession of the colony and the regime 

and the system changed. 

Working under great stress, members of the Congo Reform Movement 

could have easily chosen the easy route to fundraising on behalf of the 

victims, and send them medicine and physicians to mend their wounds. 

Such a timid campaign would have made them Leopold's tacit accomplices 

and enablers, and prolong the suffering of the Congolese. Instead, they set 

out to destroy and change the repressive system and took the necessary 

time to accomplish their goal. 

Today, at a time of instant satellite imagery, internet, instant messaging 

and other technological advances, our engagement is lackluster, and 

devoid of moral courage in the face of the wmecessary suffering of the 

Congolese. We hedge our action and refuse to see the reality before us by 

covering our faces like little children, hoping it would go away. Instead, we 

search for enemies where they do not exist. 

Earlier this year in April, over 300 Congolese civil society organizations 

and their international counterparts showed great courage and published a 

report on security sector reform in Congo. This report calls for an end to 

the conflict through a comprehensive reform of security institutions, which 

include the military, law enforcement institutions such as the police and 

the courts, as well as customs and revenue agencies. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit a copy of that 

report for the record. 

In Congo, armed groups and their international and local backers are the 

enemies. Still, the Congolese army in its present form is arguably an even 

9 
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77362d-10.eps

bigger threat to the population than the smaller militias. If we are serious 

about DRC, we should target these dangerous groups and help restore 

state authority so that the Congolese government can finally meet its 

obligations toward the people. This means that together we need to work 

on ending impunity at all levels of the polity. 

As long as the government is incapable to impose its authority and address 

the various grievances, the Congo will not know peace. 

Thank you. 

10 
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Mr. SMITH. All three of your testimonies were extraordinarily incisive, certainly timely, and prescribed a way forward for the administration as well as for Congress, so for that, our subcommittee 

is deeply grateful for your presence here today and for sharing with 

us not only your understanding of the situation on the ground but 

what ought to be done perhaps to truly rectify it. 

I think the emphasis on root causes couldn’t be more timely as 

well. I will never forget years ago, in the early days of the war in 

Yugoslavia, I, along with Congressman Frank Wolf, went to 

Vukovar and other places in Croatia after it had been devastated, 

and then we went to Belgrade and met with Slobodan Milosevic 

and others within that dictatorial government of his, and I will 

never forget getting a map of a greater Serbia that included Bosnia 

and Croatia, and the lack of understanding on all of our part about 

what the end game was was appalling. We thought this was something that would abate over a short period of time, and I think, Mr. 

Hege, your point about the key goal of establishing an autonomous 

state is largely underappreciated, and perhaps our other two distinguished witnesses might want to speak about that. You point 

out that Rwanda’s deeply ingrained federalist vision is born out of 

the geopolitical regional strategy adopted by Kigali’s leadership. A 

federal autonomous state for the Eastern Congo would cement and 

guarantee Rwanda’s already extensive influence over military, political, economic, and cultural aspects of life. 

And I think that is underappreciated almost in the extreme as 

to the why of it. We know the mineral wealth is an engraved invitation to looters and thieves, you know, to do what they do, but 

this idea that it is part of the government’s overall strategy, perhaps you as well as our other very distinguished witnesses might 

want to elaborate on. 

Mr. HEGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the question of the 

Rwandan strategy for creating or spawning an autonomous state 

for the Eastern Congo, a few things that I would like to mention 

as well in terms of timing. Some of my colleagues here have mentioned the cyclical nature and the numbers of wars that have taken 

place in Eastern Congo. It appears that the Rwandan backers of 

M23, the real masterminds that orchestrated the creation of the rebellion were looking toward the post-electoral period precisely for 

the reasons that Mvemba described, the discredited 2011 Presidential elections as a period where they would be able to mobilize 

an eastern common front against a delegitimized Kinshasa and 

President Kabila himself. This was certainly a part of their calculations about why to push for this now. 

Also the question of the CNDP’s cycles of impunity and the fact 

that the international community was increasingly resistant to allowing their capacity to control parallel chains of command to have 

access, unfettered access to illegal trade in natural resources. They 

understood that this was a time in which that, those networks 

could be curtailed, that Kinshasa could attempt to curtail them, 

and that they would need to capitalize on that, on those assets before any of those individuals were eventually redeployed out of the 

Kivus or in the case of Bosco Ntaganda that he would have been 

arrested himself. 

73

The third element that I think that they took into account in preparing this strategy, because it was quite well prepared, we have 

extensive evidence that shows Makenga himself back all the way 

in 2011 was amassing huge amounts of weapons at his home and 

in numerous arms caches in preparation for a return to war precisely after the elections, but the Rwandans also understood that 

there was a generalized Congo fatigue, as it is often described, that 

there is a sentiment that Congo is sort of always a mess. President 

Kagame, I have been told by Rwandan diplomats, likes to say that 

the Congo has been a mess before he was born and will be a mess 

infinitely or indefinitely. 

Certainly within the U.N., there are member states that are 

questioning the strategy on the Congo, how long can they continue 

to foot the bill for a peacekeeping mission which is so costly, and 

should we start to think of more radical solutions, definitive longterm solutions for the Eastern Congo and whether the current governance structure is a viable one. I think that Rwanda felt that 

that was a right period to push for this, and that unfortunately 

their success on the battlefield recently would likely embolden 

them to continue to drive for this end game, and any other issues, 

smokescreen issues on the table in political talks would only prolong this process until they can get to that key and core issue. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I want to add to what Steve said and then 

Mvemba will have something, too, of course. I will do my three 

points: Security interests, economic interests, and political interests 

that the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda have in Eastern 

Congo and why there continues to be intervention, both direct and 

indirect, by the neighboring governments in Eastern Congo. 

Security first. Rwanda has been legitimately concerned over the 

last 18 years since 1994 about the possible strengthening of the 

FDLR. They want to ensure without any doubt that the FDLR cannot come back and threaten Rwanda. And then in that context, 

can’t allow a strong Congolese state that might provide support to 

the FDLR. For the Ugandans, they will say it is the ADF, and we 

have talked, we have heard already some back and forth with Ambassador Carson and the committee on that. 

There is a second role, issue, the economic issues that I think are 

deeper than the security ones. Rwanda has benefited massively 

over the last decade from the looting of natural resources in Eastern Congo, particularly, and this is why this whole campaign in the 

United States has unfolded particularly amongst young people on 

college campuses, this conflict minerals campaign because everyone 

is somehow complicit in this, all of us that buy cell phones and 

laptops and other electronic instruments are helping to underwrite 

this smuggling network and these competing mafias that are ruining and continue to immiserate the people of Eastern Congo. 

Tin, tantalum, and tungsten are the three minerals today. There 

were others decades ago, and going all the way back to King 

Leopold, that looting that goes across borders that benefits us with 

no protections for the Congolese people. It is a huge windfall for 

Rwanda. Foreign exchange, balance of payments, all the rest of it 

drives their economic development miracle, post-genocide economic 

miracle. In Uganda it is gold, it is smuggled gold. Huge amounts 

of gold travel across the border illegally from Congo into Uganda 

74

and are then exported out of the country. These are, again, windfalls that are hard to replace by domestic economic development. 

Then the third arena, the third issue is political. Both Uganda 

and Rwanda I think, the bottom line, want proxies in positions in 

Eastern Congo, whether they are military or civilian authorities, to 

ensure their economic and security interests. So when President 

Kabila tried after the elections to redeploy the CNDP elements, as 

Ambassador Carson was describing, he described all the facts of 

what happened, but what was underneath the facts, I think, was 

that the CNDP had established for years with Rwanda and Uganda, particularly Rwandan support, this ability to export illegally 

and extract natural resources and ensure the political and security 

interests of the State of Rwanda. And so when Kabila, when President Kabila tried to redeploy these forces out of that region, which 

would have undermined that control, that proxy control that the 

neighboring countries have over the politics and the economics of 

the east, the rebellion immediately occurred because they couldn’t 

allow that to happen, so of course, the Rwandan support comes 

pouring in into the formation of the M23. They change the acronyms, it is the same group. 

Whittled down, though, Mvemba’s points are very important 

about the lack of any kind of domestic constituency that the M23 

have, but nevertheless the result is the same. It is more destabilization, more instability, and then allowing those that have powerful proxies inside Eastern Congo to profit from that destabilization. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple points. 

One is on the peacekeeping mission. We have brought up 

MONUSCO a few times today. I think MONUSCO is now part of 

the problem. It has become an enabler of insecurity just like Rwanda and Uganda and the government in Kinshasa in the sense that, 

you know, part of the challenge when we look at Congo, is that a 

lot of people discovered Congo with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 

but Congo existed way before that. Those of us who were born 

there and grew up there knew a country that worked. So when we 

go to Congo today, we don’t recognize this country. That does not 

mean the Congolese people are not capable. Some of you are old 

enough to remember the first U.N. mission in Congo, ONUC. 

ONUC was much more bolder, robust but also very determined to 

carry out its mandate. It lasted only 4 years. 

The war in 1960 was much bigger than what we are seeing 

today. You had Che Guevara show up in Congo, you had the Chinese, you had the Egyptians, you had French mercenaries, and the 

Belgians who wanted Katanga. But because ONUC was really committed in helping the Congolese meet their obligation to protect 

their country and build it together, they fought, they protected the 

civilians, and they allowed then Colonel Mobutu to build an army 

that eventually became the country, the army that the U.S. relied 

on in Angola, in Chad, when somehow Congo was your strategic 

ally. 

I am not sure what happened, but I simply mean that we need 

to scale down that MONUSCO mandate very quickly, make it very 

clear how much longer they are going to stay in Congo, and what 

75

the mission should be so that the Kinshasa government does not 

lean on the U.N. for excuses. 

So let me illustrate. If 200 women are raped in some hamlet in 

North Kivu, the headlines in the New York Times will say some 

women were raped, in fact, but the blame will fall on the U.N. first. 

They will say there was a contingent of Bangladeshi troops around 

that didn’t do anything. No one will ask where was the Congolese 

army. And we can do that because there is a force there that is 

supposed to help that is falling much shorter. 

The U.N. has failed to protect civilians throughout this entire 

M23 event. They failed in Bunagana, but the press was not there 

to report it, so they are going to just live with M23. When 

Rutshurv and Kiwanja fell, MONUSCO forgot that in 2008 there 

had been massacres there by CNDP. They didn’t do anything. They 

said we will absolutely protect Goma, Goma will not fall. Well, then 

when Goma fell, they say we didn’t fight because they didn’t want 

to endanger civilians. And then when M23 withdrew and they raided Kibumba, Mugunga, and Kibati IDP camps, the U.N. was nowhere to be seen. So going on nearly two decades, the U.N. is not 

the solution for the DRC. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. I am going to unfortunately have to leave at this point, 

but I want to thank you all for your testimony and the time you 

took out to come, and I look forward to continue to work with you, 

and especially to follow up on what we can specifically do here in 

Congress and I am most interested in the notion of sanctions and 

also sanctions on individuals and how that might work and how we 

might get that started from here, so thank you very much, and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank 

you for being here. Most of us in the room here know at least one 

measure that must be taken against Rwanda and Uganda, and 

that is considering the enactment of serious stinging sanctions. 

However—and let’s call this the way it is, you know—the Obama 

administration refuses to engage in serious monetary sanctions 

against these countries, and this is not atypical in other foreign affairs matters that plague the world today with this administration. 

So my simple question is, what do you propose that we do or that 

you can do to persuade this administration to enforce these sanctions the way that it has been so eloquently stated here today from 

you gentlemen and from this panel? So you can start, Mr. Hege, 

and each one of you, could you respond to that, please. 

Mr. HEGE. Sure, I can speak from the perspective of the Group 

of Experts. We submit annually a list of recommended individuals 

and entities for consideration before the U.N. sanctions committee. 

Obviously the United States Government plays an important role 

in taking forward and studying those names. Many of those names, 

while the list remains confidential, many of those names are included in our public reports, so there is not a great deal of surprise 

of the contents of that list. 

However, the group itself steps away from the consideration and 

discussions of the list that it provides, so in essence, we remain 

sort of indifferent to the steps that are taken subsequently. HowVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:47 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\121112\77362 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ever, I can say, having stepped away from my role in the Group 

of Experts, that measures to identify the individuals and sanction 

the individuals who are externally supporting M23, and in our conclusion they are not necessarily just externally supporting, they are 

actually commanding and running the rebellion in its day-to-day 

activities, which goes beyond external support in many cases. That 

measures to identify them, be that sanctions, be that diplomatic 

pressure, all of that is critically important in identifying the problem. 

As I said, Rwanda continues to identify itself as the solution. 

However, sanctions or efforts to identify publicly the individuals 

running the rebellion in the Rwandan Government would go a long 

way to ensuring that the problem is squarely understood as a 

Rwandan orchestration, as a Rwandan-driven and commanded rebellion, and that will have enormously important consequences for 

any peace negotiations in terms of framing the issue and not necessarily getting lost in, as I said, some of the smokescreen issues 

that have been post facto used as pretext to justify the rebellion. 

So I would encourage any of those measures and any symbolic efforts that can be made to ensure that the problem itself is squarely 

identified partly as a Rwandan-driven rebellion. Thank you. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. Mr. Prendergast. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you. There has been an amazing 

amount of continuity, I think, in U.S. policy going back to the Clinton administration, Bush administration, Obama administration. 

All three very, very slow to utilize pressures. 

Mr. MARINO. Agreed. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. It has been an incentive-based policy. This is 

a long-term problem, a belief I think fundamentally—we heard it 

from Ambassador Carson very clearly today—a belief in quiet diplomacy and in direct engagement in what I would call in the conflict resolution theory an insider partial model that has been pursued, and I think the response to that, I will give my recommendations as to what Congress can do to help the situation, and then 

say what we can do as civil society groups on the congressional 

side, I think publicizing the failure of this 15-year policy. 

Again, what has been so effective about Congress’ work, it has 

been bipartisan. The failure has largely been bipartisan, so a bipartisan effort in Congress saying it is not working, we need to do 

something differently is crucial. That can be done through the 

media and through, I think, the contact with—direct contact with 

administration officials. The letter that is circulating, there are numerous I think initiatives, both in the Senate and the House, right 

now attempting potentially to pass a quick resolution before the 

end of the term. 

There are various things that could be done to put this very 

clearly on the public record, this 15-year failure of constructive engagement, which is where we are going now as we bring that kind 

of terminology that has been used in other contexts and talk about 

this. We need more, we need to utilize those sticks. 

For our part, the NGO community, the civil society community, 

the letter that was cited by Congressman Smith at the opening is 

an example of how groups that work on all kinds of different issues 

internationally are coming together and saying let’s unify our 

77

voices around a certain set of points and an agenda that can press 

the administration to become more bold in its approach, and we 

will undertake, as will other groups, The Enough Project and many 

other groups, a series of campaigns going out, particularly to young 

people, to faith-based groups and others who actually care about 

what is happening in the Congo, and that I think constituency of 

conscience is actually expanding fairly rapidly on Congo, just as we 

saw in 2003, 2004, 2005 on Darfur, we are starting to see that now 

in Congo, and the more I think Americans care about what is happening to the people of Congo and say, you know what, the present, 

the status quo is just simply unacceptable, and U.S. policy, the 

more, I think, we will have a shot at altering that status quo. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Thank you, Congressman Marino. That is an important question. I think all of us today who spoke to you, including Ambassador Carson, mentioned all the ingredients that need to 

be put in place. I think on one side you have the government that 

refuses to call a spade a spade, so we talk about external threat, 

external support. If it is external, then we know where it is coming 

from, we should be able to name it. But I think we have talked 

about everything. So personally I would say one recommendation 

in order to put pressure on the Obama administration—the U.S. 

Congress has always been at the forefront of certain watershed 

events in Congo and Africa. 

It was this House that passed the anti-apartheid bill, it was this 

House that supported the emergence of the democracy movement 

across Africa in the 1980s. I think the chairman was around. So 

I think one recommendation I will say, because Africa is always a 

very bipartisan area, maybe you should consider passing a robust, 

more robust version of the Obama law here that you can push then 

to be applied because I am not sure why the White House, and the 

State Department are shying away from that and decide to hide behind the economic miracle of the Rwandan recovery. It is very troubling because this is what happened with King Leopold. He was a 

great philanthropist, he was bringing civilization to the savages in 

Congo, he was saving them from slave traders. Look at this great 

global trade outpost called Congo. But then behind the shadow of 

that civilizing mission, they were chopping off people’s limbs, killing people, over 10 million of them. 

Something similar is happening today. We have laws on the 

books. People are speaking, good people like you listening to us, but 

nothing is happening. So I think you have community leaders like 

John, who has rallied thousands of millions of young people to push 

Congo causes, have been listening to us, then I think we need your 

support so that the other side can start listening to what we ask 

because the interest is already there. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MARINO. I think I am right in saying that you do agree with 

me, each of you, that the previous administrations and this administration know what the facts are, know what is going on. I mean, 

they are not ignorant to these facts. I mean, it is very blatant. But 

they chose and choose not to do what should be done about this. 

So, Mr. Prendergast, I think you are absolutely right in getting 

more people involved, particularly young people. I am a freshman, 

next year I am coming back as a sophomore, and my daughter and 

78

I had the opportunity to visit the continent of Africa. We went to 

Liberia and Ghana. My daughter is going to be a physician. But 

she said, ‘‘Dad, we have to take care of these people, we have to 

help them, and if we do not do it, who is going to?’’ So you know, 

it is like banging my head against the wall sometimes. I have 

signed numerous letters that have been sent to the administration 

and the secretaries. We never get a response from them. So maybe 

we do have to take this more, with more passion to the public to 

get our Government to respond to it. You can be assured that my 

daughter and I will be there doing it. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Marino. Let me just ask 

one final question, and then I will leave any final comments to our 

three distinguished witnesses. 

Mr. Hege, there have been reports that at least one U.N. Security Council member wanted to delay the report on Eastern Congo 

this summer to perhaps lessen its criticism of the role played by 

Rwanda. Can you definitively tell us is that true or not? 

Mr. HEGE. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We submitted an interim report during the month of May which did not include information regarding arms embargo violations committed by the Government of Rwanda, precisely because those violations had just 

really manifested themselves more overtly. However, we briefed 

the sanctions committee of those, of the information we had gathered in June and suggested that we provide an additional annex 

to that report, that interim report, outlining the violations of the 

arms embargo by the Government of Rwanda. 

The committee requested that we engage once again with the 

Government of Rwanda, although we had already gone to Kigali in 

May to meet with them over a period of 3 days during which they 

refused to accept us for any substantive meetings. We remained in 

our hotel room for those 3 days. The committee asked us to provide, particularly the Minister of Foreign Affairs—the Rwandan 

Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time was coming to New York 

at the end of June. I personally met with her in New York. 

I presented to her our work, our methodology, our approach, the 

reason why this information had not been included in the interim 

report. I outlined in detail our findings, and at that stage, she declined to provide any response, explanation or justification of those, 

of our findings. As such, we proceeded to submit that document, 

and it was then made public as an addendum and not an annex 

to our interim report. 

So the answer to your question is, yes, as a committee the consensus of the committee was that Rwanda, the Rwandan Government, its request to have an additional right of reply should be 

granted by the group, and out of good faith in working for and 

under the guidance of the sanctions committee, we provided them 

with that opportunity. They declined to provide any right of reply, 

and unfortunately proceeded to make public statements that nevertheless, they had never been provided a right of reply, which for 

us, obviously, is quite frustrating, given that we purposefully delayed the submission of that information in order to engage in this 

dialogue with the Government of Rwanda. 

So we, as I said, proceeded to submit that, and that report then 

was published at the end of June. 

79

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Any final comments from any of our distinguished witnesses? 

Mr. DIZOLELE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to mention 

two things. I originally at the outset said Congo is too big to fail. 

There are quarters of enlightened people, smart people, you know 

a couple weeks ago, the New York Times ran a piece saying Congo 

should be split in half or in various portions. Anybody who entertains that idea is smoking something, because if Rwanda, as small 

as it is, has trouble, we know Rwanda would be the ideal country 

if I were a leader: Everybody speaks the same language; they have 

the same name; and they have two castes, the Hutus and the 

Tutsis. Yet, they have been killing each other over and over. 

If Rwanda thinks or if anybody thinks Rwanda can control the 

Kivus, then we have not seen the half of it. The Kivus are not 

Rwanda, is not the same makeup, they don’t know these people. 

The Rwandans tried to march all the way to Kinshasa, and they 

were kicked out of Kinshasa by the civilians in 1998, which led 

them to do the rebellion. 

So this is an idea that we should resist by all means, so anybody 

who is entertaining that will have blood on his hands, and he 

doesn’t know the half of it. 

Number two, I think we need to stand for something. In DRC, 

the people of Congo have already rallied around the democratic 

principles. They are waiting for your support. The Congolese don’t 

need help changing things. They need help to push the process 

along. They are very capable people, they are resourceful, and I 

would like, on their behalf, to thank you for your continuous interest in their plight. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. My last point, Congressman Smith and Congressman Marino, would be that we have, today, I think a clash of 

two visions of policy. One vision is a belief that I think we need 

to encourage the neighboring countries of the Congo to become part 

of a solution, and thus sanctions and aid cutoffs and those kind of 

things, punitive measures would undermine our influence. So that 

would be, I think, at this juncture what the administration and 

past administrations have pursued vis-a`-vis Congo and the continuous intervention cycles that we have seen from outside from the 

region. 

The alternative belief that I think this table has articulated and 

the committee, key members of your committee have articulated as 

well, is that these kinds of punitive measures which, by the way, 

involve withholding hard-earned U.S. taxpayer dollars for the 

kinds of support that are fungible, military and budgetary support. 

We are not talking, again, about the development and humanitarian assistance that goes straight to the people of Rwanda but, 

rather, the budget support that goes to the countries, the government. That if we utilize these punitive measures, that that will 

provide leverage for a solution, and if we are successful, I think, 

in convincing the administration to move in that direction, which 

I believe we will work assiduously to do, then we need to have 

somewhere for Rwanda, Uganda, and other elements in the Congo 

that don’t want a solution, we need to have a place for them to go, 

and I believe that place is a legitimate, credible, internationally 

80

supported peace process that allows the Eastern Congolese people 

to be part of the solution at the table, and the root causes finally 

to be addressed, and it is not going to happen unless we get U.S. 

leadership, and that is why we need that Presidential envoy. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. HEGE. Just to conclude, there is a great deal of analysis of 

Rwandan Government behavior which concludes that essentially 

their sticks don’t work, that they are very ambitious, very determined, and that any punitive measures will not necessarily deter 

their behavior. There is likely a great deal of evidence. Since our 

reports in June exposed their direct creation of M23, the rebellion 

has only grown and their involvement has only become more overt, 

and I would say many of their commanders have become more 

emboldened. Obviously the taking of a very important provincial 

capital such as Goma was a perfect example of that. 

However, that doesn’t mean, as I said earlier, that we shouldn’t 

continue to frame the problem as a Rwandan determined effort to 

obtain this objective, which is, as I said, an autonomous Eastern 

Congo. They believe that any of the short-term consequences of 

their current project may be outweighed by the gains of that state, 

particularly, as I said, given the wealthy economic interests that 

Rwanda has in Eastern Congo, the cultural ties, and the security 

interests that they would be able to ensure, including the FDLR 

and other political dissidents. 

However, that said, what is needed at this point in order to, 

faced with that Rwandan determination, a peace process will have 

to find a way to identify a solution which appears to appeal to their 

long-term objective in order for them to stop. I am not convinced 

that anything less at this stage than something close to that longterm objective would call the Rwandans to stop. 

However, if that solution is identified, it could be some sort of decentralization process, as already stipulated by the Congolese constitution. However, that, the implementation of that agreement will 

require significant accompaniment, tremendous long-term investment not only from the United States, but other members of the 

international community to reinforce the capacities of the Congolese state and precisely insulate it from external control and manipulation, and that will be, as I see, practically and realistically, 

one of the keys to moving forward from this current crisis, but it 

requires, as I said, a very long-term commitment to building up an 

economically and politically independent Congolese State in the 

Eastern Congo, where its neighbors will eventually look at it as an 

equal and not a country which it can continue to manipulate, they 

can continue to manipulate and benefit from. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, all three, for your extraordinary insights 

again and testimony, and I do want to thank C–SPAN for in their 

editorial and independent judgment seeing their way clear to cover 

this hearing because people in America know far too little as to 

what is going on in DR Congo, and as you pointed out earlier, the 

enormous loss of life, 6-plus million people who have died, and the 

fact that as we speak people’s lives are being taken from them by 

this terrible rebellious M23. So thank you so much, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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SlIBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATlVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

December 10, 2012 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Atiica, Global 

Health, and Human Rights, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Omce Building (and available 

live via the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.hollse.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, December II, 2012 

3:00 p.m. 

The Devastating Crisis in Eastern Congo 

Panel I 

The Honorable Johnnie Carson 

Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Atrican Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Panel II 

Me John Prendergast 

Co-founder 

The Enough Proj ect 

Mr. Steve Hege 

(Former Member 

United Nations Group o(rexperts on the Democratic Repuhlic o(the Congo) 

Mr. Mvemba Dizolele 

Peter L Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow 

Hoover Institution 

Stanford University 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MIN UTbS OF S UnCOMMlITEE ON ____ -=-A"''f,c.:: ic:::a,:.:G:::'!::Db:::ai:::H:::,:::al::'h2-, :::an.:::d",H::":::c .. :::an:.c::,,,,'gh:.::',-s R _ 

Day_-'l"'u"e,,s..,da"JV'---_,Date December 11. 2012 Room 2172 Ravbarn 

Starting Time "1-14 It fft Ending Time 5·54 p m 

Pre,iding Member(s) 

Rep. Chris Smith 

Check all ~f'litefollowing that app(v: 

Open Session []] 

Executive (closed) Se.~sinll D Televised []] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

The Devastating Crisi. in Easlern Congo 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Record!:!!jtaped) []] 

Stenogra)lhic Record lLI 

lffiARING 

Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. J(arm Bass, Rep, Ann Marie Buer/de, Rep. Tom 111"arino, Rep. Robert Turner 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members offoll committee,) 

Rep. Edward Royce 

HFARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'! Yes m No D 

(If "no JJ, please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

Letter/rom Members of Congress to President Obama 

Leiter from NGOs to President Obama 

Prepared stateme1tt from World Relief 

TIMF. SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

1/, /2_IL , dfl!/II41i~ TIME ADJOllRNED 5:54 p.m. 

Subcommittee Staff Director 
84

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS


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short supply. FOitunately, it is clll'rently potato harvest season in eastern DRC and these are still available 

in quantities, bu( people in Nm-th Kivu have a varied diet and potatoes will not sntist)' the requirement. 

We have also received reports that as many as 700 estimated children have been separated from their 

parcnts. III RutshurLl, we have heard from om pastors that the new administration ofM23 is quite harsh 

with sUlllmary executions for theft, but this has also cut down seriously on petty crime which has always 

heen a problem there. The pastors also report that !Hany young people have been forcihly recl'llited into 

the army especially if they have committed an offense of sOllle kind. In Minova, it has been repOlted that 

atleas( 50 women and girls were raped in the past two weeks witll tllis weapon of war being Ilsed as a 

targeting method and as a warning to opponents. Even in Goma itselt; there are reports that women and 

gids have been la"geted for sexlIal attacks by lInifonned men in the past several weeks. At night the M23 

soldicrs come iuto thc edge of city on fOl'aging missions. They have been provided with some supplies by 

MONUSCO, but there have been many and persistent reports of residents being forced to give lip mouey 

and supplies to at'med and uniformed men in the middle of (he night. 

The recent lInrest has led to repealed incidents oInew displacement. Tltere me a Iota I of2.2 million 

Internally Displaccd Persons (!DPs) in thc DRC, the highest numbcr of lDPs in the DRC in three years. 

As of Decemher 6'", 20 12, OCHA estimates that there are 115,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 

living ill 31 camps in NOlih Kivu while other IDPs live with host eommunitics. Many will bc in need of 

water, emergency shelter and protection against sexual and gender based violence while host communities 

strain under continuing new influxes Df newly displaced persons. The new character of Goma is that 

nearly evelY tinnily has had to take in people into their homes and dwellings are bursting with these 

visitors who are a heavy drain on family resources, water .supplies and food. Unforlunaft:iy, IDPs are 

oftcn displaced multiple times. In the Kanya Rutshinya camp on November 20"', for example, 60,000 

lOPs were expelled, made their way into Goma, and back to their villages. 

Matly IDP camps have been highly insecure, as recent incidents of attack in Mugunga HI, a camp of 

30,000 people, resulted in the looting of prope.t), and beating and rape of lOPs in the camp. In the pas! 

week, UNHCR and other agencies have made reSO\ll'ces available to build a new camp at Mugunga IIJ to 

replace the emptied camp and people have started to congregate there in large numhers. A visit to the 

camp at the end of last week showed that people were busy receiving plastic sheets to covel' fj'ames made 

of poles afld some food dlstribl1tion"had started as well as medical care. In addition to ongoing secmity 

challenges in the camps, however, UNIICR estimates that some 12,000 highly vulnerable families are in 

urgent need of non-food help and shelter is needed for 47,000 highly vulnerable households. 

In addition, there are some ~OO,OOO Congolese refugees in surrounding countries. Since Januaty 2012, 

40,000 Congolese refugee, have crussed into Uganda, totaling 111,000 Congolese refugees in Uganda at 

the end of September 2012. Other surrounding countries including the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, 

Burundi and Tanzania host large numbers o[Congolese refugees. Even as Congolese refugees continl1e 

to flec, substantialnumbcrs of retul'lls to specific, more secure areas of the DRC are anticipated in 2012 

frol11 Tanzania, Uganda and Republic of Congo. Approximately 49,000 Congolese will be assisted to 

return to Equateur Provifle~ ofllw DRC ill 2012, while UNHCR expects another 32,000 returns during 

the first half of2013. The multiple and ongoing displacement of persons within Congo, however, is 

expected to remain a grave concern. 

We urge robust U.S. leader'hip to end the conflict in ~as(ern DRC and I"ecommend the [allowing actions 

be takcn to promote peace and alleviate thc sutkring of the Congolese pcople: 

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Humanitarian Access 

Mally of the communities we serve in eastern Congo are 110w behind rebelliues. While we have 

communicated WWl various leadcrs to ensure thcir safety, humanitarian access has been extremely 

limited, Ongoing conflict has displaced tens of thousands of individuals who remain internally displaced 

in eastern DRC or live as refugees in camps or urban settings in neighboring countries, It is impOJ1ant 

that adequate provisions be made both fo,. the continuation ofWFP food aid programs fo,. existing IDP 

populaliolls and fo,. new groups recently displaced from thei,.land in the Kivu, as a result of recent 

militat)' and paramilitary actions 

Recommendatiolls: 

V.le urge ongoing politic-al negotiations to include discussiuns of how the inlel'1la(iotlaI COJlHlHlIliry 

can acc,,"s vulnerable I'upulations including those who need imlllediate food and shelter. 

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies 

should ensure that proper monitoring is in place and that those who are displaced have access to 

critical basic goods and livelihood opportunities. 

Congolese refugees who are returning to the DRC should be fully supported and reconciliation 

progl"amS strengthened in receiving communities. 

Given the ongoing urgent humanitarian needs ofthc Congolcse people, there should be incrcascd 

humanitarian assistance and coordinatioll. Robust funding to agencies including UNHCR and 

the WFP should increase in order meet the ongoing needs o[ displaced populations. 

The U.S. should lead an international effort to coordinate international aid to vulnerable 

communities in Congo which will ensure a proper and robust international response to the 

ongoing crisis in the Congo, 

I'rotcction 

Given the Jlrevalence of sexual and gender-hased violeuce (SGBV) in the DRC, the protection o[women 

and girls against such violence should be of utmost priority in all diplomacy and programming, Jt should 

no longel' be de dguem for armies to lise rape as. a weapon of war. 

Recommendations: 

There shollid be increased capacity of various international actors in the DRC to address SGBV, 

whether through prevention 01' protection. 

Access to services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence should also expand with a 

pal'ticulal' focus on those who have been .-epeat victi.m of violence. 

The United States should SUppOlt United Nations (UN) peacekeepers with training to provide 

broad .. · protection, including the prevention of SGRV, and strengthen the capacity ofthe UN to 

prevent conflict and manage conflicts .. Incluqing robust preventive and humanitarian diplomacy 

and mediation, 

Justice and Peace-Building 

There should be conc"ctc steps to ,'educe the impllllity of perpetrators of violence and ensure that thel'c arc 

improvements {o the infrastrudure Hndjudiclal process of the Congoles.e system. 

For a population divided along ethnic lines, pastors, church leaders and volunteers are working together 

across denominations to serve widows, orphans, and suffering people in their communities through 

Village Peace Committees (VPCs). These Committees are composed often people, both men and 

women, who are trained to bc able to resolve conflicts that others m-e unable or unwilling to tackle, These 

include conflicts over land, disputes in the family, armed conflicts, communal arguments and business 

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disagreements. These Village Peace Committees (VPCs) are thus playing an instrumental role in binding 

comnuLtlities togethet" and providing an avenue for justice and preventing conflict escalation. 

Every conflict resQlved contrihutes to a grO'\villg momentum for peace - from one v1l1age to many more. 

While the work of these local committees is critical to reconciliation in the lJRC, there must be a call 

from the international community for peace in the ORC which highlights not only what is needed at the 

national or regional level but highlights good practices that are working at the local level. 

ReconuueIuiatiolls: 

Creative ways to achieve jllStice, including the use of different court systems and mobile 

com'ts} should be encouraged. This wm enSllI'e that. victims ofvlolence will understand their 

rights and perpetrators are brought to justice. 

In addition, local efforts to build peace which have worked to alleviate tensions between and 

within local cOllununities should be suppmted. 

Political Solutions to the Conflict 

The international community should engage its fllll diplomatic efforts on building peace in the Congo, 

including suppOJting effOJis to secure a formal ceasefire with M23 and condemnation of external 

involvement in the fighting. Ill' promoting peace diplomatically with not only the Congolese government 

but regional govel'lll1lents ill Africa alld rebel movements, the people of COil go can continue to live 

without fear of attack or being displaced. The crisis in the DRC is considered to be the deadliest since 

World War II and ",,!ained polilical attention by the United States will ensure that the conilict does not 

continue. 

Recommendations: 

Peace agreements and stabilization plans that hayc already been agreed to by various parties 

should continue to be upheld. 

Plans to promote peace should recogriize and supporllhe work ofloeal peace-building 

initiatives to resolve conflicts at the cOl1lll1unallevel as well as national and regional effOits at 

peace. 

The United States should appoint a Special Envoy whose can provide sustained and focused 

diplomatic attention on the crisis. 

Leadership li'om the United States will be critical to contribute to peace in a countly racked by violence. 

The people of Congo have experienced numerous conflicts and have a deep desire to live in peace with 

their neighbors and benefit fi'om the bounty of their land. While contlict has ravaged the DRC for 

decades and may ilave led to a sense of hopelessness or intractahility by the international community, we 

have found the incredible resiliency of the Congolese people merit marc robust international attention. 

We believe there is a unique opportunity for leadership from the United States that will bring long" lasting 

peace to the Congolese people. This includes SUppOlt of good governance programs which break (he 

cycle of dys/lmetion in the Congolese government which is the root of much contliet within the nation. 

4