NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SARA FORD, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SEAN P. ERICKSON, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0387 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2019-007892

The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Glickstein Law, PLLC, Phoenix

By Falynn S. Baum

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Hoffman Legal, LLC, Phoenix

By Amy Wilkins Hoffman

Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Sean P. Erickson, Phoenix

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 4-13-2023
FORD v. ERICKSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Sean P. Erickson (“Husband”) appeals the superior court’s

order enforcing a post-nuptial agreement with Sara Ford (“Wife”). He

argues the court abused its discretion by (1) excluding his expert witness 

on California law, and (2) failing to make sufficient findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2001, the parties married in California. About one year 

later, the parties, each represented by counsel, entered a post-nuptial 

agreement.

¶3 In 2018, the parties moved to Arizona. In September 2019, 

Wife petitioned for dissolution, alleging the post-nuptial agreement 

“controls the division of property, debt and spousal maintenance.”

Husband acknowledged the agreement, but claimed it was 

“unconscionable and against public policy.”

¶4 Wife moved for partial summary judgment declaring the 

post-nuptial agreement valid and enforceable. Husband responded that 

the agreement was “unconscionable, inequitable, and unfair.” Both parties 

relied exclusively on Arizona law for their arguments. 

¶5 The court first granted Wife’s motion for summary judgment 

as to the validity of the post-nuptial agreement, but later granted 

Husband’s pro se motion to set aside that ruling based on a California 

choice-of-law provision in the agreement. The court directed the parties to 

file new motions for summary judgment on or before July 16, 2021. The 

court also denied Husband’s motion to introduce an expert opinion on 

California law.

¶6 Husband and Wife cross-moved for partial summary 

judgment on July 16, but Husband neglected to file a separate statement of 

facts until July 19. Wife argued the post-nuptial agreement was valid and 
FORD v. ERICKSON

Decision of the Court

3

enforceable under California law. Husband disagreed, pointing to an 

expert opinion on California law. A few days later, Husband requested

findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 82(a), Ariz. R. Fam. 

Law P.

¶7 Wife then moved to dismiss Husband’s motion for partial 

summary judgment based on his untimely statement of facts and objected 

to his expert witness on California law based on the court’s prior order.

¶8 The superior court dismissed Husband’s motion for partial 

summary judgment in October 2021, concluding it was “not a motion for 

summary judgment at all,” and Husband’s untimely statement of facts did 

not comply with the court’s previous order. The court later sustained 

Wife’s objection to Husband’s expert witness and denied Wife’s motion for 

partial summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact 

precluded summary judgment.

¶9 The next day, the court ordered the parties to provide joint or 

separate pretrial statements by December 1, 2021. Wife timely filed a 

separate pretrial statement and a memorandum of points and authorities.

Husband filed no pretrial statement.

¶10 At trial, the court heard testimony regarding the agreement’s 

formation, the parties’ negotiations and disclosures, and Husband’s 

contention that the agreement was waived because the parties did not 

adhere to its terms. When Husband began to testify about the effect of 

California law on the agreement, Wife’s counsel objected. The court 

sustained the objection based on its prior rulings.

¶11 After taking the matter under advisement, the court made 

factual findings and held the post-nuptial agreement was enforceable 

under California law.

¶12 We have jurisdiction over Husband’s timely appeal. See Ariz.

Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Exclusion of Expert Witness on California Law

¶13 Husband argues the superior court abused its discretion by 

excluding his expert on California law.
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¶14 We review the decision whether to admit expert testimony for 

an abuse of discretion. Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 505 

(1996); John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 208 Ariz. 532, 

543, ¶ 33 (App. 2004). “The test for whether a person is an expert is whether 

a jury can receive help on a particular subject from the witness.” Webb v. 

Omni Block, Inc., 216 Ariz. 349, 352, ¶ 8 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

¶15 Husband maintains that under Arizona Rule of Evidence 702,

the court should have allowed him to present expert testimony interpreting 

the parties’ post-nuptial agreement. A witness who is qualified as an expert 

may testify in the form of an opinion if “the expert’s scientific, technical, or 

other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Ariz. R. Evid. 702(a). An opinion 

that embraces an ultimate issue is not automatically objectionable. Ariz. R. 

Evid. 704.

¶16 Even so, opinion testimony need not be automatically

admitted. Testimony about ultimate issues may be excluded if it tells the 

factfinder how to decide the case or is otherwise unhelpful. Webb, 216 Ariz. 

at 353, ¶ 14. Moreover, a superior court judge is already considered an 

expert on the law. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27 (providing that judges “shall 

declare the law” to juries); see also Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 

F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The special legal knowledge of the judge 

makes the witness’ testimony superfluous.” (citation omitted)); Loeb v. 

Hammond, 407 F.2d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 1969) (“The question of interpretation 

of the contract is for the jury and the question of legal effect is for the judge. 

In neither case do we permit expert testimony.” (citation omitted)).

¶17 Husband does not explain how the expert’s report would 

have helped the superior court in understanding the evidence or 

determining a fact in issue, how California law supports his position that 

the post-nuptial agreement was unenforceable, how the court’s ruling 

misapplied California law, or how, had his expert and the expert’s report 

been admitted, the result would have been different. On this record, 

Husband has not shown that the superior court’s decision to exclude his 

legal expert and rely on its own interpretation of the law constituted an 

abuse of discretion.
FORD v. ERICKSON

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¶18 Husband further argues the superior court denied him 

procedural due process when it excluded his expert on California law.1 We 

review de novo an alleged due process violation. Griffin Found. v. Ariz. State 

Ret. Sys., 244 Ariz. 508, 517, ¶ 25 (App. 2018).

¶19 “Procedural due process means that a party had the 

opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner.’” Comeau v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 196 Ariz. 102, 106-07, 

¶ 20 (App. 1999) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). 

“The elements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to 

be heard.” Id. at 107, ¶ 20 (quoting Iphaar v. Indus. Comm’n, 171 Ariz. 423, 

426 (App. 1992)).

¶20 Husband received due process. Even assuming Husband has 

not waived his argument by failing to file a pretrial statement2 or otherwise 

raise any due process issue before trial, see Harris v. Cochise Health Sys., 215 

Ariz. 344, 349, ¶ 17 (App. 2007), we find no denial of due process. In the 

superior court’s ruling granting his motion to set aside, Husband was 

placed on notice that although he could retain a California attorney, the 

court would not admit an expert on California law. Nevertheless, Husband 

relied on the opinions of a purported California legal expert in his motion

for partial summary judgment. When Wife objected, Husband argued that 

he believed the court’s earlier ruling simply meant his legal expert could 

still testify as his expert, just not as the court’s expert, and the expert’s report 

could still be admitted into evidence. Husband had a full opportunity to be 

heard before the court sustained Wife’s objection.3

1 In his brief, Husband does not claim he was denied substantive due 

process. He also has not identified a constitutionally protected liberty or 

property interest necessary to make a substantive due process claim. Aegis 

of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 206 Ariz. 557, 568, ¶ 44 (App. 2003); accord 

Alpha, LLC v. Dartt, 232 Ariz. 303, 308, ¶ 23 (App. 2013).

2 See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 76.1(e)(7) (requiring pretrial statements to 

include “detailed and concise statements of contested issues of fact and 

law”); Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 378, ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (“The pretrial 

statement controls the subsequent course of the litigation.” (citation 

omitted)).

3 While the parties litigated the issue of Husband’s expert, Husband 

also moved to compel discovery, in which he again discussed his expert 
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¶21 Additionally, at trial, Husband again tried to get portions of 

his expert’s report in through his own testimony, but despite his argument, 

the court denied his attempt to do so. Husband thus had multiple 

opportunities to urge the court’s acceptance of his expert’s report, and he 

was not denied procedural due process.

II. Sufficiency of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

¶22 Husband also argues that the superior court’s findings of fact 

and conclusions of law were insufficient. He contends that when he 

compares his expert’s report with the court’s ruling, he finds “noticeable 

deficiencies” in the ruling, which he does not believe is sufficiently 

supported by “California case history and statutes.” He does not explain 

what these alleged deficiencies are, however, or how the result would have 

been different had they not occurred.

¶23 We review the superior court’s findings of fact for an abuse of 

discretion. Great W. Bank v. LJC Dev., LLC, 238 Ariz. 470, 478, ¶ 22 (App. 

2015). We do not substitute our judgment for the superior court’s and will 

reverse only if its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. The purpose behind 

requiring the superior court, upon request, to make findings of fact, is to 

enable this court to examine the basis upon which the superior court relied 

in reaching its judgment. Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz. App. 456, 460 (1973). 

Findings of fact satisfy this requirement if they are sufficient to allow an 

appellate court “to test the validity of the judgment.” Gilliland v. Rodriguez, 

77 Ariz. 163, 167 (1954).

¶24 Even assuming Husband has not waived his argument by 

failing to reference case law or statutes supporting an argument that the 

superior court misapplied California law, see ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A); Lunney v. 

State, 244 Ariz. 170, 182, ¶ 45 (App. 2017); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 

305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009), we find no reversible error.

¶25 First, a court need not set forth findings or conclusions in 

ruling on a motion to exclude expert testimony under Rule 82(a)(2).

¶26 Second, after the evidentiary hearing, the superior court 

issued a seven-page order thoroughly analyzing the evidence supporting

Husband’s claims and interpreting California statutory and case law. That 

and the expert’s need to review documents and possibly provide an 

amended report. After allowing Husband this additional opportunity to be 

heard, and considering Husband’s reply to Wife’s response, the court 

denied his motion.
FORD v. ERICKSON

Decision of the Court

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order was sufficient for this court to evaluate the basis for the court’s ruling. 

See Ellingson, 20 Ariz. App. at 460. The court addressed Husband’s 

arguments that the post-nuptial agreement provisions regarding spousal 

maintenance and property were unfair and unconscionable, that he signed 

the agreement under duress or undue influence, and that the parties never 

followed the agreement, resulting in waiver.

¶27 In its review, the court considered Husband’s arguments in 

the context of California contract law, the California Family Code, and 

California case law, including In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman, 5 P.3d 

839 (Cal. 2000), In re Marriage of Burkle, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2006), and In re Marriage of Friedman, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2002). The court found that a spousal support waiver in a marital 

agreement was not per se unenforceable when executed by intelligent, welleducated persons, each of whom appeared to be self-sufficient in property 

and earning ability and had the advice of counsel regarding their rights and 

obligations as marital partners at the time they executed the agreement. 

The court also found that negotiations had occurred, at least some concerns 

of Husband’s counsel to the proposed agreement had been addressed, 

Husband had agreed to waive spousal support, and, under the agreement,

Husband could choose to apply his income to his retirement accounts. The 

court concluded Wife had not gained an unfair advantage and Husband 

“received exactly what he bargained for.”

¶28 The court further found that any presumption of duress or 

undue influence “was dispelled by the evidence,” including the monthslong negotiation, presence of a notary, and cooling-off period. As to 

Husband’s argument that he only signed because Wife threatened to annul 

the marriage if he did not immediately sign, the superior court did “not find 

Husband credible,” noted evidence to the contrary, and found no other 

evidence to show Wife had made this threat. And as for Husband’s 

argument that the parties never abided by the agreement, the court found 

that the agreement had anticipated this circumstance by providing that the 

waiver of any breach of the agreement “shall not” be considered a waiver 

of any subsequent breach of any term, covenant, or condition. Moreover, 

the court noted that Husband had identified no conduct by Wife that 

waived the spousal support or property provisions. The court’s findings 

and legal conclusions are supported by both the record and California law.

¶29 The superior court made sufficient findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in its analysis of the post-nuptial agreement under 

California law, and we find no abuse of the court’s discretion.
FORD v. ERICKSON

Decision of the Court

8

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶30 Wife requests her attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under 

A.R.S. § 25-324, citing “the unreasonableness of Husband’s positions taken 

in this appeal.” In our discretion, we deny her request for attorneys’ fees 

but award her taxable costs upon compliance with Rule 21, ARCAP.

CONCLUSION

¶31 The superior court’s order is affirmed.