[Cite as Spurlock v. Pemberton, 2013-Ohio-4002.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LAWRENCE COUNTY 

GARY SPURLOCK and GLADYS : 

SPURLOCK, 

 : 

Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Case No. 13CA1 

 Cross-Appellees, : 

vs. : 

 

JOHN PEMBERTON and JACKIE : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

PEMBERTON, 

 : 

Defendants-Appellees/ 

Cross-Appellants. 

_______________________________________________________________ 

 APPEARANCES: 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS/ Craig A. Allen, 311 South Third Street, 

 CROSS-APPELLEES: P.O. Box No. 1, Ironton, Ohio 45638 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES/ Richard F. Bentley, Wolfe & Bentley, 

 CROSS-APPELLANTS: LLP, 425 Center Street, Ironton, Ohio 45638 

_________________________________________________________________ 

CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT 

DATE JOURNALIZED: 9-10-13 

ABELE, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas Court judgment in 

favor of John and Jackie Pemberton (Pembertons) defendants below and 

appellees/cross-appellant’s herein, on their counter-claim against Gary and Gladys Spurlock, 

(Spurlocks) plaintiffs below and appellant’s herein. The Spurlocks assign the following errors 

for review: 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 2

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF 

CROSS-APPELLANT, APPELLEE’S OWNERSHIP OF 

PROPERTY BASED UPON AN UNRECORDED LAND 

CONTRACT.” 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE 

CROSS-APPELLANT, APPELLEE HAD SECURED RIGHTS 

TO THE LAND BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.” 

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING IT SHOULD 

QUIET TITLE IN THE CROSS-APPELLANT, APPELLEES [.]” 

{¶ 2} The Pembertons raise the following cross-assignment of error for review1

: 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE 

MAGISTRATE’S DECISION AS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE 

SURVEY BY DEFENDANTS’ SURVEYOR; THEREFORE, 

NOT GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ CLAIM FOR QUIET TITLE 

BY DEED WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

{¶ 3} The parties are contiguous property owners. The Pembertons took possession of 

their land in 1984 or 1985 under a “written agreement” that was frequently referred to as a land 

contract.2

 This contract was not recorded and, when the property was finally conveyed by deed 

in 1994, the unrecorded contract was discarded. 

{¶ 4} The Spurlocks acquired their land two years later, in 1996. The dispute involves 

 1

 Cross-appellants neglect to set forth in their brief, as App.R. 16(A)(3) requires, a separate statement of 

assignments of error. Thus, we take the assignment of error from the argument portion of their brief. 

2 John Pemberton’s testimony was somewhat confusing as to the actual date he took possession of the premises. 

Early in the hearing, he testified he had “been there since 1982," but later in the hearing, he testified that it was 1984 or 1985. 

Either way, for purposes of adverse possession, the precise date under these circumstances is unimportant. 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 3

a piece of property of undetermined size3

 that lies north of Township Road 253. The 

Pembertons claim that this land belongs to them, that they have used the land consistently since 

the 1980s and that it was used by the Joseph family, their predecessors-in-title. The Spurlocks, 

however, claim the property as a part of the land conveyed to them in 1996. They commenced 

the instant action on July 26, 2010 and alleged that the Pembertons had trespassed on their 

property continuously since 1998. The Spurlocks requested an injunction against such trespass 

in the future and damages in excess of $25,000. 

{¶ 5} The Pembertons denied liability in trespass and asserted several defenses. They 

also counterclaimed and alleged, inter alia, outright ownership of the disputed land or, 

alternatively, that they acquired ownership through adverse possession. 

{¶ 6} At the hearing before the Magistrate, each side testified as to their ownership 

interests in the disputed land. However, the bulk of the evidence concerned two surveys. 

Lawrence Murphy's 1997 survey shows that the Spurlocks own the area in dispute, while Thomas 

Snyder's 2011 survey shows that the Pembertons are the owners. Both surveyors, not 

unexpectedly, criticized the methods the other used. The Snyder survey, as noted several times, 

shows Township Road 253 running entirely through the Pemberton land. This means that the 

Spurlocks have no access to the road and Gary Spurlock testified that his property has no other 

access other than that road. 

{¶ 7} The Magistrate's decision concluded that the Snyder survey is “more credible” and 

recommended that the complaint be dismissed and that title be quieted in favor of the 

 3 Lawrence Murphy testified that, although he “never really sat down and figured it out,” he estimated that the 

disputed land is “something like a half acre.” 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 4

Pembertons. Having so recommended, the Magistrate declined to rule on the Pembertons’ 

adverse possession claim expressly finding it to be “moot.” 

{¶ 8} The Spurlocks objected to that decision, and the trial court disagreed with the 

magistrate on the issue of which survey is more credible. However, although the court found the 

disputed land to be part of the Spurlock property, it also found sufficient evidence to show that 

the Pemberton’s acquired it by adverse possession. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. 

 I 

{¶ 9} In their first assignment of error, the Spurlocks assert that the magistrate erred by 

allowing testimony that the Pembertons claimed ownership of their property from the 1980s on 

the basis of an unrecorded land contract. 

{¶ 10} Initially, we point out that claims of error on appeal should be based on a trial 

court's actions, rather than the magistrate's actions. Hartley v. Jones, 3rd Dist. Hancock App. No. 

5–12–35, 2013-Ohio-2381, at ¶20. This is because a trial court conducts a de novo review to 

determine whether to adopt, or to reject, a Magistrate’s recommendation. Id. Thus, the judgment 

that constitutes the final order is always that of the trial court, not the magistrate. 

{¶ 11} Second, we find no authority for the Spurlocks’ argument in the two statutes they 

cite to support their assignment of error. R.C. 5313.02(C) requires a land contract vendor to 

record the instrument within twenty days of it being signed. R.C. 5313.04 provides that, if the 

vendor fails to do so, “the vendee may enforce such provisions in a municipal court, county 

court, or court of common pleas . . .” We, however, find found nothing in the statutes that 

renders an unrecorded land contract void, or has anything to do with the propriety of testimony 

about such instruments in a court proceeding. 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 5

{¶ 12} Third, whether the Pembertons were land contract vendees, or mere tenants as the 

Spurlocks argue, is largely superfluous. Even if the Josephs remained the owners of the 

property until the 1994 deed was recorded to transfer ownership rights to the Pembertons, as the 

trial court noted in its judgment, and as we discuss in our review of the next assignment of error, 

considerable evidence was adduced to establish that the Pembertons used the disputed piece of 

land as if it belonged to them. Accordingly, regardless of who owned the land north of 

Township Road 253 between 1984 and 1994, someone, either the Josephs or the Pembertons, 

adversely used the land the Spurlocks now claim as theirs. 

{¶ 13} Finally, even if we assume, arguendo, that Pemberton’s testimony concerning the 

unrecorded land contract should not have been permitted at the hearing, the Magistrate’s decision 

to allow that evidence constitutes harmless error. See Civ.R. 61. The trial court’s January 2, 

2013 judgment states in pertinent part: 

“Although the Defendants talked about an unrecorded land contract that has been 

since destroyed, the Court did not have the benefit of this document, its legal 

description or any other facts concerning that document and can therefore, form 

no legal conclusions as to that document.” 

{¶ 14} Thus, the trial court afforded the alleged instrument no weight in ruling for the 

Pembertons. Thus, even if testimony about the contested tract was improper, the Spurlocks have 

suffered no prejudice. 

{¶ 15} For all of these reasons, we find no merit in the first assignment of error and it is 

hereby overruled. 

 II 

{¶ 16} We jointly consider the Spurlocks’s second and third assignment of error because 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 6

they assert that the trial court erred by quieting title in favor of the Pembertons by virtue of 

adverse possession. 

{¶ 17} “To acquire title by adverse possession, a party must prove, by clear and 

convincing evidence, exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use for a 

period of twenty-one years.” See Grace v. Koch, 81 Ohio St.3d 577, 692 N.E.2d 1009 (1998), at 

the syllabus; also see Edgington v. Newman, 4th Dist. Adams App. No. 11CA917, 

2012-Ohio-4962, at ¶10. An appeal of a ruling on an adverse possession claim is usually 

considered under a “manifest weight of the evidence” standard of review. See Thompson v. 

Hayslip, 74 Ohio App.3d 829, 600 N.E.2d 756 (4th Dist. 1991); Pottmeyer v. Douglas, 4th Dist. 

Washington No. 10CA7, 2010-Ohio-5293, at ¶21. In other words, an appellate court will not 

reverse the trial court’s decision on the issue if it is supported by some competent, credible 

evidence. See Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 972 N.E.2d 517, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶14; 

Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 88 Ohio St.3d 7, 10, 722 N.E.2d 1018 (2000); C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley 

Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578, at the syllabus (1978). This standard of review 

is highly deferential and even the existence of “some” evidence is sufficient to support a court's 

judgment and prevent a reversal. See Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio App.3d 155, 159, 694 N.E.2d 

989 (4th Dist. 1997); Willman v. Cole, 4th Dist. Adams App. No. 01CA725, 2002-Ohio-3596, at 

¶24. 

{¶ 18} In the case sub judice, William Douglas testified that he was familiar with this 

area of the township for more than fifty years and knew that the Joseph family used the land 

(now claimed by the Pembertons) for more than thirty years. Charles Jones testified that the 

Pembertons used the land in dispute as a “garden spot” and John Pemberton’s uncle had lived in 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 7

“a little camper” on the area between 1985 and 1990. John Pemberton testified that he was 

familiar with the property since the 1960s when, apparently, he worked for the Joseph family. 

He testified that Ms. Joseph used the disputed area as a garden where she grew “strawberries and 

watermelons and mush melons and stuff.” 

{¶ 19} As for his claim to the land, John Pemberton testified that he took “possession” in 

1985. He further stated that the Josephs had kept old farm equipment on the land, that he gave 

away to get rid of it, and even leased a temporary right-of-way over the land so that the Ice Creek 

Land Company could access timber behind that property. It is worth repeating, as we said 

previously, that whether Pemberton engaged in these acts as a land contract vendee or a tenant is 

beside the point. The fact remains that the Pembertons, or their predecessors-in-title, exercised 

control over the land longer than the twenty-one year time period. 

{¶ 20} The Spurlocks adduced no evidence in opposition to contradict this evidence and 

their counter-argument on appeal is that because the land contract was not recorded, no tacking 

of adverse use of the Josephs and Pembertons should be permitted. We disagree.4

{¶ 21} First, appellants cite no authority for that proposition of law and we have found no 

support in our research. Second, as we discussed previously, even if the unrecorded land 

contract is disregarded, the fact remains that the Josephs adversely used the property (or allowed 

their tenants to adversely use it) until its conveyance to the Pembertons in the 1990s. We see no 

reason why the Josephs' use prior to 1994, and use the Pembertons' use after that date, should not 

 4 The “tacking” doctrine holds adverse use by prior owners in the chain-of-title can be combined to establish the 

twenty-one year time frame. See Zipf v. Dalgarn, 114 Ohio St. 291, 295-296, 151 N.E. 174 (1926); McNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio 

St. 32, (1871). 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 8

be tacked together to determine the adverse possession claim. 

{¶ 22} Thus, we readily conclude that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support 

the trial court’s adverse possession judgment. We also find no error in the trial court’s judgment 

to quiet title in favor of the Pembertons. 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, for these reasons, the assignments of error are without merit and are 

hereby overruled. 

 III 

{¶ 24} We now turn to the Pembertons’s cross-assignment of error wherein they assert 

that the trial court erred by overruling the Magistrate as to which survey was the most reliable. 

However, because we have already affirmed the trial court’s judgment that granted judgment on 

the basis of adverse possession, it is tempting to disregard this assignment of error as moot. 

App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Unfortunately, we cannot do that in light of the limited nature of the trial 

court’s ruling. 

{¶ 25} The second count of the Pemberton counterclaim alleges that they had acquired 

title through adverse possession and requests that title be quieted in their favor against “any 

right” of the Spurlocks. The remedy the trial court awarded, however, quieted title in the real 

estate “only . . . for the itemized uses which were made of it during the twenty-one year plus 

period.” What the trial court did, in essence, is to hold that the Pembertons acquired an 

easement by prescription.5

 An easement allows only for limited use of the land, Fitzpatrick v. 

Palmer, 186 Ohio App.3d 80, 2009-Ohio-6008, 926 N.E.2d 651, at ¶22 (4th Dist.); S.V., Inc. v. 

 5 For a discussion on adverse possession and easements by prescription, see Dunn v. Ransom, 4th Dist. Pike App. No. 

10CA806, 2011-Ohio-4253, at ¶¶75-77. 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 9

Casey, 5th Dist. Delaware App. No. No. 12CAE070043, 2013-Ohio-1882, at ¶51, and, as noted 

above, the trial court limited the Pembertons and their future successors-in-title to the uses that 

have been made of the land thus far. This is a lesser estate than they would have received if the 

trial court had accepted the Magistrate’s recommendations as the Snyder survey showed them 

owning the land outright. Thus, we cannot disregard the cross-assignment of error as moot.6

{¶ 26} That said, as to the Pembertons’ actual argument that the trial court erred by 

rejecting the Magistrate’s recommendations and adopting the Murphy survey over the Snyder 

survey, we find no reversible error. A trial court may adopt a magistrate’s finding as to the 

credibility of witnesses, but is not required to do so. See State ex rel Dewine v. Ashworth, 4th

Dist. Lawrence App. No. 11CA16, 2012-Ohio-5632, at ¶37; Sweeney v. Sweeney, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 06AP–251, 2006–Ohio–6988, ¶12–18. We also recognize that the trial court 

expended considerable time (nearly four full pages of its decision) and cited specific passages 

from the hearing transcript to explain why the court differed with the Magistrate's conclusion on 

this issue. Moreover, Civ.R.53(D)(4)(b) expressly grants the trial court authority to reject the 

magistrate’s decision. Thus, it is certainly within the court’s province to opt to accept the 

Murphy survey over the Snyder survey. 

{¶ 27} As for the Pembertons’ argument that the trial court’s decision on their first 

counterclaim (for quiet title) is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we again find no 

reversible error. The Murphy survey, as well as the surveyor’s testimony, established that the 

disputed land is within the Spurlock boundary line. Again, judgments supported by some 

 6 The Pembertons did not assign as error that the trial court gave them a different remedy than they requested in 

their counterclaim, so we do not address that action. 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 10

competent and credible evidence will not be reversed on appeal. Eastley, supra at ¶14; Shemo, 

supra at 10; C.E. Morris Co., supra at the syllabus. Here, the record is replete with evidence to 

support the trial court’s decision on this issue. For all these reasons, we find no merit to the 

cross-assignment of error and it is hereby overruled. 

{¶ 28} Having considered all the errors the parties assigned and cross-assigned, we 

hereby affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that the parties equally divide the costs 

herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal and cross-appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County 

Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

McFarland, P.J. & Harsha, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion 

For the Court 

BY: 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge 
LAWRENCE, 13CA1 11

 

 NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the 

time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.