SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3845-18T2

M.R.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

HUDSON COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Respondent-Respondent.

___________________________

Argued September 23, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human 

Services, Division of Family Development, Agency 

Docket No. C253478009.

Gregory G. Diebold argued the cause for appellant 

(Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; 

Rachael E. Funk, of counsel and on the briefs).

Francis Xavier Baker, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, 

Attorney General; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 24, 2019
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Attorney General, of counsel; Nicholas Logothetis, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant M.R. appeals the final agency decision of the Department of 

Human Services, Division of Family Development (Department) denying her

application for emergency assistance in the form of temporary rental assistance

through the Work First New Jersey (WFNJ) program. We reverse because we 

conclude there was no credible evidence to support the Department's 

determination that M.R. was not entitled to emergency assistance since she 

voluntary quit her employment as proscribed by N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3).

I

M.R.'s employment with Star Hospitality Group (Star Hospitality), as a 

housekeeper, was terminated.

1 Thus, on December 19, 2018, she applied to the 

Hudson County Department of Family Services (County), which administers the 

WFNJ program, for emergency assistance in order to pay her rent. However, 

because eviction proceedings against her had not yet commenced, her 

application could not be processed. The situation changed about two months 

 

1

 The record does not indicate M.R.'s termination date.
3

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later on February 4, 2019, when M.R. faced eviction so the County then

processed her application for emergency assistance.

On March 12, the County sent M.R. a notice that her emergency assistance 

application was denied because her employment termination was "caused by 

[her own] actions." The County cited N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3) and imposed a 

six-month penalty period precluding M.R. from receiving emergency assistance. 

M.R. challenged the ruling by requesting a fair hearing before an Administrative 

Law Judge (ALJ). 

At the hearing, Jared Martinez, a County employee, testified regarding his 

supervisor's interview of M.R., during her initial application for emergency 

assistance on December 19, 2018, and the efforts made to contact Star 

Hospitality to find out why M.R. was terminated. 

Martinez revealed that after multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact Star 

Hospitality by phone and mail, the County eventually received two letters from 

the company's Director of Operations. The first, dated February 13, 2019, 

merely confirmed M.R.'s employment. The second, dated February 21, 

disclosed that Star Hospitality "is a temporary work agency," and tersely stated: 

"[M.R.] was released from employment due to reduced contractual business." 
4

A-3845-18T2

Neither correspondence suggested M.R. was terminated due to poor work 

performance.

The County admitted into evidence M.R.'s hand-written statement dated 

December 19, providing: "I was fired from Star Hospitality in November for 

work performance and the business for the [h]otel was slow."

Martinez conceded the County, even after explicit requests, was unable to 

obtain any information in writing from Star Hospitality about M.R.'s alleged

poor work performance. Nevertheless, the County determined the sole written 

statement by M.R. was a sufficient basis to deny her emergency assistance. 

M.R., representing herself, was asked by the ALJ about being fired due to 

staff reduction and work performance issues. She responded, "the only reason 

why they reduced the staff was because they didn't have enough money to go 

out to people that wasn't fully clean in the room [sic]." When the ALJ inquired 

if there was any additional information she wanted to share, M.R. revealed she

had attended a job fair hosted by Star Hospitality where she was told she could 

get her job back, but was never contacted about reemployment. The record is 

unclear when the job fair took place, but it appears to have occurred around the 

time prior to M.R's eviction because the ALJ asked her if she informed the 

County about the job offer.
5

A-3845-18T2

The ALJ's three-page initial decision made seven findings of fact, 

including that M.R.'s termination was for both work performance and reduced

business. In her legal analysis, citing N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3) and N.J.A.C. 

10:90-4.14(b), the ALJ stated M.R. "lost her job due to her job performance" 

and the "cessation of employment was due to her job performance" with no 

mention of the reduction in Star Hospitality's business. 

M.R., now represented by counsel, filed exceptions to the initial decision. 

The Department rejected M.R.'s contentions and denied her emergency 

assistance. In its final agency decision, the Department, citing only N.J.A.C. 

10:90-6.1(c)(3), stated it "agree[s] [with the ALJ] that [M.R.] caused her own 

homelessness" and adopted the ALJ's factual findings and legal analysis. 

II

Before us, M.R. maintains the Department erred in applying a definition 

of "voluntary cessation of employment" that included unsatisfactory job 

performance. She asserts this is an "expansion" of the definition of the phrase 

under N.J.S.A. 44:10-63.1(g) and N.J.A.C. 90-4.14(b) and -6.1(c)(3), and, thus, 

is plainly unreasonable and de facto rulemaking. Second, she argues the 

Department's determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, 

she contends this appeal is not moot because the Department's decision impacts
6

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her future eligibility for welfare benefits, and the issue of what constitutes 

voluntary cessation of employment is capable of future repetition but will likely 

evade review because N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3)'s mandated six-month penalty 

period would often expire before the Appellate Division can issue a decision. 

Mootness

We first address the issue of mootness. The issue was seemingly raised 

in M.R.'s merits brief, in anticipation of the Department's argument that her 

appeal should be dismissed as moot because her six-month ineligibility penalty 

for emergency assistance under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3) expired on September 

11, 2019. The Department, however, did not address the issue in its merits brief 

opposing the appeal. Since the Department failed to argue M.R.'s appeal was 

moot, we need not discuss the issue. See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 

648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").

That said, for the sake of completeness we briefly address the issue. 

A matter is moot when the requested decision "can have no practical effect 

on the existing controversy." Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015)

(quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-

22 (App. Div. 2011)). Mootness occurs when the original issue between those 

who began the litigation has been resolved. Comando v. Nugiel, 436 N.J. Super. 
7

A-3845-18T2

203, 219 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting DeVesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 

(1993)). We will generally not decide a case "in which the issue is hypothetical, 

a judgment cannot grant effective relief, or the parties do not have concrete 

adversity of interest." Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J. Super. 242, 243 

(App. Div. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 437 (Ch. Div. 

1976)).

However, where there are collateral legal consequences inherent in an

issue to be decided, the legitimate policy concerns underlying the mootness 

doctrine do not restrict us in resolving an issue where the relief sought has 

passed. See Bd. of Trs. v. Davis, 147 N.J. Super. 540, 543-44 (App. Div. 1977)

(holding "defendant's right to appeal from the parole revocation is unaffected by 

his re-parole pending this appeal," because it may prejudice defendant by an 

"improperly founded prior parole revocation.").

Guided by these principles, M.R.'s claim is not moot because the 

Department's denial of emergency assistance could affect her ability to receive 

future emergency assistance and related pilot-program benefits. As she points 
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out, there are two specific pilot programs, PHASE,

2

and HHE,

3

that have been

made unavailable to applicants who have had penalties imposed against them 

for "non-compliance." N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.9(c)(5); 44 N.J.R. 1897(a) (July 2, 

2012). In fact, the HHE program specifically indicated that a past determination 

that an applicant for benefits caused his or her own homelessness makes the 

applicant ineligible for the program. 44 N.J.R. 1897(a) (July 2, 2012) (contained 

in section 6.9(c)(4)). 

Appeal Merits

To resolve the merits of M.R.'s appeal, we must first determine which 

provisions of the administrative code apply in deciding whether she was 

properly denied emergency assistance based upon the Department's 

determination that M.R. was terminated from her job due to her own voluntary 

conduct-poor work performance. 

The Department's final agency decision cited only to N.J.A.C. 10:90-

6.1(c)(3), which sets forth the guidelines for the availability of emergency 

assistance. The regulation, in pertinent part, provides: 

 

2

 Provisional Housing -- Awaiting Supplemental Social Security Income/ 

Disability Insurance Eligibility. 

3

 Housing Hardship Extension. 
9

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3. Emergency assistance shall not be provided to a 

WFNJ applicant when an actual or imminent state of 

homelessness exists as a direct result of the voluntary 

cessation of employment by the adult household 

member without good cause (as provided at N.J.A.C. 

10:90-4.11). [Emergency assistance] shall not be 

provided for a period of six months to the entire 

household in which the recipient adult member 

voluntarily quits employment without good cause 

while receiving emergency assistance (see N.J.A.C. 

10:90-4.11(b) concerning a voluntary quit).

[N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3) (emphasis added).]

To determine whether an applicant has voluntarily ceased employment 

without good cause, N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3) directs to N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.11, 

which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Good cause for . . . refusal to accept or maintain 

employment shall be found if: 

1. The mandatory WFNJ participant is certified by 

DFD to be physically or mentally unable to engage in 

an assigned WFNJ work requirement or to cooperate 

with a WFNJ program requirement; 

2. The conditions of employment are a risk to the 

WFNJ individual's health and safety (subject to review 

and determination by the Division of Family 

Development); 

3. Child care is needed and not available. (See N.J.A.C. 

10:90-5.2, Supportive services, child care); or 

4. The mandatory WFNJ participant is unable to 

engage in an assigned WFNJ work requirement or to 
10 A-3845-18T2

cooperate with a WFNJ program requirement due to 

family violence. If noncompliance relates to family 

violence, the FVO Initiative procedures are to be 

followed (see N.J.A.C. 10:90-20). 

Although the final agency decision adopted the ALJ's factual findings and 

conclusions of law, it made no mention of N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.14(b), which the 

ALJ relied upon in her initial decision. N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.14(b) provides that a 

recipient of WFNJ cash assistance benefits is no longer eligible when the 

recipient voluntarily quits employment.

4

 Considering the Department chose not 

to mention N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.14(b), it appears the agency was remiss in not 

explaining that the regulation could not apply to M.R. because she was applying 

for emergency assistance and was not a recipient of the benefits. 

Yet, neither the Department nor the ALJ cited to N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.15,

which is relevant to an applicant seeking emergency assistance.5 N.J.A.C. 

10:90-1.15, titled "Voluntary quit" provides: 

 

4

 N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.14(b) states "voluntary cessation of employment by 

recipients, without good cause, may include, but are not limited to, situations 

where individuals were discharged from employment due to an action or 

inaction on his or her part in violation of the employer's written rules or policies, 

or lawful job related instructions." 

5

 Given that N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c)(3) discusses the eligibility standard for 

emergency assistance and mentions N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.15 (Good cause), it would 

seem that N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.15 should also be referenced in N.J.A.C. 10:90-

6.1(c)(3).
11 A-3845-18T2

An adult applicant for WFNJ shall not be eligible for 

benefits when the applicant's eligibility is the result of 

a voluntary cessation of employment, without good 

cause, including situations in which an applicant has 

been discharged from employment due to an action or 

inaction on his or her part in violation of the employer's 

written rules or policies, or lawful job related 

instructions within 90 days prior to the date of 

application. The applicant shall be ineligible for 

assistance for a period of 90 days beginning with the 

date of quit. Other members of the adult applicant's 

assistance unit shall remain eligible to apply for 

benefits. The individual who voluntarily ceased 

employment shall be responsible for providing the 

necessary information so that a good cause 

determination can be made (see N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.14(b) 

for voluntary quit provisions for WFNJ recipients and 

N.J.A.C. 10:90-4.14(c) regarding good cause 

provisions).

[(Emphasis added).]

Our decision does not turn on the failure of the Department to rely upon 

N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.15, nor its apparent erroneous reliance on N.J.A.C. 10:90-

4.14(b) through its adoption of the ALJ's decision. In fact, the regulations share 

almost the exact language to define voluntary quits so the distinction is 

irrelevant as to the merits of determining whether M.R.'s termination was a 

voluntary cessation of employment. 

Instead, our decision turns on the Department's application of N.J.A.C. 

10:90-6.1(c)(3) in determining whether M.R. voluntarily ceased her 
12 A-3845-18T2

employment without good cause. In turn, we must decide if "there is a clear 

showing that [the Department's decision] is arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" R.S. v. Div. of Med. 

Assistance & Health Servs., 434 N.J. Super. 250, 261 (App. Div. 2014). 

(quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 25 

(2011)). In particular, we focus on "whether the record contains substantial 

evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action[.]" A.B. 

v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 339 (App. Div. 

2009) (citation omitted). If our review of the record leads us to conclude the 

agency's finding is clearly erroneous, the decision is not entitled to judicial 

deference and must be set aside. L.M. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health 

Servs., 140 N.J. 480, 490 (1995). We do not simply rubber stamp an agency's 

decision. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999). 

The record does not support the Department's conclusion that M.R. was 

terminated "caused by [her own] actions" – poor work performance. Star 

Hospitality advised the Department it was a temporary employment agency and 

"[M.R.] was released from employment due to reduced contractual business." 

The agency's conclusion that M.R.'s work performance caused her termination 

was limited to her ambiguous and unsophisticated written statement that she was 
13 A-3845-18T2

"fired" because of "work performance and the business for the [h]otel was slow." 

Given Star Hospitality's correspondence, the record reflects M.R. was a 

temporary employee who was terminated because staffing was reduced due to 

decreased business. The cause of M.R.'s termination was not due to her actions, 

but Star Hospitality's business turndown and the temporary nature of her 

employment. The likely inference from M.R.'s written statement, as well as her 

testimony, is that Star Hospitality had to reduce staff and decided to retain their 

best workers. 

The fact that M.R. was not terminated due to her performance is supported 

by her uncontested testimony that a representative of Star Hospitality told her at 

a job fair she would be rehired. The ALJ had the opportunity to evaluate M.R.'s 

testimony and did not find it lacking in creditability. See In re In re Taylor, 158 

N.J. 644, 660 (1999) (deference given to the ALJ's factual findings which were 

substantially influenced by the ALJ's opportunity to hear the testimony and 

observe the witnesses testify) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). 

Although M.R. testified she was not rehired, the record does not indicate it was 

due to her poor work performance. 

Furthermore, we are mindful that M.R. was not represented by counsel at 

the fair hearing, and given her lack of sophistication evidenced in her testimony, 
14 A-3845-18T2

she was not aware of the relevant regulatory standards and the proofs she needed 

to present to obtain a favorable final agency decision. 

Under the circumstances presented, the denial of emergency assistance to 

M.R. was arbitrary, unreasonable, and lacking fair support in the record.

Reversed.