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23–171 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–112

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE BLACK

SEA AREA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 8, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia, Chairman

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Allen, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement .................. 1

Baran, Zeyno, director, International Security and Energy Programs, the

Nixon Center, Washington, DC ........................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 5

Jackson, Bruce, president, Project on Transitional Democracies, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 21

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25

Socor, Vladimir, senior fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC .......... 30

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33

Tefft, Hon. John F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and

Eurasian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................ 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11

(III)

(1)

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE BLACK

SEA AREA

TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2005

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. George Allen, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senator Allen.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM VIRGINIA

Senator ALLEN. Good afternoon and welcome to all who have

gathered. We’re a little delayed. We had a vote on the floor, and

thank you all for your forbearance.

I’m proud to call this hearing to order. This is the first subcommittee hearing of any subcommittee on the Foreign Relations

Committee in this term, and this Subcommittee on European Affairs is going to examine the future of democracy in the Black Sea

area.

I will introduce—we have two panels of witnesses this afternoon.

I’ll introduce each in greater detail as they present themselves.

First we’ll hear from Ambassador John Tefft who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State. On the second panel the subcommittee will be hearing testimony from Mr. Bruce Jackson, who is the president of the

Project on Transitional Democracies; Mr. Vladimir Socor, senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation; and Ms. Zeyno Baran, the director of International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon

Center. We welcome you all.

Also, Senator Biden will not be able to be here this afternoon,

and his statement will be made part of the record.

I do understand that the Ambassador from Georgia to the United

States, Levan Mikeladze, is here. Mr. Ambassador, wave your hand

so we can see where you are. There you are. Welcome.

And we have a good sized delegation of leaders from Turkey with

us, led by Faruk Celik, who is the deputy chair, the equivalent of

the majority whip here, and so we welcome all our visitors and

friends from Turkey. Thank you all for being here as well.

We all know that the Black Sea region is strategically located.

It lies in close proximity to Europe, to Russia, and the former Soviet Republics, as well as the Middle East. Given its geographic imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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portance and the threats facing both the United States and the

world, it’s clear that the United States should carefully examine

the role that we play in the Black Sea region, and determine

whether it’s in our interest to become even more engaged.

In making such a determination, we first must examine where

today’s threats are coming from and where tomorrow’s threats are

likely to emerge, assess the situation presently, anticipate the future, and then determine the appropriate actions one should take.

Now, we all recognize that there are many trouble spots all over

the world. But most would agree that the Middle East is going to

continue to be a home of many governments and also groups that

will threaten the interests of the United States and our allies in

one form or another. And it is important, in my point of view, that

we be engaged in this region, and it’s not going to be just for a

short period of time. It’s going to be for many years to come.

Therefore, it’s logical that the United States shore up its alliances with countries that surround the Middle East. It is clearly

in our interest to have the governments and the countries on the

Black Sea move closer toward the principles of freedom and justice.

So, given this interest, the question becomes: How can the

United States help promote reform in this region? At the outset, we

should take note that the recent revolutions in Georgia and the

Ukraine have ushered in proreform leaders in governments that

have pledged transparency, accountability, and the end of corruption. These are positive developments that we must support, when

and where appropriate, to ensure their sustainability.

However, there are still a number of countries in the region that

have significant progress to make before they can objectively be

viewed as representative governments or free and just societies.

During the recent hearing, that I chaired, on the President’s international assistance budget for Europe and Eurasia, officials from

USAID provided several graphs and charts, and they were from

different organizations, Freedom House and others, which measured economic reforms and democratic freedoms.

I’m one who believes that objective measurements are very, very

helpful, because whatever can be measured can be made better.

There needs to be something that measures progress. The graphs

that they had—they had all sorts of reform charts, economic reforms on one axis, democratic reforms on another axis, and then

rated each country in Europe and Eurasia on a scale of one to five.

Not surprisingly, the countries in the European Union, particularly Western Europe, rated the highest as far as economic freedoms and also democratic freedoms. The West was No. 1, but then

you had countries in this order: Northern Europe, Southeastern

Europe, and finally was Eurasia.

What that showed were, there are a number of countries on the

Black Sea that have made significant progress, such as Bulgaria

and Romania, while in the South Caucasus, it was clear that a

number of changes had to become—had to come into fruition to

really have free and market-oriented societies.

What was also instructive about these graphs and these measurements were how these countries with the highest levels of freedom and the most economic reform not only enjoyed greater economic prosperity and opportunities and security, but they also had

3

a higher life expectancy. So it’s not just jobs, it’s not just economic,

it’s not just investment. It’s also—there’s a correlation also with

the life expectancy of their citizens.

Now, I find these to be very helpful and somewhat powerful arguments and ones that our country should continue to emphasize

to those nations in the Black Sea region that may have regressed

from the initial democratic free market reforms that were made following the fall of the Soviet empire.

Representative government and free enterprise, of course, are

noble principles. But to be successful, they must be coupled with

transparency and accountability. An impediment to progress in

many Black Sea countries has been the systemic corruption that

drains the public of all confidence in the government and reinforces

the belief that cronyism is the only path to success, with individuals not judged on their merits, but by—on their proximity to people in power.

There has been some progress, notably the efforts of the Georgian Government to purge crooked officials from ministries and law

enforcement agencies. However, until national governments make

the eradication of corruption a top priority, they will continue to

lag.

It’s clear that foreign businesses will not invest in countries

where they cannot expect equal justice under the law, and where

bribes are the common business practice. That’s not going to give

any company any confidence in the stability, the credibility they

need to be making large investments when choosing among many

places around the world.

Also hindering further progress in the region is the role of Russia. The Russian Government is playing an unconstructive role by

maintaining troops in Moldova and in Georgia. Those troops are

not maintaining order, and are often posted in regions where lawlessness and smuggling are rampant.

Russian involvement in last year’s Ukrainian elections and its

habit of punishing neighbors by withholding oil and natural gas are

additional examples of Russia’s unconstructive policy in the region.

Russia may somehow feel threatened by the emergence of democracy so close to its borders and may stubbornly want to maintain

control or influence over the former republics. Now, while the

United States should acknowledge how these changes are perceived

by Russia, I believe that our country must take a firm stance

against policies and activities that inhibit progress and fuel instability in several Black Sea areas.

Further impediments are—to greater reform are long—are in

some of the longstanding conflicts that continue in the region, for

example, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. If it could be resolved, it

could have far-reaching, positive implications for the entire region.

Peace between the Armenians and the Azeris would stabilize the

region in question and would lead to normalized relations between

Armenia and Turkey, opening the border between the two countries, and obviously access to more markets. Peace between these

two neighbors would provide Armenia, also, with greater prospects

for economic success and diminish the need for closer ties with

Iran.

4

Now, given the strategic significance of the Black Sea and the

prospects for movement toward democracy, I continue to believe

that the United States should begin basing more assets at locations

within the region. I understand that this is a decision for the Department of Defense, it’s not a State Department decision. However, the threats facing the United States and our allies may require swift and sometimes massive response to remote places anywhere in the world, but especially in Central Asia, and we know,

in the Middle East. We must objectively consider the merits of

repositioning a portion of the U.S. bases and assets where they’re

more likely or more useful for the missions that are predictable

ahead.

Another consideration to this argument is cost. Countries like

Romania and Bulgaria offer existing infrastructure and lower costs

than Western Europe. Knowing the need to maximize every dollar

we spend, it makes sense that we take a hard look at an area that

is geographically advantageous and reduces the cost to American

taxpayers.

We all recognize our military is undergoing a transformation to

become a lighter, more agile fighting force. It makes sense also,

therefore, to examine how our forces are aligned around the world

to make sure they’re ready to confront the threats quickly and effectively.

The majority, in closing, of the countries in the Black Sea have

seen the importance of aligning themselves with the United States

in the overall war on terrorism and the campaigns in Afghanistan

and Iraq. At the same time, the United States needs to recognize

the strategic importance of the Black Sea.

Further progress toward establishment of free and just societies

throughout the region would bring economic prosperity to the people in those countries that unfortunately continue to lag behind

their Western neighbors. And at the same time, it serves our foreign policy and economic interests that they do so move in the right

direction.

I want to thank our witnesses again for appearing before the

subcommittee this afternoon. I look forward to your testimony. I’m

going to first introduce our first panel of one, Ambassador John

Tefft. Ambassador Tefft is presently the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of

State. Long, distinguished career, more recently from 2000 to 2003

he was our Ambassador to Lithuania, and he’s also served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1996 to

1999, and was a Charge d’Affaires at the Embassy from November

1996 until September 1997.

Ambassador Tefft has also served as Director of the Office of

Northern European Affairs from 1992 to 1994, and also Deputy Director in the Office of the Soviet Union, later Russia and CIS Affairs from 1989 to 1992. Also—at least you had one in a warm

place—the Embassy in Rome from 1986 to 1989.

He has also had foreign assignments in Budapest and Jerusalem,

as well as service on the United States delegation on the START

arms control negotiations in 1985. In his current position as Deputy Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Tefft supervises the offices in

the European Bureau responsible for United States bilateral relaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tions with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, as well as the

Office of Policy and Regional Affairs, which coordinates nonproliferation, security assistance, export control, and other related

issues throughout the European Bureau.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important hearing.

Since September 2001 we have, understandably, been concentrating on the Middle

East and central Asia. Of late, a neighboring region, the area surrounding the Black

Sea, has increasingly claimed our attention. It has vital strategic importance. It contains examples of significant progress, but also cases of unresolved conflicts.

Several large trends can be discerned in recent events in the Black Sea area,

among them:

• A rising tide of democracy, first in Georgia, and then in Ukraine;

• Receding Russian influence and Moscow’s efforts to reverse this process;

• Connected with Russia’s efforts, the persistence of the so-called ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Azerbaijan’s NagornoKarabakh, and in Moldova’s Transnistria; and

• The drawing closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions by Romania, Bulgaria, and

Turkey.

Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to have four outstanding witnesses this afternoon

with expertise on these and other relevant issues. Therefore, I will not take up valuable time with a country-by-country recitation of details.

Rather, I would like to make a few analytical comments on the topic of this hearing, the future of democracy in the Black Sea area.

First and foremost, I would emphasize that democratization is not a zero-sum

game. Obviously, in large part I am directing this observation at our friends in the

Kremlin.

To be specific: A democratic, independent Georgia or Ukraine or Moldova—that

deepens its ties with the United States, the European Union, or NATO does not represent a threat to, or setback for Russia. The Soviet Union is dead and buried. It

will not return in some new guise, and for its own good Moscow should come to

terms with the realities of the 21st century.

On the contrary, a strengthened and increasingly western-looking Georgia,

Ukraine, and Moldova would stabilize Russia’s southwestern and western borders,

enabling more effective controls against terrorism and providing legitimate commercial opportunities for Russia’s international entrepreneurs.

I would add that the inhabitants of the break-away regions—Abkhazia, South

Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria—would also profit from peaceful settlement of their conflicts. Normalization would lead to more foreign investment and

economic development.

Second, I would hold up Georgia’s ‘‘Rose Revolution’’ and Ukraine’s ‘‘Orange Revolution’’ as hopeful examples to still-oppressed peoples elsewhere, above all to the

brave people of Belarus who continue to suffer under the brutal repression of Alexander Lukashenka. Lukashenka is running scared, and he should be, for his days

in power are numbered.

Third, the run-up to Ukraine’s elections last fall and the reaction to the fraud perpetrated in the first round provided an encouraging example of successful highstakes cooperation between the United States and countries of the European Union.

Such cooperation can, and should continue elsewhere.

Fourth, Romania and Bulgaria demonstrate that even countries that for decades

were cursed with two of the worst Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe can

achieve remarkable success.

Today, both Romania and Bulgaria are members of NATO, and both stand on the

threshold of joining the European Union. Neither country is perfect. Both have continuing challenges. But no one—and I mean no one—in Bucharest or Sofia less than

20 years ago could have dreamed how incomparably better their country would be

in 2005.

Fifth and finally, I would caution that progress rarely follows a linear trajectory.

In most countries there will be false starts, mistakes, and setbacks.

In that regard, I confess to considerable disappointment in reports I have been

hearing about recent developments in Turkey. I had been favorably impressed with

the pragmatism of Prime Minister Erdogan, both in domestic and foreign policy.

6

Then came the runup to the Iraq war, during which the Bush administration badly

mishandled our relations with Turkey.

A negative reaction from the Turkish public was perhaps to be expected, but not

the virulent anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism that has been described in the

western press.

I hope that this ugliness is just a transient phenomenon, and that Erdogan and

other moderate Turkish leaders will guide opinion back into the time-tested close

cooperation with the United States, even as Ankara embarks upon the lengthy process of qualifying for EU membership.

Welcome, again, to our witnesses, and thank you for your leadership, Mr. Chair- man.

Sen ALLEN. Mr. Tefft, if you have an opening statement you’d

like to give, we’d be pleased to hear from you.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. TEFFT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador TEFFT. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I’m

really delighted to be here this afternoon to discuss the state of democracy in the Black Sea region and the prospects for further

democratic evolution there.

While we address aspects of this important issue in one way or

another literally every day at the State Department, occasions for

reflecting comprehensively on the region are frankly very rare. So

I, especially, value the chance to share with you today our thoughts

on where we are with U.S. policy toward the countries of the region

and where we’re headed.

Let me try to summarize in this opening statement the prepared

testimony which we have submitted for the record.

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Ambassador and all our witnesses, we have

your statements. Your statements will be made part of the record,

and if you wanted to paraphrase or summarize your remarks, that

would also be welcome.

Ambassador TEFFT. The nine nations of the Black Sea region, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia,

Azerbaijan, and Russia, are diverse and hard to categorize as a

group. Geographical proximity and overlapping histories have created rivalry and friction, as well as cooperation and alliance. Centrifugal forces impelling countries outward compete with a strong

pull toward greater regional integration.

U.S. policy, by necessity, takes the specific characteristics of each

country and its unique geopolitical situation into account and deals

with each one of them accordingly. There are some broad commonalities. Black Sea States are all members of the Organization

of Security and Cooperation in Europe, and they’re either members

of NATO or NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

They belong, together with Greece, Albania, and Serbia Montenegro, to the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, we’re now considering, in consultation

with the members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the possibility that we will participate soon as an observer

to that organization.

Energy transport is one of the strongest links among the Black

Sea nations. Energy pipelines that are both existing or under construction or planned crisscross the region and create real opportuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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nities for cooperation and development of a regional dialog. Coordination between energy-exporting states and transit nations is needed to solve Bosporus bottlenecks and develop efficient solutions to

ensure that energy supplies reach the world market. The United

States has consistently worked toward this goal through encouragement of multiple pipelines and export routes.

But with a closer look, the similarities among these countries

start to break down. They vary in size from the huge, Russia with

over 140 million people, to the rather small, Moldova with 4 million

and Armenia with 3 million. They are at various stages of economic

development. Turkey, Russia, Romania, and Bulgaria fall firmly in

the World Bank’s middle-income category with annual GDP per

capita well over $2,000. Others such as Moldova and the Caucasus

countries lag behind with yearly income under $1,000 per person.

Most of the countries belong to the World Trade Organization. Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are the exceptions.

On the other end of the economic integration schedule—integration scale—Romania and Bulgaria are solid candidates for EU

membership this decade. Turkey, already an OECD member, is

likely to be next after them.

Geostrategic differences are also striking. Three countries, Turkey since the cold war, and Romania and Bulgaria since last year,

are NATO members. The others, former republics of the U.S.S.R.,

belong, however loosely, to the Commonwealth of Independent

States. Four of these, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova,

together with Uzbekistan, form GUUAM, an organization with

projects on law enforcement cooperation and development of essential economic infrastructure. Last week in Chisinau, Presidents

Saakashvili, Yushchenko, and Voronin jointly called for revitalizing

GUUAM as Moldova assumes chairmanship next month.

Separatist conflicts impede nation building and democratization

in a number of the Black Sea region’s countries, and the United

States is actively engaged in trying to solve those conflicts. Significant differences remain between Armenia and Azerbaijan over

Nagorno Karabakh, but Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev are committed to a peaceful resolution. We support the OSCE Minsk

group’s efforts to advance toward a settlement there, and we’re encouraged by discussions over the last year toward a negotiated settlement.

Transnistrian provocations caused the collapse of Moldovan political settlement talks last summer. Nevertheless, we continue to

work with Moldova and OSCE partners to press Russia to work

with us and the international community to promote progress on

settlement in Moldova.

In Georgia, we support President Saakashvili’s goal of reuniting

the country and encourage Georgia to resolve the conflicts in South

Ossetia and Abkhazia in a peaceful manner.

We also continue to insist that Russia fulfill its remaining

Istanbul Commitments on the withdrawal of its forces from

Moldova, and on reaching agreement with Georgia on the duration

and status of Russian forces there.

Throughout these protracted conflicts, the United States has

been consistent in supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,

8

Moldova, and Georgia, as well as the Russian Federation with respect to the Chechen separatist movement.

These facts provide a context for the discussion of these countries’ different levels of democratic development as well. Freedom

House, in its 2005 comparative ranking of world’s countries, found

two of the Black Sea states, Romania and Bulgaria, met its standards as free countries. Another two, Russia and Azerbaijan, fall so

far short of these standards that they are rated not free.

The other five fall in between. Freedom House categorizes them

as partly free. Our human rights report for 2004, which was just

released to the Congress on February 28, while it does not use such

specific categories, also reflects the divergence Freedom House

found in the democracy and human rights records of these countries.

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to highlight, briefly, the democracy and

democratization processes in each of these countries and describe

what the U.S. Government is going to do to improve the record. My

prepared remarks have a much more extensive discussion of each

one of the countries, but let me just hit brief highlights.

Romania. In December 2004, Romania underwent a democratic

transition with the candidate representing an alliance of opposition

parties winning a very close Presidential run-off. Civil society organizations, including some that received U.S. assistance, played a

strong role as election monitors in advocating an issue-based political campaign and in pressing for nonbiased media coverage of the

campaign.

President Basescu is scheduled to meet with President Bush

here, tomorrow, in Washington. The leaders of the former government, including the former President and Prime Minister, now

serve in Romania’s Parliament. Romania believes its location on

the Black Sea, its membership in NATO, and its respective membership in the European Union, leaves it well placed to provide a

bridge to Europe for the countries of the Caucasus. In particular,

the Romanians believe they can serve as a model for these democratizing countries. To this end, Romania has been active in the

community of democracies initiative, and recently organized an

international mission to Georgia of NGO and other experts to discuss media freedom, judicial reform, and other democracy issues.

Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s six national elections since 1990 are scheduled for June 2005 with a wide but moderate political spectrum expected to participate. Elections since 1990 have met acceptable

standards and reflect the will of the Bulgarian people. Over the

last 15 years, Bulgaria has established a full functioning free-market democracy marked by strong public support for full Euro-Atlantic integration.

Bulgaria entered NATO in March 2004 and is scheduled to sign

an EU accession agreement in April 2005 leading to full membership in 2007. Aside from supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, our

efforts in Bulgaria are designed to ensure stable democratic focus

on strengthening local governments, civil society, and a free press.

Bulgaria has a natural route for trafficking in narcotics, contraband, and persons. Like many countries in this region, Bulgaria

suffers from substantial organized crime and corruption that

9

threatens democratic development and successful Euro-Atlantic integration.

Reform of the weak judicial system is a pressing need, as is

greater transparency in public procurement and privatizations. Bilateral law enforcement cooperation with the United States has expanded significantly over the last 2 years. The Embassy now hosts

the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI plans to open an office early

in fiscal year 2005.

Turkey is a staunch NATO ally and a functioning secular democracy with a constitutional government. In an effort to meet requirements for EU membership, the government has carried out extensive democratic legal reforms during the past year. For example, in

September 2003, Parliament adopted a new penal code, and in May

2004, adopted a new package of constitutional amendments. These

reforms are designed to crack down on torture, on honor killings,

and expand freedom of religion and association.

Turkey’s made rapid progress in meeting the EU political criteria

laid out during the Copenhagen summit in 2002. And on December

17, 2004, the European Union decided that accession talks with

Turkey would start in October. The EU’s historic decision to start

these talks is a major success, not only for the Turkish people, but

we believe for Europe as well.

Nonetheless, some problems remain. We continue to press Turkey to resolve Greek Orthodox church property issues, and to open

the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary. Alevis, heterodox offshoot of

Shi’a Islam, is concerned with discrimination by the majority Sunni

population and Sunni-run religious affairs directorate. And Kurdish rights within general civil rights remain a sensitive issue.

The United States supports Turkey’s efforts to implement the reforms instituted in order to gain accession to the European Union.

We continue to urge Turkey to respect fully human rights, including freedom of speech and the press, freedom of religion, as well

as the rule of law. I might note, Mr. Chairman, that we were appalled by the violent dispersal of demonstrators in Istanbul that we

saw on film on Sunday, and we’ve let the Turkish Government

know our views quite clearly about that.

Ukraine. One of the most significant events of 2004 was, obviously, the Orange Revolution. This was an event marking a victory

for democracy. The Ukrainian people succeeded in overturning a

fraudulent Presidential election and achieving a final outcome that

reflected the will of the voters. Ukraine’s democratic institutions

demonstrated surprising strength in the face of persistent attempts

by elements within the previous government and among oligarchic

plans to subvert democratic processes.

When confronted with the allegations of widespread fraud, the

judicial system ultimately acted in an independent manner. The

legislative branch behaved responsibly in helping to broker a political solution.

Moldova. On Sunday, Moldova elected a new government. While

the final results are not yet in, it appears that the governing party,

the Communist Party, will remain the leading party in the country,

although not with the numbers that they had before. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe delegation that was

there made a statement that said that the election generally comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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plied with international standards that voting on election day was

generally fair. But they noted, as we have noted in our statements

and in the statement that the U.S. Senate made, that there were

severe irregularities during the campaign period involving media

access issues, harassment of opposition, and misuse of administrative resources.

Georgia. The Rose Revolution of 2003 demonstrated that Georgians desire fair elections and good governance, and are capable of

holding their government accountable. Since the Rose Revolution,

Georgia has made significant internal reforms to fight official corruption, consolidate bureaucracy, and increase revenue collection in

order to provide better services to its own citizens.

Progress in Georgia is hampered by ongoing separatist conflicts

in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The international community

should stand firm to encourage Georgia to resolve these conflicts

peacefully. Internal reform, in our view, will strengthen the economy and create incentives for separate regions to integrate into

Georgia.

Armenia has made significant economic and social progress since

its independence. However, the flawed Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2003 demonstrate that it has some way to go to

strengthen its democratic institutions and ensure an equitable balance of power between executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Armenia needs to take steps to improve its poor human rights

record. We are providing extensive assistance to strengthen the national assembly, the judiciary, and local government institutions in

Armenia.

Azerbaijan. The flawed Presidential elections in 2003 demonstrate that Azerbaijan has far to go to strengthen its democratic

institutions and ensure an equitable balance of power between the

various branches of government. We are focusing our assistance

programs and diplomacy on improving election procedures,

strengthening Azerbaijan’s democratic institutions as parliamentary elections approach this coming fall.

These coming elections will be an important test of Azerbaijan’s

process toward democratization. Azerbaijan also needs to take

steps to improve its poor human rights record. Azerbaijan’s economic progress in the next year will depend on its ability to direct

oil funds toward nonoil sector development.

Finally, Russia. Russia is experiencing an erosion of its democratic institutions and processes. Especially over the last 2 years,

checks and balances among the branches of government have

weakened. The Duma offers no meaningful counterweight to the

executive. National television networks are under state control.

And democratic values have yet to be inculcated in Russia’s political culture.

At the same time, there has been little resistance to this situation within Russia. While the electoral process was flawed, President Putin was reelected last year with a solid majority. Independent polling indicates that as living standards improve and the

threat of terrorism increases, a majority of the population continues to favor order and stability above all else. The Russian Government’s efforts to centralize control have taken advantage of this

11

popular sentiment, further postponing the development of democratic accountable governance.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I’ll stop at that point and I’ll be happy

to answer any questions about any of the countries or the processes

in the region.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Tefft follows:]

PAREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am delighted to be with you this afternoon to discuss

the current state of democracy in the Black Sea region and the prospects for further

democratic evolution there. While we address aspects of this important issue in one

way or another literally every day at the State Department, occasions for reflecting

comprehensively on the region in its entirety are rare. So I especially value the

chance to share my thoughts with you today on where we are with U.S. policy toward the countries of the region and where we are headed. The topic is certainly

timely, with this past Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Moldova, and the memory

of Ukraine’s dramatic Presidential contest still fresh.

OVERVIEW

The nine nations of the Black Sea region—Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine,

Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia—are diverse and hard to characterize as a group. Geographical proximity and overlapping histories have created

rivalry and friction as well as cooperation and alliance; centrifugal forces impelling

countries outward compete with a strong pull toward greater regional integration.

U.S. policy by necessity takes the specific characteristics of each country and its

unique geopolitical situation into account and deals with each accordingly.

There are some broad commonalities: Black Sea States are all members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and either members of

NATO or NATO’s Partnership for Peace. They belong, together with Greece, Albania, and Serbia-Montenegro, to the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Incidentally, we are now considering, in consultation with BSEC members, the possibility of U.S. participation as an observer at the BSEC.

Energy transport is one of the strongest links among the Black Sea nations. Energy pipelines; existing, (Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Blue Stream, Odesa-Brody),

under construction, (Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan) and planned (multiple Bosphorus bypass

plans) crisscross the region and create real opportunities for cooperation and the development of a regional dialog. Coordination between energy exporting states and

transit nations is needed to solve Bosphorus bottlenecks and develop efficient solutions to ensure that energy supplies reach the world market. The United States has

consistently worked toward this goal through encouragement of multiple pipelines

and export routes.

But with a closer look, the similarities among these countries start to break down:

They vary in size from huge (Russia, over 140 million people; next is Turkey with

70+ million) to rather small (Moldova, some 4 million; Armenia, 3 million). They are

also at different stages of economic development. For example, Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria fall firmly in the World Bank’s middle-income category, with annual GDP per capita well over $2,000. Others, such as Moldova and the Caucasus

countries, lag behind with yearly income under $1,000 per person. Most of the countries belong to the World Trade Organization—Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are

the exceptions. On the other end of the economic integration scale, Romania and

Bulgaria are solid candidates for EU membership this decade; Turkey, already an

OECD member, is likely to be next after them.

Geostrategic differences are also striking. Three countries: Turkey since the cold

war, and Romania and Bulgaria since last year, are NATO members; the others,

former Republics of the U.S.S.R., belong, however loosely, to the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS). Four of these CIS states, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,

and Moldova, together with Uzbekistan, form GUUAM, an organization with

projects on law enforcement cooperation and development of essential economic infrastructure. Last week (March 2) in Chisinau Presidents Saakashvili, Yushchenko,

and Voronin jointly called for revitalizing GUUAM as Moldova assumes chairmanship next month.

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Separatist conflicts impede nation-building and democratization in a number of

the Black Sea region’s countries, and the United States is actively engaged in solving those conflicts. Significant differences remain between Armenia and Azerbaijan

over Nagorno-Karabakh, but Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev are committed to a

peaceful resolution. We support the OSCE Minsk Group’s efforts to advance toward

a settlement there, and are encouraged by discussions over the last year toward a

negotiated settlement. Transnistrian provocations caused the collapse of Moldovan

political settlement talks last summer. Nevertheless we continue to work with

Moldova and OSCE partners, to press Russia to work with us and the international

community to promote progress on settlement in Moldova. In Georgia, we support

President Saakashvili’s goal of reuniting the country, and encourage Georgia to resolve the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a peaceful manner. We also

continue to insist that Russia fulfill its remaining Istanbul commitments on the

withdrawal of its forces from Moldova and on reaching agreement with Georgia on

the duration and status of Russia forces there. Throughout these protracted conflicts, the United States has been consistent in supporting the territorial integrity

of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia, as well as of the Russian Federation with respect to the Chechen separatist movement.

These facts provide a context for the discussion of these countries’ different levels

of democratic development as well. Freedom House, in its 2005 comparative ranking

of the world’s countries, found two of the Black Sea States (Romania, Bulgaria) meet

its standards for ‘‘Free’’ countries, another two (Russia, Azerbaijan) fall so far short

of those standards that they rated ‘‘Not Free.’’ The other five fall in between; Freedom House categorizes them as ‘‘Partly Free.’’ Our Human Rights Report for 2004,

just released to Congress on February 28, while it does not use such specific categories, also reflects the divergence Freedom House found in the democracy and

human rights records of these countries.

I’d like to consider democracy and democratization in each of these countries, and

what the U.S. Government is doing to improve the record.

Romania

In December 2004 Romania underwent a democratic transition, with the candidate representing an alliance of opposition parties winning a very close Presidential runoff election. Civil society organizations (including some that received U.S.

assistance) played a strong role as election monitors, in advocating an ‘‘issue-based’’

political campaign, and in pressing for nonbiased media coverage of the campaign.

President Basescu is scheduled to meet with President Bush on March 9. The leaders of the former goverment, including the former President and Prime Minister,

now serve in Romania’s Parliament.

Romania believes its location on the Black Sea, its membership in NATO (since

May 2004), and its prospective membership in the European Union (projected for

January 2007), leave it well-placed to provide a bridge to Europe for the countries

of the Caucasus. In particular, the Romanians believe they can serve as a model

for these democratizing countries. To this end, Romania has been active in the Community of Democracies initiative, and recently organized an international mission

to Georgia of NGO and other experts to discuss media freedom, judicial reform, and

other democracy issues.

Romania also sees opportunities to reach out to its Black Sea neighbors on economic and security issues. Romania is the host country for the Southeast Europe

Cooperative Initiative (SECI), and is involved in outreach efforts to Black Sea littoral and regional states on cooperative law enforcement initiatives, including customs and border security initiatives, antinarcotics and trafficking-in-persons initiatives. The United States has provided assistance for these regional, cooperative efforts. We continue to press the Government of Romania to promote media freedom

and combat corruption.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria’s sixth national elections since 1990 are scheduled for June 2005 with

a wide, but moderate, political spectrum expected to participate. Elections since

1990 have met acceptable standards and reflect the will of the Bulgarian people.

Over the last 15 years Bulgaria has established a fully functioning, free-market democracy, marked by strong public support for full Euro-Atlantic integration. Bulgaria entered NATO in March 2004, and is scheduled to sign an EU accession agreement in April 2005 leading to full membership in 2007. Aside from supporting EuroAtlantic integration, U.S. Government efforts to ensure stable democratic focus on

strengthening local governments, civil society, and a free press.

Bulgaria is a natural route for trafficking in narcotics, contraband, and persons.

Like many countries in the region, Bulgaria suffers from substantial organized

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crime and corruption that threatens democratic development and successful EuroAtlantic integration. Reform of the weak judicial system is a pressing need, as is

greater transparency in public procurement and privatizations.

Bilateral law enforcement cooperation with the United States has expanded significantly over the past 2 years; the Embassy now hosts the U.S. Secret Service, and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation plans to open an office in early FY 2005. The

U.S. Government has assisted in legal reforms, including legislation to combat trafficking in persons, witness protection, antimoney laundering and regulation of public procurement. An important USAID legacy mechanism is the National Institute

of Justice (NIJ), which opened last year and is already one of the leading institutions in Eastern Europe for training magistrates. Ambassador Pardew is vocal about

the need for the Bulgarian Government to face these challenges; just this week the

Ambassador publicly expressed support for a declaration by 14 NGOs calling for all

political forces to commit themselves to judicial reform.

On the border between NATO/EU countries and Eurasia, Bulgaria sees itself playing a significant role in the region. Bulgaria considers democratic reform and development of market economies and free trade in the region, and good neighborly relations with countries to its east, as important to its own national interest, placing

a priority on the development of NATO’s role in the regional security system.

Turkey

Turkey, a staunch NATO ally, is a functioning secular democracy with a constitutional government. In an effort to meet the requirements for EU membership, the

Government carried out extensive democratic legal reforms during this past year.

For example, in September 2003 Parliament adopted a new Penal Code, and in May

2004 adopted a new package of constitutional amendments. These reforms were designed to crack down on torture and ‘‘honor killings,’’ and expand freedom of religion

and association.

Turkey has made rapid progress in meeting the EU political criteria laid out during the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, and on December 17, 2004, the European

Union decided that accession talks with Turkey would start in October this year.

The European Union’s historic decision to start accession talks for Turkey is a major

success not only for the Turkish people, but for Europe as well.

Nonetheless, some problems remain. We continue to press Turkey to resolve

Greek Orthodox Church property issues and open the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary. Alevis, a heterodox offshoot of Shi’a Islam, is concerned with discrimination

by the majority Sunni population and Sunni-run Religious Affairs Directorate, and

Kurdish rights within general civil rights remain a sensitive issue.

The United States supports Turkey’s efforts to implement the reforms instituted

in order to gain accession to the European Union. We continue to urge full respect

for human rights, including freedom of speech and the press, freedom of religion,

as well as rule of law.

Ukraine

In one of the most significant events of 2004, an event marking a victory for democracy, the Ukrainian people succeeded in overturning a fraudulent Presidential

election and achieving a final outcome that reflected the will of the voters. Ukraine’s

democratic institutions demonstrated surprising strength in the face of persistent

attempts by elements within the previous government and among oligarchic clans

to subvert democratic processes. When confronted with allegations of widespread

fraud, the judicial system ultimately acted in an independent manner, and the legislative branch behaved responsibly in helping to broker a political solution to the crisis. Many journalists at state- and oligarch-owned media enterprises stopped taking

instructions from the Presidential administration and started to report news accurately and objectively. NGOs and civil society organizations took the lead in organizing peaceful demonstrations in support of a democratic outcome.

It is not true, as some have said, that the United States funded or otherwise supported any candidate or party in the election. However, over a decade of U.S. assistance for a democratic process was a contributing factor to the positive outcome.

Over a period of many months, the United States and our European allies repeatedly advised Ukrainian authorities, publicly and privately, that we were watching

the election closely and considered it a test of Ukraine’s commitment to democracy.

The United States funded local civil society groups to conduct voter education and

get-out-the-vote campaigns. We supported the work of independent media to improve coverage of campaign issues. We provided nonpartisan training to political

parties and leaders, trained election officials and observers, and more. Our electionrelated assistance to Ukraine was approximately $18 million. Of particular note, the

United States funded what we believe was an unprecedented election-observer efVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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fort, domestic and international, which turned out to be critical in spotlighting electoral fraud, particularly in the November 21 second round.

As Yushchenko and his team turn to the task of governing, they face a great

many challenges. The ‘‘Orange Revolution’’ spurred a reaction in eastern and southern Ukraine, where some officials began speaking of federation, autonomy, and even

secession and independence. This would be disastrous for Ukraine and for the region. Fortunately, then-President Kuchma summoned these governors and ordered

them to cease and desist. Nevertheless, there is disaffection in Russian-speaking

parts of Ukraine which Yushchenko needs to address. He also has his work cut out

for him in combating endemic corruption, reforming the economy, consolidating

democratic reforms and promoting human rights. Managing relations with Russia

will also be critical. We look forward to President Yushchenko’s visit to the United

States early next month.

Moldova

Moldova’s campaign period in advance of the March 6 parliamentary elections has

been blemished with irregularities, such as media access issues, harassment of opposition, and misuse of administrative resources. However, international criticism,

including the Department’s engagement and a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, prior

to election day positively encouraged the Moldovan Government to take corrective

measures. The United States has provided some $1.7 million for election-related assistance in the past year to support development of the Moldovan electoral administration and legal framework, independent media, civic involvement, nonpartisan political party training, and election monitoring. Again, our focus is on a free and fair

electoral process, not on any particular party or candidate. The results of Sunday’s

election show to what extent the Moldovan leadership’s late corrective measures to

make the campaign more fair allowed OSCE/ODIHR to assess the elections as generally meeting international standards. (Note: Oral testimony will update the subcommittee on the results of the March 6 elections.)

Moldova’s foreign policy priority is to integrate with the European Union, as

manifested by its recent conclusion of an EU Action Plan. We support Moldova’s efforts toward this goal, and we would hope that its participation in the GUUAM regional group could be deepened even further after Moldova assumes the rotating

Presidency later this spring.

The repressive Transnistrian separatists are an impediment to regional stability

and democracy. We are therefore actively looking for ways to resolve the

Transnistria conflict in a manner that would strengthen Moldova’s territorial integrity and also be supported by its people and have international credibility. We believe enhanced international participation could give new impetus to the stalled negotiation process, and are consulting with our European Union, OSCE, Ukrainian,

and Russian partners as to the most effective way forward. Equally important,

Moldova, the United States, and our NATO allies continue to press Russia to fulfill

its commitments made at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul to complete the withdrawal of its military forces from Moldova.

Georgia

The Rose Revolution of 2003 demonstrated that Georgians desire fair elections

and good governance, and are capable of holding their government accountable.

Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has made significant internal reforms to fight

official corruption, consolidate bureaucracy and increase revenue collection in order

to provide better services to its own citizens.

Progress in Georgia is hampered by ongoing separatist conflicts in South Ossetia

and Abkhazia; the international community should stand firm to encourage Georgia

to resolve these conflicts peacefully. Internal reform will strengthen the economy

and create incentives for the separatist regions to integrate into Georgia.

Georgia clearly aspires to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions; the United States

welcomes the EU’s Wider Europe program in the South Caucasus and encourages

Europe to work closely with Georgia and its neighbors in support of civil society,

human rights, and democratic development. We also continue to support talks between Georgia and Russia on the 1999 Istanbul commitments to reach agreement

on the status and duration of remaining Russian bases in Georgia.

Armenia

Armenia has made significant economic and social progress since its independence; however, the flawed Presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003 demonstrate that it has some way to go to strengthen its democratic institutions and

ensure an equitable balance of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Armenia needs to take steps to improve its poor human rights record.

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The United States is providing extensive assistance to strengthen the National Assembly, the judiciary and local government institutions in Armenia.

Further reform is hampered by Armenia’s relatively isolated position and the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has been an enormous drain on the government’s resources for over 10 years.

We welcome Armenia’s attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its economic

and other ties to the region, including with Turkey.

Azerbaijan

The flawed Presidential elections of 2003 demonstrate that Azerbaijan has far to

go to strengthen its democratic institutions and ensure an equitable balance of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. We are focusing on assistance programs and diplomacy on improving election procedures and strengthening Azerbaijan’s democratic institutions as parliamentary elections approach this

fall. These elections will be an important test of Azerbaijan’s progress toward democratization. Azerbaijan also needs to take steps to improve its poor human rights

record. Azerbaijan’s economic progress in the next year will depend on its ability

to direct oil funds toward nonoil sector development.

Political and economic reform is hampered by the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as in Armenia, an enormous drain on the government’s resources for over 10

years.

Azerbaijan continues to offer extensive and invaluable support to the United

States for the Global War on Terror, including, but not limited to, blanket overflight

rights, the use of Azerbaijan military bases, information sharing, and law enforcement cooperation.

We welcome Azerbaijanis’ attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its economic and other ties to the region.

Russia

Russia is experiencing an erosion of its democratic institutions and processes. Especially over the past 2 years, checks and balances among the branches of government have weakened. The Duma offers no meaningful counterweight to the executive, national television networks are under state control, and democratic values

have yet to be inculcated in Russia’s political culture. At the same time, there has

been little resistance to this situation within Russia. While the electoral process was

flawed, President Putin was re-elected last year with a solid majority. Independent

polling indicates that as living standards improve and the threat of terrorism increases, a majority of the population continues to favor order and stability above all

else. The Russian Government’s efforts to centralize control have taken advantage

of this popular sentiment, further postponing the development of democratic, accountable governance.

Despite some indications that the situation in Chechnya has improved, basic security is lacking as terrorists and insurgents continue to battle pro-Moscow Chechens

and federal forces, and human rights violations continue with impunity. A flawed

Presidential election in August 2004 did not advance a political solution to the conflict. Terrorist attacks at Beslan and elsewhere pose a threat to the region. Conflict

appears to be spreading across the North Caucasus, due to a combination of terrorist activities, religious extremism, criminality, and the weakness of state structures in the region. As the situation on the ground allows, we will look for opportunities to provide development assistance to people in the North Caucasus.

Russia and the United States have shared interests in stability and economic development in the Black Sea region but differ over how these goals should be interpreted and pursued.

We both want to fight weapons trafficking, narcotics trafficking, organized crime,

money laundering, and terrorist organizations in the Black Sea region. To achieve

this goal, the United States wants to encourage regional stability. Russia shares the

United States desire for stability, but appears to interpret stability in a fundamentally different way. Russia has been critical of the programs the European Union

is pursuing under its Neighborhood Policy to create a string of well-governed states

on the EU’s border and that in the Black Sea region, which explicitly includes Georgia and Ukraine.

Russia defines stability as preservation of the status quo, with regimes it knows

well. Russian support for separatists in other countries appears to be means, in

part, of maintaining levers of influence in Moldova and Georgia. For the same reason, Russia has been slow to close its remaining bases in Georgia and remove its

troops from Transnistria.

United States and Russian goals overlap more closely on the practical matter of

shutting down transshipment and smuggling routes on the Black Sea. The United

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States supports and encourages Russia’s participation in the Black Sea Force, its

cooperation with coast guards of littoral states, and its participation in Operation

Active Endeavor.

Russian and United States views also overlap on the issue of Russia’s Black Sea

Fleet as an important element in regional security. The United States encourages

continued Russian-Ukrainian cooperation that will allow Russia to lease port facilities at Sevastopol at least through the current agreement’s end in 2017.

The United States and Russia have a shared interest in economic development

and trade, in particular as concerns projects to bring Russian and Caspian Basin

oil and gas to European and world markets. We hope President Putin’s December

2004 visit to Turkey and President Erdogan’s visit to Russia the following month

will help advance such cooperation. At the same time, conflicts over the direction

of the Odesa-Brody pipeline and other projects demonstrate that tensions exist over

questions of whose oil and gas will get to market over whose territory.

Moscow continues to react strongly over a possible United States military role in

the region. This can be seen particularly in the pressure that Russia has placed on

Georgia to agree to a ‘‘no foreign bases’’ clause in a Georgia Russia Framework

Treaty, and it can be seen also in Russia’s displeasure over the United States Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and Sustainment and Stability Operations

Program (SSOP) to train Georgian forces. We have made clear to Moscow at very

senior levels that we have no plans for establishing United States bases in Georgia.

Russia’s concerns are likely to increase as Ukraine moves closer to NATO.

We are also urging Russia to stop obstructing an Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border monitoring operation along the Chechnya portion of the Russian-Georgian border. We believe this monitoring operation has

played an important role in deterring the possible movement of international terrorists and Chechen fighters between Russia and Georgia.

Assistance

Finally a word on U.S. assistance programs to the region. U.S. Goverment assistance targets enhancing regional cooperation and development as well as to support

reform bilaterally. Our support for the GUUAM organization is enabling these countries to cooperate in law enforcement and harmonize their trade and transportation

regimes. The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova (in addition to other countries that are not ‘‘Black Sea

States’’), serves as a regional assistance model for GUUAM projects. Since 2000,

SECI has promoted cross-border cooperation in Southeast Europe in the fight

against organized crime, as well as reform and harmonization of customs services

to promote economic development and facilitate trade.

Democracy assistance is key to our broader bilateral assistance programs in this

region that, with the exception of Turkey, are funded through the Support for East

European Democracy (SEED) and FREEDOM Support Acts. Under these accounts

we will be providing approximately $126 million in FY 2005 to support civil society,

access to information, pluralistic political processes, local governance and rule of law

in these countries.

Political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in the past year reflect a desire by these

countries—and their people—to establish themselves as democratic market economies. Our assistance continues to support their efforts to combat corruption and integrate them into the world economy, including the Black Sea region.

I welcome your comments and questions.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And that was a

good survey of the region; an overview. The purpose of having such

hearings is, hopefully, to educate the American public as to this region. And one thing that one understands by listening to all of this,

and we’ll get it from our second panel, but a study of history, all

these countries are not the same. They’re individual, they have

their own sovereignty, their own heritage, languages, and customs.

And each one has its own unique needs. Some are models for others to emulate, but the ones who will emulate it will do it in their

own way, hopefully in their own way, creating more just and free

societies.

One thing that ends up—and just trying to find some crosscurrents or threads and commonality—and you finished with Russia.

But Russia—beyond Russia’s own problems in their own country is

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the question of their troops in places such as Moldova and in Georgia. And you were mentioning the recent elections in Moldova. One

issue which remains there, which is an issue for Romanians, for

Moldovans, for Ukrainians as well, is the Russian presence there,

but also the Transnistrian region.

So, if you could share with us, the audience and this committee,

as part of the record: A, what has President Bush said, and hopefully in a very strong way, to President Putin when they were

meeting in Bratislava, about the concepts, not just of democracy

and human rights, which is very important, but getting their

troops out of Georgia and Moldova, as well as what are we doing

on this Transnistrian issue, which is an area from what I can understand, I have not been there, but what I can understand is, it

seems to be a lawless area, with everything from trafficking in

drugs to humans to arms as well. And so long as that haven for

such activity, criminal behavior as well as potentially terrorists acquiring weapons, this does need to be a concern to us.

So if you could—those are two large areas, issues, but I think

they’re related to the Russians’ involvement in some of these

places.

Ambassador TEFFT. Thank you. I was in Moldova in November

myself and had an opportunity to talk to not only all of the political

parties there, but with a number of others in the society. We have

directed our efforts in Moldova both at trying to encourage a democratic election—I’ve talked about that in my remarks—but also in

trying to be supportive of a process leading to a solution to the

Transnistrian problem.

We are hopeful that this election that’s just taken place, will act

as an incentive to try to bring everyone together in a new effort

to try to solve that problem. We have made this an issue with the

Russians in a number of meetings. I believe it was raised in

Bratislava. Certainly Secretary Rice has raised this in her first

meetings with Foreign Minister Lavrov.

We think it’s high time that a solution be found. We think it’s

high time that the Russian troops be withdrawn, and we have

made that very, very clear to them.

Senator ALLEN. What’s their reaction?

Ambassador TEFFT. I think at this point the—we’re still waiting.

Senator ALLEN. Do they—in other words, do they sit there impassively listening politely——

Ambassador TEFFT. They——

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. Or is there a reaction?

Ambassador TEFFT. Their claim is that they still support a solution to the problem, that they still are honoring the commitments.

You know that at NATO, at the NATO Russia summit last December, the communique had the Russians agreeing to withdraw their

troops under the Istanbul Commitments. Our view is it’s high time.

Let’s get on with the process.

Ambassador Steve Mann, who is our negotiator for what we call

the frozen conflicts, was in Moscow last Friday at the invitation of

the Russians to begin to talk about these issues. We hope this

week, Senator, that Foreign Minister Tarasyuk of the Ukraine, who

will be here at the invitation of Secretary Rice, that we will be able

to talk to him about not only enforcing the borders on the

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Transnistrian side with Ukraine, to make sure that some of the

corruption and the smuggling that’s been going on for years has

stopped, but also talk to the Ukrainians, who are also part of the

mediation effort there, to see how much they will be able to do to

push this process forward.

Finally, I would note that the United States, and I think the European Union, are prepared to join in the negotiations as observers

if that’s what the parties decide. But we’re going to try to make a

major effort to see if we can get this process going again, and we’ll

put as much pressure as we can on the Russians to try to get some

results.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. And we’ll be watching this. It’s not

going to get resolved quickly, but it’s something that needs to stay

on—right at the top of the list, because of the destabilizing impact

of this narrow, small area. But nevertheless it is in a fairly crucial

position to affect all those borders in that region and beyond there

as well.

Now, the Russians have agreed to this convention of forces in

Europe to pull their troops out of Moldova. Now what about—and

also agreed to pull them out of Georgia—what has been stated to

the Russians as far as their troops and bases in Georgia?

Ambassador TEFFT. We feel the same, that they should be withdrawn as quickly as we can—as they can. I know that Foreign Minister Lavrov was in Tbilisi just a few weeks ago. One of the issues

they talked about was just this, the question of Russian Forces

there. My understanding is that these discussions continue. There

is some hope that they could get some kind of an agreement on this

perhaps before President Saakashvili goes to Moscow on May 9 for

the victory day celebrations that the Russians are going to hold.

I think no one has any illusions about how hard this is, but it

is a matter of discussion, and we urge both sides to try to get an

agreement on this.

Senator ALLEN. Do you find the Russians willing to do this or are

they—it strikes me they made an agreement and, at best, you

could say they’re dragging their feet.

Ambassador TEFFT. I personally would agree with you, Senator.

I think——

Senator ALLEN. What do you think their motivation is? Just drag

their feet, just——

Ambassador TEFFT. I think there are people——

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. Troops in there——

Ambassador TEFFT [continuing]. Within the Russian system who

are not only—who not only support the continued stationing of the

troops, but who are clearly profiting from the situations that exist

where these troops are, there where the frozen—profiting from the

frozen conflicts in a sense.

This is going to take leadership on the part of President Putin

to cut through this, to make the decisions, and to enforce the decisions about getting these troops withdrawn. I think only that level

is going to be able to get the results that we want.

Senator ALLEN. Well, reading his actions, do you actually think

he does so desire to keep those commitments?

Ambassador TEFFT. I hope so.

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Senator ALLEN. You hope so? OK. You have to be an Ambassador

and diplomatic. I understand. We all can translate what that

means.

Finally, have you done any assessment on—and I, as I said at

the outset on the bases, moving any of our assets or bases or capabilities to the Black Sea area, say moving some of them from Germany to Bulgaria or Romania? Have you—from Department of

State—granted this is mostly a military logistics platform, power

projection issue, although these issues do have diplomatic impacts

or implications. Could you share with us your insight on that?

Ambassador TEFFT. Yes, sir. My colleagues in the Department

are involved in interagency discussions about this issue. I think

Bob Bradke, my colleague in the European Bureau, appeared before the group last week and addressed this.

I think, fundamentally, we’re not thinking of establishing new

bases per se. There’s not—we’re not looking at new Rammsteins in

that sense.

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Ambassador TEFFT. What we are interested in is looking at enhanced training, joint exercises with our allies in Southeastern Europe. We’re in the midst of some consultations, not only within the

U.S. Government but with these allies. Any future announcement,

I’m told, will really depend on the outcome of those discussions.

DOD really is the one to talk to about the financing of this, obviously, because it’s going to be expensive.

There’s been discussion. I think you’ve seen some of the interviews that General Jones has given. I think those reflect some of

the thinking in the U.S. military. State is playing the role in the

interagency process on this and trying to manage the diplomatic

side of this, but it’s an ongoing process, Senator.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I also do want to

commend General Jones. I think he’s doing an outstanding job as

a military leader, but also understanding the diplomatic and cultural aspects of these various countries and their people. And I

want to thank you also, Mr. Ambassador, for appearing before this

subcommittee today. There may be questions that are posed by

members because we have several meetings going on and votes this

afternoon. I hope you’ll be able to respond to those questions. And

with that, thank you for your testimony and your leadership for

our country.

Ambassador TEFFT. Thank you, sir. We’ll be happy to answer any

questions that come up.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. I’d like to have the second panel

please come forward. The room will please come to order. I understand for our friends from Turkey there’s translation going on in

the back, and so some people wonder what the murmuring is. It’s

not rudeness. It’s simply translation, and we’re very happy to have

our friends from Turkey with us.

Now, our second panel of witnesses includes Ms. Zeyno Baran,

Mr. Bruce Jackson, and Mr. Vladimir Socor. Each has extensive

knowledge of the Black Sea region and the challenges that it’ll face

in the coming years. I’m going to give everyone a background on

each of you. It could be very long and I could go on for hours on

each of you.

20

Let me do it in this order. Ms. Zeyno Baran first is the director

of the International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon

Center. Her current projects include devising strategies to thwart

the spread of radical Islamist ideology in Eurasia; assessing the impact of the Georgian and the Ukrainian revolutions on Central

Eurasian countries; and engaging the leaderships, civil societies,

representatives, and opposition forces of these countries to encourage democratic reform; and also contributing to the shaping of a

new trans-Atlantic energy dialog on the Caspian and Black Sea regions.

Previously—this is not the first that Ms. Baran has been involved in this region—she was the director of the Caucasus Project

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at CIS. In

1998, Ms. Baran established the Georgia Forum, at which time—

at that time was a creation—was the only program in the United

States with a focus on this strategic country of Georgia and its relations with the United States and Russian.

Ms. Baran also worked on a Caspian and Black Sea oil and gas

pipeline project since 1996, and frequently travels to the region.

Ms. Baran, welcome.

Bruce Jackson is the founder and president of the Project on

Transitional Democracies. I’ve known Mr. Jackson since the days

I was Governor when he was advocating the expansion of NATO

countries to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and I became good friends with him back then. And over the years we have

worked together on the expansion of NATO, which also gets European Union admission as well. And we’ve seen that spread of freedom and how those countries—our previous witness, Mr. Tefft, was

Ambassador to Lithuania and those countries are good friends, true

allies, not just philosophically, but also with armaments and assistance in our war on terror, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Jackson did serve in the U.S. Army as a military intelligence

officer back in 1979 to 1990. The present project that he’s working

on is to accelerate the pace of reform in the post-1989 democracies

and integrating them into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which is

perfect. He’s been doing that for decades.

He also served as the president of the U.S. Committee on NATO

back in the 1990s until 2003 promoting the expansion of NATO

and, obviously, strengthening the ties between our country and the

people of Europe.

Vladimir Socor is a senior fellow and longtime senior analyst

with the Jamestown Foundation, great name of an organization,

need to really use 2007, the 400th anniversary of the founding of

Jamestown somehow for enhancing your visibility and those wonderful principles. Mr. Socor formerly served as a senior research

analyst with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty in Munich, and as

a specialist in the non-Russian former Republics of the U.S.S.R.,

CIS affairs, and ethnic conflicts.

Welcome to all of our witnesses. Ms. Baran being the courteous

one is pointing. Did you—have you all huddled over there and determined you wanted to have an order of testimony? If so—I’m

going to let—there’s a clock here for your huddle here. I don’t mind

doing it in the order that you all are presented on this, which is

21

Bruce Jackson, Vladimir Socor, and Ms. Baran, if you want to do

it that way. You probably—were you all prepared to do it that way?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Senator ALLEN. We’ll run the play that way. Mr. Jackson, please

proceed.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON

TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON DC

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and keeping with your

injunction to summarize our prepared testimony, I’ll try to run

through the big picture here.

First, what is the Black Sea and why does it matter to this committee? Second, how are the states doing? And third, what should

be the policy of the United States as we look forward?

I think the first major point is, this is a region in a region of Europe. Classically, it’s been defined by the competitions between empires, largely Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. The three

middle states that we are so proud of today, Romania, Bulgaria,

and Ukraine, have traditionally sought alliances within that region

and usually tended toward Europe to offset the difficulties of the

region. And the four smaller states, Moldova and the three states

of the South Caucasus, lie essentially right down the seam of the

region where the frozen conflicts lie, and they tend to look at Europe enviously. They tend to fear the actions of the great powers

to their north and to their south, and actually Persia to their

southeast. And they tend to be bloodied by every change that happens along this tectonic place.

But it seems to me that there are six reasons that make this region incredibly important to the United States today. For centuries,

this region has been the entry point to the broader Middle East,

and every European power has understood that the nation that

controlled the Black Sea can control the most important real estate

in the Middle East. If we are to be successful in our effort to support democracy in the broader Middle East, we have to build a secure and prosperous Black Sea system first.

Second, the Black Sea was traditionally the beginning of the Silk

Road. While we’re not interested in spices and silks these days, we

are interested in the energy resources for Europe. Today they import 50 percent of their oil. Tomorrow it will be 70 percent. That

comes from the Caspian basins and the Black Sea is their access

to that oil.

The Black Sea region is already a part of Europe. As Ambassador

Tefft laid out, they are coming into the NATO and the European

Union. This is already part of our community and was recognized

as such at the Istanbul summit.

Fourth, it’s not only about interests, it’s also about values. Obviously, the events, as you have said, in Ukraine and in Georgia inspired the President’s second inaugural address and his recent

speech in Bratislava. Without a doubt the most democratic changes

are occurring in this part of the Euro-Atlantic.

But it is not just our hopes, it is also our fears that draw us to

this region. This belt of frozen conflicts that run from Transnistria

to Nagorno Karabakh are the most dangerous elements of what’s

left of the destruction or the collapse of the Soviet Empire. This is

22

where transnational crime has found a home. This is where criminal enterprises flourish. This is where people who would export

weapons and technology to our enemies continue to prosper.

And finally, this is—I had an opportunity to testify before this

committee before about Russia—but this is where Russia, the most

negative expressions of its foreign policy exist. And suffice it to say

whether we are just intent on protecting democracies from foreign

influence or we care about Russia is doing to its own people, we

must look at this region to answer those questions.

So the broad view is the Black Sea is where—is a knife edge of

history where the forces of reactionary politics, separatism, ethnic

historical Russian imperial aspirations and criminal interests are

doing battle with the people that see a liberal and European future

based on shared security and the vision of a European Union.

How this turns out is of great consequence to the United States,

and not only will it affect how we conduct democratic change or

support democratic change in the greater Middle East and protect

the energy security of Europe, but if we fail in this regard to build

a European system here, the lives of a quarter of a billion Europeans will be nastier, more brutish, and inevitably shorter. It matters to people. Almost one-third of the Euro-Atlantic community

lives in this region.

Now, in looking—Ambassador Tefft has gone through these nations, so I’ll just skip over and highlight the factors where we’re

being successful and where we’re being retard in our progress.

Romania and Bulgaria are clearly the two great success stories.

What continues to retard them is deeply entrenched corruption and

a compromised judiciary. The great news is the election of President Basescu in Romania. He is committed to a program of comprehensive reform. Incidentally, he is also the most eloquent advocate of a Black Sea strategy for the West that would make the

Black Sea a second Mediterranean, with everything that means.

Turkey, obviously, has achieved a historic milestone at the end

of December, but frankly the trends there have been negative since

then. Turkey was complicit in blocking NATO coming into the

Black Sea last June with their surveillance mission. It has broken

off its relations with Israel and the strategic alliance. It has not

been helpful in the solution in Nagorno Karabakh. And it is entering a period clearly—it is dangerous for Turkey, and I think the

Ambassador was correct to draw attention to the really brutal attack on women that occurred the other day on Sunday.

I think we can hope that the negative trend in Turkey is really

related to the turmoil in the Middle East and the difficulty a secular Islamic state has in integrating into Europe, and it is not a

reaction to the appearance of democracy. But still, Turkey is entering a dangerous period that we’re going to have to pay careful attention to.

Obviously the story of Ukraine is well known. I think the point

for this committee is Ukraine is going to have to build a nation at

the same time they’re trying to build a democracy, and that’s going

to be awfully difficult.

I think that two things we have to do is, basically, the United

States and our European allies must bring their entire diplomatic

and economic power to ensure that Russia or criminal groups

23

emboldened by Russia do not attempt to undermine the

Yushchenko government in its first critical year.

Georgia. I think in your remarks you referred to many of the

negative forces that exert themselves on Georgia, the persistence of

Russian bases, and the attempt by Russia to close the border monitoring operations that protects Georgia and peacekeeping operations of the OSCE. I think the good news is that the Rose Revolution has been strong enough to withstand this, and this is one of

the extraordinary success stories. It seems to me that if democracies could be compared to sports teams, this would be the 1980

Olympic hockey team. They shouldn’t be winning, but they keep

winning, and they have the scrappiness that we associated with

the revolutionaries of 1989, and they are completely committed,

and I think it’s a great story.

The smaller states, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, frankly

retain more of the characteristics of post-Soviet autocracies than

they do of emerging European democracies. They are lagging behind. The factors that retard them are the persistence of frozen

conflicts on their territories and the negative effect these conflicts

have on their economic development and domestic politics.

It seems to me, in sum, what we are talking about here is a special class of democracies which are torn between the desire of their

peoples for a European future and the lingering grip of a brutal

past. This region of Europe is a place where democracy is still at

risk.

It seems to me that there are six things that we can do to support the new democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers from

intervening in their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic institutions they seek remain open to them.

First, we must accelerate the leading democracies of the region.

The integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union

on January 1, 2007, would convey the possibility of Europe to all

the other states of the region. I think the United States can insist

in that by pushing hard for judicial reform and strict standards of

conduct and also making the long-delayed decision about repositioning U.S. bases. I think the offer of the basing at Constanza

in Romania is an offer that should be accepted, and nothing could

make more clear that the United States shares the view of the European Union that security and stability in the Black Sea is essential for Euro-Atlantic security than this decision.

Second, we have to reform and adapt our institutions for the

Black Sea. Both NATO and OSCE are not functioning well, one because it’s been blocked, the other because it’s been eviscerated by

Russian veto.

The institutions of the region, the GUUAM initiative that was referred to is confused, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

Council is largely moribund. As a consequence, we should engage

the new leaders of the region, President Saakashvili, President

Basescu, and President Yushchenko, on the formation of new structures for this region, as we did in the Baltic Charter and in previous times where democracy has reached a new area.

Third, we must confront both Russia and Turkey when they’re

acting in a negative manner. What we hope to accomplish cannot

be accomplished unless we make clear where conduct goes beyond

24

the acceptable. This is a question of frankness. Just because Russian officials become peevish when we point out that poison used

on Yushchenko came from Russia and the plastique for the car

bomb in Gori came from Russia doesn’t mean we should ignore this

conduct. And just because a discussion of the Ottoman treatment

of the Armenian population in the early parts of the last century

is a painful issue, it does not mean that coming to terms with history should not be discussed between democratic allies. If we are

to succeed where democracy is at risk, we must be clear in what

we say and what we do.

Fourth, we must prioritize the frozen conflicts as you said in

your opening remarks, beginning with the conflict in Transnistria.

With the help of Ukraine, we can end the criminal enterprise in

Transnistria and the successionist conflict with the constitutional

government in Chisinau.

In Nagorno Karabakh, we must press Azerbaijan and Armenia

back to serious negotiations and force them to begin where they

left off at the Key West Accords in 2001. And most importantly,

where leaders of the region offer a peace plan, we must basically

embrace it. President Misha Saakashvili offered an enlightened

peace plan for South Ossetia, which was greeted by resounding silence both in Brussels and here. That shouldn’t happen.

Fifth, this is an area where we’re going to need to enhance and

continue the same cooperation we developed, with the European

Union in the 10 years in the Balkans, of a close partnership with

the European Union. Both the European Union and the United

States have democracy support programs for the Black Sea region,

but there is no formal coordination as yet, and that needs to improve.

And also our—we have to challenge our NGOs that are funded

by bills coming through this committee to do more than just do

elections. Civic society, parliamentary opposition, the growth of

civic society is essential for the early years of these new democracies.

Finally, we have to focus on Ukraine. For better or for worse, the

extent and character of democracy in the Black Sea region will be

defined by whether democracy in Ukraine succeeds or fails. Without a democratic Ukraine, peace in Moldova will remain elusive

and the democracies in the South Caucasus will be isolated. If the

Orange Revolution succeeds and European institutions remain

open, then all the states of the Black Sea will someday have a

place in Europe, including at some point, Russia.

So, in conclusion, sir, what I believe is occurring around the

Black Sea is the beginning of the final phase of a Europe whole

and free. Over the 5 years remaining in this decade, I think the

rapid democratic transformation of Central, then Eastern, now

Southeastern Europe, will come to a conclusion and a new, larger

community of Euro-Atlantic democracies will result.

While the democratic change is ultimately their responsibility,

the United States has a significant role to play in supporting and

protecting these young democracies in their early years. How well

we play this role will affect the lives of tens of millions of people

and will quite literally shape the future of the West.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25

1For a fuller discussion see Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, ‘‘The Black Sea and the

Frontiers of Freedom’’ in Policy Review, June and July 2004

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE PITCAIRN JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON

TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the state of democracy in the Black Sea region and the possibilities which the vast democratic transformation of this region presents for U.S. policy.

I would like to discuss three major questions:

(1) What is the Black Sea region and why should developments there command

the attention of this committee and of U.S. policymakers?

(2) Where are the states of the Black Sea region in the development of democratic

governance and what factors retard development of a free and prosperous civil society in these states?

(3) Given the strategic importance of the region and the threats to the freedom

of peoples who profess to share our values, what should be the policy of the United

States toward the new democracies around the Black Sea?

I

Historically, the Black Sea has stood at the confluence of the Russian, Ottoman

and Persian Empires and has been a central theater in the ‘‘Great Game’’ which

was played out along its shores throughout the 19th century.1 The contours of the

Black Sea region which were established in the competitions between the great European powers in the Crimean War and World War I are still evident today. The

geopolitics of the region remain heavily influenced by the internal character and foreign policy aspirations of the larger regional powers, Russia and Turkey. The middle

powers, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria, continue to seek security and stability in

regional cooperation and, particularly, in closer relations with European institutions. The smaller littoral states, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, watch

the great regional powers fearfully, envy the more cosmopolitan and Europeanized

middle powers, and are bloodied by every tremor along the tectonic plate of the

former imperial powers.

Today, the same factors, which rendered the Black Sea region a ‘‘black hole’’ in

European history, now argue that this region is of central strategic interest to Europe and the United States. There are six major points:

1. The Black Sea region has for centuries been the entry point to the broader Middle East. The borders of the democracies of the region touch Syria, Iraq, Iran, and

the shores of the Caspian Sea. As the United States discovered to its dismay on

March 1, 2003, without the cooperation of Black Sea States, in this instance Turkey,

we cannot easily reach the northern approaches to the broader Middle East. Every

19th century European power understood that the nation which controlled the Black

Sea could control the most important real estate in the Middle East. If we are to

be successful in our efforts to support the democratization of the Middle East, we

will have to build a secure, prosperous, and democratic Black Sea region in the process.

2. The Black Sea region was the beginning of the Silk Road of trade with Asia.

While silk and spices have lost much of their allure since the times of Marco Polo,

the energy reserves of central Asia are becoming increasingly important to our European allies and to the stability of world oil prices. Today, the member states of

the European Union import approximately 50 percent of their energy needs; by 2020

imports will rise to 70 percent of consumption. This increase will be delivered to Europe across and around the Black Sea region, on routes such as the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline.

3. The Black Sea region is rapidly becoming part of Europe. With the exception

of Croatia, all current candidates for EU membership are from the Black Sea region.

Romania and Bulgaria are expected to gain EU membership in 2007 and Turkey

sometime around 2014. The western and southern shores of the Black Sea are also

the borders of NATO and soon the European Union. These facts so impressed the

heads of state of member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004

the NATO Joint Communique ́ recognized that the Black Sea region was an essential

part of Euro-Atlantic security.

4. It is not, however, only U.S. interests which tie us to the Black Sea region, but

also our political values. Both the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine occurred in countries along the northern and eastern shores of the

26

2 Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on ‘‘Democracy in Russia,’’ February 17, 2005.

sea. The possibilities created by these democratic revolutions not only inspired

President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address and his recent speech in Bratislava, but

they changed the structure of politics in Minsk, Chisinau, and as far away as

Almaty, Bishkek, and Beirut. Without doubt, the largest and most dramatic democratic changes are occurring in this part of the Euro-Atlantic.

5. Sadly, it is not only our hopes that draw our attention to this region, but also

our fears. The most sharp and dangerous fragments of the former Soviet Union lie

scattered in an arc across the northern shore of the Black Sea. A belt of ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ begins in Transdnistria in eastern Moldova and runs through Abkhazia and

South Ossetia in Georgia to the mountain heights of Nagorno-Karabakh on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each of these ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ created in the civil

wars of the dying Soviet Empire, brutal warfare and ethnic cleansing have occurred

and could reoccur. In Transdnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, transnational

crime has found a home and developed a base for trafficking in weapons, drugs,

women, and children. These criminal enterprises destabilize the governments of the

region, threaten Europe with illicit traffic, and ultimately pose a danger to the

United States with their capability and intent to sell weapons and technology to our

enemies.

6. Finally, the most negative expression of Russian foreign policy aspirations now

occurs along the northern rim of the Black Sea region. Since I have already been

given an opportunity by the committee to testify on the subject of Russian

neoimperialism in what the Kremlin regards as Russia’s ‘‘near abroad,’’ I will not

repeat the argument here.2 Suffice it to say, whether we are intent on protecting

new democracies from outside inference and coercion or are simply concerned about

the damage Russian policy is doing to its own people, we are forced to focus on the

region.

In short, the democracies of the Black Sea lie on the knife edge of history which

separates the politics of 19th century imperialism from European modernity. Reactionary forces in the region (separatism, historical Russian aspirations, and criminal

interest) would prefer a return to a balance of power system where the powerful

rule over spheres of interest and the powerless would serve either autocrat or

kleptocrat. On the other hand, those democratic reformers who view themselves as

the direct descendants of the leaders of Solidarity and Charter 77 who freed Central

and Eastern Europe in 1989, aspire to see their new democracies following the path

of Poland and the Czech Republic into a European system based on liberal values

and shared security.

Which of these forces ends up defining a modern Black Sea system is a matter

of great consequence for the United States and Europe. Not only would a return to

the politics of the past constrain our ability to work for democratic change in the

greater Middle East and damage the energy security of Europe, but if the new democracies fail to make the Black Sea a part of the Euro-Atlantic system, the lives

of a quarter of a billion Europeans will be nastier, more brutish, and (inevitably)

shorter.

II

Let me turn from the region as a whole to a summary discussion of the state of

democracy in its constituent states, where it is somewhat easier to see the great

possibilities and the factors which retard reform and political integration.

Romania and Bulgaria are undoubtedly the success stories of Southeast Europe

and the Black Sea. Both were invited to join NATO in 2002 where they have performed well and contributed to missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As I mentioned

earlier, both are expected to join the European Union on January 1, 2007, leading

their region into the institutional core of Europe. The two factors that retard the

political and economic development of both Romania and Bulgaria are deeply entrenched governmental corruption and a weak and often compromised judiciary.

But, even in this, there is a good news story to be told. In the recent Romanian

Presidential election for the first time, the issue of corruption dominated the campaign and swept reformer Traian Basescu into the Presidency. His government has

launched a large-scale offensive against corruption in government and business.

Forthcoming elections in Bulgaria may offer a similar, albeit long overdue, opportunity to accelerate reform. Clearly, Romania and Bulgaria are two democracies

whose long-term prospects look extremely bright.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, President Basescu arrives in Washington later today

for a meeting tomorrow with President Bush and Members of the Senate. President

27

Basescu is one of the most eloquent advocates of a comprehensive strategy for the

Black Sea, aimed at advancing prosperity and democracy throughout the region. His

goal is nothing less than to make the Black Sea ‘‘a second Mediterranean’’ in terms

of shared security, commerce, and political cooperation.

Turkey achieved an historic milestone on December 17, 2004, when the European

Union finally agreed to open membership negotiations. Despite this confirmation of

Turkey’s European destiny, there are strong indications that Turkey’s national and

geopolitical identity crisis is far from over and that Turkey may be entering a difficult and problematic stage. In June 2004, in order to maintain some manner of

regional hegemony, Turkey played a key role in blocking the extension of the NATO

surveillance operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR to the Black Sea. Internally, the ruling

AK Party seems have taken a turn for the worse, characterized by strident antiAmericanism, cultural anti-Europeanism, and a resurgent xenophobia. (The television footage of Turkish riot police savagely beating young women at a peaceful

protest for political rights that appeared on BBC yesterday is but the most recent

negative development.)

In foreign policy, during the term of Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey has quietly

broken off its strategic relationship with Israel, refused to negotiate with Armenia

on the opening of their common border (thereby obstructing negotiations on

Nagorno-Karabakh), and demanded of the United States a draconian treatment of

the Kurdish population of Iraq. In diplomatic parlance, Turkey has become

‘‘unhelpful.’’

Perhaps, most worrying are reports of Turkish-Russian discussions of a coordinated policy in the Black Sea region, which would inevitably be conducted at the

expense of smaller, pro-European democracies. The motivation for Turkey’s negative

regional behavior appears to be a classic case of Great Power insecurity and a fear

that Turkey will lose its distinct identity in the economic and demographic uncertainty of modern Europe. We can hope that the negative trend in Turkish politics

is related to the turmoil in the Middle East and the problems and contradictions

which a secular Islamic government encounters in the course of European integration rather than a response to the flowering of democracy around the Black Sea.

Nevertheless, Turkey has entered a dangerous period both for itself and for United

States-Turkish relations which deserves serious attention.

Ukraine is possibly the best-known and most inspiring of the Black Sea democracies. The triumph of Viktor Yushchenko and the Ukrainian people is without

question the most significant event in the advance of democracy in Europe since the

fall of the Berlin Wall. That said, President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia

Tymoshenko have a Herculean task in front of them. First and foremost, they must

unite a nation even as they undertake the reforms which are necessary for Ukraine

to become a European democracy.

The most dangerous year for a new democracy is its first year, and for Ukraine

the critical period is from today through the parliamentary elections in March 2006.

In this defining 12-month period, Viktor Yushchenko will have to address the criminal conduct of the Kuchma period, define and negotiate the rules of the game for

the business community, and make significant progress both within the Action Plan

of the European Union’s Neighborhood Policy and in an intensified dialog with

NATO. Any one of these tasks would be formidable, but the new government must

accomplish this and more, and do so in such a way that convinces the people of

Kiev, Lviv, and Donetsk that they share a common future in a united pro-Western

Ukraine. The critical task will be to establish transparent business practices and

to eliminate the ‘‘grey economy’’ without resorting to large-scale renationalization

which would destroy the confidence of foreign investors and dangerously inflame

sectional resentments.

The further danger for Ukrainian democracy lies in the hostility of Moscow toward pro-European democracies in the former Soviet space and the fear that democratic reform inspires in the criminal clans, which have dominated the ‘‘grey economy’’ of Ukraine up until now. Sadly, but necessarily, the stability and security of

EU and NATO membership is some years off and over the immediate political horizon. The United States and our European allies must bring their entire diplomatic

and economic power to bear to ensure that Russia, or criminal groups emboldened

by Russia, do not undermine the Yushchenko Government. We must support the

Ukrainian people in their truly historic endeavor.

Georgia’s democratic revolution is only slightly less well-known than Ukraine’s

and is succeeding against even longer odds. Georgia, under the leadership of President Misha Saakashvili, has finished an extraordinary first year of reform, which

saw the breakaway province of Adjaria reunited with the constitutional government

in Tbilisi. By all indicators, such as its qualification for participation within the Millennium Challenge Account, Georgia is delivering on its commitments to economic

28

reform and the democratic transformation of its society and government. Like

Ukraine, however, Georgia has encountered serious and continuous obstruction from

Russia. The Russian Government has refused to comply with its international treaty

obligation to withdraw its troops from the Soviet-era bases on Georgian soil and has

consistently supported separatists in the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia.

Late last year, Russia blocked the OSCE from reinforcing a peacekeeping mission

in South Ossetia in order to protect its ability to ship prohibited weapons and explosives through the Roki Tunnel to paramilitary gangs in South Ossetia. And, at the

December OSCE Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria, Russia forced the OSCE to close the

Border Monitoring Operation which patrolled the northern border of Georgia with

Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya. Russia’s actions could very well prove to be the

death knell for the OSCE; we must ensure that they are not for democratic Georgia.

Despite Russian attempts to destabilize the Saakashvili Government, Georgian

democracy continues to mature and was strong enough to withstand the recent tragic death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, who was a mainstay of the Rose Revolution. If democracies could be compared to sports teams, Georgia would be the 1980’s

U.S. Olympic Hockey team. Like the Lake Placid Olympic team, Georgia should not

be winning, except it does. It seems to me that Georgia has the essential quality

of scrappiness that animated successful democratic movements in Poland, the Czech

Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic States against the monolith of Soviet power; they

care more and are willing to work harder for democracy than the reactionary forces

are willing to work to restore autocratic rule and criminal enterprise.

In contrast, the other smaller states of the Black Sea regime, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, retain more characteristics of post-Soviet autocracies than of

emerging European democracies. To varying degrees, recent elections have not met

European standards. Opposition parties are harassed and opposition candidates are

occasionally threatened with criminal charges or simply imprisoned. Both civil society and the free press are under duress in these countries, as we can see from the

recent assassination of the editor of an opposition newspaper in Baku.

For the most part, the major factors retarding the democratic development of

Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are the persistence of frozen conflicts on their

territories and the negative effect these conflicts have on their economic development and domestic politics. The standoff between Moldovan Government and the

Smirnov clan in Transdnistria has proliferated corruption and crime throughout

Moldova and served as an excuse for President Voronin to limit the political and

press freedoms of Moldovan citizens. Similarly, the impasse on Nagorno-Karabakh

has served to maintain extremists in both Azeri and Armenian politics, and succeeded in isolating both countries from constructive interaction with their Black Sea

neighbors and with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

This brief survey of the mature, nascent, and inchoate democracies of the Black

Sea region reveals a special class of democracies which are torn between the desire

of their peoples for a European future (and all the economic and political freedoms

these peoples associate with Europe) and the lingering grip of a brutal past. In

short, this is a region of Europe where the future of democracy is still at risk.

III

If I am correct in arguing that the Black Sea region is a area of enormous democratic potential, but where democracy remains at risk, then the policy of the United

States has to be to support new democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers

from intervening in their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic institutions they seek remain open to them. I have six recommendations for this committee

to consider and for U.S. policy generally:

1. Accelerate the leading democracies of the region. The prospects for democracy

in the Black Sea region will be substantially enhanced by the formal integration of

Romania and Bulgaria in the European Union. Their accession must remain on

track for January 1, 2007, in order to convey to the other states of the region that

the possibility of near-term European integration exists and that painful reforms

have their reward in security and prosperity. The United States can assist Romania

and Bulgaria in achieving their goal by pushing hard for judicial reform and strict

standards of official conduct. The Department of Defense should make its long-delayed decision on the repositioning of United States European bases to the sites offered by the Romanian Government in the vicinity of Constanza on the Black Sea.

Nothing could make more clear that the United States shares the view of the European Union that security and stability in the Black Sea region is essential to EuroAtlantic security.

2. Reform and adapt our institutions to perform in the Black Sea region. Existing

institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE, must be made to perform in service of

29

democracy in the Black Sea littorals. We must revisit the decision to block Active

Endeavor from being extended to the Black Sea and overturn the archaic Montreux

Convention, which is sometimes invoked as the justification for barring NATO surveillance from transiting the Bosphorus. Similarly, we must demand that the OSCE

fulfill its peacekeeping and monitoring responsibilities throughout the region. Even

if we are successful with both NATO and the OSCE, the Black Sea region remains

‘‘institution-poor.’’ Regional initiatives, such as the confused GUUAM (Georgia,

Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) or the moribund Black Sea Economic Cooperation forum have not filled the gap. As a consequence, we should engage with regional leaders, such as Romanian President Basescu, Georgian President Saakashvili, and Ukrainian President Yushchenko, on the formation of new

structures for a Black Sea strategy.

3. Confront both Russia and Turkey. Whatever we hope to accomplish in the Black

Sea region will be impossible without the willingness to confront Russia where its

conduct goes beyond the acceptable. But we must also communicate frankly to Turkey that we expect our friends and allies to support other democratic states and to

work for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in their region. Just because Russian

officials become peevish when we point out that the poison used on Yushchenko and

the explosives used in the car bombing in Gori, Georgia, came from Russia, does

not mean we should ignore this conduct. Just because Turkish officials become indignant at the mention of a genocidal campaign conducted by Ottoman authorities

against Armenian civilians in the early years of the last century does not mean that

coming to terms with history should not be discussed between democratic allies. If

we are to succeed where democracy is at risk, we must be clear in what we say and

do.

4. Prioritize the frozen conflicts. Beginning with the conflict in Transdnistria, our

negotiators need to redouble their efforts to find creative solutions. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has opened up the possibility of ending the criminal enterprise

in Transdnistria and its secessionist conflict with the constitutional government in

Chisinau. For negotiations to succeed, however, we should expand the so-called Pentagonal-format to include both the European Union and Romania, as essential and

constructive partners. In Nagorno-Karabakh, we must press Azerbaijan and Armenia back to serious negotiations and insist that negotiations begin from the point

reached at 2001 meeting in Key West. Finally, we must show far greater resolve

and enthusiasm when parties take a meaningful step toward peace. President

Misha Saakashvili’s enlightened peace plan for South Ossetia has been greeted by

a resounding silence in Brussels and Washington, which is dumbfounding. It is also

callous and derelict.

5. Harmonize the democracy support programs of the United States and the European Union. Both the Millennium Challenge Account and European Union’s Neighborhood Policy were designed to assist emerging democracies in their efforts to accelerate economic development and strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions. Both the United States and the European Union are active in the Black Sea

region, but formal coordination does not yet exist. The four freedoms of market access, labor mobility, investment, and travel offered in Europe’s Neighborhood Policy

are the obvious complement to what the United States can offer in terms of security

support and developmental aid. Closer coordination is essential. We must also challenge our congressional-funded NGOs, such as the National Endowment of Democracy, IRI and NDI, to address a wider spectrum of democracy-support activities.

Elections are not the only things that matter in the Black Sea region. Strengthening

civil society, the press and parliamentary oppositions are also key.

6. Focus on Ukraine. For better or for worse, the extent and character of democracy in the Black Sea region will be defined to a great extent by the successes and

failures of democratic change in Ukraine. Without a democratic Ukraine, peace in

Moldova will remain elusive and the democracies of the South Caucasus will be isolated from Europe. The ultimate disposition of Ukraine may well finally answer the

question that has nagged at us since 1989: ‘‘What is the size of Europe?’’ If the Orange Revolution succeeds and European institutions maintain an ‘‘Open Door’’ policy

toward Ukraine’s candidacy for membership in NATO and the European Union,

then we can assume that all the democracies on the Black Sea have a place in Europe, including, some day, Russia.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that what is occurring around the Black Sea may be the

beginning of the final phase of the completion of a Europe whole and free. Over the

5 years remaining in this decade, I think that the rapid democratic transformation

of Central, Eastern, and now Southeastern Europe will come to a conclusion, and

a new (and far larger) community of Euro-Atlantic democracies will result. While

democratic change is ultimately the responsibility of the Black Sea States themselves, the United States has a significant role to play both in supporting and proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
30

tecting these young democracies. How well we play this role will affect the lives of

tens of millions of people and, quite literally, shape the future of the West.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Jackson, for your, as always, articulate insight and leadership. At the conclusion I was glad to get

a sense of optimism about the future.

We’ll hear from all our witnesses and then we’ll pose some questions. Thank you, Mr. Jackson. Now we’d like to hear from you, Mr.

Socor.

STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR SOCOR, SENIOR FELLOW,

JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. SOCOR. Mr. Chairman, I’m grateful for the opportunity to appear and testify in this hearing on a region that has surged to salience in debates on U.S. foreign and security policy and strategy.

With your permission, I will skip those parts of my prepared presentation that overlap with Ambassador Tefft’s and Bruce Jackson’s

presentations, and I will read those parts of my presentation that

deal with threats to U.S. interests and to the interests of U.S. allies and partners in the region.

Senator ALLEN. You have my permission and I think that’s a

good strategy.

Mr. SOCOR. Thank you—and with the frozen conflicts. American

and overall Western interests in this region require stable reformcapable states in control of their own borders, safe from external

military or economic pressures or externally inspired secessions, secure in their function as energy transit routes and capable of supporting U.S.-led or NATO coalition operations.

Those interests can only be sustained if the region’s countries develop good governance with functioning democratic institutions and

political processes resistant to corruption or hostile manipulation,

and if they are protected by international law and Western-led security arrangements.

Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan have acted as de facto allies in

providing political backing, guaranteeing air and land passage

rights, and fielding peace support troops for NATO and United

States-led operations. Georgia and Azerbaijan are active members

of the antiterrorist coalition. Their participation in the coalition is

also a means to maintain close relations with the United States,

advance the modernization of their security sectors, and earn their

credentials as NATO aspirant countries.

For its part, Azerbaijan gave radical Islamist organizations no

chance to make inroads into the country. Successful development

of Azerbaijan as a Muslim secular state is also a shared interest

of that country and the West. This goal has good prospects of fulfillment in Azerbaijan’s society characterized by religious tolerance

and receptiveness to Western cultural influences.

The region’s Western-oriented countries are facing a wide spectrum of threats to their security, mainly from Russia and its local

proteges. The overarching goal is to thwart these countries’ EuroAtlantic integration and force them back into a Russian sphere of

dominance. The scope, intensity, and systematic application of

threats has markedly increased over the last year as part of President Putin’s contribution to the shaping of Russia’s conduct.

31

These may be described as old, new, and newest type threats to

security. The old-type threats stem from troops and bases stationed

unlawfully in other countries, seizures of territories, border

changes de facto, ethnic cleansing, and creation of heavily armed

proxy statelets. Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are the targets

of such blackmail.

New-type threats are those associated with illegal arms and

drugs trafficking, rampant contraband, and organized transnational criminality, all of which use the Russian-protected secessionist enclaves as safe havens in staging areas. Such activities are

generally associated with nonstate actors of an often terrorist nature. In the Black Sea region, however, state actors within Russia

are often behind these activities, severely undermining the target

countries’ economies and state institutions.

The newest type threats to security can be seen in Russia’s assault on electoral processes, some months ago in Ukraine’s Presidential elections and in recent weeks in Moldova’s parliamentary

elections and meanwhile even in loyalist Abkhazia. Using massive

financial, mass media, and covert action means, Russia has sought

to influence the outcome of elections or hijack them outright in

order to install its favorites in power.

Closely related to this is the export of the Russian model of governance, characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures, organized crime, state bureaucracy, and government-appointed big

business. In all of the situations described above, security and democracy are equally at risk.

The Black Sea region is the most conflict-plagued region along

the new Euro-Atlantic perimeter. This situation limits the ability

of the United States to capitalize on the region’s high strategic

value. Thirteen years after the U.S.S.R.’s dissolution, Moscow continues heavily to dominate conflict management in this region.

Russia, largely responsible for sparking or fanning these conflicts,

has a vested interest in keeping them smoldering, so as to pressure

Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova and thwart their EuroAtlantic integration.

Russia’s policy consists of freezing, not the conflicts as such, but

rather the negotiating processes which Russia itself dominates. The

United Nations and OSCE, left largely to their own devices, have

merely conserved these conflicts.

There are those who suggest that the United States should defer

to Moscow on these issues, lest Russia’s cooperation with the

United States in antiterrorism and anti-WMD proliferation efforts

be jeopardized. This thesis seems to underestimate Russia’s own

declared interests in cooperating with such efforts, to overestimate

the practical value of Moscow’s contributions, and to ignore Russia’s outright obstruction of United States efforts in a number of

cases. Moreover, that thesis would seem to confirm the Kremlin in

its dangerous expectation that strategic partnership with the

United States should entail acceptance of Russian paramountcy on

peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space.

Such a quasi-monopoly would be an ingredient to sphere-of-influence rebuilding. It is crucial to avoid the perception, let alone the

fact, of a Russia-United States or Russia-West division of peacekeeping and conflict management spheres, or an informal partition

32

of countries’ territories. Strategic partnerships cannot long be sustained with rump countries vulnerable to armed secessions pressures across arm-controlled external borders.

It is high time to move this issue to the front burner of U.S. security policy, preferably in synergy with NATO and the EU countries. The United States is the best place for promoting conflict settlement solutions that would consolidate the region’s states in strategic partnerships with the United States.

Turning the broader Black Sea region into a policy priority need

not compete with the priorities assigned to other areas. On the contrary, stabilization of this region would entail incomparably lower

risks and incomparably smaller resources compared to the risks

and resource commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, or emergent initiatives in the broader Middle East. The fact is that a secure and

stable Black Sea region is necessary for sustaining those U.S.-led

operations and initiatives.

And may I conclude my prepared testimony, Mr. Chairman, with

some remarks on the CFE Treaty and Istanbul Commitments, leading off from the first panel’s presentation. Russia has openly repudiated its obligations under the 1999 adapted treaty on conventional forces in Europe and Istanbul Commitments, twin parts of

a single package, regarding withdrawal of Russian Forces from

Georgia and Moldova. The OSCE, custodian of those documents,

has cooperated with Russia in eviscerating them.

Troops withdrawal deadlines were postponed and then removed

altogether. Preconditions to withdrawal were attached where the

troop withdrawal was to have been unconditional. Excuses were

found for retaining some Russian troops in place where the withdrawal was to have been complete. Wide verification loopholes were

tacitly accepted. Heavy weaponry, coyly designated as unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment by a complacent OSCE, was

transferred from Russia’s arsenals into those of the separatist enclaves. The creation of Russian-staffed separatist forces was tolerated. And the requirement of host country consent to the stationing

of foreign troops is being flouted.

Since 2002, Moscow has rejected the very notion that it had

made commitments in Istanbul to withdraw its troops from Georgia

and Moldova. The OSCE itself all along turned those Russian commitments only politically binding as distinct from legally binding,

that is, not binding in practice. All these concessions notwithstanding, the OSCE is no longer able, since 2003, even to cite its

own 1999 decisions, because Russia has easily vetoed such references in the organization’s routine year-end resolutions. Realistically speaking, the Istanbul Commitments are dead.

Since 2004, moreover, Moscow threatens to destroy the OSCE by

blocking the adoption of the organization’s budget and terminating

certain OSCE activities. Russia does not want to kill the OSCE,

but rather to harness and use the weakened organization. Under

these circumstances, no one can possibly expect the OSCE to resurrect the Istanbul Commitments, let alone ensure compliance with

them.

Meanwhile, the United States and NATO governments collectively take the position that they would not ratify the adapted CFE

Treaty, which Moscow wants ratified, until Russia has complied

33

with the Istanbul Commitments. This form of leverage has manifestly proven too weak to induce Russia to withdraw its troops from

Georgia and Moldova. Russian officials scoff at calls for troop withdrawal based on the Istanbul documents.

It is high time for Georgia and Moldova to go beyond the OSCE

to international organizations and argue the case for Russian troop

withdrawal on the basis of national sovereignty and international

law. The United States, along with the Euro-Atlantic community,

should place these issues prominently on the agenda of United

States-Russia, NATO-Russia, and EU-Russia agendas, and not just

at summit time, as has been done occasionally and feebly this far,

but on a regular basis until this legitimate goal is achieved.

And this, Mr. Chairman, completes my testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Socor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR SOCOR, SENIOR FELLOW, JAMESTOWN

FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to

appear and testify in this important hearing on a region that has surged to salience

in debates on United States foreign and security policy and strategy: The broader

Black Sea region, new frontier in the advance of Euro-Atlantic security and democracy. My presentation will succinctly identify the interests of the United States and

its friends in the region, threats to those interests, and steps the United States can

take to promote its security and democratic goals together with its friends in the

region.

INTERESTS

The Black Sea region forms the hub of an evolving geostrategic and geo-economic

system that extends from NATO Europe to central Asia and Afghanistan, and as

such is crucial to United States-led antiterrorism efforts. It provides direct strategic

access for American and allied forces to bases and theaters of operation in central

Asia and the Middle East. It also provides westbound transit routes for Caspian energy supplies which are key to our European allies’ energy balance in the years

ahead.

Countries in the Black Sea region rarely if ever experienced security, democracy,

or prosperity. Their chance came with the end of Soviet dominance and the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community of interests and values.

At present, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin leads a campaign to halt

and turn back that process at the former Soviet borders, so as to restore a sphere

of Russian political, economic, and military dominance in a large part of the Black

Sea region. Threats of force against Georgia, refusal to withdraw Russian troops

from that country and from Moldova, overt support for secessionist enclaves in those

two countries, fanning of civil confrontation during the Presidential campaign in

Ukraine, the poison attack on Viktor Yushchenko, are among the recent brutal hallmarks of Mr. Putin’s policy in this region. The answer must be a redoubling of

democratic institution building within these countries, and anchoring them to EuroAtlantic institutions. The United States is uniquely equipped to lead this effort

within the Euro-Atlantic community and in the region itself.

With Romania and Bulgaria now in NATO and set to join the European Union,

and with old NATO ally Turkey aiming for EU entry, now is the time to start planning for the Euro-Atlantic integration of countries that have declared that aspiration in the broader Black Sea region: Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan.

FRIENDS AND PARTNERS

American and overall Western interests in this region require stable, reform-capable states, in control of their own borders, safe from external military or economic

pressures or externally inspired secessions, secure in their function as energy transit routes, and capable of supporting U.S.-led or NATO coalition operations. Those

interests can only be sustained if the region’s countries develop good governance,

with functioning democratic institutions and political processes resistant to corruption or hostile manipulation, and if they are protected by international law and

Western-led security arrangements.

34

Thus, effective state- and democracy-building and strategic interests are twin

sides of a common set of United States and Euro-Atlantic interests in the Black Sea

region. By the same token, security threats to countries in this region and actions

that undermine their sovereignty run counter to those interests.

Within this region, Romania and Bulgaria became providers of security and contributors to coalition operations even before accession to NATO. Their role is set to

grow further as the two countries become hosts to U.S. military installations on the

Black Sea littoral. NATO aspirants Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have acted as

de facto allies in providing political backing, guaranteeing air and land passage

rights, and fielding peace-support troops for NATO and United States-led operations. Georgia and Azerbaijan, active members of the antiterrorist coalition, have

thus graduated from the role of pure consumers of security to that of net consumers

and incipient providers of security to the region and beyond.

Tbilisi and Baku regard their participation in the antiterrorism coalition as synonymous with their national interests. Already before 9/11 they had experienced terrorist threats and attacks in the form of externally inspired coup and assassination

attempts against their leaders and ethnic cleansing. Thus they are vitally interested

in combating terrorism in all its forms. For both Georgia and Azerbaijan, participation in the antiterrorism coalition is also a means to maintain close relations with

the United States, advance the modernization of their security sectors, and earn

their credentials as NATO aspirant countries.

Moreover, Georgia and Azerbaijan are on the alert to prevent a spillover of the

Russian-Chechen war into their territories and to interdict the passage of any foreign gunmen, their suspected accomplices, or radical Islamist missionaries. With

United States assistance, Georgia cleaned up the Pankisi Valley in 2002–2003 and

holds it under control since then. For its part, Azerbaijan gave radical Islamist organizations no chance to make inroads into the country. Successful development of

Azerbaijan as a Muslim secular state is also a shared interest of that country and

the West. This goal has good prospects of fulfillment in Azerbaijan’s society characterized by religious tolerance and receptiveness to Western models.

The success of prodemocracy movements, known as Rose and Orange Revolutions,

in Georgia and Ukraine recently, is seen by many as potentially repeatable in Armenia, but unlikely to be duplicated in Azerbaijan or Moldova. In these two countries,

democratization will likely follow an evolutionary path. Last week Presidents

Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, meeting with

Moldova’s President Vladimir Voronin, announced their readiness to work with him

toward completing Eastern Europe’s third wave of democratization—that in the

broader Black Sea region. Mr. Voronin and his team, communists in name only,

have reoriented Moldova westward and are resisting what they describe as ‘‘Russia’s

attempts at recolonization.’’ These Presidents along with Ilham Aliev of Azerbaijan

are scheduled to meet again next month in Moldova with a view to revitalizing the

GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) group of countries.

SECURITY THREATS: OLD, NEW, NEWEST

The region’s Western-oriented countries are facing a wide spectrum of threats to

their security, mainly from Russia and its local proteges. The overarching goal is

to thwart these countries’ Euro-Atlantic integration and force them back into a Russian sphere of dominance. The scope, intensity, and systematic application of threats

has markedly increased over the last year, as part of President Putin’s contribution

to the shaping of Russia’s conduct. These may be described as old-, new-, and newest-type threats to security.

The ‘‘old-type’’ threats stem from troops and bases stationed unlawfully in other

countries, seizures of territories, border changes de facto, ethnic cleansing, and creation of heavily armed proxy statelets. Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are the

targets of such blackmail.

‘‘New-type’’ threats are those associated with illegal arms and drugs trafficking,

rampant contraband, and organized transnational criminality, all of which use the

Russian-protected secessionist enclaves as safe havens and staging areas. Such activities are usually associated with nonstate actors, often of a terrorist nature. In

the Black Sea region, however, state actors within Russia are often behind these

activities, severely undermining the target countries’ economies and state institutions.

The ‘‘newest type’’ threat to security can be seen in Russia’s assault on electoral

processes, some months ago in Ukraine’s Presidential election and in recent weeks

in Moldoya’s parliamentary elections (and meanwhile even in loyalist Abkhazia).

Using massive financial, mass-media, and covert action means, Russia has sought

35

to influence the outcome of elections or hijack them outright in order to install its

favorites in power.

Closely related to this is the export of the Russian model of governance, characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures, organized crime, state bureaucracy, and

government-connected big business. In all of the situations described above, security

and democracy are equally at risk.

‘‘FROZEN’’ CONFLICTS

The Black Sea region is the most conflict-plagued region along the new Euro-Atlantic perimeter. This situation limits the ability of the United States to capitalize

on the region’s high strategic value. Thirteen years after the U.S.S.R.’s dissolution,

Moscow continues heavily to dominate conflict-management in this region. Russia,

largely responsible for sparking or fanning these conficts, has a vested interest in

keeping them smoldering, so as to pressure Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and

Moldova and thwart their Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia’s policy consists of freezing not the conflicts as such, but the rather the negotiating processes, which Russia

itself dominates. The United Nations and OSCE, left largely to their own devices,

have merely conserved these conflicts.

There are those who suggest that the United States should defer to Moscow on

this issue, lest Russia’s cooperation with the United States in antiterrorism and

anti-WMD-proliferation efforts be jeopardized. This thesis seems to underestimate

Russia’s own declared interest in cooperating in such efforts; to overestimate the

practical value of Moscow’s contributions; and to ignore Russia’s outright obstruction

of United States efforts in a number of cases.

Moreover, that thesis would seem to confirm the Kremlin in its dangerous expectation that strategic partnership with the United States should entail acceptance of

Russian paramountcy on ‘‘peacekeeping’’ and conflict-resolution in the ‘‘post-Soviet

space.’’ This is an ingredient to sphere-of-influence rebuilding. It is crucial to avoid

the perception (let alone the fact) of a Russia-United States or Russia-West division

of peacekeeping and conflict-management spheres, or an informal partition of countries’ territories. Strategic partnerships can not long be sustained with rump countries vulnerable to armed secessionist pressures across uncontrolled external borders.

It is high time to move this issue to the front burner of U.S. security policy. Preferably in synergy with NATO and EU countries, the United States is best placed

for promoting conflict-settlement solutions that would consolidate the region’s states

in strategic partnership with the United States. Turning the broader Black Sea region into a policy priority need not compete with the priorities assigned to other

areas. On the contrary, stabilization of this region would entail incomparably lower

risks and incomparably smaller resources compared to the risks and resource commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, or emergent initiatives in the broader Middle East.

The fact is that a secure and stable Black Sea region is necessary for sustaining

those U.S.-led operations and initiatives.

CFE TREATY, ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS

Russia has openly repudiated its obligations under the 1999-adapted Treaty on

Conventional Forces in Europe and Istanbul Commitments (twin parts of a single

package) regarding withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova.

The OSCE, custodian of those documents, has cooperated with Russia in eviscerating them. Troop withdrawal deadlines were postponed and then removed altogether; preconditions to withdrawal were attached where the troop withdrawal was

to have been unconditional; excuses were found for retaining some Russian troops

in place where the withdrawal was to have been complete; wide verification loopholes were tacitly accepted; heavy weaponry—coyly designated as ‘‘unaccounted-for

treaty-limited equipment’’ by a complacent OSCE—was transferred from Russia’s

arsenals into those of the separatist enclaves; the creation of Russian-staffed separatist forces was tolerated; and the requirement of host-country consent to the stationing of foreign troops) is being flouted. Since 2002 Moscow has rejected the very

notion that it had made ‘‘commitments’’ in Istanbul to withdraw its troops from

Georgia and Moldova. The OSCE itself all along termed those Russian commitments

only ‘‘politically binding,’’ as distinct from legally binding; i.e., not binding in practice. All these concessions notwithstanding, the OSCE is no longer able since 2003

even to cite its own 1999 decisions, because Russia has easily vetoed such references

in the organization’s routine year-end resolutions. Realistically speaking, the

Istanbul Commitments are dead.

Since 2004, moreover, Moscow threatens to destroy the OSCE by blocking the

adoption of the organization’s budget and terminating certain OSCE activities. RusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
36

sia does not want to kill the OSCE, but rather to harness and use the weakened

organization. Under these circumstances, no one can possibly expect the OSCE to

resurrect the Istanbul Commitments, let alone ensure compliance with them.

Meanwhile, the United States and NATO governments collectively take the position that they would not ratify the adapted CFE Treaty (which Moscow wants ratified) until Russia has complied with the Istanbul Commitments. This form of leverage has, manifestly, proven too weak to induce Russia to withdraw its troops from

Georgia and Moldova. Russian officials scoff at calls for troop withdrawal based on

the Istanbul documents. It is high time for Georgia and Moldova to go beyond the

OSCE to international organizations, and argue the case for Russian troop withdrawal on the basis of national sovereignty and international law. The United

States, along with the Euro-Atlantic community, should place these issues prominent on the agenda of United States-Russia, NATO-Russia, and EU-Russia agendas,

and not just at summit time (as has been done occasionally and feebly thus far) but

also on a regular basis until this legitimate goal is achieved.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Socor, for your testimony. You’ve made some very probing and interesting assertions

that I want to follow up with you on in question time, but thank

you.

Ms. Baran.

STATEMENT OF ZEYNO BARAN, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ENERGY PROGRAMS, THE NIXON

CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. BARAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will not discuss developments in all the

countries and skip over some of the issues that were mentioned before. And I’d like to only mention, as far as the recent revolutions

in Georgia and Ukraine, that sustainability of these reformist revolutions is essential, and the United States needs to continue to support these two countries as they proceed with their difficult transition process.

I’d like to focus on three key issues. First is the Russian energy

monopoly over the European and Eurasian countries, which is one

of the main impediments to the future success and prosperity of

Georgia and Ukraine, as well as to the democratic future of the

Black Sea region as a whole.

Second, I’d like to mention the dangerous trend in Armenia and

especially Azerbaijan. I believe if Azerbaijan does not hold democratic parliamentary elections in the fall of 2005, Islamist forces

may gain ground. Moreover, if there is no solution to the Karabakh

issue over the next several years, I strongly believe Armenia and

Azerbaijan may once again go to war.

Third, I was asked to focus my remarks especially on Turkey and

the deterioration in the United States-Turkish relationship. Turkish mistrust of United States long-term objectives in the Black Sea

region dramatically hinders American initiatives in this area, and

Bruce Jackson briefly mentioned some.

Now, Mr. Chairman, on the Russian energy monopoly, which I

believe is a very important yet often ignored hindrance to further

reform in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Black Sea region, President

Putin’s policies indicate a desire to strengthen Russia’s already

strong position in the Eurasian and European energy markets. If

Russian monopoly power increases across the Eurasian region,

then countries will have difficulty resisting Russian political and

economic pressure. Similarly, if Russian market power within the

European gas sector increases, then the Europeans will be even

37

less willing than they are now to lean on Russia when Moscow’s

policies toward the Eurasian countries undermine the sovereignty

and independence of these states.

Armenia is already facing this problem of Russian energy leverage. Post-revolution Ukraine and Georgia, as well as others in Central Asia, and even the Baltic countries are beginning to grasp the

need to quickly come up with comprehensive energy security plans.

While many of these countries want to ensure their energy security, without strong political support from the United States and

the European Union, they will not be able to resist the Russian

pressure. Moreover, those individuals and corporations who currently benefit from nontransparent energy deals with the Russian

firms currently have no incentive to give up their power, which

would make Western support for democratic governance even more

important.

The United States needs to be aware that Russian gas monopoly,

Gazprom, wants to control the gas markets of Georgia, Turkey, and

Ukraine to form a strategic ring around the Black Sea which would

then be under permanent Russian energy control. I would then

strongly recommend the United States to include Eurasian energy

strategy in its trans-Atlantic dialog. The United States has already

helped Georgia and Azerbaijan with their energy diversification by

supporting the East-West energy corridor, by which Azerbaijani oil

and gas will soon be transported via Georgia and Turkey to world

markets, thus breaking up the Russian monopoly. Now the United

States ought to further extend the East-West corridor from central

Asia to Europe, a corridor with the Black Sea region at its heart.

Second, Mr. Chairman, I have followed the developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan closely since 1996, and I believe that until

the Karabakh issue is resolved, it will be very difficult to see real

progress in democratic and economic reform. Both countries’ politics are totally consumed by this issue, and both sides believe time

is on their side. As a result, neither one wants to make a concession, which is a dirty word in that part of the world. The main losers are the youth of these countries, who are spending their most

productive years in waiting.

To change political and economic conditions on the ground, and

the calculations of the two sides, the United States needs to get engaged at the highest levels. In addition, the solution to Karabakh

requires democratic process in both Armenia and Azerbaijan so

that the governments have legitimacy in the eyes of their people,

which is essential for support for the final agreement. The United

States, therefore, needs to encourage the leaders of these two countries to embrace the democratization process as essential to regional security and stability.

I will not spend much time on Armenia, as issues relevant to Armenia are well known here thanks to the work of the strong Armenian diaspora. I will simply mention that the strength of the diaspora cuts both ways, as it also limits U.S. ability to encourage

democratic change in that country. The United States simply cannot put the same kind of pressure on President Robert Kocharyan

as it was able to do with President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine.

Azerbaijan, however, has fewer friends here, as it does not have

a major diaspora. Potentially it can be a great strategic partner to

38

the United States. It is the only Muslim country with troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. It is a secular democracy with a Shiite majority neighboring Iran. As many Azerbaijanis proudly state,

theirs was the first secular democratic Republic in the Muslim

world. Though short-lived, the 1918 Republic included opposition

parties in the Parliament and allowed women to vote. It is an oiland gas-rich country, and if it manages to spend its energy wealth

wisely, Azerbaijan can become a great example for the rest of the

oil-rich Muslim world.

The November parliamentary elections could be a turning point

in the United States-Azerbaijan relations. The Bush administration

has made a strong commitment to prodemocracy forces throughout

the region to support their cause for free and fair elections. Many

in the opposition and civil society in Azerbaijan have been inspired

and energized by recent events in Georgia and Ukraine, and expect

the United States to deliver on its promises of democracy and freedom.

Over the next 8 months, the United States needs to both assure

Aliyev, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, that Washington does

not want to oust him, and at the same time be firm in supporting

free and fair elections. As a start, the United States, together with

the European Union, can ask Azerbaijan to allow the operation of

at least one independent television station and to let the opposition

hold meetings.

In Georgia, the so-called Baker Plan, which was delivered by

James Baker to his friend Eduard Shevardnadze and the leaders

of the opposition, provided the framework for the critical November

2003 elections. Such an approach can also work in Azerbaijan.

The United States should also be concerned about the November

elections in Azerbaijan because if the secular parties in and outside

the government lose more ground, the Islamists are elected to fill

their place. As a leader of the opposition Popular Front Party, Ali

Karimli, recently stated in Washington, with the secular political

opposition activities restricted, Islamists are getting stronger. As

he put it, quote, on Friday more than 3 or 4,000 people turn up

at services in every mosque, in a country where I cannot gather 50

people together for a meeting. This is worrisome in a country

neighboring Iran, which experienced a similar development that

brought in the Islamic Republic.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me spend a couple of minutes on Turkey and the growing mistrust toward the United States, and I

think as Bruce and others have mentioned, this I believe is going

to be an increasingly important issue. As you know, after decades

of NATO alliance and strategic partnership, Turkish-American relations began deteriorating with the Turkish Parliament’s refusal

to allow United States troops to transit Turkey and into Iraq in

March 2003, and deteriorated as the war in Iraq unfolded.

There had been ups and downs in the relationship before, but the

level of anti-Americanism in Turkey today is unprecedented. A recent BBC survey found that about 82 percent of Turks have a negative view of the Bush administration’s policies and considered today’s America to be one of the biggest threats in the world.

The Turkish anger is primarily a result of the Iraq war, which

many in Turkey opposed. Turkish concerns have focused on the

39

presence of the several thousand PKK terrorists in northern Iraq.

The United States has promised to eliminate the PKK terrorists,

but so far has not made a move.

Turks now associate Iraq with chaos and damage to their national interests, while the United States hails Iraq as a test case

for spreading democracy and freedom in the world. This has led

many Turks to associate American democracy and freedom initiative in the Middle East with an expansionist policy that will weaken Turkey. And this is part of the context for the Turkish reluctance to support United States or European initiatives for democracy in the Black Sea region.

Many in Turkey were skeptical of the Georgian and Ukrainian

revolutions, which they believed were managed by the United

States. They fear that under the rubric of democratic alliance the

United States is creating an anti-Russian alliance in the Black Sea

region which will lead in instability and undermine Turkey’s security in the region. Also, when the United States talks about democracy in the Black Sea region, Turks hear American naval presence,

which they strongly oppose to be based in the Black Sea region.

There has also been lack of bilateral dialog, and the first such

meeting took place only recently in Washington with a visiting senior Foreign Ministry representative, and both sides agreed that

more such discussions are necessary. At the same time, the United

States needs to understand a much deeper psychological issue is at

play, and this is why Turkey has been moving closer to Russia.

The United States should not ignore the psychological hangups

of former empires like Turkey and Russia. We still suffer from the

19th- or 20th-century views of strategic factors and do not share

President Bush’s vision of advancing democratic change in pursuit

of freedom. Turkey and Russia fear being surrounded by a West

hostile to their interests. Both oscillate between feelings of insecurity about their waning influence in global politics and a sense of

strategic indispensability in Eurasia.

Both have, in varying degrees, resented growing American presence in the Caucasus and central Asia, where they have historic,

ethnic and religious ties, and a sense of entitlement. The last thing

they want is to see the United States also enter the Black Sea region, which Turkey and Russia feel is their special zone of influence where they are the two major powers. Ultimately, both are

status quo powers in terms of foreign policy who oppose change in

the Black Sea region, mainly because in their recent past any

change meant losing territory or influence.

What Turkey needs more than anything is a carefully balanced

message from the United States that Washington appreciates Ankara’s importance and seeks partnership, but that Turkey’s strategic importance will not shield it against the consequences of

nasty behavior. In the Black Sea region, this means that Turkey

needs to hear that Turkish and American interests overlap in

terms of shared NATO values. But Turks also need to understand

that the unchecked growth of anti-Americanism is not acceptable.

Anti-Americanism has grown in many countries since the Iraq

war, but the tone and the depth of the anger in Turkey is the result of a number of other factors that have created a perfect storm.

In fact, today Turkey’s secular military, Islamists, leftists, and naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
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tionalists, forces that often oppose each other, have united in their

common opposition to the United States.

Maybe, the best example for understanding what is happening

inside Turkey is a very quick look at the best-selling fiction in Turkey today, ‘‘The Metal Storm.’’ While it is fiction, Turkish and

American Government leaders’ names are used and the context is

based on actual events. ‘‘The Metal Storm’’ is about a war the

United States launches against Turkey in 2007 under the name

‘‘Operation Sevres,’’ which is the much-feared agreement signed at

the end of the World War I, whereby the Western powers hoped to

dismantle the Ottoman Empire. In the book, Armenians, Greeks,

and Kurds are once again portrayed as fifth columns of Turkey who

the West can use to destabilize Turkey.

I won’t go into more details about the book, which I have actually

described at length, but I think it’s important to understand this

book because it’s important in understanding the Turkish mindset

today. With the EU reform process forcing fundamental changes in

Turkey that exacerbate many people’s sense of insecurity about

their future and sense of certainty, this book has brilliantly captured the mood in Turkey.

It also clouds effect in fiction by hinting at current issues of contention in United States-Turkish relations, including whether the

tragic events of 1915 constitute the Armenian genocide, the unresolved Cyprus issue, and the developments in Iraq. Getting United

States-Turkish relations back on track in the Black Sea region and

beyond requires a Turkish leadership to put an end to the wild and

destructive speculation portrayed in ‘‘The Metal Storm.’’

There are also certain steps the United States can take. In the

short term, the United States can take three steps to try to reverse

the negative trends and restore a sense of partnership in relations

with the United States. First, together with the Iraqi Government,

the United States needs to find a formula to assuage the Turkish

irritation with the continued PKK presence in northern Iraq. Until

and unless the PKK issue is resolved, Turkish-United States relations cannot move to a better phase, and Turkey would continue

to resist any United States initiatives in the Black Sea region.

Second, given the prevalent Turkish view that the United States

is running a campaign against Turkey, it would be very damaging

if the Armenian genocide resolution passed the Congress this year.

This year is the 90th anniversary of the tragic 1915 massacre, and

certainly the Armenian diaspora groups would like to get recognition.

However, such a resolution would play right into the hands of

the growing set of anti-Americans and ultranationalists in Turkey.

For the Black Sea region, it will mostly hurt the Turkish-Armenian

rapprochement.

Third, the United States needs to continue raising Turkish EU

membership as part of the trans-Atlantic dialog and insist that

Turkey should be accepted into the European Union on the merits.

Turkey needs to be also assured it will not be swapped with

Ukraine. This certainty is necessary for Turks to support Ukraine’s

and Georgia’s ongoing democracy reforms and make the fundamental and institutional changes at home.

Thank you.

41

[The prepared statement of Ms. Baran follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ZEYNO BARAN, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND

ENERGY PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to

appear before you today and share my views on the progress the countries of the

Black Sea have made in their democratic reform process and on the impediments

to further reform these countries face. I will also present some suggestions on how

the United States can continue to advance its own security interests in this strategic

region.

I will not discuss developments in all the countries of this region, which includes

the three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), Moldova,

Ukraine, new NATO allies Bulgaria and Romania, and the two big powers, Turkey

and Russia. I will concentrate on four principal issues:

I. The recent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia’s November 2003 Rose

Revolution and Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution have inspired people and countries from throughout the region (especially Moldova) and around the globe.

II. Russian energy monopoly over the European and Eurasian countries. This is

one of the main impediments to the future success and prosperity of Georgia and

Ukraine, as well as to the democratic future of the Black Sea region as a whole.

III. The dangerous trend in Armenia and especially Azerbaijan. If Azerbaijan does

not hold democratic parliamentary elections in the fall of 2005, Islamist forces may

gain ground. Moreover, if there is no solution to the Karabakh issue over the next

several years, Armenia and Azerbaijan may once again go to war.

IV. The deterioration in the United States-Turkey bilateral relationship. Turkish

mistrust of United States long-term objectives in the Black Sea region dramatically

hinders American initiatives in this area.

I. GEORGIA: INSPIRATION FOR CHANGE

Mr. Chairman, I was an election observer during the November 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia and saw firsthand how tens of thousands of people refused

to accept the theft of their votes and the silencing of their voices. More than anything, the Georgian people no longer wanted to live in a ‘‘failing state’’; they feared

that if the post-Communist regime stayed in office any longer, the damage would

be such that they would forever lose the prospect of reuniting with Europe, where

they believed they belonged.

The Rose Revolution was not a movement led or even inspired by the United

States; it was a domestic uprising against a corrupt and weak regime that was rotting internally and could not deliver on any promises to restore stability and economic growth and bring Georgia closer to the transatlantic community. Its internal

weakness was exploited by Russian companies as they took over strategic assets,

tying the country’s economy and future directly to Moscow—just as they had previously done in Belarus and Armenia.

Yet, over the course of a decade, American assistance was essential, especially to

preparing a cadre of reformers, both inside and outside government. Current President Mikheil Saakashvili received training and strong support for his overarching

reforms in the judicial sector when he was Minister of Justice. Former Prime Minister and parliamentary speaker Zurab Zhvania, who recently died in a tragic accident, similarly benefited from his close work with the American assistance community. These are just some of the many Georgians who, over this period, developed

personal relations with American leaders, while discovering that both sides shared

the same values and principles. Based on these experiences, these Georgians took

the initiative to move their country in a positive direction, both while in government

and in the opposition. Following this example, then, I strongly urge that the United

States assist reformers within governments, not just those in NGOs or in opposition

parties.

The Georgian revolutionaries were indeed committed to the ideal of a democratic

revolution, and wanted to share it with their country’s strategic partner, Ukraine.

Soon after the ‘‘Rose Revolution’’ of November 2003, even before he was inaugurated

as President, Saakashvili made Kyiv his first foreign destination in January 2004.

In fluent Ukrainian, Saakashvili confidently predicted that Ukraine would become

democratic over the next year, while pledging his support for his friend, Viktor

Yushchenko. While few in the West (or in Russia) noticed, over the next year Georgians and Ukrainians, in government as well as in civil society, worked together to

ensure Ukraine’s democratic triumph. While many in the West (and in Russia)

looked down on the state of Ukrainian civil society, Georgians knew that they had

helped inspire this European nation and reawaken its quest to reclaim its place in

42

1 Vladimir Socor, Wall Street Journal Europe, ‘‘The Moldovan Front: Next Test for Post-Soviet

Democratization.’’ March 4–6, 2005.

the West on the basis of the same shared values and principles. When the Georgian

President, Prime Minister, and other officials met with their American counterparts

over that period, they urged United States support for Ukraine’s democratic voices.

They knew that if Georgia remained the sole island of democratic change in the

Black Sea region, it would be very tough to succeed, especially given the Russian

pressure.

Now Saakashvili and Yushchenko want to support others who want to move in

a prodemocratic direction by aggregating their voices to obtain more attention from

the European Union and the United States. This is precisely what happened with

the Moldovan parliamentary elections on Sunday, March 6. Both Saakashvili and

Yushchenko met with President Voronin just ahead of the elections in order to provide support for a leader who seeks to reintegrate Moldova into Europe. It is no coincidence that Saakashvili and Voronin were the only Presidents of the former Soviet countries who did not accept the falsified second-round election results that declared former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as the winner of the Ukrainian

elections in November. Nor is it surprising that they in turn were also the first to

congratulate Yushchenko for his eventual victory.

But the situation in Moldova is complicated. While Voronin is head of the Communist Party of Moldova, he has distanced Moldova from Moscow in recent years

in pursuit of Moldova’s European vocation. His underlying goal may have been to

preempt any democratic revolution by playing Moldova’s European card. In contrast

to Georgia and Ukraine, Moldova is thus pursuing an evolutionary rather than a

revolutionary reform process. But the country’s progress toward democracy is no

less real.

As Saakashvili stated, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova now together believe that

‘‘we can complete democratization’s third wave in Eastern Europe.’’ 1 Completing

this wave means that each country has committed to fighting crime, corruption, and

the influence of clans that has led these countries to internal weakness and external

vulnerability; it means that each country must consolidate democratic gains and

move closer to the Euro-Atlantic institutions; and it means that each country needs

the continued support of the European Union and the United States to succeed.

The sustainability of the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions is essential for others in the Black Sea region to follow a reformist trend, whether revolutionary or

evolutionary. For this sustainability, Georgia and Ukraine have submitted their EU

action plans—plans that need to be seriously considered, as the prospect of eventual

EU membership will provide the necessary incentive for both countries to undertake

tough but necessary reforms. The United States needs to support, and to urge its

European allies to support, both Georgia and Ukraine in their EU process as well

as in their implementation of the NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans

(IPAP), which pave the way for their eventual alliance membership.

Second, the United States needs to work closely with its European allies to urge

the resolution of the separatist conflicts in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia, as well as the Moldovan region of Transnistria. It is encouraging to

see Ukraine and Romania cooperating on the issue of Transnistria, and to see the

recently founded New Group of Friends of Georgia (consisting of Poland, Romania,

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) taking the lead in urging Brussels and

Washington to pay attention to these issues. In fact, these former Soviet-bloc states

that have now joined the European Union (Bulgaria and Romania are expected to

join in 2007) and NATO have become the most visionary and constructive of America’s European allies. They are also helping the Europeans to better understand

Russia and are urging the resolution of these frozen conflicts, without which further

democratic reforms are difficult, to say the least. As long as these conflicts remain,

they will be sources of potential instability and of potential Russian pressure.

Senator Richard Lugar’s resolution on Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia

and Moldova, urging it to implement the 1999 OSCE agreement to withdraw its

troops from these two countries, is extremely timely and very important as the existence of the Russian military forces have become a hindrance to peace. One of the

four Russian bases in Georgia has been vacated, the status of the second is in dispute, and talks are ongoing regarding the remaining two. Yet after 6 years, Russian

troops still remain in both countries, and discussions on troop withdrawal are often

held in parallel with other political concessions.

The United States also needs to at the high levels engage the European Union

and NATO to ensure a new Border Monitoring Mission (BMO) in Georgia to replace

the OSCE mission, which, following the Russian veto, will terminate in May. The

BMO has been critical to the effort to obtain credible information on Georgia’s borVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
43

ders with the Russian Republics of Chechnya, Daghestan, and Ingushetia. Moreover, in the past, it was thanks to these monitors that the West found out that Russian planes had bombed Georgian territory. The United States needs to help find

a mechanism to replace the BMO; there are several European countries that are

willing to step up to the task, but none wants to take the lead for fear of drawing

Russia’s wrath.

Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are also eager to revive the GUUAM organization,

consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, an effort for

which they need United States political support. As GUUAM is perceived in Moscow

to be an alliance against Russian interests, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan at this point

are not interested in reviving it in a political form; they instead want to increase

cooperation in the economic sphere, especially regarding east-west transportation

corridors. While Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova may prefer to include security and

democratization issues in GUUAM, in order to avoid a breakup of the organization

and to instead utilize it as much as possible, an initial focus can be energy—an area

in which the United States can be particularly helpful.

II. RUSSIAN ENERGY MONOPOLY

Mr. Chairman, a very important yet often ignored hindrance to further reform in

Georgia, Ukraine, and the Black Sea region is the effects of the Russian energy monopoly in Europe and Eurasia. The West ignored the clear intentions of Anatoly

Chubais, head of Russia’s RAO UES, who declared in September 2003 that ‘‘Russian

business ought to be allowed to expand . . . with the aim of creating a liberal empire’’ in the former Soviet sphere. In addition to such an expansion of Russian energy monopolies, over the last year Russia’s largest oil company Yukos has been dismantled and through Rosneft its assets consolidated under Kremlin control. When

Rosneft merges with Gazprom, Putin will be in direct control of the world’s largest

integrated oil and gas company.

Putin’s policies indicate a desire to strengthen Russia’s already strong position in

the Eurasian and European energy markets. If Russian monopoly power increases

across the Eurasian region, then countries will have difficulty resisting Russian political and economic pressure. Similarly, if Russian market power within the European gas sector increases, then the Europeans will be even less willing than they

are now to lean on Russia when Moscow’s policies toward the Eurasian countries

undermine the sovereignty and independence of these states.

Armenia and Belarus are already facing this problem of Russian energy leverage.

Post-revolution Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the central Asian and even the Baltic countries, are beginning to grasp the need to quickly come up with comprehensive energy security plans.

While many of these countries want to ensure their energy security by diversifying their sources away from Russia, without strong political support from both the

United States and the European Union, they will not be able to resist the Russian

pressure. Moreover, those individuals and corporations who currently benefit from

nontransparent energy deals with the Russian firms currently have no incentive to

give up their power, which would make Western support for democratic governance

even more important.

The United States needs to be aware that Gazprom wants to control the gas markets of Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine to form a strategic ring around the Black Sea,

which would then be under permanent Russian energy control. Georgia is the gateway through which Caspian gas will be able to enter to Turkey and then be transported onward to the European markets. However, it is also the weakest link in this

Black Sea chain. The difficult economic conditions prevailing in Georgia have given

Gazprom a great opening to try and acquire the title to the Georgian gas pipelines,

thus bolstering its monopoly power. If Tbilisi unintentionally helps Gazprom in this

effort, then Georgia will only be enhancing the company’s long-term leverage over

European gas consumers, and thus discouraging Europeans from taking a firmer

line with Russia on political issues, such as the frozen conflicts mentioned earlier.

The United States should therefore include Eurasian energy strategy in its transatlantic dialog. The United States helped Georgia and Azerbaijan with their energy

diversification by supporting the East-West energy corridor, by which Azerbaijani oil

and gas will soon be transported via Georgia and Turkey to world markets, thus

breaking up the Russian monopoly. Now, the United States ought to further extend

the East-West corridor from central Asia to Europe, a corridor with the Black Sea

region at its heart.

While gas is more directly relevant to strategic considerations in the South

Caucasus and European countries, the situation is similar in the oil sector. Ukraine

needs the most help in this area; it had constructed the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline

44

to transport Caspian oil to European markets; yet, under Russian pressure, the

Kuchma government last year agreed to its reversal so that Russian oil could be

transported to the Black Sea. While commercial reasons were presented as justification for the reversal, it is more likely that it was done in consideration for Russian

political support to the Yanukovych Presidential campaign. This is apparent by the

fact that, over the past several months, the Russians have not put enough oil into

the line to make it profitable; expectations were that it would supply half the

amount it originally pledged for 2005.

The Yushchenko government recently announced—at a joint press briefing of the

Ukrainian and Georgian Prime Ministers—that Odesa-Brody would be reversed

back to its original direction. On March 4, the Ukrainian and Polish Prime Ministers also agreed to the extension of the pipeline to the Polish city of Plock. In this

way, Poland will also be able to diversify away from Russian oil. Despite its intentions, Ukraine will be unable to make the reversal happen on its own; it needs

American political support, which can help facilitate an intergovernmental agreement between Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Poland that will ensure supplies on one

end of the pipeline, and markets on the other end, thus making it commercially viable.

III. ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN: TIME IS ON NEITHER SIDE

Mr. Chairman, I have followed developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan closely

since 1996 and believe that until the Karabakh issue is resolved it will be very difficult to see real progress in democratic and economic reform. Both countries’ politics are totally consumed by this issue and both sides believe time is on their side;

as a result, neither one wants to make a concession—which is a dirty word in that

part of the world. The main losers are the youth of these countries, who are spending their most productive years waiting.

Azerbaijan is told by the West that it lost Karabakh in the war and needs to give

up this piece of land for the sake of peace and prosperity and move on with its EU

and NATO integration process. This kind of talk only hardens the nationalists, who

believe that with massive oil and gas revenues starting to flow into the budget over

the next several years, they can strengthen their military, and take back their land.

Given that there are already four U.N. resolutions supporting Azerbaijani territorial

integrity, if they play the oil card well, they may have a chance in getting diplomatic support. Hence, they believe the best strategy for them is to bide their time.

Armenia too believes time is on its side to turn Karabakh’s de-facto separation

from Azerbaijan to de jure acceptance. They do not think Azerbaijan would risk a

war when its oil and gas pipelines may be attacked and its economy devastated. Armenia also can wait, as its economy has grown despite having no trade with two

of its neighbors—Azerbaijan and Turkey. While Armenia wants to resume economic

relations with Azerbaijan as a best confidence-building mechanism, Azerbaijan

claims that the refusal to have economic relations is the only peaceful mechanism

they have to keep Armenia at the negotiating table. Azerbaijan’s strategic partner

Turkey has also closed its borders with Armenia, and will also not open them until

the Karabakh issue is resolved.

To change the political and economic conditions on the ground and the calculations of the two sides, the United States needs to get engaged at the highest levels.

In 2002 Presidents Bush and Putin issued a joint statement on the need to resolve

the frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and Karabakh, but no further steps were taken. The

Karabakh process has been left to the OSCE Minsk group, which cannot deliver a

solution, as the issue requires top level discussions. While it is good to keep the dialog going between Armenia and Azerbaijan, failure to deliver a solution is leading

to massive frustration among the people and hurting the image of the OSCE.

In addition to a committed Bush-Putin discussion, the solution to Karabakh requires democratic progress in both Armenia and Azerbaijan so that the governments

have legitimacy in the eyes of their people, which is essential for support for the

final agreement. The United States, therefore, needs to encourage the leaders of

these two countries to embrace the democratization process as essential to regional

security and stability.

I will not spend much time on Armenia, as issues relevant to Armenia are well

known here thanks to the work of the strong Armenian diaspora. I will simply mention that the strength of the diaspora cuts both ways, as it also limits U.S. ability

to encourage democratic change in this country. The United States simply cannot

put the same kind of pressure on President Robert Kocharyan as it was able to do

with President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine; it is inconceivable to think that Washington would threaten to keep senior Armenian Government officials out of the

United States in case of falsified elections.

45

2 Baku Today, ‘‘President Calls for Speedy Investigation into Journalists Murder.’’ March 3,

2005. 3 Nixon Center Program Brief, ‘‘Getting Azerbaijan Right.’’ February 15, 2005.

Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, has fewer friends in the United States as it does not

have a major diaspora; however, potentially it can be a great strategic partner.

Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country with troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo.

It is a secular democracy with a Shiite majority neighboring Iran. As many

Azerbaijanis proudly state, theirs was the first secular democratic republic in the

Muslim world. Though short-lived, the 1918 republic included opposition parties in

the Parliament and allowed women to vote. It is an oil and gas rich country and

if it manages to spend its energy wealth wisely, Azerbaijan can become a great example for the rest of the oil-rich Muslim world.

The November parliamentary elections could be a turning point in the United

States-Azerbaijan relationship. The Bush administration has made a commitment

to prodemocracy forces throughout the region to support their calls for free and fair

elections. Many in the opposition and civil society have been inspired and energized

by recent events in Georgia and Ukraine and expect the United States to deliver

on its promises of democracy and freedom. The government, however, is nervous

that opposition will receive support from the United States and possibly try to have

a revolution as well. Given that there is no fundamental difference between President Ilham Aliyev and the leaders of the pro-Western opposition groups, with a correct engagement strategy, the United States can help move the country in a positive

direction.

At the same time, many people are benefiting from the current corrupt, clanbased system in Azerbaijan and these forces will try their best to avoid free and

fair elections in November, which will be a turning point for Azerbaijan. In fact,

since Aliyev succeeded his father in the October 2003 Presidential elections there

has been a crackdown on media and opposition activists; this has led many to wonder whether Aliyev is not fully in charge of his government or whether he himself

sanctions these policies. The most brutal incident so far occurred last week, when

Elmar Huseinov, the editor in chief of the Azerbaijani opposition magazine Monitor

was shot dead in front of his home in Baku. Aliyev blamed ‘‘internal and external

forces’’ that want ‘‘to deliver damage to Azerbaijan’s international image, to discredit it before the parliamentary elections and present the country as an unstable

and nondemocratic state, where freedom of speech is violated and acts of terrorism

are committed.’’ 2 It is highly unlikely that Aliyev himself was involved in this murder, and it is critical for him to make sure the killers of Huseinov are found and

properly punished so that neither his nor his government’s image is further damaged.

Over the next 8 months the United States needs to both assure Aliyev that Washington does not want his ouster, and at the same time be firm in supporting free

and fair elections. As a start, the United States, together with the European Union,

can ask Azerbaijan to allow the operation of at least one independent television station, and to let the opposition hold meetings. In Georgia the so-called Baker Plan,

which was delivered by James Baker to his friend Shevardnadze and the leaders

of the opposition, provided the framework for the critical November 2003 elections.

Such an approach can also work in Azerbaijan.

The United States should also be concerned about the November elections in Azerbaijan because if the secular parties in and outside the government lose more

ground, the Islamists are likely to fill their place. As the leader of the opposition

Popular Front Party, Ali Karimli stated in his talk at the Nixon Center on February

15, 2005, with the secular political opposition’s activities restricted, Islamists are

getting stronger. As Karimli put it, ‘‘on Fridays more than 3 or 4,000 people turn

up at services in every mosque, in a country where I cannot gather 50 people together for a meeting!’’ He also mentioned, and as I have observed in my recent visits, the Islamists are gaining ground because they exploit the Karabakh issue, arguing that even though Azerbaijani territory is invaded and there are four U.N. resolutions about it, ‘‘because we are Muslim, our rights are not respected’’; second, the

Islamists highlight the ‘‘extreme poverty and the huge inequality between the average person and the top 1 or 2 percent who own everything’’; and third, they take

advantage of the fact that ‘‘no one seems to care’’ about democracy in the country.3

These are all worrisome signs in a country neighboring Iran, which experienced a

similar development that brought in the Islamic Republic.

46

4 Nixon Center Program Brief, ‘‘Turkish View of Russia and Eurasia.’’ February 25, 2005.

IV. TURKEY: GROWING MISTRUST OF THE UNITED STATES

After decades of NATO alliance and strategic partnership, Turkish-American relations began deteriorating with the Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow United

States troops to transit Turkey and into Iraq in March 2003, and deteriorated as

the war in Iraq unfolded. There had been ups and downs in the relationship before,

but the level of anti-Americanism in Turkey today is unprecedented. A recent BBC

survey found that about 82 percent of Turks have a negative view of the Bush administration’s policies and consider today’s America to be one of the biggest threats

in the world.

This Turkish anger is primarily a result of the Iraq war, which many in Turkey

opposed. They initially feared their neighbor turning into an ethnic and religious

war zone. Turkish concerns have focused on the presence of the several thousand

PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. The United States has promised to eliminate the

PKK terrorist threat in Iraq, but so far has not made a move. After a brutal civil

war with its Kurdish population that lasted a decade and cost over 30,000 lives,

Turks are angered with the United States for not taking action against a group that

already began terrorist operations inside Turkey. They are therefore wondering

whether the ‘‘global war on terror’’ is waged only on groups that threaten the United

States and excludes groups that threaten only U.S. allies.

In addition, Turks fear the Kurds in Iraq may eventually establish an independent state that would also appeal to Turkey’s own Kurds living in the border

areas; such a development could once again lead to separatism and instability inside

Turkey, potentially rekindling civil war and even undermining Turkey’s territorial

integrity. The fact that the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is gradually coming under Kurdish

control and the Turkmen—their ethnic brethren—living in Kirkuk are being discriminated against, further causes suspicion and mistrust toward the United States.

Turks now associate Iraq with chaos and damage to their national interests, while

the United States hails Iraq as a test case for spreading democracy and freedom

in the world. This has led many Turks to associate American democracy and reform

initiatives in the Middle East with an expansionist policy that will weaken Turkey,

but cloaked in the rhetoric of ‘‘freedom’’ and ‘‘justice.’’ Fearing further chaos and

change in its southern neighborhood, Turkey has even pulled closer to Syria and

Iran.

This is part of the context for the Turkish reluctance to support United States

or European initiatives for democracy in the Black Sea region. Many in Turkey were

skeptical of the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, which they believe were managed by the United States. They fear that under the rubric of ‘‘democratic alliance,’’

the United States is creating an anti-Russian alliance in the Black Sea region,

which will lead to instability and undermine Turkey’s security in this region. Second, when the United States talks about democracy in the Black Sea region, Turkey

hears American naval presence. Turkey is strongly opposed to any foreign military

presence in the Black Sea, which it fears will undermine the Treaty of Montreaux

of 1936, which designated the Turkish Straits as an international waterway but afforded Turkey rights to impose safety regulations. Retaining some jurisdiction over

the Bosporus and Dardanelles remains one of the highest priorities of Turkish national security policy, as it has since 1453.

United States-Turkish tension is aggravated by a lack of dialog. There have been

few discussions on the Black Sea region at governmental levels; the first one in several years took place only in the last week of February when Ambassador Halil

Akinci, the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Director for Russia, Caucasus and central

Asia visited Washington. In his meetings Akinci stated that Turkish policy in the

Black Sea region is based on four pillars: ‘‘Contributing to the consolidation of state

building; supporting political and economic reforms; promoting the Black Sea States’

integration with the international community; developing and enhancing bilateral

relations on the basis of equality, mutual interest and respect for sovereignty.’’ 4

Given that this Turkish vision and the American vision are at the core complementary, more bilateral discussions need to be held between diplomats, military and the

civil society so that the Turks can understand these interests are shared.

At the same time, the United States needs to understand a much deeper psychological issue is at play, and this is why Turkey has been moving closer to Russia.

The United States should not ignore the psychological hangups of former empires

like Turkey and Russia, which still suffer from the 19th/20th century views of strategic factors and do not share Bush’s vision of advancing democratic change in pursuit of freedom. Turkey and Russia still pine over lost lands and fear being surrounded by a West hostile to their interests. Both oscillate between feelings of inseVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:15 Sep 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 23171.TXT SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
47

curity about their waning influence in global politics, and a sense of strategic indispensability in Eurasia. Both have in varying degrees resented growing American

presence in the Caucasus and central Asia, where they had historic, ethnic, and religious ties and a sense of entitlement. The last thing they want is to see the United

States also enter the Black Sea region, which Turkey and Russia feel is their ‘‘special zone of influence’’ where they are the major powers. Ultimately, both are status

quo powers in terms of foreign policy who oppose change in the Black Sea region,

mainly because in their recent past any change meant losing territory or influence.

What Turkey now needs, more than anything, is a carefully balanced message

from the United States that Washington appreciates Ankara’s importance and seeks

partnership, but that Turkey’s strategic importance will not shield it against the

consequences of nasty behavior. In the Black Sea region, this means that Turkey

needs to hear that Turkish and American interests overlap in terms of shared

NATO values. But Turks also need to understand that the unchecked growth of

anti-Americanism is not acceptable. Anti-Americanism has grown in many countries

since the Iraq war, but the tone and the depth of the anger in Turkey is a result

of a number of other factors that have created a perfect storm. In fact, today Turkey’s secular military, Islamists, leftists, and nationalists—forces that often oppose

each other—have united in their common opposition to the United States. Why?

Maybe the best example for understanding what is happening inside Turkey is

a brief look at the best selling fiction in Turkey today, ‘‘The Metal Storm.’’ While

it is fiction, Turkish and American government leaders’ real names are used and

the context is based on actual events. ‘‘The Metal Storm’’ is about a war the United

States launches against Turkey in 2007 under the name ‘‘Operation Sevres,’’ which

is the much-feared agreement signed at the end of the World War I whereby the

Western powers hoped to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. In the book Armenians,

Greeks, and Kurds are once again portrayed as fifth columns of Turkey who the

West can use to destabilize Turkey.

The American operation against Turkey begins when the Turkish military enters

northern Iraq after the attacks in Kirkuk on non-Kurds, i.e., Turkmen, have increased significantly. The United States does not diplomatically oppose the Turkish

move as it is about to attack Syria. Moreover, the United States has been running

a psychological campaign against Turkey for some time and uses this opportunity

to portray the Turks as the aggressors, even though it is the United States that

launches a brutal attack on them. It is interesting to note that the book makes clear

that by that point in 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy has become France’s President, and

afterward the European Union ended talks with Turkey, which in turn has moved

away from the West. The Turkish Government has withdrawn its Ambassador to

the United States as a result of the Armenian genocide resolution that passes the

United States Congress. As part of the campaign against Turkey, the United States

was also portraying Turks are wrong in Cyprus.

Now, while for many in the United States such scenarios may be far-fetched, to

say the least, in the Turkish context they are quite believable. Since this book was

published a few months ago, there have been several TV shows in the United States

where the Turks were portrayed as terrorists, which was taken as a sign of a psychological operation against Turkey. Only a few days ago Sarkozy, who is the most

likely candidate to be France’s next President, received a huge applause when he

objected to Turkey’s EU membership. The list goes on.

In the book there are two more reasons for the United States to launch a war

on Turkey. The first is to ‘‘liberate Istanbul from 500 years of occupation by the

Turks’’ and let the Evangelical Church construct the biggest ever church in this city.

At secret meeting in Vatican called ‘‘The New Byzantium,’’ the church decides to reChristianize Anatolia, which has many holy Christian sites. Again, while this theory

sounds almost insane, many in Turkey do not understand the role of the Evangelical

church in American politics and fear that President Bush was serious when he announced the beginning of a new crusade after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

On top of this comes the EU’s religious freedom reform pressure, which again, is

perceived in Turkey as a way to ‘‘Christianize’’ Turkey. Consequently, those in Turkey promoting interfaith dialog have been accused of serving American and Western

interests, not Turkish ones. (This is, of course, very unfortunate since Turkish moderate traditions and long history of interfaith acceptance can be the best antidote

against the radicalism prevalent in many Muslim societies.)

A second reason for the U.S. attack in the book is the American desire to move

away from dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the need to develop new energy

sources. Turkey has rich borax, uranium, and thorium mines; it has monopoly in

borax, which is mainly used for space and weapons technology and, therefore, is a

strategic mineral. While few in the United States ever think of these mines, many

in Turkey, starting several years before this novel was published, have feared an

48

eventual United States attack to take over these mines. It is probably not surprising

that in the end of the book, Russia and Germany help Turkey by taking on a common diplomatic position against the United States—simply because they do not

want the United States to control these mines and become even more powerful.

Throughout the book honorable Turkish military and political leaders wondering

how and why the United States would attack Turkey after decades of partnership.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and others are often portrayed as

having difficulty grasping that the United States is indeed attacking Turkey. In several parts, the book states, ‘‘For a long time there was speculative news about the

United States plans on Turkey. Many people ignored these as fiction because it was

considered so insane’’; clearly this language is intended to make the story even more

believable.

I have spent a significant part of my testimony on ‘‘Metal Storm,’’ because it is

essential in understanding the Turkish mindset today. What can the United States

do when many Turks read this book and daily articles in the press that play on the

softest spots in the Turkish psyche to create a sense of insecurity and fear of United

States intentions?

The average reader in Turkey has difficulty in separating fact from fiction and

reports indicate many read the book as a prophetic one. With the EU reform process

forcing fundamental changes in Turkey that exacerbate many people’s sense of insecurity about their future and sense of certainty, this book has brilliantly captured

the mood in Turkey. It further clouds fact and fiction by hinting at current issues

of contention in United States-Turkish relations, including whether the tragic

events of 1915 constitute the ‘‘Armenian Genocide,’’ the unresolved Cyprus issue,

and developments in Iraq.

Getting United States-Turkish relations back on track in the Black Sea and beyond requires the Turkish leadership to put an end to the breed of wild and destructive speculation portrayed in ‘‘Metal Storm.’’ Turkish political leaders need to step

back and contemplate whether they truly believe the United States would contemplate the outlandish actions concocted by the authors of ‘‘Metal Storm,’’ who use

references to actual American leaders and a deep familiarity with United States

military technology to convey a sense of authority in their writing. Turkish leaders

must then decide whether they must clarify to the Turkish people that wild speculation about a United States plan to dominate Turkey are divorced from reality. Perhaps this will lead to a genuine debate about the future of United States-Turkish

relations, including in the Black Sea. Instead, Turkey’s civilian and military leaders

are silent, allowing thousands of Turkish readers to misperceive the book’s

ruminations as plausible, if not fact, and causing potentially serious damage to

United States-Turkish relations. There is a danger that, as Turkey proceeds with

democratic reforms required to advance its quest for EU accession, and as the hallowed role of the military decreases in Turkish politics, Turkish society may compensate these developments with growing anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism.

Hopefully, Turkey can come out of the process much stronger and as a valuable

member.

In the short term, there are three specific steps the United States can take to try

to reverse these negative trends and restore a sense of partnership in relations with

Turkey. First, together with the Iraqi Government, the United States needs to find

a formula to assuage the Turkish irritation with the continued PKK presence in

northern Iraq. Until and unless the P.K. issue is resolved, Turkish-United States

relations cannot move to a better phase, and Turkey would continue to resist any

United States initiatives in the Black Sea region.

Second, given the prevalent Turkish view that the United States is running a

campaign against Turkey, it would be very damaging if the Armenian Genocide resolution passed Congress this year. This year is the 90th anniversary of the tragic

1915 massacre and certainly the Armenian diaspora groups would like to get recognition. However, such a resolution would play right into the hands of the growing

set of anti-Americans and ultra-nationalists in Turkey. For the Black Sea region,

it will mostly hurt the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

Third, the United States needs to continue raising Turkish EU membership as

part of the transatlantic dialog and insist that Turkey should be accepted into the

European Union on the merits. Turkey needs to be assured that it will not be

swapped with Ukraine; this certainty is necessary for Turks to support Ukraine’s

(and Georgia’s) ongoing democracy reforms, and make the fundamental mental and

institutional changes at home.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Ms. Baran, for your provocative testimony as well. I’m going to ask each of you—and if one of you all,

for whatever question that I may ask one of the other witnesses on

49

this panel, if you would want to make a comment so that we—if

you may have a slightly different point of view on it, you’re certainly welcome to do so.

Both Mr. Jackson and Mr. Socor—got to put another quarter in

there to keep the lights on, this happens at 4 o’clock, I think,

around here, a slide show or Cinderella turns into a pumpkin or

something. Got it—talked about Russia as being a problem in—actually all three of you did in different ways. Mr. Socor was the

most direct. Mr. Jackson brought it up. Your was, Ms. Baran, is

what I was talking about, how they use their energy dominance as

a way to jerk people around or keep them under their thumb.

The one thing on the countries, Moldova, Georgia, the

Transnistrian area, is a lot of this is the Russian—Russia simply

completely ignoring any commitments they made. When we had

Ambassador Tefft here, I was saying, oh, what’s their reaction and

so forth, and he’s an ambassador and he’s got to be diplomatic. The

answer to the question is they—I see no action that indicates that

they’re going to do anything but drag their feet and keep their

troops there because they want to keep that influence in these

areas.

We have been working in these areas, maybe not with the same

intensity as the last few years or since 9/11, 2001, that changed everything. These areas—Armenia was always a concern because

there are many Armenian-Americans in this country, so we’re more

aware of that. Turkey is clearly a key country, you pay attention

to Turkey. It’s an important country for a variety of reasons, economically as well as its size and its aspirations to join the European Union and, obviously, is a NATO country.

Regardless, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Socor, on the issue of these

countries, the Georgia issue, the Moldova issue, Transnistria issue,

with all the efforts we’ve made, why in the heck have we been—

and I don’t want to just blame the United States for everything,

you know, the United States can only have so much influence everywhere. It’s not as if we all get—we get two out of three of you

all to agree and, therefore, it will be so. It’s just not going to happen that way.

But why have all these efforts been so fruitless in having the

Russians abide by their commitments? And moreover, it’s not just

us. Why are not other NATO countries, other European countries

also insisting on Russia? In other words, the international community that should care about the concept of sovereignty of countries

and self-determination—now granted some of them won’t, but

there’s more and more. Freedom’s on the march. There’s more free

countries than there were back in 1980.

Why has Russia been able to get away with this? Why have they

been able to abrogate, ignore these agreements to remove their

troops? And if you two could answer whatever order you all want

to, I’d like to get your perspectives.

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that we

made a fundamental mistake as we came into this period by not

putting clear red lines in for Russia where the limits were and

what was acceptable and unacceptable boundaries. As a result,

they have tended to probe and take advantage of us when we were

preoccupied in the Middle East or where—and the European Union

50

turns inward with the pressure of expansion and the West becomes

preoccupied, there’s a tendency to probe and take advantage.

So we haven’t made clear that there are consequences and held

them to consequences. We note that the Syrians are withdrawing

from Lebanon in a matter of weeks with 15,000 troops. Russia has

said it will take them 15 years to get 3,000 troops out of Georgia

and want $1⁄2 billion from the United States to pay for it. So clearly

this is not a serious discussion.

The point we have not made clear is you cannot harbor 19th century imperial neurosis and enjoy 21st century legitimacy. And the

consequences that this body has considered is to bar Russia from

access to international fora that require a certain level of democratic activity, such as the G–8, WTO, and other recognitions of legitimacy that they covet.

Second, I think we have to take actions to devalue what they

gain from these things. They profit from criminal enterprises. They

profit from the instability of the states on their borders. This serves

their purposes and they destroy institutions that compete, like the

European Union or OSCE.

I would strongly advise the NATO powers to put NATO surveillance into the Black Sea as we have in all the other seas of Europe.

If those—if this trafficking cannot occur, there’s no reason to have

the bases and the traffickers there. When Georgia found that out,

the peace started—the conflict started to be resolved where they

just simply interdicted the trafficking lines, and then the criminal

elements got bored and went home. So you have to disincentivize

and devalue what Russia seeks in having these bases and having

this control over these gray economies on their border.

That’s why I also think we should do what we can with our European allies to put the border monitors back into the Georgian borders so reactionary interests cannot exploit the vulnerability of

these young democracies.

Senator ALLEN. All right, if we did that—I do want to hear from

you, Mr. Socor—that would be predicated on the European countries actually wanting to work in concert on that, whether NATO

or—on a less than NATO basis. Do you see a willingness on the

part of the European nations to actually assist—I’m talking about

NATO. We’ve heard about Turkey. Would Turkey agree to that?

And for that matter, would France, would the Netherlands, Italy,

Spain, and others? Would we find some—we’re finding a commonality in interests in getting the Syrians out of Lebanon. France

and the United States are absolutely together on that. But do you

see that as a likelihood, or would this just be another thing that

we’re bickering with the Europeans on, who by the way ought to

care more about this than we do, because it’s right—heck, it’s part

of Europe.

Mr. JACKSON. Sir, I’m going to get in trouble on this, but my

view is that Europeans would be interested in following if the

United States started leading. And if we made clear that we are

part—we agree to defend the Euro-Atlantic space together and this

is part of the Euro-Atlantic space and these threats that emanate

from this region are threats to the United States and Europe and

we were serious about this, I am certain that European allies

would come on.

51

I think what they think today, is that we have a back-channel

partnership with Russia and a back-channel interest in Turkey and

that we’ve cut deals on the side to allow this kind of special exemption, and if it’s all right for us to cut deals, they’re going to cut

their deals, and probably with Putin on oil or economic interests.

I think that to be good allies across the Atlantic we have to be

forthright, we have to stand together when freedom is threatened

and democracy is at risk. And I think this discussion, I hope the

President began in his meetings in Brussels exactly on developing

a new agenda of greater transparency and greater common causes,

our European allies, there’s no better region to begin than here.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you.

Mr. Socor.

Mr. SOCOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bruce has zeroed in on

some major reasons why we find ourselves in the present situation

with regard to Russian troops and bases in Georgia and Moldova.

I would like to add a couple of considerations.

The existing conflict settlement negotiating frameworks and

peacekeeping mechanisms were created by Russia, on a one-on-one

basis with the target countries, these helpless target countries,

during the 1990s. These structures are relics of a bygone era. Nobody in the 1990s would have imagined that NATO and the European Union would enlarge the way they have and that their interests in these countries would increase in an exponential manner.

The increase in Euro-Atlantic interest in these countries has overtaken, greatly overtaken, those obsolete conflict settlement and——

Senator ALLEN. Say that again. Start that sentence again so I

can understand you. Say it again.

Mr. SOCOR. Those peacekeeping and conflict settlement mechanisms are relics of a bygone era of the 1990s——

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Mr. SOCOR [continuing]. When the enlargement of NATO and the

European Union was not on the agenda, was not foreseeable, now

Euro-Atlantic interest in these two countries have increased exponentially and have overtaken those peacekeeping and conflict settlement mechanisms. Those need to be simply jettisoned. We cannot afford tinkering with them, getting bogged down in procedural

issues, adding a couple of observers to the existing settlements,

continuing to treat, for example, Moldova and Transnistria or Georgia’s Abkhazia as coequal parties, getting them together, imploring

Russia, maybe, to get them together.

Senator ALLEN. OK.

Mr. SOCOR. That’s a thing of the past.

Senator ALLEN. OK, all right. Let me—then from this, let me ask

you all this question then. For countries like Georgia, Moldova,

which elected a Communist government, they had free elections,

they elect Communists. I’m not sure how good that will be for investment in their country, but it’s their country. Different states do

different things in this country, too, nothing like that, but regardless, that’s representative democracy.

The others have to make a better claim. So long as you have free

elections and people vote that way, that’s what you get. Now, the

question is, is the motivation for people—and this is—Baran mentioned this as well in a roundabout way with Turkey—but can you

52

motivate—will the people in Georgia, the people in Moldova, the

people in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, Armenia, all on different levels,

would accession to being in the European Union, not so much

maybe NATO—some might want to get into NATO, which would

be actually wonderful.

But we’ve seen in Central Europe, what we call—used to be

called Eastern inaccurately, it’s Central Europe. I’m talking about

from Bulgaria, Romania on up to the Baltics, those countries with

the benchmarks and the criteria they needed to make the reforms

they need to make to get into NATO, to get into the European

Union, was it seen by their leaders and by a majority of the people

in their countries as something they would want to aspire to? We

called them aspirant countries.

Mr. SOCOR. Yes, it’s——

Senator ALLEN. It wasn’t as if we were taking them in. They

wanted to get in, and they had to meet certain benchmarks. Is that

motivation still there——

Mr. SOCOR. Yes, very much so.

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. On the part of these countries? If so,

that is one way to not just have it just externally come in—obviously you have to deal with the Russians—but to actually effectuate the will of the people, which makes it a lot easier than if

we’re just talking here or talking at different confabs as to what

people ought to want to do. If they generally want to do it themselves, it makes it much easier to effectuate that shared goal.

Mr. SOCOR. Yes. The prospect of European integration is of

course—of course exerts a magnetic force of attraction.

Senator ALLEN. Well, is it enough of a magnetic attraction to offset the leverage that Russia can impose upon them——

Mr. SOCOR. Not really.

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. Whether it’s for energy or militarily?

Mr. SOCOR. It’s not enough for a number of reasons. The more

these countries advance on the road of reforms, the greater the gulf

separating these reforming countries from the secessionist enclaves, which are not reforming. So the gulf between them will

deepen. That’s one thing.

Second, the generation is growing up there which no longer has

a sense of belonging to the same country as the generations on the

other side.

Third, the Russian troop presence becomes, by default, the new

status quo. The mere duration of this presence has the unintended

effect of legitimizing it by——

Senator ALLEN. Legitimizing it?

Mr. SOCOR. Conferring it a spurious appearance of legitimacy.

Senator ALLEN. However, don’t—I’ll ask all three of you—

wouldn’t the people of these countries, Moldova maybe not, but at

least Georgia want—the people of Lebanon rose up. It was remarkable their bravery and courage. And I’m not saying Hezbollah

doesn’t have a great deal of power still in Lebanon. They had

counterdemonstrations today. But regardless, would they not have

that same sort of feeling that the Lebanese have about the Syrians? Would they not have that same feeling in these countries

about Russian troops?

Mr. SOCOR. They definitely should.

53

Senator ALLEN. Well, do they? Bruce? Zeyno—excuse me, Ms.

Baran?

Ms. BARAN. Well, they do, but it’s very difficult because the Russian troops there have been involved in corruption and also sort of

the way that they have operated is really dominating the local

thinking, and there’s a lot of fear on the ground. So it’s very, very

difficult for the people to just feel comfortable. For example, in

Ossetia and Abkhazia, most people there just have a very distorted

view about what the rest of Georgia looks like, and they’re constantly getting disinformation. So it’s a very, very difficult process.

For example, the President of Georgia, as Bruce mentioned,

issued a very interesting comprehensive peace initiative to the

South Ossetians, and they’re not going to really get excited unless

they hear and see that Brussels and Washington is going to really

support them, because any kind of move away from the current

status quo is going to anger Russia. And they know that an angry

Russia can do a lot of harm, ranging from electricity and gas cutoffs to local provocations.

And on the previous issue mentioned, you have, Mr. Chairman,

focused on some traditional European allies, France and Spain.

What we are seeing now is some of the newer NATO allies and EU

members really pushing those two organizations to look at Russia

and what Russia is doing in the neighborhood in a different way.

For example, there’s a new Friends of Georgia group formed,

which consists of Poland, Romania, and the three Baltic countries.

And what they hope to do is to force the rest of the European and

NATO countries to understand the difficulties that other, you

know, former Soviet countries are facing. So, I think we need to

look at different types of alliances with the Europeans.

Senator ALLEN. That’s good to hear, Mr. Jackson, that the new

countries of Europe are leading Europe and helping NATO understand the trials and tribulations of that transition. They won’t

have—you called a deafening silence in Brussels. Ms. Baran

mentioned——

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I always encourage these countries not to

shut up.

Senator ALLEN. No.

Mr. JACKSON. They make very important contributions.

Senator ALLEN. No, and I think it’s one of the reasons why they

are so helpful. They understand what it’s like to live under repression. You wanted to say something, I can tell, Mr. Jackson.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. On your major point, every single successful democratic revolution, beginning with Otpor in Serbia and the

Rose Revolution and the Orange Revolution, the democratic opposition has been running on a pro-European platform. There are no

exceptions. And the only reason Mr. Voronin and the Communist

one in Moldova yesterday, or over the weekend, is they ran on a

pro-European platform because they couldn’t win any other way.

Once the institutions of Europe close to this quarter of a billion

people, that’s the end of the democratic transformation. That is the

engine, that is the magnet, that is what people are changing for.

I don’t think that there is a lack—to your second point—that there

is a lack of resolve or a lack of gumption about this. I think because we—when we were working together under your leadership,

54

Poland never had a counterrevolution going on. Nobody was poisoning Havel or shooting at them or running people off the road.

These people are confronting very dangerous entrenched autocrats

and kleptocrats that kill people. Every single person that’s run for

President in Russia is in jail and in Belarus is in jail or in Ukraine

they were poisoned or multiple assassinations. Russian paramilitary hand out AK–47s in South Ossetia to paramilitaries.

There are forces in this third phase that did not exist in the first.

These democratic revolutions in Poland and down to Romania occurred basically in a vacuum after the fall of the wall. This third

phase is not occurring in a vacuum. It’s occurring despite active opposition of entrenched interests in the politics of the past. That’s

where the $300 million came from, at least, to stop Yushchenko

being elected, and the same people are coming back to run

against—from outside—to run against the Orange Revolution and

the parliamentary election in 12 months.

So, I think it is considerable admiration that these people have

done so much under this kind of adversity against far more powerful services and militaries.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you for that realism. The purpose of hearings is to get this perspective, and I thank all of you for it. Let me

ask a few more questions as we—so many things were brought up.

On energy, Ms. Baran, you didn’t have it in your testimony, but

I wanted to ask you about this. Azerbaijan, talking about getting

their energy, and of course if they have this, this is going to really

help their countries if properly utilized, the revenues from these

natural resources. I understood that Azerbaijan was considering

doing something similar to the Alaska permanent fund where the

oil revenues would actually be shared by the people of that country.

The reason I bring this up is I met with Ibrahim al-Jafari a few

weeks ago in Baghdad. And in addition to presenting him the Virginia Declaration of Rights and all these great ideas for a free and

just society, I also brought up that concept for Iraq to do something

like Alaska, where Alaska residents get a dividend, so to speak,

from the oil revenues, which is ownership, national unity, plus the

idea that people will care about terrorists blowing up oil pipelines

because that’s money out of their own pocket and they want those

pipelines and oil industries operating at—upgraded from the atrophied state that they’re in after many decades of Saddam Hussein.

At any rate, I understand Azerbaijan was considering this. If

Azerbaijan, which is not a—it’s a Shiite country, but not necessary

Arab, right?

Ms. BARAN. Right.

Senator ALLEN. If they do that, that might be also a model that

ultimately the Iraqis would look to to have some unifying economic

and ownership benefits from it. What do you know of Azerbaijan

considering any such idea?

Ms. BARAN. Sure. They actually have already an oil fund and the

head of the oil fund and the teams that were setting it up spent

considerable time studying the Alaskan oil fund, and went to Norway and developed an ongoing project which is considered to be

fairly successful by the IMF, World Bank, even the Soros organization that has looked into the oil fund.

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And the concept for it is really to, precisely, Mr. Chairman, the

issues that you mentioned, and also this is one of the areas where

Azerbaijan internally is talking about being an example or a model

for Iraq and Iran. Although it is a majority Shiite country, it also

has significant Sunni presence, and would like to be the model

country, together with Kazakhstan on the other side of the Caspian, which also has a strong, not as transparent maybe, oil fund.

The two of them would like to be the first countries that use their

oil wealth in a way that’s going to help the rest of the society. And

now——

Senator ALLEN. Does every resident get a check or a payment?

Ms. BARAN. Well, here is the trick. Now money is accumulating

in the oil fund, and people are not going to start seeing any kind

of immediate checks or benefits, I believe, until 2007 when initial

money starts coming to the government, because now there’s a lot

of investment and——

Senator ALLEN. Understood.

Ms. BARAN. And at that point——

Senator ALLEN. But then they would.

Ms. BARAN. At that point, provided Azerbaijan moves into more

of a democratic, transparent country and moves away from the

clan-based corrupt system, yes. And this is why it’s also very, very

important that over the next couple years until the big oil money

comes into the government, the country goes into further democracy. Otherwise, we’re going to see a small group of people benefiting from this oil, and that leads to my concern that I mentioned

in my testimony, Azerbaijan looking more like Iran used to under

a shah as opposed to becoming an example for the new Iran and

the new Iraq.

Senator ALLEN. Well, thank—I know that wasn’t going to be your

testimony here, but economics—the concept of human freedom, obviously, is very important, but also economic freedom, and that the

fact that the resources and wealth of a country, if it is actually

shared, and it’s no thanks to any government that there’s oil or gas

under a certain country, but the extent it’s shared with all the citizens, that is a democratizing factor.

I’m not going to get much into the Armenian genocide with you.

Suffice it to say, if that upsets the Turks—and I’m speaking only

for myself—the Armenian genocide happened. You may want to

call it a massacre. I have found, as a leader in studying things

throughout history, that leaders need to stand up and deplore activities when they’re wrong. And that goes on now when maybe

there will be people—a few years ago when I was Governor they

were bombing black churches. We saw the genocide in Europe by

the Nazis.

I’m always touched and remember what Hitler was told and

what Hitler said when he was told that, gosh, if you start this

genocide of Jewish people by the Germans, the world is going to

get very upset, they’re going to be mad, you’ll have to pay a tough

price. And he said, well, who remembers the Armenians? If people

remember what happened in the past, it’s not as if I’m talking—

I’m not asking for reparations and so forth, it happened 90 years

ago—but one needs to remember the past and recognize it so that

sort of activity doesn’t happen in the future. And while we all feel

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that we’re very enlightened, this sort of genocide, maybe not exactly the same, but wiping out masses of people because of their

ethnicity or because of their religion, still is occurring in this world.

And speaking only for myself, we want to have good relations

with Turkey, but we’re not going to sweep things that happened in

history under the rug. We are not blaming anybody presently in

Turkey for doing it. Anybody who was involved in it is undoubtedly

long gone and dead. But it is part of, I think, our responsibility on

human rights. So I just—that’s from my point of view.

Finally, Mr. Jackson, I want you to elaborate, and any others,

your second point of your testimony, we need a formation of new

structures for a Black Sea strategy. And you went through the list

of the new leaders, new Presidents of Georgia, Romania, Ukranian

Presidents. Could you elaborate on what you mean by a new structure? That was a very intriguing statement, but can you put some

meat on those bones?

Mr. JACKSON. I could chicken out of this question, sir, by referring to President Basescu, who has actually started talking about

this and developing the ideas organically. I think that one thing we

realize, it is the states of the given region of the Euro-Atlantic that

begin to take responsibility for their regional security and their

economic integration. This occurred in the Visegrad Group that

linked Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary and Slovakia.

Senator ALLEN. I see.

Mr. JACKSON. It occurred in the Nordic-Baltic cooperation that

built a zone of security, and Mr. Haltzel sitting behind you is one

of the key authors of this. So we have seen, basically, organic creations of regional structures where President Saakashvili has

reached out to the West and asked for support and peacekeepers.

It has been denied.

Where President Basescu has asked for coalitions of the willing

to come in to improve surveillance and traffic and bases, it has

been—we cannot get it approved. I think we have to realize——

Senator ALLEN. Approved by who?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, it depends on which organization you go to.

I mean, NATO can go into the Black Sea to conduct——

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Mr. JACKSON [continuing]. Active endeavor. Any coalition can,

basically, police the shores of NATO and EU states for interdiction

of drugs. That would basically be pressure on Transnistria not to—

to use the Black Sea as a free zone of export. That has to—we’re

seeing Romania supporting Georgia in improving interregional cooperation. That has to be encouraged and enhanced.

Regional peace dialogs, for instance, the approach in

Transnistria, is limited to a very narrow number of powers, all of

whom were responsive to Moscow’s desires. Why isn’t Romania in

that table? Why isn’t the EU part of that dialog? Why aren’t European structures allowed to lend aid and act as training wheels as

the region gets up on its own feet?

Projects that exist within Europe’s new neighborhood policy and

our Millennium Challenge Account, one, they have to be funded,

but also we should look for regional projects where the states are

internetting themselves together as the Western European States

have done.

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It seems to me that one could draw the wrong conclusion from

the events of the Rose Revolution and the Orange Revolution,

which are, of course, inspiring. But the real job of democracy support comes in the next 3 to 5 years as to helping them succeed. You

know, the first inspirational event, that’s not where the risks are.

It’s in this period where they try to build new structures and institutionalize, as a U.S. legislator must know instinctively. It’s the institutionalization of the democratic imagination that makes all the

difference.

Can they translate this vision into a real institutional character

that can be conveyed among nations and among peoples in perpetuity? That’s essentially what they’re trying to do. And we know

a lot about this and I’ve talked about the coordination we could do

with the European Union, who actually were in front of us in recognizing that this was fundamentally part of Europe’s neighborhood and might actually—they have set up programs where

Ukraine may pass from a neighborhood country to a membership

country, which is certainly what my organization hopes to be a part

of supporting.

So, I think that this is what we should—the second Bush administration and this Congress should pay attention to and see if we

can support them.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Jackson. We’ve gone on for over

2 hours here, and I want to thank all of the panelists here, Mr.

Jackson, Mr. Socor, and Ms. Baran, for coming and spending time.

I could actually go on longer. I do have to get somewhere else and

I know you do as well.

The testimony you all brought forward here is very important. I

will, as chairman of this committee—I’ve learned a great deal from

you. I will express this to my colleagues. These issues will come up.

This is a vitally important area for our country, our future, but for

theirs as well.

I’m also encouraged, to some extent, that in various ways the European countries are also involved. This is not something that the

United States can do unilaterally. It’s good to know the will of the

people. There are differences I recognize in each one of these countries, but to the extent that they can—I like to, maybe, not use the

word institutionalize, but the point is to set up constitutions, laws

that protect God-given rights, have private ownership of property,

religious freedom, freedom of expression, the rule of law, the rule

of law that protects those rights and adjudicates disputes in a fair

manner, and putting in those structures where people say not only

are we free, not only are we controlling our own destiny, we are

seeing that prosperity.

And that—you’re exactly right, Mr. Jackson—it’s hard not to call

you Bruce as a friend, but Mr. Jackson is exactly right that it’s key

that people see tangible impacts, that this is meaning something

for them and for their children’s future. And so we have a great

opportunity. I realize there’s a lot of problems here. Russia’s the

main culprit in a variety of ways.

However, we do need to seize this opportunity and not look back

5 years from now or 4 years from now and saying, gosh, if we’d

only done this, if we’d only done that. And it’s within our grasp,

it is within our security interest militarily, and also, I think it’s in

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our economic interest to also have these countries developing energy. It’s good for them and it’s also good for these high prices

we’re paying for natural gas and gasoline as well and getting that

online and not having just to rely on the existing sources.

So, for our security as well as our economic interests, and of

course, Americans love to spread freedom, this is a great opportunity. I thank all three of you all for your care, for your wisdom,

your insight, and I look forward to fighting alongside of you to advance our shared goals.

Thank you all. The subcommittee hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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