DEFENSE LOGISTICS

A Completed 

Comprehensive 

Strategy is Needed to 

Guide DOD’s InTransit Visibility 

Efforts

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2013

GAO-13-201

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-201, a report to 

congressional committees

February 2013

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

A Completed Comprehensive Strategy is Needed to 

Guide DOD’s In-Transit Visibility Efforts

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has invested heavily in its 

logistics operations, estimating that its 

overall spending on logistics—

including supply chain management—

was more than $171 billion in fiscal 

year 2011. GAO has previously 

reported that one of the most complex 

and vital tasks facing DOD is 

managing its supply chain to effectively 

and efficiently provide spare parts, 

food, fuel, and other critical supplies in 

support of U.S. military forces. GAO

has identified DOD’s supply chain 

management as a high-risk area and

has previously reported that limitations 

in asset visibility—including the 

visibility of assets in transit—make it 

difficult to obtain timely and accurate 

information on the assets that are 

present in the theater of operations. As 

part of GAO’s work to update its highrisk areas, this report assesses the 

extent to which DOD (1) is aware of its 

components’ efforts to improve intransit visibility and (2) has a strategy 

to achieve in-transit visibility that 

includes the key elements of a 

comprehensive strategic plan. To 

conduct these assessments, GAO 

obtained and analyzed information 

from the defense components, 

reviewed and analyzed relevant 

defense policies, guidance, and plans 

regarding in-transit visibility, and 

interviewed officials from DOD and the 

defense components.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that as DOD

finalizes its in-transit visibility strategy it 

should ensure that it receives complete 

information from the components that 

addresses all key elements of a 

strategic plan. DOD concurred with 

GAO’s recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to improve in-transit visibility 

of its assets through efforts developed by several of the defense components, 

but no one DOD organization is fully aware of all such efforts across the 

department, because they are not centrally tracked. In-transit visibility is the 

ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD assets and personnel 

from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. 

GAO has previously reported that it is important for organizations to have 

complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document performance, 

and support decision making. Managers striving to reach organizational goals 

must have information systems in place to provide them with needed information. 

Based on data from defense components—the Joint Staff, U.S. Transportation 

Command, U.S. Central Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the 

military services—that GAO reviewed, 34 in-transit visibility efforts are being 

conducted by the components. The department has obligated about $701 million 

for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 for these efforts and projected about $455.3

million in costs to be incurred for fiscal years 2012 through 2015—a total of 

approximately $1.2 billion. Currently, DOD conducts some informal coordination 

and information sharing regarding its in-transit visibility efforts, but information is 

not consistently shared through a formal mechanism. 

In 2012, DOD began developing a draft strategy for asset visibility and in-transit 

visibility; however, this strategy includes some but not all key elements of a 

comprehensive strategic plan. According to DOD officials, the draft strategy, 

developed in collaboration with all pertinent components, is expected to be 

completed by June 2013. Officials anticipate that it will be used to guide and 

integrate related department-wide efforts to improve end-to-end supply chain 

management and support to the services. According to DOD officials, each 

component will be expected to develop an execution plan that contains

information about its in-transit visibility efforts. The draft strategy indicates that 

such information is to include descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply 

chain, as well as the component’s actions or proposed actions to address them. 

According to GAO’s prior work, a comprehensive strategic plan should include a 

mission statement; a problem definition, scope, and methodology; goals and 

objectives; activities, milestones, and performance measures; resources and 

investments; information about organizational roles, responsibilities, and 

coordination; and a description of key external factors that could affect the 

achievement of goals. GAO’s review of DOD’s draft strategy found that it 

includes one of the seven key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, 

partially includes four others, and does not include the remaining two. For 

example, it includes overarching goals and objectives, but it does not include 

information on DOD’s planned resources and investments to achieve those goals

or key external factors that could affect the achievement of the goals. Until DOD 

has finalized a department-wide strategy with all accompanying execution plans, 

it will not have the information it needs to make well-informed decisions about 

asset visibility and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for its intransit visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly constrained 

fiscal environment. 

View GAO-13-201. For more information, 

contact Zina D. Merritt, (202) 512-5257, 

merrittz@gao.gov
Page i GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Letter 1 

Background 5

DOD Is Not Fully Aware of All In-Transit Visibility Efforts across 

the Department and Lacks a Central Mechanism to Track Their 

Status 8

DOD’s Draft Strategy to Achieve Asset Visibility and In-Transit 

Visibility Has Not Been Finalized and Does Not Include Some of 

the Key Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Plan 10

Conclusions 16

Recommendation for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments 17

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II List of In-Transit Visibility Efforts 22

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 25

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Tables

Table 1: Obligations and Projected Costs for In-Transit Visibility 

Efforts, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2015 ($ in millions) 9

Table 2: Data to Be Included in Components’ Execution Plans 13

Table 3: Extent to Which DOD’s Draft Strategy for In-Transit 

Visibility Includes the Seven Elements of a Comprehensive 

Strategic Plan 15

Figure

Figure 1: Key DOD Supply Chain Policies, Guidance, and Other 

Documents, 2003 through 2011 7

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

List of Abbreviations 

aRFID active radio frequency identification

DOD Department of Defense

RFID radio frequency identification

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 28, 2013

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily in its logistics 

operations, estimating that its overall spending on logistics—including 

supply chain management—was more than $171 billion in fiscal year 

2011.1 DOD’s goal in operating its global distribution system is to deliver 

the right items to the right place at the right time—and at the right cost. 

We have previously reported that one of the most complex and vital tasks 

facing DOD is managing its supply chain to effectively and efficiently 

provide spare parts, food, fuel, and other critical supplies in support of 

U.S. military forces.2

The performance of DOD’s materiel distribution system relies on many 

stakeholders, each with different responsibilities, systems, and 

processes. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) serves as 

DOD’s single manager for transportation (for other than service-unique or 

theater-assigned assets), responsible for providing common-user and 

commercial air, land, and sea transportation and terminal management, 

among other things. Joint logistics doctrine has established that delivery 

from major logistics bases to the point of employment is not a joint 

responsibility but rather a service-specific responsibility, as designated by 

the geographic combatant commander.

Maintaining visibility of these assets throughout the 

materiel distribution system is critical to ensuring that DOD meets its 

stated goal and provides support to the warfighter. DOD’s materiel 

distribution system covers four segments—from the movement of 

supplies in the continental United States (intracontinental movement), 

through strategic and theater movements, to tactical movement on the 

battlefield—and must be capable of reaching its military customers 

whether they are located on large, well-established bases or at small, 

remote outposts.

3

 

1

Logistics costs include supplies, maintenance, and transportation functions. DOD’s most 

recent available data for logistics spending was for fiscal year 2011.

DOD components have efforts 

2

GAO, Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address Challenges 

in Supply Chain Management, GAO-11-569 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011). 

3

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008); Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Joint Publication 4-09, Distribution Operations (Feb. 5, 2010). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

under way that attempt to address visibility issues in all segments of the 

materiel distribution system; however, maintaining in-transit visibility all 

the way through to the tactical movement segment remains challenging.

DOD defines in-transit visibility as the ability to track the identity, status, 

and location of DOD units and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, 

oils, and lubricants); passengers; patients; and personal property from 

origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations.4

Since 1990, we have designated DOD supply chain management as a 

high-risk area.

For the purposes of this report we are referring to the Joint Staff, 

TRANSCOM, U.S. Central Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, and 

the military services as the components. The military services include the 

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

5 This designation involves DOD’s management of its entire 

supply chain and includes three focus areas for improvement: 

requirements forecasting, materiel distribution, and asset visibility.6 We 

have previously reported that limitations in asset visibility make it difficult 

to obtain timely and accurate information on DOD assets that are present 

in the theater of operations.7 This report focuses on the visibility of assets 

in transit. We have previously reported on limitations to asset visibility, 

including challenges in instituting new technologies for tracking assets 

and a lack of interoperability among information technology systems.8

 

4

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms (Dec. 15, 2012). 

In 

2011, we reported that DOD had taken steps to mitigate some of the 

challenges concerning supplying the warfighter in Afghanistan, but it 

continues to face several challenges in delivering and maintaining 

5

For our most recent update, see GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283

(Washington, D.C.: February 2013). 

6

DOD describes asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and accurate information on 

the location, quantity, condition, movement, and status of items in its inventory, including 

assets in transit. 

7

While DOD’s definition of asset visibility states that it provides users with information on 

the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies, 

our prior work on asset visibility has focused on the visibility of equipment and supplies. 

8

GAO, Defense Logistics: Lack of Key Information May Impede DOD’s Ability to Improve 

Supply Chain Management, GAO-09-150 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2009) and Defense 

Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply Support for Joint Military Operations 

Could Benefit from a Coordinated Management Approach, GAO-07-807 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 29, 2007). 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

visibility of supplies and equipment. These challenges include unmet 

delivery standards and time lines for cargo shipments; incomplete 

delivery data for many surface shipments; inadequate radio-frequency 

identification (RFID)9 information to track all cargo movements to and 

within Afghanistan; lack of a common operating picture for distribution 

data that integrates DOD’s many transportation information systems; 

difficulties in collecting information on all incidents of pilferage of and 

damage to cargo; and ineffective tracking and managing of cargo 

containers. We stated that these challenges have hindered the 

distribution of supplies and equipment to the warfighter and will likely 

continue to affect operations in Afghanistan and limit DOD’s visibility and 

oversight of the supply chain. We made a number of recommendations to 

address these concerns.10 DOD concurred with five of our 

recommendations and partially concurred with another six. Although DOD 

acknowledged that several challenges remain, it did not concur with our 

four remaining recommendations. DOD did not concur with three of our 

recommendations because its view is that TRANSCOM as Distribution 

Process Owner does not and should not have any oversight between the 

logistics hubs in Afghanistan and the warfighter. DOD also did not concur 

with one recommendation because the department believes that 

adequate policy and procedures already exist to ensure that content-level 

detail is entered onto RFID tags. In July 2011, we also recommended that 

DOD develop a comprehensive corrective action plan for improving asset 

visibility, and we identified key elements that should be included in such a 

plan to maximize its usefulness. However, DOD did not concur with that 

recommendation, citing its ongoing improvement efforts as sufficient.11

Because of ongoing interest in our high-risk areas—including DOD supply 

chain management—this report was prepared under the authority of the 

We continue to believe that all of these recommendations are valid and 

should be implemented to improve DOD’s efforts in this area.

 

9

RFID technology is used on containers and major pieces of equipment for tracking 

shipments and their contents while they are in transit over long distances. Active RFID 

tags have transmitters that transmit information through radio signals that are read 

electronically.

10GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and Distribution 

Challenges Remain in Afghanistan, GAO-12-138 (Washington, DC: October 2011). 

11GAO, Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address Challenges 

in Supply Chain Management, GAO-11-569 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This 

report assesses the extent to which DOD (1) is aware of its components’ 

efforts to improve in-transit visibility12

To determine the extent to which DOD is aware of its components’ efforts 

to achieve in-transit visibility, we obtained and analyzed information from 

the defense components on efforts covering fiscal years 2009 through 

2015. We included U.S. Central Command because we have previously 

reported on weaknesses in DOD supply chain management in U.S. 

Central Command’s area of responsibility and noted that asset visibility is 

one of the focus areas for improvement.

and (2) has a strategy to achieve intransit visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive 

strategic plan.

13

 

12For the purposes of this report, in-transit visibility efforts are systems, devices, or 

programs that are intended to improve DOD’s ability to track the identity, status, and 

location of DOD cargo (excluding petroleum, oils, and lubricants) from origin to 

destination. An example of an in-transit visibility effort is the Army’s Radio Frequency Intransit Visibility system, which provides commanders and logisticians with a single source 

of near real-time location, passive security, and carrier information for DOD cargo from 

origin to destination. 

We also obtained available 

cost information for each of the in-transit visibility improvement efforts—

including obligations for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 and projected 

costs for fiscal years 2012 through 2015. We interviewed officials from the 

defense components to clarify the purpose and scope of each effort. To 

determine the extent to which DOD has a strategy to achieve in-transit 

visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, 

we reviewed and analyzed relevant defense policies, guidance, and plans 

regarding in-transit visibility, and we interviewed officials from the Office 

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration 

and from the defense components. We also reviewed DOD’s November 

2012 draft of its strategy to improve asset visibility (tracking) and in-transit 

visibility to determine whether specific elements of effective strategic 

planning were included. To do so, we conducted a content analysis of the 

draft strategy. Two analysts independently compared the strategy to the 

specific elements, then discussed their individual reviews and reached a 

consensus.

13We did not include the remaining five geographic combatant commands: Africa 

Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern 

Command. 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

We conducted this performance audit from September 2011 to February 

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides 

additional details on the scope and methodology of this report.

The performance of DOD’s materiel distribution system relies on many 

stakeholders, each with different responsibilities, systems, and 

processes. Many organizations within DOD have important roles and 

responsibilities for supply chain management, and these responsibilities 

are spread across multiple components with separate funding and 

management of logistics resources and systems. The Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics serves as the principal 

staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters 

relating to defense logistics, among other duties, and is the department’s 

Defense Logistics Executive, with overall responsibility for improving and 

maintaining the defense logistics and supply chain system. The Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, under the 

authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, is the principal logistics official 

within the senior management of DOD. Within the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration improves the 

integration of DOD’s supply chain by developing policy and facilitating the 

components’ implementation of supply chain management practices, 

among other duties. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Supply Chain Integration develops and directs DOD-wide supply chain 

integration functions by establishing and maintaining policies that are 

intended to deliver efficient, sustainable, and cost-effective end-to-end 

supply chain performance. Each of the military departments is separately 

organized, under its own Secretary. Subject to the authority, direction, 

and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the military 

departments are responsible for, among other things, organizing, training, 

and equipping their forces. TRANSCOM, in addition to its responsibilities 

for transporting equipment and supplies in support of military operations, 

is designated as the distribution process owner for DOD. The role of the 

distribution process owner is, among other things, to oversee the overall 

effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of department-wide distribution 

Background 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

activities, including force projection, sustainment, and 

redeployment/retrograde operations.

DOD has issued a series of policies, strategic planning documents, 

instructions, memoranda, and other documents related to logistics and 

supply chain management over the last several years. Joint Publication 4-

0, Joint Logistics, provides the doctrinal framework which describes how

logistics is delivered to support joint operations across the range of 

military operations. Joint Publication 4-0 also acknowledges the 

importance of technology in capturing source data effectively, integrating 

those data, and making them more accessible in order to provide the 

shared awareness needed to improve planning, decision making, and 

assessment. Key policies, guidance, and other documents that address 

many aspects of the department’s supply chain from 2003 through 2011 

are described in figure 1.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Figure 1: Key DOD Supply Chain Policies, Guidance, and Other Documents, 2003 

through 2011
 

Page 8 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

DOD has taken steps to improve in-transit visibility of its assets through 

efforts developed by several of the defense components, but no one 

organization is fully aware of all such efforts across the department, 

because they are not centrally tracked. Based on data we requested and 

received from DOD officials in several components, we were able to 

compile a list of 34 in-transit visibility efforts that are being conducted by 

the components. Currently, DOD conducts some informal coordination 

and information sharing regarding its in-transit visibility efforts, but 

information is not consistently shared through a formal mechanism.

We have previously reported that it is important for organizations to have 

complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, document 

performance, and support decision making.14 Additionally, we have found 

that having to incorporate information drawn from multiple sources can 

potentially be challenging to those responsible for managing and 

integrating that information.15 Managers striving to reach organizational 

goals must have information systems in place to provide them with 

needed information.16 We conducted our own research, in collaboration 

with the components, to identify the in-transit visibility efforts across DOD, 

because DOD has not identified and does not yet have a ready means for 

identifying these efforts. No single defense component could identify all of 

the efforts across the department or provide cost figures for them. Based 

on our analysis, 27 of the 34 efforts are each led and funded by a single 

defense component. For example, the Army leads and funds the Next 

Generation Wireless Communications effort, a wireless network that 

provides location, condition, and intrusion-detection information on DOD 

assets. Of the remaining seven efforts, each is co-led by two or more 

components. For example, TRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics 

Agency co-led an effort to merge data from several sources into one 

system.17

 

14GAO, Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better 

Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts, 

The 34 efforts are listed in appendix II. Many of these efforts 

GAO-12-359 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 8, 2012) and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 

Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

15GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National 

Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP

(Washington, D.C.: September 2009).

16GAO/GGD-96-118. 

17Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence.

DOD Is Not Fully 

Aware of All InTransit Visibility 

Efforts across the 

Department and 

Lacks a Central 

Mechanism to Track 

Their Status
 

Page 9 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

include increasing the use of automatic identification technology tools 

within the department or enhancing computer systems that store and 

report data on assets while they are in transit.

Based on information we collected, DOD has obligated about $701 million 

for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 for these efforts and projected about 

$455.3 million in costs for fiscal years 2012 through 2015—for a total of 

approximately $1.2 billion. The Army and TRANSCOM have provided the 

largest amount of funding for these efforts, compared to the other 

components. Table 1 shows the amount of obligations and projected 

costs associated with in-transit visibility efforts, as reported by the 

defense components.

Table 1: Obligations and Projected Costs for In-Transit Visibility Efforts, Fiscal 

Years 2009 through 2015 ($ in millions)

In addition, some coordination and information sharing among 

components regarding in-transit visibility efforts is taking place through 

both department-wide and service-specific activities, according to DOD 

officials. These activities include conferences, working groups, and 

workshops. The participants in these activities vary based on the focus of 

the group. However, participants have included officials from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands, the four military 

services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other government agencies 

that support distribution process improvements. DOD officials explained 

that these conferences, workshops, and meetings provide opportunities to 

discuss challenges that the components are experiencing with in-transit 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

visibility and the efforts they are taking to address these challenges. For 

example, the Marine Corps hosted a logistics summit in November 2011. 

The participants included officials from logistics offices in the Army, the 

Defense Logistics Agency, TRANSCOM, and the Marine Corps. During 

the summit, officials from the various components discussed challenges 

and issues related to in-transit visibility—such as methods to mandate 

and implement the use of RFID tags on cargo containers, pallets, and 

reusable shipping containers and the enforcement of RFID requirements 

on cargo shipments transported outside the United States. Additionally, 

TRANSCOM officials said that a list of in-transit visibility points of contact 

at each component is distributed among the components. According to 

these officials, the components use the information in this document to 

reach in-transit visibility points of contact in other components so they can 

discuss related issues on an ad hoc basis. Officials from the Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration told 

us that recent workshops have consistently included representatives of 

the DOD components; these officials believe that the workshops will 

increase awareness of all in-transit visibility efforts across the department. 

However, these opportunities to share information are informal, and we 

found that no one organization was fully aware of all of the in-transit 

visibility efforts across the department, because information was not 

consistently shared through a formal mechanism.

In 2012, DOD began developing a strategy for asset visibility and intransit visibility; however, as of January 2013 the strategy had not been 

finalized and did not include some of the key elements of a 

comprehensive strategic plan. According to DOD officials, the draft 

strategy, developed in collaboration with all pertinent components, is 

expected to be completed by June 2013. Officials anticipate that it will be 

used to guide and integrate related department-wide efforts to improve 

end-to-end supply chain management and support to the services. 

According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop 

an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility 

efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include

descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain and the 

component’s actions or proposed actions to address them. Our analysis 

shows that the current draft of DOD’s strategy for asset visibility and intransit visibility fully includes one of the seven elements of a 

comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does not 

include the remaining two. Until DOD has finalized its department-wide 

strategy, with all of its accompanying execution plans, it will not have the 

information it needs to make well-informed decisions about asset visibility 

DOD’s Draft Strategy 

to Achieve Asset 

Visibility and InTransit Visibility Has 

Not Been Finalized 

and Does Not Include 

Some of the Key 

Elements of a 

Comprehensive 

Strategic Plan
 

Page 11 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for its in-transit 

visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly constrained 

fiscal environment.

DOD has policies, instructions, and other guidance in place that address 

supply chain issues such as the use of technology to track the location of 

cargo, but these documents have not focused specifically on in-transit 

visibility. Recently, DOD has recognized the need to develop a 

comprehensive in-transit visibility strategy. The Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration leads and is 

overseeing the effort to develop the strategy for improving asset tracking 

and in-transit visibility—which encompasses taking advantage of the 

automatic identification technology implementation and process 

integration to date—and ensuring that in-transit visibility is “truly factory to 

foxhole.” The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 

Integration stated that one goal is to refocus department-wide efforts on 

measurable actions to improve asset tracking and in-transit visibility using 

automatic identification technology as an enabler when requirements for 

end-to-end supply chain optimization dictate its use. According to the 

draft strategy, it will contribute to achieving the following objectives for 

improving asset visibility (tracking) and in-transit visibility:

1. optimized deployment/redeployment, sustainment, and retrograde 

operations,18

2. integrated standards-based systems

enabled by data capture and collection

3. unique identification of assets

4. enhanced visibility

5. improved logistics decisions

As of January 2013, this strategy had not been finalized, but the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary provided us with an overview and a copy of the draft. 

The strategy was developed collaboratively by the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Defense Logistics Agency, TRANSCOM, and the 

services. As a part of developing the strategy, the components are in the 

 

18Retrograde is a process for the movement of equipment and materiel from a deployed 

theater to a reset (replace, recapitalize, or repair) program or to another theater of 

operations to replenish unit stocks or satisfy stock requirements.

DOD Has Recently 

Focused on Developing an 

Asset Visibility and InTransit Visibility Strategy 

but Has Not Finalized It
 

Page 12 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

process of developing execution plans based on a template provided by 

DOD that calls for various information about their in-transit visibility 

efforts. For example, the draft strategy for asset visibility and in-transit 

visibility, dated November 2012, included execution plans from the 

Defense Logistics Agency, TRANSCOM, and the Navy. The Army, 

Marine Corps, and Air Force have developed draft execution plans but 

have yet to submit them for inclusion in the draft strategy, according to 

DOD officials.

According to DOD officials, each component will be expected to develop 

an execution plan that contains information about its in-transit visibility 

efforts. The draft strategy indicates that such information is to include

descriptions of gaps or challenges within the supply chain and the 

component’s actions or proposed actions to address them. The draft 

strategy currently indicates that the Supply Chain Executive Steering 

Committee19 will conduct periodic progress reviews of the execution plans 

and related activities. It also includes a template for the components to 

use in developing their execution plans. This template calls for the 

identification of each effort’s objectives and activities, a detailed action 

plan, and measures of success required by the responsible component to 

ensure that DOD’s strategy is successfully executed and expected 

outcomes are achieved. Additional detail about information included in the

execution plans is provided in table 2. 

 

19The Supply Chain Executive Steering Committee consists of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration and senior officials from TRANSCOM, 

the Defense Logistics Agency, the services, and other DOD components, as required. It 

reviews progress in achieving the milestones, expected outcomes, and measures of 

success established in the execution plans.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Table 2: Data to Be Included in Components’ Execution Plans

Execution plan data 

field Description

General information • Title of effort

• Lead component

• Customer component

Introduction Provides a summary of the supporting execution plan’s 

objective(s), activities, and tasks, and how the effort supports 

improving asset visibility (tracking) and/or in-transit visibility. 

Supporting references Cites any applicable references, such as commander’s 

guidance, GAO audit findings, tasking memorandums, or 

policy directives.

Issue statement Describes the defect, deficiency, or vulnerability to be 

addressed by the effort; the needed process improvement; or 

the training, technology, and/or policy change needed to 

enable improved asset visibility (tracking) and in-transit 

visibility.

Overall objective(s) Describes the primary objective(s) for improving asset 

visibility (tracking) and in-transit visibility that the component 

is addressing with the effort. 

Supporting activities Describes in detail supporting activities or tasks planned to 

achieve the desired objective(s). The execution plan should 

specify how completion of the supporting activities will 

resolve an issue, mitigate the likelihood of the issue occurring 

or reoccurring, or implement a solution or improved process.

Detailed action plan Provides a plan of action that describes the target milestones 

for each activity and identifies the lead component and any 

supporting components. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 

Integration, components were directed to finalize their initial execution 

plans by June 2013. TRANSCOM, the Navy, and the Defense Logistics 

Agency have provided execution plans. The Army, the Marines Corps, 

and the Air Force plan to provide theirs in 2013. Until DOD has compiled 

all of these execution plans in its draft in-transit visibility strategy and 

finalized the strategy to include all of the elements necessary for a 

comprehensive strategic plan, it will not have a comprehensive approach 

to guide its planning and investment decisions to achieve desired 

outcomes and goals for department-wide in-transit visibility, including the 

priority with which to implement these efforts. According to the draft 

strategy, DOD intends to continuously update the strategy with new 

execution plans as necessary.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

DOD’s draft strategy for in-transit visibility includes some but not all of the 

elements we have identified as necessary for a comprehensive strategic 

plan. Our prior work has shown that strategic planning is the foundation 

for defining what an agency seeks to accomplish, identifying the 

strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and determining how well 

it will succeed in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving objectives. 

Combined with effective leadership, strategic planning that results in an 

integrated and comprehensive strategic plan enables decision makers to 

better guide program efforts and determine if these efforts are achieving 

the desired results. According to our prior work, a comprehensive 

strategic plan should include a mission statement; a problem definition, 

scope, and methodology; goals and objectives; activities, milestones, and 

performance measures; resources and investments; information about 

organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and a description 

of key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals.20

Our analysis shows that the current draft of DOD’s strategy for asset 

visibility and in-transit visibility fully includes one of the seven elements of 

a comprehensive strategic plan, partially includes four others, and does 

not include the remaining two. Specifically, the draft strategy includes 

overarching goals and objectives that address the overall results desired 

from implementation of the strategy. Three of the elements we identified 

as ‘partially included’ are nearing completion, but our review of the draft 

strategy shows that not all components had submitted their execution 

plans, which provide key information about the components’ in-transit 

visibility efforts and describe gaps or challenges within the supply chain, 

as well as the components’ actions or proposed actions to address them.

The draft also does not include information about the resources and 

investments that would be required to achieve the goals laid out in the 

strategy, nor does it include key external factors—issues external to the 

agency and beyond its control—that could affect the achievement of the 

strategy’s goals. We have previously reported that it is important to 

identify resources and investments—which may include skills and 

technology, human, capital, information, and other resources—in order to 

be able to monitor efficient use of resources allocated to in-transit visibility 

 

20GAO, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal Agencies’ Strategic 

Plans, GAO/GGD-97-180 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 1997). 

DOD Has Included Some 

but Not All Key Elements 

of a Comprehensive 

Strategic Plan in Its Draft 

Strategy
 

Page 15 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

efforts and measure the costs and benefits of these efforts.21 Additionally, 

it is important to identify key external factors that might affect a 

comprehensive strategic plan so that a mitigation plan can be 

developed.22

Table 3: Extent to Which DOD’s Draft Strategy for In-Transit Visibility Includes the Seven Elements of a Comprehensive 

Strategic Plan

Table 3 describes the extent to which the key elements of a 

comprehensive strategic plan are included in DOD’s draft strategy.

Elements of a comprehensive strategic plan Our assessment

Mission Statement—A comprehensive statement that summarizes the main purpose of the strategy. 

Language discussing the main purpose of the strategy and associated efforts is included in the current draft. 

In addition, the submitted execution plans included outcome oriented goals; however, not all components 

have submitted their execution plans, which would potentially include this information.

Partially included

Problem Definition, Scope, and Methodology—Presents the issues to be addressed by the strategy, the 

scope the strategy covers, and the process by which it was developed. Issues with asset tracking and intransit visibility are discussed throughout the draft strategy and in the submitted execution plans; however, not 

all components have submitted their execution plans, which would potentially include this information.

Partially included

Goals and Objectives—The goals to be achieved by the strategy. The strategy includes overarching goals 

and objectives that address the overall results desired from implementation of the strategy.

Included

Activities, Milestones, and Performance Measures—The identification of steps to achieve those results, as 

well as milestones and performance measures to gauge results. The draft strategy and its execution plans 

include activities, milestones, and performance measures to improve asset visibility (tracking) and in-transit 

visibility; however, not all components have submitted their execution plans, which would potentially include 

this information.

Partially included

Resources and Investments—Costs to execute the plan and the sources and types of resources and 

investments, including skills and technology and the human, capital, information, and other resources 

required to meet the goals/objectives. The current draft of the strategy does not identify the types of 

resources or investments needed to execute the strategy (e.g., budgetary, human capital, information 

technology, contracts, etc.) and the strategy’s guidance for preparing the execution plans does not require 

this information.

Not included

 

21GAO, DOD’s 2010 Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan 

Addressed Statutory Requirements, But Faces Implementation Challenges, GAO-11-240R

(Washington, D.C.: January 7, 2011). 

22See GAO, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal Agencies’ 

Strategic Plans, GAO/GGD-97-180 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 1997) and GAO, Next 

Generation Enterprise Network: Navy Implementing Revised Approach, but Improvement 

Needed in Mitigating Risks, GAO-12-956 (Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2012).
 

Page 16 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Elements of a comprehensive strategic plan Our assessment

Organizational Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination—A description of roles and responsibilities for 

managing and overseeing the implementation of the strategy and the establishment of mechanisms for 

multiple stakeholders to coordinate their efforts throughout implementation and make necessary adjustments 

to the strategy based on performance. The current draft discusses the roles, responsibilities, and coordination 

of several components. However, it does not include those of U.S. Central Command, although the command 

is referenced multiple times in the draft strategy and is involved with in-transit visibility efforts as an 

implementer or joint implementer.

Partially included

Key External Factors that Could Affect Goals—Key factors external to the organization and beyond its 

control that could significantly affect the achievement of the long-term goals contained in the strategy. These 

external factors can include economic, demographic, social, technological, or environmental factors, as well 

as conditions or events that would affect DOD’s ability to achieve the desired results. Such factors are not 

identified in the current draft, because the draft strategy guidance does not require them to be included.

Not included

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

DOD recognizes that challenges to in-transit visibility contribute to the 

continued inclusion of supply chain management on our high-risk list. The 

department has a number of efforts that are designed to improve asset 

visibility and in-transit visibility. However, DOD’s awareness of in-transit 

visibility efforts, and the resources allocated to them, is limited and DOD 

does not have a comprehensive mechanism in place for collecting and 

sharing complete, accurate, and consistent information about these 

efforts and the organizations conducting them. DOD is currently 

developing a strategy to address in-transit visibility challenges and guide 

efforts to achieve in-transit visibility of DOD assets. A key component of 

this strategy is the inclusion of defense components’ execution plans, 

which are based on a template provided by DOD that calls for information 

about their in-transit visibility efforts. Until DOD has compiled all execution 

plans in the draft and finalized its in-transit visibility strategy to include all 

key elements necessary for a comprehensive strategic plan, it will not 

have the information it needs to make well-informed decisions about 

asset visibility and in-transit visibility, including setting budget priorities for 

its in-transit visibility efforts across the supply chain in an increasingly 

constrained fiscal environment.

To increase DOD’s awareness of efforts across the defense components 

to improve in-transit visibility, and to guide planning and investment 

decisions for DOD’s in-transit visibility efforts, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to finalize a department-wide intransit visibility strategy that will be implemented across the department. 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action
 

Page 17 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

When finalizing this strategy and the accompanying execution plans, 

DOD should ensure that

• complete, accurate, and consistent information about all in-transit 

visibility efforts is captured, tracked, and shared across the 

department and

• the strategy contains all of the key elements of a comprehensive 

strategic plan, including resources and investments and key external 

factors. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation to finalize a department-wide in-transit visibility 

strategy—to be implemented across the department—that ensures 

complete, accurate, and consistent information about all in-transit visibility 

efforts is captured, tracked, and shared, and contains all of the key 

elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. DOD stated that the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration will 

establish a central repository to ensure that information is shared across 

the department after the strategy is finalized. DOD also stated that the 

strategy currently being drafted will be finalized by June 1, 2013, and will 

include the components’ execution plans, which will contain plans for 

implementation, cost and resource requirements, and information on 

external factors that may affect the implementation of each effort.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. This report will also be available at 

no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments
 

Page 18 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. Staff who made major contributions 

to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Zina D. Merritt

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 19 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

To determine the extent to which DOD was aware of its components’ 

efforts to achieve in-transit visibility, we asked the defense components to 

provide us with information about their efforts to address in-transit 

visibility covering fiscal years 2009 through 2015. We provided the 

defense components with requests for information about the efforts, 

including the title of each effort, the purpose, funding obligations, 

projected costs, the lead component for each effort, and whether there 

were other stakeholder components or agencies. Officials from the 

components provided us with information that they compiled from various 

offices within their organizations. We analyzed the information provided 

and conducted follow-up discussions with officials from each component 

to identify the efforts that were specifically related to in-transit visibility 

rather than other aspects of asset visibility and to clarify information that 

had been provided. To determine which of the efforts reported to us were 

related to in-transit visibility, we used DOD’s definition of in-transit 

visibility from Joint Publication 1-02.1

To determine the extent to which DOD has a strategy to achieve in-transit 

visibility that includes the elements of a comprehensive strategic plan, we 

identified draft and existing policies and guidance for in-transit visibility 

across various DOD components and assessed whether such policies 

and guidance provide a comprehensive strategic plan for in-transit 

visibility. Specifically, we evaluated DOD’s November 2012 draft strategy 

for improving asset visibility and in-transit visibility and determined

whether it included elements applicable to a strategy for maintaining intransit visibility of assets in the DOD supply chain. We reviewed prior 

GAO reports and testimonies pertaining to DOD supply chain 

For the purposes of this report, intransit visibility efforts are systems, devices, or programs that are 

intended to improve DOD’s ability to track the identity, status, and location 

of DOD cargo (excluding petroleum, oils, and lubricants) from origin to 

destination. To determine the total costs for all efforts, we added together 

the obligations and projected costs for each effort reported by the 

components. We did not assess the reliability of the cost information 

provided by the components, because the cost information they provided 

did not materially affect our key findings. We interviewed officials to 

identify coordination mechanisms, both formal and informal, and to 

determine whether components were sharing information across DOD.

 

1

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms (Dec. 15, 2012).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

management, including our reviews of DOD’s prior strategic planning 

efforts for asset visibility, and compared the draft strategy and its 

elements to criteria on effective strategic planning from our prior reports. 

Specific criteria on the elements of a comprehensive strategic plan that 

we discussed in previous reports are also discussed in this report. Using 

these same criteria, we conducted a content analysis of the draft strategy 

to determine whether specific elements of a comprehensive strategic plan 

were included. Two analysts independently compared the strategy to the 

specific elements. The analysts then discussed their individual reviews 

and reached a consensus in areas where they had disagreed. We met 

with officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Supply Chain Integration, the Defense Logistics Agency, and 

TRANSCOM to discuss features of the draft strategy and ongoing and 

possible future strategic planning efforts. We met with officials from the 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 

Integration to discuss the draft strategy and the oversight structure for 

DOD’s in-transit visibility efforts (including senior-level logistics 

governance bodies) and obtained additional insight and supporting 

documentation (e.g., agendas and meeting minutes from these bodies) 

on the purpose, status, and implementation of the draft strategy. For both 

objectives, we reviewed DOD policies and other documentation, and our 

prior work on strategic planning and defense logistics.

In conducting our work, we contacted and obtained information from the 

following organizations:

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain 

Integration

• U.S. Transportation Command

• Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

• U.S. Central Command2

• Defense Logistics Agency

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force

• Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps

 

2

We included U.S. Central Command as one of the key components, because we have 

previously reported that DOD supply chain management in U.S. Central Command’s area 

of responsibility is a high risk area, and that asset visibility is one of the focus areas for 

improvement. 
Appendix II: List of In-Transit Visibility Efforts

Page 22 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

The table below provides a list of the in-transit visibility efforts reported by 

the defense components during the course of our review, a brief 

description of each effort, and cost information where available. Where no 

cost information is provided, there was no cost during that fiscal period, 

the cost was not readily available, or the cost is included with another 

effort that is listed in the table below. The list of efforts does not include 

working groups, meetings, conferences, detection metrics, standards, 

policies, training, or staff actions.

Appendix II: List of In-Transit Visibility 

Efforts 
Appendix II: List of In-Transit Visibility Efforts

Page 23 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: List of In-Transit Visibility Efforts

Page 24 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Notes: In most cases, each effort is lead by a single component. For each effort that is led by more 

than one component, the names of the components are listed in parentheses in the table entry.

The Navy and the Air Force each have their own Active Radio Frequency Identification (aRFID) 

Migration Program. These two programs are included with the aRFID Program and the aRFID 

Infrastructure, respectively and are therefore not listed in the table.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-13-201 Defense Logistics

Zina D. Merritt, 202-512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kimberly Seay, Assistant 

Director; LaToya King; Joanne Landesman; Lisa McMillen; Connie 

Sawyer, Jr.; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; and Michael Willems made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(351652)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.