49–006 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 109–271

SECURE ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND COURT PROTECTION 

ACT OF 2005 

NOVEMBER 7, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS AND ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 1751] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 1751) to amend title 18, United States Code, to protect 

judges, prosecutors, witnesses, victims, and their family members, 

and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as 

amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 11 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 11 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 18 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 18 

Vote of the Committee ............................................................................................. 18 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 20 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 20 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 20 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 24 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 24 

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion .......................................................... 24 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 28 

Markup Transcript .................................................................................................. 41 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 189 

2 

Additional Dissenting Views ................................................................................... 195 

THE AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act 

of 2005’’. 

SEC. 2. PENALTIES FOR INFLUENCING, IMPEDING, OR RETALIATING AGAINST JUDGES AND 

OTHER OFFICIALS BY THREATENING OR INJURING A FAMILY MEMBER. 

Section 115 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1), by inserting 

‘‘federally funded public safety officer (as defined for the purposes of section 

1123)’’ after ‘‘Federal law enforcement officer,’’; 

(2) so that subsection (b) reads as follows: 

‘‘(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an offense 

under this section is as follows: 

‘‘(A) The punishment for an assault in violation of this section is the same 

as that provided for a like offense under section 111. 

‘‘(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy 

to kidnap in violation of this section is the same as provided for a like violation 

in section 1201. 

‘‘(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to 

murder in violation of this section is the same as provided for a like offense 

under section 1111, 1113, and 1117. 

‘‘(D) A threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine 

under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both. 

‘‘(2) If the victim of the offense under this section is an immediate family member of a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined for the 

purposes of section 1114) or of a federally funded public safety officer (as defined 

for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the punishments otherwise provided by 

paragraph (1), the punishments shall be as follows: 

‘‘(A) The punishment for an assault in violation of this section is as follows: 

‘‘(i) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine under this title or a 

term of imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 

‘‘(ii) If the assault resulted in bodily injury (as defined in section 

1365), a fine under this title and a term of imprisonment for not less 

than one year nor more than 10 years. 

‘‘(iii) If the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury (as defined 

in section 113), a fine under this title and a term of imprisonment for 

not less than 3 years nor more than 12 years. 

‘‘(iv) If the assault resulted in serious bodily injury (as defined in 

section 2119), a fine under this title and a term of imprisonment for 

not less than 10 years nor more than 30 years. 

‘‘(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this section is a fine under this title and 

imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for life. 

‘‘(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to 

murder in violation of this section is a fine under this title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, 

the offender may be sentenced to death. 

‘‘(D) A threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a 

fine under this title and imprisonment for not less than one year nor more 

than 10 years. 

‘‘(E) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to the offense, the punishment shall include a term of imprisonment of 5 years in 

addition to that otherwise imposed under this paragraph.’’. 

SEC. 3. PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN ASSAULTS. 

(a) INCLUSION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS.—Section 111(a) 

of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘or a federally funded public safety officer 

(as defined in section 1123)’’ after ‘‘1114 of this title’’; and 

(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ‘‘or a federally funded public safety officer 

(as defined in section 1123)’’ after ‘‘1114’’. 

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(b) ALTERNATE PENALTY WHERE VICTIM IS A UNITED STATES JUDGE, A FEDERAL

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, OR FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER.—Section 111 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(c) ALTERNATE PENALTY WHERE VICTIM IS A UNITED STATES JUDGE, A FEDERAL

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, OR FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER.—(1) 

Except as provided in paragraph (2), if the offense is an assault and the victim of 

the offense under this section is a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement 

officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1114) or of a federally funded public 

safety officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the penalties 

otherwise set forth in this section, the offender shall be subject to a fine under this 

title and— 

‘‘(A) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine under this title or a term of 

imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 

‘‘(B) if the assault resulted in bodily injury (as defined in section 1365), 

shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than 10 years; 

‘‘(C) if the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury (as defined in section 

113), shall be imprisoned not less than 3 nor more than 12 years; and 

‘‘(D) if the assault resulted in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 

2119), shall be imprisoned not less than 10 nor more than 30 years. 

‘‘(2) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to the offense, the 

punishment shall include a term of imprisonment of 5 years in addition to that otherwise imposed under this subsection.’’. 

SEC. 4. PROTECTION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS. 

(a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 

at the end the following: 

‘‘§ 1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers 

‘‘(a) Whoever kills, or attempts or conspires to kill, a federally funded public 

safety officer while that officer is engaged in official duties, or arising out of the performance of official duties, or kills a former federally funded public safety officer 

arising out of the performance of official duties, shall be punished by a fine under 

this title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for life, or, 

if death results, may be sentenced to death. 

‘‘(b) As used in this section— 

‘‘(1) the term ‘federally funded public safety officer’ means a public safety 

officer for a public agency (including a court system, the National Guard of a 

State to the extent the personnel of that National Guard are not in Federal 

service, and the defense forces of a State authorized by section 109 of title 32) 

that receives Federal financial assistance, of an entity that is a State of the 

United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 

Virgin Islands of the United States, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 

or any territory or possession of the United States, an Indian tribe, or a unit 

of local government of that entity; 

‘‘(2) the term ‘public safety officer’ means an individual serving a public 

agency in an official capacity, as a judicial officer, as a law enforcement officer, 

as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a member of a rescue squad or ambulance 

crew; 

‘‘(3) the term ‘judicial officer’ means a judge or other officer or employee of 

a court, including prosecutors, court security, pretrial services officers, court reporters, and corrections, probation, and parole officers; and 

‘‘(4) the term ‘firefighter’ includes an individual serving as an official recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department 

and an officially recognized or designated public employee member of a rescue 

squad or ambulance crew; and 

‘‘(5) the term ‘law enforcement officer’ means an individual involved in 

crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of the 

laws.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 51 

of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

item: 

‘‘1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers.’’. 

SEC. 5. GENERAL MODIFICATIONS OF FEDERAL MURDER CRIME AND RELATED CRIMES. 

(a) MURDER AMENDMENTS.—Section 1111 of title 18, United States Code, is 

amended in subsection (b), by inserting ‘‘not less than 30’’ after ‘‘any term of years’’. 

(b) MANSLAUGHTER AMENDMENTS.—Section 1112(b) of title 18, United States 

Code, is amended— 

4 

(1) by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘20 years’’; and 

(2) by striking ‘‘six years’’ and inserting ‘‘10 years’’. 

SEC. 6. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND OF THE PENALTIES FOR, INFLUENCING OR INJURING OFFICER OR JUROR GENERALLY. 

Section 1503 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) so that subsection (a) reads as follows: 

‘‘(a)(1) Whoever— 

‘‘(A) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror or officer in a judicial proceeding in the discharge of 

that juror or officer’s duty; 

‘‘(B) injures a juror or an officer in a judicial proceeding arising out of the 

performance of official duties as such juror or officer; or 

‘‘(C) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice; 

or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 

‘‘(2) As used in this section, the term ‘juror or officer in a judicial proceeding’ 

means a grand or petit juror, or other officer in or of any court of the United States, 

or an officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any 

United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate.’’; and 

(2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraphs (1) through (3) and inserting 

the following: 

‘‘(1) in the case of a killing, or an attempt or a conspiracy to kill, the punishment provided in section 1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117; and 

‘‘(2) in any other case, a fine under this title and imprisonment for not more 

than 30 years.’’. 

SEC. 7. MODIFICATION OF TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT OFFENSE. 

(a) CHANGES IN PENALTIES.—Section 1512 of title 18, United States Code, is 

amended— 

(1) in each of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), insert ‘‘or conspires’’ 

after ‘‘attempts’’; 

(2) so that subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(3) reads as follows: 

‘‘(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 

1112;’’; 

(3) in subsection (a)(3)— 

(A) in the matter following clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) by striking 

‘‘20 years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’ ; and 

(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘10 years’’ and inserting ‘‘20 

years’’; 

(4) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’; and 

(5) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘one year’’ and inserting ‘‘20 years’’. 

SEC. 8. MODIFICATION OF RETALIATION OFFENSE. 

Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ‘‘or conspires’’ after ‘‘attempts’’; 

(2) in subsection (a)(1)(B)— 

(A) by inserting a comma after ‘‘probation’’; and 

(B) by striking the comma which immediately follows another comma; 

(3) in subsection (a)(2)(B), by striking ‘‘20 years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’; 

(4) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’; 

(5) in the first subsection (e), by striking ‘‘10 years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 

years’’; and 

(6) by redesignating the second subsection (e) as subsection (f). 

SEC. 9. INCLUSION OF INTIMIDATION AND RETALIATION AGAINST WITNESSES IN STATE 

PROSECUTIONS AS BASIS FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTION. 

Section 1952 of title 18, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b)(2), 

by inserting ‘‘intimidation of, or retaliation against, a witness, victim, juror, or informant,’’ after ‘‘extortion, bribery,’’. 

SEC. 10. CLARIFICATION OF VENUE FOR RETALIATION AGAINST A WITNESS. 

Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 

the following: 

‘‘(g) A prosecution under this section may be brought in the district in which 

the official proceeding (whether or not pending, about to be instituted or completed) 

was intended to be affected or was completed, or in which the conduct constituting 

the alleged offense occurred.’’. 

5 

SEC. 11. WITNESS PROTECTION GRANT PROGRAM. 

Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is amended 

by inserting after part BB (42 U.S.C. 3797j et seq.) the following new part: 

‘‘PART CC—WITNESS PROTECTION GRANTS 

‘‘SEC. 2811. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—From amounts made available to carry out this part, the Attorney General may make grants to States, units of local government, and Indian 

tribes to create and expand witness protection programs in order to prevent threats, 

intimidation, and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, crimes. 

‘‘(b) USES OF FUNDS.—Grants awarded under this part shall be— 

‘‘(1) distributed directly to the State, unit of local government, or Indian 

tribe; and 

‘‘(2) used for the creation and expansion of witness protection programs in 

the jurisdiction of the grantee. 

‘‘(c) PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION.—In awarding grants under this part, the 

Attorney General may give preferential consideration, if feasible, to an application 

from a jurisdiction that— 

‘‘(1) has the greatest need for witness and victim protection programs; 

‘‘(2) has a serious violent crime problem in the jurisdiction; and 

‘‘(3) has had, or is likely to have, instances of threats, intimidation, and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, crimes. 

‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 through 

2010.’’. 

SEC. 12. GRANTS TO STATES TO PROTECT WITNESSES AND VICTIMS OF CRIMES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 31702 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13862) is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’ 

; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(5) to create and expand witness and victim protection programs to prevent 

threats, intimidation, and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, violent crimes.’’. 

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 31707 of the Violent Crime 

Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13867) is amended to read as 

follows: 

‘‘SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

‘‘There are authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 

2006 through 2010 to carry out this subtitle.’’. 

SEC. 13. JUDICIAL BRANCH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. 

(a) ENSURING CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS.—Section 566 of title 28, United States Code, 

is amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(i) The United States Marshals Service shall consult with the Administrative 

Office of the United States Courts on a continuing basis regarding the security requirements for the Judicial Branch, and inform the Administrative Office of the 

measures the Marshals Service intends to take to meet those requirements.’’. 

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 604(a) of title 28, United States Code, 

is amended— 

(1) by redesignating existing paragraph (24) as paragraph (25); 

(2) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph (23); and 

(3) by inserting after paragraph (23) the following: 

‘‘(24) Consult with the United States Marshals Service on a continuing 

basis regarding the security requirements for the Judicial Branch, and inform 

the Administrative Office of the measures the Marshals Service intends to take 

to meet those requirements; and’’. 

SEC. 14. PROTECTIONS AGAINST MALICIOUS RECORDING OF FICTITIOUS LIENS AGAINST A 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE. 

(a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 73 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 

at the end the following: 

6 

‘‘§ 1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or slander of 

title 

‘‘Whoever, with the intent to harass a person designated in section 1114 on account of the performance of official duties, files, in any public record or in any private record which is generally available to the public, any false lien or encumbrance 

against the real or personal property of that person, or attempts or conspires to do 

so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 73 

of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

item: 

‘‘1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or slander of title.’’. 

SEC. 15. PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS IN FEDERAL COURT FACILITIES. 

Section 930(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ‘‘or other 

dangerous weapon’’ after ‘‘firearm’’. 

SEC. 16. REPEAL OF SUNSET PROVISION. 

Section 105(b)(3) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is 

amended by striking subparagraph (E). 

SEC. 17. PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS PERFORMING CERTAIN FEDERAL AND OTHER FUNCTIONS. 

(a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 

at the end the following: 

‘‘§ 117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and federally 

assisted functions 

‘‘(a) Whoever knowingly, and with intent to harm, intimidate, or retaliate 

against a covered official makes restricted personal information about that covered 

official publicly available through the Internet shall be fined under this title and 

imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 

‘‘(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant is a 

provider of Internet services and did not knowingly participate in the offense. 

‘‘(c) As used in this section— 

‘‘(1) the term ‘restricted personal information’ means, with respect to an individual, the Social Security number, the home address, home phone number, 

mobile phone number, personal email, or home fax number of, and identifiable 

to, that individual; and 

‘‘(2) the term ‘covered official’ means— 

‘‘(A) an individual designated in section 1114; 

‘‘(B) a public safety officer (as that term is defined in section 1204 of 

the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); or 

‘‘(C) a grand or petit juror, witness, or other officer in or of, any court 

of the United States, or an officer who may be serving at any examination 

or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other 

committing magistrate.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 7 

of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

item: 

‘‘117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and federally assisted functions.’’. 

SEC. 18. ELIGIBILITY OF COURTS TO APPLY DIRECTLY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AND REQUIREMENT THAT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 

CONSIDER COURTS WHEN APPLYING FOR GRANT FUNDS. 

(a) COURTS TREATED AS UNITS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF DIS- CRETIONARY GRANTS.—Section 901 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 

Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3791) is amended in subsection (a)(3)— 

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) and (D) as subparagraphs (D) and 

(E), respectively; and 

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph: 

‘‘(C) the judicial branch of a State or of a unit of local government within the State for purposes of discretionary grants;’’. 

(b) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CONSIDER COURTS.—The Attorney General shall ensure that whenever a State or unit of local government applies for a 

grant from the Department of Justice, the State or unit demonstrate that, in developing the application and distributing funds, the State or unit— 

(1) considered the needs of the judicial branch of the State or unit, as the 

case may be; and 

(2) consulted with the chief judicial officer of the highest court of the State 

or unit, as the case may be. 

7 

SEC. 19. REPORT ON SECURITY OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS. 

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney 

General shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the security of 

assistant United States attorneys and other Federal attorneys arising from the prosecution of terrorists, violent criminal gangs, drug traffickers, gun traffickers, white 

supremacists, and those who commit fraud and other white-collar offenses. The report shall describe each of the following: 

(1) The number and nature of threats and assaults against attorneys handling those prosecutions and the reporting requirements and methods. 

(2) The security measures that are in place to protect the attorneys who are 

handling those prosecutions, including measures such as threat assessments, 

response procedures, availability of security systems and other devices, firearms 

licensing (deputations), and other measures designed to protect the attorneys 

and their families. 

(3) The Department of Justice’s firearms deputation policies, including the 

number of attorneys deputized and the time between receipt of threat and completion of the deputation and training process. 

(4) For each measure covered by paragraphs (1) through (3), when the report or measure was developed and who was responsible for developing and implementing the report or measure. 

(5) The programs that are made available to the attorneys for personal security training, including training relating to limitations on public information 

disclosure, basic home security, firearms handling and safety, family safety, 

mail handling, counter- surveillance, and self-defense tactics. 

(6) The measures that are taken to provide the attorneys with secure parking facilities, and how priorities for such facilities are established— 

(A) among Federal employees within the facility; 

(B) among Department of Justice employees within the facility; and 

(C) among attorneys within the facility. 

(7) The frequency such attorneys are called upon to work beyond standard 

work hours and the security measures provided to protect attorneys at such 

times during travel between office and available parking facilities. 

(8) With respect to attorneys who are licensed under State laws to carry 

firearms, the Department of Justice’s policy as to— 

(A) carrying the firearm between available parking and office buildings; 

(B) securing the weapon at the office buildings; and 

(C) equipment and training provided to facilitate safe storage at Department of Justice facilities. 

(9) The offices in the Department of Justice that are responsible for ensuring the security of the attorneys, the organization and staffing of the offices, 

and the manner in which the offices coordinate with offices in specific districts. 

(10) The role, if any, that the United States Marshals Service or any other 

Department of Justice component plays in protecting, or providing security services or training for, the attorneys. 

SEC. 20. FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION FOR KILLING PEACE OFFICERS. 

(a) FLIGHT.—Chapter 49 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding 

at the end the following: 

‘‘§ 1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers 

‘‘Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to 

avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the 

place from which he flees or under section 1114 or 1123, for a crime consisting of 

the killing, an attempted killing, or a conspiracy to kill, an individual involved in 

crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of the laws or 

for a crime punishable by section 1114 or 1123, shall be fined under this title and 

imprisoned, in addition to any other imprisonment for the underlying offense, for 

any term of years not less than 10.’’. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 49 

of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

item: 

‘‘1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers.’’. 

SEC. 21. SPECIAL PENALTIES FOR MURDER, KIDNAPPING, AND RELATED CRIMES AGAINST 

FEDERAL JUDGES AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 

(a) MURDER.—Section 1114 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by inserting ‘‘(a)’’ before ‘‘Whoever’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

8 

‘‘(b) If the victim of a murder punishable under this section is a United States 

judge (as defined in section 115) or a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined 

in 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine under this title and imprisonment 

for any term of years not less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.’’. 

(b) KIDNAPPING.—Section 1201(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 

adding at the end the following: ‘‘If the victim of the offense punishable under this 

subsection is a United States judge (as defined in section 115) or a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined in 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine under 

this title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or for life, or, 

if death results, may be sentenced to death.’’. 

SEC. 22. MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS. 

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) The right of the people of the United States to freedom of speech, particularly as it relates to comment on governmental activities, as protected by 

the first amendment to the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully exercised without the ability of the public to obtain facts and information about the Government upon which to base their judgments regarding important issues and 

events. As the United States Supreme Court articulated in Craig v. Harney, 331 

U.S. 367 (1947), ‘‘A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room 

is public property.’’. 

(2) The right of the people of the United States to a free press, with the 

ability to report on all aspects of the conduct of the business of government, as 

protected by the first amendment to the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully 

exercised without the ability of the news media to gather facts and information 

freely for dissemination to the public. 

(3) The right of the people of the United States to petition the Government 

to redress grievances, particularly as it relates to the manner in which the Government exercises its legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as protected by 

the first amendment to the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully exercised without the availability to the public of information about how the affairs of government are being conducted. As the Supreme Court noted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia (1980), ‘‘People in an open society do 

not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.’’ 

(4) In the twenty-first century, the people of the United States obtain information regarding judicial matters involving the Constitution, civil rights, and 

other important legal subjects principally through the print and electronic 

media. Television, in particular, provides a degree of public access to courtroom 

proceedings that more closely approximates the ideal of actual physical presence 

than newspaper coverage or still photography. 

(5) Providing statutory authority for the courts of the United States to exercise their discretion in permitting televised coverage of courtroom proceedings 

would enhance significantly the access of the people to the Federal judiciary. 

(6) Inasmuch as the first amendment to the Constitution prevents Congress 

from abridging the ability of the people to exercise their inherent rights to freedom of speech, to freedom of the press, and to petition the Government for a 

redress of grievances, it is good public policy for the Congress affirmatively to 

facilitate the ability of the people to exercise those rights. 

(7) The granting of such authority would assist in the implementation of 

the constitutional guarantee of public trials in criminal cases, as provided by 

the sixth amendment to the Constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in In 

re Oliver (1948), ‘‘Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his 

trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts 

as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.’’. 

(b) AUTHORITY OF PRESIDING JUDGE TO ALLOW MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURT

PROCEEDINGS.— 

(1) AUTHORITY OF APPELLATE COURTS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the presiding judge of an appellate court of the United States may, 

in his or her discretion, permit the photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or televising to the public of court proceedings over which that judge 

presides. 

(2) AUTHORITY OF DISTRICT COURTS.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any presiding judge of a district court of the United States may, in his or her disVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
9 

cretion, permit the photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or 

televising to the public of court proceedings over which that judge presides. 

(B) OBSCURING OF WITNESSES AND JURORS.—(i) Upon the request of any 

witness (other than a party) or a juror in a trial proceeding, the court shall 

order the face and voice of the witness or juror (as the case may be) to be 

disguised or otherwise obscured in such manner as to render the witness 

or juror unrecognizable to the broadcast audience of the trial proceeding. 

(ii) The presiding judge in a trial proceeding shall inform— 

(I) each witness who is not a party that the witness has the right 

to request that his or her image and voice be obscured during the witness’ testimony; and 

(II) each juror that the juror has the right to request that his or 

her image be obscured during the trial proceeding. 

(3) ADVISORY GUIDELINES.—The Judicial Conference of the United States is 

authorized to promulgate advisory guidelines to which a presiding judge, in his 

or her discretion, may refer in making decisions with respect to the management and administration of photographing, recording, broadcasting, or televising described in paragraphs (1) and (2). 

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) PRESIDING JUDGE.—The term ‘‘presiding judge’’ means the judge presiding over the court proceeding concerned. In proceedings in which more than 

one judge participates, the presiding judge shall be the senior active judge so 

participating or, in the case of a circuit court of appeals, the senior active circuit 

judge so participating, except that— 

(A) in en banc sittings of any United States circuit court of appeals, the 

presiding judge shall be the chief judge of the circuit whenever the chief 

judge participates; and 

(B) in en banc sittings of the Supreme Court of the United States, the 

presiding judge shall be the Chief Justice whenever the Chief Justice participates. 

(2) APPELLATE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘appellate court of 

the United States’’ means any United States circuit court of appeals and the 

Supreme Court of the United States. 

(d) SUNSET.—The authority under subsection (b)(2) shall terminate on the date 

that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 23. FUNDING FOR STATE COURTS TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE COURT SECURITY AND 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General, through the Office of Justice Programs, shall make grants under this section to the highest State courts in States 

participating in the program, for the purpose of enabling such courts— 

(1) to conduct assessments focused on the essential elements for effective 

courtroom safety and security planning; and 

(2) to implement changes deemed necessary as a result of the assessments. 

(b) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS.—As used in subsection (a)(1), the essential elements 

include, but are not limited to— 

(1) operational security and standard operating procedures; 

(2) facility security planning and self-audit surveys of court facilities; 

(3) emergency preparedness and response and continuity of operations; 

(4) disaster recovery and the essential elements of a plan; 

(5) threat assessment; 

(6) incident reporting; 

(7) security equipment; 

(8) developing resources and building partnerships; and 

(9) new courthouse design. 

(c) APPLICATIONS.—To be eligible for a grant under this section, a highest State 

court shall submit to the Attorney General an application at such time, in such 

form, and including such information and assurances as the Attorney General shall 

require. 

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 through 

2010. 

SEC. 24. ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE TO PROTECT THE 

JUDICIARY. 

In addition to any other amounts authorized to be appropriated for the United 

States Marshals Service, there are authorized to be appropriated for the United 

States Marshals Service to protect the judiciary, $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 

2006 through 2010 for— 

(1) hiring entry-level deputy marshals for providing judicial security; 

10 

(2) hiring senior-level deputy marshals for investigating threats to the judiciary and providing protective details to members of the judiciary and Assistant 

United States Attorneys; and 

(3) for the Office of Protective Intelligence, for hiring senior-level deputy 

marshals, hiring program analysts, and providing secure computer systems. 

SEC. 25. GRANTS TO STATES FOR THREAT ASSESSMENT DATABASES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—From amounts made available to carry out this section, the 

Attorney General shall carry out a program under which the Attorney General 

makes grants to States for use by the State to establish and maintain a threat assessment database described in subsection (b). 

(b) DATABASE.—For purposes of subsection (a), a threat assessment database is 

a database through which a State can— 

(1) analyze trends and patterns in domestic terrorism and crime; 

(2) project the probabilities that specific acts of domestic terrorism or crime 

will occur; and 

(3) develop measures and procedures that can effectively reduce the probabilities that those acts will occur. 

(c) CORE ELEMENTS.—The Attorney General shall define a core set of data elements to be used by each database funded by this section so that the information 

in the database can be effectively shared with other States and with the Department of Justice. 

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal 

years 2006 through 2009. 

SEC. 26. GRANTS FOR YOUNG WITNESS ASSISTANCE. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

(1) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means the Director of the Bureau of 

Justice Assistance. 

(2) JUVENILE.—The term ‘‘juvenile’’ means an individual who is 17 years of 

age or younger. 

(3) YOUNG ADULT.—The term ‘‘young adult’’ means an individual who is between the ages of 18 and 21. 

(4) STATE.—The term ‘‘State’’ means any State of the United States, the 

District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 

American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. 

(b) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION.—The Director may make grants to State and 

local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies in support of juvenile and young 

adult witness assistance programs, including State and local prosecutors and law 

enforcement agencies that have existing juvenile and adult witness assistance programs. 

(c) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to receive a grant under this section, State and 

local prosecutors and law enforcement officials shall— 

(1) submit an application to the Director in such form and containing such 

information as the Director may reasonably require; and 

(2) give assurances that each applicant has developed, or is in the process 

of developing, a witness assistance program that specifically targets the unique 

needs of juvenile and young adult witnesses and their families. 

(d) USE OF FUNDS.—Grants made available under this section may be used— 

(1) to assess the needs of juvenile and young adult witnesses; 

(2) to develop appropriate program goals and objectives; and 

(3) to develop and administer a variety of witness assistance services, which 

includes— 

(A) counseling services to young witnesses dealing with trauma associated in witnessing a violent crime; 

(B) pre- and post-trial assistance for the youth and their family; 

(C) providing education services if the child is removed from or changes 

their school for safety concerns; 

(D) protective services for young witnesses and their families when a 

serious threat of harm from the perpetrators or their associates is made; 

and 

(E) community outreach and school-based initiatives that stimulate and 

maintain public awareness and support. 

(e) REPORTS.— 

(1) REPORT.—State and local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies that 

receive funds under this section shall submit to the Director a report not later 

than May 1st of each year in which grants are made available under this section. Reports shall describe progress achieved in carrying out the purpose of this 

section. 

11 

(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Director shall submit to Congress a report 

by July 1st of each year which contains a detailed statement regarding grant 

awards, activities of grant recipients, a compilation of statistical information 

submitted by applicants, and an evaluation of programs established under this 

section. 

(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appro- priated to carry out this section $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 

2008. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 1751, the ‘‘Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection 

Act of 2005,’’ is a comprehensive measure designed to improve the 

security and protection of judges, law enforcement, prosecutors, 

and other personnel. The tragic shootings of family members of 

United States District Judge Joan Lefkow, and the brutal slayings 

of Judge Rowland Barton, his court reporter, his deputy sheriff, 

and a Federal officer in Atlanta, as well as the violent attacks outside the Tyler, Texas courthouse—all underscore the importance of 

enhanced security for judges, courthouse personnel, witnesses and 

law enforcement officers. 

At the State and local level, there is a clear and demonstrated 

need for assistance in the protection of judges, law enforcement officers, witnesses and courthouse personnel. The bulk of criminal 

prosecutions occur at the State and local level. Witness intimidation is a regular occurrence in State courthouses. H.R. 1751 provides a number of important new protections and resources for 

Federal, State and local judges, law enforcement officers, witnesses 

and other courthouse personnel. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

The administration of justice requires that court and law enforcement personnel discharge their responsibilities without fear of violence or intimidation. The House Committee on the Judiciary has 

for many years focused on the issue of protecting witnesses and victims of crime. Recent brutal acts of violence, increasing number of 

threats, and attempts to derail our civil and criminal justice system 

only underscore the urgency of addressing this issue. Judges, witnesses, courthouse personnel and law enforcement officers must be 

free of threats and violence when carrying out their duties. H.R. 

1751 seeks to provide the resources and the tools necessary to ensure the safety to those who play critical roles in our judicial system. 

Courthouse protection should not be confined to the physical security of the courthouse itself—security must extend to the homes 

and areas that judges, prosecutors, law enforcement and witnesses 

reside. Without such protection, justice will be subverted as criminals seek to undermine our justice system. H.R. 1751 would 

strengthen the integrity of our judicial system by enhancing protections against: a disgruntled civil litigant; a dangerous criminal 

seeking to harm a judge or a prosecutor; the murder of a gang 

member who has agreed to testify against other gang members; or 

the murder of innocent civilian witnesses who are trying to merely 

carry out their civil obligation to testify against a violent criminal. 

At the Federal level, the United States Marshals Service is 

charged with protecting those working in the Judicial Branch, as 

well as witnesses in Federal trials. The Committee has received inVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
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1 U.S. Department of Justice, March 2004—Review of United States Marshal’s Judicial Security Process, March 2004, Report No. I–2004–0004, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/USMS/e0404/final.pdf 2Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, November 2004—Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 2003, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/ 

leoka03.pdf. 3Faye Fiore & Miles Corwin, Tole of Violence Haunts Families of Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at 1. 4 Id. 

5 Jerry Nachtigal, Crime Down, but Number of Police Officers Killed Holds Steady, Associated 

Press Newswires, Apr. 11, 1999. 

formation that raises concerns about the United States Marshals’ 

ability to carry out its duties. A recent Inspector General’s report 

raised questions about the Marshals’ witness protection program.1

In addition, there are questions regarding: the adequacy of critical 

resources allocated to the Marshals necessary in fulfilling their 

mission; the proper allocation of resources between the field and 

headquarters locations; and arbitrary decisions at the Marshals’ 

Headquarters that may adversely impact both morale and security 

efforts in the field. 

Murders and Assaults of Law Enforcement Officers 

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 52 law enforcement 

officers were feloniously killed in the United States in 2003. In 

2002, 56 officers were killed in the United States. In the ten-year 

period from 1994 through 2003, a total of 616 law enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty in the United States, 

100 of whom were killed in ambush situations—i.e. entrapment or 

premeditated situations.2 If bulletproof vests had not been provided 

to these personnel, it is estimated that an additional 400 officers 

would have been killed over the last decade.3

Of those responsible for the unlawful killings of police officers between 1994 through 2003, 521 had a prior criminal arrest—including 153 who had a prior arrest for assaulting a police officer or resisting arrest; 264 for a crime of violence; 230 for a weapons violation; and 23 for murder. More than 57,000 law enforcement officers 

were assaulted in 2003, or one in every 10 officers serving in the 

United States.4 These attacks have been increasing since 1999, 

even as other crime rates have decreased or held steady. As the Executive Director of the Fraternal Order of Police recently noted, 

‘‘there’s less respect for authority in general and police officers specifically. The predisposition of criminals to use firearms is probably 

at the highest point in our history.’’ 5

H.R. 1751 addresses this problem by sending a strong message 

of deterrence to would-be assailants. The existing penalty for assaulting a law enforcement officer is 8 years (15 with a weapon). 

Under current criminal law, a false statement made to an FBI 

agent in a terrorism investigation carries the same penalty as a 

violent assault of a police officer. The bill adopts a reasonable penalty structure requiring 1 to 10 years for an assault that results 

in bodily injury (cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, pain, 

illness); 3 to 12 years for substantial bodily injury (temporary but 

substantial disfigurement, temporary but substantial loss or impairment); and 10 to 30 years for serious bodily injury (substantial 

risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a 

bodily member, organ or mental faculty). These penalties roughly 

13 

correspond to existing guideline ranges and simply ensure that 

Federal judges impose the required penalty, but can exercise discretion to a higher penalty if warranted. 

Assaults and Violence Against Judges 

Federal, State and local judges have suffered from rising threats 

and deadly attacks against courthouse personnel—prosecutors, witnesses, defense counsel and others have also come under more regular and violent assault. These include the killing of an individual 

with a grenade in the Seattle Federal courthouse, the killing of a 

State judge and other court personnel in Atlanta, the murders of 

a Federal Judge Lefkow’s family members, and the murders immediately outside the Tyler, Texas courthouse. According to the Administrative Office of United States Courts, there are almost 700 

threats a year made against Federal judges, and in numerous cases 

Federal judges have had security details assigned to them for fear 

of attack by members of terrorist associates, violent gangs, drug organizations and disgruntled litigants. 

The recent killing of Judge Lefkow’s husband and mother by a 

disgruntled litigant shows that this threat extends to judges and 

their family members. The Judge Lefkow attack follows on the 

heels of the 1989 bombing of Circuit Judge Robert Vance in the 

11th Circuit, the 1998 shooting of Judge Daronoco, and the 1979 

shooting of Judge Wood outside his San Antonio home. 

At the State and local level, there is no comprehensive data or 

incident reports. However, the recent slayings of Judge Rowland 

Barton, his court reporter, his deputy sheriff, and a Federal officer 

in Atlanta, and the cold-blooded shootings outside the Tyler, Texas 

courthouse all underscore the importance of security for judges, 

courthouse personnel, witnesses and law enforcement officers. The 

scourge of violence against these individuals threatens the very integrity of our judicial system. 

Two States, Missouri and Massachusetts, have gathered data 

that shows an increasing trend of violence against courts and court 

personnel. For the years 2003 and 2004, in Massachusetts, assaults 

and disturbances, medical emergencies, and weapons/contraband 

seized constituted the majority of incidents reported (72.12 percent) 

for the 2004 reporting period. There were 295 assaults and 30 

threats against judges or courthouse employees. In Missouri, for 

2001, 74 percent of reporting courts indicated that their court had 

experienced at least one security incident during the reporting period. Of the five most frequent types of security incidents, four involved a level of violence or threat of violence. 

H.R. 1751 authorizes but does not require Federal prosecution of 

Federally-funded State and local judges, and first responders (law 

enforcement officers, firefighters and ambulance crews). First, the 

bill provides that jurisdiction only exists when it involves Federal 

funding and the protection of Federal investment. Second, under 

current Federal law the Department of Justice pays survivor benefits to families of first responders who are killed in the line of duty. 

The Federal interest in minimizing these assaults and murders is 

obvious. 

These crucial provisions would authorize Federal prosecution 

only after State, local, and Federal prosecutors determine where 

such prosecution would best be brought. Some States do not have 

14 

6 National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice, Preventing Gang- and Drug-Related 

Witness Intimidation (1996). 

a death penalty and Federal prosecution of a law enforcement murder suspect may be warranted; Federal prosecution may be advantageous over State or local prosecution for a variety of reasons (law 

relating to evidence, statute of limitations, or other reasons). The 

provisions do not require Federal prosecution, but add another 

vital tool to Federal, State, and local efforts to protect law enforcement officers, judges and other courthouse personnel. 

Witness Intimidation and Killings 

A 1996 Justice Department study concluded that ‘‘witness intimidation is a pervasive and insidious problem. No part of the country 

is spared and no witness can feel entirely free or safe.’’ 6 Prosecutors estimated that witness intimidation occurs in 75 percent to 

100 percent of the violent crimes committed in some gang-dominated neighborhoods. 

States do not have significant witness protection programs. However, States do not have the ability to relocate witnesses and their 

families, if necessary, like the Federal system. There is an overwhelming need for such programs. Prosecutors in Baltimore estimate that 35 percent to 50 percent of non-fatal shooting cases in 

the city cannot proceed because of reluctant witnesses, and about 

90 percent of all homicide cases involve some manner of witness intimidation. Every year in New York City, hundreds of witnesses in 

court cases report being threatened, and at least 19 have been 

killed since 1980, according to law enforcement officials. 

H.R. 1751 addresses the issue of witness intimidation by: (1) authorizing a new grant program to provide funding to States to create witness protection programs; (2) amending existing grant program authorizations to include witness protection; (3) raising the 

maximum penalties for applicable crimes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–13); 

and (4) adding witness obstruction crimes in Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering. 

Penalty Enhancement 

The bill includes mandatory minimum penalties for assaults and 

killings of police officers, judges and family members. Law enforcement officers deserve our fullest protection—brazen criminals show 

less and less regard for the police and the hard work that they do. 

As revised, the mandatory minimums are commensurate with existing Federal sentencing guidelines. However, in the absence of a 

mandatory guideline system, there is too much at risk to leave the 

sentencing decisions to judges who sometimes depart from the 

guidelines when presented with a case. 

Mandatory minimum penalties protect law enforcement, judges, 

witnesses, and send a significant message—if you attack members 

of the judicial system or law enforcement officers, you will pay a 

definite price. Such penalties increase public safety, and provide effective tools against criminals who depend on witness intimidation 

and judicial obstruction to derail the justice system. Mandatory 

minimum penalties are effective means for ensuring consistency in 

sentencing. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 

Booker, judges now have complete discretion to ignore the Federal 

15 

7Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain 

the Decline and Seven That Do Not, 18 J.Econ. Perspectives 163 (2004); Joanna M. Shepherd, 

Police, Prosecutors, Criminals and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in-Sentencing 

Laws, 45 J.L. & Econ. 509 (2002). 

sentencing guidelines and impose whatever sentence they want— 

all to the detriment of public safety and fairness in sentencing 

through consistent and clear punishment schemes. 

Congress has a duty to set sentencing policies for Federal 

crimes—and to make sure that judges impose such sentences. Unfortunately, that has not been the experience since the Booker decision. Once freed from mandatory sentencing schemes, Federal 

judges are now starting to ignore the guidelines: in 1 of every 10 

criminal cases, they are imposing sentences below the previously 

mandated guideline range. In a recently released report, United 

States Sentencing Commission data confirmed that this trend is 

continuing, and highlighted such data by Circuits. This data 

showed that judges in the 2nd and 9th Circuits followed the guideline ranges in imposing sentences in a substantially lower percentage than other circuits. Sentences now for similar crimes are being 

handed in disparate fashion depending on the region in which the 

offense occurs. This sentencing disparity imperils equal justice in 

the Federal system. 

In a recent speech, Attorney General Gonzales noted the problems since the Booker decision and the absence of a mandatory sentencing scheme. 

More and more frequently, judges are exercising their discretion to impose sentences that depart from the carefully considered ranges developed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. In 

the process, we risk losing a sentencing system that requires 

serious sentences for serious offenders and helps prevent disparate sentences for equally serious crimes. . . . And, indeed, 

the evidence the Department has seen since the Booker decision suggests an increasing disparity in sentences, and a drift 

toward lesser sentences. 

Mandatory minimums have been supported, and adopted on a bipartisan basis in the last 30 years for: (1) drug traffickers; (2) 

armed criminals who commit a drug trafficking offense or a crime 

of violence; (3) criminals who commit crimes against children (including 387 Members of Congress who recently voted for the ‘‘Children’s Safety Act of 2005’’); (4) criminals who engage in identity 

theft; and (5) terrorists who possess and threaten to use atomic, 

chemical and biological weapons and anti-aircraft missiles. 

Mandatory minimum penalties provide the tools for prosecutors 

to secure the cooperation of co-conspirators, co-defendants and 

other organized criminals to solve crimes and dismantle organizations that may be involved in child pornography. In addition, every 

defendant may obtain a reduced sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum by providing ‘‘substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of another person.’’ 

Mandatory sentencing schemes—truth-in-sentencing, determinate sentencing practices, ‘‘three-strikes and you’re out’’—have 

resulted in dramatic reductions in crime since the 1970s.7 Other 

16 

8Peter W. Greenwood et al., Three Strikes and You’re Out: Estimated Benefits and Costs of 

California’s New Mandatory-Sentencing Law, in Three Strikes and You’re Out: Vengeance as 

Public Policy (David Schichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds. 1996). Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of First 

Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. Legal 

Stud. 159 (2002). 9 U.S. Department of Justice, 12 Sept. 2000)Survey of the Federal Death Penalty System 

(1988–2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dp—survey—toc.pdf. U.S. Department of Justice, 6 June 2001—The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary Data, Analysis 

and Revised Protocols for Capitol Case Review, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/ 

dp—survey—toc.pdf. 

studies confirm the obvious point—incarcerating an offender prevents him from repeating his crimes while he is in prison.8

Federal Death Penalty 

The need for a swift and effective death penalty is significant in 

the case of violent offenders who assault and kill law enforcement 

officers, judges, and witnesses. Several scientifically valid statistical studies—those that examine a period of years, and control for 

national trends—consistently show that capital punishment is a 

substantial deterrent and saves lives—recent estimates show that 

each execution deters 18 murders. 

With respect to the Federal death penalty, opponents continue to 

argue, contrary to the evidence, that imposition of the death penalty has been racially-biased and had a disproportionate impact on 

minority populations. To the contrary, the evidence shows that the 

Federal death penalty, with the rigorous review procedures, is imposed at a higher rate against white defendants than minority defendants. The Justice Department has concluded, after two comprehensive studies—one conducted in 2000 (under Attorney General Janet Reno) and another in 2001, that at no stage of the 

[death penalty] review process were decisions to recommend or approve the seeking of a capital sentence made at higher rates for 

Black or Hispanic defendants than for White Defendants.9

Additional Tools to Protect Judges, Law Enforcement Officers and 

Witnesses 

H.R. 1751 includes provisions to address other security issues 

and problems. First, the bill provides permanent authorization for 

Federal judges to redact information from financial disclosure reports that could endanger the filer. It is important for Congress to 

act soon because this essential security measure for Federal judges, 

employees, and their families will expire on December 31, 2005. 

In 1998, Congress amended the Ethics in Government Act to provide the judiciary with authority to redact financial disclosure reports before they are released to the public. Congress recognized 

that the judiciary faced security risks greater than those of 25 

years earlier when the Ethics in Government Act first became law. 

Congress established a process by which the judiciary would consult with the United States Marshals Service to determine whether 

information on a financial disclosure report should be redacted because its release could jeopardize the life or safety of a judge or judiciary employee. 

There have been a disturbingly high number of instances of unauthorized incursions into information databases containing personal information of court personnel. These incursions, when coupled with other personal information already available on the 

Internet, give wrongdoers the capability to cause harm as never beVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
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fore. Were the redaction authority to be removed from the Act, certain personal information in the financial disclosure reports, not 

otherwise widely available, such as the unsecured location where 

a spouse works or a child attends school, may be widely publicized 

through the Internet and other information outlets. 

Making the redaction authority permanent by removing the sunset provision from section 105(b)(3)(E) of the Act can be accomplished without diminishing the basic purpose of the Act—to allow 

members of the public to form independent opinions as to the integrity of government officials. The regulations adopted by the Judicial Conference carefully balance judges’ security concerns with 

the public’s right to view the information contained in financial disclosure reports. The judiciary has made a concerted effort to ensure 

that the authority conferred by section 105(b)(3) is exercised in a 

consistent and prudent manner. 

Protected Information and Disclosure 

The bill also restricts Internet dissemination of private information concerning law enforcement, judges, and other judicial system 

participants with the intent to harm these individuals. It has become all too common for the Internet to be used as a conduit to 

identify cooperating witnesses, informants and witnesses for purposes of intimidation, assault or even murder. The bill adopts a 

five-year maximum penalty and imposes an intent requirement 

that such disclosure is meant to ‘‘harm or retaliate’’ against the 

protected persons. 

Coordination/Consultation Between U.S. Marshals and Judges 

At the Federal level, the United States Marshals Service is 

charged with protecting those working in the Judicial Branch, as 

well as witnesses in Federal trials. The Committee has received information that raises concerns about the United States Marshals’ 

ability to carry out its duties. A recent Inspector General’s report 

raised questions about the Marshals’ witness protection program. 

In addition, there are questions regarding: the adequacy of critical 

resources allocated to the Marshals necessary in fulfilling their 

mission; the proper allocation of resources between the field and 

headquarters locations; and arbitrary decisions at the Marshals’ 

Headquarters that may adversely impact both morale and security 

efforts in the field. The bill responds to suggestions made by the 

Federal judiciary and directs coordination and notification requirements on the Marshals when dealing with security needs of the 

Federal judiciary. This request is reasonable and will ensure that 

judges are adequately informed, and that they have sufficient opportunity to provide input to the United States Marshals concerning their security needs. This provision is meant to improve 

communication and coordination efforts between the Marshals and 

the Federal judiciary. 

Fictitious Liens and Encumbrances 

The Judicial Conference, as well as the Justice Department, have 

explained that organized efforts to file such liens and encumbrances are regularly employed by groups opposed to Federal law 

enforcement and judicial participants, and who conduct organized 

efforts to harass judges, prosecutors and other Federal officials. In 

18 

order to protect court and law enforcement personnel, H.R. 1751 

creates a new Federal ten year maximum penalty crime that provides for the filing of false liens and encumbrances against real or 

personal property. 

Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Killing Peace Officers 

The bill incorporates provisions from a bill offered by Rep. Drier 

and Rep. Schiff, the ‘‘Peace Officer Justice Act,’’ to address the 

problem of law enforcement murder suspects who flee to Mexico in 

order to escape arrest. Mexico has limited extradition authority 

under treaties with the United States. On April 29, 2002, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy David March was brutally slain in 

an execution-style murder during a routine traffic stop. Suspect 

Armando Garcia fled to Mexico within hours of Deputy March’s 

death and has eluded prosecution by U.S. authorities. 

Tragically, Mexico’s refusal to extradite individuals who may face 

the death penalty or life imprisonment has complicated efforts to 

bring Armando Garcia back to the U.S. to face prosecution for his 

crimes. As a result, three years later, Armando Garcia and thousands of other fugitives still roam free. The provision ensures that 

criminals who murder law enforcement officials and escape to another country will have the full weight of the Federal Government 

on their trail. Currently under Federal law, it is a crime to kill a 

Federal peace officer or State and local officers if they are engaged 

in a Federal investigation. H.R. 1751 makes it a Federal crime for 

the killing of a Federally-financed public safety officer. The current 

punishment for fleeing prosecution under existing law is no more 

than five years or merely a fine. Under the bill, the punishment 

would be increased to a mandatory-minimum of 10 years to life. 

HEARINGS

The Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security held a legislative hearing on H.R. 

1751 on April 26, 2005. Testimony was received from four witnesses: Judge Jane Roth, Chairwoman of Judicial Conference Committee on Facilities; Judge Cynthia Kent, 114th Judicial District of 

Texas; United States Attorney Paul McNulty, Eastern District of 

Virginia; and United States Marshal John Clark, Eastern District 

of Virginia. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On June 30, 2005, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security met in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 1751 as amended by a voice vote, a quorum 

being present. On October 27, 2005, the full Committee met in 

open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 1751 as 

amended by a recorded vote of 26 to 5, a quorum being present. 

VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE

In compliance with clause 3(b) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee notes that there were the 

following recorded votes during the committee consideration of H.R. 

1751: 

19 

1. An amendment offered by Rep. Chabot to permit broadcast of 

Federal judicial proceedings was adopted by a vote of 20 to 12. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren .......................................................................................................

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X 

Mr. Flake ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Pence ..........................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt ..................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Van Hollen .................................................................................................. X 

Ms. Wasserman Schultz .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.

Total ................................................................................................ 20 12 

2. H.R. 1751 was favorably reported to the full House, as amended, by a vote of 26 to 5. 

ROLLCALL NO. 2 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Coble ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X 

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Lungren ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................

Mr. Inglis ........................................................................................................... X 

20 

ROLLCALL NO. 2—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Issa .............................................................................................................

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence ..........................................................................................................

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. King ............................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Feeney ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Franks ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X 

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X 

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Delahunt ..................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X 

Ms. Sa ́nchez ...................................................................................................... X 

Mr. Van Hollen .................................................................................................. X 

Ms. Wasserman Schultz .................................................................................... X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.

Total ................................................................................................ 26 5 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the H.R. 1751, the following estimate and comparison prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 

of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

21 

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, November 7, 2005. 

Hon. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Chairman, 

Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has completed the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1751, the Secure Access 

to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Gregory Waring, who 

can be reached at 226–2860. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 1751—Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 

2005. 

SUMMARY

H.R. 1751 would authorize the appropriation of $409 million over 

the 2006–2010 period to provide increased court security through 

the U.S. Marshals Service and to provide grants to States to increase the security of courts and protect witnesses. CBO estimates 

that it would authorize additional appropriations of $25 million a 

year over the 2006–2009 period for grants to States to create threat 

assessment databases. The bill also would establish mandatory 

minimum-prison sentences for certain crimes committed against 

judges and certain public safety officers and their families. Moreover, H.R. 1751 would increase the mandatory minimum-federal 

sentences for the crimes of murder in the second degree and manslaughter. 

Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1751 would cost about $385 million 

over the 2006–2010 period. Enacting the bill could affect direct 

spending and revenues, but CBO estimates that any such effects 

would not be significant. 

H.R. 1751 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). 

It would benefit State, local, and tribal governments by authorizing 

the appropriation of more than $400 million over fiscal years 2006– 

2010 for new and existing programs to increase protection for public safety officers, court personnel, and witnesses. Any costs to 

those governments would be incurred voluntarily as a condition of 

receiving Federal assistance. 

ESTIMATED COST TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 1751 is shown in the following table. The cost of this legislation falls within budget function 750 (administration of justice). 

22 

By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 1

Court Security and Witness Programs 

Authorization Level 63 63 63 60 60 

Estimated Outlays 14 33 45 54 61 

U.S. Marshals Service 

Authorization Level 20 20 20 20 20 

Estimated Outlays 12 26 20 20 20 

Threat Assessment Database Grants 

Estimated Authorization Level 25 25 25 25 0 

Estimated Outlays 61 31 82 22 0 

Total Changes 

Estimated Authorization Level 108 108 108 105 80 

Estimated Outlays 32 72 83 96 101 

1. In addition to the amounts shown above, enacting H.R. 1751 also could affect revenues and direct spending, but CBO 

estimates that any such effects would not be significant in any year. 

BASIS OF ESTIMATE

For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted in 

December 2005. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1751 

would cost about $385 million over the 2006–2010 period, assuming 

appropriation of the necessary funds. We also estimate that enacting the bill could increase both direct spending and revenues, but 

any such effects would not be significant in any year. 

Spending Subject to Appropriation 

For this estimate, CBO assumes that the necessary amounts will 

be appropriated near the start of each fiscal year and that spending will follow the historical spending patterns for these or similar 

activities. 

Court Security and Witness Programs. H.R. 1751 would authorize the appropriation of: 

• $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for 

the Attorney General to make grants to State and local governments to bolster or create witness protection programs; 

• $20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for the 

Attorney General to make grants to community-based programs to assist both witnesses to and victims of violence; 

• $20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for the 

Office of Justice Programs to provide grants to State courts 

to assess and implement courtroom security needs; and 

• $3 million for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2008 for the 

Bureau of Justice Assistance to make grants to State and 

local agencies specifically for the needs of juvenile and young 

adult witnesses. 

U.S. Marshals Service. H.R. 1751 would authorize the appropriation of $20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010 

for the U.S. Marshals Service to provide additional protection for 

the judiciary. The agency would hire additional Deputy Marshals, 

new investigators, and additional intelligence officers. 

Threat Assessment Database Grants. The bill would authorize appropriation of the necessary amounts for each of fiscal years 

23 

2006 through 2009 for the Attorney General to provide grants to 

States to assess threats of domestic terrorism and crime. State recipients would use the funds to analyze trends in historical data, 

project the likelihood of future acts of terrorism and crime, and develop steps to reduce the chance such events will occur. Based on 

the cost of similar information sharing and technology initiatives, 

we expect that the Department of Justice would award each State 

around $500,000 a year over this period for staff and data analysis 

tools. Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts ($25 million a year), we estimate that the grant program would cost $79 

million over the 2006–2010 period. (Some outlays would occur after 

2010.) 

Federal Prison System. H.R. 1751 would establish mandatory 

minimum-prison sentences and fines for a wide range of offenses 

committed by individuals against judges, federally funded public 

safety officers, and family members of such individuals. In addition, the bill would increase the mandatory minimum sentence for 

murder in the second degree to not less than 30 years and the 

mandatory minimum sentences for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter to 20 and 10 years, respectively. 

Based on information from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 

CBO estimates that the longer sentences required under the bill 

would not have a significant impact on the prison population over 

the 2006–2010 period, and thus, would not impose any significant 

new costs over that period. 

Direct Spending and Receipts 

H.R. 1751 would subject individuals to penalties for various 

crimes against judges, federally funded public safety officers, and 

their families. Thus, the Federal Government might collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of criminal fines are 

deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects 

that any additional revenues and direct spending would not be significant. 

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR IMPACT

This bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. It would benefit State, local, and tribal 

governments by authorizing the appropriation of more than $400 

million over fiscal years 2006–2010 for new and existing programs 

to increase protection for public safety officers, court personnel, and 

witnesses. Any costs to those governments would be incurred voluntarily as a condition of receiving Federal assistance. 

ESTIMATE PREPARED BY: 

Federal Costs: Gregory Waring (226–2860) 

Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell 

(225–3220) 

Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach (226–2940) 

ESTIMATE APPROVED BY: 

Peter H. Fontaine 

Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis 

24 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of Rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R 1751, is intended 

to protect Federal, State and local judges, law enforcement officers, 

witnesses, victims and other courthouse personnel. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in part. I, § 8 of the Constitution. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following describes the bill as reported by the Committee. 

Sec. 1. Short Title 

This section cites the short title of the bill as ‘‘The Secure Access 

to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005.’’ 

Sec. 2. Penalties for Influencing, Impeding, to Retaliating Against 

Judges and Other Officials by Threatening or Injuring a Family Member 

This section increases penalties for assault, kidnaping, murdering a member of the immediate family of, or the designated persons, including a United States official, a United States judge, a 

Federal law enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would 

be covered under 18 U.S.C. § 1114. Criminal penalties for assault, 

kidnaping, murder and threats would be increased: (1) for assaults, 

the penalty would increase depending on the severity of the assault 

and the injuries suffered by the victim; (2) for kidnaping (or attempt or conspiracy), the penalty would increase to a mandatory 

minimum of 30 years to a maximum of life imprisonment; and (3) 

for threats, the penalty would increase to a mandatory minimum 

of 1 year to a maximum of 10 years. The substitute amendment 

that was adopted during the Committee’s markup made several revisions to this section. The amendment added ‘‘Federally Financed 

Public Safety Officer’’ to coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 1111; provides enhanced criminal penalties where the victim is a United States 

judge, Federal law enforcement officer, or a Federally Financed 

Public Safety Officer (same as 1B above for assaults and use of a 

dangerous weapon); restricts Federal prosecution of assaults of 

Federally-financed public safety officers to require Attorney General approval, consultation with State and local prosecutors, and 

approval only when in the interest of justice; and increases maximum penalties for assaults of other Federal officials and employees. 

Sec. 3. Penalties for Certain Assaults 

The substitute amendment that was adopted during the Committee’s markup added this section to H.R. 1751. This section adds 

‘‘Federally Financed Public Safety Officer’’ to coverage of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1111; provides enhanced criminal penalties where the victim is a 

United States judge, Federal law enforcement officer, or a Federally Financed Public Safety Officer (same as 1B above for assaults 

and use of a dangerous weapon); restricts Federal prosecution of 

25 

assaults of Federally-financed public safety officers to require Attorney General approval, consultation with State and local prosecutors, and approval only when in the interest of justice; and increases maximum penalties for assaults of other Federal officials 

and employees. 

Sec. 4. Protection of Federally-Funded Public Safety Officers 

This section creates a new criminal offense for killing, attempting to kill or conspiring to kill, any public safety officer for a public 

agency that receives Federal funding, including a judicial officer, 

judicial employee, law enforcement officer, firefighter, or other 

State or local employee. The substitute amendment that was adopted during the Committee’s markup made several revisions to this 

section. It provides a 30-year mandatory minimum to life or death 

penalty for killing of Federally-financed public safety officer; adds 

provisions from Rep. Drier’s proposed bill, H.R. 3900, the ‘‘Justice 

for Peace Officer’s Act,’’ to include killing of State and local law enforcement officers; and adds provisions from Rep. Mica’s bill, H.R. 

3833, the ‘‘National Guard Emergency Protection Act of 2005,’’ to 

extend to the killing of members of the National Guard when authorized by States, as protected public safety officers under proposed new Section 1123 of title 18. 

Sec. 5. General Modifications of Federal Murder Crime and Related 

Crimes 

This section modifies the Federal murder and manslaughter statutes to include new mandatory minimums of 30 years imprisonment for second-degree murder; and a maximum of 20 years imprisonment, and 10 years imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter; and modifies the attempted murder and conspiracy to 

murder provisions to punish such crimes the same as the substantive offense. 

Sec. 6. Modification of Definition of Offense and of the Penalties for 

Influencing or Injuring Officer or Juror Generally 

This section clarifies 18 U.S.C. § 1503 relating to influencing or 

injuring jurors or officers of judicial proceedings, and increases 

maximum penalties for an attempted killing, use of force, or 

threats of force. The substitute amendment that was adopted during the Committee’s markup eliminated the mandatory minimum, 

but increased the maximum punishment to 30 years. 

Sec. 7. Modification of Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or Informant Offense 

This section modifies 18 U.S.C. § 1512 to increase maximum penalties for killing or attempting to kill a witness, victim or informant 

to obstruct justice. The substitute amendment that was adopted 

during the Committee’s markup eliminated all three proposed mandatory minimums for 18 U.S.C. § 1512, and increased the maximum penalties. 

Sec. 8. Modification of Retaliation Offense 

This section modifies 18 U.S.C. § 1513 for killing or attempting 

to kill a witness, victim or an informant in retaliation for their testifying or providing information to law enforcement by increasing 

26 

maximum penalties. The substitute amendment that was adopted 

during the Committee’s markup eliminated two mandatory minimum penalties and increased the maximum penalties. 

Sec. 9. Inclusion of Intimidation and Retaliation Against Witnesses 

in State Prosecutions as Basis for Federal Prosecution 

This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 1952 relating to interstate and 

foreign travel in aid of racketeering enterprise by expanding the 

prohibition against ‘‘unlawful activity’’ to include ‘‘intimidation of, 

or retaliation against, a witness, victim, juror, or informant.’’ 

Sec. 10. Clarification of Venue for Retaliation Against a Witness 

This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 1513 to clarify proper venue for 

prosecutions to include the district in which the official proceeding 

or conduct occurred. 

Sec. 11. Witness Protection Grant Program 

This section creates a new grant program for States, units of 

local government, and Indian tribes to create and expand witness 

protection programs in order to prevent threats, intimidation and 

retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, crimes. The authorized funding is $20 million for each fiscal year 2006 through 2010. 

Sec. 12. Grants to States to Protect Witnesses and Victims of Crime 

This section amends the Violent Crime Control Act to authorize 

grants to create and expand witness protection programs to assist 

witnesses and victims of crime. The authorized funding is $20 million for each fiscal year 2006 through 2010. 

Sec. 13. Judicial Branch Security Requirements 

This section would ensure consultation and coordination in determining security requirements for United States Courts between the 

United States Marshals Service and the Administrative Office of 

the United States Courts. This section seeks to improve the coordination and implementation of security measures to protect judges, 

court employees, law enforcement officers, jurors and other members of the public who are regularly in Federal courthouses and 

other buildings used by the Judicial Branch. This section would not 

alter the responsibility of the Marshals Services for protection of 

the judiciary in buildings occupied by the courts, pursuant to a 

memorandum of understanding between the General Services Administration and the Marshals Service, and the Marshals Service 

would still be responsible for the security of the judges and the 

court facilities. 

Sec. 14. Protections Against Malicious Recording of Fictitious Liens 

Against Federal Judges and Attorneys 

This section would create a new Federal criminal offense for the 

filing of fictitious liens against real or personal property owned by 

Federal judges, Federal attorneys and Federal employees. The substitute amendment that was adopted during markup restricted coverage to Federal officials and employees (including judges, law enforcement officers and prosecutors). 

27 

Sec. 15. Prohibition of Dangerous Weapons in Federal Court Facilities 

This section amends 18 U.S.C. § 930(c) to prohibit the possession 

of ‘‘a dangerous weapon’’ in a Federal court facility. 

Sec. 16. Repeal of Sunset Provision 

This section repeals the sunset applicable to the filing of disclosure statements by Federal judges pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 so that Federal judges may continue to redact 

identifying information about them and their families while ensuring that sufficient information is publicly available to ensure that 

no conflicts or other potential conflicts may arise while conducting 

their official duties. 

Sec. 17. Protection of Individuals Performing Certain Federal and 

Federally-Assisted Functions 

This section creates a new Federal criminal offense prohibiting 

persons from making available on the Internet restricted personal 

information concerning judges, law enforcement, public safety officers, jurors, witnesses or other officers in any United States Court. 

The penalty for a knowing violation is a maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years. The substitute amendment that was adopted 

during the Committee’s markup required the intent to harm or retaliate for the new criminal offense protecting disclosure of personal information on the Internet. 

Sec. 18. Eligibility of Courts to Apply Directly for Law Enforcement 

Discretionary Grants and Requirement that State and Local 

Governments Consider Courts When Applying for Grant Funds 

This section modifies the eligibility requirements for discretionary Byrne grants to restrict State court eligibility for Justice 

Department programs to discretionary grants. 

Sec. 19. Report on Security of Federal Prosecutors 

This section requires the Justice Department to submit a report 

to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on security measures taken to protect Assistant U.S. Attorneys and other Federal 

attorneys. 

Sec 20. Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Killing Peace Officers 

This section is derived from H.R. 3900, the ‘‘Justice for Peace Officers Act’’ (Rep. Dreier). It creates a new Federal criminal offense 

for flight to avoid prosecution for killing a peace officer, and imposes mandatory-minimum penalty of ten years imprisonment for 

violating its terms. 

Sec 21. Special penalties for Murder and Kidnaping and Related 

Crimes Against Federal Judges and Federal Law Enforcement 

Officers 

This section creates a mandatory minimum of 30 years imprisonment or, life or death penalty if death results for crimes against 

Federal judges and law enforcement officers. 

28 

Sec. 22. Media Coverage of Court Proceedings 

This section authorizes the presiding judges of each court to permit media broadcast of judicial proceedings, and provides specific 

procedures to be used to protect the security of witnesses. 

Sec. 23. Funding for State Courts to Enhance Court Security and 

Emergency Preparedness 

This section authorizes grants to State courts to conduct threat 

assessments and implement recommended security changes. 

Sec. 24. Additional Amounts for the United States Marshals Service 

to Protect the Federal Judiciary 

This section authorizes an additional $20 million for the U.S. 

Marshals service to protect the Federal judiciary. 

Sec. 25. Grants to States For Threat Assessment Databases 

This section authorizes a new grant program to provide States 

with funds to develop threat assessment databases. 

Sec. 26. Grants for Young Witness Assistance 

This section authorizes grants for State and local prosecutors and 

law enforcement agencies to provide witnesses assistance programs 

for young witnesses. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—CRIMES 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 7—ASSAULT 

Sec. 

111. Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees. 

* * * * * * * 

117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and federally assisted 

functions. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 111. Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or 

employees 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever— 

(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, 

or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this 

29 

title or a federally funded public safety officer (as defined in 

section 1123) while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; or 

(2) forcibly assaults or intimidates any person who formerly served as a person designated in section 1114 or a federally funded public safety officer (as defined in section 1123) on 

account of the performance of official duties during such person’s term of service, 

* * * * * * * 

(c) ALTERNATE PENALTY WHERE VICTIM IS A UNITED STATES

JUDGE, A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, OR FEDERALLY

FUNDED PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), if the offense is an assault and the victim of the offense 

under this section is a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1114) or of a federally funded public safety officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the penalties otherwise set forth in this section, 

the offender shall be subject to a fine under this title and— 

(A) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine under this title 

or a term of imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 

(B) if the assault resulted in bodily injury (as defined in 

section 1365), shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more 

than 10 years; 

(C) if the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury (as 

defined in section 113), shall be imprisoned not less than 3 nor 

more than 12 years; and 

(D) if the assault resulted in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 2119), shall be imprisoned not less than 10 nor 

more than 30 years. 

(2) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to 

the offense, the punishment shall include a term of imprisonment of 

5 years in addition to that otherwise imposed under this subsection. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 115. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family 

member 

(a)(1) Whoever— 

(A) assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or conspires 

to kidnap or murder, or threatens to assault, kidnap or murder 

a member of the immediate family of a United States official, 

a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, federally funded public safety officer (as defined for the purposes of 

section 1123) or an official whose killing would be a crime 

under section 1114 of this title; or 

(B) threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United 

States official, a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, federally funded public safety officer (as defined 

for the purposes of section 1123) or an official whose killing 

would be a crime under such section, 

with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official, 

judge, or law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance 

of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official, 

30 

judge, or law enforcement officer on account of the performance of 

official duties, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 

ø(b)(1) An assault in violation of this section shall be punished 

as provided in section 111 of this title. 

ø(2) A kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this section shall be punished as provided in section 1201 of this title for the kidnapping or attempted kidnapping 

of, or a conspiracy to kidnap, a person described in section 

1201(a)(5) of this title. 

ø(3) A murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to murder in 

violation of this section shall be punished as provided in sections 

1111 and 1113 of this title. 

ø(4) A threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment for a term of not 

more than 10 years, or both, except that imprisonment for a threatened assault shall not exceed 6 years.¿ 

(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for 

an offense under this section is as follows: 

(A) The punishment for an assault in violation of this section is the same as that provided for a like offense under section 

111. 

(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this section is the 

same as provided for a like violation in section 1201. 

(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted murder, or 

conspiracy to murder in violation of this section is the same as 

provided for a like offense under section 1111, 1113, and 1117. 

(D) A threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more 

than 10 years, or both. 

(2) If the victim of the offense under this section is an immediate family member of a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1114) or of 

a federally funded public safety officer (as defined for the purposes 

of section 1123), in lieu of the punishments otherwise provided by 

paragraph (1), the punishments shall be as follows: 

(A) The punishment for an assault in violation of this 

section is as follows: 

(i) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine under 

this title or a term of imprisonment for not more than 

one year, or both. 

(ii) If the assault resulted in bodily injury (as defined in section 1365), a fine under this title and a 

term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor 

more than 10 years. 

(iii) If the assault resulted in substantial bodily injury (as defined in section 113), a fine under this title 

and a term of imprisonment for not less than 3 years 

nor more than 12 years. 

(iv) If the assault resulted in serious bodily injury 

(as defined in section 2119), a fine under this title and 

a term of imprisonment for not less than 10 years nor 

more than 30 years. 

(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this section 

31 

is a fine under this title and imprisonment for any term of 

years not less than 30, or for life. 

(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted murder, 

or conspiracy to murder in violation of this section is a fine 

under this title and imprisonment for any term of years not 

less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, the offender 

may be sentenced to death. 

(D) A threat made in violation of this section shall be 

punished by a fine under this title and imprisonment for 

not less than one year nor more than 10 years. 

(E) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to the offense, the punishment shall include a term 

of imprisonment of 5 years in addition to that otherwise 

imposed under this paragraph. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal 

and federally assisted functions 

(a) Whoever knowingly, and with intent to harm, intimidate, or 

retaliate against a covered official makes restricted personal information about that covered official publicly available through the 

Internet shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not more 

than 5 years, or both. 

(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the 

defendant is a provider of Internet services and did not knowingly 

participate in the offense. 

(c) As used in this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘restricted personal information’’ means, with 

respect to an individual, the Social Security number, the home 

address, home phone number, mobile phone number, personal 

email, or home fax number of, and identifiable to, that individual; and 

(2) the term ‘‘covered official’’ means— 

(A) an individual designated in section 1114; 

(B) a public safety officer (as that term is defined in 

section 1204 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 

Streets Act of 1968); or 

(C) a grand or petit juror, witness, or other officer in 

or of, any court of the United States, or an officer who may 

be serving at any examination or other proceeding before 

any United States magistrate judge or other committing 

magistrate. 

CHAPTER 44—FIREARMS 

* * * * * * * 

§ 930. Possession of firearms and dangerous weapons in 

Federal facilities 

(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever knowingly 

possesses or causes to be present a firearm or other dangerous 

32 

weapon in a Federal court facility, or attempts to do so, shall be 

fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 49—FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE 

Sec. 

1071. Concealing person from arrest. 

* * * * * * * 

1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers 

Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with 

intent to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place from which he flees or under section 1114 or 1123, for a crime consisting of the killing, an attempted 

killing, or a conspiracy to kill, an individual involved in crime and 

juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement of the laws 

or for a crime punishable by section 1114 or 1123, shall be fined 

under this title and imprisoned, in addition to any other imprisonment for the underlying offense, for any term of years not less than 

10. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 51—HOMICIDE 

Sec. 

1111. Murder. 

* * * * * * * 

1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers. 

§ 1111. Murder 

(a) * * * 

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 

the United States, 

Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; 

Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years not less than 30 or for life. 

§ 1112. Manslaughter 

(a) * * * 

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 

the United States, 

Whoever is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more than øten¿ 20 years, or 

both; 

Whoever is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, shall be fined 

under this title or imprisoned not more than øsix¿ 10 years, or 

both. 

* * * * * * * 

33 

§ 1114. Protection of officers and employees of the United 

States 

(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of 

the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United 

States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of 

the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an 

officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account 

of that assistance, shall be punished— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(b) If the victim of a murder punishable under this section is 

a United States judge (as defined in section 115) or a Federal law 

enforcement officer (as defined in 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine under this title and imprisonment for any term of 

years not less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers 

(a) Whoever kills, or attempts or conspires to kill, a federally 

funded public safety officer while that officer is engaged in official 

duties, or arising out of the performance of official duties, or kills 

a former federally funded public safety officer arising out of the performance of official duties, shall be punished by a fine under this 

title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or 

for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death. 

(b) As used in this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘federally funded public safety officer’’ means 

a public safety officer for a public agency (including a court system, the National Guard of a State to the extent the personnel 

of that National Guard are not in Federal service, and the defense forces of a State authorized by section 109 of title 32) that 

receives Federal financial assistance, of an entity that is a State 

of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands of the United States, 

Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or 

any territory or possession of the United States, an Indian tribe, 

or a unit of local government of that entity; 

(2) the term ‘‘public safety officer’’ means an individual 

serving a public agency in an official capacity, as a judicial officer, as a law enforcement officer, as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew; 

(3) the term ‘‘judicial officer’’ means a judge or other officer 

or employee of a court, including prosecutors, court security, 

pretrial services officers, court reporters, and corrections, probation, and parole officers; and 

(4) the term ‘‘firefighter’’ includes an individual serving as 

an official recognized or designated member of a legally organized volunteer fire department and an officially recognized or 

designated public employee member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew; and 

34 

(5) the term ‘‘law enforcement officer’’ means an individual 

involved in crime and juvenile delinquency control or reduction, 

or enforcement of the laws. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 55—KIDNAPPING 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1201. Kidnapping 

(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or 

otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent 

thereof, when— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life 

and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death 

or life imprisonment. If the victim of the offense punishable under 

this subsection is a United States judge (as defined in section 115) 

or a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined in 115) the offender 

shall be punished by a fine under this title and imprisonment for 

any term of years not less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, 

may be sentenced to death. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 73—OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 

Sec. 

1501. Assault on process server. 

* * * * * * * 

1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or slander of title. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally 

ø(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, 

or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of 

the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge 

or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such 

officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his 

person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter 

or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors 

to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, 

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under 

this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and 

the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physical 

force or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment which 

may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
35 

wise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been 

imposed for any offense charged in such case.¿ 

(a)(1) Whoever— 

(A) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, endeavors to 

influence, intimidate, or impede a juror or officer in a judicial 

proceeding in the discharge of that juror or officer’s duty; 

(B) injures a juror or an officer in a judicial proceeding 

arising out of the performance of official duties as such juror 

or officer; or 

(C) corruptly, or by threats of force or force, obstructs, or 

impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 

administration of justice; 

or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided in 

subsection (b). 

(2) As used in this section, the term ‘‘juror or officer in a judicial proceeding’’ means a grand or petit juror, or other officer in or 

of any court of the United States, or an officer who may be serving 

at any examination or other proceeding before any United States 

magistrate judge or other committing magistrate. 

(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is— 

ø(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in 

sections 1111 and 1112; 

ø(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which 

the offense was committed against a petit juror and in which 

a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment for not more 

than 20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and 

ø(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 

years, a fine under this title, or both.¿ 

(1) in the case of a killing, or an attempt or a conspiracy 

to kill, the punishment provided in section 1111, 1112, 1113, 

and 1117; and 

(2) in any other case, a fine under this title and imprisonment for not more than 30 years. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant 

(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts or conspires to kill another 

person, with intent to— 

(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force 

against any person, or attempts or conspires to do so, with intent 

to— 

(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(3) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is— 

ø(A) in the case of murder (as defined in section 1111), the 

death penalty or imprisonment for life, and in the case of any 

other killing, the punishment provided in section 1112;¿ 

(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112; 

(B) in the case of— 

(i) an attempt to murder; or 

36 

(ii) the use or attempted use of physical force against 

any person; 

imprisonment for not more than ø20¿ 30 years; and 

(C) in the case of the threat of use of physical force against 

any person, imprisonment for not more than ø10¿ 20 years. 

(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages 

in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than øten 

years¿ 30 years, or both. 

* * * * * * * 

(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby 

hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 

not more than øone year¿ 20 years, or both. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant 

(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts or conspires to kill another 

person with intent to retaliate against any person for— 

(A) * * * 

(B) providing to a law enforcement officer any information 

relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal 

offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release,ø,¿ parole, or release pending judicial proceedings, 

(2) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is— 

(A) * * * 

(B) in the case of an attempt, imprisonment for not more 

than ø20¿ 30 years. 

(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby 

causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible 

property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 

not more than øten¿ 30 years, or both. 

* * * * * * * 

(e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any 

action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law 

enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be 

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ø10¿ 30 years, 

or both. 

ø(e)¿ (f) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this 

section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed 

37 

for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 

(g) A prosecution under this section may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending, about 

to be instituted or completed) was intended to be affected or was 

completed, or in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense 

occurred. 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim 

or slander of title 

Whoever, with the intent to harass a person designated in section 1114 on account of the performance of official duties, files, in 

any public record or in any private record which is generally available to the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the real 

or personal property of that person, or attempts or conspires to do 

so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 

years, or both. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 95—RACKETEERING 

* * * * * * * 

§ 1952. Interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid 

of racketeering enterprises 

(a) * * * 

(b) As used in this section (i) ‘‘unlawful activity’’ means (1) any 

business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances 

(as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or 

prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which 

they are committed or of the United States, (2) extortion, bribery, 

intimidation of, or retaliation against, a witness, victim, juror, or 

informant, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which 

committed or of the United States, or (3) any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States 

Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this title and (ii) the term 

‘‘State’’ includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 

States. 

* * * * * * * 

OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 

1968 

TITLE I—JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT 

* * * * * * * 

38 

PART I—DEFINITIONS

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 901. (a) As used in this title— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(3) ‘‘unit of local government’’ means— 

(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(C) the judicial branch of a State or of a unit of local 

government within the State for purposes of discretionary 

grants; 

ø(C)¿ (D) an Indian Tribe (as that term is defined in 

section 103 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5603)) that performs law 

enforcement functions, as determined by the Secretary of 

the Interior; or 

ø(D)¿ (E) for the purposes of assistance eligibility, any 

agency of the government of the District of Columbia or 

the Federal Government that performs law enforcement 

functions in and for— 

(i) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

PART CC—WITNESS PROTECTION GRANTS 

SEC. 2811. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—From amounts made available to carry out 

this part, the Attorney General may make grants to States, units of 

local government, and Indian tribes to create and expand witness 

protection programs in order to prevent threats, intimidation, and 

retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, crimes. 

(b) USES OF FUNDS.—Grants awarded under this part shall 

be— 

(1) distributed directly to the State, unit of local government, or Indian tribe; and 

(2) used for the creation and expansion of witness protection programs in the jurisdiction of the grantee. 

(c) PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION.—In awarding grants under 

this part, the Attorney General may give preferential consideration, 

if feasible, to an application from a jurisdiction that— 

(1) has the greatest need for witness and victim protection 

programs; 

(2) has a serious violent crime problem in the jurisdiction; 

and 

(3) has had, or is likely to have, instances of threats, intimidation, and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to, 

crimes. 

39 

(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 

to be appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for each of 

fiscal years 2006 through 2010. 

* * * * * * * 

VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 

ACT OF 1994 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE III—CRIME PREVENTION 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle Q—Community-Based Justice 

Grants for Prosecutors 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 31702. USE OF FUNDS. 

Grants made by the Attorney General under this section shall 

be used— 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(3) to fund programs that coordinate criminal justice resources with educational, social service, and community resources to develop and deliver violence prevention programs, 

including mediation and other conflict resolution methods, 

treatment, counseling, educational, and recreational programs 

that create alternatives to criminal activity; øand¿ 

(4) in rural States (as defined in section 1501(b) of title I 

of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 

U.S.C. 3796bb(B)), to fund cooperative efforts between State 

and local prosecutors, victim advocacy and assistance groups, 

social and community service providers, and law enforcement 

agencies to investigate and prosecute child abuse cases, treat 

youthful victims of child abuse, and work in cooperation with 

the community to develop education and prevention strategies 

directed toward the issues with which such entities are 

concernedø.¿; and 

(5) to create and expand witness and victim protection programs to prevent threats, intimidation, and retaliation against 

victims of, and witnesses to, violent crimes. 

* * * * * * * 

øSEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

øThere are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this subtitle— 

ø(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 1996; 

ø(2) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1997; 

ø(3) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1998; 

ø(4) $11,000,000 for fiscal year 1999; and 

40 

ø(5) $12,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.¿ 

SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

There are authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of 

the fiscal years 2006 through 2010 to carry out this subtitle. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART II—DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 37—UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE 

* * * * * * * 

§ 566. Powers and duties 

(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(i) The United States Marshals Service shall consult with the 

Administrative Office of the United States Courts on a continuing 

basis regarding the security requirements for the Judicial Branch, 

and inform the Administrative Office of the measures the Marshals 

Service intends to take to meet those requirements. 

* * * * * * * 

PART III—COURT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 41—ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED 

STATES COURTS 

* * * * * * * 

§ 604. Duties of Director generally(a) The Director shall be 

the administrative officer of the courts, and under 

the supervision and direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States, shall: 

(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(23) Regulate and pay annuities to judges of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims in accordance with section 178 

of this title; øand¿ 

(24) Consult with the United States Marshals Service on a 

continuing basis regarding the security requirements for the Judicial Branch, and inform the Administrative Office of the 

measures the Marshals Service intends to take to meet those requirements; and 

41 

ø(24)¿ (25) Perform such other duties as may be assigned 

to him by the Supreme Court or the Judicial Conference of the 

United States. 

* * * * * * * 

SECTION 105 OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 

1978 

CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS

SEC. 105. (a) * * * 

(b)(1) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

(3)(A) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

ø(E) This paragraph shall expire on December 31, 2005, and 

apply to filings through calendar year 2005.¿ 

* * * * * * * 

MARKUP TRANSCRIPT

BUSINESS MEETING 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2005 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Howard 

Coble, (acting Chair of the Committee) presiding. 

Mr. COBLE. I note the presence of a working quorum and we will 

come to order. 

Before we start, I want to advise Members of the Committee that 

the Chairman’s sister-in-law died as a result of an accident last 

night, and he will not be able to be here today. But we will proceed 

accordingly. I have been pressed into duty here, so we will do the 

best we can today, folks. 

[Intervening business.] 

Mr. COBLE. The next item on the agenda is H.R. 1751, the ‘‘Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005.’’ The chair 

recognizes the primary sponsor, the distinguished gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Gohmert, to explain the bill. 

[The bill, H.R. 1751, follows:] 

42 

1

I

109TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1751

To amend title 18, United States Code, to protect judges, prosecutors,

witnesses, victims, and their family members, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 21, 2005

Mr. GOHMERT (for himself and Mr. WEINER) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to protect judges,

prosecutors, witnesses, victims, and their family members, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Secure Access to Jus5 tice and Court Protection Act of 2005’’.



I1751.AAB
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2

•HR 1751 IH

1 SEC. 2. PENALTIES FOR INFLUENCING, IMPEDING, OR RE2 TALIATING AGAINST JUDGES AND OTHER OF3 FICIALS BY THREATENING OR INJURING A

4 FAMILY MEMBER.

5 Section 115 of title 18, United States Code, is

6 amended—

7 (1) in subsection (a)(1)(B), by inserting ‘‘as8 saults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or conspires

9 to kidnap or murder, or’’ after ‘‘(B)’’; and

10 (2) so that subsection (b) reads as follows:

11 ‘‘(b)(1) The punishment for an assault in violation

12 of this section is a fine under this title and—

13 ‘‘(A) if the assault consists of a simple assault,

14 a term of imprisonment for not more than one year,

15 or both;

16 ‘‘(B) if the assault resulted in bodily injury (as

17 defined in section 1365), a term of imprisonment for

18 not less than 5 nor more than 20 years;

19 ‘‘(C) if the assault resulted in serious bodily in20 jury (as defined in section 1365), a term of impris21 onment for any term of years not less than 10 or

22 life;

23 ‘‘(D) if a dangerous weapon was used or pos24 sessed during and in relation to the offense, a term

25 of imprisonment for any term of years not less than

26 15 nor life; and



I1751.AAC
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3

•HR 1751 IH

1 ‘‘(E) in any other case, not less than 2 nor

2 more than 10 years.

3 ‘‘(2) The punishment for a kidnaping, attempted kid4 napping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this sec5 tion is a fine under this title and imprisonment for any

6 term of years not less than 30, or for life.

7 ‘‘(3) The punishment for a murder, attempted mur8 der, or conspiracy to murder in violation of this section

9 is a fine under this title and imprisonment for any term

10 of years not less than 30, or for life, or the death penalty.

11 ‘‘(4) A threat made in violation of this section shall

12 be punished by a fine under this title and imprisonment

13 for a term of not less than 5 years nor more than 20 years.

14 ‘‘(5) Each punishment for criminal conduct under

15 this section shall be in addition to any other punishment,

16 whether imposed for a conviction under this section or oth17 erwise, for other criminal conduct during the same crimi18 nal episode.’’.

19 SEC. 3. PROTECTION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC

20 SAFETY OFFICERS.

21 (a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 51 of title 18, United States

22 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:



I1751.AAD
45 

4

•HR 1751 IH

1 ‘‘§ 1123. Killing of federally funded public safety offi2 cers

3 ‘‘(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever kills, or attempts or con4 spires to kill, a federally funded public safety officer while

5 that officer is engaged in official duties, or arising out of

6 the performance of official duties, or kills a former feder7 ally funded public safety officer arising out of the perform8 ance of official duties, shall be punished as is provided

9 in this chapter for the like offense against a person des10 ignated in section 1114. Any other killing or attempted

11 killing or conspiracy to kill that occurs in the same crimi12 nal episode shall also be subject to the punishment pro13 vided in this chapter for the like offense against a person

14 designated in section 1114.

15 ‘‘(b) DEFINITION.—As used in this section—

16 ‘‘(1) the term ‘federally funded public safety of17 ficer’ means a public safety officer for a public agen18 cy (including a court system) that receives Federal

19 financial assistance, of an entity that is a State of

20 the United States, the District of Columbia, the

21 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands of

22 the United States, Guam, American Samoa, the

23 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Common24 wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any ter25 ritory or possession of the United States, an Indian

26 tribe, or a unit of local government of that entity;



I1751.AAE
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5

•HR 1751 IH

1 ‘‘(2) the term ‘public safety officer’ means an

2 individual serving a public agency in an official ca3 pacity, with or without compensation, as a judicial

4 officer, as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a mem5 ber of a rescue squad or ambulance crew;

6 ‘‘(3) the term ‘judicial officer’ means a judge or

7 other officer or employee of a court, including pros8 ecutors, court security, and corrections, probation,

9 and parole officers; and

10 ‘‘(4) the term ‘firefighter’ includes an individual

11 serving as an official recognized or designated mem12 ber of a legally organized volunteer fire department

13 and an officially recognized or designated public em14 ployee member of a rescue squad or ambulance

15 crew.’’.

16 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

17 at the beginning of chapter 51 of title 18, United States

18 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

19 item:

‘‘1123. Killing of federally public safety officers.’’.

20 SEC. 4. GENERAL MODIFICATIONS OF FEDERAL MURDER

21 CRIME AND RELATED CRIMES.

22 (a) MURDER AMENDMENTS.—Section 1111 of title

23 18, United States Code, is amended—

24 (1) in subsection (b), by inserting ‘‘not less

25 than 30’’ after ‘‘any term of years’’; and



I1751.AAF
47 

6

•HR 1751 IH

1 (2) in subsection (c), by striking paragraph (4).

2 (b) MANSLAUGHTER AMENDMENTS.—Section

3 1112(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

4 (1) by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘20

5 years’’; and

6 (2) by striking ‘‘six years’’ and inserting ‘‘10

7 years’’.

8 (c) ATTEMPT AMENDMENT.—Section 1113 of title

9 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘shall, for

10 an attempt to commit murder’’ and all that follows

11 through the period at the end of the section and inserting

12 ‘‘shall be punished as is provided for a completed offense.’’

13 (d) CONSPIRACY AMENDMENT.—Section 1117 of title

14 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘by im15 prisonment for any term of years or for life’’ and inserting

16 ‘‘as is provided for the violation which is the object of the

17 conspiracy’’.

18 SEC. 5. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND

19 OF THE PENALTIES FOR, INFLUENCING OR

20 INJURING OFFICER OR JUROR GENERALLY.

21 Section 1503 of title 18, United States Code, is

22 amended—

23 (1) so that subsection (a) reads as follows:

24 ‘‘(a)(1) Whoever—



I1751.AAG
48 

7

•HR 1751 IH

1 ‘‘(A) corruptly, or by threats of force or force,

2 endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror

3 or officer in a judicial proceeding in the discharge of

4 that juror or officer’s duty;

5 ‘‘(B) injures a juror or an officer in a judicial

6 proceeding arising out of the performance of official

7 duties as such juror or officer; or

8 ‘‘(C) corruptly, or by threats of force or force,

9 obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, ob10 struct, or impede, the due administration of justice;

11 or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in sub12 section (b).

13 ‘‘(2) As used in this section, the term ‘juror or officer

14 in a judicial proceeding’ means a grand or petit juror, or

15 other officer in or of any court of the United States, or

16 an officer who may be serving at any examination or other

17 proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or

18 other committing magistrate.’’;

19 (2) in subsection (b)—

20 (A) in paragraph (2)—

21 (i) by striking ‘‘class A or B’’; and

22 (ii) by striking ‘‘not more than 20

23 years, a fine under this title, or both’’ and

24 inserting ‘‘for any term of years not less



I1751.AAH
49 

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•HR 1751 IH

1 than 20, or for life, and a fine under this

2 title’’; and

3 (B) so that paragraph (3) reads as follows:

4 ‘‘(3) in any other case, a fine under this title

5 and imprisonment for not less than 10 years nor

6 more than 30 years.’’.

7 SEC. 6. MODIFICATION OF TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS,

8 VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT OFFENSE.

9 (a) CHANGES IN PENALTIES.—Section 1512 of title

10 18, United States Code, is amended—

11 (1) in subsection (a)(3)—

12 (A) by striking subparagraph (B); and

13 (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘not

14 more than 10 years’’ and inserting ‘‘not less

15 than 5 years nor more than 20 years’’;

16 (2) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘or impris17 oned not more than ten years, or both’’ and insert18 ing ‘‘not less than 5 years nor more than 20 years’’;

19 (3) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘or imprisoned

20 not more than twenty years, or both’’ and inserting

21 ‘‘and imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more

22 than 20 years’’;

23 (4) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘or impris24 oned not more than one year, or both’’ and inserting



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1 ‘‘and imprisoned not less than 5 years nor more

2 than 20 years’’; and

3 (5) in subsection (k)—

4 (A) by inserting ‘‘attempts or’’ before

5 ‘‘conspires’’; and

6 (B) by inserting ‘‘attempted or’’ before

7 ‘‘the commission’’.

8 SEC. 7. MODIFICATION OF RETALIATION OFFENSE.

9 Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is

10 amended—

11 (1) in subsection (a)(1)(B)—

12 (A) by inserting a comma after ‘‘proba13 tion’’; and

14 (B) by striking the comma which imme15 diately follows another comma;

16 (2) in subsection (a)(2), by striking subpara17 graph (B);

18 (3) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘or impris19 oned not more than ten years, or both’’ and insert20 ing ‘‘and imprisoned not less than 10 years nor

21 more than 30 years’’;

22 (4) in the first subsection (e), by striking ‘‘or

23 imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both’’ and in24 serting ‘‘and imprisoned not less than 10 years nor

25 more than 30 years’’;



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1 (5) by redesignating the second subsection (e)

2 as subsection (f); and

3 (6) in subsection (f) as so redesignated by para4 graph (5)—

5 (A) by inserting ‘‘attempts or’’ before

6 ‘‘conspires’’; and

7 (B) by inserting ‘‘attempted or’’ before

8 ‘‘the commission’’.

9 SEC. 8. INCLUSION OF INTIMIDATION AND RETALIATION

10 AGAINST WITNESSES IN STATE PROSECU11 TIONS AS BASIS FOR FEDERAL PROSECU12 TION.

13 Section 1952 of title 18, United States Code, is

14 amended in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ‘‘intimidation

15 of, or retaliation against, a witness, victim, juror, or in16 formant,’’ after ‘‘extortion, bribery,’’.

17 SEC. 9. CLARIFICATION OF VENUE FOR RETALIATION

18 AGAINST A WITNESS.

19 Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is

20 amended by adding at the end the following:

21 ‘‘(g) A prosecution under this section may be brought

22 in the district in which the official proceeding (whether

23 or not pending, about to be instituted or was completed)

24 was intended to be affected or was completed, or in which

25 the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.’’.



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1 SEC. 10. ENSURING FAIR AND EXPEDITIOUS FEDERAL COL2 LATERAL REVIEW OF CONVICTIONS FOR

3 KILLING A STATE JUDGE OR OTHER PUBLIC

4 SAFETY OFFICER.

5 (a) LIMITS ON CASES.—Section 2254 of title 28,

6 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the

7 following:

8 ‘‘(j)(1) A court, justice, or judge shall not have juris9 diction to consider any claim relating to the judgment or

10 sentence in an application described under paragraph (2),

11 unless the applicant shows that the claim qualifies for con12 sideration on the grounds described in subsection (e)(2).

13 Any such application that is presented to a court, justice,

14 or judge other than a district court shall be transferred

15 to the appropriate district court for consideration or dis16 missal in conformity with this subsection, except that a

17 court of appeals panel must authorize any second or suc18 cessive application in conformity with section 2244 before

19 any consideration by the district court.

20 ‘‘(2) This subsection applies to an application for a

21 writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

22 pursuant to the judgment of a State court for a crime

23 that involved the killing of a public safety officer while

24 the public safety officer was engaged in the performance

25 of official duties, or arising out of the public safety offiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:13 Nov 02, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 G:\WORK\REPORTS\HR1751\H1751.IH HJUD1 PsN: HJUD1


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1 cer’s performance of official duties or status as a public

2 safety officer.

3 ‘‘(3) For an application described in paragraph (2),

4 the following requirements shall apply in the district court:

5 ‘‘(A) Any motion by either party for an evi6 dentiary hearing shall be filed and served not later

7 than 90 days after the State files its answer or, if

8 no timely answer is filed, the date on which such an9 swer is due.

10 ‘‘(B) Any motion for an evidentiary hearing

11 shall be granted or denied not later than 30 days

12 after the date on which the party opposing such mo13 tion files a pleading in opposition to such motion or,

14 if no timely pleading in opposition is filed, the date

15 on which such pleading in opposition is due.

16 ‘‘(C) Any evidentiary hearing shall be—

17 ‘‘(i) convened not less than 60 days after

18 the order granting such hearing; and

19 ‘‘(ii) completed not more than 150 days

20 after the order granting such hearing.

21 ‘‘(D) A district court shall enter a final order,

22 granting or denying the application for a writ of ha23 beas corpus, not later than 15 months after the date

24 on which the State files its answer or, if no timely

25 answer is filed, the date on which such answer is



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1 due, or not later than 60 days after the case is sub2 mitted for decision, whichever is earlier.

3 ‘‘(E) If the district court fails to comply with

4 the requirements of this paragraph, the State may

5 petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus

6 to enforce the requirements. The court of appeals

7 shall grant or deny the petition for a writ of man8 damus not later than 30 days after such petition is

9 filed with the court.

10 ‘‘(4) For an application described in paragraph (2),

11 the following requirements shall apply in the court of ap12 peals:

13 ‘‘(A) A timely filed notice of appeal from an

14 order issuing a writ of habeas corpus shall operate

15 as a stay of that order pending final disposition of

16 the appeal.

17 ‘‘(B) The court of appeals shall decide the ap18 peal from an order granting or denying a writ of ha19 beas corpus—

20 ‘‘(i) not later than 120 days after the date

21 on which the brief of the appellee is filed or, if

22 no timely brief is filed, the date on which such

23 brief is due; or

24 ‘‘(ii) if a cross-appeal is filed, not later

25 than 120 days after the date on which the apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:13 Nov 02, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 G:\WORK\REPORTS\HR1751\H1751.IH HJUD1 PsN: HJUD1


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1 pellant files a brief in response to the issues

2 presented by the cross-appeal or, if no timely

3 brief is filed, the date on which such brief is

4 due.

5 ‘‘(C)(i) Following a decision by a panel of the

6 court of appeals under subparagraph (B), a petition

7 for panel rehearing is not allowed, but rehearing by

8 the court of appeals en banc may be requested. The

9 court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a peti10 tion for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days

11 after the date on which the petition is filed, unless

12 a response is required, in which case the court shall

13 decide whether to grant the petition not later than

14 30 days after the date on which the response is filed

15 or, if no timely response is filed, the date on which

16 the response is due.

17 ‘‘(ii) If rehearing en banc is granted, the court

18 of appeals shall make a final determination of the

19 appeal not later than 120 days after the date on

20 which the order granting rehearing en banc is en21 tered.

22 ‘‘(D) If the court of appeals fails to comply

23 with the requirements of this paragraph, the State

24 may petition the Supreme Court or a justice thereof

25 for a writ of mandamus to enforce the requirements.



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1 ‘‘(5)(A) The time limitations under paragraphs (3)

2 and (4) shall apply to an initial application described in

3 paragraph (2), any second or successive application de4 scribed in paragraph (2), and any redetermination of an

5 application described in paragraph (2) or related appeal

6 following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme

7 Court for further proceedings.

8 ‘‘(B) In proceedings following remand in the district

9 court, time limits running from the time the State files

10 its answer under paragraph (3) shall run from the date

11 the remand is ordered if further briefing is not required

12 in the district court. If there is further briefing following

13 remand in the district court, such time limits shall run

14 from the date on which a responsive brief is filed or, if

15 no timely responsive brief is filed, the date on which such

16 brief is due.

17 ‘‘(C) In proceedings following remand in the court of

18 appeals, the time limit specified in paragraph (4)(B) shall

19 run from the date the remand is ordered if further briefing

20 is not required in the court of appeals. If there is further

21 briefing in the court of appeals, the time limit specified

22 in paragraph (4)(B) shall run from the date on which a

23 responsive brief is filed or, if no timely responsive brief

24 is filed, from the date on which such brief is due.



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1 ‘‘(6) The failure of a court to meet or comply with

2 a time limitation under this subsection shall not be a

3 ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction

4 or sentence, nor shall the time limitations under this sub5 section be construed to entitle a capital applicant to a stay

6 of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not

7 be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application

8 or appeal.

9 ‘‘(7) In this subsection—

10 ‘‘(A) the term ‘public safety officer’ has the

11 meaning given such term in section 1123 of title 18

12 and also includes a law enforcement officer; and

13 ‘‘(B) the term ‘law enforcement officer’ means

14 an individual involved in crime and juvenile delin15 quency control or reduction, or enforcement of the

16 laws, including police, prosecutors, corrections, pro17 bation, parole, and judicial officers.’’.

18 (b) APPLICATION TO PENDING CASES.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by

20 subsection (a) applies to cases pending on the date

21 of the enactment of this Act as well as to cases com22 menced on and after that date.

23 (2) SPECIAL RULE FOR TIME LIMITS.—In a

24 case pending on the date of the enactment of this

25 Act, if the amendment made by subsection (a) proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:13 Nov 02, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 G:\WORK\REPORTS\HR1751\H1751.IH HJUD1 PsN: HJUD1


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1 vides that a time limit runs from an event or time

2 that has occurred before that date, the time limit

3 shall instead run from that date.

4 SEC. 11. WITNESS PROTECTION GRANT PROGRAM.

5 Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

6 Streets Act of 1968 is amended by inserting after part

7 BB (42 U.S.C. 3797j et seq.) the following new part:

8 ‘‘PART CC—WITNESS PROTECTION GRANTS

9 ‘‘SEC. 2811. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.

10 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—From amounts made available to

11 carry out this part, the Attorney General may make grants

12 to States, units of local government, and Indian tribes to

13 create and expand witness protection programs in order

14 to prevent threats, intimidation, and retaliation against

15 victims of, and witnesses to, crimes.

16 ‘‘(b) USES OF FUNDS.—Grants awarded under this

17 part shall be—

18 ‘‘(1) distributed directly to the State, unit of

19 local government, or Indian tribe; and

20 ‘‘(2) used for the creation and expansion of wit21 ness protection programs in the jurisdiction of the

22 grantee.

23 ‘‘(c) PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION.—In awarding

24 grants under this part, the Attorney General may give



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1 preferential consideration, if feasible, to an application

2 from a jurisdiction that—

3 ‘‘(1) has the greatest need for witness and vic4 tim protection programs;

5 ‘‘(2) has a serious violent crime problem in the

6 jurisdiction; and

7 ‘‘(3) has had, or is likely to have, instances of

8 threats, intimidation, and retaliation against victims

9 of, and witnesses to, crimes.

10 ‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There

11 are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section

12 $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010.’’.

13 SEC. 12. GRANTS TO STATES TO PROTECT WITNESSES AND

14 VICTIMS OF CRIMES.

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 31702 of the Violent

16 Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42

17 U.S.C. 13862) is amended—

18 (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the

19 end;

20 (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at

21 the end and inserting a semicolon; and

22 (3) by adding at the end the following:

23 ‘‘(5) to create and expand witness and victim

24 protection programs to prevent threats, intimidation,



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1 and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to,

2 violent crimes.’’.

3 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section

4 31707 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement

5 Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13867) is amended to read as

6 follows:

7 ‘‘SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

8 ‘‘There are authorized to be appropriated

9 $20,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006 through

10 2010 to carry out this subtitle.’’.

11 SEC. 13. JUDICIAL BRANCH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

12 (a) ENSURING CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION

13 WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

14 STATES COURTS.—Section 566 of title 28, United States

15 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

16 ‘‘(i) The United States Marshals Service shall consult

17 and coordinate with the Administrative Office of the

18 United States Courts on a continuing basis regarding the

19 security requirements for the Judicial Branch.’’.

20 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 604(a) of

21 title 28, United States Code, is amended—

22 (1) by redesignating existing paragraph (24) as

23 paragraph (25);

24 (2) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph

25 (23); and



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1 (3) by inserting after paragraph (23) the fol2 lowing:

3 ‘‘(24) Consult and coordinate with the United

4 States Marshals Service on a continuing basis re5 garding the security requirements for the Judicial

6 Branch; and’’.

7 SEC. 14. PROTECTIONS AGAINST MALICIOUS RECORDING

8 OF FICTITIOUS LIENS AGAINST FEDERAL

9 JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS.

10 (a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 73 of title 18, United States

11 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

12 ‘‘§ 1521. Retaliating against a federal judge or attor13 ney by false claim or slander of title

14 ‘‘(a) Whoever files or attempts to file, in any public

15 record or in any private record which is generally available

16 to the public, any false lien or encumbrance against the

17 real or personal property of a Federal judge, Federal at18 torney, or a public safety officer, shall be fined under this

19 title or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.

20 ‘‘(b) As used in this section—

21 ‘‘(1) the term ‘Federal judge’ means a justice

22 or judge of the United States as defined in 28

23 U.S.C. § 451, a judge of the United States Court of

24 Federal Claims, a United States bankruptcy judge,

25 a United States magistrate judge, and a judge of the



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1 United States Court of Appeals for the Armed

2 Forces, United States Court of Appeals for Veterans

3 Claims, United States Tax Court, District Court of

4 Guam, District Court of the Northern Mariana Is5 lands, or District Court of the Virgin Islands;

6 ‘‘(2) the term ‘Federal attorney’ means an at7 torney who is an officer or employee of the United

8 States in the executive branch of the Government;

9 ‘‘(3) the term ‘public safety officer’ has the

10 meaning given that term in section 1123 of title 18

11 and also includes a law enforcement officer; and

12 ‘‘(4) the term ‘law enforcement officer’ means

13 an individual involved in crime and juvenile delin14 quency control or reduction, or enforcement of the

15 laws, including police, prosecutors, corrections, pro16 bation, parole, and judicial officers.’’.

17 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

18 at the beginning of chapter 73 of title 18, United States

19 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

20 item:

‘‘1521. Retaliating against a federal judge or attorney by false claim or slander

of title.’’.



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1 SEC. 15. EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COURT

2 PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL

3 JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.

4 (a) CIRCUIT COURTS.—Section 48 of title 28, United

5 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol6 lowing:

7 ‘‘(e) Each court of appeals may hold special sessions

8 at any place outside the circuit as the nature of the busi9 ness may require and upon such notice as the court orders,

10 upon a finding by either the chief judge of the court of

11 appeals (or, if the chief judge is unavailable, the most sen12 ior available active judge of the court of appeals) or the

13 judicial council of the circuit that, because of emergency

14 conditions, no location within the circuit is reasonably

15 available where such special sessions could he held. The

16 court may transact any business at a special session out17 side the circuit which it might transact at a regular ses18 sion.’’.

19 (b) DISTRICT COURTS.—Section 141 of title 28,

20 United States Code, is amended—

21 (1) by inserting ‘‘(a)(1)’’ before ‘‘Special’’;

22 (2) by inserting ‘‘(2)’’ before ‘‘Any’’; and

23 (3) by adding at the end the following:

24 ‘‘(b) Special sessions of the district court may be held

25 at such places outside the district as the nature of the

26 business may require and upon such notice as the court



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1 orders, upon a finding by either the chief judge of the dis2 trict court (or, if the chief judge is unavailable, the most

3 senior available active judge of the district court) or the

4 judicial council of the circuit that, because of emergency

5 conditions, no location within the district is reasonably

6 available where such special sessions could be held. Any

7 business may be transacted at a special session outside

8 the district which might be transacted at a regular session.

9 The district court may summon jurors from within the dis10 trict to serve in any case in which special sessions are con11 ducted outside the district pursuant to the provisions of

12 this section.’’.

13 (c) BANKRUPTCY COURTS.—Section 152(c) of title

14 28, United States Code, is amended—

15 (1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(c)’’;

16 (2) by adding at the end the following:

17 ‘‘(2) Bankruptcy judges may hold court at such

18 places outside the judicial district as the nature of

19 the business of the court may require, and upon

20 such notice as the court orders, upon a finding by

21 either the chief judge of the bankruptcy court (or,

22 if the chief judge is unavailable, the most senior

23 available bankruptcy judge) or by the judicial council

24 of the circuit that, because of emergency conditions,

25 no location within the district is reasonably available



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1 where the bankruptcy judges could hold court.

2 Bankruptcy judges may transact any business at

3 special sessions of court held outside the district

4 that might be transacted at a regular session.’’.

5 SEC. 16. PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS

6 WEAPONS IN FEDERAL COURT FACILITIES.

7 Section 930(e) of title 18, United States Code, is

8 amended by inserting ‘‘or other dangerous weapon’’ after

9 ‘‘firearm’’.

10 SEC. 17. REPEAL OF SUNSET PROVISION.

11 Section 105(b)(3) of the Ethics in Government Act

12 of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is amended by striking subpara13 graph (E).

14 SEC. 18. PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS PERFORMING CER15 TAIN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED

16 FUNCTIONS.

17 (a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 7 of title 18, United States

18 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

19 ‘‘§ 117. Protection of individuals performing certain

20 Federal and federally assisted functions

21 ‘‘(a) Whoever knowingly makes restricted personal in22 formation about a covered official publicly available

23 through the Internet shall be fined under this title and

24 imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.



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1 ‘‘(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this sec2 tion that—

3 ‘‘(1) the defendant is a provider of Internet

4 services and did not knowingly participate in the of5 fense; or

6 ‘‘(2) the covered official gave permission to

7 make the restricted personal information publicly

8 available.

9 ‘‘(c) As used in this section—

10 ‘‘(1) the term ‘restricted personal information’

11 means, with respect to an individual, the Social Se12 curity number, the home address, home phone num13 ber, mobile phone number, personal email, or home

14 fax number of, and identifiable to, that individual;

15 and

16 ‘‘(2) the term ‘covered official’ means—

17 ‘‘(A) an individual designated in section

18 1114;

19 ‘‘(B) a public safety officer (as that term

20 is defined in section 1521); or

21 ‘‘(C) a grand or petit juror, witness, or

22 other officer in or of, any court of the United

23 States, or an officer who may be serving at any

24 examination or other proceeding before any



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1 United States magistrate judge or other com2 mitting magistrate.’’.

3 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

4 at the beginning of chapter 7 of title 18, United States

5 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

6 item:

‘‘117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and federally assisted functions.’’.

7 SEC. 19. ELIGIBILITY OF STATE COURTS FOR CERTAIN FED8 ERAL GRANTS.

9 (a) PURPOSE OF GRANTS.—Section 510(b) of the

10 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42

11 U.S.C. 3760) is amended by inserting ‘‘State courts,’’

12 after ‘‘institutions’’.

13 (b) CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS GRANTS.—Section 515

14 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of

15 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3760) is amended—

16 (1) in subsection (a)—

17 (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ at

18 the end;

19 (B) in paragraph (3), by striking the pe20 riod and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and

21 (C) by adding at the end the following:

22 ‘‘(4) grants to State courts to improve security

23 for State and local court systems.’’; and



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1 (2) in subsection (b), by inserting after the pe2 riod the following: ‘‘Priority shall be given to State

3 court applicants under subsection (a)(4) that have

4 the greatest demonstrated need to provide security

5 in order to administer justice.’’.

6 (c) ALLOCATIONS.—Section 516(a) of the Omnibus

7 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is amended—

8 (1) strike ‘‘80’’ and insert ‘‘70’’;

9 (2) strike ‘‘and’’ before ‘‘10’’; and

10 (3) by inserting before the period the following:

11 ‘‘, and 10 percent for section 515(a)(4)’’.

12 SEC. 20. APPOINTMENTS OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS.

13 (a) APPOINTMENTS OF MARSHALS.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 37 of title 28,

15 United States Code, is amended—

16 (A) in section 561(c)—

17 (i) by striking ‘‘The President shall

18 appoint, by and with the advice and con19 sent of the Senate,’’ and inserting ‘‘The

20 Attorney General shall appoint’’; and

21 (ii) by inserting ‘‘United States mar22 shals shall be appointed subject to the pro23 visions of title 5 governing appointments in

24 the competitive civil service, and shall be

25 paid in accordance with the provisions of



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1 chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter

2 53 of such title relating to classification

3 and pay rates.’’ after the first sentence;

4 (B) by striking subsection (d) of section

5 561;

6 (C) by redesignating subsections (e), (f),

7 (g), (h), and (i) of section 561 as subsections

8 (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively; and

9 (D) by striking section 562.

10 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sec11 tions for chapter 37 of title 28, United States Code,

12 is amended by striking the item relating to section

13 562.

14 (b) MARSHALS IN OFFICE BEFORE EFFECTIVE

15 DATE.—Notwithstanding the amendments made by this

16 Act, each marshal appointed under chapter 37 of title 28,

17 United States Code, before the effective date of this Act

18 shall, unless that marshal resigns or is removed by the

19 President, continue to perform the duties of that office

20 until the expiration of that marshal’s term and the ap21 pointment of a successor.

22 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section and the amend23 ments made by this section shall take effect on January



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1 20, 2005, and shall apply to appointments made on and

2 after that date.

Æ



I1751.ABD
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Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me express what I know is everyone’s heartfelt 

feeling, and that is the deepest and sincerest sympathy to Chairman Sensenbrenner’s family in the loss of his sister-in-law so tragically and untimely. We do appreciate the opportunity to go forward with this today and thank you for this opportunity. 

I have some general statements to make and then I’ll explain exactly what the manager’s amendment does here today. To start 

with, I would like to thank not only Chairman Sensenbrenner but 

also Chairman Coble for bringing H.R. 1751 up for markup, as we 

did at Subcommittee. Additionally, I want to thank the Committee 

counsels, who worked tirelessly on this bill. They’ve done a superb 

job. I want to thank Mr. Lungren and his staff, who consulted with 

my staff on this bill, and also thank Mr. Weiner and the other cosponsors. Your support is greatly appreciated. 

This legislation is a culmination of many individuals’ proposals. 

It’s a good, strong bill that addresses some real weaknesses in our 

criminal code and the way we protect our court personnel. Already 

this year we have seen tragedies in Chicago, Atlanta, my hometown in Tyler, Texas, that involved judges, their families and other 

individuals around the courts. 

It should also be noted that Senator Kyl has introduced a similar 

bill across the way, S. 1605, the ‘‘Law Enforcement Officers Protection Act.’’ So I’m hopeful that we will see some movement, kind of 

like we’re seeing up and down the aisle here, some movement on 

these important issues. We really need to get this bill to the House 

floor, the Senate should get it to the Senate floor, and then hopefully on to the President’s desk this year. That is that important. 

We worked with Mr. Lungren and his staff to ensure that our 

law enforcement officers were taken care of and properly protected 

in this bill and that we had strong yet proportional punishments 

for individuals who harm our law enforcement officers. We worked 

with Chairman Dreier and his staff to ensure that criminals who 

harm our public safety officers and flee the United States get what 

they deserve when they’re extradited. And finally, we incorporated 

Mr. Mica’s idea to ensure that our National Guardsmen are covered by Federal criminal laws when they are acting in either their 

State or Federal capacity. 

Many of us are always concerned with preserving principles of 

federalism. Be reassured, there is a Federal nexus here. It is also 

very important that the legislative history attached to this bill reflect that it is not Congress’ intent that the U.S. Attorneys prosecute every killing of every federally funded public safety officer, 

but rather, those killings in States that lack the death penalty or 

where, for various reasons, the local prosecutors really want and 

need the Federal prosecutors to pursue the prosecution. 

Regarding mandatory minimums, we lowered some, took some 

out completely, and instead raised the maximum penalties, all in 

an effort to make this bill more palatable for our friends across the 

aisle. I appreciate Mr. Scott’s suggestions in that regard. However, 

the mandatory minimums that still remain in the bill after the adjustments are for the worst of the worst crimes, crimes that are inherently evil or, in other words, malum prohibitum crimes. 

Now to get down to what the bill actually does. The bill will protect immediate family members of federally funded public safety ofVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
72 

ficers and judges at all levels. It provides enhanced criminal penalties where the victim is a U.S. judge, Federal law enforcement officer, or federally funded public safety officer. It raises maximum 

punishments for crimes against victims, witnesses, jurors, and informants. It adds a new Federal crime prohibiting recording of fictitious liens by covering officers or employees of the U.S., including 

Federal judiciary and its employees. It provides a 30-year mandatory minimum to life in prison or the death penalty for the killing 

of a federally funded public safety officer. Of course, for the defendant to get the death penalty, a death must have resulted. 

The manager’s amendment adds provisions from Representative 

Mica’s bill, 3833, to include killing of members of the National 

Guard when authorized by the States as protected public safety officers. The amendment adds a new section to the bill, section 20, 

requiring a report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 

on the security of Federal prosecutors and measures taken to protect assistant U.S. attorneys and other Federal attorneys. These 

folks are on the front lines prosecuting drug dealers, gang members, white collar criminals, so they need protection. 

Witnesses, including Judge Jane Roth, Third Circuit Court of Appeals and chair on the Committee on Security and Facilities, testified before the Crime Subcommittee she supported section 14 requiring the U.S. marshals consult and coordinate with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts regarding security. Judge Roth 

also endorsed section 15, which makes it a Federal crime to file a 

false claim or slander of title in certain Federal officials. Other 

Federal judges have personally told Mr. Lungren and me the same 

thing. 

Just to reiterate, the amendment includes Chairman Dreier’s legislation. This security would create a new Federal criminal offense 

for flight to avoid prosecution for killing a peace officer. To deter, 

we must punish the perpetrators. We must also take preventative 

steps. This bill does that in two different ways. First—— 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. If I might in conclusion mention that I 

talked to Judge Joan Lefkow earlier this morning, a gracious 

woman. She supports the bill. She supports what it does to protect 

people. She appreciates the requirements to consult between U.S. 

marshals and the courts. She didn’t support the writ provisions, 

but she is a very gracious woman and indicated her support as 

well. 

Mr. COBLE. For what purpose does the gentleman from California seek recognition? 

Mr. LUNGREN. To make a motion, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security reports favorably the bill H.R. 1751, with a single amendment in the nature of a substitute, and moves its favorable recommendation to the full House. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. 

The distinguished gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you calling this meeting, but unfortunately I cannot support the bill in its present form. The bill still 

contains extraneous political sound bites which do nothing to proVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
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tect or assist the courts, but will assist the campaigns of those who 

want to sound tough on crime. With several sensational incidents 

in recent years involving murders of judges, family members of 

judges, court personnel, witnesses, and others, we’ve come to see 

the consequences of insufficient security for our court operations 

and persons associated with them. 

We all agree that enhancement of security for our courts and 

personnel is imperative, yet the proponents of H.R. 1751 have chosen to address those needs in a manner apparently calculated to 

prevent or undermine the prospects of broad bipartisan support. 

Unfortunately, H.R. 1751 is another effort to use appropriate use 

of concern for the Nation as a vehicle for extraneous, controversial, 

and general provisions of law that are unnecessary, costly, and 

counterproductive. 

Yet here we go again considering the bill purports to address a 

serious concern, the concern for adequate protection and security of 

judges, when in essence the bill is merely a host of more draconian 

penalties aimed at ensuring that bit players and major players in 

a crime face the same consequences. Among several provisions of 

the bill, seven new death penalties, a speedy habeas corpus procedure to ensure that people are put to death quicker and increase 

the chances innocent people may be put to death, and to increase 

the number of death penalties by applying the provision ex post 

facto. You’ve got 22 new mandatory minimum sentences, provisions 

to punish attempts and conspiracies the same as completion of the 

offense. 

The habeas corpus provision is particularly troubling, given that 

119 death row inmates have been exonerated from death penalties 

in the past 12 years after languishing on death row for many years. 

The impact of this provision would be to ensure that such persons 

are executed before they have time enough to get exonerated. As 

we the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the public rationale 

undergirding that provision is apparently that it’s more important 

for us to administer executions efficiently than to administer them 

accurately. 

The public is clearly rethinking the appropriateness of the death 

penalty in general due to the evidence that it is ineffective in deterring crime and it is especially racially discriminatory. In Illinois it 

was found to be more often erroneously applied than not. In the 23- 

year comprehensive study of the death penalty, one study found 

that 68 percent of the death penalties were erroneously applied, so 

it’s not surprising that 119 people sentenced to death over the last 

12 years have been exonerated from those crimes—and not only exonerated from those crimes, many others have had the death penalty removed. 

Mr. Chairman, the mandatory minimum sentences clearly detract from the importance of the bill. Through rigorous study and 

analysis, they have been shown to be less effective and therefore 

wasteful when compared to effective and less costly approaches. 

They have been found to be racially discriminatory in application 

and been found to be violative of common sense. 

Also, the way the bill is written is somewhat confusing. Under 

section 7 of the bill, for example, any—Mr. Chairman, we have 

heard from the Judicial Conference every time we have these manVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
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datory minimums, and we would just incorporate by reference what 

the Judicial Conference has said. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing, the State court judges have considered 

the measure of security, and I want to ask unanimous consent to 

introduce their statement and resolution on court security and on 

habeas corpus. You will note, Mr. Chairman, that their desire is for 

grants to provide actual court security. There’s no mention of habeas corpus. There’s no mention of the death penalty, no mention 

of the need for mandatory minimums. Mr. Chairman, I think we 

can trust judges to apply appropriate sentences for people charged 

with assaulting judges. 

Mr. COBLE. Without objection it will be received. 

Mr. SCOTT. And we don’t need the draconian provisions in the 

bill. I would hope we would defeat the bill and get back to a bill 

that would actually provide court security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman. Without objection the bill will 

be considered as read and open for amendment at any point. 

And the Subcommittee amendment in the nature of a substitute 

which the Members have before them will be considered as read, 

considered as the original text for purposes of amendment, and 

open for amendment at any point. 

[The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:] 

75 H.L.C.

MANAGER’S AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A

SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1751

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the

following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Secure Access to Jus3 tice and Court Protection Act of 2005’’.

4 SEC. 2. PENALTIES FOR INFLUENCING, IMPEDING, OR RE5 TALIATING AGAINST JUDGES AND OTHER OF6 FICIALS BY THREATENING OR INJURING A

7 FAMILY MEMBER.

8 Section 115 of title 18, United States Code, is

9 amended—

10 (1) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of

11 subsection (a)(1), by inserting ‘‘federally funded

12 public safety officer (as defined for the purposes of

13 section 1123)’’ after ‘‘Federal law enforcement offi14 cer,’’;

15 (2) so that subsection (b) reads as follows:

16 ‘‘(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the

17 punishment for an offense under this section is as follows:


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2

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(A) The punishment for an assault in violation

2 of this section is the same as that provided for a like

3 offense under section 111.

4 ‘‘(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, at5 tempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in vio6 lation of this section is the same as provided for a

7 like violation in section 1201.

8 ‘‘(C) The punishment for a murder, attempted

9 murder, or conspiracy to murder in violation of this

10 section is the same as provided for a like offense

11 under section 1111, 1113, and 1117.

12 ‘‘(D) A threat made in violation of this section

13 shall be punished by a fine under this title or impris14 onment for not more than 10 years, or both.

15 ‘‘(2) If the victim of the offense under this section

16 is an immediate family member of a United States judge,

17 a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined for the pur18 poses of section 1114) or of a federally funded public safe19 ty officer (as defined for the purposes of section 1123),

20 in lieu of the punishments otherwise provided by para21 graph (1), the punishments shall be as follows:

22 ‘‘(A) The punishment for an assault in vio23 lation of this section is as follows:

24 ‘‘(i) If the assault is a simple assault,

25 a fine under this title or a term of imprisVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271

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3

H.L.C.

1 onment for not more than one year, or

2 both.

3 ‘‘(ii) If the assault resulted in bodily

4 injury (as defined in section 1365), a fine

5 under this title and a term of imprison6 ment for not less than one year nor more

7 than 10 years.

8 ‘‘(iii) If the assault resulted in sub9 stantial bodily injury (as defined in section

10 113), a fine under this title and a term of

11 imprisonment for not less than 3 years nor

12 more than 12 years.

13 ‘‘(iv) If the assault resulted in serious

14 bodily injury (as defined in section 2119),

15 a fine under this title and a term of im16 prisonment for not less than 10 years nor

17 more than 30 years.

18 ‘‘(B) The punishment for a kidnapping, at19 tempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in

20 violation of this section is a fine under this title

21 and imprisonment for any term of years not

22 less than 30, or for life.

23 ‘‘(C) The punishment for a murder, at24 tempted murder, or conspiracy to murder in

25 violation of this section is a fine under this title


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4

H.L.C.

1 and imprisonment for any term of years not

2 less than 30, or for life, or, if death results, the

3 offender may be sentenced to death.

4 ‘‘(D) A threat made in violation of this

5 section shall be punished by a fine under this

6 title and imprisonment for not less than one

7 year nor more than 10 years.

8 ‘‘(E) If a dangerous weapon was used dur9 ing and in relation to the offense, the punish10 ment shall include a term of imprisonment of 5

11 years in addition to that otherwise imposed

12 under this paragraph.’’.

13 SEC. 3. PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN ASSAULTS.

14 (a) INCLUSION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC

15 SAFETY OFFICERS.—Section 111(a) of title 18, United

16 States Code, is amended—

17 (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘or a feder18 ally funded public safety officer (as defined in sec19 tion 1123)’’ after ‘‘1114 of this title’’; and

20 (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ‘‘or a feder21 ally funded public safety officer (as defined in sec22 tion 1123)’’ after ‘‘1114’’.

23 (b) ALTERNATE PENALTY WHERE VICTIM IS A

24 UNITED STATES JUDGE, A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCE25 MENT OFFICER, OR FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFEVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271

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5

H.L.C.

1 TY OFFICER.—Section 111 of title 18, United States

2 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

3 ‘‘(c) ALTERNATE PENALTY WHERE VICTIM IS A

4 UNITED STATES JUDGE, A FEDERAL LAW ENFORCE5 MENT OFFICER, OR FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC SAFE6 TY OFFICER.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),

7 if the offense is an assault and the victim of the offense

8 under this section is a United States judge, a Federal law

9 enforcement officer (as defined for the purposes of section

10 1114) or of a federally funded public safety officer (as de11 fined for the purposes of section 1123), in lieu of the pen12 alties otherwise set forth in this section, the offender shall

13 be subject to a fine under this title and—

14 ‘‘(A) If the assault is a simple assault, a fine

15 under this title or a term of imprisonment for not

16 more than one year, or both.

17 ‘‘(B) if the assault resulted in bodily injury (as

18 defined in section 1365), shall be imprisoned not less

19 than one nor more than 10 years;

20 ‘‘(C) if the assault resulted in substantial bodily

21 injury (as defined in section 113), shall be impris22 oned not less than 3 nor more than 12 years; and

23 ‘‘(D) if the assault resulted in serious bodily in24 jury (as defined in section 2119), shall be impris25 oned not less than 10 nor more than 30 years.


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6

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(2) If a dangerous weapon was used during and in

2 relation to the offense, the punishment shall include a

3 term of imprisonment of 5 years in addition to that other4 wise imposed under this subsection.’’.

5 SEC. 4. PROTECTION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PUBLIC

6 SAFETY OFFICERS.

7 (a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 51 of title 18, United States

8 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

9 ‘‘§ 1123. Killing of federally funded public safety offi10 cers

11 ‘‘(a) Whoever kills, or attempts or conspires to kill,

12 a federally funded public safety officer while that officer

13 is engaged in official duties, or arising out of the perform14 ance of official duties, or kills a former federally funded

15 public safety officer arising out of the performance of offi16 cial duties, shall be punished by a fine under this title and

17 imprisonment for any term of years not less than 30, or

18 for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.

19 ‘‘(b) As used in this section—

20 ‘‘(1) the term ‘federally funded public safety of21 ficer’ means a public safety officer for a public agen22 cy (including a court system, the National Guard of

23 a State to the extent the personnel of that National

24 Guard are not in Federal service, and the defense

25 forces of a State authorized by section 109 of title


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7

H.L.C.

1 32) that receives Federal financial assistance, of an

2 entity that is a State of the United States, the Dis3 trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto

4 Rico, the Virgin Islands of the United States, Guam,

5 American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific

6 Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mar7 iana Islands, or any territory or possession of the

8 United States, an Indian tribe, or a unit of local

9 government of that entity;

10 ‘‘(2) the term ‘public safety officer’ means an

11 individual serving a public agency in an official ca12 pacity, as a judicial officer, as a law enforcement of13 ficer, as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a member

14 of a rescue squad or ambulance crew;

15 ‘‘(3) the term ‘judicial officer’ means a judge or

16 other officer or employee of a court, including pros17 ecutors, court security, pretrial services officers,

18 court reporters, and corrections, probation, and pa19 role officers; and

20 ‘‘(4) the term ‘firefighter’ includes an individual

21 serving as an official recognized or designated mem22 ber of a legally organized volunteer fire department

23 and an officially recognized or designated public em24 ployee member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew;

25 and


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8

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(5) the term ‘law enforcement officer’ means

2 an individual involved in crime and juvenile delin3 quency control or reduction, or enforcement of the

4 laws.’’.

5 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

6 at the beginning of chapter 51 of title 18, United States

7 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

8 item:

‘‘1123. Killing of federally funded public safety officers.’’.

9 SEC. 5. GENERAL MODIFICATIONS OF FEDERAL MURDER

10 CRIME AND RELATED CRIMES.

11 (a) MURDER AMENDMENTS.—Section 1111 of title

12 18, United States Code, is amended in subsection (b), by

13 inserting ‘‘not less than 30’’ after ‘‘any term of years’’.

14 (b) MANSLAUGHTER AMENDMENTS.—Section

15 1112(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

16 (1) by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘20

17 years’’; and

18 (2) by striking ‘‘six years’’ and inserting ‘‘10

19 years’’.

20 SEC. 6. MODIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND

21 OF THE PENALTIES FOR, INFLUENCING OR

22 INJURING OFFICER OR JUROR GENERALLY.

23 Section 1503 of title 18, United States Code, is

24 amended—

25 (1) so that subsection (a) reads as follows:


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9

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(a)(1) Whoever—

2 ‘‘(A) corruptly, or by threats of force or force,

3 endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror

4 or officer in a judicial proceeding in the discharge of

5 that juror or officer’s duty;

6 ‘‘(B) injures a juror or an officer in a judicial

7 proceeding arising out of the performance of official

8 duties as such juror or officer; or

9 ‘‘(C) corruptly, or by threats of force or force,

10 obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, ob11 struct, or impede, the due administration of justice;

12 or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as

13 provided in subsection (b).

14 ‘‘(2) As used in this section, the term ‘juror or officer

15 in a judicial proceeding’ means a grand or petit juror, or

16 other officer in or of any court of the United States, or

17 an officer who may be serving at any examination or other

18 proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or

19 other committing magistrate.’’; and

20 (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraphs

21 (1) through (3) and inserting the following:

22 ‘‘(1) in the case of a killing, or an attempt or

23 a conspiracy to kill, the punishment provided in sec24 tion 1111, 1112, 1113, and 1117; and


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10

H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(2) in any other case, a fine under this title

2 and imprisonment for not more than 30 years.’’.

3 SEC. 7. MODIFICATION OF TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS,

4 VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT OFFENSE.

5 (a) CHANGES IN PENALTIES.—Section 1512 of title

6 18, United States Code, is amended—

7 (1) in each of paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub8 section (a), insert ‘‘or conspires’’ after attempts;

9 (2) so that subparagraph (A) of subsection

10 (a)(3) reads as follows:

11 ‘‘(A) in the case of a killing, the punish12 ment provided in section 1111, and 1112; and’’;

13 (3) in subsection (a)(3)—

14 (A) in striking subparagraph (B)(ii) by

15 striking ‘‘20 years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’ ;

16 and

17 (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘10

18 years’’ and inserting ‘‘20 years’’;

19 (4) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘ten years’’

20 and inserting ‘‘30 years’’; and

21 (5) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘one year’’

22 and inserting ‘‘20 years’’.

23 SEC. 8. MODIFICATION OF RETALIATION OFFENSE.

24 Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is

25 amended—


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11

H.L.C.

1 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ‘‘or con2 spires’’ after ‘‘attempts’’;

3 (2) in subsection (a)(1)(B)—

4 (A) by inserting a comma after ‘‘proba5 tion’’; and

6 (B) by striking the comma which imme7 diately follows another comma;

8 (3) in subsection (a)(2)(B), by striking ‘‘20

9 years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’;

10 (4) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘ten years’’

11 and inserting ‘‘30 years’’;

12 (5) in the first subsection (e), by striking ‘‘10

13 years’’ and inserting ‘‘30 years’’; and

14 (6) by redesignating the second subsection (e)

15 as subsection (f).

16 SEC. 9. INCLUSION OF INTIMIDATION AND RETALIATION

17 AGAINST WITNESSES IN STATE PROSECU18 TIONS AS BASIS FOR FEDERAL PROSECU19 TION.

20 Section 1952 of title 18, United States Code, is

21 amended in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ‘‘intimidation

22 of, or retaliation against, a witness, victim, juror, or in23 formant,’’ after ‘‘extortion, bribery,’’.


A1751.AAL
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12

H.L.C.

1 SEC. 10. CLARIFICATION OF VENUE FOR RETALIATION

2 AGAINST A WITNESS.

3 Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is

4 amended by adding at the end the following:

5 ‘‘(g) A prosecution under this section may be brought

6 in the district in which the official proceeding (whether

7 or not pending, about to be instituted or completed) was

8 intended to be affected or was completed, or in which the

9 conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.’’.

10 SEC. 11. ENSURING FAIR AND EXPEDITIOUS FEDERAL COL11 LATERAL REVIEW OF CONVICTIONS FOR

12 KILLING A STATE JUDGE OR OTHER PUBLIC

13 SAFETY OFFICER.

14 (a) LIMITS ON CASES.—Section 2254 of title 28,

15 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the

16 following:

17 ‘‘(j)(1) A court, justice, or judge shall not have juris18 diction to consider any claim relating to the judgment or

19 sentence in an application described under paragraph (2),

20 unless the applicant shows that the claim qualifies for con21 sideration on the grounds described in subsection (e)(2).

22 Any such application that is presented to a court, justice,

23 or judge other than a district court shall be transferred

24 to the appropriate district court for consideration or dis25 missal in conformity with this subsection, except that a

26 court of appeals panel must authorize any second or sucVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271

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H.L.C.

1 cessive application in conformity with section 2244 before

2 any consideration by the district court.

3 ‘‘(2) This subsection applies to an application for a

4 writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

5 pursuant to the judgment of a State court for a crime

6 that involved the killing of a public safety officer while

7 the public safety officer was engaged in the performance

8 of official duties, or arising out of the public safety offi9 cer’s performance of official duties or status as a public

10 safety officer.

11 ‘‘(3) For an application described in paragraph (2),

12 the following requirements shall apply in the district court:

13 ‘‘(A) Any motion by either party for an evi14 dentiary hearing shall be filed and served not later

15 than 90 days after the State files its answer or, if

16 no timely answer is filed, the date on which such an17 swer is due.

18 ‘‘(B) Any motion for an evidentiary hearing

19 shall be granted or denied not later than 30 days

20 after the date on which the party opposing such mo21 tion files a pleading in opposition to such motion or,

22 if no timely pleading in opposition is filed, the date

23 on which such pleading in opposition is due.

24 ‘‘(C) Any evidentiary hearing shall be—


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H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(i) convened not less than 60 days after

2 the order granting such hearing; and

3 ‘‘(ii) completed not more than 150 days

4 after the order granting such hearing.

5 ‘‘(D) A district court shall enter a final order,

6 granting or denying the application for a writ of ha7 beas corpus, not later than 15 months after the date

8 on which the State files its answer or, if no timely

9 answer is filed, the date on which such answer is

10 due, or not later than 60 days after the case is sub11 mitted for decision, whichever is earlier.

12 ‘‘(E) If the district court fails to comply with

13 the requirements of this paragraph, the State may

14 petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus

15 to enforce the requirements. The court of appeals

16 shall grant or deny the petition for a writ of man17 damus not later than 30 days after such petition is

18 filed with the court.

19 ‘‘(4) For an application described in paragraph (2),

20 the following requirements shall apply in the court of ap21 peals:

22 ‘‘(A) A timely filed notice of appeal from an

23 order issuing a writ of habeas corpus shall operate

24 as a stay of that order pending final disposition of

25 the appeal.


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H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(B) The court of appeals shall decide the ap2 peal from an order granting or denying a writ of ha3 beas corpus—

4 ‘‘(i) not later than 120 days after the date

5 on which the brief of the appellee is filed or, if

6 no timely brief is filed, the date on which such

7 brief is due; or

8 ‘‘(ii) if a cross-appeal is filed, not later

9 than 120 days after the date on which the ap10 pellant files a brief in response to the issues

11 presented by the cross-appeal or, if no timely

12 brief is filed, the date on which such brief is

13 due.

14 ‘‘(C)(i) Following a decision by a panel of the

15 court of appeals under subparagraph (B), a petition

16 for panel rehearing is not allowed, but rehearing by

17 the court of appeals en banc may be requested. The

18 court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a peti19 tion for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days

20 after the date on which the petition is filed, unless

21 a response is required, in which case the court shall

22 decide whether to grant the petition not later than

23 30 days after the date on which the response is filed

24 or, if no timely response is filed, the date on which

25 the response is due.


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H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(ii) If rehearing en banc is granted, the court

2 of appeals shall make a final determination of the

3 appeal not later than 120 days after the date on

4 which the order granting rehearing en banc is en5 tered.

6 ‘‘(D) If the court of appeals fails to comply

7 with the requirements of this paragraph, the State

8 may petition the Supreme Court or a justice thereof

9 for a writ of mandamus to enforce the requirements.

10 ‘‘(5)(A) The time limitations under paragraphs (3)

11 and (4) shall apply to an initial application described in

12 paragraph (2), any second or successive application de13 scribed in paragraph (2), and any redetermination of an

14 application described in paragraph (2) or related appeal

15 following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme

16 Court for further proceedings.

17 ‘‘(B) In proceedings following remand in the district

18 court, time limits running from the time the State files

19 its answer under paragraph (3) shall run from the date

20 the remand is ordered if further briefing is not required

21 in the district court. If there is further briefing following

22 remand in the district court, such time limits shall run

23 from the date on which a responsive brief is filed or, if

24 no timely responsive brief is filed, the date on which such

25 brief is due.


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H.L.C.

1 ‘‘(C) In proceedings following remand in the court of

2 appeals, the time limit specified in paragraph (4)(B) shall

3 run from the date the remand is ordered if further briefing

4 is not required in the court of appeals. If there is further

5 briefing in the court of appeals, the time limit specified

6 in paragraph (4)(B) shall run from the date on which a

7 responsive brief is filed or, if no timely responsive brief

8 is filed, from the date on which such brief is due.

9 ‘‘(6) The failure of a court to meet or comply with

10 a time limitation under this subsection shall not be a

11 ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction

12 or sentence, nor shall the time limitations under this sub13 section be construed to entitle a capital applicant to a stay

14 of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not

15 be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application

16 or appeal.

17 ‘‘(7) In this subsection—

18 ‘‘(A) the term ‘public safety officer’ has the

19 meaning given such term in section 1123 of title 18

20 and also includes a law enforcement officer; and

21 ‘‘(B) the term ‘law enforcement officer’ means

22 an individual involved in crime and juvenile delin23 quency control or reduction, or enforcement of the

24 laws, including police, prosecutors, corrections, pro25 bation, parole, and judicial officers.’’.


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1 (b) APPLICATION TO PENDING CASES.—

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by

3 subsection (a) applies to cases pending on the date

4 of the enactment of this Act as well as to cases com5 menced on and after that date.

6 (2) SPECIAL RULE FOR TIME LIMITS.—In a

7 case pending on the date of the enactment of this

8 Act, if the amendment made by subsection (a) pro9 vides that a time limit runs from an event or time

10 that has occurred before that date, the time limit

11 shall instead run from that date.

12 SEC. 12. WITNESS PROTECTION GRANT PROGRAM.

13 Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

14 Streets Act of 1968 is amended by inserting after part

15 BB (42 U.S.C. 3797j et seq.) the following new part:

16 ‘‘PART CC—WITNESS PROTECTION GRANTS

17 ‘‘SEC. 2811. PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.

18 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—From amounts made available to

19 carry out this part, the Attorney General may make grants

20 to States, units of local government, and Indian tribes to

21 create and expand witness protection programs in order

22 to prevent threats, intimidation, and retaliation against

23 victims of, and witnesses to, crimes.

24 ‘‘(b) USES OF FUNDS.—Grants awarded under this

25 part shall be—


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1 ‘‘(1) distributed directly to the State, unit of

2 local government, or Indian tribe; and

3 ‘‘(2) used for the creation and expansion of wit4 ness protection programs in the jurisdiction of the

5 grantee.

6 ‘‘(c) PREFERENTIAL CONSIDERATION.—In awarding

7 grants under this part, the Attorney General may give

8 preferential consideration, if feasible, to an application

9 from a jurisdiction that—

10 ‘‘(1) has the greatest need for witness and vic11 tim protection programs;

12 ‘‘(2) has a serious violent crime problem in the

13 jurisdiction; and

14 ‘‘(3) has had, or is likely to have, instances of

15 threats, intimidation, and retaliation against victims

16 of, and witnesses to, crimes.

17 ‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There

18 are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section

19 $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010.’’.

20 SEC. 13. GRANTS TO STATES TO PROTECT WITNESSES AND

21 VICTIMS OF CRIMES.

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 31702 of the Violent

23 Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42

24 U.S.C. 13862) is amended—


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H.L.C.

1 (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the

2 end;

3 (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at

4 the end and inserting a semicolon; and

5 (3) by adding at the end the following:

6 ‘‘(5) to create and expand witness and victim

7 protection programs to prevent threats, intimidation,

8 and retaliation against victims of, and witnesses to,

9 violent crimes.’’.

10 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section

11 31707 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement

12 Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13867) is amended to read as

13 follows:

14 ‘‘SEC. 31707. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

15 ‘‘There are authorized to be appropriated

16 $20,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006 through

17 2010 to carry out this subtitle.’’.

18 SEC. 14. JUDICIAL BRANCH SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

19 (a) ENSURING CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION

20 WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

21 STATES COURTS.—Section 566 of title 28, United States

22 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

23 ‘‘(i) The United States Marshals Service shall consult

24 with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

25 on a continuing basis regarding the security requirements


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1 for the Judicial Branch, and inform the Administrative

2 Office of the measures the Marshals Service intends to

3 take to meet those requirements.’’.

4 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 604(a) of

5 title 28, United States Code, is amended—

6 (1) by redesignating existing paragraph (24) as

7 paragraph (25);

8 (2) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of paragraph

9 (23); and

10 (3) by inserting after paragraph (23) the fol11 lowing:

12 ‘‘(24) Consult with the United States Marshals

13 Service on a continuing basis regarding the security

14 requirements for the Judicial Branch, and inform

15 the Administrative Office of the measures the Mar16 shals Service intends to take to meet those require17 ments; and’’.

18 SEC. 15. PROTECTIONS AGAINST MALICIOUS RECORDING

19 OF FICTITIOUS LIENS AGAINST A FEDERAL

20 EMPLOYEE.

21 (a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 73 of title 18, United States

22 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:


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1 ‘‘§ 1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by

2 false claim or slander of title

3 ‘‘Whoever, with the intent to harass a person des4 ignated in section 1114 on account of the performance of

5 official duties, files, in any public record or in any private

6 record which is generally available to the public, any false

7 lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property

8 of that person, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall

9 be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10

10 years, or both.’’.

11 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

12 at the beginning of chapter 73 of title 18, United States

13 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

14 item:

‘‘1521. Retaliating against a Federal employee by false claim or slander of

title.’’.

15 SEC. 16. PROHIBITION OF POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS

16 WEAPONS IN FEDERAL COURT FACILITIES.

17 Section 930(e) of title 18, United States Code, is

18 amended by inserting ‘‘or other dangerous weapon’’ after

19 ‘‘firearm’’.

20 SEC. 17. REPEAL OF SUNSET PROVISION.

21 Section 105(b)(3) of the Ethics in Government Act

22 of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is amended by striking subpara23 graph (E).


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1 SEC. 18. PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS PERFORMING CER2 TAIN FEDERAL AND OTHER FUNCTIONS.

3 (a) OFFENSE.—Chapter 7 of title 18, United States

4 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

5 ‘‘§ 117. Protection of individuals performing certain

6 Federal and federally assisted functions

7 ‘‘(a) Whoever knowingly, and with intent to harm, in8 timidate, or retaliate against a covered official makes re9 stricted personal information about that covered official

10 publicly available through the Internet shall be fined under

11 this title and imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

12 ‘‘(b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this sec13 tion that the defendant is a provider of Internet services

14 and did not knowingly participate in the offense.

15 ‘‘(c) As used in this section—

16 ‘‘(1) the term ‘restricted personal information’

17 means, with respect to an individual, the Social Se18 curity number, the home address, home phone num19 ber, mobile phone number, personal email, or home

20 fax number of, and identifiable to, that individual;

21 and

22 ‘‘(2) the term ‘covered official’ means—

23 ‘‘(A) an individual designated in section

24 1114;

25 ‘‘(B) a public safety officer (as that term

26 is defined in section 1204 of the Omnibus


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1 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968);

2 or

3 ‘‘(C) a grand or petit juror, witness, or

4 other officer in or of, any court of the United

5 States, or an officer who may be serving at any

6 examination or other proceeding before any

7 United States magistrate judge or other com8 mitting magistrate.’’.

9 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

10 at the beginning of chapter 7 of title 18, United States

11 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

12 item:

‘‘117. Protection of individuals performing certain Federal and federally assisted functions.’’.

13 SEC. 19. ELIGIBILITY OF COURTS TO APPLY DIRECTLY FOR

14 LAW ENFORCEMENT DISCRETIONARY

15 GRANTS AND REQUIREMENT THAT STATE

16 AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER

17 COURTS WHEN APPLYING FOR GRANT

18 FUNDS.

19 (a) COURTS TREATED AS UNITS OF LOCAL GOVERN20 MENTS FOR PURPOSES OF DISCRETIONARY GRANTS.—

21 Section 901 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

22 Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3791) is amended in sub23 section (a)(3)—


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H.L.C.

1 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) and

2 (D) as subparagraphs (D) and (E), respectively; and

3 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the fol4 lowing new subparagraph:

5 ‘‘(C) the judicial branch of a State or of a

6 unit of local government within the State for

7 purposes of discretionary grants.’’.

8 (b) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO CONSIDER

9 COURTS.—The Attorney General shall ensure that when10 ever a State or local unit of government applies for a grant

11 from the Department of Justice, the State or unit dem12 onstrate that, in developing the application and distrib13 uting funds, the State or unit—

14 (1) considered the needs of the judicial branch

15 of the State or unit, as the case may be; and

16 (2) consulted with the chief judicial officer of

17 the highest court of the State or unit, as the case

18 may be.

19 SEC. 20. REPORT ON SECURITY OF FEDERAL PROSECU20 TORS.

21 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact22 ment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to

23 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep24 resentatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the

25 Senate a report on the security of assistant United States


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H.L.C.

1 attorneys and other Federal attorneys arising from the

2 prosecution of terrorists, violent criminal gangs, drug traf3 fickers, gun traffickers, white supremacists, and those who

4 commit fraud and other white-collar offenses. The report

5 shall describe each of the following:

6 (1) The number and nature of threats and as7 saults against attorneys handling those prosecutions

8 and the reporting requirements and methods.

9 (2) The security measures that are in place to

10 protect the attorneys who are handling those pros11 ecutions, including measures such as threat assess12 ments, response procedures, availability of security

13 systems and other devices, firearms licensing (depu14 tations), and other measures designed to protect the

15 attorneys and their families.

16 (3) The Department of Justice’s firearms depu17 tation policies, including the number of attorneys

18 deputized and the time between receipt of threat and

19 completion of the deputation and training process.

20 (4) For each measure covered by paragraphs

21 (1) through (3), when the report or measure was de22 veloped and who was responsible for developing and

23 implementing the report or measure.

24 (5) The programs that are made available to

25 the attorneys for personal security training, includVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271

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1 ing training relating to limitations on public infor2 mation disclosure, basic home security, firearms

3 handling and safety, family safety, mail handling,

4 counter- surveillance, and self-defense tactics.

5 (6) The measures that are taken to provide the

6 attorneys with secure parking facilities, and how pri7 orities for such facilities are established—

8 (A) among Federal employees within the

9 facility;

10 (B) among Department of Justice employ11 ees within the facility; and

12 (C) among attorneys within the facility.

13 (7) The frequency such attorneys are called

14 upon to work beyond standard work hours and the

15 security measures provided to protect attorneys at

16 such times during travel between office and available

17 parking facilities.

18 (8) With respect to attorneys who are licensed

19 under State laws to carry firearms, the Department

20 of Justice’s policy as to—

21 (A) carrying the firearm between available

22 parking and office buildings;

23 (B) securing the weapon at the office

24 buildings; and


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H.L.C.

1 (C) equipment and training provided to fa2 cilitate safe storage at Department of Justice

3 facilities.

4 (9) The offices in the Department of Justice

5 that are responsible for ensuring the security of the

6 attorneys, the organization and staffing of the of7 fices, and the manner in which the offices coordinate

8 with offices in specific districts.

9 (10) The role, if any, that the United States

10 Marshals Service or any other Department of Jus11 tice component plays in protecting, or providing se12 curity services or training for, the attorneys.

13 SEC. 21. FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION FOR KILLING

14 PEACE OFFICERS.

15 (a) FLIGHT.—Chapter 49 of title 18, United States

16 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

17 ‘‘§ 1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace

18 officers

19 ‘‘Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign

20 commerce with intent to avoid prosecution, or custody or

21 confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place

22 from which he flees or under section 1114 or 1123, for

23 a crime consisting of the killing, an attempted killing, or

24 a conspiracy to kill, an individual involved in crime and

25 juvenile delinquency control or reduction, or enforcement


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H.L.C.

1 of the laws or for a crime punishable by section 1114 or

2 1123, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned, in

3 addition to any other imprisonment for the underlying of4 fense, for any term of years not less than 10.’’.

5 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

6 at the beginning of chapter 49 of title 18, United States

7 Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new

8 item:

‘‘1075. Flight to avoid prosecution for killing peace officers.’’.

9 SEC. 22. SPECIAL PENALTIES FOR MURDER, KIDNAPPING,

10 AND RELATED CRIMES AGAINST FEDERAL

11 JUDGES AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

12 OFFICERS.

13 (a) MURDER.—Section 1114 of title 18, United

14 States Code, is amended—

15 (1) by inserting ‘‘(a)’’ before ‘‘Whoever’’; and

16 (2) by adding at the end the following:

17 ‘‘(b) If the victim of a murder punishable under this

18 section is a United States judge (as defined in section

19 115) or a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined in

20 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine under this

21 title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than

22 30, or for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced to

23 death.’’.

24 (b) KIDNAPPING.—Section 1201(a) of title 18,

25 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the


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H.L.C.

1 following: ‘‘If the victim of the offense punishable under

2 this subsection is a United States judge (as defined in sec3 tion 115) or a Federal law enforcement officer (as defined

4 in 115) the offender shall be punished by a fine under

5 this title and imprisonment for any term of years not less

6 than 30, or for life, or, if death results, may be sentenced

7 to death.’’.


A1751.ABE
105 

Mr. COBLE. Are there second degree amendments? 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. The distinguished gentleman from Ohio. For what 

purpose do you seek recognition? 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from North Carolina reserved a point 

of order. 

Mr. WATT. Against this amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute. 

Mr. COBLE. The second degree amendment will be considered as 

read. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 minutes. 

[The amendment of Mr. Chabot follows:] 

106 

1

H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1751

OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO AND MR.

CONYERS OF MICHIGAN

Add at the end the following:

1 SEC. 23. MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.

2 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following

3 findings:

4 (1) The right of the people of the United States

5 to freedom of speech, particularly as it relates to

6 comment on governmental activities, as protected by

7 the first amendment to the Constitution, cannot be

8 meaningfully exercised without the ability of the

9 public to obtain facts and information about the

10 Government upon which to base their judgments re11 garding important issues and events. As the United

12 States Supreme Court articulated in Craig v. Har13 ney , 331 U.S. 367 (1947), ‘‘A trial is a public

14 event. What transpires in the court room is public

15 property.’’.

16 (2) The right of the people of the United States

17 to a free press, with the ability to report on all as18 pects of the conduct of the business of government,


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H.L.C.

1 as protected by the first amendment to the Constitu2 tion, cannot be meaningfully exercised without the

3 ability of the news media to gather facts and infor4 mation freely for dissemination to the public.

5 (3) The right of the people of the United States

6 to petition the Government to redress grievances,

7 particularly as it relates to the manner in which the

8 Government exercises its legislative, executive, and

9 judicial powers, as protected by the first amendment

10 to the Constitution, cannot be meaningfully exer11 cised without the availability to the public of infor12 mation about how the affairs of government are

13 being conducted. As the Supreme Court noted in

14 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of

15 Virginia (1980), ‘‘People in an open society do not

16 demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is

17 difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited

18 from observing.’’

19 (4) In the twenty-first century, the people of

20 the United States obtain information regarding judi21 cial matters involving the Constitution, civil rights,

22 and other important legal subjects principally

23 through the print and electronic media. Television,

24 in particular, provides a degree of public access to

25 courtroom proceedings that more closely approxiVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271

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1 mates the ideal of actual physical presence than

2 newspaper coverage or still photography.

3 (5) Providing statutory authority for the courts

4 of the United States to exercise their discretion in

5 permitting televised coverage of courtroom pro6 ceedings would enhance significantly the access of

7 the people to the Federal judiciary.

8 (6) Inasmuch as the first amendment to the

9 Constitution prevents Congress from abridging the

10 ability of the people to exercise their inherent rights

11 to freedom of speech, to freedom of the press, and

12 to petition the Government for a redress of griev13 ances, it is good public policy for the Congress af14 firmatively to facilitate the ability of the people to

15 exercise those rights.

16 (7) The granting of such authority would assist

17 in the implementation of the constitutional guar18 antee of public trials in criminal cases, as provided

19 by the sixth amendment to the Constitution. As the

20 Supreme Court stated in In re Oliver (1948),

21 ‘‘Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an ac22 cused that his trial be conducted in public may con23 fer upon our society, the guarantee has always been

24 recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to

25 employ our courts as instruments of persecution.


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H.L.C.

1 The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to

2 contemporaneous review in the forum of public opin3 ion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judi4 cial power.’’.

5 (b) AUTHORITY OF PRESIDING JUDGE TO ALLOW

6 MEDIA COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.—

7 (1) AUTHORITY OF APPELLATE COURTS.—Not8 withstanding any other provision of law, the pre9 siding judge of an appellate court of the United

10 States may, in his or her discretion, permit the

11 photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or

12 televising to the public of court proceedings over

13 which that judge presides.

14 (2) AUTHORITY OF DISTRICT COURTS.—

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any

16 other provision of law, any presiding judge of a

17 district court of the United States may, in his

18 or her discretion, permit the photographing,

19 electronic recording, broadcasting, or televising

20 to the public of court proceedings over which

21 that judge presides.

22 (B) OBSCURING OF WITNESSES AND JU23 RORS.—(i) Upon the request of any witness

24 (other than a party) or a juror in a trial pro25 ceeding, the court shall order the face and voice


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H.L.C.

1 of the witness or juror (as the case may be) to

2 be disguised or otherwise obscured in such man3 ner as to render the witness or juror unrecog4 nizable to the broadcast audience of the trial

5 proceeding.

6 (ii) The presiding judge in a trial pro7 ceeding shall inform—

8 (I) each witness who is not a party

9 that the witness has the right to request

10 that his or her image and voice be ob11 scured during the witness’ testimony; and

12 (II) each juror that the juror has the

13 right to request that his or her image be

14 obscured during the trial proceeding.

15 (3) ADVISORY GUIDELINES.—The Judicial Con16 ference of the United States is authorized to promul17 gate advisory guidelines to which a presiding judge,

18 in his or her discretion, may refer in making deci19 sions with respect to the management and adminis20 tration of photographing, recording, broadcasting, or

21 televising described in paragraphs (1) and (2).

22 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

23 (1) PRESIDING JUDGE.—The term ‘‘presiding

24 judge’’ means the judge presiding over the court

25 proceeding concerned. In proceedings in which more


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H.L.C.

1 than one judge participates, the presiding judge

2 shall be the senior active judge so participating or,

3 in the case of a circuit court of appeals, the senior

4 active circuit judge so participating, except that—

5 (A) in en banc sittings of any United

6 States circuit court of appeals, the presiding

7 judge shall be the chief judge of the circuit

8 whenever the chief judge participates; and

9 (B) in en banc sittings of the Supreme

10 Court of the United States, the presiding judge

11 shall be the Chief Justice whenever the Chief

12 Justice participates.

13 (2) APPELLATE COURT OF THE UNITED

14 STATES.—The term ‘‘appellate court of the United

15 States’’ means any United States circuit court of ap16 peals and the Supreme Court of the United States.

17 (d) SUNSET.—The authority under subsection (b)(2)

18 shall terminate on the date that is 3 years after the date

19 of the enactment of this Act.


1751B.AAG
112 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for recognizing me. Move to 

strike the last word. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to 

say a few words about the amendment introduced concerning the 

use of cameras in the Federal courtrooms. We’ve debated and 

talked about this issue for a number of years. It’s passed a number 

of times. 

I want to first thank my friends across the aisle, who have always made this a bipartisan issue. There are many Republicans for 

it, against it, many Democrats for it and against it, so it is one of 

those rare issues around this place where it truly is bipartisan. 

Mr. Delahunt has been a leading cosponsor of this in the past. 

Mr. Conyers, I believe, is the leading cosponsor this year, and I understand they both will participate in the debate. 

I also want to thank Mr. Nadler, my Ranking Member in the 

past. He’s been helpful in that he offered an amendment in the 

past to obscure the identity of witnesses who might be considered 

to be in danger if it were a mob-related type case or whatever, and 

I appreciated that helpful amendment that he had offered in the 

past. 

I’ve advocated televised coverage of Federal court proceedings 

really since my early days in Congress, and even prior to that. 

When I was a member of Cincinnati City Council I had pushed to 

get Council on cable TV access so the public had access to them. 

When I moved over to the Hamilton County Commission, did the 

same thing here. And when I came to Congress, this has always 

been one of the things that I felt was important as well. I mean 

Congress wasn’t on television early on as well, and we now—I 

mean how can you imagine being without CSPAN? I know the public is just glued to around the country. 

The cameras in the courtroom amendment would give Federal 

judges the discretion—I want to emphasize the discretion, they 

don’t have to do it, but it’s discretion—to allow media coverage of 

courtroom proceedings. 

Currently the Judicial Conference guidelines prohibit cameras in 

these courtrooms, reflecting the previous philosophy of the late 

Chief Justice Rehnquist. However, every State except for the District of Columbia allows for cameras in the courtroom in some 

form, either at the appellate level or at the trial level or both. The 

principle of open Government is embodied in this amendment. The 

American people deserve greater access to the Federal court system. It is good public policy for Congress to facilitate through 

media access to the courtroom. The ability of people to exercise 

their right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances. 

The Supreme Court has also acknowledged these rights in the 

case of Craig v. Harney. Quote, ‘‘A trial is a public event. What 

transpires in the courtroom is public property,’’ unquote. 

The amendment also recognizes the special concerns that surround televising trials, and includes language to disguise the voice 

and image of non-party witnesses and jurors upon their request. 

And again I want to recognize Mr. Nadler for his contribution in 

including that in the amendment. 

113 

A sunset provision, again, was someone’s suggestion, I believe, 

and that was also included to review the status of cameras in the 

courtroom after 3 years so we can always come back at this. If we 

find there have been problems, we can modify it or do away with 

it all together. I don’t anticipate that we would do that because I 

think it will be fine, just as the State courts have found around 

this country. There were all kinds of complaints about they put 

State courts on camera, what would happen? And the States have 

consistently kept that in the law as well. 

The nomination hearings of Justice Roberts brought the issue of 

cameras in the courtroom to light once again, and both Senator 

Grassley and Senator Specter and Senator Schumer and Senator 

Leahy, and many others, have authored legislation addressing this 

issue. There’s considerable support in the other body. I would ask 

House Members to consider supporting this regardless of that fact. 

When Judge Roberts was asked by several Senators about the 

use of cameras in the courtroom, the new Chief Justice stated, and 

I quote, ‘‘Well, you know, my new best friend, Senator Thompson, 

assures me that television cameras are nothing to be afraid of, but 

I don’t have a set view on that,’’ unquote. 

Passage of this amendment would send a strong signal to the 

Chief Justice, I believe, that coverage of Supreme Court proceedings is long overdue. 

The chambers of Congress are open to all citizens through the 

CSPAN, as I mentioned before, allowing the American people to 

stay apprised of the actions of the Legislative Branch of Government. Why should the Judicial Branch be any different? Lifetime 

tenure for unelected officials conveys a tremendous amount of 

power. When the Supreme Court is in session, you can walk by and 

see hundreds of people waiting for their opportunity to observe the 

judicial process. Why should our constituents not be allowed to observe this process, and why should people be forced to rely on the 

new media to interpret and filter the proceedings when cameras 

would allow citizens to watch for themselves? 

Mr. Chairman, I’d ask for another 10 seconds. I’m almost done. 

Mr. COBLE. Without objection. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

I’d urge my colleagues to support this, and as I say, this has 

been a bipartisan measure in the past, and I would invite suggestions from my colleagues as to how to improve this legislation, either here or on the floor. And I yield. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Does the gentleman from North Carolina insist upon his point of 

order? 

Mr. WATT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I make a point of order that while 

this may be important, it is not germane to this bill. The underlying purpose of the bill is securing witnesses, and there is no connection between this amendment and the underlying purpose of 

this bill. So I would insist on my point of order. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, if I could be heard? 

Mr. COBLE. Does the proponent wish to be heard in response? 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. I’ll be very brief. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman. I believe it’s clearly germane. It also has to do with security. For example, if a person does 

114 

wish to do harm and is in the crowd, if people have—if cameras 

are in the courtroom there’s a better chance they may be identified 

either ahead of time and be able to avoid something from happening, or if something does happen it would enable us to be able 

to prosecute that individual that’s been responsible for that. And 

clearly I think it’s relevant to this particular bill. 

And section 19, I’ve been informed also, clearly would make it 

germane and open it up for germaneness. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman will suspend for just a moment. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Watt, I am advised by the Parliamentarian that 

this is a close call, but House Rule XVI requires amendments to 

be related to the underlying bill in the amendment, and the 

amendment is germane in that it does apply to security of the 

courtroom, I am told by the Parliamentarian. 

Mr. WATT. In what way does it apply to security in the courtroom? There’s nothing in this amendment that relates to any security in the courtroom. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I think the statement that I made 

clearly indicates how it would do that. If you have cameras in the 

courtroom, clearly ahead of time there’s a possibility of being able 

to—— 

Mr. WATT. Increased insecurity in the courtroom by exposing witnesses maybe, but that’s a stretch. 

Mr. CHABOT. I don’t think it’s a stretch at all. I mean that’s one 

of the reasons you have cameras in buildings is for security purposes. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. WATT. This is not about security in the courtroom. This is 

about—— 

Mr. NADLER. If there were cameras in the courtroom, you might 

spot—yes, but if there are cameras in the courtroom, Mr. Chabot, 

might you not spot extraneous objects and be able to afford appropriate protection that way? 

Mr. CHABOT. Absolutely—— 

Mr. WATT. A security camera, not television cameras. 

Mr. CHABOT. That’s what I just indicated, the individuals, and 

the gentleman has indicated spotting objects as well. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, may I make a question, parliamentary inquiry? 

Mr. COBLE. The Chair will—reclaiming my time, the Chair has 

ruled the that amendment, that the—that this is germane to the 

subject matter. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, may I have a parliamentary inquiry? 

Mr. COBLE. Parliamentary inquiry from whom? The gentleman 

from California. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I may support the amendment, but 

I am concerned about some of the parliamentary procedures in the 

Committee because it seems like the germaneness rule is applied 

with great inconsistency and great flexibility, which the only consistency I can find is it’s employed to the disadvantage of the minority. 

When we offered amendments to the PATRIOT bill, for example, 

a great many of which were directly relevant and germane to the 

subject matter, far more germane I think than this amendment— 

115 

which I may support—is—to a court security bill, they were held 

to be non-germane. And I don’t know how the same germaneness 

standard that precluded things that were clearly within the PATRIOT bill were non-germane and somehow this is germane. I 

would like an explanation for what the contours are of this germaneness rule that seems so adaptable, depending on the will of 

the majority. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, I say to my friend from California the Chair 

has ruled, and in the Chair’s defense, I have not been inconsistent 

but this is my debut. I’m the rookie in the chair today. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Berman says I’m like the Twelfth Circuit. 

Are there additional amendments? 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt. 

Mr. WATT. I move to strike the last word. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WATT. And I won’t take 5 minutes. I just—I know there’s 

substantial difference of opinion. I don’t think this has anything to 

do with the underlying bill, not that it’s not important, and 

shouldn’t be the subject of a debate at some point. We’ve had the 

debate before, some Republicans and Democrats on opposite sides. 

I happen to feel like while the access of the public and the press 

is an important thing—and I have been a very, very strong supporter of it—the access to justice is more important. And this 

amendment I think is going to—has the prospect of jeopardizing 

the more important ingredient of providing justice in the courtroom. And I’ve said that before. That’s been my consistent position. 

There are some things that take precedence even over free 

speech and access to the press, and the one thing that I think is 

absolutely critically important to our courts is that they be able to 

operate in a way that assures a just outcome that is not influenced 

by public opinion, and I think the effect of this amendment would 

be to jeopardize that. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. WATT. I’m happy to yield to the gentleman, although I’m prepared to yield my time back, but I’m—— 

Mr. CHABOT. I will be very brief. I understand. I appreciate the 

gentleman’s concern because I know he has always in the past been 

outspoken in trying to assure that justice does prevail in the 

courts. I would just point out that the State courts have had cameras in the courtroom, virtually all the States, mostly at the trial 

level, I think 40 out of 50 at the trial level, and others at the appellate level, and most both. And there hasn’t, to my—able to be determined at my level that there has been a diminution of justice 

at the State level as a result of this. And why would we expect the 

Federal courts not to be able to—— 

Mr. WATT. I just reclaim my time long enough to say that you 

all seem to have a lot of confidence in the State courts when it’s 

convenient for you to have a lot of confidence in the State court, 

but, you know, maybe that’s one of the reasons you all are trying 

to reverse the State courts so often. Maybe you’re not getting the 

level of justice that you want out of State court. 

116 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? This is a convenient argument that you’re making. You use it to your advantage of disadvantage. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time expired. The question occurs 

on—— 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, my time hadn’t expired. You all never 

even started the clock. 

Mr. COBLE. It was well over, Mel. 

Mr. WATT. You didn’t even start the clock on this time. 

Mr. COBLE. Yeah, we did. You want another additional minute, 

Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. I don’t want another additional minute. People were 

asking me to yield. I didn’t want the extra time that Mr. Chabot 

took. 

Mr. COBLE. Gentleman from New York. 

Mr. WATT. I was prepared to yield back a long time ago, but I’m 

also prepared to respond if people want me to respond to whatever 

they want to respond to. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. For 

what purpose do you seek recognition, Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. To strike the last word. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am delighted to be able to agree with the distinguished Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, which we usually don’t, on 

this amendment. I led the opposition in the State legislature in 

New York, and I was opposed here for years to cameras in the 

courtroom because I was concerned about, not just about, about the 

intimidation of witnesses, not just in mob cases, as Mr. Chabot 

mentioned. I was concerned about the fact that—I never had a 

problem with cameras in the courtroom in an appellate case. In 

fact, I would go further, I would mandate it in appellate cases in 

Federal courts. But in the—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Will the gentleman yield? I’ll work with you on 

that. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay, I appreciate that. 

But in the trial courts I was concerned that very often you’re 

seeking witnesses who observed the accident, who observed the 

murder, whatever, and it’s intimidating enough on witnesses to 

come forward without worrying not only that they might be the 

subject of a mob hit if they’re a witness in the wrong trial, but just 

worrying about appearing in public on television in front of their 

friends and neighbors, and having to undergo cross-examination by 

some lawyer whose job it is to make them look not like the most 

accomplished, intelligent person, and that you might, therefore, 

lose witnesses. 

The amendment that’s in this bill that at the request of the witness or the jury you can obscure his or her identity, I think satisfies that concern. And with that concern of losing potential witnesses taken care of, I see no reason whatsoever why—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. NADLER. In one moment. Why you shouldn’t have cameras 

in the courtroom in any case in which you allow the press in the 

courtroom. There are some cases where a trial must be held behind 

closed doors—rare, but it does happen, and in that case obviously 

117 

we’re not going to have cameras in the courtroom. But that aside, 

wherever the public is allowed in the courtroom, I see no reason— 

now that we’ve taken care of the witness problem—not to allow 

cameras, so I am delighted to support this amendment. and I’ll 

yield. 

Mr. SCOTT. Where do you find the right—— 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman yields back? 

Mr. SCOTT. No, he yielded to me. 

Mr. NADLER. I yielded to the gentleman from—— 

Mr. COBLE. I stand corrected. Gentleman from—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Where do you find the witness having a right to have 

his image obscured? Page 5, line 9, page 5, line 9 says that the witness has a right to request, doesn’t say he has a right to have his 

image or voice obscured, he has a right to—— 

Mr. NADLER. Reclaiming my time. Page 4, starting line 23, ‘‘Upon 

the request of any witness other than a party or a juror in a trial 

proceeding, the court shall order’’—shall order—‘‘the face and voice 

of the witness or juror, as the case may be, to be disguised or otherwise obscured,’’ et cetera. 

Mr. SCOTT. And is the presiding judge bound by any Judicial 

Conference advisory guidelines in making his decisions? 

Mr. NADLER. Reclaiming my time, I don’t think he has a decision 

to make. The language is preemptory. It says ‘‘The court shall 

order’’ upon the request. 

Mr. SCOTT. This is another question. Never mind. I’ll just get my 

own time. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. I urge its passage and 

I yield back. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, for what purpose do you seek recognition? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I move to strike the last word. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I rise in support of the Chabot amendment. 

In the past I’ve filed legislation similar to the language that’s embraced in the amendment. I think this is really long overdue. 

And while I can respect my colleagues on my side, Mr. Schiff and 

Mr. Watt for raising a point of order, but I think it’s a good time 

to at least revisit what we’re trying to accomplish with this amendment. 

I am one who has advocated, as many of my colleagues on this 

side of the aisle, for discretion in trial justices. I have consistently 

opposed legislation that incorporate mandatory minimum sentences 

because I believe it erodes that discretion in judges. And yet, ironically, now I hear my colleagues on this side of the aisle inferring 

that we can’t trust judges to make decisions regarding witnesses 

and regarding whether cameras in the courtroom are appropriate 

or not. I say to my friends on this side, you can’t have it both ways. 

Yeah, they do. But we can’t, okay? [Laughter.] 

And they’re in the majority. But the reality is, if you are a practitioner, if you are either a prosecutor or counsel for a criminal defendant, you know that I can’t even imagine in an egregious case, 

where at the request of either the State or the Federal Government 

or a counsel for a criminal defendant, or in civil litigation by either 

118 

one of the parties, that a court would listen diligently to the rationale for the request, and if it made minimal sense, common sense, 

that it would not be respected by a jurist who had discretion. I 

mean, let’s talk about the real world other than some hypothetical 

case, because the benefits of having cameras in a courtroom, I 

would submit, are enormous in terms of educating the American 

people as to the judicial system. 

We hear many, again on the other side of the aisle, speak about 

activist judges, about the courts doing things that are not reflective 

of sound public policy. Well, let the public decide by seeing 

unfiltered what’s happening in our courtrooms. This is putting 

CSPAN—— 

Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield at some point, whenever 

you finish that thought? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I’ll yield to my friend, sure. 

Mr. WATT. I guess my concern is all of this is public policy stuff 

you’re talking about, and the public has some right to participate 

at some level, but I was always taught that the courts are for the 

benefit of the litigants to get a fair trial. This bill says nothing 

about giving the litigants the right to decide whether their case is 

tried or not on television, so—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time. 

Mr. WATT. I just want to be clear that the basic underlying problem I have is different than what you’re talking about. This is not 

a political body. This is—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time. 

Mr. WATT. This is a judicial body. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time. You know, the courts are a 

public institution. You know, the courts are there fundamentally 

for the benefit, not just of the litigants, but for our democratic 

order, and that there is an overriding concern on the part of the 

American people about what is transpiring in terms of the judiciary. It’s not like it’s a controversy that we hear frequently in the 

halls of Congress. 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I’ll yield to Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. I merely want to observe that all of my criticism 

about unfairness in the courts would have been taken care of had 

we had cameras there. There are more things that go wrong in 

courts that are not seen or heard or made public, than I am worried about anything else. I think throwing a light—continuing to 

throw a light on court proceedings is a very important step forward 

in the dispensation of justice in the court. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, I think that when we say 

that—when we oppose this legislation by suggesting that there are 

not enough safeguards to protect the interests of private litigants, 

that by inference what we say is that we can’t trust judges. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I think that’s a mistake. 

Mr. COBLE. The question occurs on the second—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from California. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I rise to strike the requisite number of words? 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

119 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, just on a couple points. One, yes, 

trials are for the litigants. But they’re more than that, they’re for 

the public, and the Supreme Court has spoken on that specifically 

in the Craig v. Harney case, where the Supreme Court said this: 

‘‘A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property.’’ 

It is strange that we limit the public nature of it by the number 

of seats that are in the courtroom. And I would agree with the gentlemen on both sides of the aisle who suggest that all the Federal 

Appellate Courts have no excuse for not televising their proceedings, starting with the U.S. Supreme Court. I mean the 

idea—— 

Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LUNGREN.—that the U.S. Supreme Court would be such a 

small, physical body, that you have to rotate people in during important arguments, and that they barely allow us to have recordings of the arguments, is, I think, the essence of arrogance. 

But in this particular case I thought it important for us to note, 

as we’ve gone through in this debate, that this does not mandate 

televising proceedings in Federal District Court. This allows, in the 

language of the bill, that any presiding judge of a District Court 

in the United States may, in his or her discretion, permit the 

photographing, electronic recording, broadcasting or televising to 

the public of court proceedings over which that judge presides. 

So again, we are giving it to the judges to make that decision. 

There are instances, in my judgment, where it would be inappropriate. There are instance where I think it has been inappropriate. 

My State had a very publicly broadcast trial, the O.J. Simpson, 

trial, and I think in fact the presence of cameras in that courtroom 

did influence that jury. There are some other cases I could think 

of where it did. This allows—— 

Mr. WATT. And that’s okay, I guess? 

Mr. LUNGREN. No, no. This allows the judge to make the determination as to whether or not that would be the case. Judges don’t 

always get it right, but I think in most cases they would get it 

right. And then we also have the protection built in as a result of 

the incorporation of the Nadler amendment with respect to the concerns of witnesses. That is something we don’t have in California 

law. That is something I wish we did have in California law, and 

that I think is a vast improvement over the laws if several jurisdictions that I’ve reviewed. 

So I think the gentleman, the Chairman of the Constitution Law 

Subcommittee has done a good job of reaching out to the other side 

and incorporating a number of the concerns that have been expressed, and all in all, I think this does give us the change to put 

into practice what the Supreme Court has said, that is, that the 

trial is a public event, and that what transpires in the courtroom 

is public property. In this time, in this place in our society, televising of events is the most efficient way of allowing the public to 

participate in those events by observation. 

I thank the—— 

Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LUNGREN. I will be happy to yield, yes. 

Mr. WATT. I just wanted to thank the gentleman for taking up 

for the Supreme Court in this ruling about whether a trial is pubVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
120 

lic. I hope he’ll try to take up for them when we do the next markup. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate it, and the Supreme Court does get 

it right. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman yields back the—I was going to call 

the question, but I think—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Watt, did you want to be recognized earlier? I 

guess his question. 

The gentleman from Texas, for what purpose do you seek recognition? 

Mr. GOHMERT. To strike the last word, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As a judge I was supportive of having a camera in the courtroom. 

I had a rather lengthy protective order that allowed me to dictate 

not only what happened in the courtroom with the media, but outside it gave me great leverage. 

I would be supportive of this in some other setting, rather than 

as part of the court security bill. 

I did have a provision in my protective order to address one of 

the things that was said earlier, that any litigant could object to 

the proceedings being televised, and that would be given deference. 

But as part of the court security bill, it seems that by the amount 

of public policy arguments being waged here, that it’s clear that, 

you know—step back a moment. 

What we’re trying to do here today is to provide additional help 

and security to the courts, and although it was said earlier that, 

let’s see, that this court security bill does nothing to address adequate protection of judges, that it just provides a bunch of sound 

bites to our side of the aisle, I really am deeply offended by that 

comment. It would seem that rather that’s more like a case of the 

kettle calling the pot copper here, because this does do some good 

in the court security bill. If it did not, then I would assume the 

gentleman that made that statement would be in favor of dropping 

the penalty to 1 day in jail for killing a Congressman, and seeing 

if there isn’t some deterrent effect to having longer, more profound 

sentences. 

There is a deterrent effect. This bill does provide that, but it appears that the story of the day will not be that our Committee did 

a very good thing to protect the judiciary. The story will be that 

we rammed cameras into their courtroom in some setting. 

I would be open, as I said earlier, to be cosponsoring a bill to put 

them in the Supreme Court so that people can see what goes on. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GOHMERT. But anyway—— 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GOHMERT. I am concerned about we’re losing focus and this 

will completely blur the intent of providing security. I called out 

the name of Judge Lefkow, whose husband and mother were tragically and horribly killed because of her position as a Federal judge. 

She is an eminent jurist, and it was just in visiting with her this 

morning—I should say she and other Federal judges have indicated 

to me they’d rather that provision that they had heard might happen sometime, regarding cameras in the courtroom, not be allowed. 

121 

I think that allowing them the discretion to make that determination addresses that, but I’m concerned about this public policy 

debate being a part of the court security rather than stand alone. 

And, yes, I will be glad to yield. 

Mr. CHABOT. Very briefly, as far as ramming it, this is clearly— 

you indicated—it’s discretion. In addition to that, we can’t write the 

story. 

We had a hearing the other day, our first hearing on the Voting 

Rights Act, and as a side issue it was raised relative to allowing 

felons to vote, and that was the story that the press in that instance picked up that got more play than the whole hearing. You 

really can’t affect how the press plays this. Of course, relative to 

this bill, if you have cameras in the courtroom it’s ultimately the 

public that can see firsthand and not be filtered through the press. 

Yield back. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. COBLE. Gentleman yields back. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But the goal today is to provide additional security to the judiciary. I think this bill does it, and I am required, 

though I like the concept and would support it in any other setting, 

to oppose it to this. 

Mr. COBLE. Prior to recognizing Mr. Scott, let me remind everybody again, we’ve got to get these three bills reported out today, 

and we’re going to try to work for another 30 minutes here, and 

then we will recess for lunch for about 30 minutes. And when the 

bill on the floor, Mr. Smith, that you will be managing, we will suspend for that. But then after that, the Legal Abuse Bill is resolved 

or disposed of, then we’ll all come back here. 

Now, I am pleased to recognize the distinguished gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Scott, who will strike the last word. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if you 

wanted to expedite the proceedings, you should have ruled the 

other way on this amendment. We haven’t even started the debate 

for today. 

Mr. Chairman, I join the gentleman from Texas. I’m offended 

that we’ve hijacked the court security bill and converted it into the 

cameras in the courtroom bill, and we’re talking about camera—the 

idea that this is a security measure. You could have security cameras. That is not what this bill is all about. We’re talking about 

broadcast. And this would be a good idea or bad idea. We talked 

about the State courts. Sure, some of the State courts have done 

it, but they haven’t stuck it on the back of somebody else’s bill and 

tried to make the policy that way. They’ve had hearings and discussed it, and had input from everybody to figure out what’s going 

on. 

Mr. Chairman, we’re supposed to be discussing whether or not 

you’re going to have the habeas corpus reform and the death penalty and the mandatory minimums, whether there’s going to be a 

grant program in the court security bill. All of that’s going to get 

lost. As the gentleman from Texas has indicated, that’s lost. By the 

ruling of the Chair and getting this on here, now we’re going to discuss cameras in the courtroom, and, you know, that’s the rest of 

the bill. 

We don’t know whether the—we don’t have anything before us 

that would suggest what effect this is going to have on litigants, 

122 

whether or not witnesses are intimidated or may change their testimony by virtue of the fact that they’re going to be on television, 

what effect it has on a trial. Obviously, there’s a difference in the 

effect of cameras in the courtroom with the Supreme Court, the appellate courts and the trial level. 

All of that, Mr. Chairman, we’re not putting two cents worth of 

thought into. You have down here that—the gentleman from New 

York has pointed out that a witness other than a party or a juror 

can request the name—excuse me—that the court shall order the 

face and voice of the witness or juror be disguised or otherwise obscured. It doesn’t say anything about the name. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a second? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield. 

Mr. NADLER. I would simply point out that without cameras in 

the courtroom, the name is available to the press under present 

law. That’s why this amendment doesn’t say that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I would just say that when people see what’s 

going on and all of this is now publicly broadcast, the name is not 

protected, the party can’t decide whether they want the trial broadcast. 

Broadcasting it makes a difference, may be good, may be bad, 

but it makes a difference, and I would hope that we would consider 

this not as stuck onto the back of a bill, but would give appropriate 

deliberation to this, and that all kinds of implications and whether 

you’re going to get a fair trial or not, what kinds of trials, what 

kinds of discretion. The bill says that the advisory guidelines, the 

presiding judge may refer to them if he feels like it. Basically, some 

judges are going to allow it, some judges aren’t. There’s no guidance there. 

I’d yield to the gentleman from North Carolina. 

Mr. WATT. I just want to reiterate the point that Representative 

Scott made. This is a great debate, and our Judiciary Committee 

needs to have it, but it needs to have it in the context of hearings 

because there obviously is a strong difference of opinion among a 

number of people on this Committee about what benefit the courts 

play and how it fits into our whole system. Some people apparently 

think it’s about the public’s benefit. The courts in our system were 

not for the public’s benefit. The first line of the basis for a court 

is to resolve disputes between litigants, so that they don’t go out 

in the street and duel like we used to. 

So I mean this is an important debate, but we have—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. WATT. We need to have hearings about it. We need to—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. WATT.—to give it the kind of dignity that it really deserves, 

and not put it on the back of a bill that it really has nothing to 

do with, regardless of what the technical germaneness requirement 

may say. This amendment has nothing to do with the underlying 

purpose of this bill, and we all know it, and now we spent a whole 

hour here talking about something that—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. WATT.—really should have had hearings and could have had 

hearings if you just drop the bill separately and let it go through 

the process. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield? 

123 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from Virginia has the time. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield? 

Mr. SCOTT. I’m sorry. Yes, the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, every State in the Nation permits in 

some fashion or another cameras in the courtroom, and I hear 

these questions, and I have heard them before, and they are legitimate questions: Well, what’s the impact on litigants? What’s the 

impact on this—I can never remember in any of the multiple hearings that we’ve had on this issue a single piece of data indicating 

that there has been a problem. We just can’t go making up—— 

Mr. WATT. We had hearings about it. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I have the time. I mean, let’s not just create 

problems where they don’t exist. Let’s rely on the discretion of 

judges, because that’s how the system best operates, whether it’s 

cameras in the courtroom or whether it’s sentencing. 

Mr. COBLE. The time has expired. The question occurs on the 

second degree amendment of the gentleman from Ohio. All in favor 

say aye? All opposed, nay? 

It appears the noes have it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a record—— 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from Ohio, a rollcall has been requested. When your names are called, if you favor the amendment 

in the nature of a substitute, you will vote aye, if you oppose, you 

will vote nay. The clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon? 

Mr. CANNON. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa? 

Mr. ISSA. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake? 

Mr. FLAKE. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence? 

124 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney? 

Mr. FEENEY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner? 

Mr. WEINER. Pass. 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, pass. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sa ́nchez? 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sa ́nchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen? 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz? 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, aye. 

Mr. COBLE. Are there Members in the assembly who wish to 

vote—change or—vote or change their vote? The gentleman from 

Massachusetts. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. INGLIS. Aye. 

125 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, aye. 

Mr. COBLE. Are there other Members who wish to—the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. WEINER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. 

Mr. COBLE. Are there other Members who wish to vote or change 

their vote? If not, the clerk will report. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 20 ayes and 12 noes. 

Mr. COBLE. And the second degree amendment is approved. 

Are there additional second degree amendments? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. The distinguished gentleman from California. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have two amendments I’d like to 

offer en bloc, 104 and 108. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, before I get to the amendments, I 

want to thank my colleague for his work on this bill, and also—— 

Mr. COBLE. The Committee will come to order, and, Mr. Schiff, 

I will say to you in the interest of time, you may identify your 

amendments. But the Chair will accept those amendments. You 

may identify them, however. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The amendments offered by Mr. Schiff follow:] 

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128 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO MANAGERS AMENDMENT IN THE

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H. R. 1751

OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF OF CALIFORNIA

Add at the end the following:

1 SEC. 23. ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR UNITED STATES MAR2 SHALS SERVICE TO PROTECT THE JUDICI3 ARY.

4 In addition to any other amounts authorized to be

5 appropriated for the United States Marshals Service,

6 there are authorized to be appropriated for the United

7 States Marshals Service to protect the judiciary,

8 $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2010

9 for—

10 (1) hiring entry-level deputy marshals for pro11 viding judicial security;

12 (2) hiring senior-level deputy marshals for in13 vestigating threats to the judiciary and providing

14 protective details to members of the judiciary and

15 Assistant United States Attorneys; and

16 (3) for the Office of Protective Intelligence, for

17 hiring senior-level deputy marshals, hiring program

18 analysts, and providing secure computer systems.


1751D.AAB
129 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Briefly, for the purpose of identification, the first amendment 

provides a grant program for the State courts so that courts can 

improve their security and can apply directly for Federal funding 

to make those needed improvements. We had a meeting this morning with chief justices from around the country who talked about 

the importance of a funding stream that would go directly to them 

to improve courthouse security. 

The second also authorizes some additional resources for the U.S. 

Marshals Service and particularly their Protective Intelligence Division to help them, currently only staffed by three people and 

underresourced. 

I thank the gentleman for accepting the amendments. Before I 

conclude, I just want to also thank Mr. Gohmert and other Members for incorporating provisions that Congressman Dreier have authored that allow Federal prosecutors to go after cop killers as well 

as penalize those who flee the country after killing a cop. 

Mr. COBLE. We will accept both amendments, I say to Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have a statement 

from Mr. Dreier I would like to offer for the record. 

Mr. COBLE. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dreier follows:] 

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Mr. COBLE. Are there further second degree amendments? 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. COBLE. Hearing—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman? I’m sorry. 

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized. 

Mr. SCOTT. I have an amendment at the desk, the one that 

strikes Section 11, Scott 053. 

Mr. SMITH. [Presiding.] The clerk will read the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute to H.R. 1751, offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. Strike—— 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, the amendment will be considered 

as read. 

[The amendment offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia follows:] 

133 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO THE MANAGER’S AMENDMENT IN

THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1751

OFFERED BY MR. SCOTT OF VIRGINIA

Strike section 11.


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Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized to explain 

it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, this strikes the habeas provisions in 

the bill. We have heard from the State court representatives, and 

habeas was not part of anything that they requested. This is very 

controversial. People will not be getting their appropriate due process within the death penalty. We already know we make mistakes, 

and people have gone many years before those mistakes have been 

rectified. So I would hope that we would not complicate the bill 

that has been vastly improved by the amendments that have just 

been adopted, which will actually provide some security, security 

for grants to the courts so that they can provide security, and 

grants for additional personnel to provide security so the—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Will the gentleman—— 

Mr. SMITH. Will the gentleman from Virginia yield? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield. 

Mr. SMITH. We are prepared to accept that amendment, but I 

know the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, would like to 

speak on it as well. So if you will yield to the gentleman from California, we’ll be able to expedite the process. 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. LUNGREN. If you would yield to the gentleman from Texas 

first, and then—— 

Mr. SCOTT. To whom it may concern. [Laughter.] 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. I do believe these are good provisions 

that have been placed in here regarding speeding up of the application for writ process. But we have discussed this and are willing 

to accept that and take this out of the bill, once again to focus on 

court security and have this as a stand-alone provision. 

I would like to yield also to my friend from—the gentleman from 

California. 

Mr. SMITH. Actually, the gentleman from Virginia has the time, 

and I’m sure he’ll be happy to yield to the gentleman from California. 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman knows I am very, very interested 

in this provision, as I have the habeas corpus reform bill that we 

have been discussing in our Subcommittee, and hopefully we’ll 

mark it up at some time. 

This would have applied only in one set of circumstances where 

there’s been a killing of a public safety officer while that person 

was in the performance of his or her official duties. I think it does 

make sense for us to deal with the habeas corpus reform in a single 

bill. But I just want to say that this is an important issue. 

In my home State of California, there are 26 cop killers who have 

been sentenced to death. Not a single one has had the sentence carried out. Every time a California cop killer’s death sentence has 

been affirmed by the State courts, the Ninth Circuit—remember 

that circuit we were talking about a little earlier?—has either reversed the sentence or ordered additional hearings in the case. I 

could give you chapter and verse of the cases. One of them that I’m 

very familiar with is Police Officer Kenneth Reidy, who was murdered in 1983. There’s no question about the guilt of the party involved, but here we are this many years thereafter, and the Ninth 

135 

Circuit is still—still considering this particular case. And the damage done to the family of that police officer is incalculable. 

So by this side agreeing to your amendment, we in no way mean 

to signal that we don’t think this is a serious issue that ought to 

be addressed, but we hope to address it in a comprehensive fashion 

in another stand-alone bill. 

I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I yield to the gentleman from North 

Carolina. 

Mr. WATT. I understand that we’re striking the entire provision, 

but I just wanted to make sure I understand the underlying provision. Would the underlying provision that you’re agreeing to strike 

set up a different habeas review standard for some people than 

other people? Is that—would that be the effect of what the underlying bill—— 

Mr. SCOTT. It would have—it would be a separate standard, and, 

furthermore, it would be a complicated standard. So, Mr. Chairman, I think if we’re going to have habeas corpus reform, it seems 

to me to have—to make much more sense to do it as the gentleman—as it’s been explained, in a separate piece of legislation 

where all these questions can be answered. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield one more—can we agree 

to put the camera provision over into that category, too, so—— 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman yields back, and as I say, the Chair 

has accepted the amendment. 

Are there any other amendments? 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, on the same amendment. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from New York is recognized. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I’ll be very brief. 

I support the amendment. I just have to comment on the gentleman from California’s comment. Getting it right is more important when you’re dealing with the death penalty or any other serious crime than getting it fast. We very much tightened up, in my 

judgment, far too much on habeas corpus in the Antiterrorism and 

More Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. I think we—innocent 

people will be executed because of the—because of not being afforded habeas corpus. To go further is to wreak more injustice. 

Taking it out of this bill enables me to vote for this bill in Committee. And it is certainly preferable to consider any further refinements to the habeas corpus statutes in a full discussion in a bill 

standing by itself. I expect not to agree with the gentleman at that 

time, but at least it will get, I presume, a full discussion rather 

than being passed as part of a different bill without proper consideration, I simply wanted to say. So I’m glad it’s being taken out of 

this bill. It will enable me to vote for this bill in Committee, but 

I’m glad—but I just couldn’t let those remarks pass unremarked 

upon. I think we’ve gone too far in restricting habeas—not having 

gone far—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from Virginia’s time has expired. 

Mr. NADLER. I had the time. 

Mr. SMITH. I’m sorry. The gentleman from New York. 

Mr. NADLER. And I would yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Would the gentleman yield? 

136 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand the gentleman’s concern, but I hope 

that we won’t continue to hear this when we attempt to try and 

look at reform of habeas corpus that somehow we’re acting too fast. 

The case I specifically mentioned, Police Officer Kenneth Reidy was 

killed 22 years ago. He was sentenced to death by a California 

court in 1984. That was affirmed by the California Supreme Court 

in 1989. I would defy anyone to suggest that that is a rush to judgment. 

Mr. NADLER. I will—I will—reclaiming my time, that’s obviously 

not a rush to judgment in that case, and I don’t know anything 

about that case so I can’t comment on it. But I will say that when 

we look at habeas statutes, we have to be very careful because we 

know of cases where people have been executed or—and we also 

know of cases, frankly—we know of cases, frankly, where time goes 

by not because they’re litigating new evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, but because they are litigating for years 

and years whether technical requirements for habeas corpus that 

were imposed in 1996 are met before you ever get to those cases. 

But this is a discussion that should be held for when we get to that 

bill. 

So I’ll yield back at this time. 

Mr. SMITH. I was just going to say the gentleman’s time has expired. He yields back. 

The question occurs on the second degree amendment offered by 

Mr. Scott. All in favor, say aye? All opposed, nay? 

The ayes have it. The agreement is—the amendment is agreed 

to. 

And are there any further amendments? The gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Scott, for the purpose of offering an amendment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk offered by me and the gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters. 

Mr. SMITH. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute to H.R. 1751—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent—Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment, which is fairly 

lengthy, be considered as read. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection. 

[The amendment offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia follows:] 

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Mr. SMITH. The gentleman is recognized to explain the amendment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, although it’s a long amendment, it 

has—it’s fairly straightforward. It just eliminates all the mandatory minimums in the legislation. Mr. Chairman, we know that 

mandatory minimums have been shown to be ineffective in preventing crime. They distort the sentencing process, and they’ve 

been studied and been shown to waste the taxpayers’ money, and 

they’re discriminatory in application. 

The Rand Commission studied it and titled their study ‘‘Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the 

Taxpayers’ Money,’’ concluding that mandatory sentences were not 

cost-effective, indeed much less effective than ordinary discretionary sentencing. 

Mr. Chairman, every time we consider one of these—I haven’t 

seen the letter yet, but I’m sure there’s one that we can enter into 

the record at this point from the Judicial Conference of the United 

States, which has reminded us that mandatory minimums violate 

common sense. The idea is that if the sentence makes sense, it can 

be applied; if it doesn’t make sense, mandatory minimums make 

you apply it anyway. 

The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was not generally known 

to be soft on crime, stated that, and I quote, ‘‘Mandatory minimums are frequently the result of floor amendments that demonstrate emphatically that legislators want to ‘get tough on 

crime.’ ’’ 

Just as frequently, they do not involve any careful consideration 

of the effect they might have on the Sentencing Guidelines as a 

whole. Even former President Bush, while still a Member of Congress, spoke in support of a bill that would repeal mandatory minimums, declaring that, and I quote, ‘‘Contrary to what one might 

imagine, the bill repealing Federal mandatory minimums will result in better justice and more appropriate sentences.’’ 

Furthermore, and finally, Mr. Chairman, in this context, mandatory minimums are absolutely ridiculous. If there is anywhere we 

can trust judges to apply the appropriate sentence, it’s when the 

charge is assaulting judges. I don’t think they need mandatory 

minimum guidance to do the right thing on those kinds of charges. 

So I would hope that we would eliminate all of the mandatory 

minimums in the bill. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Would the gentleman from Virginia yield? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. First of all, without objection, the letter that you 

mentioned from the Judicial Conference will be made a part of the 

record. 

[The information follows:] 

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Mr. SMITH. The second is that I understand that the gentleman 

has had—second of all, I understand that the gentleman has had 

discussions with the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, and we intend to work with the gentleman from Virginia 

between now and the next step in the process to try to address 

some of his concerns, and if that’s the case, would the gentleman 

like to have—ask unanimous consent to withdraw his amendment? 

Mr. SCOTT. I think this is better known as the faith-based initiative. [Laughter.] 

I withdraw the amendment, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn. 

Are there any other amendments? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentlewoman from Texas is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two amendments at the desk, and I’d like to take them en bloc. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Without objection, the clerk will report the 

amendments. 

The CLERK. Amendments to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas. At the end of the 

matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment, add the following new section: Sec.—Grants to States for threat assessment 

databases. A. In general, from amounts made available to carry out 

this section, the Attorney General shall carry out a program under 

which the Attorney General makes grants to States for use by the 

State to establish and maintain a threat assessment database—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

The CLERK.—described in subsection (b). 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I’d like the amendments be considered as 

read. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

[The amendments offered by Ms. Jackson Lee follow:] 

168 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1751

OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON-LEE OF TEXAS

At the end of the matter proposed to be inserted by

the amendment, add the following new section:

1 SECTION ll. GRANTS TO STATES FOR THREAT ASSESS2 MENT DATABASES.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—From amounts made available to

4 carry out this section, the Attorney General shall carry

5 out a program under which the Attorney General makes

6 grants to States for use by the State to establish and

7 maintain a threat assessment database described in sub8 section (b).

9 (b) DATABASE.—For purposes of subsection (a), a

10 threat assessment database is a database through which

11 a State can—

12 (1) analyze trends and patterns in domestic ter13 rorism and crime;

14 (2) project the probabilities that specific acts of

15 domestic terrorism or crime will occur; and

16 (3) develop measures and procedures that can

17 effectively reduce the probabilities that those acts

18 will occur.


1751J.AAB
169 

2

H.L.C.

1 (c) CORE ELEMENTS.—The Attorney General shall

2 define a core set of data elements to be used by each data3 base funded by this section so that the information in the

4 database can be effectively shared with other States and

5 with the Department of Justice.

6 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There

7 are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section

8 such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years

9 2006 through 2009.


1751J.AAC
170 H.L.C.

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE

NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1751

OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON-LEE OF TEXAS

At the end of the matter proposed to be inserted by

the amendment, add the following new section:

1 SECTION ll. GRANTS FOR YOUNG WITNESS ASSISTANCE.

2 (a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:

3 (1) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means

4 the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

5 (2) JUVENILE.—The term ‘‘juvenile’’ means an

6 individual who is 17 years of age or younger.

7 (3) YOUNG ADULT.—The term ‘‘young adult’’

8 means an individual who is between the ages of 18

9 and 21.

10 (4) STATE.—The term ‘‘State’’ means any

11 State of the United States, the District of Columbia,

12 the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Is13 lands, American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern

14 Mariana Islands.

15 (b) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION.—The Director may

16 make grants to State and local prosecutors and law en17 forcement agencies in support of juvenile and young adult

18 witness assistance programs, including State and local


1751K.AAB
171 

2

H.L.C.

1 prosecutors and law enforcement agencies that have exist2 ing juvenile and adult witness assistance programs.

3 (c) ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to receive a grant

4 under this section, State and local prosecutors and law

5 enforcement officials shall—

6 (1) submit an application to the Director in

7 such form and containing such information as the

8 Director may reasonably require; and

9 (2) give assurances that each applicant has de10 veloped, or is in the process of developing, a witness

11 assistance program that specifically targets the

12 unique needs of juvenile and young adult witnesses

13 and their families.

14 (d) USE OF FUNDS.—Grants made available under

15 this section may be used—

16 (1) to assess the needs of juvenile and young

17 adult witnesses;

18 (2) to develop appropriate program goals and

19 objectives; and

20 (3) to develop and administer a variety of wit21 ness assistance services, which includes—

22 (A) counseling services to young witnesses

23 dealing with trauma associated in witnessing a

24 violent crime;


1751K.AAC
172 

3

H.L.C.

1 (B) pre- and post-trial assistance for the

2 youth and their family;

3 (C) providing education services if the

4 child is removed from or changes their school

5 for safety concerns;

6 (D) protective services for young witnesses

7 and their families when a serious threat of

8 harm from the perpetrators or their associates

9 is made; and

10 (E) community outreach and school-based

11 initiatives that stimulate and maintain public

12 awareness and support.

13 (e) REPORTS.—

14 (1) REPORT.—State and local prosecutors and

15 law enforcement agencies that receive funds under

16 this section shall submit to the Director a report not

17 later than May 1st of each year in which grants are

18 made available under this section. Reports shall de19 scribe progress achieved in carrying out the purpose

20 of this section.

21 (2) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Director shall

22 submit to Congress a report by July 1st of each year

23 which contains a detailed statement regarding grant

24 awards, activities of grant recipients, a compilation

25 of statistical information submitted by applicants,


1751K.AAD
173 

4

H.L.C.

1 and an evaluation of programs established under

2 this section.

3 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There

4 are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section

5 $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008.


1751K.AAE
174 

Mr. SMITH. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized, but let me 

say before she begins the explanation of the amendments that the 

Chair is prepared to accept her amendments, if that might persuade her to limit her remarks. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It certainly will, Mr. Chairman, and so I 

thank you very much. Let me just simply say that amendment 

number 174 is dealing with a threat assessment provision for the 

courts. The U.S. Marshals Service has such a threat assessment, 

but the courts do not have access to such. With the various 

endangerment that we’ve seen I our courts, we know that this 

would be a vital service. So I ask my colleagues to accept it. 

I thank the Chairman. That is amendment number 174. 

Number 175 is an amendment that simply would give the Attorney General the authority to make grants to State and local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to help protect young witnesses who are witnesses to crimes such as armed robbery, assault, 

murder, sexual abuse, and domestic violence. We recognize that 

with the number of kidnappings that we have seen of very young 

victims who ultimately may be witnesses or witnesses to other horrific acts, the protection of these witnesses and the guiding of these 

witnesses is crucial to making the case against a violent predator 

or violent perpetrator of a crime. 

I ask my colleagues to support it, and I ask that both amendments be supported. I yield back to the Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. The question occurs on the amendment 

offered by the gentlewoman from Texas. All in favor, say aye? Opposed, nay? 

The ayes have it. The agreement—I mean, the amendment is 

agreed to. 

Are there any further amendments? 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, is recognized for the purpose of offering an amendment. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Mr. Speaker—Mr. Chairman, I have an 

amendment at the desk. 

Mr. SMITH. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute to H.R. 1751, offered by Mr. Nadler. Add at the end the 

following: SEC.—Incitement—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent—— 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, the amendment will be considered 

as read. 

[The amendment offered by Mr. Nadler follows:] 

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Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from New York is recognized for the 

purposes of explaining his amendment. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the 

Committee for responding to the reign of terror being directed at 

some of our institutions of justice. A free society and Nation of laws 

must protect the rule of law. Plainly, that can never be accomplished if those entrusted with its administration and their families 

face violence or death simply because they are doing the public’s 

business. We have seen countries where violence against court officials has destroyed the rule of law. We cannot allow that to happen 

here. 

Unfortunately, there are some in our society who believe that 

they have the right to be a law unto themselves. They are convinced that courts that act in ways they do not approve of must be 

stopped by any means, legal or not. Sometimes demagogues have 

stirred individuals to commit heinous crimes or to attempt heinous 

crimes against judges and law enforcement officials. When that incitement goes beyond mere advocacy, it should be a crime. 

The law has long recognized the difference between protected 

speech, even advocacy of violence and other wrongdoing, and incitement, which is not protected. 

My amendment is drawn from existing law, making it a crime to 

incite others to riot. It requires overt acts and specifically excludes 

advocacy of ideas or expressions in support of violence. The incitement to riot statute has successfully withstood constitutional challenge. The amendment would make it a crime ‘‘to incite, to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on, to commit any 

act of violence in furtherance of, or to aid or abet any person’’ to 

commit the new crimes in the bill. In other words, it would make 

it a crime to incite violence against judges and judicial personnel. 

There is no place in our society for violence. When someone steps 

over the line from protected speech and by inciting criminal violence against judges or other law enforcement officers creates a 

clear and present danger of violence or murder, that person should 

not be permitted to walk away from the consequences of their act. 

I know that I have parted company with many of my colleagues 

in other bills restricting what the courts have held to be protected 

speech because I believe we should protect speech to a very great 

extent. I hope we can, at the very least, however, agree that incitement to violence and murder for the purpose of destroying our justice system, speech that has consistently been held to be outside 

the protection of the First Amendment cannot be tolerated. If we 

can have a crime of incitement to riot, we should have a crime to 

incitement to violence against court—against court personnel and 

judges. 

I urge the adoption of this amendment and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman yields back his time. Do any Members 

wish to be heard in opposition to the amendment? The gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, is recognized. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do stand in opposition to this amendment. I believe it is overly broad, that it is constitutionally suspect under the Brandenberg case. I get very concerned any time someone attempts to limit free speech, even 

180 

though sometimes the Supreme Court itself has trouble understanding what protected political free speech should be, as we saw 

in the McCain-Feingold debacle. 

But, anyway, gee, by just making a sarcastic remark, I guess if 

someone ever did violence, they could say Gohmert aided and abetted and encouraged violence against the Supreme Court. And, 

folks, I’m telling you, there is a huge difference between protected 

free speech and violence. A huge difference. 

This country is one in which, as the gentleman says, violence 

should not be tolerated, absolutely not, and that’s why we have this 

court security bill coming here today. We need to protect the judiciary. We need to protect the participants in the process. And they 

deserve harsher penalties, all those who would attempt to do violence, who would attempt to do harm, would conspire or actually 

do violence or harm. And that’s why this bill is here. 

But heaven help us if we get to the point that we say we cannot 

criticize the Supreme Court, because when I took to the floor or I 

took to writing an editorial criticizing the ridiculous Supreme 

Court opinion saying that a city or a governmental entity could 

take someone’s private property just because somebody else is 

going to pay more taxes, lo and behold, I could be—— 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a question? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Not right now. I’m on a roll. [Laughter.] 

But I could be brought up and accused and taken before the 

grand jury because I incited somebody to get upset about a ridiculous Supreme Court decision. 

I will never yield my right to free speech. You know, as Patrick 

Henry said, ‘‘is life so short and peace so sweet it could be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God.’’ 

I ought to have the right to free speech. I do not want to ever give 

that up, and I am concerned that anyone who seeks to criticize or 

does criticize an opinion of a wayward court, including the Ninth 

Circuit, something happens and some idiot out there does violence, 

then you come back on those who exercise their constitutional free 

speech and all under this kind of thing. 

I am extremely opposed to this amendment. There is no place for 

violence in our society. I harshly sentenced people who thought 

there was. But there is no place in this country, I hope and pray, 

to limit free speech and criticism of government officials. 

Mr. NADLER. Now would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GOHMERT. I will yield now. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Gohmert. 

First of all, the language says ‘‘to incite, to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on, to commit any act of violence’’—not to criticize a court. To incite an act of violence. And 

does the gentleman believe that the incitement to riot statute is 

unconstitutional? 

Mr. GOHMERT. I don’t, but I know where this is going. You’re including it in—you’re seeking to include it in a court bill, and the 

intent would be that—to protect criticism against a court—— 

Mr. NADLER. Well, would the—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. And I understand how this works. All you have 

to do is go in and say, Well, you know what? That speech he gave, 

you know, a Patrick Henry-style speech, incited people to violence, 

181 

and the next thing you go, you got some yay-hoo like Ronnie Earle 

out there trying to indict somebody for inciting violence. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield again? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Yes, I will. 

Mr. NADLER. I don’t know if the gentleman has read the amendment because it clearly says that this amendment shall not be 

deemed to mean the mere oral or written, one, advocacy of ideas 

or, two, expression of belief, not involving advocacy of an act of violence or assertion of the rightness of or the right to commit any 

such act. That is, act of violence. So—unquote. So everything you’re 

talking about is expressly excluded from this amendment. 

Mr. GOHMERT. It is broad enough, though, that it could allow a 

prosecutor to pursue somebody on political grounds, and so I am 

concerned about the broadness of the bill, and I do stand in opposition. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Speaker—or, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman yields back. Are there any other 

Members who wish to be heard on this side? If not, the gentleman 

from California, Mr. Lungren, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, I ask to strike the requisite number of words. 

This is an issue that’s very, very important. I don’t doubt the 

gentleman’s intentions on this, but it recalls the difficult time that 

many States and the Federal Government had in coming up with 

the right formula to outlaw cross burning. As you may recall, the 

United States Supreme Court in one instance found the anti-crossburning statutes to be unconstitutional, and then in a later decision found one to be constitutional. Very difficult in terms of the 

technical language that they utilized. 

As I understand the Brandenberg case, the Court requires an 

element of immediacy. So it’s more than just urging. And I suppose 

you can even urge or incite someone in a non-immediate manner 

and you wouldn’t be allowed to be prosecuted under a reading of 

our free speech clause of the Constitution. 

And so I would just tell the gentleman, I find a tension between 

his two sections where he talks about the fact that it shall not 

mean to—mere oral or written advocacy or expression, but before 

that, you include within the definition to incite or organize, that it 

includes but not limited to urging or—and that seems so broad. 

And if it is more broad than just urging, what is not contained in 

it. And, frankly, I would just say I would be happy to be—to work 

with the gentleman—— 

Mr. NADLER. Which language are you—which language are you 

referring to? What line? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I’m referring on page 4 as it continues over 

from subsection (e). The gentleman talks about the promotion— 

well, to promote, encourage, which are far different than participate in, a violation of the section, that includes but is not limited 

to an urging. And then you go into other words. That seems rather 

expansive to me. 

Now, maybe the gentleman can show previous legislative history 

to prior—to other laws that are that broad, but that to me is—— 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield? 

182 

Mr. LUNGREN.—in tension with what the Supreme Court has instructed—— 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LUNGREN. I’ll be happy to yield. 

Mr. NADLER. I would ask unanimous consent to amend the 

amendment to take out the words ‘‘but is not limited to.’’ 

Mr. LUNGREN. He’s asked unanimous consent—I don’t know if 

that’s—that’s on the table. 

Mr. NADLER. I ask—well, because you—the gentleman just pointed out—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. No, I know. I understand that. But I’m talking 

about procedure where he has to consider your unanimous consent. 

Mr. NADLER. Oh. Well, I would ask unanimous consent to delete 

the words in line 2 on page 4, ‘‘but is limited’’—‘‘but is not limited 

to.’’ I think the point the gentleman makes may be well taken and 

I don’t need those words. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Is there an objection to the unanimous consent 

request? 

[No response.] 

Mr. SMITH. All right. If not, without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I think 

that improves it. I’m not sure it answers my questions entirely. 

What I was going to say to the gentleman is I’d be happy to work 

with you—others may as well—to try and see if we could come up 

with something perhaps in a stand-alone piece of legislation, because this really needs some delicate treatment, and I’m not prepared to support an amendment like this at this time without us 

working harder. And I—— 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman—if the gentleman would yield? 

Mr. LUNGREN. I’d be happy to yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I appreciate the—what the gentleman 

says. I’ll ask unanimous consent, with that view, to try to work this 

out, because I do think it is important. I’ll withdraw the amendment at this time. 

Mr. SMITH. Does the gentleman ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment? 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. I just did. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Are there any other amendments? The gentleman from Virginia, 

Mr. Scott, is recognized for the purposes of offering an amendment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. It’s 

the one that’s handwritten. 

Mr. SMITH. The clerk will report the handwritten amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute, offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. Page 6, line 18, after 

‘‘life,’’ delete ‘‘, or, if death results, may be sentenced to death.’’ 

[The amendment offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia follows:] 

183 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 

5 minutes to explain the amendment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for it being handwritten, but it was 

pointed out that the part we struck in the original amendment 

didn’t—it struck too much so we had to amend it. This basically 

takes the death penalty out of the bill. 

Mr. Chairman, what we know about the death penalty is, at best, 

there’s a debate on whether it reduces crime or not. I think most 

of the evidence shows if it does anything, it increases crime. But 

it’s debatable whether it does anything or not. 

We know the death penalty is applied in an arbitrary manner, 

it’s applied in a discriminatory manner, and it’s applied with mistakes. Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, this has problems not only that 

apply to general death penalties, but the way it’s applied in this 

bill, you have federalism problems. It gives the Federal Government authority to prosecute murders that are clearly State crimes. 

It imposes a Federal will on jurisdictions that do not have any 

death penalty. And it sets up a tenuous connection for the extension of Federal authority into what is traditionally State domain, 

which will probably induce turmoil and litigation as to whether it’s 

even constitutional to do what we’re doing. 


1751M.eps
184 

It’s, furthermore, Mr. Chairman, not really timely. We still make 

mistakes in the death penalty. The Innocence Protection Act has 

not done all it should have done. We’re still working through the 

mistakes in the process. We have talked about habeas corpus and 

what—how that fits in. And we should not be creating new Federal 

death penalties when we haven’t gotten the old death penalty 

straight yet. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I previously asked unanimous consent to 

introduce into the record comments by the State Courts—National 

Conference of State Courts on this bill. They’ve asked for a lot to 

help court security. The death penalty wasn’t one of them. I would 

remind the Members of that and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman yields back. For what purpose does 

the gentleman from Texas seek recognition? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Strike the last word. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do appreciate the motivation of the gentleman from Virginia, 

but with regard to striking the death penalty, that is one of the 

principal components of this. It makes the death penalty available 

for those who would seek to kill, murder—kidnap and kill, murder 

a Federal official and especially a Federal judge, a member of a 

Federal judge’s family, providing those kinds of protection. 

Now, there is—there are many constitutional protections involved in the death penalty as we’ve seen, not merely just protection of a jury of one’s peers, but also the enormous appellate avenues available, the writ process. 

Let me just mention some of the groups that are supporting this 

so that everyone understands. We’ve gotten indications of support, 

unsolicited, but some have just notified us they want to support 

this: the Federal Bar Association, the Federal Criminal Investigator Association, the Fraternal Order of Police. Those are—State 

entities. International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, International Union of Police Association, the AFLCIO, Major County Sheriffs Association, National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, National Law Enforcement Council, California State Sheriffs Association, National Sheriffs Association, National Troopers Coalition—those are State troopers—American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and the National Court Reporters Association. 

As I said earlier, if tougher sentences do not help reduce crime, 

then the trend over the last 20 years of having tougher sentences 

and the crime rate going down, they may not seem related to some, 

but I can tell you this, as a judge who has tried capital murder 

cases: Jurors are extremely concerned about the evidence that 

shows someone is a future danger, about any evidence that mitigates against the death penalty. Those are proper considerations 

for the jury. But I can also tell you without any regard for whether 

you believe this study, don’t believe that study, take the position 

that waiting 22 years to impose a capital punishment penalty just 

skews any proper study of the deterrent effect, I can tell you this: 

The recidivism rate for those who would kill or murder a Federal 

judge or a Federal judge’s family will be zero. 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GOHMERT. I yield back my time. 

185 

Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman has yielded back his time. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the last 

word. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. I support this excellent amendment, and I yield to 

the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, and I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

First of all, this doesn’t say whether you can have a death penalty or not. The States, if they want, can have a death penalty. 

This just—there just wouldn’t be any Federal death penalty. And, 

furthermore, Mr. Chairman, this isn’t just for Federal judges. It’s 

for anybody who has—whose job is even partially paid for with 

Federal money, a federally funded public safety officer. So that 

could be—that could be local police if you’ve got COPS money. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would adopt the amendment. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from New York, does he yield back 

the balance of his time? 

Mr. NADLER. Yes, I do. 

Mr. SMITH. If so the question occurs on the second degree amendment. All those in favor, say aye? All those opposed, say nay? 

The nays appear to have it. The nays have it. The amendment 

is not agreed to. 

Are there any other amendments? If not, the question occurs on 

the amendment in the nature of a substitute as amended offered 

by the gentleman from Texas. All in favor, say aye? All opposed—— [Laughter.] 

All opposed, nay? 

The ayes still have it, and the amendment in the nature of a substitute is agreed to. 

The question occurs on the motion to report the bill H.R. 1751 

favorably as amended. All in favor, say aye? All opposed, no? 

The ayes have it, and the motion to report the bill favorably is 

agreed to. Without objection, the bill will—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Could I have a recorded vote on that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. A request has been made for a reported—a recorded 

vote, and the clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Coble? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins? 

Mr. JENKINS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon? 

186 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis? 

Mr. INGLIS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, aye. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller? 

Mr. KELLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Flake? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Pence? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes? 

Mr. FORBES. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King? 

Mr. KING. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney? 

Mr. FEENEY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, aye. Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, aye. Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt? 

Mr. WATT. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No. 

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, no. Ms. Waters? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan? 

Mr. MEEHAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner? 

Mr. WEINER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye. 

187 

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sa ́nchez? 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Sa ́nchez, aye. Mr. Van Hollen? 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Ms. Wasserman Schultz? 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Wasserman Schultz, aye. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, aye. 

Mr. SMITH. Are there any other Members who wish to vote or 

change their vote? The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, aye. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon. 

Mr. CANNON. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, aye. 

Mr. SMITH. Are there any other Members who wish to vote or 

change their vote? The gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. 

Mr. SMITH. The gentlewoman from California. 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. 

Mr. SMITH. Are there any other Members who wish to vote or 

change their vote? If not, the clerk will report the vote. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 27 ayes and 4 noes. 

Mr. SMITH. The motion to report the bill as agreed to. Without 

objection, the bill will be reported favorably to the House in the 

form of a single amendment in the nature of a substitute incorporating the amendments adopted here today. 

Without objection, the staff is directed to make any technical and 

conforming changes. All Members will be given 2 days as provided 

by the House Rules in which to submit additional dissenting, supplemental, or minority views. 

Let me make an announcement to all our Members who are here. 

We obviously have a series of votes that have just been called. Also 

the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, which came out of this Committee is on the House floor immediately after these votes. So we 

will be standing in recess pending the call of the Chair until after 

the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act is considered on the House floor. 

Then we will return and take up the third and remaining bill that 

we have to consider today. 

Without—the gentlewoman from California has asked unanimous 

consent to change her vote, and without objection, that will be done 

and the record will reflect the correct vote. 

We stand in recess until the call of the Chair. 

[Intervening business.] 

That concludes the markup. I thank everyone for their participation. Without objection, the markup is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(189) 

1 Hearing on H.R. 1751, the ‘‘Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005’’ Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the Committee on the 

Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7, 10 (2005) (statement of Chairman Howard Coble) 

DISSENTING VIEWS

H.R. 1751, the ‘‘Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection 

Act of 2005’’ was introduced to address acts of violence occurring 

in and around courthouses and against judges, prosecutors, witnesses, law enforcement, and other court personnel.1 However, in 

it’s original form, the legislation failed to include several key provisions that would help it achieve this objective. Namely, it failed to 

provide state courts with adequate funding in the form of grants 

in order to improve courtroom safety and security. It also failed to 

provide the U.S. Marshals Service with the necessary resources to 

expand the investigative and protective services it currently provides to members of the federal judiciary. 

Fortunately, thanks to the Majority’s willingness to work with 

the Democratic members on the committee, many of these issues 

have been adequately addressed. However, two important issues 

still remain. Specifically, the legislation’s creation of sixteen new 

mandatory minimum criminal sentences and its establishment of a 

new death penalty eligible offense. It is for these reasons, and 

those set out below, that we respectfully dissent. 

THE LEGISLATION IMPOSES INEFFECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY

MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES

HR 1751 proposes to add 16 new mandatory minimum sentences 

to the current criminal code. Mandatory minimum penalties have 

been studied extensively and the vast majority of available research clearly indicates that they do not work. Among other things, 

they have been shown to distort the sentencing process, to discriminate against minorities in their application, and to waste valuable 

taxpayer money. 

The Judicial Conference of the United States, which sees the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on individual cases as well 

as on the criminal justice system as whole, has expressed its deep 

opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing over a dozen times 

to Congress, noting that these sentences ‘‘severely distort and damage the Federal sentencing system . . . undermine the Sentencing 

Guideline regimen’’ established by Congress to promote fairness 

and proportionality, and ‘‘destroy honesty in sentencing by encouraging charge and fact plea bargains.’’ 

In fact, in a recent letter to Members of the Crime Subcommittee 

regarding H.R. 1279, the ‘‘Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2005,’’ the Conference noted that mandatory minimum 

sentences create ‘‘the opposite of their intended effect. Far from fostering certainty in punishment, mandatory minimums result in unVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:59 Nov 07, 2005 Jkt 049006 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR271.XXX HR271
190 

2Section 4 defines a ‘‘federally funded public safety officer’’ as any individual who receives federal financial assistance while serving a public (federal, state or local government) agency in 

the capacity of a judicial officer, law enforcement officer, firefighter, chaplain, or as a member 

of a rescue squad or ambulance crew. 

warranted sentencing disparity. Mandatory minimums . . . treat 

dissimilar offenders in a similar manner, although those offenders 

can be quite different with respect to the seriousness of their conduct or their danger to society . . .’’ and . . . , ‘‘require the sentencing court to impose the same sentence on offenders when sound 

policy and common sense call for reasonable differences in punishment.’’ 

Additionally, both the Judicial Center in its study report entitled 

‘‘The General Effects of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A Longitudinal Study of Federal Sentences Imposed’’ and the United 

States Sentencing Commission in its study entitled ‘‘Mandatory 

Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System’’ found 

that minorities were substantially more likely than whites under 

comparable circumstances to receive mandatory minimum sentences. The Sentencing Commission study also reflected that mandatory minimum sentences increased the disparity in sentencing of 

like offenders with no evidence that mandatory minimum sentences 

had any more crime-reduction impact than discretionary sentences. 

The inconsistent and arbitrary nature of mandatory minimum 

sentences is made readily apparent by a quick analysis of section 

2 of the bill. Section 2 establishes a one year mandatory minimum 

(with a 10 year maximum criminal penalty) for assaulting the immediate family member of a law enforcement officer or judge—if 

the assault results in bodily injury. However, just a few lines later 

in the same section, an identical criminal penalty is established for 

a simple threat. Thus, the same section of the bill makes two completely different actions, with considerably varying outcomes, subject to the same term of imprisonment. 

Ultimately, the continued reliance on mandatory minimum sentences will not lead to a decrease in crime as some contend, but 

only further expand an ever-increasing prison population. And, 

with more than 2.1 million Americans currently in jail or prison— 

roughly quadruple the number of individuals incarcerated in 

1985—it’s hard to see how anyone can continue with such a deeply 

flawed strategy. Today, the United States incarcerates its citizens 

at a rate 14 times that of Japan, 8 times the rate of France and 

6 times the rate of Canada; and expends approximately $40 billion 

a year in incarceration costs, alone. 

THE LEGISLATION UNWISELY EXPANDS THE USE OF THE

FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

H.R. 1751 unwisely creates a new death penalty eligible offense 

for anyone convicted of killing a federally funded public safety officer.2 Expansion of the use of the federal death penalty in the current environment is patently unwarranted. The public is clearly rethinking the appropriateness of the death penalty, in general, due 

to the evidence that it is ineffective in deterring crime, is racially 

discriminatory, and is more often than not found to be erroneously 

applied. In a 23-year comprehensive study of death penalties, 68% 

were found to be erroneously applied. So, it is not surprising that 

191 

119 people sentenced to death for murder over the past 12 years 

have been completely exonerated of those crimes. Nor is it surprising with that such a lackluster record of death penalty administrations that several states have abolished the death penalty. For 

example, Connecticut has not executed anyone in 45 years. 

Without a doubt, the increasing numbers of innocent people released from death row illustrates the fallibility of the current system. Last year, a University of Michigan study identified 199 murder exonerations since 1989, 73 of them in capital cases. Moreover, 

the same study found that death row inmates represent a quarter 

of 1 percent of the prison population but 22 percent of the exonerated. 

Equally disturbing is the fact that in its application, the death 

penalty is often applied in a racially and economically discriminatory manner. A careful study of the use of the death penalty in the 

United States undertaken by the United Nations’ Human Rights 

Commission in 1998 issued a report which rightly concluded that: 

‘‘Race, ethnic origin and economic status appear to be key determinants of who will, and who will not, receive a sentence of death.’’ 

Unfortunately, these problems are not confined to state systems. 

A recent Department of Justice survey documents racial, ethnic 

and geographic disparity in the charging of federal capital cases. 

Indeed, the review found that in 75 percent of the cases in which 

a federal prosecutor sought the death penalty, the defendant was 

a member of a minority group. The explanation for these extremely 

troubling disparities is unclear, but the possibility of discrimination 

and bias cannot be ruled out. 

DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS

1. Amendment offered by Rep. Chabot & Rep. Conyers 

Description of amendment: The Chabot/Conyers amendment provides federal judges with the discretion to allow media coverage of 

courtroom proceedings. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was adopted by a vote of 

20 to 12. Ayes: Representatives Goodlatte, Chabot, Hostettler, 

Green, King, Franks, Conyers, Berman, Nadler, Lofgren, Waters, 

Delahunt, Schiff, Sanchez, Van Hollen, Wasserman Schultz, Coble, 

Meehan, Inglis, Weiner. 

Nays: Representatives Smith, Gallegly, Jenkins, Canon, Keller, 

Issa, Flake, Forbes, Feeney, Gohmert, Scott, Watt. 

2. Amendment offered by Rep. Schiff & Rep. Weiner 

Description of amendment: The Schiff/Weiner amendment directs 

the Attorney General, through the Office of Justice Programs, to 

award grants to state courts in order to enhance courtroom safety 

and security. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voicevote. 

3. Amendment offered by Rep. Schiff & Rep. Weiner 

Description of amendment: The Schiff/Weiner amendment authorizes $20 million for each of fiscal years 2006 to 2010 for the 

hiring of entry-level deputy marshals to provide judicial security; 

192 

for the hiring of senior-level deputy marshals to investigate 

threats; and to enhance the Office of Protective Intelligence. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voicevote. 

4. Amendment offered by Rep. Scott 

Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 

strike section 11 of the bill. Section 11 placed limits on the ability 

of an individual to apply for the writ of habeas corpus. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voicevote. 

5. Amendment offered by Rep. Scott & Rep. Waters 

Description of amendment: The Scott/Waters amendment proposed to strike all of the mandatory minimum criminal sentences 

from the text of the substitute amendment. 

Vote on amendment: Subject to an agreement between the Majority and Mr. Scott to work together to address some of the concerns 

highlighted by the amendment, the amendment was withdrawn. 

6. Amendment offered by Rep. Jackson Lee 

Description of amendment: The Jackson Lee amendment directs 

the Attorney General to establish a grant program for states to establish threat assessment databases. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to by voicevote. 

7. Amendment offered by Rep. Jackson Lee 

Description of amendment: The Jackson Lee amendment authorizes the Director of Bureau Justice Assistance to make grants 

available to state and local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies for the establishment of juvenile and young adult witness assistance programs. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was agreed to without a 

recorded vote. 

8. Amendment offered by Rep. Nadler 

Description of amendment: Building upon the current incitement 

to riot statute, the Nadler amendment would make it a crime to 

incite, to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on, 

to commit any act of violence against a judge or other court personnel. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was withdrawn by Rep. 

Nadler. 

9. Amendment offered by Rep. Scott 

Description of amendment: The Scott amendment proposed to 

eliminate the new death penalty offense created in subsection (a) 

of section 4 of the substitute amendment. 

Vote on amendment: The amendment was defeated by voice-vote. 

193 

JOHN CONYERS, JR. ROBERT C. SCOTT. MELVIN L. WATT. SHEILA JACKSON LEE. MAXINE WATERS. 

(195) 

ADDITIONAL DISSENTING VIEWS

I share the concerns expressed in the dissenting views that H.R. 

1751 unnecessarily and unwisely creates sixteen new mandatory 

minimum criminal sentences and a new death penalty eligible offense. In addition, I also believe that the bill as reported contains 

an ill-advised provision authorizing the discretionary use of cameras in federal courtrooms. 

During the markup I raised a point of order that the amendment 

offered by Mr. Chabot and Ranking Member Conyers was not germane. My objection was overruled and the amendment passed. The 

broad authorization to use cameras in courtrooms now included in 

H.R. 1751, however, clearly has no direct relation to the security 

issues underlying the bill as introduced. Moreover, although there 

is a substantial body of law and literature balancing the competing 

rights of defendants to a fair trial with the rights of the public and 

the press to access to the courtroom, this amendment was adopted 

without the benefit of any consideration or evaluation of this information. Because I believe that there was inadequate process for 

considering this amendment and also disagree with the policy it 

authorizes, I respectfully dissent. 

MELVIN L. WATT. 

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