*

The Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Michigan, sitting by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0169p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL HINOJOSA,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 08-1393

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 06-00093-01—Paul Lewis Maloney, Chief District Judge.

Argued: April 28, 2010

Decided and Filed: June 9, 2010 

Before: CLAY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; ZATKOFF, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jeffrey J. O’Hara, LAW OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant.

Daniel Y. Mekaru, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids,

Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey J. O’Hara, LAW OFFICE, Grand Rapids,

Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel Y. Mekaru, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee. 

_________________

OPINION

_________________

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF, District Judge. Following a bench trial, Defendant

was convicted and sentenced on the following six counts: (1) two counts of Sexual

Exploitation of a Child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e); (2) two counts of

1
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 2

1

The district court and the parties referred to Defendant’s minor daughter as “S.” We refer to her

in the same manner.

Distribution of Image of Minor Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); (3) one count of Possession of Images of Minors

Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2);

and (4) one count of Possession of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). 

Defendant’s appeal contains the following three issues, all relating to the district

court’s denial of each of his four motions to suppress evidence: 

I. Whether the entry into Appellant’s home and the Appellant’s arrest

based on a non-existent warrant resulted in Fourth Amendment

constitutional violations which required suppression of the evidence

seized? 

II. Whether the Appellant’s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights

were violated when the police made an uninvited and warrantless

intrusion into his home, enabling the police to observe evidence which

was used to obtain a search warrant? 

III. Whether the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant must be

suppressed because of the Fourth Amendment constitutional violations

involved in obtaining that search warrant?

For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was targeted as part of an international child pornography

investigation involving authorities from the United States and Canada. As part of the

investigation, undercover Canadian officials communicated with Defendant in an

internet chat room that was believed to be a forum for exchanging child pornography.

The online conversations contained graphic sexual talk, including Defendant’s claims

that he had engaged in sexual activities with his 13-year-old daughter “S.”1
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 3

2

The warrant was issued in Oakland County, Michigan, for a probation violation. The decision

to proceed on the warrant is discussed in greater detail in Part III.A infra. 

In conjunction with these chat sessions, Defendant began to electronically

transfer computer files that contained videos and images of child pornography. During

a March 1, 2006, chat session, Defendant sent the Canadian officials two files containing

videos depicting child pornography. He also provided three images of a young female,

later determined to be S. On March 10, 2006, Defendant sent the agents another

pornographic video file, which he claimed involved himself and S engaging in sexual

activity. When questioned, Defendant acknowledged that S was 13 years old at the time

the video was filmed. 

The Canadian agents traced the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the transferring

computer to Comcast, located in Michigan. The investigation was thereafter turned over

to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the United States. ICE issued

Comcast a subpoena to ascertain the subscriber information for the tracked IP address.

Comcast complied with the subpoena and informed the agents that the IP address was

registered in Defendant’s name at Defendant’s Lansing, Michigan, home address. The

agents later confirmed that a vehicle present at that address was registered in

Defendant’s name. 

As part of the investigation, ICE Special Agent Craig Smith requested a check

of Defendant’s criminal history. Two different databases were consulted: The National

Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Law Enforcement Information Network

(LEIN), the latter having been consulted on two occasions by different officers.

The LEIN report and the NCIC report were inconsistent in several ways. The

most significant difference was that the LEIN report indicated that Defendant had an

outstanding arrest warrant, while the NCIC report contained no such indication. Despite

several inconsistencies between the reports, Agent Smith and ICE Special Agent

Michael George, accompanied by members of the Lansing Police Department, traveled

to Defendant’s residence to execute the arrest warrant.2

 After arriving, they knocked on

the door. Defendant’s then-wife, Christine Spears (“Spears”), answered the door, and
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 4

the officers identified themselves. The officers informed Spears that they needed to

speak with Defendant regarding an important matter and asked permission to enter the

residence, which Spears granted. 

Spears informed the officers that Defendant was feeling ill and was asleep in the

bedroom. She offered to rouse him. The parties disagree over what happened next. The

government contends that Spears consented to the officers’ request to accompany her to

the bedroom. Defendant maintains that no such consent was given, and that Spears was

unaware that the officers had followed her until she reached the bedroom. While

proceeding down the hallway to the bedroom, the agents recognized certain hardwood

flooring, a set of French doors, and a distinctive black-and-white tile pattern in the

bathroom, all of which were visible in the videos and images that Defendant had

transferred to the Canadian authorities. 

Upon entering Defendant’s bedroom, Agent George identified himself and briefly

questioned Defendant about S. Defendant’s responses confirmed S’s age and that it was

S pictured in a non-pornographic image that Defendant had transmitted to the

authorities. The officers then informed Defendant of the investigation and requested

consent to search the residence and Defendant’s computer. Defendant declined to

consent to the searches. 

At that point, Defendant was placed under arrest and advised of his Miranda

rights. Defendant waived his rights and admitted to a sexual relationship with S and to

the manufacture of pornography involving himself and S. During the interview, the

agents determined that Defendant should be removed from the residence and taken to the

police station. After arriving at the station, the interview continued, and Defendant

confessed to engaging in sexual conduct with S on over fifty occasions. He also

admitted that he manufactured the pornographic videos and images that he transmitted

to the Canadian authorities.

Meanwhile, Agent Smith prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. The

affidavit recited facts obtained both from the officers’ observations of the residence and

Defendant’s statements, along with the knowledge previously gathered during the
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 5

investigation. A magistrate judge issued a search warrant, which was executed later that

day. 

A grand jury returned a six-count indictment. Defendant filed four motions to

suppress evidence, arguing that his arrest and the subsequent search were

unconstitutional. Following an evidentiary hearing, at which Defendant refused to

permit his attorney to make objections, call witnesses, or “argue the facts of the case,”

the district court orally denied three of the motions. After requesting additional briefing

on the remaining issue—the suppression of Defendant’s pre-Miranda statements—the

district court denied that motion as well. 

The district court held a bench trial, at which Defendant again waived his rights

to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present opening and closing

arguments. The district court found Defendant guilty on all six counts. At the

sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences on

each count, for a total sentence of 1,440 months of imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v.

Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 431

(6th Cir. 2005). “Where a district court denies [a motion to suppress], this court

considers the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the government.’” United States

v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting United States v.

Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 654–55 (6th Cir. 2004)).

This court is not restricted to considering only the evidence presented at a

suppression hearing, and it may consider evidence offered at trial to uphold the denial

of a motion to suppress. United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1993);

United States v. McKinney, 379 F.3d 259, 264 (6th Cir. 1967). 
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 6

III. ANALYSIS

A. Arrest Warrant

Defendant first attacks the district court’s conclusion that the officers’ reliance

on the arrest warrant was not unreasonable. He alleges that the inconsistencies between

the criminal history reports should have alerted the officers that the warrant was issued

for a person other than Defendant (i.e., a different person named Michael Hinojosa).

Defendant insists that all evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless entry into his

home should be suppressed. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)

(requiring that police officers obtain a warrant prior to entering a residence in order to

effectuate an arrest unless exigent circumstances are present). 

Defendant directs our attention to the following discrepancies between the LEIN

and NCIC reports: (1) the reports contained different social-security numbers; (2) the

reports contained different dates of birth; (3) the reports contained different driver’s

license numbers; (4) the listed heights varied by one inch; (5) the listed weights varied

by sixty pounds; and (6) only the LEIN report indicated an active arrest warrant. He

additionally identifies several other factors that he believes should have put the officers

on notice that they were dealing with two unique individuals: (1) the warrant was issued

in Oakland County, to which Defendant had no known ties; (2) Defendant’s only prior

criminal history involved a 1995 incident that included 2 years of probation, which

probationary period would have expired long before the bench warrant issued;

(3) Defendant’s name and hair and eye color (both brown) are all very common and

therefore should not support a conclusion that the reports referred to the same person;

and (4) a quick check of the Michigan Department of Corrections website would have

resolved the issue in Defendant’s favor.

On appeal, the government does not dispute that the relied-upon warrant was

issued for a person other than Defendant. Instead, the government contends that the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Herring v. United States, __ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 695

(2009), mandates that exclusion is not the proper remedy for mistakes that result from

police negligence. 
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 7

The resolution of this issue is unnecessary, however, because even if we were to

assume that the officers’ reliance on the arrest warrant was unreasonable under Herring,

Defendant will be unable to obtain the relief he seeks. As discussed infra, the officers

received consent to enter Defendant’s residence; therefore, an arrest warrant was not a

prerequisite for such entry. See, e.g., United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th

Cir. 1994) (“[A] denial of a motion to suppress will be affirmed on appeal if the district

court’s conclusion can be justified for any reason.”).

B. Consent

The government asserts that, despite being armed with an arrest warrant, it

nonetheless sought and received consent from Spears prior to entering the residence, and

again before proceeding from the entryway of the residence to the bedroom. Defendant

does not seriously dispute the initial consent, but he challenges whether the officers had

consent to proceed beyond the entryway. 

“It is well settled that a person may waive his Fourth Amendment rights by

consenting to a search.” Carter, 378 F.3d at 587 (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.

582, 593–94 (1946)). “Consent to search only vitiates the warrant requirement if

consent was voluntarily given.” United States v. Aaron, 33 Fed. Appx. 180, 183 (6th

Cir. 2002) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)). It is well settled that

valid consent may be given by a third party with common authority over the premises.

See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171–72 (1974); United States v. McCauley,

548 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2008). 

 “Generally, whether consent to a search was voluntarily given is a question of

fact.” United States v. Buchanan, 904 F.2d 349, 355 (6th Cir. 1990). “It is the

Government’s burden by a preponderance of the evidence, to show through ‘clear and

positive’ testimony that valid consent was obtained.” United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d

523, 541 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 625 (6th

Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). When determining whether consent was

voluntarily given, the reviewing court is to examine the totality of the circumstances

involved. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 8

There has been no challenge to Spears’s authority or ability to provide valid

consent. The record further indicates that the interaction between the officers and Spears

was devoid of coercion or intimidation. In regard to the officers’ demeanor, Spears

testified that “[t]hey were fairly polite. They saw I had two small children. I mean they

let it be known it was important they speak to [Defendant], but they weren’t intimidating

or aggressive in any way.” (9/19/07 Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 99). In fact, Spears’s cooperation

was the reason why the officers continued to seek consent, rather than proceed on the

authority of the warrant, which Agent George termed a “soft approach.” (9/19/07 Mot.

Hr’g Tr. at 59–60). 

Agent George testified that he requested consent to follow Spears to the bedroom

for “officer safety” and that Spears did not object. (9/19/07 Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 64). Spears

recalled the encounter as follows: 

Q. Do you remember one of the agents saying that he asked to

accompany you back to the bedroom? 

A: I don’t recall that, but I’m not saying it didn’t happen, I just don’t

remember. 

Q: Do you recall any of the law enforcement officers or agents saying

that we need to accompany you for officer safety? 

A: I don’t remember that.

(9/19/07 Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 99).

The district court credited Agent George’s testimony that valid consent was

requested and received for the continued entry. “We afford the district court’s credibility

determinations regarding witness testimony great deference and must uphold its findings

of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Esteppe, 483 F.3d 447, 452

(6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Horn, 355 F.3d 610, 613 (6th Cir. 2007)). The

district court’s credibility finding is particularly compelling in this case because Spears’s

testimony did not contradict that of Agent George; rather, she simply could not recall

whether she was asked for permission to further enter the residence. See United States
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 9

v. Dillard, 438 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s adoption of

officer testimony when that testimony was not contradicted by the record). 

In rebuttal, Defendant presents an alternative explanation of Spears’s testimony:

that the officers did not ask for, and Spears did not give, consent to proceed past the

entryway. Defendant simply concludes that the district court erred in not accepting this

reading. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence,” the district court does

not clearly err in accepting one interpretation over the other. United States v. NavarroCamacho, 186 F.3d 701, 708 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also United States

v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1494

(6th Cir. 1989). 

Defendant also points out that the above testimony never indicates that Spears

affirmatively responded to the officers’ request, but there is no requirement that consent

must be verbally given. See Carter, 378 F.3d at 589 (“Carter asks us to hold as a matter

of law that consent must be given verbally, perhaps by some ‘magic words’ formula.

This we decline to do.”). The district court thus did not clearly err in finding that

Spears’s non-verbal actions constituted valid consent. 

Finally, the government briefly attempts to justify the continued entry as a

protective sweep under Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). There is nothing in the

record, other than the reference to “officer safety” in requesting the further consent, to

indicate that such a sweep took place. Because the officers did not exceed the scope of

the received consent, however, we need not consider this alternate justification. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court

did not clearly err in finding that Spears consented to the officers’ continued entry into

the residence.

C. Search Warrant

Defendant next argues that the affidavit prepared to apply for the search warrant

referenced illegally-obtained evidence that should have been suppressed, including

(1) the statements he made both prior and subsequent to receiving his Miranda warnings;
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 10

3

Defendant also objects to what he deems to be false evidence contained in the affidavit,

specifically the statement that there was a valid arrest warrant. He fails to explain, however, how the

existence of an arrest warrant for an unrelated probation violation was material to the magistrate judge’s

probable-cause determination. 

and (2) the officers’ observations of his residence.3 Defendant further submits that the

affidavit lacks probable cause without this evidence. 

1. Defendant’s Statements Were Properly Included in the Affidavit

i. Pre-Miranda Statements 

Defendant first challenges the inclusion of his pre-Miranda statements in the

affidavit. The district court concluded that Miranda warnings were not required because

Defendant was not in custody during the preliminary questioning. 

The Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from compelled selfincrimination, see U.S. CONST. amend. V, and the Supreme Court has required that a

criminal defendant be apprised of certain rights prior to a custodial interrogation.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). The Miranda requirements apply

only “when there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in

custody.’” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 

We consider several factors when determining whether an interrogation was of

a custodial nature, including (1) the location of the interview; (2) the length and manner

of the questioning; (3) whether there was any restraint on the individual’s freedom of

movement; and (4) whether the individual was told that he or she did not need to answer

the questions. United States v. Panak, 552 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2009); United States

v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 942, 950

(6th Cir. 1998).

It is significant to our inquiry that the questioning occurred at Defendant’s home.

This court has found that such a venue generally does not present a coercive

environment. See, e.g., Panek, 552 F.3d at 467; Salvo, 133 F.3d at 950. The remaining

factors do not require a finding to the contrary. The interview was of short

duration—lasting only a few brief questions—and there is nothing to suggest that the
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 11

officers acted in a hostile or coercive manner. No weapons were drawn, nor were any

threats made. The officers did not place Defendant in handcuffs or otherwise restrain

his freedom. In addition, Defendant refused to consent to the further search of the

residence, which suggests that the environment was not coercive. 

Although the officers did not advise Defendant that he was not under arrest, their

failure to do so does not automatically render the encounter custodial. Rather, it is

merely “one factor among many” to be considered. Panek, 552 F.3d at 467. Likewise,

Defendant was not informed of the existence of the arrest warrant. Because he was

unaware of the warrant, “[its] existence could not have affected how [he] understood

[his] position, which is the only relevant consideration . . . .” United States v. Reynolds,

762 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1985). This reasoning similarly curtails Defendant’s

suggestion that, because the officers intended to arrest him the entire time, he was

effectively in custody as soon as they entered the residence. See Berkemer v. McCarty,

468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“A policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the

question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time; the only relevant

inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his

situation.”).

Based on the totality of the encounter, we find that the initial interrogation did

not present a custodial environment such that Miranda warnings were required prior to

questioning. Defendant’s pre-Miranda statements were therefore properly included in

the affidavit. 

ii. Post-Arrest Statements 

Defendant also challenges the statements he made following his arrest, arguing

that the arrest was illegal because the officers did not possess a valid arrest warrant. The

district court held that the officers had probable cause to believe Defendant had

committed felonies relating to the possession and transfer of child pornography. 

At the time of Defendant’s arrest, the arresting officers were aware of both the

information gathered prior to entering the residence and the corroborating facts learned
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 12

4

In fact, it is only the tiling at issue, because Agents Smith and George each testified that the

hardwood floors and French doors were visible from the entryway. (9/19/2007 Mot. Hr.’g Tr. at 40–41;

61–62). 

while inside, including the recognition of the decor and Defendant’s responses to their

initial questioning. The district court correctly determined that probable cause to arrest

Defendant existed independent of the arrest warrant. See United States v. Harness, 453

F.3d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that officers may effectuate an arrest so long as

they have “reasonably trustworthy information” that would “warrant a prudent man” in

believing that the defendant was committing, or had committed, a crime). 

Following the valid arrest, the officers immediately advised Defendant of his

Miranda rights, which he waived. Defendant does not argue that this waiver was

involuntary or coerced. Accordingly, Defendant’s post-arrest statements were properly

included in the affidavit. 

2. The Officers’ Plain-View Observations Were Properly Included in

the Affidavit

Defendant next argues that all evidence gained by the officers after leaving the

entryway was not properly included in the search-warrant affidavit. This “evidence”

consists of the officers’ observations of the hardwood floors, bathroom tiling, and French

doors, which the officers recognized as matching those in the videos and photographs.4

The government responds that these items were all in plain view during their progression

to the bedroom. 

Defendant’s argument is undermined by the fact that the officers did not “seize”

any evidence. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1990) (differentiating

between observation and seizure of items in plain view); United States v. Jackson, 131

F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Viewing an article that is already in plain view does

not involve an invasion of privacy and, consequently, does not constitute a search

implicating the Fourth Amendment[.]”). Moreover, there was no testimony that the

officers manipulated any of Defendant’s property when making their observations (i.e.,

they did not open any doors, etc.). See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987)
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 13

(finding that plain-view observations turned into a Fourth Amendment search when

officers moved audio speakers to ascertain ID numbers). 

Here, the officers received consent to enter the house and, once inside, to proceed

down the hallway and into the bedroom. Because everything that the officers observed

was in plain view from their lawful position, no constitutionally improper search

occurred. The officers therefore did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by

observing the decor of his residence, and those observations were properly included in

the affidavit. 

3. Probable Cause Existed Prior to Entry 

Finally, even if we were to excise the allegedly offending portions, we would

disagree with Defendant’s contention that the affidavit lacks probable cause. 

The Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable

cause.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that a magistrate’s duty

in determining probable cause is to:

[M]ake a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the

‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found in a particular place.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 

 In United States v. Terry, 522 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2008), this court found that

probable cause existed to issue a search warrant where images involving child

pornography were sent from an email address registered to the defendant, and the

government established that the defendant had accessed that email account at his home

address. Id. at 648. Likewise, in United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006),

this court upheld a probable-cause finding based primarily on evidence of subscriptions

to websites involving child pornography. Id. at 540. See also United States v. Lapsins,

570 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming probable-cause finding based on images
No. 08-1393 United States v. Hinojosa Page 14

that were uploaded using screen names connected to the defendant and his home

address). 

Prior to entering the residence, the officers had established that (1) videos and

images involving child pornography were transferred to undercover agents from a

specific IP address; (2) the IP address was registered to Defendant at a Lansing,

Michigan, address; and (3) Defendant resided at the Lansing, Michigan, address. Based

on the above-cited authorities, this evidence would have established the required “fair

probability” that evidence of criminal activity would be found inside Defendant’s

residence, and it would have justified the issuance of a search warrant. See, e.g., Gates,

462 U.S. at 238. 

Defendant maintains that an IP address is insufficient to establish that evidence

of child pornography would be present in his residence because IP addresses are not

always accessed at the registered address. This court has considered, and rejected,

similar arguments. See Lapsins, 570 F.3d at 767 (finding probable cause even though

there was “no direct evidence that [the defendant] used a home computer to access his

accounts” where the evidence showed that child pornography was uploaded under the

defendant’s user name and in his city of residence); Wagers, 452 F.3d at 540 (agreeing

that “evidence that a person has visited or subscribed to websites containing child

pornography supports the conclusion that he has likely downloaded, kept, or possessed

the material”). 

As a last resort, Defendant questions why a search warrant was not initially

sought by the well-trained agents if probable cause existed prior to the entry. The

agents’ prudence in seeking a search warrant, however, does not negate the existence of

probable cause. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.