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22–706 PDF 2005

FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

DEFEATING TERRORISM WITH BALLOTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–48

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Advisor

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 17, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Dugan, Elizabeth, vice president, International Republican Institute; Leslie Campbell, director, Middle East Programs, National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs; Febe Armanios, professor, middle

eastern studies, Middlebury College; Khaled Saffuri, chairman of the

board, Islamic Free Market Institute; and Mona Yacoubian, special

adviser Muslim World Initiative, U.S. Institute for Peace ........................ 47

Armanios, Febe .......................................................................................... 71

Campbell, Leslie ........................................................................................ 61

Dugan, Elizabeth ....................................................................................... 47

Saffuri, Khaled .......................................................................................... 79

Yacoubian, Mona ....................................................................................... 95

Sharansky, Natan, former Israeli Minister, author of ‘‘The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror’’;

and Mithal Al-Alusi, Democratic Party of the Iraqi Nation ...................... 14

Al-Alusi, Mithal ......................................................................................... 26

Sharansky, Natan ..................................................................................... 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Al-Alusi, Mithal, Democratic Party of the Iraqi Nation, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 28

Armanios, Febe, professor, middle eastern studies, Middlebury College,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 73

Campbell, Leslie, director, Middle East Programs, National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs, prepared statement of ........................ 64

Dugan, Elizabeth, vice president, International Republican Institute, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 51

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 8

Saffuri, Khaled, chairman of the board, Islamic Free Market Institute,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 82

Sharansky, Natan, former Israeli Minister, author of ‘‘The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror’’,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 18

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 4

Yacoubian, Mona. special adviser Muslim World Initiative, U.S. Institute

for Peace, prepared statement of ................................................................. 98

(1)

FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE

EAST: DEFEATING TERRORISM WITH BALLOTS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Dent, Kucinich, Maloney, Van

Hollen, Ruppersberger, and Higgins.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R.

Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor; Robert A. Briggs,

clerk; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley

Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant

clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. We will call this hearing of the Government Reform

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations to order. And we welcome our witnesses, our

distinguished witnesses from both panels and those in attendance.

Standing in a school courtyard in Irbil, Iraq last January, some

of us were fortunate enough to be able to witness that nation’s historic steps toward democracy in more than half a century. The election was a decisive moment for the people of Iraq, and its reverberations are still being felt throughout the Middle East. In Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, people saw that Iraqis

asserted their inalienable right to a freer, more secure future, and

asked, why not here?

The question challenges us. What does prevent the development

of a democratic institution and free economies in the region? Reasons often cited to explain the political and economic stagnation in

the Middle East include the corrupting dominance of oil wealth, the

distorting legacy of western colonialism, the military exigencies of

Arab-Israeli conflict, and the alleged inherent incompatibility between Islam and democracy. But the rise of Islamist terrorism as

a global strategic threat brought to our shores with galvanizing

horror on September 11, 2001 buried those excuses and breathed

new life into the call for democratic reforms in the Arab and Muslim world.

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The September 2002 National Security Strategy made the promotion of democracy a primary tool in the war against terrorism.

In his second inaugural address, the President succinctly set out

this element of what is called the ‘‘Bush Doctrine’’ when he declared ‘‘it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the

growth of democratic movements in institutions in every nation

and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’

It was not always so. For many, we come late to the dialog advocating democracy in the Middle East. Having long subrogated overt

support for reformists to our Faustian cold war bargains with repressive, oil-rich regimes, ours is not always a trusted voice in the

discussion. Others discount our good intentions in the mistaken belief support for Israel and support for Palestinian rights and aspirations are incompatible.

So we meet this morning to examine the scope and impact of

U.S. efforts to foster the rule of law, self-government, civil society,

and market economies in a part of the world thought by some to

be geographically or culturally immune to modern forces. In advocating the universal values of human dignity, political self-determination, and economic opportunity, we advance our national interest in helping those who would drain the repressive swamps

where terrorism breeds.

It is not easy work. Exercise of the misnamed soft power of ideas

requires subtlety, humility, and perseverance, traits not always

synonymous with U.S. trade policy. As the birth of our own democracy proved, emerging from oppression to self-sufficiency is the

work of decades, not days. But liberty must be pursued with a determination and vision that allows indigenous movements to grow

naturally and enthusiastically at a pace of their choosing.

The oppressor will always caution patience, endless patience. We

can no longer succumb to the despot’s alluring promise of nearterm stability purchased at the expense of attempting to delay the

inevitable explosion of human freedom. Nor can we indulge hubris.

As then-Governor George W. Bush said in 1999, ‘‘America cherishes

freedom, but we do not own it. We value the elegant structures of

our own democracy but realize that, in other societies, the architecture will vary. We propose our principles; we must not impose our

culture. Yet the basic principles of human freedom and dignity are

universal. People should be able to say what they think, and elect

those who govern them. These ideals have proven their power on

every continent.’’

The witnesses on our first panel today understand the power and

the cost of the pursuit of liberty. Natan Sharansky is a leading

voice for democracy as a force for change in the Middle East. A

former Israeli government minister and influential author, he offers the world a sobering look at the choice between free societies

and what he calls fear societies.

Mithal Al-Alusi is an Iraqi patriot whose dedication and personal

sacrifice to the cause of freedom give his views a unique moral authority. And I might say parenthetically, when I was growing up,

I always thought, wouldn’t it be wonderful to have met the people

who formed our country, the people who risked their lives and the

lives of their family. And I am in the presence of such a man in

Mr. Al-Alusi.

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All our witnesses bring invaluable experience and unquestioned

expertise to this important discussion, and we welcome their testimony. I want to say I am so excited about this hearing today.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

hearing entitled, ‘‘Fostering Democracy in the Middle East, Defeating Terrorism with Ballots,’’ is called to order. And I recognize the

ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want

to welcome our distinguished panelists, former Israeli Minister

Sharansky and Mr. Al-Alusi. Welcome. I want to thank the chairman for his continued dedication to working to find out what’s

going on in the Middle East and what the relationship is with the

policy of this administration and the outcome.

We have much to learn from the experts who are here with us,

and we must listen and use this knowledge to correct the disastrous foreign policy road that America has embarked upon. Congress can help save many lives by changing the direction of policies, but to do that we need facts. As a journalist, Thomas Friedman wrote recently: ‘‘You can’t build a decent society on the graves

of suicide bombers and their victims.’’

Our policy has been greatly misguided. During the President’s

2005 State of the Union address, there were Iraqis in the audience

who held up their thumbs in a symbol intended to convey that democracy had finally reached Iraq thanks to the United States.

Their hope was to send a message that, even though WMDs were

never found, the victory of bringing democracy to Iraq was worth

the cost in blood and treasure. I have to say that we are in solidarity to all of those who inspire to democracy all over the world.

We take the intention of the people of Iraq who strive for freedom seriously. But before we congratulate ourselves, I think that

we have to—I have to admit at least, that I am skeptical of the administration’s policy of promoting democracy. The United States

does not have a history of bringing democracy to nations out of

pure altruism; rather, there is usually something we have to gain

by overthrowing a Nation, and the promotion of democracy is the

excuse we use to use it. Or, in the case of Iraq, was our fallback

excuse.

Perhaps the greatest argument against this vision of true altruism is that, when it is in our interest to leave undemocratic governments alone, we do. Examples of this argument are in the central

Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kurjistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

and Uzbekistan. Those countries have well-known human rights

records and serious impediments to democracy. According to the

State Department’s 2004 report on human rights practices, they

catalog very intensely the failings of these particular governments

that we have more or less found fit to work with.

The United States does not take firm steps to encourage reforms.

There have been provisions to condition aid based on progress in

democratization, respect for human rights. However, the State Department decided to cut aid in this case to Uzbekistan for failure

to meet these conditions; but when the State Department decided

to do it, the Joints Chiefs of Staff announced that Uzbekistan

would receive more, $21 million, of military aid. And the aid condition in Kazakhstan, where they had human rights violations, was

allowed a Presidential waiver.

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So, soft line approach. And it’s probably, in large part, due to the

strategic location of these states. The central Asian states offered

overflight and other support when the United States went into Afghanistan. Kurjistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan have hosted coalition

troops, provided access to air bases.

Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on, but I want to include the

rest of this statement in the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection.

Mr. KUCINICH. But I hope as I conclude that this hearing will go

beyond self-congratulation and beyond merely illuminating the desire for democracy by people in the Middle East. Rather, I hope

that this hearing will illuminate how our missteps are hindering

democracy so that we can correct a failed policy. I want to welcome

the witnesses, and I hope that we can learn from their experiences

and knowledge. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. His entire statement will be

in the record. And with this, we would first recognize our two witnesses on our first panel, former Israeli minister Natan Sharansky,

author of ‘‘The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror,’’ and Mr. Mithal Al-Alusi, Democratic

Party of the Iraqi Nation.

As you know, we swear in all our witnesses, and I would at this

time ask you to stand. We are an investigative committee. I would

ask you to stand and be sworn in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. We will note for the record our witnesses

have responded in the affirmative.

Let me just also do unanimous consent. I ask unanimous consent

that all members of the subcommittee could place an opening statement in the record, and the record will remain open for 3 days for

that purpose. And, without objection, so ordered. I ask further

unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their

written statements in the record. And, without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Sharansky, we are going to have you open up. Your mic

needs to be on, and you should see a green light when you hit that.

Mr. SHARANSKY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. And what we do is we will have a 5-

minute count and then we roll over another 5 minutes. But we

would like your statement to be concluded within 10 minutes.

Mr. SHARANSKY. Within 5 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we are going to let you roll over. You have 5

minutes, and you can roll over into the next 5 minutes, given that

we have a smaller group here.

STATEMENTS OF NATAN SHARANSKY, FORMER ISRAELI MINISTER, AUTHOR OF ‘‘THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY: THE

POWER OF FREEDOM TO OVERCOME TYRANNY AND TERROR’’; AND MITHAL AL-ALUSI, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE

IRAQI NATION

STATEMENT OF NATAN SHARANSKY

Mr. SHARANSKY. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Definitely, I didn’t come here for self-congratulations, but I think

it is an extremely important issue, linkage between—a connection

between freedom and security in the world, and I am very glad

that today this linkage is recognized much better than some years

ago.

In the book which I recently wrote, ‘‘The Case for Democracy,’’

and which is based also on my experience as a dissident, human

rights activist, humanitarian, and prisoner of conscience for 9 years

of the Soviet Union, and also my experience of being 9 years in

Israel development and being involved in the policy discussions in

the Middle East, and it addresses the serious sources of skepticisms which people had and still many of them have about this

connection.

First, do all the people of the world really want to live in freedom? Second, is freedom good for our security? Is freedom a thousand miles from here good for our security here, or it is only a creVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:18 Sep 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22706.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ation of altruism? And does the free world have a role to play in

it? If so, what kind of role the free world can play in all this?

The first question which, in fact, was the principle question,

which we as the human rights activists were facing for many years

in the Soviet Union. And sometimes we heard that freedom is not

for the people in the Soviet Union, freedom is not for Russia, freedom is not for Eastern Europe. That type of skepticism which we

heard from our friends from the West is once more and more often

asked of the last years about Muslim countries, about Arab countries, about countries of the Middle East, about Palestinians, and

more and more we heard about there is not one Muslim country

in the world which is democratic; maybe it is simply not appropriate, it is simply a different civilization.

I hear that today it is easier to answer to skeptics than 3 or 4

months ago with what happened in Iraq during elections, what

happened in Lebanon with 1 million people demonstrating, what

happened in these weeks in Cairo when so many dissidents are

ready to raise their voices shows that this questions is—I hope, is

at least partially answered.

But the second question is no less important. The current debate

today is one focused on whether there is a real critical connection

between democracy somewhere and security here. And more and

more, the question of elections is used as a source of skepticism.

Just now leaving Israel, a couple of articles that you see that the

elections are bringing the extremists to power. This is the way how

terrorist groups can come to power. And maybe democracy can be

even dangerous for security. And so that is why in my book, I propose this town square test and why I believe that American administrations use this test.

An election, not by itself, is democracy. Free elections and free

society, that’s what has to be the aim. And free society is a society

which passes the town square test. That a peasant can go to the

center of the town square, express his or her views, and not to be

punished for this.

So if you look at every place where extremists are coming into

power as a result of elections, it is always that society is still a fear

society. There are still a lot of restrictions. You have elections in

a society where democratic institutions are built of standards and

developed around the process of developing, it is mainly because a

big influence of the results; because when given the real choice,

free choice to choose between living in freedom or living in fear,

people choose to live in freedom. And that’s why, if you have the

opportunity to choose between elections or building a free society

and elections in then the process, we always have to understand

that the most important thing is to build the free society, to help

to build the free institutions of the society.

And here is the question, the linkage. What is the role of the free

world? First of all, to bring moral clarity, to understand that for

the free world, the real partners are not the dictators but the people, the dissidents who are speaking the truth, who express the desire of their people to live in freedom.

What has been done in the last few months by the President of

the United States of America cannot be underestimated. The very

fact that the leader of the free world speaks clearly appeals to the

16

dissidents, to the democrats of the world has tremendous influence.

I remember the days when I was in a Soviet prison and when

President Reagan was speaking about the evil empire, how much

hope it gave to all of us, how much strength it gave to us. I remember the stories of my friends in solidarity when John Paul II was

speaking to them.

That is the power of the free world speaking with moral clarity,

supporting the dissidents. And, with all this, with all this position

taken by the United States of America, you cannot understand the

changes which are happening in the last month as to whether in

Ukraine, whether in Lebanon, whether in Egypt, and then speaking about Iraq.

The second level of linkage are programs supporting democracy.

And here we see some progress and here we see a lot of efforts and

institutions which start dealing with education for democracy,

which start dealing with the support of different efforts to build a

civil society. Still, it’s not enough. When even today, today I hear

from the dissidents in Iran the complaint that they have problems

in finding support to find broadcasting, like we dissidents enjoyed

in the Soviet Union the broadcasting of the free world over the

Radio Freedom.

And if today the price of this support is less than the price of one

airplane, and to see the influence of this support when Iran—letters are written—I heard from many people, Iran more and more

reminds me today of the Soviet Union in the last months of its existence, when almost everybody was double thinker, when almost

everybody had balance about this imaging. And there’s the time to

support—to encourage and support building the civil society. And

also the most important level is direct linkage, direct linkage which

then was a critical issue of the relations between the East and

West after the Helsinki agreement when directly the question of

human rights was connected to all the projects of economical, culture, political relations with these countries. Everybody who knows

the story of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the dissident also from Egypt,

who was released after 3 years because of direct linkage of the

United States of America made between the relations between

Egypt and the fate of the dissident is a very important example of

this narrow but very powerful usage of this linkage.

The fact that where in the towns of the Soviet Union the fate of

the dissidents practically never come to a reasonable conclusion in

the Soviet Union was in the minds and the decisions and the resolutions of this House and administration, and today most of the

dissidents of the Middle East, their names are not even known,

that shows that a lot can be done in this direction.

And just now we are dealing with the very important issue of

[Unintelligible.]. As you probably know, he resigned from the government, but it doesn’t matter whether you are for the way how

it was implemented or not. I think we all agree that the most important thing is that, one, that what will emerge either will be a

democratic society and not a terrorist society. And the most important question for all of us must be whether education of incitement

in schools in Gaza will continue after we leave it; whether Palestinians will continue living in awful conditions in refugee camps, or

whether this will liberate them. But that free economy will be built

17

there, or, as in the times unfortunately of Yasser Arafat, there will

be a free hand to destroy, or we will be given a free government

civil society. And, of course, whether terrorist organizations acting

there today will be dismantled or they will become even stronger.

These are the most important questions. And the course of the

free world of the United States of America, the course of Europe,

has to be whether you are helping the Palestinian society—whether

you are helping to defeat people in the Palestinian Authority to live

more free lives or less. And the more free lives they have, the more

security we will have in Israel and you in the United States of

America.

These are my initial remarks. And I will be glad to answer your

questions after this.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Sharansky. I would like to point out

that you were arrested and in Soviet prison, sentenced to 13 years

in jail. You spent how many years, sir, in jail?

Mr. SHARANSKY. Only 9, because of the pressure of the United

States of America.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you are a true hero, and it is a privilege to have

you here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sharansky follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Al-Alusi.

STATEMENT OF MITHAL AL-ALUSI

Mr. AL-ALUSI. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. Welcome, my friend.

Mr. AL-ALUSI. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, this is really a great

honor for me to be a witness before this subcommittee. Thank you

so much for this opportunity. I do agree with many of the things

Mr. Sharansky has said. But as an Iraqi politician, I have that reality. We do now have a free Iraq. We have problems, this is true.

We have a huge problem. You have to understand, after Saddam

Hussein, this kind of regime, dictatorship, killer of the innocent,

killer machines, we have a problem. We have problems, but we also

have the new Iraq. No discussion about it. The election day was the

Iraqi great day, the Iraqi happy day.

But I agree with you, sir, when you say that the extremists, that

they are using the democracy. They are smart and they are trying

to use it as the tool to have a control of our society. I agree with

you because the terrorists, the old way of the terrorism really has

been changed. They are well organized, they have government beside them, interior agencies, and they are trying to use our democracy now to get control and to come back again.

I have started in Iraq to work as the Director General by the

Iraq education. And from this experience, I know very well how the

Ba’athists, they are trying to get the power in Baghdad again. Always we have heard many things about the deratification, but always I can say from my experience, from my knowledge, from the

information that we got, from the facts, the news is totally different

and far away from the reality. This is a fact.

I would like also to say it is impossible to split between democratic peace and human rights. Some people, they believe they are

democrat but they don’t need to look for peace or they don’t need

to look for humanity rights. This is really a problem in the Middle

East. But we need time and we need the real support, moral, political, and financial support for the liberals in the Middle East. And

this is something really difficult now.

I mean, it is very painful when we see how the extremist parties

which power, which mechanisms they have. As an example, they

have TV channels, radio channels, many newspapers in Baghdad

today. They go and the Islamic extremist party and the other extremist parties, the Ba’ath party. They have more than 100 newspapers. Maximum, the liberals newspaper in Baghdad, five: 1 to 20.

They have many TV channels, many radio stations. No liberalist

party in Iraq or in the Middle East have a TV channel or free

radio. This is the fact. And Iran is our neighbor and Baghdad is

the Iraqi neighbors.

But Iran is not a democratic country. Even if they have a parliament there. The problem, I do believe that we need time to feel

this welcome, but also we need to work very hard to make it work.

There is a very important point. Again, we cannot split between

democratic, human rights, and peace. But somebody must try to

teach us that we don’t need peace in the Middle East or we cannot

start to build the peace between Iraq and Israel because of somebody. He has to start first; after that, we can think about it.

27

This kind of message, the strategy, or Palestine organization

strategy, it is against the Iraqi strategy. We were more than 50 or

60 years a hostage of every strategy in the area. The area, we in

Iraq and you see in Israel, all of us we need a clear signal that we

are for peace in the area, and we can start between Iraq and Israel.

And this will help the Palestine people to be more realistic, to understand the real politics of the problem, the pragmatic way in the

politics.

I believe the era of terrorism and the reforms has just started in

the Middle East. The terrorists, they are an alliance, Syria, Iran,

Hezbollah, Jihad, Hamas, Ba’ath party, al Qaeda, they are an alliance. They have the same political goals, they have the same mechanism. It is now that our time to stop to think about it. We need

alliance between the democratic countries where they have suffered

very or they have paid a huge price I believe is the right way to

have the strategical relationship between the United States of

America and Iraq in the alliance against the terrorism, the terror

between Iraq, Israel, United States, Turkey, maybe Kuwait, and

the United Arab Emirate.

Whatever the people can say, we know the news, always pushing

some kind of news coming from Baghdad. It might be truth, it

could be truth, but there is also another side. The Iraqi people,

they are free now. This is the main point. Let me say it also here,

Mr. Chairman, thank you, America. Thank you so much for everything.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Al-Alusi.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Al-Alusi follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. We have behind you, Mr. Sharansky, Mr. Dermer.

And he is co-author of ‘‘The Case for Democracy.’’ And if he would

like, the subcommittee would welcome him to join this panel. And

we would swear you in, if you wanted to participate in the questioning. Would you like to participate? If you don’t mind standing,

welcome. Just raise your right hand, please.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Welcome.

We are going to start out, I just would also recognize that Mrs.

Maloney has joined us as well. I recognize Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And again

I want to welcome the witnesses. And Minister Sharansky’s presence here is important because we recognize the contributions that

you have made as a dissident, someone who is willing to put himself on the line to help achieve a statement of moral clarity. And

I think that everyone in this Congress, whatever their particular

view of the situation in Iraq, respects that greatly, because it is individuals such as yourself who have had a very powerful statement

of moral clarity which helps to bring about political change.

I think that when we are speaking about Iraq, though, and the

particular problems that we have here in the Congress is with respect to the role of military intervention in bringing about ‘‘democracy.’’ now, the United States did not intervene militarily against

Russia to help encourage the kind of changes that was created or

that were created. How do you see the difference between what the

U.S.’ policy was with respect to the Soviet Union and what the U.S.

policy—where they’d they did not use military intervention, and

the U.S.’ policies in Iraq where we have used military intervention?

Do you make any distinction there at all?

Mr. SHARANSKY. Well, thank you for your question, Congressman. Of course I make a distinction. As in our book, anyway, we

believe that all the totalitarian regimes are very weak from inside

because they have to spend all their power on controlling their own

people, the minds of their own people to keep them on the course

of control. But it is a lot of power energy. In fact, and if they don’t

support it by the external sources of power, they will become weaker and weaker. And that is why it gives a great challenge to democracy simply by putting in place effective forms of linkage between

economical, political, social, cultural, financial relations with these

countries and the question of human rights. And these countries

can become strong enough to stand in the free world only if they

have peace for a long period with the free world.

Yes, the regime of Saddam Hussein became very dangerous, but

we should not forget that in the 1980’s, many countries in the free

world believed that it is in the interest of these countries that

these regimes exist, and you supported this regime.

Mr. KUCINICH. But may I ask, Mr. Sharansky, what about the

regime of, say, of Kruschev or Brezhnev? I mean, we did not intervene militarily against Russia.

Mr. SHARANSKY. I have to say that this regime became so strong

because there was a policy of appeasement toward this regime beginning from the 1930’s and 1940’s. And no doubt there were periods of that regime, Soviet regime, when the world had no other

way but to cooperate. Like in 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt could

32

not stop cooperating with the regime, starting at the times of war

against Hitler. But in 1953 and 1963 and 1973, the free world continued cooperating and in fact helping this regime to survive.

Now, the moment this regime was becoming so dangerous and so

aggressive that sometimes the free world had to respond. And I

don’t have to remind you what happened in Cuba, the times when

they sold missiles over and then the Soviet Army sent the troops—

not their troops, Cuban troops to Africa. At the same time, the very

dangerous situation and they were sending troops to Prague, Berlin, Hungary, and they take special recruit. And of course it was

dangerous moments, but there was no direct threat to the United

States. And they believe that as long as there is no direct threat

to the free world, the free world has to use the policy of linkage

and to undermine and to weaken these regimes. And it can be very

successful as it was in the case of the Soviet Union.

What happened with Iraq—well, who I am to speak in the presence of the hero of this nation here of Iraq, Mr. Al-Alusi. But my

personal opinion is that if the freedom of the United States of

America were challenged by the world terror and the President of

the United States accepted this challenge—he didn’t say that we

are now fighting this one or another terrorist group; he said we are

fighting against the world network of terror.

Sooner or later, America would have to deal with the regime of

Iraq because Saddam Hussein—and here I am speaking from my

own experience in the Middle East. The regime of Saddam Hussein

gave a lot of legitimacy, a lot of power to all the terrorists in the

Middle East. The very fact his regime was opening the way to the

free world, has been doing it for tens of years. Here was a regime

which was openly supporting every family of suicide bombers.

There was a big opportunity, President Saddam Hussein is giving

$10,000 to every family of a suicide bomber. It’s not the problem

of the money; it’s the problem of encouraging them, of telling them

that they knew that they have their motherland, their country,

their regime, which is behind them. So if you are really having a—

you are challenged with this world war of terror and you want to

respond, you have to deal with this regime.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Sharansky, first of all, you demonstrated personally in Russia through the power of your courage that one person could take a stand. And, again, I want to state that every one

of us appreciates the courage that you showed. And I think that

was one of the things that helped to lead to change in the Soviet

Union, that caused the Soviet Union to collapse: Eventually, it

could not keep people like yourself from stating through their own

sacrifice the truth of the conditions. And what I’m simply stating

here is that how much more does that power of moral force of an

individual trump the power of military intervention? It’s something

that I think is worth—from our standpoint, is worth looking at.

So thank you for your testimony. And, Mr. Chairman, I again

want to thank you for making possible for the witnesses to be here.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

I see a significant difference between Iraq and almost any other

country, because basically having gone into Kuwait, having an

agreement but not a peace agreement with the forces that got Saddam out of Kuwait, given his absolute insistence in a sense that

33

he wanted us to think that he had weapons of mass destruction.

But the challenge we have in this country, obviously, is there were

no weapons of mass destruction by that period, and we have to accept the fact that the Duelfer Report says that, means that you

have a country that is—and some debate in here with the fact that

we then sent our troops to Iraq.

I wish we had done it not under the strong belief that Saddam

had weapons of mass destruction, just that we needed to close the

chapter of 12 years of fly zones and the ambiguity of not having

a finality to our getting Saddam out of Kuwait. But, the reality is

we are there. And I would like to ask these questions. And I would

love—Mr. Dermer, I also would know that you would be speaking

as an individual, and we got you by surprise and you didn’t get to

check with other higher authorities about. So we know that you

will choose your words carefully. But it is an honor to have you

here as well.

I would like each of you to tell me, how should the United States

promote democracy in the Middle East? What’s appropriate?

What’s not appropriate? How do we promote democracy? What’s required for us?

Mr. AL-ALUSI. Well, this is really a good question. I mean, in

Iraq, we don’t have Saddam and the Ba’ath regime. And we have

started the election. Can we change everything in 1 day, in 1 year,

in 2 years? Many people they have a huge critic in Iraq politic, in

your politic or in ours. I mean, the Iraqi politician. But they forget

how many years Germany and France—they are now in the very,

very good position as democratic countries. They have forgotten,

they took more than 40 years to establish the first step what we

have done it in 6 months. We have done this very fast. But we need

also to understand that the terrorists in Iraq, they are a part of

the terrorists in the Middle East. They have their own agenda to

stop any kind of change in the area. I mean, positive change, reforms and democracy.

Here’s the difference: Cannot—if the liberals, they will not have

the help, the real help, moral, politic, and finance, they will have

the problem in the area. If we don’t make it really clear that we

are not willing to deal with terrorists, it is not enough just to

change the system. The terrorists in Iraq are really afraid, really

afraid that 1 day we will see or we will say the United States of

America, they have made the change; Saddam and the Ba’ath regime is not there. But the one now is Iran, because Iran they have

very well understood, they can have this game, to win this game

for a few million dollars, and they are pushing interior agency and

many millions to win the game.

The most important point, it is not only your responsibilities, it

is our responsibility in Iraq, but it always better to make it clear:

Iraq is a free country. And the Iraqi civility need to go through a

dialog and agreement between Iraq and the United States of America.

Mr. SHAYS. Do the Iraqis believe—and I will get to the other two

witnesses. Do the Iraqis believe that we are being impatient with

Iraq? Is there a feeling that we are asking too much?

Mr. AL-ALUSI. Not at all. No. We were glad to start. I mean, the

United States of America, the forces are there. Let me ask us any

34

Iraqi, what will happen if the American forces are not more in

Iraq? The answer would be very soon from any Iraqi—any normal

Iraqi: Iran will occupy it.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to have a lot of questions here because I’m

going to want to ask some other questions as well. So I want to

get to the other witnesses. But I am told by observers, American

observers, that Iraq has taken—the people of Iraq have taken naturally to the dialog of interaction. They like the political process,

they like the debate, they like the negotiations. That this is something that in a sense isn’t foreign to Iraqis. Is that something you

would agree with or disagree with?

Mr. AL-ALUSI. No. I agree that we are very happy, more than

happy to have this situation.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not even talking about happiness. I’m talking

about that there is just this natural inclination, that this is not—

even though democracy is something new and taking initiative is

not something you did in Saddam’s world, unless you wanted your

head lopped off. But now, given this opportunity, there is this genuine excitement, but, more than that, a liking to the negotiations,

the idea of trying to find a solution. That Iraqis are taking to it.

That it’s not something that is impossible for them to grasp. And

I’m asking if you agree with that.

Mr. AL-ALUSI. Yes, I agree.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Sharansky, Mr. Dermer, could you just respond to what you would like to see the United States be doing to

promote democracy in the Middle East? Not just in Iraq.

Mr. SHARANSKY. Well, there are so many aspects, let me touch

one of them. It will take. The big mistake of the Osla—the Osla

process was, the main effort was mainly how to have a stable regime. And if it means that we must strengthen dictatorship, we

will strengthen dictatorship. And, in fact, the efforts of Israel, of

the United States of America, of Europe, to for the very beginning

of the process how to make, to stop a dictatorship which will bring

us stability. I hope that this difficult lesson was learned, and now

more and more people understand that we have to go forward supporting free society and then we get stability.

But if we go in the opposite order, we will get only more terror.

What it means today in——

Mr. SHAYS. Can I just—so I’m following you. What I’m hearing

you say is that we may have to tolerate instability ultimately to get

to stability through a democratic——

Mr. SHARANSKY. Yes. This fear that the democracy of one freedom brings more than stability in the world, if you look a little bit

longer and you see how this so-called stability brought by strong

dictator is turned into more terrorist attacks, more hatred and

more world war. And it’s clear, why? Because dictators inevitably

need external enemies for their own stability.

And then we can extend something also process, which in advance was planned in a way that we decided—the free world decided that if Yassar Arafat needs to impose the restrictions of freedom, let him do it. But I’m saying that definitely with new leadership, we have better chance; but it will succeed with better chance

only if our enemy again will not support this leadership by all

35

means, and that is would not put restrictions—will not demand on

the democratic process.

Today, when the big efforts are taken, very positive efforts to

give economical assistance to something, it is very important that

the result of these efforts will be more free economical life for

something, and not more control over the economy in terms of authority by their leaders. The same has to be said, also, for terrorist

organizations. This readiness to tolerate the coexistence with terrorist organizations is a very—we can see how the terrorist organization are making some efforts to strengthen themselves again.

From the very beginning of the process, the demand must be

very clear, the linkage must be very clear, not cease-fire with the

terrorist organizations, but the struggle against terrorist organizations.

Mr. SHAYS. My time has run out, but if Mrs. Maloney will just

allow me to ask Mr. Dermer to respond to this as well.

The first time we met, you were working with Mr. Netanyahu,

I believe. And I would say to you that he was the first one who articulated in a way that I paid attention to the fact that you have—

you can’t have peace without democracy, ultimately. So he was

kind of the individual that was saying this in a way that at least

caught my attention. I know others were saying it before. But what

would be your response about the role of the United States in promoting democracy in the Middle East?

Mr. DERMER. Well, the first thing I would say—and I thank you

for allowing me to testify, even if it was very unexpected.

The first thing I would say is I understand exactly what the

problem is. And one of the disadvantages that I have had in trying

to understand what Natan Sharansky was saying to many people

for many years is that I was raised in a free society. So to live

under a regime where you are constantly afraid to say what you

want is something that was totally foreign to me. And to understand the mechanics of how such a society works is very hard for

me to understand. So Natan was saying for years and years and

years, and it took me a long time to understand the concept of

what he was saying or thinking behind it. When you see a suicide

bombing attack and then you would see thousands of people in the

street celebrating it, you wonder if we’re talking about democracy;

these people can be democratic?

And what I understood when I listened to him in trying to understand the problem is that you have to understand what type of society a fear society is. When you have a regime that totally determines what people do, whether they have a real component to go

into Israel, whether they’re going to receive aid from international

donors, whether or not they’re going to be able to participate in

business in any way because there is a monopoly over all basic industries, you see; but in order to survive in that type of society you

have to demonstrate loyalty to their elite. It doesn’t mean that the

images that you’re seeing on television is what is really going on

within those societies.

So I think the most critical thing that I learned and that I think

would help, moving forward, is to focus as much as possible on increasing the degree of freedom within that society, to decreasing

the dependence that people within the society have on the regime.

36

It doesn’t matter if they’re dependent on a social network of a terrorism group or whether they’re dependent on a regime; the most

important thing is to make them independent and to build civil society.

I think if we recognize that’s what the focus has to be, to make

the town square as free as possible, to build those institutions as

much as possible, constant focus on asking ourselves a simple question: Is there more freedom within Palestinian society today than

there was yesterday, or is there more freedom in Iraq than there

was yesterday, or any country that you look at? Just ask yourself

that question. Not whether we’re closer to elections, not whether or

not this particular policy has been advanced or not. Is there more

freedom for the individual in this society than yesterday? If you do

that, then I think that you’re going to be moving in the right direction.

As to specifically what the United States can do, I think that

Natan has been arguing that for many years, and he wrote in the

book, is to the greatest degree possible to link the relations that

you have to these countries to how they treat their own people.

This is really the revolution, if I recall the Sharansky document.

It is very different than the conventional approach to foreign policy.

The conventional approach says we should treat country A based

on how country A is treating country B.

And here is what Natan has been saying for many years and

what the dissidents in the Soviet Union have been saying for many

years is that we need to treat a country based on how that country

is treating its own people. That is the lesson that I think if we keep

in mind all the time and pressure the regimes to give more human

rights and more freedom to their people and use all the tools you

have—political, moral, financial, whatever you have in order to

push in that direction—then I think that things will be moving in

the right direction in terms of democracy.

Mr. SHAYS. I am loving this panel. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Maloney.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’m delighted to

welcome the distinguished panelists.

Mr. Al-Alusi, you have lost two of your children and your body

guard, and there have been nine assassination attempts against

your life. We appreciate your great courage, and we thank you for

being here. I regret that the violence seems to be increasing in

Iraq, at least as it’s reported in our papers.

And, Mr. Sharansky, it is rare to see or meet a living legend. I

recall when I was on the city council in New York, a group of us

named a street after you while you were still in prison. And I remember how effective and forceful your wife was as an advocate for

democracy and for you. And it was thrilling when you were released and came to city hall and to the mayor’s home. It was a

great event.

And I followed the wonderful contributions you’ve made to Israel.

And I admire the way women are treated in Israel.

And my first question really to Mr. Al-Alusi—and welcome, Mr.

Dermer.

And I want to know how important do you think is the role of

women in the road toward democracy? I was very heartened to

37

read in the paper that Kuwait just passed a law to allow women

the right to stand for office and to become elected to office. Qatar

recently passed such a provision.

Many Iraqi women have come to this country, they are remarkable. We have visited with them in your country. Some of them I

have corresponded with and some of them have been murdered. I

have stopped writing them because it breaks my heart when one

of them is murdered. And some of them have expressed to me their

tremendous deep concern that the Sharia may be returned to the

domestic law of Iraq. And I’d like your comments—and all of the

panelists’—on the role of women in this fight for democracy. It is

something I believe in very deeply for American women, and really

for all women in the world. And I feel it is a very positive force,

but I’d like to your thoughts on it.

And it seems to me that women are targeted. There are so many

of them that are murdered of your leaders. And if you could give

us a review of where it stands. Is it a threat that Sharia will be

returned? What are your comments?

Mr. AL-ALUSI. Thank you for your questions. Iraqi women, like

most of the women in the Middle East, they are killed more than

the men. In the Middle East, very high price because of the economy, because of dictatorship, because of some of—they call them

new Islam, I would like to call them new Islam. That means the

people, the extremists, very strong—the terrorists. But let me talk

about Iraq.

I was on election day on the street. Many Iraqi politicians also.

The first hours, we didn’t see that movement on the street. But

after that, we saw something which is only in Europe. The Iraqi

women started to move over the street. The first really movement

to go to the election or to enjoy the election, that was the Iraqi

woman. And the Iraqi woman made the real change in the next

hours. If there is any kind of statistic, we would find the Iraqi

women, they have enjoyed the election the first 8, 9, 10 hours. At

10 o’clock, after dark, they came. So they have played a very important role.

The problem is that more than 50 percent from our society, of

course, are women. And in Iraq they are about 55 percent. Those

people, those kind of parties, they are against any kind of human

rights in Iraq. And they are a part of a new strategy. They well

understand to keep from the Iraqi society, to make a huge difference in this society in Iraq, that is the girl can go for in Iraq.

That is why, and they are paying a very high price.

But now look in the government, they are very happy, very

happy and proud to have 50 percent. I am proud to have Iraqi

women. You have to like the Iraqi women, otherwise you will be

not in the party, otherwise they will punish you. This kind of message is not officially, but anyway, the Iraqi woman are willing to

be free, and they have a very important role, and you have seen

it in the election. We just need to push more in this direction.

And education is important. They are trying to keep the Iraqi

women far away from education and from the male role as employed in the government; and we need also to help in this direction. I mean, everything is new in Iraq. We just starting today, and

we just starting to feel democratic. This is the fact.

38

Mr. Chairman was talking about weapons of mass destruction. It

is truth to know you didn’t find it, or nobody has found it. But also

truth, we are not talking about an atom bomb, we are talking

about chemical weapons. To make chemical weapons, you don’t

need huge industry, you need a small level, you need the know-how

and the willing to use it. Did Saddam have the know-how? Yes. Did

he get the power to use it? Yes. He has done it more than 80 times.

And many Iraqi women, because of this chemical weapon, they

have paid a very high price. More than 80 times he has used it.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me do this. I’m going to encourage the panelists

to give a little shorter answers because we want to cover a lot of

territory, and you will be here late at night, and we do have a second panel. And you have so much to say, and it is all so important,

but we want to make sure we get these questions in.

Do you have other questions?

Mrs. MALONEY. I would just like to ask Mr. Sharansky, do you

believe that ultimately reform will come from the top from the government, or from government reform initiatives, or by popular demand by the grass-roots level? And I would ask Mr. Dermer also

to comment.

And what incentives, punishment, does the United States have

to influence other nations toward freedom and for democracy for

their people?

Mr. SHARANSKY. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, for your remarks and for your question.

No. Change is always coming when there is words of dissidents,

those who are ready to speak open and loudly, where there is determination of the free world to support these dissidents, and

where there is practical policy over linkage in their relations with

the free world with the leaders of the country for which dissidents

are speaking.

Now, no doubt for the main reason for changing that is the desire for the overwhelming majority of people to live without fear.

To get rid of this awful double-think where you have to say one

thing and think another thing, and this desire to live without fear,

that is what brings the change.

But no doubt, it could be more painful or less painful, it depends

on the leadership; and it depends to what extent the free world is

ready to keep the leadership responsible.

So if today we are optimistic, we are cautiously optimistic about

possibilities in the Middle East in connection with Palestine, it is

because they have new leadership, but also because the free world,

and of course the United States of America, demonstrates determination to connect their policy with the creation of democratic reforms.

If I am very cautious of this optimism, still we can see how this

desire to connect the policy in relation with this leadership with

the creation of democratic reforms is not otherwise long the voice

among many others who want to go back to the policy of appeasement.

Mr. DERMER. As to your first question about the rights of women,

I think that would be——

Mr. SHAYS. That says we have a vote in 15 minutes.

39

Mr. DERMER. I see. I haven’t been cutoff, right? The sandman

isn’t coming from somewhere around here.

Mr. SHAYS. It means we have one vote.

Mr. DERMER. As for the rights of women, I think that’s an excellent barometer for the degree of freedom in a society. And we chose

in the book ‘‘The Town Square Test,’’ could you walk into the town

square without fear of arrest, imprisonment or physical harm? But

I think probably something that would come in a close second is

how women are treated in society to really let you know the precise

degree of freedom; I mean, even in societies that allow women to

participate in elections, that’s going to be much freer than a society

that doesn’t, and the individual rights that they have as well.

As to the second question, what needs to be done? I want to get

back to something I said earlier about what I call the ‘‘Sharansky

Doctrine,’’ and that is, I know everyone is usually focused on the

question whether or not you engage or you confront a given regime,

and I think less focus is paid to what you are engaging them on

or about and what you’re confronting them about. And what Natan

has been trying to argue for years is that when you engage them

on the issue of how they treat their own people. And if that becomes all of a sudden the policy of the United States and other

democratic nations, that whether we’re going to engage or confront

you is going to depend on one answer, is how are you treating your

own people. And you will get more aid from us and you will get

more political support and diplomatic support, financial support,

whatever, if you give your people more rights, and you will get less

if you don’t.

And so to get beyond the engage confrontation, I suppose, dynamic and more focused on what exactly you’re engaging them

about or confronting them about. And if we start to focus on how

they’re treating their own people and use all the tools at their disposal to encourage a democratic change, I think that would be the

most effective; and I think it will most likely come from the ground

up only because the top, at least the current top in this region are

not people who have a great faith in democratic ideas or reforms.

So I think it will probably come from the bottom up.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me acknowledge that we have Mr. Higgins who

is here, as well as Mr. Van Hollen, and also Mr. Dent, and they’re

free to jump in at any time. They told me they don’t have specific

questions. And we may try to finish up so you don’t have to wait

after voting and you can go on your way here.

But I would like to have each of you respond to this question.

What would you say to the skeptics who basically say that the Islamic faith and democracy are not compatible? That’s a key question that we need to resolve. Is the Islamic faith and democracy

compatible? Are the skeptics wrong? Do they have some truth to

what they say? Mr. Dermer or Mr. Sharansky or Mr. Al-Alusi.

Mr. AL-ALUSI. I believe that Islam is compatible with democracy.

But an understanding of the new Islam, radical Islam is completely

out of with the main message of all religion, including variant

Islam. In the Quran it states that if you kill one being, it is as if

you have killed the world. But now we have people who act in the

name of Islam throughout the Middle East who are killing people

in the name of Islam. That’s why I do believe we have to split beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:18 Sep 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22706.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tween religion and state. And those people that are not Islamic and

the formation that they got is the not the real Islam because there

is no difference. I mean, just read it. And as we say it in Iraq,

Solat, Ingil and Quran, it is very difficult to find the difference between them. No one from these three religion will have allowed

anyone to kill somebody. How they can say in the name of God——

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s get beyond the killing issue, though. There

aren’t a lot of Islamic regions that are democratic, there hasn’t

been a real history of democracy in the Islamic world. And is that

an indication that they aren’t compatible, or is it just an indication

that there hasn’t been any movement for democracy? And we’re

going to know this answer pretty soon, but let me ask you, Mr.

Sharansky.

Mr. SHARANSKY. Well, when I was recent to Russia, I discovered

that Russian people for several years lived in tyranny, and that is

part of their mentality, part of their culture, they don’t want to live

in freedom. And you can read the addresses to President Truman

that Japan for 7 years never had a democracy, and it is against

their culture to live in freedom.

And I heard the last year many times responding to my arguments that Islam—people of Islam live in different religion and different mentality, and it is against their culture to be free. I think

all these remarks are racist remarks. I believe that all people who

want to live in accordance with their faith, in accordance with their

tradition, in accordance with their mentality and history and so on,

they all, when given the choice to live under constant fear, to be

punished by a totalitarian regime, or to live without this fear, will

choose to live without this fear.

That’s why all these statements of some American journalists

who are saying that people in Iraq love Saddam Hussein and this

regime, when Saddam Hussein killed 1 million of his own citizens

and he was torturing people, remind me of some of the statements

of the so-called liberal guests who would come to the Soviet Union

at the top of the repressions as are saying look how Soviet people

love Stalin and his regime. We have to believe, I think it is very

important for humanity to believe that all the people were born to

be free and deserve to live free.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Dermer. I’ll tell you, one of the contributions of Mr. Dermer

is that he got me to recognize that how I was pronouncing your

first name was not correct, it is Natan, not Natan.

Mr. SHARANSKY. It’s OK.

Mr. SHAYS. It may be OK with you, but not me. Mr. Dermer.

Mr. DERMER. I would say that if we were having this conversation 300 or 400 years ago, people would say that Christianity is incompatible with democracy; and we know that’s not the case. I

think what—not to mention about Japan is an excellent example,

because no one gave much of a chance for the Japanese to have a

democratic society. Their culture was much more inimical to Western ideas than Arab culture, Islamic culture that is. And there

were many reasons I think that they had to—when they first came

up with the idea of democracy, it took a letter of around four Japanese characters together to make sense of it because they had no

concept of what democracy was.

41

But at the end of the day, what Sharansky is arguing is that

when people are faced with this choice between fear and freedom,

they’re going to choose freedom. It’s not because they’re Jeffersonian democrats, it’s because they don’t want to live their lives in

fear. And when we say is Islam compatible with democracy, I think

the majority of people everywhere don’t want to be afraid. Whether

or not you force people to make a choice—let’s put it this way: If

you force people to make a choice, choose Islam or choose democracy—which I think is a false choice—well, they will probably

choose Islam. But in the history, as I understand it, of Christianity’s move toward democracy, they actually found the seeds of democracy in their own faith. John Locke did this, and many other

great Christian thinkers at the time of the development of democracy. They weren’t anticlerical, they actually found the seeds of democracy in their own faith.

And I think that the process will probably start happening within Islam. And the ascending force in Islam today, which is this militant Islamic force that is very hostile to the democratic way of life,

can be replaced in a rather short amount of time by a different

force within Islam where Muslims start seeing within their own

faith the seeds of democratic change. And I think that process is

happening because of what’s going on in the region now.

Mr. SHAYS. We have about 4 minutes to vote.

Mr. Ruppersberger, do you intend to come back and ask questions? Because I may keep this panel if you decide to come back

after the vote.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I think so. It depends.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me do this, if you don’t mind. We are just

going to ask you to stay. And there just may be one or two other

questions. Is that a problem for any of you? We’re going to adjourn

and we will be back. We are recessed, not adjourned. Good grief.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. This hearing is called to order.

When power was transferred to the Iraqis in June of last year,

I went in August to visit, and then I came back to the United

States and met with Condoleeza Rice and about four other Members of Congress. And she was talking about being patient with

Iraq, that this was a new democracy. And she reminded us of our

Declaration of Independence in 1776, our Articles of Confederation

in which we fought to sustain the 13 colonies in a Federation, and

then in the Constitution of the United States we created a Nation.

And I’m thinking, I get it Condi; 13 years, I understand. And then

she looked at us and she paused and then she said, in that Constitution I was three-fifths a person and a slave. And I thought,

wow, what an incredible message to Americans not to be arrogant

with the struggle that exists for any new democracy.

It took us, as you know, a Civil War to sort out a failure in our

Constitution, and we’re still resolving some of those issues. So patience, obviously, is necessary.

But in the Arab Human Development Report of 2004, there is on

page 71—they talk about democracy and the Arab region. And then

they have the photograph of the one election, and it’s the concept

of Hitler gaining power in a democracy and then taking over the

42

Nation and the concern that there could be one election in which

democracy would basically become the victim.

So what needs to happen, in your judgment, in Iraq? Does it

have to be a strong statement in the Constitution? What ensures

that there won’t be a takeover by extremists that will ultimately

mean that democracy dies in Iraq? Everybody keeps looking at you,

Mr. Al-Alusi, and you can go first. But if you want time to think

about your answer, I can have Mr. Dermer go first.

Mr. Dermer, you’re going to go first.

Mr. DERMER. You put me on the spot twice in one session.

I think the German example is a very good example. In fact, we

addressed it in the book. And the question I think we have to ask

ourselves is what was the problem with that election in Germany?

Was the problem the very fact that the Nazis were elected in a free

election—that was actually was about as free an election as you’re

going to have in one of these—and this society was problematic at

the time for other reasons, but it was a free election. Was the problem that the Nazis were elected, or was the problem that after they

were elected and then they decided to suspend and destroy democracy within Germany, that the world did nothing about it?

I think most people would understand that it’s the latter and not

the former. And I would say that is a model for how you can avoid

the problem of one man, one vote, one time, that you’re talking

about; and that is, if the world takes a very clear stand in the free

world, led by the United States, that you will not tolerate any type

of society that is not willing to tolerate dissent, and you make it

clear in the quest for international legitimacy that any new government will have—will be dependent on that government giving their

people basic rights, well then you are unlikely to face this problem

that you faced in Nazi Germany.

And what Natan was arguing for many years is that the chances

of something like that happening, one man, one vote, one time, will

be minimal if the focus is on building a free society and not on

rushing to elections; that if you get conditions of the town square

in place, that the chances of a regime that is hostile to democracy

getting elected are very small. And if it would happen on that—it

does happen occasionally, maybe once every 20 or 30 years—if the

world takes a very clear stand and says we’re not going to allow

you to crush dissent within your country, you may rule it according

to how you see fit, but as long as you preserve a basic right of dissent and to change government in the future, if the world takes

that stand, then I think that the threats that a regime like Hitler’s

pose or other regimes in the region that would seek power through

democratic means in order to subvert democracy I think would be

taken off the agenda entirely.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Natan Sharansky.

Mr. SHARANSKY. Well, if the role of Mr. Dermer, when we were

writing this book, was to explain my thoughts, I think he already

explained it, with a little to add. He is doing, of course, much better than I can do. But I will only add to this in my country, when

there is a big discussion of what will happen after the elections in

July, there is a lot of fear that Hamas will become very strong. I

have to say there is little surprise why Hamas can become very

strong when the whole organization, which is really dealing with

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welfare for the people, this terrorist organization Hamas, and when

the Palestinian Authority, its realizations with people, with citizens, is characterized first of all by its corruption. So there is little

to expect from these elections.

But if democracy is to come, building democratic institutions

which guarantee freedoms of the individuals which decrease their

fear, which improve their standards and their life, and at the same

time is effective with fighting with terrorist organizations, then I

think the chances for extremists to succeed in elections would become smaller and smaller and smaller. That’s why it is very important to see elections as—free elections as the end of a process of

a building a free society.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Al-Alusi.

Mr. AL-ALUSI. Yes. We are afraid from the Iranian influence in

Iraq, not because the Shi’ite or the Sunni, they are a part of Iran,

no, they are a part Iraqi. The problem is for more than 55 years,

we didn’t have any kind of political activity in Iraq. Most of the

people there—all of them, they were outside of Iraq, otherwise they

would be killed.

So the Iraqi—very important part of the Iraqi opposition grew up

in Syria and in Iran. They are cleric, they are Iraqi politician for

sure; but at the same time, the Iranian and the Syrian intelligence

agency, they were always trying to buy and to push them on people

in our political parties.

I am very afraid, not because we have now a little of this party,

a part of the Iranian strategy, no; I’m afraid because they are

thinking totalitarian, and I’m afraid from the second level in those

parties. Nobody knows, even the leader of those parties, nobody

knows how many people we do have from the Iranian intelligence

agency in these parties. That’s why I’m afraid that we got people

who are a part of Iranian strategy playing game, using our mechanism in the democracy and take over in the power.

Now we have the case in the security. Every Iraqi will agree to

clean the system from the Ba’athist. They are very dangerous, they

have done very, very bad things. But how to do it very quickly and

radically in 2 or 3 months? We will have a vacuum. Who is coming

to fill this vacuum? This is the main question. That is why we

agree that none Iraqi people in the name of the Iraqi opposition,

in the name of the Shi’ite or Sunni trying to take over, are using

the democratic as Hitler has done it in Germany.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. What I would like is for each of you to

tell me what you would have liked to put—what question you

would have liked us to ask—let me put it this way: Answer the

question you would have liked us to ask, and put anything else on

the record that you think needs to be put on the record, and then

we’re going to get to our second panel.

Mr. DERMER. I guess I’ll start this one off.

I actually return to something you said earlier about the link between democracy and peace. And you mentioned that—and it’s

something that Netanyahu has also talked about for many years,

and the question that has been very interesting to me over the last

few years is what is the link between terrorism and democracy,

and is democracy the antidote to terrorism? And we don’t really

focus directly on this in our book, but it is something that BenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:18 Sep 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22706.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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jamin Netanyahu has talked about for quite some time. And I

think it is a very interesting question, because if the root cause of

terrorism is not—let’s say the root cause of terrorism—which many

people believe is poverty or the root cause is desperation or the root

cause is some deprivation of rights, political rights, national rights,

social rights, then going and embarking on a process where you’re

trying to promote democracy in the region is not going to win the

war on terrorism.

But I don’t think that the root cause of terrorism is poverty. If

it were, then Haiti would be the center of international terrorism,

and it’s not. And I don’t think the root cause of terrorism is a deprivation of rights. If it were, then Gandhi would have been a terrorist, and he wasn’t; and Martin Luther King would have been a terrorist, and he wasn’t. And there were many, many conflicts that

you’ve had in history where there has been deprivation of rights

and people have responded to them without resorting to terrorism.

The French Resistance didn’t use terrorism and didn’t kill the

wives and children of their German officers, and the Jewish underground movement to win the State of Israel, Jews were not blowing

up buses in London to do so.

So if it’s not the product of desperation or the deprivation of

rights, the question is what it is. And I think the root cause of terrorism, as Netanyahu has said, is a totalitarian mindset. And that

mindset is brought under conditions of tyranny, where you can

take a closed society and you can indoctrinate people and just pummel them constantly through state-controlled media and to indoctrinate them into some culture or some belief that puts some goal

that is so all-encompassing. That justifies anything, and there is no

moral constraints.

And once I think we understand—and I believe that this is the

case—that the root cause of terrorism is this totalitarian mindset,

the way that you actually defeat terrorism is by promoting freedom; because in a free society you simply will not have terrorism

on a mass scale because people have a pluralistic viewpoint, they

can hear other ideas, and they’re not put in these pressure cookers.

And that’s why I think that this is important not only on tyranny,

but also to win the war on terror, is the key critical thing here is

I think to promote freedom, and in the end I think that will drain

the swamps of terrorism in the whole region.

Mr. SHARANSKY. I will use this last-minute opportunity to speak

on behalf of Palestinian dissidents, because it so happens so that

they’re not on our panel. But I had to say that we’re writing a little

bit about it in the book, that while meeting some of those Palestinians, who are very strong fighters for civil society, who have very

different visions than I have maybe about what kind of a future we

want to have, but both of us agree that the main thing is to make

sure that all of us live in democratic societies, a Palestinian democratic society and Israel.

And when I was talking to them in the times of Yassar Arafat,

I could always feel that they are the same dissidents as I am, with

one difference, that—I resided in the Soviet Union, but with one

difference: We in the Soviet Union knew that we could go to prison

but the free world would be on our side. Here, we are facing a situation when these people can go to prison, but the message of the

45

free world is to them, the only hope for peace is Yassar Arafat, and

that’s why I don’t try to weaken Yassar Arafat. And that’s why

many of the doors of the free world were closed for them.

Today when we have new hopes and new chances, let’s not forget

that it’s not Palestinian leadership, it’s democratic dissidents, those

Palestinians who really believe and want to have civil society, they

are our real allies. And that’s why no concern about stability of the

regime shouldn’t undermine your readiness to support them and to

stand for them. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

And Mr. Al-Alusi.

Mr. AL-ALUSI. I think we have seen many changes in the area

that is the regime in the Middle East that is going to show us some

kind of reforms or the willing of reforms. I do believe it can be only

happen because there is a pressure from Washington and the

United States in this direction. There are bad regimes, and they

are just waiting with the hope that the policy in Washington will

be changed.

So please continue in this direction. The only way to have human

rights in Middle East, pushing in the right reforms democratic.

Without this we will never have peace there. And to make a decree

of those terrorists, all of them they are aliens. And they are already

aliens. Usually, just 50 years ago, we got organization as a terrorist, we have organization and aliens with regimes in the area. We

are warned, we have to be very sure that they don’t get a chance

to win again and to have control of those areas. If America was in

Iraq, we Iraqis would not have only one Iraq, we would have

maybe five, maybe, Iraqs. And if Iran get control of Iraq, there is

no peace in Middle East. And Middle East is not that far away

from Europe and the rest of the world. Thank you so much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you so much. If you don’t mind, Mr.

Ruppersberger would just like to ask a question of you all before

we get to——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I’m sorry I wasn’t here, we have other

hearings that I had to attend.

First thing, we want to eventually try to direct families, younger

generations. And my question really to you, Mr. Al-Alusi, with respect to Iraq and how we can influence people in Iraq to look at

democracy from a positive way.

My first question, based on your conversations, do you feel that

the average person in Iraq feels that we are trying to force them

into a situation instead of helping them get to where they need to

be?

Mr. AL-ALUSI. No, not at all. We are thinking—many people in

Iraq, they cannot understand the message of what we have seen

sometimes in the newspaper, as an example of de-Ba’athification.

The main problem with the de-Ba’athification are not the

Ba’athists themselves, we can have control of them through time,

but the education in Iraq should be changed. The way of thinking

and the education should be changed. And to hear this kind of signal that the Secretary, Condoleeza Rice, she was asking to stop the

de-Ba’athification, I cannot believe it at all; that is the wrong signal. I mean, the media they’re playing now some kind of information which make the Iraqi not that sure. To help them in the demoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:18 Sep 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22706.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cratic process, we have to find the change in the way of the Iraqi

thinking to let them be free. Let me tell you, there is people that

are very afraid from the Ba’ath and the terrorists.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And they still are, which means our first

priority, which is what we’re doing, is to provide security. My point

is that for us to be able to influence the Iraqi people to understand

what a way of life would be like, we have to improve their quality

of life, we have to take care of their infrastructure, make sure they

have water that is not contaminated, make sure that we can provide their education. And then if they see that their life is better,

it seems to me that is where we’re going. I know that is our goal.

My question to you, though, is where are we at this point? I

know where your philosophy is. It’s not about philosophy, it’s about

results. And what we need to do is to make sure we are also in

the phase—and I’ve been to Iraq on numerous occasions and I understand—in fact, the last time I had a conversation with Ambassador Negroponte—he is no longer the Ambassador—about reaching the hearts and minds of the people, and it seems to me that’s

what we have to do. Because you have a different culture, you have

different religions. I mean, there are a lot of issues there. But if

you deal with the average person, it’s like in politics, people vote

based on how they feel that their families will be protected, their

communities, their security, their education systems, that type of

thing.

Where do you think we are right now in Iraq as it relates to

what I just said as far as building infrastructure, winning the

hearts and minds of the people to understand that democracy will

work in the end? And then we will get to the elections, which you

already had, and we’ve done a good job. I think there is a lot going

on. And the insurgents are attempting to disrupt all the more

where national pride comes in to stand up and take on the insurgents.

Mr. AL-ALUSI. We are on the right track but we have to continue.

It is really a huge vacuum. We are talking about a huge vacuum

that you have in Iraq. We are in the right way, but we have to continue and we are going very fast.

It is very important, as you say, sir, about the economy, the infrastructure. We have to find quick as possible that our people, the

Iraqi people, they can see and they can feel the change in their

daily life. This is very important——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And my question to you is, do you think at

this point that the average Iraqi person feels that way? Are we

making headway, are we making progress as it relates to the

hearts and minds? We know what we’re doing as far as taking on

the insurgents and trying to train Iraqis to take care of their own

security, but where are we at this point? And if we’re not where

we need to be, what do we need to do?

Mr. AL-ALUSI. If we have to deal with it, we have to work it together; that means a clear strategical relationship. This is the

problem. Now the American side is working on one side and the

Iraqi is working on the other side. You have to find a mechanism

how to work it together. But we are on the right way, and Iraq,

they are accepting more from the United States of America.

47

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Does anybody else on the panel have a—

that’s fine.

Mr. DERMER. We haven’t been to Iraq, so——

Mr. SHARANSKY. Not yet.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Not yet? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been very

helpful, very educational. And your contribution to peace and democracy is extraordinary. Thank you.

We will now go to our second and final panel. And I appreciate

the patience of our second panel: Ms. Elizabeth Dugan, vice president, International Republican Institute; Mr. Leslie Campbell, director for Middle East Programs, National Democratic Institute for

International Affairs; Professor Febe Armanios, professor for Middle Eastern Studies, Middlebury College; Mr. Khaled Saffuri, chairman of the Board, Islamic Free Market Institute; and, finally, Ms.

Mona Yacoubian, special adviser, Muslim World Initiative, U.S. Institute for Peace.

You know what I’m going to do—I’m sorry, I had you sit down,

and I do need to swear you in, so if you would stand and we will

swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record our five witnesses have responded

in the affirmative.

Given that we have five witnesses, I would prefer that you stay

close to the 5 minutes, but if you run over the 5 minutes, that’s

OK.

We welcome all of you, and I want to just say how impressed I

was with the work of the International Republican Institute and

the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in its

work in Iraq in the last election.

I met some very impressive people who were helping the Iraqis

with this election, very impressed that 165,000 Iraqis were involved in this election process. And they take great pride, and deservedly so, in having an election that frankly had more people

participate than participate in the United States. And the process

was fair and almost flawless. It was very impressive for me to

watch.

We will start with you, Ms. Dugan, and then Mr. Campbell, and

go down the line.

STATEMENTS OF ELIZABETH DUGAN, VICE PRESIDENT,

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE; LESLIE CAMPBELL, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAMS, NATIONAL

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS;

FEBE ARMANIOS, PROFESSOR, MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES,

MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE; KHALED SAFFURI, CHAIRMAN OF

THE BOARD, ISLAMIC FREE MARKET INSTITUTE; AND MONA

YACOUBIAN, SPECIAL ADVISER MUSLIM WORLD INITIATIVE,

U.S. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH DUGAN

Ms. DUGAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ruppersberger, I want to thank

you for this opportunity to testify. And in the interest of brevity,

I will ask that my full testimony be——

48

Mr. SHAYS. All your testimonies will be in the record.

Ms. DUGAN. I thank you, sir.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has given the topic

of Middle Eastern democracy a new level of sustained attention,

and has buttressed that attention with additional resources.

The questions you have posed to us as witnesses today allow us

to examine how effectively that attention and those resources are

being used. But before we look ahead, it may be important to look

back and to embrace at least two lessons learned.

The first lesson is about democracy and security. President Bush

articulated a shift in the U.S. Government’s thinking about democracy and human rights in a very powerful speech at the Commemoration of the 20th anniversary at the National Endowment for Democracy when he said, ‘‘60 years of Western nations excusing and

accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing

to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.’’

With these words he underscored that our commitment to freedom and reform in the region was serious, and that commitment

is reinforced nearly daily, not only through his vision but through

the strategic programs that define the policy, such as the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative and through organizations like IRI

that mold the policy into action.

The second lesson, which has been discussed at length here, is

about democracy in Islam. But I hope you will allow me to give my

perspective.

In the early 1980’s, skeptics said democracy was not possible in

Latin America because of an ingrained sense of servitude in the

minds of Latins. In the late 1980’s in east Asia, similar expert

theories were readily being tossed about Washington. And even

back in the 1920’s when Catholic democracy collapsed in southern

Europe and Latin America, political scientists began to theorize

that only Protestant northern European countries were capable of

democracy. Now today, no one would put forward such a notion,

and yet skepticism about the basic compatibility between democracy and Islam can still be heard in the corridors of Washington.

For IRI, the question is settled. Islam, the faith of one-fifth of the

world’s population, is consistent with democratic rule. From our

years of work in predominantly Muslim countries like Indonesia

and Bangladesh and Turkey, we have seen this; and I fully expect

that we will look back on the issue of democracy in Islam in the

years to come and see that many of the questions being raised

about the two are as wrong-minded as those theories dating back

to the European, Latin American, and east Asian examples.

Our work in Iraq further confirms this belief. In Iraq, the skeptics said Iraqis would never participate in an election organized by

the U.S. military. The skeptics said the security situation was too

dangerous for people to leave their homes. And the skeptics said

that insurgents would have a field day attacking polling stations

and voters. But the world watched in January as some 8 million

Iraqi voters turned out to participate in the country’s first democratic election in more than 30 years. And while a great deal of

hard work still remains, Iraqis are firmly committed to the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government.

49

How do we know this? In a recent poll, a national poll conducted

by IRI, 90 percent of Iraqis said they believed that it is very important, or important, that their new constitution allow for the ability

to select and change their government through peaceable and fair

elections. Ninety percent. Similarly, 87.2 percent of those polled advocate keeping some type of quota for women’s representation in

the new national assembly as a means for securing roles for women

in the new government.

These numbers perhaps surprised some observers, but to those

on IRI’s staff working daily in the region, they demonstrate that

not only is democracy compatible with Islam, democracy is the aspiration of the people. It’s not just what we think, it’s what they

think and it’s what they want. And it is reverberating across the

region and imbuing local reformers with hope and courage in

places like Lebanon, where the opposition has been emboldened by

recent events in both Iraq and Ukraine; and in Egypt, where opposition has been more vocal in its demands for reform than any

point during the last decade; in places like the West Bank in Gaza,

where the Middle East witnessed the most free and competitive

leadership election ever held in the region in January; and in

places like Qatar and Morocco and Jordan, and the list goes on.

It is not to say that significant challenges to advancing democracy don’t remain in the Middle East, but the prospect of democratic governance in Islamic countries is really no longer an abstract debate; democratic advances are occurring. Muslims in the

Middle East are participating in democratic processes. President

Bush has removed the taboo of talking about and pressing for

democratic reforms in the Middle East, and this increased attention to democracy and human rights, in words and in deeds, does

help reformers in the Middle East committed to democratic change,

and it gives organizations like IRI more muscle and more momentum to support them.

Political reform is going to be difficult, and when we’re talking

about innovative initiatives like MEPI or the Broader Middle East

Initiative, and looking for success stories and impact, we must be

wary of demanding immediate results. We need to remember Serbia, we need to remember Ukraine, countries where IRI, among

many others, engaged in democracy-strengthening programs for a

decade before the so-called overnight victories of the people against

corrupt government.

Democracy support is a long-term investment which, almost

without exception, requires a sustained diplomatic commitment.

But thanks to initiatives like MEPI, IRI is able to provide that

democratic support in a region in ways that simply were unavailable to us in the 1990’s.

At the most basic level, MEPI directly and positively benefits

IRI’s democracy support mission by allowing us to think much

more strategically about where and how we want to support democratic reform in the region.

I have some examples, they’re part of my testimony. Let me—I’ll

cut to my conclusion.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. DUGAN. I want to suggest the following: The President’s vision and commitment to democracy and human rights promotion in

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the region is well conceived and forcefully articulated, but there is

a cautionary note. If democracy promotion is undertaken without

the support of our embassies, the tasks before groups like IRI, especially in authoritarian countries, are rendered infinitely more difficult.

All elements of our foreign policy apparatus, including our embassies and USAID missions overseas, need to become constructively and consistently engaged to ensure that democracy promotion remains a priority and that both governments and citizens

in the Middle East receive a uniform message about the need to

implement reforms.

And from the standpoint of IRI’s work in the region, I can tell

you it is crucial for democracy’s expansion that Congress continues

to focus its attention on this issue, and it’s one of the reasons I’m

so grateful for the hearing today.

U.S. policymakers, including Members of Congress, must take

the lead in giving praise where praise is due for those in the Middle East moving forward on democracy, and they must continue to

condemn bad practices and to press for greater political space in

which IRI and other NGO’s can operate with indigenous reformers.

And I thank you for your kind attention.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. What a thoughtful statement;

very helpful. How many years have you now worked for the Institute?

Ms. DUGAN. I started about 10 years ago, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. You have been there during a very momentous time,

haven’t you?

Ms. DUGAN. Indeed. We have seen quite a bit of remarkable

things happen in the world.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dugan follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Campbell.

STATEMENT OF LESLIE CAMPBELL

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Chairman Shays, Mr. Ruppersberger.

I will echo my colleague, Liz, and thank you for the opportunity to

appear.

And just to refer to some of the nice words you said about the

work of NDI and IRI in Iraq, we very much appreciate that and

heard much about your visit. And I think it bears saying—and we

were very proud to work, of course, with the Iraqis, thousands of

them who really risked their lives. In fact 10,000 Iraqis acted as

domestic election monitors, receiving nothing in return, but just engaging in the process, going out to actually watch people vote. It

was an incredible day. I was there. I was one of the few international observers out on the streets. And I think, you know, without hesitation it was one of the most emotional, but also fulfilling

days of my life.

But coming back—and at the end of that day we did celebrate,

both the international staff, with our Iraqi compatriots. We also realized that probably the harder work was about to begin; in fact,

we said about midnight that night that the nice part about working

on the Iraqi election was two things: One is that Iraqis, we knew

that the demand was there, we knew that when given the chance

they were going to show what they wanted. The second part is that

we all knew what an election looked like. In a sense there was a

linear path to an election, we knew what had to happen.

Unfortunately, I don’t think any of us quite know what happens

next. We don’t know exactly what the institutions of democracy in

Iraq should or will look like. We don’t know what exactly the constitution-building process in Iraq should or will be. And I think we

knew then, and we found out in the week since that time, as we

have seen with the struggles in the government, that the next

steps are in some ways more important and also in some ways

more difficult.

So going back to the previous panel, I also would counsel a lot

of patience and have everyone understand, as you have said several

times in this hearing, that this is going to be a long complicated

process.

On the more general topic today of Middle East democracy and

the Bush doctrine, I tried to address some of the questions that

were posed for the panelists, and the first question was: Is the

Bush doctrine working? Well, my answer would be yes and no. I

have been involved in democracy promotion in the Middle East for

just under 12 years, I have been with NDI for 12 years, and much

of that time has been a struggle.

I have to say that it was difficult to get the attention of policymakers in Washington only a few years ago. And I often joke that

in 1999, if we were trying to get attention, for example, out in the

country of Yemen on the topic of democracy, that was not a popular

topic. It was difficult to get people to listen. That has changed.

This paragraph in late 2000, in summing up NDI’s work in the

region, said ‘‘that the existence of courageous, democratic activists

points to the growing consciousness of the Middle Eastern third

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isting regimes and the rhetoric of religious extremism. The vanguard of this new third way are cautiously chipping away at the

ruling elite’s assumption that they can rule without the allegiance

of the masses.’’

So we found over the years that there was a courageous third

way, the type of people that are on this panel today. But they

didn’t get a lot of support. In fact, much of the aid and diplomatic

efforts of the United States and others in the international community in the nineties appeared to be designed largely to show tangible results from the pursuit of regional peace. And this type of

democratic aid contained few programs that challenged entrenched

political authorities or that encouraged a more vigorous legislative

branch. Not only that, the aid was channeled through official conduits, using formal and informal bilateral agreements.

For example, U.S. aid to democracy in places like Egypt and Jordan and Morocco was negotiated with the government. And this is

not a judgment on those governments, but their interest was not

always in changing the structures that they themselves controlled.

So that type of aid was not the most effective. And there was clearly a reluctance on the United States and the international community to push political reform in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

and Pakistan.

So President Bush, though, has done something extremely important. He has reinforced what is widely understood and frequently

demonstrated in the Middle East, and that is that democracy is

about universal values.

There was an article last year in Foreign Policy entitled, ‘‘The

True Clash of Civilization,’’ where two professors pointed out

through surveys done in more than 70 countries, that more than

80 percent of people in the Muslim and Islamic world support democracy.

So what President Bush has done—and he has done it very, very

dramatically—is he has given voice to that huge majority in the

Arab and Islamic world, No. 1; and he has empowered and

emboldened these reformers who have existed, actually, for a number of years.

The second thing that President Bush has done is through his

very frequent and powerful and forceful repetitions of this doctrine,

of this idea that all people, given the choice, will choose freedom

and want to control the decisions that affect their lives, is that he

has slowly but surely turned U.S. policy around so that programs

like the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which Liz mentioned,

USAID programs, the programs of the National Endowment for Democracy, are now much more in the mainstream, and organizations

like NDI and IRI are much, much more effectively able to push

these democracy issues in the countries that we work in.

To conclude, I would say that the challenge before us is to ensure

that this new focus on actually pushing democracy that President

Bush has articulated very well, that this new focus has continued;

that the resources continue to be made available, and that U.S. policy doesn’t do what would be the easy thing, which is to sort of drift

and to not continue to push in these countries that resist this new

democratic change. Thank you.

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Mr. SHAYS. I need to, for my own self sense of worth here, acknowledge the fact that in my youth I had, if not led the charge,

been a vocal proponent of eliminating funding for the National Endowment for Democracy. And that absurd position, in light of

what’s happened in the last 15 years, humbles me. I am so grateful

that I wasn’t as persuasive as I thought I was.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Professor.

STATEMENT OF FEBE ARMANIOS

Professor ARMANIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished

subcommittee members, I am honored to be here today and pleased

to share with you my views on this subject. My comments today

are also part of a summary of a longer submitted testimony.

Recent events in the Middle East, including the Lebanese demonstrations for and subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops, the

Iraqi elections in January, and the announcement of forthcoming

multiparty elections in Egypt, have been viewed as a success for

the Bush doctrine on democracy promotion in the Middle East. But

the ways in which the administration’s policies have been received

by various groups in the region might be indicative of the challenges facing U.S.-sponsored programs. Some regional observers

and politicians argue that the Middle East had been moving toward democracy long before the administration’s calls for reform.

Many also argue that there is no causal link between U.S. policies

and trends toward reform.

While this is an inexact assessment, we cannot separate recent

developments from their local context. For example, the Syrian

withdrawal from Lebanon is also strongly linked to the recent assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Moreover, we

cannot neglect that there is growing suspicion in the region toward

the U.S.’ motivation for reform, even from local advocates who otherwise might be natural allies to U.S. proposals.

Mr. Chairman, critics of the administration’s policies and some

Arab leaders caution that promoting democracy in the region is incompatible with U.S. national security objectives. They argue that

there is high level of support for Islamist leaders among voting

populations in the Middle East, and that in most countries of the

region, transparent democratic elections held today would almost

certainly produce radical Islamic regimes that would then seek to

undermine U.S. interests.

In dealing with this assessment, we should first note that genuine democratic change in the region would likely bring to the

foremultiple voices, including those of radicals and militants. But

it may also create an opening for moderate Islamists. Moderate

Islamists who reject violence and are willing to participate in a

democratic framework will be crucial in sustaining stable democratic governments in the coming years. The risks involved in a

democratic process that would allow these groups to become legitimate political actors might be worth taking.

Second, there is a sense that open elections could bring radical

Islamist groups into power and they might then transform the regimes that made elections possible into theocracies. This might indeed be the case. But in Turkey, we see that religiously motivated

groups can participate under a democratic structure where they

bargain with other political actors and become full-fledged members of a politically pluralistic society. If moderate Islamists are invested in a democratic system and realize that only within this system could they express and achieve their goals, they could become

agents for, rather than obstacles to, positive change.

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Third, a push for democracy in the Middle East might create regimes that are partially or completely governed by Islamic law. We

should take into consideration that an Islamic democracy might not

completely conform to a Western-style interpretation. And in helping establish democratic structures in the region, U.S. policies must

also strive for the inclusion of women, nonMuslims, nonIslamists,

and secularist groups.

Ultimately the United States can support democratic reform by

focusing on the following points: First, the United States should encourage diversity in the political landscape of the Middle East.

While the United States may disagree with their views, Islamists

are part of the political reality of the region. Here, the United

States should learn more about different Islamist groups, about

their agendas, goals, and popular appeal, and should determine

their capacity for participating in governance alongside secular or

nonIslamist groups. The exclusion of these groups as a totality

without making any distinctions among them might reinforce an

existing notion in the region that the United States rhetoric and

policies on democracy promotion are disingenuous.

Second, the United States should be cautious in the extent in

which it recognizes existing sectarian, religious, and patriarchal divisions. In looking for natural allies in Iraq, the United States has

worked with religious and tribal leaders to form a new government.

This approach might substitute one set of traditional power holders

with another. The United States should work with NGO’s, grassroots organizations, and civil society in soliciting ways to include

women and nontraditional power holders in governance.

Third, the U.S. Congress should work to strengthen existing democracy promotion programs. Congressional oversight can monitor

programs such as MEPI by ensuring that they are signaling the

U.S.’s commitment to democratic reforms that are sensitive to local

political conditions and to indigenous interpretations of democracy.

Most importantly, perhaps, provisions in these initiatives must

take into account unique conditions within each country in the region.

Finally, the State Department should intensify its public diplomacy efforts and press for improvements in human rights, political

participation, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting freedom

of religion, speech, and press in the Middle East. The United States

will gain greater credibility in the region if it prioritizes democratic

reform alongside its short-term economic and strategic interests.

The United States should maintain bilateral dialogs, bilateral dialogs with regional governments, and should advocate reform especially from its closest allies. This dialog should be bolstered by a

willingness to exert diplomatic and economic pressure to express

the seriousness of U.S. policies.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Professor Armanios follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Saffuri.

STATEMENT OF KHALED SAFFURI

Mr. SAFFURI. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you, especially Chairman Shays,

for inviting me to testify this morning. I have a written statement

which I ask to be included on the record.

Mr. SHAYS. It will be included.

Mr. SAFFURI. Thank you. Thank you very much for holding this

hearing on such an important matter involving democracy, civil

rights, and foreign policy matters. The issue of democracy in the

Middle East has been of critical importance to the Islamic Free

Market Institute Foundation, which I am a cochairman, a cofounder and chairman since its founding in 1998. We hosted the

first conference of free market and democracy in Doha, Qatar in

the year 2000, and our fifth conference was held just a few months

ago.

Following the tragic attacks of September 11th, the larger issue

of democracy and freedom in the Muslim world has been taking a

profound importance. I welcome this opportunity to provide this

subcommittee and Members of Congress our opinion on the impact

of U.S. policy and U.S. statements on the Middle East and in the

Muslim world.

First, I would like to begin by talking about the problem that is

a credibility problem which hurts our effort in spreading democracy

in the Middle East. No matter how passionately President Bush

states or makes his notions of spreading freedom, there is a growing perception that America continues to deny justice to Islam and

Muslims. Specifically, the Muslim world is convinced that our government violates civil rights and due process of Muslims right here

in the United States. This results in a perceived double standard

which runs the risk of preventing any meaningful dialog with the

Muslim street.

A few months ago Mr. Osama Siblani, the editor of the largest

Arab American paper in Detroit wrote: ‘‘How can we believe that

America’s engaged in spreading democracy in the Arab and Muslim

world while we as Arab Americans have less democracy here in the

U.S.?’’

Many people are aware of the prosecution of Muslims in this

country, and Arabs. There is an article that I can make available

here, written in the American Conservative magazine by James

Bovard called ‘‘Undue Process.’’ These kinds of incidents are translated in the Middle East into Arab and Muslim press, and they

cause this credibility problem to spread more. This also runs the

risk of rendering unmeaningful the hundreds of millions of dollars

we continue to spend in public diplomacy, democracy initiatives,

and the media. Anyone that looks at the polling in the Middle East,

you see that in general America’s stand in the Arab and Muslim

street actually is declining, not improving.

Islam provides not only religious guidance but represents the

philosophy, culture, and sociopolitical foundation of most Muslim

societies today. It is important that we recognize, first and foremost, that allowing Islam or its belief to be attacked hinders our

effort at building bridges and understanding with the Muslim

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world. So as we consider programs and campaigns to foster freedom in the Muslim and Arab world, we must realize that these societies will reject any approach which marginalizes Islamic

thought.

Yet there is much for us in the United States to teach in emerging democracies. We can demonstrate the importance of civic institutions which would be compatible to Islam to serve as barriers to

social injustice and authoritarian regimes.

In a nutshell, only—it is not only that Islamis compatible with

democracy, it is required as a foundation in any Muslim country.

The issue of the state-run media—and this is something I would

like to address here regarding the programs of Radio Sawa and Al

Hurra—I would like to address the hurdles in presenting U.S.

viewpoints through media efforts such as Al Hurra satellite channel and Radio Sawa. One thing that can be said of Arabs is total

distrust of state-run media. For generations, governments in the

Middle East were feeding information to their public that people

have total mistrust, it’s a government propaganda. The government

point of view was always presented without any challenge. Al

Hurra is U.S. Government-funded and perceived as strictly controlled by the U.S. Government. This might not be true, but this

is how the street looks at Al Hurra. And this is the reason why Al

Jazeera has been very successful. And every time Al Jazeera is attacked in America, the more popular it becomes in the Middle East.

Furthermore, the constant broadcasting on stations in the Muslim world such as the Armed Forces Radio of perceived anti-Islamic

commentary by the likes of Rush Limbaugh. I have a personal experience. I was in Bahrain 2 years ago, and a high-ranking official

of the Foreign Ministry said we are strong allies of the United

States but we are constantly embarrassed. He said, we have the

naval base in Bahrain, and we allow the radio station, military

radio station here, but we get complaints and people are angry on

the street because there is this program of a guy—he couldn’t spell

his name, he said Limbo. I said, Rush Limbaugh. He said, ‘‘Yes. He

is constantly insulting Islam, and there’s nothing we can do.’’ So

I said I will go back to the States.

Mr. SHAYS. I have something in common with that as well. I get

the same insults.

Mr. SAFFURI. We raised the issue with two Pentagon officials and

a letter was sent immediately. We didn’t get an answer. Then I

raised an issue with Mr. Wilcox, assistant in the Secretary of Defense, and he said this will be considered censorship. He said Rush

Limbaugh’s program is the most popular in the military radio, so

they could not censor it, they could not remove it.

But this really undermines the work, the great work that has

been done by IRI and NDI, and also the other stations that we support, like Al Hurra and Radio Sawa.

I would like to conclude, I think I can talk more about these

issues later.

Mr. SHAYS. If you could bring your comments to a close.

Mr. SAFFURI. OK. I will close here and I will leave it for answering. Thank you again.

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you so much. I complimented our first speaker

on her thoughtful comments, but I congratulate all of you and

thank all of you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saffuri follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Ms. Yacoubian.

STATEMENT OF MONA YACOUBIAN

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the

subcommittee for inviting me to speak today. I am truly honored

to be among such distinguished company. The powerful title of this

morning’s hearing, ‘‘Fostering Democracy in the Middle East: Defeating Terrorism with Ballots,’’ underscores the critical role that

freedom and democracy can play in countering extremism in this

troubled region.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks,

the world turned its attention to the Middle East’s longstanding democracy deficit. With the Pentagon in flames and the Twin Towers

collapsing, the horror of that day initiated deeper reflection both

here and in the Arab world about the roots of such a horrendous

act.

Recently, global and regional interest has focused intensely on

the Middle East’s need for reform. The region’s stagnation dates

back decades. Yet until the 2001 attacks, these ills received scant

attention from governments in the region or their global counterparts. The September 11th attacks shattered the conventional wisdom that the region’s stability, anchored by its authoritarian governments, could endure indefinitely and would come at little cost

to U.S. interests. Precisely the opposite conclusion has become apparent. Middle East reform is critical for long-term regional stability and broader international security. Absent change, the status

quo will only breed greater popular disaffection and provide fertile

ground for the continued growth of extremism.

In advance of today’s hearings, you provided a number of complex questions focused on two key issues: first, the region’s ripeness

for reform; and, second, the Bush administration’s policies on Middle East reform. I will devote the majority of my testimony to the

first question. I want to add that the views I express are my own

and not necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does

not advocate specific policy positions.

The absence of freedom in the Middle East is well documented.

Freedom House, in its most recent survey, notes that the region is

distinguished from the rest of the world by its distinct lack of political rights and civil liberties. At times, regimes in the region have

resorted to wide-ranging repressive practices in the name of fighting the global war on terror. Such policies often result in an increase in human rights violations and the overall suppression of

dissent, even when peaceful.

An Arab awakening to the need for reform has taken place as

well. In July 2002, less than a year after September 11th, a U.Ncommissioned panel of 30 Arab experts issued the first Arab

Human Development Report. In blunt language, the AHDR issues

a probing self-critical analysis of the region’s shortfalls. Specifically, the paper outlines three key deficits: freedom, women’s empowerment, and knowledge that impede the Arab world from

achieving its true potential.

The report concludes with a clarion call for reform. While the

Arab world’s lack of political freedom is well documented, the region’s democracy deficit should not be misinterpreted as a lack of

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desire or capacity for democratic reform on the part of its citizens.

Numerous polls and surveys verify the Arab public’s hunger for

freedom and democracy. The most compelling data originates from

the 2001 World Value Survey which reveals that Arab countries

had the highest percentage of publics, 61 percent, who agreed

strongly that, ‘‘democracy may have many problems, but it’s better

than any other form of government.’’

Beyond the polling results, other data coupled with key concepts

in Islam suggests that there is not necessarily an inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy. First, there are many examples of countries with significant Muslim populations that are

considered electoral democracies. Second, notable principals within

Islam such as shura or consultative decisionmaking and ijtihad, or

interpretation, can propel a democratic ethos.

The absence of freedom in the Middle East does not appear to

have precluded many of its people from embracing the hope for

democratic reforms. Indeed, intense international interest directed

at the need for Middle East reform has helped to initiate an unprecedented dialog over reform in the region.

The boldest and most detailed proposals originating in the Arab

world have emerged from nongovernment organizations. Beginning

in January 2004, a diverse array of groups ranging from the Arab

Business Council to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have published a wide variety of reform initiatives. Most significantly, many

of these initiatives have advocated forcefully for political reform. I

would be happy to discuss the specifics of these initiatives during

the question and answer.

In contrast, government proposals for reform may provide entry

points for pressing for more substantial democratic change, but

they fall short of meaningful, deeply rooted, and sustained reform.

Instead, government measures typically appear designed to relieve

popular pressure at home and assuage critics abroad while leaving

the power equation unaltered. To be successful, any reform effort

must be inclusive, reaching out to all elements of society, including

modern Islamists who likely constitute the region’s most potent opposition force. Yet, with few exceptions, joint reform efforts that

bring together secular and Islamist reformers are rare. Calls for

the creation of national pacts could bridge secular and Islamist demands for reform and possibly galvanize the reform movement.

In closing, it is useful to consider the implications for U.S. policy.

To date, the Bush administration’s focus on Middle East reform at

a minimum has energized discussion of the issue in the region. For

all of its controversy, the U.S. invasion of Iraq may have contributed indirectly to numerous positive developments in the region.

Still, several significant challenges remain. First, bolstering U.S.

credibility in the region stands as a key priority for policymakers.

Second, the administration must determine how to reconcile the

well-documented need for change in the region with longstanding

desires for stability. Third, U.S. engagement with moderate

Islamist reformers is essential. Finally, U.S. policymakers need to

harmonize U.S. policies in support of the global war on terror with

the desire to promote reform.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today on such

an important issue. The movement toward political reform in this

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critical region of the world will not be easy, quick, or without difficulties, but it is necessary and must be sustained. The long-term

stability of the region, which is in everyone’s interest, is at stake.

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Yacoubian follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. It’s been a wonderful panel to

hear from. And we will start with Mr. Ruppersberger for questions.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do think

it’s an excellent panel.

I think we all agree that we would love to see the goal of democracy in countries throughout the world. But then there’s the challenge of implementation, and that’s a part of what we are trying

to talk about today. I think the areas that I would like to focus on

in my questions—and I will probably go to you first Mr. Saffuri—

are these.

First, how do we deal with radical Islam? Because I see radical

Islam, probably as one of our biggest problems as it relates to

world peace, as it relates to what’s going on in Iraq. And I’m concerned about the education of children with respect to radical

Islam. And how do we deal with that issue?

The second issue. I have been to numerous countries throughout

the Islamic world, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, over in Asia,

different countries. And one of the things that I think has to be

done and has to be worked through is the discrimination against

women. If we are going to have a true democracy, we have to deal

with that issue. Saudi Arabia, considered to be progressive, a

woman cannot drive a car. They have police running around trying

to catch them showing a little skin or whatever their issues are.

And yet, you know, if we don’t have women involved—and I think

there’s a good role model with Karzai in Afghanistan who worked

hard to get women involved. I think that’s a very important and

relevant issue.

The next issue is education. And that is so important. And I

talked in the previous panel, infrastructure and quality of life. But

that goes in together.

And the fourth is that how do we mitigate, how do we mediate

between the different religions? Iraq, as an example, where you

have Sunni, you have Shia, you have different religions and have

different points of view and they’re fighting with each other. How

do we pull them together as it relates to democracy? If you can address those four issues, I would—and if we have time, I will go to

the rest of the panel.

Mr. SAFFURI. Thank you. I think this is a very difficult subject

to tackle.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is why I asked the questions. And one

point I want to say about Rush Limbaugh. Rush Limbaugh has

personally said over and over he is an entertainer. So even though

a lot of people like to hear what he has to say in the United States,

if he says himself that he is an entertainer, I would send that message out to the rest of the Islamic world when he does—you feel

like he is attacking you, that he says he is an entertainer and not

a part of the media. Maybe that might help the situation.

Mr. SAFFURI. Well, the problem, these statements come very frequently. And the incident with the desecration of the Quran in

Guantanamo, even though Newsweek denied the story, but still the

result of that story, as you saw, caused the death of 17 people.

The issue of radical Islam, I really think one of the most important issues is to engage Islamic parties and Islamic activities in dialog. And if you look at the Islamic movement in the Muslim world,

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it varies from one country to another. The Islamic bloc in the Kuwait Parliament, they have been participating in elections since

1963, they have 11 people out of 15 in Parliament and they represent—even though they work frequently as the Cabinet members.

They are engaged in dialog with the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. They

come frequently to Washington. There was one of the leaders here

just 2 weeks ago speaking at the National Defense University. So

it’s from country to another. The more pressure there is on people,

the more radical the reaction comes in the street.

This is my personal belief. You have countries that are allies of

the United States receive great aid from taxpayers’ money, and

these countries imprison people for simply running for Parliament.

So when people have no hope in their societies, they become

radicalized gradually. So I think the most important thing that the

United States needs to do, we need to start with our allies before—

I think pressuring Syria is very important, but before we pressure

Syria we have to set an example with our closest allies in the area.

These countries that get foreign aid, you can use for it as leverage

with these countries, whether you want to hold part of foreign aid,

whether you want to engage these countries, hold part of the foreign aid until they start conducting political reforms in these countries. And I think having these billions of dollars pumped into

these economies should be used to pressure these countries to

make change. That is extremely important.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me stop you there, because I want to

get an issue out. And I know I’ve had numerous conversations, just

this last Sunday night with Muslim Americans about what we can

do and what the Muslim community can do to help world peace,

to help democracy. And one of the issues that I think is extremely

important is controlling the message, something that maybe Rush

Limbaugh tries to do. And controlling the message that we need

the help of Islamic Americans and other Muslims throughout the

world to let the people in other countries know that Islam is not

about killing yourself because that’s what God wants you to do.

And I think you have to start with the younger generation and

have to educate. But I am calling out and challenge the American

Muslim community, and then Muslims throughout the world who

are leaders, to help control that message and to get the message

out that Islam is a peaceful religion. And to have people professing

that they are killing for God, that’s not what it’s about. And I

would think that any Muslim throughout the world would hold

anybody and radical Islam accountable for preaching and for promoting that.

And I think that we can’t do it alone, the United States or other

countries. We can help you with security, we can help you with infrastructure and money, but we need to have the Muslims throughout the world, the leadership. And I know there’s some that are

doing it, but it’s not enough. And I’m encouraging you to reconsider

your goals throughout the world to help us control that message

about Islam.

Mr. SAFFURI. Absolutely. I think the Muslim community have a

duty to help the United States, but also the U.S. Government has

a responsibility on asking the help of the Muslim community. Frequently the State Department implores people that all the relationVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:18 Sep 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22706.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ship with Islam is a few classes at Georgetown University, or being

born and coming to the United States at the age of 2 and having

very little knowledge of the Islamic world. That is a fact——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. My time is almost up. Mr. Chairman, are

you going to let us go a little longer?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Mr. SAFFURI. On the woman issue, the other——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let’s get to the women issue about discrimination and how—you know, how can we have democracy and

freedom if we don’t deal with the issue of women and discrimination? And I know it’s a different culture.

I will give you an example. I was at a function, an Islamic function, and talking to the men and women that were mixed together.

And then it was time for me to have a speech, and in the room the

Muslim women were on one side and the men were on the other.

And during the speech I made a comment that I don’t really understand, but I understand it’s your culture. Boy, after I gave my

speech I really got criticized by the women, that this is what we

want to do, that’s our religion. And that’s where we have to understand and educate each other. So I think this discrimination

against women has to be dealt with.

Mr. SAFFURI. Yes, I agree——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It doesn’t mean that I am saying to change

your culture.

Mr. SAFFURI. Frequently——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But educating women.

Mr. SAFFURI. Frequently Islam is used to justify the discrimination against women. In reality, it is absolutely not true. I was in

Kuwait during the debate over women being allowed to vote in the

year 2000. Kuwait issued a decree allowing women to vote; Parliament overruled it. And we were then with the congressional delegation meeting with some members of the Islamic bloc, and they

used Islam as a justification. And I challenged them to prove it,

and then they backed down. They said actually Islam have nothing

to do with it; the whole issue is tribal and culture issue. And this

is why—the vote took place 2 weeks ago in Kuwait, and the Islamic

parties did not vote, actually did not vote against it because they

know that there is nothing in Islam against it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It’s a good step. But it’s also—you need to

deal with the issue of education, too.

Mr. SAFFURI. So going back to the issue. I think we need to engage Islamic parties and Islamic activists in dialog whether by inviting them here. The State Department have speakers program

where they bring people around the country. I think they should

include a large number of Islamic activities. I know the work of

NDI and IRI, they do lots of work in the Gulf of Yemen and North

Africa. They need to talk to those people. Some countries they probably cannot meet with them probably because, for example, in

Tunis, Islamic activism is barred by the government. They put all

of them in prison a long time ago.

But you need to engage them, and I think through engagement

and dialog you can—I think they will eventually have to admit that

lots of stuff was influenced in the last 30 years by Wahhabi ideas

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that have nothing to do with Islam; it’s more of the ideology, in my

opinion. I can debate this——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But, you know, the influence of children

with Wahhabism and the schools that are developing, that’s a very

serious issue, because the children are very impressionable. And

these are some of the people that are recruited to put bombs on

their bodies to kill themselves. So I mean, I think—I would like to

hear you suggest in dealing with radical Wahhabism, how you as

a Muslim and how leadership in the Muslim community can deal

with those messages.

Mr. SAFFURI. I think Saudi Arabia is a very close ally of the

United States, and I think that’s another leverage we should use.

We have a close relationship, and these issues should be constantly

with——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But how do we implement dealing with

that issue? How do we implement dealing with Saudi Arabia? I was

in Saudi Arabia and had conversations about this issue, and they

said, well, we have—how can you promote Wahhabism and some

of the radical teachings? And yet those are the same people that

are attempting to kill your leadership. How would you recommend

that we deal with that? If we don’t deal with radical Wahhabism

and the training of young people, we are going to have serious

problems throughout this world for a long time.

Mr. SAFFURI. I do agree with that——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So how would you recommend that we deal

with it?

Mr. SAFFURI. You know, I think the Saudis are trying to make

some changes. They have great resistance inside the country. But

I think that doesn’t mean we should stop pressuring them. I think

the pressure should continue. I think more visits from Members of

Congress to engage the Saudi leadership, this kind of dialog of

making the changes. And also with the leadership. I think the last

elections of Riyadh, the Islamic candidates won the entire, the elections for the city of Riyadh. So I think those guys should either invite them to the United States, engage them in dialog. You have

to reach some kind of agreement.

I also think another way of supporting more Muslim, moderate

Muslim leaders who do not subscribe to the Wahhabi ideas, I think

there is plenty of them. I think in the last 30, 40 years, the oil

money caused explosion with this Wahhabi ideas all over the

world, especially in Muslim communities within the Muslim world

or in the West. Because of the access to the large amount of money,

these ideas were turned into books and these books were made

available where many Muslims who tried to learn about Islam understood the Wahhabi ideas to be the legitimate ideas for Muslim.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do you think the leaders of the different

governments should attempt to have influence on the Wahhabi

teachings?

Mr. SAFFURI. I think if they feel the pressure from the outside,

they will go hide in a corner and continue their activities. I think

it should be an open dialog. And they should be challenged on facts

from the history of Islam. Women and Islam participated with men

in the battlefield, participated—the prophet’s wife was a trader,

she was a businesswoman. So now to say women could not drive

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a car or women could not mix with men, it is really in total contradiction with Islamic teaching. So you have to challenge it. You

have to allow the more open-minded Muslim leaders to challenge

it under an open dialog.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Anyone else have comments on what we

discussed?

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could jump in.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could jump in, maybe——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. We learn more this way. Thank you.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Maybe, with respect to my friend—and we have

talked a lot, I think, all of us, so you know we see ourselves as colleagues basically. And I didn’t hear anything I disagreed with totally, but I think I would challenge the thesis a bit about how to

tackle Islam. And I would say that the challenge before us—and I

am thinking about NDI and IRI and others that are on the ground

doing these programs—it’s not so much to democratize Islam. I

don’t disagree with any of the concerns that you brought up. I

think these are real concerns. But I think if we tackle this problem

by thinking that we have to go in, in a sense, as outsiders and try

to democratize Islam, I think we will get bogged down and not get

very——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I agree. It has to come from within. And

success breeds upon success.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That’s very important.

Mr. CAMPBELL. It does breed success. The other thing is that if

we champion freedom—and I don’t always like to sound like I’m

parroting President Bush’s words because I come from a different

political vantage point.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. This shouldn’t be——

Mr. CAMPBELL. But—but if we champion——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Partisan anyway.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Then what happens is you can build a middle. I

think the problem that we run into in Saudi Arabia, even in Kuwait, certainly in Egypt, is that there are two extremes. You are

on the government’s side where they say, oh, we can’t open up because we have the specter of the radicals on that side. If you are

on the radical side, they say there is no other choice; the only way

we can organize and speak is in the mosque. And I think that the

challenge that we have is, in thinking about democracy promotion,

is how do you open up that middle? So not so much to democratize

Islam, but to provide the political space where other voices can be

heard, including——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So be more specific. How would you implement that?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, one thing, pressure to have elections. I

agree that elections are not the only answer, but successive

iterations——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But before you can have elections, you

must have security. You must train countries to also provide their

own security, which is the only way in the end we are going to get

out of Iraq. And we have a long way to go there.

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Mr. CAMPBELL. That’s true. Although—and, again, this is a

chicken and egg problem. If you have security but no freedom, then

we end up with this problem of developing a malignancy. You

know——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. No question.

Mr. CAMPBELL. People have said that we thought we were getting stability in the Middle East; what we were getting was malignancy, and eventually it erupts and it hurts us all. So it’s a very

difficult balance. You can’t have—I’m not suggesting you forget

about security and go into democracy in elections, but you pursue

these things simultaneously because people are demanding a

chance to have a voice. If they don’t have a voice, then the radicals

dominate the agenda, and I think that’s what we have seen.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And if that is the case, then you must win

the hearts and minds of the people, because no government—no

one is going to be able to force somebody. They are going to know

what their quality of life is.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. If you want to jump in, Ms. Dugan, please feel free.

Ms. DUGAN. Not to put too fine a point on it, but just to perhaps

jump off from where Les left off here and talk a little bit about the

women’s aspect of this. I think it would be a different matter if

NDI and IRI found themselves on the ground in a place like Iraq

or a place like Afghanistan, saying to people women must be more

involved here, so you’ll have to go out and try to find them and

then we will do what we can to find them.

In fact it’s quite the opposite that has occurred. There are women

who have come to us from the very beginning and said we need

your help, we need an understanding, we need tools to allow us to

have our voices be more strongly heard. And as you yourself have

pointed out, the women’s participation in the political process in

Afghanistan has been enshrined to some degree in the constitution

of Afghanistan. This is——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And that started with the leadership of

Karzai, too.

Ms. DUGAN. Exactly correct. Exactly correct. So these are the

sort of signals that we can take to begin to expand our programs.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In order to do that, do you feel that education is one of the strongest elements to help this issue of discrimination against women?

Ms. DUGAN. It’s a very important element. And the women themselves, I think, are prepared to step up to that plate.

Mr. SHAYS. Did either one of you want to respond to Mr.

Ruppersberger’s questions?

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Maybe just very, very briefly. One is to actually

build on the point that was made here. And that is the whole issue

of family code revisions, that—these are laws that dictate women

and their status that are often discriminatory. And so certainly one

way to begin to get at this problem is to advocate for revision of

these family code laws.

I would raise the example of Morocco in which its family code

law was revised, I believe it was last year, and it now has one of

the most liberal status codes with respect to women in the Arab

world. Of course, the trick is that once those revisions are made,

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ensuring that in fact those statutes are implemented and so forth.

But I think that’s a very important means of getting at some of the

discrimination issues. And the only other point I’d like to make is

that——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But where does that have to come from?

Does that have to come from the religious leaders? How can you

change a code?

Ms. YACOUBIAN. That has to come from government, governments in power and parliaments. And obviously in the Arab world,

typically governments are the ones that control these kinds of

issues; parliaments often have their hands tied. And I think in this

regard the United States can play an important role, quietly to

push for and advocate for revisions of family code.

I believe there are discussions now in Algeria—is that correct,

Les—about the family law. So this would be an important place

again to quietly perhaps lobby and push for revision of a code in

such a way that it’s more liberal and freer with regard to the way

women are treated.

Professor ARMANIOS. I would like to just add that we have to be

willing to be open to different voices within even the women’s

movement itself. For the example of Iraq, we see that there is a

spectrum of women’s groups, some of which are actually advocating

for a greater implementation of Islam. They see that through Islam

they would have greater rights. And this is kind of building on

your point. It takes a more moderate interpretation in that sense

of the religion. But they are still working within those parameters

rather than abandoning cultural and traditional values, and that’s

something that I think we need to be sensitive to on the ground.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. This is fascinating stuff. I was just thinking as you

were talking, I was an administrative aide to a mayor, and I got

a call from a constituent who was very unhappy that the legislature was abolishing a law that said women couldn’t work past 12

at night. And she was a supervisor and didn’t want to work past

12 at night, and so she wanted that law. And I think of that in

light of the distortions sometimes that we get in public policy. You

know, if she didn’t want to work past 12 at night, she needed to

work that out with her boss, but she didn’t need a law that prevented every woman from working past 12 at night.

I want to just, I have been in awe, I was in awe of the experience

I had in Iraq during the election, and I interacted in Irbio with

both the International Republican Institute and the National

Democratic Institute. In Irbio, one was involved with the monitoring and another was involved with getting out the vote. Do you remember which organization, what your organizations did in that

area in Irbio? Do you remember?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, the organization that NDI was associated

with was called the Election Information Network, which was more

a monitoring organization. And IRI was dealing with an organization which was much more about actively encouraging people to

vote. I don’t remember the name of the organization.

Mr. SHAYS. And you had incredible systems set up around the

country. And they were Iraqis. But what was fascinating to me was

with the—I think it was the International Republican Institute.

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There was a woman who was—appeared to be fairly young. I

thought she was still in her twenties. And I was thinking she was

devoting morning, noon, and night to this effort. And she was from

former Yugoslavia. And I said, why are you here? And she said in

so many words: Because your country helped bring democracy. And

I don’t even know if she said ‘‘your country.’’ She said you helped

bring democracy to my country, and I wanted to share what I

learned with someone else.

I thought the power of that was just extraordinary. Do you remember this young woman? I mean, is she—I mean, just, it was

just mind-boggling.

Ms. DUGAN. Mr. Chairman, her name is Olga. She is star on our

team in Iraq, which is no small effort, as you know well. And I too

am grateful for your praise of our programs there. You can know

that it is a very challenging environment but one that the entire

staff of IRI is completely dedicated to.

Mr. SHAYS. Was she Muslim herself? I mean, was she a Christian? Muslim? Do you know?

Ms. DUGAN. No. But it’s an interesting point that you bring up

because it’s one of the things that we have tried to do, not only in

Iraq, but in many programs that we have around the world. And

that is to build off the experiences of those in countries which are—

which have come more recently to democracy, who have a more recent experience with how these systems are in fact not only built

but rooted deeply. And so here’s a young woman who has sort of

lived it in her lifetime, who can bring her own sense of how you

apply these things in a different environment. And as I think you

know well, this is not a cookie-cutter approach that we can take.

We understand this from our work. You can’t just pick it up, move

it over, and put it down. But you can begin to apply a lot of the

same concepts and modify them appropriately.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, it spoke to my Peace Corps heart, because I

was thinking this wasn’t an American telling Iraqis or helping,

showing Iraqis. Not that there weren’t Americans there, but it was

someone closer to their experience. It was just downright extraordinary, it was impressive, and I think of her and the organization

and what you all accomplished in that effort.

Last August, I led a CODEL, a number of Members of Congress,

not many, but a number, went to Iraq, spoke to the leaders there,

the leaders in Jordan, the leaders in Israel, the leaders in the Palestinian community, the leaders in Lebanon. That was really fascinating, how they have been able to kind of cultivate a democracy.

And then we went into Syria. And that was extraordinary, too.

What I had learned of Lebanon made me feel that it was so fragile. I mean, there are different leaders, different faiths, allocations

of who got to be in what position. And so when there was this effort

to get after—the assassination to get Syria to leave, take its troops

out of Lebanon, I thought this isn’t going to happen. And I was

wrong. And it made me think of how surprised I was that Syria

did take its troops out. I was surprised that there was a strong

movement to make that demand. But then there was the

counterforce, Hezbollah and others, the political wing of Hezbollah

was out in force.

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And so the question I want to ask each of you, because the surprise to me was that Syria took its troops out. I want to ask each

of you, what is the biggest surprise that’s happened in the Middle

East since the fall of Saddam? It can be a positive surprise, it can

be a negative. If you have more than one but they are clustered together, you can do that. But tell me the thing that honestly surprised you, your expectation was different. And I’m not going to go

in order because you may want to think about this. But is anyone

ready to say what surprised them?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I’ll jump in.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Sure. I think we don’t know how it will turn out

yet, but what has surprised me are the potential changes in Egypt

and the fact that there are people on the street in Cairo and in

other places of Egypt. In the years that I’ve been doing this, I think

my greatest frustration has been the inability to find partners in

Egypt. NDI now has 10 offices across the region, but one of those

offices does not include Egypt. And we have found demand for democracy in almost every other country. If the Syrian government

would allow, we could easily work with Syrian reformists more. But

Egypt has been difficult. And now there are people on the street.

These are not large numbers, it’s a couple hundred people in a

country of 55 or more million. But the fact that people have the

nerve to go on the street, the guts, the steel to go on the street and

face arrest and ask for change has really surprised me. I don’t

know how it will turn out, but that I did not expect.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me another surprise. Anyone? There has to have

been—everything has gone just the way you anticipated it? I mean,

there had to have been things that surprised you.

Mr. SAFFURI. I think I have two surprises. One of them that I

am still astonished, that the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia still have so much power and the government claim they cannot

do anything about it. That is a huge surprise, because I think the

government have lots of power and they can marginalize them.

The other surprise is I think the Arab dictatorships are the only

ones in the world besides North Korea that these revolutionary republics are giving the children the Presidency. The President dies

now, it’s becoming monarchy republics. And it happens in Syria

and it looks like it might happen in other places there, too.

Mr. SHAYS. And it’s a surprise that could happen.

Mr. SAFFURI. That could happen. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. In this day and age.

Mr. SAFFURI. Absolutely. Yes.

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I’m actually going to volunteer three surprises.

But I think if I sat here and thought more, I could probably give

you more. But the first that comes to mind is the holding of municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, which, again, to my mind, represents a very important forward step. While they were limited in

many ways, for a country that had not had nationwide elections in

decades, to me it showed the power of over time the realization of

what happened post-September 11th and the need to change.

I have not had the privilege of going to Iraq, and I have to say

that I was very surprised at the way those elections took place, and

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very, very wowed by the courage of the Iraqi people to go to the

polls.

And, finally, I too was surprised by the Syrian withdrawal from

Lebanon. And the power of the Lebanese people, again, to go out

into the street and demand some control over their destiny, to me

very, very powerful, and a reminder of the forces at play at the region and how unpredictable they often are.

Ms. DUGAN. We are a little stymied by the question because I

think actually there have been a lot of things in the region that

have stunned us, because 5 years ago we couldn’t have really considered them.

Maybe the one thing that I will mention is this. For so long the

Middle East was the democratic exception, the only place in the

world where you just couldn’t really have these conversations.

Clearly, that’s not the case any longer. Now what we find, though,

is people in these countries as a result of what happened in Iraq,

presumably, saying, you know, if they could have it there, why

can’t we have it, too? This has been—I think this sort of vocalization of we want it, too, is perhaps, you know, something that’s

clearly noteworthy.

Professor ARMANIOS. Without being redundant, I would cite both

Egypt and the Lebanese case as the most surprising. But overall—

I guess I’m—having grown up in the region, I’m surprised by a

sense of optimism that exists there now that perhaps had not existed earlier as a result of all of these changes. I’m approaching it

with cautiousness, but I’m sharing the optimism as well, that reform will come soon.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Can I cheat, because I have a surprise that someone else told me the other day, which I thought was interesting.

And that is that the—his name is Mosin, and I’m sorry I forget his

second name. An Iranian student activist who eventually became

the architect of the repressive part of the Iranian establishment

that enforced certain types of behavior on the street is now a fellow

at the Washington Institute, as everyone will know, what’s regarded as a pro-Israel think-tank here in Washington. And he is

unapologetically there to talk about the possibilities of democracy

in Iran and the Middle East. And an Iranian activist said yesterday: Why is this not front-page news in the New York Times and

Washington Post? This is amazing.

So I will cheat and add someone else’s surprise to that.

Mr. SHAYS. Any others? It’s kind of fun to think about. Isn’t it?

This is not intended—this question is not intended to justify our

presence in Iraq or not. I mean, I voted to go there and so on. But

I have to believe that some of these surprises are related to a presence in Iraq. Obviously, the elections in Iraq itself. Obviously the—

frankly, the timely death of Arafat, frankly. And I want to know

if you think these things would have happened had there not been

this stirring up. I’m not saying—it happened now. Maybe they

would have happened, but it happened now.

Maybe I will put you on the spot a little, Mr. Saffuri. I mean,

not justifying our presence there. But has that been a catalyst for

some of these changes?

Mr. SAFFURI. Probably in Egypt, yes. I’m not sure Lebanon. I

think the situation in Lebanon’s been deteriorating for the last few

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years. Lebanon also have a history of democracy. They hold elections, they held elections during 29 years of Syrian presence in

Lebanon. I think the biggest factor in Lebanon was really the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. But I think

Egypt probably is a factor. I think another is Kuwait. That debate

over women’s right to vote and participate in the democratic process in Kuwait, there has been lots of resistance and the government was not willing to confront the tribal section in Parliament

or sector and Islamic parties. But because of how they would be

viewed by the United States, I think that’s how many of them

backed down. And I believe in that. I was in Kuwait 2 weeks ago

during this debate.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t know what final status is though.

Mr. SAFFURI. Yesterday the decision was made, there was another vote taken that women will be allowed to participate in elections.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. SAFFURI. So I think these are major changes, and I think

these are taking place because of the United States and because of

us being in Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. I participated in the World Economic Forum, and

frankly, in Jordan, and it is one of the most engaging 3 days I have

had in the world community. And I see this unbelievable desire on

the part of individuals from so many different towns in the Middle

East, from wanting to interact and wanting to reverse this report

that basically points out that of the 21 Arab states, their gross domestic product is smaller than Spain’s, in spite of oil wealth. And

it’s a powerful feeling that it is, you know, taking place in this

forum, and yet there is absolute—there is very strong anger with

the arrogance of the United States at the same time. And yet in

a way I feel like maybe it should have happened differently. And

clearly we shouldn’t be so arrogant, but I feel it’s happening in part

because of what we’re seeing happen there.

What the thing that you would fear the most that the United

States could do to overplay its cards, to force a response that would

be contrary to what the United States would do? In other words,

if I asked someone in Iraq their biggest concern, they would say

that the United States will leave, after doing all this, after getting

us, you know, to a point where we’re willing to, you know, come

out of the cave in a sense and step forward and risk our lives. Now

that’s one fear that Iraqis tell me. But what are other fears that

you may have that the United States could do that you think would

be a mistake? If you could tell the President of the United States

or me or someone else, what would you not want to see the United

States do?

Mr. SAFFURI. My biggest fear is Iraq turning into a theocratic democracy, and this is a truth here. And the end part is run in the

elections, run in the Kurdish umbrella or the Shi’ite umbrella. And

I think the majority of parliament now is held by the Shi’ite

groups, and my fear is that Iraq will turn into Iran because you

have religious and ethnic in the civil war.

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t we take the question that you answered,

which isn’t the question I asked; what is the biggest fear that you

have in the Middle East? Forget the United States for a second. I

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should have asked it first. And you gave a very important answer,

what is the biggest fear that you have that might occur in the Middle East that we need to be alert to? I’m asking anyone.

Mr. SAFFURI. I think a coup in Egypt or Saudi Arabia would be

my biggest fear. I think that would change the two countries and

would change the entire region.

Mr. SHAYS. Other comments?

Professor ARMANIOS. I think my biggest fear that the change that

the United States is advocating from the ground will appear to be

coming only from the United States and not from indigenous

sources. It needs legitimacy. The kind of forces we’re advocating, it

needs legitimacy, and my fear is not being able to engage with

wider groups in making significant change.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I’m not sure if I fear that because in our work

in the Middle East, we have never seen or felt the demand that we

see now. In other words, there is no amount, it seems, of time or

staff or money that can satisfy the demand that we’re finding from

indigenous reformers. I find that there could be more, and they are

committed and they are emboldened and empowered by the rhetoric of President Bush and others. Other countries are also stepping forward, Lebanon is becoming very much a European project.

Palestine is becoming more and more a European project. So I feel

optimistic about the region.

My fear here in the United States is that the constituency, the

policy constituency I think and the political constituency, for the

realist point of view, for the point of view that says that we have

to approach the rest of the world with our interests in mind, and

you know, Henry Kissinger had an op ed piece in the newspaper

yesterday articulating this very well. The people that believe, that

are still there, they’re around, they’re still in the State Department, they’re in academia.

Mr. SHAYS. They believe what, specifically?

Mr. CAMPBELL. They believe that stability is—certainly stability

would be paramount and would take precedence over democracy,

because there is something inherently destabilizing about democracy. They believe that the United States should approach international relations with its own interests in mind——

Mr. SHAYS. But the interesting thing is—excuse me for interrupting, so keep your thought. If I attributed that policy to any one government official, it would have been Henry Kissinger. That’s the

irony.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And he is articulating it again——

Mr. SHAYS. But promoting it?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think he is promoting the idea of stability

and——

Mr. SHAYS. Well, that would be consistent with his message.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is what he is promoting, but he is simply

voicing what others still feel—I can’t put my fingers on it, but in

attending many, many meetings at the State Department talking

about Middle East democracy, there is still a large reservoir of

doubt and cynicism and skepticism. It is out there. And a lot of

people are laying in wait for this whole experiment to fail, and it

will become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

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And again, I have to preface these things because I don’t speak

as a political supporter, in fact, I’m a stealth Canadian from a left

wing party in Canada. So if I had to express my personal views,

but in this business the United States has unleashed, and I think

tremendously positively unleashed, something that existed below

the surface. I don’t think going to war was the right idea, but there

is no denying that it has set in motion something unbelievably important. President Bush’s rhetoric gives voice to this, and it has energized the demand. The fear is that there are many, many people

laying in wait. Europeans that are waiting for President Bush to

fail, there are some saying this is a cockamamie idea that is going

south, and it’s going south in Iraq first.

So my fear is that people, through just kind of being half-hearted, lay back and allow these things to fail. So I think my final comment would be, that those of us who play a lesser role need to redouble our efforts if we’re serious about this, and if we honestly believe that they deserve freedom as much as anyone else, that has

to be an absolute change in our thinking, it cannot be reversed by

the political ups and downs, or even the ups and downs in Iraq.

And I think a lot of people are waiting for the political wings to

change.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other comments? I’d just like to say I would like

to invite you all to my house for dinner, the only problem is I

wouldn’t want to go to bed. You just make me want to ask more

questions. Your expertise is terrific, and you are giving so much

thought to these issues. It is really an enjoyable opportunity to

have with all of you. Thank you.

Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.

I am relatively new here. And first of all, I’m very impressed

with your thoughtful analysis and presentation of a very complex

subject matter that is critically important to our national security,

but also to the security of our Nation and all free nations throughout the world.

I’m a history teacher, and my focus of attention was Anglo Irish

history. But in the study of history and in the presentation of it

to students, you find that history lessons inherent in history are

timeless and universal, and they belong to no one culture or no one

people. And I was struck by not only this panel, but the one that

preceded it as well. And we’re talking about what is that tipping

point, who are the courageous leaders who sometimes are known,

but today they may be unknown. And I think of communist Poland

in the earlier part of the 20th century, and also the Islamic extremists within the early part of the 21st century, when you look at

both of those tyrannical governments, what they seem to do is keep

people afraid, keep them isolated. They seek to own everything

physical and control everything intellectual.

And I am also struck, the recent passing of Pope John Paul II,

forget about religion for a moment, what he did for the Polish people, he taught them to be unafraid, to challenge their government.

And when he went to Poland after becoming Pope, he not only

talked about God, he talked about history and culture. And his

warmth through millions of people into the street, which he gave

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them, instilled in them the strength to challenge the old way of

government.

And I’m reminded of Machiavelli, who had said that the reformer

has enemies, and all those profit by the older order and only lukewarm defenders who would profit by the new order. And what he

was saying was reform is very, very difficult. A lot of people want

it, but they don’t quite know how to get there. And the last panel,

Mr. Al-Alusi, I think, demonstrated the kind of emerging courageous leaders that will fundamentally transform the direction of

the Middle East to a more free and democratic place. So thank you

very much, it has been helpful to me.

Mr. SHAYS. This is a comment only intended to say having been

to Iraq seven times, I would have been surprised if the elections

hadn’t succeeded because I saw in Iraqis tremendous pride, a lot

of desire to succeed, and embarrassment in the way that the

United States had to come to rid them of Saddam, that this is

something they would have wanted to do on their own. And absolute extraordinary astonishment and disappointment that we basically wiped out their police, their army, their border patrol, and

started fresh because they had a lot of capable people they felt,

their brothers, their uncles and so on, fathers who worked there.

So mistakes, I think, we made. But just an extraordinary—when

I meet with some of these Iraqi leaders, and I don’t know if you

all have encountered this, but I feel like I’m meeting with people

who want to be the Jeffersons, the Madisons, the Hamiltons. They

feel like they have been given historic opportunity. And obviously

not every one, but there wasn’t everyone like that in our own beginnings. But they do realize that they have this extraordinary opportunity. And Mr. Al-Alusi is an example of one. I mean, I literally, when I met with him in my office, said you can’t go back

to Iraq, you are not safe, you are a target, your family is a target;

I will do everything I can to enable you to stay in the United

States. And he looked at me with some astonishment that I would

say that and said, no, I can’t desert my party and desert my country, they need me, or it needs me. It was just like this moment of

saying whoa, I’m seeing something extraordinary.

So I would like to just end by your all saying what you think a

question we should have asked that we didn’t, something you want

on the record that you think needs to be on the record, and just

hear you close up this panel.

Maybe we could start with you, Ms. Dugan.

Ms. DUGAN. Well, we had a bit of a curtain raiser within the first

panel, so I have been giving it some thought.

It really speaks to resources. And when I say resources, I mean,

quite distinctly, not just money. The fact of the matter is that we

are well funded. We will always be looking for more money, but it

really has to do with more, it has to do with all the other tools that

are available in our tool box, not only from the perspective of an

institute like IRI or NDI, but also when it comes to kind of harnessing the energies of the U.S. Government, of the U.S. Congress,

of partners abroad, not only at the government level, but also our

counterparts at the NGO level and identifying those voices on the

ground and giving to them as much oxygen as we possibly can provide.

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And I just want to make sure that everyone has a chance to reflect on that, because at the end of the day, that is what will win

the day. I thank you, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Again, referring to some of the questions that

were provided to us to help prepare our testimony, one of the questions was how should the Bush doctrine be changed or modified to

encourage reform in countries. And what struck me in thinking

about that is it is very easy to think about the experience in Iraq

and some of the things that have happened lately, Lebanon as we

discussed and Saudi Arabia and so on, and to assume that we

should all be looking for dramatic changes.

It has struck me in my travels back and forth from Iraq and

watching Iraq that the experience of Iraq may, in the end, be more

instructive and more helpful in helping about the countries that

are called liberalized countries in the Middle East, for example,

Qatar and Yemen, countries that have gone a certain distance, but

who try to manage the process of political change, who attempt to

free up, to some extent, are meant to control the rest. And my dealings in Iraq, as I watched 300 parties emerge on the scene, hundreds of civil society organizations and seen Iraqis celebrate the

idea that they could go out and cast a vote, it has struck me that

Iraq ultimately may cause the greatest change in those countries

that are trying to control this process of liberalization. And it

seems to me that the greatest challenge exists, and U.S. policy

changes challenges exist in pushing—continuing to push in these

liberalizing countries, in other words, not just concentrating on the

big breakthroughs, the Syrians and so on, but to say you have gone

this far, but you have to go further. You are our friend, we respect

you, we want to work with you, but this is not yet democracy. So

not stopping now and pushing even with your friends. So I think

that is a great challenge.

Professor ARMANIOS. I think one of the challenges in front of us

today is the extent to which the United States is willing to take

risks in the region to promote democracy. Some of the things that

might happen are exactly what Mr. Saffuri was implying, the rise

of theocracies or the rise of governments that do not necessarily adhere to our own interpretations of democracy.

And I’m just curious to what extent the United States will be

willing to go that extra step to engage those groups that frankly

have been long disenfranchised and ignored by our policies, but it

might be time to really consider how they’re going to become included in the future.

Mr. SHAYS. I want to be clear, they being?

Professor ARMANIOS. They being moderates on all sides, those

who call themselves moderate, Islamists, those who will be willing

to work in a pluralistic society without promoting violence. Nonviolent groups——

Mr. SHAYS. You don’t feel that they’re being engaged by the

United States?

Professor ARMANIOS. I don’t feel that they’re being engaged

enough. And ‘‘engaged’’ here is a problematic word. I don’t know

how exactly we should go about engaging them, that is a problematic question. I do feel that we should learn more about them, we

should find out more about them, who are they.

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Mr. SHAYS. And this is more grassroots folks that you’re thinking

of?

Professor ARMANIOS. Yes, grassroots groups that have been long

repressed. I’m not suggesting that we talk to the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, but we should find out more about their appeal, find

out who their message appeals to and why, and talk to those communities.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. SAFFURI. I think the U.S. Government is talking to the

brotherhood in many countries.

There is several points I would like to bring up. First, the issue

of Islam and democracy, they are compatible. I would like to stress

a point that Islam, the leader or the ruler does not get his legitimacy without the sharia and the baya. When the profit died, he

did not appoint anyone, the elderlies, the heads of the tribes had

to meet, nominate during the sharia and naya to get the baya. So

to argue all the time that Islam is not compatible with democracy

is fault. As a matter of fact, the leader is not legitimate as long as

he does not go through that process.

The other point is the media. The U.S. Government, according to

some reports, have spent over $1.7 billion to spread democracy in

the Middle East, and I think some of that money has been well

spent and there is lots of—has been put to a great use, but one of

the areas that has to be taken a look at, and this is Congress, because Congress appropriated that money, is the media project. I

think the viewers show horrors between 2 and 5 percent.

For the amount of money that is being spent, I think about $170

billion a year, that is very little, they have to little of another way

of how to turn a horror into a real form that people can watch

something, not to compete with Jazeera, but something similar to

what Jazeera provides.

There is a real hunger in the Arab street for free dialog and free

debate. What Jazeera provided people in the Arab street is something they never seen before, they saw it on CNN, but they never

saw it from their press. And for that reason everyone watches

Jazeera, regardless, they think some programs are very civil programs, some programs are serious. And Jazeera have been a cause

of problem for the government of Qatar. And I think several countries pulled their Ambassadors because of Jazeera, many Arab

countries. At one point four north African countries pulled their

Ambassadors.

The PLO closed their office one time also. And there was an attack. So they must be doing something right, and I think we teach

the whole world, you know, with the influence of Hollywood—Time

magazine is everywhere you go. In the airport, there is more Time

magazine on the display than there is economists.

So we have this tremendous influence that American media plays

on the whole world; on the other hand, we cannot pay any influence as an American media in the Arab street. And this is an area

that really needs to be addressed.

Last point. I also have been thinking about this question, and to

my mind, the word that immediately came to mind was courage.

And I think first it was heartening to have such courageous gentleVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:18 Sep 08, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22706.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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men to sit at the table, and it has been a theme, the courage of

those in the region pushing and voting for reform.

I think that here in the United States we need to match that

courage with our own, both with respect to what my colleagues

suggest with regard to the need to engage Islamist—moderate

Islamists and others whom there is a bit of knee-jerk response

against. And also I think courage to push for governments in the

region who are our friends, who take some of the difficult and necessary steps for opening that in the long term will lead to a more

stable free and prosperous Middle East.

Mr. SHAYS. I want to thank each and every one of you. You have

been a wonderful panel. You have given us lots to think about. And

whether it was intended or not, you leave me with a lot of hope,

a lot of hope. And I appreciate the competence of all five of you.

It’s nice to know that you’re doing the work you’re doing. Thank

you so much.

With that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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