T h is vic tim , w h o se d a te o f b irth is J u ly 1 5 , 1 9 9 2 , w a s le ss th a n thirte e n a t t h e ti m e o f t h e c rim e , an d , i n 1

acc ordanc e wi t h t he po l i ci es of t hi s Co ur t , we r ef

r ai n f r om us i ng hi s na me.

T hi s vi ct i m, wh ose dat e of bi r t h i s M ay 30, 198 8, was l es s t han t hi r t een at t he t i me of s om e of t he cr i mes 2

aga i ns t hi m, an d, i n a ccor dance wi t h t he po l i ci es of t hi s Co ur t , we r ef

r ai n f r om us i ng hi s na me. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 21, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. BOBB Y N ORT HCU TT

On Direct

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty Nos. F -9187, F -9255 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2003- 02805-CCA -R3-C D - F iled October 7, 2004

The De fenda nt, Bobby

Northcutt, pled g uiltyto two co u n t s o f ra pe of a child, and the tria l court sentenc ed him to twenty -five y ear s in prison on eac h count, orde ring the sentenc es to run
c on se c uti ve ly . T he De fe nd a nt a pp e a ls h is se nte nc e , c on te nd ing that th e tr ia l c ou rt : ( 1) imp ro pe rl y failed to a pply one mitigating factor; (2) i mproperly applied two enhanc ement fa ctors; and ( 3) er red wh e n it or de re d th a t hi s se nte nc e s ru n c on se c uti ve ly . F ind ing that r e ve rs ibl e e rr or e xists , w e re ve rs e t h e j u d gm en t s o f t h e t ri al co u rt an d re m an d t h e c as e f o r r es en t en ci n g.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uit Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., and J OE G. R I L EY , S P

. J ., joined.

Michae l D. Gallig an (on appea l), Robert W. Ne wman (at sentenc ing hearing) , J ohn P. Partin (at plea he ari ng ), Mc Min nv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, B ob by

No rthc utt

.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi stant A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Dale Potter, D istrict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION I. F acts

This case arises out of the rape of t wo vi ctims, G.P.M. and C.M. I n case number F -9187, 1 2 the Warre n CountyGra nd J ury indicted the De fendant on six counts of ra pe of a child, one count of-2-

a g g ra vate d s e xua l batte ry , an d one c ou nt of a g g ra vate d c hil d a

bu se , f or his a c tio ns a g a ins t G .P. M. I n c a se nu mbe r F -9 25 5, the Gr a ndJury ind ic te d th e De fe nd a nt o n f ou rt e e n c ou nts of

ra pe of a c hil d

a ndtw o c ou nts of

ra pe , f or his a c tio ns a g a ins t C. M.
At a plea hearing on both c ases, the Def endant pled g uiltyto two counts of ra pe of a child. I n c a se nu mbe r F -9 18 7, the Sta te art ic ulate d th e fa c ts a s f oll ow s:
[The crime involved] oral penetration but there wer e mul tiple penetrations in reg ards to this vi ctim. This .

. . victim r ece ived g enital warts f rom this [D]efendant a nd that’s how this case w as broug ht to our office ’s attention

. The victim had soug ht out medical tre atment or his fa milyhad, not awa re of what w as wr o n g wi th the child. They went to a doctor who then ref err ed him to a specia list and in the proce ss of that th ey dis c ov e re d th is c hil d h a d g e nit a l w a rt s. I t’ s [th e state ’s ] und e rs ta nd ing [that] afte r the investigation, t he child [related] what all had occ urre d betwee n him and the [D] efe ndant or what all the [ D]efenda nt had done to him and at some point the [D] efe ndant gave a stateme nt admitting his involvement and also wa s discovere d with ge nital warts . . . .

I n case number F -9255, the State told the trial cour t that the evidenc e would show the fo llo wi ng :
[Th e vic tim wa s] the br oth e r to the oth e r v ic tim , [a nd thi s c a se inv olv e s] 14 c ou nts of ra pe of a ch i l d , [and] two counts of ra pe. Those two c ounts of rape [are appropriat e in] that they

occur red a fter the child was ove r the a g e of thirtee n. . . . [I nitially ,] t he victim . . . did not want to discuss anything or talk about it but after

.

. . the family [was] seeking some counseling , he reve aled to his psy cholog ist . . . what had happene d to him or parts of the details of what had happene d wi t h t he [D] efe n d an t an d the child was the n interviewe d and g ave de tails of the sexual penetr ation being oral a nd anal that ha d occur red to him . . . .

At the sentenc ing he aring , the Def endant’ s couns el i n fo rmed the c ourt that, upon the Def endant’ s reque st, he would not cross-e x amine either victim. G.P.M. testified that he wa s eleve n y ear s old and that he wa s sexuallyabused by the Def endant onc e or twic e per

wee k beg inning whe n he was five or six y ear s old. He said that the abuse included sexual pe netration. G.P.M

. testified that the Def

endant lived in the sa me house a s G.P.M. and G.P.M.’s brother, C.M., a nd baby sat the bo y s f or ma ny y e ars

. G. P.M . tes tif

ie d th a t he ne ve r r e po rt e d th e abu se to h is p are nts or a ny on e e lse beca use the De fenda nt threate ned him with harm if he told any one about the a buse. G.P.M. testified that he had to se ek medica l treatment a s a re sult of the abuse.

C.M. testified that he was fiftee n y ear s old and that he w as sexually abused by

the Def endant

once or twice pe r we ek fr om the time that he was four y ear s old, in 1993, unti l the Def endant we nt to j a il i n 2 00 2. C.M . te sti fi e d th a t th is a bu se inc lud e d sexua l pen e tr a tio n a ndind ic a te d th a t he didIn the interest of p ro t ec t i ng t he victi m s’ p rivac y we re fer to t he i r m o t he r b y her ini t i als. 3

-3- not tell any one about the a buse bec ause he was frighte ned by the Def endant’ s threats. C.M. testified that he wa s underg oing c ounseling as a r esult of this abuse.

M.M., the boy s’ mother, testified that the Def endant lived with the family and baby sat the 3 boy s from time to time. She said that she bec ame a war e that the De fendant was abusing G.P.M. after finding g enital warts around his rec tum. M.M. testified t hat, af ter discove ring the g enital warts, she too k G .P. M. to a

ph y sic ia n, wh o in fo rm e d h e r that th e g e nit a l wart s were the re su lt o f a se xua lly transmitted disease. A ccor ding to M.M., the phy sician t old her that the only way G.P.M. could have

c on tr a c te d th e g e nit a l w art s wa s th ro ug h s e xua l a bu se by so me on e inf

e c te d w ith the dis e a se . M .M

. ind ic a te d th a t sh e a ndhe r famil y wa nte d the c ou rt to imp os e a n e xten siv e se nte nc e on the De fe nd a nt.

Dr. De borah Watling ton, a license d psy cholog ist, testified that she had bee n providing

c on tin uo us the ra

py to G .P. M. sin c e Se pte mbe r o f 2 00 2. Dr . Watli ng ton test ifie d th a t G .P. M. suffe red f rom hy pervig ilance, anx iety , sleep dist urbanc e, and flashbac ks reg arding the Def endant’ s past abuse of

him. Dr. Watlingto n al s o said that G.P.M. had difficulties at school, including difficulty conce ntrating , restlessness, hy pera ctivity , social wit h d raw al, and diff iculty focusing on schoolwork. Dr

. Watlington opined that these problems wer e a r esult of the De fendant’s abuse of G.P.M. She sa id that G.P.M. described to he r the De fendant’s abuse of him, which included ana l intercour se and othe r inappropriate touching of g enitalia.

Dr. W atlington testified that she began treating C.M. in October of 2002. She testified that C.M. often ac companied G .P.M. and his pare nts to G.P.M.’s therapy sessions. She said that, after one such se ssion, C.M. appr o ac h ed h er and asked he r to schedule an appointment for him. Dr. Watlington said that C.M. told her that he wa s also sexually abused by the Def endant. She sa id that he told her that the Def

endant a bused him prior to abusing G.P.M. Dr. Watlington testified,

He ha d decide d to disclose [t he abuse to me] because he felt l ike I was someone he could trust and talk to, [he] knew [ G.P.M.] was seeing me for counseling , and at that point felt that it was safe for him to disclose. At that time [ t h e De fe n dant] was incar cer ated. He hadn’t disclosed [the abuse to any one] prior to that due to fea r. Dr. Watlington stated that C.M.’s problems were more significa nt than hi s y oung er br other’s beca use C.M.’s a

buse was for a long er pe riod. Dr. Watlington testified that C.M. questioned his own sexualit y and fea red that he was homosex ual. Dr. Watling ton said, “Any time there w as any

kind of re fe re nc e in the me dia or stu de nts sa y ing g a y or ho mo, he wa s sur e the y we re ta lki ng abo ut h im

. . . .” Acc ording to Dr. W atlington, C.M. suffe red f rom extreme sleep diff

iculties “to the point that the par ents [sought] . . . medical relief to t ry to help with some of that anxiety .” Dr . Watlington summarized that “[C. M

. ] is failing at school” and “ continues to have very limit ed socia l outlets. .

. . He has quite a few issues to w ork throug h.” Dr . Watlington explained that, while C.M. is m aking improvement, it is “g oing to take some extensive thera py beca use of the l eng th of t ime this went on.”In the int ere st o f p ro t ec t i ng t he victi m s’ p rivac y we re fer to t he i r f athe r b y hi s i nit i als. 4

-4- On c ros s-e x a min a tio n, Dr . Watli ng tona c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt’ s d e c isi on no t to
cross-e x amine the v i ct i m s was helpful to them. She also said that the drug Celexa, which the Def endant ha d been p re s cr i b ed, was used to treat major depre ssion and Seroquel, whic h the Def endant wa s also presc ribed, wa s usually presc ribed to treat schizophrenia. Dr. Watli ng ton stated that some sy mptoms of schizophrenia include delusions, a uditory hallucinations, and “just not being able to disce rn re ality .”

I n a dd iti on to the te sti mon y of the wi tne sse s, the tr ia l c ou rt a dmi tte d a

pr e se nte nc e re po rt

int o
e vid e nc e , w hic h it c on sid e re d wh e n de te rm ini ng the De fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e . A c c or din g to the re po rt , the Def endant wa s thirty -nine y ear s old and single at the time of the sentenc ing hearing. T he re port sh ow e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt h a d w ri tte n a n a po log y fo r h is c ri me s, statin g , “ At the tim e of

thi s o ff e ns e I wa s li vin g a ndwo rking wi th [the vic tim s’ fathe r]. I be c a me se xua lly inv olv e d w ith his tw o s on s. I ’m sorry for what I did and for any hurt I cause d any one. I

don’t have any

rea sons or excuses for what I did.” The r eport a lso contained a statement fr om the investigator for the District Attorney Ge ne ra l:

I

. . . r e c e iv e d in f

o r mati o n that [t h e D e f

e n d a n t] h a d s e xu a l r e lati o n s w ith [C

. M

. ]. [C .M.] was interviewed by [t he Te nnessee ] Department of Chil dren Ser vices a nd stated that [the Defe nd ant] had bee n having sex wit h him since about 1994 and continued until 2002 when [the Defe ndant] went to jail

. . . . [C .M.] s tated that [the Def endant] penetrated him anally and orally at least one or two times a month during 19 94 to 2 00 2. [Th e De fendan t] wo uldha ve the c hil d s le e p w ith him a nd

. . . th is

wo uldoc c ur

wh e re the re we re we apo ns in the ro om[, ] an d [th e De fe nd a nt] w ou ld threaten the child that he w ould kill hi m or his family

. Finally , the re port documente d the Def endant’ s prior crimina l rec ord. The D efe ndant had be en
con v ic te d o f f

ir s t d e g r e e b u r g la

r y , s e v e r a l c o u n ts o f d r iv in g w h il e u n d e r th e in f lu e nce of an intox icant, and two c ounts of theft of pr operty

.
Wit h reg ard to mitigating fac tors, the Defenda nt claimed that he had a his tory of sustained employ ment, with an indication of a strong work e thic. Acc ording to the pre- senten ce re p ort, the Def endant spe nt a consider able a mount of time doing logg ing work for G.M. , the victims’ fathe r. 4 Prior to that, he worke d at a metal fa brication plant. The Def endant c laimed that his history of

s u s t a i n e d e m p l o ym e n t , i n d i c a t i n g a s tr o n g w o rk e t h i c , w a s a

v a l i d m i t i g a t i n g f

a c t o r

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, the Def en d an t as k ed the court to consider in its sentenc ing de cision his cooperation with the investigation, his g uilty plea, his ref usal to have the victims cross-examined in order to avoid further ment a l h ar m t o th e m, a n d th e f a c t th a t e v e n a

tw e n ty

- y e ar

s e n te n c e w o u lde f

f e c ti v e ly b e a life sentenc e for

him, given his a g e and his ineligibility for parole. Finally , the Defenda nt stated t hat he was be ing tr eate d at a menta l health ce nter for his nerve s , d epression, and anxiety , and had be en presc ribed Celexa, Altace , and Seroque l.-5-

The State filed se ven enhanceme nt f actor s with the trial court. The State re quested that the trial court e nhance the Def endant’ s sentence based upon his prior criminal history , which included

sever al drunk driving citations, burg lary , and theft of property

. I n addition, the State contende d that the of fe ns e s invo lve d mor e than one vic tim , the pe rs on a l inju ri e s inf lic te d upo n one of

the vic tim s
wer e par ticularly g reat, the Def

endant wa s on bail when he committed the offe nse, and the Def endant ha d a bu se d a po sit ion of

private trus t. F ina lly , the State c la ime d tha t th e vic tim s w e re pa rt ic ula rl y vulnera ble bec ause of

their ag es and that the offe nse wa s committed to gratify the Def endant’ s desire for plea sure or

excitement.
When sentencing the Defenda nt, the trial court found that the following enhanc ement fa ctors
wer e applicable under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114 ( 2003): (2) the Def endant’ s prior criminal hist ory ; (5) the victims’ par t i cu l ar vulnerability due to their a g es at the time of the offe nses; (7) the pa

rticular se verity

of the victims’ injuries; (8) the Def endant’ s commission of the offe nse to g ratify

his desire for

pleasure or excitement; and (16) the Def endant’ s abuse of a position of private trust. The trial court found as a mitig ating fac tor that the Def endant ha d a sustained wor k history but affor ded it littl e we ight. As a result of its consideration of the enhanceme nt and mitigating fac tors, the trial court imposed a twenty -five- y ear sentenc e for e ach c onviction. The trial court orde red that the sentenc es run c onsecutively under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35- 11 5( b) (5 ) ( 20 03 ), wh ic h s ta te s:

T h e c o u r t m a y o r d e r

s e n t e n c e s t h a tru n c o n s e c u t i v e l y i f t h e c o u r tf

i n d s b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e that:
(5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offe nses involving sexual abuse of a minor with consider ation of the a g g ravatin g circ umstances a rising f rom the re lationship between the defe nd an t and the victim or victims, the time span of defe ndant’s unde t ec t ed s ex ual ac tivity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s.

I n relying on t h is statutory basis for imposing consec utive sentenc es, the trial c ourt cited the enhanc ement fa ctors it had alr eady applied, the leng th of time that the abuse w ent o n , the seve re nature of the menta l harm to both victims, and the threats that t h e De fe n dant made to ke ep the victims from reporting their abuse.

The De f e n d a n t ap p e a ls , c o n te n d in g th a t th e tria l c o u r t: ( 1 ) imp r o p e r ly f a il e d to ap p ly

one mitigating fac tor; (2) im proper ly applied two enhanc ement fa ctors; and ( 3) er red w hen it order ed that h i s s e n t e n c e s ru n c o n s e c u t i v e l y.

II. Ana lys is

When a def

endant c halleng es the leng th or manner of ser vice of a sentenc e, it is the duty of this Court t o conduct a de novo re view of the rec ord with a pre sumption t hat “the de terminations made by the court from which the appea l is taken are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann

. § 4 0 -3 5 -401(d)-6-

(2003). This pre sumption i s “‘c onditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial

c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s and a ll re le va nt fa c ts an d cir c ums ta nc e s. ’” State v. Ros s, 49 S.W. 3d83 3, 84 7 ( Te nn . 200 1) (q uo tin g Sta te v. Pe ttu s, 98 6 S. W.2 d 5 40 , 5 43 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ); Sta te v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The pre sumption does n o t ap p l yto the leg al conclusions re ache d by

the trial court in se ntencing a defe ndant or to the determinations made by the trial co u rt which ar e pre dicated upon unc ontroverte d fac ts. St ate v. De an, 76 S.W.3d 352, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Butler , 900 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ; State v. Smit h 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . I n conducting a de novo review of a se ntence , we must consider : (a) any evidenc e re ceive d at the trial an d / o r sentencing hearing; ( b) the pr e se ntenc e repo rt; ( c ) the princ ipl e s o f s e nte nc ing ; ( d) the arg ume nts of c ou ns e l r e la tiv e to sentenc ing a lternatives; (e ) the nature a nd char act er i s t i cs o f the off ense; (f ) any mitigating or statutory enhanc ement fa ctors; (g ) any statements made by

the def endant on his or her own be half; and (h) the def

endant’ s potential or lack of potential for reha bilitation or treatment. T enn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -210 (2 00 3) ; State v. Tay lor , 6 3 S. W.3 d 4 00 , 4 11 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 01 ). Th e pa rt y
c ha lle ng ing a

se nte nc e imp os e d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

ha s th e bu rd e n o f e sta

bli sh ing that th e se nte nc e is

e rr on e ou s. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ), Se nte nc ing Com m’ n Cm ts.

I n the ca se under

submiss i o n , we c onclude that ther e is ample e vidence that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances. The ref ore, we re view it s d e c is io n d e n o v o w ith a p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s

. A c c o r d in g ly , s o lo n g a s the trial cour t compli ed wi t h t h e purpose s and proc edure s of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct and its finding s are supported by

the fa ctual re cord, this Court may not disturb this sent ence even if we would ha ve pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cmts; S tate v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We note that the def endant be ars the burden of showing that the sentenc e i s i m p roper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cm ts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

The De fenda nt pled g uiltyto two counts of ra pe of a child, a Class A fe l o n y , as a R an ge I of fe nd e r. Th e se nte nc e rang e fo r C la ss A f e lon y , Rang e I

of fe nd e rs is f

if te e n to tw e nty -f

ive y e ars

. T en n

. C o de Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(1) . I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class A fe lony , the presumptive sentenc e is the midpoint of the rang e, in the absenc e of enhanc ement and mi t i gating fa c tor s. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ). I f the re are e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s bu t no mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, the sentenc e must be set at or above the midpoint of the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d). I f there are mitigating fac tors but no en h an ceme nt fac tors, the trial court must set a sentence at or below the midpoint of the ra ng e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d). I f t here are both miti g ating and enhanc ement fac tors, the trial court must adjust t he sente nce ba sed on the we ight it assig ns to eac h fac tor. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-210( d).

I n the case under submissi on, the t rial court found t hat five enhanc ement fa ctors applied and

on e mit ig a tin g fa c tor

app lie d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de c ide d that the mit ig a tin g fa c tor wa s e nti tle d to lit tle if any weig ht, and thus sentence d the Def endant to the m axim um allowed by the rang e, which w as twenty -five y ear s for each c onviction. The trial court then order ed that the De fendant’s sentenc es
run conse cutively

under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(5)

.-7- A. Mitigating F actor

The De fenda nt contends that hi s decision t o fore g o cross-e x amination of the victims in the sentenc ing he aring is a mi tigating factor under Tennessee Code Annotated Sec tion 40-35-113(13) and that the tria l court should have a pplied this factor. Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35- 113(13), is the “ catc h-all” of the statute, and pr ovides that a tria l co u rt m ay ap ply as a mitig ating fac tor “[a]nyother fa ctor c onsistent with the purposes of this chapte r.”

We have f

ound no case in which we a ffirme d the application of Tennessee Code Annotated

se c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 13 (1 3) in re sp on se to a de fe nd a nt’ s d e c isi on to f

or e g o c ro ss- e xami natio n o f a vic tim

. I nstead, mitigating fac tor (13) is usua lly applied wher e the trial court found some condition of the defe ndant or some a ction or inac tion by the defendant a

part fr om the trial proce eding s that

nece ssitated leniency , but was not cove red by the statute expli citly . For instance, in State v. Nic holas Wil li a ms , N o

. M 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 7 8 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 1 WL 7 4 1 9 3 5 , a t * 1 2 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A pp., at Nashville, J uly 3, 2001), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Dec

. 17, 2001), we conclude d that the trial court improperly

failed to a pply mitigating fac tor (13) ba sed on t he defenda nt’s excellent work history and the fa ct that he had only one prior c onviction. I n State v. Christopher Max Hall, No. M1998-00180- CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298592, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar . 23, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. N ov. 6, 2000), we aff irmed the trial c ourt’s application of m itigating fac tor (13) w here t h e d e f e n d a n te x h i b i t e d p o o r

m e n t a l h e a l t h b y

u n d e r g o i n g c o u n s e l i n g a n d t ak i n g m e d i c a t i o n

. In Sta te v. Andr a

L a mar D ill ard , N o. 01 C01 -9 80 4- CC- 00 15 7, 19 99 WL 72 92 05 , at *9 (T e nn . Crim. App., at Na shville, Sept. 20, 1999), no perm. app. filed , we affirme d the trial court’s application of mitigating fac tor (13) w here the def endant showe d that he had a troubled childhood and expressed

remorse over his crime to police investig ators.

We conclude that this case is disti ng uishable fr om the case s discussed above . The De fenda nt pr ov ide s n o auth ority , a ndwe c a n f indno ne, su pp ortin g the pr op os iti on that de c lin ing to c ro ssexamine a victim m u s t be applied by a trial c ourt as a mitig ating fac tor under T ennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40-35-113( 13). W e hold that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s r efusa l to apply

this mi tigating f

actor

.
B. En hancem ent F actor s

T h e D e f e n d a n t c o n c e d e s o n ap p e a l th at th e tria l c o u r t p r o p e r ly ap p li e d th r e e o f

th e five enhanc ement fa ctors it found applica ble, but contends that the tria l co u rt i m proper ly applied two enhanc ement fa ctors in cal cu lating his sente nce. Spec ifically , the Def endant a sserts that the trial court e rre d when it found ap p l i cable enhanc ement fa ctor (5) , “A victim of the of fense was particula rly vulnera b l e b eca use of a g e or phy sical or menta l disabilit y . . .,” Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114( 5), and e nhance men t fac tor (8), “ The off ense involved a

victim and

was c ommitt ed to g ratify the def endant’ s desire f

or plea sure or

excitemen t , ” T ennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114( 8).-8- 1. Enh ancem ent F actor

(5)
As to the applicati o n o f en h ance ment fac tor (5), the Def endant f irst arg ues that the enhanc ement fa ctor i s never applicable to the offe nse of r ape of a child bec ause the offe nse, by definition, involves a victim of particula r vulnera bilitydue to ag e. The Def

endant f urther a rg ues that the Sta te faile d to me e t it s b ur de n o f s ho wi ng that th e vic tim s w e re pa rt ic ula rl y vu ln erab le in this

case . The Def

endant insists that, under State v. Colli ns, 986 S.W .2d 13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) , the pr os e c uti on mus t sh ow that the vic tim is “u na ble to re sis t, una

ble to s umm on he lp o r u na ble to testify ag ainst the perpe trator.” I d.

The De fenda nt is corre ct that an e nhancement fa ctor may only be applied to a

particula r offe nse if the enhanc ement fac tor is not an essential ele ment of the off ense. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114. Howe ver, the Tenne ssee Supre me C ourt has concluded that enhanceme nt fac tor (5) c an be

app lie d to ra

pe of c hil d c a se s, so lon g a s th e vic tim wa s particularly vulnerable beca use of ag e or phy sical or menta l disabilit y . S t at e v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993). The Def endant

a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y app lie d e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor (5 ) i n th is c a se be c a us e the State failed to mee t its burden of proving that the victims were “particularly vulnera b l e. ” P articula

r vulnera bilityonly

exis ts w hen the victim is “inca pable of resisting , summoning help, or testifying

a g a ins t th e pe rp e tr a tor .” Ad a ms, 86 4 S.W.2 d at 35. Whe the r a g ive n c hil d is pa

rt ic ula rl y vu lne ra ble “is a fa ctual issue to be r esolved by the trier of

fac t on a ca se by

case basis.” I d.

Con sid e ri ng the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t the se nte nc ing he ari ng the e vid e nc e do e s n ot s e e m to preponde rate ag ainst the t rial court’s finding that the victims were particula rly vulnera ble. Howe ver, the United States Supreme Court’s rec ent opinion in Blake ly v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), calls into question the cont i n u i n g v alidity of portions of our statutory sentenc ing sc heme. In that

case , the hig h court, a

pply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), struck down a provision of t he W ashing ton sentenc ing guide lines that permitted a trial judge to impose an “exceptional sente nce” upon the finding of certain statutorily enumer ated enhanc ement fa ctors. The C o u rt observe d that “the ‘statutory maxi mum’ for Appre ndi pur poses is the maxi mum se ntence a j u d g e m a y

i m po se s o lely on the basis of the facts reflecte d in the jury ve rdict or admitted by the defendant .” I d. at 2537. Fina lly , the Court conclude d that “eve ry defe ndant has the right

to i ns ist that the prosec utor prove to a jury all fac ts leg ally

essential to the punishment. I d. at 2543.

I n light of this rec ent decision by the Unit ed S tates S upreme Court, we must conclude that t h e ru l e i n B l ak e l y p r e c l u d e s ap p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s e n h a n c e m e n t f a c t o r u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s

. In order for this enha nceme nt fac tor to be prope rly applicable to the Def

endant, it must be submitted to and found by

a jury or admitted by

the Def endant.

2. Enh ancem ent F actor

(8)
Next, the Defe ndant contends that the trial court imprope rly applied enhanceme nt fac tor (8), “The offe nse involved a vic tim and was committed to g ratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement.” Tenn. Cod e An n

. § 40-35-114( 8). The D efe ndant contends that, because sexual-9-

assaults occ ur for

many rea sons other than e x cit em ent or pleasure, inc luding f eeling power ful or exacting r eveng e, u n d er St ate v. Arnett, 49 S.W .3d 250 (Tenn. 2001) , in order f or enhanceme nt fac tor (8) to a

pply , the State must provide some “a dditional objective evidenc e of the defe ndant’s motivation to s eek ple asure or excitement throug h sexual assault.” Ar n ett, 49 S.W .3d at 262. Ac c or din g to the De fe nd a nt, e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (8 ) ma y be app lie d to ra

pe c a se s w he re the State has put forw ard e vidence showing that the offe nder soug ht e x citement or pleasure “including , but not limited to, se x ually expli cit rema rks and overt sexual display s made by the def endant, suc h as fondling or kissing a victim or otherwise behaving in a sexual manne r, or re m ar k s o r b ehavior demonstrating the def

endant’ s enjoy ment of the shee r violence of the ra pe.” I d.

The trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fac tor (8) ba sed on the testimony of t he victims, the old e r of wh om te sti fi e d that the De fe nd a nt se xua lly abu se d h im o nc e or

tw ic e we e kly

fr om 1 99 3 to 2002. Howeve r, the State provide d no objective evidence showing that the offe nses wer e committed to gr atify the Def endant’ s desire f

or plea sure or

excitement. I n apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (8), the trial court r easone d that the only explanation for such a

leng thy period of ab u se would be that the Def endant wa s rec eiving pleasure or ex citement from it, and “[it did] not appea r [the abuse] was for punishment or any

other re ason . . . .”
We disag ree with the t rial court’s finding s. Evidence showing that the abuse went on for an extended period of time, w ithout other evidenc e, does not nec essarily reve al the De fendant’s motive in p e rp e tr a tin g the of

fe ns e

. “Ab sen t spec if

ic ob je c tiv e e vid e nc e of

the de fe nd a nt’ s mo tiv a tio n to seek ple asure or excitement,” Arnett, 49 S.W .3d at 263, the trial c o u rt s h o u l d not have a pplied enhanc ement fa ctor (8) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the trial co u rt improperly applied

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor (8 ), no tw ith sta nd ing the pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss a ffor de d th e tr ia l c ou rt

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, w e n o t e t h a t t h e ru l e o f l a w ar t i c u l a t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r ti n B l ak e l y, prec ludes the application of t his enhanc ement fa ctor unless it is submit ted to a jury or admitted by the def endant.

3. Other Enhan cem ent F actor s

The trial c ourt additionally found that three other enhanc ement fac tors applied: enha nceme nt fac tor (2) that the Def

endant had an extensive prior criminal history ; e nhance ment fac tor (7) that the injuries to the victims we re sever e; and enhanc ement fac tor (16) that the D efe ndant abuse d a position

o f tr u s t. We f ir s t n o te th a t th e D e f

e n d a n t h a s n o t c o n te s te dth e ap p li c a ti o n o f th e s e e n h a n ceme nt f a c t o r s o n ap p e a l , a n d a n y ar g u m e n ti n t h a tr e g ar d i s l i k e l y w a i v e d

. H o w e v e r , p u r s u a n tt o B l ak e l y,
we c onclude that the application of the enha nceme nt fac tor (7) and (16) must be submitted to a jury or admitted by

the Def endant be fore properly

applied.

I n light of our holding that the trial court improperly applied enhanc ement fac tors (5) and (8) , we c onclude that this case must be reve rsed a nd rema nded for rese ntencing . On re sentenc ing, the trial court should apply

the law a rticulated in B lakely to determine w hether enhanc ement fa ctors (7) and (16) are applicable

.-10- C. Consecutive Sente nces Finally , the Def

end an t ar gues that the trial c ourt err ed by ordering his sente nces to run
c on se c uti ve ly . F ir st, the De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t or de ri ng the se nte nc e s to ru n co nc ur re ntl y wo uld have be en suff

icient to achie ve the purposes of t he trial court. I n his appellate brief, the Def endant states that, g iven his age at s entenc ing, a concur rent sente nce w ould ensure “ that he would not be rele ased until he wa s into h is six ties . . . [and that] . . . this would have bee n sufficie nt to achieve whateve r purpose s the trial [c]ourt sought to a chieve .” Second, the Def endant asserts that the trial court improperly

failed to inqui re into other sente ncing considerations after f inding that Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(5) applied to the ca se.

Under Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-115( a), if a de fendant is convicted of more than one c rimi n al o ffe nse, the c ourt shall order the sentenc es to run either consec utively

or
c o n c u rr e n t l y. T h e tr i a l c o u r tm a y o r d e r s e n t e n c e s t o ru n c o n s e c u t i v e l y i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e ce rtain criteria e numerated in T ennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40- 35-115(b) (1)-(7 ). T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed s ec t i o n 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 5 (b )( 5 ) p ro v i d es t h at a t ri al co u rt may fi ndthat c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is p ro pe r w he re :

The de fenda nt is co n v i cted of two (2) or

more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with considerat ion of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e de fe nd a nt b e tw e e n th e de fe nd a nt andvic tim or vic tim s, the time span of the de fenda nt’s undetec ted sexual activity , the natureand scope of the sexual acts and the e x tent of the re sidual, phy sical and m en t al damage to the victim or victims.

B e c a us e we are re ma nd ing thi s c a se fo r re se nte nc ing , w e c on c lud e that w e ne e d n ot a dd re ss this iss ue at this time. The trial c ourt, on rese ntencing , will have more i nformation before it upon wh ic h it c a n b a se a

de te rm inatio n a

bo ut w he the r this iss ue ha s me ri t.

III. Conclusi on

I n a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e f o r e g o in g r e a s o n in g a n d a u th o r it ie s , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e rec ent United States Supreme Cour t d ecision in Bla kely mandates that this case be r emande d for

rese ntencing . There fore , we R E VE R S E t he trial c ourt’s judg ment and re mand this cause f or
rese ntencing and re consideration of all the issues prese nted her ein.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE