i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 6- 00 37 7- CV Chester D. EASTI N J r., Appellant
v . Preston H. DI AL J r., De bra Ly nn Dial, Robert Scott Dial, and Ra lph L op e z, Sh e ri ff

of B e xar County , T e xas, Appellee s Fr om the 293rd Judi cial District Court, Z avala County , Texas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 03 -0 8- 10 79 6- Z CV Honora ble Cy nthia L . Muniz , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: J anuar y 28, 2009 AFF I RMED Chester D. Ea stin J r. appeals t he trial court’s order gr anting summary judgme nt in favor of appellee s Preston H. Dial J r., Debra L y nn Dial, Robert Scott Dial, and Ralph L opez, Sheriff of B exar County , Texas. Eastin contends the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingDial’ s m o t i o n for summ ary judgme nt, de nying Eastin’s motions for summary judgme nt, a nd denying Eastin’s bill of r eview.04
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- 2- He a lso claims the bill of review procedure , which re quired Ea stin to establish a meritorious gr ound of appe al, violates his due proc ess rig hts. W e af firm the trial c ourt’s judg ment. B ACKG ROUND In 1966, Eas t i n p u rc hased a pproxi mately

969 acr es in Z avala

County (“the Ranch” ) fr om G.C. J ackson and others. Jackson rese rved a one-ha lf interest in the prope rty ’s minera ls. The
rema ining one -half inter est went to E astin. I n 1981, Eastin sold the Ranch to J ohn R. Blanton. As part of the purcha se, B lanton assumed a $251,000.00 note pay abl e to t he F eder al L and B ank and executed anothe r note in f av or of Ea stin, secure d by a sec ond lien deed of

trust. The next y ear , a dispute arose over late note pay ments and Eastin instigated fore closu r e p r o c e e d in g s based on his lien. Bla nton filed suit a g ainst Eastin to stop the fore closure. When B lanton’s re quest for a n injunction failed, Ea stin forec losed and re purcha sed the Ranc h at t h e fo rec losure sale . Bla nton therea fter amende d his suit, s eekingto set aside the f orec losure and r ecove r dama g es. In October

or Nove mber of 1983, Preston H. Dial J r. ente red into a se ries of c ontrac ts for a tax-free exchang e of prope rties in Comal, Bexar, a nd Z avala counties. One of these c ontrac ts was wi th E a sti n a

nd wa s e nti tle d Co ntr a c t f

or Tax Fr e e Exc ha

ng e (“ CTF E” ). Un de r t

he CTF E, Ea sti n ag ree d to convey

the Ranch to Dia l and Dial agree d to convey p ro p er t y he owne d in Comal and B e xar c ounti e s to Ea sti n. Ea sti n w a s r e qu ir e d, be fo re c los ing , to de liv e r a tit le ins ur anc e po lic y

to Dial that would guara n t ee cl ea r t i tle to the Ranch. B eca use of the dispa

rity in the value of

the proper ties, Dial ag ree d to assume the balanc e of the Fe dera l L and B ank note a nd to pay sufficie nt
c a shto m ake up the dif

fe re nc e in val ue. Th e ob lig a tio ns se t f or th i n th e CTF E w e re “ e xpre ssl y conditioned or subjec t to” (1) a pproval of D ial fo r assumpt ion of the F eder al L and B ank note, ( 2) a minera l lease f

rom 1981 betwe en Ea stin and Z eitg eist Ex ploration C o m p an y , an d (3) a mineral04
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- 3- r e s e r v a t i o ni nf

av o r o f E a s t i no f o n e - h a l f ( 1⁄2 ) o f h i s “ r i g h t , t i t l e an d

i n t e r e s ti nan d

t o th e r o ya l ty, excess roy alties and overriding roy alties, of all the oi l, g as and/or minerals in, to and under or that may be produc ed” f

rom the Ranch, pro rata participation in any bonuses, and participation in delay renta ls. The c losing date for the transac tions was Dec ember 19, 1983. Acc ordingto Dial, when the time came to c lose, Eastin could not convey clea r title to the Ranch beca

use of Bla

nton’s claim, as well as a nother a lleg ed enc umbranc e. E as t in and Dial ente red into anothe r contra ct, which wa s
e n ti tl e d Co n tr a c t to Cl e ar T it le ( “ CC T ” )
. T h e p arti e s a g r e e d th e CC T w o u ld “ r e la te[] back to,
surv ive [ ], and

inc or po rate [] by

re fe re nc e the Contr a c t fo r T ax Fr e e Exc ha ng e ” and wa s e nte re d into to “ca rry out the intent a

nd terms of the” CTFE. After acknow ledg ing in the CCT that there wer e clouds on the Ranch that preve nted Eastin from de liveringa cle ar title policy , the par ties ag ree d Ea sti n w ou ld h ave tw e lve months to o bta in c le a r t itl e , but sti ll re qu ir e d Ea sti n to de liv e r i mme diate ly to Dial a wa

rra nty deed a s contempl at ed in the CTFE. Ea stin ag ree d to provide Dial with a $1 00 ,0 00 .0 0 le tte r o f c re dit up on wh ic h D ia l c ou ld d

ra w if Ea sti n f a ile d to c le ar t

he tit le , a nd to
c on tin ue makin g pa

y me nts on the F e de ra l L and

B ank no te , w hic h Dia l wou ld r e imb ur se if c le ar t itl e
wer e deliver ed. The CCT also included a para g raph stating that all other require ments imposed upon Eastin would be per formed at the time he re moved the clouds on the tit le, “including a r eplac ement Warranty Dee d under the Contract for Tax Free Ex chang e.” On Dec ember

29, 1983, in acc ordanc e with the CCT, Eastin delivere d a “War ranty Dee d,” to Dial, which Dial rec orded on J anuar y 4, 1984. The 1983 deed c onvey ed the Ranc h to Dial without the minera l reser

vation contemplated in the CTFE an d d i d n o t refe r to Dial’s a ssumption of the Fe dera l L and B ank note or the Z eitg eist Ex ploration Company lease . Eastin claimed he did not04
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- 4- ob je c t to the a

bs e nc e of the min e ra l r e se rv a tio n o r t he oth e r c on dit ion s r e qu ir e d und e r t he CTF E b ec au s e t h e 1 9 8 3 d ee d

wa s m er el y a “ t em p o ra ry d ee d ” e x ec u t edwi thth e “ ex p re s s un d er s t an d i n g” that w he n h e re mov e d th e c lou ds on the Ranc h ti tle , a

“ re pla c e me nt d e e d” wo uld be iss ue d to Di a l, which would con t ai n all of the c onditions set forth in the CTFE, includingthe re servation of the mineral intere st. Dial, on the other ha nd, asser ted the 1983 dee d was e x ecute d, alongwith the letter of cr edit, in exchang e for

permitting Ea stin a dditional tim e to clea r title to the Ranch. Dial c laimed he neve r re prese nted to Eastin or anyone else that the 1983 deed was a temporar y deed. Indeed, D ial too k p os se ssi on

of the Ranc h p ur su ant t o th e 19 83 de e d, pe rf or me d h is o bli g a tio n t o con vey his proper ty to Eastin, and paid Ea stin including the pa y ment of $11,000.00 in ea

rnest money
. After Eastin fore closed a

nd delivere d the 1983 deed to Dial, Bla nton amended his pe tition, naming Dial as a

defe ndant. Dial answe red. The matter proce eded to trial and on August 8, 1984, a judg ment was enter ed in B lanton’s favor based on the jury ’s ver dict. The judg ment canc elled the fore closure a

nd awa rded B lanton title to the Ranch plus damag es for wrong ful fore closure. T he judgme nt “ canc elled and annulled” the Dec ember 1983 deed f rom Eastin to Dial, and stated that Dial “at a ll tim es, had know ledg e of the controve rsy betwee n EASTI

N and B L ANTON .” Ea stin alone appea led, but the parties ultimately settled and Ea stin moved to dism iss the appea l. On J anuar y 31, 1985, this court g rante d the motion to dis miss, dis missed the appea l, and vacated the trial court’ s judgme nt. Acc ordingto Dial, his attorney advised him afte r t he settl ement that to “assure the tax fre e
e xch ang e ,” B lanto n s ho uld e xec ute a de e d tr ans fe rr ing the Ranc h b a c k to Ea sti n a nd Ea sti n s ho uld
e xec ute ano the r d eed to Di al. Bla nto n tr ans fe rr e d th e Ranc h a nd , at th e e nd

of 19 84 , E a sti n
e xec ute d a

no the r d e e d to Di a l e nti tle d “ Exc ha ng e War ra nty De e d” (“ 19 84 de e d” ). Th is d e e d a g a in04
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- 5- tr ans fe rr e d th e Ranc h to Dia l but unl ike the 19 83 de e d, the Exc ha ng e War ra nty De e d in c lud e d mo st of the c onditio n s s t at ed i n the CTFE. N otably howeve r, the 1984 de ed, which w as pre pare d by Dial’s attorney , did not include the mineral re servation in favor of Ea stin. Accordingto Eastin, he
and his a tto rn e y

no tic e d th e mis sin g min e ra l re se rv a tio n whe n the y we nt to re vie w the do c ume nts at the closing . Eastin claimed th at t h er e wa s no one at the title compa ny available to prepa

re a n ad d i t i o n t o t he dee d so they took the 1984 deed to a

nother off

ice, ty ped an a llonge rese rvingthe
ro y a lti e s in

fa vo r o f Ea sti n, and a tta c he d it to t he 19 84 de e d. Di a l a sse rt e d h e e xec ute d th e de e d, in
acc ordanc e with his attorney ’s advice reg arding assuringthe tax-free exchang e, bef ore Ea stin signed the deed. He further claimed that at the time he signe d the deed no allong e was attache d. Howeve r, h e no t i ce d wh en i t wa s re turn ed t o h i m af t er re co rd i n g i th ada “ s co t ch -t ap edal l o n ge c o n t ai n i n g a
on e -h a lf min e ra l r eser vatio n in

fa vo r o f E a sti n. ” Di a l c la ime d th e a llo ng e wa s a dd e d w ith out hi s knowledg e or a g ree ment. In 1 99 0, Ea sti n lea

rn e d fr om h is p re de c e sso r i n inte re st that a $2 4, 00 0. 00 bo nu s w a s p a id t o Dial pursuant to a miner al lease with J o e R
. P ea co ck. Ea stin also learne d about a pa y ment of $8,000.00 in delay

renta ls. Eastin asked his attorney to contact Dia l reg ardingpay ment to Eastin of his share of

the bonus and de lay

renta ls, which he c laimed pursuant to the r eser v ation in the 1984 deed. E astin’s attorney

contac ted Dial and demanded that Dial ac knowledg e the r eser vation attache d to the 1984 deed a

nd pay Eastin his share of

monies due base d there on. Dial’s attorne y responde d by le tte r s tatin g in p art : Please re mind Dr. Easton [si c] that in Dec ember of 1983 he executed a war ranty deed f or the same re al prop e r

ty w ithout any

rese rvation of miner al intere st. The subsequent e x chang e dee d wa s f or the purp os e of

c le ari ngtit le in t

he g ra nte e of any c lou d b y the B lanto n c la im a

nd to insure [sic] a land e x chang e fr ee of income tax consequenc es.04
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1 ... D ebr a Ly n n D i al a n d Rober t Sc ot t D i al a r e t h e ch i l dr en of Pr es t on H
. D i al J r . B eg i n n i n g i n O ct ober 1990, D ia l b e g a n to gift his c h ild re n w ith su rfa c e a n d m ine ra l i n te re sts in th e R a n c h
.

- 6- The letter conclude d by

stating that under we ll-settled law the 1983 g ener al warranty deed c onvey ed fe e sim ple to D ia l and e sto pp e d Ea sti n fr om as se rt ing any int e re st i n th e Ranc h. Ap pa re ntl y Ea sti n took no further

action until 1992 when he sent a copy of the 1984 de ed to Dial and a g ain demande d his share of

any monies due him based on the r eser vation in the deed. In September 1994, D ial ex ecute d a minera l lease w ith Col umbia Gas De velopment Cor po ratio n (“ Col umb ia ” ). Ha vin g a pp are ntl y dis c ov e re d th e e xiste nc e of the 19 84 de e d, Col umb ia
c on ta c te d Ea sti n and re qu e ste d that he ratif y the le a se . E a sti n c la ime d Co lum bia re pr e se ntativ e s to ld him that unless he ratified the lease and appr oved a poolingag ree ment, Columbi a would not drill on the Ranc h. Ea sti n th e re a ft e r e xec ute d a n a g reement with Co lum bia a c kn ow le dg ingthe dis pute be tw e e n E a sti n a

nd Di a l and a g re e ingto p la c e the dis pute d f un ds fr om a

ny ro y a lty or oth e r p ay me nts in a spec ial escr ow ac co u n t pendingresolution of the matter . Ultimately , Columbi a obtained pr o d u c t i o n an d th e d i s p u t e d f un d s b a s e d o n E a s t i n ’ s c l a i m e d o n e - f o urth i n t e r e s t w e r e pla c e d in
escr ow. On August 28, 1997, Dial and his children f iled suit ag ainst Eastin seekingto settle the matter of the disputed minera l reser vation. 1 They asked the court to de clar e that the 1983 dee d transfe rre d Ea sti n’ s e nti re int e re st i n th e Ranc h to Di a l, i nc lud ingany min e ra l or

ro y a lty int e re st. Th e Di a ls claimed Ea stin was estopped to deny the ef fec t of the 1983 d ee d
. T h ey alternatively

claimed
owner ship based on the doc trine of a fter- acquir ed title and adve rse possession. They further alleg ed damag e cla ims for fra

ud and violations of the Te x as De ceptive T rade Prac t i ces A ct and soug ht attorney ’s fe es under

the Texas Dec laratory J udg ments Act. Eastin answe red a nd denied a ll of the04
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- 7- Dials’ cla ims, asserted de fense s, and counte rcla imed for f raud, f raud in a rea l estate transac tion, and brea ch of c ontrac t. Both the D ials and Eastin moved for summary judgme n t o n al l claims. On Novembe r 15, 20 00 , th e tr ial cou rt is su e d a le tte r r uli ngon the mot ion s. In e arl y

20 01 , b oth

the Di a ls a

nd Ea sti n prepa red pr oposed orde rs base d upon the cour t’s letter. B elievingthe cour t had fa iled to take any
a c tio n o n e ith e r o f t

he pr op os e d ord e rs , th e Di a ls s e nt a no the r p ro po se d o rd e r, a lon g wi th a le tte r, to the cour t in April of 2002; Eastin did the s am e. On April 25, 2002, Eastin’s attorne y rec eived a messag e fr om the trial court’s court coordinator asking that he return the call that day . When Eastin’s attorney called, he was infor

med the trial court ha d signe d the judg ment and seve ranc e pre sented by Dial on August 10, 2001. The district cler k of Z avala County sent the parties a letter e x plaining what ha d h a pp e ne d: Afte r m y revie w of the f

ile and inspec tion of same, my only conclusion is that the confor med copies of [t he judgme nt] wer e not f orwa rded to a ll c ounsel of rec ord at that tim e . Th e on ly

e xplanatio n I

have , is that th is w a s d

ue to a n a pp are nt o ve rs ig ht i n my office
. In its judgment, the trial c ourt g rante d the Dials’ motion for summary judgme nt and denied Eastin’s m otion for summ ary judgme nt with reg ard to the di sputed mineral inter est. The tria l court denied summary

judgme nt as to both parties’ c laims for dama g es, but sever ed those c laims in order to m ake the jud g me nt a s to the dis pute d mine ra l inte re st fin a l. B a se d on the ru lin g , fe e sim ple tit le to the proper

ty , including the disputed interest, was awa rded to the Dials, entitling them to the money place d in escrow

by Columbi a. The Dials wer e also a war ded $8,000.00 in attorne y ’s fe es. When the Dials rec eived notice of t he judgment, t hey withdrew the disputed funds from the Columbia escr ow
acc ount and soug ht to recove r the attorney ’s fe es aw arde d in the judgme n t
. Ul timately , the B exar04
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2 ... T h is is t h e re a so n fo r th e S h e riff’ s inc lus io n a s a p a rty in th is m a tter
. 3 ... E a stin c o n te n d s the D ia ls’ m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t wa s a c tua lly a tra d iti o n a l m o tio n b e c a u se it co nt ai ns a reci t at i o n of b ackgro und f act s and has an af

f i d avi t at t ached t o i t
. W e dis agree and E ast i n has ci t ed no au t ho rit y s ug ge st i ng t his t ran sf o rm s a no ev i d en ce m o t i o n i nto a trad i t i o na l o ne . N o t hing in R ule 1 6 6 a(i) p rec l ud es a n o e v id e n c e m o v a n t f

ro m inc lud ing b a c k g ro u n d fac ts. See T EX . R. C IV . P
. 166 a( i )
. At t ach i ng ev i dence t o a no e vi dence m o tio n d o e s n o t a u to m a tica lly tur n the m o tio n into a tra d iti o n a l o n e . See Bi nur v . J acobo , 13 5 S.W
. 3 d 64 6 , 65 1 (T ex. 2 0 0 4 ). If a m o tio n c le a rly se ts fo rth it s g ro u n d s a n d o the rw ise m e e ts the re q u ire m e n ts o f R u le 1 6 6 a (i), it i s su ff ic ie n t. I d. T h e D ia ls’ m o tio n a sse rte d it w a s fil e d p u rs u a n t t o R u le 1 6 6 a (i) a n d a sse rte d “the re is no e v id e n c e o f p la intiff ’s e sse n tial m e rito rio u s d e fen se e le m e n t.” T h is is o n e o f th e th re e e le m e n ts a b ill -o f- re v ie w p la intiff m u st e sta b lish a n d in this c a se , t h e o n ly ele m e n t at issu e . See Ca l dw el l v. B arnes , 154 S
. W
. 3d 9 3 96 ( T ex. 200 4). T he D i al s t her ef ore s at i s f i ed the re q u ire m e n ts o f R u le 1 6 6 a (i). See T e x . R . C iv. P . 1 6 6 a (i).

- 8- County She ri ff pu bli sh e d n oti c e of

the int e nt t o e xec ute on

and se ll r e a l pro pe rt

y ow ne d by Ea sti n to
satis fy the jud g me nt f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. 2 Ea sti n obta ine d a tem po ra ry re str a ini ngor de r t o s top the sa le and the parties agr eed to a temporary injunction, pending resolution of Eastin’s bill of review, which he filed in 2003. Be cause Eastin did not rec eive notice of the judg ment for more than eig ht months, he miss ed his deadlines for

filing a motion for new tria l an d a notice of appea l, prompting the f

iling of the petition for bill of revie w. The Dials answe red the bill of revie w and filed a no evide nce motion for summary judgme nt. Eastin filed a tra ditional motion for summ ary judgme nt. The trial cour

t gr anted the Dials’ moti on for summ ary judgme nt, denied Ea stin’s, and dismissed Eastin’s action ag ainst the Sheriff. Ea stin perfe cted this appe al. D I S CUS S I ON Issues One and Two – Ti tle to the Ran ch In issues one and two, Eastin contends the trial court erre d in gr anting the Dials’ no e vidence mot ion fo r summary jud g me nt an d de nying his tr a dit ion a l mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt. 3 Court s
re vie w tr a dit ion a l and no e vid e nc e mot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt de novo
. ValenceOperating Co.

v . D or se tt , 1 64 S.W. 3d

65 6, 66 1 ( Te x. 20 05 ). A n o ev ide nc e mot ion fo r summary jud g me nt s ho uld04
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- 9- be g rante d if the non-movant f ails to presen t more than a scintilla of probative e vidence to raise a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t on the challeng ed ele ment. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A traditional motion for summary judgme nt is gra

nted only when the mova

nt establishes t here are no g enuine issues of m ater ial fac t and it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of la w on the grounds ex pressly set forth in the m otion. Browning v. Prostok, 1 6 5 S. W. 3 d 3 3 6 , 3 4 4 ( T e x. 2005). When revie wing an orde r g rantinga tra ditiona l m o t i on for summary judgme nt, courts take evidenc e favorable to nonmovant as true a nd indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e fr om the evidenc e in favor of

the nonmovant. Am . To ba c c o Co . v . G rin ne ll , 951 S.W .2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). A bill of review

is an equitable procee ding to set aside a pr ior judg ment that can no long er be challeng ed by

a motion for new

trial or appe al. Cal

dwe ll , 1 5 4 S
. W
. 3 d a t 9 6 (c i t i n g Bake r v. Go lds mi th , 582 S.W .2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)). A bill-of-re view plaintiff must ordinar ily plead a nd prove ( 1) a me ritorious defe nse or c laim to the underlying c ause of action, (2) which the plaintiff wa s pre v e n te d f r o m m ak in g b y

th e f r a u d , a c c id e n t, o r

w r o n g f u l a c t o f th e o p p o s in g p arty

o r o f ficial mistake, (3) unmixed w ith a ny neg lige nce or fault on the par t of the plaintiff. Id . Howeve r, whe n the bill-of-re view plaintiff pa rticipates in the unde rlying suit, but was prevented from fil ing a motion for
new trial or appea l be cause the district c lerk failed to g ive notice of judgme nt, th e b i l l-of-r eview plaintiff must estab l i s h a “m eritorious ground of appea l” in lieu of a me ritorious claim or def ense. Pe tro -C he mi c al T ra ns p. , I nc . v . Ca rro ll , 5 1 4 S
. W
. 2 d 2 4 0 , 2 4 5 (T ex . 1 9 7 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Ove rton v. Blum , 50 Te x. 41 7, 42 6 ( 18 78 )) ; Tho mp so n v . B all ar d , 149 S.W .3d 161, 164 (Tex
. Ap p . –Tyler 2004, no pet.). A “ meritorious g round of a ppeal” is one that might, and probably would, result in a re versa l of the trial c ourt’s judg ment. Mc Ro be rts v . R

y als , 8 6 3 S
. W
. 2 d

4 5 0 , 4 5 5 n . 1 (T ex . 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g PetroChemical , 514 S.W .2d at 245).04
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- 10- The Pe tro -C

he mi c al elements a

pply in t h i s ca s e beca

use Eastin fully

participated in the underlying suit, but failed to r ece ive notice of the trial cour

t’s judgme nt for more than eig ht months afte r it was sig ned. B eca

use it was undisputed that Eastin did not rec eive notice of the August 2001 judgme nt until April 2002 d u e t o an ad mitted mis take by the district cler

k, unmix ed with any neg lige nce by

Eastin, the only i s s u e fo r summary judgme nt was whe ther Ea stin had a meritorious g round of a

ppeal. Se e Cal

dwe ll , 1 54 S.W. 3d

a t 96 ; P e tro - Chemical , 514 S.W .2d at 245. Acc ording ly , summary

judgme nt in favor of

the Dials was proper in this case unless Eastin prese nted more than a

scintilla of probative evidence to raise a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t on the element of meritorious g round of a

ppeal. See R idgway , 135 S.W .3d at 600. Given the posture of this case – an under lying summar y judgme nt fol l owed by

a summary judgme nt denying a

bill of review – we m u s t conduct a de novo revie w to deter mine whether

a de

novo revie w of the unde rlying c ase wo u l d h av e resulted in the r ever sal or modification of the
un de rl yingjud g me nt. In d oin g so , w e are lim ite d to a re vie w of wh a t wou ld have be e n th e a pp e llate
rec ord if Ea stin had appea led the under lying judg ment. See P etro-Chemic al , 514 S.W .2d at 246. The unde rlying judg ment g ranted t h e Dials’ motion for summar y judgme nt and denied Ea sti n’ s o n th e iss ue of

tit le to the min e ra l in te re st, but sp e c if ic a lly de nie d a nd the n s e ve re d b oth parties’ other c laims. The ref ore any g round of a

ppeal c halleng ing the sever ed dama g e issues will not
su pp or t E a sti n’ s b ill of

re vie w a nd we wi ll c on sid e r o nly

tho se g ro un ds of a

pp e a l re le va

nt to the tit le adjudication. Given the fore g oing, a s well the issues actua lly raised and addr essed in the pe tition for bill of review, the parties’ m o t ions for summary judgme nt, and the appe llate brief s, there a re thre e possible meritorious g rounds for appea l to be considere d by this court: (1) Ea stin’s challeng e to the04
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4 ... T houg h Eas t i n r ai s es a M a lo o ly po i nt of error and ref ers i n hi s b ri ef

s t o num erous al l eged “ m eri t o ri o us g ro u n d s o f ap p e a l” tha t we re p re se n te d in h is p e tit io n fo r b ill o f re v ie w a n d his m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t, h is b rie fs c o n ta in a rg u m e n t an d a u tho rities re la ting o n ly t o the se thr e e issu e s. A c c o rd ing ly, the se c h a llen g e s to the trial c o u rt’s su m m a ry j u d g m e n t ar e the o n e s p ro p e rly b e fo re this c o u rt. See Br own v . H ear t hwood I I O wner s As s ’ n, I

nc . , 201 S. W
. 3d 1 5 3 , 1 5 6 -5 7 (T e x . A p p .– H o u sto n [1 4 th D ist.] 2 0 0 6 , p e t. d e n ie d ) (h o ld ing tha t ge n e ra l M al oo l y i ss ue p res erves co m p l ai nt o n ly i f gro u n d c h a llen g e d o n a p p e a l i s su p p o rte d b y a rg u m e n t); s ee al s o T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8 .1 (h ).

- 11- leg al ef fec t of the 1983 dee d, (2) Ea stin’s at t ack on the Dials’ alter native cla im of titl e base d on
a dv e rs e po sse ssi on , a

nd (3 ) t he awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. 4 1983 Dee d Eastin first argues the summary jud gm en t wa s err oneous bec ause he prese nted evidenc e
e sta bli sh ing , or a t le a st ra isi nga fa c t is su e , th a t th e 19 83 de e d c ou ld n ot c onve y tit le to D ia l be c a

us e it wa s canc elled by the trial court’s judgme nt in the Blanton v. Eastin suit, a judgme nt from which Dial did not appea l. He conte nds t h i s court ther efor e would have been r equire d to reve rse the jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he Di a ls if Ea sti n ha d be e n ab le to a pp e a l. I n s up po rt of his c on te nti on , E a sti n submitt ed numer ous documents from the Eastin v. Blanton suit and the ensuingappea l, including the pleading s, t h e j u d gm en t and mandate , and the c ost bond perfe cting the appe al, as we ll as his own aff idavit describingthe eve nts relatingto the suit and the appe al. T h e tr ia l c o urt’ s ju d g ment in B l a n t o n v. Eastin decr eed the 1983 deed f rom Eastin to Dial “ca ncelled a nd held for na

ug ht.” Howe ver, Ea stin’s own summary judgme nt proof estab l i s h es he
a pp e a le d the jud g me nt an d whi le the a pp e a l wa s pen din g , Ea sti n an d B lanto n s e ttl e d th e dis pute . T his
c ou rt g r a n t e d E a s t i n ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s an d i s s u e d a p e r c ur i am o p i n i o n s t a t i n g , i n r e l e v an t part ,

“ [t]he mot ion

is gra nte d. Th e jud g me nt be low is va c ate d and the c a us e is dis mis se d f

ro m th e do c ke ts of the trial court. The a

ppeal is dismissed.” Eastin v. Blanton , No. 04-84-00496-CV (Tex. App.–San Antonio J an. 31, 1985 , n o writ). Our judgme nt vacated the trial c ourt’s judg ment and orde red the04
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- 12- cause dismiss ed fr om the trial court’ s docket. The court’s mandate iss ued on Marc h 22, 1985, making our judg ment final for

all purposes. Eastin’s ar g ument ignor es the fa ct t h at this court did not merely dismiss the appe al, but
vacated the trial c ourt’s judg ment, not just part o f t h e j u d gment or as to one pa rty , but the entire judgme nt. See id. When a judgme nt is vacated, “it is entirely destroy ed, and the rig hts of the par ties
ar e le f t a s if n o s u c h ju d g me n t h a d e v e r b e e n e n te r e d.” Ba in v . Co ats , 2 4 4 S. W. 1 3 0 , 1 3 4 ( T e x. Comm’ n App . 1 92 2, jud g m’ t a do pte d) ; see O il Field Haulers A s s ’n v. R.R . Comm’n , 381 S.W .2d 183, 188 (Tex. 1964) (holding that vacated judg ment cannot unde r any circ umstances be final judgme nt); cf. Jones. v. Ill. Employe rs I ns. of W ausau , 136 S.W .3d 728, 739 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (holdingthat wher e cour t of appeals di smissed appea l but did not vacate t rial cour t’s judgme nt, such judg ment was lef t intact). The le g al ef

fec t of this court’s vacatur of the trial cour

t’s judgme nt in Blan ton v . E

as tin was to re turn all parties a nd proper ty interests to what they

wer e bef ore B lanto n f ile d s uit
. Cf. Mo nte ma

y or v . O rti z , 208 S.W .3d 627, 665 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006 pets. denied) (holding that g ranting of new trial has leg al eff ect of vacating judg ment and re turning
case to trial court docke t as thoug h there had bee n no trial or hea ring ). Ea sti n n e xt co nte nd s D ia l w a s n ot e nti tle d to th e be ne fi t of our d ism iss a l and

va c a tur be c a us e he did not appea l the Blanton v. Eastin judgme nt. G ener ally , when one party appea ls a judg ment, any relief aff orded that party

applies o n l y t o h im and not to any nonappea ling pa

rty
. See Saigh v

. Mo nte ith , 1 47 Te x. 34 1, 21 5 S. W.2 d 6 10 , 6 13 (19 48 ). How ever , w he n a n a pp e llate c ourt

iss ue s a judgme nt and mandate that unambig uously reve rses, vacate s, or otherw ise modifies a lowe r cour t’s judgme nt in its entirety , t h at j u d gm ent and mandate is binding on a ll parties to the judg ment. See Fl e tc he r v . B lai r , 8 74 S.W. 2d 83 , 8 4 n .1 (T e x. Ap p. –Aus tin 19 94 , w ri t de nie d) . M or e ov e r, to h old04
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5 ... E ast i n ref

ers t o t he 1 9 8 4 de ed as t he “ R ep l acem ent E xchange W arrant y D eed
. ” H o wever, t he t erm “ r epl ac eme n t ” does n ot appe ar i n t h e t i t l e of t h at de ed, i t i s s i mpl y e n t i t l ed “ Exc h an g e W ar r an t y D ee d, ” a den omi n at i on cl ear l y r ef

er r i ng t o t he un derl y i ng pur po s e of t he deed, t he t ax- f

r ee “ exc han ge. ”

- 13- that the Eastin v. Blanton jud g me nt w a s v a c a te d as to Ea sti n, but no t a s to Di a l, w ou ld b e int ole ra bly inc on sis te nt –

Ea sti n w ou ld h ave tit le to t he pr op e rt

y a s if Bl anto n ha d ne ve r br ou g ht s uit , b ut E a sti n could not have tr ansfe rre d title to Dial because Eastin did not have title. This is untenable; Eastin’s
and Di a l’ s r e sp e c tiv e ri g hts are so int e rw ov e n that vac a tur of the jud g me nt as to one is va c a tur a s to both. Cf. T

urner v. Collie &Braden, Inc . v. Brookhollow, Inc ., 642 S.W .2d 160 , 1 6 6 (Tex. 1982) (holding that g ener ally when one party appea ls judg ment, reve rsal as to him will not jus tify reve rsal
as to othe r nonappea ling parties unless respe ctive rig hts of appea ling and nonappea lin g p ar t i es are so interwoven or

depende n t as to require reve rsal of e ntire judg ment to affor d appea ling pa rty true relief ). Ac cording ly , we hold the 1983 de ed fr om Eastin to Dia l wa s not “ca ncelled a nd held for naug ht” and Ea stin therefor e pre sented no e vidence to support a meritorious g round for

appea l based on the Eastin v. Blanton judgme nt. Eastin also argues the 1983 dee d did not convey title of the disputed mineral intere st to Dial beca use the pa

rties intended it as a temporar y deed, which was repla ced by what he ref ers to as the 1984 repla ceme nt warr anty deed. 5 In support, Eastin points to the CTFE, the CCT, his affidavit, the aff idavit of his attorney , and the 1984 de ed. Neither party contende d the 1983 dee d is ambiguous, so we construe the languag e of the deed to asce rtain the int en t of the par ties without consideringparol e vidence , i.e., as a matter of la

w. Ave ryt v. Grande, Inc ., 71 7 S. W.2 d 8 91 , 8 93 (T e x. 19 86 ); Pierson v. Sange r , 9 3 T e x. 1 6 0 , 5 3 S. W. 1012, 1013 (1899). The primary duty of a court when construing a deed is to a scer tain the intent of the par ties from the languag e in the dee d using the “four corne rs” rule. Luc k e l v . W hite , 819 S.W .2d04
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- 14- 45 9, 46 1 ( Te x. 19 91 ). Th e int e nt t hat g ov e rn s is no t th e int e nt the pa rt ie s me ant but f

a ile d to e xpre ss, but rather the intent actual l y ex p re s s ed in the dee d. Go reOi l C. v . R oo sth , 158 S.W .3d 596, 599 (T e x. Ap p. –E a stl and

20 05 , n o p e t.) . Ade e d mu st b e c on str ue d to c on fe r up on

the g ra nte e the g re a te st
e s tate th a t th e te r

ms o f th e in s tr

u me n t w il l p e r

mi t. L ot t v . Lo tt , 370 S.W .2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963). A dee d will pass whateve r intere st the g rantor ha s in the land, unless it contains languag e showing the intention to g rant a

lesser e state. Sharp v. Fowler , 151 Tex. 490, 252 S .W.2d 153, 154 (1952); see J asper State Bank v . Goodrich , 1 07 S.W. 2d 60 0, 60 2 ( Te x. Civ . App .–B e a umo nt, 19 37 , w ri t dism’d) (“[T]he law ca

n indulge the pre sumption t hat the g rantor ‘ intends to convey the trac t to which he has title’ . . . whe n that presumption does not do violence t o t h e languag e of the deed” ). A warranty de e d w ill pa ss a ll o f t

he e state ow ne d b y

the g ra nto r a t th e tim e of

the c onve y anc e un le ss there are rese rvations or e x ceptions that re duce the est at e co n v ey ed
. Sh ar p , 252 S.W .2d at 154. Reservations of minerals are eff ective only if made in c lear languag e. Id .; se e Me lto n v . D av is , 443 S.W .2d 605, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.–Ty ler 1969, writ ref

’d n.r.e.) (holding that if appellee s had intended t o rese rve disputed miner al intere st, they could have done so by languag e spec ifically

and unequivoca lly

expressing suc h intent; having f ailed to include such languag e in the deed, the minera l estate pa ssed to appellants unde r the de ed). Th e 19 83 de e d, wh ic h w a s si g ne d b y Ea sti n a nd re c or de d b y

Di a l a ft e r t

he CTF E a

nd CCT
wer e executed, is e ntitled “Warranty Dee d” and it g rants, sells, and convey s the Ranch to Dial without any mineral re servation in favor of Ea stin. There is no languag e in the dee d sugges t i n g it was int e nd e d to be te mpo ra

ry , wo uld be re pla c e d, or

that it did no t a c tua lly

c onve y the de sc ri be d p ro pe rt

y to D ia l at th e tim e . B e c a

us e the re we re no re se rv a tio ns or e xce pti on s in the 19 83 de e d f ro m E a sti n to Dial, Eastin conveyed all the rights he had in the R anch, including his interest in the minera l estate.04
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- 15- Ea sti n’ s b e lie f t

hat th e le g a l e ff

e c t or me anin g of

the de e d w a s so me thi ngoth e r tha n what is pla inl y stated t here in does not permit him to avoid its eff ect. See D avis v. Bond, 138 Tex. 206, 158 S.W .2d 297, 300 (1942). The parties’ prior agr eeme nts, the C TFE and t he C CT, which did express an intent by Ea sti n to re se rv e a

min e ra l in te re st, are wh oll y inc on sis te nt w ith the te rm s o f t he 19 83 de e d w ith reg ard to the miner al reservation. We conclusively presume the 1983 deed a

nd its terms supersede d any prior agree ment about Eastin’s miner al re s er v ation. Se e Fi sh v . Ta nd

yCor p ., 948 S.W .2d 88 6, 89 9 (Te x. Ap p. –F or t Wor th 1 99 7, wr it d e nie d) ; Sm ith v . S mi th , 7 9 4 S
. W
. 2 d

8 2 3 , 8 2 8 ( T e x. App.–Dallas 1990, no writ). Ac cording ly , Eastin neither pr oved as a matter of la

w nor pre sented a scintilla of evidenc e to show the 1983 de ed wa s temporar y and failed to convey the Ranch, inc luding Eastin’s minera l interest, to Dial. Adve rse Possession In the 1997 l awsuit, the Dials alleg ed adverse possession of the Ranch a s an alter nate g round fo r f ind ingthe y

ow ne d th e Ranc h, inc lud ingthe min e ra l in te re st. B e c a us e the 19 83 de e d v e ste d ti tle in t he Di a ls, the me ri t of

the a lte rn a te g ro un d is ir

re le va nt, a s are any

“ me ri tor iou s g ro un ds of

a pp e a l” that Eastin might have raised w ith respect t o t h e adverse posse ssion claim. We therefor e nee d not addre ss whether

Eastin proved a matter of law or raised a fac t issue as to the Dials’ cla im to the Ranch based on a dverse possession. Attorney’s Fe es F ina lly , E a sti n c on te nd s h e wo uld lik e ly have be e n e nti tle d to a re ve rs a l of

the jud g me nt i n the 19 97 su it b a se d o n th e tr ial cou rt ’s awa rd to t he Di a ls o f $ 8, 00 0. 00 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Ea sti n
c on te nd s th e a ff

ida vit Di a l su bmi tte d in

su pp ort of hi s fe e c la im w a s c on c lus or y and fa ile d to seg reg ate r ecove rable from u nr e cover able f

ees. H oweve r, Eastin pre sents absolutely no argument and04
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- 16- cites no authority

to support the alleg ation the affidavit is conclusory
. Acc ording ly , this contention is w a ive d a

nd we wi ll c on sid e r o nly

his c la im t

hat th e fa ilure to s e g re g a te a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is a meritorious g round of appea l. Se e In reB. L. , N o . 0 4
- 0 5
- 0 0 6 2 1
- CV , 2 0 0 6 WL 1 8 9 5 4 5 0 , a t * 5 ( T e x. Ap p . – S an An t o n i o J u l
. 1 2 , 2 0 0 6 , p et
. d en i ed(m em . o p . ) ( ci t i n g Fr e do nia Sta teBa nk v . G e n. Am . Li

fe Ins
. Co ., 88 1 S. W.2 d 2 79 , 2 84 -8 5 ( Te x. 19 94 ) (h old inga pp e llate c ourt

ha s d isc re tio n to de e m po int s of e rr or wa ive d d ue to i na de qu a te br ie fi ng )) ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8. 1( h) (s tatin g that br ie f m us t c on ta in clea r and c oncise a

rgument for c ontentions m ad e with appropriate c itations to authorities and the
rec ord). In th e 19 97 su it, the Di a ls sou g ht attor ne y ’s fe e s pur su ant to the Te xas D e c larator y Judg me nts Ac t. T he y

fi le d a n a ff ida vit fr om t he ir a tto rn e y wi th t he ir mot ion fo r su mmar

y jud g me nt. Ea sti n objected to the a ffidavit and the Dials submitt ed an amende d aff idavit. E astin never

objected to the orig inal aff

idavit or the ame nded af fidavit on the g round i t fa i l ed t o seg reg ate r ecove rable from
unre c ov e ra

ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. As a g e ne ra l r

ule, a pa rt y se e kin g to r e c ov e r atto rn e y ’s fe e s is “re quired to se g reg ate fee s betwee n claims for which they are rec overa

ble and c laims for which the y
are not.” T

o ny Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa , 2 1 2 S. W. 3 d 2 9 9 , 3 1 1 ( T e x. 2 0 0 6 )
. H o w e v e r , the opposing pa

rty must properly

prese rve f

or appe llate re view a contention t hat the fe e cla imant failed to seg reg ate the f

ees soug ht. Gr e e n I

nt’ l, I nc . v . S oli s , 9 51 S.W. 2d

38 4, 38 9 ( Te x. 19 97 ). B e c a us e Ea sti n d id n ot o bje c t to the a tto rn e y ’s a ff ida vit on g rou nd s o f f

a ilure to s e g re g a te , h e wa ive d th is objection. See id. Iss ue

Thre e– Co nsti

tutiona lit y of Bill of Re v ie w Proc e dure Eastin argues in his third issue that requiringhim to establish a meritorious g round of a ppeal deprive s him of his right to due proce ss. He contends both f eder al and state law “make [] it c lear that04
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- 17- one re ceivingno actua l or cons t ru ct i v e n o tice of a judgme nt is entitl ed to have it set aside without provinga mer itorious defense .” Ea stin relies on authority holding that to re q u i re pr oof of a
me ri tor iou s d e fe ns e wh e re a de fe nd ant re c e ive d no noti c e of the laws uit

wo uld vio late du e pr oc e ss. Se e Pe ra lta v . H

e igh ts M e d. Ctr ., Inc ., 485 U.S. 80, 84-97 (1988) (holding that “a judg ment enter ed without notice or ser

vice is constitutionally

infirm” bec ause a

“‘f undamental requireme nt of due pr oc e ss i n a

ny pr oc e e din g wh ic h is to b e a c c or ded fi nal ity is n oti c e re a so na

bly c a lc ulate d .
. . to apprise inter ested pa

rties of the pe ndency

of the a ction and af

ford them the oppor

tuni t y to present t h ei r o b j ec t i o n s ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Mullane v. Central Hanov er Bank & Trust Co. , 3 3 9 U
. S. 306, 314 (1950))
. We ag ree that under Pe ra lta , a def en d an t wh o was never g iven notice of the suit in which judgme nt was re ndere d ag ainst him is not require d to prove the e x istence of a mer itorious defense
. Id. Howeve r, we do not ag ree that a def endant who w as ser

ved with citation and pa

rticipated in the lawsu it, but then failed to rec eive notice of the judg ment, is ex cused f rom provinga mer itorious d ef en s e. The due proce ss exception of Peralta is lim ited to those instances in which the bill-ofrevie w plaintiff wa s not serve d with valid citation in the suit i n which the judg ment was re ndere d. See id. ; Ca ld well , 154 S.W .3d at 96-97. The Peralta e xc e p ti o n d o e s n o t a p p ly to E a s ti n b e c a

use he
un dis pute dly

re c e ive d s e rv ic e of

c itatio n in

the un de rl yingmatte r and fu lly pa rt ic ipate d in

the laws uit
. Despite Peralta and Cal

dwe ll , Eastin argues that under Dispensa v. Univ . State Bank, the exception to the meritorious defe nse re quirement should apply to a ca se whe re the d efe ndant was
serve d but did not rec eive notice of the judg ment. 987 S.W .2d 923 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Ag ain, we disa g ree . In Di sp e ns a , the cour

t of appe als held Peralta did no t a pp ly to
a de fe nd ant who wa s n ot p ro pe rl y se rv e d with c itatio n, but had a c tua l noti c e of the jud g me nt at a tim e04
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- 18- when he could have challeng ed the judgme nt based on lack of valid service
. Id. at 926-28. The c ourt
rea soned the Peralta exception was inapplica ble bec ause the defe ndant’s own inaction, rather than
a la c k o f n oti c e , c a

us e d h im t o mi ss t

he op po rt un ity to f ile a mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l or re str ic te d a

pp e a l. Id. at 928. Howe ver, it does not fo l l o w from the holdingin Dispensa that the Peralta exception applies in eve ry

case wher e ac tual knowledg e or notice of the judg ment is lacking . I t was undisputed that the def

endant in Dispensa did not rec eive va lid service of proce ss, the very

fac t upon which the Peralta exception is based. Te xas l aw re qu ir e s a bill- of -r e vie w pla int if

f wh o wa s pro pe rl y se rv e d with no tic e of the su it to show the exis tence of a me ritorious defe nse. Eastin has c ited no authority to support his contention that the Peralta e xce pti on a pp lie s w he n a

de fe nd ant w a s p ro pe rly se rv e d w ithc itatio n, fu lly participated in the lawsuit, but f ailed to rec eive timely

notice of the judgme nt. Se e, e. g. , Ca ldw e ll , 15 4 S. W.3 d at 96 . A c c or din g ly , w e ho ld Ea sti n wa s no t de nie d d ue pr oc e ss b y

havin g to e sta

bli sh
a mer itorious defense in order to suc cee d on his bill of re view. C ONCL US I ON We hold Eastin has failed to conclusively establish or present more than a scintilla of evidenc e of a me ritorious g round of a ppeal. Ac cording ly , we ove rrule his issues and a ffirm t h e t rial cour t’s judgme nt.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice