ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CHRISTOPHER A. CAGE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JUSTIN A. STATON, )

)

Appellant, )

)

 vs. ) No. 48A02-1112-CR-1192

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable David A. Happe, Judge

Cause No. 48D04-1009-FD-343

August 1, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MATHIAS, Judge

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
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Justin A. Staton (“Staton”) appeals following the Madison Circuit Court’s 

revocation of his probation and argues (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence to 

support the revocation, and (2) that the trial court violated his due process rights by 

improperly basing its revocation decision on matters not alleged in the petition to revoke. 

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 2, 2011, Staton pleaded guilty to Class D felony theft, Class B 

misdemeanor unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle, and Class B misdemeanor inhaling 

toxic vapors. Staton received an aggregate sentence of two years, with all but two days 

suspended to probation.

Less than two months later, on June 14, 2011, Cody Rose (“Rose”) and Raymond 

Gallegos (“Gallegos”) were walking together when they met Staton and Tracy Smith 

(“Smith”). Smith and Rose began to argue about a previous incident, and Staton struck 

Rose on the back of the head. Smith then pulled the back of Rose’s shirt over his head 

and Rose was knocked to the ground. After Rose fell to the ground, Staton and Smith 

continued to hit him. Rose then pulled out a knife and “started flailing [it] around[.]” As 

a result, Staton was stabbed in the hand and leg. Gallegos eventually pulled Staton off of 

Rose, and Staton fled when he heard police sirens.

On June 17, 2011, the State filed a petition to revoke Staton’s probation. The 

petition alleged that Staton had violated his probation by committing the new offenses of 

Class A misdemeanor battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. A 
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revocation hearing was held on November 15, 2011, at which both Rose and Gallegos 

testified for the State. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Staton 

had violated his probation as alleged in the petition. After hearing evidence and 

argument concerning sanctions, the trial court revoked Staton’s probation and ordered 

him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. Staton now appeals. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Staton first argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the 

revocation of his probation. It is well settled that probation is matter of grace left to the 

discretion of the trial court, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Smith v. 

State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012). Accordingly, a trial court’s decision to revoke 

probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which occurs where the decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. 

Id. A person’s probation may be revoked if he or she violates a condition of probation 

during the probationary period. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1)). “A probation 

hearing is civil in nature and the State need only prove the alleged violations by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. We will consider the evidence most favorable to the 

judgment of the trial court, without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of 

witnesses. Id. “If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial 

court’s conclusion that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, we will affirm its 

decision to revoke probation.” Id. The State need not show that the defendant was 

convicted of a crime to support the revocation of probation. Lightcap v. State, 863 
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N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “Although an arrest standing alone does not 

necessarily support a revocation of probation, where there is evidence submitted at the 

hearing from which the trial court could find that an arrest was reasonable and that there 

is probable cause for belief that the defendant violated a criminal law, revocation of 

probation is permitted.” Id.

The State alleged that Staton violated his probation by committing two new 

offenses, Class A misdemeanor battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. 

The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s decision establishes that Rose was 

arguing with Smith when Staton struck Rose in the back of the head. Smith then pulled 

the back of Rose’s shirt over his head, and when Rose was knocked to the ground, Smith 

and Staton continued to strike him. This evidence was more than sufficient to establish 

by a preponderance of the evidence that Staton committed battery and disorderly conduct. 

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a) (providing that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally 

touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B 

misdemeanor”); Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a) (providing that a person who recklessly, 

knowingly, or intentionally “engages in fighting or tumultuous conduct” commits Class B 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct). Staton’s arguments to the contrary are nothing more 

than requests to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we 

will not do on appeal.1

 1 Staton claims that the trial court’s statement that it was “not sure that . . . any individual witness has given us a 

complete version of what really happened here” somehow undermines its ultimate conclusion that Staton had 

violated his probation. Tr. p. 45. But the court went on to explain its reasons for concluding that Staton was not 

acting in defense of Smith as he claimed and had, in fact, violated his probation as alleged in the petition. 
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II. Due Process

Next, Staton argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by basing its 

revocation decision on matters not alleged in the petition to revoke. “It is well settled 

that although a probationer is not entitled to the full array of rights afforded at trial, 

certain due process rights inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing.” Hubbard v. 

State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Among these due process rights is the 

right to receive written notice of the alleged violations. Piper v. State, 770 N.E.2d 880, 

882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. It is error for a probation revocation to be based 

upon a violation for which the probationer did not receive notice. J.H. v. State, 857 

N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

In support of his argument that the trial court’s revocation decision was based on 

alleged violations of which he received no notice, Staton directs our attention to certain 

statements of the trial court concerning Staton’s choice to remain at the scene even after 

it became apparent that Smith and Rose were going to get into an altercation and Staton’s

flight from the scene after hearing police sirens. 

Staton’s argument is meritless. The trial court clearly indicated that it found “[b]y 

a preponderance of the evidence . . . that Mr. Staton did violate his probation as alleged 

in the June 17th notice.” Tr. p. 46 (emphasis added). And as we explained above, the 

State presented sufficient evidence to support that finding. The statements of which 

 Specifically, the court noted that Staton saw the situation unfolding, yet chose to stay and become involved, and that 

Staton fled when he heard police sirens. Thus, the trial court was simply acknowledging that it had heard conflicting 

testimony, and although it was not sure that any one witness had given a full and accurate account of the events, it 

nevertheless believed that Staton had violated his probation as alleged.
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Staton now complains were merely explanations of why the trial court rejected Staton’s 

claim that he was defending Smith against an attack by Rose and found that he had, in 

fact, violated his probation by committing the new offenses of battery and disorderly 

conduct.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and BAILEY, J., concur.