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ASSESSING ANTHRAX DETECTION METHODS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 5, 2005

Serial No. 109–57

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

KRISTINE MCELROY, Professional Staff Member

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 5, 2005 ................................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Burrus, William, president, American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO;

Linda D. Stetzenbach, director, Microbiology Division, Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; James

H. Schwartz, chief, Arlington County Fire Department; Michael P.

Neuhard, chief, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department; Philip

Schaenman, president, Tridata Division of System Planning Corp.; and

John Jester, Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department

of Defense ...................................................................................................... 109

Burrus, William ......................................................................................... 109

Jester, John ............................................................................................... 164

Neuhard, Michael P. ................................................................................. 148

Schaenman, Philip .................................................................................... 155

Schwartz, James H. ................................................................................... 140

Stetzenbach, Linda D. ............................................................................... 117

Rhodes, Keith, Chief Technologist, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Sushil Sharma, Associate Director for Science, Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention; Dr. Tanja Popovic, Associate Director for Science, Centers for Disease and Prevention, accompanied by

Maxim Kiefer, Assistant Director for Emergency Preparedness and Response, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention; Dr. Klaus Schafer, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense,

Department of Defense; Dana Tulis, Deputy Director for the Office

of Emergency Management, Environmental Protection Agency, accompanied by Mark Durno, on-Scene Coordinator [OSC] EPA Region 5,

Environmental Protection Agency; Thomas G. Day, vice president of

engineering, U.S. Postal Service; and Dr. Katherine Kelley, director,

Department of Public Health Laboratory ................................................... 12

Day, Thomas G. ......................................................................................... 73

Kelley, Dr. Katherine ................................................................................ 80

Popovic, Dr. Tanja ..................................................................................... 36

Rhodes, Keith ............................................................................................ 12

Schafer, Dr. Klaus ..................................................................................... 55

Tulis, Dana ................................................................................................ 62

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Burrus, William, president, American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 112

Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 8

Day, Thomas G., vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 76

Jester, John, Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department

of Defense, prepared statement of ............................................................... 167

Kelley, Dr. Katherine, director, Department of Public Health Laboratory,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 82

Neuhard, Michael P., chief, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 150

Popovic, Dr. Tanja, Associate Director for Science, Centers for Disease

and Prevention, prepared statement of ....................................................... 38

Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Nevada, prepared statement of .................................................................... 61

Page

IV

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by—Continued

Rhodes, Keith, Chief Technologist, Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 15

Schaenman, Philip, president, Tridata Division of System Planning Corp.,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 157

Schafer, Dr. Klaus, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for

Chemical and Biological Defense, Department of Defense, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 57

Schwartz, James H., chief, Arlington County Fire Department, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 143

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut:

Letter dated April 1, 2005 ........................................................................ 187

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Stetzenbach, Linda D., director, Microbiology Division, Harry Reid Center

for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 120

Tulis, Dana, Deputy Director for the Office of Emergency Management,

Environmental Protection Agency, prepared statement of ........................ 65

(1)

ASSESSING ANTHRAX DETECTION METHODS

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Porter, Tom Davis (ex officio),

and Kucinich.

Also present: Representative Norton.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R.

Nicholas Palarino, senior policy adviser; Kristine McElroy, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Andrew Su and

Denise Wilson, minority professional staff members; Earley Green,

minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. The Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, ‘‘Assessing Anthrax Detection Methods,’’ is

called to order.

Is this building contaminated? Almost 4 years after mail-borne

anthrax attacks killed five Americans, infected 22 others and polluted postal facilities, the answer to that urgent ‘‘yes or no’’ question remains a protracted cacophony of ‘‘maybes.’’ Recent detections

in local Department of Defense [DOD], mail facilities produced

painful reminders of persistent gaps in both the science of biological detection and the art of communicating test results, and risks,

to the public.

Today, with those recent events as context and cautionary tale,

we assess the extent of progress by Federal agencies toward standardizing and validating sampling, testing and analysis protocols for

Bacillus anthracis.

Each incident of suspected or actual biological contamination will

be unique. Every situation presents a daunting array of variables

and unknowns. But inherent complexity is no excuse to deter needed research or ignore lessons learned in favor of an ad hoc, uncoordinated and scientifically unsound response. All these events

pose the same question: Is it anthrax? Is it still there? Only strong

science and vigilant integration of that knowledge into a coordinated response will conquer the unknowns and limit the variables

that still plague anthrax detections.

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Last year we asked the Government Accountability Office [GAO],

to examine anthrax detection strategies used by the U.S. Postal

Service [USPS], and other Federal agencies. In a report released

today, GAO finds that despite some scattered efforts, the multi-step

anthrax detection and confirmation process still has not been validated; that is, scientifically tested to measure its sensitivity, reliability and limitations.

As a result, those responsible for assessing or mitigating anthrax

contamination have scant information on which to base selection of

sample techniques, specimen storage modes or testing methodologies appropriate to the incident at hand. Nor can first responders,

potential victims, or the public have the degree of confidence they

need in positive or negative results that only slowly emerge from

this loosely forged chain of custody.

Different anthrax detection technologies emitting different measures of ‘‘positive’’ and ‘‘negative’’ can trigger different responses by

local, county, regional, State and Federal officials. The public often

hears confusing and sometimes contradictory assessments of the

anthrax threat. Law enforcement and public health officials on the

scene don’t get timely, actionable information on the level of risk.

In effect, workers and the public are expected to serve as human

detectors, as the absence of illness is used to prove the absence of

contamination. But anthrax detection and remediation should be

an environmental, not just an epidemiological exercise. Proven tenets of environmental science and industrial hygiene can be applied to determine with measurable accuracy when a building is

clean.

Without validated detection protocols, we risk terrorizing ourselves with preventable false positives that subject people to needless countermeasures and, perhaps more dangerously, we invite

false negatives that breed an equally false sense of security.

GAO recommends that Federal agencies refine their approach to

anthrax detection, build on lessons learned and incorporate probability-based sampling techniques into a more coordinated response. Although these recommendations are directed primarily to

the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], it is still not clear

who is in charge of this process as evidenced by our crowded witness panels this afternoon.

But the Department of Health and Human Services, specifically

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Environmental Protection Agency are designated as lead agencies for anthrax detection and remediation. Their testimony today and that of

all our witnesses will help us understand how this vital public safety and public health process can be improved. DHS, fully engaged

today in the TOPOFF III National Counterterrorism Exercise, will

testify at a subsequent hearing.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. At this time, with the lady’s permission, I will go to

the chairman.

Ms. NORTON. Certainly, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Shays, thank you very much.

I still remember the call I got from Fairfax Inova Hospital in November 2001 telling me that a postal worker from northern Virginia had the symptoms of anthrax. This individual, Leroy Richmond, would ultimately survive inhalation anthrax, but we all remember the five individuals who did not.

Three and a half years have passed since the anthrax attacks on

Capitol Hill and millions of dollars have been spent to improve our

ability to detect and respond to future anthrax attacks. Yet as both

the GAO report released today, and last month’s anthrax incident

demonstrate, we are still unable to perform those core responsibilities as we should.

In fact, one of my greatest concerns since the United States refocused on homeland security in 2001 has been that we would

throw money at innumerable problems to little or no benefit—much

sound and fury, signifying nothing. Things are not quite that extreme, but we still struggle to accomplish fundamental tasks, and

we must therefore continue to provide close oversight of Federal efforts to better protect our citizens.

As we continue to see, there is little room for error in responding

to a real or perceived biological attack. If the situation is not effectively managed, public confidence quickly erodes.

In reviewing the testimony today, it is clear that our ability to

detect the presence of anthrax leaves much to be desired. Our response capabilities hinge on our ability to determine whether or

not anthrax is present. Proper scientific rigor must be applied to

this issue so that all facets of anthrax sampling, strategy development, collection, transportation, extraction and analysis, ensure the

highest probability of success.

Last month’s anthrax incidents at the Pentagon and Bailey’s

Crossroads provide an excellent opportunity to assess our ability to

respond to a biological attack. While I am pleased the Federal,

State and local entities involved conducted, or are conducting afteraction reports, questions have also arisen. Specifically, I am curious

why the Department of Defense has developed both detection and

response protocols that differ from civilian agencies. I am also curious why DOD did not coordinate medical decisions with the appropriate State and local public health officials.

At first glance it seems that a unified approach across all Federal

agencies would be optimal. Is there an operational reason for DOD

to be different? If so, what efforts have been made to facilitate

interaction with civilian Federal agencies, States and localities?

From my review of last month’s events, it seems that even DOD’s

use of different terminology created much unnecessary confusion,

especially when conference calls were the primary means of interagency communication. If our communication methods result in a

telephonic Tower of Babel, we are not doing our jobs.

I appreciate the work already commissioned by Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia to examine last month’s events

from the State and local perspective. I eagerly await the Federal

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component. This cannot be another scenario where lots of people

agree that we need to sit down and talk about X and Y. I want to

see actions and want to see results.

In closing, I want to thank Chairman Shays for this timely hearing and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the chairman. At this time the Chair would

also like to recognize another member from the area of D.C., obviously in D.C., who also has vital concerns about this issue.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for

your permission to sit in on this hearing. I am on the full committee, not on your subcommittee, and I appreciate your understanding the special interest that I have in this issue in particular.

I am not surprised, Mr. Chairman, for your foresight, because

foresight is what it is, for calling these hearings, and members in

this region will think that this hearing is in response to the frightening false alarms that recently occurred here, but this hearing

and the GAO report where they were already when that took place

makes the hearing especially timely.

Mr. Chairman, I was so concerned, even before we knew that

these were false alarms at the Pentagon facilities, that I immediately wrote to Chairman Davis to ask for a hearing, if only to settle the region down. About the last thing this region needs to go

through is another sense that we have not gotten control of contamination of the mail, not after we have lost two good men, three

others are seriously injured. False alarm or real alarm, the effect

on particularly postal employees is virtually the same, and here of

course including having to take Cipro.

Mr. Chairman, when I looked at the GAO report, I was absolutely stunned. I could only think what year is this, are we back

in 2001, because if you look at that report I think it is fair to say

that nothing got fixed. It looks as if everything went wrong—detection, testing, coordination, communication. The only thing that ultimately went right is somebody understood that you ought to at

some point tell employees and begin taking steps. Of course, those

steps turned out to be unnecessary and we are 4 years after September 11th.

Mr. Chairman, I was particularly concerned that the Pentagon

had done its own testing in a non-CDC-certified lab. What in the

world is the Pentagon doing farming out this important mission to

a lab which hasn’t gone through certification by the CDC when

there are more than 100 such labs all around the country that

have—I couldn’t help but think who does the Pentagon think they

are? Do they think they are not bound by the rules that came out

after the anthrax scare here?

That was extremely disconcerting to me. I cannot know whether

or not another lab would have done better. I do know that workers

and people who live in this region and in the United States have

a right to expect after the anthrax attacks that occurred here and

around the country, if I may remind you, have resulted in our taking care of the basics. The basics weren’t attended to here and, Mr.

Chairman, you were on the case as if clairvoyant with the GAO report and with this hearing, and I can’t thank you enough for that.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentlelady and am very grateful that she

is here to participate fully in this hearing.

Let me say before recognizing our witnesses and swearing them

in, that we have six witnesses in this panel and I think six in the

next. So we are going to stick to the 5-minute rule. When the 5

minutes are up, I will ask you to wrap up if you haven’t wrapped

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up, just so we can get to the questions, and we will have a number

of questions to ask.

So at this time the Chair would just note for the record that we

have Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Center for Technology and

Engineering Department, Applied Research and Methods, U.S.

Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Dr. Sushil

Sharma, just behind him. So, Doctor, if you would stand when we

swear and others as well; Dr. Tanja Popovic, Associate Director for

Science, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department

of Health and Human Services, accompanied by Maxim Kiefer; Dr.

Klaus Schafer, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for

Chemical and Biological Defense; Dana Tulis, Deputy Director for

the Office of Emergency Management, Environmental Protection

Agency, accompanied by Mark Durno; Thomas G. Day, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service; as well as Dr. Katherine

Kelley, director, Association of Public Health Laboratories.

So if you would stand, if everyone else who I called will stand

or anyone who might be providing some testimony would stand as

well, if there is anyone accompanying you who may participate; if

you would all stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I would note for the record that all our witnesses and

those who might testify have responded in the affirmative, and we

will start with you, Mr. Rhodes. Thank you very much for being

here. I thank all of you for being here and thank you all for your

service to our country, whether it’s directly in the government or

in the case of the Associated Public Health Laboratories for your

work as well. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF KEITH RHODES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST,

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY

SUSHIL SHARMA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; DR. TANJA

POPOVIC, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE, CENTERS

FOR DISEASE AND PREVENTION, ACCOMPANIED BY MAXIM

KIEFER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE

CONTROL AND PREVENTION; DR. KLAUS SCHAFER, DEPUTY

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DANA TULIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE

OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK DURNO, ON-SCENE

COORDINATOR [OSC] EPA REGION 5, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; THOMAS G. DAY, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE; AND DR. KATHERINE

KELLEY, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY

STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES

Mr. RHODES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members

of the subcommittee, thank you for asking us to participate in this

hearing by presenting our assessment of the Federal activities conducted to detect anthrax in postal facilities in the fall of 2001.

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Mr. Chairman, the bottom line of our findings is the following:

Since there were and largely still are no validated methods for

sample collection and analysis, agencies cannot know with any

level of statistical confidence whether or not a building is contaminated. In short, agencies cannot know when a negative result

means negative and when a positive result means positive.

I will now take a moment to discuss two of our major findings

about Federal agencies’ sampling strategies and lack of validation.

Our first finding is that the agencies primarily used a targeted

strategy; they collected samples from specific areas considered

more likely to be contaminated based on their judgments.

However, such judgments can only be effective when the source

of contamination is definitive and the sample collection and analytical methods are validated. In addition, these judgments are based

on certain assumptions.

For example, contamination levels at the highest public health

concern can usually be detected using a variety of available methods, despite their limitations. However, these assumptions may not

always apply. For example, there may be limitations in the available information that restrict an agency’s ability to reliably identify

target locations. And when all results are negative, additional testing will need to be done, as was the case in Wallingford, CT.

This in turn will result in the loss of critical time needed for public health intervention. A major weakness of targeted sampling approach is that in the case of a negative result, the basic question

is this building contaminated will remain unanswered with a given

level of confidence.

Without probability sampling, inferences about a facility’s status;

that is, whether it was contaminated, could not be reliably made

based on negative results. Probability sampling would address not

only the immediate public health needs but also the wider environmental contamination and cleanup issues.

In the future if the agencies decide to use a targeted sampling

strategy, they must recognize that they could lose a number of days

if test results are negative. Agencies would then have to collect and

analyze additional samples, resulting in a loss of critical time for

public health interventions.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, this was the case at the Wallingford postal facility in the fall of 2001. About 3 weeks elapsed between the time the first sampling took place and the results of the

fourth testing which revealed positive results. Furthermore, about

5 months elapsed between the time of the first sampling event and

the time anthrax was found in the Wallingford facility’s high bay

area, the rafters above the machine that was contaminated.

Our second finding finds that some collection and analytical

methods used by Federal agencies were not validated for anthrax.

This means that the agencies had no reliable basis on which to

choose one method over another and there can be no statistical confidence in the negative results. Validation as it is generally understood is a formal empirical process involving two steps: One, development of standard protocols and, two, evaluation of those protocols in different labs and on several occasions. Reproducibility of

the results by different labs and scientists is an essential component of this evaluation process.

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Validating a process is important because operational and

health-related decisions are made on the basis of testing results

generated by that process. In addition, validation would offer assurance that the results of using a particular method are robust

enough to be reproduced regardless of which agency, contractor or

laboratory is involved.

Thus, agencies and the public could be reasonably confident that

any test results generated by that method were reliable and, in

particular, that any negative results would mean that a sample

was free from contamination or within the method’s limits of detection.

Mr. Chairman, while agencies have taken some actions toward

validation, these actions do not address the issue of validating all

activities related to sampling. Since the fall of 2001, agencies have

begun studies that may contribute to the validation process. Nonetheless, these studies appear to be limited in addressing only some

aspect of an individual activity rather than the entire process.

Finally, the agencies have not made appropriate and prioritized

investments to develop and validate all activities related to sampling for anthrax and other biothreat agents. Accordingly, we made

several recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

The Secretary should: One, ensure the appropriate validation

studies of the overall process of sampling activities, including the

methods, are conducted; two, ensure that a definition of validation

is developed and agreed upon; three, see that appropriate investments are made in empirical studies to develop probability-based

sampling strategies that take into account the complexities of indoor environments; and, four, ensure that appropriate prioritized

investments are made for all biothreat agents.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to

answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may

have.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, ‘‘Anthrax Detection, Agencies

Need to Validate Sampling Activities in Order to Increase Confidence in Negative Results,’’ may be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rhodes follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I didn’t interrupt you because you left your most important part to the end and I couldn’t interrupt you.

Mr. RHODES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. You are welcome.

Dr. Popovic.

Dr. POPOVIC. Thank you very much.

Dr. SHAYS. Is your mic on, Doctor?

Dr. POPOVIC. It is now.

Mr. SHAYS. Good.

STATEMENT OF DR. TANJA POPOVIC

Dr. POPOVIC. Good afternoon, Chairman Shays and members of

the subcommittee. I am Dr. Tanja Popovic, Acting Associate Director for Science for Disease Control and Prevention, and I am accompanied today by Mr. Max Kiefer of CDC’s National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health.

On behalf of CDC, I am pleased to describe CDC’s views on detection of anthrax, the role of the laboratory response network and

our ongoing activities to fully establish the scientific validity of environmental testing methods.

During the 2001 anthrax attacks, CDC teams conducted a number of outbreak investigations in Florida, New York City, New Jersey, Washington, DC, and Connecticut. An environmental sampling

was a very important component of these investigations.

CDC used targeted or epidemiologically driven sampling strategies as the most straightforward approach to initial assessment

that allowed for rapid determination of contamination and quick

public health decisions. Targeted sampling proved to be rapid, efficient and successful and will continue to be our primary strategy

in outbreak investigations.

Environmental sampling approaches have substantially expanded since that time, and now they include early warning systems. BioWatch is an environmental air sampling surveillance initiated by the Department of Homeland Security with CDC, Department of Justice, EPA and National Laboratories as key partners.

Over 500,000 analyses have already been conducted. Another system is biohazard detection system, the one used by the U.S. Postal

Office, postal system. Both of them rely on a phased-in approach,

and that is the initial signal for a particular biothreat agent is then

followed by confirmatory identification.

CDC has worked very closely with USPS and public health partners on steps needed for that confirmatory identification and on developing effective response protocols. CDC has also taken the lead

in working with Department of Homeland Security, Department of

Justice and EPA in creating similar guidance for response to

BioWatch signals. It is exactly the highly reliable methods of the

Laboratory Response Network [LRN], that are used for this step of

confirmatory identification.

LRN is a national network of front line and advanced laboratory

capacities capable of providing support in bio-threat, chemical or

other public health emergencies. During 2001, LRN laboratories

have conducted hundreds of confirmatory identifications for anthrax bacteria from all kinds of sources, environmental, human and

others. They have also tested more than 120,000 environmental

37

specimens for a total of about 1 million tests. At this time, it is

very important for us to continue to grow and enhance this network’s capacity to be parallel with its continuously growing responsibilities.

With much of the progress, CDC does agree with the GAO that

there is room for further research in the area of validation. The

anthracis protocols that we used in 2001 have been validated for

identification of the anthracis, and the members of the participating laboratories did take part in the proficiency testing programs.

However, validation methods for collecting Bacillus anthracis

from air and surface did not exist at that time and therefore CDC

used caution when providing recommendations and guidance for

use of these methods to others. We began addressing the issues of

validation of these methods immediately after the response ended.

And the example of that is a side-by-side study conducted at Brentwood in which we used different sampling materials, which was

done almost in the middle of the national crisis.

We do continue to make efforts to validate components of this

biothreat agent detection process, but we do believe that the full

validation of every possible scenario variation might not only be

practical but could not entirely replace the scientific judgment and

event-specific evaluations.

In the meantime, CDC microbiologists have really worked hard

on evaluating efficiency of different sampling materials and processing methods. We had an interagency agreement with the U.S.

Army Dugway Proving Grounds that has led to the development of

a chamber in which we can establish and generate known concentrations of anthrax spores, which is critical for any kind of reliable and repetitive validation procedures. Studies are under way

that will look at the efficiency of sampling methods for both air and

surfaces that will allow for the detection—for lower limits of detection and also, very importantly, talk about intra-laboratory validation.

We also have extensive collaboration with the Sandia National

Laboratory on a project funded by DHS, and these are the studies

that will talk about the surface sampling and extraction methods

as well.

So, in summary, environmental microbiology and sampling issues

are indeed important tools for public health decisions, for law enforcement investigations and for evaluation of remediation success.

CDC is sponsoring research for a number of validation gaps for Bacillus anthracis, and there are many other agents, and we are looking forward to working with all the agencies, Department of Health

and Human Services, Homeland Security and other agencies, so

that we can move forward and improve all of our methods.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Popovic follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Doctor.

Dr. Schafer.

STATEMENT OF DR. KLAUS SCHAFER

Dr. SCHAFER. Chairman Shays, distinguished members.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t think your mic is on. I have never figured this

out. Doctors know so much, but they never know to turn their mics

on. There you go.

Dr. SCHAFER. Chairman Shays, distinguished members, I am

honored to appear before the subcommittee today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. It is an honor to have you, sir.

Dr. SCHAFER. I am responsible for the oversight of the Chem-Bio

Defense Program [CBDP] within the Department of Defense. The

CBDP is responsible for all aspects of the Department of Defense’s

fielding of operational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

defense capabilities, and the chemical, biological, radiological and

nuclear force installation program.

The program has efforts across the acquisition life cycle from

very early basic research and development activities, advanced development and the procurement of chemical and biological defense

capabilities; finally, the entire life cycle management of these field

of capabilities to ensure their quality and support while in the

hands of the warfighter.

I am accompanied this afternoon by Dr. David Cullen, who is immediately behind me, from the Joint Program Executive Office for

Chemical and Biological Defense. The CBDP has been aggressively

engaged in the research and development of biological warfare detection and identification technologies. Among these are technologies geared to rapidly and accurately detect anthrax in environmental and clinical samples.

Prior to September 11, 2001, CBDP efforts had focused exclusively on developing capabilities that would eventually be fielded to

their operational military forces. September 11th forced a broadening of the Chem-Bio Defense Program focus to provide capabilities

in support of installation for its protection and the emerging homeland defense missions. Many of these technologies are the backbone

of today’s response system protecting the American public.

In pursuit of these new missions, the CBDP has, and is currently

fielding these systems and continuing the development of new capabilities which put a premium on sensitivity and precision in the

integration of these technologies into the broader interagency response community.

However, while the end mission has changed, the early research

and development of these capabilities is still founded on the same

basic tenets used to develop capabilities for the operational force,

sound science and laboratory validation of technologies. This is always the first step in the eventual fielding of any capability.

In support of the installation force protection and homeland defense missions, the Chem-Bio Defense Program has developed a

total systems approach from directing the sample, the laboratory

system for the routine analysis of aerosol samples as well as confirmatory analysis of suspect samples from other sources.

The capability is founded on technologies largely developed and

validated in DOD laboratories, such world class laboratories as

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USAMRIID and the Naval Medical Research Center, which are, by

the way, also recognized as definitive Laboratory Response Network laboratories. Technologies, protocols and procedures developed in these labs, as well as others, are then transitioned into a

network of laboratories providing capability to insulation force protection.

This is what the Pentagon Force Protection Agency uses today.

The CBDP has instituted an overarching Quality Assurance and

Quality Control Program that assures these technologies, protocols

and procedures developed and validated in the hands of scientists

at DOD labs can and will perform with required precision and accuracy in the hands of field activities.

The QA/QC Program involves not only the required documentation of all procedures and processes, but also continual proficiency

testing to ensure that the laboratories are performing equally within the framework designed. The Chem-Bio Defense Program has

also continually and aggressively engaged with operational units to

assure that decisionmaking and risk assessment is coupled with

the correct technical information so that timely and accurate operational decisions can be made.

Finally, we have been and we will continue to coordinate the development of technologies with the requisite policymaking that

must go hand in hand to create a proficient and capable system.

Within the Department of Defense, we are collaborating with the

Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Homeland Defense and Health

Affairs so technologies we are developing and fielding can be integrated properly and seamlessly into the medical response community and within the interagency to provide these desperately needed capabilities.

To that end we are collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services

in studies aimed at gaining VW collection, detection and identification systems, equivalencies between agencies, and we are developing interagency response frameworks that are so important to protecting the American public.

Subject to your questions, that concludes my remarks.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schafer follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Dr. Schafer, would you mind if we had

someone reproduce your remarks? We don’t have any written testimony from you.

Dr. SCHAFER. I was told this was oral testimony, and I will be

happy to provide written testimony at a later date, if that’s OK

with the chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this, just so it doesn’t happen again

in my subcommittee. My staff said you didn’t need written testimony? It is usual practice we require it the day or night before you

come to testify.

Dr. SCHAFER. No, sir. I was a late add, so I did not prepare testimony. Through the processes, we couldn’t get it cleared in time by

OMB.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I understand that part. What you are saying

for the record is that you——

Dr. SCHAFER. This is oral testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. You were told just a while ago that you were testifying and didn’t have anything written at the time, is that correct?

Dr. SCHAFER. This is my oral testimony, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. All right. Well, that’s what we will have to deal with.

I’m sorry, excuse me.

Let me just recognize Jon Porter. Do you have a statement you

would like to make or something you would like to say?

Mr. PORTER. Actually, I would like to enter it for the record, Mr.

Chairman. I will submit it.

But I would also like to welcome a good friend of mine, Linda

Stetzenbach. She is here from environmental studies at the University of Nevada Las Vegas, Harry Reid Center. I will embarrass her

for the moment. I think she is on the next panel. Welcome. But I

will be submitting my statement. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Let me just, as you stated,

ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be

permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the

record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection,

so ordered.

And I will ask for unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record, and without objection so ordered.

Dr. Schafer, we appreciate your being here. We understand you

were told recently you would be testifying. So it is good to have you

here. We will just have to proceed through questions to ask you.

Dr. SCHAFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. Tulis.

STATEMENT OF DANA TULIS

Ms. TULIS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Dana Tulis, Deputy Director of the EPA’s Office

of Emergency Management. My office is responsible for providing

national leadership to prevent, prepare for and to respond to

human health and environmental emergencies, including terrorist

events. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss EPA’s involvement

in the multiagency efforts to detect anthrax during 2001 and GAO’s

findings in their recent report on anthrax detection.

I would also like to share with you steps we have taken since

that time to improve the Nation’s ability to detect and respond to

anthrax contamination. With me today is Mark Durno, Senior OnScene Coordinator in EPA’s Region 5 and one of EPA’s foremost

sampling experts.

In responding to the anthrax attacks of 2001, EPA’s role at a site

generally began after CDC determined the presence of a biological

contaminant, in this case anthrax. EPA collected targeted environmental samples at postal facilities in Florida, on Capitol Hill and

other nonpostal facilities for the purpose of characterizing the extent of contamination and for subsequent decontamination.

In taking these steps, we used either wet swabs, wet wipes,

HEPA vacuum samples or combination of these depending on the

site specific circumstances. We did not use dry swabs because we

did not believe they were effective.

The GAO report appears to recommend probability sampling over

targeted sampling for detecting anthrax contanimation in a building. EPA believes that targeted sampling strategies are valid and

necessary for rapidly accessing the likelihood of contamination to

ensure that necessary actions can be taken quickly and to protect

those potentially exposed. Especially where the source of contamination is known, targeted sampling of services most likely to be

contaminated, as determined from incident-specific details such as

traffic patterns and air flow within the facility, epidemiological

data and forensic information should provide key information to determine whether contamination exists in a facility. Where contamination is known to exist, but the source is unknown, however, use

of statistically based sampling, may improve the probability of detecting contamination.

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During the anthrax attacks of 2001, there were hundreds of postal facilities potentially contaminated and quick action was needed,

therefore we used targeted sampling to minimize people being exposed.

EPA agrees with GAO that there is a critical need for validated

sampling and analytical methods, and we are taking a number of

steps to address this gap. Although a lot remains to be done, sampling methodologies have improved and are more consistently applied.

EPA is collaborating with other agencies to develop standardized

methods and procedures, and anthrax, of course, is one of those

contaminants. Techniques are being developed to concentrate samples of chemical and biological contaminants where necessary to facilitate detection at low levels. EPA is also evaluating the performance of emerging and commercially available technologies such as

amino acid test kits and water and other methods.

The GAO report notes that extensive sampling efforts constrain

available laboratory capacity and it suggests that laboratory capacity can be increased. Unfortunately, it is not that easy to increase

laboratory capacity, especially for environmental analyses associated with biological and chemical warfare agents, where capacity

is very limited right now or may not exist.

However, when possible, we do look at individual labs to assess

whether research capacity is available during time of critical incidence. But there is no environmental laboratory response network

analogous to the CDC’s laboratory response network at this time.

EPA and other agencies have initiated a number of steps to deal

with this problem. Internally, EPA’s own Homeland Security Lab

Response Work Group was created in October 2002, and we are

working closely with the White House’s Homeland Security Council, DHS, USDA, DOD, FBI, CDC, FDA, State laboratory directors

and a number of associations, including the Public Health Laboratories Association.

We as a work group have developed an on-line Environmental

Lab Compendium of State, EPA and some commercial environmental analysis capability for homeland security purposes. We are

also working to incorporate the capabilities of other Federal agencies. We have analyzed and mapped current laboratory capacities

to determine the national supply of laboratory analyses for chemical, biological and radiological warfare agents, and we are currently

analyzing five of the White House Homeland Security Council’s scenarios to look at what the need is and therefore we can determine

the gap between supply and demand.

We have also established a reserve corps of 79 EPA analysts who

can be trained in chemical and biological analyses, and we will be

able to assist in meeting surge demand.

CDC and EPA have developed a MOA to work closely together

and to leverage the work of the Laboratory Response Network and

to define our respective roles in environmental analyses. We have

worked closely with the White House’s Homeland Security Council

to expand the MOA to include all other Federal agencies with existing or developing networks. This MOA, known as the Integrated

Consortium of Laboratory Networks, is expected to be signed very

soon.

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We have already started to meet and DHS has been posting

these meetings. Consortium work groups will address consistency

in sampling and analytical methods across the agencies. We do appreciate GAO’s efforts to improve the Nation’s ability to respond

more effectively in the future, and we recognize there is a need to

validate sampling and analytical methods to improve our tools and

to increase national capacity for analyzing environmental samples.

We believe we have taken significant steps in these areas and

have greatly benefited by working closely with our colleagues on

this panel, and we look forward to continued collaboration.

Mr. Chairman, subcommittee members, this completes my oral

statement. I, of course, am open to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tulis follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Ms. Tulis.

Mr. Day.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. DAY

Mr. DAY. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you today

to discuss the recommendations of the Government Accountability

Office regarding validation of anthrax detection methods.

As the Federal agency most directly and tragically affected by

the anthrax attacks of 2001, the Postal Service fully understands

the value of public and employee confidence and test results for the

presence of anthrax. This was an issue raised by the Government

Accountability Office in connection with the 2003 hearing of this

subcommittee.

GAO recommended that the Postal Service work with other agencies and its unions to consider a number of issues related to the

testing of 286 facilities in the fall of 2001, of which only 23 tested

positive for anthrax. We were asked to: Reassess the risk level for

our employees and customers of the facilities that tested negative;

reconsider the advisability of retesting those facilities, employing

the most effective sampling methods and procedures; and then finally communicate our conclusions along with our rationale to the

Postal Service employees and general public.

Following extensive review by a work group that included experts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration and our employee unions, it was concluded

that no further sampling was warranted for those facilities that

tested negative for anthrax spores.

This decision was based on a number of factors. First, there was

no new evidence of anthrax disease in postal employees or customers. Second, the Postal Service had instituted new maintenance

procedures and modified work practices to reduce the potential for

reaerosolization of anthrax spores. Third, that additional testing

would not appreciably increase the safety of our facilities for employees or customers.

The Postal Service is continuing to improve its process to protect

our employees and our customers from biohazards in the mail. We

have installed advanced Biohazard Detection Systems at 107 facilities. Eventually they will be installed at 282 of our key mail processing plants.

To date, the Biohazard Detection System has performed over

550,000 tests involving over 12 billion pieces of mail. To date there

have been no false positives.

These automated systems, developed with the cooperation of experts from the Federal Government, the military and the private

sector, provide rapid onsite PCR analysis of aerosol samples collected during the earliest stages of mail processing. They allow for

quick response to a positive test result, triggering the local integrated emergency management plan, which includes the cessation

of operations, facilities shutdown, notification to community first

responders, including public health officials who would make any

medical decisions regarding potentially exposed employees and customers.

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In addition to the Biohazard Detection System, we are also installing a ventilation filtration system designed to contain to release of biohazards as it moves through the mail.

In developing and deploying the Biohazard Detection System, we

recognized the need, very real need for standardization of processes

to produce reliable, accurate test results in which our stakeholders

can have a high level of confidence.

Over the last several years, and as recently as last month, the

Postal Service has been the focus of a number of events in which

detection systems at other government facilities that receive mail

have indicated possible presence of a biohazard. In each of these

cases the Postal Service implemented a response plan that involved

sampling and testing, operational adjustments and, where appropriate, preventive medical treatment for employees.

Ultimately, investigation and further testing determined that

mail was not involved in these incidents and, in fact, that no biohazards were present. The initial positive alerts, however, appear

to reflect the varying capabilities of detection equipment as well as

sampling and testing protocols relied upon by other agencies.

Based on our experience, we agree with the Government Accountability Office recommendation that there be coordinated interagency efforts to develop standardized processes in connection with

sample collection, transportation, extraction and analysis. However,

based on our experience, we believe that targeted sampling, rather

than the probability sampling recommended by the GAO, represents the most prudent and productive approach for the Postal

Service.

We believe probability sampling can be of value as a sampling

protocol in response to a random event. However, once mail has

been identified as a potential source of contamination, it is no

longer random. At that point, logic and responsibility dictate that

sampling follow the trail of the mail, permitting us to conduct sampling along the path taken by the suspect mail during processing.

Probability sampling, by its very nature, might not include sampling from a specific location or piece of equipment through which

a contaminated piece of mail has moved. This can create the potential for a false negative.

Following last month’s incident at the Defense Department’s Remote Delivery Facility, we conducted targeted sampling at our

Washington, DC, Government Mails Facility, where mail for delivery to the Department of Defense is prepared. Targeted environmental sampling allowed us to focus on the areas and the equipment through which this mail would have moved. While it was

found that mail was not involved in the Defense Department, it

provides a demonstration of the steps we take when this type of incident occurs.

We quickly implemented a controlled shutdown of the Government Mails Facility. We promptly notified employees and their

unions, both at a national and local level. We continued to provide

employees and unions with regular information updates until the

situation was resolved. We arranged for the distribution of antibiotics to all of the facility’s employees on all work shifts, reflecting

a decision that was made in conjunction with the Department of

Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and the

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District of Columbia Department of Public Health. We also promptly accounted for seven employees who were recorded on sick leave

during the period of concern to verify that they were not exhibiting

symptoms of anthrax.

Considering that incident and others like it, we believe that the

recommendations of the GAO, with the sole exception of probability

based sampling, would go a long way in minimizing the possibility

of similar future incidents. We look forward to working with the

Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to implement

these recommendations.

Thank you, and I would be delighted to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Day.

Dr. Kelley, we saved the best for the last. I say that because you

are a true Yankee from Connecticut.

Dr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t know how long you have lived in Connecticut

though.

Dr. KELLEY. About 6 years.

Mr. SHAYS. About 6 years. Well, welcome to Connecticut. You

have the floor. Is your mic on?

Dr. KELLEY. Yes, it is.

Mr. SHAYS. I asked only because you are a doctor.

Dr. KELLEY. I know, we have problems with those things.

STATEMENT OF DR. KATHERINE KELLEY

Dr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank

you for the opportunity to testify on assessing anthrax detection

methods.

My name is Dr. Katherine Kelley, and I am here today representing the Association of Public Health Laboratories [APHL]. I

am currently the director of the Connecticut Department of Public

Health Laboratory. As its name implies, APHL is the association

for State and local governmental laboratories that perform testing

of public health significance. In the area of terrorism response that

includes both human and environmental testing. This work is done

through key partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide

rapid local response to a biological event, using consistent scientific

methods and reagents and nationally accepted evidentiary practices. The structure for this partnership is the Laboratory Response

Network [LRN].

The LRN was deployed in response to the mail contamination

events post-September 11th. In some States the laboratory role was

limited to testing mail distribution centers in support of the early

survey to assess the extent of contamination. In other States, such

as Connecticut, the laboratory participated in the diagnosis of infected people and clinical investigations to find the source of their

infection and environmental investigations of the postal distribution system as a possible source of anthrax and in the environmental cleanup and clearance of contaminated sites.

All this work was carried out under the direction of a joint command center made up of experts from CDC, the Environmental

Protection Agency, National Institutes of Occupational Safety and

Health, U.S. Postal Service and APHL, and we drew on outside experts as needed.

APHL agrees with the recommendations of the GAO report

under consideration today. There continues to be a need for agreed

upon, validated methods for clinical specimens and environmental

samples that may be encountered in any kind of a threat event.

However, 4 years after these events, it is easy to overlook the

highly charged, complex situation of that moment in this Nation’s

history. I would like to use our experience in Connecticut as an example.

The Connecticut Department of Public Health received CDC

funding to build a response laboratory capacity for weapons of

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mass destruction bioagents. The working hypothesis at that time

was that the LRN would be responding to human outbreaks caused

by biothreat agents and that most, if not all, of the testing would

be of human clinical specimens.

As a followup to the anthrax letter sent to Congress, our laboratory assisted USPS in an assessment of three postal distribution

centers in Connecticut. On November 11, 2001, our laboratory tested 53 samples from the Wallingford USPS distribution center as

part of the assessment of the facilities that might have been contaminated by the Daschle or Leahy letters.

All samples tested negative. But the machine that processed the

mail at Oxford and Seymour wasn’t sampled. On November 19th

a local hospital contacted the Connecticut State Health State Department to report a suspected anthrax case in an elderly woman

from Oxford, CT. Blood culture specimens were transported to our

laboratory from the patient, and they tested positive for anthrax

using LRN methods. CDC and the FBI were notified immediately.

On November 20th, CDC retested the specimens and confirmed anthrax.

Assuming that this was the index case of a potential anthrax

outbreak, CDC was asked to provide assistance and a team of epidemiologists was dispatched to Connecticut. In the interim, the FBI

and Connecticut State police secured the patient’s home.

Over the course of the next few weeks, CDC and State epidemiologists collected samples from all locations the patient had

visited prior to her illness and also from every part of her home.

The DPH Laboratory tested them all, and they were all negative

for the anthrax Bacillus.

One of the CDC epidemiologists was familiar with the USPS bar

code system for tracking first class mail. This data were reviewed

to see if any mail coming into close proximity to the Daschle or

Leahy letters had gone to Oxford or Seymour. One such letter was

identified and retrieved for testing. It was positive for anthrax

spores even after repeated sampling. This link to the anthrax positive mail directed the investigation to the Wallingford postal distribution center and to a more targeted sampling of the machines

that process mail to the Oxford-Seymour route.

Mr. SHAYS. Your 5 minutes are up.

Dr. KELLEY. Yes, OK. To this day there hasn’t been a direct link

made to that case, but we do believe that the patient was very

fragile and that cross-contaminated mail was probably the source

of her infection.

As I indicated at the start of my testimony, we agree with the

recommendations of the GAO report. However, I would be remiss

if I did not mention the challenges associated with the response to

chemical terror events.

Federal funding has improved the availability of public health

labs to measure chemical substances in people exposed to a toxin.

In fact, we drilled that yesterday. There is still, however, much

work to be done to increase the capability of public health laboratories to be able to address local events in terms of environmental

testing.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kelley follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

At this time the Chair will recognize Ms. Norton, give her the

gavel for a few minutes, and I will be back in a second.

Ms. NORTON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first

question has to go to the place where you would, I think if you

asked the average person, I think if I asked any of you, if somebody

was terrible and treacherous enough to want to do another anthrax

attack, what facility of the U.S. Post Office would they go to, and

I think you would say, well, they’d go to the facility that handled

congressional mail or White House mail. You would say that based

on past practice, where two Senators got terribly lethal letters. You

would say that based on what we know about al Qaeda and terrorists.

I have to say that I was stunned to learn, and if I am wrong I

would like to know that right now, that of these facilities that have

gotten the equipment, 107 facilities—and I understand you have to

spread them, can’t do it all at one time, but 107 facilities, eventually 282 plants, that V Street, where White House mail, congressional mail goes, is not one of the facilities that has these detection

systems, is that true?

Mr. DAY. That’s correct. As of now, that is a facility that will

have it. That facility along with the Curseen-Morris facility, which

already has one system, or a modification to the system that we are

installing everywhere else. It’s a free-standing system. So the V

Street facility will have a free-standing system as well the

Curseen-Morris facility.

Ms. NORTON. I asked this question not because I think Members

of Congress or the White House are entitled to any preference over

the average American, but looking at where the priorities for—that

I think anybody, even your common sense, even the average layman would say, if you were going to pick, pick 50 places, pick 5

places to start and gave them a description, it does seem to me

that at least in the top five, V Street would be there. The mail coming, for example, to the Congress was shut down 3 or 4 days after

this until this got straightened out.

So I want to know what are your priorities. How do you decide

when this detection equipment will in fact be installed? Is there

some method to your madness that escapes me when V Street

doesn’t have——

Mr. DAY. V Street and the Curseen-Morris facility lack the piece

of equipment that the biodetection system is installed on the Advanced Facer-Canceler. So there is a unique application, a freestanding——

Ms. NORTON. So why do the others have it and they don’t? First

of all, I want to know what your priorities are. First of all, I want

to know how you select the order in which facilities get this equipment. Second, I want to know when V Street, which serves the part

of U.S. mail most likely to be attacked will, in fact, get such equipment? Those are my questions.

Mr. DAY. The priority has been along the East Coast in the areas

that were directly affected. It went onto the Advanced Facer-Canceler System, which is not a system that either the Curseen-Morris

or the V Street facility has or will ever have. They don’t process

that kind of mail. There is a free-standing system that is located

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at Curseen-Morris. The same system will go into the V Street facility as will additional free-standing systems.

Ms. NORTON. Thank God it is in Curseen-Morris, which everybody should understand is Brentwood, but haven’t I gotten an answer from you about how you choose priorities based on the section

of the country? OK, so we got the section nailed down pretty clear.

Once you know the section of the country, and there are umpteen

places to go, then how do you decide where in fact this equipment

is going to go, and when will V Street get equipment? There are

people in V Street who were at Brentwood and one of the reasons

they wanted to get out of Brentwood is because they couldn’t stand

to go back in Curseen-Morris and now they learn that—or yet to

hear that the equipment isn’t in V Street, and I haven’t yet heard

from you when it will be in V Street.

Mr. DAY. We are working with a contractor to get it deployed in

there. I will get back to you with the exact state it will be installed.

Ms. NORTON. I am speaking, I am sure, for the chairman. May

I ask that in 30 days you get us a list of your priorities for installation for this equipment and specifically when the equipment will be

installed in V Street. Again, this is why I say it is really 2001 all

over again.

Let me go to my next question.

Mr. Rhodes. You know, you opened your testimony saying that

there are no validated methods for sample collection and analysis,

so that agencies, quote, cannot know. As you opened your testimony, I felt like I was hearing someone talk about how we don’t

have a cure for cancer yet so we cannot know certain things. I

mean, is this really rocket science? I mean, what is it?

I don’t understand why we don’t have any validated methods. Do

you mean there doesn’t exist any? Do you mean we just don’t have

any? Would you please clarify why there are no validated methods,

4 years after an anthrax attack. Or perhaps this is more complicated, would you break it down for us so that perhaps the Congress needs to do more to help whoever it is, CDC, EPA, somebody,

learn how to validate methods so that they can then be assured

that any samples will be as close to valid and what you tell us and

what they tell us is possible.

In trying to answer your question about why, I don’t know exactly why, other than in the world of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures, biological countermeasures are

still considered less important.

Ms. NORTON. Do you think it is a matter that the priority has

not been put on finding ways to validate these samples?

Mr. RHODES. Validation methods are well understood. I’m a scientist. Everyone here is a scientist. We know how to validate. It’s

a matter of is something going to be done. As you’ve heard from

every person here, they’ve all concurred that validation of methods,

they concur with that recommendation.

Let’s go back to the 1990’s. In the 1990’s there were several

incidences, actually several hundred incidences of hoax letters

being sent through the mail that claimed to have anthrax. As a

matter of fact, in the year 2000 alone, the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated approximately 200 false anthrax letters sent

through the mail. At that point in time, methods still weren’t valiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:20 Oct 14, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23142.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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dated and people didn’t consider biological terror and biothreat to

be a high threat.

Since 2001, the fall of 2001, you would think that now that we

have five people actually dead from that, 23 injured, seriously injured, that an emphasis on validation of both protocols as well as

the techniques, the techniques, the tools, the procedures and the

processes, would occur and would be a priority. It hasn’t occurred.

And I do not know why.

It’s not that it’s something that isn’t understood well by everyone

sitting here at the table and other places. It’s a matter of are we

going to make it a priority; are we going to take the time? Because

it’s not just enough to say that a dry swab is inappropriate for testing in a particular area. It’s taking the entire process of sample collection method—tool, transport, extraction, and analysis—so all of

that has to be validated and the inherent errors in the various

steps have to be understood so we can have confidence about the

answer that comes out at the other end.

Ms. NORTON. Dr. Popovic, I do not understand how you can certify labs if in fact we don’t have any understanding in these labs

about validating their processes. On what basis are you able to certify the labs that have been certified?

Dr. POPOVIC. I agree with everybody on the panel that validation

of a lot of these steps is really important. I would add that there

are a lot of steps within this process that have been validated. For

example, the protocols for identification and molecular characterization of a number of biothreat agents have existed in 2001 and

have been expanded up to this point. At this point, we have added

to the laboratory response network 160 protocols to the existing

spectrum of what we had since 2001.

The problem here is twofold: One is scientific and one is physical.

A lot of these validation studies require two things. One is space

that has to be specifically designed. A lot of studies cannot be done

with surrogates. They have to be done with the real thing, and so

we do need more biosafety level 3 and biosafety level 4 space.

Ms. NORTON. Do you have to have anthrax in order to do it?

Dr. POPOVIC. You can use surrogates for a large number of studies. But you cannot use it for all. So the other thing is you do need

diverse scientific expertise. What we are saying here is individual

agencies have done some steps of the validation, but as Dr. Tulis

has pointed out, this integrated consortium of network laboratories

is really a place where all of these individual efforts are now getting to be put together, and we see that as a big umbrella under

which really major steps toward validating a lot of these methods

are going to be able to take place.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I see you have returned.

Mr. SHAYS. Keep going. The gentlewoman has more time. Let’s

turn off the clock.

Ms. NORTON. What you last said gave me some hope. Obviously

this is something we have had to begun doing after the horrific,

tragic anthrax attacks, and we understand that. And you say that

this consortium of labs that Ms. Tulis talked about, too, are now

apparently getting their act together and what is not an easy process will be taken care of. And I have every confidence that you are

doing that.

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The problem we have is that in the meantime, these false

positives, these false alarms—imagine yourself working in a postal

facility today, hearing the testimony you have heard here. Nobody

can tell you if it is or if it’s not; so if they say it’s not, they are

not going to believe it’s not. It must be terribly anxiety-producing.

I must ask you, even given the complexity of the process you describe, when you think we will get validated testing somewhere, so

that we don’t have the GAO telling us that there’s nowhere—because they say anywhere, there’s nowhere anyway—there’s no way

anywhere, rather, in our country to know, when you get a sample,

if it is negative or positive, regardless of what the lab tells you.

That is extremely disconcerting for us to hear here, not to mention

postal workers who every day have to deal with our mail here.

So I have to ask you, when do you think we will in fact have this

validation process underway so that at least the GAO will tell us

there is somewhere in America where validated testing goes on?

Dr. POPOVIC. I would like to emphasize once again that the steps

for confirmatory identifications have been validated, and those are

the steps that are necessary to be linked with the initial signals

that come out of various early warning systems such as BioWatch,

BioHazard detection systems. Efforts are really underway, and we

have already talked with a number of our colleagues on trying to

coordinate these initial signals with a proper public health response, which is what you are asking: When can we know that the

initial signal is going to be confirmed?

Confirmatory tests can be done within the LRN within the day,

within several hours actually, so we are already working on that.

Ms. NORTON. We should remember that this has occurred after

this mail has gone and been irradiated, or whatever we call it, and

so obviously the chances are low. I do not want to scare everybody.

But nevertheless, everybody knows that none of this is perfect. I

am concerned that you have not given us a protocol for how you

are going to get there and when you are going to get there. And

knowing this chairman, I think he is going to want you to be more

specific than that. I do not know if Miss Tulis is prepared to be

more specific.

But to say we are getting there really is not good enough, particularly since Mr. Rhodes has clarified that it really isn’t rocket

science. And he has been clear that in fact if the effort is put there,

it can be done. And clearly the effort yet has not been focused here.

And we are asking for it simply to be focused enough so that, for

example, somebody from the government would be able to say in

6 months, by the end of the year, we ought to have a validated

testing protocol so that we could then spread to the labs around the

country. So is that too much to ask?

Miss Tulis, you didn’t have an opportunity to respond to the

question.

Ms. TULIS. On the environmental side, we have had a little bit

of a problem, because we don’t have the analogous laboratory response network, so we’ve been working the best we can to leverage

the existing resources that are out there. In fact we’ve been having

a number of conversations with CDC and worked on this initial

memorandum of agreement which now has been expanded to all

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the Federal agencies. So what we’re trying to do is leverage the resources as best we can.

I don’t know if I can give you a timeframe today, but I can tell

you that on the analytical side, there is a basic compendium, standard and local methods, which we have put together with other

agencies, which really is the first step. And the next step, as we

are going through right now, is establishing a validation process for

those methods.

Again, I cannot give you an exact timeframe because we need to

figure out which ones to validate first and how to go through this

process. But it is something that is very much right now of being

a high priority.

Ms. NORTON. Just bear in mind that our mail is irradiated before

it comes here, for good reason, because this is the place of the tragedy; but the mail of most people in the United States is not irradiated so that the clear and present danger posed, as concerned as

I am with the targeted facilities of the U.S. Government—let us be

clear, the clear and present danger really is the people of the

United States who don’t have their mail irradiated. So if it goes to

some big post office somewhere where there isn’t a government facility, my friends, with what you have just testified here, there is

a far greater danger to the average American and to the average

American postal worker outside of this region than there is to anyone else.

For that reason I believe that the subcommittee has simply got

to look into giving you a deadline for focusing on the validation

process so—that Mr. Rhodes of the GAO tells us can happen. And

remember what his testimony is. Yes, it is not rocket science. No

one has given it the focus that would produce validation. Yet that

says it all to me. And without validation, I think you are endangering mail systems throughout the United States. And that is on you,

and I think you have to do something about it right now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. I thank the gentlewoman.

I was thinking as we were having this hearing, that we have had

hearings that go well before September 11, 2001 in which we

talked about, in theory, weaponized anthrax. And we said it had

no antidote in a sense that where, if you were not protected before,

it could kill you. Then we used Cipro, an antibiotic, to deal with

it and it appeared to work better than I think we anticipated. So

obviously we keep learning things.

I am wrestling with a few things. I get the sense that CDC

thinks from a target, and it starts narrowly and works out, and I

get the sense that EPA starts broadly and works in. And then I am

thinking to myself, well, is one better than the other? It seems to

me they both have their role.

But with the facility in Connecticut, we basically identified someone who was not well, an older person, and I am suspecting from

that, the conclusion is that the more frail you are, the more vulnerable you become to the anthrax spores.

I am told you can basically put about a million spores in your

hand and have clearly weaponized a very fine structure. You could

literally hold about a billion. I’m sorry, not a million, about a billion. And then what I have the sense was we did the CDC model,

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the person, and we targeted where the flow could go. And so there

was part of this building that was not checked out. And in the

rafters and in the machinery, we then did the EPA model. We then

looked at every aspect and found some spores, anthrax spores.

So far, does anyone want to correct me on what I am seeing has

happened? Dr. Kelly, is that accurate or not?

Dr. KELLEY. That’s pretty much the way it went, right. The Wallingford facility was sampled many, many, many times and from a

different perspective, part being the investigation of the case, and

then the extent of the problem; and then was it cleaned up sufficiently. So there were quite a few different ideas that were being

called on.

Mr. SHAYS. What’s amazing to me is that I make the assumption

that the elderly woman who was killed in Connecticut wasn’t in the

facility, yet she was killed by some contact with spores. I make an

assumption—and I want to be corrected if I am wrong—that it’s

likely that some in the postal facility, they were also exposed, but

they had the capability to have not been, to ultimately succumb to

it.

Were people in the facility given Cipro?

Dr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. So the irony here is that if we are using the model

that if you didn’t die, it must not be there. Once we use Cipro, you

might not even be sick; in a sense, we were using a prophylactic

that protected some who were in the facility, so the model that you

look at, you look at its impact on the folks there. So in one sense,

one of our modeling systems couldn’t work properly because we introduced Cipro to it.

Dr. KELLEY. The patient also received antibiotic therapy, but——

Mr. SHAYS. It was too late.

Dr. KELLEY. It was too late.

Mr. SHAYS. And she was how old?

Dr. KELLEY. Ninety-four.

Mr. SHAYS. So the bottom line is, though, it’s very possible that

we had postal workers who were exposed, who either didn’t succumb because the exposure was so slight and they were so healthy,

or that they were exposed more significantly but they had actually

taken an antibiotic that got them through, and we then never knew

they were exposed.

Dr. KELLEY. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. The chairman raised questions about why is DOD

given different—and I’m going to raise it in two parts. Dr. Schafer,

this is not in any way directed to you, but in the process of trying

to find who would testify, it became very real to us that DOD didn’t

know; and the fact that DOD didn’t know was an indication to us

that you have a broad—there are a lot of folks involved, and there

is no sense of one person being ultimately in charge. Dissuade of

me of that view or help me sort out why it’s true.

Dr. SCHAFER. Sure, Mr. Chairman. DOD has had well-established processes in place for a long time. I believe after September

11th, many people tried to put things in place, so that may have

been a factor. But there was an element of human error that happened in this particular case. But the processes we have in place

for verification of results, we never rely on a single test alone, and

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there is this process that moves, basically moves through the various layers of the lab, with the final element of that being one of

the lab response network labs actually doing confirmation. So I

think that’s why this particular incident looks somewhat different.

But in general we have put processes in place that mirror the

CDC processes, are exactly the same thing, and we are part of that

network. So I don’t view that——

Mr. SHAYS. You used the words ‘‘exactly the same’’ and ‘‘part of

the network.’’ My view is that you used validated labs and some

that were not. I do not know, what is the proper term? Certified

and not certified?

Dr. SCHAFER. Well, let me talk about something called the installation protection program. That was the Secretary’s decision to

bring 200 military installations, start doing environmental sampling in those. And those processes had to be established primarily

because of funding constraints and so on. And the labs are different

but the processes are exactly the same. So we are no different than

the other agencies in that regard. But we do have different requirements, and so there may be differences in that regard.

Mr. SHAYS. I honestly don’t quite understand what you’re saying.

What I hear you saying is in a sense saying, yes, we used labs that

weren’t certified but were different.

Dr. SCHAFER. In this particular instance, this was a contract let

outside the system.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Dr. SCHAFER. And so there was an exception and there was

human error as well. So it probably looked a lot worse than it really was. But on the other hand, it generated——

Mr. SHAYS. Describe human error to me. I am not asking for a

name, but I am asking for human error in what way?

Dr. SCHAFER. Well, we think there was an error introduced in

the laboratory that did the procedure. What I would like to do is

defer that to the second, the operational side of the questions that

you have, because they have all those details.

Mr. SHAYS. So we will leave on the table that there was human

error, and you think the second panel will get the answer to that.

Dr. SCHAFER. I believe there was error in the process which generated the false positive.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Rhodes, when you hear the question I ask, what

is your reaction? Don’t tell me you are thinking about the fact that

Illinois lost last night. What is your reaction to what we are wrestling with?

Mr. RHODES. Trying to find a single point of contact relative to

this question? I think that is the problem everywhere. As you look

at our recommendations relative to DHS—and I understand you

want to have another hearing where DHS is actually present, but

I have to be very clear. You have read DHS’s comments. DHS’s response to our report is a few pages of explaining why they can’t do

it, whether they have the charter or not.

Not everybody in government is supposed to look like the

Heisman Trophy, you know, pushing away the problem and carrying their own ball. Somebody has to be in charge. You have to be

able to come back and say you are the one who is responsible. You

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now own the problem. That is how we organize validation and that

is how we make it a priority.

Mr. SHAYS. Who do you think owns the problem right now?

Mr. RHODES. Everybody.

Mr. SHAYS. And who should own it?

Mr. RHODES. Well, the Department of Homeland Security is our

recommendation, that they should be the one who owns it as a Department; but then within each department or agency, someone

has to be designated as the owner and you should have the 1–800

number or something: Iamit.gov. That’s the location. That’s the

person.

Mr. SHAYS. One of the problems in this administration, I think,

and in this Congress too, I guess, is that there is not the accountability that we need in a lot of things. I think that the failure to

hold people accountable for a lot of bad things that are happening

in government is seeping through. Nobody is making claim to it, no

one wants ownership, and no one is taking responsibility once

something goes wrong.

Mr. RHODES. I guess fallout is the wrong term—but the downstream effect is that you can’t get good information. For example,

you asked were the postal workers put on Cipro, and everyone

jumped in and said yes, right away. Wrong. The moment it was

found out that it was positive they were put on Cipro.

There was a postal carrier who delivered a 94-year-old asthmatic

shut-in’s mail that killed her. His bag was contaminated. His vehicle was contaminated. No one knew it. So once everybody found out

that it was positive, then, yes, they were put on Cipro.

As somebody who was in the Hart Building the day that it was

contaminated, yes, I was put on Cipro, but that was a very, very

straightforward event: Open the letter. It falls on the floor. We all

go get our Cipro.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just understand the concept of validation. We

are not sure that we really have a good process in place, correct?

Let me back up and say it’s very difficult to detect anthrax, would

everyone agree? I mean, it costs millions and millions of dollars, because we are in a huge building and we are looking for a few

spores that you cannot even see.

Mr. RHODES. And let me extend this, when you say a few spores.

If we are talking about your constituent who was a customer at

Wallingford, as you’ve heard, no anthrax detected. There’s anthrax

in the neighbor’s mail, there’s anthrax in the postal carrier’s vehicle, but no one found in all the sampling that was done in her

home, no one found anything.

So if I design a detection system for the lethal dose, 50 percent

of 10,000 spores, what we have found in the fall of 2001 is the lethal dose, one, which is an immeasurable amount. She may have

completely inhaled all of it, and now we’re talking about less than

100 spores. You made the point, a billion spores in the palm of your

hand. That’s small potatoes. Multiple trillions of spores can be held

in your hand if it is weaponized well enough.

Mr. SHAYS. I am an impressionable person, and I may say that

at some meeting. Your testimony is that where I said a billion,

you’re saying you could literally hold trillions of spores.

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Mr. RHODES. Absolutely. You can hold trillions of spores in your

hand if we’re talking 1 to 5 micron with no electrostatic charge and

all the rest of that. If we have milled it down to that level, of

course, you can hold trillions of it. You can have trillions per gram,

depending on the concentrate. So billion is a big number, but trillion is a bigger number.

Mr. SHAYS. So my conclusion is that it’s pretty difficult to locate

this stuff in a building where you could have a handful, a trillion

spores that go through the system, the air ducts and so on. At one

point they were even talking about taking down the Hart Building,

and I don’t know if that was foolish talk, but they were basically

saying that they may not be able to get all that is in this building,

they would have to tear it down. Which was an extreme statement,

but not so far-fetched given what you have just said.

So having said that, we all acknowledge it’s difficult to find these

spores and determine it; and what you are saying to me is reminding me that what triggered the investigation the second time in

Connecticut was someone died we believe because of anthrax, but

we never nailed it, affirmed that she in her person and so on, but

that it was in the neighborhood. It was with the carrier. It was

with her neighbor and on and on.

Mr. RHODES. Just one clarification on that. That was actually the

fourth time that facility was tested.

Mr. SHAYS. Having said that, I came to this hearing thinking

this is almost an exercise in futility. It’s so difficult. How could you

ever be certain? We could do the best test and never be certain, so

how can we give something a clean bill of health even if we do

what you recommend?

So that is what I am still wrestling with a little bit. Maybe you

can help me sort that out. What I am wrestling with is we can

never know if the positive is real and if the negative is meaningful,

because it may be we just didn’t find it.

Mr. RHODES. What you can know through validation of both protocol as well as tools, techniques, etc., is you can understand your

confidence interval, who comes back to you and says this building

is clean, this building is safe. You can then ask them, how do you

know, how well do you know, how much confidence do you have in

that answer?

Right now, as you’ve said and as Ms. Norton has said and as

Chairman Davis said, we have a nice mosaic of maybes. And the

idea is you’re always going to get some confidence interval. But if

somebody walks up to you and says I’m 90 percent confident or I’m

40 percent confident or I’m 60 percent confident, now you’re able

to make a public health decision based on how good the data are.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I’m going to put it in my words. First off, let me

ask you, would anyone here like to make a comment to the dialog

that is happened so far? Does anyone want to respond to any question I have asked or make a comment? Anybody disagree with anything I’ve said or anything anyone else has said?

Mr. DAY. Mr. Chairman, you’ve just used the case of Mrs.

Lundgren. The fourth time through is when the positive was finally

found, and it was through the ability to track through the trail of

the mail to a specific bin on a specific machine. It was targeted

sampling that found it ultimately.

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I agree with Mr. Rhodes, there’s a level of probability sampling

that can be done that will have confidence interval around it. But

when you have a known event—and that becomes a critical issue

for us, is it a known event, known source, versus a random event,

unknown source—targeted sampling, as was the case with what

happened with Mrs. Lundgren and when we finally were able to

find it in the Wallingford facility, it was targeted sampling that

found it.

Mr. SHAYS. But what’s interesting to me is had she not died, we

never would have known that there was in fact anthrax at that facility. We never would have known it, ever.

What I’m hearing you say about the validated approach is that

we are going to know the strengths for the most part and weaknesses of the process.

Mr. RHODES. The limits, the limits of detection.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. And we are going to know some consistency from one place to another to another.

Mr. RHODES. Right, right.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me, before going back to Ms. Norton, let me ask

counsel to ask a few questions.

Mr. HALLORAN. Dr. Popovic, you said twice that the CDC testing

methodology in the lab has been validated. Is that validation, is it

the same for clinical samples as well as environmental samples or

is there some difference?

Dr. POPOVIC. I was talking about the methods for identification,

confirmatory identification. Those are the methods that are the

same regardless of what the source of the organism is. Once you

isolate the organism, be it from a clinical sample or from an environmental sample, the procedures and steps to identify what the

organism is are the same.

Mr. HALLORAN. So that’s the gold standard?

Dr. POPOVIC. Correct.

Mr. HALLORAN. Now, work me back from there. Can you repeat

what the gold standard is?

Dr. POPOVIC. Once you have an organism regardless of the

source, where it came from, it can come from air, from surfaces,

from food, from clinical sample, the procedures to identify that organism and say this is Bacillus anthracis and the procedures that

are molecular characterization are gold standard. They have been

validated. And those are the methods that are used in the LRN.

Mr. HALLORAN. And once that sample walks in your door, how

long does it take to get that validation?

Dr. POPOVIC. It can depend on a type of a sample. For example,

if you have a clinical sample——

Mr. HALLORAN. Wait a minute. It didn’t depend on the type of

sample a second ago.

Dr. POPOVIC. OK. Let me back up a little bit. If you have blood

from a patient, you can usually grow the organism within 12 to 24

hours, and within another few hours you can perform all of the

tests that are necessary for you to be able to say this is the Bacillus anthracis.

Mr. SHAYS. Can you grow it faster than what would happen naturally within the body? I mean, do you speed up the process?

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Dr. POPOVIC. You cannot actually grow it faster than it would

normally multiply in the best circumstances. Bacillus anthracis is

one of the amazing bugs which actually multiplies fairly quickly.

Mr. SHAYS. You’re telling me more than I want to know right

now. The point is, though, that is not really much of a help, because in the end, the person who has the blood who has been—not

infected, because—well, it’s infected—who has been infected would

be proceeding just along the same lines as when you discovered it.

In other words, they would be getting sicker during that period of

time. I’m sorry I went off the subject, but unfortunately I’m chairman so I get to interrupt. Remember your line of questioning.

Let me understand this so I don’t leave with a false impression.

If you find it in the blood, you will find it fast enough to give them

Cipro to help them.

Dr. POPOVIC. It depends when the blood was collected. If the

blood was at the beginning of the disease, yes. If the blood was collected when the patient was dying, then no. It really depends at

what stage of the patient’s disease. The sooner the better.

Mr. SHAYS. Clear your mind of everything I asked you and go

back to his questions.

Why don’t you start over again?

Mr. HALLORAN. Work me back through the process now in terms

of the differentiation between clinical and environmental samples

and why there seems to be this either/or choice between targeted

sampling and environmental sampling. Is it, let me spray the panel

here, is that a mutually exclusive choice? Must we make that

choice?

Dr. POPOVIC. Do we have to make a choice with it to do targeted

or probabilistic sampling?

Mr. HALLORAN. Right.

Dr. POPOVIC. We don’t have to make that choice always. There

are situations, such as in outbreak investigations, when you need

to have rapid assessment, when you need to be able to make a decision, when you need to be able to within a very short period of time

to make that decision, then targeted sampling is really efficient

and effective.

Mr. HALLORAN. Right. But wouldn’t it make sense at the same

time to begin to map out your grid and start sampling on that grid

at the same time you are doing your targets, to know the zone of

exposure you are going to have to go back to anyway, as they found

out in Wallingford 5 months later? Why pick one?

Dr. POPOVIC. There are a lot of issues. Sometimes there is a capacity issue. Can you actually handle thousands and hundreds of

specimens when you actually have a fairly good scientific judgment

based on epidemiology that this is where you need to look.

Mr. HALLORAN. But you could store them, could you not? Do they

keep?

Dr. POPOVIC. You can store samples, that is correct. Samples can

be stored.

Ms. TULIS. If I may, grids could miss very small areas of contamination where, if you’re targeted, you would know to go there,

so you could do a larger sample area.

Dr. POPOVIC. One example is if people are coming into a room

and you can actually use the grid and sample all of the areas, but

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if you sample the doorway, many times your chances of getting

something there are probably better than just going all over the

room because the concentration of the entrance of—in this case

let’s talk about bacteria—would be a smaller area that you can

focus on.

Mr. HALLORAN. So you said, the chances are. It strikes me either

way it is a crap shoot here. Where are the odds better?

Dr. POPOVIC. I’m sorry; I did not hear you.

Mr. HALLORAN. Where are the odds better that you will find

what you need to find to be able to make a conclusion with some

confidence of what you have found or not found?

Dr. POPOVIC. If you have epidemiological information, if you have

assessment of the individual event, then your chances and the odds

are better that you will get the results quicker with the targeted

sampling.

Mr. HALLORAN. But in the nonspecific event that Mr. Day referred to, when you have a threat or someone says I sent anthrax

through there but no one is sick yet, what’s your plan?

Dr. POPOVIC. Well, if you look at the nonspecific event and you

look at the Wallingford postal facility, the first two samplings were

really not targeted, they were sampled as part of the sampling of

facilities. But as pointed out, when you actually knew where to

look for it and when you focus there, we found it. So there are advantages in different situations. And like I said, for this initial assessment, for making a public health decision, it is really critically

important to do this quickly. One of the main reasons is because

the period of time within which antimicrobial prophylaxis is going

to be effective is short.

Mr. HALLORAN. I understand. Miss Tulis, in your testimony you

said, ‘‘but there is no environmental laboratory network analogous

to the Laboratory Response Network at this time.’’ Should there

be?

Ms. TULIS. That’s a loaded question. We believe we need to have

more capability than we have at this point and we do not have that

capability. We’re trying to do our best to leverage existing resources. We do need more capacity than we have at this point.

Mr. HALLORAN. But separate environmental from clinical?

Ms. TULIS. It is a separate type of analysis; yes, it is.

Mr. HALLORAN. In what way?

Ms. TULIS. It’s different concentrations. Your whole focus is different when you’re looking in air versus water versus looking at

blood or serum. You’re not looking at metabolites. It’s a very different set of processes that you use.

Mr. HALLORAN. But in that process you’d still need to get to that

point where you could go to the gold standard before you really

know; or do you have some confidence in the decision before that?

Ms. TULIS. Generally we come in, once detection has been made,

to do the actual decontamination, and that’s generally when we’re

using our environmental sampling.

Mr. HALLORAN. There was another statement to the effect that

validation, the concern of validation at the time anyway, was the

lack of facilities that could do validation studies. Is there still that

capacity constraint or can these studies be done now?

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Dr. POPOVIC. I can address that. A lot of work is happening already. I did mention in a lot more detail in my written testimony,

CDC has an interagency agreement with the Dugway Proving

Grounds where such a chamber for establishing and generating

known concentration of spores is available; and it has been available and studies are actually taking place there.

One of the things that is important is, like I said, you really need

to use the real thing for a lot of these studies. So there are efforts

and there are places where these studies now can be conducted and

some of these studies are conducted. Some of the preliminary results from the studies conducted at Dugway will be available in December of this year.

Mr. HALLORAN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me, before letting this panel go, just ask the

question of DOD. According to Dr. Kelley’s testimony, ‘‘There is no

comprehensive plan in place today for a response to a chemical terrorism event, and there are only three Department of Defense laboratories that could safely and effectively analyze these materials.

Currently, public health laboratories are not privy to the analytical

methods and check standards that have been developed by the Department of Defense, and thus have no ability to perform analysis

in a validated and standardized method.’’

She goes on to say, ‘‘In the absence of these materials, public

health laboratories will be limited to clinical testing in the response

to a chemical event and will not be able to assist in determining

the substance involved in the contamination or its source.’’

Is that question pretty clear to you? Can you comment on that?

Dr. SCHAFER. There are more than a couple of facilities capable

of doing these procedures, but what I would like to do for the subcommittee is get back to you with the specific breakout of what

those are, if that is OK.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me the impact of what she’s saying, just so I

make sure you understand and maybe help me understand what

she’s saying. What’s the significance of her point?

Dr. SCHAFER. I presume she’s referring to perhaps a response

time; that if we have to send all samples to a couple of laboratories,

it would take a lot longer. That’s probably the only reason.

Mr. SHAYS. Aren’t you saying something more than that, Dr.

Kelley?

Dr. KELLEY. I am. The Laboratory Response Network that Dr.

Popovic and others have talked about is primarily set out for biological agents. And we do have the capacity that recently has been

put into the LRN to look for chemical WMD agents in clinical

specimens, in human specimens.

But one of the lessons we learned from anthrax is you don’t have

one without the other. If you have a human exposure, you want to

know where that came from and is it cleaned up. So the environmental testing goes hand in hand with the clinical testing. And a

lot of these things we’ve learned are local. They happen quickly

and right within our jurisdictions. We currently do not have the

ability to——

Mr. SHAYS. ‘‘We’’ being?

Dr. KELLEY. The State public health labs, the LRN labs at the

State and local level, to do any kind of testing for a chemical agent

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to assist with the investigation, or to be the companion piece to a

human exposure.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you want to followup?

Dr. SCHAFER. If I could respond to that. We actually do have the

ability in 14 laboratories to do this kind of work. And then there

is an interagency effort that’s ongoing to try to put some processes

in place for chemical laboratory network just like we’re doing with

the other laboratory network.

Mr. SHAYS. But the point is, it’s not very clear how that system

is working right now?

Dr. SCHAFER. No. Again, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to get

back to you with the very specifics on that.

Mr. HALLORAN. One final question. Mr. Day, the recent detections in this area were not at the USPS facilities; is that correct?

Mr. DAY. No, absolutely not. Since 2001, all of the false-positive

events that have occurred in this area have been at other agencies,

not with the postal service.

Mr. HALLORAN. And in the 107 facilities where you have these

detection devices operating, describe for us—assure us, if you

would, of the response plan: when the red light goes on at one of

those facilities, when there is an initial positive what happens?

Who calls who, who talks to who; does it look like an ordinary process or does it look like the keystone cops?

Mr. DAY. Let me start at a high level. What we did before we

ever deployed the equipment was to develop a template for response. We clearly did not want to deploy the equipment and not

have a plan for how we would respond. We worked with other Federal agencies, DHS, CDC, OSHA, EPA, even the FBI to get the law

enforcement piece into it.

That template is then taken to a local level or local management

team working with their supervisory work force as well as the local

union and management associations and the local first responders—police, fire, rescue and public health—are all brought in so

that everyone knows who is notified and what the response will be.

Mr. HALLORAN. So, unlike in the DOD situation, when a local

first responder comes to a postal facility, he or she knows what

that equipment is, knows what its capabilities and limitations are,

knows what’s inside that building.

Mr. DAY. Absolutely. And we need to know it as well, because as

you go out to 282 local and State government entities, the capabilities are quite different. So we need to understand from our standpoint what the local first responder is capable of doing. So there

is a nationally developed template that every site utilizes, and then

we implement that on a local level with agreement with local first

responders, so that when the alarm goes off we know who is notified and what the appropriate actions will be.

Mr. HALLORAN. Finally, just one last chance. As I recall, each of

your testimonies agreed with the GAO recommendation to pursue

validation of the whole process, including possibility sampling; is

that correct?

Dr. POPOVIC. No.

Dr. KELLEY. No.

Mr. DAY. No.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you satisfied? They said no.

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Mr. HALLORAN. That is their answer.

Mr. SHAYS. It begs the question why. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Well, I must say, I had a different question for Mr.

Day, but given Mr. Rhodes’ testimony, I can understand about targeted sampling. Of course, I’m thinking also about places in the

United States where it would be more difficult to know where the

anthrax is, but I also recall from his testimony about the time it

took, what has to be done, the followup, the days he talked about

in Connecticut, weeks and finally months.

And so to hear you all say, nevertheless targeted sampling is

best, even given the false alarms and the time delay, probability

testing has its drawbacks too. And I am aware that always we

have to balance one against the other.

I wonder. I know the targeted sampling is cheaper. I wonder if

that has anything to do with it. I wonder if one has to be done to

the exclusion of the other, and why we would only be validating for

targeted sampling given the experience in Connecticut and elsewhere with delay and false alarms and the rest. And all of you

going against the recommendation of the GAO just sort of leaves

us in a real quandary as to—with the government all coming down

on one side, and without your telling us why you would want to

exclude probability sampling, which is the very recommendation of

the GAO.

Ms. TULIS. There’s a lot of questions, so maybe we can tradeoff

here as partners. I don’t think we’re saying we want to exclude

probability sampling.

Ms. NORTON. I thought that was your response to the last question.

Ms. TULIS. As a total, no. For example, when we went back to

the Hart Building we did do statistical sampling before we had reoccupancy of letting people come back in.

Ms. NORTON. So you really had to do that, didn’t you? You really

had to do the probability sampling before you let people back into

the Hart Building?

Ms. TULIS. For reoccupancy, not for detection.

Ms. NORTON. We are all going to reoccupy these buildings, so

why doesn’t that tell you something? Why shouldn’t both be done,

Ms. Tulis?

Ms. TULIS. Because the concern is that if you’re not targeting

where your areas of contamination are and you’re using statistics,

you can actually miss those areas. And we actually have some statistics, if you’re interested, that we can give you on the effectiveness of targeting versus statistical.

Ms. NORTON. Somebody tell me why you cannot do both, as you

did in Hart?

Dr. POPOVIC. What I think we’re saying is that both don’t need

to be done at the same time, that each one of them has a specific

function in a different situation. And that is why we kind of all

said no, because we feel that there is a need for these plans, which

components need to be validated in which situations to really be

made. And we’re hopeful that this integrated consortium of networks of laboratories can actually provide guidance for that. We’re

thinking that the probability sampling can be a useful tool that can

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be added to targeted sampling, but we’re not looking at it as a replacement for targeted sampling.

Ms. NORTON. I think we all need to give Mr. Rhodes the opportunity to respond to this, since it is all of you against one.

Mr. SHAYS. Why the resistance?

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Rhodes, the chairman is asking why the resistance, do you think, to probability?

Mr. RHODES. I think that the point that keeps coming up relative

to targeted is that there is an assumption that the people who walk

into the facility actually know something.

As a scientist, I know nothing until it’s proven to me. The concern that I have about targeting—and I don’t view them as being

mutually exclusive. I would view targeting as being a weighted

probability. And there was some discussion earlier about you can

miss things with the grid. Yes, you can miss things if your grid is

not fine enough. That’s also a function of probabilistic analysis of

space and air current and things like that.

For example, you will note in a standard office, the computer

screen is an attractive location. The neon lights are an attractive

location. The ceiling tile is an attractive location. So is the carpet

and things like that. So you may not want to stand exactly in the

middle of the room and take a HEPA sample from the middle of

the room. That can be a decision that’s made.

The point that we’re making is that—and I think the reason that

there is resistance is that probabilistic sampling is large sample

set. There is no way for the current laboratory network to handle

the load that would come off of that. It is not going to be as rapid

as people would like.

Now, my concern would be rapid is nice but getting the wrong

answer faster and to a greater degree of precision is not useful to

us. So I think that hearing a uniform statement of yes, we believe

in validation; yes, we believe in this; yes, we believe in process; no,

we don’t believe in probabilistic; I think it’s a function of dollars,

network, capacity, it’s all those things. And what you’re probably—

probably—hearing is that these are government professionals who

are looking at it and saying, I can’t get the money, I can’t get the

priority.

I go back to my original statement about CBRN, the B is a little

b, everything else is really important, even though we haven’t encountered that. The thing we’ve encountered is a bio-attack. Nobody set off a nuclear weapon. Nobody has come in and dumped radiological material with dynamite around it, like the Chechens did

over in Russia; but the thing that has happened, people have to

complain because they can’t get the support on it. If we were taking it seriously we wouldn’t be having this argument, because B

would be a capital B and it would be as important as anything else.

Mr. SHAYS. There is a gentleman behind. Were you sworn in and

did you want to make any comment? Did you want to respond to

something here? Identify yourself.

Mr. KIEFER. My name is Max Kiefer with the CDC, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

Mr. SHAYS. Give your card to the transcriber when you leave, if

you would, please.

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Mr. KIEFER. OK. I was very pleased to hear you mention that industrial hygiene as a basic tenet was very important. Targeted

sampling, what is also known as worst-case sampling, is a fundamental basic industrial hygiene tenet that is used to help us target where we sample to try and rapidly get information for making

public health assessments and decisions rapidly. That is what was

done at Wallingford to get information on where the source of contamination was, as the doctor mentioned.

It was targeted sampling that found the contamination in delivery bar code sorter No. 10, and not probabilistic sampling. Probabilistic sampling does have a role, and we certainly recognize that

and want to work and we are doing work at CDC with Sandia National Laboratories to explore the use of probabilistic sampling for

a characterization sampling, for remediation sampling, where it

does have a very prominent role. But certainly, in the onset of an

outbreak, it is very critical for us to really find out where the contamination is very quickly so we can target medical prophylaxis to

people quickly, and we don’t have the time to wait for 4 or 5 days

to grid out a facility.

And I’d like to correct something that was mentioned earlier. The

high base sampling in Wallingford was not something that was uncovered due to probabilistic sampling or a different sampling strategy. That was found because—later in the course of routine maintenance on the part of the postal service. Because of the contamination found at DBCS No. 10, there was a concern that there might

have been aerosolization, and there was examination of the upper

structures above DBCS No. 10 because targeted sampling had been

found there; and there was knowledge because of what had happened at Brentwood, that there may have been aerosolization

there, and that’s why the sampling was conducted there.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, could I say what I think the problem is just as I derived it from your testimony? It sounds as if targeting sampling is fine if you—for example, if it’s positive, you

know something. I think what concerns us, as I understand, Mr.

Rhodes’ testimony, is that if it’s negative, you’re not sure if it is

really negative. It sounds to me that if it’s positive, before you let

people back in there, it looks like you’re going to do all the probability approaches anyway, so that you really do have a two-step

process if in fact it is positive for anthrax.

Where I think the problem comes is that if it is negative for anthrax, at least as I understand Mr. Rhodes, you do not know for

sure it is negative because you have done no probability sampling.

And some of our testimony, sir, about how things were found later,

some of the testimony we’ve heard here about how they could be

in the lights or other places, even though they are not where the

target says you should go, would leave people who work there with

the negative ‘‘but perhaps there are spores in that facility’’ because

you have not done probability sampling. If I’m wrong on that I’d

be pleased to hear it.

Dr. POPOVIC. I would just like to comment that it is not just the

sampling results that, in the initial phase of an investigation, are

weighed in to make a decision whether to close the facility or

whether to provide antimicrobial prophylaxis, and there’s other factors that play into place and those decisions again have to be made.

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Ms. NORTON. Like what?

Dr. POPOVIC. There has to be epidemiological evidence. If you actually, for example, know that there were cases associated with

postal facilities and you have had sick people in one facility and

you have them at the other, you don’t necessarily have to wait 2

or 3 days or how long it takes. You can make those decisions. The

kinds of exposure that people had. There is a lot of these epidemiologic background information that really plays into place. You can

put people on prophylaxis and then come back after a couple of

days and decide whether to continue it or not. So those are the instances where time really is of essence.

Ms. NORTON. And you would have done probability sampling by

that time.

Again, you all have not convinced me at least that this is not a

two-step process. And if you worked in that facility, I bet you would

want it to be a two-step process. And all I can tell you is if it was

a two-step process in the Senate of the United States, it better be

a two-step process everywhere else. We’re not going to have disparate treatment. That was one of the great, huge, terrible lessons

that came out of the anthrax scare here. People believed, and believe to this day, that Congress was treated differently. If you’re

going to do that, you’re going to have to develop somehow protocol

to do it all.

Mr. Chairman, I never did get to ask my question because your

staff asked such a good question.

Mr. SHAYS. You will get your chance. But before the transcriber

leaves, I was just thinking that this is like my worst nightmare in

college when I was taking statistics and probability, and I was

watching the transcriber try to concentrate as we talked about this,

and I was hoping that she would stay awake during the whole time

here, just given my own record in college during that time.

At any rate, we get to stay awake because we get to ask questions. That is one reason we get to ask questions.

Ms. NORTON. And you have to stay awake because you have to

answer them.

I have one last question for the panel today. In fairness, I think

I should ask this question of you, because I read Mr. Burrus’s testimony. He is on the next panel. You know how concerned I am that

V Street, the No. 1 target for anybody wanting to use anthrax, does

not have the basic bioterrorism equipment that 107 facilities somehow have.

Mr. Chairman, while you were gone, I asked him to get us a priority schedule and get you a priority schedule in the next 30 days.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, we would like that, why would it take 30 days?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DAY. Mr. Chairman, I can get you the schedule tomorrow.

Mr. SHAYS. If you would just give it to our committee so we can

make sure that Ms. Norton gets it.

Ms. NORTON. Now, if you don’t have the biodetection equipment

in V Street, even though V Street serves the Congress, the White

House—the one place that the terrorists—the Federal agencies, the

places where the terrorists want to get. OK.

But I need to hear, because I am going to ask Mr. Burrus this,

and I looked at his testimony, and he doesn’t have an answer in

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his testimony, because I suppose it isn’t in his control. But he says

that he recently visited V Street.

So not only don’t we have equipment in V Street, but he says

there’s an oscillating fan in V Street, and that is precisely what the

first thing that the Postal Service did when the Brentwood anthrax

scare occurred was to say, shut down the fan. I want to know

why—we already know you don’t have—and you haven’t given me

any reason for why they don’t have—biodetection in V Street.

But I want to know why there is a fan there, when our experience just a few blocks away in Brentwood says that fans will distribute the anthrax so you shouldn’t have a fan going where there

is no equipment, where you can’t tell where there might be anthrax

there at all?

Mr. DAY. The term V Street actually gets used in a generic way.

There are two facilities over there. The facility that processes mail

that has the automated equipment in it does not have any fans.

That’s concurrent and follows the national policy. We have a national policy, ever since the events of 2001, that our automated

processing equipment—you are not allowed to have fans that direct

air flow toward what we call the feed deck where the most likely

release would take place, and that’s true in V Street. It’s not in

place near any of that automated equipment.

It’s my understanding at the facility across the street, where the

trays are simply prepared to go to the irradiation facility which has

no air conditioning, has some fans in there. But, again, that is fully

in keeping with the national policy. You will find that true

throughout the Postal Service, that areas that do not have automated processing equipment have fans; it is true throughout the

Postal Service.

Initially in 2001, we shut down all the fans, and the request from

many of our employees was to try to relax that policy. And the policy that’s remained intact since then is we do not have fans that

are directed at the automated equipment. That is the case at V

Street as well.

Ms. NORTON. So the fans are directed at what at V Street? There

are fans at V Street.

Mr. DAY. Across the street where the mail is prepared.

Ms. NORTON. There are two places at V Street. One has a fan,

and one does not. And the one that does have the fan, what happens in the V Street facility that does have a fan?

Mr. DAY. That’s what we call our preparation area. They simply

are transferring trays of letters, tubs of flats to go into containers

to be sent up to the irradiation facility in Bridgeport. You have no

individual distribution of the mail; it’s not opened up. It’s just sent

up prepared to go to the facility. So that’s deemed a much lower

risk, and we see that as reasonable that in those—those employees

be allowed to have those fans. Again, consistent with national policy.

Mr. SHAYS. Bridgeport?

Mr. DAY. New Jersey.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, I live in Bridgeport, CT and I just wanted

to make sure. All right.

All right, is there any response to a question or a comment on

the second tier behind the speakers that have been responding.

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Any of those of you who stood up that want to set the record

straight or want to correct your boss and lose your job or want to

amplify what your boss said. I am serious. Just identify yourself,

make sure you leave a card with the transcriber.

Dr. SHARMA. Yes. My name is Sushil Sharma, and I work for

Keith Rhodes. I want to clarify and set the record straight, with

respect to how we articulate the role of the probability versus the

targeted sampling. What we are saying is that, eventually, no matter what, whether you find a positive or a negative, you have to do

probability sampling.

What do I mean by that? If you have a positive, in order for EPA

to do the cleanup, they have to do a probability sampling. If you

don’t have a positive, you have to offer some assurance to the public that, if anthrax is present, it is below certain detection limits

that our meter could not find. Now, what we said in our report is

that, at the outset, you decide how many samples and from where

you need to collect in order to have that confidence level.

Once you have done that, then we are not saying, don’t use your

head or judgment. Of course you should. You should first go to

those places which you think would be most likely to, under the

grand plan. If you don’t find there, continue outwards. So we are

not saying one versus the other; we think it is a good blending.

There is a role for professional judgment, but there are also occasions when judgment does not work, as was the case in the Wallingford facilities.

On the one hand, we hear that time is very critical for public

health intervention. But in the case of Wallingford, it wasn’t until

3, 4 weeks that anthrax was detected. So there is a chance, in the

case of negative results when the source of contamination is not definitive, that you should have—you should work within the grand

plan of probability sampling. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I was looking at body language with you,

Dr. Schafer and Ms. Tulis, as he was talking. Do you disagree with

what he said? I mean, it’s almost like I was reading. I will tell you

what I was thinking: Easy for him to say, but he doesn’t have to

do it. OK. Was I reading something incorrect in that?

Ms. TULIS. What I was doing is conferring with our sampling expert to verify the information. He can share some information with

you if you would like to hear that further.

Mr. SHAYS. Was he sworn in?

Ms. TULIS. Yes, he was.

Mr. SHAYS. Identify yourself and leave a card.

Mr. DURNO. Sir. My name is Mark Durno. I am a Federal onscene coordinator with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Basically, with designing sampling approaches to attack any kind

of contaminant, be it biological, chemical or whatever, we establish

a hypothesis, or a set of objectives. And then our second step is to

identify a sample space from which to collect these samples. And

in the case of the Postal Service facilities, the sample space was the

buildings where the letters originally passed through down to the

buildings to which cross-contaminated mail may have passed.

So the initial sample space, including the mail that had then

passed down through the subsequent Postal Service facilities, contained a large number of samples. And if statistics were done on

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this process, I think you would see that the probability was very

good that this sampling approach was adequate.

In addition to that, utilizing targeted or judgmental techniques,

we have a much, much greater confidence in the results that we

see from that. So I will give you a case in point.

At the Hart Building, for which we designed the sampling strategies for characterization, we established both a grid pattern over

the entire Hart Building. We also instituted a judgmental or targeted sampling approach. Using those techniques, 23 locations

were found to be contaminated or positive with Bacillus anthracis;

22 of those 23 locations were found through judgmental or targeted

technique. One location was found by this grid sampling approach,

and it just gives more credibility to the idea that this judgmental

approach is one of the most important pieces of designing an appropriate data quality objective-based sampling plan.

Mr. SHAYS. Sounds like nonhuman profiling.

Any other comments? We are going to end this panel soon. We

are going to begin the evening portion of our program.

Dr. POPOVIC. May I make one comment?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Dr. POPOVIC. I was thinking to put it in terms of human beings

and live people. If you come to your physician, and you say I have

certain symptoms and whatever, the physician can draw probably

1,000 different lab tests, and we will eventually, after 3 months,

when those come from all of the laboratories pinpointed, but the

physician also talks to you, and he targeted those after your symptoms.

So if you have symptoms of knee ache, he is not necessarily going

to do a brain biopsy. I am exaggerating of course of. But I think

it’s really important for us to emphasize that all kinds of information that you make when you make decisions about human beings,

you actually make when you work in a setting where a bacteria

like anthrax or other bacteria are spread all over the place. I just

wanted to draw that comparison. I hope it’s helpful.

Dr. SCHAFER. Actually, if I could jump on that, I think this is actually the big issue. There are no silver bullets today.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Dr. SCHAFER. And I think that’s the bottom line. We all know the

various sampling techniques, we know how to use them and how

to employ them. One is not necessarily better than the other. And

at the end of the day, one has to make the decision as to what is

the impact of whatever we find on a human being. So the goal here

is, no matter what we do, human judgment has to come into the

decision process. The end point is we are all here to try to protect

our people. That’s all I want to say.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Any other comments from anyone?

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman. Could I just put——

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Ms. NORTON. The chairman talked about our evening panel. You

can see that this is a chairman that doesn’t have show hearings.

We really learn something, and the only way we can learn it is to

have an exchange. Very few hearings I go to where the chairman

says, ‘‘and does anybody else in the room have anything he wants

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to say?’’ But it does help Members of Congress to learn what we

ought to do.

Mr. Day, I just want to be clear what I heard, because it seems

to me we have gone from bad to worse. We already have established that V Street, where all Federal mail and all White House

mail comes, does not have the biodetection equipment. I asked you

a question about fans.

As I hear you, you said that in the particular facility we are talking about, there was a fan, but it was really not the facility we

ought to be worried about, because this is a facility where workers

are dealing with the mail before it has been irradiated and before

it is sent to New Jersey for irradiation. What that means—again,

I want to hear your explanation, because maybe I have it wrong

again—is that these workers are working where there is no air conditioning. So in order for them to work, they have to say, will somebody turn on the fan?

Well, if you turn on the fan and they are handling mail that has

not been irradiated, as, for example, occurred when the mail came

to the Senate, then, of course, you are really handling dangerous

mail. Yes, it hasn’t been opened, but as with the Senate mail, some

anthrax could easily come through the openings in the envelope.

And there you are with the fan on with unirradiated mail in a nonair-conditioned building, and I am supposed to feel that these V

Street workers are really OK. I want you to explain why that is

not a situation. If anything, that is even worse than the situation

across the street where at least they are working with irradiated

mail.

Mr. DAY. Again, that’s consistent with our national policy. I

would gladly go back.

Ms. NORTON. Excuse me, what is our national policy then?

Mr. DAY. Our national policy on fans that we implemented either

late 2001 or early 2002 was to not direct fans at the automated

equipment where the pinching occurs with the mail that causes

it—if a biological threat were in there—to come out. Mail in trays,

mail in tubs, is deemed a much, much lower risk. In just picking

up a tray, there is nothing about the activity that is going to dislodge it.

Ms. NORTON. Well, of course, this is the same facility through

which the anthrax mail came, through these three facilities.

Mr. DAY. Yes, ma’am. I will gladly go back. I will work with the

local union. In a large extent, again, in 2001, we shut off all fans.

That was our initial reaction. The feedback we got from employees

was, is there a reasonable go-between where instead of all fans,

what is reasonable in terms of risk?

Ms. NORTON. You are darn right. And the goal is, get some air

conditioning in that building where government mail is handled

and where anthrax is likely to occur, to be distributed.

Mr. DAY. I can find out about air conditioning, but that has an

air flow associated with it as well. That does not mean, if there’s

a risk there, that it’s eliminated.

Ms. NORTON. You have—across the street in V Street and quote,

national policy, I take it does not pertain to air conditioning. Look,

Mr. Day, you know, I am willing to go with the flow. I know we

are trying to get this together, but I am really not willing to hear

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excuses about Government mail, White House mail, 4 years after

September 11th—I’m sorry, after the anthrax scare—does seem to

me that everything should be done in that facility to protect workers, because those are the facilities where people died, where workers are most fearful.

And one of the things that I am asking you to do, whatever you

do with the national policy everywhere else, is to remember that

V Street and Brentwood are indeed where the deaths occurred and

are indeed where the targeted mail for any, any terrorist should be

if he is really seeking to do harm to us.

And I am asking that the Post Office this summer take steps to

air condition that facility. I am asking that V Street be put at the

top of whatever lists you have for insulation of biodetection system.

I am particularly concerned about these workers, because they are

handling irradiated mail possibly with a fan.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. NORTON. Could I get your promise on that, Mr. Day? Excuse

me.

Mr. DAY. The equipment for biodetection will be in there. I will

find out the specifics about putting air conditioning in the other

building. And, again, the policy is about fans that are directed at

those pinch points. That is in effect in V Street. We will continue

to do that.

Ms. NORTON. We just ask you to use your common sense when

it comes to the kind of facility you are dealing with, and we are

dealing with a facility that will most likely be the subject of an anthrax attack. If, quote, the national policy doesn’t fit as well then

please take steps to protect those who are in that facility.

Mr. SHAYS. I think what Ms. Norton is basically saying is that

most Members of Congress would believe that this facility more

than any other facility is a targeted facility and should be highest

on the list. And that’s not a reflection of wanting to protect Members of Congress; it’s talking about your postal employees. I think

you know it. I am just going to say it that way.

Mr. DAY. We understand and concur.

Mr. SHAYS. I think you do. I think all of you have been excellent

witnesses, and we thank all of you, and we thank you for your patience. Is there anything that any of you wish we had asked that

we didn’t ask that you would like to put on the record?

I honestly learned more from that last question. I mean, we had

a hearing on terrorism. I asked at the end of a panel and a noted

doctor of a major medical magazine before September 11th said, ‘‘I

want to share my greatest fear.’’ He said his greatest fear is that

a small group of dedicated scientists will create an altered biomedical agent that will wipe out humanity as we know it. This was

by someone who was a mainstream doctor. That got our attention.

That was before September 11th, and there were no cameras, and

there were no print media.

So I learned a lot from that last question, is there anything we

need to put on record that wasn’t? And it also enables me to say

that if you leave here saying we should have asked a question we

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swer it. Any question we should have asked and any that you

should have answered?

OK. Thank you so much. You have been a wonderful panel. Very

patient. We are very grateful to you. We appreciate your dedication

to your work and to your country. We particularly thank the lady

from Connecticut.

And I am happy there’s a Bridgeport, NJ.

Our next panel is Mr. William Burrus, president, American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO; Dr. Linda D. Stetzenbach, director of

Microbiology Division, Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Chief James A. Schwartz,

chief, Arlington County Fire Department; Chief Michael P.

Neuhard, chief, Fairfax Fire and Rescue Department; Mr. Philip

Schaenman, president, Tridata Division of System Planning Corp.;

and Mr. John Jester, director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency,

Department of Defense.

We will ask you to stay standing, actually, and we are going to

swear you all in. So when you get by your seat, we will swear you

all in. Thank you all for your patience.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I would note for the record our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

Again, we will go with you, Mr. Burrus. We are really going to

try to be as close to 5 minutes as you can. I do appreciate this panel’s patience. Let me say the advantage of the second panel is you

have heard the questions of the first panel, and there may be

things you want to depart from your opening statement, if you feel

it’s been covered, and speak that way. But your full statement will

be in the record.

Mr. Burrus.

STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM BURRUS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN

POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL–CIO; LINDA D.

STETZENBACH, DIRECTOR, MICROBIOLOGY DIVISION,

HARRY REID CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS; JAMES H. SCHWARTZ,

CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL

P. NEUHARD, CHIEF, FAIRFAX COUNTY FIRE AND RESCUE

DEPARTMENT; PHILIP SCHAENMAN, PRESIDENT, TRIDATA

DIVISION OF SYSTEM PLANNING CORP.; AND JOHN JESTER,

DIRECTOR, PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BURRUS

Mr. BURRUS. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, I would like to

thank you and the subcommittee members for the opportunity to

address the important issues of this hearing. As requested, my testimony will concentrate on the GAO draft report about the anthrax

detection methods as well as the impact of the events surrounding

the recent anthrax event at the Pentagon mail facilities. The terrible events of September and October 2001 have had a lasting effect on our country, taking the lives and shattering our citizens’ security. Much as we evaluate what can be done to prevent such

tragedies in the future, we must apply the lessons learned. The

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fears postal workers harbor about the accuracy of anthrax testing

remain, and they will not be overcome until a comprehensive plan

of protection and detection is put in place.

I preface these remarks by stating my belief that in the immediate aftermath of the attack, the U.S. Postal Service acted appropriately based on the limited scientific knowledge available. Postal

management relied upon the advice of public health officials, and

the unions were informed that critical decisions were made. And

when presented with the evidence that postal employees had been

exposed, managers did not hesitate to close postal facilities. Mistakes were made, but they were honest mistakes. And hopefully,

we have learned from them.

However, in the weeks and months that followed, serious errors

were made, errors that could have been avoided. Considerable resources had been expended to study anthrax detection methods

since the October 21, 2001 incident. The GAO draft report presents

a detailed analysis that reflects many of the concerns that we have

raised since 2001.

Following the 2001 attack, the Postal Service initiated testing

protocol to evaluate all mail processing facilities. The facilities tested negative, but the experience in Wallingford called into question

the accuracy of the sampling and the testing protocol. Subsequent

tests using a different method, conducted after the death of an elderly woman, revealed the presence of anthrax.

In response to GAO recommendations to reassess postal facilities

that previously tested negative, the Postal Service asserted that,

because there had been no accidental incidents—additional incidents of anthrax-related illnesses or death, there was little or no

risk to postal workers or the public.

Despite our requests, the Postal Service declined to conduct future tests. We strongly disagree with the rationale and the decision

not to conduct additional tests. No one can reasonably suggest that

our members should serve as the ‘‘canaries in the coal mines’’ of

the years past.

The absence of illness or death cannot serve as proof that all is

well. The buildings and their contents must be tested and declared

free of agents of bioterrorism. APWU concurs with the GAO report

that all testing should utilize the best-known practices, and the

methods that will provide results that first and foremost is to protect the employees and the public. In those circumstances where

nonvalidated processes have been used, we must ask: Are our postal facilities really safe, or could improper sampling and testing

methods have missed anthrax? Could unsuspecting employees be

exposed at some future date? While the GAO report does not answer these questions, it brings them to the forefront for a thorough

examination.

In 2001, the Postal Service was forced to make an emergency decision regarding the type of samplings to be used in postal facilities, whether to dry swab or wet swab. Despite the fact that the

scientific community expressed concerns about the efficiency of the

dry swab method, that was the method chosen. This choice was accepted by postal public health officials.

However, it was known at the time—and GAO has now confirmed—that dry swab sampling is less efficient than the wet swab

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method. The USPS advanced a strategy of targeted sampling that

proscribed testing the areas that were most likely to be contaminated. This approach, known as ‘‘following the mail and monitoring

employees,’’ neglects the use of statistical probability. The APWU

and GAO reject the premise that following the mail and monitoring

employees can serve as a means of determining contamination.

This is unacceptable and should not be permitted by the Congress

of the United States.

Recent anthrax-related events at the Pentagon mail rooms demonstrate a number of efficiencies in communication. They highlight

the absence of standardized and validated testing protocols and expose the lack of coordination in public messages.

These most recent events serve as the poster child for inefficiency. Many accounts of the Pentagon incident indicate that the

initial sampling was done March 10th and that a positive result

was announced March 14th. Reports also specify that the positive

result was confirmed on March 15th. That means there was a lapse

of 5 days between the initial sampling and the confirmation results.

If it had been a true positive, postal workers would have been

in grave danger. Had a biohazard been present, postal workers

would have been exposed for 8 or 9 days before the results of the

confirmation test were received. We know from our experience at

Brentwood that waiting even a few days to act can result in death.

Other major concerns arise from the most recent incident as well.

First, timely notification was not provided by the Department of

Defense to the Postal Service. Second, a certified laboratory was

not selected. Third, reporting the results took too long, and as a result, postal workers were potentially at risk. It is fortunate that

the positive results were false, but these failures cannot be overlooked.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Burrus, you have gone now 61⁄2 minutes, so I

need you to wrap up.

Mr. BURRUS. I will. Of major concern is the situation at V Street

that has been discussed at some length already. I will defer to

questions in more depth about this issue, but the use of fans at V

Street, sir, are not for the comfort of the employees. Those fans are

used for the exhaust of the gases that are generated by the irradiation of the mail. So I would hope we would get into that subject

in a little more depth as we go to the questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. BURRUS. Let me conclude, I endorse in large part the inclusion of the GAO draft report and hope you will find them useful

in initiating a comprehensive and effective program. Thank you for

the opportunity to testify, and I will be pleased to answer any

questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burrus follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your very helpful statement.

Dr. Stetzenbach.

STATEMENT OF LINDA D. STETZENBACH

Dr. STETZENBACH. Good afternoon. I am Linda Stetzenbach, the

Director of the Microbiology Division for the Harry Reid Center for

Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, where I

have been conducting bioaerosol research for the last 17 years.

I would like to acknowledge Congressman Porter’s attendance

earlier today, and I know he is very concerned about these issues

as well.

Mr. SHAYS. That is Harry Reid of——

Dr. STETZENBACH. The Harry Reid, got us the Senate appropriation to build the building where our research center is located, yes,

sir. The university names their buildings after the people that donate the money.

In 1994, I presented results of our laboratory’s work on the dispersal of microorganisms into the air at a scientific conference on

chemical and biological defense at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in

Aberdeen, MD. During a break after my presentation, I was told

by one of the attendees that while my data was interesting, anthrax spores would not redistribute into the air once they had settled, and therefore, my data had very little interest for biodefense.

This is a——

Mr. SHAYS. How long ago was that?

Dr. STETZENBACH. That was in 1994, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Interesting.

Dr. STETZENBACH. Later, in June 2001, we published some data

using an anthrax simulate in a room-sized environmental chamber

that we have had at UNLV since about 1991. Unfortunately, the

events in the fall of 2001 demonstrated that dispersal of infectious

spores does occur and re-aerosolization does occur. But our earlier

data basically was ignored.

Since 2001, it’s also acknowledged that monitoring of biothreat

agents is problematic due to the lack of standardization and analysis protocols. You heard that with the earlier panel.

For example, there are a variety of sampling methods that have

been used by various Government agencies when monitoring for

biothreat agents, but the likelihood of success using these methods

has not been established. And there are currently no standardized

environmental sampling methods for first responders, public health

officials, law enforcement agencies and other agencies.

I think it’s acknowledged, and you heard earlier, that surface

sampling is very useful for determining the presence and concentration of a contaminant, the location where it may have been

released, the extent of contamination, forensics and the effect of remediation.

But while swab sampling has a time-honored tradition in the

hospital setting from everything from sore throats to wounds, the

usefulness of the swab sampling method for sampling buildings is

very limited.

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lected as a result of the anthrax attacks. And the laboratory response network was simply overwhelmed.

Handling of swabs by emergency personnel responding to an incident is also extremely difficult. Results in our laboratory that we

published in 2004 evaluated a Government-developed large area

surface sampling method, it’s called the BiSKit. It demonstrated

the ability to rapidly sample large areas, which translates into better detection and fewer samples. But the swab and the BiSKit are

the only two surface sampling methods that have undergone validation testing. Validation testing and the establishment of all protocols used to determine if a biothreat exists in a building is critical.

Therefore, research should be conducted to evaluate currently

available and newly developing devices for biological sampling of

surfaces. This would provide information on their efficiency of collection and the limits of their capability. You heard that earlier as

well.

This information can then be used to determine what device is

optimal for what biothreat scenario. An integral part of this research is developing analytical capability through the application of

molecular biology methods that enhance the enumeration and characterization of biothreat agents. And molecular biology methods are

rapid, sensitive and specific. Unfortunately, there are interferences

when you use these methods with environmental samples. They

are not clinical samples. They are environmental samples. And

simple background dust can give you a false negative.

Therefore, research is needed to minimize the interferences and

to optimize analysis of samples from surfaces from the earth and

from the air. Also we need to develop standard operating procedures from optimal detection and measurement of biological contaminants. Comprehensive research on these topics would enhance

sampling capabilities for the purpose of identification or attribution, while allowing inter-laboratory and interagency comparisons.

There’s also serious concerns with assessing the results of bioaerosol monitoring. We have been focusing today on surfaces, but

indoor and outdoor surfaces where air samples are taken is a very

real issue. The purposeful dissemination of biothreat agents in enclosed public environments and outdoor facilities that attract the

public would potentially result in the exposure of large numbers of

individuals.

Therefore, programs utilizing routine monitoring of aerosols has

been initiated. Unfortunately, little information is available on the

natural background populations of these organisms that are now

called biothreat agents. This lack of data has resulted in false positive results with the biowatch system that’s currently deployed in

selected cities in the United States. A comprehensive survey to determine the levels of naturally occurring biothreat agents would assist decisionmakers when interpreting positive results.

In addition, naturally occurring organisms in the air and on surfaces can affect the ability to discriminate background aerosols

from biocontaminants. While some data has been published, the

naturally occurring organisms in the types of facilities that may be

sites of a purposeful biocontaminant release, such as sports arenas,

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convention facilities and mass transit, have not been adequately

characterized.

The research that I have outlined for you today is vital to provide

rapid and accurate information to decisionmakers that are charged

with protecting the public health and security of our citizens.

But in closing, I wish to emphasize that universities are an

underutilized research resource for much of this research. University scientists have a track record of high quality research on these

topics, and they are cost-effective.

In addition, they do not have a vested interest in any method,

in any particular protocol, and they can develop and evaluate protocols with an unbiased perspective.

In closing, I would like to thank you for allowing me to come

today, and I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Stetzenbach follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. It is pretty extraordinary that you would have been

told in 1994 that once they settled, you didn’t need to worry about

the anthrax spores.

Dr. STETZENBACH. Pardon me. I didn’t hear you.

Mr. SHAYS. It is pretty amazing to me that you were told, once

anthrax spores had settled, they would not be a recurring problem.

I mean, that’s basically what you said, or did I——

Dr. STETZENBACH. That was the basic answer, yes, sir. And I

said, ‘‘did you see my data,’’ and he said, basically, ‘‘don’t confuse

me with the facts.’’ It was unfortunate.

Mr. SHAYS. That was 4 years before—I mean 10 years earlier

from now.

Dr. STETZENBACH. That was years earlier, yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Chief Schwartz, welcome.

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. SCHWARTZ

Chief SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.

In addition to my responsibilities as a fire chief in Arlington

County, I am also a member of the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization where I co-chair the Detection and Decontamination Subgroup. And I am also a member of the International

Association of Fire Chiefs Committee on Terrorism and Homeland

Security. These issues have great relevance for both of those

groups.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the issue of

valid test methods for Bacillus anthracis today. This is a significant

issue for Arlington County, which like most local governments, provide the public safety and public health response for our residents,

visitors and businesses.

In Arlington, our services also protect the Pentagon and dozens

of Federal agencies that reside in the over 60 percent of the county’s available commercial office space, office space that I would observe is greater than what you will find in Baltimore, Seattle or

San Francisco.

Arlington bears a significant responsibility for response to any

incident that is perceived to have involved anthrax or other biological agents. I want to begin by complimenting the subcommittee on

its charge to GAO regarding the assessment of postal facility testing and the validity of detection activities. This is a critical issue

for local governments who, again, must manage the consequences

of a local biological incident. But I would observe, it is not just

postal facilities that we need to concentrate on.

Given our experience to date, I would also observe that there is

no crisis that requires more accurate and timely public information

than a public health crisis. Assuring the public, especially those

who have been potentially exposed to a biological agent, is of the

highest importance and makes reliable test results from a certified

laboratory essential.

The decisions that result from testing, including the possible distribution of powerful antibiotics as prophylaxis, poses different but

no less significant kinds of risk for the public.

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I want to say that I agree with the recommendations of the GAO

draft report which was provided to us. While the report describes

significant hurdles to effective testing, it is imperative that methods of detecting anthrax and other biological hazards be developed

so that appropriate decisions that are in the best interests of public

health can be made in a timely way.

Special emphasis should also be put on environmental sampling

methods. Detection methods have a considerable effect on the actions of local government. And as such, I want to take an opportunity to discuss briefly the incident at the Pentagon on March

14th, which I know you will be getting more testimony on in just

a few moments. This incident was in many ways a model of intergovernmental cooperation.

Arlington County was notified of a possible test result at the

Pentagon’s remote delivery facility. Upon arrival at the facility, responders from Arlington learned that a swab taken from a filter 3

days earlier had tested positive for BA at a contract laboratory. Arlington committed its fire, police, public health and emergency

management departments to support the Pentagon.

Because of our close working relationships with the Pentagon

Force Protection Agency, we have a great deal of knowledge about

their procedures. Numerous exercises over the last 7 years have

helped to provide Arlington and the Pentagon Force Protection

Agency with a better development system of planning and response.

In general, the response was good. The Pentagon Force Protection Agency notified Arlington as soon as they recognized a problem. And our first responders notified our Office of Emergency

Management as soon as they arrived on the scene and assessed the

situation.

Our Office of Emergency Management then made internal notifications and to other local governments in the region and the State.

And I want to digress from my written testimony for just a moment

here, because this morning, in hearing reports regarding the failure, the suggested failure of notification of the State in this particular incident, I believe that conclusion is largely flawed. Information went directly to the State from Arlington County’s Office of

Emergency Management as per protocols established by the Department of Homeland Security, soon after recognition that this

was in fact an event, and our Office of Emergency Management

took the next step by notifying the D.C. Emergency Management

Agency to let them know what was going on as well.

As always, there are lessons to be learned from incidents such

as this. While there are parts of the March 14th Pentagon response

that could be improved upon, we are far beyond where we were 5

years ago. And I am confident that the after-action reports will

bear that out. However, one of the salient points with this incident

that the subcommittee focuses on today is valid detection methods.

Can we rely on the results we get from environmental sampling

and subsequent laboratory analysis? Experts far smarter than I, I

guess as you mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, smart science, will

have to work out the answers to the challenges posed by the GAO

report. But as a recipient of information derived from these practices, information on which critical public health and emergency

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management decisions can be made, I can say that the issue must

be pursued.

In addition to the importance of valid testing methods of the

postal facilities, I want to draw the subcommittee’s attention to the

importance of providing reliable screening technology for first responders.

The issue of testing for biological hazards has been a topic before

the interagency board for over 3 years. First responders must have

reliable biological detection capabilities. And I would ask that the

subcommittee do everything it can to encourage the development of

enhanced field-deployable technologies.

There are those in the Federal Government who would dismiss

the need for this kind of capability in the hands of first responders.

They insist that local first responders cannot be properly trained

to use handheld assays or PCR technology and that responders

should rely solely on the LRN to provide definitive results regarding the identification of suspicious substances. As my friend A.D.

Vickery from Seattle Fire Department is fond of saying, this is the

same argument we heard years ago when we were told that doctors

only should be doing CPR.

The reality is that, on a frequent basis, first responders are

called to investigate suspicious substances. This is especially true

when the media is reporting a situation such as the one that occurred in Arlington and Fairfax several weeks ago. Simply relying

on the LRN for test results is an ineffective way to provide timely

advice and guidance to people who believe that they have been exposed to a biological agent.

First responders understand that there are more sophisticated

field testing methods, that sophisticated field testing methods only

yield presumptive results. We are not making clinical decisions

with these methodologies but tactical decisions to manage public

anxiety.

I will leave the remainder of my testimony in the written form

and be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Chief Schwartz follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very, very much.

Chief Neuhard.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. NEUHARD

Chief NEUHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will note that I

have provided some lengthy testimony in writing, and I will summarize that very quickly here for you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Chief NEUHARD. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the

subcommittee. I am Michael Neuhard, and I am the fire chief of

the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, which is located

in the northern Virginia area of the National Capital Region. We

appreciate this opportunity to provide you with a local perspective

on anthrax detection and the problems associated with first responder activities during potential anthrax incidents.

During the last 4 years, Fairfax County and other regional agencies have had the unfortunate occasion to respond to over 1,000 potential anthrax incidents. As you are aware, we recently responded

to a detection device activation at a Department of Defense facility

located in Fairfax County, which occurred simultaneously with a

potential anthrax incident at the Pentagon, Arlington County, VA.

Our experience at these incidents shows that, at the most fundamental level, the question of determining if we are dealing with

a biological agent in an accurate and timely manner remains elusive. We believe there are four areas relevant to this hearing in the

anthrax detection chain which presents significant challenges during the first 72 hours of an incident.

First is the current state of fixed detection systems being operated in local jurisdictions at government mail-handling facilities.

Fixed mail-handling facilities are using different detection technologies with varying degrees of reliability. In many instances, the

instance and type of device is not known to nor coordinated with

local officials. Furthermore, these facilities may not even have technical support available for these detectors after normal business

hours.

On a positive note, a postal facility in Fairfax County has worked

very diligently with officials to develop joint protocols for response

to an activation of their biological detection system. Conversely,

when the 911 call was received for the DOD facility on Leesburg

Pike, first responders were not even aware that a detection device

was located within the facility.

The second issue is the lack of reliable field screening capabilities

for first responders, as was noted by Chief Schwartz. None of the

field test devices on the market today are endorsed by scientists or

laboratories as being reliable, accurate and consistent. This prevents the first responders from having appropriate, technical information to support initial decisions in the field, and all of us know

the consequences of that.

The third issue is obtaining the laboratory results and ensuring

that they are available for decisionmakers during an incident. Once

field samples have been transported to a laboratory, local and State

officials are not fully aware of nor included in the process. Many

times and most of the time, our experience has been these have

gone to Federal laboratories.

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During the recent simultaneous events, it was difficult to determine which location or sample, testing procedures or time lines the

subject matter experts were referring to as they attempted to make

decisions and articulate this to local and State representatives.

This problem leads to local and State responders making decisions

based on limited and sometimes unreliable information.

Finally, the lack of confidence in the ability of the laboratories

to produce timely, accurate and reliable analysis is troubling. Since

emergency responders have limited ability to identify a potential

biological agent in the field, they rely heavily on the testing laboratories for accurate and timely information.

It is unconscionable that a laboratory can provide positive

screening and culture test results for a biological agent that was

not present. At a minimum, laboratories utilized for routine and incident specific samples should be certified in part of the laboratory

response network. Additionally, initial test results should be available to decisionmakers within 4 to 6 hours as opposed to the 12 to

15 hours indicated during recent events.

It is imperative that Federal, State and local authorities partner

in efforts to improve detection, screening and analysis of potential

anthrax contamination. The Federal Government can help by insuring, first, that all stakeholders are at the table as we further

refine these capabilities, the local, State and Federal levels together. Second, provide ample funding to continue research that

enables reliable, consistent and timely detection, field screening

and lab analysis.

Third, require Federal agencies operating fixed detection systems

in localities to coordinate with local first responders and public

health officials. And, finally, ensure that Federal agencies ensure

similar protocols across Federal agency lines in the detection and

response to potential anthrax incidents.

While the Federal Government must continue to provide leadership in the anthrax response arena, it must remember that when

an incident strikes, it is the localities that would be impacted and

challenged with the appropriate response. We must recognize this

and accept this, and we must do everything possible to provide appropriate technical capabilities so we can answer as quickly and

confidently as possible the question, do we have anthrax?

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Chief Neuhard follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Chief Neuhard.

Mr. Schaenman. Am I pronouncing your name correctly?

STATEMENT OF PHILIP SCHAENMAN

Mr. SCHAENMAN. Schaenman, yes. Thank you again and the

members of the subcommittee for inviting me to this important

hearing. I will give you a quick verbal summary of the written testimony. I am Philip Schaenman, president of the Tridata Division

of System Planning Corp.

We have been providing analytical services dealing with public

safety for about 35 years. We have done over 50 after-action reports for major public safety incidents. And we have evaluated public safety services at about 150 communities and 40 Navy installations.

About 2 weeks ago, State and local officials in Virginia, Maryland

and D.C. voiced concerns about the information flow, as well as the

science—as you have been talking about—during the suspected anthrax incidents. They wanted a rapid after-action review of the

State and local actions and information flow by an expert third

party in parallel with the Federal studies that were being done of

the time lines and what happened. And I got tagged with being the

project manager. Here is a brief summary of the findings, focusing

on the information flow rather than the science.

Overall, the National Capital Region did much better than it

would have been 5 years ago. Arlington and Fairfax County did extremely well in responding to the incidents, in communicating with

each other and in sending information to the region, as Chief

Schwartz said.

The Commonwealth of Virginia was prepared to assist its counties. The State of Maryland was prepared and kept informed. D.C.

government was prepared and played a direct role at the V Street

facility. So the overall picture was good, but there were many communication problems identified. Most of them stemmed from the

root cause of not having clear information about the status and

findings of the anthrax tests.

But in a sense, that’s the homeland security version of the fog

of war. You need to be able to deal with the uncertainty in these

types of incidents.

For one thing, there needs to be better protocols on who has responsibilities for keeping the region informed, beyond the jurisdictions directly involved. Should a county pass information to the National Capital Region or to the Department of Homeland Security

for dissemination into the rest of the region.

Mr. SHAYS. You have to move your mic back just a speck. Please

just slide it back.

Mr. SCHAENMAN. Sorry.

Mr. SHAYS. No need to apologize. You are doing great.

Mr. SCHAENMAN. So how should the information flow? Should it

go from the State through the region, or should it go to DHS and

then through the region? Should it go from office of emergency

management to office of emergency management that are the hubs

and in through the spokes, or should it be broadcast to all agencies

simultaneously? Should it go public health to public health and fire

to fire?

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Well the problem in these incidents, I went through all these

channels. And it led to uncertainty as to what was the latest and

most authoritative information at any given time, in part because

the tests weren’t clearly defined and time stamped as the information flowed across agencies.

There were times when 80 people were on a conference call being

updated without knowing what the source of the information was,

whether that was the most recent information and whether they

could ask questions or not, so they had little idea of the validity

of the information at times.

Another issue that needs guidance from the State and local chief

executives is when they want to be informed about incidents that

are not yet confirmed. There was hesitancy about passing information up the line, but generally good judgment.

But people are concerned about the boy who cries wolf syndrome

on the one hand and, on the other hand, keeping political leadership informed before they hear about it from CNN. A balance needs

to be struck.

There is also a need to more forthrightly inform the public on

what is going on even in the face of uncertainty. It’s probably better to say we have conflicting test information and trying to resolve

it than delaying press releases all together, and that happened.

There needs to be greater care in the use of English language

and acronyms in emergency communications. We have been working the problem of interoperability of the hardware of communications, but there’s an interoperability problem on the human side as

well. For example, there was communication that it had set off an

automatic alarm at Skyline Towers when it was in fact a person

giving an alarm. And there’s a big difference. There was a misunderstanding about whether a test was for the presence of anthrax spores or for the viability of anthrax spores, and that’s a difference.

DOD, several State and local agencies felt that DOD needed to

better coordinate medical treatment decisions with their public

health agencies, in this case Pentagon with Arlington County, but

elsewhere in the Nation as well. And it affects people in the local

jurisdiction.

So those are just some of the key findings. We are going to have

detailed time lines and findings from the point of view of all the

major State and local government participants in a report that’s

forthcoming. I would be glad to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaenman follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Jester.

STATEMENT OF JOHN N. JESTER

Mr. JESTER. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank

you.

My name is John Jester. I am the Director of the Pentagon Force

Protection Agency. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the emergency response activities to the suspected anthrax contamination at

the Pentagon’s Defense Post Office and at a mail office in Skyline

Tower 5.

In addition to a brief summary of events, I also plan on sharing

with the subcommittee lessons learned and actions taken since the

event. Overall, I want to assure the subcommittee that the Pentagon is an equal partner with the Federal, State and local entities

in protecting the health and safety of our employees and the surrounding communities.

To briefly summarize the recent events, on Thursday, March

10th, Vistronix, a U.S. Army contractor, screened mail entering the

Defense Post Office over down-draft tables. Swab samples taken

from the filters under the tables were collected and sent to the

Commonwealth Biotechnology Inc. Laboratory, hereafter referred to

as CBI Lab. Standard procedures call for the contractor to hold the

mail in quarantine mail for 3 days until the lab reports negative

results.

At 4 p.m. on Friday, March 11, representatives from the CBI Lab

informed the Vistronix site supervisor that the initial test result of

Thursday’s mail sample would be delayed due to a preliminary

positive test result.

The Vistronix supervisor did not inform DOD of this preliminary

test result. Over the weekend, CBI performed a confirmation test

on the sample. On Monday morning, March 14, 6:15 a.m., Vistronix

released Thursday’s mail to the Defense Post Office for distribution. Three hours later, the CBI Lab informed the Vistronix supervisor that the test results from one of the samples from Friday’s

mail resulted in a positive response for anthrax.

The Defense Post Office was notified of the positive test results,

immediately shut down their facility and immediately notified the

Pentagon Force Protection Agency. In the 2 hours that followed, we

established a secure perimeter around the remote delivery facility,

notified Arlington County and set up an instant command post integrating local and Federal emergency response efforts; 236 employees from the remote delivery facility were evacuated to a nearby vacant building until they could be briefed, tested and issued

precautionary treatment, and offered counseling services.

We coordinated with other Pentagon distribution offices to identify all possible recipients of the morning mail and deployed our

HAZMAT teams to the sites for additional swab sample tests. Between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m., Pentagon Force Protection Agency notified State and local, Federal emergency response agencies of the

potential biohazard incident through the Washington Area Warning System.

By 1 p.m., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the

Homeland Security Operation Center and the Office of the U.S.

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Postmaster General were all notified. The Arlington County Fire

Department arrived at the Pentagon 11:04 a.m., and the FBI was

on the scene by 1 p.m.

Over the next 3 days, Pentagon officials coordinated with local,

State and Federal officials, health and law enforcement officials. At

approximately 2 p.m., we were notified that a bio alarm was set up

in a mail distribution office in Skyline 5. It was later determined

that the room in question did not have a biosensor or bioalarm.

The device was a biological air filtration hood, and the alarm was

simply a red light indicating air flow restriction. All subsequent

tests returned negative, and the Skyline Complex and the Remote

Delivery Facility reopened on Thursday, March 17th. By Thursday,

March 17th, the DiLorenzo Clinic in the Pentagon tested more

than 800 people through nasal swabs and provided 3 days of antibiotics.

As in any emergency, there were actions that went very well and

procedures that need to be improved. Our initial after-action assessments identified some positive aspects of the collective Pentagon response to this incident. The remote delivery facility as designed kept potentially harmful substances isolated from the large

Pentagon population.

We immediately identified and screened potentially contaminated

employees. Within 3 hours, our organic HAZMAT team conducted

130 tests of the mail room and other suspected areas.

Not everything transpired as it should have. It took too long for

the original contractor lab mail results to be processed, and the

contractor staff failed to follow mail release protocols. Additionally,

there was no way to confirm that all State, local and Federal agencies heard the Washington Area Warning System message. The

event illustrated that incidents at high-profile symbolic Federal facilities become breaking news stories and are quickly perceived as

national events.

We have already taken major steps to address these issues. Since

the suspected anthrax incident, Pentagon Force Protection Agency

has assumed responsibility for the oversight of the mail screening

process and testing the samples from filters at our Pentagon laboratory. The onsite lab provides 24-hour response for positive initial screening of multiple threat agents.

The Pentagon Force Protection Agency will ensure that mail is

properly quarantined until the Pentagon lab returns negative sample test results. Revised notifications, both interagency and external, are in place for future chem-bioevents. Our procedures for

using the Washington Area Warning System now include a preamble with an emergency message stating the who, what, where

and when of the event. We will ensure that a response is received

from an appropriate agency such as DHS, FBI and local counties.

In 30 to 45 seconds, the emergency message will be repeated.

A thorough review and the assessment of the ability to response

to and management of the incidents is being conducted. DOD will

receive a draft after-action report in 21 days and a final report

within 45 days. The Pentagon is fortunate to have an excellent

working relationship with Arlington and Fairfax Counties’ police

and fire departments. These working relationships were tested and

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proven on September 11th and continue to improve as we participate in annual exercises.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you

for the opportunity to speak, and I will be happy to answer any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jester follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

We will start out with Ms. Norton. We are going to try to get at

the bottom of what is still not clear to me as to where mistakes

were made.

You have you the floor for such time as you need it.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Burrus, I am going to ask you to have somebody go with me

to V Street. I am going to ask Mr. Day in the same way. You know,

he laid it on the workers. We were able to—if you will forgive me,

cross-examination that we are dealing with an unairconditioned facility. I think I just want to go there. It looks as though we did get

a promise to deal with that situation. Very, very troubling.

I would like to know from you whether this is the first time—

were not V Street workers put on Cipro?

Mr. BURRUS. On which occasion?

Ms. NORTON. On this?

Mr. BURRUS. On the most recent one?

Ms. NORTON. Yes, on the most recent one.

Mr. BURRUS. Yes, they were offered Cipro.

Ms. NORTON. Was this the first time since the anthrax attack in

2001 that any postal workers in the United States have been on

Cipro?

Mr. BURRUS. No, the employees at V Street. This is the second

or third occasion since 2001. There have been other circumstances

where those employees in that facility have been put on Cipro.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Burrus, that is very troubling testimony to me.

We know that at the time of the anthrax attack that Cipro was not

a very nice medicine to have to take. We also know, if you keep

taking something, it doesn’t work, and yet, of course, we have

heard from the last panel that there’s no way to tell when there’s

a false positive, that is, simply saying something is negative doesn’t

make it negative.

That’s why you heard a lot of cross-examination by the chairman

and me on that; your own testimony reinforces that. We are going

to have to get to the bottom of that, particularly given your testimony that, in V Street, we have already had three times where

people have had to take Cipro, and I understand that all of these

are false positives.

So, I mean, how many times are we going to expose workers to

a very important, probably the only drug they could take, and

when the real deal comes, and it’s our job to see that it doesn’t,

then many of them would have been exposed over and over again

to this antibiotic and perhaps it wouldn’t work as well. That is

very, very troubling.

I want to move to Mr. Jester. Mr. Jester, is it your view that

what we were dealing with here, we know we were dealing with

a contractor. We know it was a noncertified contractor. So perhaps

I ought to ask you why the Pentagon, of all places, was using a

noncertified contractor. We had testimony in the prior panel—that

this contractor was, ‘‘outside of the Pentagon system.’’ If you have

a system, I assume that within your system they are certified. Is

that true? Those who are within the Pentagon system are certified

by CDC?

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Mr. JESTER. We utilize the CDC protocols in our laboratories, but

the laboratory, to answer your question—the laboratory, the CBI in

Richmond, this contract was set up in November 2001, right after

the incident on the Capitol, and the Pentagon quickly came to the

conclusion they need to screen the mail, and they had a contract

with Vistronix. Vistronix in turn subcontracted with CBI Laboratory.

That process remained in place until this recent incident. We recognize there were some problems with that process.

Ms. NORTON. Well, subcontract—you didn’t contract—there was

a subcontract that resulted with this particular contractor being

the laboratory?

Mr. JESTER. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. Not the contractor you in fact had employed?

Mr. JESTER. No, ma’am. The CBI laboratory was under contract

to Vistronix who was under contract to the Army to screen the

mail. And Vistronix screened the mail and sent their samples to

the CBI Lab, so they were a subcontractor.

Ms. NORTON. I see.

Mr. JESTER. We recognize some problems with this. The Army

had the American Academy of Sciences come in and take a look at

the process and equipment. And they recognized there needed to be

some changes. In fact, about 2 months before this event, the Army

had asked my organization to take a look at the oversight of the

screening process. And when we did that, we would then eliminate

the CBI Lab and use our own laboratory.

Ms. NORTON. So are you any longer using this contractor or subcontractor to do lab work for the Pentagon?

Mr. JESTER. Pardon?

Ms. NORTON. Are you any longer using——

Mr. JESTER. No, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. So you are no longer using——

Mr. JESTER. We stopped using it from the day of the incident.

Ms. NORTON. Are you using a CDC certified contractor?

Mr. JESTER. We are using a laboratory that we have with the

Pentagon. The protocols that we use there are developed by the

Army in consultation with CDC. The laboratory we have at the

Pentagon is simply what I call a first alert laboratory. If we get a

positive sample there, and we do have a PCR test there, we will

immediately notify the FBI, and the FBI would take custody of

that sample and then take it to the laboratory of their choice,

which would be, I am sure, LRN laboratory.

Ms. NORTON. I guess that’s all right, since you said, I understand, the Pentagon has perhaps the best experience with anthrax,

because you have the military experience on which initially we relied. I will most certainly ask that—so when you said in consultation with CDC, I have to assume that CDC, that’s the same thing

as CDC certified. Because that consultation would not have their

sign off, if it is not the functional equivalent of the certification?

Mr. JESTER. I would have to find out. I don’t think there’s a sample of approval per se. They did work with the CDC, the Army.

Ms. NORTON. They shouldn’t be throwing their name around unless there is in fact something like that.

Mr. JESTER. Yes, ma’am.

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Ms. NORTON. So I think you ought to get—if you would simply

transmit to the chair by way of letter.

Mr. JESTER. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. What the CDC consultation connotes so that we

can translate it, do—does the lab use CDC reagents?

Mr. JESTER. Pardon?

Ms. NORTON. Does the lab use CDC certified reagents?

Mr. JESTER. No, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. No? We use the Army agents, the Army’s agents.

Ms. NORTON. Again, you know, that’s going to be fine with me

so long as two branches of government, the two agencies agree.

Mr. JESTER. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. I have respect for the work that the Army and the

military has done long before September 11th on anthrax, so just

so we are talking about the same thing. But, again, I think that

the chairman needs to have that understanding in writing.

Let me tell you what really disturbs me and I guess the chairman when he opened this set of questions really got to the bottom

of the core concern we have. We really are not interested, if you

see how Mr. Shays goes at these hearings, which is not to ask a

question, say got you and go on to the next one. We really are interested in finding out what happened particularly with respect to

coordination so that this can kind of be a test that leads to remediation everywhere. We did not mean it as a test but it amounts to

that.

Now, in this region we have a National Capital Region Coordinator. I know it because it was my amendment to the bill that resulted in the National Capital Region Coordinator. When it got to

the Senate it was even expanded. The feeling in both bodies was

that this was the target region of the country, and while everybody

else should have some kind of coordination in the States, since Federal facilities were located for the most part here, that the Department of Homeland Security should actually pay for the Coordinator.

In all of this testimony, I have a hard time finding that Coordinator, and indeed, I can’t figure out what the protocols are. So I’m

going to try to break it down and not ask, you know, who struck

John.

Let me just ask a straight-forward question. Were there, let’s

leave aside what there are now because if there’s something here

now that was not there, you can tell me about that in answering

this question. Were there, I will call them protocols, you can call

them a list, for purposes of everybody understanding what I am

talking about, that said once there is an incident, contact one, then

contact two, then contact three, that kind of thing, the simple

ABC’s if you prefer of what to do in case there is an incident involving anthrax? Is there something that says immediately tell the

National Capital Region Coordinator. Is there something that says

go to the local police or fire, then go to X, Y?

Remember we are dealing with somebody who may be anybody.

There may be a worker who says there is some powder here, I don’t

know what to do. Well, is there a piece of paper that says every

worker should go to his supervisor and the supervisor knows bingo,

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tion flows out and because the experts then know, the information

then flows back as to what to do?

If I could ask anybody who knows if there is anything written

down that would tell a worker then or would tell a worker now

what the steps are, let us say from 1 to 10 about who to notify or,

if you like, what to do.

Mr. BURRUS. The Postal Service does have such information that

is distributed to employees. The level of distribution is certainly dependent upon the managers in thousands of facilities across the

country, but the real problem is we interact with all of the other

agencies as well as private entities and everybody has a different

protocol. There is no universal protocol. The Postal Service has its

own. The Department of Defense or the Army, the Navy is not required to follow the Postal Service protocol. They have their own.

So where the two intersect, as they differ, they differ. The Postmaster General, the U.S. Postal Service will follow his protocol, not

that of the U.S. Army.

Ms. NORTON. But on an anthrax incident.

Mr. BURRUS. Yes, even with anthrax.

Ms. NORTON. Everybody has a postal facility.

Mr. BURRUS. Everybody suspects that if anthrax is identified

that its origin—the initial suspicion is its origin is the U.S. Postal

Service, particularly if it is discovered in a mailroom, and there are

hundreds of thousands of mailrooms scattered in private entities.

So if they discover anthrax in the mailroom, the immediate suspicion is that its origin was the U.S. Postal Service. That independent entity will follow their protocol and it will differ from what is

followed by the U.S. Postal Service.

So you have conflicting protocols. What happened in the Pentagon recently, the suspicion was it was a Postal Service initiated action. There were two different protocols that were in play and the

media was in between.

Ms. NORTON. What protocols were in play?

Mr. BURRUS. The Postal Service.

Ms. NORTON. And who else?

Mr. BURRUS. The Department of Defense because the suspicion

was the anthrax was identified as having not been initiated but

identified in the Pentagon.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Jester, was there anything in writing that indicated in this region what you should do in a Pentagon postal facility if there was a suspicion of anthrax in the facility? Was there

anything in writing which I am calling a protocol, but it is anything in writing? You can call it what you want to.

Mr. JESTER. Yes, ma’am. We have what we call a concept of operations, CONOPS, and we have detailed concepts of operations both

for chem, bio and radiological situations, and it details what you

do in each of those events, what kinds of notification you make.

Ms. NORTON. Who is the first person you would notify in this region?

Mr. JESTER. Arlington County. They are our first responder. And

then based on what we see we would be contacting the FBI.

Ms. NORTON. Who would be doing this contacting, the person in

the facility?

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Mr. JESTER. Our operations center. Let me back up a little bit.

We train our employees in the building. We give them training. For

example, we provide all of our employees with escape masks like

they have here in the Capitol. To get that escape mask they must

come to a training class where they are educated on the chemical,

biological or radiological threat and what they should do. And they

are also told on who they should contact. They contact our emergency number.

We also train our employees on evacuation procedures. We also

have an ability from our operations center to communicate to all

20,000 computers within a minute to say what is going on and

what people should do.

We exercise these procedures, these CONOPS that we have on

the chemical, biological, radiological; we exercise these measures

each year with Arlington County Fire Department. We have an exercise that’s called ‘‘Gallant Fox.’’ So there are procedures set up

for employees on who to contact and who we should contact.

Ms. NORTON. I’m with you so far as your emergency responders

are concerned, but as I look at your testimony between 10 and 1

you say ‘‘PFPA notified, local,’’ the various parties. Then you say

by 1 p.m. the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Homeland Security Operations, Postmaster General were all notified.

That is between 10 and 1. By 1 that is 3 hours. I do not even see

the National Capital Region Coordinator in here. Maybe somebody

told him along the line. I do not see anybody who was responsible

after the emergency responders were notified to then make sure

that there was proper notification given all over, and in fact the

Mayor of the District of Columbia and the county executives have

all complained about confusion in response. And part of the problem I am having is I don’t see that it has made any difference to

have a Regional Coordinator paid by the Federal Government in

this region, and I still don’t know who is in charge of this operation

once anthrax is suspected. There’s no question if there’s a fire, first

call the fire department, and that is what you had here, but after

that there may be something far larger going on and I am not clear

from your testimony or the other testimony where it goes after the

emergency responders are notified.

Mr. JESTER. Ma’am, what we do is we use what is called the

Washington Area Warning System. It’s an open telephone line. It’s

a system maintained by FEMA. When you pick up that telephone

line and give a message, we gave it three times that day.

Ms. NORTON. That should mean everything in the whole region

got it long before 1; that should mean instant notification if it’s an

open line.

Mr. JESTER. It was around 12, I don’t know the exact time.

Ms. NORTON. Why did it take so long? If it was an open line why

wasn’t there an immediate response, Roger, or whatever you say.

Mr. JESTER. Our first issue is we’re working with Arlington

County. That’s our first responder.

Ms. NORTON. I understand that. That’s the first thing you have

to do, and I will get to them in a minute. After that, since this may

be an anthrax attack, there may be some reason to tell the Congress and the White House, there may be a reason to tell God

knows who, I wouldn’t know who, therefore I would want somebody

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in the Federal Government who knows who to know and all I’m

trying to find out is after you call the emergency responders who

should we look to for leadership on this issue so that everybody

knows to relate to that person.

Mr. JESTER. We utilize the instant command system. We have a

unified command. We follow the National Incident Management

System on who is in charge of the event. The Washington warning

system also goes to over 80 organizations.

Ms. NORTON. It was just pointed out, in your testimony, you say

there is no way to confirm that all local, State and Federal agencies, this is what you’ve testified, heard the Washington Area

Warning System message. So there’s no way for them to say Roger,

got you.

Mr. JESTER. There is no way of verifying.

Ms. NORTON. That isn’t technology. That’s what you could have

done 100 years ago virtually. Mr. Jester, it is not you alone. We

have a problem far larger than you. I’m just trying to figure out

how it works.

Chief Schwartz, did you want to clarify how this communicating

worked?

Chief SCHWARTZ. A couple of points. One is that the National

Capital Region Coordinator is not an operational position. While

his role is to assist——

Ms. NORTON. I’m fully aware of that but for him not to know,

what’s the point? Let’s get rid of him them.

Chief SCHWARTZ. I’m getting to that. The way that the system is

supposed to work is that initial notification and response is made,

and then the jurisdiction in which the incident is occurring establishes their emergency management system. They may open their

emergency operations center.

Ms. NORTON. Say that again. Who establishes?

Chief SCHWARTZ. The local jurisdiction. In this case, originally

Arlington. When Fairfax had their incident they did the same

thing. They are opening their local emergency operation center.

That becomes the conduit from the incident scene, through the

local jurisdiction, and possibly, and in this case this was done, to

the State. The State is notified of the incident. It has an awareness

for what’s going on. The State, if they feel the need to notify the

Federal Government, they can do that. Normally that occurs when

we are requesting additional resources, when we are requesting

something that is not available.

Ms. NORTON. Chief Schwartz, you are dealing with how a local

official would normally through the chain of command up to his

Governor handle this matter. But what we in Congress have to

worry about is that anthrax is not a local or State concern. Once

you are talking about anthrax you are immediately talking about

a major Federal concern. You did the right thing. In fact, if anything the reports about Fairfax and Arlington or even D.C., which

wasn’t as closely involved, were that they responded appropriately.

But anthrax is a national concern. It involves a Federal matter.

And I cannot yet figure out after you did your job, which was making sure, one, that you got there, and, two, that you located everybody who should have been notified in your jurisdiction. Still the

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tion and knowledge about how to deal with anthrax is supposed to

reside and I can’t find out who is in charge.

I don’t know if it’s DHS. I don’t know if it’s the Pentagon. I don’t

know if it’s the National Capital Region Coordinator. I don’t know

if it’s the Department of Homeland Security, somewhere in the

bowels of that organization. I don’t know if it is the Postal Service,

which is a Federal agency. I don’t know who Mr. Jester is supposed

to relate to. He’s just in one agency. And at this point I can’t figure

that any of you know as well.

Chief SCHWARTZ. The answer is it’s the local authority. The Federal Government does not take control even of anthrax.

Ms. NORTON. But we are not talking about control. You see, I’ve

got to make sure we understand what we’re talking about.

Chief SCHWARTZ. Because the issue you’re talking about is notification.

Ms. NORTON. I’m not talking about notification in the local or

county sense.

Chief SCHWARTZ. I know but here’s the point that I was going to

make, and this touches on something that Mr. Jester just mentioned. There is no reliable system in the National Capital Region

where a jurisdiction can make a notification about an incident and

be assured that everybody who has a need to know in fact gets that

information.

Ms. NORTON. That really is all I need to know. The fact is that

Mr. Jester has testified that this Washington Area Warning System message open line was used. And yet he did not know, or he

is not able to say in his testimony that such primary actors as the

actual operation center, you are talking operation, he cannot say

for sure. He can only say for sure that their operations center at

Homeland Security knew by 1 p.m. We are talking about 10 a.m.

when all of this began, whatever the local officials were doing. And

all reports are they were doing—they handled their own internal

protocols appropriately. What we can’t understand is how the Federal Government was not itself coordinating its appropriate response.

Mr. Schaenman, you have looked at this matter in terms of the

actors who were involved. As I have indicated, I’m not concerned

about the emergency response because they have tested and rehearsed and they are just there when there is an event. But once

they get there we are talking about anthrax. What in the world are

they going to do? Anthrax has to go some place to be verified.

Somebody has to say, I’m in charge here, everybody relate to me.

And I would be very interested in what you found and where you

think the flaws were, who you think might have been in charge or

should have been in charge and what you’d recommend.

Mr. SCHAENMAN. Your question actually raises a whole bunch of

issues. It’s not a single simple thing. As the chief was saying, the

actual incident was managed very well. There was unified command. In the face of uncertainty, the hard issue here was was it

or wasn’t it anthrax. So that drove a whole lot of things.

Ms. NORTON. Let me stop you there. So when the two chiefs go

and the question is was there or was there not anthrax, what can

they do? What can they do? Was it or was it not anthrax? What

can two chiefs doing their jobs do?

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Mr. SCHAENMAN. I think what happened early in the process,

and, chiefs, tell me if this wasn’t true, is the public health, the

county level public health authorities get notified and start talking

to each other and making medical decisions.

Ms. NORTON. Did your men and women go to the site?

Chief SCHWARTZ. Yes. To the Pentagon, yes.

Ms. NORTON. When you got there what could you do?

Chief SCHWARTZ. We immediately, recognizing the situation, notified our Office of Emergency Management. They operate our

emergency management system. They have the connections

throughout the local government. They immediately notified our

local Public Health, who has a direct and statutory relationship to

State Public Health because there is no Federal Public Health.

Ms. NORTON. What did they do about the substance or the part

of the facility where it was thought that anthrax was suspected?

What could they do about that? Here is where I’m trying to see the

relationship between the Federal Government and the State authorities.

Chief SCHWARTZ. What they’re doing is they’re working with the

folks on the ground, in this case at the Pentagon and I presume

at the Fairfax facility also. They’re working with Federal law enforcement personnel.

Ms. NORTON. Do either Fairfax or Arlington have facilities for

testing?

Chief SCHWARTZ. No, we rely——

Ms. NORTON. No matter what you can’t test.

Chief SCHWARTZ. We have some minimal field testing capabilities

to give us some indication as to what we may be dealing with. That

was not necessary here although there were a number of those

tests done.

Ms. NORTON. Let me go to Mr. Schaenman and then I will go to

the chairman, who has been very gracious. The point I have been

trying to establish is that making their very best, even heroic efforts, when it comes to anthrax, local emergency responders are at

the mercy of somebody who can test to see if there is anthrax. I

don’t care how good they are, that is not their job. That is why I’m

interested in the relationship between the local responders here,

two counties that acted appropriately, and what looks to be the

only entity that can get at whether or not we have a homeland security emergency. And Mr. Schaenman and I know Chief Neuhard

also wanted to say something on that. So I would like your responses.

Mr. SCHAENMAN. The information flowed very fast, very early.

NCR did know about it. NCR did participate in disseminating

waves of information. It was not the only route.

Ms. NORTON. So who was in charge?

Mr. SCHAENMAN. So the people in charge of the incident, dealing

with the incident were the local authorities.

Ms. NORTON. Here we go again. I know that. I’ve just established

they can’t do anything. They don’t know what it is. They are doing

their jobs. Who’s in charge of everybody here? They’re fine, so is

everybody else fine. Mr. Jester has done what he’s supposed to do.

He said he’s talked on his little phone and said hey out there, anthrax, anthrax, but nobody answers him back because that’s not a

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part of the protocol. That’s what I’m trying to find out. Who is in

charge, who should be in protocol?

Mr. SCHAENMAN. There’s one set of protocols that deal with disseminating the information about an emergency. There’s a different

set of protocols that deal with dealing with the action. It goes into

the public health sector. The public health people who are alerted

at the local, State and national level, it was going in waves. So lots

of people are readied, resources were being readied to move drugs

but until the incident gets beyond the local governments it

doesn’t——

Ms. NORTON. Who’s in charge, Mr. Schaenman, who’s in charge?

Mr. SCHAENMAN. The local agencies are in charge. I mean, the

incident commanders are in charge. There’s a medical answer also.

Ms. NORTON. Well, that’s certainly not acceptable. It’s not that

your answer isn’t acceptable. It’s truthful, but it’s not unacceptable

to us that local authorities are in charge of a major homeland security national event.

Yes, sir.

Chief NEUHARD. There are through the incident management

system very clear lines of authority and through State law and

Federal law. The problem is as that escalates, as we asked for increased resources, which we do. And in this case we would need resources, there are Federal authorities that have very specific authorities on that scene and they would come integrate with us and

we ask them for assistance in certain areas.

We had two different incidents here with two different sets of

problems. The problem became that while we knew at the incident

scene who the Federal representatives were and what they were

doing and how they integrated with the system, as you moved

away from the incident site and the sample is taken to the lab, we

knew where it was going, and the scientists within the Federal

Government and the agencies within the Federal Government became to bear on the problem, it then was a question by the localities.

We know who the responsible agencies are here, but we’ve got a

lot of people talking and confused with no single clear point of contact about where this information should come back to the locality.

And you’re exactly right, we are slaves to that and that is a problem.

The incident management system provides the answer to that,

but that assumes that the plans that are in place identify who the

lead authorities are in that case. At the local level and the State

level it says for the type of emergency who is supposed to be there.

And the national response plan, if operated, is supposed to define

that as well.

Ms. NORTON. Who does it say is supposed to be there? Who does

it say is supposed to be the lead authority in this region in the

event of an anthrax incident of the kind we had at the Pentagon,

for example?

Chief NEUHARD. I cannot answer that clearly for you, Ms. Norton. It will have to be asked to Federal authorities.

Ms. NORTON. The chairman says why not. If you don’t know,

Chief Neuhard, since you clearly understand what is supposed to

be at your level it is because there is not clarity at the Federal

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level about who is in charge. I mean, if we have established nothing else here today, we have established that there is nobody in

charge when there is an anthrax event, that there is plenty of information flowing, and that really scares me because information

flowing from multiple sources is as confusing and perhaps more

confusing than no information, and I think the way it began, Mr.

Jester, was the right way to begin. But it seems to me that little

fixes here could help. It began apparently with you using this

Washington Area Warning System message. That message could

have been received not only by everybody and may have been but

by, quote, whoever is in charge. But the first thing to know is how

do you report back that you have gotten it and how do you know

that whoever is in charge, this mystery person, has gotten it, so

that we know that all of the action that is then supposed to take

place is then taking place. I’m assured that at some point it was,

but everybody reported confusion, and that confusion begins and

ends with no point of responsibility and accountability for an anthrax attack in this region, and that is something that we’ve simply got to straighten out.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I go to staff to ask some questions, Mr. Jester,

are you involved with the anthrax vaccine program?

Mr. JESTER. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So would the Force Protection Agency—define to me

what the Director of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency means.

You are in charge of the building?

Mr. JESTER. I’m in charge of the security for the Pentagon reservation and other DOD office buildings in the National Capital

Region that are not military reservations; for example, leased commercial buildings around the metropolitan Washington area. We

perform a function that is very similar to the U.S. Capitol Police

at this location.

Mr. SHAYS. So in the end are you agreeing with Ms. Norton that

we really don’t know who is in charge of anthrax?

Mr. JESTER. No, sir. We are all guided by the National Incident

Management System, which establishes a process on who is in

charge——

Mr. SHAYS. If you don’t agree then, don’t tell me we all are. Tell

me who is in charge.

Mr. JESTER. There is an incident commander. There is a process

described in the National Incident Management System. It describes an incident.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there a person with a name that is in charge overall? Who is that person? I see two heads shaking.

Mr. JESTER. It would depend on the nature of the incident. It is

scenario driven, whether it is a law enforcement incident or whether it’s a fire/rescue incident or whether it is a public health incident.

Mr. SHAYS. Anthrax. We’ll take anthrax. Who’s in charge?

Mr. SCHAENMAN. The local public health director.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t believe the local public health director can go

into the Pentagon and take charge. I don’t believe it.

Chief SCHWARTZ. And one of the things that the State and local

after action report does point to is the fact that the public health

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dimensions; that is, the release of prophylaxis for those employees,

was not well coordinated.

Mr. SHAYS. You said ‘‘and’’ like you were going to give me some

information. I said I don’t believe that the public health director

can in fact take charge, can take command in the Pentagon and

you started to say ‘‘and.’’ What does ‘‘and’’ have to do with it? Are

you agreeing or disagreeing that’s true? Do you think the public

health director can take charge? Can she tell Rumsfeld what to do?

Chief SCHWARTZ. No. But I’m saying by NIMS and by the National Response Plan she is supposed to be able to.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So in theory the national public health director

has jurisdiction, except that we learn from Dr. Schafer that DOD

has separate requirements and basically plays by separate rules.

So what is the point of your telling me that the health director has

jurisdiction and is in charge when in fact they haven’t been in

charge? They aren’t in charge, and they probably never will be in

charge.

Chief SCHWARTZ. Well, I think that things have changed a lot in

the last couple of years, but I would also say with all due respect,

sir, that’s the purpose of these kinds of hearings is to get to the

bottom of that and perhaps resolve some issues that we are unable

to resolve.

Mr. SHAYS. I basically view you as the good guy here in the sense

that you are trying to help us sort that issue out, and I appreciate

it. But it just seems to me we could just have someone without 30

minutes of questioning, if someone could say what it is and we

don’t have to do this kind of probing. I’m wondering why we have

to do this kind of probing.

The bottom line is nobody is in charge in essence or there is a

real disagreement as to who’s in charge or that everybody’s in

charge therefore nobody is in charge. I mean, that would start us

in this process.

Mr. JESTER. From the standpoint of the Department of Defense,

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr.

Winkenwerder, was our immediate public official, and he’s the one

that made the decision. He contacted CDC right away to talk about

what he was facing. He was facing a situation where he had a positive test even though it was flawed but it was not known at the

time. He had mail that was there for 5 days and he had 236 employees that were very concerned for their safety. So he made that

decision, he made the public health decision.

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s just take what you said, Dr. Winkenwerder, he

basically notified CDC. Did he notify the health director?

Mr. JESTER. The local health director? Arlington County Public

Health Director?

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not going to help you out as to who that would

be. Did he?

Mr. JESTER. He did not notify directly the Arlington County

Health Director. He talked to them later in the day.

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s stop right there. Chief Schwartz, you are telling

me who’s in charge?

Chief SCHWARTZ. I’m telling you by statute in Virginia the local

public health director has that authority, including on the PentaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:20 Oct 14, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00184 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23142.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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gon reservation. Now that did not happen in this incident, but that

doesn’t diminish the fact that is the law in the State of Virginia.

Chief NEUHARD. Mr. Chairman, I would say that in our incident

in Leesburg Pike that did occur.

Mr. SHAYS. What is that?

Chief NEUHARD. That did occur, where our Public Health Director was the incident commander, decided when that building was

going to be opened again based on the information provided to her,

decided whether prophylaxis was going to be given to other building occupants. Now if the DOD went beyond that with their people

that was their business, but very clearly in that case it was clearly

our Public Health Director that was in charge after our initial response.

I would also say that in past histories where we have had chemical releases in buildings that have been occupied by Federal agencies we have taken control and command of those buildings. The

problem comes when you get to a facility that is federally owned

and not leased, such—in our case such as the CIA. Then it is a

Federal reservation and we do support their operations.

Mr. SHAYS. So in my lingo support means don’t take control, you

just help them?

Chief NEUHARD. In most cases that is correct, sir. If it is on their

land under their control then we support their operations. If they

are in a position where they are in State or local lands, we very

clearly take command and control and introduce our particular response plans to that. The incident commander will be the lead. It’s

defined. And if I were at the CIA ultimately there would be a Federal person that would be the lead on that incident, even though

I would be in a unified command structure and providing my services at that incident under the National Incident Management System.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, that is fine and that is appropriate

because we are talking about the difference between a Federal

property where you are preempted if the Federal Government so

desires. And this facility was just an ordinary office building, isn’t

that true, and there were other people in there even besides—the

Pentagon facility was not a Federal facility, isn’t that right? It was

an office building?

Chief NEUHARD. Skyline was not a Federal facility.

Ms. NORTON. It was not a Federal facility. So you understand we

are not talking about preempting the State government. Indeed, I

have to tell you that the D.C. government here pretty much had

a very central role here even though we were talking about a Federal facility. So nobody would preempt you in an ordinary office

building in the State of Virginia. What concerns us is that, for example, as with September 11th, you could have these incidents

breaking out all over, No. 1. And that is their modus operandi by

the way. That is exactly what they try to do, what you know they

did do on September 11th, at least when they were using airplanes

as weapons. That’s the first thing.

The second thing is that with a biological attack it is particularly

important that at some level the Federal Government certify

whether or not there has in fact—such an attack has occurred,

every bit as much as if that attack had been on an office building

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owned by a developer in downtown Washington. At some point the

Federal Government would have to assure us that a biological attack had or had not occurred. So really all that we are asking

about when we say ‘‘is not in charge,’’ is not preempting the State

officials who know better than the Federal officials could possibly

know what to do in their own jurisdictions, but making sure that

as with our questioning about certified laboratories, and so forth,

with the prior panel that we are assured that we are not under attack, because if we are under attack Virginia may be the site but

it is the United States of America that is under attack. Therefore,

somebody in the Federal sector, particularly where all the information is—yes, there’s a lot of information in public health departments, but that’s why you pay taxes, for the Federal Government

to come to grips with all of this.

So I just wanted to make that distinction that I do not think the

chairman or I are talking about preempting the State of Virginia

and you acted absolutely appropriately, but we do think the Federal Government should have somehow understood its appropriate

role.

Mr. SHAYS. I am having trouble understanding who’s on first and

who’s on second. I’m trying to sort out if there was a fire at the

Pentagon, would the local fire department do that or would that be

the Pentagon that would deal with the fire and then they would

call in and who would have command.

Chief SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, we can reply September 11th

again and the attack on the Pentagon. It was the local authority

that had all command and control for that incident.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you agree with that?

Mr. JESTER. Yes, sir, he was the incident commander.

Mr. SHAYS. See, I can almost understand it in reverse. I can almost understand that if the Pentagon had its own force they would

be in charge because it is localized and they would ultimately,

whatever consequence is localized. But I begin to be very uneasy

if the Pentagon acts like China within the United States and there

is a break out of SARS—I’m using that as somewhat an absurd example, but a biological problem that could go well beyond the confines of the Pentagon.

Now I realize anthrax isn’t contagious so it is not maybe the best

analogy, but when it’s a health issue I have a greater appreciation

that it has to be more than the Pentagon that is involved, and

what I am left with and I will leave this hearing with a weird feeling that we really don’t know who’s in charge and that’s very unsettling to me. And no one here is basically telling me—in theory

you are telling me, Chief, that it is the health director but in practice you said it isn’t. So then I don’t know who’s in charge.

Chief SCHWARTZ. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think that

is only with regard to the Pentagon. This is the third incident of

anthrax that we have experienced in the National Capital Region

or the northern Virginia area since October 2001, November 2003,

and a couple of weeks ago at the Pentagon, and we learn more each

time we deal with these. I would submit that there is no kind of

response that we deal with in this country with regard to terrorism

where a systems approach to dealing with it is more required than

a biological incident. There are not—because what I will tell you

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is when the incident is confined to a specific site it is very easy to

determine what command and control system, what set of resources you’re going to apply to that, how you reach out for that

next set of resources.

In a biological incident that spans—that knows no jurisdictional

boundaries, and even in an anthrax incident the ones we went

through before caused difficulties because the people that work at

the Pentagon work in Maryland, they work in the District and they

work in Virginia.

Mr. SHAYS. So anthrax could still be on their clothes and they

could carry it out?

Chief SCHWARTZ. Anthrax could be in all those jurisdictions and

three different public health authorities might have to manage

their components of that incident.

Mr. SHAYS. So let me just be clear. In this incident, the Health

Director in the Pentagon did not take command?

Chief SCHWARTZ. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. And was notified in the beginning, others were?

Chief SCHWARTZ. Our Public Health Director was notified very

early because again the system works such that the first responders arrive on the scene, recognize the problem, reach back through

our communications mechanisms to activate our emergency management system, our emergency managers say to Public Health

this involves you, this is not the traditional public safety responders by themselves, you’re involved here.

Mr. JESTER. In our operations center we have the Arlington

County Deputy Police Chief, we have the Public Health Office, and

we have the Office of Emergency Management, all within our office.

Mr. SHAYS. And who is in charge?

Mr. JESTER. From the public health standpoint? It was just the

Secretary for Health Affairs. He made the decision on the issue of

antibiotics. The decision about isolating the areas was done initially by my personnel. When the incident first occurs, we secure

the location. We are in charge. And again it is scenario driven. We

have many exercises and, like Jim said on September 11th, many

times the Arlington County Fire Department is the incident commander, in fact in many cases are the incident commander. But in

the National Response Plan it talks about incidents of national significance. And from our operation of this event, it was looked at as

a local event. There was no decoration that we know of, that I

know of where it was declared an incident of national significance,

which would then have made DHS come in. If that declaration had

been made, DHS would have had a leading control.

Mr. SHAYS. We are not talking about DHS. We’re talking the director of health in the area. And even then we did not have—that

person was not in charge. That’s all.

Each of us are doing—I mean, if I got blamed for all the inefficiencies of Congress because I’m a Member of Congress I would be

pretty unhappy, and I am not blaming any of you but where I have

a little bit of lack of patience it just seems we could have described

this scenario a lot sooner and not taken so long.

In the end we know there is a lack of knowledge of who is in

charge, not in terms of theory but in practice, and I would also say

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even in theory I don’t believe the Secretary of Defense believes that

the Health Director is in charge. I don’t believe that for a minute.

I do not think there is anything that would indicate that DOD in

general thinks that the Health Director is in charge. At any rate

I don’t even know where this hearing is going to go because I don’t

know if anybody is going to pay any attention. I think DOD is

going to keep doing what it does.

I will just say, Mr. Jester, my sense of concern just goes back to

hearings years and years ago when we were asking about the anthrax vaccine program. And we said the way we were doing it was

an experimental drug and the courts said yes, it was an experimental drug and stopped doing it, but we basically court-martialed

people. We saw people from the National Guard go out. And even

though the court said this was illegal, the Pentagon basically said

we do not care. We are going to keep going on.

So there is a lack of credibility when I hear the word ‘‘anthrax,’’

whether it is vaccines or who’s in charge here. I just think DOD

is going to do whatever the hell it wants, and I don’t think it’s

going to be in our Nation’s best interest.

Mr. JESTER. Sir, I think except for the situation of public health,

we’ve had September 11th, we’ve had other exercises there, we’ve

had other incidents there, and we’ve always followed the National

Incident Management System. We do not want to operate independently because we need our partners in the local communities.

Mr. SHAYS. I think it would be good to sit down with the Health

Director.

Mr. JESTER. And we will. Like I said, there are things we felt

that, well, there are some things we need to work on, and that’s

one of the areas that we have to have some discussions.

Mr. HALLORAN. Dr. Statzenbach, I just want to ask if you heard

the CDC testimony in the first panel. Did they describe any of the

research that you are advocating in your testimony? Did you hear

that any of it was underway or planned?

Dr. STETZENBACH. It is my understanding that CDC is working

with Dugway in an experimental room to do the very research that

we published on a couple years ago.

Mr. HALLORAN. Twenty years ago?

Dr. STETZENBACH. No, no. We published a couple papers in 2004

using an experimental room where we released an anthrax

simulant and tested different sampling methods. They are now

moving forward with that research in Dugway.

Mr. HALLORAN. Replicating your research?

Dr. STETZENBACH. I don’t know if they’re doing simulants or

they’re doing the actual anthrax. That’s something we can’t do in

my laboratory. But our lab started off with some of that work.

We’re currently not doing it now.

Mr. HALLORAN. Anything else that you heard that would meet—

the research you’re advocating, did you hear anything else that is

planned or underway?

Dr. STETZENBACH. There’s a tremendous amount of research that

needs to be done. As I was listening to the gentlemen here, it

struck me that we can’t lose sight of the fact that all of these different groups have a different focus. The first responders as they’re

called to a scene their question is, is there a threat. The public

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health officials want to know if there has been exposure and a resulting adverse human health effect. Law enforcement wants to

know who did it and how can they gather their forensic evidence.

And ultimately EPA wants to know what the scope of the contamination is so that they can get it cleaned up.

Each of those different groups right now has a different sampling

strategy and it is chaos when they all show up at the same place

at the same time.

Mr. HALLORAN. And I would suggest that each of them has different information needs in time. Whereas a fire is happening now,

this thing moves across time and space as it were. You know things

later that you would like to know now, which leads me to the next

question to the chiefs. In terms of handheld assays or field tests

for anthrax or biological agents, what do you know about their capabilities now? What do you feel now? What are their limitations

and what realistically would you like them to be able to do?

Chief SCHWARTZ. A higher level of reliability is what we’re looking for. But as I mentioned in my testimony that I want to be real

clear with, we are not using a handheld assay or any kind of field

testing. We are not using any handheld devices, any field testing

to make clinical decisions. What we are looking to do is just manage the public anxiety when we’re confronted with an incident like

this, and when we’re dealing with that we’re dealing with it by

doing a threat assessment and in consultation with our public

health authorities.

So we want higher levels of reliability but it is hard for me to

imagine today a level of reliability or validity that would change

that portion of the response. We’re still going to be making tactical

decisions as a part of our incident management structure and consulting with Public Health to make those clinical decisions.

Chief NEUHARD. As I mentioned in my testimony, we are very

concerned about the reliability and the accuracy of what is available today on the market. We believe we need it and what we want

from it is for us to say yes or no, it is present, and do that with

probably 99 percent reliability.

Dr. STETZENBACH. And those data are not out there.

Chief NEUHARD. And they’re not there and that’s the problem.

But to say that they are not needed, we go through incidents, we

maintain people onsites, we go through emergency actions over

time because we don’t have that answer and that prolongs the anxiety of the community. It prolongs the use of resources and we need

a method that will allow us to do that. Now we keep getting closer.

The PCR is the closest thing we’ve got today, but it’s expensive. It

requires a lot of training and a lot of use, and we’re hoping that

some day there is a better technology.

Mr. HALLORAN. Just two more. Mr. Schaenman, who convened

those conference calls with 80 people on them?

Mr. SCHAENMAN. Some of them were, they were convened by the

Department of Homeland Security. NCR convened some of them.

There were others that were convened by counties.

Mr. HALLORAN. What was the point? What did they hope to

achieve?

Mr. SCHAENMAN. I think they were trying to inform everybody

where things stood. It wasn’t just one call. It was a series of calls,

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and people were occupied with the call and it would be time for the

next call. And they weren’t using technology that allowed people to

identify somebody who wanted to ask a question. It was a good

hearted ‘‘let’s tell everybody what’s going on.’’ The pendulum has

swung the other way, from everybody guarding information to too

many people spreading information. And the kernel of the information not being clear as to what test are you talking about, what

does it mean, what’s the timestamp on it? Am I hearing the same

thing three different ways? Is it a positive test? Is it a negative

test? What’s the interpretation?

So there was almost overcommunication in these incidents. And

people have called, all the State and local governments we interview have called, as Ms. Norton was suggesting, for a clearer protocol of who is responsible for sending the information beyond the

county or jurisdiction of origin where it first starts.

Mr. HALLORAN. Finally, Mr. Jester, it was described in an incident that local responders were coming up to a DOD facility and

they did not know what technology was being used inside. They

didn’t even know that any technology was being used inside. Is

that true elsewhere throughout this area? Can you tell us if it is

getting better?

Mr. JESTER. You’re talking about the Skyline 5 incident?

Mr. HALLORAN. Yes.

Mr. JESTER. We didn’t know there was technology that was being

used. It was purchased by the tenants in that office. They used it,

told no one except themselves, and so it confused Fairfax County.

It confused us.

Mr. HALLORAN. Was that the human error?

Mr. JESTER. I think what is happening is that offices are concerned for their safety and they see a lot of brochures and things

around and salesmen go around and try to sell things to them, and

they buy them probably carelessly. Hardware is no good without

concept of operations. If there is a device in a building, you need

to have someone who knows what they’re doing, how to use it.

There should be manuals there and they should be coordinated

with their local responders.

Mr. HALLORAN. Assuming for a moment that’s the outlier, can

you assure the committee that in DOD facilities not run by a contractor with technology that you don’t know about, that you have

made proper liaison with local officials so they know what’s there

when they get there?

Mr. JESTER. As far as we know, but what we’re going to need to

do is go out and survey. We have to go around to every office and

ask the question, do you have a device here and if you do where

is it, what is it, and in most cases tell them to shut it down until

we can find out what they have and whether it is worthwhile.

Mr. HALLORAN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to do a UC, and put into the record a

letter and support materials from Assistant Chief Alan Vickery of

Seattle, WA Fire Department. Without objection, so ordered.

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Mr. SHAYS. I would like to thank Bill Womack of Mr. Davis’s legislative staff for very valuable help preparing for this hearing.

I would like to thank the patient and wide awake court reporters. Thank you very much.

I would also like to thank Kristine Kathleen McElroy of my staff,

who has worked on this hearing, and to say that by the time the

court reporter gives us the transcript her name will be Kristine

Kathleen Fiorentino. McElroy is going to be history and it will be

Fiorentino. Congratulations on your wedding next week.

Without any more important business to do, let us adjourn.

[Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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