Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-ES-140 | October 7, 2020 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Lawrence T. Newman

Bradenton, Florida

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Estate of Al Katz, 

Deceased, 

and

Lawrence T. Newman

Appellant-Petitioner, 

v. 

Robert W. York, 

Appellee-Respondent. 

October 7, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-ES-140 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable James A. Joven, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D13-1009-ES-40244 

Tavitas, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-ES-140 | October 7, 2020 Page 2 of 21

Case Summary

[1] Lawrence Newman, pro se, appeals the trial court’s award of appellate attorney 

fees to Robert York (“Attorney York”), personal representative of the Estate of 

Al Katz (“Estate”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Newman raises numerous issues on appeal. We revise the issues as follows:

I. Whether Newman is entitled to raise arguments on 

behalf of beneficiaries to the Estate.

II. Whether Newman is entitled to raise arguments not 

presented to the trial court.

III. Whether the trial court properly ordered the appellate 

attorney fees to be paid to the Estate.

IV. Whether the trial court was biased and prejudiced 

against Newman.

V. Whether Newman properly challenges prior appellate 

court orders awarding appellate attorney fees.

VI. Whether the trial court properly awarded $167,437.50 

in appellate attorney fees.

VII. Whether the appellate attorney fee award violated 

Newman’s constitutional rights. 
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Facts

[3] This is the fourth appeal instituted by Newman or his wife, Beverly, regarding

the Estate of Al Katz (“Estate”). Beverly was Katz’s daughter, but Katz’s last 

will and testament “intentionally [left Beverly] nothing” due to an 

estrangement. In re Estate of Katz, No. 18A-ES-1721 (“Appellate Cause 1721”), 

slip op. at 2 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2018), trans. denied, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 

534 (2019). After Katz’s death in 2010, Beverly was appointed as personal 

representative, and Newman, an attorney, filed an appearance on behalf of

Beverly. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, suspended Newman in 

December 2011.1

 See In re Newman, 958 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. 2011). 

[4] In 2013 and 2014, Newman filed several motions for reimbursement of alleged 

administrative expenses. In 2015, the trial court removed Beverly as personal 

representative and appointed Attorney York to serve as the successor personal 

representative and attorney of the Estate. Under Appellate Cause No. 49A02-

1506-ES-642 (“Appellate Cause No. 642”), Beverly appealed the trial court’s 

order removing her, but this Court dismissed Beverly’s appeal on August 21, 

2015. On November 10, 2015, this Court denied Beverly’s petition for 

rehearing, and our Supreme Court denied Beverly’s petition to transfer.

[5] Newman continued filing claims and various pleadings in the Estate 

proceedings, and he filed another appeal under Appellate Cause Number 

1 Newman remains suspended.
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49A05-1710-ES-2475 (“Appellate Cause No. 2475”) regarding three of the trial 

court’s orders, including an injunction order. Attorney York filed a motion to 

dismiss, and on January 4, 2018, this Court entered an order which granted in 

part and denied in part Attorney York’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, this 

Court ordered Newman’s appeal from two of the trial court’s orders to be 

dismissed with prejudice, but denied the motion to dismiss Newman’s appeal of 

one of the trial court’s orders. On June 6, 2018, Attorney York filed a second 

verified motion to dismiss the appeal. On September 12, 2018, this Court 

granted Attorney York’s motion to dismiss the appeal, granted Attorney York’s 

request for appellate attorney fees, and remanded to the trial court to calculate 

the amount of appellate attorney fees. 

[6] On October 12, 2018, Newman filed a petition for rehearing. On November 19, 

2018, this Court denied Newman’s petition for rehearing and granted Attorney 

York’s request for additional appellate attorney fees. Newman then filed a 

petition to transfer, which our Supreme Court denied. Our Supreme Court 

granted Attorney York’s request for attorney’s fees and remanded to the trial 

court “to determine the amount of attorney’s fees the appellee is entitled to 

recover from the appellant related to the transfer proceedings.” Appellate 

Cause No. 2475, April 12, 2019 order.

[7] Meanwhile, the trial court issued an order on June 12, 2018, regarding the sale 

of certain property belonging to the Estate. In Appellate Cause No. 1721, 

Newman appealed the order and argued:
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Newman argues that Attorney York was wrongfully appointed 

because of his long-standing animus against [Newman]; that the 

trial court’s disparate treatment of [Newman] and Attorney York 

evidence bias; the trial court’s determinations that [Newman’s] 

administrative expense claims were dismissed or denied are 

erroneous; and that [Newman’s] administrative expense claims 

have statutory priority over federal and state tax claims.

Appellate Cause No. 1721, slip op. at 15. We affirmed the trial court and, 

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E), we concluded that Attorney York as 

personal representative was entitled to appellate attorney fees. We remanded

“to the trial court to determine the proper amount of the appellate fee award.” 

Id. at 18.

[8] Newman filed a petition for rehearing, which this Court denied. Newman then 

filed a petition to transfer, which our Supreme Court denied. Newman then 

filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court 

denied on November 18, 2019.

[9] Attorney York filed a petition with the trial court for a determination of 

appellate attorney fees. Attorney York detailed all of the appellate pleadings 

and proceedings and noted the following regarding Appellate Cause No. 2475:

34. In summary, Newman filed 320 pages of Motions, Briefs, 

Responses and the like, in addition to 599 pages of documents.

35. York in summary filed 193 pages of Motions, Responses, 

Briefs and the like, in addition to 366[ ]pages of documents from 

the record which had not been included by Newman.
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 125. Regarding Appellate Cause No. 1721, 

Attorney York detailed the pleadings and appellate proceedings and noted:

65. In summary, Newman filed 192 pages of Motions, Briefs, 

Responses and the like, in addition to 254 pages of documents.

66. York in summary filed 116 pages of Motions, Responses, 

Briefs and the like, in addition to 346[ ]pages of documents from 

the record which had not been included by Newman.

Id. at 128. 

In the Appellate Cases Newman filed a combined total of 512 

pages of Motions, Briefs, Responses and the like, in addition to a 

combined 853 pages of documents. In order to properly respond 

to Newman’s voluminous submissions, York was nevertheless 

required to file a combined total of 309 pages of Motions, 

Responses, Briefs and the like, in addition to a combined 712[ ] 

pages of documents from the record which had not been included 

by Newman.

Id. at 130. York requested that the trial court assess his fees at $375.00 an hour

for 453.20 hours. 

[10] Newman filed an objection to Attorney York’s request, and the trial court set 

the matter for hearing. Newman, however, did not appear for the hearing. 

Attorney Robert Zaban, a claimant in the Estate, appeared. With the trial 

court’s approval, Attorney York proceeded “in summary fashion.” Tr. Vol. II 

p. 8. Attorney Karl Mulvaney testified as an expert on Attorney York’s behalf 
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regarding attorney fees in the appellate matters. Attorney York reduced his 

requested fees by 6.7 hours pursuant to one of Newman’s objections. 

[11] The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon granting 

Attorney York’s petition for appellate attorney fees as follows:

7. The two Appellate Cases involved numerous and extensive 

filings by Newman, which went beyond the normal amount of 

briefing for appeals, and which required consideration of and 

responses by York. And, in addition to the initial briefing before 

the Indiana Court of Appeals, Newman sought rehearing, and 

then transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.

8. York expended 446.5 hours in providing reasonable, just, and 

successful appellate services to the Estate in the Appellate Cases, 

as documented in York’s Appellate Time Records.

9. A reasonable rate for York’s appellate services is $375.00 per 

hour.

10. The Estate thereby incurred York’s reasonable appellate 

attorney’s fees in the total amount of $167,437.50.

11. Pursuant to Orders of the Indiana Supreme Court and the 

Indiana Court of Appeals, this Court determines that the amount 

Newman should pay the Estate for the appellate attorney’s fees 

the Estate incurred as Appellee in Appellate Case No. 49A05-

1710-ES-02475 and Appellate Case No. 18A-ES-01721 is 

$167,437.50.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 92-93. Newman filed a motion to correct error, 

which the trial court denied. Newman now appeals.
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Analysis

[12] We begin by noting that Attorney York has not filed an appellee’s brief. When 

an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of 

developing arguments for the appellee, and we apply a less stringent standard of 

review. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We may 

reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, which is error at first sight, 

on first appearance, or on the face of it. Id. at 351-52. This rule relieves us of 

the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that 

burden properly rests with the appellee. Id. at 352. We are obligated, however, 

to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine 

whether reversal is required. Id. 

[13] We also note that Newman is proceeding pro se. We note that “a pro se litigant 

is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent 

leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 

N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “An appellant who proceeds pro se is held to the 

same established rules of procedure that trained legal counsel is bound to follow 

and, therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her 

action.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014), trans. denied, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 227 (2015). Although we prefer to 

decide cases on their merits, arguments are waived where an appellant’s 

noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes 

our appellate consideration of the errors. Id. Indiana Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief “contain the 
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contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent 

reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, 

statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on . . . .” 

We will not consider an assertion on appeal when there is no cogent argument 

supported by authority and there are no references to the record as required by 

the rules. Id. We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments 

that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood. 

Id. 

[14] Newman repeatedly argues in his appellant’s brief that he is entitled to relief 

pursuant to Article 1, Section 26 of the Indiana Constitution2 because the trial 

court “suspended the operation of applicable law.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 10, 13, 

15, 15 n.1, 17, 18, 28-29, 37, 41, 54, 57. Newman, however, cites no relevant 

authority on the application of Article 1, Section 26. Accordingly, Newman’s 

contentions regarding Article 1, Section 26 are waived for failure to make a 

cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 

764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the failure to present a 

cogent argument waives the issue for appellate review), trans. denied.

2 Article 1, Section 26 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “The operation of the laws shall never be 

suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly.”
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I. Service of Fee Petition on Beneficiaries

[15] The first issue is whether Newman is entitled to raise arguments on behalf of 

beneficiaries to the Estate. According to Newman, Attorney York failed to 

serve his fee petition on certain beneficiaries or interested persons and, thus, the 

trial court should not have considered the fee petition. Newman contends that 

the failure to serve the beneficiaries violated Newman’s constitutional rights

because the beneficiaries were denied “their right to object to York’s fees and 

participate in the hearing thereto, to Newman’s detriment.” Appellant’s Br. p. 

14.

[16] Although Newman was an attorney in Indiana, his license has been suspended 

since 2011. This Court previously informed Newman that he “may only pursue 

claims on his own behalf.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 94 (Appellate Cause 

2475, Jan. 4, 2018 Order). We again remind Newman that, as a pro se litigant,

he cannot assert claims on behalf of others. 

[17] To the extent Newman attempts to argue that the failure to serve the 

beneficiaries with the fee petition in some way impacts Newman’s 

constitutional rights, this argument is waived for Newman’s failure to make a 

cogent argument and for Newman’s failure to cite any relevant authority 

supporting the argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Loomis, 764 N.E.2d 

at 668 (holding that the failure to present a cogent argument waives the issue for 

appellate review).
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II. Waiver of Issues

[18] Newman next argues that: (1) Attorney York was not properly sworn in as a 

witness; (2) Attorney York’s fee petition was not properly introduced into 

evidence; and (3) Attorney Mulvaney’s expert opinion was inadmissible and 

insufficient. We afford a trial court broad discretion in ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence. Sims v. Pappas, 73 N.E.3d 700, 705 (Ind. 2017). We 

will disturb the trial court’s ruling only where the trial court has abused its

discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[19] We note that Newman did not appear for the hearing on Attorney York’s

petition for appellate attorney fees and that the trial court conducted the 

proceedings in a summary fashion. “Summary proceedings function to 

efficiently resolve disputes by allowing parties and the court to forego [sic] the 

use of formal rules of procedure and evidence and instead allow the court to 

base its findings and conclusions upon the arguments of counsel and limited 

evidence.” Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 739 (Ind. 2015). Our Supreme 

Court has required a timely objection to summary proceedings. See id. at 741 

(holding that, “if Father did not want to proceed summarily and believed that a 

full evidentiary hearing was necessary, that objection should have been raised at 

the time of the hearing”).

[20] Because Newman did not appear at the hearing, he did not object to the 

summary proceedings and did not object to the admission of any of the 

evidence he now argues was inadmissible. “Generally, a party cannot raise an 
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argument for the first time on appeal.” Anonymous, M.D. v. Hendricks, 994 

N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Accordingly, Newman has waived his 

contentions regarding the admission of this evidence.

[21] To the extent Newman argues that Attorney Mulvaney’s opinion was 

insufficient because his opinion was based on “baseless and irrelevant factors”, 

this argument goes to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 32. “[T]he lack of facts and reasoning, which may be brought 

out on cross-examination of the expert, goes to the weight to be given to the 

expert’s opinion, not its admissibility.” Summerhill v. Klauer, 49 N.E.3d 175, 

182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion.

III. Payment of Fees to the Estate

[22] Newman next argues that the trial court erred by ordering the appellate attorney 

fees to be paid to the Estate. Newman contends that the fees should have been 

ordered to be paid directly to Attorney York.

[23] The trial court appointed Attorney York as successor personal representative of 

the Estate, and Attorney York was also attorney for the Estate. As such, 

Attorney York was entitled to compensation for his services. Indiana Code 

Section 29-1-10-13 provides: “An attorney performing services for the estate at 

the instance of the personal representative shall have such compensation 

therefor out of the estate as the court shall deem just and reasonable.” (emphasis 

added). In each of the appeals, appellate attorney fees were awarded to the 
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Attorney York as successor personal representative of the Estate, not in his

individual capacity. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 29-1-10-13, those 

appellate attorney fees must be paid out of the estate, and accordingly, the trial 

court properly ordered Newman to pay the attorney fee award to the Estate, not 

Attorney York.

IV. Bias

[24] Newman argues that the trial court was biased and prejudiced against him.3 

“Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge are not sufficient reason to believe 

the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 

(Ind. 2018). We “credit judges with the ability to remain objective 

notwithstanding their having been exposed to information which might tend to 

prejudice lay persons.” Id. “The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and 

unprejudiced.” Id. “To overcome this presumption, the moving party must 

establish that the judge has personal prejudice for or against a party.” Id. 

“Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the 

judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before him [or 

her].” Id. “[P]rejudice must be shown by the judge’s trial conduct; it cannot be 

inferred from his [or her] subjective views.” Richardson v. Richardson, 34 N.E.3d 

696, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A party “must show that the trial judge’s action 

3 There is no indication that Newman filed a motion for the recusal of the trial court.
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and demeanor crossed the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced” that party’s 

case. Id. at 703-04. 

[25] In support of his argument that the trial court was biased against him, Newman 

contends: (1) in its order, the trial court called him “Newman” throughout the 

order rather than first calling him “Lawrence Newman”; (2) during the hearing, 

the trial court said it was “well aware of [Attorney York’s] credentials”; (3) the 

trial court noted in its order that Newman was a suspended attorney, 

“diminished the weight given to Newman’s legal position,” and “ostensibly 

intended to embarrass Newman”; (4) the trial court failed to discuss a long 

history of disputes between Newman and Attorney York; (5) during the 

hearing, the trial court asked Attorney Zaban if he had any questions for the 

witnesses; and (6) the case was withdrawn from the trial court pursuant to Trial 

Rule 53.1 on August 27, 2017, but remanded to the trial court by our Supreme 

Court on September 12, 2017. Appellant’s Br. p. 25.

[26] None of Newman’s allegations overcomes the presumption that the trial court 

was unbiased and unprejudiced. Rather, Newman’s allegations are frivolous 

and fail to demonstrate that the trial court’s “action[s] and demeanor crossed 

the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced” Newman’s case in any way; has 

personal prejudice for or against Newman; or expressed an opinion on the 

merits of the controversy before him. Richardson, 34 N.E.3d at 703-04; L.G., 88 

N.E.3d at 1073. Newman’s argument fails.
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V. Challenges to Prior Appellate Orders

[27] Newman repeatedly challenges the orders from our Supreme Court and this 

Court awarding Attorney York, as appellee in the appeals, appellate attorney 

fees. We remind Newman that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation 

of an issue where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same 

issue between the same parties or their privies by a court of competent 

jurisdiction.” Counceller v. Counceller, 810 N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

To the extent Newman seeks to relitigate the final orders awarding appellate 

attorney fees by our Supreme Court and this Court, those issues are barred by

res judicata.

VI. Appellate Attorney Fee Award

[28] Newman challenges the trial court’s award of $167,437.50 in appellate attorney 

fees. “We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of 

discretion.” River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 

(Ind. 2020). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision either 

clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or 

misinterprets the law.” Id. “To make this determination, we review any 

findings of fact for clear error and any legal conclusions de novo.” Id.

[29] Newman raises several challenges to the appellate attorney fee award. He 

contends: (1) the trial court applied the wrong legal standard; (2) the trial court 

awarded appellate attorney fees for time periods not covered by the orders 

awarding such fees; (3) the trial court awarded appellate attorney fees for time 
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that was not related to appellate work; (4) Attorney York’s claimed hours were 

“grossly-inflated”; and (5) the trial court should have sanctioned Attorney York

for his “documented perjuries, false statements under oath, gross overcharging, 

charging for matters not connected with Newman’s Appeals, and charging for 

matters not subject to the appellate court’s orders granting appellate attorney 

fees.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 38, 54.

[30] “In assessing what qualifies as a reasonable fee, trial courts have broad 

discretion in determining a fee award and may consider several factors.” 

Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 178 (Ind. 2019). “When 

evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney fee award, the starting point is the 

hours worked and the hourly rate charged.” Himsel v. Indiana Pork Producers 

Ass’n, 95 N.E.3d 101, 113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “The trial court may consider a 

number of other factors, including the responsibility of the parties in incurring 

the attorney fees and the judge’s personal expertise and knowledge.” Id. “In 

addition, a court may consider the factors listed in Indiana Professional 

Conduct Rule 1.5(a) governing the reasonableness of a fee for disciplinary 

purposes, but it is not required to expressly do so.” Id. at 113-14.

[31] At the hearing on Attorney York’s petition for appellate attorney fees, Attorney 

York presented evidence that he spent 453.20 hours addressing appellate issues. 

He conceded, based upon Newman’s response to his petition, that he 

improperly included 6.7 hours for addressing the petition to transfer in 

Appellate Cause No. 1721, for which Attorney York had not requested an 

award of appellate attorney fees. Accordingly, the trial court did not award 
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appellate attorney fees for those 6.7 hours. Attorney Mulvaney testified that: 

(1) an hourly rate of $375.00 per hour was reasonable; (2) a typical appeal 

usually costs a minimum of $30,000.00; and (3) the two appeals brought by 

Newman involved extraordinarily extensive, lengthy pleadings, including 

petitions for rehearing and petitions for transfer.

[32] In its order, the trial court found that: “[t]he two Appellate Cases involved 

numerous and extensive filings by Newman, which went beyond the normal 

amount of briefing for appeals, and which required consideration of and 

responses by York”; “York expended 446.5 hours in providing reasonable, just, 

and successful appellate services to the Estate in the Appellate Cases, as 

documented in York’s Appellate Time Records”; and “[a] reasonable rate for 

York’s appellate services is $375.00 per hour.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 92. 

We find no indication that the trial court used the wrong standard in assessing 

the attorney fees, as alleged by Newman.

[33] Newman challenges Attorney York’s claim of forty-two hours of work between 

October 26, 2017, and January 6, 2018, for Attorney York’s first motion to 

dismiss in Appellate Cause No. 2475. On September 12, 2018, this Court 

granted Attorney York’s second motion to dismiss the appeal, granted Attorney 

York’s request for appellate attorney fees, and remanded to the trial court to 

calculate the amount of appellate attorney fees. Our order did not limit the 

appellate attorney fees to those that addressed the second motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding appellate 

attorney fees for those forty-two claimed hours.
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[34] Newman also challenges the trial court’s award of appellate attorney fees for 

Attorney York’s claimed hours on September 26, 2018, for Appellate Cause 

No. 2475. Attorney York’s time entry for that date provides: “Consider and 

research regarding Motion to Reconsider Appellate Order. Research and 

memo regarding appellate attorneys’ fees. Review Beverly’s deposition. Work 

on Response to Motion to Reconsider.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 136. 

Newman claims that Beverly’s deposition did not relate to the appeal. At the 

hearing, Attorney York, however, testified that Beverly’s deposition related to 

the injunction, which was a subject of the appeal. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by awarding those appellate attorney fees.

[35] Additionally, Newman challenges 25.7 hours that Attorney York claimed 

between January 29, 2019, and February 5, 2019, for preparing a response to 

Newman’s petition for rehearing in Appellate Cause No. 1721. In our 

memorandum decision in Appellate Cause No. 1721, we held: “[W]e conclude 

that Attorney York as personal representative is entitled to appellate attorney 

fees, and we remand to the trial court to determine the proper amount of the 

appellate fee award.” Appellate Cause No. 1721, slip op. at 18. Newman then 

filed a petition for rehearing, which Attorney York responded to, and this Court 

denied the petition for rehearing. Our memorandum decision was broadly 

worded and did not limit the appellate attorney fee award; we cannot say the 

trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellate attorney fees for Attorney 

York preparing the response to Newman’s petition for rehearing.
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[36] Next, Newman contends that Attorney York spent too much time responding 

to several of Newman’s pleadings. Newman instituted several frivolous 

appeals; filed numerous, lengthy petitions at every opportunity; and has been 

generally overly-litigious. Given the number, length, and often rambling nature 

of Newman’s filings, we find Newman’s argument that Attorney York spent 

too much time responding to Newman to be unavailing. 

[37] Newman also argues that the trial court should have sanctioned Attorney York 

rather than awarding him appellate attorney fees. We see no indication that 

Newman requested such a sanction. Moreover, given Newman’s litigiousness

and the difficulty involved in addressing Newman’s filings, we find no 

indication that Attorney York’s requested fees were “obviously inflated,”

“shocking to the conscience,” or “grossly excessive” as Newman contends. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 54. Newman’s contention that the trial court should have 

sanctioned Attorney York fails.

[38] Attorney York’s requested appellate attorney fees were reasonable, and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Attorney York, as personal 

representative, $167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees. Although it is a large 

attorney fee award, it is warranted by Newman’s conduct. We note that 

“[g]ross abuse of the right to appellate review ‘crowds our court to the 

detriment of meritorious actions, and should not go unrebuked.’” Posey v. 

Lafayette Bank & Tr. Co., 512 N.E.2d 155, 156 (Ind. 1987) (quoting Marshall v. 

Reeves, 262 Ind. 403, 404, 316 N.E.2d 828, 830 (1974)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 

988, 108 S. Ct. 1292 (1988).
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VII. Constitutional Claims

[39] Finally, Newman contends that the appellate attorney fee award violated his 

rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana 

Constitution. 

[40] The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 

Similarly, Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “Excessive 

bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and 

unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned 

to the nature of the offense.” Newman seems to argue that the appellate 

attorney fee award is an excessive fine. Newman, however, cites no authority 

for the proposition that appellate attorney fees awarded in an estate matter,

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66, qualify as an “excessive fine” under 

either constitutional provision. This argument is waived for Newman’s failure 

to make a cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Loomis, 764 

N.E.2d at 668 (holding that the failure to present a cogent argument waives the 

issue for appellate review).

[41] Newman also argues that the appellate attorney fee award violates his rights 

under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

which provides: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Newman argues 

that the appellate attorney fees award was an excessive fine prohibited by the 
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Privileges and Immunities Clause. Newman, however, again cites no authority 

for the proposition that appellate attorney fees awarded in an estate matter 

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66 qualify as an “excessive fine.” This 

argument is waived for Newman’s failure to make a cogent argument. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Loomis, 764 N.E.2d at 668 (holding that the failure to 

present a cogent argument waives the issue for appellate review).

Conclusion

[42] The trial court properly awarded $167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees 

pursuant to multiple orders in Appellate Cause No. 2475 and Appellate Cause 

No. 1721. We affirm.

[43] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.