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“Jordan’s public line 

sounds congenial, but 

apprehension lies beneath 

the surface. There have 

been in fact innumerable 

Syrian efforts over the years 

to undermine the Jordanian 

monarchy, infiltrate the state, 

support Palestinian groups 

opposed to Jordan and, at 

one point, invade militarily.”

November 7, 2011

Jordan and the Current Unrest 

in Syria

Summary

•	 The Government of Jordan is deeply concerned about the turmoil in Syria, fearing the spillover 

effect and knowing Syria’s historic capacity to undermine Jordanian internal stability.

•	 Initial official Jordanian reaction has been cautious, to avoid antagonizing Syria and provoking 

retaliation.

•	 There is great anxiety over what may follow the collapse of the Assad regime. 

•	 Jordan is under increased pressure from both internal elements and external powers to 

toughen its public posture toward Damascus. 

•	 Ultimately, Amman will react carefully to events in Syria, taking actions that best ensure the 

security of the state and the survival of the monarchy.

Syria’s internal crisis is an issue of deep concern for Jordan. The country is worried about border 

security and potential Syrian military or intelligence moves against it if Syria perceives there is 

Jordanian support for Syrian dissidents. The core concern, however, is the uncertain impact events 

in Syria could have on Jordan. Consequently, the Jordanian government has been cautious in 

public comments—almost silent until recently—to avoid antagonizing Damascus. 

That may be changing. As Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have 

taken a more critical approach to the Assad regime, Jordan is challenged to reconcile its posture 

toward Damascus and the GCC. While it remains wary of its northern neighbor, it cannot afford 

to be at cross purposes with Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners, especially as it negotiates a closer 

relationship with the GCC. Meanwhile, domestic Islamic groups and others attack the government 

of Jordan for its timid position toward the Syrian regime’s brutality against its people. 

Jordan Has Reasons to Fear Syrian Retribution

Jordan has often found itself caught up in regional crises not of its own making but undermining its 

stability and threatening its survival. The current situation in Syria is but the latest such crisis. Publicly, 

all is well. “We feel that Syria and Jordan are more than just brotherly countries and there are mutual 

interests. . .,” declared Jordanian Senate President, Taher al-Masri, while visiting Damascus in April.

Jordan’s public line sounds congenial, but apprehension lies beneath the surface. There have 

been in fact innumerable Syrian efforts over the years to undermine the Jordanian monarchy, infiltrate the state, support Palestinian groups opposed to Jordan and, at one point, invade militarily.

Edward W. Gnehm, Jr.

E-mail: ambgnehm@gwu.edu

Phone: 202.994.0155

peaceBrieF114
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Jordan and the Current Unrest in Syria

page 2 • PB 114 • November 7, 2011

King Abdullah II’s ascendance to the throne coincided with Bashar al-Assad’s inauguration as 

President of Syria, offering a ripe opportunity for reconciliation between the two countries. The 

King often spoke of a new generation of Arab leaders, most notably including Assad,1 which would 

change the region. As events played out, he became increasingly disillusioned with Assad. He 

made repeated attempts to build a closer relationship, but differences on multiple issues thwarted 

those initiatives. Differing perspectives on the Arab-Israeli peace process, post-2003 Iraq, and 

ongoing Syrian support for terrorist groups complicated the relationship.

Even in the early years after Assad became President, cross border infiltration into Jordan continued. 

The Jordanians apprehended persons they identified as Syrian intelligence agents carrying arms and 

cash. Exchanges of gunfire resulting in deaths and injuries, though never admitted publicly, were all 

too common. The assassins of a U.S. diplomat in 2002 came from Syria, and Jordanian-born al-Qaeda 

leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his group were known to have contacts with Syrian intelligence.

Sensitivities along the Border

The Jordanian monarchy is exceedingly concerned about the Syrian regime’s efforts to destabilize 

Jordan’s domestic political environment. Growing unrest resulting from the Syrian regime’s repressive activities, especially its ruthless crackdown in Dara’a, could produce potentially destabilizing 

reverberations in the Hashemite Kingdom. The populations that live along the Syrian-Jordanian 

border are interrelated and have historic ties. Jordanians along the border would naturally aid their 

neighbors to the north. Any such support could well provoke Syrian retribution.

The Syrians have already accused Jordan of such cross border support. The Jordanian newspaper, Al-Sabil, reported Aug. 12, that the King had sent a secret envoy to meet with Assad due 

to “concern about the accelerating events in Syria and their potential impact on the Kingdom of 

Jordan.” The article said Assad “responded...with a sudden attack on Amman accusing Jordanian 

quarters of supporting revolution and the smuggling of arms and criminal elements across the 

border.” The envoy reportedly responded that “Jordan only wants to see stability prevail in Syria 

and that “‘Jordan has no interest in the continuation of the current chaos in Syria’.”

While difficult to document, there are certainly troubles along the border. A Sept. 18 Associated 

Press (AP) report, quoting “a Syrian asylum seeker,” states that Jordanian security forces have transferred 

60 Syrian army and police defectors from a compound near the border with Syria to a safer place.

Describing “a vicious attack on Jordan by official Syrian television,” Al Sabil reported that for 

weeks state-run television has alleged the existence of terrorist cells in Irbil and Ramtha that 

are smuggling weapons and telecommunication devices to demonstrators. (Western newspapers 

reported that citizens residing in the border area could communicate using Jordanian cell phones).

A Cautious Jordanian Public Position

Initial Jordanian public statements were cautious. Al-Sabil described the government’s response 

to Syrian accusations as “shy.” Clearly, the government did not want to provoke Damascus. Senior 

officials, therefore, spoke in support of Bashar’s call for reforms and urged the peaceful resolution 

of resistance demands. In April, Taher al-Masri “affirmed Jordan’s support for the reform steps 

undertaken by Syria” under Bashar.

Concern over Successor Regime in Damascus

Despite Jordan’s reticent public posture, it is profoundly concerned with what may follow 

the collapse of the Bashar regime. If religious extremists become dominant, as the Jordanian 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Jordan and the Current Unrest in Syria

page 3 • PB 114 • November 7, 2011

government fears, the new regime could well take hard-line positions on such issues as the peace 

proces—harkening back to the days when Syria was known for its “resistance” position. In short, 

while Jordan has its troubles with the current regime, its successor might be far more hostile than 

the Bashar regime on issues critical to Jordan.

Impact on Domestic Politics

The Jordanian establishment is acutely concerned over the potential impact of changes in Syria on 

Jordan’s internal situation. Multiple groups in Jordan are demanding political reform. Calls for revising the election law resulting in a significant increase in political power of Palestinian-Jordanians 

exacerbate internal demographic tensions. Additionally, calls for the election of prime ministers 

by Parliament rather than appointment by the King and demands for a constitutional monarchy 

threaten to seriously erode the monarchy’s political hegemony.

The successful overthrow of the current Syrian regime and establishment of a more democratic 

state will inevitably embolden democratic and reformist elements in Jordan. Several voices in 

Jordan are already criticizing the government for what they see as a “timid” response to events 

in Syria. A spokesman for the Jordanian Committee for Supporting the Syrian People, quoted as 

recently as Aug. 12, described the official Jordanian position as “hesitant and vague.” Some critics 

and advocates of reform are quick to attack the government on yet another front, hoping to 

convert public sympathy for the plight of Syrians resisting regime brutality into public support for 

renewed political pressure against the Jordanian monarchy. 

The Islamic Action Front (IAF) is among the most outspoken groups pressuring the government. 

Al-Sabil quoted Islamic leader Ali Abu-al-Sukkar in August as calling on the Jordanian government 

“to adopt a clear position on the ongoing bloodshed [in Syria].” He accused the government of 

being “silent about Al-Assad’s massacre” and called for the expulsion of the Syrian Ambassador. 

Jordanians who are concerned about the IAF’s influence in Jordan describe the IAF’s position as 

opportunistic. They may be correct; but the IAF calculates that the emergence of a Sunni dominated group in Syria will significantly enhance their position in Jordan. Naturally, the Jordanian 

establishment fears and deeply opposes IAF’s empowerment. 

A More Assertive Public Position

By mid-August the Jordanian government seems to have adopted a more critical and condemnatory posture toward the Syrian Government. In a sharp break from previous statements, Prime 

Minister Marouf al-Bakhit, speaking with his Syrian counterpart on Aug. 15, called for the immediate halt of military operations, speedy implementation of reforms, and exhorted the regime to 

“spare. . . the blood of the Syrian people.” According to Petra News Agency, al-Bakhit called for a 

“dialogue to guarantee the safety of the Syrian people and the security, stability and territorial 

integrity of Syria.” He noted “the mounting anger of people and governments across the world and 

their rejection of continued violence in Syria.” 

Even so, the IAF continued its attacks on the Jordanian government. IAF Secretary General 

Hamzah Mansour sent a letter to the prime minister on August 20, noting that the ongoing “daily 

massacres” by the Syrian regime against civilians “will cause a regional crisis that would affect 

Jordan.” He called on the government to recall its ambassador in Damascus and “issue an official 

objection to what is taking place in Syria.”

On Sept. 12, Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh reiterated “a call for an immediate end to the bloodshed in Syria and the need to begin political reform that meets the public’s demands,” signaling an 

apparent shift in the official Jordanian position toward Assad’s brutality. 
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About This Brief

This brief is part of a series 

examining the regional dimensions 

of Syria’s popular uprising. The 

Institute invited leading experts 

from the U.S. and the Middle 

East to identify key vectors of 

influence that Syria’s neighbors are 

bringing to bear on the conflict, 

to forecast how the situation there 

will affect the regional balance of 

power and to examine how the 

opposition and the Syrian regime 

are responding to these regional 

dynamics. Through its work, the 

Institute aims to provide analysis 

and tools for on-the-ground 

conflict management in support of 

political transitions across the Arab 

world. The series was edited by 

USIP’s Steven Heydemann, senior 

adviser for Middle East Initiatives, 

and Scott Lasensky, a senior 

program officer. Edward Gnehm 

is the Kuwait Professor of Gulf 

and Arabian Affairs at the George 

Washington University. 

The GCC Factor

What accounts for this shift in public remarks? Certainly, the Jordanian government perceives 

a growing international consensus against the Syrian government’s use of violence against its 

citizens. The monarchy also seeks to prevent its domestic critics from seizing the issue as a form of 

political leverage. 

External considerations also factor into the monarchy’s calculus. The king is ever sensitive to 

U.S. policy on unfolding events, as in Syria today. While concerns for domestic affairs remain 

paramount, Jordan is likely to be more vocal in its criticism of the Bashar regime as the U.S. public 

posture toughens. Saudi Arabia’s increased criticism of the Syrian regime and the dramatic action 

of three of the GCC states in recalling their ambassadors from Damascus heightens pressure on 

Jordan to take a more hard-line stance against the al-Assad regime.

The GCC recently announced that Jordan and Morocco would be invited to join the GCC. 

Jordan has long coveted membership in this organization and certainly anticipates badly needed 

financial support and employment opportunities for its citizens. It is also counting on significant 

GCC political support in a region where Jordan has often been isolated. In particular, Jordan’s 

ambivalent stance toward Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait created serious tension with Saudi Arabia 

and the GCC states. The King adamantly asserts that Jordan will never be in that situation again. As 

Jordanian rhetoric becomes more critical of the Syrian government, it reinforces the commonality 

of interests with the GCC.

In conclusion, Jordan has very little influence on events in Syria, but enormous stakes in its 

outcome. The King, as he considers Jordan’s response to the situation in Syria, will keep the survival 

of the state and the monarchy foremost in mind. Jordan will seek, to the maximum extent possible, 

to avoid antagonizing the Syrian regime and provoking retribution. The King will continue to 

monitor the positions of the U.S. and regional states, especially Saudi Arabia, in order to maintain 

the relationships that he has worked so hard to cultivate during the past decade. In the final 

analysis, however, he will take actions that best enable him to control his domestic environment.

Endnotes

1. All references to Assad or the Assad regime refer to that of Bashar al-Assad.

Jordan and the Current Unrest in Syria

page 4 • PB 114 • November 7, 2011