UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

OMAR JERMEL DIXON, a/k/a Omar  No. 03-4051 Jermal Dixon El, a/k/a Omar Jermal

Dixon, a/k/a Omar Germal Dixon,

a/k/a Omar Jermel Dixon-El, a/k/a

Omar Dixon-El, a/k/a "O Dixon,"

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CR-02-209)

Submitted: May 16, 2003

Decided: June 13, 2003

Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Brian J. Grossman, ECK, COLLINS & MARSTILLER, Richmond,

Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney,

Brian R. Hood, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Omar Jermel Dixon was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine ("PCP"), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He

appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on his drug

charges. We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges by determining whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Government, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United

States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). 

Dixon first challenges the evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction, arguing that the evidence, at most, showed a series of

buyer/seller relationships. To sustain its burden on the conspiracy

charge, the Government must show that a conspiracy existed, that

Dixon knew it existed, and that he knowingly entered into it. United

States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 1997). Circumstantial

evidence, including the defendant’s relationship with his coconspirators, the length of his association, his attitude, conduct, and

the nature of the conspiracy, may be used to prove the existence of

and participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Brown, 856 F.2d

710, 711 (4th Cir. 1988). When the evidence establishes a lengthy

buy-sell relationship coupled with substantial quantities of drugs, a

reasonable inference can be drawn that a conspiracy existed among

the parties to the buy-sell transaction. United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d

480, 485 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1993). 

In the instant case, the conspiracy was charged to have lasted over

four years, and there was overwhelming evidence that Dixon repeatedly bought and sold quantities of cocaine and crack cocaine and

worked with co-conspirators during that time period. For example,

Tony Johnson repeatedly bought crack cocaine from Dixon over a

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period of several years under a consignment agreement. In addition,

Leonard Pratt and Dixon pooled their money and bought up to half

a kilogram of crack cocaine from Paulette Bumbrey on several occasions, and Pratt and Dixon also shared certain customers, each supplying portions of the crack cocaine required. Further, Paul Ramsey

White purchased ounce-quantities of crack cocaine regularly from

Dixon from 2000-2001, and Dixon would sometimes front the drugs

to White. Based on the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient to show that Dixon conspired with Pratt, Johnson, Bumbrey,

White, and others to sell crack cocaine. 

Dixon next contends with regard to the substantive count that lay

testimony that the substance at issue was PCP was insufficient to

show that the substance was, in fact, phencyclidine. We have held that

"lay testimony and circumstantial evidence may be sufficient, without

the introduction of an expert chemical analysis, to establish the identity of the substance involved in an alleged narcotics transaction."

United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976). Such

circumstantial proof may include evidence of the physical appearance

of the substance, evidence that the substance produced the expected

effects when used by someone familiar with the subject drug, evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the subject

drug, and evidence that the substance was called by the name of the

subject drug by the defendant or others in his presence. Id. at 1221.

Although, in this case, the Government did not introduce an expert

chemical analysis as to the substance Dixon was charged with illegally possessing, David Haigler, Johnson and White testified that

Dixon possessed a bottle of liquid PCP. Haigler and White testified

to the effects in themselves and others after smoking the substance.

Johnson and White testified to large dollar amounts being associated

with the substance, and several witnesses testified that the substance

was called by its various street names by both Dixon and others in his

presence. Thus, we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish

that the substance in question was PCP or phencyclidine. See id. at

1223 n.8 ("[W]e take judicial notice that phencyclidine is commonly

known as ‘PCP.’"). 

Thus, we affirm Dixon’s convictions. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

UNITED STATES v. DIXON 3
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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