Filed 2/9/23 Ruiz v. Ruiz CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

MANUEL L. RUIZ, 

 Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant 

and Respondent, 

v.

MARIBEL RUIZ, 

 Defendant, CrossComplainant and Appellant. 

 

2d Civ. No. B315514

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2019-

00524937-CU-OR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Manuel L. Ruiz and his sister, Maribel Ruiz, are co-owners 

of residential property located at 1254 South K. Street in Oxnard 

(the Property). Manuel claims an 83.5 percent interest, while 

Maribel asserts an adverse 50 percent joint tenancy interest.1 

Manuel brought this action to quiet title to the Property

and for partition by sale and an accounting. Maribel cross1 For sake of clarity, we refer to the parties by their first 

names. No disrespect is intended.
2

complained for partition, appointment of a receiver and an 

accounting. The parties waived a jury. 

The trial court heard evidence regarding the legal effect of 

the recorded grant deeds and the allocation of the anticipated 

partition sale proceeds. A principal issue was the effect of a 

September 2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 7) purporting to transfer 

Manuel’s entire interest in the Property to Maribel. Finding that 

Manuel’s signature was forged and that “Maribel’s explanation, 

knowledge, or lack thereof, of the ‘Forged Deed’ was not credible,” 

the court ruled in Manuel’s favor. It determined he has an 83.5 

percent interest in the Property and that Maribel holds the 

remaining 16.5 percent. 

Maribel contends the trial court erred by failing (1) to 

correctly assess the parties’ respective ownership interests in the 

Property; (2) to correctly determine the parties’ obligations 

regarding the mortgage loan Maribel obtained to renovate the 

Property; (3) to apply the partition statutes to award Maribel 

compensation for those renovations; and (4) to consider whether 

the doctrine of ratification applies to Manuel’s conduct. Maribel 

further asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 

Manuel the $4,490 in costs he incurred in proving a fact she 

denied in response to his request for admissions. We affirm in all 

respects.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Property

The parties’ parents purchased the Property in 1971. 

Manuel, Maribel, and their siblings grew up in the home. 

In 1993, Manuel purchased his father’s interest in the 

Property. His mother later transferred her interest to him, 

giving Manuel sole legal title. 
3

In 2003, Manuel agreed to give Maribel a 33 percent 

interest in the Property if she obtained the funds to construct 

room additions. The parties recorded a grant deed to that effect 

in August 2003 (Trial Ex. 6), and Maribel applied for a mortgage 

loan in her name only. 

The parties hired a contractor, Omar Lara, to construct the 

addition to the Property. The existing one-story home was 

“roughly 1500, 1600, or 1900 square feet.” The renovation, which 

cost $161,000, resulted in a two-story, 3,000-square-foot home. 

Both Manuel and Maribel signed the construction contract. 

After the lender approved the $217,600 loan, Maribel 

executed a promissory note and deed of trust securing the loan 

(Trial Ex. 8). The deed of trust was recorded on September 25, 

2003. Earlier that same day, the September 2003 grant deed

(Trial Ex. 7) transferring Manuel’s entire interest in the Property 

to Maribel also was recorded. 

Manuel testified that he did not sign the September 2003 

grant deed and did not know of its existence until after it was 

recorded. After receiving the deed in the mail, Manuel 

confronted Maribel and “told her to go and fix these papers 

because they were very wrong.” 

Although Manuel did not know who signed his name to the 

grant deed, he testified that Maribel “knows who signed” it. 

Maribel, however, disclaimed any knowledge of the grant deed.

The trial court found that “Maribel’s explanation, knowledge, or 

lack thereof, of the ‘Forged Deed’ was not credible.” It noted that 

“Maribel closed the mortgage loan, borrowed the money for the 

room additions that she wanted, in her name alone, and she 

wanted the house for herself.” (Italics added.) 

Handwriting examiner Sheila Lowe testified that she 

analyzed the September 2003 grant deed, comparing it to 
4

Manuel’s known signatures. She concluded that the signature on 

the deed is “an unsuccessful attempt to simulate [Manuel’s] 

signature and, therefore, not genuine.”

Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the 

September 2003 grant deed “is a forgery” and is therefore “void 

ab initio.” 

In February 2004, Maribel executed and recorded a grant 

deed transferring her interest in the Property to herself and 

Manuel as joint tenants (Trial Ex. 9). Given that the September 

2003 grant deed was deemed “void ab initio,” the trial court 

determined Maribel held only the 33 percent interest previously 

granted to her by Manuel (Trial Ex. 6). The court found that the 

February 2004 grant deed divided that 33 percent interest in 

half, giving both Maribel and Manuel a 16.5 percent interest as 

joint tenants. 

The trial court concluded that Manuel had established, by a 

preponderance of the evidence that, as of June 14, 2019, he has 

an 83.5 percent interest in the Property (67 percent as sole owner 

plus 16.5 percent as a joint tenant), and that Maribel has a 16.5 

percent interest as a joint tenant. 

B. Mortgage Loan

The mortgage loan proceeds were distributed as follows: 

“$12,772.00 to creditors of Maribel; $10,559.88 for closing costs; 

and $194,268.12 to Maribel.” Maribel paid for the home 

renovation from those funds and also made the monthly 

mortgage loan payments. For “about a year,” Manuel and their 

brother Lionel each gave Maribel $100 a month toward the loan. 

When Maribel moved out in 2012, she stopped making the loan 

payments. Manuel then started making the payments, believing 

he would lose the Property otherwise. 
5

The trial court rejected Maribel’s assertion that Manuel 

agreed to pay 50 percent of the mortgage loan payments and 

therefore owes her $87,144.52. It noted that “[a]ny alleged 

agreement to pay 50% of this loan is not memorialized in a 

writing signed by the parties, and is unenforceable under the 

Statute of Frauds, as the loan here is a 30-year term and . . . ‘by 

its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making 

thereof.’ (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(1).)” 

The trial court granted Manuel’s claim for reimbursement, 

finding he is entitled to recover the payments he made on 

Maribel’s mortgage loan between April 1, 2012 and April 1, 2021. 

C. Judgment

The judgment allows Manuel to purchase Maribel’s 

“interest in the Property at fair market value, via a receiver . . . , 

or other method as agreed upon by the parties;” and provides that 

the gross sale proceeds shall be divided in accordance with the 

parties’ respective ownership interests. In addition, Maribel is 

charged with the mortgage loan payoff amount, the $59,353.89

owed to Manuel for mortgage loan principal payments and the 

$54,000 owed to Manuel for mortgage loan interest payments. 

Should these charges result in a negative number, Manuel is 

entitled to a money judgment “for the amount of that shortfall.” 

D. Costs of Proof Award

During discovery, Manuel propounded requests for 

admission to Maribel, in which he asked her to admit: 1. “The 

signature purporting to [b]e that of Manuel Ruiz on the Grant 

Deed recorded in the Official Records of Ventura County as 

Instrument number 20030925-0364570 is a forgery.” Maribel 

responded by stating: 1. “Responding party lacks sufficient 

information to admit or deny this request for admission and 

therefore denies it.”
6

Maribel’s denial of the request required Manuel to prove 

the issue at trial. After he prevailed, Manuel moved for costs of 

proof in the sum of $4,490. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420.)2 The 

trial court granted the motion and awarded Manuel “$4,490 in 

costs associated with the proof of the denied request for 

admissions.” The court found that the “claimed costs are 

reasonable” and that Maribel had failed to establish “one of the 

grounds listed under [section 2033.420, subdivision (b).]” 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of 

decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de 

novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of 

review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this 

deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally 

construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all 

reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v. 

Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981; see Fladeboe v. American 

Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 59-60.

“An appellate court has no right to retry a case on the facts. 

Our whole duty as to the factual showing is to determine whether 

there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier 

of fact even though there is contrary evidence equal to, or even 

greater than, that which favors the trial court’s decision. We 

cannot weigh the evidence, or pass upon the credibility of the 

witnesses. If we reach a conclusion that there is substantial 

evidence to support a judgment or order we must affirm it 

(Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439), even though we 

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise stated. 
7

might have reached a contrary conclusion . . . if we had been the 

triers of fact below.” (Kallman v. Henderson (1965) 234 

Cal.App.2d 91, 96-97 (Kallman); In re Michael G. (2012) 203 

Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)

We review “an interlocutory judgment of partition [for]

abuse of discretion.” (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 

589, 596-559.) Under that standard, “[t]he trial court’s 

‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary 

and capricious.’ [Citation.]” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 

145, 159.) 

We review an order granting fees and costs fees under 

section 2033.420 for abuse of discretion. (Laabs v. City of 

Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1275-1276; Wimberly v. 

Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 637, fn. 10.)

B. Maribel Has Not Demonstrated that the Trial Court

Abused Its Discretion by Partitioning the Property

Maribel contends the trial court erred by failing to consider 

the partition statutes in its ruling. She cites section 872.140,

which states: “The court may, in all cases, order allowance, 

accounting, contribution, or other compensatory adjustment 

among the parties according to the principles of equity.” Maribel 

claims she was entitled to compensation for enhancing the 

Property’s value through the home renovation.

It generally is true that a cotenant who improves real 

property is entitled to contribution from other cotenants and, on 

partition by sale, is entitled to reimbursement for those 

expenditures before division of the proceeds among the property 

owners. But the parties can agree otherwise. (See, e.g., Milian v. 

De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1194 (Milian).) 

In Milian, the trial court declined to order an accounting 

and reimbursement “because it found an agreement between the 
8

parties to own and divide the property equally irrespective of the 

exact dollar contributions of each party to the purchase price or 

to the subsequent improvement, maintenance, or preservation of 

the property.” (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1194.) The 

court found that the parties were competent to make such an 

agreement and that the “critical question on appeal is whether 

the court’s finding of such an agreement is supported by 

substantial evidence.” (Ibid.)

Here, the trial court found “Manuel agreed to grant Maribel 

a 33% interest in the Property in exchange for Maribel’s 

monetary investment in the Property for the construction of room 

additions,” and “had [the August 2003] grant deed drawn up for 

this purpose.” Maribel contends the trial court misconstrued the 

effect of the August 2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 6). Instead of 

granting her a 33 percent interest in the Property, as found by 

the trial court, Maribel claims the deed granted her sole title to 

33 percent of the Property plus a 50/50 joint tenancy interest 

with Manuel in the remaining 67 percent. We are not persuaded. 

Grant deeds generally are interpreted in the same manner 

as contracts. (Civ. Code, § 1066; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz

(1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 521.) “The interpretation of a written 

instrument, even though it involves what might properly be 

called questions of fact [citation], is essentially a judicial function 

to be exercised according to the generally accepted canons of 

interpretation so that the purposes of the instrument may be 

given effect. [Citations.] Extrinsic evidence is ‘admissible to 

interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it 

is not reasonably susceptible’ [citations], and it is the instrument 

itself that must be given effect. [Citations.].” (Parsons v. Bristol 

Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866.) 
9

The parties agree the grant deed’s language is ambiguous 

in that the grant is from Manuel to “MANUEL L. RUIZ, a single 

man, and MARIBEL RUIZ, a single woman with the 33%, all as a 

joint tenant.” (Italics added.) It is undisputed Maribel did not 

previously have an ownership interest. 

Manuel testified that he and Maribel had agreed to the 33 

percent interest and that he instructed the notary public who 

prepared the grant deed “to add 33 percent for my sister, and 

that’s it.” No other explanation was given for the words “a single 

woman with the 33%.” 

As for the words “joint tenant,” the trial court correctly 

noted that a joint tenancy cannot exist where, as here, the parties 

were accorded unequal interests. (Yeoman v. Sawyer (1950) 99 

Cal.App.2d 43, 45-46; Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 1185 at 

p. 1195 [“[B]y definition joint tenancy ownership means equal 

ownership”]; see Civ. Code, § 683, subd. (a) [“A joint interest is 

one owned by two or more persons in equal shares”].) Given the 

parties’ unequal ownership interests, we conclude substantial 

evidence supports the court’s finding that Maribel had received a 

33 percent interest in the Property as a tenant in common with 

Manuel. (See Yeoman, at pp. 45-46.)

We also are not persuaded by Maribel’s argument that the 

contract for the renovation establishes the parties’ intent to own 

the Property 50/50 as joint tenants. Both Manuel and Maribel 

signed the contract, thereby agreeing to pay for the renovation

costs, but the contractor, Omar Lara, testified that all the 

renovation costs were paid by Maribel. This evidence supports 

the trial court’s finding that Manuel and Maribel agreed she 

would receive a 33 percent interest in the home in exchange for

payment of the renovation costs. 
10

C. Maribel Has Failed to Demonstrate that the Trial

Court’s Ruling on the Statute of Frauds Defense

Constituted Prejudicial Error

Maribel testified that Manuel had orally agreed to pay 50 

percent of all the mortgage loan payments. The trial court 

rejected this testimony, citing the statute of frauds. It concluded 

that “[a]ny alleged agreement to pay 50% of this loan is not 

memorialized in a writing signed by the parties, and is 

unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, as the loan here is a 

30-year term and . . . ‘by its terms is not to be performed within a 

year from the making thereof.’ (Civ. Code, § 1624[, subdivision] 

(a)(1).)” 

Maribel argues this was error because Manuel did not 

assert the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense in his 

answer to her cross-complaint. As Manuel points out, however, 

Maribel did not allege the existence of an oral agreement in her 

cross-complaint. Since the claim first arose during her trial 

testimony, Manuel appropriately asserted the defense at that 

time. 

Maribel does not contend the trial court’s application of 

Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(1) to the claimed oral 

agreement is incorrect. Rather, she asserts the court committed 

reversible error by failing to “address[] the issues raised by its 

usage” of the statute of frauds defense, and to “examine[] the 

legal and/or factual basis of that usage, and whether any 

exception applied.” 

A statement of decision requires an explanation of the 

factual and legal bases of the court’s decision on the principal 

controverted issues at trial; the court is not required to address 

every question. (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 
11

1509, 1530-1531; Hellman v. La Cumbre Golf & Country Club

(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.) 

But even if we assume the trial court erred by failing to 

issue a more detailed statement of decision regarding its 

application of the statute of frauds, such error “is not reversible 

per se, but is subject to harmless error review.” (F.P. v. Monier

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) Under this standard, the appellant 

must demonstrate that the error was prejudicial. (In re Marriage 

of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337; F.P., at p. 1114 [It 

“‘is not error, or at least, . . . not a prejudicial error’” where the 

trial court’s failure to make a finding on an issue “‘could make no 

possible difference in the result’”]; Citizens for Open Government 

v. City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 308 [“[A]ppellant 

bears the burden to show it is reasonably probable he or she 

would have received a more favorable result at trial had the error 

not occurred”].) 

Having made no attempt to demonstrate prejudicial error, 

Maribel has forfeited the issue as a basis for appellate relief. 

(Vought Construction Inc. v. Stock (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 622, 

630, fn. 7; Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824, 829, 

fn. 4.) Among other things, Maribel complains the trial court 

failed to consider the “numerous exceptions” to the statute of 

frauds, but she does not identify those exceptions or explain how

their consideration would have made a difference in the outcome.

D. Maribel has Not Demonstrated the Trial

Erred by Rejecting Her Ratification Defense

Maribel contends the trial court erroneously failed to 

consider her ratification defense. Maribel raised this contention 

in her objections to the proposed statement of decision. The trial 

court overruled the objection, evidencing its consideration of the 

issue. 
12

“Ratification is the voluntary election by a person to adopt 

in some manner as his own an act which was purportedly done on 

his behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to some or all 

persons, is to treat the act as if originally authorized by him.” 

(Rakestraw v. Rodrigues (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73 (Rakestraw).) 

Maribel claims Manuel “accepted [her] actions in obtaining 

the loan and renovating the residence and by doing so he ratified 

the use of the September 2003 Grant Deed, the loan, the 

construction contract and the renovation, and his responsibility 

to pay for it all.” (Italics omitted.)

We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

finding that Manuel did not ratify the forged September 2003 

grant deed. As soon as he became aware of that deed, he 

demanded that Maribel restore his name to title. There was no 

finding that Manuel believed the mortgage lender relied upon the 

forged deed. 

“Ratification can only occur where the person ratifying has 

full knowledge of the facts.” (McNulty v. Copp (1949) 91 

Cal.App.2d 484, 492.) That did not occur here. This case is not 

like Rakestraw, where the wife knew the lender had relied upon 

and she benefited from the forged promissory note and deed of 

trust yet she took no action to remedy the situation until the 

lender filed suit three years later. (Rakestraw, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 

p. 71.) 

In addition, the trial court found that Maribel’s testimony 

regarding her knowledge of the September 2003 grant deed, i.e., 

the forged deed, was not credible and that she “closed the 

mortgage loan, borrowed the money for the room additions that 

she wanted, in her name alone, and she wanted the house for 

herself.” These factual findings, which are supported by 

substantial evidence, are inconsistent with Maribel’s ratification 
13

defense. We are bound by these findings, particularly as they 

involve credibility. (Kallman, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at pp. 96-

97.) 

E. The Trial Court Properly Found That

Maribel Has a 16.5 Percent Interest in the Property

Maribel claims the trial court erred when it determined, 

based upon the February 2004 grant deed (Trial Ex. 9), that she 

now has only a 16.5 percent ownership interest in the Property. 

Despite what either party intended, that grant deed on its face 

transferred Maribel’s interest in the Property to herself and 

Manuel as joint tenants. The question is what exactly was her 

interest at that time.

The prior grant deed in the chain of title – the September 

2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 7) – granted Maribel exclusive title to 

the property. The trial court found that the grantor’s signature 

had been forged. “‘[A] forged document is void ab initio and 

constitutes a nullity; as such it cannot provide the basis for a 

superior title as against the original grantor.’ [Citations.]” 

(Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, 380.) 

The trial court determined that because the September 

2003 grant deed was void ab initio, it did not transfer any 

property interest to Maribel. Instead, the court looked to the 

prior deed in the chain of title – the August 2003 grant deed 

(Trial Ex. 6) – which granted Maribel a 33 percent interest in the 

Property pursuant to her agreement with Manuel. The court 

determined that was Maribel’s property interest at the time she 

executed the February 2004 grant deed.

Maribel maintains the February 2004 grant deed gave her 

and Manuel 50/50 joint tenancy title. That may have been the 

case if the September 2003 grant deed had not been declared void 

ab initio. Without that deed in the chain of title, the trial court 
14

properly looked to the prior grant deed in the chain. That deed 

granted Maribel a 33 percent interest, which was divided in half 

by her grant in the February 2004 grant deed. Maribel has not 

demonstrated that the court erred by finding Manuel has an 83.5 

percent interest in the Property (67 percent as sole owner plus 

16.5 percent as a joint tenant), and that Maribel has a 16.5 

percent interest as a joint tenant. 

F. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

by Awarding Costs of Proof to Manuel

Maribel contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

granting Manuel’s request for the $4,490 expended in proving 

that the September 2003 grant deed (Trial Ex. 7) is a forgery. 

Section 2033.420, subdivision (a) provides: “If a party fails 

to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any 

matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the 

party requesting that admission thereafter proves the 

genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the 

party requesting the admission may move the court for an order 

requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the 

reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including 

reasonable attorney’s fees.” 

Maribel argues that (1) Manuel’s declaratory evidence was 

insufficient to establish that he incurred $4,490 in costs to prove 

the forgery, (2) Manuel should have moved to compel a further 

response to the request for admission before seeking costs, (3) 

Maribel had a reasonable basis for believing she would prevail on 

the forgery claim and (4) Maribel had a good reason for failing to 

admit the request because she had yet to file an answer to 

Manuel’s complaint. 

We are not persuaded by these arguments. We agree with 

the trial court that the $4,490 cost of proving the forgery was 
15

reasonable given Maribel’s denial. Manuel had to retain a 

handwriting expert, who testified at trial, and his attorney had to 

prepare for and present that defense. 

The attorney’s declaration itemizes the costs incurred in 

proving the defense: $2,600 in expert fees for consultation, 

analysis and trial testimony, and $1,890 in attorney fees (5.4 

hours at $350 per hour). The declaration amply supports these 

relatively modest expenses. 

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his

costs on appeal. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.*

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J. 

YEGAN, J. 

* Judge of the Ventura Superior Court assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

constitution.
16

Jeffrey G. Bennett, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Law Office of Michael A. Morrow, Michael A. Morrow, on 

behalf of Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant. 

Christina Vanarelli, Inc., Christina Vanarelli, on behalf of 

Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent.