### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No

. 18

- 1266 J OHN V ERGARA , et al

. , Plaintiff s

- Appellants ,

v.

C ITY OF C HICAGO , et al

. , Defendants

- Appellees

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division.

No. 1 5

- cv

- 02407

— Andrea R. Wood , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 17 , 201 9

— D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 30, 2019

____________________

Before M ANION , S YKES , and B RENNAN , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. John Vergara, Carlos Ruiz, and Jose Garcia filed a civil

- rights lawsuit against the City of Chicago and Chicago P olice O fficers John Dal Ponte, Boonserm Srisuch , and Perry Nigro

. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit as untimely. The plaintiffs asked the district judge to equitably estop the defendants from raising the limitations defense, claiming that the officers intimidated them into silence.2 No. 18

- 1266

The judge dismissed the suit in a minute order saying she would later file an opinion explaining her reasons

. The promised opinion came almost two years later, and the plaintiffs then appeal ed

. U nder the Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, entry of judgment for appeal purposes

occurr ed 150 days after the judge’s minute order, see F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(a)(7)(A), and the 30

- day time to file a notice of appeal ran from that date , s ee Walker v. Weatherspoon , 900 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 2018). T he appeal was therefore woefully late.
The defendants noted the un timeliness problem in their docketing statement , but th is filing too was quite l ate . O ur circuit ’s rules require the appellee to identify erro rs in the appellant’s docketing statement within 14 days. 7 TH C IR

. R. 3(c)(1) ; see Hame r v. Neighborhood Hous

. Servs

. of Chi

. , 897 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). The defendants missed that deadline by about six months.
After disentangling this procedural web, we decline to dismiss the ap peal. T he defendants’ objection to the Rule 4(a) violation came too late under Circuit Rule 3(c) (1)

. But the suit is untimely , and o ur precedent forecloses the plaintiffs’ equitable estoppel theory. We affirm. I. Background This case comes to us from a dismissal on the pleadings,

so we accept the following facts from the plaintiffs’ complaint as true

. See Price v. City of Chi cago , 915 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2019). In September 2011 Chicago Police Officers Dal Ponte, Srisuc h , and Nigro stopped and searched the plaintiffs without justification and t ook t hem to Homan Square , a notorious police warehouse that was later exposedNo. 18

- 1266 3

as a den of police misconduct

. There the officers interrogated the plaintiffs for eight or nine hours , omitting Miranda warnings and ignoring their repeated requests for an attorney. The plaintiffs were denied food, water, and access to a bathroom , and t he officers tried to coerce false confessions from them. The officers also thre atened to file false charge s against the plaintiffs if they told anyone about their mistreatment at Homan Square

. T he plaintiffs were released only after they agr eed to keep quiet about what had happened . O ver the next two weeks, the officers told the plaintiffs they “were watching” them

. F ear ing for their safety , the plaintiffs did n o t seek legal redress for th is police m isconduct

. In early 2015 the Guardian newspaper ran an expos é on Homan Square , and a t that point the plaintiffs felt secure enough to speak to an attorney. I n March t he y sued the City and the three officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a raft of constitutional violations. But t h e suit came three and a half years after the ir detention , so th e defendants moved to dismiss i t as untimely under the applicable two

- year statute of limitations

. On March 31, 2016 , t he district judge issued a minute order dismiss ing the suit “[f]or the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order to follow.” The judge issued her opinion almost two years later , on January 31, 2018 , together with a Rule 58 judgment

. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 58(a). O n February 6, 2018 , the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal and docketing statement

. By the n, however, the time to appeal had long since expired

. A notice of appeal is due 30 day s after entry of the4 No. 18

- 1266

judgment or order appealed from, but when the district court omits a separate Rule 58 judgment , “entry” occurs 150 days after the judgment or order is entered on the court docket

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(a)(7)(A). Here t he judge d ismiss ed the case by minute order entered on March 31, 2016. By operation of Rule 4(a)(7)(A), th at order was deemed “entered” for appeal purposes 150 days later, and the time to file a notice of appeal expired 30 days after tha t

. On August 17, 2018 , the defendants filed their docketin g statement noting the un timeliness problem and moved to dismiss the appea l

. We directed the parties to brief the dismissal motion with the merits

. II. Discussion We begin by untangling the procedural snarl. Under Rule 4 (a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure , the plaintiffs had to file a notice of appeal within “ 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(a)(1)(A)

. Rule 4 ( a) also specifies how to calculate the date of “entry.” For most civil judgments, including this one, the date of entry is the earlier of (1) the day “the judgment ... is set forth on a separate document” in accordance with Rule 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or (2) “150 days ... from entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket. ” F ED

. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(7)(A).

T he February 6, 2018 notice of appeal was clearly untimely under these rules

. The judge dismissed the case by minute order on March 31, 2016

. Her opinion explaining her reasons came two years later

— on January 31, 2018

— along with a Rule 58 judgment . Because of this unusual ga p , the dismissal order’s date of entry was 150 days after March 31, 2 016

— orNo. 18

- 1266 5

August 29, 2016

. The plaintiffs had 30 days from that date to appeal

. The notice of appeal came a year and a half later. The question is whether th e plaintiffs’ procedural misstep requires dismiss al of the appeal. Rule 4(a) is not jurisdictional, bu t it is a mandatory claim

- processing rule , s ee Walker , 900 F.3d at 356 , which means that it “must be enforced” if it is “properly invoke d , ” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi. , 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017)

. Still, we have emphasized that “[t]he ‘properly invoked’ qualifier is important, for a litigant may ... forfeit the benefit of these rules.” Walker , 900 F.3d at 356. That’s exactly what the plaintiffs accuse the defendants of doing

. The plaintiffs argue that the d efendants forfeited their objection by failing to comply with our circuit rules. Circuit Rule 3(c)(1) requires that if an appellant ’s docketing statement “is not complete and correct, the appellee must provide a complete one to the court of appeals clerk w ithin 14 days after the date of the filing of the appellant’s docketing statement.” T he defendants didn ’t comply with this deadline. They delayed fil ing t heir corrective docketing
statement until August 17 , 2018

— six months after the plaintiffs filed theirs

— only then drawing our attention to the

un timeliness problem.
We think t he plaintiffs have a good point about forfeiture. Cf. Walker , 900 F.3d at 357 (holding that parties can waive arguments through docke ting statements); Hamer , 897 F.3d at 840 (holding the same )

. As a “time limitation found in a procedural rule,” Circuit Rule 3(c) (1) is a claim

processing rule. In re Wade , 926 F.3d 447 , 449 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). We may enforce

our rules through waiver and forfeiture doctrine

. See Walker ,6 No. 18

- 1266

900 F.3d at 357 (“Enforcing waivers and forfeitures gives litigants incentives to explore issues themselves rather than wait for the court to do the work. It is best to have defects dete cted in time to dismiss the appeal without the need for briefs and argument.”).

T he defendants forfeited their Rule 4(a) objection by missing the deadline specified in Circuit Rule 3(c) (1)

. The rule gave them 14 days to correct the record if the plaintiffs’ docketing statement wasn’t “complete and correct.” And the plaintiffs’ docketing statement wasn’t correct. A d ocketing statement must include “ [ t ] he date of entry of the judgment ... sought to be reviewed.” 7 TH C IR . R. 28(a)(2)(i). The plaintiffs incorrectly reported the date of entry as January 31, 2018. As we’ve explained, t he correct date of entry i s August 29, 2016. Under Circuit Rule 3(c) (1) , the defendants had to correct the record within 14 days. They waited six months. That’s enough for fo rfeiture. To be sure, we can suspend our rules for “good cause.” 7 TH C IR . R. 2. So Circuit Rule 3(c) (1) isn’t a mandatory claim

processing rule like Rule 4(a). See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert , 139 S. Ct. 710, 714 (2019) (stating that whether a claim

- processing rule is mandatory turns “on whether the text of the rule leaves room for ... flexibility”). But the defendants haven’t given us good cause to suspend the rule

. Disrupting an otherwise orde rly appeal with an untimely objection in the middle of briefing is a proper ground to enforce forfeiture

. By not following our rules, the defendants ’ objection “just complicated the appeal.” Walker , 900 F.3d at 357

. We de ny the motion t o dismiss the appeal

. That brings u p the merits. We review a dismissal order de novo. Ochoa v. State Farm Life Ins. Co. , 910 F.3d 992, 994No. 18

- 1266 7

(7th Cir. 2018). “ [ A ] motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with the statute of limitations should be granted only where the alleg ations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.” Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc. , 770 F.3d 610, 613

– 14 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs ’ complaint fits th at description . Indeed, the plaintiffs don’t dispute th at their lawsuit is untimely

. T hey instead invoke equitable estoppel , which bars a limitations defense if “the defendant took active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time, such as by hiding e vidence or promising not to plead the statute of limitations.” Lucas v. Chi. Transit Auth. , 367 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and alteration omitted)

. To raise equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must actually and reasonably rely on the othe r party’s actions

. Rager v. Dade Behring, Inc. , 210 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs contend that p olice intimidation can justify equitable estoppel. We have repeatedly disagreed: “ [ A ] threat to retaliate is not a basis for equitable estoppel

. ” Beckel v. Wal

- Mart Assocs

. , Inc. , 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002 ); accord Shanoff v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs ., 258 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2001 ). “To allow the use of retaliation as a basis f or extending the statute of limitations would ... distort the doctrine of equitable estoppel.” Beckel , 301 F.3d at 624. The plaintiffs’ theory

— that the officer s’ threats intimidated them into silence until the Guardian ’s exposé provided “a newfound sense of security”

— suffers from the same deficiencies as other retaliation claims

. Most importantly , it would significantly expand our equitable

- estoppel doctrine without a limiting principle . It allows retaliatory threat s to8 No. 18

- 1266

indefinitely exte nd the time to sue. But the protection offered by equitable estoppel ends when “the circumstance giving rise to the estoppel is removed.” Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of Chi. , 275 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 200 1 ). The problem with the plaintiffs’ argument is r eadily apparent: T h ey contend that the officers’ threats, which stopped two weeks after the alleged constitutional violation s , tolled the limitations period for the next three and a half years

. Statutes of limitations “serve the important purpose of encouraging the prompt filing of claims and by doing so of enhancing the likelihood of accurate determinations and removing debilitating uncertainty about legal liabilities.” Shanoff , 258 F.3d at 703 (quotation marks omitted). Extending equitable estoppel to th is case would permit plaintiffs to avoid the limitations period for § 1983 claims indefinitely by alleging a n episode of official intimidation. We cannot endorse such an expansi on of the doctrine

. See id. at 702(“[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that we must seriously recognize and apply statutes of limitations.”)

. In short, the suit is untimely, equitable estoppel does not apply, and the judge was right to dismiss the case

. A FFIRMED