U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

76–688 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–601 

NATO: CHICAGO AND BEYOND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 10, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Binnendijk, Dr. Hans, vice president for research and applied learning, 

National Defense University, Washington, DC ................................................. 47 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Brzezinski, Ian, senior fellow, the Atlantic Council; principle, the Brzezinski 

Group, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 39 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Gordon, Hon. Philip H., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .............................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Response to a question submitted for the record by Senator James M. 

Inhofe ............................................................................................................. 65 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Richard 

G. Lugar ......................................................................................................... 65 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Kupchan, Dr. Charles A., professor, Georgetown University; Whitney 

Shepardson senior fellow, Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, DC ..... 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 32 

Townsend, James J., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European 

and NATO Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC .................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Richard 

G. Lugar ......................................................................................................... 66 

Response to a question submitted for the record by Senator Tom Udall .... 69 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey, Jr. ....................................................................................................... 69 

(III)

(1) 

NATO: CHICAGO AND BEYOND 

THURSDAY, MAY 10, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Corker, Risch, 

and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Thank you all very much for being here this morning. I apologize 

if we are starting a moment or two late. 

By way of process, I have a conflict at about 10:30, about 10:25. 

Senator Shaheen, who is the chairman of the European Affairs 

Subcommittee, will chair the hearing from that point forward. And 

I appreciate everybody’s understanding of that. 

Yesterday, the committee had the opportunity to have a very 

healthy and broad discussion with Secretary General Rasmussen, 

and he laid out for us the general expectations of the summit and 

the road forward as we continue to define NATO’s new parameters. 

This is our fourth hearing on NATO since 2009 and that’s no 

accident. I think all the members of the committee share the belief 

that the alliance remains vital to American security and its 

effectiveness as an institution deserves our continued focus and 

attention. 

But needless to say, that focus has changed. Europe has changed. 

The world has changed. And later this month when the allies meet 

in Chicago to discuss its future in Afghanistan and elsewhere, a lot 

of that redefining will be on the table. 

So this summit is about how do you make NATO stronger and 

how do we learn from our shared experiences. In my judgment, 

NATO is—and I think this is a shared judgment—a fundamental 

element of our national security and its organization demands critical analysis in order to meet the evolving threats of our national 

security. 

One thing is pretty clear about NATO. It has already confounded 

its skeptics. From Bosnia to Kosovo, from Afghanistan to Libya, the 

alliance has demonstrated an ability to adapt to the post-cold-war 

security environment. Obviously, we have had our challenges in 

both Afghanistan and Libya, but we have learned from them. 

2 

The signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement by President 

Obama last week signaled the gradual transition from a war-fighting posture to a supportive role, and NATO’s commitment to the 

people of Libya in the past year has shown that the alliance, properly leveraged, is still a very highly responsive, capable, and legitimate tool when it really matters. 

I do not want to spend too much time on the full agenda in which 

the members are engaged, including strengthening partnerships 

with countries and organizations around the globe, defending 

against terrorism and cyber threats, and deploying defenses 

against the real missile threats that the alliance faces. Each will 

get, I am sure, some further attention in the course of the hearing 

today. 

But let me just make a couple of broader points. First, on 

Afghanistan and then second, on meeting our security needs in the 

age of austerity. 

Recently, just literally a day before the President arrived in 

Afghanistan, I was there for 2 days for discussions with Ambassador Crocker and the head of the United States forces, General 

Allen. I met with President Karzai, his Cabinet members, and with 

Jan Kubis, the head of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan. I also visited with civil society members, with potential Presidential candidates and parties. To a person, everyone emphatically stated that 

the completion of this agreement is something of a game-changer. 

And over the years that I have traveled to Afghanistan and the region, I think about 18 times since 9/11 events, I have had many 

conversations with people at all different levels there in the high 

points and the low points of the conflict, and I think I can confidently say that I have never sensed quite a collective sense of 

direction or sigh of relief as a consequence of that agreement. 

But I will say definitively—and I said this to Jan Kubis and to 

President Karzai—that in the end our gains are going to mean 

nothing if we lose sight of three major challenges that remain. 

One is the continued challenge of governance, the challenge of 

corruption within the government process and the delivery of services. That is paramount. 

Two is the question of the continued danger of a sanctuary war 

being prosecuted against the forces there. I am a veteran of a sanctuary war, and I know how insidious it can be. And I personally 

think it is simply unacceptable to have a zone of immunity for acts 

of war against armed forces and against the collective community 

that is trying to accomplish what it is trying to accomplish. That 

means Pakistan has to become more assertive and more cooperative, and we may have to resort to other kinds of self-help depending on what they decide to do. 

And the final point that I think everything hangs on—and again, 

I underscored this as powerfully as I could and having been involved in sort of trying to dig our way out of the problems of 2009’s 

election. We must prepare now for the election process, not later, 

but now. It is imperative that the Afghan Government, through an 

independent election commission, put out the rules of the road for 

that election. The lists have to be prepared. The registration has 

to take place. There has to be openness, transparency, accountVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:01 Nov 19, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051012-M.TX
3 

ability. Free and fair elections are mandatory to any chance to go 

forward after 2014 with any possibility of success. 

So those three things leap out at the NATO challenge as we go 

forward here. 

And finally, the second point. The alliance can only endure if 

there is a shared sacrifice and a shared commitment to the common purpose. We talked yesterday with Secretary General Rasmussen about this. The failure of some countries to muster their 2-percent contributions and the expectations going forward really raise 

serious questions still as we define the road ahead. So we need to 

work with our European friends. We all understand this is a time 

of austerity. It is a time of austerity for everybody. But we are 

going to have to set priorities. We are going to have to decide what 

is really important and what is perhaps less important. And while 

we all understand that military budgets may not be inviolable with 

respect to the austerity, certain priorities have to stand out, and 

I believe the mutuality of this defense is one of those and we need 

to make that real. 

So we have to be clear that even before the financial crisis, 

NATO was seriously underfunded. And as we emerge from the 

financial crisis, we have all got to commit the resources necessary 

for the core security interests. 

But I just say in the end I am delighted to have the panels that 

we have here today. We could not have a better group of experts 

of varying views to share our thinking about this important topic. 

And on the first panel, we have Dr. Philip Gordon, the Assistant 

Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; James 

Townsend, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European 

and NATO Policy. And on the second panel, we are joined by Dr. 

Charles Kupchan, professor of international affairs at Georgetown 

University and the Whitney Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Ian Brzezinski, senior fellow at the 

Atlantic Council and principal of the Brzezinski Group; and Dr. 

Hans Binnendijk, vice president for Research and Applied Learning 

at the National Defense University. So we are very grateful to all 

of you today for taking time to be here and look forward to your 

testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. And Senator Corker, I recognize you. 

Senator CORKER. Go ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Chairman Kerry, and to other members 

of the committee for inviting us here to testify on the NATO summit, which the United States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on 

May 20 and 21. 

With your permission, Senator, I would like to submit my full 

statement for the record and just briefly summarize my comments 

here. 

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate that, and without objection, the 

full statement will be in the record. 

4 

Dr. GORDON. Thank you. 

I want to say I appreciate the committee’s support for this summit, as well as its sustained recognition of the significance of this 

alliance to transatlantic security. This Chicago summit will be the 

first NATO summit on American soil in 13 years and the first ever 

outside of Washington. In addition to the opportunity to showcase 

one of our Nation’s great cities, our hosting of the summit in Chicago is a tangible symbol of the importance of NATO to the United 

States. It is also an opportunity to underscore to the American people the continued value of this alliance to security challenges we 

face today. 

At NATO’s last summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, the 

allies unveiled a new strategic concept that defines NATO’s focus 

in the 21st century. Building on the decisions taken in Lisbon, the 

allies have three objectives for the Chicago summit: Afghanistan, 

capabilities, and partnerships. And if I might, I would like to just 

say a few words about each. 

On Afghanistan, the ISAF coalition has made significant progress in preventing that country from serving as a safe haven for 

terrorists and ensuring that Afghans are able to provide for their 

own security. These are both necessary conditions to fulfill the 

President’s goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. 

Last week, as the chairman acknowledged, the United States 

demonstrated its commitment to the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan when President Obama and President Karzai 

signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement. And again, I appreciated hearing Chairman Kerry’s assessment and look forward to 

discussing Afghanistan further. 

At Chicago where Afghanistan is concerned, the United States 

anticipates three deliverables in particular: an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF’s mission will shift from combat to support for the Afghan National Security Forces, the ANSF; 

second, an agreement on the size, cost, and sustainment of the 

ANSF beyond 2014; and finally, a roadmap for NATO’s post-2014 

role in Afghanistan. 

Regarding capabilities, NATO’s ability to deploy an effective 

fighting force in the field makes the alliance unique. However, its 

capacity to deter and respond to security challenges will only be as 

successful as its forces are able, effective, interoperable, and 

modern. 

In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still maintain a 

strong defense, but doing so requires innovation, creativity, and 

effectiveness. The United States is modernizing its presence in 

Europe at the same time that our NATO allies and NATO as an 

institution are engaged in similar steps. This is a clear opportunity—you might even say necessity—for our European allies to 

take on greater responsibilities. The United States continues to 

strongly urge those allies to meet the 2-percent benchmark for defense spending and to contribute politically, financially, and operationally to the strength of the alliance. In addition to the total 

level of defense spending, we should also focus on how these limited resources are allocated and for what priorities. 

NATO has made progress toward pooling more national resources, which is exemplified through the capabilities package that 

5 

the United States anticipates that leaders will endorse in Chicago. 

This package for Chicago includes missile defense, the alliance 

ground surveillance program, and Baltic air policing. Our allies are 

furthermore expected to endorse the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, the DDPR. The DDPR will identify the appropriate 

mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities that 

NATO needs to meet 21st century security challenges, as well as 

reaffirm NATO’s commitment to making consensus decisions on 

alliance posture issues. 

Finally, the Chicago summit will highlight NATO’s success in 

working with a growing number of partners around the world. 

Effective partnerships allow the alliance to extend its reach, act 

with greater legitimacy, share burdens, and benefit from the capabilities of others. Our allies will not take decisions on further enlargement of NATO in Chicago, but they will, nonetheless, send a 

clear, positive message to aspirant countries in support of their 

membership goals. The United States has been clear that NATO’s 

door remains open to European democracies that are willing and 

able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are 

all working closely with allies to meet NATO membership criteria. 

Let me just very briefly talk specifically about two aspirants that 

I know are of particular interest to this committee: Macedonia and 

Georgia. 

Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members 

and has contributed to regional and global security. The United 

States fully supports the U.N. process, led by Ambassador Nimetz. 

We also engage regularly with both Greece and Macedonia to urge 

them to find a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute 

which will fulfill the decision taken at the NATO summit in Bucharest and extend a membership offer to Macedonia. 

With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and military engagement support the country’s defense reform, train and equip 

Georgian troops for participation in ISAF operations, and advance 

its NATO interoperability. In January, President Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance 

Georgia’s military modernization, defense reform, and self-defense 

capabilities. U.S. assistance programs provide additional support to 

ongoing democratic and economic reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations where they have 

made important strides. U.S. support for Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders remains steadfast 

and our nonrecognition of separatist regions of Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia will not change. 

Finally, let me address NATO’s relationship with Russia: 2012 

marks the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and 

the 10th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council; anniversaries 

that we commemorated at a NATO-Russia Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels last month. The NRC is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas of mutual interest and address issues 

of disagreement. The best example of cooperation is our joint 

efforts in Afghanistan where Russia’s transit support has been critical to the mission’s success. 

6 

At the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense in order to enhance our individual capabilities to counter this threat. While we strive for cooperation, we have 

also been frank in our discussions with Russia that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile defenses irrespective of the 

status of missile defense cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear. 

NATO is not a threat to Russia, nor is Russia a threat to NATO. 

It is no secret that there are issues on which the allies and Russia differ. Russia has been critical of NATO’s operation in Libya. 

We also disagree fundamentally over the situation in Georgia. 

Since 2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity and has continued to urge Russia to meet 

its commitments with respect to Georgia. 

In conclusion, the three summit priorities that I just outlined 

demonstrate how far NATO has evolved since its founding six decades ago. The reasons for its continued success are clear. The alliance has over the last 63 years proven to be an adaptable, durable, 

and cost-effective provider of security. When President Obama welcomes his counterparts to Chicago in just over a week, the United 

States will be prepared to work with our allies and partners to 

ensure that the alliance remains vibrant and capable for many 

more years to come. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE PHILIP H. GORDON

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO summit, which the United 

States is proud to be hosting in Chicago on May 20–21. I appreciate the committee’s 

support for this meeting, as well as its sustained recognition of the significance of 

this alliance to transatlantic security. This will be the first NATO summit on American soil in 13 years and the first ever outside of Washington. In addition to the 

opportunity to showcase one of our Nation’s great cities, our hosting of the summit 

is a tangible symbol of the importance of NATO to the United States. It is also an 

opportunity to underscore to the American people the continued value of the alliance 

to the security challenges we face today. 

Indeed, NATO is vital to U.S. security. More than ever, the alliance is the mechanism through which the U.S. confronts diverse and difficult threats to our security 

together with like-minded states who share our fundamental values of democracy, 

human rights, and rule of law. Our experiences in the cold war, in the Balkans and 

now in Afghanistan prove that our core interests are better protected by working 

together than by seeking to respond to threats alone as individual nations. 

At NATO’s last summit in Lisbon nearly 18 months ago, allies unveiled a new 

Strategic Concept that defines NATO’s focus in the 21st century. Former Secretary 

of State, Madeleine Albright, was appointed by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 

to develop the basis for the Strategic Concept and consulted with this committee 

during that process. First and foremost, NATO remains committed to the article 5 

principle of collective defense. It is worth recalling that the first and only time in 

the history of the alliance that article 5 was invoked was after terrorists attacked 

the United States on September 11, 2001. The very next day NATO invoked article 

5 in recognition of the principle that an attack against the U.S. represented an 

attack against all. 

In addition to being a collective security alliance, NATO is also a cooperative security organization. Unlike an ad hoc coalition, NATO can respond rapidly and achieve 

its military goals by sharing burdens. In particular, NATO benefits from integrated 

structures and uses common funding to develop common capabilities. 

It is in this context that allies and partners will be meeting in Chicago next 

month. Building on the decisions taken in Lisbon, the President has three objectives 

for the Chicago summit. The centerpiece will be the announcement of the next 

phase of transition in Afghanistan and a reaffirmation of NATO’s enduring commitment to the Afghan people. Second, we will join allies in a robust discussion of our 

7 

most critical defense capability requirements in order to ensure that the security 

that NATO provides is both comprehensive and cost effective. And finally, we must 

continue our efforts to develop NATO’s role as a global hub for security partnerships. 

Afghanistan: On Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

coalition—comprised of 90,000 U.S. troops serving alongside 36,000 troops from 

NATO allies and 5,300 from partner countries—has made significant progress in 

preventing the country from serving as a safe haven for terrorists and ensuring that 

Afghans are able to provide for their own security, both of which are necessary conditions to fulfill the President’s goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda. At 

Chicago, the U.S. anticipates three deliverables: an agreement on an interim milestone in 2013 when ISAF’s mission will shift from combat to support for the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF); an agreement on the size, cost, and sustainment 

of the ANSF beyond 2014; and a roadmap for NATO’s post-2014 role in Afghanistan. 

At the NATO summit in Lisbon, allies, ISAF partners and the Afghan Government agreed upon a transition strategy that would result in the Afghan Government 

assuming full responsibility for security across the country by the end of 2014. This 

strategy is on track, as approximately 50 percent of the population lives in areas 

where Afghan forces are taking the lead. As transition progresses, the role of ISAF 

forces will evolve. In Chicago, leaders will establish a milestone in 2013 when 

ISAF’s mission will shift from combat to support as the ANSF becomes more responsible for security.Throughout the transition period, ISAF forces—including American 

forces—will continue to be fully combat ready and will conduct combat operations 

as required. The United States, allies and partners remain fully committed to this 

Lisbon framework, as well as to the principle of ‘‘in together, out together.’’ 

Leaders will also agree upon a plan for the future sustainment of the ANSF, 

which has been endorsed by the international community and the Government of 

Afghanistan and reflects what we believe will be necessary to keep Afghan security 

in Afghan hands. It is our goal that the international community will pledge 1 billion euro annually toward supporting the ANSF beyond 2014. We know this is not 

an easy pledge, particularly with some European governments facing difficult 

budget decisions as they work to recover from the economic crisis. Already, the British have stepped forward with a substantial commitment; we welcome early pledges 

from Estonia, Latvia, and Luxembourg, as well. We are engaged in active diplomacy 

to encourage contributions. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta were in Brussels last month for a series of NATO meetings and emphasized the importance of 

ANSF funding in every forum and in their bilateral meetings. We have also welcomed complementary efforts to encourage ANSF funding, such as the Danish-led 

Coalition of Committed Contributors initiative, which 23 nations have signed onto— 

including the United States. 

Finally, the summit will make clear that NATO will not abandon Afghanistan 

after the ISAF mission concludes. In Chicago, the alliance will reaffirm its enduring 

commitment beyond 2014 and define a new phase of cooperation with Afghanistan. 

Last week, President Obama and President Karzai signed the Strategic Partnership 

Agreement, which demonstrates U.S. commitment to the long-term stability and 

security of Afghanistan. 

Capabilities: Turning to capabilities, NATO’s ability to deploy an effective fighting 

force in the field makes the alliance unique. However, its capacity to deter and respond to security challenges will only be as successful as its forces are able, effective, interoperable, and modern. Last year’s military operation in Libya showed that 

the requirements for a strong, flexible, and deployable force remain vital. New 

threats require capable, flexible, and immediately available forces. Even when major 

operations in the field have ended, it is essential for the alliance to continue to exercise, plan, and maintain its forces. 

In the current era of fiscal austerity, NATO can still maintain a strong defense, 

but doing so requires innovation, creativity, and efficiencies. The United States is 

modernizing its presence in Europe at the same time that our NATO allies, and 

NATO as an institution, are engaged in similar steps. This is a clear opportunity 

for our European allies to take on greater responsibility. The U.S. continues to encourage allies to meet the 2-percent benchmark for defense spending and to contribute politically, financially, and operationally to the strength and security of the 

alliance. However, it is important not only to focus on the total level of defense 

spending by allies but also to consider how these limited resources are allocated and 

for what priorities. 

NATO has made progress toward pooling more national resources, including 

through the defense capabilities package that the U.S. anticipates leaders will endorse in Chicago. Two key elements of this package will be the NATO Secretary 

General’s ‘‘smart defense’’ initiative, which encourages allies to prioritize core capaVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:01 Nov 19, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051012-M.TX
8 

bilities in the face of defense cuts, cooperate on enhancing collective capabilities, 

and specialize according to national strengths, and his ‘‘connected forces’’ initiative, 

which aims to increase allied interoperability. The package will also track progress 

on acquiring the capabilities that leaders identified in Lisbon as NATO’s most pressing needs. The alliance’s record in the last 18 months has been impressive and includes several flagship capabilities programs. Let me cite three examples: 

• At the Lisbon summit, NATO allies agreed to develop a NATO missile defense 

capability to provide protection for all NATO European territory, populations, 

and forces. The United States is committed to doing its part by deploying all 

four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach; in fact, the first phase 

is already operational. Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey have agreed to host 

critical elements. We would welcome additional allied contributions. NATO remains equally committed to pursuing practical missile defense cooperation with 

Russia, which would enhance protection for all of us. 

• A second key capability is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)— 

the systems that provide NATO commanders with a comprehensive picture of 

the situation on the ground. Allies contributed more combat power in Libya 

than in previous operations (around 85 percent of all air-to-ground strike missions in Libya were conducted by European pilots, as compared to about 15 percent in the Kosovo air campaign in 1999). However, Libya demonstrated considerable shortfalls in European ISR capabilities as the U.S. provided one quarter 

of the ISR sorties, nearly half of the ISR aircraft, and the vast majority of analytical capability. This past February, NATO Defense Ministers agreed to fund 

the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program. The five drones that comprise 

this system will provide NATO with crucial information, including identifying 

potential threats, monitoring developing situations such as humanitarian crises, 

and distinguishing possible targets for air strikes. 

• A third initiative is Baltic Air Policing. The 2004 enlargement of NATO forced 

the alliance to examine burden-sharing among allied militaries, as well as modernization programs that benefit the alliance as a whole. In the Baltic States, 

for example, air policing is seen as a national defense imperative by three countries without national air forces. In February, NATO allies agreed to the continuous presence of fighters for NATO Air Policing of Baltic airspace. This helps 

assure the security of allies in a way that is cost effective, allowing them to invest resources into other important NATO operations such as Afghanistan. For 

their part, the Baltic States are working to increase their financial support for 

this valuable programs. 

In addition, the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)—which allies 

will endorse in Chicago—will reaffirm NATO’s determination to maintain modern, 

flexible, credible capabilities that are tailored to meet 21st century security challenges. The DDPR will identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and 

missile defense capabilities that NATO needs to meet these challenges, as well as 

reaffirm NATO’s commitment to making consensus decisions on alliance posture 

issues. The DDPR will outline the priorities that NATO needs to address, and the 

actions we need to take, to ensure that we have the capabilities needed to fulfill 

the three core missions identified in the new strategic concept, namely: collective 

defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. 

Partnerships: Finally, the Chicago summit will highlight NATO’s success in working with a growing number of partners around the world. Effective partnerships 

allow the alliance to extend its reach, act with greater legitimacy, share burdens, 

and benefit from the capabilities of others. Non-NATO partners deploy troops, invest 

significant financial resources, host exercises, and provide training. In Afghanistan, 

for example, 22 non-NATO countries are working alongside the 28 nations of NATO. 

Some partners (such as Austria, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, New Zealand, and Sweden) contribute to NATO’s efforts to train national forces to prepare them for NATO 

missions. Partners (including Australia, Finland, Japan, Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UAE) also give financial support to either the Afghan National Army 

Trust Fund or the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. Furthermore, 

partners participate in discussions on wide-ranging security issues from counterterrorism to cyber security. 

In turn, NATO has worked to give partners a voice in decisions for NATO-led operations in which they participate, opened alliance training activities to partners, 

and developed flexible meeting formats to ensure effective cooperation. Allies want 

the Chicago summit to showcase the value of our partners, especially those who provide significant political, financial, or operational support to the alliance. All these 

countries have come to recognize that NATO is a hub for building security, as well 

as a forum for dialogue and for bringing countries together for collective action. In 

9 

light of the dramatic events of the Arab Spring and NATO’s success in Libya, we 

envision a particular focus on further engagement with partners in the wider Middle East and North Africa region. 

NATO membership has been of great interest to this committee since the first 

post-cold-war enlargement of the alliance. Allies will not take decisions on further 

enlargement of NATO in Chicago, but they will nonetheless send a clear, positive 

message to aspirant countries in support of their membership goals. The U.S. has 

been clear that NATO’s door remains open to European democracies that are willing 

and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia are all working closely with 

allies to meet NATO membership criteria. 

Macedonia has fulfilled key criteria required of NATO members and has contributed to regional and global security. The United States fully supports the U.N. process, led by Ambassador Nimetz, and regularly engages with both Greece and Macedonia to urge them to find a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute in 

order to fulfill the decision taken at the NATO summit in Bucharest and extend a 

membership offer to Macedonia. 

The United States is assisting Montenegrin reform efforts by taking steps to 

embed a Defense Advisor in the Ministry of Defense. We are encouraging other allies to consider similar capacity-building support. The recent agreement in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina on registering defense properties is a significant step forward toward fulfilling the conditions laid out at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in 

Tallinn in April 2010. NATO should spare no effort in assisting the Bosnian Government’s implementation of this decision, which would allow them to submit their first 

Annual National Program this fall. 

With regard to Georgia, U.S. security assistance and military engagement support 

the country’s defense reforms, train and equip Georgian troops for participation in 

ISAF operations, and advance its NATO interoperability. In January, President 

Obama and President Saakashvili agreed to enhance this cooperation to advance 

Georgian military modernization, defense reform, and self defense capabilities. U.S. 

assistance programs provide additional support to ongoing democratic and economic 

reform efforts in Georgia, a critical part of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, 

where they have made important strides. U.S. support for Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders remains steadfast, and our nonrecognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not change. 

Finally, let me say a word about NATO’s relationship with Russia. 2012 marks 

the 15th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 10th anniversary 

of the NATO-Russia Council. The 1997 Founding Act expressed NATO and Russia’s 

common commitment to end rivalry and build mutual and cooperative security arrangements. It also provided reassurance that NATO’s open door to new members 

would not undermine Russia’s security. Five years after signing this act, our leaders 

met in Rome to develop an expanded framework for our partnership, the NATORussia Council (NRC), in order to have a forum for discussing the full range of 

shared security concerns. We commemorated these anniversaries at a NATO-Russia 

Foreign Ministers meeting last month in Brussels. 

NATO-Russia relations cannot be defined by any single issue. Indeed, the NRC 

is founded on our commitment to cooperate in areas of mutual interest and address 

issues of disagreement. The best example of cooperation is our joint efforts in 

Afghanistan. Russia’s transit support for NATO allies and our ISAF partners has 

been critical to the mission’s success. For the U.S. alone, more than 42,000 containers of cargo have transited Russia under NRC arrangements, providing materiel 

for U.S. troops and our ISAF partners. Since 2006, NATO allies and Russia have 

worked together to provide counternarcotics training to more than 2,000 law enforcement officers from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan. In addition, the 

NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund helps address the challenges of keeping 

the Afghan Air Force’s helicopter fleet operation-ready. Beyond Afghanistan, NATO 

continues practical security cooperation with Russia in key areas such as counterterrorism and counterpiracy. 

At the same time, NATO continues to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense. By working together, we can enhance our individual capabilities to counter 

the ballistic missile threat. We can also show firsthand that NATO’s missile defense 

efforts are not a threat to Russia. In late March, the NRC held its first theater missile defense exercises since 2008, an important step. While we strive for cooperation, 

we have also been frank in our discussions with Russia that we will continue to develop and deploy our missile defenses irrespective of the status of missile defense 

cooperation with Russia. Let me be clear: NATO is not a threat to Russia, nor is 

Russia a threat to NATO. 

10 

It is no secret that there are issues on which the allies and Russia differ. Russia 

has been critical of NATO’s operation in Libya. We also disagree fundamentally over 

the situation in Georgia. Since 2008, NATO has strongly supported Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and has continued to urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia. 

As we look to Chicago, these three summit priorities—defining the next phase of 

the transition in Afghanistan, outlining a vision for addressing 21st century challenges in a period of austerity, and expanding our partnerships—show just how 

much NATO has evolved since its founding six decades ago. The reasons for the alliance’s continued success are clear: NATO has, over the last 63 years, proven to be 

an adaptable, durable, and cost-effective provider of security. President Obama 

made this point at the NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl: ‘‘We cannot be content 

to merely celebrate the achievements of the 20th century, or enjoy the comforts of 

the 21st century; we must learn from the past to build on its success. We must 

renew our institutions, our alliances. We must seek the solutions to the challenges 

of this young century.’’ In Chicago, the United States will work with its allies and 

partners to ensure that the alliance remains vibrant and capable for many more 

years to come. With that, I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate it. 

Secretary Townsend. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Chairman Kerry and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO summit 

which the United States will host in Chicago in May. I will describe for the committee what we hope to achieve at the summit 

from the defense point of view and its relevance for U.S. national 

security. I particularly look forward to hearing the committee’s 

views on the summit and the priorities you have for its outcomes. 

I would like to summarize my statement, Mr. Chairman, and 

submit the full statement for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. NATO heads of state and government come together at a summit every few years not only to approve important 

pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the highest level 

the commitment allies have made to one another in the North 

Atlantic Treaty. This commitment to come to one another’s defense, 

as expressed in article 5 of the treaty, is a solemn one that has 

only been invoked once, after the United States was attacked on 

September 11, 2001. 

This commitment was critical during the cold war to help deter 

the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the United 

States and our allies. Even with the end of the cold war, this article 5 commitment remains the core of the alliance. NATO serves 

as the organizing framework to ensure that we have allies willing 

and able to fight alongside us in conflict and provides an integrated 

military structure that puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability of our allies, NATO serves as a hub and an integrator 

of a network of global security partners. 

The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates this 

point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing involving 

the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. However, 

when NATO answered the U.N.’s call to protect the Libyan people, 

it was able to take on the mission and execute it successfully. Had 

11 

NATO not been there or had NATO been too weak an institution 

to take on such an operation, the coalition would have had to carry 

on alone. 

Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to 

ensure NATO is ready when it is needed. This has been true for 

the past 20 years when the turbulence of the international system 

has demanded that NATO respond nearly continuously to crises 

throughout the globe. Today, for example, NATO forces are in 

Afghanistan, in the Balkans, countering pirates in the waters off 

of Somalia, and have just concluded operations in Libya. Looking 

out into the future, challenges to the United States and our allies 

can come from ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, as well as from just the instability that we can see happening as turmoil takes place as nations 

wrestle to set up their forms of government. We must be ready to 

meet emerging threats. We would prefer to meet these challenges 

together with allies and not alone. 

So the strategic context for the summit is what I have just described, and for our work at NATO every day, this is what we have 

in mind. How can we keep NATO and the allies ready and able to 

meet the challenges of today and in the future? This is especially 

complex today as the European economic crisis compels allies to cut 

defense spending and force structure in order to reduce their debt 

and decrease government spending. 

Allies, too, have different views and priorities regarding perceptions of the threat and the traditions of their own military forces. 

Not every ally sees the world and their role in it the way we do. 

But one thing we all agree on is that we need the alliance to be 

unified and strong. Allies look to the United States to lead the way 

in keeping NATO strong, capable, and credible. 

That is where we come to the summit in Chicago. At Chicago, 

heads of state and government will agree or approve work that we 

committed to at the last summit at Lisbon 18 months ago. At 

Chicago, this work will focus on three areas: an agreement on a 

strategic plan for Afghanistan, military capabilities, and NATO 

partnerships. 

The United States has three summit objectives. No. 1 is charting 

a clear path for the completion of transition and reaffirming 

NATO’s commitment to the long-term security of Afghanistan. The 

second objective, maintaining NATO’s core defense capabilities during this period of austerity and building a force ready for future 

challenges. And finally, deepening the engagement of NATO’s partner nations in alliance operations and activities. 

Chairman, I would like to conclude my summary here, and I welcome your questions and look forward to a good discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JAMES TOWNSEND

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for inviting me here today to discuss the NATO summit which the United 

States will host in Chicago in May. I will describe for the committee what we hope 

to achieve at the summit from the Defense point of view and its relevance for U.S. 

national security. I particularly look forward to hearing the committee’s views on 

the summit and the priorities you have for its outcomes. 

12 

NATO heads of state and government come together at a summit every few years 

not only to approve important pieces of alliance business, but also to renew at the 

highest level the commitment allies have made to one another in the North Atlantic 

Treaty. This commitment to come to one another’s defense as expressed in article 

5 of the treaty is a solemn one that has only been invoked once—after the United 

States was attacked on September 11, 2001. 

This commitment was critical during the cold war to help deter the Soviet Union 

and the Warsaw Pact from attacking the United States and our allies. Even with 

the end of the cold war, this article 5 commitment remains the core of the alliance. 

NATO serves as the organizing framework to ensure that we have allies willing and 

able to fight alongside us in conflict, and provides an integrated military structure 

that puts the military teeth behind alliance political decisions to take action. In addition to ensuring the interoperability of our allies, NATO serves as a hub and integrator of a network of global security partners. 

The NATO air and maritime operation in Libya illustrates this point. The operation began as a coalition of the willing involving the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and France. However, when NATO answered the U.N.’s call to protect the 

Libyan people, it was able to take on the mission and execute it successfully. Had 

NATO not been there, or had NATO been too weak an institution to take on such 

an operation, the coalition would have had to carry on alone. 

Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to ensuring NATO 

is ready when it is needed. This has been true for the past 20 years, when the turbulence of the international system has demanded that NATO respond nearly continuously to crises throughout the globe. Today, for example, NATO forces are in 

Afghanistan, in the Balkans, countering pirates in the waters off Somalia, and have 

concluded operations in Libya. Looking out into the future, challenges to the United 

States and our allies can come from ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attack, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, as well as from the instability we see in North 

Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. We must be ready to meet emerging 

threats, and we would prefer to meet these challenges together with allies, and not 

alone. 

So the strategic context for the summit, and for our work at NATO every day, 

is how can we keep NATO and the allies ready and able to meet the challenges of 

today and in the future? This is especially complex today as the European economic 

crisis compels allies to cut defense spending and force structure in order to reduce 

their debt and decrease government spending. 

Allies too have different views and priorities regarding perceptions of the threat 

and the traditions of their own military forces. Not every ally sees the world and 

their role in it the way we do. But one thing we all agree on is that we need the 

alliance to be unified and strong. Allies look to the United States to lead the way 

in keeping NATO strong, capable, and credible. 

That is where we come to the summit. At Chicago, heads of state and government 

will agree or approve work that we committed to at the last summit at Lisbon 18 

months ago. 

At Chicago this work will focus on three areas: an agreement on a strategic plan 

for Afghanistan, military capabilities, and NATO partnerships. The United States 

has three summit objectives: 

• Charting a clear path for the completion of transition and reaffirming NATO’s 

commitment to the long-term security of Afghanistan; 

• Maintaining NATO’s core defense capabilities during this period of austerity 

and building a force ready for future challenges; and, 

• Deepening the engagement of NATO’s partner nations in alliance operations 

and activities. 

Afghanistan. While the past few months have been tumultuous in Afghanistan, 

U.S. forces, and those of our allies and ISAF partners, have shown deep resolve and 

dedication to the transition strategy laid out at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon. 

ISAF troops continue to perform exceptionally well, particularly in the process of 

training and partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces, in our effort to 

ensure that the Afghans are ready to assume full responsibility for security in 

Afghanistan by the end of 2014. While ISAF troops will stand ready to conduct combat operations as required right up until the end of 2014, the fact is that Afghan 

forces are growing ever stronger and more professional. This was clearly demonstrated a few weeks ago when ANSF troops successfully repelled enemy attacks 

in and around Kabul. 

Our strategy is working. What we do from now until the end of 2014—whether 

on the ground in Afghanistan, back here in Washington, or in Chicago next month— 

must build responsibly on what ISAF has accomplished to date. Our efforts must 

13 

safeguard NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe-haven for terrorists. I have no doubt that our resolve will be tested in the coming months, but I 

also have no doubt that the U.S. and our ISAF partners will remain focused on our 

Lisbon commitments. The Strategic Partnership Agreement that President Obama 

and President Karzai signed just days ago, provides a clear demonstration of our 

commitment to the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan. 

The upcoming NATO summit presents us with an important opportunity to send 

a unified message that we are on track to achieve our Lisbon goals. We view the 

Chicago summit as a critical milestone in our effort in Afghanistan, as leaders come 

together to determine the next phase of transition and the future of our support for 

Afghanistan and its security forces. All of these steps will help define how we can 

responsibly conclude the war in Afghanistan while achieving our objectives and 

building a long-term partnership with the Afghan people. 

Alliance Military Capabilities. One of the greatest challenges that NATO faces 

today is the need to maintain critical combat capabilities during this period of economic austerity, as defense investment decisions made now will affect the availability of defense capabilities 5 to 10 years from now. 

To help nations under financial pressure keep up their military strength and 

build for the future, NATO is putting together a capabilities package for approval 

at Chicago that provides an organizing framework to advance a range of capability 

initiatives, both old and new, to get us through the next 10 years with our capabilities intact and our forces strong. It protects a core of capabilities from further cuts 

and provides tools to help nations acquire military capabilities more affordably. 

The major elements of the capabilities package are as follows: 

• Smart Defense: Introduced by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, Smart 

Defense is a concept by which NATO members can enhance security capabilities 

more efficiently through greater multinational coordination, collaboration, and 

coherence. The U.S. supports the Smart Defense approach, and will participate 

in many of the multinational initiatives, but Smart Defense must not be used 

as a means to justify further cuts to allies’ defense budgets. There can be no 

substitute for nations providing adequate resources and investment in their own 

domestic and our collective security. In addition to applying resources most efficiently in an austere fiscal environment, Smart Defense should also ensure investments are made in the right capabilities when economic conditions improve. • Missile Defense. In Lisbon, NATO allies took the unprecedented step of declaring that NATO would develop a territorial ballistic missile defense capability, 

taking on this critical mission in the face of the real and emerging ballistic missile threat to NATO European territories and populations. Since then, we have 

worked closely with our NATO allies to turn this ambition into a real capability. 

In Chicago, we expect to further that goal by taking steps to advance the implementation of our missile defense system. • Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). At the 2010 NATO Lisbon summit, heads 

of state and government identified AGS as one of the alliance’s top 10 critical 

capabilities. Recent operations in Libya highlighted alliance shortfalls in surveillance and reconnaissance. The Alliance Ground Surveillance system will 

provide alliance members with a significantly enhanced ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations and all of the associated 

tasks. • Training. I would like to highlight the improvements in training that I believe 

will be critical to implementing the Chicago capabilities package. This commitment is reflected in the changes the United States is making to its force posture 

in Europe. The NATO Response Force will continue to be the engine for transformation within the alliance. Only through a robust exercise program can we 

develop and validate new doctrine, provide visible assurance of alliance commitment to collective security, and institutionalize the interoperability we have developed over the past 10 years in places like Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya. 

The United States is refining plans to rotate U.S.-based ground units to Europe 

twice during each NATO Response Force cycle to participate in NATO Response 

Force training and exercises. In addition, these units will be available to participate in full-spectrum training with individual allies as well as multinational 

formations. 

• Baltic Air Policing. In the Baltic Region the United States is a key contributor 

to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission, which deploys fighter aircraft that are 

ready to launch at a moment’s notice. The United States joined with all 27 

other NATO allies in February to ensure a continuing presence of fighters for 

NATO Air Policing of Baltic skies. NATO Air Policing helps assure the security 

of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in a way that is cost effective, allowing them 

14 

to focus resources on other critical NATO priorities. We anticipate that for their 

part, the Baltic nations will increase their Host Nation Support for nations that 

deploy fighter aircraft. This mission demonstrates our commitment to the collective defense of all NATO members and is also a superb example of defense burden-sharing through Smart Defense. 

This capabilities package provides the ways and means to ensure alliance forces 

are capable and effective. While tools such as Smart Defense will help us achieve 

these goals, all allies must maintain a base consisting of essential operational capabilities. These core capabilities must be protected from further cuts to ensure that 

we will have the forces we need over the next 10 years and that we have a sure 

foundation upon which to build NATO Forces in 2020 and beyond. One of the ways 

they will reaffirm NATO’s determination to maintain modern, flexible, credible capabilities is by approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review which will 

identify the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities NATO needs to meet today’s challenges and tomorrow’s emerging threats. 

Partnerships. NATO is working more closely than ever with non-NATO partners 

to address global challenges. We saw the value of our partnerships in Libya, when 

our European partners as well as countries in the Middle East and North Africa 

helped the alliance to protect the Libyan people, and we continue to benefit from 

our partners’ contributions in Afghanistan, with 22 countries standing shoulder to 

shoulder with NATO. In Chicago we look to broaden and deepen our network of 

partnerships worldwide. 

This summit is an opportunity to carry forward the critical work our alliance is 

conduction. At Chicago, we will underscore NATO’s accomplishments in Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans—successes delivered despite financial crisis. But as we 

confront current challenges, we must also invest in the future. NATO relies on individual allies for the bulk of the capabilities needed for future operations, but we 

must find a way to ensure NATO will be able to maintain critical capabilities in 

this period of austerity. We can ensure the greatness of this alliance into the next 

decade in spite of fiscal and security challenges; but we must invest the extra effort 

to work collectively and to support those institutions that facilitate our multinational cooperation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thanks very much, Secretary Townsend. 

We will have that, I am sure. 

Let me ask you quickly, if I can, before I turn the gavel over. 

Secretary Gordon, first of all, what is the reaction of the Europeans 

generally to the Obama administration’s decision to take two of the 

four combat brigades, Army brigades, out of Europe? And what is 

the impact? I mean, how is that going to affect—— 

Dr. GORDON. No, I appreciate the opportunity to address that because I think we have been quite successful in explaining what is 

behind that thinking. I was actually in Berlin, Lithuania, and 

Copenhagen the week we announced it and had the opportunity to 

engage extensively and to explain the thinking behind it. 

It is a misunderstanding to even think about it in terms of a 

withdrawal from Europe. That was the initial concern, that people 

would be imagining that somehow we were reducing our presence 

in Europe. The fact is those brigade combat teams that you are referring to have been fighting in southwest Asia for the past decade. 

The issue that the Defense Department was addressing in rethinking our force presence in Europe was after this decade of heavy 

presence, spending hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of 

thousands of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, what was the right 

posture moving forward, especially at a time of fiscal constraint. 

And we have had the opportunity to explain this thinking to our 

European allies, that we remain absolutely committed to Europe 

and to article 5. And moving forward, even after those brigade combat teams do not return to their original homes in Germany, 

Europe will have at least as many U.S. forces as it has had for the 

15 

past decade, during which we believe that article 5 has been credible and we have absolutely had an ability to defend Europe. 

We have also—and the Pentagon is working this out as we 

speak—taken the decision to ensure that elements of those brigade 

combat teams rotate through Europe to ensure the critical partnership function that they performed while they were there. 

So whereas there may have been some initial concern that the 

headline of withdrawing troops in Europe would dominate, we 

think that by actually explaining what is behind this thinking and 

reiterating our commitment to Europe which, by the way, should 

not be—I will end with this—reduced to the number of brigade 

combat teams in Europe. Over the 3 years of the Obama administration, we have done a number of other things to modernize and 

reiterate our commitment to Europe, including deploying missile 

defense, which will mean an American presence—including troops, 

people—in Romania and Poland. We are going to have the radar 

in Turkey. We are rotating Aegis cruisers which will home port in 

Spain. So there is actually a whole web of new American presence 

in Europe. We have moved forward on an aviation detachment in 

Poland. We have done some other things with special forces in the 

U.K. and elsewhere. So we have also tried to remind them that 

America’s commitment to Europe and America’s presence in 

Europe should not be reduced to the number of brigade combat 

teams. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me a quick take—because I have 

one other question I want to ask—on President-elect Hollande’s 

promise to withdraw our combat forces by the end of this year out 

of Afghanistan and the impact of that on the entire collective 

effort? 

Dr. GORDON. Absolutely. As you know, one of the things we were 

most successful in doing at the NATO summit in Lisbon was getting everyone on the same page for the 2014 timetable. Our core 

principle has been ‘‘in together, out together.’’ And at Lisbon, the 

alliance as a whole, ISAF as a whole, agreed that combat troops 

would remain performing their mission, being successful through 

the end of 2014, after which they would be gone. 

Candidate Francois Hollande took the position that French 

troops should be out sooner than that by the end of 2012, and this 

is obviously something we will look forward to discussing with the 

President once he is sworn in. In fact, I leave for Paris this afternoon to carry on this conversation, which has already begun. We 

have been in touch with them, as you would expect, in recent days 

and weeks. The French assure us that they are committed to our 

common success in Afghanistan, and I am sure we will find a way 

forward that ensures that common success. 

All I can do is speak to our own view, which is that this principle 

of ‘‘in together, out together’’ remains critical, and we should also 

not lose sight of the fact, which I think is quite an accomplishment 

for the President and his leadership of this alliance, that every single member of ISAF has stuck to that. And there have not been the 

withdrawals, notwithstanding the economic crisis that we know is 

painful, notwithstanding the domestic political pressures. Every 

member of ISAF is on board for maintaining that commitment to 

the end of 2014. 

16 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, those will be interesting discussions, obviously. I was just sitting here thinking how you have the toughest 

job of all having to travel to these difficult capitals of London and 

Brussels and Paris and so forth. 

Dr. GORDON. I made clear to Secretary—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to comment. [Laughter.] 

Dr. GORDON. I started to say I made clear to Secretary Clinton 

that I am ready to spend as much time as necessary in Paris in 

the coming weeks. That is the least I can do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough. 

Final question just quickly. Almost a year ago now, Secretary 

Gates made a very strong statement to the alliance in which he 

lamented, ‘‘that many of the allies are unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and 

capable partners in their own defense.’’ Where does the administration stand with respect to that statement today, and what can we 

hope for? 

Dr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, as I underscored in my statement, 

we continue to urge our European partners to uphold their responsibilities in the areas of defense, including the common pledge of 

2-percent spending on defense. It is a reality that the trend of 

European defense spending is poor, and in the long run, if it is not 

sustained, the alliance will not be able to do what we have so successfully done for so many years and decades, including most recently in Libya where, notwithstanding the real constraints that we 

face, the European allies were able to step up. They flew more than 

85 percent of the strike missions in Libya. They made a critically 

important contribution. In Afghanistan, they have sustained nearly 

40,000 troops as part of ISAF for almost a decade. In these and 

other cases, we want more and need more, but we should not overlook the fact that they are making critically important contributions. We are constantly urging them to make the investments necessary so that that will be true in 5 years from now, just as it is 

true today. 

Last thing. We understand the constraints. That is why one of 

the deliverables for Chicago that both Jim and I have emphasized 

is this question of capabilities and smart defense. Even if we sustain levels, we have to do it better, more efficiently, and we have 

some particular projects that we would be happy to talk about that 

will actually show the alliance moving forward in pooling and sharing and spending more wisely with the limited resources that are 

available. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate it. There are obviously some 

followups to that. And, Secretary Townsend, I am sure you have a 

point of view on it. So we will leave the record open for a week 

after this and we will try not to burden you with too much, but 

there may be some things we want to do to fill it out. 

I will now recognize Senator Corker, and I will turn the gavel 

over to Senator Shaheen. Thank you. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your testimony. 

You know, this issue of the 2-percent GDP commitment that is 

not being honored is something that has been talked about for a 

long time. Secretary Albright was in maybe 2 years ago talking 

17 

about the same thing. Secretary Gates has been in talking about 

the same thing and certainly did so in Europe. And we talked yesterday with the Secretary General about this same issue, and it 

continues to be, well, we are urging. I do think it is a huge problem, and this trend has been continuing for a long time. We understand Europe is under stress right now. 

But what set of ingredients do you think exist or what is it that 

we are doing? You know, we spent last year a little bit over 5 percent of GDP here on defense, and I am glad that we did. I know 

it is dropping to the high 4s in this next year. And certainly I think 

we should make sure we invest appropriately in that regard. But 

as we continue to do what we are doing, we almost become the provider of security services, and they more and more are becoming 

the consumer of security services, and there does not seem to be 

anything that is really changing that dynamic. I know there have 

been commitments in Afghanistan, and on a per capita basis, many 

of the countries have actually had more casualties than us and we 

honor that. 

But from the standpoint of year-in/year-out investment in modernization and defense forces, it is just not happening. And we 

have been talking this same line since I have been here. I have 

been here 5 years now and nothing has changed. As a matter of 

fact, it is moving in the other direction. There are only three countries today, us, the U.K., and believe it or not, Greece, of the entire 

alliance that is investing 2 percent. A lot of people are saying 

Greece’s investment is not being done wisely or at least that is 

what we heard yesterday. 

But I just wonder if there is anything that you would tell us that 

other than urging, anything that is going to really change that 

dynamic and cause this to be a true alliance and not one of us 

again providing security services and them being the consumers. 

Dr. GORDON. Again, I will start and Jim may want to jump in 

on this. 

First of all, Senator, we agree with that assessment, and that is 

why, as I say, we have been clear in making similar comments to 

our European allies about how critical this is. 

I would again recall Libya as an example of doing more than urging, where we faced a grave humanitarian crisis, the situation of 

a dictator using violence against his own people, European allies 

coming to us and telling how important it was for us to act, and 

the Arab League calling for intervention as well. We went to the 

Europeans in that case and said we agree. Action needs to be 

taken. We took the lead, got a U.N. Security Council resolution, 

and said we are prepared to do what only we can do. 

Senator CORKER. I appreciate and honor that too. But you know, 

to build an appropriate defense mechanism as a group of countries, 

it takes year-in/year-out, year-in/year-out investment. I mean, just 

as we see right now with sequestration here, I mean, the Pentagon 

is already beginning to be concerned about the future because their 

horizon is not just in a month, but it is over a long period of time. 

And I think what we are seeing in Europe is over a long period of 

time a very downward trajectory. 

And so I honor what happened in Libya, but I am still not seeing 

anything whatsoever that is changing the trend to move it back up 

18 

to, by the way, what is a commitment. I mean, this is not like a 

goal. A 2-percent investment of GDP is an absolute commitment by 

the NATO allies. It is not being honored. And so what I am concerned about is the long-run trajectory and that is what we are not 

seeing. And I am just wondering again what set of ingredients is 

going to change that, especially with the economic times we are 

dealing with. 

Dr. GORDON. Once again, Senator, I agree with that assessment. 

The point I was going to make about Libya is not just in the 

short term but actually addresses the longer term point which was 

to say in that case, we said we will provide our unique capabilities, 

but we expect you to be able to play a major role yourselves. And 

by insisting on that, we got them to do it in that case and are now 

able to say, well, there is the example. If you do not continue to 

invest in the advanced fighter planes and precision-guided munitions and the intelligence assets, then you will not be able to do 

this in the future and you cannot expect the United States to do 

it for you. You know, only they can make those decisions. But that 

is what they are hearing from us. 

And we also believe, as I referred to our capabilities deliverables 

for Chicago, there are a lot of inefficiencies in the alliance when it 

comes to defense spending. There are redundancies and people are 

not doing it, if I might, smartly enough. And just to take one example, the agreement by NATO countries to build this allied ground 

surveillance system where 13 of them will come together and buy 

five drones—built by an American company, by the way—to be able 

to share all of this with the entire alliance is the sort of thing they 

need to be investing in. Unless they are going to have enough 

money for all of them to buy individual drones, which is not realistic, this is the sort of thing that they can do with less money to 

actually provide a capability for everybody. So we are trying to do 

that as well. 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you. And I am glad we are on the 

same page here. 

Let me ask another question. This commitment to Afghanistan. 

The last I checked—and I am a little dated on this. To provide 

enough resources for them just to maintain the security forces that 

we have trained up with them, I think it is about $9 billion a year, 

if I remember correctly. You all might correct me. I think the 

budget authority last time I checked in Afghanistan—and again I 

am a little dated—was around $1.5 billion-$2 billion. So there is a 

huge gap. And that is for the entire government. OK? 

What is the entire security tab and what kind of commitments? 

Because this is something that is coming up like right now. This 

is not a trajectory. These are commitments we need to make. What 

is the exact gap, and when do we expect from our NATO allies to 

have those real pledges coming forth to fill that gap? 

Dr. GORDON. We will have to get you the exact numbers on 

where we are right now. I can talk a little bit about—— 

Senator CORKER. I think I meant the order of magnitude. 

Dr. GORDON. I mean, what we are focused on where this is concerned for Chicago, obviously, is that this number needs to go 

down. I think your order of magnitude is about right on where we 

are and have been for the past couple of years. None of us want 

19 

to keep spending that amount years into the future, and that is 

why we are focused on how to leave something sustainable in our 

wake. Once Afghans are fully in charge of their security, we want 

it to work, but we know we are going to have to help. And the plan 

that we are looking at for Chicago would involve the international 

community putting in around $4 billion a year to maintain the 

Afghan National Security Forces for up to a decade. Now, the 

Afghans themselves have already pledged $500 million a year of 

their own money toward that goal for 3 years, and that amount 

should rise year by year after that. And Secretary Gates challenged 

the rest of ISAF to come up with a billion euros per year, so about 

$1.3 billion of that $4.1 billion total. And we have been working 

very hard at the highest levels of our Government to get the rest 

of the international community to deliver on that pledge so that if 

we get to that point, of the $4.1 billion, the Afghans will be doing 

$1⁄2 billion, the other members of ISAF would be doing at least $1.3 

billion. That would bring our numbers down, obviously, considerably by a factor of 5 or 6 or more. 

Senator CORKER. And you think you may get those commitments 

in Chicago. Is that what you are saying? Or is that going to take 

a much longer period of time? 

Dr. GORDON. We are looking to get as solid a political commitment from as many countries as possible, and I think it is fair to 

say we are making good progress toward that goal. 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you for your work. 

And, Madam Chairman, thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

Let me thank our witnesses. 

Secretary Gordon, I want to follow up on a point that I talked 

to Secretary General Rasmussen about yesterday, and that is the 

Chicago summit will not be an enlargement summit. And I got the 

Secretary General’s view on how we deal with the aspirant nations 

that one day we hope will be part of NATO. 

And I want to start off with my concern. It has been that ability 

or desire to join either the European Union or NATO that has been 

a motivating factor to accelerate democratic reforms in many countries of Europe. And we have seen that work very successfully. 

I think there must be some disappointment that the summit will 

not be an enlargement summit. Montenegro and Macedonia were 

very close to moving forward on their plans. We have the issues 

with Bosnia where they have made some significant progress and 

have not quite met the target dates, but they are moving forward 

in a very positive way. Georgia has also made substantial progress, 

and I understand they may not have reached the plateau for formal 

acceptance. But I think the signal that is being sent is that we are 

slowing down the formal expansion of NATO for many reasons and 

many legitimate reasons. On a parallel path, the EU has been very 

slow now on expansion because of the economic problems of 

Europe. 

So I guess I would like to get the administration’s view as to how 

we continue to keep the momentum moving toward democratic 

reform and ultimate membership in NATO in countries that we 

have been very actively engaged, the four I mentioned, plus others. 

20 

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator. 

The first point is I absolutely agree that historically NATO 

enlargement has been good for NATO, good for Europe, and good 

for those countries. As you said, it has contributed to democracy in 

Europe and stability and has been absolutely the right policy, and 

administrations of different stripes have all been strongly supportive of it. We completely agree with that. 

I think we have been saying—and this phrase that you heard 

with Rasmussen, ‘‘not an enlargement summit’’—we have been saying, OK, it is not an enlargement summit, but it is also not a summit that should be backing away from enlargement. It so happens 

that there is not a country ready to be included in the alliance at 

this summit with a consensus behind it. So in that sense, it is not 

an enlargement summit. But we want to be clear that this does not 

mean that we are not focused on enlargement or as supportive as 

ever of the open door policy. 

One of the ways we are going to signal that is Secretary Clinton 

will participate in a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers with the 

four aspirant countries to specifically acknowledge them, note that 

the door remains open, and talk to them about the process going 

forward. And we hope and expect that the communique will also 

signal our strong support for enlargement in general and the processes of these four aspirants in particular. 

The only reason that none are joining at the summit—I think 

you would also agree that every case needs to be treated separately 

and we should have high standards and important criteria for joining the alliance. And we continue to work in different ways with 

each of the four countries you mentioned. I would be happy to talk 

in more detail about where we are with each. But our bottom line 

point is no one should see this summit as somehow the end of 

enlargement or some different priority. We remain committed to 

the open door. 

Senator CARDIN. And I accept that and I agree with you. Each 

of the four countries is truly unique, and I understand the hurdles 

that each of the four countries still has remaining. I really do. 

I think, though, that it is very important the signal that is given. 

The types of reforms that are being carried out, not just in these 

four countries but others who would like to become one day candidates for a plan for entering NATO are not necessarily popular 

locally, the types of commitments to their defense, the types of 

commitments to their constitutional change for authority, the types 

of democratic reforms that we see, the types of controls necessary 

for security. Those types of issues are not always the most popular 

domestically in those countries. But they are able to do it because 

they see a path toward integration, and if that path looks like it 

is going to be a long haul, seeing in the recent European elections 

that populaces do not always go for the responsible route—and so 

I think it is very important that the message come from the United 

States clearly. 

I am pleased Secretary Clinton will be talking to the four aspirant countries. But we have to be very clear that we do want integration and we do see the path that will lead to that and that there 

are reforms that need to be pursued and although we are not ready 

at this summit, we do anticipate there will be enlargement and we 

21 

do encourage countries to seek membership in Europe and membership in NATO. 

Dr. GORDON. We agree with that for the very reasons you state, 

and it is our goal and commitment to make sure that the summit 

sends a positive signal in that direction. I will be honest. Not every 

member of NATO is enthusiastic about the enlargement process, 

and sometimes it takes some persuading to make sure that that 

positive signal gets sent. But it is certainly this administration’s 

view and we appreciate the support of this committee for that goal. 

Senator CARDIN. And we have seen that at prior summits, the 

exact points that you have raised. I know there are concerns about 

other countries in Europe and their view about NATO enlargement. We are all aware of all those different issues. And that is 

why I think it is particularly important for U.S. leadership to be 

pretty focused and clear in Chicago. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for coming. 

As you probably know, this committee met with the Secretary 

General yesterday and we had a spirited discussion along the lines 

that Senator Cardin raised on enlargement. And I would like to 

associate myself with his remarks. I think all of us have the same 

concerns that he does and want to make certain that the communication is clear that wanting to join is one thing. A strong commitment to the requirements for joining is another issue that certainly 

needs to be underscored. 

Let me say that, Secretary Gordon, you correctly identified, I 

think, the issues that this committee is interested in, and I want 

to talk about just one of those briefly and that is the Georgia situation. It is a concern to a lot of us. In your remarks, you have talked 

about the stressing that you did to the Russians about meeting 

their commitments as far as Georgia is concerned. And you touched 

on it kind of lightly, and I do not mean that derogatorily. It is 

almost as if the international community understands the commitments that the Russians have made regarding Georgia, but no one 

really expects them to meet those commitments. As I kind of read 

between the lines with what you were saying, it was almost a reiteration of that. And it is unfortunate. 

But give me your thoughts on whether Russia is going to meet 

its commitments. I mean, they made very strong commitments—or 

excuse me—not strong commitments—clear commitments as to 

what they were and what they were not going to do to the French. 

And the one that I am most interested in is the obligation to vacate 

occupied territories. It is just not right. The Russians said that 

they would meet the commitment to vacate. They have not done 

that. And from what I can tell, nobody really expects them to do 

that. What are your thoughts on that regard? 

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator. I will not pretend it is easy to 

find a way to get Russia to meet those commitments. We completely agree with your assessment that Russia is currently in violation of the cease-fire agreements that were reached in August 

and September 2008. They had six points, and one of them was for 

Russian troops to go back to where they were prior to the start of 

22 

the conflict, and those troops are not currently back to where they 

were prior to the start of the conflict. We believe, therefore, like 

you that Russia is in violation of those commitments. And we have 

been clear and Secretary Clinton has referred to Russia’s occupation of Georgia. This is not meant to be provocative, but to simply 

describe what we believe to be the case which is Russia having 

military forces within the territorial boundaries of an internationally recognized country. 

We have been very active in preventing any further recognitions 

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is of course what Russia did. 

I think there are maybe three other countries in the world that 

have done so, and every single other member of the international 

community has refused to do so. In that sense, we believe we have 

denied Russia any legitimization that they have tried to have over 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

We have also maintained not just rhetorical support for Georgia’s 

sovereignty and territorial integrity but genuine support for the 

country of Georgia. This was most recently manifested in the visit 

that President Saakashvili paid to President Obama in the Oval 

Office where we committed to strengthening the economic 

relationship, which is hugely important to Georgia and its success 

as a country, and the defense relationship. 

And I will take the opportunity to express appreciation for the 

contributions Georgia has made in Afghanistan where they are one 

of the leading troop contributors certainly per capita. And we are 

working to strengthen that defense relationship as well. 

Senator RISCH. And I think we have all done likewise in expressing appreciation. 

But I have to tell you it is disheartening to sit here and watch 

this sort of thing where a commitment is made like this, and it is 

just handled cavalierly by the international community. Nobody 

does anything about it. It is disheartening, to say the least. 

Mr. Townsend, I am going to follow up on comments that Senator Corker made. And if you feel comfortable in answering these, 

fine; if not, we can go back to Mr. Gordon. But it has to do with 

the sustainability of the ANSF forces. 

You know, those of us who deal with this regularly, when you 

put a pencil to this, it just does not work. I know Secretary Gordon 

has said—in fact, I think he listed as the No. 1 priority for the 

Chicago meeting was to chart a clear path forward for security 

forces in Afghanistan for sustainability. And I understand you 

want the money that you want from the Europeans and from 

others, but when you look at what it costs to maintain the ANSF 

and you compare it to the GDP of the country, even if you include 

the drug profits that they make, it just does not work. 

So what are your thoughts on that? How do you get there? How 

do you get some confidence in being able to do this when the numbers just do not work? 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Senator. The pencil work you 

describe is, I am sure, being done on the Hill. It is being done by 

the administration as well I know. But my Department, as well as 

the Department of State—we are working those numbers as well. 

At NATO, too, with allies, with the Afghan Government. There are 

a lot of pencils going about trying to determine, as we chart the 

23 

way forward between now and 2014 and post-2014. Whether you 

are at NATO and you are looking at what the NATO presence 

could be, whether you are looking at the United States side of it 

on a bilateral basis, the Afghan side, what we have to figure first 

is what do we think we are going to need in terms of the ANSF 

to do the job after 2014. What needs to be some of the factors we 

look at? 

And I think one of the major factors driving the size of the 

ANSF, which is, of course, part of what drives the number, will be 

conditions on the ground, the type of job the ANSF will face after 

2014, what will the Taliban look like. These are all right now 

unknown factors. We feel that we have got a pretty good feeling for 

what we think could happen, but so much depends on how much 

we are able to degrade the Taliban and so that presents less of a 

threat to Afghanistan and less of a threat to the ANSF. That certainly impacts the size. 

We know, as Senator Kerry talked about, there is a very important election coming up in 2014. What would be the requirements 

there in terms of security and making sure that that election goes 

off without a security threat? 

So the pencils are moving and we are still in the middle of that 

work. At Chicago, NATO is going to produce its strategic plan for 

Afghanistan where it will be trying to deal with these numbers and 

describe what the NATO presence is going to look like. As you 

know, we just signed also the U.S. Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Afghans. And so we are right now putting down on 

paper the structure of what we think we are going to be doing. 

That will impact what the ANSF will look like, and that in turn 

will have the cost figure there. 

And so we know we have got a tall job ahead, but we know too 

that we have got to make sure that the Afghans have what we 

think they are going to need to do the job and we are in the middle 

of doing that now. 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. 

I have to say that I think everybody has got a long ways to go 

before the comfort level of a lot of people up here is met. We are 

very nervous about this and have a difficult time bringing the two 

ends together with the amount of money that we are talking about 

and particularly under the present economic circumstances of this 

country, the European countries, and clearly the Afghans themselves. 

My time is up. I would like to hear from you, Mr. Gordon. Maybe 

we will get another round here. But thank you very much, Madam 

Chair. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

I want to get into some of the specifics of the upcoming summit, 

but before I do that, I want to ask you about some news that broke 

this morning around the decision in Russia that newly inaugurated 

President Putin is not going to come to the G8 summit next week. 

And I wonder what we think about this decision by Mr. Putin, if 

that comes as a surprise, and more generally, how is his return to 

the Presidency going to affect NATO-Russian relations? 

Secretary Gordon. 

24 

Dr. GORDON. Thank you. I am happy to address both the narrower question of the G8 summit and the broader one about United 

States-Russia relations. 

President Putin called President Obama yesterday to have an 

exchange on the anniversary of Victory Day but more specifically 

to let him know that he looked forward to continuing the relationship. It is the first time they have spoken since he was inaugurated. Given Putin’s responsibilities in Moscow, having just been 

inaugurated, of trying to put a Cabinet together, he felt it was important to stay there and instead would send former President— 

now Prime Minister—Medvedev to the G8 summit and instead suggested that the two Presidents meet at the next G20 meeting, 

which is some 5 weeks from today. So that is that. And the President will look forward to seeing Prime Minister Medvedev at the 

G8 and he will look forward to seeing President Putin at the G20. 

In terms of the broader relationship, as you know, we have been 

very proud of what we have been able to accomplish with Russia 

over the past 3 years on the very straightforward basis that we 

have a lot of interests in common. And where we have some significant differences—and I was just talking about one with regard to 

Georgia—the President felt it was in our national interest to pursue those areas of cooperation where we could, while agreeing to 

disagree and standing for our principles elsewhere. And, as you 

know, we have done that. The New START treaty agreement on 

transit in Afghanistan, the 123 civil nuclear agreement, Russian 

support for Security Council resolutions on Iran, most recently 

Russia’s agreement to join the WTO which included a bilateral economic treaty with Georgia, all of this we think is in our interests 

and is the basis for cooperation with Russia. 

And so your question is how does that continue with President 

Putin. We will see. I can only speak from our end that we are 

determined to pursue the same practical policy we have all along 

in our own national interest. We will look for areas of cooperation 

with Russia. Nobody can predict the future. What we can say, however, is that President Putin, then Prime Minister Putin, was 

around for every agreement that I just described, and we managed 

to agree then. So there is no reason to believe that, even with those 

two gentlemen in different jobs, we will not be successful in continuing to reach practical areas of agreement when they are 

mutual. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So we really think he is just busy and there 

is no underlying ulterior motive here. 

Dr. GORDON. I think only the Russian Government can—we take 

at face value what—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. That was a rhetorical question. [Laughter.] 

Stepping back a little bit from the specifics of the upcoming 

Chicago summit, I want to talk about what we see as a NATO 

member, the messages is that people should take away from Chicago. Last month I had the opportunity to host with the Atlantic 

Council an event around the upcoming summit. Secretary Albright 

and former Senator Warner were there. And it was very well attended. There was a lot of interest in it. 

And I think the summit comes at a very important time as we 

look at what has happened with NATO, what is happening in 

25 

Europe right now. There have, in some quarters, been a suggestion 

that we should pull back from our commitments to NATO, that the 

same is true in Europe, as we look at the declining defense budgets, which people have raised here today. And I actually think that 

would be a mistake if we look at the successes of NATO, and you 

both talked about those very eloquently in your opening remarks. 

This is a 60-year-old alliance. It has been the most successful one 

in modern history anyway. You talked about the success in Libya. 

We still represent three of the top four defense spending countries 

in the world. And we have, after a decade of fighting in Afghanistan, the most experienced fighting force that we have seen again 

in modern history. Enlargement has been good for Europe. 

So in view of where the alliance is now, in view of some of the 

criticisms and questions that have been raised about its ongoing 

potency to deal with the challenges we face in the world today, 

what is the message that you all would like to see coming out of 

the Chicago summit about NATO and about our role in NATO? I 

would like to ask actually both of you if you could address that. 

Dr. GORDON. Well, Madam Chairman, I could not agree more 

with your analysis and could not disagree more with the notion 

that maybe it is time to move on. And as you say, beyond the particulars on Afghanistan in capabilities, I think the overall message 

is that it is simply in the national security interests of the United 

States to strengthen our partnerships with these key allies. Whatever the drawbacks and deficiencies in defense spending or different points of view we may have on some international questions, 

it is clearly in our interest to face the daunting challenges we face 

around the world with a standing alliance of countries who broadly 

share our values and interests. 

And I just think that the case for doing that in some ways is 

greater than ever before, given the fiscal situation that we are all 

in. If you just take any of the most recent examples—doing Afghanistan is challenging enough—imagine trying to do it without this 

alliance, without the contributions of our partners, without an integrated military command structure and a tradition of militaries 

that cooperate with each other, and some common pooled assets 

like the AWACs and soon allied ground surveillance. It just does 

not make sense. Again, broadly speaking, European partners are 

those with which we manage global problems whether it is in the 

Balkans, in Libya, in Afghanistan, or—not in a military sense, but 

our Iran negotiations and so many other questions. So I think it 

is just absolutely the case that it is in our interest to do this. 

Again, Libya is another very recent example. I do not think anybody would have imagined us doing a military operation in Libya, 

if you look back a couple of years ago, but to have a command and 

control system that is practiced and interoperable forces and a 

political body in Brussels because, you know, you cannot just whip 

these things up at the snap of a finger. You have to have these 

standing institutions and structures. So I think that is the broad 

message of cooperation we would like to see go out. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Townsend, would you like to add to that? 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Senator, thank you very much. I agree with 

everything that Assistant Secretary Gordon said. 

26 

And just a personal reflection, I have worked in the Department 

of Defense since the early 1980s in various guises, as well as at the 

Atlantic Council. And what I have seen over time and when I answer this question to groups of Americans, you know, when a crisis 

happens, going back so many years, the telephones ring in Europe. 

They do not ring other places in terms of Washington calling our 

allies, calling the NATO Secretary General. That is where the 

phone rings in those early days as we grapple with what to do. And 

it is something that is precious and it is something that we have 

not always had. 

And if you look back in history, whether to the 1930s and 

watched how we as nations tried to organize ourselves to deal with 

problems—the problems of those days are different than problems 

today. But we have with NATO an organizing entity to help us 

quickly come together just on a political basis at 28 around a table 

and try to sort out what do we need to do. We are able to go to 

the U.N. with these nations with us and get U.N. assistance. The 

U.N. Security Council takes on these issues. And then when politically we all decide on a course of action, you have at NATO on the 

military side the integrated military structure that actually helps 

us to organize ourselves militarily and take action pretty quickly. 

And Assistant Secretary Gordon mentioned Libya. And I use 

Libya as well as an illustration on how we were able to come 

together politically, work with the United Nations, work with the 

international community, not just with our European allies but 

broadly, and then take a course of action. And it is a great test case 

of the theory. 

But I will also say in closing that we have to always work at it. 

There will always be critics, and we need the critics because we 

need to understand where we are failing here and there, the lessons learned coming out of Libya, the defense spending, the capabilities. And I have worked for years with this trying to keep moving forward and keep the alliance strong. We will never reach 100 

percent in terms of fixing all the problems and getting it exactly 

right, but we have to keep trying. And what I know Assistant 

Secretary Gordon and I, who have worked for many years on this 

together—we want to hand off to our successors an alliance that is 

continuing to move forward and continuing to look for ways to get 

better. 

And a lot of what the Chicago summit is and the capabilities 

package particularly are ways in which we can try to address the 

defense spending issues, the way we can address trying to spend 

money with a priority. Some of the Senators in their statements 

have talked about prioritizing in this era of austerity how we spend 

money. That is what we are going to be trying to do in Chicago. 

And every summit, as it comes around, takes us another step 

toward addressing these issues and becoming an even stronger 

alliance. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you both very much. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thanks to both of you for joining us. 

27 

I would like to start with Mr. Gordon. Do you anticipate that 

over the next 10 days we might see any softening of Turkey’s objection to Israel’s participation in the upcoming summit? 

Dr. GORDON. I think there is some misconception about this issue 

that I actually appreciate the opportunity to clarify. 

NATO had not envisaged inviting Israel to the Chicago summit. 

Israel is an important partner of NATO. It is certainly an important ally of the United States. It is a member of the Mediterranean 

Dialogue, one of NATO’s manifold partnership arrangements. But 

the Chicago summit was never going to have a meeting of every 

single one of those partnerships simply as a matter of logistics and 

time. So there was no meeting of the Mediterranean Dialogue 

or particular invitation to Israel for Turkey to block. And I have 

seen news reports and speculation about this, but that is just not 

accurate. 

What is accurate, as you know very well, is that the TurkeyIsrael relationship is fraught, which we deeply regret because one 

of the more positive aspects of the Middle East is that there was 

deep cooperation between those two countries. And we have invested an awful lot of diplomacy in overcoming that, and we regret 

that partnership activities at NATO with Israel are not proceeding 

because of Turkish objections. And we have been very clear about 

that, that no country should bring bilateral disputes into the alliance. So as a broad matter, it is something we are very focused on 

advancing. As a specific matter for the NATO summit, it is not 

really an issue. 

Senator LEE. OK. So would you say that the relationship 

between Turkey and Israel does not bode well for the partnership, 

such as it is, between Israel and NATO? 

Dr. GORDON. That is right. And as I say, NATO has a history of 

partnership activities with lots of countries throughout the Mediterranean Arab world. We see it as a package. As I said, first of 

all, we do not accept that countries should bring any bilateral dispute into the alliance, and we do not accept that countries can pick 

and choose in blocking partnership activities. So our view is if an 

ally—and as you know, NATO operates by consensus. If an ally is 

going to block partnership with one country, then we are not going 

to accept partnership—— 

Senator LEE. Partnerships generally. 

Dr. GORDON [continuing]. Generally. And that is where we are 

now because we are not going to allow sort of discrimination 

against a particular ally. 

Senator LEE. Right, right. But Turkey’s actions here sort of jeopardize that understanding. Right? They are challenging that 

assumption, that assertion. 

Dr. GORDON. Well, not the assertion that it is all or nothing. We, 

the United States, because again everything is by consensus, will 

not allow certain countries to be blocked and others to go ahead 

with their participation. 

Senator LEE. But Turkey is, nonetheless, objecting to any partnership activities that involve Israel. 

Dr. GORDON. Correct. 

Senator LEE. Through the Mediterranean partnership or otherwise. 

28 

Dr. GORDON. Correct. 

Senator LEE. What are the administration’s plans with regard to 

possible funding of Afghan security forces at their peak of 350,000 

troops beyond 2014? What can you tell us about that? 

Dr. GORDON. Well, as I think you know, you are right that the 

peak ANSF will be around 330,000–350,000 troops. But then in the 

longer term, we believe a sustainable goal will be considerably less 

than that, closer to 230,000, because our principal guiding thinking 

about this all along is that ANSF need to be sufficient to do the 

mission but also sustainable, which is to say affordable, over the 

long term. And that is where we think this remains to be decided. 

It is one of the issues to be discussed among allies in Chicago and 

work continues to be done, but we do not envisage that that 

350,000 peak will be sustained necessarily over the next decade. 

We also acknowledge—and this is partly a further response to 

Senator Risch’s questions earlier—that the Afghans cannot do this 

by themselves. The international community is going to have to 

step up and play a major role probably for the next decade in 

ensuring that ANSF are sustainable. But it is also important to 

remember that whatever that costs the international community, it 

will be far less than we have been paying every year for the past 

decade. 

Senator LEE. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Townsend, French President-elect Francois Hollande has indicated that he would like to withdraw all French combat forces 

from Afghanistan by the end of 2012. What do you think the odds 

are that that will actually occur? 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Senator, I am not a betting man, so establishing 

odds is going to be difficult. But we have been in touch with the 

Hollande team as they begin to take the reins of power. They are 

not there yet obviously. The inauguration has got to come. I know 

Assistant Secretary Gordon just a few minutes ago told the committee that he will be going to Paris I think this afternoon to talk 

to the team. 

Their shadow Defense Minister, if you will, Messr. Le Drian, 

came by about a month or 2 ago, and I spoke with him a bit and 

listened to what he had to say. 

I think they face the situation that many politicians face after an 

election. They are now going to be faced with governance. They are 

going to be faced with a summit where a lot of work has been done 

by the allies to try to make sure that the way ahead is something 

that we are all unified on. And of course, we are going to be making a declaration at the summit on Afghanistan. There will also be 

the NATO strategic plan for Afghanistan that will be agreed there. 

So there has been a lot of work done. And so the new French Government, as it takes the reins of power once Hollande is inaugurated, they are going to be stepping into an already flowing stream. 

And so we are looking forward to talking to them and explaining 

this to them as they get ready to take that big step. 

Speaking personally, I would expect and I would hope that they 

would understand, as they take the reins of power in France, that 

in the NATO context they will be one of 28 nations that is coming 

together around the plan for 2014 and afterward. France has 

played a very important role in the development of this plan, a 

29 

very important role in Afghanistan. And so they will be taking on, 

as they take the reins of power, a very big responsibility to join 

with us and to go forward in an alliance that wants to make sure 

that there will be an enduring presence after 2014, that the alliance will do its bit in helping the Afghan ANSF and the Afghan 

Government stand up and take on its role as a nation. And I am 

sure that the discussions that Assistant Secretary Gordon will have 

will be along those lines. 

Senator LEE. Thanks to both of you. 

Madam Chair, I see my time has expired. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for doing 

this today. 

As all of you are aware, the United States has about 90,000 

troops currently in the combat mission there in Afghanistan. And 

I think they have done an outstanding job in terms of the mission 

that we have entrusted to them, and I think they have largely 

accomplished their mission. I mean, Osama bin Laden is dead. The 

Taliban is no longer in power. Terrorists no longer have a safe 

haven in Afghanistan. And that is why I was really encouraged 

when Secretary Panetta stated that we could bring home our combat troops as early as 2013: ‘‘Hopefully by mid to the latter part 

of 2013, we will be able to make a transition from a combat role 

to a training, advice, and assist role.’’ 

Could you update me on his hope and where we are on that? 

I mean, I interpreted at the time when he said that that he was 

really moving in that direction, but I have not heard anything else 

and I am wondering. Mr. Townsend, maybe you could start on 

where we are because I think there are a growing number of Americans who ask the question, Why are we in these villages and basically policing villages when we have been there for 10 years? Why 

are the Afghans not doing that? 

And it just seems to me that Secretary Panetta hit it on the head 

when he said we need to move our combat forces out of that combat 

role and do everything we can to have the Afghans out there in the 

front taking the lead, moving forward to bear the major part of 

responsibility. And I hope that that is what we are pushing for. 

And I also hope that the Chicago summit, when folks come together, that they listen to these kinds of issues and maybe reconsider the 2014 date that they have. But please, go ahead. 

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate that question. That is certainly where we are working toward right now is 

this transition. 

Twenty fourteen, of course, has been the date that came from the 

Lisbon summit as an important date, both to the alliance and to 

President Karzai, where we will see that the Afghans taking the 

lead for security and taking on the front end of the combat missions from 2014 out. 

But what is important now, what has been underway that Secretary Panetta was talking about was this transition from the 

United States and other allies being in the lead for a lot of the 

combat missions to that transitioning to the Afghans. That is unVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:01 Nov 19, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051012-M.TX
30 

derway, and the date of 2013 that has been discussed we look on 

as a milestone date along the road to 2014. 

Twenty thirteen is important because in terms of this transition, 

this is where the ANSF will be in the security lead for most of 

Afghanistan by that time. Already here in 2012, the Afghan forces, 

the ANSF, are taking on the lead in much of Afghanistan. Twenty 

thirteen will see, I think, pretty much the completion of that. Now, 

it has got to be facts on the ground and certainly the Afghan Government and the ISAF commander and the allies are working on 

this. But right now, if you talk to General Allen and some of the 

commanders, we have been pretty impressed with the work of the 

ANSF, that they are certainly up to the task of taking the lead in 

terms of combat, and that we are going to see this transition that 

you mentioned and that Secretary Panetta mentioned in terms of 

allied forces, U.S. forces, transitioning from combat to this advise 

and assist and letting the Afghans take this lead in terms of combat. And that is what we are seeing. In a great extent, 2013 is 

going to be a landmark year for that. 

And we have seen over the past couple months security incidents 

have happened such as in Kabul. The ANSF have done the right 

thing. They have stepped up, and we have been very impressed 

with their performance. So a lot of what I can hear from you in 

terms of your aspirations of what you want to see in terms of transition is occurring. 

And while, as we go from 2013 to 2014, we will be primarily in 

this assist role, we will be ready to take on combat should that 

happen, but I think what we are seeing, though, is that the ANSF 

is going to be up to the task and we will be largely doing this 

assisting and this training up to 2014. 

Senator UDALL. Well, it seems to me that before you have this 

firm date, whenever we set it, of getting out of Afghanistan in 

terms of combat troops, not the counterterrorism role and all the 

assists and the other things that we clearly need to continue, that 

you need to really test out whether they are up to it. And they need 

to be there in the front doing the job and us just be in an assist 

role to make sure that we test their capabilities. And I think that 

is what Secretary Panetta was hitting on in terms of that we have 

been there so long, we need to try to do everything we can to get 

them out and be doing the major responsibility for security, and we 

are really only in an advise and assist role. 

And I just hope we are not headed for a situation where we are 

going to keep pushing our date down the line. We need them to 

take responsibility. If they cannot do it, we need a really tough, 

firm assessment of what is going on and a reassessment of what 

is going on. 

Mr. Gordon, I do not know whether you were going to comment 

or not. You made some notes there. But I thought that was primarily a question for Mr. Townsend, but I am happy to hear from 

you too. 

Dr. GORDON. No. I would just endorse what Jim Townsend said. 

I hear what you are saying and that is precisely the point of the 

milestone, after which our role will be primarily training, advising, 

and assisting. But we also have to be clear and honest. We cannot 

promise that from some date in 2013 there will be no combat in 

31 

Afghanistan. Obviously, that would be ideal. But we need to make 

sure we succeed as well. So from the milestone we will primarily 

train, advise, and assist, and by the end of 2014, combat troops are 

out and Afghans are fully in charge. And the purpose in many 

ways of the discussions in Chicago will be to get everyone on the 

same page for exactly that concept: the milestone, the transition at 

the end of 2014, and how we make sure we succeed after 2014. 

Senator UDALL. Well, my guess is that in Chicago there is going 

to be a big push to try to do what Secretary Panetta was talking 

about. I think many of our NATO partners, as in France—you are 

going to go talk to them, but I think they just see this, that we 

have waited too long in terms of having an Afghan lead. I mean, 

I have heard the Europeans talking about this for 8 years. I mean, 

they have talked about this should be Afghan-led, security should 

be Afghan-led. And I think they are getting very impatient. 

I know that you all cannot make a commitment publicly and say 

this is what we are going to discuss at the meeting in Chicago because that would be the big headline in everything. But I hope that 

there is very serious discussion about this transition and how 

quickly we can do it and how we make sure that this is an Afghanled security operation. 

Sorry to run over, Madam Chair, but I really appreciate you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. 

In the interests of time because we have another panel, I think 

we should go ahead and move on unless either Senator Udall— 

Senator Lee is leaving. So unless you have further questions, I am 

going to move on to the second panel. 

Senator UDALL. I am ready for the second panel. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you both. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I have a lot more questions, but I will reserve 

those. So let me thank you both very much. Have a good trip to 

Paris, Under Secretary Gordon. 

While we are transitioning the panels in and out, I will take a 

moment to introduce the second panel. Senator Kerry did that a little bit. But let me point out that each of the next three experts has 

extensive experience working throughout Government and in the 

private sector on Europe and NATO issues, and we are very 

pleased to have them join us today. 

First is Dr. Charles Kupchan who is the Whitney Shepardson 

Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor 

of international affairs in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and 

Government at Georgetown University. 

Second is Ian Brzezinski who is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Atlantic Council and a member 

of the council’s Strategic Advisors Group. He also leads the 

Brzezinski Group. 

Finally is Dr. Hans Binnendijk who is currently the vice president for research at the National Defense University and the Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy at the university. 

Thank you all very much for being here. 

Let me just point out I have a statement that I am going to submit for the record and ask Dr. Kupchan if he would like to begin. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:] 

32 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to examine the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization, which will convene in Chicago just 10 days from now 

to discuss the alliance’s current and future trajectory. We have two impressive panels of witnesses here to help us better understand the difficult issues facing NATO 

and its members. 

This year’s NATO summit could not come at a more important time. In Washington and in the capitals of nearly all NATO member nations, Western leaders are 

wrestling with unprecedented challenges: fiscal crises that have forced unwelcome 

austerity measures, declining defense budgets, less-than-robust economic growth, 

and even a return to recession in some European countries. At the same time, global 

security demands are rapidly evolving and becoming more and more complex. 

In the face of these difficult and growing challenges, there may be a tendency to 

question ourselves, to pull back or to lower our goals and expectations. I think this 

is exactly the wrong time to question the very principles that have guided this alliance to be the successful, dominant force that it is today. 

The message out of the Chicago summit this month needs to be that the United 

States and its NATO allies will continue to be a dominant force for good in 

the world—just as we have been over the last 60 years. We should emphasize 

that NATO is ready to adapt to 21st century threats, to address our shortfalls and 

to make the tough choices necessary to meet the next generation of security 

challenges. 

A successful summit will need to see progress on a number of critical issues facing 

the alliance today. 

The first is Afghanistan, where we are seeking to shift from a combat-focused role 

to one of training, advising, and assisting the Afghan forces as they take the lead 

for the security of their country. Last week, President Obama signed the U.S.- 

Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement, providing a 10-year commitment to our 

Afghan partners after the transfer of security responsibility in 2014. At the summit, 

we should seek buy-in and support from our NATO allies while working closely with 

alliance members—and our Afghan partners—to identify realistic, sustainable troop 

numbers and financial commitments. 

The second is NATO’s ‘‘Smart Defense’’ initiative, which has been touted as an 

effort to prioritize defense projects and pool and share resources at a time of increasingly strained budgets. I welcome the effort to ensure the maximum possible 

return on investment of our limited defense dollars, and NATO can build on successful initiatives like the Baltic Air Policing mission and the Strategic Air Lift Capability program. However, it is important that ‘‘Smart Defense’’ does not become an 

excuse for further underinvestment in much-needed defense spending by our allies. 

The lack of burden-sharing will remain an important issue that must be 

addressed in Chicago. Just a few NATO countries are spending at or above 2 percent of their GDP, the level of commitment required of all alliance members. While 

the United States spends over 4 percent of its GDP on defense, Europe as a whole 

spends only 1.6 percent, and many of those individual countries spend less than 

1 percent. The United States spends three times more than the other 27 allies 

combined. 

The NATO Strategic Concept—agreed to at the Lisbon summit 2 years ago—outlined the capabilities needed to deter and defend against future threats to the alliance. In Chicago, ‘‘Smart Defense’’ should be utilized to begin to meet all of those 

capabilities and to make real commitments of resources toward that effort. 

Finally, at the summit, we must maintain our focus on the alliance’s ‘‘open door’’ 

policy. NATO enlargement has been one of the great successes of the alliance over 

the last two decades, bringing in critical allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, 

which have rapidly transformed themselves from security consumers to security contributors. Poland and Romania will soon host critical missile defense sites. Estonia 

may be one of only a few NATO members to actually reach its defense spending 

requirements. And most of the newer members have also made significant troop 

commitments to the fight in Afghanistan. 

Despite the success, enlargement has begun to demonstrate signs of strain, due 

to both geographic location and political realities. At the Chicago summit, no new 

members are expected to join the alliance; however, that does not mean NATO’s 

‘‘open door’’ is off the agenda. There are currently four aspirant nations that are interested in pursuing membership, including Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. It will be important for NATO to maintain the credibility 

of our ‘‘open door’’ by identifying a clear path to NATO membership for deserving 

countries. 

33 

The summit in Chicago comes at a crucial time for the U.S. and our allies, and 

these are just three of many important issues that should be discussed. In a world 

where the security focus is shifting toward Asia and military budgets are shrinking, 

now is the time for NATO to redefine its role as a preeminent force for peace and 

stability. 

Despite our difficulties, NATO has arguably been the most successful modern 

military alliance in history. Our deep ties were born out of World War II, where 

victory as a truly joint force was unlike anything that had ever been seen before. 

At the height of the cold war, our alliance deterred the very real threat of a nuclear 

devastation brought on by two global superpowers bent on conflict. It is an alliance 

that helped tear down the Berlin Wall and dismantle the Communist empire.And, 

it has moved us ever closer to a Europe that is ‘‘whole, free, and at peace.’’ 

Today, even in the face of austerity, our alliance is an unrivaled military force. 

NATO has three of the top four defense spending countries in the world and represents nearly two-thirds of worldwide military expenditures. Due to nearly a decade of fighting in Afghanistan, NATO members have some of the most experienced, 

battle-tested warriors in a generation. NATO acted when no other force in the world 

had the capacity or the will to avert genocide in the Balkans or prevent a civilian 

massacre in Libya, ultimately bringing an end to brutal dictatorial regimes in both 

places. 

Do we have our problems? Absolutely. We need to take an honest, critical account 

of our shortfalls and inadequacies. Libya exposed some glaring capability gaps. Our 

open door policy has begun to show some strain and limits. At times, we struggle 

to find consensus on the role NATO should play in the world, and we have serious 

questions about equality and burden-sharing. 

Past success does not guarantee future relevance. Any alliance that wishes to remain relevant to a rapidly changing world must adapt and respond to new realities. 

As such, we come to Chicago at a critical turning point. NATO needs to define its 

role in a world where the focus is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. And it needs to 

do so in a time of shrinking budgets. 

The outcome there will help determine whether we will remain the undisputed 

leader of a free society in this century. Chicago should be a chance to remind the 

world—and perhaps convince a new generation of Americans—that the United 

States and its NATO allies continue to wield unprecedented influence and are 

actively shaping our world for the better. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, PROFESSOR, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; WHITNEY SHEPARDSON SENIOR 

FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. KUPCHAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is a privilege to have the opportunity to have a conversation with the committee today. I will simply summarize my written testimony and 

would like to ask that it be submitted for the record. 

I think the upcoming summit in Chicago represents a moment 

for stocktaking, in the sense that we have been through two decades of post-cold-war NATO, and I think the alliance has fared 

much better than many of us had expected in the sense that most 

alliances disappear when the threat that gave birth to them disappears. But here we are in 2012 and not only is NATO still in 

existence, but it has troops in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, just fought 

a war in Libya, and has partnerships around the world. So clearly 

the alliance is a going concern. 

I also think that despite the ups and downs of transatlantic relations over the last 20 years, we can relatively confidently say that 

the United States and Europe remain each other’s best partners 

and that when the American President or a European leader looks 

out at the world and says who do I call when there is a problem 

out there, the answer is the person on the other side of the Atlantic. My judgment is that that is not going to change anytime soon, 

and that is partly because of the affinity of interest and common 

34 

values but it is also because there are not other options. And even 

though there are rising powers in the world, I think we still count 

on our European allies and can rely on our European allies more 

than we can count on others. 

At the same time, I think it is clear that we are at the cusp of 

a major transition, a historic transition in the global landscape in 

which the community of nations that NATO represents is losing 

the primacy that it has enjoyed for the last 200 years. If you look 

at the share of global product represented by NATO—and I would 

include Japan in that calculation because they have been part of 

the Western world since World War II—we have gone from roughly 

70 percent of global product to 50 percent, and we are now headed 

toward 40 percent. And that says to me that the big security questions of the day are about how we are going to manage that transition. The big challenges to American security moving forward are 

not within the Atlantic community but outside the Atlantic community. 

And as a consequence, the relevance of this alliance to us and to 

our European allies—but I think more to us because we are a 

global power—will be what is NATO doing in this wider world. 

How is NATO keeping the United States safe as the global distribution of power shifts in the years and decades ahead? I would 

like to offer a few comments on that broad subject of NATO in the 

wider world. 

First, I think it is important to keep in mind that NATO represents the primary institutional infrastructure of the West. It 

keeps us together as a meaningful political community. That is 

particularly important when some of the emerging powers around 

us do not share our values and do not share our interests. I think 

one of the grand strategic questions of our time is how can we preserve the rules-based system that the United States and the Europeans have together built since World War II as the circle widens, 

as more players have seats at the table. This is not a conversation 

that is front and center on NATO’s agenda, but I think it has to 

be moving forward because the West, if it comes together, coheres, 

and generates a plan for managing this transition, it will withstand 

the test of time. If the United States and Europe go their separate 

ways in figuring out how to preserve a rules-based system, then I 

fear that the next 20–30 years will be a very bumpy period in 

international history. 

The second point in this respect is that I think that NATO needs 

to establish itself as a global security hub. That in my mind does 

not mean that NATO should go global. I think a global NATO 

would be a bridge too far. It would be a step that would burden 

the alliance with political requests and material requests that it 

would be unable to sustain. And in that respect, I think we should 

be sober and cautious about thinking of NATO as the military alliance of last resort for missions moving forward. 

Yes, NATO went into Afghanistan. Yes, the allies will hopefully 

leave together. Yes, NATO just finished a mission in Libya that 

was reasonably successful. But I think the take-away from Afghanistan and Libya should be sobriety, not gearing up for the next 

NATO deployment. The Afghan mission has been somewhat successful, but not a smashing success. Most of the allies are chafing 

35 

at the bit to get out—as you were just saying, Senator—and I think 

that it will be a long time coming before NATO engages in the 

same kind of operation that it engaged in in Afghanistan. 

Libya—I think the success is more conclusive, but many of the 

conditions that were present in Libya are not being replicated elsewhere, particularly in Syria: a U.N.-backed legal authority, the 

approval of the Arab world, the degree to which Libya was close 

to reservoirs of European power and therefore easy for the Europeans to do—even though they still relied heavily on United States 

support. 

In that regard, I think some of the most important NATO programs moving forward will not be the deployment of force even 

though, surely, there will be some of that. Instead, some of the 

most effective initiatives will be the broad array of global programs, including the NATO partnerships, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the support for the African Union, and the training mission in Iraq, which has already 

concluded. I think in many respects, NATO has to help other 

regions do for themselves what NATO has done for the Atlantic 

community: deepen integration, understand what it means to work 

together, and gradually build the solidarity that preserves regional 

peace. 

Two final comments. One concerns a subject we have already discussed this morning. If NATO is to be a global hub and to serve 

as the institutional core of the West during this period of transition, I think it requires a European pillar that stands up to the 

plate. And this issue is more pressing today than it has ever been 

before. We have had debates about burden-sharing since NATO 

was born. But during the cold war, that debate only went so far 

because the Europeans were quite confident that we were there to 

stay and that if something went wrong, the United States would 

show up at the party. 

I think right now we are seeing a world where the Europeans 

know that they need to do more. The U.S. pivot to Asia and the 

drawdown in Europe are not only justified and inevitable, but they 

also put a fire to the feet of the Europeans about the need to do 

more to balance the alliance. 

I am skeptical that the Europeans will spend more on defense. 

In fact, I would go as far as to say they are going to be spending 

less, and that is because for the foreseeable future, they are going 

to be worried about bailing out Greece, how to deal with their debt, 

and how to save the eurozone and perhaps even the European 

Union. That picture says to me that we should be pressing them 

not so much about spending, because I think that is running into 

a brick wall, but on rationalizing how they spend, on getting more 

bang for the buck, on getting them to pool their resources. That 

aggregation in my mind is the best way to get Europe to become 

more capable. This approach, in many respects, would also involve 

much closer links between NATO and the European Union. 

Finally, I think that it would be remiss for me not to make the 

following point, which is not going to be on the summit agenda in 

Chicago, but I think should be in the back of our minds in any 

case. And that is, from the very beginning of the Atlantic partnership, our strength abroad has depended upon our strength at home, 

36 

our economy, our political solvency. What I am most worried about 

today, as I testify before the committee, is not whether we get 

NATO enlargement right. It is not when and how we get out of 

Afghanistan. It is the degree to which we are now stumbling—the 

West collectively—in terms of our economies stuck in neutral, the 

European Union pulling apart, experiencing a renationalization of 

the sort that we have not seen since World War II, and our own 

political system here going through a very rough patch. 

So my final thought would be it is impossible to think about, talk 

about, and imagine NATO’s future without doing the hard work of 

getting our own houses in order because in the end of the day 

NATO will only be as strong as its individual Member States. We 

have a lot of work to do on that front. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kupchan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. KUPCHAN

NATO has demonstrated impressive resilience and solidarity since the cold war’s 

end. Indeed, it has defied history; alliances usually disband when the collective 

threat that brought them into being disappears. Instead, NATO has not only survived, but markedly expanded its membership and undertaken major missions in 

the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. As the cold war came to a close, few observers 

could have predicted that NATO, 20 years later, would be in the midst of an extended operation in Afghanistan while simultaneously carrying out a successful air 

campaign to topple the Libyan Government. 

The durability of NATO stems from the reality that the United States and Europe 

remain one another’s best partner. To be sure, differing perspectives and priorities 

regularly test transatlantic solidarity. But teamwork between the United States and 

Europe remains vital to addressing most international challenges. As President 

Obama affirmed prior to the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, ‘‘our relationship with 

our European allies and partners is the cornerstone of our engagement with the 

world, and a catalyst for global cooperation. With no other region does the United 

States have such a close alignment of values, interests, capabilities, and goals.’’ 

NATO’s endurance beyond the cold war’s end makes clear that it is much more 

than a military alliance. NATO is perhaps the primary institution responsible for 

preserving the coherence and effectiveness of the West as a community of shared 

values and interests. That function, reinforced by transatlantic cooperation in a 

multiplicity of other forms, will only grow more important over time as the primacy 

long enjoyed by the Atlantic democracies gives way to a redistribution of global 

power. 

Its impressive track record notwithstanding, the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago 

represents a moment that demands strategic ambition and vision, not complacency. 

As many parts of the developing world continue to experience economic and political 

awakenings, NATO must serve as an anchor of liberal values and democratic institution and as a key venue for managing a global landscape in transition. Most 

emerging security challenges lie well beyond alliance territory, making NATO’s ability to serve as a global security hub and to contribute to stability in other regions 

fundamental to its future relevance. 

The missions in Afghanistan and Libya represent important steps in this direction, but they also reveal the profound political and operational difficulties confronting the prospect of a ‘‘global NATO.’’ Accordingly, even as the alliance invests 

in its capacities for military intervention, it should recognize that one of its key contributions to security ‘‘out of area’’ will be facilitating regional integration and building regional capacity. NATO’s ability to serve as a global security hub also depends 

on addressing the issue of burden-sharing; Europe must strengthen its own ability 

to project power if it is to remain an attractive partner for the United States. 

Finally, NATO members must be mindful of the reality that purpose and strength 

abroad require purpose and strength at home. Ultimately, the welfare and efficacy 

of the Western alliance depends upon restoring economic and political solvency on 

both sides of the Atlantic. 

37 

NATO IN THE WIDER WORLD

During the cold war, the West (including Japan) collectively accounted for roughly 

75 percent of global economic output. Today, it accounts for about 50 percent, and 

that share will decline steadily as emerging economies continue to enjoy impressive 

rates of growth. Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing countries—Brazil, China, India, and Russia—to match that of the G7 countries within about two decades. This ongoing shift in wealth is already affecting 

military expenditures. For the first time in the modern era, Asia now spends more 

on defense than Europe. 

The international system is headed into uncharted waters; Western nations need 

a common strategy to address this tectonic shift in the global landscape. The 21st 

century will hardly be the first time that multiple centers of power embraced quite 

different models of governance and commerce: during the 17th century, for example, 

the Holy Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, Mughal Empire, Qing Dynasty, and 

Tokugawa Shogunate each ran its affairs according to its own distinct rules and 

culture. But these powers were largely self-contained; they rarely interacted with 

each other and thus had no need to agree on a set of common rules to guide their 

relations. 

This century, in contrast, will mark the first time in history in which multiple 

versions of order and modernity coexist in an interconnected world; no longer will 

the West anchor globalization. Multiple power centers, and the competing political 

and economic systems they represent, will vie on a more level playing field. Effective 

global governance will require forging common ground amid an equalizing distribution of power and rising ideological diversity. 

NATO is by no means the only available venue for coordinating Western efforts 

to manage this transition, but its political and military institutions and its timetested mechanisms for building consensus among the Atlantic democracies are 

tremendous assets. The fact that almost 20 leaders of non-NATO countries plan to 

attend the Chicago summit attests to the alliance’s growing reach. As the European 

Union deepens its collective character and its new foreign policy institutions, teamwork between NATO and the EU can guide the West’s engagement with the wider 

world. The top priority is forging a united front on countering emerging threats and 

on making the adaptations to international institutions and rules needed to preserve cooperative stability amid global change. 

Although it is impossible to predict where the next NATO mission might take 

place, the alliance will surely continue to play a direct role in addressing security 

challenges well beyond its borders. At the same time, the idea of a ‘‘global NATO’’ 

is a bridge too far. Trying to turn the alliance into an all-purpose vehicle of choice 

for military operations around the world would likely lead to its demise, not revitalization. In many parts of the world, a NATO-led mission might lack legitimacy 

among local parties, compromising its chances of success. Efforts to turn NATO into 

a global alliance would also saddle it with unsustainable burdens and insurmountable political divides. 

The missions in Afghanistan and Libya amply demonstrated the readiness of 

NATO to take on missions well beyond alliance territory. NATO also maintains ongoing operations in Kosovo, off the Horn of Africa (Operation Ocean Shield), and in 

the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour). But such missions may well prove 

to be more the exception than the rule. In Afghanistan, NATO members have demonstrated impressive solidarity. The mission, however, has not been an unqualified 

success and member governments now face strong domestic pressures to bring the 

operation to an end. It is doubtful that NATO would countenance a similar mission 

for a long time to come. In Libya, NATO was more successful in meeting its objectives, and Europeans demonstrated their ability to take the lead (although not without significant U.S. participation). But the Libya operation does not represent a 

model for the future. Many aspects of the intervention in Libya would be difficult 

to replicate, including strong support in the Arab world and approval by the U.N. 

Security Council. Due to Libya’s proximity to European air bases, European members of NATO were able to carry out missions that would be much more difficult 

in theaters farther afield. The impediments to military intervention in Syria are a 

case in point. 

NATO should of course keep its integrated military structure in fine working 

order; unforeseen missions can emerge with little warning, often requiring urgent 

action. But some of NATO’s most important and effective contributions to global 

security are likely to come in the form of capacity-building rather than war-fighting. 

In this regard, NATO should aim to do for other regions what it has done for the 

Atlantic community: advance the cause of security and peace through political/ 

military integration and building regional capability. Put differently, NATO should 

38 

help other regions help themselves through training, assistance, exercises, and exchanges. Some of most important security institutions of the 21st century are likely 

to be regional ones—such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union, the 

Association of Southeast Asia States, and the Union of South American Nations. 

NATO should be investing in the efficacy of these regional bodies. 

In pursuit of this objective, NATO should intensify and expand the numerous programs it already maintains to advance these goals, including: 

• Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace: engages 22 European partner countries in multilateral and bilateral relations with NATO. • Mediterranean Dialogue: engages Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, 

Morocco, and Tunisia in NATO activities. • Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: provides training and exchanges with Bahrain, 

Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. • NATO Partners: engages non-NATO members in NATO operations, including 

Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Mongolia. • Support for African Union: provides NATO assistance to the AU mission in 

Somalia and to AU peacekeeping capacity. • Training Mission in Iraq (2004–2011): trained Iraq’s armed forces. 

As NATO deepens its engagement in areas beyond its territorial boundaries, it 

should address potential changes to its decisionmaking procedures to ensure its 

effectiveness. In the absence of the unifying threat posed by the Soviet Union, 

NATO solidarity is more difficult to sustain—as made clear by the inequitable division of labor in Afghanistan and the decisions by roughly half of NATO’s members 

to abstain from participation in the Libya mission. To ensure that divergent perspectives do not become a source of paralysis, the alliance should consider moving 

away from a consensus-based approach to decisionmaking. Options such as the formation of coalitions of the willing and the use of constructive abstentions—members 

opt out of rather than block joint action—could provide NATO the greater flexibility 

it needs. New decisionmaking procedures would also provide the opportunity for 

more input from non-NATO members that participate in alliance operations. 

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

Inequitable-burden sharing has strained transatlantic relations even in good economic times. Europe’s military shortfalls have become even more problematic amid 

the global downturn. The United States is scaling back its own defense spending, 

making Washington more sensitive to the readiness of its partners to shoulder defense responsibilities. Nonetheless, America’s European allies are slashing, not augmenting, their own defense expenditures; they now spend about 1.5 percent of their 

GDPs on defense, compared with over 4 percent in the United States. In addition, 

NATO’s new missions depend heavily upon types of capability—lift, targeting, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—that highlight Europe’s military shortcomings. It is this reality that prompted former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

to worry that NATO’s future could be ‘‘dim if not dismal.’’ Put simply, Europe will 

be of declining strategic relevance to the United States if its ability to shoulder 

international responsibilities continues to decline. 

In light of the economic problems plaguing Europe, increases in defense spending 

are not likely for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the only realistic course for 

strengthening the European pillar of NATO is for European nations to do a much 

better job of aggregating their political will and resources. America’s European allies 

need to allocate defense resources more effectively and take advantage of the institutional changes effected by the Lisbon Treaty to forge a more common and collective security policy. Europe would be not only investing in its own security, but also 

strengthening the integrity of the Atlantic link. 

The integration of Europe has admittedly arrived at a fragile moment. The 

eurozone crisis has led to a renationalization of political life that is fragmenting 

Europe’s landscape. But there are also developments on the positive side of the 

ledger. France’s reintegration into NATO’s military structure advances the prospect 

for better cooperation between the EU and NATO. It is conceivable, if not likely, 

that a ‘‘core’’ Europe—an inner grouping that provides for more centralized and purposeful governance—could emerge from the ongoing fiscal crisis. The deeper integration and oversight reflected in the fiscal pact could be replicated in the security 

realm. In addition, precisely because austerity is cutting into resource availability, 

it is leading to new collective synergies—such as conventional and nuclear cooperation between Britain and France. Finally, the drawdown of U.S. troop levels in 

Europe and the prospect of a ‘‘pivot’’ to Asia should help convince Europeans that 

‘‘free-riding in perpetuity’’ is not an option. 

39 

Building a more capable European pillar is primarily up to Europeans: they must 

increase their deployable military and civilian assets and ensure that the more capable institutions launched by the Lisbon Treaty are not offset by the renationalization of European politics. But the United States can help by making clear its unequivocal support for a strong Europe and engaging the EU at the collective level 

as its institutions mature. 

STRENGTH STARTS AT HOME

Many analysts have fretted over the past two decades about the prospects for 

NATO’s survival in the post-cold-war era. Their anxiety has so far proved unnecessary; the alliance is alive and well. However, most analysts failed to foresee what 

today may well be the greatest threat to NATO’s future—the economic and political 

malaise plaguing both sides of the Atlantic. The West has entered a prolonged period of sluggish economic growth, political polarization, and self-doubt, producing a 

crisis of democratic governance. It cannot be accidental that the United States and 

Europe (as well as Japan) are simultaneously passing through a period of unprecedented economic duress and political discontent. Globalization, by reallocating 

wealth and making less effective the policy levers that democratic states have at 

their disposal, is producing a widening gap between what electorates are asking of 

their governments and what those governments are able to deliver. 

At issue is not merely the availability of resources for defense, but the political 

vitality of the West. The West’s strength abroad has always depended upon its economic health and political purpose at home. The political awakening in the Middle 

East and the continuing rise of illiberal powers make all the more urgent the task 

of revitalizing the Western model of free commerce and democratic governance. 

Backstopped by NATO and the broader network of ties that bind North America and 

Europe to each other, the West needs to ensure that it has the economic and political wherewithal to anchor the ongoing shift in the international system. 

The NATO summit in Chicago is not the place for discussion of how to stabilize 

the eurozone or breathe new life into the European project. Nor is it the appropriate 

venue for debate about restoring Western economies to full health and rebuilding 

popular confidence in democratic institutions. 

Nonetheless, NATO is in the midst of charting its new course for the 21st century. 

Any serious consideration of the future of the alliance must urgently address how 

to restore the West’s economic and political vitality. Strength starts at home; in the 

end, NATO can only be as strong and resilient as its individual members. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Brzezinski. Can I just get you to get a little closer to the mic 

so we can hear better? 

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, SENIOR FELLOW, THE 

ATLANTIC COUNCIL; PRINCIPAL, THE BRZEZINSKI GROUP, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. As a former Senate staffer, who served this committee and prior to that, the late Senator William V. Roth, it is a 

real pleasure to return to these halls. It makes me recall the 

strong, bipartisan leadership that this committee brought to the 

efforts to extend NATO membership to the democracies of Central 

Europe. Those were historic decisions. They strengthened the alliance. They strengthened transatlantic security. 

The Chicago summit is going to be important in large part because of the context in which it takes place. That context includes 

a war in Afghanistan from which both the United States and 

Europe appear to be disengaging; economic crises on both sides of 

the Atlantic; diminishing or atrophying European defense capabilities; NATO’s qualified success in Libya, one that nonetheless raised 

questions about U.S. commitment to NATO and highlighted European defense shortfalls; and of course, the recent U.S. defense guidance that features a pivot to Asia and initiates another reduction 

of American forces stationed in Europe. 

40 

Some have asserted that this should be an implementation summit that focuses on the alliance’s military operation in Afghanistan 

and reviews NATO’s progress under its new Strategic Concept. In 

light of our context, that would be insufficient. That would reinforce a sense of NATO’s growing irrelevance and further a process 

of transatlantic decoupling. 

Senator Shaheen, you asked what should be the one central message from the Chicago summit. In my view, if the Chicago summit 

is to have one overarching purpose, it should be to provide a credible reaffirmation of the transatlantic bargain, one in which the 

United States demonstrates real commitment to Europe’s regional 

security interests and our European allies demonstrate they are 

ready to stand with the United States to address global challenges 

to transatlantic security. 

Toward that end, the United States should pursue five priorities 

at the Chicago summit. 

First and foremost, the President must credibly reaffirm Europe’s 

centrality in U.S. global strategy. The drifting apart of the two continents has many causes, but they include a United States transatlantic agenda whose dominant elements recently have been: a 

vaguely defined reset of relations with Russia; the new defense 

guidance; and, a proposed missile defense architecture that still remains conditional. The decision to further reduce United States 

forces stationed in Europe occurs in the context of an increasingly 

assertive Russian foreign policy. Just last week, Russia’s chief of 

the general staff threatened to launch preemptive strikes against 

proposed missile defense sites in Central Europe. 

Washington should remove the conditionality that still hangs 

over U.S. missile defense plans for Europe. That conditionality not 

only undercuts European confidence in the U.S. commitment to 

build those sites, it certainly incentivizes Kremlin opposition. 

The U.S. military drawdown will also make it important to ensure that the remaining forces in Europe are fully equipped and 

funded, and equally important, careful consideration has to be 

given how in the future the United States and Europe will sustain 

their military interoperability. The way we fight war—the way the 

United States fights wars—has become so technologically complex. 

It is now much more difficult, challenging, and time-consuming to 

maintain interoperability with other allied forces. It is not yet clear 

how interoperability will be sustained as the United States further 

reduces its forces in Europe. Continued ambiguity on this issue 

communicates disinterest not just in the regional security concerns 

of our allies but also in their role as potential partners in out-ofarea operations. 

Second, the Chicago summit should be used to reanimate the 

vision of a Europe whole, free, and secure as a guiding priority of 

the alliance, and the United States should be leading this effort. A 

Europe that is undivided, whole, and free would be a more stable 

and secure continent, one thereby better able to address global concerns in partnership with the United States. 

Imagine Europe today if it did not integrate Poland, the Baltics, 

Romania, and Bulgaria into NATO. Would the EU have extended 

membership to all of them? Would Russia and Poland be on a path 

today toward more normalized relations? 

41 

To revitalize the process of NATO enlargement, the alliance can, 

and should, at the Chicago summit declare its intent to issue invitations no later than the next summit to qualified candidates. It 

should underscore the urgency of resolving Macedonia’s dispute 

with Greece over the former’s name, the last remaining impediment to its accession to the alliance. It should assert that Georgia’s 

path to NATO can be through the existing NATO-Georgia Commission; and, it should applaud Montenegro’s significant progress 

under the membership action plan. 

Third, the alliance must chart its way forward in this era of 

financial austerity. Resource constraints are a double-edged sword. 

They can halt multinational cooperation and generate division, and 

indeed, we see a little bit of that today as the Central Europeans 

watch aghast as Germany, France, and Italy sell military equipment to Russia in their efforts to sustain their respective national 

defense industries. 

Allow me to commend Senator Lugar and the Congressional 

Research Service for their recently published study examining 

these sales. I hope this report will prompt the alliance to take action on this potentially divisive issue. 

Austerity can also be leveraged to drive forward needed prioritization, innovation, and collaboration. I am glad the alliance plans 

to roll out Force 2020, a set of long-term capability goals, but I 

hope it will give equal, if not greater, emphasis to near-term, multinational projects that address existing shortfalls. Such projects as 

shared logistics hubs and pooled buys of platforms are urgently 

needed. Because they can be accomplished in the near term, these 

are projects that will also be more credible to NATO publics than 

promises regarding the distant future. 

Fourth, the summit should be used to expand and deepen the 

partnerships the alliance has developed around the world. Sweden, 

Australia, and New Zealand, Korea, Jordan, UAE, Qatar, Morocco, 

and other non-NATO members have made important contributions 

to ISAF, the Libya mission, and other alliance operations. In addition to military capability, they bring diplomatic leverage, as well 

as needed insight and intelligence regarding their respective localities and regions. 

NATO should expand the Partnership for Peace so that it is open 

to all who qualify regardless of geography. Those who contribute 

more militarily should have the opportunity to be certified as 

NATO-interoperable. Those certified could then be allowed to participate perhaps in a tiered fashion in different NATO programs, 

be it NATO exercises, the integrated command structure, centers 

of excellence, and civilian agencies. 

And finally, of course, NATO at Chicago needs to demonstrate 

unambiguous determination to sustain a stable Afghanistan. I hope 

NATO will be able to commit to a strategic partnership with Kabul 

that will endure well beyond 2014. The recently signed United 

States-Afghanistan agreement is an important step but, even if it 

is fleshed out robustly, will likely be insufficient to ensure success 

in Afghanistan in the absence of a long-term transatlantic commitment. 

Strong leadership has always been a prerequisite for NATO’s 

vibrancy and success. Likewise, Europe’s ability and willingness to 

42 

contribute the military forces and political capital necessary to 

address regional and global concerns are equally essential. It is neither in Europe’s nor the United States interest to allow the transatlantic bargain that has done so well over the last decade to drift 

into irrelevance. If the Chicago summit credibly reaffirms that bargain, it will serve as an important if not inspiring benchmark of 

American commitment and European ambition regarding the 

transatlantic alliance. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share my views. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. IAN J. BRZEZINSKI

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, I am honored to speak at your hearing on the upcoming meeting of NATO heads of state in 

Chicago on May 20. 

As a former Senate staffer, who served this committee and prior to that the late 

Senator, William V. Roth, it is a real pleasure to return to these Halls. It makes 

me recall the strong, bipartisan leadership this committee brought to the effort to 

extend NATO membership to the democracies of Central Europe. Those were historic decisions. They strengthened the alliance and transatlantic security. 

The Chicago summit will be important in large part because of the context in 

which it takes place. That context includes: 

• A war in Afghanistan from which both the United States and Europe appear 

to be disengaging; 

• Economic crises on both sides of the Atlantic that have atrophied European defense capabilities; 

• A qualified success in Libya that nonetheless raised questions about U.S. commitment to NATO and highlighted European defense shortfalls; and, 

• The new U.S. defense guidance that features a pivot to Asia and reduction in 

American forces stationed in Europe. 

Some have asserted that the NATO meeting in Chicago should be an ‘‘implementation summit’’ that focuses on Afghanistan and reviews alliance progress under its 

new Strategic Concept promulgated in 2010. In the light of the above, that will be 

insufficient. That would reinforce a sense of NATO’s growing irrelevance and further a process of transatlantic decoupling. 

If the Chicago summit is to have one principal, overarching purpose, it should be 

to provide credible reaffirmation of the Transatlantic Bargain—one in which the 

United States demonstrates commitment to Europe’s regional security interests and 

our European allies demonstrate that they stand ready to address global challenges 

to transatlantic security. 

WHY IS NATO RELEVANT TO TODAY?

Today, the transatlantic community lacks consensus over how to address the 

unprecedented dilemmas inherent in global connectivity and interdependence. Advances in transportation and the ongoing revolution in communications have facilitated the spread of prosperity, respect for human rights, democratic principles of 

governance, among other positive attributes of modernity. However, these benefits 

have also been accompanied by challenges, including transnational threats, sociopolitical upheavals, and a decentralization of global power. 

Transnational Threats: Among the most urgent of these threats has been the proliferation of technologies pertaining to weapons of mass destruction, missiles and 

other means than can be used to terrorize, if not severely damage, societies. These 

threats have been accompanied by the emergence of powerful and sometimes dangerous nonstate actors, the latter including criminal and terrorist organizations 

whose ideological and operational reach span across continents. 

The Global Political Awakening: The revolution in communications, including 

global television, the Internet, and cell phones, now links previously isolated populations, exposing them to each other’s economies and cultures, politics, standards of 

living and ideologies. The result has been recent events in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, 

Bahrain, Iran, and Russia—referred to as a ‘‘global political awakening’’ by 

Zbigniew Brzezinski [full disclosure—he is my father 1] and it is a a double-edged 

sword. 

43 

It can bring down dictators, end corrupt autocracies, and create opportunities for 

democracy, reform, and accountability in government. It can also be an impatient 

force, one prone to violence especially when it is driven primarily by sentiments that 

flow from inequity and injustice. As demonstrated in Russia and the Middle East, 

this political awakening often generates social upheaval in the absence of leadership, a clear platform or ideology. In these cases, especially if events take a destructive turn, this upheaval can leave societies vulnerable to organized groups intent 

on leveraging dangerous ideologies. 

The Rise of the Rest and the Dispersal of Power: What some have called the third 

strategic revolution involves a profound shift in the global balance of power.2 If 1991 

marked a brief unipolar moment featuring a globally preeminent United States, 

globalization has contributed to the emergence of a more complex constellation of 

actors with global reach and ambitions. These include China, India, Brazil, Russia, 

and could well include others in the future. 

The implications of these three separate but related dynamics for the transatlantic community are both urgent and profound. Today’s world is one where the 

United States, even in collusion with Europe, is no longer as predominant as it was 

in the past. The rise of new powers has resulted in a dispersion of global power 

away from the West and to other regions of world. 

The emergence of new powers with regional, if not global, aspirations is often accompanied by territorial claims, historic grudges, and economic demands that can 

drive geopolitical tension, competition, and collision. These increase the likelihood 

of regional conflicts. They make consensual decisionmaking more difficult, and they 

yield a world that is more volatile and unpredictable. 

Managing this new global order and its proclivity to uncertainty, if not violence, 

is the defining challenge of our time. Its effective management will require: 

• Economic resources that can be readily mobilized to foster economic development, if not to stave off, economic crisis consequent to upheavals; 

• Military capabilities that are expeditious and can be readily integrated with 

civilian efforts, including those fostering economic and political development; 

• Political legitimacy that is optimized through multilateral versus unilateral 

action. 

It is due to these requirements that the transatlantic community and its key institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union 

(EU), have grown in importance. Indeed, due to the growing complexity and turbulence of the post-cold-war era, the democracies of North America and Europe need 

each other more rather than less. Their respective ability to shape the world order 

is diluted by divergence and strengthened through collective action. 

The transatlantic community brings to the table powerful capacities in each of 

these three dimensions. Europe and North America constitute the world’s most 

important economic partnership, and that will remain the case for the foreseeable 

future. Today, the EU and U.S. account for 54 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). In 2010, the U.S. generated $15 trillion in GDP, the EU $16 trillion. 

(China in contrast produced $6 trillion in GDP and today lacks partnerships akin 

to that between the United States and Europe.3) 

Second, the cornerstone of the transatlantic community, NATO, remains history’s 

most successful multinational military alliance. It is unmatched in its ability to generate and sustain interoperability among military forces, an increasingly challenging 

requirement in battlefields where operations are ever more technologically complex 

and whose technologies evolve ever more rapidly. In this regard, the value of NATO 

has been vividly demonstrated by coalition operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

Libya. 

Third, members of transatlantic community, particularly the newest members of 

NATO and the EU, offer experience useful to societies in North Africa and the 

Middle East transitioning from authoritarian to more democratically accountable 

systems of governance buttressed by market-based economies. 

Fourth, the transatlantic community presents a collective of likeminded democracies—and herein lies a vision for its role in the global order of today and tomorrow. It can serve as the core of a geographically and culturally expanding community of democracies that act collectively to promote freedom, stability, and security 

around the globe. 

In a world where power is more dispersed, only by operating in concert will the 

nations of Europe and North America be able to tap this potential in the effort to 

manage the complex volatility consequent to the challenges posed by transnational 

threats, sociopolitical upheavals, and a shifting global balance of power. 

44 

REVITALIZING THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

Herein, lies the challenge before President Obama and his NATO counterparts 

when they meet in Chicago on May 20. In order for that potential to be tapped, the 

transatlantic bargain that sustained the alliance during the first decade of the cold 

war must be revitalized. Toward that end the United States should pursue five objectives in Chicago if this summit is to be remembered as moment of transatlantic 

renewal rather than transatlantic disengagement. 

First, the President must credibly reaffirm Europe’s centrality in U.S. global 

strategy. The drifting apart of the two continents has many causes, but they include 

a U.S. transatlantic agenda whose dominant elements recently have been a vaguely 

defined reset of relations with Russia, a defense guidance that articulates a pivot 

to Asia, and reductions of combat capability deployed in Europe. 

This has left many with the impression that America views Europe as increasingly irrelevant to U.S. interests in the world at large. The force reduction decisions 

generate questions about America’s commitment to NATO’s article 5 responsibilities. 

The decision to withdraw two of the four Brigade Combat teams deployed in Europe 

contradicts the 2010 posture statement to Congress of the U.S. Commander of 

EUCOM, Admiral James Stavrides who stated: ‘‘Without the four Brigade Combat 

Teams and one tactical intermediate headquarters capability, European Command 

assumes risk in its capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, 

and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk.’’ 

The fact that U.S. drawdowns in Europe occur in the context of an increasingly 

assertive Russian foreign policy, rising Russian defense expenditures, and increased 

Russian military deployments along the country’s western frontiers only adds to a 

sense of regional consternation. The belligerent tone of Russian policy was recently 

underscored by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, General Nikolai Makarov, who threatened to launch preemptive strikes against missile 

defense sites the U.S. plans to build in Central Europe. 

The United States should remove the conditionality it has placed over those missile defense sites. That conditionality not only undercuts European confidence in the 

U.S. commitment to the European Phased Adaptive Approach, it encourages and 

incentivizes the Kremlin’s opposition to its implementation. 

U.S. military reductions in Europe will make it even more important to ensure 

that those elements remaining are fully equipped and funded. Additionally, careful 

consideration needs to be given to how the U.S. and Europe will sustain interoperability between their military forces. American units stationed in Europe are highly 

effective, low cost force multipliers. They facilitate training, planning, and relationships essential for U.S. and European forces to fight together effectively in Europe 

and elsewhere. 

Recognizing this, the Obama administration promised to increase rotational deployments to Europe. But, it will be challenging for a unit that rotates to Europe 

for 6 to 8 weeks a year to match the engagement a unit permanently stationed there 

has with its European counterparts. 

The administration has yet to communicate when and what units will execute 

those exercise rotations. It would be appropriate and reassuring to NATO allies to 

have that training schedule articulated by the time of the Chicago summit. Continued ambiguity on this issue communicates disinterest not just in Europe’s regional 

security, but also in Europe’s role as a military partner in out of area operations. 

Second, the Chicago summit should be used to reanimate the vision of a Europe 

whole, free, and secure as a guiding priority for the transatlantic relationship. This 

vision has been largely sidelined since the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. While 

it may be too late to generate the consensus necessary for new invitations at Chicago, the summit should nonetheless leverage the process of enlargement forward, 

particularly concerning the candidacies of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Georgia. 

NATO enlargement has strengthened the transatlantic community by integrating 

nations into community of free-market democracies committed to each other’s security. A Europe that is undivided, whole, and free would be a more stable and secure 

continent and one better able to address global concerns in partnership with the 

United States. 

Imagine a Europe today that did not integrate Poland, the Baltics and Romania, 

Bulgaria, into NATO? Would the EU have integrated these countries? Would Russia 

and Poland be on the path today toward normalized relations? 

Abandoning this vision would have strategic consequences. It would undercut 

those in aspirant countries—and for that matter Kiev—who seek a future for their 

countries in the transatlantic community. It would reinforce those in the Kremlin 

nostalgic for a sphere of influence over Russia’s periphery vice those who see value 

in normal, cooperative relations with neighboring democracies. 

45 

To revitalize the process of NATO enlargement at the Chicago summit, NATO 

heads of state can and should: 

• Declare its intent to issue invitations to qualified aspirants no later than the 

next summit; 

• Underscore the urgency of resolving Macedonia dispute with Greece over the 

former’s name, the last remaining obstacle to Skopje’ accession to the alliance; 

• Assert that Georgia’s path to NATO can be through the NATO-Georgia Commission; and, 

• Applaud Montenegro’s significant progress under the Alliance’s Membership 

Action Plan. 

The Chicago summit presents the alliance an opportunity to make clear that its 

‘‘open door policy’’ is neither a passive phrase nor an empty slogan. The open door 

policy needs to be both a guiding vision that extends to all Europe’s democracies 

and an active, forward-moving process central the alliance’s security strategy. 

Third, the alliance must chart its way forward in an era of financial austerity. 

The Chicago summit occurs in the midst of a prolonged economic crisis on both sides 

of the alliance, but in Europe it has exacerbated an endemic problem of eroding 

European military capabilities. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently found that total defense spending for 37 European 

countries had declined by an average of 1.8 percent annually between 2001 an 2009, 

from total of 251B Euros to 218B. Today, only two European NATO members spend 

2 percent of GDP or more on defense. 

The qualified success of NATO forces in Libya last year highlighted this crisis in 

underinvestment in European military capabilities. During Operation UNIFIED 

PROTECTOR, European allies ran short of precision-guided munitions and found 

themselves dependent upon U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and refueling planes, among other critical assets. 

Resource constraints are a double-edged sword. They can halt multinational cooperation, undermine capabilities and generate division within the alliance. We see 

this today as Central Europeans watch aghast as German, French, and Italian firms 

sell military equipment to Russia in their effort to sustain their respective defense 

industries. 

Austerity can also be leveraged to drive forward needed prioritization, innovation, 

and collaboration. Toward this end, NATO Headquarters and Allied Command 

Transformation are driving forward a capabilities package at the summit consisting 

of a Smart Defense Initiative intended to foster pooling and sharing of resources, 

a Connected Forces Initiative to improve training and exercises and Force 2020, a 

long-term plan defining the forces the alliance should be able to bring to the battlefield at the end of this decade. 

The alliance’s capability shortfalls are real and urgent today. NATO has worked 

diligently to foster Smart Defense initiatives in areas of logistics and sustainment, 

force protection, training, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat 

operations. The summit’s capability emphasis should focus on these projects to 

which allies can sign up today and deliver in the near term. 

Capability development need not always be revolutionary and dramatic. In an age 

of austerity, the focus should be on the practical and attainable. Such projects are 

not only needed for operational purposes, they are more credible to NATO publics 

than promises concerning the distant future. 

Fourth, the Chicago summit should be used to expand and deepen the partnerships the alliance has developed around the world. The globalized and increasingly 

hybrid character of today’s challenges make it important for the alliance to expand 

and deepen its relationships with nongovernmental organizations and nonmember 

states around the globe. They have been of great value to NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere. They include the military and financial contributions 

of Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar and Morocco, 

among others. 

Partner contributions bring more than military forces. They can also serve vital 

political purposes and provide invaluable insight and intelligence specific to the cultural, historical, political, and geographic realities of their respective localities, be 

it the Greater Middle East, Asia, or Africa. 

NATO should expand the Partnership for Peace so that is open to all who qualify 

and who seek to participate regardless of geography. It should be tiered to reflect 

the degree of engagement and integration sought by member states. Those who 

make regular and significant contributions to NATO operations—such as Sweden, 

for example—should be eligible for a process that certifies them as interoperable 

with NATO forces. That certification should make them eligible for specified NATO 

programs, including: exercises; training; the integrated command structure; civilian 

46 

agencies; centers of excellence; and, decisionmaking structures overseeing operations 

in which their forces are employed. 

Global partnerships are an absolute requirement for an alliance that has to be 

engaged around the world. They constitute one important means by which the 

transatlantic community, as a whole, can ‘‘pivot’’ from the challenges of the past to 

those of today and tomorrow. 

Finally, NATO must demonstrate unambiguous determination to sustain a stable 

Afghanistan. At its last summit in Lisbon in November 2010, the alliance and the 

Afghan Government agreed to a transition strategy intended to shift to Kabul full 

responsibility for security across all of Afghanistan. At Chicago, NATO aims to map 

out a strategic partnership with Afghanistan that will endure well beyond 2014. The 

U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, even if it is fleshed out robustly, will likely 

be insufficient to ensure success in Afghanistan in the absence of a long-term transatlantic commitment to the Afghan people. 

Failure in Afghanistan would present its own negative regional consequences. It 

would also be a serious blow to the credibility of the alliance and, thus, to the commitment of its member states who have sacrificed much largely out of resolute solidarity with the United States. 

CONCLUSION

Strong U.S. leadership has always been a prerequisite for NATO’s vibrancy and 

success. Likewise, Europe’s ability to contribute the military forces and political capital necessary to address both regional and global concerns are equally essential to 

the alliance’s relevance. It is neither in Europe’s nor the United States interest to 

allow the Transatlantic Bargain to drift into irrelevance. 

The Chicago summit presents the United States an opportunity to contribute to 

the revitalization of the Transatlantic Bargain: 

• Through robust military engagement with Europe, the United States would reinforce the credibility of its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty and sustain, if not improve, the ability of European and U.S. forces to operate together 

within and beyond the North Atlantic area. 

• By leading the effort to fulfill the vision of a unified, undivided Europe, the 

United States would drive forward a process that strengthens Europe’s stability 

and security and thereby reaffirm the centrality of Europe in America’s global 

strategy. 

• By ensuring that the Alliances’ Smart Defense initiatives feature not just longterm vision but also practical near term initiatives, the U.S. will help NATO 

address urgent shortfalls and in a manner credible to its increasingly skeptical 

publics. 

• By leveraging the potential offered by a network of NATO global partnerships, 

the United States and Europe can play a more effective role together addressing 

the global challenges that already define this century. 

In these ways, the Chicago summit can emerge as an important, if not inspiring, 

benchmark of American commitment and European ambition regarding the Transatlantic Alliance. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1. Brzezinski, Zbignew, ‘‘Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.’’ Basic 

Books, 2012. This work also influenced the section on the dispersal of global power. 

2. For insight into the emerging global balance of power and its ramifications see: Brzezinski, 

Zbigniew, ‘‘Strategic Vision’’ and Zakaria, Fareed, ‘‘The Post American World: 2.O.’’ W.W. Norton 

& Company, 2011. 

3. For an insightful annual survey of the EU–U.S. trade relationship, see Daniel Hamilton 

and Joseph P. Quinlan (eds.), ‘‘The Transatlantic Economy 2012,’’ Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2012. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Let me just point out that you mentioned the report that was 

done that Senator Lugar had requested on the recent sales of military equipment. I would just like to point out we will be submitting 

that for the record. So thank you for raising that. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The submitted report mentioned above was too 

voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be maintained 

in the permanent record of the committee.] 

47 

Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Binnendij. 

STATEMENT OF DR. HANS BINNENDIJK, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

RESEARCH AND APPLIED LEARNING, NATIONAL DEFENSE 

UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Madam Chairman, Senator Udall, let me also 

say that it is a great pleasure to be back testifying before this committee. I spent nearly a decade of my life in those seats back there 

serving this committee on both sides of the aisle. And I was just 

recalling that my first boss up here was Hubert Humphrey after 

he left the Vice Presidency. So I am sort of dating myself. 

I wanted to make just a few very general comments about the 

summit and then focus in on what I was asked to talk about, which 

is military and defense capabilities. And I might ask that my full 

statement be placed in the record and I will just ad lib a little bit 

if I might. 

First, let me say that if you look at past summits, they often 

tend to be turning points in the direction of the alliance. If you look 

back to the Rome and London summits, it was really turning the 

alliance from a cold-war organization to one that would endure for 

other missions. Madrid was about enlargement, really a change in 

the alliance. Prague was about military transformation of the alliance. Lisbon was a new strategic concept and a new direction for 

the alliance politically. 

So the question is what will be the focus of the Chicago summit? 

And I think the headline will certainly be Afghanistan, Senator 

Udall, and the kinds of questions that you were focusing on. It will 

be about how do you transition, how do you keep the ‘‘in together/ 

out together’’ formula, and what is the formula for the post-2014 

period. 

But I think the other two elements of the summit, both capabilities and partnerships, are also very important. Dr. Kupchan talked 

a bit about partnerships. I think this is extremely important 

because the alliance basically will not fight by itself anymore. 

Wherever it goes in out-of-area operations, it is going to have partners, and it needs to have capable partners. 

I do not see this particular summit basket as being full at this 

point. I think more work needs to be done. I think there are real 

opportunities to make our partners interoperable, to certify that, to 

give them better consultation arrangements, and I think a bit of 

work could still be done between now and Chicago on that. 

But let me turn my attention to military capabilities because 

that is what I was asked to talk about. I want to raise four problems, and I will argue that the summit will take positive steps in 

each case to begin to alleviate those problems. 

The first problem has been addressed already in some depth. 

That is the collapse of European defense spending. A little over a 

decade ago, the United States spent about half of total NATO 

defense spending. Right now, it is about 69 percent. The United 

States today spends about 4.8 percent of its GDP on defense. The 

alliance average now is about 1.6 and falling. That 2-percent figure 

that we talk about—there is only a handful of European allies who 

spend that much. And that creates problems. 

48 

Personnel costs have remained about the same for European 

militaries. They are funding operations out of their current budgets 

while we fund them out of supplementals. So what does that mean? 

It means that their investment accounts and their procurement 

accounts are being hurt very badly. That is about the future. So 

they are cutting into their future defense capabilities. 

Their cuts are not being coordinated with NATO or really with 

many others. These are national decisions and that has to change. 

We have done an assessment at NDU about the impact of this, 

and we have seen what you might call horizontal cuts initially 

where you are cutting across the force, and that tends to hollow 

out. It tends to make the forces less ready, less sustainable. And 

now they are moving to vertical cuts where they are taking entire 

chunks of capability out of the force. You see this with the Dutch 

in armor. You see it with the Danish in submarines. You see it 

with the British and their carrier capabilities. So this is a problem 

for the future. 

Now, the summit I think will take some steps in the right direction. I think we are going to see some kind of a commitment out 

of the summit to identify the core capabilities that the alliance 

needs and to try to protect that core and to also create kind of an 

aspirational view of where we should be going, and that would be 

called NATO Force 2020. I think the summit will continue the Lisbon capabilities commitment and the work that was done there, 

and it will continue the command structure reform. 

What will be new here is what Secretary Rasmussen has called 

‘‘smart defense.’’ That is really about pooling and sharing. Somebody referred to it as ‘‘let us go buy together.’’ That is not a bad 

start. There will be about 20 projects or so that will be put on the 

table at Chicago to demonstrate that smart defense will have some 

meat on the bones. 

And then there will be what is called a connected force initiative. 

The danger here is that the military interoperability between the 

United States and our European allies is very important and very 

fragile. We have good interoperability now because of combined 

operations in Afghanistan and Libya, but ISAF will end so we need 

to start thinking now about how to continue to maintain that 

interoperability. There will be an initiative at the summit to try to 

do that. 

I think more needs to be done to deal with this problem. We need 

to put smart defense on steroids. My view is that as things get 

worse, we are going to have to have a much higher degree of role 

specialization within the alliance. Clusters of allies will need to 

become responsible for certain missions. This means allies will 

have to be able to trust their fellow allies. If they are going to concentrate on a certain capability, a certain role or mission, they are 

going to have to trust allies. That trust is not there yet. So we have 

to build that trust and move in that direction. 

I think our own EUCOM command needs to become much more 

of an interoperability command. EUCOM has been sort of a lily pad 

where we move U.S. troops to forward areas of operations: Afghanistan, Iraq in the past. That has to change. EUCOM has to be about 

maintaining the interoperability of our forces. And as I said, we 

need to do much more with our partners. 

49 

The second problem is missile defense. You know the story here: 

The Iranian threat is building; Russia is trying to limit the European Phased-Adaptive Approach and to get as much of a veto over 

its future as they can. 

I think missile defense is a success story for the summit. There 

is a consensus in the alliance that we need to move forward with 

missile defense, and that is a really solid consensus and it is a good 

thing. We will be able to announce at the summit that there will 

be an interim capability for missile defense. If you look at both the 

technical and the political achievements here over the last couple 

of years, they are great. We have deployed a missile defense radar 

in Turkey. We will be deploying missile interceptors in Romania 

and Poland. We will be home-porting Aegis destroyers in Rota, 

Spain. We have got agreement on a command and control system 

for the alliance called ALT BMD. And the Dutch and others will 

be building up their sea borne radar capability. So there is a whole 

long list of things that the allies have done to build on this consensus, and I think that is good news. 

The problem in all of this, of course, is that we cannot get the 

Russians to cooperate. I think they are concerned about countries 

in their so-called ‘‘near abroad’’ that are participating in this, and 

they are concerned about where phase III and phase IV of the 

EPAA will go. Will it represent some threat to their deterrent capability? The United States has gone out of our way to assure them 

that it will not undermine their deterrent capability. 

I do think it is important for us continue to try cooperation with 

the Russians, and this is very important. It is standing in the way 

of other things. But we should not cross redlines and I do not think 

we will. So far, the Obama administration in my view has been 

very successful in putting forward good ideas to the Russians but 

not crossing those redlines. 

The third problem has to do with nuclear deterrence. I was asked 

to say a few words about the Deterrence and Defense Posture 

Review. This is really about nuclear deterrence in Europe. We have 

perhaps a few hundred U.S. nuclear weapons that are forwarddeployed in Europe, and as we know, the Germans and others have 

been putting pressure on the system to reduce those numbers. 

The Strategic Concept that came out of the Lisbon summit 

designed a very nice formula for this. It said that the alliance will 

remain a nuclear alliance as long as there are nuclear weapons, 

but we will try to create the conditions for further reductions; there 

would be no unilateral action, and that the aim of all of this should 

be to create greater transparency for Russian substrategic systems 

and to get these Russian systems relocated out of Europe. I think 

that is a good formula. 

What happened subsequently is that there was additional pressure to try to change that Lisbon formula, and I think that was 

what was behind the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. To 

its credit, I think the administration has been able to work with 

that Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. And it has not been 

made public yet, but I believe the conclusion of that review is that 

the current mix is sound. And that is an important conclusion to 

obtain. 

50 

The fourth problem is—and Ian mentioned this—reassurance on 

article 5. I was privileged to work with Secretary Albright on 

NATO’s new Strategic Concept. I was one of her advisors to the 

group of experts. This article 5 reassurance problem was probably 

the single most important issue that we tackled. And out of our 

work and in the new NATO Strategic Concept there is a very clear 

statement about the importance of article 5. 

What has happened subsequently is that both European defense 

cuts and also Russian intimidation has led to some opening up of 

that question again. Is reassurance really what we said it would 

be at Lisbon with regard to article 5? 

I think a number of things have happened since then that should 

give comfort to our eastern allies. One is that we now have new 

plans to deal with problems, threats from that part of the world, 

and we will be exercising those plans; for example, Steadfast Jazz 

is coming up next year. Baltic air policing will be continued at least 

through 2018 and probably beyond. The NATO Response Force, 

which Ian and I worked on many years ago, will be revitalized and 

refocused on article 5. The United States has F–16 training programs in Poland and will retain a base in Romania. So this is just 

a few examples of the steps that we have taken as a nation and 

as an alliance to reassure our eastern allies that article 5 remains 

vital. There is more that can be done, but I think those are important first steps. 

So I have laid out these four problems, and my argument is that 

at the summit and within NATO, we are taking steps to deal with 

all those problems. That does not mean they go away as problems, 

but steps are taken to deal with them. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Binnendijk follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. HANS BINNENDIJK

It is a great pleasure for me to appear before this committee again. I spent nearly 

a decade working on the staff of this committee. NATO is focused on the Chicago 

summit. Past summits have marked major turning points in NATO’s direction. For 

example the Prague summit will be remembered for transforming NATO’s military 

capability, and the Lisbon summit will be remembered for shifting the alliance’s 

political focus with a new Strategic Concept. This summit will not mark a major 

turning point in NATO’s direction. Instead it will be a celebration of renewed NATO 

cohesion. At the center of the summit will be an agreement on NATO’s ongoing commitment to Afghanistan. 

The second key item on the summit agenda behind Afghanistan is the Alliance’s 

military posture. That is what I would like to discuss with the committee today. Let 

me divide my testimony into three parts and discuss in turn: (1) NATO’s conventional capabilities, (2) European missile defense, and (3) NATO nuclear deterrence 

and the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. My general conclusion is that 

while there are difficult challenges in all three areas, the alliance is postured to 

make progress in all three areas at the Chicago summit. 

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

The Economics of European Defense Spending 

The impacts of economic austerity since 2008 on European defense spending and 

forces have been significant and are far from over. The situation is especially acute 

because the recent downturn began from an already low level of defense investment. 

At the end of the cold war European NATO members were spending an average 

of 2.7 percent of GDP on defense (in constant 2010 dollars). Soon thereafter budgets 

declined precipitously as European public sentiment forced a ‘‘peace dividend’’ from 

which Europe has yet to recover. In 2001 NATO’s European members spent an average of 1.9 percent of GDP on defense. This aggregated to $279.8 billion, compared 

51 

to the U.S. defense budget of 3 percent of GDP, or $385 billion. These figures equate 

to 41 percent and 57 percent of total NATO defense spending for European NATO 

members and for the United States respectively. 

In 2011, the latest data available, NATO’s European members averaged just 1.6 

percent of GDP or $282.9 billion spent on defense while the United States spent 4.8 

percent of GDP or $685.6 billion on defense. These figures equate to 69 percent and 

28 percent of total NATO defense spending for European NATO members and the 

United States respectively. (In both 2001 and 2011, Canada provides the other 

approximate 2–3 percent spending to round up to 100 percent of NATO spending.) 

The near term future is not bright: today 11 European countries both within and 

outside of the eurozone are officially in recession for a second time in 4 years. 

European capabilities have contracted over this long period of flat or lower spending for two reasons. First, personnel costs have remained relatively fixed even as 

overall troop strength has declined. Second, unlike the United States, Europeans 

fund operations such as Kosovo and Afghanistan out of annual budgets without supplemental funding. The only relief is to shrink defense investment accounts even as 

the costs of new systems increase. 

Overall European defense spending in NATO is also less efficient for the obvious 

reason that spending is disaggregated across 26 separate national military structures and defense bureaucracies. Added to these realities is the gradually growing 

investment in European Union level structures: those institutions that give visibility 

and some substance to the concept of a Common Security and Defense Policy 

(CSDP), intended as a complement NATO at the low end of the military spectrum. 

CSDP is a positive development endorsed by the United States, however it is not 

without cost. 

Why has Europe invested so little in its own defense over so long; a period unprecedented in modern times? Three reasons underlie this trend. First, most Europeans 

do not perceive a major military threat, resulting in little appetite for increased defense spending. Since the cold war European public concern for defense has lingered 

at less than 10 percent and from 2003–2011 eurobarometer polls show only 1–2 percent of Europeans select defense or foreign affairs among their uppermost concerns. 

Second, the financial crisis of 2008 that persists across Europe puts further pressure 

on governments to avoid increases in defense, especially as recent public protest signal that austerity measures may have reached their political limit. Finally, Europeans know they can rely on the United States for strategic deterrence and defense 

and for operational crisis response in situations such as Libya. From this vantage 

point, they spend enough to remain credible allies in some areas. Beyond this vague 

threshold, allies are focused on domestic priorities. 

NDU Assessment of European Defense Cuts 

In summer 2011 NDU undertook an analysis of the impact of national cuts in defense spending across Europe. Special attention was given to the situations in seven 

key allied countries. We found that since 2008 most European cuts were typical of 

earlier downturns but much deeper. We termed these across the board budget reductions ‘‘horizontal cuts.’’ They affected all national forces through reduced training 

and exercises, gapped personnel billets, diminished stocks of fuel and munitions, 

stretched out maintenance and deferred modernization. Transformation initiatives 

were slowed or ground to a halt. 

More drastic cuts were also observed, where nations eliminated whole categories 

of capability, or most of a capability, in order to stay within available budgets. We 

call these ‘‘vertical cuts.’’ One example is the Dutch decision to discard all remaining 

armored forces, rather than continue to trim across the board. Once eliminated, restoring basic defense capabilities such as armored forces is a long-term proposition. 

In essence such cuts redefine national defense strategies in a fundamental way. 

With the Dutch decision six NATO members have no armored forces (Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). These nations must 

rely on other allies for such capabilities. In recent years, Denmark has eliminated 

submarine forces and the U.K. has retired its carrier-based naval aviation for an 

anticipated period of 10 years. 

The biggest impact to date is on the readiness and sustainability of existing 

forces. Nations focus their spending on deployed or deploying forces to the neglect 

of their wider forces. NATO is at risk of having far fewer forces ready and able to 

deploy. There is a limit to how far horizontal cuts can be made before units become 

untenable as a result of inoperable equipment or untrained and missing personnel. 

It would appear these limits are being approached and that the only choices that 

remain are to spend more or cut force structure; i.e, more vertical cuts. The number 

of allies able to maintain their current spectrum of capabilities, especially in combat 

52 

brigades, naval combatants and strike aircraft will diminish over the next 10 years 

without additional defense spending by allies. 

European defense spending cuts will therefore soon open unacceptable gaps in the 

capabilities military commanders deem essential to perform the alliance’s three 

strategic tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. In 

order to keep the risk of that outcome low, NATO has to channel near-term national 

defense spending into efforts that close gaps and provide the optimum capability for 

each nation’s investment. 

There is some good news in this otherwise dim picture of conventional European 

defense capabilities. Taken as a whole, NATO Europe is still the second strongest 

military power in the world. They are willing to use their power; for example, 90 

percent of all ordinance dropped on Libya was delivered by Europeans. And some 

progress has been made on ‘‘high end enablers’’ such as air to ground surveillance, 

joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, the decision to broaden AWACS 

to all NATO allies, and the European Union initiative on refueling tankers. This 

will shift some of the burden from the United States since we usually supply these 

high-end enablers to the alliance. The problem is that the European firepower that 

these enablers support is being cut by perhaps 20–30 percent or more. 

The Upcoming NATO Summit—Opportunities for Solutions 

The Chicago summit provides an important opportunity for NATO to help members realize the most from their defense investments. In so doing, it will generate 

the optimum collective return from limited national investments. 

First, NATO must agree at the summit on a core set of required capabilities commanders really must have to perform the three strategic tasks cited above. This will 

likely be something less than what NATO commanders consider the minimum requirement for all stated goals yet it has to establish what NATO needs to remain 

credible to its members; and to any possible adversary across the spectrum of military missions. At the summit, NATO heads of state and government should endorse 

a pledge not to reduce any of these required core capabilities if forced to further cut 

defense spending. 

Second, NATO should define at the summit an aspirational goal force, what some 

are already calling NATO Force 2020. This should describe what a future NATO 

force should look like when the current financial crisis passes and defense spending 

recovers. This force should be capable of performing the full level of ambition in 

terms of the continuous and concurrent NATO operations agreed by nations in 2006 

and reaffirmed in 2011. NATO has not been capable of this level of operations for 

several years. At Chicago it must set a longer term goal of providing the forces to 

match its political aims. 

Third, the Chicago summit must reaffirm the 11 critical capability commitments 

agreed by heads of state and government at their last summit in 2010 at Lisbon. 

Significant progress has been made since then on all 11 in spite of the financial crisis. That is laudable and encouraging. Chicago has to maintain momentum on these 

critical programs, all of which were carefully weighed and selected at a summit also 

framed by the pressures of financial constraints. Follow through at this next summit 

is an important political signal. 

Fourth, NATO leaders must press the alliance to move ahead with command 

structure and agency reforms approved at Lisbon. These are already being vigorously pursued. They will cut costs and streamline NATO institutions for the management of alliance political, military and administrative business. It is essential 

that overhead costs be controlled and, wherever possible, reduced. NATO has a good 

plan to achieve these goals, but it will take several more years of strong top-down 

emphasis to put all reforms in place. 

Fifth, Secretary General Rasmussen’s 2011 concept of Smart Defense, NATO’s 

new capabilities initiative, should be endorsed and put into action. Allied Command 

Transformation has already identified about 20 specific Smart Defense projects 

aimed at greater efficiencies through multinational cooperation. More are anticipated. This year the Secretary General announced a related initiative called the 

Connected Forces Initiative. This initiative concentrates on deepening interoperability among NATO members and partners, through greater emphasis on education 

and training, more effective exercises—especially for the NATO Response Force, and 

more adaptive technological interface among existing systems. 

Both Smart Defense and the Connected Forces Initiative should include strong 

links to the EU’s parallel initiatives of pooling and sharing defense capabilities, 

being steered by the European Defense Agency. The NATO and EU initiatives are 

complementary and define cooperative efforts intended to get more capability out of 

what nations invest. 

53 

Steps Beyond Smart Defense 

NATO’s Smart Defense concept opens a new horizon in multinational cooperation 

that should be pushed beyond the initial steps described above. As European cuts 

continue, we will need Smart Defense on steroids. Agreements to date are concentrated on cooperation in the areas of procurement, logistics, and training infrastructure—with a few operational exceptions. These will cut costs and promise real 

savings; hence they must be completed in the near term. 

A bolder goal should then be set. Clusters of NATO nations should be asked to 

agree to take on greater role specialization and focus on specific missions. Similarly 

equipped and like-minded allies and partners would form informal, core clusters of 

nations interested in honing specific capabilities relative to some of NATO’s missions, both article 5 and non-article 5. NDU has called these Mission Focus Groups. 

This phenomenon has existed informally for a long time in the alliance in select 

areas and to great effect. NATO has standing maritime groups that refined operational capabilities over more than 10 years in the Mediterranean (Operation Allied 

Endeavor). These forces are now committed to the antipiracy mission Operation 

Ocean Shield where much of the same skills are being applied. Another select group 

of allies focus on NATO nuclear mission expertise and capabilities and still another 

provides seasoned multinational capacity for air policing missions over the Baltic 

States. NATO defines many specific missions within the strategic tasks of collective 

defense and crisis management that are performed initially by a cluster of allies 

with the best capabilities and often proximate to the mission area. 

Allies are not prepared to accept this bolder concept of mission focused groups at 

Chicago. It requires a high degree of trust that allied nations will provide capabilities another nation has given up to specialize in other missions. However, as the 

budget crisis persists and allies are forced to cut deeper into existing capabilities, 

much can be gained by working with allies to identify mission capabilities they will 

hold as their highest resource priorities. NATO should build on informal mission 

clusters already in being, and adopt the concept in other mission areas based on 

military advice, harmonization with the NATO Defense Planning Process and members’ resource constraints. 

The Chicago Summit Focus on a Future Role of the U.S. European Command 

(EUCOM) 

In the future EUCOM becomes vital to U.S. operations worldwide as the strongest 

link to America’s most capable and seasoned military allies and partners. At the 

Chicago summit the United States should emphasis its continuing commitment to 

NATO through EUCOM in light of announced force drawdowns in 2012 and 2013. 

NATO has 28 members: 32 formal partners and 9 informal partners participating 

or having participated in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations 

in Afghanistan. By far most of these partners are in NATO and/or the Europe 

Union. Yet even the seven NATO partners in the Pacific region have come to adopt 

many NATO standards, tactics, and procedures over the past 10 years of ISAF operations. Maintaining this perishable reservoir of interoperable partners should be a 

primary mission of EUCOM as ISAF operations draw down. 

The core of EUCOM’s efforts at partner engagement will be the new U.S. commitment to participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF) with elements of a brigade 

combat team (BCT) based in the United States and deployed annually to Europe for 

exercises with allies. The details of this commitment are yet to be worked out. However, EUCOM, DOD and the Congress should take a very broad view of partner engagement and build a strong transatlantic bridge that will sustain allied support for 

the U.S. worldwide. EUCOM should be the engine for engagement with all NATO 

members and partners. It should make its training areas available for allies. 

Deploying U.S. forces—air and maritime as well as land—should be programmed for 

engagement with forces of multiple allies and not limited to the NRF. It should 

study investing in forward command elements of a brigade and or corps in-theater 

to plan with allies and periodically exercise as part of the NRF’s tactical and operational joint command structure. 

In order to reduce the impact of the withdrawal of the final two heavy Brigade 

Combat Teams from Europe by the end of 2013, the forces rotating to Europe to 

meet the U.S. commitment to the NRF should be heavy forces as often as possible. 

While the current trend is toward lighter forces, heavy forces are a reality in Europe 

where there are almost 10,000 main battle tanks among allies and partners. In contrast, the U.S. will soon have no main battle tanks in Europe for the first time since 

June 1944. That could have a negative effect on the confidence of some allies in the 

U.S. commitment to NATO, especially in Central and Eastern Europe where the 

main interest remains article 5 preparedness. 

54 

A wise investment would be to provide EUCOM with a prepositioned heavy BCT 

set of equipment, visibly maintained and exercised in theater as a political symbol 

of military resolve. Moreover, U.S. force deployments to exercises in Europe would 

be more affordable and therefore would be more likely to be sustained over the long 

term, as envisioned by the U.S. commitment. 

Given the global value of interoperable partners, Congress should consider establishment of an interoperability line in the DOD budget specific to EUCOM. This 

budget line should fund NRF participation, plus the maintenance and deepening of 

interoperability across all NATO members, partners, and future partners. The risk 

in requiring the funding of interoperability activities to come out of Service budgets 

is that it will be perpetually vulnerable to higher priorities and limited resources. 

EUCOM should be designated the global coordinator for U.S. interoperability, responsible to reach out to other COCOMs to ensure standards and agreements are 

consistent for all U.S. forces worldwide. 

EUCOM should look innovatively at a host of other initiatives that will nurture 

transatlantic interoperability, especially as the drawdown of forces under ISAF curtails operational multinational experience. 

Partner Initiatives at the NATO Summit 

Given the vast numbers of partners in various organizational geometries, NATO 

needs to find ways to differentiate among partner levels of engagement with the 

alliance. A least common denominator approach is no longer the best, neither for 

NATO or its wealth of partners. Indications are that as many as 13 NATO partners 

will be present in Chicago, an ideal opportunity for the alliance to take steps to reshape its formal partnership programs along more functional and substantive lines. 

Partners could be invited to signal their willingness to work with the alliance more 

closely in operational areas. If mutually agreed, NATO would then design a concentrated program aimed at honing greater interoperability with these allies and establish an appropriate certification process. In turn, NATO would consult more 

closely with these partners when considering operations that affect their interests. 

THE EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

The threat that is driving U.S. (and NATO) missile defense efforts originates from 

the Middle East, primarily from Iran. In 2007, the Bush administration proposed 

creating a ‘‘Third Site’’ in Europe consisting of 10 long-range mid-course interceptors 

in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic. The Obama administration replaced that plan with a more flexible and responsive plan called the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA is based on the SM3 interceptor, 

deployed in four phases through 2020, on land and at sea. Throughout all four 

phases, increasingly capable versions of the SM3 will be introduced. The EPAA is 

designed to adapt in response to the evolution of the ballistic missile threat and 

BMD technology. 

The United States plans to make the EPAA its national contribution to the NATO 

missile defense plan. The United States is not alone fielding the capabilities or in 

bearing the costs for missile defense in Europe. There is a strong consensus in the 

alliance in support of a NATO-wide territorial missile defense capability, in addition 

to its already agreed position of defending deployed troops against missile threats. 

Getting this expanded consensus has been a political and technical achievement 

Major milestones include the following: 

• Agreement by the Turks to host a U.S. BMD radar. That critical radar was deployed in December 2011. 

• Agreement by the Romanians and the Poles to host land-based Aegis Ashore 

SM interceptor sites, in the 2015 and 2018 timeframes respectively. 

• Agreement by the Spanish to home-port four U.S. Aegis ships with SM3 Interceptors, starting in 2014. 

• Deployment of the first U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ship (March 2011) to the Mediterranean Sea in support of EPAA. 

• Agreement by the alliance to fund the so-called ALT BMD command and control 

program for territorial BMD. NATO now has a BMD command and control center at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. 

• Agreement by the Dutch and potentially others to upgrade radar systems for 

BMD use on their frigates. 

• Integration of several other national missile defense systemsinto the NATO 

BMD effort, such as German and Dutch Patriots, or future French early warning sensors. 

At the NATO summit in Chicago, the alliance plans to announce that it has an 

operational ‘‘interim capability’’ for command and control for NATO missile defense. 

55 

This will be common-funded and represents the first step in implementing NATO’s 

2010 decision to pursue territorial missile defense. The interim capability for command and control will allow U.S. EPAA assets to operate under a NATO mission. 

While there is good news regarding EPAA implementation and NATO BMD, Russia continues to oppose missile defense in Europe and is refusing to cooperate. That 

is why President Putin will not attend the Chicago summit. Russia was opposed to 

the mid-course interceptors proposed by the Bush administration and after a brief 

pause they have also opposed the Obama administration’s EPAA. They are concerned about deployments in Poland and Romania, their former Warsaw Pact Allies. 

They are concerned about Phase III and IV when more capable Standard Missiles 

will be deployed; they say they fear a threat to their second strike capability. They 

remain bitter about the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. 

In the negotiations on BMD cooperation, the Russians have tried multiple tactics 

to seek limitations or even a veto over NATO BMD deployments and use. They have 

also sought to intimidate host nations for EPAA assets. 

Per President Obama’s direction, U.S. and NATO negotiators have not agreed to 

such limitations, and have made clear such limitations are unacceptable. The worldwide ballistic missile threat is real and growing, hence the U.S. needs these capabilities for defense of our population, forces, allies, and partners. But there is still 

a great deal of scope for meaningful and mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia. This is a high-priority effort. We have made numerous proposals and have 

adapted some Russian ideas, such as the concept for two NATO-Russian centers 

that might be created for operational coordination and data-sharing. 

Progress has been slow. To find a breakthrough, the United States has been building a detailed case for why the EPAA and NATO missile defense are not a threat 

to Russia’s strategic deterrent. Last week Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn 

Creedon spoke at a conference in Moscow, presenting a strong argument. She pointed out that even the SM3–IIB is not designed or positioned to catch sophisticated 

Russian ICBMs. Furthermore she highlighted the quantitative argument. Russia 

has hundreds of ICBMs, while the EPAA will employ only a few dozen interceptors. 

Simply by looking at a globe, one can see that facilities in Poland, Romania, and 

Turkey are optimally positioned to defend NATO from the Middle East, not counter 

Russia launches toward the United States. 

It remains in the U.S. interest to seek an agreement with Russia on BMD cooperation. But the U.S. can not agree to the ‘‘legally binding’’ assurances that Russia seeks. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has suggested ‘‘political assurances’’, 

along the lines of the NATO consensus on EPAA, but Russia does not seem interested. Nonetheless, cooperation is ultimately in Russia’s interest. They are testing 

the alliance. Once their test fails, the hope is that they will recognize that the transparency and real missile defense benefits they would gain with cooperation will outweigh their other concerns. 

THE DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW

The NATO Strategic Concept, agreed at the Lisbon summit, contains a carefully 

worked out compromise on the role of nuclear deterrence in Europe. On the one 

hand it stated that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear 

alliance, and that NATO will retain the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional 

weapons. On the other hand, it stated that NATO’s broad goal is to reduce the role 

and number of nuclear weapons and to create the conditions for a nonnuclear world. 

To square this circle, it agreed that nations would not take unilateral action to withdraw nuclear assets and that in negotiating future nuclear reductions the aim 

should be to seek Russian agreement to increase nuclear transparency and to relocate their weapons away from NATO territory. 

This puts the focus in the right place. The nuclear problem in Europe is Russia. 

They have 10 times the nonstrategic nuclear weapons that NATO has in Europe. 

The Russian doctrine is first use. And they have used nuclear weapons to intimidate 

their neighbors. But they have refused to talk about either nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons transparency or reductions. An agreement on missile defense cooperation 

could change their attitude. 

But several European countries, with Germany in the lead, have sought to modify 

that NATO consensus. They have concerns about the safety of U.S. nuclear weapons 

on their soil. And so those nations initiated a Deterrence and Defense Posture review, which has recently been completed. That so-called DDPR assessed NATO’s 

conventional, nuclear, and BMD capabilities. The main protagonists were the Germans and the French. 

The U.S. interest here is to retain the Strategic Concept consensus and to put the 

burden of nuclear reductions in Europe where it belongs, on Russia. While the 

56 

DDPR has not yet been made public, I anticipate that its basic conclusion will be 

that the current mix of defenses is sound. 

A major issue during the deliberations focused on NATO’s declaratory policy. The 

U.S. sought to bring NATO’s declaratory policy for nuclear use closer to that of the 

United States. U.S. declaratory policy has a so-called ‘‘negative security assurance’’ 

which says it will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states 

who are a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a possible reconsideration of 

this policy if biological weapons are used against the United States. France and the 

U.K. have their own declaratory policies. Several nations sought to exclude discussion of declaratory policies from the DDPR. 

REASSURANCE ON THE ARTICLE 5 COMMITMENT

Several years ago some of our Eastern European allies raised concerns about the 

continuing validity of the article 5 (all for one) commitment. This became a central 

issue in the study undertaken by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and 

the Group of Experts. That group highlighted the importance of article 5 and that 

emphasis made its way into NATO’s new Strategic Concept. 

Cuts in defense spending and belligerent Russian comments have reawakened 

some of those concerns. The alliance and the United States have taken several steps 

to make clear that the article 5 commitment remains rock solid. A few examples 

include the following: 

• Defense plans have been refocused on article 5. 

• Exercises have been planned to test that new including ‘‘Steadfast Jazz’’ in 

2013. 

• Baltic Air Policing will be continued until at least 2018. 

• The NATO Response Force will be revitalized and focused more on article 5 

missions. 

• The United States will conduct F–16 training in Poland. 

• A United States base will be retained in Romania. 

More can be done, for example, to make sure that NATO’s core military capabilities retain a robust article 5 capability. 

CONCLUSION

There are downward pressures on both NATO’s conventional defense capabilities 

and on the willingness for European nations to host U.S. nuclear deterrent assets. 

The Chicago summit is poised to take useful steps to mitigate those pressures and 

retain a useful military capability for the alliance. The summit will also take another important step to protect the alliance against the potential nuclear and missile threat from Iran. The cost for that may be a deteriorating relationship with 

Russia. While the summit will be a success with regard to these issues, this committee will need to continually monitor the situation to assure that those downward 

pressures on defense budgets do not create the ‘‘dim if not dismal’’ situation that 

Secretary Robert Gates envisioned. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much. 

I want to start, Dr. Binnendijk, with your comments around missile defense. As Mr. Brzezinski mentioned earlier, this month we 

heard Russia suggest that they might use preemptive force against 

missile installations if there is not a cooperative agreement reached 

with NATO. Do you think this is just posturing? Do you think this 

represents a heightened threat on the part of Russia to oppose the 

missile defense installations, or should we just expect more rhetoric 

and continue? You suggested that we have been operating in a way 

that is sufficient to continue to have some sort of a relationship 

with Russia that allows us to move forward. 

Dr. BINNENDIJK. I think we are being tested by the Russians. 

There is a long history to this, of course. During the cold war, 

essentially the United States convinced the Russians of the importance of a second strike capability, and that notion was accepted 

by both sides and kept the peace during the cold war. I think the 

Russians were quite upset when the ABM Treaty was abrogated 

because it tended to challenge that cold-war notion of mutual 

57 

assured destruction. When the Bush administration put forward 

the notion of the so-called third missile defense site, which was different in composition but a similar purpose, the Russians opposed 

that. When the Obama administration decided to go with another 

option, the Phased-Adaptive Approach based on the Standard Missile 3, the Russians were quite. They thought it might be a good 

deal. Then they started looking at it. They started looking at phase 

III and IV and thought, well, maybe that is a threat. 

So I think they are testing us. They are uncomfortable with 

where the EPA might go. They would like to set limits. I think 

actually if you look at the consensus in Europe, the consensus in 

Europe really is about creating missile defenses to deal with an 

Iranian threat, not to deal with a Russian threat. If you look at the 

capabilities that we are talking about, these missile interceptors 

are slow. They are not going to catch an ICBM. We have been telling the Russians that. They want greater assurances. They want 

legally binding assurances. I am not sure that a legally binding 

assurance would be ratified. So Secretary General Rasmussen is 

prepared to give political assurances. 

I do not think we need to give in, though. I think we need to 

understand where the redlines are. There is a real threat coming 

from the Middle East. This is a serious proposal that has consensus, and I do not think we should let the Russians move us 

from the direction in which we are headed. But we ought to seek 

to give them as many reassurances as we can within the scope of 

the plan that we have. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me just ask the other two panelists. Do 

you all agree with that analysis? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree with the analysis. I think Hans is spot 

on. 

I would add that I think Russian motivations behind their opposition to those defense plans are really more geopolitical than they 

are technical. They are more upset over the fact the United States 

will have military installations on the territories of Poland and 

Romania. 

The only thing that I would add concerns the conditionality of 

U.S. missile defense plans. Allow me to quote the President, he 

stated—President Obama—‘‘as long as a threat from Iran persists, 

we will go forward with a missile defense system that is costeffective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will 

have a stronger basis for security and the driving force for missile 

defense construction in Europe will be removed.’’ 

Now, that has been hanging like a dark cloud over Central 

Europe, undercutting Central European confidence in America’s 

commitment to this plan. I do not think there is high confidence 

in Warsaw, in Bucharest, and elsewhere that these facilities are 

going to be built in 2018. In fact, Poland’s Foreign Minister Radek 

Sikorski when reporting on the state of Polish foreign policy to his 

Parliament just this spring, said ‘‘we stand ready to implement the 

Poland-United States agreement on the missile defense base even 

though we are aware of the fact that United States plans may be 

subject to modification, for example, if agreement is reached on 

Iran’s nuclear program.’’ So they are not confident at all that these 

plans are going to go forward. 

58 

I personally think these plans are justified whether or not we 

make progress with Iran because we have a basic fact. Weapons of 

mass destruction and missile technologies are proliferating. Missile 

defense is going to become a required part of any major nation’s or 

alliance’s complement of military capabilities, including NATO’s 

complement of defense capabilities. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Kupchan. 

Dr. KUPCHAN. I would associate myself with Dr. Binnendijk’s 

analysis. I think that the dispute over missile defense is really part 

of a broader lack of confidence and trust that exists between NATO 

and Russia. I would agree with what Ian just said that it is not 

a technical issue. It is much broader than that. 

I am someone who is broadly supportive of the Obama administration’s reset policy toward Russia. It has had good days and bad 

days, but I think the glass is more half full than half empty. And 

I believe that we should continue to press on United StatesRussian relations and NATO-Russian relations, realizing that we 

have differences over Georgia, that we have differences over missile 

defense, but continue to pocket those areas where we have agreement because if we can build greater trust, if we can get the Russians to see that NATO means them no harm, then I actually think 

we will be able to reach agreement on missile defense and perhaps 

on Georgia. I do not want to minimize the difficulties of doing that, 

but I think the outreach to Russia is correct and we should push 

hard on that front. 

One quick comment on what Mr. Brzezinski said about conditionality. I do not see Obama’s commitment to missile defense as conditional. I think it is conditional in the sense that it is being adapted 

to the nature of the threat, and that is why there was a revision 

to begin with to move toward a sea-based structure that would better deal with the threat from Iran. So I think that both sides of 

the house are moving forward on missile defense. What remains to 

be determined is the exact nature of that system, and that will 

depend upon the nature of the threat. 

Senator SHAHEEN. But I assume you would agree with his analysis that there is still some concern in Eastern European capitals 

about the commitment of our missile defense efforts. 

Dr. KUPCHAN. I think there is still some broad discomfort in Central Europe about the degree to which they do not enjoy the same 

pride of place that they did in the alliance 10 years ago. During 

the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, they were the 

apple’s eye. They had a sort of door-open policy in Washington. 

They do not enjoy quite as much access and pride of place as they 

used to. I do not think that is because the Obama administration 

is neglecting them or going over their heads or working on Russia 

at their expense. I think it is what one could call the ‘‘new normal,’’ 

a NATO alliance in which Poland starts to enjoy the same kind of 

status as an Italy and a Spain. That requires adjustment, but it 

is actually very good news for Poland. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Given what you said about the Russian reset, 

do you share what we heard earlier from Secretary Gordon that we 

should not read anything more ominous into Putin’s not coming to 

the G8 summit other than that he has work at home? 

59 

Dr. KUPCHAN. I find it regrettable that President Putin has 

decided not to come. I think that it is a mistake on Russia’s part. 

Who knows exactly why he made that decision? But there is no 

question that his initial decision not to go to Chicago and now his 

decision not to show up at the G8 suggests that he is keeping a 

certain distance. I am confident that over time Russia is going to 

orient itself westward, and that is because I am not sure geopolitically speaking they have a lot of other options. Union with Belarus 

and Kazakhstan is not a bright future for Russia. It is in my mind 

just a question of when Russian domestic politics works itself out. 

It could take a very long time, but I think Putin is smart enough 

to know that the arrow points westward and that the markets, the 

institutions of the European Union and NATO provide a better 

future for Russia than the alternatives. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You said in your statement that—I am not 

quoting you exactly, but you suggested that as the circle widens, 

preserving the rules-based system, as you said, that has really 

been established by the United States and Europe and the transatlantic relationship will be difficult if the United States and 

Europe do not move forward together. Is there some reason to believe that we will not be moving forward together? Are you suggesting that because of the current fiscal crisis, because of some of 

the domestic issues that you identified, that we should worry about 

this as a future challenge? 

Dr. KUPCHAN. I worry about two different dimensions of that 

challenge. One is the bigger question of the degree to which the 

Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils of the world will embrace a rulesbased system, and if so, will it be our rules-based system. And I 

think that is a conversation that will be increasingly important in 

the years ahead. It has already started. 

My second concern is that we cannot manage that task on our 

own. The West as a going concern has really been about partnership between the United States and Europe and between the 

United States and Japan and other allies in the Pacific. And I do 

worry that the European Union’s foreseeable future is perhaps 

introverted and fragmented. So it is not that they will diverge from 

us on the need to sustain a rules-based system. It is they might 

not be in the game due to their economic and political weakness, 

and that I think would leave us in an exposed position. The United 

States and Europe should together do what they can to refurbish 

and revitalize the West as an anchor of liberal values, open markets, and democratic institutions; they are now under threat. Rising powers do not share these same commitments, and that is why 

we need to make sure that our model is strong and serves as an 

example for the rest of the world. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You know, we had a panel in the European 

Affairs Subcommittee last fall on the European fiscal crisis, and 

virtually all of the panelists agreed that one of the most important 

things we could do to support Europe in addressing their fiscal crisis was to address our own at home. So I would certainly support 

your analysis. 

Let me just go to an issue that I think has been brought up several times, and that is, as we look at the summit, as we look at 

the future of NATO, that the partnerships is one way for us to exVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:01 Nov 19, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051012-M.TX
60 

pand the influence and the ability to work in the global environment that we are now in. Do you think that offers an opportunity? 

And I guess I would ask Mr. Brzezinski and Dr. Binnendijk if you 

have views on this as well. Do you think this offers the opportunity 

to expand the circle in a way that allows that influence to continue 

to happen as you look at the partnerships that have been developed 

and that are being looked at in the future? Is this a way for NATO 

to continue to have some influence and work with those countries 

with rising economies? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Absolutely. I think partnerships are the way of 

the future for the alliance. The fact is that the most urgent challenges and most surprising, unpredictable challenges are most 

likely going to come from outside the North Atlantic area. It is 

going to be the Middle East. It is going to be Asia. I think it is 

eventually going to be Africa also because of the systemic challenges these regions are facing. NATO is going to be drawn into 

them just the way we have been drawn into Afghanistan because 

those changes, when they are particularly negative, can directly affect our own security. We experienced that on September 11, 2011. 

Partnerships provide an opportunity not only to bring more capability to the table, but they also provide an opportunity to bring to 

the table countries, regions, players, sometimes nongovernmental 

organizations that really understand the situation because they 

live there. They have the relationships. They have the diplomatic 

clout, the diplomatic legitimacy. They have the intelligence. They 

can provide the nuance that countries from the North Atlantic area 

do not have. We are going to need more of those relationships. I 

think it is smart to think about NATO as a community of likeminded democracies serving as a hub that can participate with a 

wider set of players, be it Brazil, be it India, be it Japan, Australia, 

most of whom already have these relationships. We need to deepen 

them and leverage them more. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Binnendijk. 

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Let me answer your last two questions together 

because I think they do fit together. 

If you look at American grand strategy today and you look at the 

so-called pivot to Asia or the rebalancing to Asia, I think that is 

probably the right thing to do. That is where the long-term security 

challenges lie. Shorter term challenges still remain in the greater 

Middle East. So that is the second part. And we are looking to our 

European allies to help us in that second endeavor, otherwise we 

are not going to have the capacity to do it. The question is, are the 

European allies willing and able to do that? There is Afghanistan 

fatigue in Europe, as there is here, but it is even worse in Europe. 

And you have got the financial problems that we discussed. 

So as you look at that strategy, the question is: Are the European allies willing to go along with this strategy. Some have talked 

about not pivoting away from Europe, but rather pivoting with 

Europe, and that notion of pivoting with Europe requires partners 

who are willing and able to do it. And that is the test. Will they 

be able to do that? So that is the first part of the answer. 

61 

The second part has to do with partnership, and here I agree 

with Ian. We are going to have 13 or so partners meeting with 

NATO in Chicago, and there is a real opportunity there. 

If you look at so-called partnerships for the alliance today, you 

have got the Partnership for Peace, which was initially a waiting 

chamber for membership. Now you have some very capable countries and some very less capable countries in the PEP. It is not 

really functional anymore. You have got the Med Dialogue. You 

have the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and others. But they do 

not make much sense anymore. 

We really need to rethink partnerships in general for the alliance. It does not mean you cannot keep those dialogues going, but 

to me it is about capabilities and will. And you need to find those 

‘‘functional partners,’’ who can be with us, and they can be global: 

Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, potentially others. How do 

you partner with them, and how can they be useful to the alliance 

and to the United States? Where you have to start, in addition to 

the political elements, is military interoperability so that we can 

operate together when agreed. And there are standards within 

NATO. We should be using those NATO standards to apply to 

these other countries so that when we come together in an operation, we are interoperable and we should be able to certify that. 

And these countries should get something for that, which is greater 

consultation. 

So I think there is a lot that can be done with this notion of partnership that will help that grand strategy to be able to work. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You know, I think you all have mentioned the 

pivot toward Asia and what the European reaction has been in 

some quarters. I liked your comment, Dr. Binnendijk, about the 

idea that this is really—what is happening in Asia is of equal interest to Europe and there is an opportunity to pivot together. 

And I wonder if any of you have thoughts about to what extent 

that kind of message will come out of the summit in Chicago and 

whether there is an opportunity to make that point in a way that 

has not been made to date anyway? 

Dr. KUPCHAN. You know, I think the Europeans are beginning to 

understand the importance of global engagement. They are beginning to understand that the future of our partnership with them 

depends on their readiness to do things that are well beyond their 

normal purview. But I think that is going to be a long-term process 

in the sense that the Europeans at this point simply do not have 

the equities or the capabilities to be players in Asia in the same 

way we are. That does not mean they cannot be helpful. That does 

not mean that they cannot invest in the kind of capabilities that 

will get them there. 

But I do think—and this comes back to the discussion we were 

just having about partnerships—that that conversation should not 

just be about what partners can do for NATO to increase NATO 

capability, it is also about what NATO can do for others in the 

sense that—as I suggested in my opening remarks, I am not sure 

that NATO is going to be sending out the fire trucks every few 

months whenever there is a problem out there. Who is going to be 

sending out the fire trucks? Probably groupings that are local. So 

if I were to guess at what the most important security institutions 

62 

of the coming decades will be, they are going to be regional institutions like ASEAN in Southeast Asia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, 

the African Union, and UNASUR, which is a defense union emerging in Latin America. And so I think that NATO’s engagement 

with these groups should be partly about interoperability, as Hans 

was just saying, but also teaching them to do for themselves what 

NATO has done for itself. NATO is the most successful multinational, operational, integrated military/political institution in history. So, if NATO is not always able to address crises, it should 

invest in making sure that others will be ready to fill the gap. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Yes, Mr. Brzezinski. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would hope that would be the message that 

comes from Chicago, that we will be pivoting together to the new 

challenges of the 21st century. That is the essence of the transatlantic bargain. 

I think global partnerships are a way to do that because it would 

be the United States, Canada, and our European allies reaching 

out to the Brazils, to the Indias, the Australias and deepening the 

transatlantic community’s ties to them. That is Europe and North 

America pivoting together to these new regions. 

But I am concerned about our ability to pivot militarily together 

as we reduce the U.S. force presence in Europe. We are reducing 

two of four BCT’s, brigade combat teams. We are pulling out 

prepositioned ships from the Mediterranean and we are pulling out 

an A–10 squadron, among other elements. I think it does raise, because it has not been adequately addressed by the administration, 

the important issue of how in the long term we will maintain interoperability between United States and European forces so that 

they can pivot together to these new regions. 

To get a sense of the implications the administration’s decisions 

to reduce U.S. presence in Europe portend for engagement between 

United States and European forces, lets take a closer look at their 

plans for future engagement. They have decided to remove or eliminate two brigade combat teams now deployed in Europe. To make 

up for that loss of presence, the administration has committed a 

United States brigade combat team to the NATO Response Force. 

Fantastic, that is a first-rate decision. We should have done it a 

long time ago. 

The administration has also said it will ensure that two brigade 

combat team equivalents will rotate to Europe each year, which 

sounds good. When you start scratching the surface of that, those 

rotations are only 6 to 8 weeks long per year. That comes nowhere 

close to the kind of engagement that a permanently based unit in 

Europe can provide. That comes nowhere close to the kind of level 

of joint training that a unit based in Europe can do with the 

Italians, with the Poles, with the Norwegians and such. And so I 

think there is a real question out there of what is going to happen 

to all the great interoperability we have developed over the last 

decade. 

Remember when Europeans started first flowing into Afghanistan and into Iraq also, we had real interoperability problems. It 

was not smooth. As the battlefield becomes more complex, more 

technologically demanding interoperability is more difficult to 

63 

develop and more difficult to sustain. It requires more engagement 

rather than less engagement. So that is the question mark I bring 

to the table concerning these reductions of U.S. military presence 

in Europe. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes, Dr. Binnendij. 

Dr. BINNENDIJK. I would hope that the message from Chicago is 

that we face global challenges together, that this group of nations, 

this group of democracies needs to work together to meet those 

global challenges. That is what the message should be. 

And I think if you look at Libya and what happened there, it 

does demonstrate that if an issue is in the interest of our allies to 

engage in, they will do it. It did not require all European allies to 

engage in that. Enough engaged. Ninety percent of the ordnance 

dropped on Libya was European ordnance. So that demonstrates 

that when there is an interest, there can be a will. So I would not 

write off the Europeans as quickly as some others might. 

Now, they are in a near existential crisis today over the future 

of the euro, and we see that with developments in Greece. So that 

will complicate it. 

Let me just say a final word about what Ian just raised which 

is the sort of narrower issue of brigade combat teams and the 

American presence there. 

As Ian suggested that this was a very sound decision to have 

these brigade combat teams—to have at least one U.S.-based brigade combat team deploy battalions to Europe to do joint training 

with the NATO Response Force. That ought to be a model. It ought 

to be a model for what we do to maintain military interoperability 

between the United States and our allies post-ISAF. 

And we need to find many other examples. And this actually may 

be a place where the committee could play a constructive role to 

try to urge the administration to find other places because interoperability is very precious and it is very fragile, and we need to 

be able to sustain that if we are going to sustain the alliance over 

time post-ISAF. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much. I know we promised 

to have folks out by about 12:30. 

So let me just close with one question that is a little more parochial for me. I am planning to attend the summit in Chicago, and 

one of the programs that I am going to be participating in is the 

Atlantic Council’s Young Atlanticist Program. Obviously, it is 

aimed at trying to engage more young professional leaders and 

future decisionmakers in policy questions and particularly in the 

importance of NATO. So do you all have thoughts about what we 

can do to better engage upcoming leaders on NATO and on what 

the next generation should look like for NATO and for our future 

leaders? You professors ought to have some really good ideas about 

this. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. We are thrilled to have you at the Atlantic 

Council conference there, Senator Shaheen. The fact that you are 

attending this event and some of the NATO events in Chicago is 

important because you represent this institution and that communicates a lot. It communicates a lot of commitment. 

With that said, I would reinforce that message. They need to 

hear that that America is interested in Europe’s security interests. 

64 

And second, I would encourage our European allies to think globally and to recognize that they and their countries have a lot at 

stake globally, and they have to start looking beyond their immediate financial crises and thinking about how their interests are 

affected by developments in Asia, Africa, Latin America. 

And then third, I would remind them, just as Charlie did today, 

that by working with the United States, we are together stronger 

and are going to be more influential and better able to shape and 

drive events beyond the North Atlantic area in Asia, in Africa, in 

the Middle East together than if we try to do that separately. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Any other thoughts? 

Dr. KUPCHAN. I would concur that it is not just important but 

more and more important over time in the sense that I think on 

both sides of the Atlantic we are going through generational 

changes that are to some extent—‘‘eroding’’ would be too strong a 

word, but diminishing the social foundations of the partnership in 

the sense that—I guess you and I, Ian—we sort of represent the 

last generation of people in this game who entered professional life 

when the cold war was still alive. Not so for younger generations. 

The students I teach at Georgetown are growing up in a world in 

which Atlantic Partnership, the cold war, the Berlin Wall are very 

remote. That is why it is especially important to get younger Americans and Europeans to engage in these issues, to be educated on 

these issues. 

And also for Europeans, I think the other thing I worry about is 

their own commitment to the European project. One of the issues 

that polling data is beginning to show is that they do not have the 

same emotional attachment to Europe as the older generation. 

What Angela Merkel has been doing with the euro—moving reluctantly and cautiously—Helmet Kohl would have never done 

because the European project was sacred ground for him. And that 

is particularly why I think investing in the emerging generation is 

so critical. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Dr. Binnendijk, you have the last word. 

Dr. BINNENDIJK. Thank you. 

First, I think it is great that you are going for that purpose, and 

Fran Burwell has just done a great job with that program. And it 

is a problem. I mean, I go to meetings on NATO, and everybody 

looks like me and my generation. And we need to fix that problem. 

I have taken one small step. I have my daughter, Anika, now 

engaged in NATO affairs. So that is a personal contribution. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So if I bring my daughter, that would help 

probably. Right? 

Dr. BINNENDIJK. I think the message is that we are really faced 

with global challenges, global problems that cannot be solved by 

the United States or a small group of nations alone. They have to 

be solved globally. For all of the faults that the Europeans have, 

they still are our best partners in dealing with those global challenges. And it is not just military stuff. It is energy. It is climate. 

It is cyber. All of these new challenges. And actually that is where 

the latest generation is focusing. They understand those problems. 

And so I would focus on those as well. 

65 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you all very much. This has been 

very enlightening. 

At this time, I will close the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE PHILIP GORDON TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, member states agreed that Georgia would become a future NATO member. This decision has been reaffirmed by 

NATO on numerous subsequent occasions. Georgia has been making impressive 

progress in its democratic transformation which I believe facilitates Georgia’s NATO 

accession process. Georgia has also made extraordinary contributions to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. 

The NATO summit in Chicago is an important moment to recognize Georgia’s 

progress and advance its prospects for membership in the alliance. U.S. leadership 

is essential for this. Could you please elaborate further on how the administration 

will use the summit to ensure not only that Georgia’s progress and its contributions 

to NATO are recognized, but that it is also given a clear roadmap and benchmarks 

for achieving full NATO membership? 

Answer. The United States continues to support Georgia’s aspirations for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO. In order to be considered for 

NATO membership, Georgia must make further progress on the range of reforms 

required to meet NATO’s standards for membership. Georgia’s Annual National Program (ANP) and the NATO—Georgia Commission (NGC) continue to guide Georgia’s reform efforts in this regard. 

While the Chicago summit is not an enlargement summit, we have worked hard 

with allies to secure a strong signal of support for Georgia’s candidacy. Specifically, 

Georgia has been invited to attend an aspirants meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers along with Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. This meeting will highlight NATO’s open door policy and support for these countries EuroAtlantic aspirations. Georgia continues to be an important NATO partner and significant contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan and will be represented at 

the ISAF summit meeting. Additionally, at the summit we are going to highlight 

those partners who have made significant contributions to NATO operations and activities by holding a heads of state meeting with 13 of these partners, including 

Georgia. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHILIP GORDON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. To advance the bipartisan agenda of NATO enlargement, Congress has 

passed several bills to authorize security assistance geared toward NATO enlargement, the most recent of which is the NATO Enhancement Act. Do you support passage of the NATO Enhancement Act, which is pending before the committee? 

Answer. Yes. We appreciate the bill’s strong support for NATO, which continues 

the long tradition of Senate advocacy. The bill’s support for NATO enlargement reflects the administration’s policy that Euro-Atlantic integration is critical to achieving a Europe whole, free, and at peace. We particularly appreciate the continuation 

of programs to assist NATO aspirants to meet the standards for NATO membership, 

which are helpful to our efforts to hasten their entry. 

Question. What effect has the recent ICJ decision concerning the MacedoniaGreece name dispute issue had on moving the parties closer to a compromise? Has 

this decision had any impact on U.S. policy toward the issue? 

Answer. The United States looks to the leaders of both countries to use the ICJ 

judgment as an opportunity to renew their efforts toward finding a solution that 

benefits both Greece and Macedonia. The U.S. position on the name dispute is longstanding. We strongly support the ongoing U.N. effort, led by Matthew Nimetz, to 

resolve this issue and will support any mutually acceptable solution. We regularly 

engage both countries at a high level on this issue and continue to urge Athens and 

Skopje to reach agreement on the name issue as soon as possible. 

66 

Question. Please list all European military assets that have been expressly 

assigned to the NATO missile defense mission in terms of radars, sensors, and air/ 

missile defense interceptors. 

Answer. While Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to host U.S. missile defense assets in support of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 

to missile defense, NATO allies are just beginning to capitalize upon the alliance’s 

decision to develop a NATO missile defense capability. The alliance has, and continues to develop, a command and control system paid for with NATO common funding. Allies have committed over $1 billion in common funding toward the NATO 

missile defense command and control architecture. 

At the Chicago NATO summit, heads of state and government noted the potential 

opportunities for cooperation on missile defense, and encouraged allies to explore 

possible additional voluntary contributions, including though multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment. 

Allies are stepping up as contributors to the NATO missile defense effort. For 

example, the Netherlands has agreed to contribute their deployable Patriot air and 

missile defense systems as needed. In September, the Netherlands announced that 

it would upgrade the SMART–L radars aboard its air defense frigates so as to be 

able to contribute sensor missile defense data to NATO. France is further developing the SAMP/T system, which has capabilities similar to those of the Patriot and 

is continuing to explore the development of a space-based early warning radar 

system. 

Discussions between allies and the NATO organization, as well as bilateral discussions between the United States and our NATO allies, on their possible future 

contributions to European missile defense are ongoing. 

Question. What steps has the Department taken to ensure greater European contributions to the missile defense mission? 

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense work closely together to engage 

European allies continuously both bilaterally and at NATO on NATO missile 

defense. Through bilateral and NATO working groups, as well as senior level policy 

and defense discussions, the United States strongly advocates for additional European contributions to NATO missile defense. We believe the alliance has a number 

of opportunities for national and multinational contributions to bring additional 

capability to NATO’s missile defense mission. For example, a number of allies possess maritime assets that could be upgraded for missile defense capabilities. In September 2011, the Netherlands announced plans for the upgrade of the SMART–L 

radars on its four air defense frigates in order to contribute to NATO missile defense at a cost of approximately 250 million euro. The Departments of State and 

Defense will continue to engage allies to deepen our bilateral and collective missile 

defense cooperation. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES TOWNSEND TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. To advance the bipartisan agenda of NATO enlargement, Congress has 

passed several bills to authorize security assistance geared toward NATO enlargement, the most recent of which is the NATO Enhancement Act. Do you support passage of the NATO Enhancement Act, which is pending before the committee? 

Answer. Yes. We appreciate the bill’s strong support for NATO. The bill’s support 

for NATO enlargement reflects recognition that Euro-Atlantic integration is critical 

to achieving a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. We particularly appreciate 

the continuation of programs to assist NATO aspirants to meet the standards for 

NATO membership, which are helpful to our efforts to support their entry. 

Question. What effect has the recent ICJ decision concerning the MacedoniaGreece name dispute issue had on moving the parties closer to a compromise? Has 

this decision had any impact on U.S. policy toward the issue? 

Answer. The United States looks to the leaders of both countries to use the ICJ 

judgment as an opportunity to renew their efforts toward finding a solution acceptable to both Greece and Macedonia. The United States continues to support the ongoing U.N. effort, led by Matthew Nimetz, to resolve this issue and will support any 

mutually acceptable solution. We regularly engage both countries at a high level on 

this issue and continue to urge Athens and Skopje to reach agreement as soon as 

possible. 

67 

Question. Please list all European military assets that have been expressly assigned to the NATO missile defense mission in terms of radars, sensors, and air/ 

missile defense interceptors. 

Answer. While Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to host U.S. missile defense assets in support of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 

to missile defense, NATO allies are just beginning to capitalize upon the alliance’s 

decision to develop a NATO missile defense capability. The alliance is developing 

a command-and-control system paid for with NATO common funding. 

At the Chicago NATO summit, heads of state and government will note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defense, and encourage allies to explore 

possible additional voluntary contributions, including though multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment. 

Allies are stepping up as contributors to the NATO missile defense effort. In September 2011, the Netherlands announced that it would upgrade the SMART–L 

radars aboard its air defense frigates so as to be able to contribute sensor missile 

defense data to NATO. France is further developing the Surface-to-Air Missile 

Platform/Terrain (SAMP/T) system, which has capabilities similar to those of the 

Patriot, and is continuing to explore the development of a space-based early warning 

radar system. The Netherlands and Germany could contribute their deployable 

Patriot air and missile defense systems as needed. Discussions between allies and 

the NATO organization, as well as bilateral discussions between the United States 

and our NATO allies, on their possible future contributions to European missile defense are ongoing. 

Question. What steps has the Department taken to ensure greater European contributions to the missile defense mission? 

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense work closely together to engage 

European allies both bilaterally and at NATO on NATO missile defense. Through 

bilateral and NATO working groups, as well as senior-level policy and defense discussions, the United States strongly advocates for additional European contributions 

to NATO missile defense. We believe the alliance has a number of opportunities for 

national and multinational contributions to bring additional capability to NATO’s 

missile defense mission. For example, a number of allies possess maritime assets 

that could be upgraded for missile defense capabilities. In September 2011, the 

Netherlands announced plans for the upgrade of its air defense frigates in order to 

contribute to NATO missile defense. The Departments of State and Defense will 

continue to engage allies to deepen our bilateral and collective missile defense cooperation. 

Question. Please describe all steps that are being taken to reassure allies as two 

Brigade Combat Teams are being withdrawn from Europe. 

Answer. European allies remain vitally important to the United States, and the 

new strategic guidance calls Europe ‘‘our principal partner in seeking global and 

economic security.’’ We consulted with allies in advance of the decision on the brigade combat teams (BCT), and we continue to reassure them that we have strong, 

enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe and in bolstering 

the strength and vitality of NATO. 

Although our posture in Europe will evolve with the strategic landscape, we will 

maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations. We will maintain a substantial 

presence in Europe—with capable military forces focused on combined training, exercises, and military cooperation—and provide new capabilities, including missile 

defense, that address the evolving threats to Europe and the United States. The 

U.S. European Command assesses that the two remaining BCTs represent an adequate ground combat maneuver force for assigned missions, including partner capacity-building activities. Additionally, there are meaningful improvements in U.S. air 

and naval posture that will enable security cooperation activities consistent with the 

new strategic guidance. 

To reassure allies further, we will allocate a U.S.-based BCT to the NATO 

Response Force and rotate elements of this U.S.-based BCT to Europe in order to 

bolster the training and exercising we conduct with allies to ensure strong links and 

interoperability. We will continue to implement the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach to missile defense. We deployed a radar in Turkey and an Aegis ship in 

the eastern Mediterranean, and we plan to station land-based SM–3 missiles in 

Romania and Poland and forward deploy four Aegis multimission ships to Spain. We 

will continue to support a framework for the NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

Headquarters. We will establish an aviation detachment in Poland later this year 

68 

and plan to rotate aircraft to it on a quarterly basis beginning in 2013. We also plan 

to enhance readiness training at combat training centers in Germany. 

Question. What is the schedule for sending U.S. forces to Europe to train with 

their European counterparts? Which forces will be part of these missions? 

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the 

U.S. European Command and the U.S. Army, continues to plan for a fiscal year 

2014 implementation of a reinvigorated contribution to the NATO Response Force 

(NRF). As part of committing an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to the NRF 

on an annual basis, the vision is that that BCT will rotate elements (up to a battalion task force and BCT Headquarters) up to twice a year to Europe to conduct 

interoperability-focused training. The Department will make a final decision on how 

to implement this concept later this year. 

Question. What concrete commitments will be made by allies under the Smart 

Defense Initiative? 

Answer. ‘‘Smart Defense,’’ a term initially introduced by Secretary General Rasmussen in March 2011, describes a framework that assists nations to build greater 

security through multinational collaboration, coordination, coherence, and efficiency. 

At the Chicago summit, heads of state are expected to agree to a Defense Package 

that will help NATO develop and deliver the capabilities that our missions and operations require, a package that paves the way ahead whereby NATO, in 2020, will 

continue to have the capabilities necessary to address the threats and the challenges 

that may be anticipated. The following are highlights of the Defense Package: 

Missile Defense: Leaders will declare they have an interim NATO ballistic missile 

defense capability. NATO will now have an operationally meaningful ballistic missile defense mission. 

—The United States has agreements with four countries—Spain, Turkey, Romania, Poland—to host U.S. missile defense assets. 

—Allies themselves have committed to invest more than $1 billion in command 

and control and communications infrastructure needed to support the ballistic 

missile defense system. 

—U.S. missile defense ships are already in the Mediterranean, and they are able 

to operate under NATO command. 

Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS): At Chicago, it is anticipated that NATO will 

sign a contract to acquire the AGS system (five Global Hawk drones and associated 

command and control ground stations). 

—Thirteen allies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United 

States) are undertaking to acquire the system, and all allies will contribute to 

the operational costs. 

—Two additional allies have pledged a desire to become additional acquisition 

partners. 

Baltic Air Policing: At Chicago, it is anticipated that allies will agree to extend 

the Baltic air policing mission. 

—Various allies take turns in patrolling air space, thus allowing the Baltic allies 

to focus their investment efforts in other critical areas, such as deployable 

forces for Afghanistan. 

Smart Defense Multinational Projects: There are approximately 20 smaller scale 

initiatives (categories including improvements in sustainment, force protection, intelligence, and engagement) underway to acquire NATO capabilities efficiently. This 

list is continually evolving. 

—Each project is led by a specific ally and supported by one or more additional 

allies. 

—Lead nations for individual nations include Germany, the United States, Canada, France, Italy, the U.K., Denmark, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Turkey, 

and the Netherlands. 

—Nearly every other NATO member is supporting one or more multinational 

projects. 

Question. What is the schedule for the F–16 detachment in Poland and how many 

aircraft will be involved? 

Answer. The 10 full-time personnel for the Aviation Detachment at Poland’s Lask 

Airbase are scheduled to begin arriving in October 2012, with an official ceremony 

scheduled for the following month. Aircraft rotations are planned to begin in the 

first quarter of calendar year (CY) 2013 and to occur quarterly thereafter, lasting 

69 

approximately 2 weeks at a time. Aircraft type and numbers for each rotation will 

vary, but they are projected to be composed of at least four F–16 or two C–130 aircraft (both of which Poland possesses) to enhance U.S. Air Force and Polish Air 

Force cooperation most effectively. A unit has not yet been identified for the initial 

C–130 unit rotation in the first quarter of CY13, so specific dates and aircraft numbers are not yet firm; F–16 unit rotations are anticipated for the second and third 

quarters of CY13. 

RESPONSE OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES TOWNSEND TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM UDALL

Question. In the state of New Mexico, the German Air Force flies aircraft out of 

Holloman Air Force Base. They are extremely professional, and a very welcome part 

of the Holloman community and nearby Alamogordo. This joint training is crucial 

for strengthening the alliance, but also for improving the interoperability of U.S. 

and NATO forces. Working together, before there is conflict, is a crucial part of 

preparation for NATO. What can we do to expand NATO training in the United 

States, are there countries interested in expanding joint training, and what is preventing this from occurring? 

Answer. Joint, multinational training is indeed critical to sustaining and improving interoperability, and something NATO takes very seriously. Each year, the alliance develops and publishes the NATO Military Training and Exercise Program, 

which covers a 5-year period and focuses on preparing multinational headquarters 

and forces for operations. The program addresses training and certification exercises 

for land, maritime, and air units, as well as for joint and multinational headquarters. 

The United States also participates in bilateral training with many newer NATO 

allies through the National Guard Bureau-administered State Partnership Program. 

National Guard personnel often travel overseas to train with their Partners, and on 

several occasions, Partners have traveled to the United States for small unit training. 

The United States also participates in several officer exchange programs where 

allied officers attend U.S. professional military education courses, are embedded in 

U.S. staffs, and in some cases deploy to operations with U.S. units. During the April 

2012 NATO Defense Ministerial, Secretary Panetta invited ministers from the other 

27 allies to explore opportunities to send their forces to the United States for training. To date, none have accepted the offer. We believe this is due primarily to the 

costs associated with deploying forces and equipment to the United States and the 

desire of most allies to train on their home soil. 

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES TOWNSEND TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Ensuring the capabilities, independence and professionalism of the 

ANSF over the next few years will be critical to the stability of Afghanistan in the 

future. However, the lack of southern Pashtun officers and enlisted personnel in the 

ANSF jeopardizes the cohesion needed to ably represent the ethnic makeup of the 

country and address ongoing security challenges in the south. In addition, there is 

currently a shortfall of 440 training positions that has an adverse impact on NATO’s 

ability to adequately train Afghans in a timely manner. ‘‘What is NATO doing to 

improve the ethnic makeup of the ANSF, specifically by increasing the proportion 

of ANSF officers and enlisted personnel that are southern Pashtuns?’’ What is 

NATO doing to address the shortfall of ANSF trainers and encourage its members 

to fill the open positions? 

Answer. At the upcoming Chicago summit, NATO is expected to reaffirm its commitment to support the Government of Afghanistan in its responsibility to develop 

Afghan forces that are capable of assuming full lead for security in Afghanistan by 

the end of 2014 and of maintaining security after transition is complete. Afghan 

forces that are inclusive and representative of all Afghan people will be better able 

to meet those requirements; however, allies and non-NATO partner nations recognize that ANSF recruiting is an Afghan responsibility. The Afghan National Army 

Recruiting Command and Afghan National Police Recruiting agencies continue to 

focus on recruiting officer and enlisted candidates from the southern Pashtun regions of Afghanistan. Southern Pashtuns average approximately 12 percent of Afghans recruited. 

70 

Regarding your question on trainers, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe actively manages NATO and ISAF partner nation force contributions in relation to the Commander ISAF-validated Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. 

This force generation process maximizes the utility of allied and partner nation 

troop contributions throughout the ongoing transition from combat to support of the 

ANSF. The most recent joint manning conference, held in May 2012, helped address 

ISAF’s shifting requirements from institutional trainers to security force assistance 

teams as the ANSF’s internal training capacity continues to expand and Afghan 

training institutions continue to transition to ANSF lead. 

Question. NATO’s support for Afghan women has been key to raising the profile 

of women’s rights and emphasizing the important role that women can play in conflict resolution and peace building. Although there has been progress on these 

issues, many continue to be concerned that the ongoing political reconciliation process with the Taliban could result in backsliding on key protections for women. 

‘‘What specific steps does NATO plan to take to ensure that women’s rights are protected during the security transition, including in areas where the ANSF has assumed primary responsibility for security, and after 2014?’’ How can NATO ensure 

that the ANSF are prepared to respond to incidents of violence against women and 

other rights violations? What is being done to increase the number of women recruited for the ANSF? 

Answer. At the upcoming Chicago cummit, NATO is expected to reaffirm its commitment to support the Government of Afghanistan in its responsibility to develop 

Afghan forces that are capable of assuming full lead for security by the end of 2014 

and of maintaining security in Afghanistan after transition is complete. NATO and 

the Government of Afghanistan also recognize that a political process involving successful reconciliation with the Taliban is integral to peace and stability. This process 

must be Afghan-led to succeed, and NATO stands ready to support that process as 

long as the Government of Afghanistan remains resolved to deliver on its commitment to a democratic society where the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 

its citizens are respected—including the equality of men and women and the active 

participation of both in Afghan civil society. 

It is the case, however, that recruiting women into the ANSF continues to be a 

challenge. NATO Training Mission –Afghanistan is working at the ministerial level 

to increase the opportunities available for women within the ANSF and to improve 

acceptance of women across the force. 

Æ