United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations,

Committee on Government Reform, House of

Representatives

BORDER SECURITY

Strengthened Visa Process 

Would Benefit from 

Additional Management 

Actions by State and DHS 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, September 13, 2005 

 

GAO-05-994T
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 13, 2005

BORDER SECURITY

Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit

from Additional Management Actions by

State and DHS 

Highlights of GAO-05-994T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of

Representatives

State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an

antiterrorism tool. Consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the 

importance of addressing national security concerns through the visa 

process, and State has established clear procedures on visa operations 

worldwide. State has also increased its hiring of consular officers and 

language proficient Foreign Service officers, and has enhanced training and 

fraud prevention efforts. Further, consular officers have access to more

information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, 

some areas require additional attention. For example, officers we spoke 

with said that guidance is needed on DHS staff’s roles and responsibilities 

overseas. In addition, while State has hired more consular officers, it

continues to experience shortages in supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 

26 percent of midlevel positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level

staff. During our February 2005 visits to three consular posts in Saudi

Arabia and Egypt—all of which are of interest to U.S. antiterrorism efforts—

the visa sections were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent 

midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct oversight. Further improvements are 

also needed in training and fraud prevention, as well as information sharing 

with the FBI. 

In September 2003, DHS assigned visa security personnel to consular posts 

in Saudi Arabia. According to DHS, State’s consular officials, and the deputy 

chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the DHS officers in Saudi Arabia strengthen 

visa security. However, DHS does not maintain comprehensive data on their 

activities and thus is unable to fully demonstrate the program’s impact. 

Further, DHS has not developed a strategic plan for visa security operations

in Saudi Arabia or for the planned future expansion of the program. 

 Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process

Issue Improvements Issues requiring attention 

Policy Clarified policies on national

security concerns

Guidance needed on DHS roles overseas,

and Foreign Affairs Manual should be

updated 

Staffing Increased hiring and focused 

recruitment

Shortages of midlevel and language

proficient officers and unreliable data on

wait times for applicant interviews

Training Expanded consular training with 

an emphasis on counterterrorism

Courses needed on terrorism travel trends

and fraud prevention, among others

Fraud 

Prevention

Increased fraud awareness Standard criteria needed to identify highfraud posts

Information 

sharing 

More information available from

other agencies for name checks

Additional information from FBI criminal

history files would facilitate visa

processing

DHS Visa

Security

Program 

Stationing of officers in Saudi

Arabia with plans for expansion 

Comprehensive data and strategic plan

needed

Source: GAO.

In adjudicating a visa application,

Department of State (State)

consular officers are on the front

line of defense against those whose

entry would likely be harmful to

U.S. national interests. In October 

2002, we identified shortcomings 

and made recommendations on the

role of national security in the visa

process. This testimony discusses 

our report issued today on actions 

taken since our 2002 report to

strengthen the visa process, as well

as areas that deserve additional

management actions. It also

discusses our July 2005 report on

the status of the assignment of

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) personnel to U.S. consular

posts overseas. 

What GAO Recommends

In our report issued today and our 

July report, we recommended

further improvements to the visa 

process and the management of

DHS’s Visa Security Program. In 

addition, we recommended that

Congress consider requiring State 

and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) to report on the 

options for and feasibility of

providing visa adjudicators with

more detailed information from the

FBI’s criminal history records, and

to allow DHS personnel in Saudi 

Arabia the flexibility to determine

the extent of their application

reviews. 

State and DHS agreed with most of

our conclusions. Both agencies 

indicated that they were taking

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-994T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
Changes to the Visa Process

September 13, 2005 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss our reports issued today and in July1

 on 

the actions that the Departments of State (State) and Homeland Security

(DHS) have taken to strengthen the nonimmigrant visa2

 process as an

antiterrorism tool. All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers 

were issued a visa, which is a U.S. travel document foreign citizens must

generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for business, 

tourism, or other reasons. In deciding to approve or deny a visa 

application, State’s consular officers are on the front line of defense in

protecting the United States against potential terrorists and others whose 

entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. But consular

officers must balance this security responsibility against the need to

facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified shortcomings 

and made recommendations aimed at strengthening the role of national

security in the visa process, procedures for addressing heightened border 

security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism training of consular 

officers.

3

 Similarly, staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, reported that while there

were efforts to enhance border security prior to September 11, no agency

of the U.S. government at that time thought of the visa process as an 

antiterrorism tool.

4

 Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that

consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists. 

Today I will discuss the changes made since our 2002 report to strengthen 

the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management

attention. First, I will focus on our report issued today on changes in visa

policy and guidance; consular resources, including staffing and training; 

 it i t

i

/ t i

t

1

See GAO, Border Secur y: Act ons Needed to Strengthen Management of Depar ment of

Homeland Security’s Visa Secur ty Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005),

and GAO, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit From Improvements

in Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005).

2

The United States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. 

In this testimony, the term “visa” refers to nonimmigrant visas only.

3

GAO, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, 

GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002). 

4

9-11 Commission, 9 11 and Terrorist Travel: S aff Report of the National Comm ssion on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United Sta es (Washington, D.C.; Aug. 21, 2004). 

Page 1 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

and the extent to which U.S. agencies share information with visa 

adjudicators. Second, I will discuss our July 2005 report on the placement

of DHS Visa Security Officers (VSO) at U.S. embassies and consulates 

overseas. 

In conducting this work, we reviewed relevant legislation and agency 

documents, and interviewed State, DHS, and Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) officials in Washington, D.C., as well as visa chiefs and 

other consular affairs staff from 25 posts overseas. We observed visa 

operations and interviewed U.S. government officials at 8 U.S. consular

posts in seven countries—Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, 

Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. Our work was conducted in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In 

addition, GAO has conducted extensive reviews of different aspects of the 

visa process and related areas (see appendix I for a list of GAO reports). 

State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an 

antiterrorism tool. Specifically, State has provided clear instructions to 

consular officers on the importance of national security to the visa 

process. At every post we visited, including those of special interest to

antiterrorism efforts, consular staff viewed security as their top priority,

while recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel. To

further strengthen the visa process, State has increased hiring of consular

officers, targeted recruitment of foreign language proficient officers, 

revamped consular training with a focus on counterterrorism, and 

increased resources to combat visa fraud. Further, intelligence and law

enforcement agencies have shared more information for consular officers’

use in conducting name checks on visa applicants. Despite these 

improvements, we found that further actions are needed to enhance the 

process. Consular officers we interviewed said that guidance is needed on

interagency protocols regarding DHS staff’s roles and responsibilities 

overseas. Actions are also needed to ensure that State has sufficient 

experienced staff with the necessary language skills at key consular posts. 

While State has hired more consular officers, it continues to experience 

shortages in supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 26 percent of midlevel 

positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level staff. Moreover, State 

has not prioritized the staffing of more experienced officers to key posts. 

For example, we found that the visa sections in critical posts in Saudi

Arabia and Egypt were staffed with first-tour, entry-level officers and no 

permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct supervision and

oversight. Our report issued today also calls for further improvements in 

training and fraud prevention, as well as information sharing with the FBI.

Summary 

Page 2 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the assignment of DHS 

employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice and 

training to consular officers regarding visa security, among other things.5

In September 2003, DHS assigned VSOs to consular posts in Saudi Arabia 

and plans to assign staff to other posts to strengthen the visa process at 

these locations. VSOs assigned to Saudi Arabia review all visa applications 

prior to final adjudication by consular officers as required by the 

Homeland Security Act. These VSOs also assist consular officers with 

interviews and fraud prevention. According to DHS, State’s consular 

officials, and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the VSOs in

Riyadh and Jeddah have strengthened visa security. However, no 

comprehensive data exists to demonstrate the VSOs’ impact. In addition,

the requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia limits the 

VSOs’ ability to provide additional training and other services to consular 

officers, such as assisting with interviews. Furthermore, DHS planned to 

expand the Visa Security Program6

 to five locations in fiscal year 2005 and 

intends further expansion in future years; however, chiefs of mission at

the posts chosen for expansion in fiscal year 2005 delayed approvals 

needed for the expansion. Embassy and State officials attributed the 

delays to various questions and concerns about the program’s goals, 

staffing requirements, and coordination plans. According to DHS officials, 

the department provided sufficient responses throughout 2004 and 2005 to 

answer the concerns. However, DHS has not developed a strategic plan for 

visa security operations in Saudi Arabia or the future expansion posts that

defines mission priorities and long-term goals and identifies the outcomes 

expected at each post.

In our report issued today and our July report, we have recommended 

actions to further improve both the visa process and the management of

the Visa Security Program. In addition, we have recommended that

Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to report on the options for 

and feasibility of providing visa adjudicators with more detailed 

information from the FBI’s criminal history records, and to allow DHS the 

flexibility to determine which visa applications its personnel in Saudi

Arabia will review. 

 5

P.L. 107-296.

6

For the purpose of this statement, we refer to DHS’s program that oversees the 

implementation of the requirements in sect. 428 (e) and sect. 428 (i) of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 as the Visa Security Program.

Page 3 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

In general, State and DHS agreed with the majority of our conclusions in 

both reports. Both agencies indicated that they have begun taking steps to 

implement our recommendations. However, State believed that it already 

had a plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing and that 

development of a comprehensive plan that we recommended was not 

necessary. The Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for

congressional consideration regarding visa adjudicators’ access to certain 

information in the FBI’s criminal history records; it provided additional

information about other efforts that the department is taking to enhance 

the sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information in connection 

with visa processing. 

The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the primary 

body of law governing immigration and visa operations.7

 The Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority to issue

regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and Nationality

Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the functions 

of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting or denial of visas.

8

As we reported in July 2005,9

 the act also authorized the assignment of 

DHS employees to U.S. embassies and consulates to provide expert advice 

and training to consular officers regarding visa security, among other 

things. In particular, the act mandated that VSOs on-site in Saudi Arabia

review all visa applications prior to final adjudication by consular officers. 

Background 

A September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS 

further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with respect to visa 

issuance. State manages the visa process, as well as the consular corps 

and its functions at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In addition, State 

provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to consular officers 

regarding visa policies and procedures. DHS is responsible for establishing 

visa policy, reviewing implementation of the policy, and providing

additional direction. This agreement also broadly defines the DHS officers’ 

responsibilities in reviewing visa applications at consular posts overseas, 

indicating, among other things, that they will provide expert advice to 

consular officers regarding specific security threats relating to visa 

 7

P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 

8

State retains authority in certain circumstances as outlined in the act. See P.L. 107-296.

9

GAO-05-801. 

Page 4 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

adjudication and will also provide training to consular officers on terrorist

threats and applicant fraud. 

The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains

several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews, 

collection of biometrics (fingerprints), and cross-referencing of the 

applicant’s name against the Consular Lookout and Support System

(CLASS) 10 (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy 

 

Applicant 

goes to 

post

Application reviewed, 

fingerprints collected, 

and name check 

performed

Applicant 

interviewed and 

supporting 

documents 

reviewed

Consular officer 

reviews namecheck results and 

determines if 

Security Advisory 

Opinion (SAO) 

is required or 

warranted

SAO 

submitted for 

interagency 

check

SAO 

needed

SAO not 

needed

Post 

receives 

SAO 

response

Applicant 

schedules 

interview 

with post

Visa 

issued 

or 

denied

Sources: GAO; Nova Development (clip art).

10CLASS is a State Department name-check database that posts use to access critical 

information for visa adjudication. The system contains records provided by numerous

agencies and includes information on persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, 

and terrorism concerns. 

Page 5 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an 

antiterrorism tool, including 

• establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing 

national security concerns through the visa process; 

• creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on 

how consular officers should use the visa process to screen against

potential terrorists; 

• performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill

requirements for visa operations; and 

• revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more 

emphasis on detecting potential terrorists. 

Since 2002, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken numerous steps to

strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and increase its 

overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant Secretary 

in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leading role in implementing 

changes to the visa process and promoting its use as a screen against 

potential terrorists. However, additional actions could enhance the visa 

process. State has increased and clarified visa policies and guidance, but

additional steps are needed to ensure these changes are implemented. 

Additionally, State has increased resources to strengthen the visa process, 

including hiring additional consular officers, targeting recruitment, and 

expanding training efforts; however, staffing limitations remain a concern, 

posts seek further training, and other gaps remain. Lastly, while 

interagency information-sharing efforts have increased, consular officers 

do not have direct access to detailed information from the FBI’s criminal 

records, which would help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers. 

Visa Process 

Strengthened, and 

Further Actions 

Would Support 

Ongoing

Improvements 

Visa Policies, Procedures,

and Guidance Enhanced, 

but Additional Steps 

Needed to Ensure They 

Are Implemented 

We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views on 

balancing the need for national security and customer service in the visa

process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy guidance 

to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the heightened 

border security concerns following the September 11 attacks. Over the 

past three years, State has implemented several changes to address these 

issues, and consular officials stated that the report and its 

recommendations provided a framework for these changes. For example,

in February 2003, Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national 

Page 6 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

security as the first priority of the visa process. Consular officers we

interviewed said the guidance was generally clear, and officers at all eight 

posts we visited viewed security as the most critical element of the visa

process. In addition, Consular Affairs identified certain areas where 

additional guidance was needed to streamline visa procedures. State has 

issued more than 80 standard operating procedures, in consultation with

DHS, to inform consular officers on issues such as fingerprinting and 

special clearance requirements. 

Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed

stated that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply all of

the changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to consular 

officers in the field is voluminous and can change rapidly, according to 

consular officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify its officers 

overseas of policy changes through cables, postings on its internal Web 

site, and informal communications. However, the bureau has not

consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs

Manual—State’s central resource for all regulations, policies, and 

guidance—to reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau has 

updated several portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some

sections had not been updated since October 2004. Consular officials 

stated that they are overhauling the standard operating procedures to

eliminate those that are obsolete and incorporate current requirements

into the manual. However, while the Consular Affairs Bureau’s internal 

Web site contains all of the standard operating procedures, it also links to

out-of-date sections in the manual. As a result, there is no single, reliable

source for current information. 

Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on 

certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs we

interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful regarding 

the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS. For 

example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of

immigration and border security activities and serve in a regional capacity. 

However, DHS has not provided guidance to consular officers regarding 

the roles and geographic responsibilities for its personnel.

Page 7 GAO-05-994T
In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined with

increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available staff. As a 

result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental reassessment

of staffing requirements for visa operations. In our report issued today, we

have noted that State has received funding to address staffing shortfalls, 

but we continue to see the need for a reassessment of resource needs

worldwide. Through the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and other 

sources,11 State has increased its Foreign Service officer consular positions 

by 364, from 1,037 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,401 in fiscal year 2005. Moreover,

a senior human resource official anticipates that many officers hired under 

the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will begin to reach promotion 

eligibility for midlevel positions within the next two years. However, as we

have previously reported in 2003,12 the overall shortage of midlevel Foreign 

Service officers would remain until approximately 2013. As of April 30,

2005, we found that 26 percent of midlevel consular positions were either

vacant or filled by an entry-level officer (see fig. 2). In addition, almost 

three-quarters of the vacant positions were at the FS-03 level—midlevel

officers who generally supervise entry-level staff—which consular officials 

attribute to low hiring levels prior to the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative 

and the necessary expansion of entry-level positions to accommodate

increasing workload requirements after September 11, 2001. 

Resources for Visa 

Function Increased, but 

Staffing Shortages and 

Other Gaps Remain a 

Concern 

 

t t ,

i

11In 2001, State launched the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative—a 3-year effort to ensure

global diplomatic readiness. 

12GAO, Sta e Department: Targe s for Hiring Filling Vacancies Overseas Being Met, but 

Gaps Rema n in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003). 

Page 8 GAO-05-994T Changes to the Visa Process
Changes to the Visa Process

Figure 2: Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and Distribution of Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005 

34% 63% 74%

12%

14%

Entry-level (879)

Midlevel (478)

3%

Senior (44)

Staffed with entry-level

officers (65)

Staffed by at least 

midlevel officers (355)

Vacant (58)

Source: Department of State.

Note: Vacancy figures may not reflect recent promotions of officers to a higher grade who were still 

serving in lower-grade positions as of April 30, 2005.

During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we observed 

that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level officers on their 

first assignment with no permanent, midlevel visa chief to provide 

supervision. Although these posts had other mid- or senior-level consular

officers, their availability on visa issues was limited because of their 

additional responsibilities. For example, the head of the visa section in

Jeddah was responsible for managing the entire section as well as services

for American citizens due to a midlevel vacancy in that position. At the

time of our visit, the Riyadh Embassy did not have a midlevel visa chief.

Similarly, in Cairo, there was no permanent midlevel supervisor between 

the winter of 2004 and the summer of 2005, and Consular Affairs used five

temporary staff on a rotating basis during this period to serve in this 

capacity. Entry-level officers that we spoke with stated that due to the 

constant turnover, the temporary supervisors were unable to assist them

adequately. At the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, entry-level officers expressed 

concern about the lack of a midlevel supervisor. Officers in Jeddah stated 

that they relied on the guidance they received from the DHS visa security

officer assigned to the post. However, as of July 2005, visa security officers 

are stationed only at two consular posts in Saudi Arabia—not at any of the 

other 209 visa-issuing posts overseas. 

Page 9 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

If the Consular Affairs Bureau identifies a need for additional staff in

headquarters or overseas, it may request that the Human Resources 

Bureau establish new positions. 

In addition, posts can also describe their needs for additional positions 

through their consular packages—a report submitted annually to the 

Consular Affairs Bureau that details workload statistics and staffing 

requirements, among other things. For example, in December 2004, during 

the course of our work, the consular section in Riyadh reported to

Washington that there was an immediate need to create a midlevel visa 

chief position at post, and State worked with human resource officials to

create this position, which, according to State officials, will be filled by 

summer 2005. 

However, the current assignment process does not guarantee that all 

authorized positions will be filled, particularly at hardship posts.

13

Historically, State has rarely directed its employees to serve in locations 

for which they have not bid on a position, including hardship posts or 

locations of strategic importance, due to concerns that such staff may be 

more apt to have poor morale or be less productive. Further, though 

Consular Affairs can prioritize positions that require immediate staffing, 

according to a deputy assistant secretary for human resources, it generally 

does not do so. For example, Consular Affairs could choose not to

advertise certain positions of lesser priority during an annual assignment

cycle. However, senior Consular Affairs officials acknowledged that they 

rarely do this. According to these officials, Consular Affairs does not have

direct control over the filling of all consular positions and can often face 

resistance from regional bureaus and chiefs of mission overseas who do 

not want vacancies at their posts. Therefore, due to State’s decision to not 

force assignments, along with the limited amount of midlevel officers 

available to apply for them,

14 important positions may remain vacant.

 13State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. government provides

differential pay incentives—an additional 5 percent to 25 percent of base salary depending

on the severity or difficulty of the conditions—to encourage employees to bid on 

assignments to these posts and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter. 

14The assignment process begins when Foreign Service employees who are eligible to be

transferred from their current assignment each year receive a list of instructions and 

upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff then must submit a list of those

positions for which they want to be considered. 

Page 10 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

In 2002, we found that not all consular officers were proficient enough in

their post’s language to hold interviews with applicants. We also found 

that training for new consular officers was focused on detecting intending

immigrants through the visa process, with little training given on detecting 

possible terrorists. Today we are reporting that State has made a number 

of improvements in its recruitment of language proficient Foreign Service 

officers, expanded and revamped consular training, and increased the 

attention paid to fraud prevention. However, we found that additional 

actions would support ongoing improvements. For example, 

Improvements Made in 

Recruitment, Training, and 

Fraud Prevention, and 

Additional Actions Would 

Support Ongoing Initiatives 

• State has created programs to better target its recruitment of Foreign 

Service officers who speak critical languages. For example, in March 

2004, State created the “Critical Needs Language Program,” which 

increases the opportunities for appointment to the Foreign Service for 

new hires proficient in Arabic, Chinese, Indic, Korean, Russian, or 

Turkic, and who have passed the Foreign Service Exam. From March 

2004 through May 2005, 172 of the 564 Foreign Service officers hired 

were proficient in one of these languages. Despite these improvements, 

additional actions are needed to fill continuing language proficiency 

shortfalls. As of April 30, 2005, State reported that about 14 percent of 

consular-coned15 Foreign Service officers in language designated

positions did not meet language requirements for their position. 

• State has revamped and expanded consular training to enhance visa 

security. For example, in October 2003, the Basic Consular Course was 

extended from 26 days to 31 days, and classes were added in analytical 

interviewing and fraud prevention. In addition, in March 2002, State 

created a new course in advanced name-checking. However, additional 

training could further assist consular officers. All of the posts we

contacted reported that additional training on terrorist travel trends 

would be helpful, with 16 posts responding that such training would be 

extremely helpful. Some posts also reported that additional briefings 

on counterterrorism techniques specific to post and fraud prevention 

would be helpful.

• State has taken several steps to increase its focus on preventing and 

detecting fraud in the visa process. For example, by 2004, State’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security had deployed 25 visa fraud investigators 

 15State requires that a generalist applicant to the Foreign Service select a “cone,” which is a 

functional area of specialization, when applying to take the written examination. For

generalists, Foreign Service specializations are management, consular, economic, political, 

and public diplomacy.

Page 11 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

to U.S. embassies and consulates. In addition, State’s Office of Fraud 

Prevention Programs has developed several ways for consular officers 

in the field to learn about fraud prevention, including developing an 

Internet-based “E-room,” with more than 500 members, which serves as

a discussion group for consular officers, as well as a place to post 

cables and lessons learned from prior fraud cases. However, until 

recently, the department has not used a systematic process to identify

consular posts with the highest degree of visa fraud. According to State

officials, fraud rankings for consular posts have not been based on an 

objective analysis using standardized criteria, but have been selfreported by each post. As a result, previous resources for fraud 

prevention, including the 25 visa fraud investigators assigned in 2004, 

may not have been allocated to posts with the highest need. We also 

plan to report later this year on the internal controls that are in place to 

mitigate the risks of visa malfeasance—the provision of a visa in 

exchange for money or something else of value—and intend to make 

several recommendations to help ensure adherence to these controls. 

Number of Intelligence and 

Law Enforcement Records 

in CLASS Increased, but 

Additional Information 

Would Help Facilitate

Legitimate Travel

The September 11 attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive 

information sharing. In January 2005, GAO identified effective information 

sharing to secure the homeland as a high-risk area of the U.S. government

due to the formidable challenges the federal government still faces in this

area.16 With cooperation from other federal agencies, State has increased 

the amount of information available to consular officers in CLASS. Namecheck records from the intelligence community have increased fivefold 

from 48,000 in September 2001 to approximately 260,000 in June 2005, 

according to consular officials. Moreover, consular officials told us that, as 

of fall 2004, CLASS contained approximately 8 million records from the 

FBI. In addition, State has developed more efficient methods of acquiring 

certain data from law enforcement databases. For example, State 

established a direct computer link with the FBI to send descriptive 

information from the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to

CLASS on a daily basis. 

While the additional records in CLASS have helped consular officers 

detect those who might seek to harm the United States, many consular 

officers we interviewed stated that the increased volume of records and 

lack of access to other detailed information can lead to visa-processing

delays. In particular, consular officers do not have direct access to

detailed information in the FBI’s criminal history records. Section 403 of

 16GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005).

Page 12 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

the USA PATRIOT Act of 200117 directs the Attorney General and the FBI 

to provide State with access to extracts of certain files18 containing 

descriptive information for the purpose of determining whether a visa 

applicant has a criminal history record contained in the NCIC Interstate

Identification Index (or Index). The USA PATRIOT Act also states that

access to an extract does not entitle consular officers to obtain the full 

contents of the corresponding records. In accordance with this mandate, 

FBI officials stated that the bureau provides to CLASS extracts that 

contain all available biographical information, such as the date of birth 

and height of the person with the criminal record.19 As a result, when 

conducting a CLASS name check, consular officers told us they may not be 

able to determine whether an FBI file matches an applicant because the 

extracts lack sufficient biographical information. Moreover, in accordance 

with section 403, the extracts do not contain details such as charges or 

dispositions of the cases, which are necessary to determine if the applicant

might be ineligible for a visa.20 For example, the information in CLASS 

does not distinguish between a conviction for a crime such as kidnapping, 

or an acquittal on charges of driving while intoxicated. 

Consular officers, therefore, must fingerprint applicants who have a 

potential match in the Index for positive identification in FBI records to

then ascertain whether the information contained in the criminal record

would make the applicant ineligible for a visa.21 In fiscal year 2004, of the 

 17P.L. 107-56. 

18The files include the NCIC’s Interstate Identification Index, which is the FBI’s database of 

criminal history records, Wanted Persons Files, and any other files maintained by NCIC 

that may be mutually agreed upon by the Attorney General and the agency receiving 

access.

19According to FBI officials, examples of the information provided to CLASS, when 

available, include the FBI record number, name and alias, date of birth, place of birth, 

citizenship, sex, race, eye color, hair color, height, or weight. 

20To render an alien ineligible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), the conviction must be for a 

statutory offense that involves moral turpitude, which includes many serious crimes, such 

as kidnapping and murder, but does not include other crimes that may be reflected in the 

NCIC database. 

21This requirement is also consistent with the National Crime Prevention and Privacy 

Compact Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 14611 et seq.) (or Compact Act), which organizes an 

electronic information-sharing system among the federal government and states to

exchange criminal history records, such as those contained in the Index, for noncriminal 

justice purposes. The Compact Act requires that consular officers, as noncriminal justice 

personnel, first submit the visa applicant’s fingerprints, or other approved form of 

identification, for positive identification before the record can be released. 

Page 13 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

more than 40,000 sets of fingerprints consular officers sent to the FBI for 

verification, about 29 percent were positive matches between the 

applicant and a criminal record in the Index. State officials we spoke with

estimated that of those applicants who were positively identified, only 

about 10 percent were denied a visa based on the information provided by 

the FBI. Moreover, fingerprinted applicants are charged an additional $85 

processing fee and, as of the spring of 2005, must wait an estimated 4 to 8 

weeks for a response from Washington, D.C., before adjudication can 

proceed. According to FBI and State officials, the processing delays are 

due to inefficiencies in the way the prints are sent to the FBI for clearance 

(see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information in FBI Files and Proposed Changes 

Same process

Different process

Different process and time

Electronic pilot process: 

estimated time for response = 24 hours

Sources: GAO; Nova Development and Map Resources (clip art).

Applicant’s 

name 

checked 

against 

watch lists

Watch list 

“hit” 

requires 

fingerprints 

to be taken • 10 electronic 

fingerprints 

collected

• Applicant 

charged 

 $85 processing 

fee

• FBI compares electronic 

fingerprints to criminal 

database file (24 hours)

• Results sent back to post

• Consular officer decides 

to issue/deny based on 

FBI results

• FBI compares electronic 

fingerprints to criminal 

database file (24 hours)

• Results sent back to post

• Consular officer decides 

to issue/deny based on 

FBI results

• 10 ink

fingerprints 

collected

• Applicant 

charged 

 $85 processing 

fee

Fingerprints sent by mail to National Visa Center

Fingerprints take up to 8 weeks using pouch mail to reach National 

Visa Center

National Visa Center converts ink fingerprints into electronic format

National Visa Center sends fingerprints electronically to FBI

Fingerprints sent 

electronically to 

FBI

Fingerprints 

instantly received 

by FBI

Current process: estimated time for response = 4-8 weeks

Page 14 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

To facilitate more efficient fingerprint processing, State and the FBI are 

implementing an electronic fingerprint system whereby consular officers 

will scan the applicants’ fingerprints at post and submit them directly into 

the FBI’s database. FBI and State officials told us that posts would be

notified if the record in question matched the applicant within 24 hours. 

However, thousands of visa applicants could still face lengthier wait times 

and additional fingerprinting fees that they would otherwise not have 

incurred because consular officers lack enough information at the time of

the interview to determine if the records in CLASS match the applicant.

The FBI and State have discussed several options to help ensure that

consular officers can facilitate legitimate travel; however, each would 

require legislative changes and would entail associated trade-offs. These 

options include the following: 

• Consular officials told us that access to additional information in a 

criminal history file, such as the charge and disposition of a case, 

would allow their officers to determine which crimes are serious 

enough to require a positive fingerprint match prior to adjudication. 

However, FBI officials noted that there are some technical limitations

on extracting specific pieces of data from the criminal history records. 

• To avoid some of the technical limitations associated with the Index, 

FBI officials stated that it would be easier to provide visa adjudicators 

access to the full criminal history records. However, these officials told 

us that assurances would need to be in place to prevent misuse of the 

information, given its sensitive nature. Indeed, State and the FBI have 

already negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at 

protecting the information passed from NCIC to CLASS. However, 

consular officials indicated that their officers may need access only to 

the criminal charge and disposition of the case to adjudicate a visa case

more efficiently.

Recommendations In our report issued today, we are recommending, among other things, 

that State and DHS, in consultation with appropriate agencies, clarify 

certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their implementation, 

and ensure that consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance 

national security and promote legitimate travel, including effective human 

resources and training. In particular, we recommend that State develop a 

comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing 

worldwide, including an analysis of staffing requirements and shortages, 

foreign language proficiency requirements, and fraud prevention needs, 

Page 15 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

among other things—the plan should systematically determine priority

positions that must be filled worldwide based on the relative strategic 

importance of posts and positions and realistic assumptions of available

staff resources. We also suggest that Congress consider requiring State 

and the FBI to develop and report on a plan to provide visa adjudicators 

with more efficient access to certain information in the FBI’s criminal 

history records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, State noted that it is a fair and 

balanced evaluation of the improvements made to the visa process. State 

agreed with most of our conclusions, and indicated that it is taking action 

to implement the majority of our recommendations. However, State 

disagreed with our recommendation that it prepare a comprehensive plan 

to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing. State argued that it already 

had such a plan. Based on our analysis, we continue to believe it is

incumbent on the department to conduct a worldwide analysis to identify

high-priority posts and positions, such as supervisory consular positions in

posts with high-risk applicant pools or those with high workloads and long 

wait times for applicant interviews. As we note in our report, at the time of

our work, the midlevel visa chief positions in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi

Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, were not filled with permanent midlevel officers.

This was a serious deficiency given that the visa sections were staffed with

officers on their first tour. Although State noted that it anticipated 

addressing this shortage of midlevel consular officers before 2013, it did 

not indicate when that gap would be filled. Moreover, State’s bidding and 

assignment process does not guarantee that the positions of highest

priority will always be filled with qualified officers. Therefore, a further 

assessment is needed to ensure that State has the right people in the right 

posts with the necessary skill levels. 

In September 2003, DHS assigned Visa Security Officers (VSO) to consular

posts in Saudi Arabia and plans to assign staff to other posts to strengthen 

the visa process at these locations. As we addressed in our July 2005 

report, according to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief 

of mission, and DHS officials, VSOs in Saudi Arabia enhance the security

of the visa adjudication process at these consular posts, though several

issues raise concerns about the VSOs’ role and impact. VSOs in Saudi 

Arabia provide an additional law enforcement capability to the visa 

adjudication process and have access to and experience using important 

law enforcement information not readily available to consular officers. 

Moreover, VSOs’ border security and immigration experience can assist 

consular officers during the visa process. The consular sections in Riyadh 

Actions Needed to 

Strengthen

Management of DHS’s

Visa Security Program 

Page 16 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

and Jeddah have incorporated the VSOs’ review of all visa applications

into the adjudication process in Saudi Arabia. In addition to reviewing 

applications, the VSOs may conduct secondary interviews with some visa

applicants based either on findings from their application reviews or a 

consular officer’s request. Despite the VSOs’ positive effect on visa 

operations, however, several concerns exist about their role and overall

impact. 

• The requirement that VSOs review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia 

limits the amount of time they can spend on training and other valuable

services. We observed that VSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah must spend a 

significant amount of time reviewing all visa applications, including 

those of low-risk applicants or individuals who do not pose a threat to

national security, as well as those that have preliminarily been refused 

by consular officers. A Visa Security Program official noted that this

mandate is only for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and not

other posts to which DHS plans to expand the program. VSOs, DHS and 

State officials, and the deputy chief of mission all agreed that the 

mandate to review all applications was forcing the VSOs to spend time

on lower priority tasks, limiting their ability to perform other important

activities, such as providing training or conducting additional

secondary interviews of applicants. 

• DHS has not maintained measurable data to fully demonstrate the 

impact of VSOs on the visa process. The VSOs that were stationed in

Riyadh during our visit estimated that, based on their review of visa 

applications, they had recommended that visas be refused after the 

preliminary decision to issue a visa by consular officers in about 15 

cases between October 2004 and February 2005. In addition, the DHS 

officials in Saudi Arabia and in Washington, D.C., were able to provide 

anecdotal examples of assistance provided to the consular officers. 

However, DHS has not developed a system to fully track the results of

visa security activities in Saudi Arabia. For example, DHS could not

provide data to demonstrate the number of cases for which they have 

recommended refusal.

DHS’s Planned Expansion 

of Security Program 

Delayed 

DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program to five additional posts in

fiscal year 2005; however, the assignments of VSOs were delayed at four of 

the five selected expansion posts. DHS attributed the delay to resistance 

by State, as well as funding problems; State and chiefs of mission

attributed the delays to various outstanding questions about the program.

Following DHS’s initial request in June 2004 to assign 21 VSOs to five

expansion posts, embassy officials raised questions and concerns, 

Page 17 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

including regarding the criteria used by DHS to select expansion posts, the 

reasoning for the number of VSOs requested for the posts, and DHS’s plans 

to coordinate with existing law enforcement and border security staff and

programs at post. In 2004 and 2005, DHS provided responses, through 

State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, to the questions raised by the chiefs of 

mission at four of the expansion posts. According to DHS, the responses 

were sufficient to answer the concerns. We reviewed DHS’s responses to

the posts, and identified a number of issues that had not been fully 

addressed, such as what criteria DHS would use to demonstrate the 

effectiveness of its officers. Nonetheless, the chiefs of mission at three 

posts approved DHS’s National Security Decision Directive 3822 requests in 

March and June 2005, while, as of June 2005, one post had still not 

approved the request. 

Although DHS plans to expand the Visa Security Program in fiscal year 

2005 and beyond, it does not a have a strategic plan that defines mission 

priorities and long-term goals and identifies the outcomes expected at

each post. We have identified the development of a strategic plan as an

essential component of measuring progress and holding agencies 

accountable.

23 The development of an overall strategic plan for the Visa

Security Program prior to the expansion of the program may have 

addressed the questions initially raised by State and embassy officials that 

led to the delay of the assignment of VSOs. Moreover, a strategic plan

would provide a framework for DHS to address broader questions 

regarding the selection criteria for expansion, the roles and 

responsibilities of VSOs, and the cost of establishing the program at posts. 

Officials from DHS and State, as well as consular officials we contacted 

overseas, all agreed that the development of such a plan would be useful 

to guide visa security operations in Saudi Arabia and other posts. It would 

also be useful to inform the Congress, as well as State and other agencies

who participate in the visa process at consular posts overseas. 

Recommendations In our July 2005 report, we recommended that DHS develop a strategic 

plan to guide the operations of the Visa Security Program in Saudi Arabia

 22The National Security Decision Directive-38 process requires non-State agencies to seek 

approval of chiefs of missions on any proposed changes in the size, composition, or

mandate of their staff. 

23See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

Page 18 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

and the program’s expansion to other embassies and consulates. This plan 

should define mission priorities and long-term goals and identify expected 

outcomes. In addition, the strategic plan and supporting documents should 

include the criteria used to select the locations for expansion, justification 

for the number of VSOs at each post, costs associated with assigning VSOs 

overseas, and their roles and responsibilities in relation to other agencies 

at post. In addition, we recommended that DHS develop and maintain

comprehensive performance data that track the results and demonstrate 

impact of VSO activities. We also proposed that Congress consider 

amending current legislation, which requires the review of all visa

applications in Saudi Arabia, to allow DHS the flexibility to determine 

which applications VSOs will review prior to final adjudication by consular

officers. This would allow VSOs to focus on the applications of those who 

may pose a risk to national security, providing them time to perform other 

tasks that could benefit consular officers. 

In commenting on our report, DHS stated that it was taking actions to

implement performance measurements and a strategic plan for the Visa 

Security Program, as described in our recommendations. DHS indicated

that it is expanding the tracking and measurement of performance data to

better reflect program results, and is developing a strategic plan that will

integrate the key elements described in our recommendation. Regarding 

the matter for congressional consideration to provide DHS with the 

flexibility to determine the review of visa applications in Saudi Arabia, 

DHS noted that a legislative change should maintain the department’s 

authority and discretion in determining the scope of the VSOs’ review. 

DHS agreed that it needed to expand some of the VSOs’ activities in Saudi 

Arabia, such as providing additional training, which we found were not

being provided because of the volume of work that resulted from fulfilling

the legislative requirement. 

The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate travel 

and identifying those who might harm the United States. State, in 

coordination with other agencies, has made substantial improvements to

the visa process to strengthen it as a national security tool. DHS has also 

taken steps to assign personnel to consular posts to provide an additional

layer of security to the visa process in these locations. However, we

identified areas where additional management actions are needed by State

and DHS to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the visa 

process. 

Conclusions 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to

answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Page 19 GAO-05-994T
Changes to the Visa Process

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-

4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this

statement include John Brummet, Assistant Director, and Joseph Carney, 

Daniel Chen, Kathryn Hartsburg, and John F. Miller. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 20 GAO-05-994T
Related GAO Products 

Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Wou d Benefit From

mprovements in S aff ng and In ormat on Shar ng.

l

I t i f i i

i

t

li ti

l fi t

t t i l

i li

i i

t f i t

t

t, i t

i ill

t

t t

t it

t i f l f ti t t

i

GAO-05-859. 

September 13, 2005. 

Border Security: Act ons Needed to Strengthen Management of 

Department of Homeland Securi y’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. 

July 29, 2005. 

Border Security: Stream ned Visas Man s Program Has Lowered Burden 

on Foreign Science Students and Scho ars, but Further Re nemen s 

Needed. GAO-05-198. February 18, 2005. 

Border Securi y: State Department Rollou of Biometric V sas on Schedu e, 

but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. September 9, 2004. 

Border Security: Additional Act ons Needed to E minate Weaknesses in 

the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. July 13, 2004.

Visa Operat ons at U.S. Posts n Canada. GAO-04-708R. May 18, 2004.

Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to

Adjudica e Visas or Sc ence Studen s and Scholars. GAO-04-371. February 

25, 2004.

State Departmen : Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas Being

Me but Gaps Rema n in Hard- o-Learn Languages. GAO-04-139. November 

19, 2003.

Border Security: New Pol cies and Procedures Are Needed to F Gaps in 

the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. June 18, 2003.

Border Security: Implica ions of Eliminating the Visa Waiver 

Program. GAO-03-38. November 22, 2002.

Technology Assessment: Using Biome rics for Border Securi y. GAO-03-

174. November 15, 2002.

Border Securi y: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Ant errorism

Tool. GAO-03-132NI. October 21, 2002.

State Departmen : Staff ng Short al s and Inef ec ve Assignmen Sys em

Compromise D plomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts. GAO-02-626. June 

18, 2002.

Page 21 GAO-05-994T Changes to the Visa Process (320385)
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