Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2005 BORDER SECURITY

Strengthened Visa 

Process Would Benefit 

from Improvements in 

Staffing and 

Information Sharing 

GAO-05-859 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-859.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-859, a report to 

congressional committees 

September 2005

BORDER SECURITY

Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit 

from Improvements in Staffing and 

Information Sharing 

The Department of State (State), the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), and other agencies have taken many steps to strengthen the visa 

process as an antiterrorism tool. Led by the Assistant Secretary of State for 

Consular Affairs, consular officers have received clear guidance on the 

importance of national security. We observed that consular officers at eight 

posts, including those of interest to antiterrorism efforts, regard security as 

their top priority, while recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate 

travel. State has also increased hiring of consular officers, targeted 

recruitment of foreign language speakers, revamped consular training with a 

focus on counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat visa fraud. 

Further, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have shared more 

information for consular officers’ use in conducting name checks on visa 

applicants. 

Additional issues require attention. For example, State has not consistently 

updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual to 

reflect recent policy changes. Consular officers we interviewed also said 

that guidance is needed on DHS staff’s roles and responsibilities overseas. 

Actions are also needed to ensure that State has sufficient experienced staff 

with the necessary language skills at key consular posts. In particular, 

staffing shortages at the supervisory level place a burden on new officers. In 

February 2005, we found that the visa sections in critical posts in Saudi 

Arabia and Egypt were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent 

midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance. Further improvements in training 

and fraud prevention are also needed, and additional information from FBI 

criminal history files would allow consular officers to help facilitate efficient 

visa adjudication. 

Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process 

Issue Improvements Issues requiring attention 

Policy Clarified policies and issued new 

guidance on national security 

concerns 

Additional guidance needed on DHS and 

State interagency protocols 

 

Update the Foreign Affairs Manual 

Staffing Increased hiring and focused 

recruitment 

Shortage of midlevel officers and unreliable 

data on interview wait times 

Training Revamped and expanded consular 

training with an emphasis on 

counterterrorism 

Courses needed on terrorism travel trends, 

fraud prevention, and post-specific 

counterterrorism techniques 

Fraud 

prevention 

Increased antifraud resources for 

consular officers 

Standard criteria needed to identify highfraud posts 

Information 

sharing 

Increased information from 

intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies 

Consular officers need additional 

information from FBI criminal history files to 

adjudicate visas more efficiently 

Source: GAO. 

GAO reported in October 2002 that 

the visa process needed to be 

strengthened as an antiterrorism 

tool and recommended that the 

Secretary of State, in consultation 

with appropriate agencies, (1) 

develop a clear policy on the role 

of national security in the visa 

process, (2) create more 

comprehensive guidance on how 

consular officers should screen 

against potential terrorists, (3) 

fundamentally reassess staffing 

requirements, and (4) revamp and 

expand consular training. This 

report examines State’s and other 

agencies’ progress in implementing 

changes to the visa process since 

2002, in the areas of policy and 

guidance; consular resources, 

including staffing and training; and 

information sharing. 

What GAO Recommends

To further improve the visa process 

as an antiterrorism tool and 

facilitate legitimate travel, GAO is 

making seven recommendations to 

the Secretaries of State and 

Homeland Security in the areas of 

visa policy, consular resources, and 

information sharing. GAO is also 

suggesting that Congress consider 

reviewing visa adjudicators’ access 

to FBI criminal history information. 

State agreed with most of the 

conclusions, but did not agree on 

the need for a comprehensive 

staffing plan. DHS agreed with the 

conclusions, and the Department of

Justice provided information on 

steps it is taking to improve 

interagency information sharing. 
Page i GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 4 

Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support 

Ongoing Improvements 8 

Conclusions 27 

Recommendations for Executive Action 28 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 29 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 33 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 35 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 53 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice 55 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58 

Table 

Table 1: Improvements in Consular Training Since 2002 19 

Figures 

Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy 7 

Figure 2: Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa 

Process 9 

Figure 3: Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions 

and Distribution of Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005 14 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Figure 4: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed 

Information in FBI Files and Proposed Changes 26 

Abbreviations 

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

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Page 1 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

September 13, 2005 

Congressional Committees 

All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued a 

nonimmigrant visa,1

 which is a U.S. travel document that foreign citizens 

must generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for 

business, tourism, or other reasons.2 In deciding to approve or deny a visa 

application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the front 

line of defense in protecting the United States against potential terrorists 

and others whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. 

Consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the 

need to facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified 

shortcomings and made recommendations on State’s policy on the role of 

national security in the visa process, procedures for addressing heightened 

border security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism training of 

consular officers.3

 Similarly, staff of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, reported that 

while there were efforts to enhance border security prior to September 11, 

no agency of the U.S. government at that time thought of the visa process 

as an antiterrorism tool.4

 Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that 

consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.5

Given the widespread congressional interest in ensuring that visa 

operations are a tool to prevent those who might pose a threat from 

obtaining a visa, we reviewed the changes that State, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have made since our 2002 

 1

The United States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. 

In this report, we use the term “visa” to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. 

2

Most citizens of the 27 countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Program, Canada, and 

certain other locations are not required to obtain a visa for business or pleasure stays of 

short duration. 

3

GAO, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, 

GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002). 

4

9-11 Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.; Aug. 21, 2004). 

5

The 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers received a total of 23 visas at five different posts 

from April 1997 through June 2001. See GAO-03-132NI. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

report to address potential vulnerabilities in the visa process, and 

determined whether additional vulnerabilities remain. To assess agencies’ 

progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, we 

reviewed changes in visa policy and guidance; consular resources, 

including staffing and training; and the extent to which U.S. agencies share 

information with visa adjudicators. In addition, we conducted structured 

interviews with visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff from 25 posts 

overseas, either via telephone or in person, on issues related to visa policy 

and consular resources, among others. We observed visa operations and 

interviewed U.S. government officials at 8 U.S. consular posts in seven 

countries—Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and 

the United Kingdom. We chose these countries because they are of interest 

to antiterrorism efforts. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from 

State, DHS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We conducted 

our work from August 2004 through August 2005, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards (see app. I for more 

information on our scope and methodology). 

Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken many 

steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Under the 

leadership of the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, 

consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of 

addressing national security concerns through the visa process. Our 

observations of consular sections at eight posts confirmed that consular 

officers overseas regard security as their top priority, while also 

recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel to the United 

States. In addition, State has established clear procedures on visa 

operations worldwide, as well as management controls to ensure that 

visas are adjudicated in a consistent manner at each post. State has also 

increased its hiring of consular officers; increased hiring of foreign 

language proficient Foreign Service officers; revamped consular training 

with a focus on counterterrorism; strengthened fraud prevention efforts 

worldwide; and improved consular facilities. In addition, consular officers 

now have access to more information from intelligence and law 

enforcement databases when conducting name checks on visa applicants. 

Despite these improvements, additional actions can further enhance the 

visa process. For example, Consular Affairs has not consistently updated 

the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual—State’s 

central resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance—to reflect 

recent changes. In addition, consular officers at several posts told us it is 

difficult to identify points of contact at DHS’s overseas offices because 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

DHS has not issued guidance on its staff’s roles and responsibilities 

overseas. Further, State has not conducted a worldwide, comprehensive 

assessment of staffing requirements for visa operations, as we 

recommended in 2002. We continue to see a need for such an assessment 

and believe that further actions are needed to ensure that State has 

sufficient staff with the necessary skills at key consular posts, especially in 

light of the increased workload per visa applicant due to additional border 

security requirements. In particular, as of April 2005, 26 percent of 

midlevel positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level officers, 

placing a large burden on these officers. During our February 2005 visits to 

posts in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, the visa 

sections were staffed with first-tour, entry-level officers, with no 

permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance, support, and 

oversight. In addition, resource constraints alongside new procedural 

requirements may create extensive waits for visa interviews, though data 

gaps prevent a reliable assessment of these wait times worldwide. Further, 

despite the large responsibility placed on consular officers, particularly 

entry-level officers, we found that post-specific training was offered in 

only about half of the posts we reviewed, and that officers at these posts 

desired additional training—in such areas as terrorist travel trends, 

fraudulent documentation detection, and counterterrorism techniques. 

Moreover, we observed that information sharing at posts between the 

consular section and the law enforcement and intelligence communities 

was inconsistent. Lastly, additional information from FBI criminal history 

files would allow consular officers to help facilitate visa adjudication and 

the efficient and effective approval of visas for legitimate travelers to the 

United States. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of State and 

Homeland Security to, in consultation with appropriate agencies, 

• clarify certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their 

implementation; 

• ensure that consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance 

national security and promote legitimate travel, including effective 

human resources and training; 

• ensure that consular managers report, on a weekly basis, posts’ wait 

times for applicant interviews; and 

• further encourage interactions between consular sections, law 

enforcement officials, and intelligence officials at post to increase 
Page 4 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant 

to the visa process. 

We also suggest that Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to 

develop and report to Congress on a plan to provide visa adjudicators with 

more efficient access to certain information in the FBI’s criminal history 

records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers. The plan 

should describe any potential technical or policy concerns regarding 

sharing this information with visa adjudicators, and how these concerns 

can be mitigated. The plan should also identify any legislative changes that 

may be necessary for its implementation. 

We received written comments from State, DHS, and the Department of 

Justice, which we have reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. 

State agreed with most of our recommendations and stated that it is taking 

actions to implement them. State, however, also noted its belief that it 

already had a plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing and that 

the development of a comprehensive plan that we recommended was not 

necessary. DHS agreed with our recommendation to provide additional 

guidance on the relationship between DHS and State. The Department of 

Justice did not comment on the matter for congressional consideration 

regarding visa adjudicators’ access to certain information in the FBI’s 

criminal history records; it provided additional information about other 

actions that the department is taking to enhance the sharing of law 

enforcement and intelligence information in connection with visa 

processing. 

The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the primary 

body of law governing immigration and visa operations.6

 The Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority to issue 

regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and Nationality 

Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the functions 

of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting or denial of visas.7

As we reported in July 2005, the act also authorizes DHS, among other 

things, to assign employees to any consular post to review individual visa 

applications and provide expert advice and training to consular officers 

 6

P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 

7

State retains authority in certain circumstances as outlined in the act. See P.L. 107-296. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

regarding specific security threats related to the visa process.8 A 

subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between 

State and DHS further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with 

respect to visa issuance. DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy, 

reviewing implementation of the policy, and providing additional 

direction. State manages the visa process, as well as the consular corps 

and its functions at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In addition, State 

provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to consular officers 

regarding visa policies and procedures. In technical comments on a draft 

of this report, State emphasized that the Secretary of State has the lead 

role with respect to foreign policy-related visa issues. 

Several agencies stationed at U.S. embassies and consulates can assist 

consular officers and support the visa adjudication process. On a formal 

basis, all embassy sections and agencies involved in security, law 

enforcement, and intelligence activities are expected to participate in the 

congressionally mandated “Visas Viper” terrorist reporting program. This 

program is primarily administered through a Visas Viper Committee at 

each overseas post and chaired by the deputy chief of mission or the post’s 

principal officer. The committees meet at least monthly to share 

information on known or suspected terrorists and determine whether such 

information should be sent to Washington, D.C., for potential inclusion on 

watch lists. Interagency information sharing at post can also occur on an 

informal basis. For example, overseas FBI officials can assist consular 

officers when questions about an applicant’s potential criminal history 

arise during adjudication. Additionally, DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement have responsibility for some immigration and 

border security programs overseas, and consular officers may seek advice 

from these officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of 

entry. 

The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains 

several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews, 

 8

The act also requires that DHS on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review all visa 

applications prior to adjudication by consular officers. P.L. 107-296, Sec. 428(e) and Sec. 

428(i). See GAO, Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of 

Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 29, 2005). 
Page 6 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

collection of biometrics9 (fingerprints), and cross-referencing an 

applicant’s name against the Consular Lookout and Support System 

(CLASS) 10 (see fig. 1). 

 9

Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify a person’s identity by 

measuring and analyzing that person’s physiological characteristics. In this case, and for 

the purposes of this report, “biometric identifiers” refers to fingerprints. See GAO, 

Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

10CLASS is a State Department name-check database that posts use to access critical 

information for visa adjudication. The system contains records provided by numerous 

agencies and includes information on persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, 

and terrorism concerns. 
Page 7 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy 

In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an 

antiterrorism tool, including 

• establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing 

national security concerns through the visa process; 

• creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on 

how consular officers should use the visa process as a screen against 

potential terrorists; 

• performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill 

requirements for visa operations; and 

• revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more 

emphasis on detecting potential terrorists. 

Applicant 

goes to 

post

Application reviewed, 

fingerprints collected, 

and name check 

performed

Applicant 

interviewed and 

supporting 

documents 

reviewed

Consular officer 

reviews namecheck results and 

determines if 

Security Advisory 

Opinion (SAO) 

is required or 

warranted

SAO 

submitted for 

interagency 

check

SAO 

needed

SAO not 

needed

Post 

receives 

SAO 

response

Applicant 

schedules 

interview 

with post

Visa 

issued 

or 

denied

Sources: GAO; Nova Development (clip art).
Page 8 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken 

numerous steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and 

increase its overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant 

Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leadership role in 

implementing changes to the visa process and promoting the use of the 

process as a screen against potential terrorists. However, additional 

actions could enhance the visa process. State has increased and clarified 

visa policies and guidance, but additional steps are needed to ensure these 

changes are implemented. Additionally, State has increased resources to 

strengthen the visa process, including hiring additional consular officers, 

targeting recruitment, and expanding training efforts; however, staffing 

limitations remain a concern, posts seek further training, and other gaps 

remain. Lastly, while interagency information-sharing efforts have 

increased, consular officers do not have direct access to detailed 

information from the FBI’s criminal history records, which would help 

facilitate the approval of visas for legitimate travelers. Figure 2 

summarizes the steps taken to improve the visa process since 2002 and 

areas that require additional management attention. 

Visa Process 

Strengthened, and 

Further Actions 

Would Support 

Ongoing 

Improvements 
Page 9 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Figure 2: Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process 

Source: GAO.

Consular Affairs Bureau has taken a 

leadership role in stressing national 

security concerns in the visa process

Established more than 80 standard 

operating procedures for consular officers

Emphasized consular management and 

internal controls through Consular 

Management Assistance Teams

More guidance needed on

 Roles and responsibilities of consular 

officers in relation to DHS

Update portions of the Foreign Affairs 

Manual online

Hired additional consular officers

Increased consular recruitment of 

proficient foreign language speakers

Revamped and expanded consular training 

with an emphasis on counterterrorism

Added fraud prevention tools, such as 

Internet anti-fraud chat room

Assigned fraud investigators at 25 

consular posts

Improved consular facilities and 

workspaces

Obtained additional records from law 

enforcement and intelligence sources in 

consular name-check database

Resources

Staffing

Training

Fraud

prevention

Facilities

Policy

Issue Improvements Issues that require attention

Shortage of midlevel consular officers

 Entry-level officers serving in midlevel 

positions

Data on wait times for interviews not 

sufficiently reliable

Additional courses needed on

 Terrorist travel trends

 Fraudulent documentation detection

 Counterterrorism techniques specific to 

post

Information sharing for consular officers 

at post inconsistent

No criteria to identify high-fraud posts

Requirements at some posts will not be 

met until new embassies or consulates are 

built

Consular officers need additional 

information from FBI criminal history files 

to adjudicate visas more efficiently and 

effectively

Interagency information sharing
Page 10 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views on 

balancing the need for national security and customer service in the visa 

process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy guidance 

to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the heightened 

border security concerns following the September 11 attacks. Since our 

report, State implemented several changes to address these issues, and 

consular officials stated that our 2002 report and its recommendations 

provided a framework for these changes. For example, in February 2003, 

Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national security as the first 

priority of the visa process. Consular officers we interviewed said the 

guidance was generally clear, and officers at all eight posts we visited 

viewed security as the most critical element of the visa process. In 

addition, Consular Affairs identified certain areas where additional 

guidance was needed to improve visa procedures. For example, State has 

issued more than 80 standard operating procedures, in consultation with 

DHS, to inform consular officers on issues such as 

• citizens of countries requiring special clearance requirements and other 

name-check procedures;11

• fingerprint requirements; and 

• annotating visas with current and historical information about a visa 

applicant to assist immigration inspectors at ports of entry. 

To reinforce standard operating procedures and internal controls, State 

created Consular Management Assistance Teams that conduct 

management reviews of consular sections worldwide. These teams 

comprise Consular Affairs officials, diplomatic security officials, and DHS 

officials, and they report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Consular 

Affairs. According to State, as of June 2005, the teams have completed 81 

field visits and have provided guidance to posts on standard operating 

procedures, as well as other areas where consular services could become 

more efficient. In addition, State has regional consular officer positions 

overseas, through which five experienced officers serve as regional 

 11Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 restricts 

the issuance of visas to aliens who are nationals of countries that are state sponsors of 

international terrorism unless the Secretary of State determines the alien does not pose a 

safety or security threat. Currently, citizens from Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, 

and Syria must, under this provision, undergo security clearances from agencies in 

Washington, D.C., prior to adjudication by a consular officer. 

Visa Policies, Procedures, 

and Guidance Enhanced, 

but Additional Steps 

Needed to Ensure They 

Are Implemented 
Page 11 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

officers to 56 posts in Europe, Near East, and Africa. These officers 

provide support and guidance to less-experienced officers in small 

consular sections at neighboring posts where, in many instances, there are 

no other officers at post with recent consular experience. 

Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed 

stated that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply all of 

the changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to consular 

officers in the field is voluminous and can change rapidly, according to 

consular officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify its officers 

overseas of policy changes through cables, postings on its internal Web 

site, and informal communications. However, the bureau has not 

consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs 

Manual—State’s central Internet resource for all regulations, policies, and 

guidance—to reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau updated 

several portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some sections had not 

been updated since October 2004, such as policies on consular duties, 

clearances at post, and the submission of fingerprints to the FBI for visa 

applications. Consular officials also stated that they are overhauling the 

standard operating procedures to eliminate those that are obsolete and 

incorporate current requirements into the manual. While the Consular 

Affairs Bureau’s internal Web site contains all of the standard operating 

procedures, it also links to out-of-date sections in the manual, which do 

not yet incorporate all updated procedures. As a result, there is no single, 

reliable source for current information. The visa chief at one post in Africa 

told us that while the additional guidance from Consular Affairs has been a 

positive step, consular officers should not have to go back to paper files to 

locate it. Some posts we visited had developed their own methods—such 

as creating standard operating procedure reference books and holding 

weekly staff meetings to discuss all new policies—to help ensure that all 

consular officers were applying the new procedures consistently and 

appropriately. The consular section in London, for example, created a 

post-specific internal Web site to post guidance for consular officers. 

According to State officials, in August 2004, Consular Affairs developed a 

classified Web site to post additional guidance that is accessible to all 

consular officers, but only 48 percent of visa chiefs we interviewed 

reported having used the Web site. 

Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on 

certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs we 

interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful regarding 

the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS. For 

example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of 
Page 12 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

immigration and border security activities and largely serve in a regional 

capacity. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services staff, for instance, 

have regional offices in Rome, Bangkok, and Mexico City that can assist 

consular officers in surrounding posts. However, DHS has not provided 

guidance to consular officers regarding the roles and geographic 

responsibilities of its personnel. In addition, consular officers at several 

posts told us it is difficult to identify points of contact at DHS’s overseas 

offices when questions arise on issues such as immigration violation 

records in CLASS. Further, consular officers at all posts we reviewed 

stated they would like additional information on DHS procedures at the 

ports of entry into the United States, such as guidance on how to resolve 

cases in which visa holders have been denied entry to the United States. 

For example, detailed information on the reason why a visa holder was not 

allowed into the United States—the person was recently placed on a 

watch list, for example—is not automatically transferred to CLASS. A 

senior consular official stated that State and DHS are working to create a 

link between consular and border inspectors’ databases that would allow 

the transfer of data, including transcripts of interviews at ports of entry. 

In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined with 

increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available staff. As a 

result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental reassessment 

of staffing requirements for visa operations. We continue to see the need 

for such an assessment. While State has been able to hire more entry-level 

officers in recent years, we found that more than one-quarter of State’s 

midlevel consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level 

officer.12 In addition, consular headquarters officials may not have 

accurate statistics on wait times for visa interviews from which to allocate 

resources effectively, and visa applicants may be using inaccurate waittime information when planning their travel to the United States. State has 

also increased its targeted recruitment of foreign language proficient 

officers, but gaps remain. Further, State has expanded its training efforts, 

but additional training would further benefit consular officers. Moreover, 

State has strengthened its fraud prevention efforts, but has not developed 

systematic criteria to identify high-fraud posts. Finally, State has increased 

 12Foreign Service officers are assigned a grade, which ranges from FS-06 to FS-01, 

corresponding from entry-level to midlevel, respectively. According to State, officers at 

grades 6 through 4 are classified as junior officers; 3 through 1 are midlevel officers. In 

addition, members of the senior Foreign Service are senior officers. In this report, we refer 

to them as entry-level, midlevel, and senior-level officers. 

Resources for Visa 

Function Increased, but 

Staffing Shortages and 

Other Gaps Remain a 

Concern 
Page 13 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

funding to improve consular facilities, but many posts’ facilities remain 

inadequate. 

Since 2002, State has received funding to address ongoing staffing 

shortfalls, but we continue to see the need for a fundamental reassessment 

of resource needs worldwide. Through the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative 

and other sources,13 State has increased the number of Foreign Service 

officer consular positions by 364, from 1,037 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,401 in 

fiscal year 2005. Moreover, human resource officials anticipate that many 

officers hired under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will begin to reach 

promotion eligibility for midlevel positions within the next two years. 

However, as we previously reported in 2003,14 the overall shortage of 

midlevel Foreign Service officers would remain until approximately 2013. 

As of April 30, 2005, we found that 26 percent of midlevel consular 

positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level officer (see fig. 3). 

In addition, almost three-quarters of the vacant positions were at the FS-03 

level—midlevel officers who generally supervise entry-level staff—which 

consular officials attribute to low hiring levels prior to the Diplomatic 

Readiness Initiative and the necessary expansion of entry-level positions 

to accommodate increasing workload requirements after September 11, 

2001. 

 13In fiscal year 2002, State launched the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative—a 3-year effort to 

ensure global diplomatic readiness—through which State reported that it hired 834 Foreign 

Service officers. In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

authorized the hiring of an additional 150 consular officers per year for fiscal years 2006 

through 2009. See P.L. 108-458 § 7203. 

14GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas Being Met, but 

Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2003). 

State Has Hired More Consular 

Officers, but Has Not Assessed 

Overall Resource Needs 
Page 14 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Figure 3: Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and Distribution of Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005 

Note: Vacancy figures may not reflect recent promotions of officers to a higher grade who were still 

serving in lower-grade positions as of April 30, 2005. 

During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we observed 

that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level officers on their 

first assignment with no permanent midlevel visa chief to provide 

supervision and guidance. Although these posts had other mid- or seniorlevel consular officers, their availability on visa issues was limited because 

of their additional responsibilities. For example, the head of the visa 

section in Jeddah was responsible for managing the entire section, as well 

as services for American citizens due to a midlevel vacancy in that 

position. At the time of our visit, the Riyadh Embassy did not have a 

midlevel visa chief. Similarly, in Cairo, there was no permanent midlevel 

supervisor between the winter of 2004 and the summer of 2005, and 

Consular Affairs used five temporary staff on a rotating basis during this 

period to serve in this capacity. Entry-level officers we spoke with stated 

that due to the constant turnover, the temporary supervisors were unable 

to assist them adequately. At the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, entry-level 

officers expressed concern about the lack of a midlevel supervisor. 

Officers in Jeddah stated that they relied on the guidance they received 

from the DHS visa security officer assigned to the post. However, as of 

July 2005, visa security officers are stationed only at consular posts in 

Saudi Arabia—not at any of the other 209 visa-issuing posts overseas. 

34% 63% 74%

12%

14%

Entry-level (879)

Midlevel (478)

3%

Senior (44)

Staffed with entry-level

officers (65)

Staffed by at least 

midlevel officers (355)

Vacant (58)

Source: Department of State.
Page 15 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

If the Consular Affairs Bureau identifies a need for additional staff in 

headquarters or overseas, it may request that the Human Resources 

Bureau establish new positions. In addition, posts can also describe their 

needs for additional positions through their consular package—a report 

submitted annually to the Consular Affairs Bureau that details workload 

statistics and staffing requirements, among other things. For example, in 

December 2004, during the course of our work, the consular section in 

Riyadh reported to Washington that there was an immediate need to 

create a midlevel visa chief position at post, and consular officials worked 

with human resource officials to create this position, which according to 

State officials, will be filled by summer 2005. 

However, the current assignment process does not guarantee that all 

authorized positions will be filled, particularly at hardship posts. 

Historically, State has rarely directed its employees to serve in locations 

for which they have not bid on a position, including hardship posts or 

locations of strategic importance to the United States, due to concerns 

that such staff may be more apt to have poor morale or be less 

productive.15 Due to State’s decision to not force assignments, along with 

the limited amount of midlevel officers available to apply for them,16

important positions may remain vacant. 

According to a deputy assistant secretary for human resources, Consular 

Affairs can prioritize those positions that require immediate staffing to 

ensure that officers are assigned to fill critical staffing gaps. For example, 

Consular Affairs could choose not to advertise certain positions of lesser 

priority during an annual assignment cycle. However, senior Consular 

Affairs officials acknowledged that they rarely do this. According to these 

 15State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. government provides 

differential pay incentives—an additional 5 percent to 25 percent of base salary depending 

on the severity or difficulty of the conditions—to encourage employees to bid on 

assignments to these posts and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter. 

According to State officials and Foreign Service employees, the incentive provided by 

hardship pay for overseas service has been diminished because unlike private sector 

employees, Foreign Service employees serving overseas do not receive locality pay or a 

salary comparability benefit to attract workers in the continental United States to the 

federal government. See GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective 

Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626

(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2002). 

16The assignment process begins when Foreign Service employees who are eligible to be 

transferred from their current assignment each year receive a list of instructions and 

upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff then must submit a list of those 

positions for which they want to be considered. 
Page 16 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

officials, Consular Affairs does not have direct control over the filling of all 

consular positions and can often face resistance from regional bureaus 

and chiefs of mission overseas who do not want vacancies at their posts. 

Thus, as we have previously reported, certain high-priority positions may 

not be filled if Foreign Service officers do not bid on them. 

Additions to consular workload since the September 11 attacks have 

exacerbated State’s resource constraints. Both Congress and State have 

initiated a series of changes since our 2002 report to increase the security 

of border security policies and procedures, which have added to the 

complexity of consular officers’ workload. These changes include the 

following: 

• Consular officers are no longer able to routinely waive interviews; as of 

August 2003, waivers for visa applicant interviews are limited to a few 

categories, such as the elderly, diplomats, and young children. 

• As of October 2004, consular officers are required to scan foreign 

nationals’ right and left index fingers and clear the fingerprints through 

the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System before an 

applicant can receive a visa.17

• Some responsibilities previously delegated to Foreign Service 

nationals18 and consular associates19 have been transferred to consular 

officers. For example, as of September 30, 2005, consular associates 

will no longer be authorized to adjudicate visas. 

 17The Automated Biometric Identification System is a DHS database that includes some 5 

million people who may be ineligible to receive a visa. For example, the Automated 

Biometric Identification System data includes, among other records, FBI information on all 

known and suspected terrorists, selected wanted persons, and previous criminal histories 

for high-risk countries. See GAO, Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric 

Visas on Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging, GAO-04-1001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept 9, 

2004). 

18Foreign Service national employees are non-U.S. citizens employed at a U.S. Foreign 

Service post by a U.S. government agency. 

19Consular associates are U.S. citizens and relatives of U.S. government direct-hire 

employees overseas who, following successful completion of the required Basic Consular 

Course, are hired by the Consular Section at their post. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, State 

began a 3-year transition to remove adjudication functions from consular associates and 

provide additional consular officers. 

Increased Consular Workload 

Exacerbates Staffing Shortages 
Page 17 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Due to the new interview requirements and screening procedures, as well 

as potential staffing shortages, applicants may face extensive wait times 

for visa interviews at some consular posts overseas. According to consular 

officials, in general, State considers that posts with consistent wait times 

for visa interview appointments of 30 days or longer may signal a resource 

or management problem. However, reliable data that could determine the 

extent to which posts face long delays are not available. To monitor posts’ 

progress in achieving this goal, according to consular headquarters 

officials, State requires that posts report, on a weekly basis, the wait times 

for applicant interviews to allow officials to monitor posts’ workload. 

State’s data showed that between November 2004 and May 2005, 63 posts 

reported wait times of 30 or more days in at least one month; at 13 posts, 

the wait times were in excess of 30 days for the entire 6-month period. As 

of July 2004, these data are posted on State’s Web site so that applicants 

will have the information when applying for a visa. However, posts are 

often late to report these data, according to consular officials. Indeed, our 

analysis of State’s data on wait times revealed significant numbers of posts 

that did not report on a weekly basis during this 6-month period. 

Therefore, the data are not sufficiently reliable to fully determine how 

many posts have wait times in excess of 30 days. Consular headquarters 

officials may not have accurate workload statistics from which to allocate 

resources effectively, and visa applicants may be using inaccurate waittime information when planning their travel to the United States. For 

example, there could be additional posts with 30-day or more wait times 

that have not reported these data to Consular Affairs. 

In our 2002 report, we found that not all consular officers were proficient 

enough in their post’s language to hold interviews with applicants. In 2003, 

we reported that State had not filled all of its positions requiring foreign 

language skills.20 We noted that a lack of staff with foreign language skills 

had weakened the fight against international terrorism and resulted in less 

effective representation of U.S. interests overseas. In addition, we 

reported that some entry-level officers did not meet the minimum language 

proficiency requirements of the positions in countries of strategic 

importance to the United States. In response, State has created programs 

to better target its recruitment of Foreign Service officers who speak 

critical languages. For example, in March 2004, State created the “Critical 

 20Most of State’s positions that require general proficiency in speaking and reading abilities 

are categorized as “language-designated” positions. In addition, State has some positions 

categorized as “language-preferred,” where State considers language proficiency useful but 

not essential. See GAO-02-626. 

Targeted Recruitment Has 

Increased Number of Foreign 

Language Proficient Officers, 

but Gaps Remain 
Page 18 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Needs Language Program,” which increases the opportunities for 

appointment to the Foreign Service for new hires proficient in Arabic, 

Chinese, Indic, Korean, Russian, or Turkic, and who have passed the 

Foreign Service Exam.21 From March 2004 through May 2005, 172 of the 

564 Foreign Service officers hired were proficient in one of these 

languages. 

Despite these improvements, language gaps still exist. As of April 30, 2005, 

State reported that about 14 percent of consular-coned22 Foreign Service 

officers in language-designated positions did not meet language 

requirements for their assigned position. Our interviews with visa chiefs at 

25 posts identified 8 posts with at least one consular officer who did not 

meet the designated language proficiency requirements for their position. 

To increase the proficiency of Foreign Service officers, State supports 

post-specific language programs, among others. According to language 

training officials, the department allocated $1.2 million in fiscal year 2004 

for these programs, which teach a new language or enhance the language 

of the participant. Twenty-three of the 25 posts we contacted offer a 

language-training program at post. State has also developed training 

modules for specific languages that include technical vocabulary that 

might be beneficial to consular officers. 

In 2002, we reported that training for new consular officers was focused 

on detecting intending immigrants through the visa process, with little 

training given on detecting possible terrorists. In addition, we found that 

consular officers wanted more training in how to interview applicants 

more effectively for the purposes of detecting possible terrorists. Since 

our report, State has revamped and expanded consular training at the 

 21After candidates pass both the written and oral exams, they are placed on a register of 

eligible hires and will remain there for up to 18 months or until being placed in an initial 

training class, according to State officials. During training, entry-level officers are required 

to bid on a list of available jobs from which State’s Entry-Level Division will assign them to 

an overseas post. The officers receive language and job- specific training after they receive 

their assignments. See GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies 

Overseas Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-139

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003). 

22State requires that a generalist applicant to the Foreign Service select a “cone,” which is a 

functional area of specialization, when applying to take the written examination. For 

generalists, the Foreign Service specializations are management, consular, economic, 

political, and public diplomacy. 

Consular Training Expanded, 

and Additional Courses and 

Information Sharing Would 

Further Benefit Consular 

Officers 
Page 19 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Foreign Service Institute23 to enhance visa security. Table 1 outlines 

additions to consular training. 

Table 1: Improvements in Consular Training Since 2002 

 Course 

Basic consular Fraud prevention for managers Advanced name checking 

Date of improvement October 2003 April 2005 March 2002 

Type of improvement Course enhancement Course enhancement New course 

Improvements • Increased length of course from 

26 days to 31 days 

• Added classes in analytical 

interviewing and fraud 

prevention 

• Counterterrorism training at CIA

• Briefings on 9/11 Commission 

report 

• Expanded course offerings 

from 2 to 10 times a year 

• Participation by DHS in training 

of fraud prevention managers 

• Training at DHS’s Forensic 

Document Laboratory 

• Includes 1 day of training in 

analytical interviewing 

• Identifies name structures and 

variations, helping consular 

officers spot anomalies 

• Explains how Consular Affairs 

name-check systems search 

for, identify, evaluate, rank, and 

return matches 

Source: GAO. 

Training efforts have been bolstered by contributions from law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies and DHS, as well as by improved 

information sharing. For example, as part of the basic consular training 

course, consular officers receive a counterterrorism briefing by the 

Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 granted DHS the authority to develop homeland security training 

programs for consular officers, and the Memorandum of Understanding 

between State and DHS outlined DHS’s participation in this training. Since 

2003, DHS has contributed to several aspects of the consular training 

program. For example, 

• for the basic consular course, DHS has funded a presentation to 

consular officers by former 9/11 Commission staffers; 

• officials from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services provide 

training at State’s course for fraud prevention managers; and 

 23The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center’s Foreign Service Institute, 

is the federal government’s primary training institution for officers and support personnel 

of the U.S. foreign affairs community. 
Page 20 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

• DHS officials have accompanied consular officials at regional 

leadership conferences for consular managers overseas. 

In July 2003, State issued guidance to chiefs of mission regarding consular 

training at posts, and encouraged the regular exchange of information 

between consular sections and relevant agencies on fraud and law 

enforcement issues, as well as security trends that may impact consular 

work. However, additional training could further assist consular officers. 

For example, despite guidance from the Consular Affairs Bureau, 12 of the 

25 visa chiefs we interviewed reported that the embassy did not offer postspecific training. In addition, all of the posts we contacted reported that 

additional training on terrorist travel trends would be helpful, with 16 

posts responding that such training would be extremely helpful. For 

example, the visa chief at a consular post in the Middle East said that an 

in-depth class that trains officers to better identify high-risk applicants 

based on specific intelligence information would be helpful. Consular 

officials in Washington, D.C., acknowledged that this type of training 

would be useful, but noted that it requires support from chiefs of mission 

and other agency officials overseas. Some posts also reported that 

additional post-specific briefings on counterterrorism techniques and 

fraud prevention would be helpful. State is currently developing distancelearning courses in the areas of fraud prevention and disruption of 

terrorist mobility, which, once implemented, will be available to consular 

officers worldwide. Given that some terrorists make use of fraudulent 

documents, training in these subjects is useful for helping consular 

officers detect terrorists and criminals applying for visas. 

Although Consular Affairs has advised chiefs of mission to encourage 

interagency information sharing, we found that information sharing at 

posts between the consular section and the law enforcement and 

intelligence communities varied. While we found that some posts had 

frequent communications, others had little or no communication. For 

example, at one post, we noted frequent communication and proactive 

information sharing between the consular section, law enforcement, and 

intelligence communities. Consular officials told us that this cooperation 

strengthened the visa process at this post. During our visit to another post, 

the consular section requested regular counterterrorism briefings from 

intelligence officials, who conducted the first such formal briefing in 

March 2005 following our visit. The Consul General stated that these 

briefings will become a standard practice at the post. At another post we 

reviewed, however, consular officials stated that they were concerned 

about the lack of communication between their section and law 

Inconsistent Information 

Sharing at Posts 
Page 21 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

enforcement and intelligence officials, despite repeated inquiries for 

guidance in areas such as watch list records in CLASS. 

As the 9-11 Commission staff highlighted, the September 11 terrorists were 

able to obtain U.S. visas through fraudulent means. For example, 

according to the 9-11 Commission staff report on terrorist travel, two 

hijackers used passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent 

manner to obtain visas to the United States. State has taken several steps 

to increase its focus on preventing and detecting fraud in the visa process. 

For example, by 2004, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security had deployed 

25 visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies and consulates. In addition, 

State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs has developed several ways 

for consular officers in the field to learn about fraud prevention, including 

• developing an Internet-based “E-room,” with more than 500 members, 

that serves as a discussion group for consular officers, as well as a 

place to post cables and lessons learned from prior fraud cases; 

• publishing fraud prevention newsletters; and 

• assigning liaison officers to work with consular sections worldwide on 

fraud prevention. 

However, until recently, the department has not used a systematic process 

to identify consular posts with the highest degree of visa fraud. According 

to State officials, fraud rankings for consular posts have not been based on 

an objective analysis using standardized criteria, but have been selfreported by each post. Therefore, according to the Director of the Office of 

Fraud Prevention Programs, State’s fraud rankings were not a quantifiable 

assessment of posts’ actual fraud conditions. As a result, previous 

resources for fraud prevention may not have been allocated to posts with 

the highest need, including the 25 visa fraud investigators assigned 

overseas in 2004. 

In response to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 

2004, State is now developing systematic criteria to identify high-fraud 

posts. The act mandates that State identify the posts experiencing the 

greatest frequency of visa fraud and place in those posts at least one fulltime anti-fraud specialist. The presence of full-time fraud officers at highfraud posts is particularly important given that entry-level officers may 

State Strengthened Fraud 

Prevention Programs, but 

Efforts to Establish 

Systematic Criteria to 

Identify High Visa Fraud 

Posts Have Not Been 

Completed 
Page 22 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

serve as fraud prevention managers24 on a part-time basis, in addition to 

their other responsibilities. Moreover, of the 25 posts we reviewed, only 2 

had full-time fraud prevention managers, and 10 visa chiefs reported that 

their fraud prevention managers had not yet received training specific to 

these duties. In June 2005, the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs was 

awaiting final approval of its reassessment of posts’ fraud levels using 

weighted criteria such as 

• refusal rates for certain classes of visas; 

• DHS data on visa holders who applied for permanent residence once in 

the United States on a temporary tourist or business visa; and 

• State’s threat assessments for the post. 

Consular Affairs is also developing a fraud prevention computer program 

that will allow State to quantify and analyze fraud workload data, 

according to the Fraud Prevention Programs director. 

State’s Bureau of Overseas Building Operations is responsible for 

managing the department’s property overseas, including the rehabilitation 

of existing facilities and the construction of new embassies and 

consulates. In March 2003, we reported that working conditions at many 

U.S. embassies and consulates were inferior and unsafe.25 In particular, we 

found that the primary office building at more than half of the posts did 

not meet certain fire/life safety standards, and at least 96 posts had 

reported serious overcrowding. Despite increased funding to improve 

consular facilities, needs remain. Many of the new requirements in the visa 

adjudication process, such as the increased interview requirements and 

the collection of applicants’ fingerprints, have strained consular facilities. 

Indeed, many visa chiefs we interviewed reported problems with their 

facilities. For example, 14 of 25 rated the consular workspace at their post 

as below average, and 40 percent reported that applicants’ waiting rooms 

were below average. In addition, due to overcrowded waiting rooms at 

four of the eight posts we visited, we observed visa applicants waiting for 

 24Consular officers who serve as fraud prevention managers are in charge of investigating 

cases of fraud, conducting fraud training for the consular section, and providing 

information on fraud relevant to the consular section at post. 

25GAO, Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities, GAO-03-557T

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2003). 

Increased Funding to Improve 

Consular Facilities, but Many 

Posts Remain Inadequate 
Page 23 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

their interviews outside or in adjacent hallways. A senior consular official 

acknowledged that many consular facilities are located in run-down 

buildings with insufficient adjudicating windows and waiting rooms. In 

fiscal year 2003, Congress directed the Overseas Building Operations 

Bureau to begin a 3-year Consular Workspace Improvement Initiative to 

improve the overall working environment for consular officers.26 In fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004, State obligated $10.2 million to 79 workspace 

improvement projects at 68 posts. State officials currently plan to fund up 

to $18.1 million for fiscal year 2005. Improvement projects ranged from 

adding more interview windows to increase visa processing in Seoul to a 

complete consular section reconfiguration in London. However, according 

to a senior consular official, these funds are being used to provide 

temporary solutions at posts that may require a new embassy, as part of 

State’s multibillion-dollar embassy construction program. 

The September 11 attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive 

information sharing.27 In January 2005, GAO identified effective 

information sharing to secure the homeland as a high-risk area of the U.S. 

government because the federal government still faces formidable 

challenges sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate and 

timely manner to minimize risk.28 With cooperation from other federal 

agencies, State has increased the amount of information available to 

consular officers in CLASS. Name-check records from the intelligence 

community have increased fivefold from 48,000 in September 2001 to 

approximately 260,000 in June 2005, according to consular officials. 

Moreover, consular officials told us that, as of the fall of 2004, CLASS 

contained approximately 8 million records from the FBI. In addition, State 

has developed more efficient methods of acquiring certain data from law 

enforcement databases. For example, State established a direct computer 

link with the FBI to send descriptive information from the FBI’s National 

Crime Information Center (NCIC) to CLASS on a daily basis. 

 26See House Conference Report 108-10, attached to P.L. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations 

Resolution, 2003. 

27See the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), which 

requires that the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center report to Congress on a 

strategy to combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement into a 

cohesive effort. This strategy may address, among other things, granting consular officers 

and immigration adjudicators, as appropriate, the security clearances necessary to access 

law enforcement sensitive and intelligence databases. 

28GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Number of Intelligence and 

Law Enforcement Records 

in CLASS Increased, but 

Additional Information 

Would Help Facilitate 

Legitimate Travel 
Page 24 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

While the additional records in CLASS have helped consular officers 

detect those who might seek to harm the United States, many consular 

officers we interviewed stated that the increased volume of records and 

lack of access to other detailed information can lead to visa-processing 

delays for applicants. In particular, consular officers do not have direct 

access to detailed information in criminal history records. Section 403 of 

the USA PATRIOT Act of 200129 directs the Attorney General and the FBI 

to provide State with access to extracts of certain files30 containing 

descriptive information for the purpose of determining whether a visa 

applicant has a criminal history record contained in the NCIC Interstate 

Identification Index (or Index). The USA PATRIOT Act also states that 

access to an extract does not entitle consular officers to obtain the full 

contents of the corresponding records. In accordance with this mandate, 

the FBI stated that the bureau provides to CLASS extracts that contain all 

available biographical information, such as the date of birth and height of 

the person with the criminal record.31 However, when conducting a CLASS 

name check, consular officers told us that they are not able to conclusively 

determine whether an FBI file matches a visa applicant because the 

extracts lack sufficient biographical information. Moreover, the FBI stated 

that, in accordance with section 403, the extracts do not contain details 

such as charges and dispositions of cases, which are necessary to 

determine if the applicant might be ineligible for a visa.32 For example, the 

information in CLASS does not distinguish between a conviction for a 

crime such as kidnapping or drug possession, or an acquittal on a charge 

of driving while intoxicated. 

Consular officers, therefore, must fingerprint applicants who have a 

potential match in the Index for positive identification in the FBI records; 

if there is a match, they can then ascertain whether the information 

 29P.L. 107-56. 

30The files include the NCIC’s Interstate Identification Index, which is the FBI’s database of 

criminal history records, Wanted Persons Files, and any other files maintained by NCIC 

that may be mutually agreed upon by the Attorney General and the agency receiving 

access. 

31According to FBI officials, examples of the information provided to CLASS, when 

available, include the FBI record number, name and alias, date of birth, place of birth, 

citizenship, sex, race, eye color, hair color, height, or weight, among other things. 

32To render an alien ineligible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), the conviction must be for a 

statutory offense that involves moral turpitude, which includes many serious crimes, such 

as kidnapping and murder, but does not include other crimes that may be reflected in the 

NCIC database. 
Page 25 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

contained in the criminal record would make the applicant ineligible for a 

visa.33 In fiscal year 2004, of the more than 40,000 sets of fingerprints 

consular officers sent to the FBI for verification, about 29 percent were 

positive matches between the applicant and a criminal record in the Index. 

State officials we spoke with estimated that of those applicants who were 

positively identified by fingerprints, only about 10 percent were denied a 

visa based on the criminal history record information provided by the FBI. 

Moreover, fingerprinted applicants are charged an additional $85 

processing fee and, as of the spring of 2005, must wait an estimated 4 to 8 

weeks for a response from Washington, D.C., before adjudication can 

proceed. According to FBI and State officials, the processing delays are 

due to inefficiencies in the way the fingerprints are sent to the FBI for 

processing (see fig. 4). 

 33This requirement is also consistent with the National Crime Prevention and Privacy 

Compact Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 14611 et seq.) (or Compact Act), which organizes an 

electronic information-sharing system among the federal government and states to 

exchange criminal history records, such as those contained in the Index, for noncriminal 

justice purposes. The Compact Act requires that consular officers, as noncriminal justice 

personnel, first submit the visa applicant’s fingerprints, or other approved form of 

identification, for positive identification before the record can be released. 
Page 26 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Figure 4: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information in FBI Files and Proposed Changes 

To facilitate more efficient fingerprint processing, State and the FBI are 

implementing an electronic fingerprint system whereby consular officers 

will scan the applicants’ fingerprints at post and submit them directly into 

the FBI’s database if there is a potential match in CLASS. FBI and State 

officials told us that posts would be notified if the record in question 

matched the applicant within 24 hours. However, thousands of visa 

applicants could still face wait times and additional fingerprinting fees that 

they would otherwise not have incurred because consular officers do not 

have enough information at the time of the interview to determine if the 

records in CLASS match the applicants. 

There are several options that the FBI and State have discussed to help 

ensure that consular officers can facilitate legitimate travel; however, each 

would require legislative changes and the agencies would need to weigh 

Same process

Different process

Different process and time

Electronic pilot process: 

estimated time for response = 24 hours

Sources: GAO; Nova Development and Map Resources (clip art).

Applicant’s 

name 

checked 

against 

watch lists

Watch list 

“hit” 

requires 

fingerprints 

to be taken • 10 electronic 

fingerprints 

collected

• Applicant 

charged 

 $85 processing 

fee

• FBI compares electronic 

fingerprints to criminal 

database file (24 hours)

• Results sent back to post

• Consular officer decides 

to issue/deny based on 

FBI results

• FBI compares electronic 

fingerprints to criminal 

database file (24 hours)

• Results sent back to post

• Consular officer decides 

to issue/deny based on 

FBI results

• 10 ink

fingerprints 

collected

• Applicant 

charged 

 $85 processing 

fee

Fingerprints sent by mail to National Visa Center

Fingerprints take up to 8 weeks using pouch mail to reach National 

Visa Center

National Visa Center converts ink fingerprints into electronic format

National Visa Center sends fingerprints electronically to FBI

Fingerprints sent 

electronically to 

FBI

Fingerprints 

instantly received 

by FBI

Current process: estimated time for response = 4-8 weeks
Page 27 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

the associated trade-offs inherent in each option. These options include 

the following: 

• Consular officials told us that access to additional information in a 

criminal history file, such as the charge and disposition of a case, 

would allow their officers to determine which crimes are serious 

enough to require a positive fingerprint match prior to adjudication. 

However, FBI officials noted that there are some technical limitations 

on extracting specific pieces of data from the criminal history records 

in the Index. 

• To avoid some of the technical limitations associated with the Index, 

FBI officials stated that it would be easier to provide the full criminal 

history records to consular officers for the purpose of visa 

adjudication. However, these officials told us that assurances would 

need to be in place to prevent misuse of the information, given its 

sensitive nature. Indeed, State and the FBI have already negotiated a 

Memorandum of Understanding aimed at protecting the information 

passed to CLASS. Consular officials indicated that their officers may 

need access only to the criminal charge and disposition of the case to 

adjudicate a visa case more efficiently. 

The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate travel 

and identifying those who entry into the United States might be harmful to 

U.S. national interests. Since our 2002 report, State, in coordination with 

other agencies, has made substantial improvements to the visa process to 

strengthen it as a tool to prevent terrorists and others who might pose a 

threat from entering our country. However, given the large responsibility 

placed on consular officers, particularly entry-level officers, it is critical 

that State continue to improve the tools, guidance, and training necessary 

for them to be effective. In particular, State’s assignment system is not 

effectively meeting the staffing needs of its consular posts. A rigorous 

assessment of staffing priorities is needed for State to achieve its goal of 

having the right people in the right place with the right skills, especially at 

critical posts of national security concern. Additionally, while visa policies 

and procedures have been updated and enhanced, these changes must be 

more clearly communicated to all consular staff to ensure they are 

consistently and properly applied. Action is also needed at the interagency 

level to encourage interactions between consular sections, law 

enforcement officials, and other security officials at post to increase 

information sharing on terrorism issues relevant to the visa process. 

Conclusions 
Page 28 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

We are making seven recommendations to further strengthen the visa 

process. These recommendations are being directed to the Secretary of 

State, who is generally responsible for visa operations, and to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, who is generally responsible for visa 

policy. 

To further clarify current visa policies and procedures, we recommend 

that 

• the Secretary of State update the Foreign Affairs Manual on a regular 

basis to incorporate all changes in visa policies and procedures; and 

• the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary 

of State, develop additional guidance on the relationship between DHS 

and State in the visa process, including the roles and responsibilities of 

DHS personnel overseas who assist consular sections and DHS’s 

procedures at points of entry. 

To ensure consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance national 

security and promote legitimate travel, we also recommend that the 

Secretary of State 

• develop a comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular 

staffing worldwide, including an analysis of staffing requirements and 

shortages, foreign language proficiency requirements, and fraud 

prevention needs, among other things—the plan should systematically 

determine priority positions that must be filled worldwide based on the 

relative strategic importance of posts and positions and realistic 

assumptions of available staff resources; 

• report to Congress, within 1 year of this report, on the implementation 

of this plan; 

• ensure that consular chiefs update interview wait-time data on a 

weekly basis; and 

• in consultation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, further 

expand consular training in terrorist travel trends, post-specific 

counterterrorism techniques, and fraud prevention, either at the 

Foreign Service Institute or at overseas posts. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 29 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

To ensure that consular officers have access to all relevant information on 

known or suspected terrorists, we recommend that the Secretary of State, 

in consultation with appropriate agencies, 

• further encourage interactions between consular sections, law 

enforcement officials, and other security officials at post to increase 

information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant 

to the visa process, including regional or post-specific terrorism trends, 

either through the Visas Viper process, or other similar interagency 

mechanisms. 

As GAO has reported,34 information is a crucial tool in fighting terrorism, 

and the timely dissemination of that information is critical to maintaining 

the security of our nation. Although State and the FBI have taken steps to 

increase the amount of information available to consular officers in the 

visa process, further information from criminal history files would help 

facilitate visa adjudication for legitimate travelers. Thus, Congress may 

wish to require that the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation develop and report on a plan that details 

• the additional information from criminal history records that should be 

made available to visa adjudicators; 

• how the FBI proposes to provide this additional information to State; 

• the potential concerns associated with increased access to this 

information such as technology limitations and privacy concerns, and 

how the agencies propose to mitigate these concerns; and 

• any legislative changes that may be necessary to facilitate the exchange 

of this information between the FBI and State. 

State, DHS, and the Department of Justice provided written comments on 

a draft of this report (see apps. II, III, and IV, respectively). 

State noted that the report is a fair and balanced evaluation of the 

improvements made in the visa process since our 2002 report. State agreed 

with most of our conclusions, and indicated that it is taking action to 

 34GAO-05-207. 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 30 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

implement the majority of our recommendations. For example, the 

department indicated that it is revising consular guidance located in the 

Foreign Affairs Manual and standard operating procedures, and is 

working with DHS to clarify guidance on the roles and responsibilities of 

various DHS personnel overseas. In addition, State agreed that additional 

training would be beneficial for consular officers, and stated that it intends 

to provide further guidance to overseas posts about the importance of 

interactions between consular officers and law enforcement and 

intelligence officials at post. With regard to the matter for congressional 

consideration, State agreed to work with the FBI to determine how 

additional information from the FBI might be shared with visa 

adjudicators. 

State disagreed with our recommendation that it prepare a comprehensive 

plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing. State argued that it 

already had such a plan. Moreover, State claimed that it appreciates that 

priority positions must be filled worldwide based on the relative strategic 

importance of posts and positions. While State argued that every visa 

consular officer is serving a strategic function, the department identified 

one post, Embassy Baghdad, as a clear example of a priority post. Further, 

State acknowledged that it has fewer midlevel consular officers than it 

needs. We continue to believe it is incumbent on the department to 

conduct a worldwide analysis to identify high-priority posts and positions, 

such as supervisory consular positions in posts with high-risk applicant 

pools or those with high workloads and long wait times for applicant 

interviews. As we note in our report, at the time of our work, the midlevel 

visa chief positions in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, 

were not filled with permanent midlevel officers. This was a serious 

deficiency given that the visa sections were staffed with officers on their 

first tour. Although State noted that it anticipated addressing this shortage 

of midlevel consular officers before 2013, it did not indicate when that gap 

would be filled. Moreover, State’s bidding and assignment process does 

not guarantee that the positions of highest priority will always be filled 

with qualified officers. Therefore, a further assessment is needed to ensure 

that State has the right people in the right posts with the necessary skill 

levels. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with its 

summary of improvements to the visa process since September 11, 2001. 

In addition, State provided technical comments on a draft of this report, 

which we have incorporated, as appropriate. 

DHS concurred that, in consultation with State, it needed to develop 

additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State in the visa 

process, and agreed to provide that guidance to all overseas posts. DHS 
Page 31 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

also indicated that it would work to ensure that all posts understand the 

roles and responsibilities of DHS personnel conducting visa security 

functions, as well as DHS procedures at ports of entry. 

The Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for 

congressional consideration in our report. The department provided 

additional information on other actions it is taking, in collaboration with 

State and DHS, to improve interagency information sharing. In particular, 

the department detailed U.S. government efforts to integrate various 

databases aimed at providing fast access to biometrically-verified criminal 

history record information for visa adjudication and immigration 

purposes, which it stated would increase the accuracy and reliability of 

criminal history record checks. The Department of Justice also provided 

technical comments on a draft of this report, which we have incorporated, 

as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and 

Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other interested Members 

of Congress. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix V. 

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 
Page 32 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

 Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Emerging Threats, and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Don Young 

Acting Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John N. Hostettler 

Chairman 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

To review the changes to the visa process since 2002, we analyzed 

consular policies and procedures; resources that support consular 

functions; and the types of information on known or suspected terrorists 

that are used to screen visa applicants. For example, we reviewed the 1952 

Immigration and Nationality Act,1

 as amended; the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002;2

 and other related legislation. In addition, we examined State’s 

Foreign Affairs Manual and consular standard operating procedures, and 

analyzed consular workload and staffing data. We also attended several 

consular training courses, including those on analytical interviewing 

techniques, advanced name checking, and fraud prevention, conducted at 

State’s George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center. In 

Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from State’s Bureaus of 

Consular Affairs and Human Resources. We also spoke with officials from 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Border and Transportation 

Security Directorate, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as officials from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., and West Virginia. 

We visited U.S. consular posts in seven countries—Egypt, Indonesia, 

Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. During 

these visits, we observed visa operations and interviewed consular staff 

and embassy management about visa adjudication policies, procedures, 

and resources. In addition, we spoke with officials from other U.S. 

agencies that assist consular officers in the visa adjudication process. 

We also administered 25 structured interviews between January and April 

2005 regarding the impact of State’s changes to policies and guidance, 

staffing, training, resources, and interagency coordination on the visa 

process The interviews were conducted in-person and by telephone with 

visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff in overseas posts. We selected 

posts that were of interest to antiterrorism efforts or received a large 

number of third-country national applications from countries of interest to 

antiterrorism efforts: Abu Dhabi, Beirut, Brussels, Cairo, Casablanca, 

Damascus, Dubai, Frankfurt, Islamabad, Jakarta, Jeddah, Jerusalem, Kuala 

Lumpur, Lagos, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Muscat, Nairobi, Paris, 

Riyadh, Rome, Sana’a, Tunis, and Toronto. The responses to the structured 

interviews are not intended to be representative of all posts. 

 1

P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq. 

2

P.L. 107-296. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 34 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

The structured interview contained open- and close-ended questions about 

staffing, policy guidance, screening procedures, training, workload, 

facilities, foreign language proficiency, fraud prevention, and the impact of 

changes to the visa process since September 11, 2001. We developed the 

interview questions based on our review of the documentation and data 

listed above. We also pretested the interview with four current and former 

visa chiefs to ensure that the questions were clear and could be answered. 

We modified the interview questions on the basis of the pretest results and 

an internal expert technical review. We provided the visa chiefs and other 

consular officials with the questions in advance to allow them time to 

gather any data necessary for the interview. We also conducted follow-up 

discussions with each of the posts for more detailed information about 

staffing. 

To assess the reliability of State’s human capital data on consular staffing 

and officers’ foreign language proficiency, we queried human capital 

officials at State and examined the data electronically. We determined that 

the data were sufficiently reliable to report on consular staffing and 

language proficiency data from fiscal year 2002 through April 2005. 

To determine the reliability of State’s data on wait times for applicant 

interviews, we reviewed the department’s procedures for capturing these 

data, interviewed the officials in Washington who monitor and use these 

data, and examined the data electronically. We analyzed interview wait 

times for applicants applying for visas for temporary business or tourism 

purposes, but not for other types of visas, including student visas. 

Specifically, we queried the database to show the (1) consular post, (2) 

date of last entry, and (3) reported wait time for all visa-issuing posts from 

October 2004 through March 2005. We performed independent checks of 

these data during our structured interviews with 25 consular posts, as well 

as our visits to 8 posts overseas. We found missing data throughout the 6-

month period because posts were not reporting each week. Based on our 

analysis, we determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable to 

determine the exact magnitude of the problem because the exact number 

of posts with a 30-day or more wait could not be determined. Consular 

officials who manage consular sections overseas acknowledged that many 

posts are not reporting on a weekly basis. We conducted our work from 

August 2004 through August 2005, in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 35 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

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Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 52 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 53 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 54 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 55 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Justice 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

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Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 57 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 58 GAO-05-859 Visa Process Changes 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, John Brummet, Assistant 

Director, and Joseph Carney, Daniel Chen, Etana Finkler, Kathryn 

Hartsburg, Amanda Miller, John F. Miller, and Mary Moutsos made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320301) 
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