### I N THE UNI TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-20195

SHAWN JOSEPH STAUFFER
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARNA E. GEARHART; TAMMY A. BROADWAY; L APORSHA C. JENKINS; JENNIFER SMITH; ENOG O NG J. INYANG; G ERALYN ENGMAN; MADALINE ORTIZ; DAVID L. BONE; CHARLES A. WILLIAMSON; BRIAN A. KASPAR; R O BERT D. LIONS, III; RALPH A. PHILLIPS; ROBERT L. VANBURKLEO; GAIL THOMPSON; B RAD LIVINGSTON; J OHN/JANE DOE
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
P r iso n m a i lro o m e m p l o y e e s co n f isca te d co p ie s o f se v e ra l a u to m o tiv e

m a g a zin e s th a t in m a te S h a w n S ta u f fe r (“S t a u ffe r”) o rd e re d w h i le h e w a s

p a rticip a tin g in th e T e x a s D e p a rtm e n t o f C rim in a l J u stice ’ s ( “T D C J ”) S e x O ffe n d e r T re a t m e n t P ro g ra m (“S O T P ” o r “P ro g ra m ”). S ta u ffe r file d a § 1 9 8 3

a ctio n a lle g in g th a t th e se co n fisca tio n s v i o l a te d h is F irst a n d F o u rte e n th
A m e n d m e n t r ig h ts. T h e d istrict co u rt d i sm isse d h is cla i m s o n su m m a ry ju d g m e n t a n d S ta u ffe r a p p e a le d

. H e se e k s b o th m o n e ta ry a n d in ju n ctiv e re lie f U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D January 24, 2014
Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

fo r th e se a lle g e d v io la tio n s. B e ca u se S t a u ffe r is n o t e n t itle d to e ith e r fo rm o f

re lie f, w e A F F IR M th e d istrict co u rt’s d ism issa l o f S t a u ffe r’s ca se

. I.
S ta u ffe r w a s c o n v icte d o f th e a tte m p te d a g g ra v a te d se x u a l a ssa u lt o f a ch ild

. In 2 0 0 8 , T D C J a ssig n e d S ta u ffe r to th e G o re e U n it s o h e c o u l d a tte n d
T D C J ’ s S O T P

. T h e P ro g ra m ’s g o a l s a r e (1 ) to h e lp p a rticip a n ts u n d e rsta n d a n d

co n t ro l th e se x u a l u rg e s th a t ca u se d th e m to co m m it se x u a l crim e s, a n d (2 ) to

p ro v id e tra i n in g a n d sk ills to a l lo w s e x -o ffe n d e rs to a ct in a m a n n e r th a t

p ro m o te s th e s a fe ty o f th e c o m m u n itie s t o w h ich th e y m a y re tu rn

. P a rticip a n t s

a re e n ro lle d in th e P ro g ra m fo r th e la st e ig h te e n m o n th s o f th e ir in ca r ce ra tio n

a n d sp e n d th o se m o n th s in i n t e n siv e tre a tm e n t in a g ro u p th e ra p e u tic

e n v iro n m e n t.
T D C J lim it s t h e o u tsid e a ctiv itie s a n d re a d in g m a te ria l a v a ila b le to

p a rticip a n ts d u rin g th e ir tim e in th e P ro g r a m

. A cco rd in g to T D C J , th is p o licy
is m e a n t to m a x im ize S O T P ’s e ffe ctiv e n e ss b y a llo w in g p a rticip a n ts to fo cu s a ll

o f th e ir e n e rg y o n fu lfillin g th e P ro g ra m ’ s re q u ire m e n ts. A cco rd in g to a ffid a v its

su b m itte d b y D e fe n d a n ts, S O T P p a rticip a n ts sp e n d “2 4 h o u rs a d a y , se v e n d a y s

o f w e e k ” e n g a g e d in th e P ro g ra m , “le a v in g e sse n tia lly n o tim e f o r a n y o th e r

a ctiv itie s.” A t th e tim e th a t S t a u ffe r w a s e n ro lle d in S O T P , P ro g ra m

p a rticip a n ts co u ld n o t e n g a g e in v o ca t io n a l a ctiv itie s o r o th e r p ro g ra m s d u rin g th e ir tim e in S O T P , e x ce p t fo r ce r ta in G E D p ro g ra m s

. In a d d i t i o n , p a rticip a n t s

w e re su b je ct to S O T P 0 2 .0 6 , w h ich p r o v id e d , in re l e v a n t p a rt:
II. In o rd e r to fa cilita te tre a tm e n t, a ddi t i o nal s t andard s fo r o ffe n d e r
co rre sp o n d e n ce h a v e b e e n im p o se d

. T h e y a re a s fo llo w s: A

. N o p u b lica tio n s o th e r t h a n n e w sp a p e rs a n d r e lig io u s m a t e r i a l sh a ll b e a cce p te d

. B

. C o r r e s p o n d e n c e c o n ta in in g co n te n t a p p ro v in g o r p r o m o t i n g
a lco h o l/d ru g u se sh a ll b e re je cte d fo r o ffe n d e r re ce ip t.

2 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

C

. C o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h a t i s s e x u a lly su g g e stiv e , e x p licit, a n d /o r p ro v o ca tiv e i n n a tu re sh a ll b e re je cte d f o r o ffe n d e r r e c e ip t. S e x u a l ly e x p licit a n d / o r p ro v o ca tiv e co rre sp o n d e n ce in clu d e s, b u t i s n o t l i m i t e d t o , n u d i t y o r p a r t i a l n u d i t y t h a t i s stim u la tin g /e x citin g o r se x u a lly su g g e stiv e in n a tu r e

. D

. O ffe n d e r s m a y n o t a p p e a l d e n i a l s t o th e D ire cto r’s R e v ie w C o m m itte e b a se d o n th e se a d d itio n a l re strictio n s. F r o m F e b ru a ry th r o u g h M a y 2 0 0 8 , th e G o re e U n it M a ilro o m co n fisca te d
S ta u ffe r ’ s co p ie s o f “C a rC r a ft
, ” “H o tR o d , ” “P e rfo rm a n ce P ro d u c ts,” a n d “J e g ’s
P e r fo r m a n ce P a rts” m a g a zin e s w h ile h e w a s e n ro l le d in S O T P

. A cco r d i n g t o St auf f er , he want ed t he magaz i nes b e ca u s e t h e y “p ro v id e [d ] in f o rm a tio n re la te d

to h is tra d e in a u to m o t iv e re p a ir a n d p e rfo rm a n ce .” T D C J p re v e n te d S ta u ffe r fro m re ce iv in g “ p u b lica t io n s su ch a s ‘C a r -C r a f t,’ ‘H o t-R o d ,’ a n d ‘L o w R id e r’

m a g a z i n e s” b e ca u se ( 1 ) “a ll v o ca tio n a l p ro g ra m s m u st b e co m p le te d p rio r to

e n te rin g th e S O T P ”; (2 ) “s u c h p u b lica t io n s o f te n co n ta in se x u a lly e x p licitly

m a te r i a l w h i c h stro n g ly u n d e rm i n e s th e g o a ls o f th e p ro g r a m ”; a n d (3 ) “ 1 8

m o n th s is fa r to o b rie f a p e rio d in w h ich to co v e r a ll o f th e m a t e ria l o f t h e

p ro g ra m

. . . . [a n d i]t is o f th e h ig h e s t p rio rity th a t p a rticip a n ts e n ro lle d in t h e [S O T P ] u se th o se 1 8 m o n t h s to th e ir u tm o st a n d n o t b e a llo w e d t o e n g a g e in

u n n e ce ssa ry d istra ctio n s .” 1 A t le a st o n e o f t h e c o n fisca t e d m a g a zin e s “d isp la y s

w o m e n in se x u a lly p r o v o ca t iv e p o sitio n s.”
S ta u ffe r a p p e a le d th e re strictio n s o n th e se re a d in g m a te ria ls th ro u g h t h e T D C J g rie v a n ce p ro ce ss. I n r e sp o n se to h is S te p 2 G rie v a n ce , T D C J e x p la in e d
th a t th e m a i lro o m sta ff p ro p e rly co n f isca t e d th e m a g a zin e s in a cco r d a n ce w ith
S O T P 0 2 .0 6

. O n M a y 2 0 , 2 0 0 8 , S t a u ffe r file d th is § 1 9 8 3 su it a g a in st fifte e n

1 Stauf f er contes ted D ef

end ants ’ claim s about the all- cons um ing nature of SO TP. H e
as s erts that SO TP m od ules and therap y occurred fro m 7 : 0 0 a

. m

. and 4: 00 p. m

. and that, out s i d e o f treatm ent hours , SO TP inm ates w ere allow ed to attend outs id e recreation and religious s ervices , read new s pap ers and religious m aterials , and to check m aterials out of the
p ris on library. A ccord ing to Stauf f er, a num ber of magazines , as well as at leas t one o f the
p ublications d enied to Stauf f er, w ere available in the p ris on library.

3 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

T D C J e m p lo y e e s i n th e ir in d iv i d u a l a n d o fficia l ca p a citie s (“D e f e n d a n ts”)
cla im in g th a t th e y : ( 1 ) v io l a te d h is F irst A m e n d m e n t rig h ts b y co n fisca tin g t h e

m a g a zin e s u n d e r S O T P 0 2 .0 6 ; ( 2 ) v io la te d h i s D u e P r o ce ss rig h t s u n d e r t h e F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t b y fa ilin g to p ro v i d e a n y m e a n in g fu l re v ie w o f th e

m a ilro o m e m p l o y e e ’s d e cisio n s; a n d ( 3 ) v io la te d h i s E q u a l P ro te ctio n rig h t s

u n d e r th e F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t b y a p p l y i n g t h e p o licy so le ly to in m a te s

p a rticip a tin g i n S O T P

. H e se e k s o n e m illio n d o lla r s i n n o m i n a l, p u n i tiv e , a n d

co m p e n sa t o r y d a m a g e s a g a in st e a ch D e fe n d a n t, a s w e ll a s a d e cla ra to ry ju d g m e n t th a t S O T P 0 2 .0 6 v io la te d h is F irst a n d F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t rig h ts. In th e ir a n sw e r , D e fe n d a n ts a sse rte d a n u m b e r o f d e fe n se s, in clu d in g

q u a l i f ie d im m u n ity u n d e r th e E le v e n th A m e n d m e n t.
O n S e p te m b e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 9 , D e f e n d a n ts file d a m o tio n fo r su m m a ry ju d g m e n t. T h e d istrict c o u rt g ra n te d th e m o tio n in p a rt, ru lin g th a t D e fe n d a n t s

w e re e n title d to im m u n i ty f ro m S t a u ffe r ’s cla im s fo r m o n e ta ry co m p e n sa tio n

a g a in st th e m in th e ir o fficia l ca p a city , a n d th a t S t a u f fe r’s c la im fo r m o n e ta ry

co m p e n sa t io n fo r th e lo ss o f th e m a g a z in e s w a s n o t a v ia b le § 1 9 8 3 cla im

. 2 T h e d istrict co u rt th u s d ism isse d S ta u ffe r’s D u e P r o ce ss cla i m

. T h e d istrict co u rt
th e n o r d e re d D e fe n d a n ts to file a n a m e n d e d m o ti o n f o r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t

a d d re ssin g o n ly S ta u ffe r’s F irst A m e n d m e n t a n d E q u a l P ro t e ctio n cla im s. D e fe n d a n ts d i d s o

. S ta u ffe r th e n file d a re sp o n se to th e a m e n d e d m o tio n f o r

su m m a r y ju d g m e n t. In th is re sp o n se , S ta u ffe r cla im e d fo r th e first tim e th a t
D e fe n d a n ts w e re re t a lia t in g a g a i n st h im fo r b r i n g i n g th e l a w su it a n d a sse rtin g h i s F i rst A m e n d m e n t rig h ts. H e a sse r t e d th a t th e re t a lia tio n in clu d e d d e n y in g

2 In s ep arate ord ers , the d is trict court als o d enied Stauf f er’s motions to ap p oint couns el, and to p relim inarily enjoin p ris on of f icials f rom conf is cating his m agazines

. The d is trict court als o d enied Stauf

f er’s m otions for d is covery becaus e he f ailed to s et f

orth any ground s or argum ents s how ing good caus e. The d is trict court noted , how ever, that the ruling w as “s ubject to p laintif

f tim ely res ubm itting his d is covery m otions w ith a s how ing of good caus e f or each
p articular d is covery reques t. ” Stauf f er d id not f

ile any further d is covery reques ts

. 4 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

h im p a ro le , a fa lse civ il co m m itm e n t a ctio n , a n d a fa lse re p o rt to th e I N S
cla im in g h e w a s a n ille g a l a l ie n

. T h e d istrict co u rt g ra n te d D e fe n d a n ts’ a m e n d e d m o tio n , co n clu d in g th a t
S ta u ffe r fa ile d t o sh o w th a t T D C J ’s a d d itio n a l re strictio n s o n h is a cce ss to

m a g a zin e s w h ile in S O T P v io la t e d h i s F irst A m e n d m e n t o r E q u a l P ro te ctio n rig h ts. T h e d i strict co u rt a lso re je cte d S ta u ffe r’s re ta lia tio n cla im b e c a u se t h e “a sse rtio n o f re ta lia tio n w a s n o t ra ise d in th e co m p la in t, i s n o t b e fo re th e C o u rt,

a n d m u s t b e p u rsu e d b y p la in tiff th ro u g h a se p a r a te l a w su it.” S ta u ffe r

a p p e a le d

. 3
A t o ra l a r g u m e n t , co u n se l fo r S ta u ffe r re p r e s e n te d th a t S ta u ffe r is n o lo n g e r e n ro lle d in S O T P

. I n F e b ru a ry 2 0 1 3 , T D C J p u b l i sh e d a re v i s e d v e rsio n

o f S O T P 0 2 .0 6 (“R e v ise d 0 2 .0 6 ”). R e v ise d 0 2 .0 6 p ro v i d e s: A

. I f a n y p a rt o f a p u b lica t i o n , o th e r p rin te d m a t e ria l, o r
co rre sp o n d e n ce i s d e t e r m in e d t o b e d e trim e n ta l to re h a b ilita tio n , th e n th e e n t i r e p u b lica tio n , o th e r p rin te d m a te ria l, o r
co rre sp o n d e n ce sh a ll b e d e n ie d

. B

. C o r re sp o n d e n ce co n ta in in g q u e stio n a b le c o n te n t a p p ro v in g o r p ro m o tin g a l co h o l o r d ru g a b u se sh a ll re q u ire fu rth e r r e v ie w b y th e P r o g ra m S u p e rv iso r

. C

. C o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h a t i s s e x u a l l y s u g g e s t i v e , e x p l i c i t , o r p r o v o ca tiv e in n a tu r e sh a ll b e re je cte d fo r o ffe n d e r re ce ip t o r d isp a t ch

. S e x u a l ly e x p licit o r p ro v o ca tiv e co rre sp o n d e n ce i n clu d e s, b u t is n o t lim ite d to : p ictu re s, d r a w in g s, o r la n g u a g e th a t is

se x u a lly stim u l a tin g o r su g g e stiv e in n a tu re

. R e v ise d 0 2 .0 6 a lso p ro v id e s th a t “[ a ] l l p ro ce d u re s f o r o ffe n d e r

co rre sp o n d e n ce sh a ll b e fo llo w e d in a c co rd a n ce w ith th e T e x a s D e p a rtm e n t o f
C r i m i n a l J u stice B o a rd P o licy 0 3 .9 1 .” A p u b lica tio n m a y b e re je cte d u n d e r

3 Stauf f er argues that the d is trict court als o erred by denying him dis covery, f ailing to review the conf

is cated m agazines , d e n ying Stauf f er ap p ointed couns el, ap p lying an unf air
p lead ing s tand ard , and requiring Stauf f er to f ile a s ep arate law s uit to ad d res s his retaliation claim s

. We need not d eterm ine whether the d is trict court erred in reaching any o f thes e conclus ions becaus e w e hold that Stauf f er w as not entitled to injunctive relief or d am ages

. 5 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

P o l i cy 0 3 .9 1 if “[a ] sp e cific d e te rm in a tio n h a s b e e n m a d e th a t t h e p u b lica tio n is d e trim e n ta l to o ffe n d e rs’ re h a b ilita t io n b e ca u se it w o u ld e n co u ra g e d e v ia n t
crim in a l se x u a l b e h a v io r .” P o licy 0 3 .9 1 , I V (E )(1 )(d ). P o licy 0 3 .9 1 a lso re q u ire s

a ca se -b y -ca s e re v ie w o f m a te ria ls c o n ta in i n g se x u a lly e x p licit im a g e s

. Id

. a t
IV (E )(1 )(f).
II.
W e re v ie w th e g r a n t o f su m m a ry ju d g m e n t d e n o v o

. X trem e L a sh es, L L C

v

. X ten d ed B e a u ty , I

n c. , 5 7 6 F .3 d 2 2 1 , 2 2 6 (5 th C ir

. 2 0 0 9 ) (cita tio n o m itte d ).
S u m m a ry ju d g m e n t is a p p ro p ria te if th e re co r d d e m o n stra te s “th a t t h e re is n o

g e n u in e d isp u te a s to a n y m a te ria l fa ct a n d th a t th e m o v a n t is e n title d to ju d g m e n t a s a m a tte r o f la w .” F e d

. R

. C i v

. P

. 5 6 (a ). T h e p ro p o n e n t o f t h e

m o tio n t y p ica lly b e a rs th e b u rd e n o f sh o w i n g a la ck o f e v i d e n ce to su p p o rt h is

o p p o n e n t’s ca se

. 4 N

o rw eg i a n B u lk T

ra n sp

. A / S v

. In t’l M a rin e T e rm in a ls
P ’ s h ip , 5 2 0 F .3 d 4 0 9 , 4 1 2 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 8 ) (cita tio n o m itte d ). If a m o tio n f o r

su m m a r y ju d g m e n t is p ro p e rly su p p o r t e d , th e o p p o s in g p a rty m a y n o t re ly

m e re ly o n a l le g a t io n s o r d e n ia ls in its o w n p le a d in g s, b u t m u s t, i n its re sp o n se ,

se t o u t sp e cific fa c ts s h o w in g a g e n u in e f a ctu a l d isp u te fo r tria l. H a th a w a y v

. B a z a n y , 5 0 7 F .3 d 3 1 2 , 3 1 9 ( 5 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ) ( n o tin g t h a t a n o n m o v a n t ca n n o t

s a tisfy h is su m m a r y ju d g m e n t b u rd e n “w ith co n c lu so ry a lle g a ti o n s ,

u n su b sta n tia t e d a sse rtio n s, o r o n ly a scin tilla o f e v i d e n ce ” (in t e rn a l q u o ta tio n

m a rk s a n d cita t io n s o m itte d )). A lle g a tio n s in a v e rifie d co m p la in t m a y se rv e a s

co m p e te n t su m m a ry j u d g m e n t e v id e n ce

. H a rt v

. H a irsto n , 3 4 3 F

. 3 d 7 6 2 , 7 6 5

4 Citing Cel otex C

orp

. v. Ca trett , 477 U

. S. 317, 322 ( 1986)
, Stauf fer argues that “the

us ual requirem ent of pres enting evid ence borne by the p arty w ho w ill bear the burd en of p roof at trial d oes not ap p ly to this cas e becaus e dis covery w as dis allow ed

. ” In Cel otex , the Sup rem e C o u r t interp reted Rule 56 to require “ad equate tim e” f or dis covery; it s aid nothing about a
s ituation, lik e the one here, w here the d is trict court has d enied ad d itional d is covery becaus e the p arty failed to s how good caus e. See i d. A s a res ult, Stauf f er bears the burd en of p roof in this cas e.
6 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

(5 th C i r

. 2 0 0 3 ). W e d r a w i n fe re n ce s a b o u t d i s p u te d fa cts in S ta u ffe r’s fa v o r, b u t

m u st
d istin g u i s h b e t w e e n e v i d e n c e o f d i s p u t e d f a c t s a n d d isp u te d

m a tte rs o f p ro f

e ssio n a l ju d g m e n t. In r e s p e c t t o th e la t te r , o u r in f e re n ce s m u st a cco rd d e fe re n ce to th e v ie w s o f p riso n a u th o ritie s. U n le ss a p r iso n e r ca n p o in t to s u fficie n t e v id e n ce re g a r d in g su ch issu e s o f ju d g m e n t to a llo w h im to p r e v a il o n th e m e rits, h e ca n n o t p re v a il a t th e su m m a ry ju d g m e n t sta g e

. B e a rd v

. B a n k , 5 4 8 U .S

. 5 2 1 , 5 2 9

– 3 0 (2 0 0 6 ). W e m a y a f firm th e d istrict co u rt

o n a n y g ro u n d s su p p o rte d b y th e re c o rd

. Mangaroo v. Nelson
, 864 F.2d 1202, 1204 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989).
III.
Stauffer requests both injunctive and mo n e tary relief f or the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. We address each request in turn.
A

. Stauffer’s claims for injunctive relief are moot because TDCJ has replaced
SOTP 0 2.06 with a new version of the rule tha t c o r r e c t s the d e ficiencies that
Stauffer complains o f here. I f the controversy between Stauffer and Defendants
has been “ r e s o l v e d to the point that they no l onger qualify as ‘adverse parties
with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation,’ we a re without power
to entertain the c ase.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas , 560 F.3d 316, 324 ( 5th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub n om., S ossamon v. Texas , 131 S. Ct. 1651 (20 1 1 )

. Stauffer argues that nothing indicates t h a t T DCJ’s change in p olicy is permanent, a n d t hat his claims therefore qualify for an exception to the

mootness doctrine. It is true that “defendant’s volunta r y c essation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court o f its power to determine the legality of the practice.” Id. at 325 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v

. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167 (2000)). In an ordinary case, “subsequent

even t s” would have to make it “absolutely c lear that the allegedly wrongful

7 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. Stau f fer’s a rgument, however, ignores the “lighter burden” t hat government entities bear in proving
that the c hallenged c onduct will not recur o nce the s uit is dismissed as m oot. I d. “[G]overnment actors in their sovereign capacity a nd in the exercise of
their official duties are accorded a presumption o f g o od faith because they are public servants, not self-interest e d private parties. Without e vidence to the contrary, we assume t hat f ormally a nnounced changes to official governmental policy are not mere litigation posturing.” Id. Here, TDCJ has published a new official v ersion of SOTP 02.06, and Stauffer has not presented any e vi d e n ce to suggest that the TDCJ is not following its own policy as w ritten. As a result, the
claim that Stauffer or any other partici p a n t 5 may again be subjected to the
version of SOTP 02.06 in ef f e c t a t t h e time that he was in t he Program is “too speculative to avoid mooting the case.” Id. Stauffer does not argue that Revised 02.06 would violate his—or anyone else’s—rights

. Stauffer sought to enjoin t he previous version of SOTP 02.06 because it did not require Defendants to review a publication’s

c o n t e n t , s h o w s p e c i f i c a r t i c l e ( s ) o r m a t e r i a l ( s ) c o n s i d e r e d questionable to deny publications, all o w t he appeal to denial

5 At oral argum ent Stauf f er’s couns el rep orted that Stauf f er has com p leted SO TP, and is theref ore not currently s ubject to any f orm of SO TP 02. 06. Couns el f or Def end ants rep orted that Stauf

f er is s till s erving his s entence, and the p arties w ere in d is agreem ent as to w hether it is p os s ible that Stauf f er could once again enroll in S O TP and thus be subject to any regulations ap p licable to particip ants

. As sum in g a r guendo that he could never again be a SO TP p articip ant, Stauf f er argues that his cas e is s till not m oot becaus e w e have recognized excep tions to the “s am e p arties ” requirem ent in the“cap able of rep etition yet evad ing review ”
excep tion to m ootnes s in certain circum s tances

. See M oore v

. H osem a nn , 591 F. 3d 741, 744–45 ( 5th Cir. 2009) ; Ctr. f

or Indi v i dua l Freedom v. Ca rm ouche
, 449 F. 3d 655, 662 ( 5th C ir. 2006)

. Stauf f er has not p ointed to any cas es w here w e have held that this excep tion is als o ap p licable

w hen a p laintif

f is challenging an on- going governm ent p olicy in the pris on context. Cf

. U ni ted Sta tes v

. How a rd
, 480 F. 3d 1005, 1009–10 ( 9th Cir. 2007)

. We need not reach that is s ue tod ay becaus e there is no ind ication here that a nyone w ill again be s ubject to the vers ion of SO TP 02. 06 at is s ue in this cas e. Lik ew is e, w e need not d eterm ine whether the f act that Stauf

f er has lef t the Program im p acts his stand ing to reques t injunctive relief becaus e we d is m is s thes e claim s as m oot.

8 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

decisions, a nd a dd itionally the s pecific acceptance of publications and subscription magazines a s well as catalogs that relate to my trade allowed to be received by all other offenders and puzzle books to further stimulate the mind. By con t rast, Revised 02.06 requires an i n d ividualized review of publications
before t hey a re confiscated, and places far fewer limits on what p ublications an SOTP participant may receive. F o r example, while the old version of SOTP
02.06 did not allow p articipants to receive any m agazines, Revised 02.06 allows magazines so l ong as t hey are not: (1) detrimental to the rehabilitation program; (2) do n ot approve or pr o m o t e alcohol or drug use; and (3) are not sexually explicit. These limitations are m u ch more closely tailored to the TDCJ’s
rational for limiting the r eading material a vailable to Program participants.
Stauffer f

a i l s t o provide any argument as to why Revised 02.06 is constitutionally i mpermissible. Given this change in policy, Stauffer’s claim for injunctive relief is moot. 6
B

. W e n o w tu rn to S ta u ffe r’s cla im s fo r m o n e t a ry re lie f. S ta u ffe r d id n o t

su ffe r p h y sica l in ju ry i n c o n n e ctio n w ith h is co n stitu tio n a l cla i m s, a n d is
th e re fo re p re clu d e d fro m re co v e rin g co m p e n sa to ry d a m a g e s. 4 2 U .S

. C

. § 1 9 9 7 e (e ); see a lso M a y f ield v

. T e x a s D ep ’t o f C r im in a l J u stice , 5 2 9 F .3 d 5 9 9 , 6 0 5

– 0 6 (5 th C i r. 2 0 0 8 ); Geiger v. Jowers , 4 04 F.3d 371, 3 75 (5th Ci r

. 2 005) (a p p l y in g § 1 9 9 7 e (e ) to b a r p riso n e r’s c la im fo r d a m a g e s b ro u g h t u n d e r § 1 9 8 3

6 TD CJ’s change in p olicy lik ew is e moots Stauf f er’s reques t f

or a declaratory jud gm ent. See Connel l v

. Shoem a ker , 555 F. 2d 483, 486 ( 5th Cir. 1977) (“[ T] he ques tion of the m ootnes s
v el non of ap p ellants ’ claim und er the Declaratory Jud gm ent Act, 28 U

. S. C

. § 2201, becom es
w hether the facts alleged , und er a ll the circum s tances , s how that there is a s ubs tantial controvers y, betw een p arties having ad vers e legal intere s t s , of s uf ficient im m ed iacy and reality to w arrant the is s ue of a d eclaratory jud gm ent. ” (intern a l q u o t ation m ark s and citations om itted ) )

. 9 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

a lle g in g a F irst A m e n d m e n t v io l a t i o n ). 7 A n in m a t e ’s a lle g a tio n t h a t h is

p e rso n a l p ro p e rty w a s lo st, co n fisca te d , o r d a m a g e d d o e s n o t sta te a cla im

u n d e r 4 2 U .S .C

. § 1 9 8 3 , e v e n w h e n p riso n o fficia ls a cte d i n te n tio n a lly

. H u d so n

v

. P a lm er , 4 6 8 U

. S

. 5 1 7 (1 9 8 4 ); G eig er , 4 0 4 F

. 3 d a t 3 7 4

. In T e x a s, w h e n a n in m a te ’s p ro p e r ty i s ta k e n w ith o u t co m p e n sa tio n , h i s re m e d y is in sta te co u rt,

n o t fe d e ra l co u r t. T

h o m p so n v . S l e ele , 7 0 9 F

. 2 d 3 8 1 , 3 8 3 (5 th C ir. 1 9 8 3 ).
Stauffer is likewise not entitled to p u nitive damages. N e ith e r a s ta te n o r

a sta te o fficia l su e d in a n o fficia l ca p a city is a “p e rso n ” u n d e r § 1 9 8 3

. W ill v

. M ich ig a n D ep ’

t o f S t a t e P o l i c e , 4 9 1 U .S

. 5 8 , 6 4 , 9 2 (1 9 8 9 ) ; see a lso O liv er v

. S C a li
, 2 7 6 F .3 d 7 3 6 , 7 4 2 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 2 ). A cco rd in g ly , S ta u ffe r’ s cla im s f o r

m o n e ta ry d a m a g e s a g a in st D e fe n d a n ts in th e ir o fficia l ca p a citie s w e re p ro p e rly
d ism isse d b y th e d istrict co u rt.
D e fe n d a n ts a re a lso im m u n e fro m d a m a g e s i n th e ir in d iv id u a l ca p a city
b e ca u s e th e y d id n o t v io l a te S ta u ffe r ’s cle a rly e sta b lish e d co n stitu t io n a l rig h ts. “Q u a lifie d im m u n i ty sh ie ld s fe d e ra l a n d sta te o fficia ls fro m m o n e y d a m a g e s

u n le s s a p la in tiff p le a d s fa cts sh o w i n g (1 ) th a t th e o fficia l v io la t e d a sta tu to ry

o r co n stitu tio n a l rig h t , a n d (2 ) th a t th e r ig h t w a s cle a rly e s ta b lish e d a t th e tim e

o f t h e c h a lle n g e d c o n d u c t.” A sh cro ft v

. a l-K id d
, 1 3 1 S

. C t

. 2 0 7 4 , 2 0 8 0 (2 0 1 1 ) (cita tio n o m itte d )

. “A Government o fficial’s conduct violates c learly established
law when, at the time of t he challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently c lear’ that every ‘reaso n a ble official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right.’ W e do not require a case directly o n point,
but existing precedent must have placed t he statutory or c onstitutional question beyond debate.” A sh cro ft
, 1 3 1 a t 2 0 8 3 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton
, 483 U.S. 635, 6 40 (1987)). W e need not decid e w hether Stauffer’s rights were actually

7 Stauf f er can, how ever, recover nom inal and p unitive d am ages w ithout a s how ing of
p hys ical injury. See Ma yf i el d
, 529 F. 3d at 606.

10 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

v i o lated, because even if they were, Stauffer has n ot p roven that those rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.
i.
Prisoners do not lose all constitutional rights once they pass b eyond prison

w a l l s , b ut they r etain only those First A mendment rights which are n ot
inconsistent with t heir status a s prisoners or with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison system. See Turner v. Safley
, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); see also Hudson v

. P

alm e r , 4 6 8 U.S. 517, 523 (1984). Because courts are “‘ill equipped’ t o deal with the difficult a nd delicate problems of prison management, [the S upreme Court] has afforded considerable deference to the d eterminations
of prison administrators.” Thornburgh v. Abbott , 490 U.S. 4 01, 407–08 (1988). “[P]rison administrators

. . . , and not the courts, [are] to m ake the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Id. a t 409 ( quoting Turner, 482
U.S. at 8 9). Furtherm o re, “prison officials may well c o nclude that certain proposed interactions, though seemingly innocuous to laymen, have potentially

s i gnificant implications for the order a nd security of the prison.” Id. at 4 0 7

. Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court has rejected a “heightened” scrutiny standa r d for regulations t hat are “ centrally concerned with the
maintenance of order a nd security within prisons” and inste a d a p plies a reasonableness standard. Id. at 409–10. A prison regulation that “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights

. . . is v alid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner , 428 U.S. at 88.
The Turner Court s e t out four factors to consider in determining the
reasonableness o f t h e regulation at issue: (1) whether there is a rational relationship between t he prison regulation and the l e gitimate g o v e r nmental
interest put forward to j ustify it; (2) whether the inmate has an available
alternative means of exercising the rights; (3) the impact of a ccommodation on other inmates, guards, and allocation of prison resources; and (4) the presence

11 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

or a bsence of easy and o bvious alternative means to accommodate t he r ight.
Turner , 4 82 U.S. at 89–91; see also Prison Legal News v. Livingston , 683 F.3d 201, 2 14 ( 5th C ir. 2012). “‘[R]ationality is the controlling factor,’ and t h e remaining factors a re best understood a s indicators of rationality.” Prison Legal
News , 683 F.3d at 214–215 (quoting Mayfield
, 5 29 F.3 d at 607). The prisoner
has t he burden o f demonstrating that there is no rational relation to a legitimate penological interest, and t h e prison does n ot have to p rove t hat t h e censored
materials would cause problems. Id. at 216. The prison policy d oes not need to
be the least r estrictive means t o a c c o mplish t he policy, but only generally necessary to a legitimate governmental i n terest. See Thornburgh
, 490 U.S. at
410–11. The prison policy may be struck down only if its relationship to the government objective is “so remote as to render the p o l i cy arbitrary or irrational.” Freeman v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice , 369 F.3d 854, 8 61 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Turner , 482 U.S. at 89–90).
Stauffer has n ot show tha t S O T P 02.06 was irrational under existing precedent. First, Stauffer f ailed t o prove that SOTP 02.06 is not “legitimate and
neutral.” Thornburgh
, 4 90 U .S. at 414. To fulfill the neutrality requirement,
“the regulation or p ractice in question m ust further a n important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of e xpression.” Prison Legal
News , 683 F.3d at 215 (quoting Thornburgh
, 490 U.S. at 415). A regulation can be considered neutral even if it is content o r v iewpoint specific. See id. at 218 n.6; see also Thornburgh
, 4 90 U.S. at 415–16. SOTP 02.06 itself stated that its

purpose was to “facilitate treatment” and Stauffer has n ot shown that the TDCJ
had any ulterior m o t i v e i n p romulgating the rule. Defendants argue that the
content-based distinctions that SOTP 02.06 made for sexually explicit materials

w ere neutral because they were drawn on the b asis of their po t e n t i a l
i m p l i cations for SOTP. The purpose o f the distinction that SOTP 02.06 drew
between newspapers and r eligious materials and all other p ublications was also

12 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

arguably related to the Program’s rehabilitation purpose. TDCJ dete r m i n e d that newspapers and religious materials were “bare essentials,” but concluded
that other publications would further distract participants from focusing on the Program. E ven though Defendants h a v e n o t a r t i c u l a t e d t h e clearest explanation
for these distinctio n s , S tauffer bears, and fails to m eet, the burden o f showing
that SOTP 02.06 was not neutral. 8
S e co n d , S ta u ffe r fa i ls to sh o w th a t S O T P 0 2 .0 6 w a s n o t ra tio n a lly re la te d

to T D C J ’s le g i tim a te in te re st in se x -o ffe n d e r re h a b ilita tio n

. In M cK u n e v

. L ile
, th e S u p re m e C o u rt r e co g n i ze d t h a t K a n sa s h a d a n u n d e n i a b le in te re st in

re h a b i l ita tin g s e x
- o f

fe n d e rs. 5 3 6 U .S

. 2 4 , 3 2

– 3 3 , 4 8 (2 0 0 2 ). D e fe n d a n t s lik e w ise a r g u e th a t se x -o ffe n d e r tre a t m e n t p ro g r a m s a r e a n i m p o rta n t

re h a b i l ita tio n g o a l in th e p riso n sy ste m s, a n d th a t S O T P 0 2 .0 6 p la ce d

re strictio n s o n r e a d in g m a t e ria l in o rd e r to fa cilita t e t r e a tm e n t b y p r e v e n tin g d istra c tio n s. D e fe n d a n ts su b m itte d a ffid a v i ts e x p la in in g w h y so m e o f t h e

m a g a zin e s S ta u ffe r re q u e s t e d u n d e rm in e d th e g o a ls o f S O T P

. T h e se
sta te m e n ts a re n o t, a s S ta u ffe r a sse rts, “b a re co n c lu sio n s” o r “ m e re ip s e d i x i t

o f a p u rp o r te d e x p e rt w ith n o p ro b a tiv e v a lu e

. ” In ste a d , th e y a re t h e

p ro fe s sio n a l ju d g m e n ts b y p riso n o fficia ls ta s k e d w ith o v e rse e i n g t h is P ro g ra m ,

a n d a re th e re fo re e n title d to d e fe re n ce

. S ee B ea r d
, 5 4 8 U .S

. a t 5 2 9

– 3 0 (C o u r t s “m u st d istin g u i sh b e tw e e n e v id e n ce o f d isp u te d fa cts a n d d isp u te d m a tte rs o f

8 Stauf f er als o argues that SO TP 02. 06 fails the neutrality requirem ent as ap p lied to him becaus e the “regulations f airly invited pris on of

f icials and em p loyees to ap p ly their ow n p ers onal p rejud ices and op inions as s tand ard s f or pris oner m ail cens ors hip .” We ad d res s ed

a very s im ilar ques tion in Pri son Lega l N ew s. 683 F. 3d at 220. There, w e d eterm ined that the

c e n so r i n g rule was neutral d es p ite incons is tent res ults s tem ming f rom “ t h e e n o r mo u s d i f

f u si o n of res pons ibility f

or m ak ing initial cens ors hip d ecis ion s ” b y “ r o u g h l y 5 0 0 ma i l room em p loyees

. ” Id. As w e exp lained , d ecis ions about w hich p ublications the p ris oners could and could not read

are “p recis ely the t y p es of subjective as s es s m ents that us ually f all w ithin p ris on ad m inis trators ’ d is cretion” and w e conclud ed that the incons is tencies w ere not enough to d e f e a t t h e r e a s o nablenes s of the p ractice. Id. at 221. SO TP 02. 06 is lik ew is e neutral as ap p lied to Stauf

fer not w iths tand ing the f act that SO TP 02. 06 allow s p ris on s taf f to exercis e their d is cretion in d eterm ining w hich p ublications p articip ants could receive.

13 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

p ro fe s sio n a l ju d g m e n t

. In re sp e ct t o t h e l a tte r, o u r in fe re n ce s m u st a cco rd
d e fe re n c e to th e v ie w s o f p riso n a u t h o ritie s.”).
S ta u ffe r co n te n d s th a t S O T P 0 2 .0 6 w a s irra tio n a l b e c a u se it a llo w e d

a lte rn a tiv e ch a n n e l s fo r p a rt i c i pant s t o r ec ei ve “d istra ctin g ” m a te ria ls a n d d o e s

n o t ju stify its b a n o n t h e p a r ticu l a r m a g a zin e s th a t S ta u ffe r o rd e re d

. S ta u ffe r cite s tw o p re

- T

u r n er ca se s t o a r g u e th a t S O T P 0 2 .0 6 w a s p a te n tly in e ffe ctiv e

a t a c h i e v in g its sta te d p u rp o se , a n d th u s v io la te d h is rig h ts. 9 See Mann v

. Smith, 796 F .2d 79, 81–83 (5th Cir. 1986); Green v. F e r r e ll, 801 F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1986)). 1 0 Specifi c a l l y , Stauffer argues that SOTP 02.06 was underinclusive b e c a u se it banned some distracting materials but n ot others.
E v e n a s suming the applicability of M a n n and Green
, Stauffer has n ot shown
that th e co n to u rs o f h is rig h t to re ce iv e th e m a g a zin e s w a s “su fficie n tly cle a r”
th a t e v e ry “re a so n a b le o fficia l w o u ld h a v e u n d e rsto o d th a t w h a t h e is d o in g

9 B as ed on our d e c i s i o n in Pri son L ega l N ew s , SO TP 02. 06 m ay s till be cons id ered rational even if Stauf

f er had acces s to a num ber of book s and m agazines in the li b r a r y t h a t could als o d is tract him f rom f ocus ing on the Program

. S ee P ri son Lega l N

ew s , 683 F. 3d at 216. N or are D ef

end ants requir e d t o e x p lain w hy the p ublications allow ed by SO TP 02. 06 ( new s p a p e r s and religious m aterials ) are les s dis tracting than the m agazines Stauf f er reques ted ; D ef

end ants only need t o a r ticulate a valid , rational reas on related to the
p enological interes t in rehabilitat i o n f o r e xclud ing thes e s p ecif ic car m agazines

. Id. D ef end ants of

f er s everal: “Firs t all vocational program s m us t be com p leted p rior to entering the SO T P. Second
, s uch publications of ten contain s exually exp licit m aterial w hich s trongly und erm ines the goals of the program

. . . . [ Third , i] t is of the highes t p riority that particip ants enrolled in the Sex O f

f end er T reatm ent Program us e thos e 18 m onths to their utm os t and not be allow ed to engage in unneces s ary d is tractions

. ” Each of thes e reas ons could ind ep end ently jus tif y the D ef

end ants ’ d ecis ions to d eny the m agazines to Stauf f er. So long as their d ecis ions

are ind ivid ually jus tif iable, p ris on of

f icials are entitled to d ef erence w hen s electing betw een
w hich p ublications will and w ill not be conf is cated

. Id.

1 0 In Ma nn , w e overturned a p ris on regulation that banned m agazines and new s p ap ers in ord er to p revent p ris oners from s tarting f ires and clogging toilets

. There, we exp lained that the p olicy w as und erinclus ive and an “exaggerated res p ons e” becaus e it d id not ban a num ber of other m aterials ( s uch as book s , toilet p ap er, s heets , and blank ets ) that could als o be us ed to s tart f ires or clog toilets

. M

ann , 796 F. 2d at 81–83. In G reen the pris on regulation banned

new s pap ers and w e held that the cas e w as f actually ind is tinguis hable from M ann and thus overturned the regulati o n. G reen , 801 F

. 2d at 772 ( “If anything, the Ad am s County rule is

even more und erinclus ive becaus e it p rohibits new s p ap ers but not m agazines

. ”)

. 14 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

v io l a te s t h a t rig h t.” A sh cro ft
, 1 3 1 S

. C t. a t 2 0 8 3 ( in te rn a l q u o t a t io n m a rk s a n d
cita ti o n s o m i tte d ). In M a n n , w e co n tra ste d th e re g u la tio n a t issu e w ith t h e “ca re fu lly t a ilo re d re s t r ictio n ” in B e ll v

. Wol f i s h
, 4 4 1 U .S

. 5 2 0 , 5 5 0 (1 9 7 9 ), w h e re th e S u p re m e C o u rt u p h e ld a p ro h ib itio n a g a i n st re ce ip t o f h a rd b a c k b o o k s

u n le s s m a ile d d ire ctly fro m p u b lish e rs, b o o k clu b s, o r b o o k s to re s. M a n n , 7 9 6
F

. 2 d a t 8 2

. S O T P 0 2 .0 6 w a s lik e w ise m u ch m o re ca re f u l ly ta ilo re d to m e e t t h e P r o g ra m ’s g o a l o f re h a b i lita tio n t h a n w e re th e b a n s in M a n n a n d G reen , w h ich
d e n ie d p riso n e r s a cce ss to a ll m a g a zin e s a n d /o r n e w sp a p e rs. S ta u ffe r a d m its
th a t h e still h a d a cce s s to a w i d e ra n g e o f p u b lica tio n s. I n a d d itio n , S O T P 0 2 .0 6

o n ly a p p lie d to p a r ticip a n ts fo r th e lim ite d 1 8

- m o n th p e rio d th a t th e y w e re in
S O T P , w h ile th e b a n s in M a n n a n d G r e en a p p l ie d a cro ss th e b o a rd to a l l
i n m a te s d u r in g t h e e n tire d u ra tio n o f t h e i r in ca rce ra tio n

. I d

. a t 8 1

. G iv e n th e se d iffe re n ce s, w e ca n n o t sa y th a t e x istin g p re ce d e n t “p la ce d th e sta tu to ry

o r co n stitu tio n a l q u e s tio n b e y o n d d e b a t e .” A sh cro ft , 1 3 1 S . C t. a t 2 0 8 3

. S t a u f f e r has not s hown that SOTP 02.06 was i rrational, and has thus
failed to prove that our binding precedent at the time o f t h e a l l e g ed violation
made the contours o f his right suffici e n t l y c lear that Defendants would have
understood t hat they were v i olating his First Amendment rights. See A shcroft
, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. His First Amendment claims therefore fail.
ii.
We now turn to Stauffer’s rights under the Equal Protection C lause and
likewise conclude that Defendants did not v iolate his clearly established rights.
Stauffer contends t hat S O TP 02.06 violated his Equal Protection rights because
it targeted convicted sex-offe n d e r s a s a specific class of offenders. He argues that T D C J l a c ked a reasonable justification f or treating SOTP p articipants differently under SOTP 02.06, and that the rule was motivated by “an indignant
animus towards s ex offenders.” “A classification that categorizes inmates based

15 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

on the type o f c riminal o f fenses f o r w h i c h they have been convicted d oes not implicate a suspect class.” W attlin v

. F

l e m i n g , 136 F.3d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). As a result, any classification of convicted sex-offenders is only subject to a rational basis review. I d. at 1036–37.
The d i s t r i ct court applied the rational basis t est and granted summary judgment t o Defendants with respect to this claim because the a ffidavits they
submitted with t h eir summary judgment mo t i o n established that sexually explicit materials would undermine the Program. In addition, the district court
determined that the policy limiti n g the participants’ distractions while in the Program was rationally related to the goal of i ncreasing the p articipants’ focus

on t h e Program. As we have already noted, SOTP 02.06 is rationally related to
this l e gitimate penalogical interest in rehabilitation

. It therefore satisfies the rational basis test and Stauffer’s Equal Protection claim fails.
iii.
Stauffer next argues that Defendants deprived him of due process when they confiscated his magazines. Once again, Stauffer has failed to p r ove that
Defendants violated his clearly established rights because the TDCJ grievance

p r o c e s s provided S tauffer with due process. Stauffer could, and did, use t h e TDCJ grievance system to claim t hat he w a s wrongly denied the car magazines.
His Step 2 Grievance Report indicates that Stauffer was able to make his claims,
and that prison administrators responded by investigating his claims and giving

a written j ustification for why he was not entitled to r elief. T he district court therefore correctly ruled that Stauffer failed to state a Due Process claim. See Geiger
, 4 0 4 F .3d a t 374 (“Geiger does not have a federally protected liberty
interest in having these grievances r e solved to his satisfaction. As h e relies on

a legally nonexistent interest, any alleged d ue process v iolation arising from the alleged failure to investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.”).

16 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/24/2014No. 12-20195

In su m , S ta u f

fe r d id n o t h a v e a c l e a r l y e s ta b lish e d r i g h t to re ce iv e t h e

m a g a z in e s a t th e tim e th a t th e y w e re co n f isca te d

. H e h a s n o t p o in te d to a n y

ca se la w in d ica tin g th a t D e fe n d a n ts s h o u ld h a v e re a so n a b ly k n o w n th a t h e h a d

a rig h t to th e m a g a zin e s. His claim for damages therefore fails. 1 1
IV. For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the dismissal of Stauffer’s case.

1 1 There is no relief t h a t Stauf f er is entitled to, as his claim s for injunctive relief are
m oot and his claim s for d am ages are w ithout m erit. Accord ingly, we d o not reach his other claim s

. Stauf

f er m ay s till f

ile a s ep arate s uit f

or his retaliation claim s

. 17 Case: 12-20195 Document: 00512512020 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/24/2014