KC-46 TANKER 

AIRCRAFT

Program Generally 

Stable but 

Improvements in 

Managing Schedule 

Are Needed 

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2013

GAO-13-258

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-258, a report to 

congressional committees 

February 2013 

KC-46 TANKER AIRCRAFT 

Program Generally Stable but Improvements in 

Managing Schedule Are Needed 

Why GAO Did This Study

Aerial refueling allows U.S. military

aircraft to fly further, stay airborne

longer, and carry more weapons,

equipment, and supplies. Yet the

mainstay of U.S. tanker forces—the

KC-135 Stratotanker—is over 50 years

old. It is increasingly costly to support

and its age-related problems could

potentially ground the fleet. As a result,

the Air Force has initiated the $52

billion KC-46 program to replace the

aerial refueling fleet. The program

plans to produce 18 tankers by 2017

and 179 aircraft by 2027. 

The National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requires GAO

to annually review the KC-46 program

through 2017. This report addresses

(1) progress made in 2012 toward cost,

schedule, and performance goals, (2)

identified program challenges, and (3) 

program risk mitigation tools. To 

address these areas, GAO reviewed 

key program documents, discussed 

development plans and results with 

officials from the KC-46 program office, 

other defense offices, and the prime 

contractor, Boeing. GAO assessed the 

program’s development schedule and 

technology risks. GAO also assessed 

the program’s acquisition plan to

determine compliance with acquisition

legislation and acquisition best

practices. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Department 

of Defense (DOD) analyze the root 

causes for the rapid allocation of 

management reserves and improve the

KC-46 master schedule. DOD fully 

concurred with these 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The KC-46 program 2012 estimates for cost, schedule, and performance are

virtually the same as last year’s, with the contractor running very close to the 

planned budget and schedule. Development work is more than one-fourth

complete and a successful preliminary design review was held on schedule in 

April 2012. In response to a prior GAO recommendation, the program now has 

fully implemented metrics to measure the progress toward its key performance 

parameters and expects to meet these requirements. There are two areas of 

concern regarding program cost: first, both the contractor and government 

estimate the cost of development will exceed the contract ceiling price of $4.9 

billion (although government liability is capped at that ceiling); and second, the 

contractor has already allocated about 80 percent of the management reserves 

budget, primarily for identified, yet unresolved, development risks, with the bulk 

of work—about 5 years—remaining. GAO maintains that significant use of these 

funds early in a program may indicate problems. The program has not yet 

evaluated how the significant use of these funds early could impact future 

milestones. 

With development generally stable, the program is addressing, in varying

degrees, some key challenges. First, defense, contractor, and federal aviation 

officials all identify the flight test schedule as a substantive concern. An 

integrated test team continues to evaluate and adjust flight test plans ahead of 

the 2015 start. Second, the contractor must still complete a significant number of 

engineering drawings needed for the upcoming critical design review; about 

three-fifths are complete and some lower level subsystem reviews are behind 

schedule. Third, the contractor is still in the process of relocating key personnel 

and establishing facilities needed for integrating defense equipment after 

deciding to close the original location. Additional work continues to more fully 

mature critical technologies, solidify software plans, address growth in aircraft 

weight, and ensure there are no design issues with the wing refueling pods and 

the boom refueling system. Program officials continue to monitor these issues to 

ensure they will not have major impacts.

The KC-46 program acquisition strategy and contract type are effective

mechanisms for mitigating risks. The use of a fixed price contract limits

government cost risk and technology risk is lessened by converting a commercial 

derivative aircraft into the KC-46 tanker. The KC-46 master schedule, acquisition 

plan, and management framework favorably compare with best practices and 

acquisition reform legislation, with some exceptions. For example, the master 

schedule met 7 of 10 best practices criteria, but did not include and sequence all 

activities and could have incorporated a broader range of uncertainty, leaving 

room to improve the schedule so program success is not jeopardized.

View GAO-13-258. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841, 

or sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Letter 1 

Background 2

KC-46 Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance Estimates 

Remain Unchanged but There Are Some Concerns as 

Development Progresses 5

Program Is Working On Some Testing, Design, Manufacturing, and 

Technical Challenges 11

Program Has Effective Mechanisms for Mitigating Risks and 

Conducting Program Oversight 19

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments 25

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27

Appendix II Comparison of Current KC-135 versus Planned KC-46 

Performance Capabilities 30

Appendix III Description of KC-46 Key Performance Parameters 31

Appendix IV Top Risks Identified by the KC-46 Integrated Test Team and 

Proposed Mitigation Efforts 32

Appendix V KC-46 Critical Technology Elements 34

Appendix VI Description of GAO Scheduling Best Practices 35

Appendix VII Key Boeing Suppliers for the KC-46 Program 37

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of Defense 38

Appendix IX GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 40

Tables

Table 1: Approved KC-46 Quantities, Cost, and Schedule 6

Table 2: KC-46 Development Contract Amounts Compared to 

Current Estimates 9

Table 3: Changes to the Planned Composition of KC-46 Software 17

Table 4: Summary Assessment of KC-46 Development Schedule 

Compared to Best Practices 21

Figures

Figure 1: Conversion of Boeing 767-2C into KC-46 Aerial Refueling 

Tanker 3

Figure 2: KC-46 Development Contract Management Reserves 

Allocation Trend (December 2012) 10

Figure 3: KC-46 Engineering Design Drawing Completion Status 

Leading to Critical Design Review 15

Figure 4: Planned KC-46 Program Concurrency between 

Development, Flight Testing, and Production 19
Page iii GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Abbreviations

CDR critical design review

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DOD Department of Defense

EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FPIF fixed price incentive (firm target)

ITT Integrated Test Team

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PDR preliminary design review

TPM technical performance measures

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

February 27, 2013

Congressional Committees

The KC-46 tanker modernization program, valued at $52 billion, is the Air 

Force’s highest acquisition priority and recently completed its second year 

in development to convert a commercial derivative aircraft into an aerial 

refueling tanker.1

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requires that 

we annually review and report on the KC-46 program.

Aerial refueling—the transfer of fuel from airborne 

tankers to combat and airlift forces—is critical to the U.S. military’s ability 

to project power overseas and to effectively operate within a combat 

theater. It enables military aircraft to fly further, stay airborne longer, and 

carry more weapons, equipment, and supplies than unrefueled forces. 

KC-46 aircraft are expected to replace about two-fifths of the KC-135 

Stratotanker fleet, currently the mainstay of the U.S. large tanker force. 

This force is now over 50 years old on average and costs increasingly 

more to maintain and support, with additional concerns that age-related 

problems could potentially ground the fleet. Consequently, the Air Force 

plans to develop, test, and field 18 KC-46 tankers by August 2017, and 

eventually have a total of 179 aircraft by 2027.

2 In our initial March 

2012 report, we recommended close monitoring of its cost, schedule, and 

performance outcomes in order to identify positive or negative lessons 

learned.3

 

1

The KC-46 designation refers to the acquisition program, while the actual tanker aircraft 

being procured is designated the KC-46A. For purposes of this report, we will use the KC46 designation throughout. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) agreed. These lessons and 

the data compiled by the program could be very illustrative and important 

to decision makers to help guide and improve future defense acquisition 

programs since the KC-46 is one of the few major programs to award a 

fixed price incentive (firm target) (FPIF) development contract in recent 

years. We also recommended that the KC-46 program manager fully 

implement sound metrics for each of the aircraft’s planned key 

performance parameters, to help ensure that achievement of these 

2

Pub. L. No. 112-81 § 244 (2011).

3

GAO, KC-46 Tanker Aircraft: Acquisition Plans Have Good Features but Contain 

Schedule Risk, GAO-12-366 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2012).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

parameters can be appropriately measured as the program moves toward 

production. Subsequently, the program office took steps to do so.

This is our second annual report in which we (1) evaluate program 

progress toward cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) identify 

design, manufacturing, testing plan, and technology challenges; and (3) 

assess the extent the program has developed effective, appropriate 

methods to contain and mitigate risks. We could not assess the 

contractor’s manufacturing processes because the program has only 

recently completed its second year of development and it is too early for 

this assessment. To conduct this work, we discussed plans and results 

with the Air Force’s KC-46 program office, other defense offices, and the 

prime contractor, the Boeing Company (Boeing). We reviewed financial 

management documents, program budgets, risk assessments, technical 

performance indicators, flight test plans and data relating to the program’s 

cost, schedule, and performance. We visited Boeing’s commercial 

production line and its facilities for system integration and military 

modifications, and obtained information on the program’s flight testing 

and manufacturing plans.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to February 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more 

information on our scope and methodology.

In February 2011, Boeing won the Air Force competition to develop the 

next generation aerial refueling tanker aircraft. Boeing received a FPIF 

development contract with incentives to control cost while limiting the 

government’s financial liability. The development contract is to design, 

manufacture, and deliver four KC-46 tankers for flight testing. The Air 

Force expects to exercise contract options for the first production lot in 

2015 and the second production lot in 2016, both needed for Boeing to 

produce and deliver 18 operational aircraft in the final production 

configuration by August 2017. In addition, all required training must be 

complete, and the required support equipment, and sustainment support 

in place by August 2017. Then the acquisition strategy calls for Boeing to 

produce the remaining aircraft through year 2027 at a target rate of 15 

aircraft per year. Separate competitions may occur for later acquisitions, 

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

nominally called the KC-Y and KC-Z, to replace the rest of the KC-135 

fleet and the KC-10 fleet (the Air Force’s other large tanker).

The KC-46 program’s acquisition strategy is to convert a commercial 

Boeing 767 airframe into a militarized aerial refueling tanker in two 

phases. In the first, Boeing is modifying their 767 airframe with a cargo 

door and an advanced flight deck display borrowed from the new Boeing 

787 aircraft and calling this modified version the 767-2C. In the second, 

the 767-2C airframe will be further militarized by adding the air refueling 

capabilities, an air refueling operator station that includes panoramic 

three-dimensional displays, and threat detection and avoidance systems. 

Figure 1 depicts how the 767-2C aircraft is to be configured into the KC46 tanker.

Figure 1: Conversion of Boeing 767-2C into KC-46 Aerial Refueling Tanker

The new KC-46 tanker is expected to be more capable than the KC-135 it 

replaces in several respects. It will have a modernized KC-10 tanker 

refueling boom integrated with a fly-by-wire (computer assisted) control 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

system and a permanent hose and drogue refueling system that will 

enable both types of refueling to be employed on the same mission.4

The KC-46 program is one of only a few major weapon system programs 

in recent years to employ a fixed price development contract. In the past, 

DOD has typically used cost-reimbursement contracts in which the 

government pays all allowable costs incurred by the contractor. Recent 

legislation and defense policy now emphasize the use of fixed price 

development contracts, where warranted, to limit the government’s 

exposure to cost increases. Defense officials believe that a fixed price 

development contract is appropriate for this program because KC-46 

development is considered to be a relatively low-risk effort to integrate 

mostly mature military technologies onto a well-defined commercial 

derivative aircraft.

The 

KC-135 has to land and switch equipment to transition from one mode to 

another. Also, the KC-46 is expected to be able to refuel in a variety of 

night-time and covert mission settings and will have countermeasures to 

protect it against infrared missile threats. Designed with more refueling 

capacity, improved efficiency, and increased cargo and medical 

evacuation capabilities than its predecessor, the KC-46 is intended to 

provide aerial refueling to Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied 

aircraft. Appendix II compares, in more detail, the current capabilities of 

the KC-135 with the planned capabilities of the new KC-46 tanker.

 

4

Currently, Air Force fixed-wing aircraft refuel with the “flying boom.” The boom is a rigid, 

telescoping tube that an operator on the tanker aircraft extends and inserts into a 

receptacle on the aircraft being refueled. Air Force helicopters, and all Navy and Marine 

Corps aircraft refuel using the “hose and drogue.” The “hose and drogue” system involves 

a long, flexible refueling hose stabilized by a drogue (a small windsock) at the end of the 

hose. The pilot of the receiving aircraft maneuvers and connects to the hose.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

The KC-46 program estimates for cost, schedule, and performance are 

essentially unchanged from last year. While the current cost estimate 

shows an increase of about $217 million for development and 

procurement combined, program officials explained this increase was 

unneeded funding that will be returned to DOD. The contractor is running 

very close to its budget and schedule. Development work is more than 

one-fourth complete and the program successfully accomplished its 

preliminary design review (PDR) on schedule. Also, the program has now 

implemented metrics, in response to our prior recommendation, to 

measure the development progress toward achieving its nine key 

performance parameters and projects it will meet those requirements by 

the end of development. However, there are two areas of concern at this 

point. First, both the contractor and the government estimate that 

Boeing’s development cost will exceed the contract ceiling price of $4.9 

billion, and second, the contractor has already allocated about 80 percent 

of the management reserves budget set aside for known and unknown 

development risks with about 5 years of work remaining.

Since the start of the KC-46 program about two years ago, planned 

aircraft quantities and key schedule events remain unchanged. The 

program’s latest cost estimate shows a total increase of $217 million in 

development and procurement, but Air Force officials told us that this is 

due to unneeded funding from DOD budget adjustments and the Tanker 

Replacement Transfer Fund.5

 

5

In August 2004, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-

287, § 8132) established the Tanker Replacement Transfer Fund (TRTF) through which 

Congress has made funding available to the Air Force to proceed with a tanker acquisition 

program. The Air Force must notify Congress prior to making any transfer of funds from 

the TRTF and funds transferred shall be available for the same purpose and time period 

as the appropriation to which they are transferred. Since August 2004, the Air Force has 

transferred a total of $840.7 million in budget authority from the TRTF to the tanker

program’s research, development, test, and evaluation appropriation account to fund 

weapon system development and program support activities.

Officials said that the February 2011 cost 

estimate remains the program of record and that these funding additions 

will be returned to DOD. The program also completed a major schedule 

milestone in April 2012 with a successful PDR that determined no major 

design changes were needed. The PDR is an important risk reduction 

activity as the program moves into integration and manufacture of the KC46. Table 1 summarizes the planned quantities, costs, and milestone 

KC-46 Program Cost, 

Schedule, and 

Performance 

Estimates Remain 

Unchanged but There 

Are Some Concerns 

as Development 

Progresses

Quantities, Schedule, Cost, 

and Expected 

Performance Unchanged 

Since Program Start
 

Page 6 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

dates approved when the program began in February 2011 and the most 

current estimates in October 2012.

Table 1: Approved KC-46 Quantities, Cost, and Schedule

Source: GAO presentation of Air Force data.

The current development cost estimate of $7.2 billion as reported in 

October 2012 includes $4.9 billion for the aircraft development contract 

and 4 test aircraft, $0.3 billion for the aircrew and maintenance training 

systems, and $2 billion for other government costs to include program 

office support, government test and evaluation support, contract 

performance risk, and other development risks associated with the aircraft 

and training systems. The total procurement cost estimate of $40.4 billion 

is to procure 175 production aircraft, initial spares, and other support 

February 2011 October 2012

Expected quantities

Development quantities 4 4 

Procurement quantities 175 175

Total quantities 179 179

Cost estimates (then-year dollars in 

millions)

Development $7,149.6 $7,239.6

Procurement $40,236.0 $40,363.3

Military construction $4,314.6 $4,314.6

Total program acquisition $51,700.2 $51,917.5

Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars 

in millions)

Average program acquisition $288.8 $290.0

Average procurement $229.9 $230.6

Key milestones

Program contract award (Milestone B) February 2011 February 2011

Preliminary design review April 2012 April 2012

Critical design review July 2013 July 2013 

Low rate initial production (Milestone C) August 2015 August 2015 

Initial operational test and evaluation 

start 

May 2016 May 2016

Full rate production decision June 2017 June 2017

Required assets available (18 aircraft 

operationally ready)

August 2017 August 2017
 

Page 7 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

items as priced in contract options. The military construction estimate of 

$4.3 billion includes the projected costs to build aircraft hangers, 

maintenance and supply shops, and other facilities to house and support 

the KC-46 fleet.

Through December 2012, Boeing has accomplished approximately $1.4 

billion (28 percent) in development work and has more than $3.5 billion 

(72 percent) in estimated work to go over the next 5 years. Boeing reports 

it is running very close to its budget for cost and schedule. Minimal 

schedule delays to this point are attributed primarily to design difficulties 

with the aerial refueling system, hardware deliveries for the system 

integration labs, and configuration changes to the commercial platform 

needed to accommodate military specific hardware. DOD officials do not 

expect these delays to affect the completion of critical tasks that 

ultimately determine whether Boeing can meet the required delivery date 

in the development contract. While the schedule delays are relatively 

small, studies of more than 700 defense programs have determined there 

is limited opportunity for a program to get back on schedule once they are 

more than 15 to 20 percent complete.6

The program office currently projects that the KC-46 aircraft will meet the 

requirements of all nine key performance parameters by the end of 

development. These parameters are system characteristics considered 

critical or essential to developing an effective military capability. Satisfying 

these parameters will ensure that the KC-46 will be able to accomplish its 

primary mission of providing worldwide, day and night, adverse weather 

aerial refueling as well as its secondary missions. Several of these 

parameters address performance characteristics that are limited or do not 

exist in the current tanker fleet. For example, only 8 KC-135 aircraft have 

the capability to receive fuel from another aerial refueling tanker while 

airborne. At times this limits the range of the tanker force and lessens the 

efficient use of assets. The Air Force hopes to address this by enabling 

the entire KC-46 fleet to receive fuel from other tankers. Appendix III 

describes the key performance parameters for the KC-46 program.

Also, the pace of development 

work is expected to accelerate. So far, on average, about $60 million 

worth of work has been completed per month, but over the next year 

more than $100 million worth of work per month is planned.

 

6 See Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis, “Earned Value Management Systems 

(EVMS) Tracking Cost and Schedule Performance on Projects” (2003).
 

Page 8 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Our report on the KC-46 last year noted that the program had yet to fully 

implement specific metrics needed to measure progress against these 

parameters.7 As a result, we recommended it do so as soon as possible 

to help ensure that progress toward meeting these parameters can be 

appropriately measured. The program has now fully implemented metrics 

to help measure progress toward achieving these parameters. Now that 

these metrics have been fully established we plan to track their status in 

our subsequent annual reviews of the KC-46 program.

The KC-46 development contract is designed to hold Boeing accountable 

for cost, limit the government’s financial liability, and provide Boeing 

incentives to reduce costs in order to earn more profit. At this point in the 

program, both the contractor and the government estimate that 

development costs will exceed the contract ceiling price of $4.9 billion and 

Boeing has already allocated about 80 percent of the contract’s 

management reserves, which are set aside for known and unknown 

development risks, with about five years of development work remaining.

Barring any changes to KC-46 requirements by the Air Force, the contract 

specifies a target price of $4.4 billion and a ceiling price of $4.9 billion at 

which point Boeing must assume responsibility for all additional costs.8

 

7

Currently, both Boeing and the Air Force project that the development 

effort will exceed the $4.9 billion ceiling price, with the Air Force 

concluding that the primary reason is the schedule risk associated with 

the remainder of the development effort. If so, the contractor will have to 

absorb all costs above this amount. Table 2 provides development 

contract details, current contractor and government estimates to 

complete, and the projected amounts over ceiling to be absorbed by the 

contractor.

GAO-12-366. 

8 The KC-46 development contract with Boeing specifies an incentive ratio for sharing any 

savings in the event of underruns when the actual contract cost is less than the target 

cost, or the sharing of additional costs when the actual contract cost is greater than this 

target cost. The government’s share of any cost savings or cost overrun is 60 percent 

while Boeing’s share is 40 percent. This cost sharing arrangement ends when the actual 

contract cost reaches a level that invokes the contract ceiling price of $4.9 billion, at which 

point the contractor is responsible for all additional costs.

Development Contract

Cost Estimates Exceed the 

Contract Ceiling Price and 

the Majority of Funding to 

Alleviate Program Risk 

Has Been Allocated
 

Page 9 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Table 2: KC-46 Development Contract Amounts Compared to Current Estimatesa 

Dollars in millions

Contract amounts Target price $4,393.9

Ceiling price $4,897.6

 

Current estimates at contract completion Contractor $5,163.5 (+ $265.9 over 

ceiling price)

Government $5,615.1 (+ $717.5 over 

ceiling price)

Source: GAO presentation of Air Force data..

a

Costs in this table include all fixed price incentive fee contract line items as well as two firm fixed 

price items for $66.6 million. 

The development contract performance baseline set aside $354 million in 

the management reserves account, about 7 percent of the contract ceiling 

price. As of December 2012, less than $72 million in unallocated reserves 

remain. About $282 million had been allocated, the majority to noncommercial militarization requirements, including:

• $94 million for increased system engineering and program 

management costs;

• $72 million for design and integration of military equipment with the 

commercial airframe;

• $52 million for construction of system integration labs to reduce 

development risks; and

• $42 million for additional test and evaluation challenges as well as 

cost growth for training activities, support equipment, and operational 

site activation.

Figure 2 shows the use of management reserves to date and future 

projections based on past use. Since the start of performance reporting in 

May 2011, the contractor has allocated an average of about $15 million in 

reserves each month.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Figure 2: KC-46 Development Contract Management Reserves Allocation Trend (December 2012)

Note: Reporting of contract cost performance data including the allocation of management reserves 

started in May 2011. 

The quick rate of depletion of Boeing’s management reserves raises 

concerns. Two years into a 7-year development program, the contractor 

has already allocated about 80 percent of the total available. Less than 

$72 million is available for future contingencies related to the more than 

$3.5 billion in government funded contract work remaining. DOD 

anticipates this negative trend will continue, since Boeing has told them 

design and technical issues driving the allocation of management 

reserves are not fully resolved.

At the current allocation rate, our analysis shows that management 

reserves will be depleted in May 2013, prior to the critical design review in 

July 2013 and more than 4 years before the contractually required 

delivery date for 18 operationally ready KC-46 aircraft in August 2017. 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, significant 

use of management reserves early in a program may indicate contract 

performance problems and decreases the amount of reserves available 

for future risks, particularly during the test and evaluation phase when 

demand may be the greatest.9 At the current rate, none of the reserves 

will be available to complete the bulk of development work, as well as the 

entire period of development testing. Even though Boeing is contractually 

liable for all costs above the $4.9 billion ceiling price, unanticipated design 

changes, deficiencies discovered in testing, and other risks encountered 

that might require management reserves funding could place added 

pressures on cost and schedule as the development program moves 

forward. The program has not yet evaluated how the significant use of 

these funds early in development could impact future milestones.

With development generally proceeding as planned, the program is 

addressing, in varying degrees, some key challenges. All major 

stakeholders in the program have identified concerns about the degree of 

risk in the KC-46 flight test plans and an integrated test team is evaluating 

and adjusting test plans. Also, in preparing for the program’s critical 

design review, completing extensive engineering drawings on time will be 

challenging and some lower level subsystem design reviews are behind 

schedule. Furthermore, Boeing changed its plans and location for 

manufacturing and assembling military equipment and is still in the 

process of relocating key personnel and establishing needed facilities. 

While not as complex as a new fighter aircraft, the tanker program still 

needs to integrate critical technologies, develop and test software, keep 

the aircraft within its target weight, and at the same time, navigate risks 

posed by the concurrency, or overlap, between testing and production 

activities.

The Air Force, DOD, Boeing, and the FAA have all identified the 

aggressive KC-46 flight test schedule as a risk. Developmental flight 

tests, to prove aircraft design and demonstrate the aircraft will perform as 

expected, are set to occur within a 15-month window starting in early 

2015 and ending in 2016. Concerns include the relatively short time for 

 

9

GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 2009).

Program Is Working 

On Some Testing, 

Design, 

Manufacturing, and 

Technical Challenges

Flight Test Plans a 

Concern among Program 

Stakeholders
 

Page 12 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

flight testing and fixing any deficiencies, plans for aircraft flying rates and 

personnel resources, and the time needed for air worthiness flight 

certifications.

To achieve developmental flight test plans, the contractor has proposed a 

5- to 6-day-a-week flight test approach based on its commercial aircraft 

test practices. As part of this plan, Boeing intends to fly KC-46 test aircraft 

5 days a week with a scheduled make-up day on day 6, and possibly an 

additional day, if necessary. This is a more aggressive pace than the two 

to three test missions per week for each test aircraft typically assumed by 

the Air Force for other aircraft programs. Air Force officials said their 

typical approach enables execution of test plans at a steady rate and 

includes sufficient time for data analysis, aircraft maintenance, aircrew 

training, and test planning between test flights. This issue and other flight 

test issues are being addressed by officials on the Integrated Test Team 

(ITT).10

As we stated in last year’s report,

The ITT was concerned about the Air Force’s access to contractor 

test documents and data but now has resolved this issue with Boeing. 

Also, the ITT is currently in the process of developing formal agreements 

with the Air Force, Navy, Boeing, and a foreign partner regarding the use 

of 18 military receiver aircraft to be used to certify the KC-46’s aerial 

refueling capabilities. Appendix IV provides a list of the top 8 flight test 

risks identified by the ITT and plans to mitigate those risks.

11 DOD’s Office of the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),12 also expressed concerns in 

December 2011 about the pace of testing and time available to complete 

development testing and transition to initial operational testing.13

 

10The ITT is the overarching test management team comprised of representatives from 

the KC-46 program office, the contractor, operating command, and OSD testing offices. 

In their 

most recent December 2012 assessment of the KC-46, the DOT&E has 

recommended that the start of initial operational test and evaluation, 

11GAO-12-366. 

12The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is responsible for all operational 

tests and evaluation and approves operational and live fire test and evaluation within each 

major defense acquisition program. The office also approves the test and evaluation 

master plan, which documents the overall structure and objectives of the test and 

evaluation program.

13Initial operational test and evaluation is conducted on production aircraft, or production 

representative articles, to determine whether systems are operationally effective and 

suitable to support a full-rate production decision.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

scheduled to begin in May 2016, be delayed by at least 6 months to allow 

additional time for completion of developmental testing and initial aircrew 

and maintenance training due to the aggressive flight test schedule. Their 

assessment also cites a concern that the current schedule for military 

flight testing may need to be extended by 4 to 7 months. In addition, the 

DOD development testing office has stated that the proposed flight test 

plan allots little time for correction of deficiencies discovered during 

development testing prior to the planned start of operational testing.14

The FAA still has to certify airworthiness for both the 767-2C and then the 

KC-46. The first FAA certification must approve the modifications being 

made to the original baseline 767 design and the second certification 

must approve the installation of military aerial refueling equipment for the 

KC-46 tanker configuration. Boeing established plans for the FAA to 

accomplish part of both of these certifications concurrently rather than 

consecutively which is the typical procedure. FAA officials said that such 

a condensed timeframe will require additional agency resources which 

the Air Force has to pay under a program services agreement. According 

to DOD risk assessments, if problems arise during this concurrent 

certification process, little time will be left for Boeing to recover from 

delays.

In 

January 2013, both offices approved the KC-46 overall test strategy, but 

each office still has concerns regarding the program’s detailed test plans, 

including the training of aircrew and maintenance personnel overlapping 

with the completion of developmental testing.

The KC-46 critical design review (CDR) is scheduled for July 2013. The 

CDR is a major milestone that assesses the system’s final design so that 

the product can move into fabrication, demonstration, and test. It also 

verifies whether performance requirements can be met within cost and 

schedule constraints. To prepare for the complete system CDR, the 

contractor has been conducting individual subsystem design reviews 

during 2012, a few of which were delayed. The design review on the 

aerial refueling boom hardware, for example, has been rescheduled 5 

months later than planned due to design problems. A design review of the 

 

14The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation 

reviews and approves the developmental test and evaluation content, as well as issues in 

the test and evaluation strategy and the test and evaluation master plan for each major 

defense acquisition program.

Completing Required 

Engineering Drawings for 

the Upcoming Critical 

Design Review May Be 

Challenging
 

Page 14 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

software associated with the aerial refueling operator station has also 

been rescheduled. Also, an analysis to validate the software design was 

delayed from June 2012 until February 2013. Despite these slips, 

program officials told us subsystem reviews will still occur in time to 

support the July 2013 CDR. During the upcoming CDR, Air Force officials 

indicated they will also review and approve the contractor’s plans for 

system specifications, flight testing, and supplier management.

An important contractual requirement (and best practice) is for Boeing to 

release 90 percent of the total engineering design drawings by the CDR. 

At this point, Boeing data shows that, as of early December 2012, Boeing 

has completed the expected amount of drawings and about 60 percent of 

design drawings were complete, which is about 9,000 out of nearly 

15,000 total drawings. However, given the time remaining, reaching the 

90 percent requirement by CDR could be challenging. Drawings still to be 

completed include much of the more complex, new design efforts to 

integrate the military technologies on the commercial derivative airframe. 

Figure 3 shows that as of December 2012, Boeing is adhering to its 

schedule to complete the required number of drawings before CDR.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Figure 3: KC-46 Engineering Design Drawing Completion Status Leading to Critical Design Review

Note: PDR refers to preliminary design review, and CDR refers to critical design review. 

The location, facilities, and some personnel for militarizing the 

commercial-derivative aircraft have changed since the contract was 

awarded. The Air Force originally expected Boeing to do most of the work 

at its long-standing Wichita, Kansas, facility. In January 2012, however, 

Boeing announced plans to close its Wichita plant and move all military 

modification assembly work to Seattle (home to its commercial 

manufacturing operations) to achieve greater cost efficiencies and 

accommodate defense cuts. The company has relocated key personnel, 

and plans are in place for the remaining relocations. A temporary facility 

Original Plan for 

Manufacturing and 

Assembly of Militarized 

Equipment Has Changed 

and New Plan and Needed 

Facilities Are Not Yet 

Complete
 

Page 16 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

was opened in Seattle in October 2012 to begin production of the first 

refueling aircraft boom, and the company is also examining what 

additional facilities may be needed for future production and aircraft 

militarization. Air Force officials stated that Boeing must still meet all 

contractual requirements on-time and within cost, regardless of where 

development has been taking place, and has identified this transition as a 

watch item going forward.

The KC-46 program plans to integrate three critical technologies—a 

Three Dimensional Display, Airborne ESTAR, and Threat Correlation 

Software—needed to achieve the tanker’s capability requirements. These 

technologies have each been demonstrated in a relevant environment in 

accordance with DOD and statutory requirements, but have not yet been 

demonstrated in a realistic environment. Demonstrating technology in a 

realistic environment offers a higher level of maturity and is considered a 

best practice.15 We have previously reported that programs that began 

development with technologies demonstrated to this level experienced 

less cost growth than programs with less mature technologies.16

However, the program does not plan to demonstrate these critical 

technologies in a realistic, operational environment before production 

starts. Boeing is required to submit an update to its technology maturation 

plans prior to the CDR in July 2013 and the start of low-rate initial 

production in 2015. Appendix V describes the KC-46 program’s three 

critical technologies in detail.

 

15Demonstration in a relevant environment is defined as technology readiness level 6, 

meaning that a model or prototype close to final form, fit, and function has been tested in a 

high fidelity laboratory environment or in a simulated operational environment. 

Demonstration in a realistic environment is defined as technology readiness level 7 and 

means that an actual system prototype has been integrated with key supporting 

subsystems to demonstrate full functionality and flight tested in a realistic operational 

environment. Our extensive body of work in commercial best practices suggests that this 

higher standard be attained for each critical technology before a new acquisition enters 

system development. Technology readiness requirements are defined in Department of 

Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, enc. 2, para. 5 

d. (4) (Dec. 8, 2008) and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 

Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 801 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b (a)(3)(D)).

16GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,

GAO-11-233SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011).

Program Has Some 

Remaining Technical 

Challenges
 

Page 17 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Other technical challenges include: 

• Software development. Software development plans are still evolving 

and not complete at this time. While the total amount of software 

under development has been reduced by 40 percent since the start of 

development, increased amounts of certain types of software are now 

anticipated and the planned mix of software has also changed. Boeing 

now estimates they will be not be able to reuse as much existing 

software as they thought, and must instead develop more new and 

modified software. Table 3 shows the estimated changes to the KC-46 

software plan. While needing less software overall is a positive, the 

need for more new and modified software typically requires more 

testing than software being reused. Growth in these two software 

classifications is not a favorable trend. However, at this point, officials 

do not expect that this will affect the software test schedule.

Table 3: Changes to the Planned Composition of KC-46 Software

Software type

Percent of software planned 

at start of development

Percent of software 

currently expected

Reuse 76% 52%

Modified 18 34

New 6 14

Source: KC-46 Air Force Program Office.

• Aircraft weight. Projected weight increased since last year more than 

anticipated and is now expected to exceed the KC-46’s target weight. 

If the target weight is not achieved, the aircraft will not be able to carry 

as much fuel as required. Essentially, every one pound in excess 

weight equals one pound less fuel that can be carried to accomplish 

its primary mission of refueling other aircraft. Extra weight could also 

affect operating requirements for takeoff, mission radius, and landing. 

The program does have a mitigation strategy in place to help control 

weight. Historically, weapon system acquisition programs can 

experience weight gains during development. With about 5 years of 

development remaining, including the entire flight test program, 

additional weight reduction activities may be necessary.

• Wing aerial refueling pod. Problems with buffeting, or instability, of the 

aircraft’s wing experienced on another Boeing tanker, led to the 

introduction of a new wing aerial refueling pod design for the KC-46. 

The new design also required changes in the way the refueling hose 

exits the pod, raising concerns whether the hose will be stable in 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

flight. If the new design has technical shortcomings, additional cost 

and time for unplanned design changes and subsequent testing may 

be needed.

• Boom refueling system. Some changes to the boom refueling system 

design have been determined necessary, possibly delaying the 

development of boom hardware. Boeing has added manpower to help 

manage its suppliers and is addressing risk. According to the program 

office, the boom refueling system is still on schedule, but if hardware 

is delayed, boom testing could be as well.

Successful and timely resolution of design, manufacturing, testing, and 

technical challenges could lessen and help manage cost and schedule 

risks posed by the concurrency, or overlap, of development, testing, and 

production activities. As we reported last year, funding commitments and 

the start of low rate production is scheduled before significant 

development and testing activities are completed. Currently, about 60 

percent of the dedicated KC-46 development flight testing is planned for 

completion by the start of production. While not as extensive or potentially 

costly as we have reported elsewhere,

17

 

17GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and 

Address Affordability Risks, 

 KC-46 concurrency can have 

cost and schedule consequences. Development flight testing is supposed 

to demonstrate the maturity of the design and to fix design and 

performance problems during the development phase. Discovering and 

fixing such problems during production may require modifications to 

aircraft already built and, as a result, affect schedule. Figure 4 shows the 

program’s current schedule with concurrency between planned 

development, testing, and production.

GAO-12-437 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012).

Concurrency Increases 

Schedule Risk
 

Page 19 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Figure 4: Planned KC-46 Program Concurrency between Development, Flight Testing, and Production

The KC-46 program continues to mitigate risks principally through its 

acquisition strategy and contract mechanism. The use of a fixed price 

incentive contract limits government cost risk and the plan to convert a 

commercial derivative aircraft into the KC-46 tanker lessens technology 

risk. Our assessments of the KC-46 master schedule, the acquisition 

plan, and management framework find that they favorably compare with 

best practices and acquisition reform legislation, with some exceptions.

Program Has 

Effective Mechanisms 

for Mitigating Risks 

and Conducting 

Program Oversight
 

Page 20 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

The KC-46 fixed price development contract helps control costs by 

placing more responsibility on the contractor and limiting government 

liability for cost increases. Specific contract provisions ensure that Boeing 

must correct any deficiencies and bring them to the final aircraft 

configuration at no additional cost to the government. Program officials 

have also taken steps with the KC-46 acquisition strategy to limit changes 

to requirements similar to those that have caused problems in many 

previous acquisition programs. Now, an engineering or contract change 

affecting system requirements or possibly impacting program cost, 

schedule, and performance baselines must be approved by top Air Force 

officials. Program officials also maintain the program is being managed in 

an event-based manner—meaning the start of low-rate initial production 

is not driven by a certain schedule date, but instead will not be approved 

until Boeing demonstrates the knowledge and readiness required for 

production.

As DOD seeks to employ more fixed price development contracts, where 

appropriate, and acquire more evolutionary weapon system capabilities, 

different acquisition strategies and contract provisions come into play. At 

times, these factors, and others, can change the responsibilities among 

key stakeholders. For example, when using a strategy that couples a 

fixed price contract with a largely commercial-derivative system, the 

government generally has and needs less access to the contractor’s 

activities compared to when a purely military system is being acquired.

KC-46 program officials told us the majority of preliminary and critical 

design reviews for components and subsystems used on the commercial 

767-2C aircraft are conducted as Boeing internal events, with the Air 

Force participating but not leading these reviews. Also, officials told us 

they do not receive regular status updates for some types of contractor 

data, including engineering design drawings. Officials from the Defense 

Contract Management Agency, which oversees the KC-46 development 

contract, also told us their typical oversight of defense contracts involving 

commercial items is more constrained compared to its oversight of unique 

military weapon systems.18

 

18The Defense Contract Management Agency is the DOD component that works directly 

with defense suppliers (contractors) to help ensure that DOD supplies and services are 

delivered on time, at projected cost, and meet all performance requirements. The specific 

role of the agency after a contract has been awarded to a contractor is to monitor their 

performance and management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and 

delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts.

Program Contracting 

Method and Acquisition 

Strategy Mitigate Risks
 

Page 21 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

The KC-46 program’s schedule substantially meets the 10 best practices 

we have identified as being associated with effective schedule 

estimating.19

Table 4: Summary Assessment of KC-46 Development Schedule Compared to Best 

Practices

Our analysis found that while the schedule does not fully 

meet any of the 10 best practices, it is generally comprehensive, wellconstructed with a logical sequence of activities, controlled, and credible. 

Table 4 summarizes these best practices and our assessment of the 

degree to which the KC-46 program has met them.

Best practice Extent satisfied

1. Capturing all activities Partially met

2. Sequencing all activities Partially met

3. Assigning resources to all activities Substantially met

4. Establishing the duration of all activities Substantially met

5. Verifying the schedule is traceable horizontally and vertically Substantially met

6. Confirming the critical path is valid Substantially met

7. Ensuring reasonable total float Substantially met

8. Conducting a schedule risk analysis Partially met

9. Updating the schedule using actual progress and logic Substantially met

10. Maintaining a baseline schedule Substantially met

Source: GAO analysis of KC-46 Air Force Program Office data.

Note: “Fully met” means the program provided evidence that completely satisfies the best practices 

criterion. “Substantially met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of 

the criterion. “Partially met” means the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the 

criterion. 

Overall, the evidence suggests that the KC-46 program office and Boeing 

are working to develop and maintain a healthy master schedule. Still, our 

assessment identified three areas that could be improved where the 

current schedule partially meets the best practices.

• First, our analysis found that not all activities are reflected in the 

schedule. The schedule primarily contains Boeing’s activities but does 

not fully include government activities. To better satisfy best practices, 

 

19GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, 

GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 2012). See appendix VI for a detailed description 

of these best practices.

Program Development 

Schedule Mostly Meets 

Best Practices for 

Schedule Estimating
 

Page 22 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

a program’s schedule should reflect all efforts necessary for 

successful completion regardless of who performs them.

• Second, we found a relatively large number of schedule lags and date 

constraints that may negatively impact the ability to predict how the 

delay or early completion of scheduled activities could affect the KC46 major milestones and planned finish date. While lags are included 

in a schedule to denote the passage of time, the KC-46 schedule 

provided few details on the reasons why such a large number of lags 

are included in their schedule. We also found a large number of 

constraints built into the schedule that are being used to control the 

timing of activities. Program officials stated these time constraints 

represent the contractor’s resource availability but they also prevent 

activities from starting sooner than planned to take advantage of time 

savings realized on earlier activities. It also requires constant manual 

upkeep of the schedule, increasing the likelihood of errors.

• Third, while the program office adhered to the best practice that a risk 

analysis be conducted on its planned schedule and even conducted a 

second revised schedule risk analysis after our initial assessment, we 

report this best practice as partially met. Our initial assessment found 

that the original program office schedule risk analysis may not have 

factored in enough risk into the contractor’s activity duration 

estimates, and assumptions used to conduct the risk assessment 

were not fully documented. Nor did it account for the correlation 

between activities, that is, the degree to which the duration of some 

related activities may vary together. Program officials reported that 

they revised their original analysis during October 2012 to research 

differences and record assumptions between their schedule risk 

analysis and the contractor’s. According to the program office, the 

differences were resolved and assumptions are now documented, 

which addressed some of our earlier concerns. While the program 

office reported these constructive efforts, the revised schedule risk 

analysis still does not account for the correlation between activities, 

and we did not have the time or complete information to accomplish 

an independent assessment of the revised analysis.

On the whole, the KC-46 program’s acquisition plan and management 

framework continue to favorably compare with the standards and 

requirements in GAO’s best practices work on acquisition development 

and reform legislation. The program has utilized:

• a time-defined development approach of about 7 years;

Program Has Generally 

Adhered to Acquisition 

Best Practices and Reform 

Legislation
 

Page 23 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

• a process requiring consultation with top Air Force officials before 

changing requirements;

• manufacturing readiness levels designed to provide a common 

measure and vocabulary for assessing manufacturing maturity and 

risk; and

• a knowledge-based acquisition approach, in which knowledge is 

acquired at key decision points, by ensuring requirements and 

resources match, the product design is stable, and manufacturing 

processes are mature.

As we reported last year, while the program has implemented many 

acquisition best practices, the Air Force did not conduct a technology 

development phase and instead proceeded directly into development.20

The program reports that it is also meeting many of the requirements of 

the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act) that 

encourages DOD to engage in a more robust discussion of trade-offs 

among cost, schedule, and performance.

The program’s three critical technologies were assessed as approaching 

maturity and meeting internal defense policy, but below the fully mature 

level associated with best practices. Our prior work consistently shows 

that programs going directly into development before fully maturing all 

critical technologies typically incur additional costs and take longer to 

complete.

21

Finally, the contractor is using several commercial best practices for the 

KC-46 program. For example, Boeing requires all of its major suppliers to 

meet a stringent aerospace industry quality management standard and 

has a supplier quality assurance surveillance process to monitor supplier 

 To comply with this 

legislation, the program has implemented cost and schedule 

management requirements and is measuring and reporting on operation 

and sustainment costs. Further, they have also implemented cost 

effective measures including plans for future competitions for aircraft 

subsystems and several software integration laboratories. The Air Force 

is also employing an incremental acquisition approach, as mentioned in 

the Reform Act, to replacing the current refueling fleet by procuring the 

KC-46, and then later the KC-Y and KC-Z. This approach could leverage 

competition for future tanker aircraft development and procurement.

 

20 GAO-12-366. 

21 Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 201. 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

technical, cost, and schedule delivery information to mitigate risk. 

Appendix VII provides a list of key Boeing suppliers for the KC-46 

program. In addition, the Air Force has approved the contractor’s 

manufacturing program plan that leverages military modifications on the 

commercial 767 assembly line with Boeing planning to use a 

manufacturing readiness assessment and production reviews for quality 

assurance.

Entering its third year, the KC-46 development program is, for the most 

part, progressing as planned even though some concerns exist. The 

program has an ambitious schedule, particularly with regard to flight 

testing. While program estimates are essentially unchanged, the 

development contract cost estimate continues to be above the contract 

ceiling price, making it essential the government not change KC-46 

requirements. Boeing has also allocated management reserves at a high 

rate which raises concerns because doing so early in a program is often 

an indicator of future contract performance problems. While the fixed 

price development contract caps the government’s cost liability, it would 

still behoove the Air Force to fully understand the causal factors driving 

the accelerated use of management reserves in order to recognize risks, 

consider potential trade-offs, and better understand circumstances that 

could impact on-time delivery to the warfighter. Also, improvements to a 

few aspects of the program’s master schedule could make it more 

complete and robust to further help ensure program success.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following 

two actions on the KC-46 program.

• To help understand and monitor the causes of the majority of 

contractor management reserves being allocated two years into 

development, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Air Force, 

after Boeing has fully resolved the relevant design and technical 

issues, to analyze the root causes for the rate of expenditure of 

reserves in order to help the Air Force fully recognize and mitigate risk 

areas.

• To help maintain a more thorough and insightful KC-46 development

schedule, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Air Force to 

address our concerns related to three schedule best practices 

(capturing all activities, sequencing all activities, and conducting a 

schedule risk analysis), where we concluded the program’s master 

schedule had only partially met best practice criteria.

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 25 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report which 

are reprinted in appendix VIII. DOD concurred with our two 

recommendations. We also incorporated technical comments from DOD 

as appropriate. 

Regarding the recommendation to analyze the use of management 

reserves, DOD stated that the contractor has performed a root cause 

analysis and that the program office will monitor, analyze, and report on 

the use of management reserves. Regarding the recommendation to 

improve the master schedule, DOD stated that the Air Force is taking 

action to address each of the 3 schedule best practices we cited.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website 

at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff contributing to this report are 

listed in appendix IX. 

Michael J. Sullivan

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Agency Comments
 

Page 26 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 27 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

We interviewed officials from the KC-46 program, Air Force, and Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to obtain their views on KC-46 

development progress, ongoing concerns and actions taken to address 

program technical risks, and future plans to complete KC-46 flight testing 

and manufacturing. We also reviewed program documentation and plans 

for compliance with current Department of Defense (DOD) policy, 

acquisition reform legislation, and GAO best practices for weapon system 

development.

To determine the extent the KC-46 program is meeting cost, schedule, 

and performance goals in the calendar year of this review (2012), we 

reviewed briefings by program and contractor officials, financial 

management documents, defense acquisition executive summary reports, 

selected acquisition reports, monthly activity reports, technical 

performance indicators, risk assessments, and other documentation. To 

evaluate cost information, we reviewed program office documentation on 

what actions are currently being taken in the areas of earned value 

management and contractor performance. We also reviewed contractor 

use of management reserves funding to project when this funding will 

likely be depleted. To assess the program’s development schedule 

progress, we reviewed the program’s latest master schedule and 

compared it against previous master schedules and reviewed monthly 

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) reports for information 

relating to a 14-point schedule risk assessment they conduct as part of 

their ongoing oversight to identify changes that could impact key program 

milestone events. Regarding performance goals, we reviewed key 

performance parameters and progress in fully implementing technical 

performance measures used to evaluate whether program performance 

parameters are being achieved.

To identify the design, manufacturing, testing plan, and technology 

challenges, we met with contractor, Air Force, and DOD officials and 

examined program documentation such as the post preliminary design 

review report, manufacturing program plan, software block functionality 

plan, reliability growth curve charts, and critical technology element 

maturation plan. To measure progress regarding the relocation of military 

modification work on the KC-46 tanker, we met with Boeing officials and 

reviewed briefings on their transition plans from Wichita, Kansas to 

Everett, Washington and the implications on expertise, knowledge, 

personnel relocation, and associated costs and impact on program 

development and production. To assess progress toward test plans, we 

compared the revised KC-46 test and evaluation master plan to the 

original and against recent reviews completed by the Air Force and DOD 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

test offices to evaluate whether changes have been made to mitigate 

flight testing concerns. Specifically, we analyzed contractor and program 

office mitigation efforts planned to deal with identified flight test 

challenges of the commercial derivative 767-2C and KC-46 tanker and 

also Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air worthiness certification 

requirements. We also discussed related software development, test, and 

integration with the DCMA, Director, Operational Test, and Evaluation 

(DOT&E) officials, and OSD Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)

officials and reviewed DOT&E and DT&E annual assessments on the KC46 program, integrated test team minutes, program assessment reports, 

and contractor and program office risk summary charts to identify risk 

areas and what actions are being taken to address challenges to the 

program. Finally, we leveraged information received as part of a related 

GAO review on weapon system assessments, which includes the KC-46 

program.

To assess the extent the program has developed effective, appropriate 

methods to mitigate challenges, we analyzed contractor and program 

office plans for risk mitigation contained on their respective risk and 

technical watch lists. We reviewed a preliminary design report and 

briefing and subsystems critical design review results. We concentrated 

especially on follow-up actions (redesigns) the program has identified as 

a need to address, the program’s critical technology maturation plan, key 

performance parameter achievement concerns and operational 

assessment criteria used to note significant trends in development efforts, 

programmatic voids, risk areas, and operational testing plans. We 

compared these risk mitigation plans to GAO’s commercial best practices 

work on weapon system programs, focusing on knowledge points, 

technology readiness levels, software development, and testing to identify 

processes and trends that provide a framework for improving weapon 

system development outcomes. Finally, to analyze risk in the program’s 

development schedule, we reviewed the integrated master schedule and 

determined the extent to which the program’s development schedule was 

prepared in accordance with best practices that GAO has identified as 

fundamental to having a reliable schedule. We then characterized the 

extent to which each of the 10 scheduling best practices were met; that is, 

we rated each characteristic as being either: not met, minimally met, 

partially met, substantially met, or fully met. We could not assess the 

contractor’s manufacturing processes because the program is only in its 

second year of development and it is too early for this assessment.

In performing our work, we interviewed officials from Air Mobility 

Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; Air Force Operational Test and 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Evaluation Center, Detachment 5, Edwards Air Force Base, California; 

412th Test Wing, Edwards Air Force Base, California; KC-46 program 

office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Defense Contract 

Management Agency, Seattle, Washington; and Federal Aviation 

Administration, Wichita, Kansas. We also met with and obtained 

information from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in Washington, D.C; the Director 

of Operational Test and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; and the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation, 

Washington, D.C.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to February 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Comparison of Current KC-135 

versus Planned KC-46 Performance 

Capabilities 

Page 30 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Capability area

Aerial refueling and airlift with 200,000 lbs total fuel for refueling Aerial refueling and airlift with 212,000 lbs total fuel for refueling

Hydraulic system with 1,176 gallons per minute refueling 

rate

Not capable of both on same mission. 

Computer assisted with 1,200 gallons per minute refueling rate

Capable of using both refueling types on the same mission

Limited to 20 tankers with the capability to attach wing pods 

and conduct multipoint refueling of two aircraft

All tankers have the capability to attach wing pods and conduct 

multipoint refueling, but only 46 sets of wing pods will be procured

6 cargo pallets, 53 passengers, 44 medical patients 18 cargo pallets, 114 passengers, 54 medical patients

Does not possess sufficient systems Protection from nuclear, infrared (heat seeking missiles), and 

biochemical threats

Restricted in tactical missions Able to refuel in tactical missions

Primary Function

Boom Refueling

Permanent system does not exist – must be temporarily 

added

Probe and Drogue Permanent centerline probe and drogue system

Refueling

Boom and Probe & 

Drogue Refueling on 

Same Mission

Refueling of T wo 

Aircraft At the Same 

Time

Cargo/Passenger/

Medical Patient

Defensive Systems

Night-time Refueling

Source: GAO presentation of Air Force information; © Boeing Company (photos).

KC-135 KC-46 

Appendix II: Comparison of Current KC-135 

versus Planned KC-46 Performance 

Capabilities 
Appendix III: Description of KC-46 Key 

Performance Parameters

Page 31 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Key performance parameter Description

Tanker Air Refueling Capability Aircraft shall be capable of accomplishing air 

refueling of all Department of Defense current and 

programmed (budgeted) receiver aircraft. The 

aircraft shall be capable of conducting both boom 

and drogue air refueling on the same mission. 

Fuel Offload versus Radius Aircraft shall be capable of carrying certain amounts 

of fuel (to use in air refueling) certain distances.

Operate in Civil and Military 

Airspace 

Aircraft shall be capable of worldwide flight 

operations in all civil and military airspace.

Airlift Capability Aircraft shall be capable of transporting certain 

amounts of both equipment and personnel.

Receiver Air Refueling Capability Aircraft shall be capable of receiving air refueling 

from any compatible tanker aircraft.

Force Protection Aircraft shall be able to operate in chemical and 

biological environments.

Net-Ready Aircraft must be able to have effective information 

exchanges with many other Department of Defense 

systems to fully support execution of all necessary 

missions and activities.

Survivability Aircraft shall be capable of operating in hostile threat 

environments.

Simultaneous Multi-Point 

Refueling

Aircraft shall be capable of conducting drogue 

refueling on multiple aircraft on the same mission.

Source: GAO presentation of Air Force data.

Appendix III: Description of KC-46 Key 

Performance Parameters
Appendix IV: Top Risks Identified by the KC-46 

Integrated Test Team and Proposed Mitigation 

Efforts

Page 32 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Risk Risk issue Air Force mitigation efforts

1 Military Type Certification Schedule and Flight Test 

Rate: Planned military-specific test schedule is more 

aggressive than historical experience. Planned flight hours 

per aircraft per month average (50 hours vs. approximately 

30 hours) and test efficiency exceeds that for similar aircraft 

(85 percent vs. 55 percent).

Integrated Test Team (ITT) clarification: Approximately 90 

percent of aircraft testing will be achieved under the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) process. Previous commercial 

767 aircraft test programs have significantly exceeded 30 flight 

hours per aircraft per month and 55 percent efficiency.

2 Receiver Certification Planned Flight Test Hours: Aerial 

refueling certification testing of required Initial Operational 

Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) receiver aircraft will take longer 

(approximately 400 flight hours) than the hours and time in 

the current schedule. This is estimated to extend the test 

schedule by almost 6 to 8 months. 

ITT clarification: Boeing flight test hours are indicative of actual 

receiver time on station, not total flight time. The method of 

calculating test hours is now understood correctly.

3 Access to Boeing Data and Personnel: Integrated Test 

Team requires access to Boeing proprietary commercial test 

data and commercial division personnel. Air Force Flight 

Test Center is concerned about Boeing proprietary Test 

Planning, Execution, and Reporting Tool interfacing with 

government tracking tools.

ITT resolution: Responsible Test Organization (RTO) and 

Boeing reached agreement that test planning will be 

conducted by Boeing. A common test and evaluation database 

is being implemented through Boeing’s Integrated Digital 

Environment (IDE) database system.

4 Responsible Test Organization (RTO) Crew Staffing: 

RTO crew personnel could impact test operations schedule 

due to availability of RTO personnel. There are no 

contractual Type 1 (one-time or limited training) slots for 

replacement training and there have been issues with 

retention of crews due to permanent change of station and

deployments.

ITT resolution: Boeing has agreed to include a 10 percent 

replacement training factor (by specialty) for all Type 1 

training. An executable training plan has been built within the 

fixed-price construct. Increases in Type 1 training allocations 

for the 412th Test Wing is to be offset by personnel sharing.

5 Developmental Testing (DT) / Operational Testing (OT) 

Maintenance Staffing: Insufficient number of qualified 

tanker maintenance personnel to support DT and IOT&E. Air 

Mobility Command and Air Force Materiel Command 

(AFMC) planning and programming effort required to meet 

requirement of 100 maximum slots to support IOT&E and 15 

additional slots for DT.

ITT resolution: Initial staffing assumptions by the RTO and Air 

Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) did 

not support the pace of test outlined by Boeing’s Stage 2 flight 

test plans. RTO has since added additional manning slots for 

DT and will share resources with AFOTEC to meet OT 

demands. The KC-46 Program Office has adjusted Type 1 

training requirements to the new demand.

6 DT/OT Aerial Refueling Operator (ARO) Personnel: 

Insufficient number of qualified ARO personnel to support 

DT and IOT&E activities. Potential AFMC programming and 

budgeting input required for additional ARO positions for DT 

and OT activities.

ITT resolution: Initial staffing assumptions by the RTO and 

AFOTEC did not support the pace of test outlined by Boeing’s 

Stage 2 test plans. RTO has since added additional manning 

slots for DT and will share resources with AFOTEC to meet OT 

demands. The KC-46 Program Office has adjusted Type-I 

training requirements to the new demand. Additionally, the 370 

Flight Test Squadron remained activated to support KC-46 

testing.

7 Schedule Sufficiency for Deficiency Correction: Flighttest schedule does not reflect sufficient time to correct 

discrepancies identified prior to start of operational testing. 

There is a lack of Integrated Test Team insight into schedule 

and contract and concerns whether the Joint Deficiency 

Reporting System can support pace of test operations.

ITT clarification: Although a Correction-of-Deficiency period is 

not identified on the current KC-46 Test and Evaluation Master 

Plan (TEMP) test schedule due to a lack of available space, 

there is a 90-day aircraft refurbishment period of time to bring 

the four test aircraft to production configuration. This time is 

annotated on the detailed test schedules provided by Boeing.

Appendix IV: Top Risks Identified by the KC46 Integrated Test Team and Proposed 

Mitigation Efforts 
Appendix IV: Top Risks Identified by the KC-46 

Integrated Test Team and Proposed Mitigation 

Efforts

Page 33 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Risk Risk issue Air Force mitigation efforts

8 Receiver Aircraft Availability: Lack of military receiver 

aircraft availability to support aerial refueling certification 

testing. Air Force will have to maximize flexibility of receiver 

aircraft for air refueling certification testing by possibly 

utilizing Navy, Boeing, and foreign partner F/A-18 aircraft.

ITT clarification: Memorandums of Agreement / Memorandums 

of Understanding (MOAs/MOUs) will be implemented between 

organizations to facilitate support of test activity. MOAs are 

expected with owning aircraft using commands to support 

receiver certifications.

Source: GAO presentation of Air Force information.
Appendix V: KC-46 Critical Technology 

Elements 

Page 34 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Critical Technology Description Testing to Date

3-Dimensional Display The display screens at boom operator stations inside the aircraft 

provide the visual cues needed for the operator to monitor the aircraft 

being refueled before and after contact with the refueling boom or 

drogue. The images of the aircraft on the screens are captured by a 

pair of cameras outside that aircraft that are meant to replicate the 

binocular aspect of human vision by supplying an image from two 

separate points of view, replicating how humans see two points of 

view, one for each eye. The resulting image separation provides the 

boom operator with greater fidelity and a more realistic impression of 

depth, or a 3rd dimension. 

Similar technology has been used 

on two foreign-operated refueling 

aircraft and a representative model 

in tests with other Boeing tankers.

Airborne ESTAR This software module is planned to have an algorithm that allows for 

automatically re-routing and constructing new flight paths for the 

aircraft that are safe, flyable, and avoid potential threats. The 

algorithm is new and novel technology, critical to meeting operational 

requirements.

Airborne ESTAR has been tested in 

a simulation that provided data on 

its performance, interfaces, and 

functionality.

Threat Correlation 

Software 

Somewhat similar to Airborne ESTAR, this new software module 

serves to correlate tracks from multiple potential threats and 

automatically help re-route the tanker’s flight path to avoid them.

The integration of software 

algorithms with the associated 

processor has been laboratory 

tested in a relevant environment.

Source: GAO presentation of Air Force information.

Appendix V: KC-46 Critical Technology 

Elements 
Appendix VI: Description of GAO Scheduling 

Best Practices 

Page 35 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Criterion Explanation 

(1) Capturing all activities The schedule should reflect all activities as defined in the project’s work breakdown 

structure (WBS), which defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a project’s 

objectives, including activities both the owner and contractor are to perform. 

(2) Sequencing all activities The schedule should be planned so that critical project dates can be met. To do this, 

activities need to be logically sequenced-that is, listed in the order in which they are to be 

carried out. In particular, activities that must be completed before other activities can 

begin (predecessor activities), as well as activities that cannot begin until other activities 

are completed (successor activities), should be identified. Date constraints and lags 

should be minimized and justified to help ensure that the interdependence of activities 

that collectively lead to the completion of events or milestones can be established and 

used to guide work and measure progress.

(3) Assigning resources to all activities The schedule should reflect the resources (labor, materials, overhead) needed to do the 

work, whether they will be available when needed, and any funding or time constraints.

(4) Establishing the duration of all 

activities 

The schedule should realistically reflect how long each activity will take. When the 

duration of each activity is determined, the same rationale, historical data, and 

assumptions used for cost estimating should be used. Durations should be reasonably 

short and meaningful and allow for discrete progress measurement. Schedules that 

contain planning and summary planning packages as activities will normally reflect longer 

durations until broken into work packages or specific activities. 

(5) Verifying that the schedule can be 

traced horizontally and vertically 

The detailed schedule should be horizontally traceable, meaning that it should link 

products and outcomes associated with other sequenced activities. These links are 

commonly referred to as “hand-offs” and serve to verify that activities are arranged in the 

right order for achieving aggregated products or outcomes. The integrated master 

schedule (IMS) should also be vertically traceable-that is, varying levels of activities and 

supporting subactivities can be traced. Such mapping or alignment of levels enables 

different groups to work to the same master schedule. 

(6) Confirming that the critical path is 

valid

The schedule should identify the program critical path-the path of longest duration through 

the sequence of activities. Establishing a valid critical path is necessary for examining the 

effects of any activity’s slipping along this path. The program critical path determines the 

program’s earliest completion date and focuses the team’s energy and management’s 

attention on the activities that will lead to the project’s success. 

(7) Ensuring reasonable total float The schedule should identify reasonable float (or slack)-the amount of time by which a 

predecessor activity can slip before the delay affects the program’s estimated finish dateso that the schedule’s flexibility can be determined. Large total float on an activity or path 

indicates that the activity or path can be delayed without jeopardizing the finish date. The 

length of delay that can be accommodated without the finish date’s slipping depends on a 

variety of factors, including the number of date constraints within the schedule and the 

amount of uncertainty in the duration estimates, but the activity’s total float provides a 

reasonable estimate of this value. As a general rule, activities along the critical path have 

the least amount of float. 

(8) Conducting a schedule risk analysis A schedule risk analysis uses a good critical path method (CPM) schedule and data about 

project schedule risks and opportunities as well as statistical simulation to predict the level 

of confidence in meeting a program’s completion date, determine the time contingency 

needed for a level of confidence, and identify high-priority risks and opportunities. As a 

result, the baseline schedule should include a buffer or reserve of extra time. 

Appendix VI: Description of GAO Scheduling 

Best Practices
Appendix VI: Description of GAO Scheduling 

Best Practices 

Page 36 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Criterion Explanation 

(9) Updating the schedule using actual 

progress and logic 

Progress updates and logic provide a realistic forecast of start and completion dates for 

program activities. Maintaining the integrity of the schedule logic at regular intervals is 

necessary to reflect the true status of the program. To ensure that the schedule is 

properly updated, people responsible for the updating should be training in critical path 

method scheduling.

(10) Maintaining a baseline schedule A baseline schedule is the basis for managing the project scope, the time period for 

accomplishing it, and the required resources. The baseline schedule is designated the 

target schedule, subject to a configuration management control process, against which 

project performance can be measured, monitored, and reported. The schedule should be 

continually monitored so as to reveal when forecasted completion dates differ from 

planned dates and whether schedule variances will affect downstream work. A 

corresponding baseline document explains the overall approach to the project, defines 

custom fields in the schedule file, details ground rules and assumptions used in 

developing the schedule, and justifies constraints, lags, long activity durations, and any 

other unique features of the schedule.

Source: GAO.
Appendix VII: Key Boeing Suppliers for the KC46 Program

Page 37 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Supplier and location Key component(s) being developed

Cobham (Davenport, Iowa) Refueling systems, including Wing Aerial Refueling Pods and 

Centerline Drogue System

DRS Laurel Technologies Inc. (Johnstown, Pa.) Aerial Refueling Operator Station

Eaton Aerospace (Grand Rapids and Jackson, Mich.) Electromechanical and cargo door actuation systems; hydraulic and 

fuel distribution subcomponents

GE Aviation Systems (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Clearwater, 

Fla.)

Mission Control System

Goodrich (Colorado and Ontario, Canada) Interiors and landing gear

Honeywell (Phoenix and Tucson, Ariz.; Coon Rapids, Mich., 

and Urbana, Ohio)

Auxiliary power unit; cabin pressure control system; air data inertial 

navigation; lighting

Moog Inc. (East Aurora, N.Y., Torrence, Calif., and 

Wolverhampton, UK) 

Electro-hydraulic servo valves, actuators, stabilize trim controls, 

leading edge slat actuator, inboard/outboard leading edge rotary 

actuators, autopilot actuators, elevator feel system; refueling boom 

actuators

Northrop Grumman (Rolling Meadows, Ill.) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures

Parker Aerospace (Ariz., Calif., Florida, Ga., Mich., N.Y., N.C., 

Ohio, Tex., and Utah)

Refueling components including the receptacle door actuator, aerial 

refueling interface control system, and wing refueling, pod hydraulic 

power packs; primary flight controls and fuel equipment; pneumatic, 

fluid conveyance, and hydraulic equipment

Pratt & Whitney (Middletown, Conn.) Engines

Raytheon Company (El Segundo, Calif.) Digital radar warning receiver and digital anti-jam receiver GPS

Rockwell Collins (Cedar Rapids, Iowa) Integrated display system featuring 15 inch diagonal crystal 

displays from the commercial 787; tactical situational awareness 

system; remote vision system 3-D and 2-D technology for the boom 

operator; communications, navigation, surveillance, networking and 

flight control systems

Spirit (Wichita, Ks. and Prestwick, Scotland) Forward fuselage section; strut; nacelle components to include inlet, 

fan cowl and core cowl; fixed fan duct; fixed leading edge 

Triumph Group Inc. (Berwyn, Pa.) Horizontal stabilizer and aft body section, including pressure 

bulkhead; wing center section, doors, nacelles and other 

components including cowl doors, seal depressor panels, acoustic 

panels and aft wheel well bulkhead

Woodward Inc. (Skokie, Ill.) Several elements of the aerial refueling boom, including the sensor 

system, control unit, and telescopic and flight control sticks

Source: GAO presentation of Boeing Company information.

Appendix VII: Key Boeing Suppliers for the 

KC-46 Program
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 38 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 39 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments

Page 40 GAO-13-258 KC-46 Tanker Aircraft 

Michael Sullivan (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made 

key contributions to this report: Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Tina 

Cheng; Matt Drerup; Keith Hudson; John Krump; Don Springman; and 

Robert Swierczek.

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(121064)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.