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[Senate Report 109-142]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                    109-142

======================================================================

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                _______
                                

               September 29, 2005.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Roberts, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 1803]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, to which was referred 
the bill (S. 1803) having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the 
bill do pass.
    The Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI or Committee), 
having considered the original bill (S. 1803), to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System, and for other purposes, reports an original bill 
without amendment favorably thereon and recommends that the 
bill do pass.

             CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

    The classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of details of 
its budgetary recommendations in this Report. The Committee has 
prepared a classified supplement to this Report that contains 
(a) the Classified Annex to this Report and (b) the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the same legal 
status as public law. The Classified Annex to this Report 
explains the full scope and intent of the Committee's actions 
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Classified 
Annex has also been incorporated by reference in Section 103. 
As such, the Intelligence Community is required to comply with 
any directions or requirements contained therein as it would 
any other statutory requirement.
    The classified supplement to the Report is available for 
review by any Member of the Senate, subject to the provisions 
of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress, as amended by 
Senate Resolution 445 of the 108th Congress.
    The classified supplement is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to the 
President. The President shall provide for appropriate 
distribution within the Executive Branch.

              SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, as reported herein. Following the section-by-section 
analysis and explanation there are Committee comments on other 
matters. The report also includes additional views offered by 
Committee Members regarding this legislation and other matters.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for fiscal year 2006.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2006 are 
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Incorporation of classified annex

    Section 103 incorporates into law the Classified Annex to 
this Report. Unless otherwise specifically stated, the amounts 
authorized in the Classified Annex are not in addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of 
the Act or by the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
    The Committee has taken the step of incorporating the 
Classified Annex because the Executive Branch has refused to 
treat with equal weight the language in the classified annexes 
and the text of recent authorization acts and their 
accompanying classified schedules of authorizations. This 
Committee, and Congress, will not permit the Executive Branch 
to ignore the clear instructions of Congress merely because the 
directives are contained, by necessity of classification, in an 
annex accompanying the report associated with intelligence 
authorizing legislation. The Committee directs the Executive 
Branch to comply fully with any directed transfers, temporary 
limitations on use (fences), or other limitations or 
instructions contained in the Classified Annex to this Report.

Section 104. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 104 authorizes the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), with the approval of the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2006 to 
authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the 
personnel ceilings applicable to the elements of the 
Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount not to 
exceed 2 percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under 
Section 102. The DNI may exercise this authority only if 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to 
the intelligence committees of the Congress.

Section 105. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 105 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (CMA) of the DNI and sets the 
personnel end-strength for the Intelligence Community 
Management Staff for fiscal year 2006.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $1,014,362,000 
for fiscal year 2006 for the activities of the CMA of the DNI. 
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced 
research and development to remain available for two years.
    Subsection (b) authorizes 882 full-time personnel for 
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2006 and provides that 
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or 
detailed from other elements of the United States government.
    Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and 
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule 
of Authorizations and permits the additional funding for 
research and development to remain available through September 
30, 2007.
    Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in Section 
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from 
another element of the United States government shall be 
detailed to an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, 
except that for temporary functions such personnel may be 
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis for periods of less than 
one year.
    Subsection (e) authorizes $17,000,000 of the amount 
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the 
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e) 
requires the DNI to transfer these funds to the Department of 
Justice (DoJ) to be used for NDIC activities under the 
authority of the Attorney General, and subject to Section 
104A(e)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by 
Section 421(b)(1) of this Act.

Section 106. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 106 incorporates into the Act by reference each 
requirement to submit a report contained in the joint 
explanatory statement to accompany the conference report or in 
the classified annex accompanying the conference report.

Section 107. Response of intelligence community to requests from 
        Congress for intelligence documents and information

    Section 107 provides for certain procedural requirements 
related to the ability of Congress to gain access, through the 
intelligence committees and other committees of jurisdiction, 
to intelligence reports, assessments, estimates, legal 
opinions, and other intelligence information. The provision 
states that elements of the Intelligence Community must provide 
to the intelligence committees any intelligence documents or 
information requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman (or 
Ranking Minority Member) of such committees. The statutory 
requirement applies only to existing intelligence documents and 
information and would not apply to requests to generate new 
intelligence assessments, reports, estimates, legal opinions, 
or other information.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$244,600,000 for fiscal year 2006 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 303 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as 
``elements of the intelligence community'' of other elements of 
departments and agencies of the United States government not 
listed in Section 3(4). Section 3(4)(L) is redesignated as 
Section 3(4)(M) by Section 441(d) of this Act.

Section 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
404k) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier 
when it is consistent with Intelligence Community mission 
requirements or, more specifically, is required for cover 
purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional 
circumstances. As presently written, the DNI may only delegate 
this authority to the Principal Deputy DNI or, with respect to 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees, to the Director of 
the CIA.
    Section 304 of this bill provides that the DNI may delegate 
the authority in Section 116 of the National Security Act of 
1947 to the head of any element of the Intelligence Community. 
This expansion is consistent with the view of the Committee 
that the DNI should be able to delegate authority throughout 
the Intelligence Community when such delegation serves the 
overall interests of the Community.
    Section 304 also provides that the head of an Intelligence 
Community element to whom travel authority has been delegated 
is also empowered to delegate the authority to senior officials 
of the element as specified in guidelines issued by the DNI. 
This allows for administrative flexibility, consistent with the 
guidance of the DNI, for the entire Community. To facilitate 
Congressional oversight, the DNI shall submit the guidelines to 
the intelligence committees of the Congress.

Section 305. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 305 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) 
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the 
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. 
L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004)) (governing the transfer and 
reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding). In 
particular, this conforming amendment replaces the ``unforeseen 
requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a clearer 
standard to govern reprogrammings and transfers of funds 
authorized for a different intelligence or intelligence-related 
activity. Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer 
would be authorized if, in addition to the other requirements 
of Section 504(a)(3), the new use of funds would ``support an 
emergent need, improve program effectiveness, or increase 
efficiency.'' This modification brings the standard for 
reprogrammings or transfers of intelligence funding into 
conformity with the standards applicable to reprogrammings and 
transfers under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 
1947. The modification preserves Congressional oversight of 
proposed reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the 
Intelligence Community's ability to carry out missions and 
functions vital to national security.

Section 306. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of 
        the intelligence community

    Section 306 adds a new Section 1103 to the National 
Security Act of 1947, authorizing Intelligence Community 
elements to accept, retain, and--for certain purposes--use 
amounts received from private parties as repayment of debts 
owed to such element.
    Each year some property purchased with appropriated funds 
is damaged beyond use or is lost through the negligence of a 
private party or an employee of the Intelligence Community. The 
damaged or lost property may have been used to support wartime 
activities or other national intelligence missions and, thus, 
waiting for the next annual appropriation cycle for additional 
funds to repair or replace the property inhibits the 
Intelligence Community's ability to quickly and efficiently 
support the war fighter and other national intelligence 
missions.
    Section 306 addresses this shortcoming by authorizing 
elements of the Intelligence Community to accept and retain 
reimbursement, outside of the annual appropriations cycle, from 
a private party, including a Federal employee, who has been 
found to have negligently lost or damaged property. As a 
result, elements of the Intelligence Community will be able to 
expeditiously repair or replace lost or damaged property 
without waiting for the next appropriation cycle. Similarly, 
this new section also authorizes elements of the Intelligence 
Community to retain funds paid by Intelligence Community 
employees or former employees as repayment of a default on the 
terms and conditions of scholarship, fellowship, or other 
educational assistance provided by the Community to the 
employee. The section authorizes crediting payments only to the 
current appropriation account related to the debt and limits 
the subsequent use of the funds.

Section 307. Pilot program on disclosure of records under the Privacy 
        Act relating to certain intelligence activities

    As a result of reporting requirements in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 
(Dec. 13, 2003)) intended to improve information access across 
the Intelligence Community and the Federal government, the 
Intelligence Community, Department of Defense (DoD), Department 
of Homeland Security, and Federal law enforcement agencies 
formed the Information Sharing Working Group (ISWG) to, inter 
alia, identify impediments to information access in existing 
laws and in Intelligence Community and DoD policies. The ISWG 
issued its report in December 2004.
    In the report, the ISWG noted that certain provisions of 
the Privacy Act could prevent the sharing of intelligence 
information within the Executive Branch. Generally, the Privacy 
Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) precludes the dissemination of information 
regarding U.S. persons stored within a system of records 
maintained by the United States government without the consent 
of that individual. There are, however, twelve exceptions to 
this general rule. For example, one exception permits the 
sharing of information to support a civil or criminal law 
enforcement activity under certain prescribed circumstances. 
There is no exception permitting Intelligence Community 
elements and other United States government agencies to share 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information 
(including information concerning international terrorism or 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) between or with 
elements of the Intelligence Community.
    To address this shortcoming, Section 307 creates a pilot 
program to study a narrow intelligence exception to the Privacy 
Act. Specifically, the provision allows transfers under three 
circumstances. First, the provision permits elements of the 
Intelligence Community, including their parent departments and 
agencies, to share with other elements of the Intelligence 
Community, and their parent departments and agencies, 
information covered by the Privacy Act when that information is 
relevant to a lawful and authorized foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence activity. Second, the provision permits the 
head of an element of the Intelligence Community to request in 
writing Privacy Act records relevant to a lawful and authorized 
activity of that element to protect against international 
terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
from another United States government agency with similar 
responsibilities related to protection against international 
terrorism and proliferation. Third, the provision authorizes 
heads of non-Intelligence Community agencies with 
responsibilities to protect against international terrorism or 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to share 
Privacy Act records with an element of the Intelligence 
Community if the record constitutes ``terrorism information'' 
(as defined in Section 1016(a)(4) of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 
17, 2004)) or information concerning the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, if the receiving element of the 
Intelligence Community is lawfully authorized to collect or 
analyze the information to protect against international 
terrorism or proliferation. When necessary to determine whether 
a record held by a non-Intelligence Community agency 
constitutes terrorism information or information concerning the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the head of such 
agency may consult the DNI or the Attorney General. Section 307 
also extends to the pilot program an exemption from certain 
records access and disclosure accounting requirements. In order 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure, this exemption is identical to the exemption 
extended to the DNI under Section 416 of this Act.
    Section 307 facilitates the sharing only of intelligence 
information already lawfully collected and maintained within 
United States government record systems and relevant to a 
lawful and authorized foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence activity (with a particular focus on 
sharing by non-Intelligence Community elements on information 
concerning international terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction). The provision expressly states 
that the new authority does not permit the collection or 
retention of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
information not otherwise authorized by law.
    To ensure that the exception to the Privacy Act permits 
necessary sharing of critical foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence information while providing appropriate 
protections for the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. 
persons, Section 307 establishes a four-year pilot program. The 
exception to the Privacy Act will expire on December 31, 2009, 
unless renewed. In the interim, the DNI and the Attorney 
General, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, are required to submit to the intelligence 
committees an annual report on the status and implementation of 
the pilot program. On June 31, 2009, the DNI and the Attorney 
General, in coordination with the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, will submit a final report to the intelligence 
committees, including any recommendations regarding continued 
authorization of the exception. Additionally, the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board will submit to the 
Congressional intelligence committees a separate report 
providing the Board's advice and counsel on the development and 
implementation of the authorities provided under this Section.

Section 308. Extension to intelligence community of authority to delete 
        information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and 
        decorations

    Current law requires that certain Federal ``employees''--a 
term that generally applies to all officials and personnel of 
the Intelligence Community and certain contractors, spouses, 
dependents, and others--file reports with their ``employing'' 
agency regarding the receipt of gifts or ``decorations'' from 
foreign governments. See 5 U.S.C. 7342. Following compilation 
of these reports, the ``employing'' agency is required to 
annually file with the Secretary of State detailed information 
about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations reported by 
its employees, including the source of the gift. See 5 U.S.C. 
7342(f). The Secretary of State is then required to publish a 
comprehensive list of the agency reports in the Federal 
Register. See id. With respect to the activities of the 
Intelligence Community, the public disclosure of such gifts or 
decorations in the Federal Register has the potential to 
compromise intelligence sources (e.g., the confirmation of an 
intelligence relationship with a foreign government) and could 
undermine national security. Recognizing this potential 
concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted 
a limited exemption from reporting certain specified 
information about such foreign gifts or decorations where the 
publication of the information could adversely affect United 
States intelligence sources. See Pub. L. No. 95-105, Sec. 
515(a) (Aug. 17, 1977). Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 
17, 2004) (``Intelligence Reform Act''), extended a similar 
exemption to the DNI (in addition to amending the existing 
exemption to apply to the Director of the CIA).
    Section 308 amends existing law to provide to the heads of 
each Intelligence Community element the same limited exemption 
from specified public reporting requirements that is currently 
authorized for the DNI and the Director of the CIA. The 
national security concerns that prompted the initial DCI 
exemption, and the more recent exemptions for the DNI and 
Director of the CIA, apply with equal weight to other 
Intelligence Community elements--the publication of certain 
information relating to foreign gifts or decorations provided 
to employees of all Intelligence Community agencies could 
adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 
308 provides the exemption necessary to protect national 
security, but mandates that the information not provided to the 
Secretary of State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued 
independent oversight of the receipt by Intelligence Community 
``employees'' of foreign gifts or decorations.

Section 309. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of 
        personal effects, household goods, and automobiles

    Section 309 provides the CIA and the Office of the DNI the 
same authority that is granted to the Department of State by 
Section 2677 of Title 22, United States Code, when travel and 
transportation authorized by valid travel orders begins in one 
fiscal year, but may not be completed during that same fiscal 
year. The Committee believes this authority will relieve the 
administrative burden of charging the eligible costs to two 
fiscal years' appropriations and adjusting associated accounts.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Section 401. Additional authorities of the Director of National 
        Intelligence on intelligence information sharing

    Section 401 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the DNI statutory authority to use National 
Intelligence Program funds to quickly address deficiencies or 
needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing 
capabilities. The new Section 102A(g)(1)(G) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 authorizes the DNI to provide to a 
receiving agency or component--for that agency or component to 
accept and use--funds that have been authorized and 
appropriated to address intelligence information access or 
sharing needs. In the alternative, the DNI may provide to a 
receiving agency necessary or associated services and equipment 
procured with funds from the National Intelligence Program. The 
new Section 102A(g)(1)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 
also grants the DNI the authority to provide funds to non-
National Intelligence Program activities for the purpose of 
addressing critical gaps in intelligence information access or 
sharing capabilities. Without the authority, the development 
and implementation of necessary capabilities could be delayed 
by an agency's lack of authority to accept or utilize systems 
funded from the National Intelligence Program, inability to use 
or identify current-year funding, or concerns regarding the 
augmentation of appropriations. These new DNI authorities are 
similar to authority granted to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) with respect to imagery and imagery-
related systems. See Section 105(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5).

Section 402. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director 
        of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence 
        sources and methods

    Section 402 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
modify the limitation on delegation by the DNI of the authority 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure. The provision permits the DNI to delegate the 
authority to the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence or 
the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. A 
previous provision in the National Security Act of 1947 had 
vested the power to protect sources and methods in the DCI, but 
did not constrain further delegation of the authority.

Section 403. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to 
        manage access to human intelligence information

    Section 403 provides the DNI with the authority to ensure 
the dissemination of intelligence information collected through 
human sources, including the underlying operational data 
necessary to understand that reporting, to appropriately 
cleared analysts or other intelligence officers throughout the 
Intelligence Community. Recent intelligence failure---
particularly related to pre-war intelligence assessments on 
Iraq--have demonstrated the importance of rebuilding and 
improving the nation's human intelligence capabilities. While 
the Intelligence Community is making some progress in this 
regard, a great deal remains to be done, particularly in the 
area of access to intelligence gathered through human 
intelligence operations.
    The Committee's review of the Intelligence Community's pre-
war assessments on Iraq highlighted the impact of unnecessary 
restrictions on access by intelligence analysts to human 
intelligence information. In its Report of the Select Committee 
on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Pre-War 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, the Committee concluded that 
the Intelligence Community's failure to provide cleared 
analysts with a legitimate need-to-know broader access to human 
intelligence reporting, including the operational data 
underlying that reporting, contributed to the flawed 
intelligence assessments on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
programs. Access to this data-controlled by the agencies that 
collected the information-would have provided analysts with a 
better understanding of the reliability of the sources of the 
reporting, as well as other significant intelligence 
information required for their work.
    The Intelligence Reform Act provides the DNI with a number 
of tools to foster greater information access within the 
Community. Section 403 builds on these tools by providing the 
DNI with the specific authority to ensure analysts and other 
Intelligence Community officers are provided with improved 
access to human intelligence reporting, consistent with the 
DNI's determinations regarding the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods. Although the Committee expects that 
individual elements will continue to retain human intelligence 
operational data, access decisions will be made by the DNI as a 
neutral arbiter of need-to-know. No longer will these access 
decisions be left to individual agencies with a parochial--and 
understandable-desire to protect sources at all costs. Access 
to human intelligence reporting, and underlying operational 
reporting, must be balanced against real threats to sources and 
methods. Under Section 403, the Committee expects the DNI to 
perform the necessary balancing. Section 403 also provides the 
DNI with full and regular access to the information necessary 
to ``manage and direct . . . the tasking of, collection, 
analysis, production, and dissemination of national 
intelligence by elements of the intelligence community.'' See 
Section 102A(f)(1)(A)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-1(f)(1)(A)(ii)).
    To effectively implement Section 403, the DNI should 
standardize security clearance processes across Intelligence 
Community elements to resolve issues that have hampered 
information access in the past. The Committee does not believe 
that working in a particular agency makes one Intelligence 
Community officer inherently more trustworthy than a 
counterpart with the same security clearance and a legitimate 
``need-to-know'' at another element. Resolution of disparate 
clearance standards and processes, however, should provide 
Intelligence Community elements with an additional degree of 
comfort that, while information from sources for which those 
agencies are responsible has received greater distribution, the 
recipients of that information are appropriately cleared 
consistent with DNI standards. Based on the authorities 
provided to the DNI in the Intelligence Reform Act and this 
section, the Committee is confident that the DNI can implement 
the protections necessary for intelligence sources and methods, 
while making human intelligence information more readily 
available to appropriately cleared intelligence officers who 
need the information for the conduct of their duties.

Section 404. Additional administrative authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    From an organizational standpoint, the DNI should be able 
to rapidly focus the Intelligence Community on a particular 
intelligence issue through a coordinated effort that uses all 
available resources. The ability of the DNI to respond with 
flexibility and to coordinate the Intelligence Community 
response to an emerging threat should not depend on the time-
sensitive vagaries of the budget cycle and should not be 
constrained by general limitations found in appropriations law 
(e.g., 31 U.S.C. 1532) or the annual limitation set forth in 
the ``General Provisions'' of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of 
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. See, 
e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Division H--
Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 2005, Section 610, Pub. L. No. 
108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004); see also, e.g., In re: Veterans 
Administration Funding of Federal Executive Boards, 65 Comp. 
Gen. 689 (July 1, 1986) (discussing history of prohibition on 
interagency financing of boards, commissions, councils, 
committees, or similar groups).
    To provide this needed operational and organizational 
flexibility, Section 404 grants the DNI the authority-
notwithstanding certain specified provisions of general 
appropriations law--to approve interagency financing of 
national intelligence centers (authorized under Section 119B of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-2)) and of 
other boards, commissions, councils, committees, or similar 
groups established by the DNI (e.g., ``mission managers,'' as 
recommended by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD 
Commission)). Under Section 404, the DNI could authorize the 
pooling of resources from various Intelligence Community and 
non-Intelligence Community agencies to finance national 
intelligence centers or other organizational groupings designed 
to address identified intelligence matters. Once approved by 
the DNI, the provision also expressly permits other United 
States government departments and agencies, including 
Intelligence Community elements, to fund, or participate in the 
funding of, the authorized activities.
    The Committee recognizes the need for coordinated responses 
to national security threats and intelligence problems. To 
better understand how the DNI intends to utilize the authority 
provided under Section 404, the Committee directs the DNI to 
provide an annual report--through the end of Fiscal Year 2010--
providing details on how this authority has been exercised, 
what amount of appropriated funds attributable to each 
interagency contributor has been accessed to finance each 
national intelligence center or other organizational grouping 
under this section, and whether the National Intelligence 
Program or other budget account has been modified to provide 
specific funding for such national intelligence centers or 
other organizational groupings or whether funding will continue 
to be provided under the authority of Section 404.

Section 405. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 405 clarifies that the ban on co-location of the 
Office of the DNI with any other Intelligence Community 
element, which is slated to take effect as of October 1, 2008, 
applies to the co-location of the headquarters of the Office of 
the DNI with the headquarters of any Intelligence Community 
agency or element. This provision provides flexibility to 
ensure that components of the Office of the DNI may be located 
in the most appropriate facility or facilities, including co-
location with components of Intelligence Community agencies or 
elements. The Committee is aware that the DNI intends to find a 
headquarters that is separate and apart from the headquarters 
of the various Intelligence Community elements, consistent with 
the expressed intent of Congress.

Section 406. Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    As part of the restructuring of the nation's intelligence 
infrastructure in the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress created 
a Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the 
DNI. Under the Act, the Director of Science and Technology 
serves as the DNI's chief representative for science and 
technology, assisting the DNI in formulating a long-term 
strategy for scientific advances in the field of intelligence 
and on the science and technology elements of the intelligence 
budget. Additionally, the Director of Science and Technology 
chairs the DNI's Science and Technology Committee-responsible 
for coordinating advances in intelligence-related research and 
development.
    The House-passed version of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 2475 (109th Congress), contains 
a provision (Section 304) that further expounds on the role of 
the Director of Science and Technology. Section 304 in H.R. 
2475 would require the Director of Science and Technology to 
systematically identify the Intelligence Community's most 
significant challenges requiring technical solutions and to 
develop options to enhance research and development efforts to 
meet requirements in a timely manner. Section 304 would also 
require the DNI to submit to Congress a report detailing the 
strategy for development and use of technology throughout the 
Intelligence Community through 2021. The report is to identify 
the Community's highest priority intelligence gaps that may be 
resolved by the use of technology; identify goals for advanced 
research and development; explain how advanced research and 
development projects funded under the National Intelligence 
Program address the identified gaps; specify current and 
projected research and development projects; and provide a plan 
for incorporating technology from research and development 
projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition 
programs.
    Section 406 incorporates additional requirements into a 
provision otherwise similar to Section 304 of H.R. 2475.
    The Committee supports the House provision, but also 
believes that such a provision should make clear that it is the 
responsibility of the Director of Science and Technology to 
assist the DNI in ensuring that the Intelligence Community's 
research and development priorities and projects are consistent 
with national intelligence requirements; that a priority be 
placed on addressing identified deficiencies in the collection, 
processing, analysis, or dissemination of national 
intelligence; that the research and development priorities and 
projects account for program development and acquisition 
funding constraints; and that such priorities and projects 
address system requirements from collection to final 
dissemination.
    The Committee further requires the Director of Science and 
Technology, at the direction of the DNI, to develop and 
maintain an integrated Technical Standards System for major 
acquisitions. The Technical Standards System should improve the 
availability of technical standards for the design, 
development, and operation of Intelligence Community programs 
and projects; reduce duplication of effort and improve 
interoperability within the Intelligence Community, with the 
private sector, and with international partners; and enhance 
awareness of standardization in the Intelligence Community. 
Under this provision, the Director of Science and Technology 
will develop standards that document uniform engineering and 
technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices, 
and methods, including requirements for selection, application, 
and design criteria of particular items. The Committee 
encourages the DNI to consult, as appropriate, with the heads 
of other United States government departments and agencies 
(e.g., the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Secretary of 
Homeland Security) when developing standards and specifications 
under this provision.

Section 407. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 407 converts the position of Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) of the Intelligence Community from an appointment 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to an appointment by the DNI. The provision also 
expressly designates the position as CIO of the Intelligence 
Community. The modification to the title of the position of CIO 
is consistent the position's overall responsibilities as 
outlined in Section 103G(b) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g(b)).
    The creation of a CIO of the Intelligence Community 
(Section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-487 (Dec. 23, 2004)), combined with 
the budgetary authorities and information technology 
responsibilities of the DNI (see, e.g., Section 1011 of the 
Intelligence Reform Act), laid an important foundation for 
improvements in the information technology infrastructure of 
the Intelligence Community. The Committee believes that the CIO 
of the Intelligence Community must provide direction and 
guidance to all elements of the Intelligence Community to 
ensure that information technology research and development, 
security, and acquisition programs support information access 
throughout the Intelligence Community. The modification to the 
manner in which the CIO of the Intelligence Community is 
appointed should not be construed to diminish the authorities 
or responsibilities of the position.
    Under existing law, the President has submitted a 
nomination for the position of CIO of the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee will proceed to consider and, as 
appropriate, act on the nomination. If Senate confirmation 
precedes conference action on this Act, the Committee will ask 
the conference to provide that the amendment proposed in 
Section 407 not apply until a vacancy in the position of CIO of 
the Intelligence Community next occurs.

Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes the 
DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI 
determines that an Inspector General ``would be beneficial to 
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the 
DNI.'' It further provides that the DNI may grant to the 
Inspector General ``any of the duties, responsibilities, and 
authorities'' set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. 
The DNI has now appointed an Inspector General; however, the 
duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the Inspector 
General, and his ability to exercise his authorities across all 
elements of the Community, remain ambiguous.
    The DNI and the Intelligence Community need an empowered 
and effective Inspector General. A strong Inspector General is 
vital to achieving the goal, set forth in the Intelligence 
Reform Act, of improving the operations and effectiveness of 
the Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the 
broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever 
they may be found in the Intelligence Community, including the 
manner in which elements of the Community interact with each 
other in such matters as providing access to information and 
undertaking joint or cooperative activities. To that end, by 
way of a proposed new Section 103Hof the National Security Act 
of 1947, Section 408 of this Act establishes an Inspector General for 
the Intelligence Community.
    The office will be established within the Office of the 
DNI. The Inspector General will keep both the DNI and the 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about 
problems and deficiencies in Intelligence Community programs 
and operations and the need for corrective actions. The 
Inspector General will be appointed by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and will report directly to 
the DNI. To bolster the Inspector General's independence within 
the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General may be 
removed only by the President, who must then communicate the 
reasons for the Inspector General's removal to the intelligence 
committees.
    The DNI may prohibit the Inspector General from conducting 
an investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines 
that is necessary to protect vital national security interests. 
If the DNI exercises the authority to prohibit an 
investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons for taking such 
action to the intelligence committees within seven days. The 
Inspector General may, as necessary, provide a response to the 
intelligence committees regarding the actions of the DNI.
    The Inspector General will have direct and prompt access to 
the DNI and any Intelligence Community employee, or employee of 
a contractor, whose testimony is needed. The Inspector General 
will also have direct access to all records that relate to 
programs and activities for which the Inspector General has 
responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for 
appropriate administrative action.
    The Inspector General will have subpoena authority; 
however, information within the possession of the United States 
government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject 
to the DNI's concurrence, the Inspector General may request 
information from any United States government department, 
agency, or element. Upon receiving such a request from the 
Inspector General, heads of United States government 
departments, agencies, and elements, insofar as practicable and 
not in violation of law or regulation, must provide the 
requested information to the Inspector General.
    The Inspector General must submit semiannual reports to the 
DNI that include a description of significant problems relating 
to Intelligence Community programs and operations and to the 
relationships between Intelligence Community elements. The 
reports must include a description of Inspector General 
recommendations and a statement whether corrective action has 
been completed. Within thirty days of receiving the report from 
the Inspector General, the DNI must submit each semiannual 
report to Congress.
    The Inspector General must immediately report to the DNI 
particularly serious or flagrant violations. Within seven days, 
the DNI must transmit those reports to the intelligence 
committees, together with any comments. In the event the 
Inspector General is unable to resolve differences with the 
DNI, the Inspector General is authorized to report the serious 
or flagrant violation directly to the intelligence committees. 
Reports to the intelligence committees are also required with 
respect to investigations concerning high-ranking Intelligence 
Community officials.
    Intelligence Community employees, or employees of 
contractors, who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent 
concern''--such as a violation of law or Executive Order, a 
false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from 
Congress--may report such complaints and supporting information 
to the Inspector General. Following a review by the Inspector 
General to determine the credibility of the complaint or 
information, the Inspector General must transmit such complaint 
and information to the DNI. On receiving the complaints or 
information from the Inspector General (together with the 
Inspector General's credibility determination), the DNI must 
transmit such complaint or information to the intelligence 
committees. If the Inspector General does not find a complaint 
or information to be credible, the reporting individual may 
submit the matter directly to the intelligence committees by 
following appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. 
Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting individuals 
constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.'' The Committee will 
not tolerate actions by the DNI, or by any Intelligence 
Community element, constituting a reprisal for reporting an 
``urgent concern'' or any other matter to Congress. 
Nonetheless, reporting individuals should ensure that the 
complaint and supporting information are provided to Congress 
consistent with appropriate procedures designed to protect 
intelligence sources and methods and other sensitive matters.
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the Inspector 
General for the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General 
for another Intelligence Community element (or a parent 
department or agency), the Inspectors General must 
expeditiously resolve who will undertake the investigation, 
inspection, or audit. The final decision about jurisdiction 
will, however, be made by the Inspector General for the 
Intelligence Community. For investigations, inspections, or 
audits commenced by an Inspector General for an Intelligence 
Community element prior to the enactment of this Act, the 
Inspector General for the Intelligence Community should 
exercise his authority in a manner that does not disrupt the 
timely completion of such investigations, inspections, or 
audits or result in unnecessary duplication of effort. An 
Inspector General for an Intelligence Community element must 
share the results of any inspection, investigation, or audit 
with any other Inspector General, including the Inspector 
General for the Intelligence Community, who otherwise would 
have also had jurisdiction over the investigation.
    Consistent with existing law, the Inspector General must 
report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or 
complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
violations of Federal criminal law.

Section 409. Leadership and location of National Counter Proliferation 
        Center

    Section 1022 of the Intelligence Reform Act added a new 
Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 which 
provides that the President shall establish a National Counter 
Proliferation Center (NCPC). Under the Act, the Center has 
seven missions and objectives and should serve as the primary 
organization within the United States government for analyzing 
andintegrating all intelligence pertaining to proliferation. 
Among its other powers, the NCPC is authorized to coordinate the 
counter proliferation plans and activities of all United States 
government departments and agencies. Section 119A also provided that 
the NCPC should conduct ``strategic operational planning'' for the 
United States government to prevent the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, delivery systems, and materials and technologies.
    Congress provided the President with the authority to waive 
any, or all, of the requirements of Section 119A if it was 
determined that they did not materially improve the 
nonproliferation ability of the United States. At the time 
Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, the WMD 
Commission had not completed its work. Congress provided that 
the President, after receiving the WMD Commission report, 
should submit to Congress his views on the establishment of the 
NCPC.
    In its March 31, 2005 report, the WMD Commission 
recommended that the President establish a relatively small 
NCPC that manages and coordinates analysis and collection 
across the Intelligence Community on nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons. The WMD Commission supported the concept of 
``strategic operational planning,'' but recommended that it not 
be performed by the NCPC.
    On June 29, 2005, the White House announced that the 
President had endorsed the establishment of an NCPC. The 
statement provided that the NCPC would exercise ``strategic 
oversight'' of the Intelligence Community's weapons of mass 
destruction activities. The DNI would ensure that the NCPC 
establishes strategic intelligence collection and analysis 
requirements regarding WMD that are consistent with United 
States policies. Under the President's plan, the NCPC would be 
established within the Office of the DNI, and the DNI would 
appoint the Director of the NCPC who would then report to the 
DNI. On August 8, 2005, the DNI announced the appointment of 
the first Director of the NCPC. This appointment represents an 
important first step in the establishment of the NCPC.
    Section 409 of this Act reflects the President's 
determination that the DNI should appoint the Director of the 
NCPC and that the NCPC should be located in the Office of the 
DNI.
    Section 409 does not amend any other procedural or 
substantive provision of Section 119A of the National Security 
Act of 1947. If the President determines not to assign to the 
NCPC any power provided by Section 119A, notice must be 
provided to Congress in writing as required by that section.

Section 410. Operational files in the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    Section 410 adds a new Section 700 to the National Security 
Act of 1947. It ensures that protected operational files 
provided by elements of the Intelligence Community to the 
Office of the DNI carry with them any exemption such files had 
from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements for search, 
review, publication, or disclosure.
    In the CIA Information Act, Congress authorized the DCI to 
exempt operational files of the CIA from several requirements 
of the FOIA, particularly those requiring search and review in 
response to FOIA requests. In a series of enactments codified 
in Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress has 
extended the exemption to the operational files of the NGA, the 
National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO). It has also provided that the files of the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) should be 
treated as operational files of the CIA (to the extent they 
meet the criteria for CIA operational files). Section 434 of 
this Act would extend the FOIA exemption to the operational 
files of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
    The components of the Office of the DNI, including the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), require access to 
information contained in operational files. The purpose of 
Section 410 is to make clear that the operational files of any 
component of the Intelligence Community, for which an 
operational files exemption is applicable, retain their 
exemption from FOIA search, review, disclosure, or publication.
    The new Section 700 of the National Security Act of 1947 
provides several limitations. The exemption does not apply to 
information disseminated beyond the Office of the DNI. Also, as 
Congress has provided in the operational files exemptions for 
the CIA and other Intelligence Community elements, Section 700 
provides that the exemption from search and review does not 
apply to requests by United States citizens or permanent 
residents for information about themselves (although other FOIA 
exemptions, such as appropriate classification, may continue to 
protect such files from public disclosure). The search and 
review exemption would not apply to the subject matter of 
Congressional or Executive Branch investigations into 
improprieties or violations of law.
    In the DNI's request to the Committee for legislative 
authorities, the Office of the DNI asked for a broader 
exemption from the FOIA than currently provided in Section 410. 
The Committee considers it likely that the operations of the 
Office of the DNI, in particular the activities of the NCTC and 
the NCPC, may require an operational files exemption. Before 
acting on such a request, the DNI, through the Chief 
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community or other 
appropriate officers, should systematically study and report to 
the intelligence committees regarding the application of the 
FOIA to the Office of the DNI.
    As part of this review, the DNI should report on the 
responsibility assigned by Congress in the Intelligence Reform 
Act concerning operational file exemptions. Congress amended 
each operational file statute to provide that the exemption 
should be made only with the coordination of the DNI. Congress 
also provided that the decennial review of the exemptions in 
force must be undertaken with the DNI. These decennial reviews 
must include consideration of the historical value or other 
public interest in categories of files and the potential for 
declassifying a significant amount of the material in them. The 
DNI should advise the intelligence committees on the benefits 
of coordinating the four decennial reviews (five with the 
enactment of Section 434 of this Act) which now occur at 
different times.

Section 411. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 411 updates Section 402 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-215 
(Dec. 9, 1983)) to reflect and incorporate organizational 
changes made by the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 411 also 
makes other technical and stylistic amendments and strikes a 
subsection of the law that applied only during fiscal year 
1987.

Section 412. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 412 amends the authorities and structure of the 
Office of the NCIX to eliminate certain independent 
administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX 
when that official was appointed by, and reported to, the 
President. Those authorities are unnecessary, redundant, and 
anomalous now that the NCIX is to be appointed by, and under 
the authority, direction, and control of the DNI.

Section 413. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to 
        advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
(5 U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees 
throughout the Federal Government. The FACA sets forth the 
responsibilities of Congress and the Executive Branch with 
regard to such committees and outlines procedures and 
requirements for such committees. As originally enacted in 
1972, the FACA expressly exempted advisory committees utilized 
by the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. Section 413 amends 
the FACA to extend this exemption to those advisory committees 
established or used by the Office of the DNI.

Section 414. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 414 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI's designee, as 
a member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board 
established under Section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States 
Code, in place of the Director of the CIA.

Section 415. Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence of certain financial reporting 
        requirements

    Section 3515 of Title 31, United States Code, requires 
certain United States government agencies to prepare and submit 
to the Congress and the Director of the OMB, not later than 
March 1 of each year, an audited financial statement for the 
preceding fiscal year. Section 3515 applies to the Office of 
the DNI. When the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 
(Pub. L. No. 107-289 (Nov. 7, 2002)), amended Section 3515, the 
Director of the OMB was given the authority to waive the 
audited financial reporting requirements for up to two fiscal 
years for any newly covered agency. Section 3515 was later 
amended to allow the Director of the OMB to waive the reporting 
requirements for a covered agency if the budget authority for 
the agency did not exceed $25 million (in the given fiscal 
year) and if the Director of the OMB determined that there was 
an absence of risk associated with the agency's operations. The 
Director of the OMB cannot use this limited waiver authority to 
grant a grace period for the Office of the DNI. Although the 
former Community Management Staff (CMS) has taken significant 
strides to address the financial management issues of the 
Office of the DNI, the DNI requested a grace period from the 
audited financial reporting requirements of Section 3515.
    Section 415 exempts the Office of the DNI from the 
requirements of Section 3515 for fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 
2007. This grace period will give the DNI the necessary time to 
establish a financial management system for the Office of the 
DNI that will be able to generate financial statements that 
meet the prescribed legal and auditing standards. The Committee 
expects the DNI to work diligently to bring the Office of the 
DNI into compliance with the requirements of Section 3515. 
Notwithstanding the length of the waiver provided in Section 
415, the Committee strongly encourages the DNI to ensure 
compliance with the requirements of Section 3515 at the 
earliest possible date.

Section 416. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of 
        National Intelligence and Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) has long contained a 
provision under which the Director of the CIA could promulgate 
rules to exempt any system of records within the CIA from 
certain disclosure requirements under the Act. The provision 
was designed to ensure that the CIA could provide adequate and 
appropriate safeguards for certain sensitive information in its 
records systems. In assuming the leadership of the Intelligence 
Community, the DNI similarly requires the ability to safeguard 
sensitive information in records systems within the Office of 
the DNI. Section 416 extends to the DNI the authority to 
promulgate rules under which certain records systems of the 
Office of the DNI may be exempted from certain Privacy Act 
disclosure requirements.

Section 417. Temporary exemption from personnel limits of certain 
        Office of Director of National Intelligence personnel assigned 
        to the National Counterterrorism Center

    Section 1096 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes 
within the Office of the DNI only 500 new personnel positions 
during fiscal years 2005 and 2006. The Committee is concerned 
that Section 1096 places an artificial limitation on the 
ability of the DNI to create permanent personnel positions 
within the NCTC. As currently constructed, the NCTC relies on 
detailees from other Intelligence Community elements. To ensure 
institutional memory and build an NCTC analytic base 
independent of any particular Intelligence Community element, 
the Committee strongly encourages the development of a 
permanent cadre of analysts at the NCTC. To promote the 
creation of this permanent cadre, Section 417 of this Act 
exempts permanent positions within the NCTC from the 
application of the personnel limitations in Section 1096. 
Section 417 will permitthe creation of a permanent cadre at the 
NCTC-administratively a part of the Office of the DNI-without 
interfering with the DNI's ability to create permanent positions 
elsewhere within the Office, including a permanent cadre charged with 
the coordination and management of the Intelligence Community.

Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Section 421. Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    The Intelligence Reform Act established the positions of 
the DNI and the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence (PDDNI) and abolished the positions of DCI and 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as those positions had 
previously existed. The DNI and PDDNI are responsible for 
leading the entire Intelligence Community, which includes many 
components from the DoD. Moreover, the DNI and PDDNI must 
ensure that the war fighter continues to receive timely, 
actionable intelligence. Accordingly, the Intelligence Reform 
Act continued the tradition of permitting a commissioned 
officer to serve as either the leader or principal deputy of 
the Intelligence Community, so long as both positions are not 
filled by commissioned officers at the same time.
    In establishing the positions of DNI and PDDNI, the Act 
separated the leadership of the Intelligence Community from the 
leadership of the CIA. Although the Act explicitly provided for 
a Director of the CIA, it did not provide for a statutory 
deputy to the Director.
    Section 421 establishes the position of Deputy Director of 
the CIA. The Deputy Director will be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and will assist the Director of the CIA in carrying out the 
duties and responsibilities of that office. In the event of a 
vacancy in the position of Director of the CIA, or during the 
absence or disability of the Director, the Deputy Director will 
act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director. The DNI will 
recommend a nominee to the President to fill any vacancy in 
this position.
    With the amendments made by Section 421, the Presidential 
nomination of both the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA 
must be confirmed by the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Given the sensitive operations of the CIA, nominees for the 
positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIA merit 
close scrutiny by Congress to examine the nominees' 
qualifications prior to their assumption of the duties of these 
offices. With respect to the Deputy Director of the CIA, the 
requirement for Senate confirmation also provides assurance 
that, in the event of a vacancy in the position of Director of 
the CIA, or during the absence or disability of the Director, 
Congress will have previously expressed its confidence in the 
ability of the nominee to assume those additional duties.
    Section 421 also requires that both the Director and Deputy 
Director of the CIA be appointed ``from civilian life.'' The 
considerations that encourage appointment of a military officer 
to the position of DNI or PDDNI do not apply to the leadership 
of the CIA. Indeed, given the CIA's establishment in 1947 as an 
independent civilian intelligence agency with no direct 
military or law enforcement responsibilities, the Committee 
does not believe that a similar construct of military 
leadership is appropriate at that agency. Accordingly, the 
Committee recommends that both the Director and Deputy Director 
of the CIA should be appointed from civilian life. To preserve 
the important liaison relationship between the military and the 
CIA, Section 426 of this Act removes a limitation that might 
have otherwise discouraged the appointment of a military 
officer to serve as the Associate Director of the CIA for 
Military Support. In Section 426, the Committee recognizes the 
important role played by the Associate Director of the CIA for 
Military Support by ensuring that an officer of the armed 
forces assigned to the position cannot be counted against the 
numbers and percentages of the grade of that officer authorized 
for that officer's armed force.
    Unlike the requirement that the Secretary of Defense be 
appointed ``from civilian life'' (see 10 U.S.C. 113(a)), 
Section 421 does not contain any limitation on how long a 
nominee must have been ``from civilian life'' prior to 
appointment. The only restriction is that an active duty 
officer must first retire or resign his or her commission and 
return to civilian life prior to being appointed as either the 
Director or Deputy Director of the CIA. Thus, the President 
retains the flexibility to nominate candidates with significant 
military experience for either or both positions.
    The Committee recognizes that the person presently engaged 
in the administrative performance of the duties of the Deputy 
Director of the CIA is an active duty commissioned officer. The 
prohibition on an active duty commissioned officer serving as 
the Deputy Director of the CIA and the requirement that the 
position be filled by a Presidential nominee confirmed by the 
Senate will not take effect until the earlier of the date the 
President nominates an individual to serve in such position or 
the date the individual presently performing the duties of that 
office leaves the post. To insulate the current officer from 
undue military influence, Section 421 provides that so long as 
the individual continues to perform the duties of the Deputy 
Director of the CIA, he may continue to receive military pay 
and allowances, but he is not subject to the supervision or 
control of the Secretary of Defense or any of the military or 
civilian personnel of the DoD, except as otherwise authorized 
by law.

Section 422. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure

    Section 422 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the Director of the CIA the authority to protect CIA 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, 
consistent with any direction from the President or the DNI. 
Prior to the Intelligence Reform Act, the authority to protect 
intelligence sources and methods had been assigned to the DCI, 
as head of the Intelligence Community. The CIA relied on the 
DCI's sources and methods authority as the CIA's primary 
statutory basis for protecting a range of CIA information, 
including its human sources, from public or unauthorized 
disclosure in a wide range of contexts and proceedings. This 
authority proved critical for assuring current and potential 
human intelligence sources that CIA could, and would, keep the 
fact of their association with the United States government 
secret, whether in civil litigation, administrative 
proceedings, or other arenas. In Section 102A(i) of theNational 
Security Act, as added by the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress 
transferred this DCI authority to the DNI.
    At the request of the Office of the DNI, Section 422 would 
supplement that grant of authority to the DNI with a comparable 
grant to the Director of the CIA, subject to the direction of 
the President or DNI. It is intended to underscore for 
intelligence sources that the CIA has explicit statutory 
authority to protect its sources and methods. The revision to 
Section 104A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 is not 
intended to, and does not, authorize the Director of the CIA to 
withhold from the DNI any CIA information to which the DNI is 
entitled by statute, Executive Order, Presidential directive, 
or other applicable law or regulation.
    Section 422 also makes conforming changes to Section 6 of 
the CIA Act of 1949.

Section 423. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency 
        requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 423 modifies statutory provisions pertaining to 
foreign language proficiency for certain senior officials in 
the CIA. Currently, Section 104A(g) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (Section 421 of the Committee's bill results in the 
re-designation of Section 104A(g) as 104A(h)) provides that an 
individual cannot be appointed to a position in the Senior 
Intelligence Service (SIS) in the CIA's Directorate of 
Intelligence (DI) or Directorate of Operations (DO) unless the 
individual demonstrates at least a specified level of 
professional speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign 
language. Current law also grants the Director of the CIA 
limited authority to waive this requirement with respect to a 
position or class of positions with notification to the 
intelligence committees.
    Section 423 enhances CIA management flexibility by 
authorizing the Director of the CIA to waive the foreign 
language proficiency requirement, not just with respect to 
positions or categories of positions, but also as to individual 
officers or categories of individual officers-subject to the 
Director of the CIA's determination that such proficiency is 
not necessary for the successful performance of the duties and 
responsibilities involved. The section also adds a 
``grandfather'' clause to the language proficiency requirement, 
creating a transition period that will allow CIA leadership to 
more effectively manage the senior Agency workforce during a 
critical period of change. Finally, Section 423 makes 
appropriate conforming changes to the report on waivers 
currently required by Section 104A(g).
    The Committee expects the CIA to move forward in its 
commitment to enhance its overall language capabilities. The 
personnel flexibility granted by Section 423 will allow the 
Director of the CIA to better integrate requirements for 
language skills into leadership training, promotion, and 
retention decisions and to plan for the projected influx of new 
DI and DO officers.

Section 424. Exclusion of the Central Intelligence Agency from annual 
        report on improvement of financial statements for auditing 
        purposes

    Section 424 repeals the requirement that the Director of 
the CIA submit to the intelligence committees an annual report 
describing the activities being undertaken to ensure that 
financial statements of the CIA can be audited in accordance 
with applicable law and the requirements of the OMB. The report 
is unnecessary and duplicative now that CIA has submitted, and 
will continue to submit, audited financial statements in 
accordance with the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 
(Pub. L. No. 107-289 (Nov. 7, 2002)).

Section 425. Additional functions and authorities for protective 
        personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 425 amends Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) which authorizes protective functions by 
designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective 
details.
            Arrest Authority
    Section 425 authorizes protective detail personnel, when 
engaged in the performance of protective functions, to make 
arrests in two circumstances. Under this section, protective 
detail personnel may make arrests without a warrant for any 
offense against the United States-whether a felony, 
misdemeanor, or infraction-that is committed in their presence. 
They may also make arrests without a warrant if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested 
has committed or is committing a felony, but not other 
offenses, under the laws of the United States.
    Regulations, approved by the Director of the CIA and the 
Attorney General, will provide safeguards and procedures to 
ensure the proper exercise of this authority. The provision 
specifically does not grant any authority to serve civil 
process or to investigate crimes.
    By granting CIA protective detail personnel limited arrest 
authority, the provision mirrors statutes applicable to other 
Federal law enforcement agencies that are authorized to perform 
protective functions. The authority provided under this section 
is consistent with those of other Federal elements with 
protective functions, such as the Secret Service (see 18 U.S.C. 
3056(c)(1)(c)), the State Department's Diplomatic Security 
Service (see 22 U.S.C. 2709(a)(5)), and the Capitol Police (see 
2 U.S.C. 1966(c)). Arrest authority will contribute 
significantly to the ability of CIA protective detail personnel 
to fulfill their responsibilities to protect officials against 
serious threats without being dependent on the response of 
Federal, State, or local law enforcement officers. The grant of 
arrest authority under this amendment is supplemental to all 
other authority that CIA protective detail personnel have by 
virtue of their statutory responsibility to perform the 
protective functions set forth in the CIA Act of 1949.
            Protection of Personnel of the Office of the DNI
    Section 425 also authorizes the Director of the CIA, on 
request of the DNI, to make CIA protective detail personnel 
available to the DNI and to other personnel within the Office 
of the DNI. The DNI, in consultation with the Director of the 
CIA and the Attorney General, should advise the intelligence 
committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act on whether 
this arrangement meets the protective needs of the Office of 
the DNI or whether other statutory authority is needed.

Section 426. Modification of exclusion of military officer serving as 
        Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for 
        Military Support from officer strength and distribution-in-
        grade limitations

    Section 426 amends existing law to reflect the appropriate 
designation of the ``Associate Director of Central Intelligence 
for Military Support'' as the ``Associate Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency for Military Support.'' The 
provision also ensures that the position will be ``non-count'' 
for purposes of Chapter 32 of Title 10, United States Code.

Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Section 431. Modification of requirements on disclosure of governmental 
        affiliation by Department of Defense intelligence personnel

    Section 431 provides a necessary, but limited, DoD 
intelligence exemption to a provision of the Privacy Act (5 
U.S.C. 552a). Section 552a(e)(3) of Title 5, United States 
Code, requires each agency that maintains a system of records 
to inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, 
on the form which it uses to collect the information or on a 
separate form that can be retained by the individual, of:
          (A) The authority (whether granted by statute, or by 
        executive order of the President) which authorizes the 
        solicitation of the information and whether disclosure 
        of such information is mandatory or voluntary;
          (B) The principal purpose or purposes for which the 
        information is intended to be used;
          (C) The routine uses which may be made of the 
        information . . .; and
          (D) The effects on [the individual], if any, of not 
        providing all or any part of the requested information.
    To improve the ability of intelligence personnel of the DoD 
to recruit sources, it is sometimes necessary for Defense 
intelligence personnel, without having to divulge their 
affiliation with the DoD or the United States government, to 
approach potential sources and collect personal information 
from them to determine their suitability and willingness to 
become intelligence sources.
    The DCI recognized that compliance with the requirements of 
Section 552a(e)(3) has the potential to threaten operational 
relationships, compromise the safety of intelligence officers, 
and jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Pursuant to 
Section 552a(j)(1) of the Privacy Act, the DCI exempted all 
systems of records maintained by CIA from the requirements of 
Section 552a(e)(3). See 32 C.F.R. 1901.62(b). Section 
552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act grants a similar exemption to law 
enforcement personnel. Compliance with Section 552a(e)(3) poses 
similar risks to Defense intelligence personnel and to the 
lawful and authorized human intelligence missions of the DoD.
    Congress has previously recognized the limitations that 
Section 552a(e)(3) places on Defense intelligence personnel. 
Section 503 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1995 (Pub. L. No. 103-359 (Oct. 14, 1994)) granted Defense 
intelligence personnel a very limited exemption from Section 
552a(e)(3). The exemption in Section 503 was limited to a 
single ``initial assessment contact outside the United 
States.'' Current counterterrorism and other foreign 
intelligence operations highlight the need for greater latitude 
to assess potential intelligence sources, both overseas and 
within the United States. Providing an additional limited 
exemption to the Privacy Act to give Defense intelligence 
officers the same protection enjoyed by the CIA when assessing 
and recruiting sources should serve to protect these officers, 
shield their operations from security risks, and improve the 
ability of the DoD to conduct successful human intelligence 
operations.
    Section 431 does not expand the intelligence collection 
mission of the DoD. Section 431 also maintains current 
limitations in Executive Order 12333 and DoD Regulation 5240.1-
R concerning the collection and retention of information about 
U.S. persons. In fact, the legislation codifies several 
restrictions in Executive Order 12333 and DoD Regulation 
5240.1-R that provide protections for U.S. persons.
    The Committee expects that the majority of Defense 
intelligence ``assessment contacts'' with U.S. persons, whether 
within or outside the United States, should continue to be 
``open''--i.e., the U.S. person should be aware that they are 
talking with a representative of the United States government. 
Under DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, Defense intelligence officials 
are required to use the ``least intrusive means'' for 
collecting intelligence information. In other words, without 
meeting specified requirements for more intrusive techniques 
(such as other-than-overt or ``clandestine'' approaches), 
Defense intelligence agents must use overt methods to collect 
publicly available information or information provided with the 
consent of the person concerned. Within the United States, a 
clandestine collection effort may be undertaken to collect 
foreign intelligence about U.S. persons only under the 
following specified circumstances:
          (a) The foreign intelligence sought is significant 
        and collection is not undertaken for the purpose of 
        acquiring information concerning the domestic 
        activities of any U.S. person;
          (b) Such foreign intelligence cannot reasonably be 
        obtained by overt means;
          (c) The collection of such foreign intelligence has 
        been coordinated with the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation; and
          (d) The use of other than overt means has been 
        approved in writing by the head of the Department of 
        Defense intelligence component concerned, or his single 
        designee, as being consistent with [DoD Regulation 
        5240.1-R].
    The regulatory conditions under which Defense intelligence 
personnel may collect information about a U.S. person are quite 
rigorous and, in large part, have been incorporated in Section 
431. If any condition for collection is not met, then the 
Defense intelligence component may not utilize the authorities 
provided in Section 431.
    Section 431 amends Section 503 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Pub. L. No. 103-359 
(Oct. 14, 1994)) to permit Defense intelligence personnel, 
under certain limited circumstances, to make assessment 
contacts with U.S. persons without providing notice of 
governmental affiliation. In addition to the restrictions in 
Executive Order 12333 and DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, the 
authority may only be exercised within the United States upon a 
determination by the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), or the single designee of the Director, that:
          (a) Foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, 
        security, or other operational concerns require that 
        such notice not be given; and
          (b) Such assessment contact is undertaken for the 
        purpose of determining whether such U.S. person 
        possesses, or has access to, foreign intelligence 
        information, and whether such U.S. person is credible 
        or suitable as a source, provided that no assessment 
        contact shall be undertaken . . . for the purpose of 
        acquiring information concerning the domestic 
        activities of any U.S. person.
    Section 431 also requires that the DoD maintain records 
associated with each assessment contact under this provision 
that describe (1) the authority under which the information was 
collected, (2) any interagency coordination required before the 
contact, (3) a brief description of such interagency 
coordination, (4) the basis for the decision not to disclose 
governmental affiliation, (5) the nature of the information 
obtained from the U.S. person as a result of the contact, and 
(6) whether additional assessment contacts, beyond the initial 
assessment contact, resulted with the person concerned.
    The Committee will closely monitor the DoD's use of the 
authorities provided by Section 503 (as amended by this 
section) to ensure that the requirements of the provision, 
Executive Order 12333, and DoD Regulation 5240.1-R are strictly 
followed and that the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. 
persons are appropriately protected.
    In addition, Section 431 requires the DNI to examine the 
legal and regulatory requirements and guidelines applicable to 
assessment contacts to determine whether such requirements or 
guidelines should be modified to ensure that appropriate 
protections are afforded United States persons in the course of 
such contacts. Section 431 also requires the DNI to modify 
requirements and guidelines applicable to assessment contacts 
if the DNI finds such modification appropriate. Nothing in the 
section, or the amendments made by the section, is to be 
construed as authority for the collection, retention, or 
dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons not 
otherwise authorized by law, Executive Order, or this section.

Section 432. Enhancements of National Security Agency training program

    Section 16 of the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
authorizes the NSA to establish and maintain an undergraduate 
training program to facilitate the recruitment of individuals 
with skills critical to the NSA's mission. Under the program, 
the government has always had the right to recoup the 
educational costs expended for the benefit of employees whose 
employment with NSA is ``terminated''--either voluntarily by 
the employee or by the NSA for misconduct.
    Section 432 amends Section 16(d) of the NSA Act of 1959 to 
clarify that ``termination of employment'' includes situations 
where employees fail to maintain satisfactory academic 
performance as defined by the Director of NSA. Such employees 
shall be in breach of their contractual agreement and, in lieu 
of any service obligation arising under such agreement, shall 
be liable for repayment. Failure to maintain satisfactory 
academic performance has always been grounds for default 
resulting in the right of the government to recoup the 
educational costs expended for the benefit of the defaulting 
employee. Thus, this provision is a clarification of that 
obligation.
    In addition, Section 432 permits the Director of NSA to 
protect intelligence sources and methods by deleting a 
requirement that the NSA publicly identify to educational 
institutions which students are NSA employees. Deletion of this 
disclosure requirement will enhance the ability of NSA to 
protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the 
ability of training program participants to undertake future 
covert or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure is 
appropriate when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources 
or methods, would endanger the life or safety of the student, 
or would limit the employee's or prospective employee's ability 
to perform intelligence activities in the future. Despite the 
deletion of the disclosure requirement, the Committee expects 
the NSA to continue to prohibit participants in the training 
program from engaging in any intelligence functions at the 
institutions they attend under the program. See H.R. Rep. 99-
690, Part I (July 17, 1986) (``NSA employees attending an 
institution under the program will have no intelligence 
function whatever to perform at the institution.'').

Section 433. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency 
        protective personnel

    Section 433 amends the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
by adding a new Section 20, to clarify and enhance the 
authority of protective details for the NSA.
    New Section 20(a) would authorize the Director of the NSA 
to designate NSA personnel to perform protective detail 
functions for the Director and other personnel of the NSA who 
are designated from time to time by the Director of the NSA as 
requiring protection. Section 11 of the NSA Act of 1959 
presently provides that the Director of NSA may authorize 
agency personnel to perform certain security functions at NSA 
headquarters, at certain other facilities, and around the 
perimeter of those facilities. The new authority for protective 
details would enable the Director of the NSA to provide 
security when the Director or other designated personnel 
require security away from those facilities.
    New Section 20(b) would provide that NSA personnel, when 
performing protective detail functions, may exercise the same 
arrest authority that Section 425 provides for CIA protective 
detail personnel. The arrest authority for NSA protective 
detail personnel would be subject to guidelines approved by the 
Director of the NSA and the Attorney General. The purpose and 
extent of that arrest authority, and the limitations on it, are 
described in the section-by-section explanation for Section 
425. That analysis applies equally to the arrest authority 
provided to NSA protective detail personnel by Section 20(b).
    While this bill provides separately for authority for CIA 
and NSA protective details, the DNI should advise the 
intelligence committees whether overall policies, procedure, 
and authority should be provided for protective services, when 
necessary, for other elements or personnel (or their immediate 
families) of the Intelligence Community.

Section 434. Protection of operational files of the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 434 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
adding a new Section 705 governing the ``operational files'' of 
the DIA. Section 434 exempts specified files from the 
publication, disclosure, search, and review requirements of the 
FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552). Existing authority in the National 
Security Act of 1947 provides the CIA, NSA, NRO, and NGA with 
certain FOIA exemptions for defined categories of ``operational 
files.'' Under these ``operational files'' exemptions, the CIA, 
NSA, NRO, and NGA are relieved of the administrative burden of 
searching and reviewing sensitive classes of files only to 
retrieve information that would not be subject to release under 
the FOIA. With some minor variations to reflect the role of the 
DoD and the armed services committees of the Congress, Section 
434 extends to DIA operational files the same FOIA ``search and 
review'' exemptions applicable to CIA operational files--i.e., 
to those files documenting certain human intelligence, foreign 
liaison, and technical operations of DIA.

Section 435. Inspector General matters

    The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452 (Oct. 
12, 1978)) established a government-wide system of Inspectors 
General, some appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and others ``administratively appointed'' 
by the heads of their respective Federal entities. These 
Inspectors General were authorized to ``conduct and supervise 
audits and investigations relating to the programs and 
operations'' of the government and ``to promote economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and . . 
. to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and 
operations.'' See 5 U.S.C. App. 2. These Inspectors General 
also perform an important reporting function, ``keeping the 
head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently 
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 
administration of . . . programs and operations and the 
necessity for and progress of corrective action.'' Id. The 
investigative authorities exercised by Inspectors General, and 
their relative independence from the government operations they 
audit and investigate, provide an important mechanism to ensure 
that the operations of government are conducted as efficiently 
and effectively as possible.
    The Inspectors General of the CIA and Departments of 
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Treasury are appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. These Inspectors General--authorized by 
either the Inspectors General Act of 1978 or Section 17 of the 
CIA Act of 1949--enjoy a degree of independence from all but 
the head of their respective departments or agencies. These 
Inspectors General also have explicit statutory authority to 
access information from their respective departments or 
agencies or other United States government departments and 
agencies and may use subpoenas to access information (e.g., 
from a department or agency contractor) necessary for them to 
carry out their authorized functions.
    The NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA have established their own 
``administrative'' Inspectors General. Because they are not 
identified in Section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, 
however, these Inspectors General lack the explicit statutory 
authorization to access information relevant to their audits or 
investigations, or to compel the production of such information 
via subpoena. This lack of authority has impeded access to 
information--in particular, information from contractors--that 
is necessary for these Inspectors General to perform their 
important function. These Inspectors General also lack the 
indicia of independence necessary for the Government 
Accountability Office to recognize the annual financial 
statement audits of these Inspectors General as compliant with 
the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-576 
(Nov. 15, 1990)). This lack of independence also prevents the 
DoD Inspector General, and would prevent the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community, from relying on the results of 
NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA Inspector General audits or 
investigations that must meet ``generally accepted government 
auditing standards.''
    To provide an additional level of independence and to 
ensure prompt access to the information necessary for these 
Inspectors General to perform their audits and investigations, 
Section 435 amends Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978 to include the NRO,DIA, NSA, and NGA as 
``designated federal entities.'' As so designated, the heads of these 
Intelligence Community elements will be required by statute to 
administratively appoint Inspectors General for these agencies. As 
designated Inspectors General under the Inspector General Act of 1978, 
these Inspectors General will be responsible to the heads of the NRO, 
DIA, NSA, and NGA. The removal or transfer of these Inspectors General 
from their post by the heads of their respective office or agency must 
be promptly reported to the intelligence committees. These Inspectors 
General will also be able to exercise other investigative authorities, 
including those governing access to information and the issuance of 
subpoenas, utilized by other Inspectors General under the Inspector 
General Act of 1978.
    To protect vital national security interests, Section 435 
permits the DNI or the Secretary of Defense to prohibit the 
Inspectors General of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA from 
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation they are otherwise authorized to conduct. This 
authority--similar to the authority of the Director of the CIA 
under Section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949 with respect to the 
Inspector General of the CIA and the authority of the Secretary 
of Defense under Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
with respect to the DoD Inspector General--provides the 
President, through the DNI or the Secretary of Defense, a 
mechanism to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources 
and methods or other vital national security interests. The 
Committee expects that this authority will be rarely exercised 
by the DNI or the Secretary of Defense.

Section 436. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components 
        of the intelligence community

    Under present law and practice, the directors of the NSA, 
NGA, and NRO--each with a distinct and significant role in the 
national intelligence mission--are not confirmed by the Senate 
in relation to their leadership positions at these agencies. 
Presently, the President appoints the Directors of NSA and NGA, 
and Secretary of Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. None 
of the appointments must be confirmed by the Senate, unless a 
military officer is promoted or transferred into the position. 
Under such circumstances, Senate confirmation of the officer's 
promotion or assignment to that position is the responsibility 
of the Committee on Armed Services. The review of the Committee 
on Armed Services, however, relates to the military promotion 
or assignment and not specifically to the assumption by the 
individual of the leadership of these critical Intelligence 
Community elements.
    Section 436 provides, expressly and uniformly, that the 
heads of each of these entities shall be nominated by the 
President and that such nominations will be confirmed by the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The NSA, NGA, and NRO play a 
critical role in the national intelligence mission of the 
United States government. The spending of these agencies 
comprises a significant portion of the entire intelligence 
budget of the United States, and a substantial portion of the 
National Intelligence Program. Through advice and consent, the 
Senate can enable the Congress to fulfill more completely its 
responsibility for providing oversight to the intelligence 
activities of the U.S. Government. Section 436 does not alter 
the role of the Committee on Armed Services in reviewing and 
approving the promotion or assignment of military officers.
    Section 436(b) provides that the amendments made by Section 
436 apply prospectively. Therefore, the present Directors of 
NSA, NGA, and NRO are not affected by the amendments, which 
will apply initially to the appointment and confirmation of 
their successors.

Section 437. Security clearances in the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Although the NSA and the NGA have much in common as 
technical collection intelligence agencies administratively 
linked with the DoD, their present authorities for handling 
security clearances differ significantly. The Secretary of 
Defense has delegated to the NSA authority for contracting out 
background investigations and performing adjudications on 
individuals doing work for the agency--both for government 
employees and contractors. In contrast, the NGA must rely 
exclusively on the Defense Security Service or the Office of 
Personnel Management for background investigations and on the 
DIA for adjudication. The consequences for processing times are 
dramatic, particularly regarding contractor clearances. 
According to information provided by the DNI's Special Security 
Center, the average end-to-end processing times for contractors 
in July 2005 was 73 days for NSA and 540 days for NGA.
    The NGA's long backlog for contractor clearances is 
deleterious for both the agencies and the contractors that 
support them. For NGA, the backlog drives up financial costs 
and makes it more difficult to compete for talent. The backlog 
also distorts efficiencies and good business practices in the 
private sector, as contractors adjust to the realities of 
significantly different agency clearance timelines.
    The Committee calls upon the Secretary of Defense and the 
DNI to remedy this unacceptable situation and to report to the 
intelligence committees on strategies to mitigate the present 
situation within 90 days of the issuance of this Report. In so 
doing, the Committee strongly urges the Secretary of Defense to 
use all available legal authorities, including the delegation 
of background investigation and adjudication authorities to the 
NGA for a time-limited period to reduce current backlogs.

Subtitle D--Other Elements

Section 441. Department of Justice intelligence matters

    Section 441 establishes a National Security Division (NSD) 
within the DoJ, headed by an Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security (AAGNS). This provision is consistent with 
the WMD Commission's recommendation that the ``Department of 
Justice's primary national security elements--the Office of 
Intelligence Policy and Review, and the Counterterrorism and 
Counterespionage sections--should be placed under a new 
Assistant Attorney General for National Security.'' The 
President endorsed this recommendation in a June 29, 2005, 
memorandum for the Vice President, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of 
HomelandSecurity, Director of OMB, DNI, Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, and Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism.
    Like all other Assistant Attorneys General in the DoJ (see 
28 U.S.C. 506), the AAGNS will be appointed by the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The nomination of 
any individual by the President to serve as the AAGNS shall be 
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and, if and when 
reported, to the Select Committee on Intelligence for not to 
exceed 20 calendar days (except that in cases where the 20-day 
period expires while the Senate is in recess, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence shall have five additional calendar 
days after the Senate reconvenes to report the nomination). The 
Attorney General must obtain the concurrence of the DNI prior 
to making a nomination recommendation to the President for an 
individual to serve as the AAGNS.
    The AAGNS will be responsible for performing duties 
assigned by both the Attorney General and the DNI. It is 
important to note, however, that the DNI will have no authority 
through the AAGNS to execute any police, subpoena, law 
enforcement or prosecution powers or internal security 
functions not otherwise authorized by law. Section 441 also 
amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) 
(50 U.S.C. 1801(g)) to allow the AAGNS, upon a designation by 
the Attorney General, to approve applications for electronic 
surveillance and physical searches for national security 
investigations.
    The Committee believes that the creation of an NSD within 
the DoJ is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the 
AAGNS can effectively carry out the position's 
responsibilities. The NSD will be a full element of the 
Intelligence Community, except those portions or components 
charged with the investigation or prosecution of domestic 
terrorism. The NSD budget will be part of the National 
Intelligence Program, and the Committee strongly urges that the 
NSD budget should remain unclassified to the fullest extent 
practicable. Although Section 441 leaves the organization of 
the NSD to the discretion of the Attorney General, the 
Committee believes that the NSD's organization and structure 
should parallel other DoJ divisions. For example, the AAGNS 
should supervise at least two Deputy Assistant Attorneys 
General (DAAGs). One of these DAAGs should be a career criminal 
prosecutor who would supervise the Counterterrorism and 
Counterespionage sections. The other DAAG would supervise the 
Intelligence Oversight Section and the FISA Support Section. 
These sections would perform the responsibilities currently 
assigned to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. The 
AAGNS should also be afforded a Chief of Staff, an Office of 
Administration, a Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General, 
and an Office of Policy and Legislation. Section 441 also 
permits the Attorney General and the DNI to jointly designate 
any other element, component, or office of the DoJ (other than 
the FBI) as a component of the NSD.
    Like the Criminal Division, the NSD should be considered a 
law enforcement agency, albeit one that specializes in the 
prevention, detection, investigation, neutralization, and 
prosecution of crimes that threaten the national security. 
Through its components, the NSD should: (1) advise the Attorney 
General on all matters relating to the national security 
activities of the United States; (2) provide oversight of the 
FBI's intelligence components to ensure that their activities 
are conducted in accordance with the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States; (3) supervise the investigation and 
prosecution of cases affecting national security (e.g., 
international terrorism, sabotage, espionage, and other 
national security or foreign intelligence crimes), foreign 
relations, and the export of military and strategic commodities 
and technology; (4) supervise and manage the FISA process; (5) 
formulate legislative initiatives, DoJ polices, and guidelines 
related to national security; (6) provide legal advice to 
Federal prosecutors, investigators, and analysts concerning 
national security legal authorities; (7) conduct training on 
national security legal topics; (8) conduct liaison activities 
with other Intelligence Community agencies; (9) facilitate 
broad access to, and sharing of, foreign intelligence 
information across the Intelligence Community and with Federal, 
State, local, and tribal governments; (10) supervise the 
preparation of the Division's submission for the annual budget; 
and (11) perform other duties as assigned by the Attorney 
General and DNI. The NSD is expected to actively participate in 
the Intelligence Community's mission to prevent and otherwise 
neutralize threats to the national security.
    In matters of oversight, the activities of the AAGNS and 
the NSD will be subject to the shared jurisdiction of the 
Congressional appropriations, intelligence, and judiciary 
Committees.

Section 442. Foreign language incentive for certain non-special agent 
        employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 442 authorizes the Director of the FBI to pay a 
cash award, up to 5 percent of basic pay, to any FBI employee 
who uses or maintains foreign language skills in support of FBI 
analyses, investigations, or operations to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. 
Such awards are subject to the joint guidance of the Attorney 
General and the DNI.
    The Committee believes that the guidance of the Attorney 
General and DNI should reward FBI employees who are using one 
or more foreign languages in the regular performance of their 
official duties or maintaining proficiency in an obscure 
language that is of occasional operational significance. An 
employee should not automatically receive a 5 percent award for 
proficiency in any language. An FBI employee working in support 
of the FBI's counterintelligence mission who is fluent in 
French, German, or Spanish should not be eligible for a foreign 
language incentive, unless that employee is using those 
language skills in the regular performance of his or her 
official duties. However, the joint guidance should recognize 
that there are certain languages of operational significance 
that are not used on a routine basis, but for which a 
significant incentive should be awarded to maintain the 
necessary proficiency so that the employee can use the skill 
for operational purposes when the need arises. Finally, the 
joint guidelines should also provide for enhanced language 
incentive awards for those employees who use multiple languages 
in the performance of their duties, provided that no language 
incentive award can exceed the cap of 5 percent of basic pay.

Section 443. Authority to secure services by contract for the Bureau of 
        Intelligence and Research of the Department of State

    Section 443 authorizes the Secretary of State, in certain 
circumstances, to enter into personal services contracts to 
support the mission of the Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR). The authority, which is similar to that 
provided to the DoD (see 10 U.S.C. 129b), will enable INR to 
obtain the services of personal services contractors to respond 
to unanticipated surge requirements prompted by emergent events 
or crises or under unique circumstances (e.g., to provide 
temporary backup that will permit full-time employees to seek 
needed training). Personal services contractors, particularly 
those with previous INR experience, would also be valuable to 
train and mentor new INR personnel.

Section 444. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard element in the 
        intelligence community

    Section 444 restores, with respect to the United States 
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' 
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that 
service. See 50 U.S.C. 401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence 
Reform Act modified the definition of ``intelligence 
community,'' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion 
in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or 
those portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis 
of intelligence. Section 444 clarifies that all of the Coast 
Guard's intelligence elements are included within the 
definition of ``intelligence community.''

Section 445. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 445 clarifies that the establishment of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the 
Treasury (Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003))), and 
its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence (Section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations 
Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004))), do 
not affect the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with 
respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an 
element of the Intelligence Community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Section 501. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 501 corrects several inadvertent technical 
anomalies in the National Security Act of 1947 arising from the 
amendments made to that Act by the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 502. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 502 makes technical clarifications to Section 102A 
of the National Security Act of 1947 to preserve the 
participation of the DNI in the development of the annual 
budgets for any successor program or programs of the Joint 
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence 
and Related Activities. Section 502 also preserves the 
requirement for consultation by the Secretary of the Defense 
with the DNI in the reprogramming or transfer of funds 
involving any successor program or programs of the JMIP.

Section 503. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 503 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in the specified sections of the Intelligence Reform 
Act.

Section 504. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
        of 1949

    Section 504 amends Section 5(a)(1) of the CIA Act of 1949 
by striking or updating outdated references to the National 
Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform Act significantly 
restructured and renumbered multiple sections of the National 
Security Act of 1947, leaving references in Section 5(a)(1) of 
the CIA Act to provisions that no longer exist or that are no 
longer pertinent.

Section 505. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear national 
        intelligence program

    Section 505 updates the ``multiyear national foreign 
intelligence program'' provision to incorporate and reflect 
organizational and nomenclature changes made by the 
Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 506. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 506 makes several technical corrections to the 
Executive Schedule. This section substitutes the ``Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency'' for the previous reference in 
Executive Schedule Level II to the ``Director of Central 
Intelligence.'' See 5 U.S.C. 5313. Section 506 also strikes 
outdated references to Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence 
from Executive Schedule Level III. See 5 U.S.C. 5314. The 
provision also corrects the erroneous reference to the 
``General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director'' in 
Executive Schedule Level IV. See 5 U.S.C. 5315.

Section 507. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
        National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 507 makes several technical and conforming changes 
to existing law to bring these provisions in line with the 
change in name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to 
the NGA, as provided for in Section 921(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 
108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)).

                            COMMITTEE ACTION

Motion to close

    On September 22, 2005, on the motion of Chairman Roberts, 
the Committee agreed, by unanimous consent, to close the markup 
because matters under consideration at the meeting would 
require the discussion of information necessary to be kept 
secret in the interests of national defense or the confidential 
conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

Motion to report committee draft bill favorably subject to amendments

    On September 22, 2005, on the motion of Chairman Roberts, 
by a vote of 15 ayes and 0 noes, the Committee voted to report 
the bill favorably, subject to amendment. The votes in person 
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--aye; Senator 
Hatch--aye; Senator DeWine--aye; Senator Bond--aye; Senator 
Lott -aye; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator 
Chambliss--aye; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--
aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--
aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Corzine--aye.

Amendments to committee bill

    On September 22, 2005, by a vote of 15 ayes and 0 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Mikulski to require 
that the Directors of the NSA, NGA, and NRO be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Roberts--aye; Senator Hatch--aye; Senator DeWine--aye; Senator 
Bond--aye; Senator Lott--aye; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator 
Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--aye; Vice Chairman Rockefeller--
aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator 
Corzine--aye.
    On September 22, 2005, the Committee agreed, by unanimous 
consent, to an amendment by Senator Mikulski to provide the DNI 
or the Secretary of Defense with additional authority to 
delegate security clearance responsibilities to the NGA until 
December 31, 2007.
    On September 22, 2005, by a vote of 8 ayes and 7 noes, the 
Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Levin (for himself 
and Senator Hagel) that would require certain officials to 
provide to Congress requested intelligence documents and 
information within 15 days, unless the President refuses to 
provide the documents or information based on an assertion of a 
privilege pursuant to the Constitution. The votes in person or 
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--
no; Senator DeWine--no; Senator Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; 
Senator Snowe--no; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; 
Vice Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Corzine--aye.
    On September 22, 2005, by a vote of 9 noes and 6 ayes, the 
Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Levin to modify 
Section 307 to require the Director of the FBI to request, on 
behalf of a lawful and authorized activity of an element of the 
Intelligence Community, information regarding international 
terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from 
a non-Intelligence Community element; to require non-
Intelligence Community elements to provide terrorism 
information or information concerning the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction to the Intelligence Community 
through the FBI; and to modify the date on which certain 
reports must be filed regarding the pilot program established 
under Section 307. The votes in person or by proxy were as 
follows: Chairman Roberts--no; Senator Hatch--no; Senator 
DeWine--no; Senator Bond--no; Senator Lott--no; Senator Snowe--
no; Senator Hagel--no; Senator Chambliss--no; Vice Chairman 
Rockefeller--aye; Senator Levin--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--no; 
Senator Corzine--aye.

                           COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Appointment of the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 20 of the CIA Act of 1949 provides that the General 
Counsel of the CIA be appointed by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Section 20 of the CIA Act was 
enacted in 1996 as part of the Intelligence Renewal and Reform 
Act of 1996 (Section 813, Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293 (Oct. 11, 1996)). Prior 
to the enactment of Section 20, the Committee had encouraged 
the creation of the position, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Church Committee and the Iran-Contra 
Committees. At the time Section 20 was enacted, the Committee 
believed that the nature of the legal advice provided by the 
CIA General Counsel on sensitive matters such as covert action 
and other activities merited close scrutiny of the individual 
performing these duties through appointment by the President 
and approval of the Senate.
    With passage of the Intelligence Reform Act, establishment 
of the position of DNI, and the creation of a General Counsel 
of the Office of the DNI, the responsibilities of the CIA 
General Counsel should be considered in light of the 
responsibilities of the DNI and the DNI General Counsel. 
Indeed, the Committee expects that many of the sensitive legal 
functions previously performed by the CIA General Counsel--on 
behalf of the former DCI, as both head of the CIA and of the 
entire Intelligence Community--will now be performed, or 
closely managed and directed, by the DNI General Counsel. In 
particular, given the DNI's responsibility under Section 
102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 to ``ensure 
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States 
by the CIA [and other elements of the Intelligence 
Community],'' the Committee expects that the DNI General 
Counsel will provide important legal guidance and serve as 
theprimary legal advisor on activities such as covert actions and the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence information concerning U.S. persons. The 
Committee's expectations regarding the DNI General Counsel do not 
diminish the importance of the CIA General Counsel in providing 
important legal guidance on the sensitive activities of the CIA. The 
fulfillment of the Committee's expectations may, however, lessen the 
need to have a CIA General Counsel that is a Presidential nominee, 
confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate.
    In the request for legislative authorities for fiscal year 
2006, the DNI included a provision that would have eliminated 
the requirement for the CIA General Counsel to be appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Instead, the provision would have granted the appointment 
authority to the Director of the CIA. Although the Committee 
has not included this provision in this legislation, it may be 
appropriate at a later date to revisit the method in which the 
CIA General Counsel is appointed. In making this determination, 
the Committee will consider the role the DNI General Counsel 
fills in providing legal advice on sensitive matters such as 
covert action and other sensitive activities--roles the 
Committee envisioned for the CIA General Counsel in 1996. As 
the Committee monitors the development of the respective roles 
of the DNI and CIA general counsels, the Committee strongly 
encourages the President to appoint a qualified candidate to 
serve as the CIA General Counsel consistent with the advice-
and-consent requirements of current law.

Management of United States Government Human Intelligence Activities

    The collection of timely and useful human intelligence 
(HUMINT) is crucial to protecting against some of the most 
serious threats to our national security. Prior to the 
enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act, the DCI, in his 
capacity as head of the CIA, had the statutory responsibility 
for overall direction and coordination of the nation's human 
intelligence operations--a responsibility often referred to as 
the ``National HUMINT Manager.'' When the position of DNI was 
established, and leadership of the Intelligence Community and 
the CIA was separated, the Director of the CIA was given the 
statutory responsibility for overall direction of the nation's 
overseas HUMINT operations. Given the Intelligence Community--
wide responsibilities and authorities of the DNI, however, the 
Director of the CIA's authority is now subject to broad 
authorities granted to the DNI, including the DNI's 
responsibility to ``manage and direct the tasking of, 
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national 
intelligence by elements of the intelligence community.'' See 
Section 102A(f)(1)(A)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-1(f)(1)(A)(ii)).
    A number of inquiries have revealed shortcomings and 
failures of the nation's HUMINT operations. This Committee, the 
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and 
after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, and the 
WMD Commission have all documented instances in which the 
nation's HUMINT operations were hindered by lack of innovation, 
aversion to risk, and failure to coordinate. This Committee has 
also observed that the CIA's DO (acting as the designee of the 
DCI) did not effectively exercise the authorities of the 
National HUMINT Manager, often focusing instead on its own 
structure and operations instead of coordinating a strong, 
Intelligence Community-wide HUMINT effort. In this regard, the 
Intelligence Community's HUMINT operations have lacked strong 
leadership and an effective mechanism to resolve conflicts 
among Intelligence Community elements attempting to conduct 
HUMINT operations.
    In the wake of the intelligence failures associated with 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Intelligence 
Community's assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 
program, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, creating 
a DNI with the authority, inter alia, to establish the 
objectives, priorities, and guidance for, and direct the 
collection of, national intelligence. The Committee urges the 
DNI to use the authorities granted under the Act to directly 
manage and oversee the conduct of HUMINT operations across the 
Intelligence Community. Indeed, as elements of the Intelligence 
Community, such as the DIA and the FBI, and other United States 
government agencies, such as the DoD, place a greater emphasis 
on HUMINT operations, it is imperative that the DNI exercise 
the authority to prioritize, direct, and coordinate the 
Intelligence Community's HUMINT operations. The Committee 
expects the DNI, as ``National HUMINT Manager,'' to provide a 
level playing field across the community for all elements 
engaged in HUMINT operations. In furtherance of this goal, the 
Committee urges the establishment of standards and guidelines 
for training, coordination, and deconfliction of HUMINT 
operations and for the allocation of manpower and resources for 
HUMINT operations across the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee looks forward to the DNI's efforts in this regard and 
will work closely with the DNI, and all elements of the 
Intelligence Community that conduct HUMINT operations, to 
ensure the authorities and resources necessary to fulfill this 
important Intelligence Community mission are provided.
    Currently, the DNI's staff that manages HUMINT issues is 
largely composed of former officers from a single Intelligence 
Community element. The Committee believes that this staff will 
perform its duties in an evenhanded manner. Unfortunately, 
however, perception is often as important as reality. The 
Committee believes it is critical that the DNI move quickly to 
ensure that all Intelligence Community HUMINT agencies are more 
adequately represented on the DNI's HUMINT management staff. 
This action by the DNI will give all Intelligence Community 
HUMINT elements confidence that the DNI is working to create a 
level playing field for HUMINT operations.

Defense HUMINT Management Office

    The Committee supports the creation of the Defense HUMINT 
Management Office (DHMO) as a means of executing DoD objectives 
under the DoD HUMINT Enterprise, including the intelligence 
activities of the military department counterintelligence 
agencies. The Committee also supports full and extensive 
oversight and coordination of the Department's HUMINT efforts 
by the DNI.
    Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
military services have been authorized to rebuild their HUMINT 
capabilities. Given the number of DoD entities now authorized 
to collect intelligence through human sources, the Committee 
expects the DHMO willprovide crucial direction, prioritization, 
and coordination of DoD's various HUMINT activities. Moreover, the 
Committee expects the DHMO to facilitate the DNI's efforts to direct 
and prioritize national intelligence activities across the Intelligence 
Community, including DoD HUMINT collection.
    The Committee recommends that the DHMO be granted the 
authority to direct and control DoD's collection of 
intelligence through human sources, consistent with the 
guidance and direction of the DNI. The Committee also expects 
the Secretary of Defense to work with the DNI to take all 
appropriate steps to support the operations of the DHMO and to 
develop standards and procedures for the coordination, 
consultation, and deconfliction of DoD and other Intelligence 
Community HUMINT activities.

Treatment of Intelligence Community Detainees

    During his February 16, 2005, testimony in open session 
before the Committee, then-Director of Central Intelligence 
Porter Goss stated that the CIA had received a CIA Inspector 
General report on the treatment of detainees by members of the 
Intelligence Community. Director Goss stated that he believed 
that eight of the ten recommendations made by the CIA Inspector 
General had been implemented by the CIA.
    According to the CIA's Office of Inspector General, only 
five of the ten corrective recommendations have been 
implemented. The Committee is concerned with this delay in 
implementation and urges the Director of the CIA, in 
consultation and coordination with the DNI, to complete the 
remaining actions recommended by the CIA Inspector General 
without further delay.

The National Counterterrorism Center and Information Access

    For many years, the Intelligence Community has sought to 
achieve greater coordination of intelligence analysis and 
operations through the creation of centers. Although some 
successes have been achieved through the use of centers, the 
Committee is increasingly concerned that the proliferation of 
``centers'' throughout the Intelligence Community may have 
become a crutch that prevents the fundamental evolution of the 
Intelligence Community from a stove-piped system of 
intelligence collectors to a flexible intelligence information 
enterprise--where data is readily accessible, via technological 
means, by any Intelligence Community officer or employee with 
an appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know regardless 
of the agency that collected the data. To more closely examine 
this concern, the Committee Audit and Evaluations Staff is 
conducting an oversight review of the organization of the 
Intelligence Community around centers.
    The Committee is also concerned that limits on information 
access--whether based on legal interpretations or ineffective 
policy--are migrating from parent agencies into the NCTC and 
possibly other centers. When the NCTC and its predecessor, the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), were established, 
the Committee expected that these centers would become models 
for information access--true interagency information fusion 
centers, with representation from all concerned Intelligence 
Community elements and with policies and procedures that 
transcended previous limitations on information access and 
distribution, promoting information access across the 
Intelligence Community and, as appropriate, with other Federal, 
State, and local officials.
    In several instances since the establishment of the TTIC, 
the Committee has been disappointed by ineffective information 
dissemination practices at the TTIC and the NCTC. The Committee 
is extremely frustrated that four years after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and after Intelligence Community 
promises to improve information sharing, the Community appears 
to have made little progress in this regard. The Committee was 
particularly perplexed by divergent threat analyses preceding 
the 2004 Presidential election. During this period, separate 
Intelligence Community elements reached different conclusions 
on the level of the terrorist threat to the homeland, and the 
divergence seemed to be based on one element's lack of access 
to another element's intelligence reporting and to associated 
background information. Each Intelligence Community element 
brings a unique and critical perspective to its analytic 
mission, but without timely, equivalent access to intelligence 
information these analysts--scattered throughout the 
Intelligence Community but covering similar analytic topics--
cannot effectively conduct their respective missions. The 
Committee has strongly encouraged thoughtful and in-depth 
intelligence analysis that may lead to separate analytic 
conclusions, but the underlying analysis must be based on 
similar data sets or the divergent conclusions add little value 
to the policymaking process. Indeed, these sorts of divergent 
conclusions--based on different data--can actually cause 
significant confusion among policymakers and lead to delays in 
the implementation of policies and procedures necessary to 
protect the United States and its interests.
    The Committee's continuing concern with information access 
does not mean, of course, that all analysts will have access to 
all data. Rather, the Committee's construct of ``information 
access'' specifically recognizes that only appropriately 
cleared analysts working on a specific topic will have access 
to all information relevant to that topic. In addition to 
information technology solutions and the removal of legal and 
policy impediments, the Committee believes that information 
access by analysts, with a valid need-to-know, will also 
require the DNI to effectively manage the overall Intelligence 
Community analytic mission. Historically, this management has 
been lacking. The Committee is concerned that the nature of 
analysis is such, particularly as it relates to international 
terrorism, that every Intelligence Community element wants its 
analysts' opinion on every intelligence topic. The Committee 
believes that this distribution of analytic resources leads to 
inappropriate duplication of effort. While the Committee 
supports alternative analysis and ``red teaming,'' given the 
limitation on Intelligence Community analytic resources, the 
Committee expects the DNI to carefully examine the analysis 
mission to address the full spectrum of threats, both immediate 
and strategic. This effort to administer dispersed analytic 
resources will benefit efforts to promote real ``information 
access.''
    The effectiveness of the NCTC as an information fusion 
center has been hindered by a lack of formal procedures to 
guide NCTC analysts on how information can be distributed from 
the NCTC back to the analysts' parent agencies. The NCTC 
presently operates on a loose, informal system that the former 
Director of the NCTC described as ``the rules of the road.'' 
Under these``rules,'' NCTC analysts assigned from their parent 
agencies are granted access to databases from other Intelligence 
Community elements--access they would not have had at their parent 
agencies. If an NCTC analyst finds intelligence reporting based on this 
database access which he believes should be distributed to other 
analysts at his parent agency, the analyst must ask a reports officer 
from the Intelligence Community element responsible for the report to 
expand its dissemination. If the reports officer denies the request, 
the NCTC analyst must then ask his superiors at the NCTC, perhaps even 
the Director of the NCTC, to assist him in his efforts. The NCTC does 
not have clear procedures in place to guide this process. The NCTC also 
fails to keep records documenting how often these requests occur and 
the outcome of the process with respect to each request. This lack of 
process and metrics is not acceptable. The Committee directs that the 
DNI draft formal guidelines to address this issue, monitor all 
instances of requests for broader access to information under these 
procedures, and track the outcomes of such requests.
    The information access problems experienced at the NCTC are 
a microcosm of the problems confronting the entire Intelligence 
Community. Arcane policies and procedures--vestiges of a stove-
piped intelligence system--continue to prevent broader data-
level access to intelligence information. With respect to the 
applicable statutes, Executive orders, regulations, policies, 
and legal interpretations that inhibit all-source intelligence 
analysis, the Committee has now received the report of the ISWG 
convened by the Intelligence Community Deputies Committee. 
Based on the work of the ISWG and this Committee's continuing 
oversight of the Intelligence Community's information access 
standards, the Committee has included a pilot program in 
Section 307 of the bill to provide a limited exception to the 
Privacy Act to permit certain disclosures within the 
Intelligence Community and between the Intelligence Community 
and other departments and agencies of the United States 
government. The Committee will continue to conduct independent 
oversight and to review the work of the ISWG to determine 
whether additional legislative action is required.

Report on Advanced Analytic Tools and Information Access Impediments

    Congress, in the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2417, 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003), directed a report on the 
application of the Constitution, laws, regulations, Executive 
orders, and guidelines of the United States to the use of 
advanced analytic tools by the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee believed that this report was part of the work of the 
ISWG, but the issues were not included in that product. The 
Committee understands that work on this report continues in the 
Executive Branch, but is quite concerned that the report is now 
well overdue. The Committee renews its request for a report on 
these matters. The report by the Attorney General and DNI (now 
nearly five months overdue) should be provided to the 
intelligence committees no later than six months after issuance 
of this Report.
    In addition, the Committee directs the Attorney General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and DNI to provide a report to 
the Committee on the outcome of the review required by Section 
4 of Executive Order 13356 (Aug. 27, 2004). Under Section 4, 
the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
former DCI were directed to report to the President their 
recommendations ``on the establishment of Executive Branch-wide 
collection and sharing requirements, procedures, and guidelines 
for terrorism information to be collected within the United 
States, including, but not limited to, from publicly available 
sources, including nongovernmental databases.'' The report was 
required to be provided to the President by late November 2004. 
The Committee has not yet been informed of any recommendations 
contained in the report (or whether that report was ever, in 
fact, provided to the President).

Information Technology and Information Access

    As discussed previously, the NCTC's struggle with 
information technology and access solutions also highlights 
greater Intelligence Community-wide difficulties. The 
development of an Intelligence Community enterprise 
architecture and shared technological standards for information 
technology and applications, enforced by a Community-wide 
manager, is a necessary first step in ensuring secure 
information exchange across disparate Intelligence Community 
networks. To that end, the Committee continues to underscore 
the significance of the position of CIO of the Intelligence 
Community. See Section 407 of the bill. The Intelligence 
Community also lacks a comprehensive, coordinated investment 
portfolio for the research and development of processing, 
analysis, and collaboration technologies that would enable 
broader and more sophisticated access by analysts to 
information lawfully collected by the Intelligence Community. 
The Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community 
continues to devote significant amounts of funding to 
collection without a comprehensive, balanced investment in 
processing, analysis, and collaboration technology. The 
development and use of these processing, analysis, and 
collaboration technologies could help address the vast 
differences in the amount of information the Intelligence 
Community collects versus the information it actually analyzes. 
The Committee expects that the DNI, through the CIO of the 
Intelligence Community, will take appropriate steps to address 
this deficiency in future budgets for the Intelligence 
Community.

Classification and Information Access

    Section 102A(i)(2)(A) of the National Security Act directs 
the DNI to establish and implement guidelines for the 
classification of information, under applicable law, Executive 
orders, or other Presidential directives. The Committee 
strongly recommends that the DNI examine the guidelines and 
rules for classification, and, as necessary, propose standards 
for the modernization and simplification of the classification 
system. This review, and any associated recommendations, should 
attempt to maximize information access while maintaining limits 
on the disclosure of truly sensitive intelligence or national 
security information.
    Classification of data by its very nature limits access to 
information. Although classification is often necessary to 
protect sensitive intelligence or national security 
information, overclassification can have serious consequences 
on the ability of the Intelligence Community to accurately 
assess information, and on the ability of policymakers to 
effectively respond to national security threats. Improper 
classification of information--the disclosure of which would 
not harm national security--prevents the public from 
considering national issues in light of all publicly available 
facts.
    In addition to the DNI's responsibilities noted above, 
Section 1016(d)(3)(A) of the Intelligence Reform Act directs 
the President to require the heads of Federal departments and 
agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by 
reducing disincentives to information sharing, including 
overclassification. The Committee notes that while some 
departments and agencies have begun to reduce these 
disincentives, barriers to effective information access remain. 
The Committee encourages the President to address the 
requirements of Section 1016, particularly in the context of 
the ``Information Sharing Environment.''

The Information Sharing Environment

    The Intelligence Reform Act also required the creation of 
the ``Information Sharing Environment'' (``Environment'') for 
terrorism information. The Environment, when fully implemented, 
is to be a combination of policies, procedures, and 
technologies to facilitate the sharing of terrorism 
information, as appropriate, among Federal, State, local, and 
tribal governments, and the private sector, whether collected, 
produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, 
military, homeland security, or other activities. By statute, 
the Environment is to be implemented government-wide. The 
Committee expects the Program Manager, under the direction, 
control, and authority of the DNI, to drive the creation of the 
Environment across the Federal government. The Committee will 
closely monitor the development of the Environment and its 
coordination with the Intelligence Community's own information 
technology enterprise architecture.
    The Committee looks forward to working with the Program 
Manager to eliminate unreasonable and unnecessary legal and 
policy impediments to greater information access. In that 
regard, the Committee awaits the development and implementation 
of the guidelines required by Section 1016(d) of the 
Intelligence Reform Act. The Committee directs that the Program 
Manager report to the Committee regarding the guidelines 
developed under that section.

Reorganization of Intelligence Community Elements

    As the President, DNI, and other officials implement the 
Intelligence Reform Act, consider the recommendations of the 
WMD Commission, and take other steps to reorganize the elements 
of the Intelligence Community, the intelligence committees must 
be kept fully and currently informed of all planned 
reorganization activities, including efforts to reorganize 
within elements of the Intelligence Community or reorganize the 
structure and role of Intelligence Community elements within 
the parent departments and agencies of such elements. The 
Committee is aware of reorganization efforts at the CIA, 
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and other Intelligence Community elements. All 
elements of the Intelligence Community engaged in 
reorganizations should ensure that the DNI is kept fully and 
currently informed of the activities and is fully coordinated 
with on all significant decisions.
    Congress should also be consulted on any significant 
decisions to restructure the organization or roles of 
Intelligence Community elements. Under Title V of the National 
Security Act of 1947, the DNI, the heads of all elements of the 
Intelligence Community, and the heads of all departments and 
agencies of the United States government are required to keep 
the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all 
intelligence activities. The intelligence committees should not 
be required to consider reorganization plans after they have 
been finalized. Instead, consistent with the requirements of 
Title V, the intelligence committees should be provided with 
sufficient opportunity to review and respond to such proposals. 
A failure to consult with the intelligence committees during 
the early stages of planning will increase the likelihood that 
it is necessary for the committees to act, through legislation 
or through the annual budget process, to remedy inefficient or 
ineffective structures resulting from agency reorganizations.

Report on the Creation of an Intelligence Community Reserve Account

    Since its creation, the CIA has utilized a ``reserve for 
contingencies'' that permitted the DCI (now, the Director of 
the CIA) to transfer funds, with appropriate notification to 
Congress, to address significant intelligence needs that arise 
during a fiscal year and that must be addressed outside the 
normal budget process. The CIA Reserve has proven crucial in 
permitting the flexibility required to address operational 
realities as they arise.
    As the Committee continues to examine the budgetary and 
management authorities of the DNI, it may be appropriate to 
provide the DNI with a ``reserve for contingencies'' for use 
across the Intelligence Community to address emergency needs or 
operational exigencies. Any grant of authority would require 
legislative action outlining specific limitations on use, 
requirements for notification to the intelligence committees, 
and strong control by the DNI. Under extremely limited 
circumstances and with prior notification to Congress, it may 
also be appropriate to permit the DNI to transfer certain 
limited categories of funds to this reserve account for use 
without fiscal year limitation. The flexibility of a reserve 
and the ability to transfer funds to a reserve for later use 
would require a strong commitment from the DNI to eliminate 
waste in budget requests and to fully comply with the 
requirement to produce independent cost estimates for major 
systems, as required by Section 506A of the National Security 
Act of 1947. In addition, the DNI would need to closely examine 
how the reserve account is used so that excessive balances were 
not maintained in the account over extended periods of time.
    To aid the Committee as it considers possible legislative 
action on this topic, the Committee directs the DNI to provide 
a report to the intelligence committees within 90 days of 
release of this Report concerning the possible creation of a 
``reserve for contingencies'' for the Intelligence Community 
and whether the reserve would provide needed budgetary and 
operational flexibility. The DNI should also report to the 
intelligence committees regarding the management of existing 
reserve accounts, including steps the Office of the DNI will 
take to ensure that excessive balances are not maintained in 
these reserves for extended periods. The DNI should also 
provide any additional information deemed appropriate related 
to this topic, including any specific recommendations regarding 
the creation or construction of a ``reserve for contingencies'' 
for the Intelligence Community or other authorities needed to 
provide needed budgetary flexibility.

Central Intelligence Agency Organization

    The CIA is a dynamic organization. For example, the 
Directorate of Support was created in 2005, and in the last few 
years, new centers and offices have been created, functions 
have been consolidated, and new directors, deputy directors, 
and associate directors have been appointed. To keep up with 
these changes and to assist in coordination, the CIA widely 
distributes throughout the Agency an organization chart that is 
updated quarterly. To assist the Congress in its oversight 
responsibilities, the Committee directs the CIA to distribute 
its organization chart to each of the intelligence committees 
by November 1, 2005, and thereafter to provide those committees 
with each updated version of the organization chart.

Public Interest Declassification Board

    Section 1102 of the Intelligence Reform Act extends and 
expands the mandate of the Public Interest Declassification 
Board. To date, no funds have been made available for the Board 
to begin operations in fiscal year 2005, and the Administration 
did not include any money to fund the Board's operations in its 
budget request for the National Archives and Records 
Administration for fiscal year 2006. While this omission is 
understandable, as the Intelligence Reform Act was not passed 
until well into the budgeting process, the Committee is 
recommending the authorization of funds to allow the Board to 
begin its important work in fiscal year 2006. The 
Administration should also include sufficient funding for the 
Board in future budget requests, starting with the fiscal year 
2007 budget request, either under the National Archives and 
Records Administration or another appropriate account.

                           ESTIMATE OF COSTS

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to the legislation. On September 
29, 2005, the Committee transmitted this bill to the 
Congressional Budget Office and requested that it conduct an 
estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions 
of this bill.

                    EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        CHANGES IN EXISTING LAWS

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR SNOWE

    I would like to thank the Chairman and the Committee for 
including Section 408, the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, in the underlying bill.
    As many may know, before the release of the report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, I introduced stand-alone legislation-cosponsored by 
Senator Mikulski, Senator Roberts, and Senator Feinstein--
creating an Inspector General for Intelligence. The 
``Intelligence Community Accountability Act of 2004'' proposed 
an independent Inspector General for the entire Intelligence 
Community--all fifteen agencies.
    The Inspector General that I had envisioned was undoubtedly 
created in the same vein as the Inspector General that the 
Committee contemplated when it drafted Section 408. Section 408 
stipulates that the Inspector General (IG) of the Intelligence 
Community (IC):
          1. Has the ability to initiate and conduct 
        independent investigations, audits and inspections 
        relating to the programs and operations of the IC, and 
        the relationships between the elements of the IC within 
        the National Intelligence Program and the other 
        elements of the intelligence community ensuring that 
        the office's jurisdiction is not confined to the 
        National Intelligence Program;
          2. Has the ability to recommend policies and the 
        implementation of those policies, enabling the IG to 
        making sweeping recommendations to the entire IC;
          3. Provides a means for keeping the Director of 
        National Intelligence (DNI) fully and currently 
        informed of problems and deficiencies, as well the 
        progress of any recommended corrective actions;
          4. Shall be appointed by the President and confirmed 
        by the Senate and report directly to the DNI;
          5. May only be removed from office by the President;
          6. May only be prohibited from initiating, carrying 
        out, or completing an investigation, inspection, or 
        audit by the DNI, and only if the DNI determines that 
        it is vital to national security;
          7. Shall have direct and prompt access to the DNI or 
        any employee or any employee of a contractor of any 
        element of the IC and failure to cooperate shall be 
        grounds for appropriate administrative action, 
        including loss of employment;
          8. Shall have access to all records, reports, audits, 
        reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other 
        material, and the level of classification shall not 
        provide a sufficient rationale for denying the IG 
        access to those materials;
          9. Is authorized to receive and investigate 
        complaints from any person and, once such a complaint 
        has been received, the IG may not disclose the identity 
        of the individual filing the complaint without that 
        person's consent;
          10. Shall have the authority to administer to or take 
        an oath, affirmation, or affidavit from any person and 
        such an oath will have the same force and effect as an 
        officer having a seal;
          11. Is authorized subpoena power;
          12. Shall expeditiously resolve which IG shall 
        conduct an investigation in the event of a matter of 
        jurisdiction of the another IC agency; however the IG 
        of the IC shall make the final decision on the 
        resolution of such jurisdiction;
          13. May conduct a separate investigation, inspection, 
        or audit of any matter if the IG of the IC determines 
        that the initial investigation conducted by an IG other 
        than the IG of the IC was deficient;
          14. Shall be provided with a staff large enough to 
        carry out the functions of the IG effectively;
          15. Shall create a career cadre to provide 
        appropriate continuity;
          16. May request information or assistance from any 
        department, agency, or other element of the United 
        States government and upon request of the IG of the IC 
        shall furnish such information or assistance;
          17. Shall ensure that each IG of an element within 
        the IC complies fully with a request for information or 
        assistance from the IG of the IC;
          18. May, upon reasonable notice, conduct an 
        investigation, inspection, audit of any element in the 
        IC and may enter into any place occupied by any agency 
        giving the IG access to real-time operations;
          19. Shall submit to the DNI a classified and 
        unclassified semiannual report summarizing its 
        activities;
          20. Shall immediately notify the congressional 
        intelligence committees if the IG, after exhausting all 
        possible alternatives, is unable to obtain documents in 
        the course of an investigation;
          21. Shall include in the National Intelligence 
        Program budget a separate account for the office of IG 
        of the IC;
          22. Shall not have any duty, responsibility, or 
        function regarding another element of the IC be 
        construed to modify of effect the duties of any other 
        IG; and,
          23. Must notify Congress if an investigation of any 
        Senate-confirmed community official is initiated.
    These key components were the tenets of my proposed 
legislation. I would like to, once again, thank the Chairman 
and the Committee for its valiant effort and commend the 
drafters of this bill who clearly understand the necessity of a 
community inspector general.

                                                  Olympia J. Snowe.

  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS ROCKEFELLER, LEVIN, FEINSTEIN, WYDEN, 
                      BAYH, MIKULSKI, AND CORZINE

    The process leading up to Committee action on this bill and 
report followed the long tradition of bipartisanship on the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The various provisions 
in the public legislation and the budget guidance in the 
classified annex accompanying the bill were the result of 
extensive consultation and negotiation in which all members' 
perspectives were heard. Although some members had serious 
reservations about specific provisions, all members voted to 
report the bill to the Senate.
    There are two areas, however, not directly related to the 
bill, that reflect a serious disagreement among Committee 
members. These issues not only reflect a breakdown of the 
Committee's bipartisan tradition, but a failure in conducting 
its basic oversight responsibilities. The first is the 
Committee's very limited progress toward completing the second 
phase of its inquiry related to pre-war intelligence on Iraq. 
The second is the Committee's refusal, despite repeated 
requests from the minority, to initiate a formal review of the 
many questions surrounding the detention, interrogation and 
rendition of individuals held in U.S. custody. These two issues 
are discussed more fully following specific comments related to 
the bill.

         HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    In the past few years, this Committee, and many other 
commentators, have pointed out the shortcomings of our nation's 
human intelligence collection efforts. Our spies had not 
penetrated al Qaida prior to 9/11 and they had not penetrated 
Saddam's inner circle prior to the Iraq war. The report 
includes language that could give the impression this problem 
existed because the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had too 
much authority. The report language suggests the Directorate of 
Operations has performed so poorly that human intelligence can 
be improved only by stripping the agency of its position as the 
Intelligence Community's primary human intelligence collection 
organization.
    This assessment is off the mark and the solution misguided. 
We had too little intelligence prior to 9/11 and the war in 
Iraq in part because our nation reduced its investment in 
intelligence, particularly human intelligence, for a decade 
beginning in 1989. The understandable desire to cut spending on 
national security programs after the Cold War led to the 
closure of CIA stations and bases and a pull back from the 
CIA's global presence. Other problems certainly affected the 
CIA as it struggled to transition from the Cold War, but 
clearly the reduction in resources was a significant factor.
    The CIA began rebuilding its cadre of case officers in 1999 
and accelerated that process after September 11, 2001. This 
rebuilding is a lengthy process and it will be some time before 
we realize all the benefits. But even without the infusion of 
new talent, the CIA's Directorate of Operations is populated 
with dedicated, brave individuals who serve around the world in 
dangerous assignments with little or no recognition. They are 
innovative, resourceful and not afraid to take risks, both 
professional and personal. As we change organizational 
structures in an attempt to correct the mistakes of the past, 
we must keep these individuals in mind and make sure we do not 
do damage to what works.
    Section 403 of the bill is designed to ensure that the 
Director of National Intelligence has the final authority over 
decisions regarding dissemination of intelligence information 
from human sources. Language in the report accompanying the 
bill alludes to problems that have surfaced in the past when 
information is not shared to the greatest extent practical.
    Indeed, both 9/11 and the Iraq intelligence failures have 
highlighted the need for better information access. But the 
information access problems identified after those events were 
not limited to human intelligence; they were structural 
problems across the Intelligence Community. These structural 
problems were among the most compelling arguments for the 
creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) last year. And in creating that office, the Congress 
imbued it with the authority necessary to obtain access to all 
intelligence information and to manage the dissemination of 
that information.
    Given the broad authority provided to the DNI in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, it is 
unclear why the additional authority of Section 403 is 
necessary. It also is unclear why the additional authority is 
required for information related to human intelligence, but no 
other intelligence discipline.
    The report includes language under the heading of 
``Committee Comments'' sharply critical of the Central 
Intelligence Agency's performance as the ``National HUMINT 
Manager.'' The report suggests the DNI is better suited for 
this job.
    The Committee certainly should support the DNI and ensure 
the authority given the office is exercised to the fullest 
extent and for the betterment the Intelligence Community. But 
the clear intent of the Congress in passing the Intelligence 
Reform Act was to create a DNI that manages the Intelligence 
Community by making use of the considerable expertise that 
exists within the various agencies. The Director of the 
National Security Agency is the Intelligence Community 
functional manager for signals intelligence; the Director of 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the Intelligence 
Community functional manager for imagery intelligence; and the 
Director of the CIA has been the Intelligence Community 
functional manager for human intelligence. There are other 
elements of the Intelligence Community involved in each of 
these collection disciplines, but the heads of these agencies 
are the individuals with the expertise and scope to properly 
coordinate and de-conflict the activities of all the 
contributing agencies. Any change to these responsibilities is, 
at best premature, just one year after passage of the 
Intelligence Reform Act. The DNI was not established as a new 
bureaucracy to assume the responsibility for day-to-day 
intelligence operations.
    The report language describes the need to have the DNI 
resolve conflicts among intelligence organizations conducting 
human intelligence. The language does not, however, describe 
what those conflicts might be. The CIA has, in fact, recently 
reached separateagreements with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense to avoid confusion 
and ensure smooth coordination of human intelligence operations both 
here and abroad. These negotiations were initiated by the CIA and the 
other parties involved prior to the establishment of the DNI's office. 
The DNI has an important role in ensuring the agreements are carried 
out and effective, but clearly the CIA can play the role of human 
intelligence manager.
    The report also uses the phrase ``provide a level playing 
field'' as part of the rationale for making the DNI the 
National Human Intelligence Manager. This language suggests 
that the CIA is but one among equals in an array of human 
intelligence collection agencies. This suggestion is 
inaccurate. The CIA was established as and remains our nation's 
primary source for human intelligence collected overseas. The 
FBI plays a critical role in domestic collection of foreign 
intelligence and the Defense Department has a smaller but 
important role in collecting national intelligence. The Defense 
Department's primary focus, however, is on tactical human 
intelligence to support military operations. All human 
intelligence collectors rely on CIA tradecraft standards for 
highest operational effectiveness. This is a division of labor 
that can work well, but the CIA must remain in charge.
    The Committee needs to monitor the implementation of the 
Intelligence Reform Act and ensure the Office of the DNI has 
the authority and resources needed to do the job. And the 
Committee must closely review the many changes taking place 
within the CIA as it rebuilds and refocuses its human 
intelligence collection efforts on today's threats. But as we 
undertake these oversight responsibilities we must be careful 
that our actions and words support and not hinder the reform 
process.

                  CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION

    The Committee has included two provisions dealing with 
different aspects of the problem of obtaining sufficient 
information for the Committee to accomplish its oversight 
responsibility.
    The first provision, Section 107, is the result of an 
amendment, offered by Senators Levin and Hagel and adopted by 
the Committee, to require elements of the Intelligence 
Community to provide, upon request of the Chairman or Vice 
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee or the Chairman 
or Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee, timely 
access to intelligence assessments, reports, estimates, legal 
opinions, or other intelligence information. The requirement 
would apply unless the President asserted a Constitutional 
privilege related to the specific documents. This language is 
similar to a provision included in the Senate-passed version of 
the intelligence reform legislation last year. That provision 
was removed in the conference with the House of 
Representatives.
    The second provision is the result of an amendment offered 
by Senator Corzine to the classified annex accompanying the 
bill. This classified provision, which addresses specific 
compartment programs, expresses the frustration of the 
Committee with the Administration practice of requesting limits 
on the number of Committee staff with access to information 
critical to the Committee's oversight responsibilities. The 
Committee historically has respected requests to limit access 
to extremely sensitive material. In some cases, however, these 
requested limits are overly restrictive and can interfere with 
the Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities and 
conduct effective oversight of executive branch intelligence 
programs.
    This problem has become more acute because of 
Administration requests to limit Committee access to certain 
critical programs regarding the war on terrorism. These 
programs are of obvious importance to the Committee and 
individual members. Protecting national security information is 
paramount and the Committee has a tradition of working 
cooperatively with the executive branch in establishing access 
to exceptionally sensitive material. Limitations cannot, 
however, be allowed to interfere with effective oversight.

 LACK OF PROGRESS ON PHASE TWO OF THE COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO ISSUES 
              ASSOCIATED WITH PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQ

    On February 12, 2004, the Committee voted unanimously to 
authorize an inquiry related to pre-war intelligence on Iraq. 
At that time, an informal Committee inquiry had been underway 
for almost eight months and the initial tasks were close to 
complete. The Committee decided to finish this work, issue a 
report as soon as possible, and tackle additional issues in a 
second report. The first phase report was issued in July 2004. 
The delay in completing phase two of the Committee's Iraq 
inquiry is inexcusable.
    The resolution adopted by the Committee last February 
``refine[d] the terms of reference of the Committee's ongoing 
inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq'' to 
include: (1) whether public statements and reports and 
testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made 
between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information; 
(2) the post-war findings about Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how 
they compare with pre-war assessments; (3) pre-war intelligence 
assessments about post-war Iraq; (4) any intelligence 
activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy 
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy; and (5) the use by the 
Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi 
National Congress. A thorough review of these matters is an 
essential adjunct to the issues addressed in the Committee's 
report, ``U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq,'' released in July 2004.
    The Committee's press release announcing the decision to 
expand the inquiry into pre-war intelligence related to Iraq, 
stated that: ``[t]he resolution adopted unanimously today 
illustrates the commitment of all members to a thorough review, 
to learning the necessary lessons from our experience with 
Iraq, and to ensuring that our armed forces and policymakers 
benefit from the best and most reliable intelligence that can 
be collected.''
    Since the Committee identified these so-called Phase Two 
issues as a high Committee priority in February of last year, 
the minority has repeatedly urged completion of the review and 
been assured that the Committee will fulfill this commitment. 
Yet despite these repeated assertions, it is clear that only 
sporadic work has been done on Phase Two since it was 
authorized.There has been ample time for the Committee to 
complete the Phase Two inquiry and prepare a written product for member 
consideration.
    The Committee adopted the terms of reference listed above 
because these questions are central to understanding the events 
leading to the ongoing war in Iraq. To complete this work 
requires only one thing--a decision to live up to the 
Committee's commitment.
    The Committee's delinquency in addressing an issue that it 
unanimously voted to address over a year and a half ago has 
diminished the Committee's credibility as an effective overseer 
of the Intelligence Community.

      OVERSIGHT OF DETENTION, INTERROGATION AND RENDITION PROGRAMS

    The Committee adopted three amendments offered by Vice 
Chairman Rockefeller to the classified annex accompanying the 
bill related to detention, interrogation and rendition issues. 
One of these classified amendments, dealing with 
recommendations from the CIA Inspector General, is described 
briefly in unclassified language elsewhere in this report. The 
other two amendments require the CIA and the President to 
provide certain information to the Congress. The details of 
those reporting requirements are classified. While these three 
amendments will help answer some of the questions related to 
these issues, they are not a substitute for the kind of 
effective oversight these issues demand.
    The controversy surrounding the collection of intelligence 
using detention, interrogation, and rendition has been growing 
since the disclosure of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison 
early last year. Since then we have seen a steady flow of 
allegations of abuse, not just in Iraq, but Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo Bay as well. While there have been a number of 
prosecutions and several reviews, no investigation has looked 
at the full range of issues associated with how these programs 
have developed, how they are being conducted, and what the long 
term plans are. These issues fall squarely within our 
Committee's jurisdiction.
    Interrogation is a major intelligence tool in the war on 
terrorism and an essential component of the intelligence 
related to the insurgency in Iraq. Just as it conducts 
oversight of human, signals, and imagery intelligence 
collection, the Committee's obligation under S. Res. 400 ``to 
provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence 
activities of the United States'' requires it to undertake 
oversight of intelligence collection through interrogation. It 
is this Committee's responsibility, not only to answer 
questions related to abuse, but just as importantly to examine 
the effectiveness of the methods used in interrogations and the 
reliability of the information obtained from those 
interrogations.
    Despite repeated attempts to initiate a detailed review of 
fundamental legal and operational questions surrounding the 
detention, interrogation and rendition of individuals held in 
U.S. custody, the Committee majority has refused to conduct 
such an investigation.
    One result of the Committee's failure to thoroughly review 
these programs is the continued ambiguity in the underlying 
legal authority creating an ongoing risk to intelligence 
personnel engaged in these programs. This ambiguity has created 
serious concerns about the legal and operational protection of 
intelligence officers involved in detention and interrogation 
operations. Rules applicable to detention, interrogation, and 
rendition are the product of treaties, federal statutes, 
judicial decisions, the legal opinions of the Department of 
Justice and agency counsel. Unfortunately, in the realm of 
Department of Justice and agency opinions, there appears to be 
a body of secret law. To assess the lawfulness and efficacy of 
current practices, and bring to the attention of the Executive 
Branch matters requiring reassessment or correction, the 
Committee should be carefully examining this body of secret 
legal opinions and operational directives.
    One argument put forward by those opposed to a Committee 
investigation into detention and interrogation matters was the 
notion that any inquiry would be perceived as an attack on the 
brave men and women of the Intelligence Community performing 
these duties. The opposite is in fact true. A full 
investigation could aid in clarifying the legal and operational 
ambiguity that currently hampers the program's effectiveness 
and possibly endangers intelligence personnel. If the Committee 
is serious about supporting the intelligence officers in the 
field, we should be pushing the Executive Branch to resolve 
this and other shortcomings in the detention and interrogation 
program without further delay.

                                   John D. Rockefeller IV.
                                   Carl Levin.
                                   Dianne Feinstein.
                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Evan Bayh.
                                   Barbara A. Mikulski.
                                   Jon S. Corzine.

              ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS LEVIN AND WYDEN

    From al Qai'da and terrorism to nuclear proliferation and 
the spread of long range missile capabilities, the United 
States faces a diversity of threats unique in our history. 
Understanding the challenges posed by these threats and 
responding effectively depends on us having reliable 
information about the capabilities and intentions of our 
adversaries. A focused, effective intelligence community is 
essential in this regard. Strong Congressional oversight is 
critical to ensuring that our intelligence agencies are up to 
the job.
    In the preface to its report, the 9-11 Commission stated 
that ``Congress needs dramatic change . . . to strengthen 
oversight and focus accountability.'' In the 108th Congress, we 
took some important steps toward that goal in passing both the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and a 
resolution creating the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee and clarifying certain committee oversight 
authorities. However, additional reforms are needed.
    Effective oversight also depends on Congress having timely 
access to intelligence information. That sentiment is reflected 
in S. Res. 400, the resolution that established the Standing 
Committee of the Senate on Intelligence in the 94th Congress. 
Section 11(b) of the resolution states that it is the ``sense 
of the Senate that the head of any department or agency of the 
United States involved in any intelligence activities should 
furnish any information or document in the possession, custody, 
or control of the department or agency, or person paid by such 
department or agency, whenever requested by the select 
committee with respect to any matter within such committee's 
jurisdiction.'' However, despite the clear message of S. Res. 
400, too often members of Congress, even those of us who are 
members of committees of jurisdiction, do not have timely 
access to the intelligence information necessary to do our 
jobs.
    IRTPA was helpful in clarifying Congress's right to 
intelligence information. Prior to its passage, Section 103 of 
the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3) stated that the 
Director of Central Intelligence ``shall be responsible for 
providing national intelligence . . . where appropriate to the 
Senate and House of Representatives and the committees 
thereof.'' (Emphasis added). IRTPA not only shifted that 
responsibility to the new Director of National Intelligence, 
but removed the phrase ``where appropriate,'' thus clarifying 
that Congress had the same right to national intelligence as 
elements of the executive branch (IRTPA Section 102A(a)(1)(D)). 
Unfortunately, in some cases, that right has yet to become a 
reality.
    This problem is not unique to any particular 
administration. Indeed, it reflects longstanding tension 
between the executive and legislative branches over their 
respective roles in national security affairs. However, when 
those tensions manifest themselves in the withholding of 
relevant intelligence information from the Congress, they can 
have disastrous consequences.
    To offer just one example, forty years ago, Secretary of 
Defense McNamara invoked classified communications intercepts 
to support passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was 
used by President Johnson as the legislative foundation for 
expanding the war against Vietnam. According to John Prados, an 
analyst at the National Security Archive, Secretary McNamara 
used the intercepts as a ``trump card during the 1964 hearings 
to silence doubters.'' The intercepts later proved dubious. We 
won't speculate as to whether Congress's consideration of the 
Gulf of Tonkin resolution would have been different if the 
Johnson administration had given Congress all the relevant 
intelligence, but the example illustrates why Congressional 
access to intelligence information is so critical.
    During the Senate Intelligence Committee's consideration of 
fiscal year 2006 Intelligence Authorization legislation, the 
Committee adopted an amendment Senator Levin offered with 
Senator Hagel that is consistent with the changes made by IRTPA 
and reflects the sentiment of S. Res. 400. A similar provision 
was included in the version of IRTPA that passed the Senate 96-
2 in the 108th Congress, but that provision was removed in 
conference committee.
    The amendment adopted by the Intelligence Committee 
requires elements of the intelligence community to provide, 
upon request from Congressional Committees of jurisdiction or 
the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee or Chairman or Ranking Member of the House 
Intelligence Committee, timely access to intelligence 
assessments, reports, estimates, legal opinions, or other 
intelligence information.
    The Senate Intelligence Committee has a longstanding 
nonpartisan tradition. The Committee has a Chairman and Vice 
Chairman, rather than a Chairman and Ranking Member. And, in 
the Chairman's absence, the Vice Chairman, rather than the next 
most senior majority party member of the Committee, acts in his 
place. Requiring intelligence community elements to respond to 
requests from either the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, as does the amendment, is in 
keeping with that tradition.
    The amendment's requirement that the intelligence community 
respond to Congressional requests for information is intended 
to apply only to existing documents and other intelligence 
information. The amendment does not create new authority for 
the Congress to task the intelligence community to generate new 
intelligence assessments, reports, estimates, legal opinions, 
or other intelligence information.
    Under the Levin-Hagel amendment, elements of the 
intelligence community are required to respond to requests for 
intelligence information unless the President certifies that 
the documents or information is not being provided because the 
President is asserting a privilege pursuant to the 
Constitution.
    The Constitution entrusts Congress with important 
responsibilities in the area of national security. It is the 
responsibility of Senators to seek information so that we may 
make informed decisions. The Levin-Hagel amendment will improve 
Congress's ability to carry out that responsibility.
    During the Committee's consideration of the fiscal year 
2006 Intelligence Authorization bill, Senator Levin also 
offered an amendment to Section 307 of the bill. Section 307 
would add an exception to the Privacy Act, permitting the 
sharing of Privacy Act records between elements of the 
intelligence community (IC), their parent agencies and other 
federal agencies, under certain conditions.
    Privacy Act records contain sensitive information about 
American citizens. Veterans' health records at the Veterans 
Administration, case files compiled by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission during the investigation of 
discrimination complaints, and certain mental health records 
maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services, are 
all protected under the Privacy Act. While it's clear that the 
IC must improve information sharing, changes to the Privacy Act 
ought to be carefully considered. With that in mind, we were 
disappointed that the Committee did not hold any hearings on 
the changes proposed by Section 307 and Committee members were 
not afforded the perspective of Privacy Act experts within or 
outside the government on the proposed changes.
    As drafted, Section 307 would arguably not permit the CIA 
to access Privacy Act records from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), as HUD does not contain an IC 
element and, to our knowledge, does not have responsibility for 
protecting the country against the threat of international 
terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). By contrast, 
simply because it shares a parent agency with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an IC element, the bill would 
permit the CIA to access Privacy Act records from the 
Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division as long as the 
records related to a lawful and authorized foreign intelligence 
or counterintelligence activity of the CIA. This is despite the 
fact that the DOJ Civil Rights Division, like HUD, does not 
have the responsibility to protect against the threat of 
international terrorism or WMD.
    It seems unwise to permit sensitive records of American 
citizens held by DOJ's Civil Rights Division to be disseminated 
under the terms described in the bill. In addition, the bill's 
inconsistent treatment of Privacy Act records held by DOJ's 
Civil Rights Division and similarly situated non-IC entities 
and those held by HUD and other agencies that do not contain an 
IC element is illogical. The Levin amendment would have 
corrected that inconsistent treatment and provided stronger 
Privacy Act protections than those in the bill by treating 
DOJ's Civil Rights Division like HUD rather than the FBI.
    As discussed above, when certain conditions are met, the 
Committee reported bill authorizes any IC element to seek 
Privacy Act records directly from certain non-IC elements. The 
bill also permits non-IC agencies to initiate sharing of 
Privacy Act records if the head of the non-IC agency determines 
that the record constitutes either terrorism information as 
defined in Section 1016(a)(4) of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 or information concerning the 
proliferation of WMD, and the disclosure is to an appropriate 
IC element.
    Under Executive Order 12333, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation is the primary agency responsible for the 
collection of foreign intelligence in the United States. The 
Attorney General has established guidelines as to how those 
responsibilities are carried out. Consistent with the Bureau's 
existing responsibilities, the Levin amendment would have 
required the FBI to coordinate requests from IC elements to 
non-IC agencies for Privacy Act records and would have 
designated the FBI as the recipient of Privacy Act records 
shared by non-IC agencies. The Levin amendment was a modest 
attempt to improve privacy protections for American citizens 
and we will continue to pursue such improvements.
    Section 307 also directs the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board to review implementation of the provision. 
While this may be an appropriate activity for the Board, it 
should be noted that nearly a year after its statutory 
creation, the Board has yet to be constituted. In fact, while 
the President has publicly announced which individuals he 
intends to appoint to the Board, he has not yet submitted their 
names to the Senate for confirmation. Ideally, the Committee 
would have had the benefit of the Board's input prior to 
considering legislation that directly affects privacy rights. 
But at a minimum, it would make sense that the Board be 
constituted before passage of legislation which it has been 
explicitly directed to monitor and report on.
    Finally, we have concerns with Section 431 of the bill. 
That section would permit certain Department of Defense (DoD) 
intelligence personnel to meet with and conceal their 
governmental affiliation from, United States citizens within or 
outside the United States for the purpose of determining the 
citizens' access to foreign intelligence information and their 
suitability as a source. Current law permits DoD intelligence 
personnel to make one such contact overseas. The legislation 
reported by the Committee would permit an unlimited number of 
contacts and would allow them to be made either in the United 
States or overseas. We believe that DoD intelligence personnel 
should be required to tell United States citizens in the United 
States who are not suspected of any wrongdoing that they work 
for the government. We intend to support changes to this 
authority as the legislation moves forward.

                                   Carl Levin.
                                   Ron Wyden.

             ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN AND CORZINE

    On June 21, 2005, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) formally transmitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees the Administration's proposed 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. The ODNI 
also provided to the committees a detailed section-by-section 
explanation of the provisions in the proposed bill.
    As in the past, this part of the Intelligence Community's 
annual request for legislative authorities is unclassified, in 
contrast to the Administration's annual request for budgetary 
authority, which is contained in a classified document. The 
proposed bill consists of suggested amendments or additions to 
public law. As an unclassified document that contains 
recommendations on the enactment of new or modified provisions 
of public law, there is no reason to treat the document as a 
secret one.
    Next year, the Committee should begin a new practice. The 
Administration's unclassified request for legislative 
authorities should be treated as a public document. In that 
way, other committees and the public will have the opportunity 
to know what legislative proposals have been placed before the 
Committee and be able to submit comments to it. The Committee 
should also proceed as openly as is consistent with national 
security to consider the Administration's proposals as well as 
proposals for the enactment of legislative authorities that 
originate within the Committee.
    As other committees, the Committee must meet in closed 
session when the matters to be discussed will include sensitive 
national security information. But much of the Committee's 
discussion of legislative matters concerns issues of policy 
that should be discussed in open session. And the Committee 
should hold public hearings on legislative proposals that have 
a public consequence, such as proposals concerning 
investigative authorities or the application of the Freedom of 
Information Act or Privacy Act to the Intelligence Community. 
In addition to the public's legitimate interest in knowing 
about proposals that have an impact on it, the Committee would 
benefit from the insights and information of those whose 
experiences and expertise may inform the Committee's debate.

                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Jon S. Corzine.

                                  
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