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© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

“’This is not a reintegration 

process, this is an American 

process. With whom should 

we join? With this corrupt 

and unjust government? I will 

never join this process and 

won’t let any of my friends.’ 

—A Taliban commander 

from Helmand Province”

September 22, 2011

Impact or Illusion? Reintegration 

under the Afghanistan Peace and 

Reintegration Program

Summary

•	 The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) aims to reintegrate insurgents in return 

for security, jobs and other incentives, but has seen limited results.

•	 Rapid implementation of the program has failed to address adequately a variety of political, 

employment and security concerns. 

•	 As a result, reintegrees of varying backgrounds are joining the Afghan Local Police, potentially 

perpetuating instability.

•	 Without a political approach addressing drivers of the insurgency and higher-level reconciliation, reintegration will see limited results. The government and its partners should concentrate 

on how to make reintegration part of a broader political process. 

Why the APRP Developed

Since late 2010 the Afghan government, supported by its international partners, has tried to 

reintegrate insurgents under the APRP. The program aims to entice fighters to leave the battlefield 

in return for security, jobs and other incentives—provided they renounce violence, respect the 

Afghan constitution and cut ties with al-Qaida. 

The program, authorized by President Karzai in June 2010, proposes parallel processes of reintegrating lower-level fighters and reconciling with higher-level insurgent commanders through 

political dialogue. At the London Conference six months earlier, donors pledged $140 million for 

reintegrating these commanders and foot soldiers. Western governments, hoping to withdraw 

troops amid deteriorating security, increasingly favor a political solution. The Afghan government 

envisaged reintegration accompanied by talks with insurgent leaders. But the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) saw it as part of a military strategy that would force the leadership 

of the insurgency to the table. As a result, ISAF pressed for its quick implementation. 

The program is led by a 70-member High Peace Council (HPC) created in September 2010, and 

implemented by a Joint Secretariat (JS) in which ISAF and the United Nations mission participate 

with the government. It intends to offer not only employment to former fighters, but protection 

and grievance resolution in their communities. 

Deedee Derksen

E-mail: deedeederksen@gmail.com

peaceBrieF106
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Impact or Illusion? Reintegration under the Afghanistan Peace 

and Reintegration Program page 2 • PB 106 • September 22, 2011

APRP is being rolled out in a challenging context. Progress on high-level dialogue among the 

parties is fitful at best, while the government is perceived as corrupt and weak. NATO tactics are 

heightening tensions and public commitments to withdraw international troops are raising fears 

that it could be unwise to reintegrate and side with an Afghan government that may not have a 

strong partner to back it up.1

Unsurprisingly, in this context there have been few takers for reintegration. 

Implementation: the Devil’s in the Details

Establishing the local infrastructure (bank accounts, provincial peace councils and support teams) 

has taken longer than the ambitious schedule demanded. By the end of May 2011, the Afghan 

government had received $133.4 million of the committed funds for reintegration, but spent only 

$7.7 million. Instead, ISAF has assumed many responsibilities, reinforcing the perception that APRP 

is driven by the international military. 

Although the APRP promises to address grievances in communities and support an amnesty 

policy consistent with Afghanistan’s constitution and treaty obligations, few concrete steps have 

yet been taken. JS and the HPC officials have visited several provinces, but delays in establishing 

APRP provincial infrastructure and providing guidelines for governors have meant little outreach 

at local level. Nor has a detailed amnesty policy been finalized, with Western and Afghan officials 

reluctant to tackle this politically sensitive issue.

 The inability to guarantee the security of former fighters is another grave problem. All reintegrated commanders interviewed feared for their safety, with many threatened. While some commanders are in safe houses and others have returned to their villages, the program does not yet provide 

any systematic way to protect them. This is a major obstacle, especially in Afghanistan’s South and 

East, where insurgents who approach local authorities are at extreme risk from both sides. 

Moreover, very little has been on offer thus far in terms of employment and community 

rehabilitation. In theory, options include vocational and literacy training, religious mentoring, or 

enrollment in Afghanistan’s security forces, or in a public works or agriculture conservation corps. 

But in reality, former fighters have been offered few civilian jobs. 

Without civilian jobs or adequate security, many reintegrees are admitted into the Afghan Local 

Police (ALP), despite the formal independence of the two programs. Linking the APRP and ALP, 

however, risks additional problems. First, many reintegrees are not vetted and their enlistment has 

led to abuse of authority. Second, recruiting reintegrees into the ALP can perpetuate and intensify 

rivalries by encouraging local powerbrokers to introduce their allies into the APRP. A local official 

involved with APRP in Baghlan argued: 

“Now there is a big problem between Tajiks and Pashtuns because of reintegration, Tajiks see 

Pashtuns joining the government, receiving weapons and becoming powerful locally, and they 

want to increase their own strength.”

Questionable Reintegration Numbers and Roles

Although former fighters are supposed to be vetted and registered, their numbers and backgrounds are disputed. The JS claims all were “real Taliban,” but others disagree, noting that 85 

percent of reintegration has occurred in provinces where the insurgency is less intense.2 ISAF 

appears to view reintegration of non-insurgents as legitimate, whereas the Afghan government 

views APRP as exclusively for the Taliban. According to the JS, the National Directorate of Security 

and the Ministries of Interior and Defense vet potential fighters to reintegrate at the provincial and 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Impact or Illusion? Reintegration under the Afghanistan Peace 

and Reintegration Program page 3 • PB 106 • September 22, 2011

national level. But as of May 2011, no finalized standard operating procedure appeared to exist 

and ISAF was still developing the Reintegration Tracking and Monitoring Database. 

In the North and West, where the numbers of reintegrated former fighters are highest, their 

backgrounds appear mixed or unclear. In Baghlan, for example, Taliban commanders interviewed 

who had not joined the government are ideological and entrenched in the movement with ties 

to commanders elsewhere. In contrast, reintegrated commanders tend to present themselves as 

leaders of village defense forces that switched sides when the government established a presence 

in their area, or in response to pressure from rival insurgents. Some groups approached the police, 

others the NDS or provincial councilors. The “hosts” took care of vetting but neglected to share 

findings with other implementers.

The first group of some 100 reintegrees, who presented themselves as Hizb-i-Islami, joined in 

March 2010 after losing a battle against Taliban gaining strength in the area. Another group of 

100-160 men represented a pro-government unit that reintegrated in order to enlist in the ALP. (It 

is unclear if that group is still in the program.) According to researchers familiar with the cases, in 

Badghis and Kunduz, only a part of those who were reintegrated were actually insurgents: others 

were criminal groups or members of pro-government militia.

In the East and the South, where the insurgency is fiercest, there has been little official reintegration though ISAF officials and the JS claim that insurgents are being reintegrated informally: they 

agree with a governor to stop fighting and go home, but are not registered for the APRP. 

The Missing Political Approach

On paper, the APRP is a two-track program “aiming to promote peace through a political 

approach”—involving reintegration and reconciliation. In reality, international actors and the 

Afghan government have disagreed on the sequence of both. ISAF and donors hoped that the 

reintegration of low- and mid-level fighters, combined with the pressure of kill-capture campaigns 

would force insurgent leaders to negotiate. However, this largely military-led strategy is unlikely 

to fully address the ties of patronage and loyalty within the Taliban movement. Almost all active 

insurgent commanders interviewed argued they were not interested in reintegration unless 

their leaders were at the table with the Afghan government and the process addressed the core 

grievances of the international military presence and government corruption and predation. At 

the same time, many former fighters reintegrated under the program appear only loosely tied to 

the insurgency, if at all. All this suggests that reintegration without broader reconciliation will have 

limited strategic impact.

The main national and international civilian and military actors involved in APRP used a review 

conference in May to evaluate its progress. Their plan for the APRP now aims to put the necessary 

infrastructure in place quickly. But many of the people interviewed find it overly focused on economics, while overlooking other factors like the behavior of foreign forces, dissatisfaction with the Afghan 

government and Pakistan’s influence. The emphasis on economics also ignores the destabilizing 

impact of development aid, which can fuel corruption and competition for limited resources.

The international community and Afghan government appear reluctant to tackle drivers of the 

insurgency linked to their own behavior—notably government corruption and foreign troop’s 

tactics. Also, some interviewees noted that those who are implementing reintegration are far from 

neutral in that they are parties to the conflict. That has led to groups questioning the legitimacy of 

the HPC, for example, some of whose members have more experience waging war than making 

peace. Many insurgents therefore regard reintegration as surrender. As one Taliban commander 

from Helmand said, “This is not a reintegration process, this is an American process. With whom 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

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About This Brief

Deedee Derksen is a journalist, 

Ph.D. candidate and author of 

“Tea with the Taliban,” a Dutch 

book nominated for a non-fiction 

award. This Peace Brief is part of 

a project by the Chr. Michelsen 

Institute (CMI), Peace Research 

Institute Oslo (PRIO), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 

to identify issues and options to 

help Afghanistan move toward 

sustainable peace. Research was 

conducted in Kabul and two 

provinces, Baghlan and Helmand, 

and included about 65 interviews 

with Afghan and Western officials, 

active and reintegrating insurgent 

commanders and analysts.

should we join? With this corrupt and unjust government? I will never join this process and won’t 

let any of my friends.”

Many U.N. and Afghan officials agree that significant reintegration will not occur unless insurgents see it as part of a broader, politically negotiated settlement process.

Conclusion

There is broad support among Afghans and Afghanistan’s partners for a peace process. On paper, 

the APRP is quite comprehensive, however, to date it has yielded limited results. In rolling out the 

program quickly, political issues like grievance resolution and amnesty were inadequately tackled, 

and the lack of a political approach to reintegration embedded in a broader reconciliation process 

remains a fundamental flaw.

Reintegration began during an American military troop surge and was aimed by ISAF at 

weakening the Taliban movement before inviting them to the negotiating table. However, as 

troops withdraw and the Afghan government assumes increasing security responsibilities, there 

may be an expansion of talks with the Taliban leadership. This “transition” involves challenges, but 

also opportunities to tie reintegration to a broader political process. Looking ahead to this process, 

the international community and the Afghan government should:

•	 Link reintegration with reconciliation. Situate reintegration of low- and mid-level commanders within a broader reconciliation process aimed not only at insurgent leaders, but 

also disenfranchised groups. Prepare for scenarios under which reintegration supports 

the implementation of a peace settlement, potentially including a broader based Afghan 

management mechanism acceptable to settlement parties, or management by a third 

party implementer. 

•	 Focus on quality not speed. Afghanistan will require a robust reintegration infrastructure 

able to handle large numbers to secure a sustainable peace. Instead of trying to quickly reintegrate the highest numbers possible, concentrate on establishing effective institutions, 

particularly political and judicial, and manage expectations through clear communication 

of program goals and features.

•	 Support local processes. Expand administrative, financial and moral support for local officials involved in implementing APRP, coupled with monitoring of the use of resources and 

community vetting of reintegrees.

Endnotes

1. On Afghan stakeholder perceptions, see Hamish Nixon, Achieving Durable Peace: Afghan 

Perspectives on a Peace Process, Oslo/Washington D.C.: CMI, PRIO, and USIP.

2. Afghan government documents in May 2011 showed 1,571 of 1,809 reintegrees were in 

northern and western provinces.

Impact or Illusion? Reintegration under the Afghanistan Peace 

and Reintegration Program page 4 • PB 106 • September 22, 2011