a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security, and 

Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives

October 2005 STATE DEPARTMENT

Stronger Action 

Needed to Improve 

Oversight and Assess 

Risks of the Summer 

Work Travel and 

Trainee Categories of 

the Exchange Visitor 

Program

GAO-06-106
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-106.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-106, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, 

Border Security, and Claims, Committee 

on the Judiciary, House of 

Representatives 

October 2005

STATE DEPARTMENT

Stronger Action Needed to Improve 

Oversight and Assess Risks of the 

Summer Work Travel and Trainee 

Categories of the Exchange Visitor 

Program 

State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer Work 

Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the programs and 

has been slow to address program deficiencies. State attempts to ensure 

compliance with program regulations through its processes of approving and 

annually reviewing the organizations that sponsor exchange visitors. These 

processes, however, are not sufficient to ensure that visitors participate only 

in authorized activities because the procedures consist primarily of 

document reviews, and State rarely visits the sponsors or host employers of 

the exchange visitors to make sure they are following the rules to investigate 

complaints. Moreover, some sponsors have asserted that the program 

regulations need updating. Further, State officials believe that the sanctions 

provided in the regulations are difficult to enforce. State acknowledged that 

it has been slow to address identified deficiencies and update the 

regulations, but had indicated that it is beginning to revise the regulations 

and is establishing a unit to monitor exchange activities. However funding 

of the unit has not been secured. 

 

A number of potential risks are associated with the programs, including that 

exchange visitors might use it to remain in the United States beyond their 

authorized time. There is also the potential for the Trainee Program to be 

misused as an employment program. Further, negative experiences for 

exchange participants could undermine the purpose of the programs. 

However, State has little data to measure whether such risks to the program 

are significant. As a result, State cannot determine if additional management 

actions are needed to mitigate the risks. 

Summer Work Travel Participants and Trainee Participants, 2003 and 2004

Program 2003 2004

Summer Work 

Travel 88,000 89,453a

Trainee 31,084 27,475

Source: The Department of State. 

a

As of November 2004. 

Exchange programs, which bring 

over 280,000 foreign visitors to the 

United States annually, are widely 

recognized as an effective way to 

expose citizens of other countries 

to the American people and 

culture. Past GAO and the 

Department of State (State) Office 

of Inspector General reviews have 

reported that some exchange 

visitors have participated in 

unauthorized activities and cited 

problems in the management and 

oversight of the programs. Strong 

management oversight is needed to 

ensure that the programs operate 

as intended and are not abused. 

This report examines how State 

manages the Summer Work Travel 

and the Trainee programs to ensure 

that only authorized activities are 

carried out under the programs and 

identifies potential risks of the 

programs and the data available to 

assess these risks. 

What GAO Recommends

This report recommends that the 

Secretary of State take strong 

action to enhance the overall 

management and monitoring of the 

Summer Work Travel and Trainee 

programs, including fully 

implementing a compliance unit to 

monitor exchange activities; 

updating and amending regulations; 

and developing strategies to obtain 

data on overstays, program abuses, 

and other risks associated with the 

programs. State acknowledged 

weaknesses in the programs and 

described actions it is taking to 

address our recommendations. 
Page i GAO-06-106 State Department

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

State Has Maintained Limited Oversight of Exchange Programs 9

State Has Not Assessed Potential Risks 17

Conclusions 23

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 26

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 29

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 32

Table Table 1: Top-10 Countries Participating in the Summer Work Travel 

and the Trainee Programs in 2004 9

Figures Figure 1: J-1 Visas Issued Fiscal Years 1995-2004 5

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Sponsoring Organizations 7

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OIG Office of Inspector General

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System

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Page 1 GAO-06-106 State Department

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

October 14, 2005 Letr

The Honorable John N. Hostettler

Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, 

 Border Security, and Claims

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Exchange programs are widely recognized as an effective way to expose 

citizens of other countries to the American people and culture. According 

to former Secretary of State Colin Powell, a good stay in this country is the 

best public diplomacy tool the United States has. The Department of State’s 

(State) 2004 public diplomacy strategy calls for broader and deeper use of 

exchanges—people-to-people contacts—that, according to the strategy, 

can change hearts and minds. More than 280,000 foreign nationals travel to 

the United States annually using a J-1 visa1

 to participate in the Exchange 

Visitor Program. This program encompasses 13 categories of educational 

and cultural exchanges designed to enhance understanding between the 

people of the United States and those of other countries. Among the largest 

exchange programs are the Summer Work Travel Program, which allows 

bona fide foreign college and university students to learn about life in the 

United States through temporary work and travel, and the Trainee 

Program, which, through a structured training program, allows participants 

to enhance their skills in their chosen career field. State’s Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs administers the Exchange Visitor Program 

through the Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation. Past GAO 

and State Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews cited a few specific 

cases where J-1 visa holders participated in unauthorized activities and 

cited problems in program management. In particular, the OIG reported 

instances where companies were using exchange visitors to fill regular 

staff positions and not trainee positions as mandated by the Exchange 

Visitor Program regulations.2

1

A J-1 visa is a nonimmigrant visa issued to foreign nationals to visit the United States 

temporarily to teach, instruct or lecture, study, observe, conduct research, consult, 

demonstrate special skills, or receive training.

2

Office of Inspector General, The Exchange Visitor Program Needs Improved Management 

and Oversight, 00-CI-028 (Washington, D.C.: September 2000).
Page 2 GAO-06-106 State Department

This report (1) examines how State manages the Summer Work Travel and 

the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried 

out under the programs and (2) identifies potential risks of the programs 

and the data available to State to assess these risks. 

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed previous GAO and OIG reports 

and examined current and proposed program regulations, State cables, 

sponsoring organizations’ annual reports, agency databases, and other 

information pertaining to the Summer Work Travel and Trainee programs. 

We also met with representatives of nine sponsoring organizations of the 

Summer Work Travel Program that accounted for 75 percent of the 

participants in 2004 and representatives of 13 sponsors of the Trainee 

Program that accounted for 54 percent of the participants in 2004. 

Additionally, we visited three overseas posts––Minsk, Belarus; Warsaw, 

Poland; and Dublin, Ireland––where we discussed the programs with U.S. 

embassy officials, including consular officers, and the overseas partners of 

the U.S. sponsors of the exchanges. We selected these posts because they 

are among the top sending countries for the Summer Work Travel Program. 

We focused on the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs because 

they bring in nearly one-half of the Exchange Visitor Program participants. 

In addition, the Trainee Program was the subject of a 2000 OIG report. We 

conducted our review from November 2004 to August 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I 

provides more information on our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer 

Work Travel and the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized 

activities are undertaken. Sponsoring organizations, employers, third-party 

organizations, and exchange visitors are required to comply with the 

Exchange Visitor Program regulations. These regulations require, for 

example, that sponsors monitor the exchange visitors to ensure that they 

engage only in activities consistent with the Exchange Visitor Program 

category listed on their certificate of eligibility. State attempts to ensure 

compliance with the regulations through its processes of designating and 

redesignating (every 2 years) organizations that sponsor J-1 exchange 

visitors. However, the process of redesignating sponsor organizations and 

the review of sponsors’ annual reports are not sufficient to ensure that 

visitors participate only in authorized activities. State officials rarely visit 

the sponsors, host employers or third-party organizations of the exchange 

participants to ensure compliance with the rules or investigate complaints. 

For example, in the last 4 years, State officials made just eight visits to its 
Page 3 GAO-06-106 State Department

206 designated Summer Work Travel and/or Trainee sponsors. Moreover, 

some sponsors stated that the regulations need updating to clarify how the 

programs should be implemented. In addition, State officials in charge of 

the programs said the sanctions outlined in the regulations are difficult to 

enforce. State is currently establishing a compliance unit and revising the 

regulations, including developing new sanction regulations; but these 

changes have not been fully implemented. 

There are a number of potential risks associated with the Summer Work 

Travel and the Trainee exchange programs. These include the potential risk 

of (1) foreign nationals using the program as a means of entering the United 

States and remaining illegally after their visa expires; (2) the Trainee 

Program being misused as a work program; and (3) exchange participants 

being exploited, resulting in negative experiences, which could undermine 

the purpose of the programs. State and Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) officials and some sponsors that we met with provided evidence of 

such abuse. For example, DHS and the overseas posts provided data on 

potential overstays 3 that indicated that some exchange visitors had 

remained in the United States after their programs concluded. As an 

example of abuse of the Trainee Program, State and some of the sponsors 

described an incident in which 650 electrical engineers entered the United 

States to participate in training programs but were instead employed on 

construction projects as electricians, contrary to the program’s intent. In 

another example, a State official described an incident in which about 45 

current Summer Work Travel participants were placed in substandard 

housing, which was apparently leased by an employee of the sponsoring 

organization. GAO internal control standards instruct agencies to identify 

risks that could impede the efficient and effective achievement of program 

objectives and assess their impact. However, State has insufficient data to 

assess whether potential risks to the programs are significant. For 

example, due to weaknesses in the DHS’ system for tracking visitors’ 

arrivals and departures,4

 the full extent of the overstays is not known. 

Moreover, State does not systematically document program abuse. 

Furthermore the State and the Department of Labor (Labor) do not compile 

or analyze data concerning the potential impact of program abuse on the 

3

An overstay is a foreign national who was legally admitted to the United States as a 

nonimmigrant for a specific period but remained in the country after that period expired.

4

Weaknesses include noncollection of many departure forms that visitors to the United 

States are required to submit when they leave the United States and an inability to match 

departure forms to data on arrivals. 
Page 4 GAO-06-106 State Department

U.S. labor market, although Labor officials said that it is not likely that the 

exchange programs will have any effect on U.S. employment opportunities 

because of the small number of J-1 exchange visitors relative to the U.S. 

workforce. Additionally, State does not know the extent to which 

participants have negative experiences because it does not systematically 

document and analyze reports of complaints made by program participants 

and serious problems submitted by the sponsors.

This report recommends that the Secretary of State take the following 

three actions to enhance the overall management and monitoring of the 

Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs:

• fully implement a compliance unit to better monitor Exchange Visitor 

Program activities and address deficiencies; 

• update and amend the regulations where necessary; and

• develop strategies to obtain data, such as information on overstays and 

labor market abuses, to assess the risks associated with the exchange 

program categories, and use the results of its assessment to focus its 

management and monitoring efforts.

In commenting on a draft of this report, State acknowledged weaknesses in 

its oversight and administration of the Exchange Visitor Program and 

reported that it has designated program oversight and administration as a 

weakness under the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act.5

 State 

described a number of actions it is taking to implement each of our 

recommendations.

Background The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 19616

 authorizes the 

J-1 Exchange Visitor Program. The program provides foreign nationals with 

opportunities to participate in exchange programs in the United States and 

return home to share their experiences, while also encouraging Americans 

to participate in educational and cultural programs in other countries. 

5

The Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (P. L. 97-255) requires agency heads to 

establish a continuous process for assessment and improvement of their agency's internal 

control and to annually report on the status of their efforts.

6

P. L. 87-256, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §2451 et seq.
Page 5 GAO-06-106 State Department

Foreign nationals who participate in the program enter the United States 

with a J-1 visa. The program has grown considerably over the years. Figure 

1 shows the number of J-1 visas issued since 1995.

Figure 1: J-1 Visas Issued Fiscal Years 1995-2004

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

The program is comprised of 13 categories of exchanges, which are 

grouped under private sector programs or academic and government 

programs. The private sector programs include the Alien Physician, Au 

Pair, Camp Counselor, Summer Work Travel, and Trainee categories. The 

academic and government programs include the Government Visitor, 

International Visitor, Professor and Research Scholar, Short-Term Scholar, 

Specialist, Student (Secondary School Student, College/University 

Student), and Teacher categories. The Exchange Visitor Program had about 

282,000 exchange visitors in the 13 program categories for fiscal year 2004.

State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs administers the 

Exchange Visitor Program through the Office of Exchange Coordination 

and Designation. This office administers the program through the 

designation of United States organizations to conduct exchange programs 

in the various exchange categories. There are 1,457 designated exchange 

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Fiscal year

Visas issued in millions
Page 6 GAO-06-106 State Department

programs. Designated sponsors are responsible for screening and selecting 

qualified applicants for program eligibility. The office determines which 

organizations will be designated to administer the international exchange 

programs on the basis of information provided during the application 

process in accordance with regulatory requirements. The office also 

develops and administers policy and regulations for the exchange 

categories and oversees sponsoring organizations’ compliance. 

Sponsors may be for profit or nonprofit organizations; businesses; state, 

local, or federal government agencies; and education-related institutions. 

Sponsors sometimes contract with overseas organizations—such as 

student travel agencies—as local partners to help identify and screen 

exchange program applicants. Some sponsors serve as intermediaries 

between the exchange visitor and a third party, which engages the 

exchange visitor in the program activity for the category in which they are 

being sponsored. For example, for trainees, the third parties are the 

organizations where the exchange visitors will receive training. Third 

parties consist of a variety of organizations, which include—but are not 

limited to—hotels, law firms, restaurants, Internet companies, and other 

private and public sector businesses and organizations. Sponsors are 

responsible for overseeing the operations of their overseas partners, and 

any third parties they work with. 

Also chief among the sponsors’ responsibilities is that of managing 

information on the exchange participant in DHS’ Student and Exchange 

Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which has been in operation since 

January 2003. SEVIS, which is maintained and administered by DHS’ U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is an Internet-based system that 

electronically collects information on all nonimmigrants that enter the 

United States with student visas and exchange visitor visas, and their 

dependents. Once a participant’s data are entered into SEVIS by the 

sponsor, a Form DS-2019 is issued by the system in the applicant’s name. 

This identifying information in SEVIS can be reviewed by a consular officer 

at the time of the visa interview and during the processing of the exchange 

visitor at the port of entry. Upon the arrival of the Exchange Visitor 

Program participant, the sponsor is required to document their 

participation in their program activity and record information on the 

location of the visitor’s employment or training and U.S. residence address. 

Figure 2 describes the sponsoring organizations’ roles and responsibilities.
Page 7 GAO-06-106 State Department

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Sponsoring Organizations

Exchange

progr

particip

am 

ant’s 

data is entered 

into SEVIS by 

sponsor

This identifying information 

in SEVIS can be reviewed 

by the consular officer at

the time of the visa interview

via the Consular Consolidated

Database and during the 

processing of the exchange 

visitor at point of entry 

Source: GAO.

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Sponsors

• 

• 

• 

Sponsoring organizations

nonprofit organizations

businesses

state, local, or federal government agencies

educational institutions

hospitals and related institutions

Sponsoring organizations’ responsibilities

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. oversee the operations of their local overseas partners and any third parties they work with

use local overseas

partners 

serve as intermediaries between the

exchange visitor and

a third party who

engages the 

exchange visitor in

the program category

some sponsors do not 

use third parties and

identify jobs directly

for Summer Work 

Travel participants

Local overseas partners 

may assist sponsor to

identify exchange

program

participants

(overseas

organizations, such

as student travel

agents)

SEVIS is managed 

and administered by 

DHS’ Immigration 

and Customs 

Enforcement

SEVIS

Internet-based

registration system

Upon arrival of the exchange

program participant, the

sponsor is required to

validate participation by

recording site of activity and

current U.S. address in SEVIS

Sponsor

Third party

Local overseas partner

Exchange visitor program

participant

identify and screen applicants for program eligibility

assist exchange participants in finding jobs or trainee positions

enter the exchange participant information in the Department of Homeland Security's 

(DHS) Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)

Form

DS-2019 

issued in 

applicant’s

name

Third party may provide jobs 

or training positions for trainees

hotels

law firms

restaurants

internet companies

other private and public sector

businesses and organizations

•

•

•

•

•
Page 8 GAO-06-106 State Department

Summer Work Travel and 

Trainee Programs

The Summer Work Travel Program is among the largest of the 13 categories 

of exchanges, with about 89,4537 participants in 2004. This program is 

designed to achieve the educational objectives of international exchange 

by involving bona fide foreign college or university students directly in the 

daily lives of U.S. citizens through travel and temporary work 

opportunities. The Trainee Program, with about 27,475 participants in 2004, 

provides foreign nationals the opportunity to enhance their skills in their 

chosen career field through participation in a structured training program. 

Summer Work Travel sponsors help the participants obtain jobs8

 and 

provide pre-arrival information, an orientation to life in the United States, 

and contact information in the event of problems. Sponsors of trainees are 

also required to provide pre-arrival information to the trainees and are 

directly responsible for all aspects of the trainees’ program, including the 

selection, orientation, training, supervision, and evaluation. About 52 

Summer Work Travel and 170 Trainee sponsors operated programs in 2005.9

Thousands of employers participate in the Summer Work Travel and the 

Trainee programs. Typical Summer Work Travel employers include 

amusement parks, resorts, hotels, and restaurants. The jobs generally 

include ride operators, waiters, lifeguards, receptionists, and guides. The 

types of organizations that utilize trainees include corporations, 

architectural firms, hotels, restaurants, development organizations, 

airlines, investment and financial services entities, and manufacturing 

companies. The participants are placed in locations wherein they receive 

training in engineering, drafting and design, biomedical technology, 

agricultural technology, hospitality administration and management, 

marketing, agricultural and food products processing, culinary arts and 

chef training, financial management, and many other careers.

Throughout the existence of the Summer Work Travel Program, there has 

been a geographic shift in which countries provide the most program 

participants. In the past, Western Europe had the largest numbers of 

7

As of November 2004.

8

Regulations require sponsors to ensure that at least half of their Summer Work Travel 

participants identify jobs before they leave their home country. The rest of the participants 

can look for jobs once they arrive in the United States. 

9

Some sponsors are designated to administer exchange programs in more than one 

exchange category. In 2005, there were 206 individual organizations that sponsored the 

Summer Work Travel and/or the Trainee programs. 
Page 9 GAO-06-106 State Department

participants. However, more recently, the largest numbers of Summer Work 

Travel participants have been citizens of Eastern European countries, 

including Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Romania. Table 1 lists the 

10 countries with the largest numbers of Summer Work Travel and Trainee 

participants. 

Table 1: Top-10 Countries Participating in the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee Programs in 2004 

Source: Department of State.

State Has Maintained 

Limited Oversight of 

Exchange Programs

State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer 

Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the 

programs. State primarily ensures compliance with program regulations 

through a paperwork review, and there is inconsistent monitoring by 

sponsors. Moreover, some sponsors believe that the program regulations 

need updating, and State officials have expressed concerns about the 

enforceability of the sanction/revocation process provided for in the 

Exchange Visitor Program regulations. Sponsors have also expressed 

concern about their communication with State. State has acknowledged 

problems, is establishing a compliance unit to monitor program activities, 

and is revising the regulations; however progress has been slow.

State’s Monitoring Efforts 

Are Minimal

State’s monitoring efforts largely consist of reviewing written information 

provided by sponsors, with minimal efforts of verifying such information 

Summer Work Travel 

Program Trainee Program

Country Number of participants Country Number of participants

Poland 18,691 Germany 3,021

Russia 9,962 France 1,748

Bulgaria 6,993 United Kingdom 1,023

Slovakia 5,581 Canada 660

Brazil 5,477 China 458

Ireland 4,309 Netherlands 408

Czech Republic 3,053 Mexico 403

Peru 2,978 Japan 371

Romania 2,901 Ireland 364

Belarus 2,607 India 344
Page 10 GAO-06-106 State Department

through program visits. State relies on sponsors to provide written 

information, primarily through annual reports, which describe the number 

of individuals a sponsor has placed and a brief narrative on program 

activities, difficulties encountered, and their resolution. Exchange program 

regulations require that sponsors promptly notify State about any serious 

problem or controversy that could cause State or the sponsor’s Exchange 

Visitor Program notoriety or disrepute. When a sponsor reports a problem, 

State officials follow-up by telephone, e-mail, fax or letter, according to 

sponsors and State officials. However, State rarely visits sponsors to 

observe program activities and verify the information that they provide, 

although such visits are a good internal control practice for ensuring that 

management’s directives are being carried out. We found that in the past 4 

years, State officials made visits to only 8 of its 206 Summer Work Travel 

and/or Trainee sponsors. 

Additionally, information on problematic incidents provided by the 

sponsors and any notes or correspondence on the matter are filed as part of 

the material that is examined when the sponsor applies for redesignation, 

which is required every 2 years.10 In their applications for redesignation to 

State, all sponsors are required to estimate the number of exchange visitors 

their organization would like to place and provide information on their 

legal, financial, and managerial resources to manage exchange programs in 

compliance with federal regulations. State reviews these applications along 

with the annual reports and other documentation collected over the 2-year 

period and determines whether it should grant a 2-year designation to a 

sponsor and the number of participants the sponsor will be authorized to 

include in their exchange program activity. The vast majority of sponsors 

who apply for redesignation are approved. State officials said that their 

staffing levels and lack of travel funds do not allow for intensive monitoring 

of the Exchange Visitor Program sponsors. The Office of Exchange 

Coordination and Designation has five Program Designation officers who 

serve as the point of contact and are responsible for the day-to-day 

administration and management of the 13 exchange programs. 

10According to the program regulations, sponsors’ designations are effective for 5 years, 

although State may designate a shorter period. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa 

Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173) requires State to conduct a review every 2 years of 

the entities designated to sponsor exchange programs to determine if they are in 

compliance with certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements. State designated all 

sponsors for 2 years when they were entered in SEVIS in January 2003. State has drafted 

revisions to its regulations that will reflect the change in the period of designation from 5 to 

2 years.
Page 11 GAO-06-106 State Department

Sponsors’ Monitoring of 

Employers and Third Parties Is 

Limited

Exchange Visitor Program regulations require sponsors to effectively 

administer and monitor their Exchange Visitor Program and ensure 

exchange participants engage in activities consistent with the appropriate 

exchange category. Nevertheless, recent discoveries by consular officers 

overseas suggest that some sponsors do not consistently carry out their 

oversight and monitoring responsibilities. For example:

• A trainee applicant submitted a training offer that included the name 

and organizational information of a legitimate financial services 

company, but listed as a contact an individual with a noncompany e-mail 

address. When the consular officer checked the contact information, he 

learned that the contact person was not affiliated with the financial 

services company. The sponsor admitted to only spot-checking the 

viability of third party organizations and training plans. 

• When a consular officer at another post checked a company’s Web site 

to verify the job offer of a foreign student applying for the Summer Work 

Travel Program, he discovered that the company was a topless bar. 

• In another case, consular officers noticed a number of trainee applicants 

who said they were going to the United States to work as kitchen help 

and wait staff. When State contacted the U.S. sponsor about these 

applicants, the sponsor stated that it relied on another organization to 

help it select and place the trainees and admitted that it had not 

followed up directly with each trainee and employer to ensure that its 

standards were being satisfied. 

Sponsors are required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that third 

parties know and comply with applicable provisions of the Exchange 

Visitor Program regulations. However, State does not offer any guidance on 

how the sponsors should carry out their monitoring and oversight 

responsibilities. Two of the sponsors we met with said that, after they 

discovered that trainees whom they had sponsored were not receiving any 

training, they established new practices to visit at least 10 percent of their 

exchange program participants and all employers and exchange 

participants where there were problems. 
Page 12 GAO-06-106 State Department

Various Concerns Exist 

About Program Regulations 

During our review, several sponsors we met with raised concerns about the 

clarity of the program regulations and also complained that varying 

interpretations of the regulations make it difficult for them to implement 

the program. Moreover, State officials believed that the sanctions provided 

in the regulations are not adequate to control the activities of sponsors who 

incorrectly implemented the program. State has been revising the 

regulations but has not finalized the changes.

Regulations Need Revising Six of the 13 sponsors that we met with described a range of problems 

pertaining to the regulations, particularly regarding the Trainee Program. 

Their comments included the following:

• The Trainee regulations lack specificity and are open to differing 

interpretation by State and the sponsors. 

• Dealing with State has become more complicated for sponsor 

organizations because State has at times changed rules outside of the 

formal regulation-setting process.

• The Trainee regulations are so cumbersome that it is unclear what 

should be included in a training plan. 

• Training plans vary widely among sponsors, and there is no guidance on 

what constitutes a good plan.

• The regulations should include a separate category for interns. 

A past OIG report also cited problems with the regulations and 

recommended in particular that, for the Trainee Program, the training 

regulations should more clearly define what is not considered training.11

Six of the sponsors we met with and the representative of an association of 

sponsors expressed concern with State’s interpretation of certain 

provisions of the regulations, while seven sponsors and the association 

representative also said that State does not consistently disseminate its 

interpretations or guidance on the regulations to the sponsors. For 

example, the regulations state that the maximum period of the 

participation in the Exchange Visitor Program for a trainee, with the 

11OIG OO-CI-028.
Page 13 GAO-06-106 State Department

exception of flight training, shall not exceed 18 months. Some sponsors 

said they interpreted this provision to mean that an individual could come 

to the United States one or more times as a trainee as long as the combined 

duration of the visits did not exceed 18 months. In 2002, however, some 

sponsors said they were told that the Trainee Program was restricted to a 

one-time training session not to exceed 18 months. This clarification in 

regulations has surprised some sponsors, according to one of the sponsors 

who was notified about this change through a fax from State. A State 

official explained that all Trainee sponsors were sent a message through 

SEVIS in October 2003, explaining State’s policy on this matter. According 

to the documentation, the message was to be addressed to all sponsors that 

conduct Trainee programs and all responsible officers and their alternates. 

Moreover, a few sponsors said guidance or interpretations of various 

provisions of the regulations have been communicated inconsistently. For 

example, representatives of two sponsoring organizations said that State is 

no longer requiring that sponsors recruit no more than 10 percent of repeat 

Summer Work Travel participants, as specified in the regulations, but State 

did not make any formal effort to inform the sponsors of the change. One of 

the sponsors said that the organization learned about the change from the 

U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. A State official explained that policy changes are 

announced in the Federal Register or by written notice to all sponsors. 

According to the official, two cables were sent to all overseas posts 

clarifying the requirements of the Summer Work Travel Program and the 

removal of the 10 percent rule regarding repeat participants. In addition, 

copies of these cables were sent, by e-mail, to all Summer Work Travel 

sponsors, according to the official.

State Officials Believe 

Regulations Lack Enforceable 

Sanctions 

State is also reviewing the sanctions provided in the regulations. State 

officials, including the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau 

of Educational and Cultural Affairs, said the current sanction/revocation 

process that State may use to limit the activities of sponsors that do not 

comply with the regulations—or remove a sponsor from the program 

altogether—is difficult to enforce. The sanctions range in severity from a 

letter of reprimand to an action to revoke a sponsor’s designation. One 

sanction that State uses is to deny the sponsor’s request for certification 

forms until the compliance issue has been resolved. For example, State 

officials described a recent case in which State’s attempt to revoke a 

sponsor’s designation was challenged by the sponsor in district court. In 

this case, State received complaints from two trainees who alleged they 

were not receiving the training that they had expected and were displeased 

with their training assignments and compensation. The sponsor in this case 
Page 14 GAO-06-106 State Department

had placed individuals in positions in the hospitality industry. State 

investigated the sponsor’s operation, interviewed a number of program 

participants, and concluded that the sponsor was not placing participants 

in management training positions but was operating a work program, in 

violation of the regulations. State’s in-house revocation board agreed and 

supported the sanction of revocation. However, in remanding the matter to 

the board for further proceedings, the district court concluded that State's 

investigation had been too limited and had not produced evidence adequate 

to support the severe punishment of revocation. After a second hearing, the 

board overturned the revocation, thereby enabling the sponsor to resume 

its program. State concluded that the sanctions’ provisions needed 

streamlining and tightening for more effective and assured application. 

State Slow to Revise Regulations State has acknowledged that the regulations need revising; however, more 

than 3 years after revisions were suggested by the exchange industry they 

are still in draft form. According to the Acting Director of the Office of 

Exchange Coordination and Designation revisions are in process. For 

example, State is revising the Trainee regulations to create a separate 

Intern category to accommodate younger, less experienced applicants, 

such as students or recent university graduates seeking to gain practical 

work experience. The exchange community generally supports the 

creation of a new Intern category and, in November 2001, an association of 

organizations that sponsor exchange students submitted its proposals for 

revising the regulations to State. The Acting Director of the Office of 

Exchange Coordination and Designation said that the sections of the 

regulations on interns and trainees are still being reviewed at State and 

attributed the delay in completing the regulations to the review process. He 

also stated that State’s Office of Legal Advisor was given the responsibility 

to develop new sanctions for the program 2 years ago. According to the 

Assistant Legal Advisor for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, revised 

sanctions regulations were drafted and shared with the Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs for review and comment. The Assistant 

Legal Advisor stated that recent guidance from the Bureau’s Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary suggested that further revisions were 

warranted to best suit evolving program needs. Once State has completed 

its review, the Department of Justice will be consulted prior to publication 

of the revised regulations. She stated that while this process could take an 

additional 2 to 6 months to complete, the timing should fall well within the 

time lines and milestones set forth in a 24-month corrective action plan 

proposed by the Bureau in March 2005.
Page 15 GAO-06-106 State Department

Communication between 

State and Sponsors and with 

Posts Has Raised Concerns

According to GAO guidance on internal controls, managers should ensure 

that effective external communications occur with groups that impact its 

program, projects, operations, and other activities. According to seven of 

the sponsors we met with and the organization representing sponsors, 

communication with State is a problem. For example, one sponsor 

described State as reactive rather than proactive in its communication 

practices. Representatives of four of the sponsoring organizations 

complained that program officers were not always responsive to their 

inquiries or were difficult to reach. Some sponsors attributed the 

difficulties to an insufficient number of State staff. 

Some sponsors also complained about a lack of feedback from a study 

commissioned by State on SEVIS compliance and other issues, which was

completed in December 2003. The report concluded that in some cases the 

sponsors’ staff was not adequately trained, that the sponsors did not 

maintain required records, and did not fully provide oversight of their 

foreign partners, employers, third-party organizations, or the exchange 

participants. The report made a number of recommendations on how State 

should further clarify the program regulations and help train the sponsors 

on both State regulations and their role in maintaining SEVIS data. We met 

with six sponsors that participated in the study, and none had received 

feedback from State on the results of the study. One said the Acting 

Director of the Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation made 

some general comments about the study at a meeting of an industry 

association. 

Communication between the Office of Exchange Coordination and 

Designation and the overseas posts has also been cited as a concern. For 

example, one sponsor said there is no mechanism to ensure consistent 

interpretation of the regulations by the overseas posts, while another said 

the posts are the last to know about program changes. For example, a 

sponsor said that even though the office has told them that applicants can 

have only one trainee placement, one post was still telling applicants in 

2004 that they can participate more than once. Further, a representative of 

an exchange industry organization stated that the Office of Exchange 

Coordination and Designation knows too little about what is really going on 

in the field. This situation may have been the reason ineligible students 

from at least one country, Ireland, were allowed to participate in the 

Summer Work Travel Program for over 30 years before an apparent 

misinterpretation of the regulations was discovered. In 2002, a consular 

officer in Dublin asked for clarification on the eligibility of students who 

had completed their course work but had not formally graduated, 
Page 16 GAO-06-106 State Department

according to an embassy official. In response, State instructed the posts not 

to change their selection procedures for the 2003 season. However, 

according to the Acting Director of Office of Exchange Coordination and 

Designation, State ultimately confirmed that such students were not 

eligible for the program, unless they could demonstrate enrollment in 

another degree program, and sent a cable to the posts with its decision in 

2004. According to the local program representatives, such students had 

constituted up to a third of the participants from Ireland.

Establishment of a 

Compliance Unit Not Fully 

Implemented 

State has been slow to implement the OIG’s 2000 recommendation that it 

devote the necessary resources to perform more rigorous oversight. The 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Educational and 

Cultural Affairs and the Acting Director of the Office of Exchange 

Coordination and Designation acknowledged that State has been slow to 

establish a compliance unit. The Acting Director of the Office of Exchange 

Coordination and Designation said funding to establish a compliance unit 

has been requested for several years without success. The Bureau 

requested funding in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for five additional positions 

for the compliance unit, but State did not approve the request for 

submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), according to a 

State official. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs stated that the unit was not funded 

initially because of a lack of senior managerial support. State has since 

supported the request for funding because of congressional interest and the 

increased emphasis on strengthening program management, according to 

the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. Subsequent requests for funding 

for the unit for fiscal years 2004 to 2006 were approved by State but not 

approved by OMB. However, the officials told us they realized that the 

program regulations have been ignored by some exchange program 

sponsors, agreed that a compliance unit was needed, and are in the process 

of the establishing the unit by diverting existing positions.

According to State officials, the unit as it is currently conceived would 

initially consist of one Foreign Service officer and two program analysts 

and will report to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. The officials 

stated that the compliance unit will rely on structured reviews conducted 

by contractors. They said State will utilize the system currently in place at 

DHS, which uses contractors for on-site reviews of schools to verify their 

eligibility to register foreign students into the SEVIS system. The 

contractors will verify the information that the sponsors submit as part of 

the redesignation process and may check the names of the responsible and 
Page 17 GAO-06-106 State Department

alternate responsible officers—and possibly board members—through law 

enforcement databases, according to the State officials. They said that as 

part of the new compliance effort, sponsors for all nonacademic exchanges 

will be required to contract for and submit annual audits of their activities. 

The compliance unit will develop a management template to guide the 

audits. Currently only sponsors of the Au Pair Program are required to 

submit such audits.12 

It is too early to determine whether implementation of the planned 

compliance unit will resolve all of the issues identified by GAO and OIG. 

For example, using contractors to visit the sponsors will address OIG’s 

criticism that State does not visit the sponsors. However, State has not 

determined what information the contractors need to review to assess how 

well the sponsors monitor employers and third parties. Moreover, State has 

not provided a written plan describing in detail how the compliance unit 

will operate. Funding also remains an issue. State initially plans to cover 

the cost of the new compliance unit by redirecting current appropriations 

and obtaining—as agreed upon by OMB—about $450,000 of the SEVIS fees 

collected from exchange program sponsors by DHS. Further, State will 

again request funding for the compliance unit in the 2007 budget request.

State Has Not Assessed 

Potential Risks

GAO internal control standards instruct agencies to identify risks that 

could impede the efficient and effective achievement of its objectives and 

assess their impact. A number of potential risks are associated with the 

Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs, including the risk of 

participants using the programs to remain in the United States beyond their 

authorized time. Exchange participants may also use the programs as a 

means to fraudulent immigration. There is also the potential for the Trainee 

Program being misused as an employment program, although State does 

not have data on the extent that such abuse occurs. The exchange 

participants could be exploited by employers or other third parties. While 

State investigates complaints, it does not know the extent to which 

participants have negative experiences because it does not systematically 

document and analyze complaints made by program participants and 

reports of serious problems reported by the sponsors.

12Compliance unit staff will analyze the results of the contractor reviews and the audits, 

although a regulatory change is needed to implement the audit requirement, according to 

the Acting Director of the Office of Exchange Designation and Coordination. 
Page 18 GAO-06-106 State Department

Some Exchange 

Participants Have Used the 

Programs to Remain in the 

United States

Although exchange program participants are expected to return to their 

country following completion of their program, there is information 

indicating that some participants remain beyond the time that they were 

authorized to stay. Information on overstays is available from DHS’s arrival 

and departure database and the results of returnee validation studies 

conducted by overseas posts. For example, we asked DHS to check the 

total number of J-1 visa recipients in all exchange categories who had 

completed their program since January 2003 against its arrival and 

departure database to determine which visa holders had departed the 

country. The results showed that about 362,000 exchange participants had 

concluded their program during this period. The data showed that about 36 

percent of the participants had departed the United States by the end of 

their program and about 24 percent were potential overstays.13 However, 

the full extent of overstays is uncertain because DHS could not find 

information on an additional 40 percent of the J-1 visa holders because they 

may have entered the United States before the current entry system was 

operational. DHS’ primary method for estimating overstays is to match the 

arrival portion of a form collected by DHS when the visitor enters the 

United States to the departure portion of the form generally collected by 

the airlines when the visitor departs. One of the weaknesses in this system 

is that the departure portion of the form is not always submitted to airline 

staff. Further, data entry errors by DHS contractors also make it difficult to 

match the forms. The U.S. government is phasing in a more comprehensive 

entry-exit system, US-VISIT, to correct the weaknesses in its current 

system. 

Some overseas posts periodically conduct validation studies to determine if 

visa applicants who received J-1 visas at their post have returned to that 

country. These studies generally consist of telephone inquiries to the visa 

recipient, while some posts have required J-1 visa recipients to report to 

the post upon their return. The results vary. For example, one post in the 

former Soviet Union conducted a study of its 2004 Summer Work Travel 

season that showed that, as of January 20, 2005, 26 percent of the 2004 

participants from that country remained in the United States. This post 

reported overstay rates of 29 percent for 2003, 25.6 percent for 2002, and 27 

percent for 2001. Other posts have reported lower overstay rates. For 

example, a post in a Western European country conducted a validation 

13Some of these individuals may have changed their immigration status legally. DHS would 

need to analyze each individual record to determine if these individuals were actually 

overstays.
Page 19 GAO-06-106 State Department

study of its 2004 Summer Work Travel Program that showed that all of the 

visa applicants in the sample who were issued J-1 visas returned home, as 

required. The posts can use the results of such studies to guide their 

decision making when they adjudicate visas. For example, the post with a 

26 percent overstay rate in 2004 developed additional selection factors for 

the 2005 Summer Work Travel season to assess the potential for individuals 

to return to their country after their programs are completed. However, 

these studies are not always statistically valid. Moreover, the Acting 

Director of Exchange Coordination and Designation said the post 

validation studies are not useful to program officials because the posts do 

not follow a standardized methodology.

J-1 visitors who remain in the United States beyond their program do not 

necessarily stay for long periods of time, and not all of them remain in the 

United States illegally. According to consular officials we talked with at one 

post, some participants in the Summer Work Travel Program from their 

country who remain in the United States beyond their program date might 

typically overstay anywhere from a few days to no more than a few months. 

The consular officials said the participants sometimes remain in the United 

States longer if they have not earned sufficient money to cover their 

expenses. Others change their visa status to another nonimmigrant 

category. For example, the 2004 validation study by one post in the former 

Soviet Union country showed that 39 percent of those who had remained in 

the United States beyond the completion of the program had either 

changed their visa status, got married, or were seeking asylum. Changing 

status from a J-1 visa to another visa category is permitted under U.S. 

immigration laws in certain circumstances, but Bureau of Consular Affairs 

and other officials have stated that it is not the intent of the program.

Potential Exists for 

Fraudulent Immigration 

Claims

DHS data show that a growing number of J-1 visa holders had applied for 

political asylum between 1995 and 2004, about 6,300 individuals who 

entered the United States with J-1 visas applied for asylum. According to 

DHS, the numbers of asylum applications from J-1 visa holders from former 

Soviet Union countries have more than doubled since 2000. These 

countries include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and Ukraine. The officials are 

concerned that some of these claims are fraudulent, as they doubt that J-1 

visa holders—who have to be students in good standing in their 

countries—are being persecuted. The recent increase in numbers of such 

claims and the similarities of the stories—which indicate coaching, are also 

indicators of fraud, according to DHS officials. DHS’ Fraud Detection and 

National Security Unit and State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of 
Page 20 GAO-06-106 State Department

Consular Fraud Prevention are monitoring this issue. These units would 

turn over any suspected fraud to U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement for investigation. According to a DHS official, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement is conducting asylum fraud 

investigations in Los Angeles and Cleveland. Among the targets of those 

investigations are individuals who were admitted with J-1 visas, as well as 

several other classes of nonimmigrants. 

Trainee Category Is 

Vulnerable to Misuse as 

Employment Program 

The potential exists for the Trainee Program to be misused as an 

employment program. Regulations strictly prohibit the use of the trainee 

category for ordinary employment purposes, stating in particular that 

sponsors may not place trainee participants in positions that are filled or 

would be filled by full-time or part-time employees. State and the overseas 

posts provided some information describing Trainee Program abuses, but 

they did not have information on the extent of the problem.

• In one example, a sponsor learned that an organization it had contracted 

with to help select and place trainees had placed the participants with 

employers that had contracts to provide H-2B temporary workers.14 The 

organization had participated in the Trainee Program because the H-2B 

visa category was at its limit and it was looking for an alternative way to 

receive foreign workers. 

• In another example, a staffing agency recruited about 650 electrical 

engineers, primarily from Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, to come to 

the United States as trainees. Ostensibly, the plan was to train the 

engineers in the United States because they would be working on 

projects in Europe that required knowledge of U.S. standards. However, 

the organization served as an electrical contractor, placing the trainees 

on U.S. construction projects as electricians. Because it was not 

designated to sponsor trainees, the staffing agency approached a few 

designated sponsors to issue the DS-2019 forms. State received 

complaints from the trainees and the electrician’s union and 

investigated this case. To correct the situation, the sponsors and the 

union eventually found appropriate placements for some of the 

engineers. Others returned to their countries. According to a State 

14An H-2B visa is a nonimmigrant visa issued to foreign nationals who are temporarily 

coming to the United States to perform nonagricultural services or labor, if an unemployed 

person capable of performing such work cannot be found in the United States.
Page 21 GAO-06-106 State Department

official, the staffing agency went out of business, and the principal party 

was indicted on criminal charges. 

The Acting Director of the Office of Exchange Coordination and 

Designation described agricultural training programs as problematic 

because of the potential for fraud. He said the abuses are not hidden and 

that there is not even an attempt to represent jobs as training, and that 

employers refer to the participants as employees rather than trainees. For 

example, a 2004 DHS investigation involved four Chinese nationals brought 

to the United States by an individual to participate in an agricultural 

program sponsored by a Florida university. The trainees were placed with a 

dairy farm that had an agreement with the university. DHS found that only 

one trainee had a firm grasp of English, which called into question the 

trainees’ eligibility for a J-1 visa as well as whether the trainees were 

receiving training or simply employed at the farm. Upon further 

investigation DHS found that the individual had brought 17 trainees to the 

United States to participate in the university’s training program. The 

trainees were placed at four participating dairies. DHS also found that only 

one of the dairies reported having a structured training plan. According to 

DHS, the university violated regulations concerning sponsoring 

organizations for exchange trainees by failing to ensure that the J-1 trainees 

were properly compensated and possessed the required language ability to 

participate in an English language-based training program. DHS further 

stated that the dairies were exploiting the J-1 trainees for cheap labor and 

in most cases were not concerned with actually training them beyond what 

was necessary to perform their work. The OIG’s 2000 report also described 

abuse of the Trainee Program. In two of the cases that the OIG investigated, 

U.S. workers complained that they were replaced by trainees. 

Despite such misuses, Labor officials stated that it is not likely that the 

exchange programs will have any effect on the U.S labor market because of 

the small number of J-1 exchange visitors (about 283,000 in fiscal year 

2004) relative to the U.S. workforce.15 However, the U.S. government does 

not collect data to assess any potential effect of exchange programs on the 

U.S. labor market. Labor officials said that a monthly household survey, the 

Current Population Survey, reviews a sample of households to compile 

labor statistics on foreign-born workers. However, the numbers of 

exchange program participants is so small that even if they were captured 

15For example, the total civilian workforce in the United States was over 147 million as of 

September 2004.
Page 22 GAO-06-106 State Department

by these surveys there is no way to separate out the effect of their labor 

participation from that of the other foreign-born workers. Also, it is 

possible that exchange participants would not be captured in the survey 

because of their housing arrangements. For instance, if they do not reside 

in traditional housing units and live in dormitories or resort-provided 

housing, they may not be included in the survey sample. 

Some Exchange 

Participants Could Be 

Exploited or Have 

Otherwise Negative 

Experiences

The Summer Work Travel and Trainee participants generally have positive 

experiences in the United States, according to the sponsors and 

participants we met with. Some sponsors and overseas representatives 

survey their participants on their experiences. One of the sponsors said its 

research showed that about 85 percent of its participants were satisfied 

with their placement. All of the Summer Work Travel and Trainee 

participants whom we met with described their overall experiences as 

positive. 

When the participants do complain, the complaints are generally minor, 

usually involving disappointments with their placement, housing, or 

location. The Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation 

investigates all complaints that are brought to its attention, according to 

State officials. In addition, the regulations require the sponsors to inform 

State of any serious problems or controversy that could be expected to 

bring State or the sponsors’ exchange programs into disrepute. However, 

we found that although State may follow up on such reports, it does not 

systematically document or analyze them. Such an analysis could be used 

to identify program weaknesses. State acknowledged that is does not have 

procedures for recording and maintaining all complaints in all categories 

and stated such procedures are currently being prepared and will be 

incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Manual.

Occasionally, the exchange participants have negative experiences as a 

result of exploitation by a third party. A State official described an incident 

in which about 45 current Summer Work Travel participants were placed in 

substandard housing. Apparently, the housing was leased by an employee 

of the sponsoring organization. The sponsor subsequently placed the 

students in better housing, and the OIG is investigating the incident at the 

Exchange Visitor Program office’s request. State officials described another 

situation in which they fear a third party might have exploited the exchange 

participants. In this case, Bulgarian Summer Work Travel participants were 

approached by an employee of the local program representative while they 

were still in Bulgaria and told that the jobs arranged for them in New Jersey 
Page 23 GAO-06-106 State Department

by the U.S. sponsor were no longer viable and that they were instead to 

report to jobs in Florida. As a result, when the Bulgarians arrived in the 

United States, they refused to continue on to New Jersey with the sponsor’s 

representative, who met them at the airport. Instead, they had tickets to 

Florida and went there to work for a third-party organization that provided 

cleaning services to hotels. State and DHS are currently investigating this 

case. 

When such situations receive negative media attention, it can further 

undermine the purpose of the program. For example, a July 13, 2005, article 

in a New Hampshire newspaper reported on the plight of three students 

from Romania who arrived in the United States on July 5, 2005, to find that 

the jobs they were promised no longer existed. News of these situations 

may even reach the foreign media. For example, a June 2004 United Press 

International article concerning an incident affecting Russian students 

stated the incident was also reported by the Moscow Times. As a result of 

such situations at least one foreign government has discussed its concerns 

with U.S. embassy officials in their country, according to a Bureau of 

Consular Affairs official. 

Conclusions The Summer Worker Travel and Trainee Exchange Visitor Program 

categories are important components of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. 

However, State has not exercised sufficient management oversight of the 

programs to ensure that they operate as intended and are not abused. State 

has taken some action to address identified deficiencies, such as beginning 

efforts to revise the regulations; but progress has been slow. Also, State 

has been slow in establishing a compliance unit, which would bolster 

oversight efforts, despite recommendations from State’s OIG to do so. GAO 

guidance on internal control standards instructs agencies to identify risks 

that could impede the efficient and effective achievement of program goals. 

Once these risks are identified, they should be analyzed for possible effect. 

For example, an analysis of complaints and problems that participants and 

sponsors report could uncover program weaknesses, and these results 

could be used to guide the efforts of the compliance unit. Assessing such 

risks is a necessary step to mitigating the risks. But State has not taken 

action to assess the risks associated with the Summer Work Travel and the 

Trainee programs, in part because limited data are available. 
Page 24 GAO-06-106 State Department

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

This report recommends that the Secretary of State take the following 

three actions to enhance the overall management and monitoring of the 

Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs:

• fully implement a compliance unit to better monitor exchange program 

activities and address deficiencies; 

• update and amend the regulations where necessary; and

• develop strategies to obtain data, such as information on overstays and 

program abuses, to assess the risks associated with the program, and 

use the results of its assessment to focus its management and 

monitoring efforts.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

State provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments 

are reprinted in appendix II. State and DHS also provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate.

In its comments, State acknowledged weaknesses in its oversight and 

administration of the Exchange Visitor Program and reported that it has 

designated program oversight and administration as a weakness under the 

Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act. State described a number of 

actions it is taking to implement each of our recommendations, including 

developing a corrective action plan, establishing a compliance unit, 

working to revise program regulations, and working with DHS to gather 

data related to the tracking of overstays.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, and the Secretaries of State, DHS, and Labor. 

We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 25 GAO-06-106 State Department

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 26 GAO-06-106 State Department

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To examine how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee 

programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried out under the 

programs, we

• reviewed previous GAO and OIG reports, program regulations and 

guidance, cables, sponsors’ annual reports, and other information 

pertaining to the programs; 

• reviewed program files maintained by the Bureau of Educational and 

Cultural Affairs, Office of Exchange Coordination and Designation, for 

selected Summer Work Travel and Trainee sponsors to gain an 

understanding about the kinds of problems that the sponsors report to 

the Department of State (State) and how State has addressed them; 

• interviewed State officials, including the Bureau of Educational and 

Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss how the U.S. government 

manages the programs;

• interviewed Department of Labor (Labor) officials about the impact of 

the programs on the U.S. labor market, and the Social Security 

Administration on issues related to Social Security cards for exchange 

visitors; and

• met with nine sponsors of the Summer Work Travel Program that 

accounted for 75 percent of the participants in 2004 and 13 sponsors of 

the Trainee Program that accounted for 54 percent of the participants in 

2004,1

 as well as an official of an association of exchange program 

sponsors to discuss how sponsors carry out their monitoring and 

oversight responsibilities. 

We relied on data from DHS’ Student and Exchange Visitor Information 

System (SEVIS) to identify sponsors and the number of participants. The 

SEVIS database is used by exchange program managers, sponsors, and U.S. 

government agencies to keep track of individuals who enter the United 

States on exchange visitor and student visas. We reviewed SEVIS data and 

discussed its reliability with State and DHS officials and sponsors, based on 

the descriptions of the database, procedures for entering and managing the 

1

We visited 13 sponsors in all. Seven of the 13 managed both Summer Work Travel and 

Trainee programs.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 27 GAO-06-106 State Department

data, and the internal checks that are part of the system. We believe these 

data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We relied on data from the 

sponsors to identify their overseas representatives, exchange participants, 

employers, and host companies.

We met with 28 exchange participants to discuss their views of the 

programs. We reviewed data provided by the sponsors to identify exchange 

participants who were in their programs during our fieldwork and who 

were in nearby locations. We visited exchange participants in Boston, 

Massachusetts; Bolton Valley and Smugglers’ Notch, Vermont; and 

Washington, D.C. We used the results of our interviews for illustrative 

purposes and not to generalize to all participants.

We also visited three overseas posts-–Minsk, Belarus; Warsaw, Poland; and 

Dublin, Ireland––where we observed visa interviews of exchange program 

applicants, reviewed post validation studies and other exchange program 

guidance, and discussed the exchange programs with consular and 

embassy officials. We also met with the local representatives of the U.S. 

sponsors to discuss how they recruited and screened Summer Work Travel 

and Trainee applicants. We selected Belarus because of consular concerns 

about overstays and the integrity of the overseas partners. Belarus is also 

one of the top sending countries for the Summer Work Travel Program. We 

selected Poland because it was the number one sending country for 

Summer Work Travel participants and within the top-10 sending posts for 

trainees in 2004. We selected Ireland because it is also within the top-10 

sending countries for both the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee 

programs and because of the decreased participation in the Summer Work 

Travel Program after State’s ruling concerning the eligibility of certain 

students. We used the results of our fieldwork for illustrative purposes and 

not to generalize to all posts.

To examine the potential risks of the programs we reviewed past GAO and 

OIG reports, and examined post validation studies, cables, and other 

documents. We followed up on information we obtained in Belarus on 

asylum seekers with J-1 visas with (1) the Bureau of Consular Affairs’ 

Office of Consular Fraud Prevention; (2) DHS’ Citizenship and Immigration 

Services, Asylum Division; and (3) DHS’ Fraud Detection National Security 

Unit. We also requested data on overstays from the National Security 

Investigations Division of DHS’ Office of Investigation, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. The overstay data that DHS provided were 

primarily obtained from DHS’ arrival and departure information system. 

Past GAO reports have discussed the weaknesses in the U.S. government’s 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO-06-106 State Department

methods of collecting overstay data. However, despite the lack of precision 

of both the DHS and post data on overstays, these data are sufficiently 

reliable to indicate overstays are a cause for concern. 

We conducted our review from November 2004 to August 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 29 GAO-06-106 State Department

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 30 GAO-06-106 State Department
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 31 GAO-06-106 State Department
Page 32 GAO-06-106 State Department

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4128

Staff Acknowledgment In addition to the individual named above, John Brummet, Assistant 

Director; Joseph Brown; Joseph Carney; Maria Oliver; and La Verne 

Tharpes made key contributions to this report.

(320322)
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

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