Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 23 , 2023

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00303

- CV

ALAN W. NALLE, SR. , Appellant

V.
KATHRYN HALE , Appellee

On Appeal from the 459th District Court

Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D

- 1

- GN

- 20

- 005928

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a s ummary judgment case

. Appellant Alan W. Nalle, Sr. sued

a ppellee Kathr yn Hale alleging various causes of action related t o a dispute with
his communit y ’ s homeowne r ’ s association. Hale eventually file d a mo tion for summary judgment on Nalle ’ s causes of action , which the trial court granted.
Because we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error when it granted Hale ’ s motion for summary jud g ment, we affirm.2 B ACKG ROUND This litigation orig inal ly aros e out of a dispute between Nalle and his
homeowner ’ s a ssociat ion, the Westlake Oaks Property Owners Association, Inc. ( Westlake ) . Nalle believed that Westlake
, its Architectural Control Committee ( the Committee )
, and Board of Directors violated Wes tlake ’ s p r otective co venant s by approv ing plans and then grant ing a con struction variance for a new h ouse being constructed on the lot ne xt to Nalle ’ s house

. At the time the variance was approved , Hale was serving as a voluntary member of t he Committe e

. Hale sign ed
the variance in her c apacity as a representative of the Committee

. Appellant filed suit against We stlake alleg ing claims for breach of c ontract for failing to enfo rce protective covenants, negligenc e, and “int entional conduct”
that vio late d Nalle ’ s “ right to privacy and right to quiet enjoyment of his home.” Among other allegations, Nalle alleg ed that the Committee “did not act reasonably in granting ap proval ” of the new construction “an d instead a cted arbitrarily without
fa ir, solid a n d sub stantial cause or reason and took action with out co nsideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the matter. ” Nalle further alleged that h e had pro vided “a list of errors in the approv al process made by the
arch itec t and b y the [Co mmittee ] that demonstrated that the [Committee] had failed to properly conform to the requirements of the [protect ive co venants] in granting its approvals and that such approvals were in violation o f the [ prot ective

covenants ]

. ” In ad diti o n to other allegations against the Committee, Nalle alleged

t ha t the B oard and then the Committee “ did not act reasonably in granting the

var ianc e , and instead acted arbit rarily without fair, solid and subs tantial cau se or reason and took actio n wi th out c o nsideration and in disr egard of the facts and
circumstances of the matter. ” Finally, Nalle sought recovery of the following damages:3

( a ) A ctual or economic damage s for at least $1,000,000.00 , and ( b ) S pecial or consequ enti al damages to be determined by a jury, in an amount of a t least $1,000,000.00
, including for the vi o lation of plainti ff ’s right to pr ivacy and right to quiet enjoyment of his home
, and ( c ) A dditio nal damages , past and future, for l oss of use and enjoyment of his proper ty u ntil elimination of the nu isance descri bed above
, and ( d ) P leading further, and alternatively, if necessary, Defendant is guil ty o f miscond uct which was committed in reckless and callous disregard of the legitimate rights of the Plain tiff so far as to just ify the imposition of exe mplary damages . Plaint iff seeks recovery of such exemplary damages from Defe ndant.

Westlake made an offer to settle Nalle ’ s lawsuit pursuant to Rule 167.2 of
the T exas Rules of C ivi l Proced ure and Chapter 42 of th e T exas Civil Practi ces and
Remedies Code

. See Tex. C iv. Prac. & Rem. Code § 42.001 et seq; Tex. R. App.
P. 167.2. Among other provi sions, the settlement offer provi ded that Wes tlake was offering “ to settle all claims that have been as ser ted or t hat could have been
asserted by Plai ntiff ag ainst any Defendan t who have been named as pa rties to th is cause of action in any way related to , based upon, or arising out of any of the fact s, events, occurrences , circumstan ces, acts, omissions, tr ans acti ons, or relatio nships
described in Plain ti ff ’ s Second Amend ed Peti tion. ” The settlement offer further provided that Westlake would pay Nalle $300,000 in full and final s ettlement of all
cl aims “ in cluding all monetar y damages, statut ory or exe mpla ry damages,

atto r n ey ’ s fees, court costs, a nd interest that could be recove rabl e against any Defendant who have been named as parties to this lawsuit as of th e date of this
offer. ” Finally, the settlement offer prov ided that it was “ subjec t t o th e execution
of a written settlement agreement , and th e d ismissal with prejudice of a ll claims against Defendant Westlake and it s cur rent and former officer s , board membe rs,
ag e n ts, attorneys, representatives, he irs , and assig n s. ”4

Nalle timel y a ccep ted Westlake ’ s offer

. Efforts to draft the req uired written
settlement agreement stalled over whether the individual B oard mem bers, officers, agents , and o the r represent at ives of We stlak e should be inclu ded

. Nalle filed a
motio n t o en force the settlement and the trial court held a n on

- eviden tiary hearing
and eventually issued its decision in a le tter. T he part ies then ex ecuted a written
settle ment agreement based on t he trial court ’ s let t er. The executed Settlement Agreement r ecited that:

WHE REAS .

. . Defendant Westlake offered to settle all claims that have been asserted or that could be asserted by Plaintiff against any Defe ndant who have been named as parties to this caus e of acti on i n any way relate d to, based upon, or ar ising o ut of any of the facts, events, occurrences, circumstances, acts, omissions, transactions or relationships des cribed in Plaintiff’s Second Amended O riginal Petitio n. WHEREAS , Defendant offered to p ay [$3 00,00 0 .00] to Plain tiff Nalle in full and fina l settl ement of all claims described in the paragraph above, incl uding all monetary damages, statutory or exemplary d amages, attorney ’s fees, court costs, and interest th at could be recoverable against an y Defendant who have been named as parties to this la wsuit a s of the date of this offer.
WHER EAS De fendant made its Offer of Settlement, and P laintiff

a ccepted the Defen dant’s O ffer of Settlement
, sub ject to the execution

o f a written settlement agreement, and th e di s m issal with prejudice of all claims again st Defe ndant Westlake and its current and former officers, board members, agents, attorneys, represe ntatives, heirs and

ass ig ns. The Se ttlement Agreement furt her provided:

In consideration of the to tal s u m of [ $300,000.00 ] (“the Settlement Amou nt ” ) fro m Defendant, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby ack nowledged by Plaintiff, and in consideration of the mutua l agreements, conditions, re presentations, warranties, recitals
, covenants and sta teme nt s of intention contained herein , Plaintif f, Alan W. Nalle, Sr. hereby accepts the above

- referenced payment in f ull settlement, comprom ise and release of all c laims as [ sic] arising out of5

or in co nnection with t he Lawsuit, pursuant to this Set tlement Agr ee m ent, against Defendant Westlake Oaks Property O wners Association, Inc.

The trial court then signed an Agr eed Order Dismissing wi th Prejudice, which provided that:

All claims against De fendant Westlak e Oaks Property Owners Associati on, Inc . an d i ts current and former officers, board members, agents, attorneys , representatives, heirs, and assigns are DISMISSED, With Prejudice. (emphasis in original).
Nearly eighteen mon ths after the agreed dis missal order
, Nalle filed th is
l awsuit agai ns t Hale

. Nalle alleged claims of f raud a n d b reach of contract a gainst
Hale in her ind ividual capacity

. Nalle alleg ed that Hale “could not have signed the variance acting within her autho rity, if any.” Nalle sought re covery of t he following damages :
39. As a direct a nd proxima t e result of the D efendants ’ [sic] fraud Defendant caused injury to [Nalle]

. [Nalle] is therefore entitled to recover for any dimi nishment of his pr operty ’s fair m a rket value , and for the loss of intrin sic va l ue of [Nalle ’s] damaged property, physical dam a ge to the [Nalle ’s] property, along w ith lo ss of use and enjoyment of his property, personal injuries, past and future, harm to [Nalle ’s] health, an d harm to [Nall e ’s] peace of m in d in the use an d enjoy ment o f his property. 40. [Nalle] has sustained damag e s in exces s of this Court ’s jurisdictional minimum, as a result of the actions and /or omissions of Defendant described hereinabove, including but not limited to : 41

. Actual or econ omic damages fo r at least $1,000,000.00, and
42 Special or consequenti al damages to be determined by a jury; and 43. Additional damages for l oss of use and enjoyment of his property; and6

44. P leading further, and altern atively, if nec essa ry, Defendant is guil ty o f misc ond u ct whi c h was committed in reckless and callous disreg a rd of the legitimate rights of [Nalle] so far as to justify the imposition of exe mplary damages

. [Nalle] seeks recovery of such exemplary damages f

rom Defe ndant.

Ha le filed an a nswer and assert e d a counterclaim against Nalle. Hale moved
fo r summary judgment arguing that N alle ’ s claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata, the one satisfaction rule, and the election of remedies. Ha le also
in cluded a reques t for sanc tion s in h e r motion. The trial court granted H ale ’ s motion for summary judgment on Nalle ’ s c laims against her without specifying the grounds

. Hale then non

- s uited her c o unterclaim

. The t rial court deni ed Hale ’ s request for sanc tions in a se parat e ord er

. The trial court subsequent l y signed an order of nonsuit making the summary judgment final

. This appeal followed.

A NALYSIS 1
Nalle challenges the trial court ’ s summa ry judgment in a sin gle is sue with

mu ltiple su b

- p a rts

. Beca u se we conclude Nalle ’ s claim s against Hale are barred by application of the one satisfaction rule affirma tive defense , we need not address the
remainder of Nalle ’ s arguments rai sed in this appeal

. See Carr v. Bras her
, 776
S. W

. 2 d 567, 569 (Tex. 198 9 ) ( “ Wh e n a trial court ’ s or der gran t i ng summary judgment does not specif y the ground or gr ounds relied on for its ruli ng, summary judgment will be aff

irmed on appeal if any of the theorie s advanced are
meritori ous. ” ).

1 The Texas Supreme Court or dered the Third Court of Appeals to transfer this case to our court. Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Proc edure , “the cour t of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the pr ecedent of the transferor court under pr inciples of stare decisis if the transferee court ’ s decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the prec edent of th e transferor court.” Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.7

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo th e trial court ’ s rulin g on a m o t ion for summary judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In a traditional motion for summary judgment, th e movant

must e stablish that no gen uine issue of mate rial fa c t exists
, and the mo vant is

e n titled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and
indu lge every r easo nable inference and resolve any do ubts in the nonmovant ’ s favor. Val ence O

p erating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Provident Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). A genuine issue of material fac t exists if t he nonmovant prod uces more than a

sc inti lla of p robative evidence re gar ding t h e challenged element. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment on an aff irmative defense must conclusiv ely
establish each element of that aff irmat iv e defense. Sci. Spec trum, Inc

. v. Martinez , 941 S.W .2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997).

II. The one sati sfaction rule bar ’ s Nalle ’ s lawsuit against Hale.

“ The one satisfaction rule applies to prevent a plai ntiff from obta ining more
than one recovery for t he s ame inj u ry. ” Ste war t Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling
, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991) ; see also Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel
, 22 S.W .3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000)

. Under this rule, a plaintiff is entitl ed to one recovery for damages suff

ered when multiple defendants commit the same act as well as when multip le defendants commit technically different acts resulting in a singl e injury.
C a steel
, 22 S.W.3d at 390 ; see El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Berryman
, 858 S.W.2d 362, 36 4 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) ( “ The one satisfaction rule provides that a party

w hich suffers but one injury can re cover only o ne satisfaction for damages a r ising8

from that injur y. ” )

. Because the rule focuses on whether the plain tiff has suffered a single
, indivisible injury and not the alleged causes of action, the rule can apply

to both tort and contract c laims. Sk y View at L a s Palmas, LLC v. Men dez , 555
S .W.3d 1 01, 113

– 15 (Tex. 2018). A trial c ourt can grant summary ju dgment based

on application of the one satisfaction ru le. Se e El Pa so Natural Gas Co.
, 858
S.W.2d at 363 ( “ Beca u se we find Berryman ’ s claims b arred by the one satisfaction
rule and co llateral estoppel, w e reverse the judgment of the court o f appeals and
affirm the [summary ] judg ment of the trial cour t. ” )

. As detailed abo ve, Nalle filed two l awsuits where in he so ugh t to recover the

same damages a llegedly caused his neig h b or was granted a v ariance from two
different d efendants : Westlake and Hale

. Nal l e ’ s alleged damages all related to the allegedly negative impac t the variance had on Na lle ’ s pro p erty and h i s use and quiet enjoyment of th at propert y. Nalle ac cepted $300,000 in full and f inal
settlement of his claims against Westlake “ in any way related to, based upon, or arising out of any of the facts , events, occurrences, circum stances , acts, o m issions,

t r a nsactions , or relationships th at he desc ri bed in his Secon d Amended Petition

. ”
I n addition
, Nalle expressly se ttle d his claims for “ all monetary da mages, statutory or exemplary damages, attorney ’s fees , court costs, and interes t. ” (e m ph asis add e d )
Hale moved for summary judgme nt on Nalle ’ s claims against her. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 166a (b)

. Hale attached the Westlake Settlement Agreement as evidence

to her motion for summar y jud gment

. It is undi sputed that the settlement amou n t

w as paid t o Nalle. We hold that , as a result of t he ful l and final settlement of
Nalle ’ s claims again st Westlake
, Hale proved as matter of law that Nalle is barred by t he one sati sfaction rule from recovering the same dam ages against her

. See
Brewer & Pritchard, P .C. v. AM KO Resources, Intern., LLC , No. 14

- 13

- 00113

- CV, 2014 WL 3512836
, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 2 014, n o9

pet.) (holding that because judgment creditor suffered only one injury, the one

sa tisfaction rule barred judgment creditor ’ s c laims aga inst second defendant
beca use j udgmen t creditor accepted settlement pa yment from first defendant in

“ full satisfaction of the judgment ” ).

In an effort to avoid this result, Nalle
, citing Cohen v. Arthur Andersen,
L.L.P. , 106 S.W

. 3d 30 4 , 310 (Tex

. App.

— Hous ton [1st Dis t.] 2003, no pet.),

argue s the one sat is faction rule is inapplicable becau se it does not apply to claims for pun itive or exemplary damages. W hile it i s true that the o ne satisfaction rule is
often inapplicable to punitive damage awa r d s , h e re , N alle chose to fully settle hi s claim s for both com pensatory damage s and exemplary da mages arising out of
West l ake granting his neighbor a var iance when h e ex ecuted the Westlake Settlement Agreement

. See Shields Ltd. P ’ ship v. Bradberry , 526 S. W.3d 471, 482 (Tex. 2017) ( “ Freedom of c ontract is a policy of individual self

- determination;
in dividuals can control the ir destiny and structure th eir b usiness int e ractions through agreements with other competent adults of equal bargaining power, absent

v iolation o f law or public policy. ” ); In re Prude ntial Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tex. 2004) ( “ As a rule, parti es have the right to contra ct as they see f i t as long as their a greement does not violate the law or public policy. ” )

. There is no di spute that Nalle received the full settl ement am ount. It is th ese
two fact s , settlement o f all claims and full payment, t hat take this case out of the

g eneral rule

. See El Paso Natural Gas Co.
, 858 S.W.2d a t 364 ( hol d ing th at because the full sett lement a mount had been paid to the p laintiff by one defendant
, the one satisfactio n rule extingui shed plain t i ff ’ s claims aga i n st second defendant ).
As a result of this contractual agreement
, the one s atisfaction rule ba rs Na lle ’ s claims against Hale

. See Mobil O il Corp. v. Ellender , 968 S.W.2d 917, 928 (Tex

. 1998) ( recogn izi ng th at one sati s f action rule can appl y to settlement agreement s10

resolving claims for ac tual and punitive da mage s ). H aving determined that Hale

pr o ved a s a m atter of law that the one sati s fac tion rule bars Nalle ’ s claims against
her , we need not address t he re mainder of t h e arguments Nalle raised in his sin gle issue on appeal

. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We o ve rrule Nall e ’ s issue on appe al

. C ONCLUS I O N

Ha ving overruled Nalle ’ s single issue on appeal, we a f firm the tria l court ’ s ju dgment.

/s/ Jerry Zimmerer Justi ce

Panel con sists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, a nd Hassan.