Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. PST 

Monday, October 31, 2005 ATF

Thefts of Explosives from 

State and Local Government 

Storage Facilities Are Few 

but May Be Underreported 

Statement of Laurie E. Ekstrand 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-06-182T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-182T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand 

at (202) 512-8777 or ekstrandl@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-182T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

October 2005

ATF

Thefts of Explosives from State and Local 

Government Storage Facilities Are Few 

but May Be Underreported 

Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives 

from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to 

February 2005, ATF received 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives from 

state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives thefts 

reported from all sources nationwide during this same period. During the 

course of the audit, GAO found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local 

government facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF’s national database 

of thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring 

at state and local facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data. 

ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect state and local government 

explosives storage facilities. State and local agencies are not required to 

obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and only licensees—

such as private sector explosives storage facilities—are subject to 

mandatory oversight. Thus, ATF has no means to ensure that state and local 

facilities comply with federal regulations. Further, ATF does not collect 

nationwide information on the number and location of state and local 

storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of 

explosives being stored in these facilities. Because this data collection is a 

function of the licensing process and state and local facilities are not 

required to be licensed, no systematic information about these facilities is 

collected. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a 

variety of information about their facilities—including location and security 

measures in place—to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects 

information about these facilities during mandatory inspections. 

At the 18 state and local government storage facilities GAO visited, a variety 

of security measures were in place, including locked gates, fencing, patrols, 

and in some cases electronic surveillance. All the facilities’ officials told 

GAO that they conducted routine inventories. But most of the state and local 

government entities GAO visited were not required to be licensed or 

inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. GAO identified several 

instances of possible noncompliance with federal regulations, but these 

were related primarily to storage safety issues rather than security. 

Explosives Storage Facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas 

Source: GAO.

More than 5.5 billion pounds of 

explosives are used each year in 

the United States by private sector 

companies and government 

entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) has authority to regulate 

explosives and to license privately 

owned explosives storage facilities. 

After the July 2004 theft of several 

hundred pounds of explosives from 

a local government storage facility, 

concerns arose about vulnerability 

to theft. 

This testimony provides 

information about (1) the extent of 

explosives thefts from state and 

local government facilities, (2) 

ATF’s authority to regulate and 

oversee state and local government 

storage facilities, and (3) security 

measures in place at selected state 

and local government storage 

facilities. This information is based 

on a report GAO is releasing today 

on these issues. 

What GAO Recommends

In the report released today, GAO 

is recommending that the Attorney 

General direct the ATF Director to 

clarify explosives incident 

reporting regulations to help 

ensure that all entities storing 

explosives, including state and 

local government agencies, 

understand their obligation to 

report all thefts or missing 

explosives. The Department of 

Justice agreed with GAO’s 

recommendation and indicated it 

would take steps to implement it. 
Page 1 GAO-06-182T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss security and safety at state and 

local government explosives storage facilities. More than 5.5 billion 

pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States. These 

explosives are used by both public sector entities (such as state and local 

government agencies) and private sector companies for a variety of 

purposes—including mining, construction, avalanche control, and law 

enforcement. Under current federal explosives laws and regulations, the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is 

responsible for licensing and regulating explosives manufacturers, 

importers, dealers, and users. It is primarily through this licensing 

authority that ATF oversees and inspects privately owned explosives 

facilities to ensure they comply with federal explosives storage laws and 

regulations. However, state and local government agencies are exempt 

from ATF licensing requirements. 

In August 2004, the subcommittee held a hearing here in California to 

investigate the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives 

from a storage facility being used by local law enforcement agencies. At 

that hearing, the subcommittee heard testimony from federal, state, and 

local officials regarding the safety and security of publicly managed 

explosives storage facilities and the adequacy of federal authority to 

regulate and oversee these facilities. Out of concern that state and local 

government explosives storage facilities could be vulnerable to theft, you 

asked us to study the security and oversight at these facilities. 

My testimony this morning is based on a GAO report1

 being released today 

in conjunction with this hearing, and will focus on the following issues: 

1. the extent to which state and local government explosives storage 

facilities have been vulnerable to theft, 

2. the extent to which ATF regulates and oversees state and local 

government explosives storage facilities, and 

3. the types of security measures in place at selected state and local 

government explosives storage facilities. 

 1

GAO, ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are 

Few but May Be Underreported, GAO-06-92 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 3, 2005). 
Page 2 GAO-06-182T 

We conducted our work on this report from February 2005 to August 2005 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts reported at 

state and local government explosives storage facilities. However, these 

reported thefts could be understated by an unknown amount. During the 

3-year period from January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received 9 reports 

of thefts or missing explosives from state and local law enforcement 

storage facilities, compared with 205 thefts from all sources nationwide. 

Similarly, during a 10-month period (ending December 2003), there were 

76 theft incidents reported nationwide resulting in a loss of about 6,700 

pounds of high explosives and blasting agents. By comparison, over an 

entire 10-year period (ending December 2004), ATF received 14 reports of 

theft from state and local law enforcement storage magazines, resulting in 

reported losses of about 1,000 pounds of explosive materials. The actual 

number of state and local thefts could be higher than indicated by ATF 

data. While ATF interprets its theft reporting requirement to mean that 

state and local entities, among others, must report explosives thefts, ATF 

officials acknowledged that state and local government entities may be 

unclear as to whether they are covered under this requirement. Indeed, 

during our site visits and other state and local contacts, we found evidence 

of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not 

appear in ATF’s national database on thefts and missing explosives. 

Although state and local government explosives storage facilities must 

comply with federal storage regulations, ATF does not have oversight 

authority at these facilities. ATF oversight—including the ability to 

conduct regulatory inspections—is linked to licensing, and state and local 

government entities are not required under federal explosives law to 

obtain such a license. ATF does not have specific statutory authority to 

conduct regulatory inspections at these storage facilities. Through its 

licensing and inspection authority, ATF is able to collect nationwide 

information on the number and locations of private sector storage 

facilities and the types and amounts of explosives being stored. Because 

ATF does not license and inspect state and local government facilities, no 

similar information is collected about them. On the basis of our audit 

work, we identified three types of government entities that used and 

stored explosives: (1) law enforcement bomb squads, (2) public 

universities, and (3) state and local departments of transportation. We 

were unable to gather sufficient information about these entities to 

reliably estimate the total number of state and local government storage 

facilities and magazines nationwide. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-06-182T 

During our audit, we visited 14 state and local government entities—13 

bomb squads and 1 public university—and observed the security measures 

in place at their 18 explosives storage facilities. Regarding physical 

security, most facilities had a locked gate to prevent vehicle access and 

several had fencing surrounding their storage facilities. Several storage 

facilities also had electronic security systems in place—such as video 

surveillance. These types of security measures—fences, vehicle barriers, 

and electronic monitoring devices—all exceed the requirements of federal 

explosives regulations. Officials at all the entities we visited told us they 

visually inspected or patrolled the facilities on a regular basis and 

conducted routine inventories. Most facilities were not required to be 

licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. Of the 5 

explosives thefts we identified during our site visits and other contacts, 2 

had occurred at state and local storage facilities we visited, but only 1 of 

these incidents appeared in ATF’s nationwide theft database. 

In our report released today, we recommend that the Attorney General 

direct the ATF Director to clarify federal explosives regulations to ensure 

that state and local government agencies understand their obligation to 

report thefts or missing explosives. The Department of Justice agreed with 

our recommendation and indicated it would take steps to implement it. 

ATF is the chief enforcer of explosives laws and regulations in the United 

States and is responsible for licensing and regulating explosives 

manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users.2

 ATF is also responsible for 

regulating most, but not all, explosives storage facilities. Under federal 

explosives regulations, a license is required for persons who manufacture, 

import, or deal in explosives and, with some exceptions, for persons who 

intend to acquire explosives for use. No license is required solely to 

operate an explosives storage facility. State and local government agencies 

are not required to obtain an explosives license to use and store 

explosives. However, all persons who store explosive materials (including 

state and local entities) must conform with applicable ATF storage 

regulations, irrespective of whether they are required to obtain an 

explosives license for other purposes. According to ATF data, as of 

February 2005 there were 12,028 federal explosives licensees in the United 

 2

Licenses are issued to persons who manufacture, import, or sell explosives, while permits 

are issued to persons who intend to acquire and use explosives. Throughout the remainder 

of this statement, references to explosives licenses, licensees, or ATF’s licensing authority 

refer to both explosives licenses and permits. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-06-182T 

States.3 Roughly 7,500 of these had some kind of explosives storage 

facility, consisting of 22,791 permanent or mobile storage magazines. 

ATF storage regulations include requirements relating to the safety and 

security of explosives storage magazines—that is, any building or 

structure (other than an explosives manufacturing building) used for 

storage of explosive materials. Regarding safety, the storage regulations 

include requirements related to location, construction, capacity, 

housekeeping, interior lighting, and magazine repairs, as well as a 

requirement that the local fire safety authority be notified of the location 

of each storage magazine. Regarding security, the ATF storage regulations 

include the following requirements: 

• Explosives handling. All explosive materials must be kept in locked 

magazines unless they are in the process of manufacture, being physically 

handled in the operating process of a licensee or user, being used, or being 

transported to a place of storage or use. Explosives are not to be left 

unattended when in portable storage magazines. 

• Magazine construction. Storage magazines must be theft-resistant and 

must meet specific requirements dealing with such things as mobility, 

exterior construction, door hinges and hasps, and locks. 

• Magazine inspection. Storage magazines must be inspected at least every 

7 days. This inspection need not be an inventory, but it must be sufficient 

to determine if there has been an unauthorized entry or attempted entry 

into the magazines, or unauthorized removal of the magazine contents. 

• Magazine inventory. Within the magazine, containers of explosive 

materials are to be stored so that marks are visible. Stocks of explosive 

materials are to be stored so they can be easily counted and checked. 

Notwithstanding the security requirements described above, ATF storage 

regulations do not require explosives storage facilities to have any of the 

following physical security features—fences, restricted property access, 

exterior lighting, alarm systems, or electronic surveillance. Also, while 

ATF licensing regulations require explosives licensees to conduct a 

physical inventory at least annually, there is no similar inventory 

requirement in the storage regulations applicable to other persons who 

store explosives. 

 3

Including the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
Page 5 GAO-06-182T 

According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local government 

thefts is relatively small when compared with the total number of thefts 

that have occurred nationwide. During a recent 3-year period (January 

2002—February 2005), ATF received reports of 205 explosives thefts from 

all sources nationwide. By comparison, during this same period, only 9 

thefts were reported that involved state and local government storage 

facilities—5 involving state and local law enforcement agencies,4

 3 

involving state government entities (all universities), and 1 involving a 

county highway department. The amounts of explosives reported stolen or 

missing from state and local government facilities are relatively small 

when compared with the total amounts of stolen and missing explosives 

nationwide. During a recent 10-month period for which data were 

available (March 2003 through December 2003), there were a total of 76 

theft incidents nationwide reported to ATF, amounting to a loss of about 

3,600 pounds of high explosives, 3,100 pounds of blasting agents, 1,400 

detonators, and 2,400 feet of detonating cord and safety fuse. By 

comparison, over an entire 10-year period (January 1995 through 

December 2004), ATF received only 14 reports of theft from state and local 

law enforcement storage magazines. Reported losses in these cases were 

about 1,000 pounds of explosive materials, and in 10 of the incidents less 

than 50 pounds of explosives was reported stolen or missing. 

While the ATF theft data indicate that thefts from state and local facilities 

make up only a small part of the overall thefts nationwide, these reports 

could be understated by an unknown amount. There are two federal 

reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives. One is specific 

to all federal explosives licensees (and permittees) and requires any theft 

or loss of explosives to be reported to ATF within 24 hours of discovery. 

The second reporting requirement generally requires any other “person” 

who has knowledge of the theft or loss of any explosive materials from his 

stock to report to ATF within 24 hours. Although the term “person” as 

defined in law and regulation does not specifically include state and local 

government agencies,5

 ATF has historically interpreted this requirement as 

applying to nonlicensed state and local government explosives storage 

facilities. However, ATF officials acknowledged that some state and local 

 4

One of these was later determined to be the possible result of training explosives that had 

been mistakenly discarded. 

5

The term “person” is defined in statute and regulation as “any individual, corporation, 

company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company” (see 18 U.S.C. § 

841(a); and 27 C.F.R. § 555.11). 

Thefts Reported at State 

and Local Explosives 

Storage Facilities Are Few 

but May Be Underreported 
Page 6 GAO-06-182T 

government entities could be unsure as to their coverage under the theft 

reporting requirements and, as a result, may not know they are required to 

report such incidents to ATF. Indeed, during our site visits and other state 

and local contacts, we identified five state and local government entities 

that had previously experienced a theft or reported missing explosives—

two involving local law enforcement agencies, two involving state 

universities, and one involving a state department of transportation.6

However, one of these five incidents did not appear in ATF’s nationwide 

database of reported thefts and missing explosives. Based on these 

findings, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local 

government storage facilities nationwide could be more than the number 

identified by ATF data. 

There is no ATF oversight mechanism in place to ensure that state and 

local government facilities comply with federal explosives regulations. 

With respect to private sector entities, ATF’s authority to oversee and 

inspect explosives storage facilities is primarily a function of its licensing 

process. However, state and local government entities are not required to 

obtain a federal license to use and store explosives. In addition, ATF has 

no specific statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state 

and local government storage facilities. Under certain circumstances, ATF 

may inspect these facilities—for example, voluntary inspections when 

requested by a state and local entity, and mandatory annual inspections at 

locations where ATF shares space inside a state and local storage 

magazine. Regarding those state and local government facilities that ATF 

does not inspect, ATF officials acknowledged they had no way of knowing 

the extent to which these facilities are complying with federal explosives 

regulations. 

ATF officials stated that if the agency were to be required to conduct 

mandatory inspections at all state and local government storage facilities, 

they would likely need additional resources to conduct these inspections 

because they are already challenged to keep up with inspections that are 

mandated as part of the explosive licensing requirements. Under 

provisions of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF is generally required to 

physically inspect a license applicant’s storage facility prior to issuing a 

federal explosives license—which effectively means at least one 

inspection every 3 years. At the same time, however, ATF inspectors are 

 6

Two of these five incidents occurred at locations we visited; three occurred at other 

locations we identified during the course of our audit work. 

ATF Lacks Authority to 

Regulate and Oversee 

State and Local Explosives 

Storage Facilities 

Nationwide 
Page 7 GAO-06-182T 

also responsible for conducting inspections of federal firearms licensees. 

The Department of Justice Inspector General reported that ATF has had to 

divert resources from firearms inspections to conduct explosives storage 

facility inspections required under the Safe Explosives Act. Despite recent 

funding increases for ATF’s explosives program, giving ATF additional 

responsibility to oversee and inspect state and local government storage 

facilities could further tax the agency’s inspection resources. According to 

ATF officials, because inspection of explosives licensees is legislatively 

mandated, the effect of additional state and local government explosives 

responsibilities (without related increases in inspector resources) could 

be to reduce the number of firearms inspections that ATF would be able to 

conduct. 

ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location 

of state and local government explosives storage facilities, nor does the 

agency know the types and amounts of explosives being stored in these 

facilities. Since data collection is a function of the licensing process and 

state and local facilities are not required to be licensed, no systematic 

information about these facilities is collected. With respect to private 

sector licensees, ATF collects descriptive information concerning 

explosive storage facilities as part of the licensing process. ATF license 

application forms require applicants to submit information about their 

storage capabilities, including specific information about the type of 

storage magazine, the location of the magazine, the type of security in 

place, the capacity of the magazine, and the class of explosives that will be 

stored. ATF also collects information about licensed private sector storage 

facilities during mandatory inspections, through examination of explosives 

inventory and sales records and verification that storage facilities meet the 

standards of public safety and security as prescribed in the regulations. 

During the course of our audit work, we compiled some data on state and 

local government entities that used and stored explosives. At the 13 state 

and local law enforcement bomb squads we visited, there were 16 storage 

facilities and 30 storage magazines. According to Federal Bureau of 

Investigation data, there are 452 state and local law enforcement bomb 

squads nationwide. However, because of the limited nature of our 

fieldwork, we cannot estimate the total number of storage facilities or 

magazines that might exist at other bomb squad locations. Moreover, other 

state and local government entities (such as public universities and state 

and local departments of transportation) in addition to law enforcement 

bomb squads also have explosives storage facilities. At the one public 

university we visited, there were 2 storage facilities and 4 storage 

magazines. Again, however, because of the limited nature of our fieldwork, 
Page 8 GAO-06-182T 

we cannot estimate the total number of storage facilities and magazines 

that exist at these other state and local government entities nationwide. 

We found that security measures varied at the 14 state and local 

government entities we visited. Overall, we visited, 2 state bomb squads, 

11 city or county bomb squads (including police departments and sheriffs’ 

offices), and 1 public university. Four of the 14 state and local entities had 

2 separate storage areas, resulting in a total of 18 explosives storage 

facilities among the 14 entities. Three of these storage facilities were 

located on state property, 7 were located at city or county police training 

facilities, 7 were located on other city or county property, and 1 was 

located at a metropolitan airport. Eleven of the 18 explosives storage 

facilities we visited contained multiple magazines for the storage of 

explosives. As a result, these 18 facilities comprised a total of 34 storage 

magazines. All of the 18 facilities contained a variety of high explosives, 

including C-4 plastic explosive, detonator cord, TNT, binary (two-part) 

explosives, and detonators. Estimates of the amount of explosives being 

stored ranged from 10 to 1,000 pounds, with the majority of the entities (9) 

indicating they stored 200 pounds or less. 

At each of the 14 state and local storage entities we visited, we observed 

the types of security measures in place at their explosives storage 

facilities. Our criteria for identifying the type of security measures in place 

included existing federal explosives storage laws and regulations (27 

C.F.R., Part 555, Subpart K) and security guidelines issued by the 

explosives industry (the Institute of Makers of Explosives). Most of these 

security measures (fencing, vehicle barriers, and electronic surveillance, 

for example) are not currently required under federal storage regulations. 

However, we are presenting this information in order to demonstrate the 

wide range of security measures actually in place at the time of our visits. 

• Physical security. Thirteen of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle 

access to the facility grounds by way of a locked exterior security gate or 

(in one case) by virtue of being located indoors. Five of the 13 facilities 

restricted vehicle access after normal working hours (nights or nights and 

weekends). Officials at 7 other facilities said that vehicle access to the 

facilities was restricted at all times, including the 1 indoor facility that was 

located in the basement of a municipal building. Six of the 18 storage 

facilities had an interior barrier—consisting of a chain-link fence with a 

locked gate—immediately surrounding their storage magazines to prevent 

direct access by persons on foot. One other facility (the indoor basement 

facility), relied on multiple locked doors to prevent access by 

unauthorized personnel. Conversely, at 1 facility we visited, the storage 

Security Measures Varied 

at State and Local 

Explosives Storage 

Facilities We Visited 
Page 9 GAO-06-182T 

magazine could be reached on foot or by vehicle at any time because it did 

not have fencing or vehicle barriers to deter unauthorized access. In 

addition to restricted access to storage facilities, officials at all of the 18 

storage facilities we visited told us that official personnel—either bomb 

squad or other police officers—patrolled or inspected the storage facility 

on a regular basis. And, at 9 of the 18 storage facilities we visited, officials 

said that state or local government employees—police training personnel, 

jail or correctional personnel, or other city/county employees—maintained 

a 24-hour presence at the facilities. 

• Electronic security. Four of the 18 explosives storage facilities had either 

an alarm or video monitoring system in place. Two storage facilities with 

video surveillance took advantage of existing monitoring systems already 

in place at their storage locations—one located at a county correctional 

facility and one located inside a municipal/police building. Officials at 4 

storage facilities told us they had alarm systems planned (funding not yet 

approved), and officials at 3 facilities said they had alarm systems pending 

(funding approved and awaiting installation). Officials at 2 facilities also 

told us they planned to install video monitoring. Regarding the feasibility 

of installing electronic monitoring systems, 4 officials noted that storage 

facilities are often located in remote areas without easy access to 

electricity. Regarding the possibility of new federal regulations that would 

require electronic security at storage magazines, 9 officials told us they 

would not object as long as it did not create an undue financial burden. 

• Inventory and oversight issues. Officials at all 14 of the entities we visited 

told us they performed periodic inventories of the contents of their 

explosives storage magazines in order to reconcile the contents with 

inventory records. In addition, 9 entities said they had received 

inspections of their storage facilities, primarily by ATF. Six entities told us 

they received the inspections on a periodic basis, with another 3 entities 

having received a onetime inspection. Regarding oversight by multiple 

regulatory authorities, one entity had been inspected by both ATF and a 

local government authority, while another entity was inspected on a 

recurring basis by both ATF and a state government authority. Five of the 

14 entities we visited told us they were required to obtain a license from 

state regulatory authorities to operate their explosives storage facilities. 

One of these entities was also required (by the state regulatory authority) 

to obtain a federal explosives license issued by ATF. Officials at 13 entities 

we visited said they did not object to the possibility of federal licensing or 

inspection of their explosives storage facilities. Officials at 3 state and 

local entities noted that additional federal oversight was not a concern as 

long as they were not held to a higher standard of security and safety than 

ATF requires of private industry. 
Page 10 GAO-06-182T 

• Thefts and compliance issues. Two of the five thefts we documented 

during our site visits and other state and local contacts occurred at state 

and local entities we visited. At one storage facility, officials told us that 

criminals had once used a cutting torch to illegally gain entry to an 

explosives storage magazine. At another storage facility, officials said that 

an unauthorized individual had obtained keys to a storage magazine and 

taken some of the explosives. In both incidents, the perpetrators were 

apprehended and the explosives recovered. However, one of these 

incidents did not appear in ATF’s nationwide database of reported thefts 

and missing explosives. We also observed storage practices at four 

facilities that may not be in compliance with federal explosives 

regulations. However, these circumstances appeared to be related to 

storage safety issues, rather than storage security. In April 2005, the 

National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board—which represents 

more than 450 law enforcement bomb squads nationwide—initiated a 

program encouraging bomb squads to request a voluntary ATF inspection, 

maintain an accurate explosives inventory, and assess the adequacy of 

security at their explosive storage facilities to determine if additional 

measures might be required (such as video monitoring, fencing, and 

alarms). This is a voluntary program and it is too soon to tell what effect, if 

any, it will have towards enhancing security at state and local law 

enforcement storage facilities and reducing the potential for thefts. 

The overall number of state and local government explosives storage 

facilities, the types of explosives being stored, and the number of storage 

magazines associated with these facilities are currently not known by ATF. 

ATF has no authority to oversee state and local government storage 

facilities as part of the federal licensing process, nor does it have specific 

statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of these facilities. As 

a result, ATF’s ability to monitor the potential vulnerability of these 

facilities to theft or assess the extent to which these facilities are in 

compliance with federal explosives storage regulations is limited. 

According to ATF’s interpretation of federal explosives laws and 

regulations, state and local government agencies—including law 

enforcement bomb squads and public universities—are required to report 

incidents of theft or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an 

occurrence. Because this reporting requirement applies to any “person” 

who has knowledge of a theft from his stock and the definition of “person” 

does not specifically include state and local government agencies, ATF 

officials acknowledged that these entities may be unsure as to whether 

they are required to report under this requirement. If state and local 

Conclusions and 

Recommendations 
Page 11 GAO-06-182T 

government entities are unsure about whether they are required to report 

thefts and missing explosives, ATF’s ability to monitor these incidents and 

take appropriate investigative action may be compromised by a potential 

lack of information. Further, the size of the theft problem, and thus the 

risk, at state and local government storage facilities will remain unclear. 

To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or 

stolen explosives, the report we are releasing at this hearing recommends 

that the Attorney General direct the ATF Director to clarify the explosives 

incident reporting regulations to help ensure that all persons and entities 

who store explosives, including state and local government agencies, 

understand their obligation to report all thefts or missing explosives to 

ATF within 24 hours of an occurrence. The Department of Justice agreed 

with our recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may 

have. 

For information about this testimony, please contact Laurie E. Ekstrand, 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-8777, or 

EkstrandL@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

testimony. Other individuals making key contributions to this testimony 

include William Crocker, Assistant Director; Philip Caramia; and Michael 

Harmond. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440462) 
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Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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