IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 10, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER M. EPPS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2012-B-1179 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge

No. M2014-01955-CCA-R3-CD – Filed October 14, 2015

_____________________________

Following a jury trial, Christopher M. Epps (“the Defendant”) was convicted of first 

degree felony murder and sentenced to life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the 

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it 

denied his request for a special jury instruction on eyewitness identification. Discerning 

no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., joined.

Joshua L. Brand, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher M. Epps.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior 

Counsel; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Dina Shabayek and Rob 

McGuire, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In May 2012, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for first 

degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and employing a firearm during 

the commission of a dangerous felony, all in connection with the death of the victim, 

Dustyn Taapken. At the Defendant’s subsequent trial, Steven Simpson testified that he 
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had been the victim’s best friend before the victim’s murder in May 2011. Mr. Simpson 

explained that, at the time of his death, the victim lived on Barella Court in Antioch and 

regularly sold marijuana to support himself. Mr. Simpson recalled that, on the evening of 

May 21, 2011, he went to the victim’s residence to “hang out” and play video games. 

Although Mr. Simpson admitted using marijuana at times, he stated that he had not been 

smoking marijuana that night. Mr. Simpson recalled that, around 11:00 p.m., Joseph 

Snorten and two other men came to the victim’s residence. Mr. Simpson did not find it 

unusual for the victim to have visitors that late because the victim “was selling drugs, 

plus he had a lot of friends[.]” As they came into the victim’s residence, Mr. Snorten 

introduced the two men, later identified as the Defendant and Mr. Varquez Sails.

1

 Mr. 

Simpson sat on a sectional sofa, along with the victim and the Defendant. Mr. Snorten 

sat on a love seat with Mr. Sails. The group talked about drugs for a while, and the two 

men showed the victim and Mr. Simpson a large bag of marijuana they had in their 

possession. Mr. Simpson recalled that one of the men had a small, red and black 

backpack. 

As the group talked, Mr. Sails asked to use the restroom. Mr. Sails was in the 

restroom for only a short time and then returned to the living room, holding a gun. The

Defendant also pulled out a gun and began demanding money. The Defendant said, 

“[D]on’t do anything stupid, we’ll shoot,” and Mr. Sails told Mr. Simpson and the victim 

that “they weren’t playing.” As they brandished the weapons, the Defendant and Mr. 

Sails made the victim and Mr. Simpson get off the couch and lay face down on the floor. 

The Defendant and Mr. Sails took cash from the victim and Mr. Simpson and then asked 

if anyone else was in the home. When the victim indicated that someone was in the back 

bedroom, Mr. Sails went down the hallway to the bedroom and brought out the victim’s 

roommate, Nicholas Watson. The Defendant, who was still in the living room telling Mr. 

Simpson and the victim not to move, directed Mr. Sails to “bring him out.” Mr. Simpson 

testified that, as Mr. Sails led Mr. Watson into the hallway, Mr. Simpson heard gunshots. 

He looked toward the victim and saw that the victim had been shot. The Defendant was 

standing over the victim with a gun. Mr. Simpson stated that he was about two to three 

feet away from the Defendant and he looked at the Defendant’s face while the Defendant 

was looking at the victim. Mr. Sails ran into the living room and told the Defendant, 

“Hey, we got to go, we got to go.” After they left, Mr. Simpson immediately called 911 

and began performing CPR on the victim until help arrived. He recalled that Mr. Snorten 

sat on the love seat during the robbery but fled the scene with the Defendant and Mr. 

Sails after the shooting. Mr. Simpson testified that he never saw Mr. Snorten with a gun. 

 

1 Mr. Sails was indicted along with the Defendant for his role in the offense. 
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Mr. Simpson spoke to police officers at the scene and provided descriptions of the 

Defendant, Mr. Sails, and Mr. Snorten. Mr. Simpson testified that, once he knew the two 

men had guns, he became “more intent looking at the faces” because he thought he would 

be able to “know . . . their intentions.” Mr. Simpson described the Defendant as a black 

male in his early twenties, about six feet tall and heavyset. He estimated the Defendant 

weighed about 300 or 350 pounds and said that he had “[l]oose, curly hair.” Mr. 

Simpson told the police that Mr. Snorten’s name was “Joe” and that he went to school at 

Nashville Auto Diesel College (“NADC”). The following day, detectives showed Mr. 

Simpson a photo lineup from which he identified the Defendant as the shooter. He was 

also able to identify Mr. Snorten and Mr. Sails from additional photo lineups. Mr. 

Simpson identified the Defendant at trial as the individual that shot the victim. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Simpson acknowledged that he did not tell 

investigators that the Defendant had dreadlocks. Mr. Simpson explained, “[I]t wasn’t a 

real tight dreadlock. They were single strands, you know, like dreadlocks, but it wasn’t 

just real tight, pulled together, seemed like.” Mr. Simpson testified that he did not pick 

anyone out of the first photo lineup because none of the men in the lineup looked like the 

suspects. Mr. Simpson stated, “[I]t was important to me to make sure a hundred percent 

that if I did pick anyone that it was going to be the correct person.” He stated that he was 

“[p]ositive 100 percent” that the Defendant was the man that shot the victim. 

Joseph Snorten testified that, in May 2011, the victim was his friend and 

marijuana supplier. Mr. Snorten explained that he would purchase marijuana from the 

victim and then resell it. Because he had both a business and social relationship with the 

victim, Mr. Snorten had been to the victim’s home on multiple occasions before the night 

of the offense. Mr. Snorten acknowledged that he had been arrested in connection with 

the victim’s murder and had retained an attorney to represent him. He explained that, 

while he hoped to get a benefit from his testimony, he had no agreement with the State to 

that effect. 

Mr. Snorten stated that he met Mr. Sails, whose nickname was “Quez,” while he 

was locked up on another charge. Mr. Snorten knew the Defendant, whose nickname 

was “Goldie,” through the Defendant’s brother. On the evening of May 21, 2011, Mr. 

Sails contacted Mr. Snorten, seeking to purchase marijuana. Mr. Snorten did not have 

any marijuana, so he intended to obtain some from the victim. Mr. Snorten met Mr. Sails 

and the Defendant and drove the two men to the victim’s home. Mr. Snorten recalled that 

Mr. Sails suggested they rob the victim and the Defendant agreed to participate in the 

robbery. Although Mr. Snorten had a feeling “something wasn’t going to go right,” he 

went along with the idea. Mr. Snorten explained that he, the Defendant, and Mr. Sails 

were armed with guns when they went to the victim’s house. When they arrived, Mr. 

Snorten initially “tried to abort the mission,” but the Defendant said that he “didn’t come 
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out here for nothing.” Mr. Snorten testified that he was afraid the Defendant and Mr. 

Sails might rob him if he backed out of the robbery of the victim. 

According to Mr. Snorten, the men sat down in the living room once inside the 

victim’s residence, and the victim brought out some marijuana. About this time, the 

Defendant asked the victim if he could use the restroom. The Defendant came out of the 

restroom with a gun and said, “[D]on’t nobody move.” Mr. Sails also pulled out a gun, 

and the Defendant directed the victim and Mr. Simpson to get down into the floor. Mr. 

Sails then told Mr. Snorten to go to the back of the house to make sure no one else was 

there. While in the back bedroom, Mr. Snorten heard the Defendant say several times 

from the living room “don’t move,” and then he heard a gunshot. Mr. Snorten, Mr. Sails,

and the Defendant ran out of the house, and Mr. Snorten drove the men away from the 

scene. Inside the car, the Defendant said, “hey, man, my bad” and that he “didn’t mean

for it to go down like that.” 

Mr. Snorten testified that he contacted an attorney and turned himself in the 

following day after learning that the police were looking for him. On cross-examination, 

Mr. Snorten stated that he initially told the police he did not have a gun and denied 

knowing the robbery was going to take place. He also lied to investigators about 

knowing Mr. Sails’ identity because he and Mr. Sails were members of the Gangster 

Disciples and he did not want to be labeled a “snitch.” However, when shown a photo 

lineup containing Mr. Sails, Mr. Snorten identified him as one of the assailants. Mr. 

Snorten also identified the Defendant in a photo lineup and told the police that the 

Defendant was the shooter. Mr. Snorten stated that the Defendant had been a member of 

the Gangster Disciples at one time but had switched gangs to join the Crips. He denied 

ever hearing that the Defendant was a snitch. Mr. Snorten stated that the Defendant had 

dreadlocks in May 2011. 

Nicholas Watson testified that he was currently serving a fourteen-year sentence 

for attempted murder in connection with an unrelated offense. Mr. Watson stated that he 

was living with the victim on May 21, 2011, and was asleep in the back bedroom when 

he heard “loud talking.” Mr. Watson heard someone say, “Where’s the money at? You 

better tell me where the money is at or I’m gonna bust your [a**][.]” He then heard 

someone say, “[W]ho else is in the house, I’m gonna search the house.” Mr. Watson 

recalled that a “dark-skinned” man with dreadlocks came into his room and forced him 

out of the bed and into the floor at gunpoint. The assailant then called for Mr. Snorten 

who came into the bedroom and held Mr. Watson at gunpoint. When the man with 

dreadlocks left the room, Mr. Watson heard gunshots, and Mr. Snorten ran out of the 

room. When Mr. Watson went into the living room, he saw Mr. Simpson performing 

CPR on the victim. Mr. Watson confirmed that he never left the bedroom until the 

incident was over and he never saw the third suspect. He explained that, at the time of 
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the murder, he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and had been hiding out at the 

victim’s residence.

Detective Daniel Polk with the Metro Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) 

responded to the call from the victim’s residence on the night of May 21, 2011. 

Detective Polk testified that, when he arrived, there was a white male on the front porch 

directing him into the house. The victim, who appeared to have a gunshot wound to the 

chest, was lying on his back in the floor of the living room, and Mr. Simpson was

performing CPR. Mr. Simpson gave Detective Polk a very brief, general description of 

the suspects, stating there was a “big fat black guy and a tall skinny black guy.” 

Detective Polk recalled that there was an overwhelming smell of marijuana coming from 

the victim’s house. 

Sharon Tilley, a crime scene technician with MNPD, testified that she and another 

technician responded to the victim’s residence. They photographed and sketched the 

scene and collected two shell casings. Ms. Tilley stated that she did not collect any

weapons and did not know if a weapon was ever tested against the collected shell casings. 

She was not aware of any physical evidence from the scene that implicated the 

Defendant. 

Dr. Feng Li, the senior associate medical examiner for Davidson County, testified 

that he conducted the victim’s autopsy. Dr. Li stated that the victim had received a 

perforating gunshot wound to his back, causing injury the victim’s left lung, heart, and 

stomach. Dr. Li determined that the gunshot had been an “intermediate range” shot, 

meaning that the assailant had been shot the victim from two and a half to three feet 

away. 

Detective Corey Wall with MNPD testified that, when he responded to the crime 

scene about half an hour after the 911 call, he could smell the odor of marijuana inside 

the residence. However, when he later interviewed Mr. Simpson at the police 

department, Mr. Simpson denied smoking marijuana that night. Mr. Simpson described 

the shooter as a black male, 350 pounds, with “[l]oose, curly” hair. Mr. Simpson 

identified Mr. Snorten by his first name, “Joe,” and told Detective Wall that Mr. Snorten 

attended NADC. Based upon this information, Detective Wall placed Mr. Snorten in a

photo lineup the day after the murder, and Mr. Simpson positively identified him. 

Detective Wall interviewed Mr. Snorten after his arrest on May 25, 2011. Mr. 

Snorten informed Detective Wall that “Quez” and “Goldie” were involved in the robbery

and murder but claimed that he did not know their real names. Mr. Snorten later 

identified the Defendant in a photo lineup. Detective Wall explained that he instructed 
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both Mr. Snorten and Mr. Simpson to make an identification only if they were one 

hundred percent sure. 

Detective Wall recalled that the police received several anonymous tips on 

potential suspects through Crimestoppers in relation to the case. One tip led Detective 

Wall to a man named Victor Sherrell-Scruggs. Detective Wall obtained cell phone 

records for Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs and Mr. Snorten and found that Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs’

phone number appeared on Mr. Snorten’s cell phone records twice on the day of the 

murder. Detective Wall also received information from another source that someone 

with the nickname “Goldie” was involved in the murder. Once he determined that the 

Defendant’s nickname was Goldie, Detective Wall prepared a photo lineup for Mr. 

Watson and Mr. Simpson with the Defendant’s photograph. Mr. Watson could not make 

an identification, but Mr. Simpson identified the Defendant. Detective Wall explained 

that he did not initially charge the Defendant because he had only one identification and 

needed follow-up on the tip on Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs. Detective Wall interviewed Mr. 

Sherrell-Scruggs and placed him into a photo lineup. Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs was 

eliminated as a suspect after witnesses failed to identify him. Detective Wall testified 

that he received another tip at the end of June 2011, which provided the Defendant’s 

name. The Defendant turned himself in on July 7, 2011. 

Williams Skeeters testified that, in May 2011, he ran an after-hours bar on Lea 

Avenue. Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs occasionally worked for Mr. Skeeters as a bouncer. Mr.

Skeeters recalled that Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs worked on May 22, 2011, and would have 

been at the bar at the time it opened. Mr. Skeeters believed that the bar opened at 2:00 

a.m. on May 22, but he was “[n]ot a hundred percent” sure. In any event, Mr. SherrellScruggs did not appear nervous or exhibit unusual behavior while at work. After hearing 

about the victim’s murder, Mr. Skeeters called Crimestoppers and left information that 

Mr. Sherrell-Scruggs and another bouncer at the bar matched the description of one of the 

suspects. 

Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz testified for the Defendant as an expert in eyewitness 

identification. Dr. Neuschatz described several factors that could affect an individual’s 

ability to accurately remember a situation and identify a suspect. He first explained that 

high-stress situations impaired memory. Dr. Neuschatz cited studies that showed when 

individuals were afraid for their lives or safety, facial recognition identification was 

“significantly worse.” Dr. Neuschatz clarified that it was more difficult to make an 

accurate identification after a stressful situation but not impossible. Dr. Neuschatz next

discussed “weapon focus” and explained that eyewitnesses tended to look at a weapon 

rather than other aspects of an event when a weapon was present, which lessened 

identification accuracy. Dr. Neuschatz also stated that research showed people were 

worse at identifying someone of another race. He further explained that the use of 
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alcohol and marijuana impaired the encoding process of memory, making it more 

difficult to make an accurate identification. Given the facts of this case, Dr. Neuschatz 

opined that is was possible Mr. Simpson’s memory of the incident was mistaken. On 

cross-examination, Dr. Neuschatz agreed that, if an individual had the ability to observe a 

person for a period of several minutes prior to a weapon being brandished, it would 

improve the potential for accuracy in identification. 

The Defendant testified that, in the spring of 2011, he lived with his grandmother 

in East Nashville. He did not have a job, but his grandmother provided him with money. 

The Defendant acknowledged that he had joined the Gangster Disciples when he was 

fourteen years old and remained a member of the gang until 2008. He explained that 

both Mr. Sails and Mr. Snorten were also Gangster Disciples members. According to the 

Defendant, when he was about sixteen, he witnessed a murder and was subpoenaed to 

court to testify. Although the case ended up settling, the Defendant had been labeled a 

snitch, and he broke ties with the Gangster Disciples and associated himself with the 98 

Mafia Crips. The Defendant stated that he and Mr. Sails were together on a regular basis 

in May 2011 and they spent most of their time at Mr. Sails’ house. On the other hand, 

Mr. Snorten gave the Defendant the cold shoulder, refusing on one occasion to give the 

Defendant a ride to a store. The Defendant testified that in May 2011, he wore his hair in 

dreadlocks. He stated that his hair would not have been “fuzzy” at that time of the 

offense because his grandmother had given him money to have his hair done for his 

birthday earlier that month. 

The Defendant stated that, on the day of the victim’s murder, he did not go to Mr. 

Sails’ house. Instead, he was picked up at his grandmother’s house around 8:00 p.m. by 

Jamaal Saunders, the brother of the Defendant’s ex-girlfriend. The Defendant explained 

that Mr. Saunders had been a member of the 98 Crips but had been shot and killed 

sometime after the victim’s murder. According to the Defendant, Mr. Saunders took him 

to meet with Mr. Sails and Mr. Snorten so that Mr. Saunders could sell the two men some 

marijuana. The Defendant recalled that the inside of Mr. Saunders’ car smelled strongly 

of marijuana, and Mr. Saunders showed the Defendant a quarter-pound of marijuana 

inside a small red and black backpack. The Defendant stated that he and Mr. Saunders 

met with Mr. Sails and Mr. Snorten at Panorama Apartments in East Nashville. Mr. Sails 

and Mr. Snorten were together in a small blue car. While the Defendant spoke to Mr. 

Sails, Mr. Saunders and Mr. Snorten walked off together. When they returned, Mr. 

Snorten had the backpack with the marijuana. 

The Defendant denied that he planned to rob the victim with Mr. Sails and Mr. 

Snorten and testified that he did not see the two men for the remainder of the evening. 

The Defendant recalled that he and Mr. Saunders later stopped at the house of another 

member of the 98 Crips, Charles Transley, who was also no longer alive. The Defendant 
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and Mr. Saunders then went to another apartment complex and stayed with Mr. Saunders’

girlfriend for the rest of the night. The Defendant denied killing the victim and stated 

that he was not with Mr. Sails and Mr. Snorten at the time of the robbery and murder. 

At the close of proof, the Defendant requested a modification of the pattern jury 

instruction on identity, which incorporated the issues raised by Dr. Neuschatz’s 

testimony. The proposed instruction read as follows:

One of the issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the 

person who committed the crime. The State has the burden of [proving] 

identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Identification testimony is an 

expression of belief or impression by the witness. It is a statement of how 

well the witness remembers the other person, and its value may depend 

upon your consideration of several factors including:

(1) The witness’ capacity and opportunity to observe the other 

person. This includes, among other things, the length of time 

available for observation, the distance from which the witness 

observed, whether the two people are of the same race or 

different races, the lighting, whether a weapon was involved, 

the witness’ level of stress or fear, whether the person was a 

prior acquaintance of the witness, and whether the witness 

was able to clearly see the person’s face; 

(2) The occasions, if any, on which the witness made either a 

correct or incorrect identification of the defendant and the 

circumstances surrounding that identification, including any 

actions on the part of the person conducting the lineup that 

might be suggestive or improperly bias the witness; 

(3) The witness’ prior descriptions, or lack thereof, of the 

person, including those given immediately after the event as 

well as those given at later times; 

(4) Testimony regarding general principles of how memory 

works, if such is presented by either side.

Again, the State has the burden of proving every element of the crime 

charged, and this burden specifically includes the identity of the defendant 

as the person who committed the crime for which he is on trial. If after 

considering the identification testimony in light of all the proof you have a 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, 

you must find the defendant not guilty. 

The trial court denied the Defendant’s request, finding that the proposed jury 

instructions, if included, would amount to a comment on the evidence. Instead of 

providing the special instruction as requested, the trial court amended its instruction on 

the identification of the Defendant to allow the jury to consider “any other factors fairly 

raised by the evidence.” 

Following deliberations, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the lesser-included 

offense of second degree murder in count one, first degree felony murder in count two, 

and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous offense in count three. 

At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged count one into count two and sentenced 

the Defendant to life for first degree felony murder. The trial court dismissed count three 

“as a matter of law.”2 The Defendant subsequently filed a timely motion for new trial, 

which was denied by the trial court after a hearing. This timely appeal followed. 

II. Analysis

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for 

first degree felony murder because the identification testimony from Mr. Snorten and Mr. 

Simpson was unreliable. The Defendant argues that Mr. Snorten had a “substantial

motivation to lie, rendering his testimony completely untrustworthy and incredible.” He

also contends that Mr. Simpson’s initial description of the shooter did not correspond to 

the Defendant and that the trauma of the incident led to Mr. Simpson’s incorrect 

identification of the Defendant in a photo lineup. 

The applicable standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); 

see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). A guilty verdict “removes the presumption of innocence 

and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, and the Appellant has the burden of 

illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” State v. Bland, 

958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). 

Our standard of review “is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or 

 

2

Following the trial, the State requested that count three be dismissed as a matter of law based 

upon a faulty indictment. 
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circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting 

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In a jury trial, the weight and credibility given to the testimony of witnesses, as 

well as the reconciliation of conflicts in that testimony, are questions of fact best 

determined by the jury, since they saw and heard the witnesses, and by the trial judge, 

who concurred in and approved the verdict. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. This court will 

not reweigh the evidence. Id. On review, the “State must be afforded the strongest 

legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

The identity of the perpetrator is “an essential element of any crime.” State v. 

Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006). Identity may be established with circumstantial 

evidence alone, and the “jury decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, 

and [t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The question of identity is a question of fact left to the trier of fact to resolve. 

State v. Crawford, 635 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(a)(2) states that “[a] killing of 

another committed in the perpetration of . . . robbery” is first degree murder. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2010). The felony murder rule applies when the killing is “done 

in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.” State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 

208, 223 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The killing may precede, coincide with, or follow 

the felony and still be considered as occurring in the perpetration of the felony offense, so 

long as there is a connection in time, place, and continuity of action.” State v. Buggs, 

995 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). No culpable 

mental state is required for a felony murder conviction except the intent to commit the 

underlying felony—in this case, robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(b) (2010). 

Robbery is defined as the “intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of 

another by violence or putting the person in fear.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(a)

(2010). 

We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the 

evidence clearly supports the Defendant’s conviction for first degree felony murder. The 

proof at trial established that on the night of May 21, 2011, the Defendant, Mr. Sails, and 

Mr. Snorten planned to rob the victim, a known marijuana supplier. The three men 

armed themselves with guns and drove to the victim’s residence. Once inside, the 

Defendant and Mr. Sails pulled out their guns and ordered the victim and Mr. Simpson to 

the floor. The Defendant told the victim and Mr. Simpson, “[D]on’t do anything stupid, 

we’ll shoot.” The Defendant then took cash from the victim and Mr. Simpson. While 
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Mr. Snorten and Mr. Sails were in the back of the house dealing with Mr. Watson, the 

Defendant shot the victim in the back. Mr. Simpson testified that, immediately after the 

shooting, he looked at the Defendant and saw the Defendant standing over the victim 

with the gun. The Defendant, Mr. Sails, and Mr. Snorten then fled the scene. Inside the 

car, the Defendant took responsibility for the shooting telling Mr. Sails and Mr. Snorten, 

“[H]ey, man, my bad.” Dr. Li testified that the victim died as a result of the gunshot 

wound to his back, and both Mr. Simpson and Mr. Snorten later identified the Defendant 

as the shooter. 

The Defendant does not contest that the State presented sufficient evidence to 

establish the elements of the crime. Instead, he challenges the credibility of the State’s 

two identification witnesses. However, the question of identity is a question of fact left 

to the jury to resolve. Crawford, 635 S.W.2d at 705. Moreover, the jury verdict accredits 

the testimony of the State’s witnesses, and this court may not reweigh that evidence on 

appeal. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. The Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

Special Jury Instruction on Identity

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for the 

special jury instruction modification on identity. He asserts that the trial court’s 

instruction on identity failed to take into account “the objective nature of the scientific 

expert testimony offered by Dr. Neuschatz” and did not adequately inform the jury of the 

“current state of the law as it applied to the facts.” The Defendant further asserts that the 

trial court’s refusing to incorporate Dr. Neuschatz’s factors into the jury instruction was 

the equivalent of the court “commenting that [the] evidence should be disregarded[.]” 

The State responds that because the trial court used the proper jury instruction on identity 

and amended its instruction to assure that the Defendant’s evidence on identity could be 

considered, the jury received a “correct and complete” explanation of the current law as it 

applied to the case and there was no error. We agree with the State. 

Questions regarding the propriety of jury instructions are mixed questions of law 

and fact; thus, our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001). In Tennessee, “a defendant has a right 

to a correct and complete charge of the law, so that each issue of fact raised by the 

evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions.” State v. Garrison, 40 

S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990)).

Additionally, trial courts have a duty to give “a complete charge of the law applicable to 

the facts of the case.” State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) 

(citing State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986)). A trial court need not 

grant a defendant’s request for special instructions when the general jury charge is correct 
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and complete. State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W.2d 874, 892 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing 

State v. Blakely, 677 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)).

In State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tenn. 1995), the Tennessee Supreme Court 

held that when identity is material and the instruction is requested by the defendant, the 

trial court must give the following instruction to the jury:

One of the issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the 

person who committed the crime. The state has the burden of proving 

identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Identification testimony is an 

expression of belief or impression by the witness, and its value may depend 

upon your consideration of several factors. Some of the factors which you 

may consider are:

(1) The witness’ capacity and opportunity to observe the 

offender. This includes, among other things, the length of 

time available for observation, the distance from which the 

witness observed, the lighting, and whether the person who 

committed the crime was a prior acquaintance of the witness;

(2) The degree of certainty expressed by the witness 

regarding the identification and the circumstances under 

which it was made, including whether it is the product of the

witness’ own recollection;

(3) The occasions, if any, on which the witness failed to make 

an identification of the defendant, or made an identification 

that was inconsistent with the identification at trial; and

(4) The occasions, if any, on which the witness made an 

identification that was consistent with the identification at 

trial, and the circumstances surrounding such identifications.

Again, the state has the burden of proving every element of the crime 

charged, and this burden specifically includes the identity of the defendant 

as the person who committed the crime for which he or she is on trial. If 

after considering the identification testimony in light of all the proof you 

have a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the 

crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Id.; see also 7 T.P.I.—Crim. 42.05 (18th ed. 2014). The Dyle Court adopted the abovequoted identity instruction over a more expansive instruction to avoid “impermissibly 

comment[ing] on the evidence; thus, invading the province of the jury.” Dyle, 899 

S.W.2d at 612. 

In support of his position, the Defendant relies heavily on the Tennessee Supreme 

Court’s decision in State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2007). In Copeland, our 

supreme court overruled a per se ban on the admission of expert testimony on the 

reliability of eyewitness identification. Id. at 290, 300-01 (overruling State v. Coley, 32 

S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2000)). However, the decision in Copeland was limited to ending the 

ban on expert testimony on identity based upon “advances in the field of eyewitness 

identification.” Id. at 299. Copeland does not require the admission of the testimony of 

an eyewitness identification expert, nor does it require that a trial court adopt an expert’s 

opinion testimony as “law” in its instruction to the jury. See id. at 299-301; Troy Allen 

Pruitt v. State, No. M2012-00897-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 1858783, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.

App. May 2, 2013), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 10, 2013). To be in line with 

Copeland, all that a trial court is required to do is to allow the identification expert to 

testify. See Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 299-302. The jury is still entrusted with 

determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and 

with reconciling conflicts in the proof. Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 662. 

In this case, the trial court’s charge to the jury on identity was complete and 

accurate. The instruction included the identification instruction as required by Dyle. The 

court also included an additional paragraph instructing the jury to consider “any other 

factors fairly raised by the evidence.” The trial court’s instruction was broad enough to 

allow the jury to consider the various factors affecting eyewitness identification discussed 

by Dr. Neuschatz in his testimony. The Defendant’s proposed special jury instruction 

amending the Dyle instruction was not a correct statement of the law, and the trial court 

did not err in refusing to instruct the jury accordingly. We agree with the State that the 

identity instructive requested by the Defendant would have required the trial court to 

usurp the jury’s role as finder of fact and direct it to accredit the testimony of the 

Defendant’s expert witness. Because the jury received a “correct and complete” 

explanation of the current law as it applied to the case, the trial court’s instruction was 

not error, and the Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

III. Conclusion

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

_________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE