In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1779 

PAULA MCALLISTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

INNOVATION VENTURES, LLC, doing business as Living Essential 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. 

No. 17-CV-00867 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2020 — DECIDED DECEMBER 30, 2020 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Paula McAllister suffered 

serious injuries in a car accident in June 2016. In the following 

months, her treating physicians repeatedly concluded she 

could not yet return to work for her employer, defendant Innovation Ventures, LLC. Innovation provided her with medical leave and short-term disability benefits while she sought 

treatment. Once it became clear that McAllister likely could 
2 No. 20-1779 

not return to work until at least February 2017, Innovation terminated McAllister. McAllister sued Innovation. As relevant 

on appeal, she claimed Innovation failed to accommodate her 

during the summer of 2016 in violation of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Because we 

agree with the district court that McAllister was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA, we affirm. 

I. Background 

McAllister worked for Innovation, the producer of the 

popular liquid dietary supplement 5-hour ENERGY. Through 

a staffing agency, McAllister began working as an assembly 

worker in October 2014. She soon directly applied to and was 

hired by Innovation as an assembly worker, which sometimes 

entailed “rework,”1 and she later became a machine operator. 

On June 10, 2016, an unfortunate automobile accident left 

McAllister with serious head and back injuries. At the hospital, spinal surgeon Dr. Jeffrey Kachmann performed spinal 

surgery on McAllister and treated her for several injuries: a 

herniated disc, spinal cord compression, central cord syndrome (which often weakens motor and sensory functioning), 

a closed-head injury, and a “complex,” “multi-direction laceration.” 

Shortly after her injury, McAllister sought short-term disability benefits and medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Dr. 

Kachmanns office submitted an FMLA certification indicat1 “Rework,” also known as “reprocessing,” was a periodic duty that Innovation assigned its employees, but it was not an independent job. McAllisters rework required her to conduct quality checks on certain products. 
No. 20-1779 3

ing that McAllister had “central cord syndrome” and a “significant head injury” with “some posttraumatic subarachnoid 

hemorrhage and some possible posttraumatic superficial 

brain contusion.” On the certification, where asked what job 

functions McAllister “[was] unable to perform,” Dr. 

Kachmann wrote she could not perform “any & all” functions. He estimated that McAllister could not return to work 

until September 8, 2016. McAllister also sought short-term 

disability benefits. Guardian, Innovations benefits provider, 

granted these benefits partially based on Dr. Kachmanns 

view that she was “totally disabled (unable to work)” and his 

estimate of a September return. 

McAllister asked Innovations human resources department whether she could return to work before receiving a 

complete medical clearance, as her doctors had imposed restrictions on how much she could lift. According to McAllister, Innovation refused, telling her that “all restrictions had to 

be lifted before [she] could return to work because that was 

the policy that the company had used.” 

Thereafter, McAllister fell into a frustrating cycle wherein 

her doctors would examine her, predict she could return to 

work in some number of weeks, then later elongate their prediction at a follow-up visit. On August 24, 2016, as her expected September 8 return approached, she met with April 

Christlieb, Dr. Kachmanns physician assistant. Christlieb 

wrote a report that she faxed to Innovation indicating that 

McAllister may be getting a “little bit better” but that she had 

hip and knee pain, foot swelling, some balancing issues, and 

post-concussion symptoms. Christlieb concluded, “I dont 

feel at this time she is quite ready to go back to work.” 
4 No. 20-1779 

On October 3, 2016, McAllister again met with Dr. 

Kachmanns office, which sent Innovation a work status report restating that McAllister still could not return to work. 

Despite her desire to return, McAllister recalled experiencing 

balance, dizziness, and memory loss issues, and some “difficulty getting words out.” Her doctors told Innovation that 

McAllister needed a neuropsychological evaluation before 

they could clear her and estimated that would take at least six 

more weeks. 

In the interim, Innovations human resources department 

reached out to McAllister because her FMLA leave had expired. At an October 26, 2016 meeting, McAllister notified the 

department that she still could not return to work. Innovation 

told her that, per its policy, an employee unable to return to 

work after six months of leave would be terminated. McAllister notified Innovation that she scheduled her neuropsychological evaluation with another doctor, Dr. Paul Roberts. Considering this upcoming evaluation, Innovation granted her request for additional leave, set to expire at the time of her follow-up appointment with Dr. Kachmann on November 14. By 

the time of that appointment, however, Dr. Roberts had not 

completed McAllisters testing. Dr. Kachmanns office sent 

another work status report to Innovation, this time estimating 

that McAllister could not return to work until February 2017 

to allow Dr. Roberts to finish his testing. McAllister again 

spoke with the human resources department, but Innovation 

declined to extend her leave any further and instead terminated her on December 14, 2016. 

After her termination, McAllister continued her treatment 

and applied for long-term disability benefits and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. After completing her 
No. 20-1779 5

testing, Dr. Roberts opined that “most all of her mental functions were within the normal range or almost above normal 

range.” He believed that McAllister could gradually return to 

work, and by June 2017, she would have no restrictions. 

She applied for long-term disability benefits with Guardian in February 2017. In her application, she recounted her 

difficulties with memory, balance, arm and hand tremors, 

neck and muscle pain, basic household tasks, and numbness 

in her foot. Guardian granted McAllister long-term disability 

benefits until it terminated them in October 2018 when it determined she no longer had “functional deficits ... that would 

support an inability to return to work” as a machine operator. 

In addition to long-term disability benefits, McAllister applied for SSDI benefits in September 2017. In her application 

she asserted that “I BECAME UNABLE TO WORK BECAUSE 

OF MY DISABLING CONDITION ON June 10, 2016. I AM 

STILL DISABLED.” She identified several ailments that afflicted her: brain injury, cervical vertebrae injury, tremors in 

right arm, head shakes, “cant raise arms above my head,” 

“unsteady on my feet when up and down stairs,” and “right 

foot and leg numbness.” She further listed that her injuries 

adversely affected her ability to: lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, 

walk, sit, kneel, talk, climb stairs, recollect, complete tasks, 

concentrate, use her hands, and get along with others. The Social Security Administration granted her SSDI benefits in February 2018, to apply retroactively to the date of her accident. 

McAllister sued Innovation in November 2017, alleging 

that Innovation failed to accommodate her under the ADA as 

well as bringing several causes of action for discrimination. 

Innovation filed a motion for summary judgment on all of 

McAllisters claims. McAllister only defended her failure-to-
6 No. 20-1779 

accommodate ADA claim. The district court granted Innovations motion in full. With respect to the contested ADA claim, 

the court found that McAllister was not “qualified” under the 

ADA. Alternatively, the district court found that McAllister 

was equitably estopped from arguing she was “qualified” because she received disability benefits premised on contradictory representations about her inability to work. McAllister 

timely appealed. 

II. Discussion 

We review a district courts grant of summary judgment 

de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

that partys favor. James v. Hyatt Regency Chi., 707 F.3d 775, 779 

(7th Cir. 2013). The moving party, in this case Innovation, is 

entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Thus, to survive 

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact on all essential elements of its case.” Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 

561 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). 

“The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for a qualified individual with a disability.” TaylorNovotny v. Health All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th 

Cir. 2014). McAllister “bears the burden of proving that she is 

a ‘qualified individual with a disability—that is, a person 

‘who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of her job.” Cleveland v. Pol’y 

Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
No. 20-1779 7

§ 12111(8)). “Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable or not is a highly fact-specific inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002). If 

McAllister proves she was a qualified individual, then Innovation “has the burden to establish that the accommodation 

would have created an undue hardship on its business.” Taylor-Novotny, 772 F.3d at 493. 

McAllister argues on appeal that she can satisfy the preliminary showing that she was able to perform the essential 

functions of her position with or without accommodation, 

and therefore she is a qualified individual under the ADA. 

Specifically, she first contends that between August and September 2016 she could have performed her machine operator 

job with accommodations. Next, she argues she could have 

performed rework or an assembly job without accommodations during that same period. Failing that, she then asserts 

that Innovation should have granted her additional leave, 

which she argues would have been reasonable. 

A. Machine Operator 

First, McAllister argues that had she “received the same 

accommodations available to employees with work-related 

injuries, McAllister[] could have returned to work as a machine operator in August and September 2016.” McAllister 

urges that she could have continued working but for Innovations unwillingness to accommodate her lifting restrictions. 

McAllisters threshold problem is that her contentions that 

she could work that summer as a machine operator directly 

contradict her doctors orders. 
8 No. 20-1779 

“At summary judgment, it is the plaintiffs burden to provide evidence such that a rational jury could find her to be a 

qualified individual,” meaning the plaintiff “is one who ‘can 

perform the essential functions of the employment position

either ‘with or without reasonable accommodation.” Kotaska 

v. Fed. Express Corp., 966 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Once an employee is evaluated by a doctor, an “employer is entitled to rely on a physicians recommendation that the employee is not able to safely perform an 

essential function of his job.” Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 

788 F.3d 276, 294 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, absent evidence to the contrary, a 

doctors view that an employee cannot “return to work ... in 

any position” means an employee cannot “establish that she 

is a ‘qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.” 

Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996);

see also Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564

(7th Cir. 1996). 

McAllisters doctors made clear that she could not work as 

a machine operator during the summer of 2016, even with reasonable accommodation. Dr. Kachmann told Innovation on 

June 16, 2016, that McAllister was “totally disabled” and that 

she was unable to perform “any & all” job functions until September 8, 2016. Then, on August 24, 2016, Christlieb, on behalf 

of Dr. Kachmann, notified Innovation that she did not “feel at 

this time [McAllister] is quite ready to go back to work,” estimating yet another six weeks before she could return. Even 

though McAllister now argues she was then fit to work, her 

doctors at that time thought otherwise, reporting serious lingering physical and mental symptoms: central cord syndrome, a closed-head injury, “dizziness and vertigo,” and 

memory and speech difficulties. During the relevant period 
No. 20-1779 9

between August and September 2016, her doctors never found 

(nor notified Innovation) that McAllisters condition had improved enough to allow her to return to work; they maintained throughout that she had not improved. It would defy 

common sense to demand that Innovation disregard these 

well-documented medical opinions and allow its employees, 

like McAllister, to prematurely return to work, thereby jeopardizing their safety. Instead, Innovation was “entitled to rely 

on [these] recommendation[s] that [McAllister was] not able 

to safely perform an essential function of [her] job.” Stern, 

788 F.3d at 294. Therefore, “[t]he undisputed facts establish 

that [McAllister was] unable to perform the essential functions of her position,” Weiler, 101 F.3d at 525, and was thus not 

a qualified individual under the ADA.

McAllister attempts to sidestep this analysis by pointing 

to how Innovation treated its employees injured in the workplace because “if an employer has a policy of creating lightduty positions for employees who are occupationally injured, 

then that same benefit ordinarily must be extended to an employee with a disability who is not occupationally injured unless the company can show undue hardship.” Severson v. 

Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2017). This 

argument misses the mark. Whether other employees received accommodations (reasonable or not), McAllister cannot escape the unfortunate reality that her doctors wholly precluded her from returning to work during the summer of 2016 

in the first place. 

McAllister then attempts to contradict her doctors statements and bolster her claim that she could return to work in 

August and September through the testimony of her sister 
10 No. 20-1779 

and boyfriend. In Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Center, we affirmed summary judgment because a plaintiff failed to present “non-speculative, non-conclusory evidence that a proposed accommodation or treatment would have allowed him 

to adequately perform the essential functions of his job.” 788 

F.3d at 289. We held that even the statements of the plaintiffs 

psychiatrist were “too conclusory and uninformative” to satisfy the plaintiffs burden. See id. (citing Weigel v. Target Stores, 

122 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

McAllister cites lay testimony from her sister, Kim Raderstorf, and her former supervisor and boyfriend to show that 

she could perform the duties of her machine operator job. 

Based on their knowledge of Innovations operations, they 

testified, in McAllisters view, that she could have returned 

with accommodations. In her affidavit, Raderstorf discussed 

how she regularly observed McAllister engaging in physical 

activity during summer 2016, including “regular walks” and 

“shopping trips,” and “mental activity, such as calculating 

bills and communicating with others.” It follows, according 

to McAllister, that with accommodations akin to those received by others, she could have resumed working. 

Raderstorfs lay testimony does not contradict the doctors

testimony to create a genuine dispute about whether McAllister could return as a machine operator because it lacks foundation and is conflicting. “[W]here deposition testimony and 

an affidavit conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded unless it 

is demonstrable that the statement in the deposition was mistaken.” See Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 910 (7th Cir. 

2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Raderstorf made comments in her deposition that she had a “lack 
No. 20-1779 11

of knowledge” to state, as she did in her affidavit, that McAllister could have “returned months prior to December[] 

2016,” admitting she “shouldnt have put that in there.” See 

Stern, 788 F.3d at 287 (reasoning plaintiffs administrative assistant lacked knowledge of his duties to sufficiently “rebut[] 

[the doctors] professional opinion that [plaintiff] was ‘not believed to be fit for duty”). Raderstorf also admitted that 

McAllister did not return to shopping until spring 2017 and 

that their walks only began a month after McAllisters rehabilitation. Raderstorfs deposition statements here undercut 

her affidavit statements—and McAllisters characterization of 

them. In light of the lack of foundation for and inconsistencies 

between Raderstorfs deposition and her affidavit statements, 

her testimony is insufficient to create a material issue of fact 

to “rebut [Dr. Kachmann and Christlieb]s professional opinion that” McAllister was unable to work. Stern, 788 F.3d at 

287. 

To the extent the statements of McAllisters boyfriend are 

not similarly tainted by contradictions elsewhere, those statements alone are far too “conclusory and uninformative” to 

present a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 289. In Stern we 

rejected even medical opinions that were too speculative. Id. 

Here, the boyfriends “conclusory and untested opinion/hope 

that the proposed treatment/accommodation would enable 

[McAllister] to perform the essential functions of [her] job[],” 

viewed in contrast to the opinions of the medical professionals specifically charged with determining her physical and 

mental capacities, are insufficient. See id. at 288 (“[Plaintiff] 

fails to lay an adequate foundation establishing that [plaintiffs wife]—who describes her educational degrees as being 

‘in painting—is competent to rebut [the plaintiffs doctors] 
12 No. 20-1779 

professional opinion.”). We cannot accept McAllisters boyfriends post hoc opinions alone to take precedence over those 

learned views. 

McAllister has failed to create a genuine issue of material 

fact to survive summary judgment that she could “perform 

the essential functions” of her machine operator job during 

August and September 2016, even with accommodations. See 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Given this failure to demonstrate a capability to perform the essential functions asked of a machine 

operator, McAllister is not a qualified individual under the 

ADA. 

B. Other Jobs 

Second, McAllister argues that beyond her view that she 

could have worked as a machine operator with accommodations she could also have worked in other capacities. In particular, she argues she “could have performed the light-duty 

job of rework in August and September of 2016” and she 

could have “filled a vacant assembly position.” The same 

threshold problem described above remains: her doctors precluded her from working in any capacity, even a desk job. 

Thus, the post hoc assertions that she could have performed 

in these roles ring hollow. She again places too much reliance 

on lay testimony, this time from her other sister who believed 

McAllister could have performed the assembly worker job 

during the summer. 

To downplay the effect of her doctors orders, McAllister 

argues that had Innovation offered to accommodate her, her 

doctors would have cleared her to work. This argument relies 

on the faulty assumption that her doctors would have allowed her to return to work under any circumstances. The 
No. 20-1779 13

statements of her doctors made clear that not only could 

McAllister not work as machine operator, but she could also 

not work at all. Dr. Kachmann notified Innovation that McAllister could not perform “any & all” functions and, when deposed, suggested she could not even perform an office or desk 

job. So even if Innovation bent over backwards to accommodate her, there were no accommodations—short of paying her 

to not work—that could have mitigated McAllisters sweeping limitations. In this vein, McAllister suggests that because 

her doctors never knew what her job entailed they never had 

the opportunity to adequately assess her ability to work. Even 

if true, the fact that her doctors (without knowing any details 

of her job) ordered her not to return to work could just as easily imply that the severity of her injuries meant she could not 

work in any capacity. 

McAllister then turns around to argue the contrary: not 

only did her doctors know of the details of her job but their 

orders that she not work were rooted in those very details and 

Innovations alleged unwillingness to accommodate her. But 

support on the record for this claim is wanting. McAllister alleges that Christlieb instructed her not to return to work only 

“after assessing [her] medical condition and unaccommodated job requirements, including lifting restrictions.” Yet 

Christlieb testified that she only had a “brief” discussion with 

McAllister about her job and had no recollection of her duties. 

This testimony alone is too weak to support McAllisters view 

that her doctors ordered that she stay home because Innovation refused to accommodate her. McCallister accordingly 

failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact that she 

could perform another job with or without accommodations; 

the record establishes the opposite is true, that she could not 
14 No. 20-1779 

work in any role at Innovation. Thus, the district court did not 

err in granting summary judgement. 

C. Extended Medical Leave 

Third, attacking from a slightly different angle, McAllister 

argues that even if no other accommodations were available, 

Innovation could have granted her additional leave, which 

would have been reasonable. In particular, she argues that if 

Innovation permitted her to return to work during some period in August or September 2016 (which, again, Innovation 

could not because of her doctors orders), then McAllister 

would not have needed the monthslong leave that she requested and would only have only requested “a few weeks.” 

As already stated, to be “qualified” under the ADA, an individual must be able to “perform the essential functions” of 

her job “with or without reasonable accommodation.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Inability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA.” 

Byrne v. Avon Prod., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003). By 

October 2016, however, Innovation already knew that McAllister had been unable to “perform the essential functions” of 

her job for months and would not be cleared to work for several more months still. 

In Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., we expanded on 

Byrne, holding that a “multimonth leave of absence is beyond 

the scope of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” 

872 F.3d at 479. We said: 

[A] long-term leave of absence cannot be a reasonable accommodation. As we noted in Byrne, 

“[n]ot working is not a means to perform the 
No. 20-1779 15

jobs essential functions.” Simply put, an extended leave of absence does not give a disabled 

individual the means to work; it excuses his not 

working. Accordingly, we held in Byrne that 

“[a]n inability to do the jobs essential tasks 

means that one is not ‘qualified; it does not 

mean that the employer must excuse the inability.” 

Id. at 481 (citations omitted).2

McAllister instead attempts to analogize her situation to 

Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th 

Cir. 1998), which concerned a plaintiffs request for additional 

leave of two to four weeks after already receiving two weeks 

of leave and two weeks of a reduced schedule, id. at 595. We 

held “there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 

juror could conclude that the second medical leave, as requested, would have been a reasonable accommodation.” Id.

at 601. 

Even assuming McAllister worked in August and September 2016, Innovation would have needed to grant McAllister 

leave from October 2016 until February 2017 (when her doctors expected to clear her), for a total of four months. McAllisters claim that she would have “only requested a few 

weeks leave in October” is thus unsupported by the record. 

2 Of course, we do not eliminate “the possibility that a brief period of leave 

to deal with a medical condition could be a reasonable accommodation in 

some circumstances.” Severson, 872 F.3d at 481. Such an accommodation is 

particularly apt for “intermittent conditions,” Byrne, 328 F.3d at 381, distinguishable from the more sustained condition from which McAllister 

suffered. 
16 No. 20-1779 

The four months of leave she would have required would 

have been on top of the two and a half months of leave Innovation gave her between June and August 2016. Far from a 

modest two to four weeks of leave, see Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 

595, four months (or six and a half months if we include the 

initial two and a half months) is plainly not a reasonable accommodation, see Severson, 872 F.3d at 479. Affording McAllister such prolonged leave effectively excuses her inability to 

work, which the ADA does not require of employers. See id. 

McAllister anchors her argument about the reasonableness of requesting additional leave to her related argument 

that Innovation “obstruct[ed] or delay[e]d the interactive process” in bad faith. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 

1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996). In her view, Innovations alleged 

refusal to engage in an interactive process prevented her from 

“finding and requesting a reasonable accommodation.” She 

repeats that “[t]here were reasonable accommodations available to McAllister in August and September 2016.” 

McAllisters contention that Innovation refused to engage 

in the interactive process fails because Innovation could not 

have engaged in an interactive process when her doctors had 

already barred her from working, finding she could not perform “any & all” functions. “[F]ailure to engage in the interactive process alone is not an independent basis for liability,” 

although “it is actionable if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation for a qualified individual.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As already 

discussed, McAllister never clearly asked for an “appropriate 

accommodation.” See id. She now argues that “the doctors 

would have reached a different conclusion” had Innovation 
No. 20-1779 17

engaged in the interactive process. Beyond cherry-picked 

statements from Dr. Kachmann about how his opinion depended on what she did for Innovation, there is no evidence 

her doctors premised their opinions on such details. In fact, 

Dr. Kachmann elsewhere implied she could not even perform 

at a desk job, let alone a machine operator job. 

McAllister suggests Christliebs testimony forgetting or 

not knowing the details of McAllisters job “further pro[ves] 

that Innovations conduct influenced and obstructed the conversation.” The logical leap makes little sense. Although we 

must “draw[] all reasonable inferences in [McAllisters] favor,” James, 707 F.3d at 779, McAllister must still “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported 

motion for summary judgment,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). This gap in the record does not 

qualify as affirmative evidence of what McAllister discussed 

with Christlieb nor can McAllister rely on that gap to meet her 

burden of presenting a genuine issue that she was denied a 

reasonable accommodation that would have allowed her to 

resume working. See id. at 252 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the plaintiff.”). 

Because she was not “qualified” to do her job due to her 

doctors orders, “this case falls into the category of cases in 

which an employers alleged failure to adequately engage in 

the interactive process is immaterial.” Stern, 788 F.3d at 293; 

see also Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (“Even if an employer fails to engage in the required 

process, that failure need not be considered if the employee 

fails to present evidence sufficient to reach the jury on the 
18 No. 20-1779 

question of whether she was able to perform the essential 

functions of her job with an accommodation.”). 

Accordingly, the district court correctly found that any request for additional leave was not “reasonable,” and therefore, McAllister did not establish a genuine issue that she was 

a qualified individual under the ADA. Having decided McAllister does not qualify as a disabled individual under the 

ADA, we decline to reach the district courts conclusions 

about equitable estoppel. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.