DENY and Opinion Filed December 14, 2023 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-01088-CV HARMEET SINGH, Appellant V. RATEGAIN TRAVEL TECHNOLOGI ES, LIMITED AND RATEGAIN TECHNOLOGIES, I NC., Appellees On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-06923 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burn s, Justice Pedersen, III, and Justice Goldstein Opinion by Chief Justice Burns Harmeet Singh has filed a pe tition for permission to appeal the trial court’s October 24, 2023 order granting RateGain Trav el Technologies Limited (RateGain) and RateGain Technologies, Inc.’s (RIT) motion to enforce arbitration. In that order, the trial court ordered that all of Singh’s claims related to stock options, whether for breach of contract, statutory fraud, or based on any ot her legal or equitable theory, be compelled to arbitration in New Delhi, India pursuant to RateGain’s stock option scheme. Because the issue in this case is not one in which th ere is substantial disa greement regarding the–2– law and because the issue would not materia lly advance the ultima te resolution of the case, we deny the petition for permission to appeal. Background Singh is the former CEO of RateGain, a corporation incorporated and officed in India 1 After resigning as CEO, Singh sued RateGain and RIT, RateGain’s U.S. subsidiary, to collect unpaid compensation and benefits he claims are owed to him under his employment agreement and for breach of contract for failing to provide him the benefit of certain stock options owed to him. Singh filed suit in Dallas County pursuant to a venue provision in the employment agreement. RateGain and RIT moved to compel arbi tration of Singh’s stock options breach of contract claim asserting the stock options were issued to Singh pursuant to grant letters that expressly incorporated the terms of RateGain’s St ock Options Scheme. That scheme contains a provision requ iring disputes related to the scheme to be arbitrated in India. The trial court granted RateGain and RI T’s original motion to compel by order dated January 9, 2023. Thereaf ter, Singh amended his petition. In hi s amended petition, Singh continued to assert his breach of cont ract claim for the stock options, but he added a statutory fraud claim related to the same st ock options. Pursuant to that claim, Singh

1 The facts are taken from the petition for permissive appeal , documents in support of the petition, RateGain and RIT’s response to Singh’s petition, and Singh’s repl y. We do not have a clerk’s record.–3– sought the same measure of damages for the stock options as he did for his breach of contract claims. RateGain and RIT renewed their motion to compel arbitration, seeking an order from the trial court making it clear that any claims related to stock options in the Indian company must be arbi trated in India. After a h earing, the trial court signed such an order. This petition for a permissive appeal followed. Applicable Law Generally, appeals may be taken only fr om final judgments or interlocutory orders for which appeal is authorized by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp ., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Guzman , 390 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet. ). Under certain circumstan ces, a trial court may allow an appeal from an order that is otherwise not appealable. See Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG , 567 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. 2019). When the trial court permits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the pa rty seeking to appeal mu st file a petition in the court of appeals seeking permission to appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 28.3(a). We strictly construe such request s because statutes allowing for interlocutory appeals are an exception to the general rule that on ly final judgments are appealable. See Gulf Coast Asphalt Co. v. Lloyd, 457 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. App— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Rogers v. Orr , 408 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2013, pet. denied). Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits an interlocutory appeal of an otherwise unappealab le order, only if several predicates are
met. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE § 51.014(d). To qualify, the trial court must–4– first certify the order is immediately app ealable and expressly identify a controlling question of law on which there is subs tantial ground for disagreement. Id .; see also T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 168 (requirement that trial court’s or der identifies a “controlling question of law on which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion[.]”). The trial court’s order must also explain why an immediate a ppeal may materially advance the ultimate resolution of the case. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE § 51.014(d). Finally, this Court must then agree to hear the appeal. Id. at § 51.014(f). Our procedural rules make it clear we have the discretion to accept or deny a permissive interlocutory appeal. Sabre Travel , 567 S.W.3d at 732. We exercise that discretion, however, with an eye toward sparin g parties “the inevitable inefficiencies of the final judgment rule” when we can quick ly and efficiently re solve “controlling, uncertain issues of law that are impor tant to the outcome of the litigation.” Id . But to that end, the controlling issue needs to be solely a question of law unconstrained by procedural or factual issues. See El Paso Tool and Dies Co. v. Mendez , 593 S.W.39 800, 805 (Tex. App—El Paso 2019, no pet.); College Station Med. Ctr., LLC v. Kilaspa , 494 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Tex. App—Waco 2015, pet. denied) (“In a permissive interlocutory appeal, the issue should be framed solely as a question of law that needs to be resolved that disposes of the case.”); Diamond Prods. Int'l, Inc. v. Handsel , 142 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“The statute does not contemplate permissive appeals of summary judgments wh ere the facts are in dispute. Instead,–5– permissive appeals should be reserved fo r determination of c ontrolling legal issues necessary to the reso lution of the case.”). Case law is not well devel oped concerning what constitutes a controlling question of law or when there are substantial grounds for disagreement. But if the resolution of the question will considerably sh orten the time, effort, and e xpense of fully litigating the case, the question is controlling. Gulf Coast Asphalt, 457 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Renee Forinash McElhaney, Toward Permissive Appeal in Texas , 29 St. Mary’s L.J. 729, 747

– 49 (1998)). And, generally, if the viability of a cl aim rests upon the court’s determination of a question of law, the question is controlling. Id . Substantial grounds for disagreement exist when the question presented to the court is novel or difficult, when controlling law is doubtful, when controlling law is in disagreement with other courts of appeals, and when there simply is little authority up on which the district court can rely. Id . Generally, a district court will make a fi nding that an appeal will facilitate final resolution of the case when reso lution of the legal question dr amatically affects recovery in a lawsuit. Id

. Conversely, when other issues are left pending in the litigation, ultimate termination of the litigation is not advan ced by allowing immedi ate appeal of an otherwise interlocutory order. Id . (citing Harden Healthcare, LLC v. OLP Wyoming Springs, LLC , No. 03-20-00275-CV, 2020 WL 6811994, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Van Peterson Fine Jewelers , No. 05-15-00646-CV, 2015 WL 4554519, at * 3 (Tex. App. —Dallas July 29, 2015, no–6– pet.) (mem. op.) (permissive a ppeal would not materially advance ultimate termination of litigation because, regardless of result on appeal, “neither party would seek judgment without further litigation”). Ultimately, a permissive app eal should “provide a means for expedited appellate disposition of fo cused and potentially dispositive legal questions.” Armour Pipe Line Co. v. Sandel Energy, Inc ., No. 14-16-00010-CV, 2016 WL 514229, at *4 (Tex. App.—H ouston [14th Dist.] Feb. 9, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). This purpose is not served when a permissive appeal is used to obtain piecemeal appellate review of ordina ry interlocutory orders. See id

. Discussion Here, the trial court’s order compelled Si ngh to bring all clai ms related to stock options, whether for breach of contract, statutory fraud, or based on any ot her legal or equitable theory, in arbitration in New Delhi, India. In the order, the trial court identified the controlling question of law as to which there is a substa ntial ground for difference of opinion as “whether an arbitr ation agreement never signed by [Singh] and subject to other objections raised by [Singh] should be enforced.” Although Singh thoroughly addresses why he believes the trial court erred in compelling him to arbitration, he does not explain why there is a substantial grou nd for disagreement about the law regarding this issue. Singh does not explain, and we do not see, how the question presented to this Court is novel or difficult, th e controlling law is doubtful, or that there is little authority upon which the district court could rely. See e.g., In re Polymerica, LLC , 296 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (neither the FAA nor Texas law requires–7– arbitration clauses be signed, so long as they are written a nd agreed to by the parties); In re AdvancePCS Health L.P ., 172 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (same). As to the existence of other objections to the arbi tration agreement, Singh also fails to explain how there is a substantial ground for disagreement about the law. Further, we are not convinced an immedi ate appeal from the complained-of order would materially advance the ultimate terminatio n of this litigation. Appellate review of this order only as to Singh’s claims re garding the stock options , even if successful, would leave Singh’s remaining breach of cont ract claims arising under the employment agreement unresolved. 2 In other words, regardless of the outcome of this permissive appeal, neither party would seek judgment without further litiga tion. Under these circumstances, we conclude allowing a pe rmissive appeal in this case would not materially advance the ultimate te rmination of this litigation. See ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. , 2015 WL 4554519 at * 3. Given the limited nature of interlocutory appeals and the requirement that we construe statutes authorizing such appeals st rictly, we conclude Si ngh has not satisfied the requirements of section 51.014(d) of the civil practices and remedies code.

2 Our record does not contain a copy of Singh’ s amended petition. However, in his petition for permissive appeal, Singh lists his damages as including not only the stock options, but also money due to him pursuant to a bonus letter, payment equal to 4 weeks of paid time off, and payment of back pay.–8– Accordingly, we deny his pet ition for permissive appeal.

231088F.P05 /Robert D. Burns, III / ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE–9– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT HARMEET SINGH, Appellant
No. 05-23-01088-CV V.
RATEGAIN TRAVEL TECHNOLOGIES, LIMITED AND RATEGAIN TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-06923. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns. Justices Pedersen, III and Goldstein participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opini on of this date, we deny appellant’s petition for permissive appeal.
Judgment entered December 14, 2023