REBUILDING IRAQ 

Enhancing Security, 

Measuring Program 

Results, and Maintaining 

Infrastructure Are 

Necessary to Make 

Significant and Sustainable 

Progress 

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations; House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, October 18, 2005 

GAO-06-179T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-179T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-179T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform; Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations; House of 

Representatives 

October 18, 2005

REBUILDING IRAQ

Enhancing Security, Measuring Program 

Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure 

Are Necessary to Make Significant and 

Sustainable Progress 

The United States is the primary contributor to efforts to stabilize and 

rebuild Iraq. Since 2003, the United States has made available about $30 

billion for activities that include the construction and repair of 

infrastructure, procurement of equipment, and training and equipping of 

Iraqi security forces. International donors have pledged $13.6 billion in 

reconstruction funds (from 2004 through 2007), of which about $2.7 billion 

was provided in multilateral and bilateral grants through August 2005. 

However, most of the pledged amount—about $10 billion—is in the form of 

loans on which the Iraqi government largely has not yet drawn. Iraqi funds 

have primarily supported the country’s operating budget, with some focus on

capital improvement projects. For 2005, Iraq planned for about $28 billion in 

expenditures—largely supported by oil proceeds—to fund salaries, pensions, 

ministry operations, and subsidies. It is likely that Iraq may need more funds 

than currently available due to the severely degraded infrastructure, post 

conflict looting and sabotage, and additional security costs. 

The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding 

Iraq. First, the security environment and the continuing strength of the 

insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security 

responsibilities to Iraqi forces and to engage in rebuilding efforts. The 

security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant 

increases in attacks against the coalition and the coalition’s partners. 

Second, inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to 

determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. The 

United States has set broad goals for providing essential services in Iraq, but 

limited performance measures present challenges in determining the overall 

progress and impact of U.S. projects. Third, the U.S. reconstruction program 

has encountered difficulties with Iraq’s ability to maintain new and 

rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in 

the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors. For example, as of June 2005, 

U.S.-funded water and sanitation projects representing about $52 million of 

approximately $200 million spent on completed projects were inoperable or 

were operating at lower than normal capacity. 

The United States has made a significant investment in the rebuilding and 

stabilization of Iraq. To preserve that investment, the United States must 

address these critical challenges. 

The United States, along with 

coalition partners and various 

international organizations, has 

undertaken a challenging and 

costly effort to stabilize and rebuild 

Iraq following multiple wars and 

decades of neglect by the former 

regime. This enormous effort is 

taking place in an unstable security 

environment, concurrent with Iraqi 

efforts to complete a constitutional 

framework for establishing a 

permanent government. The United 

States’ goal is to help the Iraqi 

government develop a democratic, 

stable, and prosperous country, at 

peace with itself and its neighbors, 

a partner in the war against 

terrorism, enjoying the benefits of a

free society and a market economy. 

In this testimony, GAO discusses 

(1) the funding used to rebuild and 

stabilize Iraq and (2) the challenges 

that the United States faces in its 

rebuilding and stabilization efforts. 

This statement is based on several 

reports GAO has issued to the 

Congress over the past three 

months. In July, we issued two 

reports on (1) the status of funding 

and reconstruction efforts in Iraq 

and (2) the use of private security 

providers in Iraq. We issued two 

additional reports in September on 

(1) U.S. reconstruction efforts in 

the water and sanitation sector and 

(2) U.S. assistance for the January 

2005 Iraqi elections. Finally, we 

expect to issue shortly a report on 

U.S. efforts to stabilize the security 

situation in Iraq (a classified 

report). This statement includes 

unclassified information only.
Page 1 GAO-06-179T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. efforts to rebuild and 

stabilize Iraq. The United States, along with its coalition partners and 

various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging and 

costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and 

decades of neglect by the former regime. This enormous effort is taking 

place in an unstable security environment, concurrent with Iraqi efforts to 

complete a constitutional framework for establishing a permanent 

government. The United States reconstruction assistance goal is to help the 

Iraqi government develop a democratic, stable, and prosperous country, at 

peace with itself and its neighbors, a partner in the war against terrorism, 

enjoying the benefits of a free society and a market economy.

My testimony today is based on several reports that we have issued to the 

Congress over the past 3 months. In July 2005, we issued two reports on (1) 

the status of funding and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, focusing on the 

progress we have achieved and the challenges we face in rebuilding Iraq’s 

infrastructure and (2) the use of private security providers in Iraq. We 

issued two additional reports in September on (1) U.S. reconstruction 

efforts in the water and sanitation sector and (2) U.S. assistance for the 

January 2005 Iraqi elections. Finally, we expect to issue a report shortly on 

U.S. efforts to stabilize the security situation in Iraq (a classified report).

Based on these five reports, I will discuss (1) the funding used to rebuild 

and stabilize Iraq and (2) the challenges the United States faces in its 

rebuilding and stabilization efforts.

This statement includes unclassified information only and is based on 

recent GAO reports. We conducted our review for these reports between 

September 2004 and August 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

Summary The United States is the primary contributor to rebuilding and stabilization 

efforts in Iraq. Since 2003, the United States has made available about $30 

billion for activities that include the construction and repair of 

infrastructure, procurement of equipment, and training and equipping of 

Iraqi security forces. International donors have pledged $13.6 billion in 

reconstruction funds (from 2004 through 2007), of which about $2.7 billion 

was provided in multilateral and bilateral grants, through August 2005. 

However, most of the pledged amount is in the form of loans on which the 
Page 2 GAO-06-179T 

Iraqi government largely has not yet drawn. Iraqi funds, first under the 

control of the Coalition Provisional Authority and then the Iraqi 

government, have primarily supported the country’s operating budget with 

some focus on capital improvement projects. For 2005, Iraq planned for 

about $28 billion in expenditures—largely supported by oil proceeds—to

fund salaries, pensions, ministry operations, and subsidies. While about 21 

percent of planned expenditures are for capital investment in the oil and 

gas sector, food and fuel subsidies account for nearly 40 percent of Iraq’s 

planned expenditures. It is likely that Iraq will need more funds than 

currently available due to the severely degraded infrastructure, post-2003 

conflict looting and sabotage, and additional security costs.

The United States faces three key challenges in rebuilding and stabilizing 

Iraq. First, the security environment and the continuing strength of the 

insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security 

responsibilities to Iraqi forces and engage in rebuilding efforts. The 

security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant 

increases in attacks against the coalition and coalition partners. Second, 

inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine 

the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. The United 

States has set broad goals for providing essential services in Iraq, but 

limited performance measures present challenges in determining the 

overall impact of U.S. projects. Third, the U.S. reconstruction program has 

encountered difficulties with Iraq’s inability to sustain new and 

rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in 

the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors. For example, as of June 2005, 

U.S.-funded water and sanitation projects representing about $52 million of 

the approximately $200 million in completed projects were either not 

operating or were operating at lower than normal capacity.

Background From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA), led by the United States and the United Kingdom, was the 

UN-recognized coalition authority responsible for the temporary 

governance of Iraq and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the 

reconstruction effort. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military 

organizations of the former regime and began the process of creating or 

reestablishing new Iraqi security forces, including the police and a new 

Iraqi army. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed 

responsibility for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense and police
Page 3 GAO-06-179T 

forces in their areas of responsibility.1

 In May 2004, the President issued a 

National Security Presidential Directive, which stated that, after the 

transition of power to the Iraqi government, the Department of State 

(State), through its ambassador to Iraq, would be responsible for all U.S. 

activities in Iraq except for security and military operations. U.S. activities 

relating to security and military operations would be the responsibility of 

the Department of Defense (DOD). The Presidential Directive also 

established two temporary offices: (1) the Iraq Reconstruction and 

Management Office to facilitate transition of reconstruction efforts to Iraq 

and (2) the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and 

project management support for some U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. 

Other U.S. government agencies also play significant roles in the 

reconstruction effort. USAID is responsible for projects to restore Iraq’s 

infrastructure, support healthcare and education initiatives, expand 

economic opportunities for Iraqis, and foster improved governance. The 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering and technical services 

to the PCO, USAID, and military forces in Iraq.

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign Iraqi 

government, the CPA was officially dissolved, and Iraq’s transitional period 

began. Under Iraq’s transitional law,2

 the transitional period covers the 

interim government phase (from June 28, 2004, to January 30, 2005) and the 

transitional government phase, which is currently scheduled to end by 

December 31, 2005.3

 Under UN Resolution 1546, the Multi-National Force - 

Iraq (MNF-I) has the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute 

to security and stability in Iraq during this process, working in partnership 

with the Iraqi government to reach agreement on security and policy 

issues. The Presidential Directive required the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) to direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and 

train Iraqi security forces. The Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq, which operates under MNF-I, now leads coalition efforts to 

train, equip, and organize Iraqi security forces.

1

The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan academies. The 

Iraqi army units were trained by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

2

Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 2004.

3

See GAO, Iraq’s Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2004), for 

more information on key events during Iraq’s transitional period. 
Page 4 GAO-06-179T 

U.S. Appropriations 

Primarily Support Iraqi 

Reconstruction While 

Iraqi Funds Support 

Iraqi Government 

Operations

The United States is the primary contributor to rebuilding and stabilization 

efforts in Iraq. U.S. appropriations have been used largely for activities that 

include the repair of infrastructure, procurement of equipment, and 

training of Iraqi security forces. International donors have provided a lesser 

amount of funding for reconstruction and development activities; however, 

most of the pledged amount is in the form of loans that largely have not 

been accessed by the Iraqi government. Iraqi funding, under CPA or Iraqi 

control, has generally supported operating expenses of the Iraqi 

government. Finally, Iraqi needs may be greater than the funding currently 

made available.

U.S. Funding Supports 

Rebuilding and Stabilization 

Efforts in Iraq

U.S. appropriated funding has largely focused on infrastructure repair and 

training of Iraqi security forces and this funding has been reallocated as 

priorities changed. As of August 2005, approximately $30 billion in U.S. 

appropriations had been made available for rebuilding and stabilization 

needs in Iraq, about $21 billion had been obligated, and about $13 billion 

had been disbursed. These funds were used for activities that included 

infrastructure repair of the electricity, oil, and water and sanitation sectors; 

infrastructure repair, training, and equipping of the security and law 

enforcement sector; and CPA and U.S. administrative expenses.

Many current U.S. reconstruction efforts reflect initial plans that the CPA 

developed before June 2004. As priorities changed, particularly since the 

transition of power to the Iraqi interim government, the U.S. administration 

reallocated about $5 billion of the $18.4 billion fiscal year 2004 emergency 

supplemental among the various sectors4

 (see fig. 1).

4

See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction 

of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-106.
Page 5 GAO-06-179T 

Figure 1: Funding Distribution of $18.4 Billion for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, by 

Sector

Note: “Other” category includes democracy, education, governance, agriculture, transportation, 

telecommunications, health, employment, privatization, and administrative costs.

According to State department documents, these reallocations were made 

to meet immediate needs: in October 2004, for projects in security and law 

enforcement, economic and private sector development, and governance; 

in January 2005, for quick-impact projects in key cities; in April 2005, for 

job creation and essential services activities; and in July 2005, for security 

force training and election support.5 As Figure 1 shows, security and justice 

funds increased while resources for the water and electricity sectors 

decreased.

5

See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction, GAO-05-876

(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005), for more information on the October 2004, January 2005, 

and April 2005 reallocations of the $18.4 billion of fiscal year 2004 appropriations for Iraq 

relief and reconstruction. In July 2005, the administration reported that it had reallocated 

$255 million to create Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees, to fund training 

of security forces, and to support the upcoming elections, among other things.

As of July 2004 As of July 2005

Oil

Other

Water

Security

and

justice

Electricity

Water

Oil

Electricity

Other

Source: GAO analysis Department of State data.

23%

23%

30%

34%

23%

22%

9%

12%

Security

and

justice

15%

9%

Other

Security and justice

Essential services
Page 6 GAO-06-179T 

Some International Funds 

Have Been Provided for 

Reconstruction, but Pledges 

are Mostly Loans

International donors have provided about $2.7 billion in multilateral and 

bilateral grants, of the pledged $13.6 billion, for reconstruction activities; 

however, most of the pledged amount is in the form of loans that largely 

have not been accessed by the Iraqis.6

 International reconstruction 

assistance provided in the form of multilateral grants has been used largely 

for activities such as electoral process support, education and health 

projects, and capacity building of the ministries. As of August 2005, donors 

have deposited about $1.2 billion into the two trust funds of the 

International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI).7

 Of that 

amount, about $800 million had been obligated and nearly $300 million 

disbursed to individual projects. Donors have also provided bilateral 

assistance for Iraq reconstruction activities; however, complete 

information on this assistance is not readily available. As of August 2005, 

State has identified $1.5 billion—of the $13.6 billion pledged—in funding 

that donors have provided as bilateral grants for reconstruction projects 

outside the IRFFI. About $10 billion, or 70 percent, of the $13.6 billion 

pledged in support of Iraq reconstruction is in the form of loans, primarily 

from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Japan. 

According to a State Department official, Iraq is in discussions with the 

government of Japan and the World Bank for initial projects of lending 

programs that total about $6.5 billion. As of October 12, 2005, Iraq had 

accessed a loan of $436 million from the IMF and an initial loan of $500 

million from the World Bank, according to a State Department official.

Iraqi Funds Support Iraq’s 

Government Operations 

Iraqi funds—under the CPA or Iraqi control—primarily have supported the 

Iraqi operating budget with some focus on relief and reconstruction

6

According to a State Department official, in addition to the $13.6, donors pledged an 

additional $203 million for Iraq reconstruction at the International Reconstruction Fund 

Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) Donors’ Committee meeting at the Dead Sea in Jordan, in July 2005. 

See GAO-05-876 and Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, 

and Oversight Issues GAO-04-902R, (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004), for more information 

on international donor support for Iraq reconstruction.

7

The IRFFI was established in response to the June 24, 2003, UN technical meeting and the 

2003 Madrid conference’s calls for a mechanism to channel and coordinate donor resources 

for Iraq reconstruction and development activities. The IRFFI is composed of two trust 

funds, one run by the United Nations Development Group and the other by the World Bank 

Group.
Page 7 GAO-06-179T 

projects.8 Of the Iraqi funds under CPA control from May 2003 to June 2004, 

about $21 billion came from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)9

 and 

$2.65 billion from vested and seized assets from the previous Iraqi regime.10

The CPA disbursed these Iraqi funds primarily to support the 2003 and 2004 

Iraqi budgets for government operating expenses, such as salary payments 

and ministry operations, the public food distribution system, and regional 

government outlays. In addition, CPA used Iraqi funds to support efforts 

such as the import of refined fuels and electricity restoration projects. On 

June 28, 2004, stewardship of the DFI was turned over to the Iraqi interim 

government. Proceeds from Iraqi crude oil exports continue to be 

deposited into the DFI11 and represent more than 90 percent of the $23 

billion in domestic revenue support for the Iraqi 2005 budget.12

According to Iraq’s National Development Strategy, the 2005 Iraqi budget 

planned for nearly $28 billion in expenditure. These expenditures exceed 

estimated domestic revenues by $4.8 billion. However, higher than 

anticipated domestic revenues may offset this deficit. Planned 

expenditures of this budget include about 37 percent for direct subsidies; 

about 21 percent for capital investment, especially in the oil and gas sector; 

about 20 percent for employee wages and pensions; nearly 18 percent for 

goods and services; and about 4 percent for war reparations.13 Direct 

subsidies included the import of gasoline and other refined fuel products 

8

See GAO-05-876 and GAO-04-902R, for more information on the DFI and vested and seized 

Iraqi funds.

9

The DFI was initially comprised of Iraqi oil proceeds, UN Oil for Food program surplus 

funds, and returned Iraqi government and regime financial assets.

10The vested assets were former Iraqi regime funds frozen and held in U.S. financial 

institutions after the first Persian Gulf War and subsequently vested by the President in the 

U.S. Treasury in March 2003. In addition, assets of the former regime were seized by 

coalition forces within Iraq.

11As directed under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 95 percent of oil proceeds are to 

be deposited into the DFI. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 directed that oil proceeds 

would continue to be deposited in the DFI after the CPA transfer of power to Iraq. UN 

Security Council Resolution 1483 directed that 5 percent of oil proceeds are to be deposited 

into a UN Compensation Fund account to process and pay claims for losses resulting from 

Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

12The 2005 Iraqi budget includes an additional $9 billion in aid expected from external 

sources that is to be spent in accordance with grant and loan conditions.

13The $28 billion does not include expenditures associated with the $9 billion in expected aid 

from external sources.
Page 8 GAO-06-179T 

(projected to cost $2.4 billion) and Iraqs’ public distribution system’s basic 

food basket (projected to cost $4 billion). The Iraqi government continues 

to develop plans to reform fuel price subsidies, partly due to an agreement 

with the IMF to reduce subsidies by $1 billion per year, according to IMF 

and agency documents. In addition to subsidy expenditures, Iraq has 

planned for capital investment levels of 21 percent from 2005 to 2007. In 

2005, the majority of these funds were planned for the oil and gas 

sector—about $3 billion of about $5 billion in total for various ministries. 

Iraqi Needs Greater than 

Originally Anticipated

Initial assessments of Iraq’s needs through 2007 by the UN/World Bank and 

the CPA estimated that the reconstruction of Iraq would require about $56 

billion. However, Iraq may need more funding than currently available to 

meet the needs and demands of the country. The state of some Iraqi 

infrastructure was more severely degraded than U.S. officials originally 

anticipated or initial assessments indicated. The condition of the 

infrastructure was further exacerbated by post-2003 conflict looting and 

sabotage. For example, some electrical facilities and transmission lines 

were damaged, and equipment and materials needed to operate treatment 

and sewerage facilities were destroyed by the looting that followed the 

2003 conflict. In the oil sector, a June 2003 U.S. government assessment 

found that over $900 million would be needed to replace looted equipment 

at Iraqi oil facilities. In addition, initial assessments assumed 

reconstruction would take place in a peace-time environment and did not 

include additional security costs. 

Further, these initial assessments assumed that Iraqi government revenues 

and private sector financing would increasingly cover long-term 

reconstruction requirements. However, private sector financing and 

government revenues may not yet meet these needs. In the oil sector alone, 

Iraq will likely need an estimated $30 billion over the next several years to 

reach and sustain an oil production capacity of 5 million barrels per day, 

according to industry experts and U.S. officials.14

14According to State Department monthly estimates from January 2005 to September 2005, 

crude oil production averages ranged from 2.08 to 2.17 million barrels per day (bpd) and 

monthly crude oil export averages ranged from 1.37 to 1.61 million bpd.
Page 9 GAO-06-179T 

Security, Measurement, 

and Sustainability 

Challenges in 

Rebuilding and 

Stabilizing Iraq

The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding 

Iraq. First, the unstable security environment and the continuing strength 

of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer 

security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and engage in rebuilding efforts. 

Second, inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to 

determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. 

Third, the U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with 

Iraq’s inability to sustain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and 

to address maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity 

sectors.

Strength of the Insurgency 

Has Made It Difficult to 

Transfer Security 

Responsibilities to Iraqi 

Forces and Engage in 

Rebuilding Efforts

Over the past 2 years, significant increases in attacks against the coalition 

and coalition partners have made it difficult to transfer security 

responsibilities to Iraqi forces and engage in rebuilding efforts in Iraq. The 

insurgency in Iraq intensified in early 2005 and has remained strong since 

then. Poor security conditions have delayed the transfer of security 

responsibilities to Iraqi forces and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. The 

unstable security environment has also affected the cost and schedule of 

rebuilding efforts and has led, in part, to project delays and increased costs 

for security services.

Insurgency Intensified through 

Early 2005 and Remains Strong

The insurgency intensified through early 2005 and has remained strong 

since then. As we reported in March 2005, the insurgency in 

Iraq—particularly the Sunni insurgency—grew in complexity, intensity, and 

lethality from June 2003 through early 2005.15 Enemy-initiated attacks 

against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure had increased in 

number over time, with the highest peaks occurring in August and 

November 2004 and in January 2005. The November 2004 and January 2005 

attacks primarily occurred in Sunni-majority areas, whereas the August 

2004 attacks took place countrywide. MNF-I is the primary target of the 

attacks, but the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians and security forces 

increased significantly during January 2005, prior to Iraq’s national election 

for a transitional government that was held January 30, 2005. According to 

the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), attacks on Iraq’s 

15For more information on security trends and the makeup of the insurgency, see GAO, 

Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security 

Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police, GAO-05-431T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 

2005). 
Page 10 GAO-06-179T 

Election Day reached about 300, double the previous 1-day high of about 

150 attacks on a day during Ramadan in 2004.

Although the number of attacks decreased immediately after the January 

elections, the strength of the insurgency in Iraq has remained strong and 

generally unchanged since early 2005, according to senior U.S. military 

officers. As shown in figure 2, although enemy-initiated attacks had 

decreased in February and March 2005, they generally increased through 

the end of August 2005. 

Figure 2: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition and Its Partners, by Category, June 2003 through August 2005 

a

According to DIA officials, June 2003 data are incomplete.

According to a senior U.S. military officer, attack levels ebb and flow as the 

various insurgent groups—which are an intrinsic part of Iraq’s 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug.

2003 2004 2005

Attacks on Infrastructure

Attacks on Iraqi government officials

Attacks on Iraqi security forces

Attacks on civilians

Attacks on coalition

Number of attacks

Source: Multi National Corps - Iraq.

a
Page 11 GAO-06-179T 

population—rearm and attack again. As DOD reported in July 2005,16

insurgents share a goal of expelling the Coalition from Iraq and 

destabilizing the Iraqi government to pursue their individual and, at times, 

conflicting goals. Iraqi Sunnis make up the largest proportion of the 

insurgency and present the most significant threat to stability in Iraq. 

Radical Shia groups, violent extremists, criminals, and, to a lesser degree, 

foreign fighters, make up the rest. Senior U.S. military officers believe that 

the insurgents remain adaptive and capable of choosing the time and place 

of their attacks. These officers have also predicted spikes in violence 

around Iraq’s upcoming constitutional referendum scheduled for October 

15, 2005, and the national elections scheduled for December 15, 2005. 

Poor Security Conditions 

Have Delayed Transfer of 

Security Responsibilities to 

Iraqi Forces and Draw 

Down of U.S. Forces

The continuing strength of the insurgency has made it difficult for the 

multinational force to develop effective and loyal Iraqi security forces, 

transfer security responsibilities to them, and progressively draw down 

U.S. forces in Iraq. In February 2004, the multinational force attempted to 

quickly shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces but did not succeed in 

this effort. Police and military units performed poorly during an escalation 

of insurgent attacks in April 2004, with many Iraqi security forces around 

the country collapsing or assisting the insurgency during the uprising. 

About that time, the Deputy Secretary of Defense said that the 

multinational force was engaged in combat in Iraq, rather than in 

peacekeeping as had been expected. The United States decided to maintain 

a force level of about 138,000 troops until at least the end of 2005, rather 

than drawing down to 105,000 troops by May 2004 as DOD had announced 

in November 2003. The United States has maintained roughly the same 

force level of 138,000 troops in Iraq since April 2004,17 as it has sought to 

neutralize the insurgency and develop Iraqi security forces. 

16Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 

July 20, 2005.

17The United States temporarily increased the number of troops in Iraq to about 160,000 

during the January 2005 election period by overlapping units during their planned rotations 

into or out of Iraq and bringing in an additional 12,000 military personnel. On September 2, 

2005, a senior U.S. military officer said that the United States would bring in an additional 

2,000 military personnel for the upcoming referendum and national election in Iraq. On 

October 6, 2005, DOD reported that it had employed overlapping troop rotations to 

temporarily increase the number of U.S. military forces in Iraq to about 152,000. These 

forces will provide additional security for the referendum. 
Page 12 GAO-06-179T 

In late September and early October 2005, the Secretary of Defense and 

senior U.S. military officers reported on their strategy to draw down and 

eventually withdraw U.S. forces as Iraq meets certain conditions. These 

conditions would consider the level of insurgent activity, readiness and 

capability of Iraqi security forces and government institutions, and the 

ability of the coalition forces to reinforce the Iraq security forces if 

necessary. The ability to meet these conditions will be affected by progress 

in political, economic, and other areas. According to the commanding 

general of the multinational force, as conditions are met, multinational 

forces will progressively draw down in phases around the country. By the 

time the multinational force’s end state is achieved, U.S. forces will be 

withdrawn or drawn down to levels associated with a normal bilateral 

security relationship. The defined end state is an Iraq at peace with its 

neighbors, with a representative government that respects the human 

rights of all Iraqis, and with a security force that can maintain domestic 

order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.18

DOD and the multinational force face a number of challenges in 

transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government and security 

forces. As we reported in March 2005, the multinational force faced four 

key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, 

equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a 

system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraq forces; (3) 

building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and 

(4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile 

environment. Further, in a July 2005 report to Congress, DOD noted 

continuing problems with absenteeism in the Iraqi Army, Police Service, 

and Border Police; among those units conducting operations; and units 

relocating elsewhere in Iraq. The report also noted that there was 

insufficient information on the extent to which insurgents have infiltrated 

Iraqi security forces.19 However, in an October 2005 report to Congress, 

DOD noted insurgent infiltration is a more significant problem in Ministry 

of Interior forces than in Ministry of Defence forces.20 Moreover, in early 

18Press conference with Major General Rick Lynch, Deputy Chief of Staff, Multinational 

Force Iraq, Aug. 25, 2005.

19The DOD report noted that insurgent infiltration was low for Special Police Commando 

battalions but high among the Border Police.

20Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 

October 2005.
Page 13 GAO-06-179T 

October 2005, senior U.S. military officers noted challenges in developing 

effective security ministries, as well as logistics capabilities of Iraqi forces. 

Since March 2005, the multinational force has taken some steps to begin 

addressing these challenges. For example, the multinational force has 

embedded transition teams at the battalion, brigade, and division levels of 

Ministry of Defense forces, as well as in the Ministry of Interior’s Special 

Police Commando battalions, the Civil Intervention Force, and the 

Emergency Response Unit. Multinational force transition teams conduct 

new transition readiness assessments that identify the progress and 

shortcomings of Iraqi forces. According to DOD’s report, these assessments 

take into account a variety of criteria that are similar but not identical to 

those the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units’ operational readiness, 

including personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, 

equipment, and leadership. The assessments place Iraqi units into one of 

the following four categories: 

• Level 1 units are fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

independent counterinsurgency operations.

• Level 2 units are capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.

• Level 3 units are partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency 

operations in conjunction with coalition units.

• Level 4 units are forming or otherwise incapable of conducting 

counterinsurgency operations.

The multinational force is also preparing similar readiness assessments on 

the Iraqi police through partnerships at the provincial levels. These 

assessments look at factors that are tailored to the tasks of a police force, 

including patrol/traffic operations, detainee operations, and case 

management. 

According to DOD’s October 2005 report and DOD officials, Iraqi combat 

forces have made progress in developing the skills necessary to assume 

control of counterinsurgency operations. However, they also recognize that 

Iraqi forces will not be able to operate independently for some time 

because they need logistical capabilities, ministry capacity, and command 

and control and intelligence structures. According to DOD’s October 2005 

report, Iraq has 116 police and army combat battalions actively conducting 
Page 14 GAO-06-179T 

counter insurgency operations. This number corresponds to the number of 

battalions in levels 1, 2, and 3 described above. Of these battalions, 1 

battalion was assessed as level 1, that is, fully capable of planning, 

executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations. 

Thirty-seven were level 2, or capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations with coalition support; and 78 were level 

3—partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in 

conjunction with coalition units. The assessment of Iraqi units’ capabilities 

also considers the threat level they face. According to a senior U.S. military 

officer, Iraqi forces have more quickly progressed from level 3 to level 2 in 

areas that have experienced fewer insurgent attacks, such as southern Iraq. 

GAO’s forthcoming classified report on Iraq’s security situation will provide 

further information and analysis on the challenges to developing Iraqi 

security forces and the conditions for the phased draw down of U.S. and 

other coalition forces.

Security Situation Has Affected 

Rebuilding Efforts

The security situation in Iraq has affected the cost and schedule of 

reconstruction efforts. Security conditions have, in part, led to project 

delays and increased costs for security services. Although it is difficult to 

quantify the costs in time and money resulting from poor security 

conditions, both agency and contractor officials acknowledged that 

security costs have diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction 

resources and have led to canceling or reducing the scope of some 

reconstruction projects. For example, in March 2005, the USAID cancelled 

two electrical power generation-related task orders21 totaling nearly $15 

million to help pay for increased security costs incurred at another power 

generation project in southern Baghdad. In another example, work was 

suspended at a sewer repair project in central Iraq for 4 months in 2004 due 

to security concerns. In a September 2005 testimony, the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction and a USAID official also observed that the 

cost of security had taken money away from reconstruction and slowed 

down reconstruction efforts.22

21Task orders are placed against established contracts for the performance of tasks during 

the period of the contracts.

22U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, “Oversight Hearing on Iraq 

Reconstruction,” September 7, 2005, Washington, D.C.
Page 15 GAO-06-179T 

However, the actual cost that security has added to reconstruction projects 

is uncertain. We reported in July 2005, that, for 8 of 15 reconstruction 

contracts we reviewed, the cost to obtain private security providers and 

security-related equipment accounted for more than 15 percent of contract 

costs, as of December 31, 2004.23 Our analysis and discussions with agency 

and contractor officials identified several factors that influenced security 

costs, including (1) the nature and location of the work, (2) the type of 

security required and the security approach taken, and (3) the degree to 

which the military provided the contractor security services. For example, 

projects that took place in fixed locations were generally less expensive to 

secure than a project, such as electrical transmission lines, which extended 

over a large geographic location. In addition, some contractors made more 

extensive use of local Iraqi labor and employed less costly Iraqi security 

guards, while others were able to make use of security provided by the U.S. 

military or coalition forces.

Our analysis did not include increased transportation or administrative 

expenses caused by security-related work stoppages or delays, or the cost 

associated with repairing the damage caused by the insurgency on work 

previously completed. We also excluded the cost associated with the 

training and equipping of Iraqi security forces and the costs borne by DOD 

in maintaining, equipping, and supporting U.S. troops in Iraq.

In July 2005, to improve agencies’ ability to assess the impact of and 

manage security costs in future reconstruction efforts, we recommended 

that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator, 

USAID, establish a means to track and account for security costs to 

develop more accurate budget estimates. State did not indicate whether it 

agreed with our recommendation, Defense agreed, and USAID did not 

comment on the recommendation.

In addition, the security environment in Iraq also has led to severe 

restrictions on the movement of civilian staff around the country and 

23Several contractor officials noted that the cost of security relative to total contract costs 

can vary over time. For example, they noted that initial security costs, such as for mobilizing 

and equipping security personnel and purchasing armored vehicles, can be considerable in 

relation to the amount of reconstruction work authorized. As additional work is authorized, 

the relative percentage accounted for by security costs may decrease considerably. See 

GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers, 

GAO-05-737 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005) for more information on the use and costs of 

private security providers.
Page 16 GAO-06-179T 

reductions of a U.S. presence at reconstruction sites, according to U.S. 

agency officials and contractors. For example, work at a wastewater plant 

in central Iraq was halted for approximately 2 months in early 2005 because 

insurgent threats drove subcontractors away and made the work too 

hazardous to perform. In the assistance provided to support the electoral 

process, U.S. funded grantees and contractors also faced security 

restrictions that hampered their movements and limited the scope of their 

work. For example, IFES24 was not able to send its advisors to most of the 

governorate-level elections administration offices, which hampered 

training and operations at those facilities leading up to Iraq’s Election Day 

on January 30, 2005.

While poor security conditions have slowed reconstruction and increased 

costs, a variety of management challenges have also adversely affected the 

implementation of the U.S. reconstruction program. In September 2005, we 

reported that management challenges such as low initial cost estimates and 

delays in funding and awarding task orders have also led to the reduced 

scope of the water and sanitation program and delays in starting projects. 

In addition, U.S. agency and contractor officials have cited difficulties in 

initially defining project scope, schedule, and cost, as well as concerns with 

project execution, as further impeding progress and increasing program 

costs. These difficulties include lack of agreement among U.S. agencies, 

contractors, and Iraqi authorities; high staff turnover; an inflationary 

environment that makes it difficult to submit accurate pricing; 

unanticipated project site conditions; and uncertain ownership of projects 

sites.

Limited Performance Data 

and Measures and 

Inadequate Reporting 

Present Difficulties in 

Determining Progress and 

Impact of Rebuilding Effort

State has set broad goals for providing essential services, and the U.S. 

program has undertaken many rebuilding activities in Iraq. The U.S. 

program has made some progress in accomplishing rebuilding activities, 

such as rehabilitating some oil facilities to restart Iraq’s oil production, 

increasing electrical generation capacity, restoring some water treatment 

plants, and reestablishing Iraqi health services. However, limited 

performance data and measures make it difficult to determine and report 

24IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Elections Systems. IFES is a 

nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 1987 that provides technical assistance 

concerning democracy and governance to transitional democracies. In 2004, USAID gave 

IFES a $40 million grant to provide technical assistance to the Independent Electoral 

Commission of Iraq through the end of 2005 to help it administer elections.
Page 17 GAO-06-179T 

on the progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction. For example, in the 

water and sanitation, health, and electricity sectors, limited performance 

data and reporting measures are output focused and make it difficult to 

accurately measure program results and assess the effectiveness of U.S. 

reconstruction efforts. Although information is difficult to obtain in an 

unstable security environment, opinion surveys and additional outcome 

measures have the potential to help determine progress and gauge the 

impact of the U.S. reconstruction efforts on the lives of the Iraqi people.

• In the water and sanitation sector, the Department of State has primarily 

reported on the numbers of projects completed and the expected 

capacity of reconstructed treatment plants. However, we found that the 

data are incomplete and do not provide information on the scope and 

cost of individual projects nor do they indicate how much clean water is 

reaching intended users as a result of these projects. For example, 

although State reported that 143 projects were complete as of early July 

2005, it could not document the location, scope, and cost of these 

projects. Moreover, reporting only the number of projects completed or 

under way provides little information on how U.S. efforts are improving 

the amount and quality of water reaching Iraqi households or their 

access to sanitation services. Information on access to water and its 

quality is difficult to obtain without adequate security or water metering 

facilities. However, opinion surveys assessing Iraqis’ access and 

satisfaction with water sanitation services have found dissatisfaction 

with these services. The most recent USAID quality of life survey, in 

February 2005, found that just over half of respondents rated their water 

supply as poor to fair and over 80 percent rated their sewerage and 

wastewater disposal as poor to fair. These surveys demonstrate the 

potential for gathering data to help gauge the impact of U.S. 

reconstruction efforts.

• Limitations in health sector measurements also make it difficult to 

relate the progress of U.S. activities to its overall effort to improve the 

quality and access of health care in Iraq. Department of State 

measurements of progress in the health sector primarily track the 

number of completed facilities, an indicator of increased access to 

health care. For example, State reported that the construction of 145 out 

of 300 health clinics had been completed, as of August 31, 2005. 

However, the data available do not indicate the adequacy of equipment 

levels, staffing levels, or quality of care provided to the Iraqi population. 

Monitoring the staffing, training, and equipment levels at health facilities 

may help gauge the effectiveness of the U.S. reconstruction program 
Page 18 GAO-06-179T 

and its impact on the Iraqi people. In addition, opinion surveys assessing 

Iraqis’ access and satisfaction with health services also have the 

potential for gathering data to help gauge the impact of U.S. 

reconstruction efforts. For example, the most recent USAID quality of 

life survey, in February 2005, found that the majority of Iraqis approved 

of the primary healthcare services they received; although fewer than 

half of the respondents approved of the level of health care at Ta’mim, 

Al Basrah, and Maysan governorates.

• In the electricity sector, U.S. agencies have primarily reported on 

generation measures such as levels of added or restored generation 

capacity and daily power generation of electricity; numbers of projects 

completed; and average daily hours of power. For example, as of May 

2005, U.S.-funded projects reportedly had added or restored about 1,900 

megawatts of generation capacity to Iraq’s power grid. However, these 

data do not show whether (1) the power generated is uninterrupted for 

the period specified (eg., average number of hours per day), (2) there 

are regional or geographic differences in the quantity of power 

generated, and (3) how much power is reaching intended users. 

Information on the distribution and access of electricity is difficult to 

obtain without adequate security or accurate metering capabilities. 

However, opinion surveys assessing Iraqis’ access and satisfaction with 

electricity services have found dissatisfaction with these services. The 

February 2005 USAID survey found that 74 percent of the respondents 

rated the overall quality of electricity supply as poor or very poor. The 

surveys also found that the delivery of electricity directly influenced the 

perceived legitimacy of local government for many respondents. These 

surveys demonstrate the potential for gathering data to help gauge the 

impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts.

In September 2005, we recommended that the Secretary of State address 

this issue of measuring progress and impact in the water and sanitation 

sector. State agreed with our recommendation and stated that it is taking 

steps to address the problem.

Iraq’s Capacity to Operate 

and Maintain U.S.-Funded 

Projects Presents 

Sustainability Problems

The U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with the 

Iraqis’ ability to sustain the new and rehabilitated infrastructure and 

address maintenance needs. In the water, sanitation, and electricity 

sectors, in particular, some projects have been completed but have 

sustained damage or become inoperable due to the Iraqis’ problems 

maintaining or properly operating them.
Page 19 GAO-06-179T 

In the water and sanitation sector, U.S. agencies have identified limitations 

in the Iraqis’ capacity to maintain and operate reconstructed facilities, 

including problems with staffing, unreliable power to run treatment plants, 

insufficient spare parts, and poor operations and maintenance procedures. 

As of June 2005, approximately $52 million of the $200 million in completed 

large-scale water and sanitation projects either were not operating or were 

operating at lower capacity due to looting of key equipment and shortages 

of reliable power, trained Iraqi staff, and required chemicals and supplies. 

For example, one repaired wastewater plant was partially shut down due to 

the looting of key electrical equipment and repaired water plants in one 

southern governorate lacked adequate electricity and necessary water 

treatment chemicals. In addition, two projects lacked a reliable power 

supply, one lacked sufficient staff to operate properly, and one lacked both 

adequate staff and power supplies. In response, U.S. agencies have taken 

initial steps to improve Iraqi capacity to operate and maintain water and 

sanitation facilities. For example, in August 2005, USAID awarded a 

contract to provide additional maintenance and training support for 6 

completed water and sanitation facilities.

The U.S. embassy in Iraq stated that it was moving from the previous model 

of building and turning over projects to Iraqi management toward a 

“build-train-turnover” system to protect the U.S. investment. However, 

these efforts are just beginning, and the U.S. assistance does not address 

the long-term ability of the Iraqi government to support, staff, and equip 

these facilities. It is unclear whether the Iraqis will be able to maintain and 

operate completed projects and the more than $1 billion in additional 

large-scale water and sanitation projects expected to be completed through 

2008. Without assurance that the Iraqis have adequate resources to 

maintain and operate completed projects, the U.S. water and sanitation 

reconstruction program risks expending funds on projects with limited 

long-term impact. In September 2005, we recommended that the Secretary 

of State address the issue of sustainability in the water and sanitation 

sector. State agreed with our recommendation and stated that it is taking 

steps to address the problem.

In the electricity sector, the Iraqis’ capacity to operate and maintain the 

power plant infrastructure and equipment provided by the United States 

remains a challenge at both the plant and ministry levels. As a result, the 

infrastructure and equipment remain at risk of damage following their 

transfer to the Iraqis. In our interviews with Iraqi power plant officials from 

13 locations throughout Iraq, the officials stated that their training did not 

adequately prepare them to operate and maintain the new U.S.-provided 
Page 20 GAO-06-179T 

gas turbine engines. Due to limited access to natural gas, some Iraqi power 

plants are using low-grade oil to fuel their natural gas combustion engines. 

The use of oil-based fuels, without adequate equipment modification and 

fuel treatment, decreases the power output of the turbines by up to 50 

percent, requires three times more maintenance, and could result in 

equipment failure and damage that significantly reduces the life of the 

equipment, according to U.S. and Iraqi power plant officials.

U.S. officials have acknowledged that more needs to be done to train plant 

operators and ensure that advisory services are provided after the turnover 

date. To address this issue, USAID implemented a project, in February 

2005, to train selected electricity plant officials (plant managers, 

supervisors, and equipment operators) in plant operations and 

maintenance. According to DOD, PCO also has awarded one contract and 

is developing another to address operations and maintenance concerns.

Although agencies had incorporated some training programs and the 

development of operations and maintenance capacity into individual 

projects, recent problems with the turnover of completed projects, such as 

those in the water and sanitation and electricity sectors, have led to a 

greater interagency focus on improving project sustainability. In May 2005, 

an interagency working group including State, USAID, PCO, and the Corps 

of Engineers, was formed to identify ways of addressing Iraq’s capacity 

development needs.

The working group reported that a number of critical infrastructure 

facilities constructed or rehabilitated under U.S. funding have failed, will 

fail, or will operate in sub-optimized conditions following handover to the 

Iraqis. They found that a number of USAID and PCO projects encountered 

significant problems in facility management and operations and 

maintenance when turned over to the Iraqis or shortly thereafter. To 

mitigate the potential for project failures, the working group recommended 

increasing the period of operational support for constructed facilities from 

a 90-day period to a period of up to one year. According to a State 

department official, as of September 22, 2005, the recommendations are 

currently under active consideration and discussion by the Embassy 

Baghdad and Washington.

Conclusion For the past two and half years, the United States has served as the chief 

protector and builder in Iraq. The long-term goal is to achieve a peaceful 

Iraq that has a representative government respectful of human rights and 
Page 21 GAO-06-179T 

the means to maintain domestic order and quell terrorism. To achieve this 

goal, the United States has provided $30 billion to develop capable Iraqi 

security forces, rebuild a looted and worn infrastructure, and support 

democratic elections.

However, the United States has confronted a capable and lethal insurgency 

that has taken many lives and made rebuilding Iraq a costly and challenging 

endeavor. It is unclear when Iraqi security forces will be capable of 

operating independently, thereby enabling the United States to reduce its 

military presence. 

Similarly, it is unclear how U.S. efforts are helping the Iraqi people obtain 

clean water, reliable electricity, or competent health care. Measuring the 

outcomes of U.S. efforts is needed to determine how they are having a 

positive impact on the daily lives of the Iraqi people. 

Finally, the United States must ensure that the billions of dollars it has 

already invested in Iraq’s infrastructure are not wasted. The Iraqis need 

additional training and preparation to operate and maintain the power 

plants, water and sewage treatment facilities, and health care centers the 

United States has rebuilt or restored. This would help ensure that the 

rebuilding efforts improve Iraq’s economy and social conditions and 

establish a secure, peaceful, and democratic Iraq.

We will continue to examine the challenges the United States faces in 

rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. Specifically, we will examine the efforts to 

stabilize Iraq and develop its security forces, including the challenge of 

ensuring that Iraq can independently fund, sustain, and support its new 

security forces; examine the management of the U.S. rebuilding effort, 

including program execution; and assess the progress made in developing 

Iraq’s energy sectors, including the sectors’ needs, existing resources and 

contributions, achievements, and future challenges.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.
Page 22 GAO-06-179T 

Appendix I

Contact and Staff Acknowledgements ApendxiI

For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512-

8979. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony were 

Monica Brym, Lynn Cothern, Tim DiNapoli, Muriel Forster, Charles D. 

Groves, B. Patrick Hickey, Sarah Lynch, Judy McCloskey, Kendall Schaefer, 

Michael Simon, and Audrey Solis.

(320390)
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