[Cite as Parker v. Wilcox, 2019-Ohio-75.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 

NAKYIA D. PARKER, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 CASE NO. 2018-T-0041

 - vs - : 

RONALD D. WILCOX, et al., : 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

Civil Appeal from the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2017 CV 

01012. 

Judgment: Appeal dismissed. 

Nakyia D. Parker, pro se, PID: #A690-764, Lake Erie Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 

8000, 501 Thompson Road, Conneaut, OH 44030 (Plaintiff-Appellant). 

Frank G. Mazgaj, Emily R. Yoder, and Catherine E. Nagy, Hanna, Campbell & Powell, 

LLP, 3737 Embassy Parkway, Suite 100, P. O. Box 5521, Akron, OH 44333 (For Ronald 

D. Wilcox and Daniel Parker, Defendants-Appellees). 

Michael R. Shanabruch, and Sonia Whitehouse, 625 Alpha Drive, Box #011 B, Highland 

Heights, OH 44143, and William M. Shackelford, 8040 Cleveland Avenue, N.W., Suite 

400, Canton, OH 44720 (For Progressive Preferred Insurance Company, DefendantAppellee). 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Nakyia D. Parker, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for 

reconsideration of its prior dismissal. We dismiss. 
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{¶2} Appellant’s refiled case was dismissed in its entirety against all remaining 

parties for failure to prosecute under Civ.R. 41(B)(1). That dismissal was appealed to this 

court and was dismissed as untimely. Parker v. Wilcox, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2018-T0016, 2018-Ohio-1215. 

{¶3} Dismissal in its entirety under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) is a final judgment. McCann 

v. Lakewood, 95 Ohio App.3d 226, 231, 642 N.E.2d 48 (8th Dist.1994). Having failed to 

timely appeal the dismissal, and in an effort to circumvent this court’s prior dismissal, he 

now appeals the denied motion for reconsideration. 

{¶4} The Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for motions for reconsideration 

after a final judgment in a trial court. Pitts v. Dept. of Transportation, 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 

423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981). Accordingly, a judgment entered on a motion for 

reconsideration is a nullity and cannot be appealed. McCullough v. Catholic Diocese of 

Columbus, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 99CA77, 2000 WL 329658 (Mar. 13, 2000), citing 

Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St.2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974). We, therefore, lack 

jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s appeal. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA90, 2018-Ohio-3642, ¶18. 

{¶5} Moreover, the substance of appellant’s argument goes not to the trial court’s 

dismissal, but rather, its denial of his motion to vacate that was not appealed. 

{¶6} Appellant’s appeal is dismissed. 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., concurs, 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion. 

____________________ 
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COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J., concurs with a Concurring Opinion. 

{¶7} I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we lack jurisdiction of Mr. Parker’s 

appeal. However, a brief discussion of the issues he attempts to raise would benefit him, 

by demonstrating that we take his rights seriously. I would, therefore, include the 

following. 

{¶8} June 20, 2012, Mr. Parker was struck by a vehicle driven by Daniel Parker, 

belonging to Ronald Wilcox. Mr. Parker retained counsel, and filed an action sounding in 

negligence against Daniel Parker, Mr. Wilcox, and Progressive Preferred Insurance 

Company on June 19, 2014. Mr. Parker alleged Progressive owed him medical 

payments, and UM/UIM coverage. Eventually, Mr. Wilcox moved for summary judgment, 

which was granted. March 30, 2015, Mr. Parker voluntarily dismissed his remaining 

claims. 

{¶9} June 16, 2017, Mr. Parker, proceeding pro se, refiled his complaint. The 

refiled complaint listed his address as 1815 Southwest Blvd., Warren, Ohio, 44485, and 

this address was entered on the docket. July 13, 2017, Progressive moved to dismiss 

and/or for summary judgment, alleging the refiled complaint was untimely. 

{¶10} A status conference was held August 23, 2017. Mr. Parker failed to appear. 

{¶11} September 5, 2017, Mr. Wilcox moved for summary judgment. Mr. Parker 

failed to respond, and the motion was granted. 

{¶12} November 16, 2017, Mr. Wilcox moved to dismiss. Mr. Parker failed to 

respond. 

{¶13} A status conference was held December 14, 2017. Mr. Parker failed to 

appear. 
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{¶14} Mr. Parker never responded to any discovery served on him. 

{¶15} January 9, 2018. The trial court dismissed the action. 

{¶16} January 31, 2018, Mr. Parker moved to vacate the judgment entry of 

dismissal, contending he had never been served with any hearing notice, or discovery, or 

any motions. Mr. Parker revealed he was, unfortunately, incarcerated at the Lake Erie 

Correctional Facility in Ashtabula County, Ohio. 

{¶17} February 9, 2018, Mr. Parker appealed the judgment entry of dismissal. By 

a memorandum opinion and judgment entry filed March 30, 2018, this court dismissed 

the appeal as untimely. 

{¶18} February 13, 2018, the trial court filed a judgment entry, denying the motion 

to vacate, which it treated as a motion for relief from judgment. In so doing, the trial court 

observed that Mr. Parker had never informed it or the clerk of court of his change of 

address, and further, he had a duty to monitor the docket. Mr. Parker did not appeal this 

judgment entry. Instead, April 9, 2018, he moved the trial court to reconsider its January 

9, 2018 judgment entry a second time. April 12, 2018, the trial court denied this motion. 

Mr. Parker timely appealed, assigning a single error: “The trial court abused its discretion 

when it denied appellant’s (Parker) motion for reconsideration and/or relief after judgment 

pursuant to Civ.R. 60.” 

{¶19} We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for 

abuse of discretion. Huntington Natl. Bank v. Lomaz, 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2008-P0007, 2008-P-0061, 2010-Ohio-705, ¶27. Regarding this standard, we recall the term 

“abuse of discretion” is one of art, connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither 

comports with reason, nor the record. State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678 
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(1925). An abuse of discretion may be found when the trial court “applies the wrong legal 

standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of 

fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶15 (8th Dist.) 

{¶20} Civ.R. 60(B) provides, in pertinent part: 

{¶21} “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 

or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following 

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 

new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment 

has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 

should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the 

judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) 

and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or 

taken. * * * ” 

{¶22} “Civ.R. 60(B) is an equitable remedy that is intended to afford relief in the 

interest of justice. To prevail on a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must 

demonstrate: ‘(* * *)(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is 

granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) 

through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time (* * *).’ GTE Automatic 

Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, * * *, at paragraph two of 

the syllabus. These requirements are conjunctive; not disjunctive. Id. at 151, * * *.” 
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Ludlow v. Ludlow, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2006-G-2686, 2006-Ohio-6884, ¶23. (Parallel 

citation omitted.) 

{¶23} Again, Mr. Parker’s essential argument appears to be he lacked notice 

regarding anything occurring in the trial court, since all papers were being sent to the 

address in Warren, Ohio, rather than to the prison. This is an assertion of “excusable 

neglect,” pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1). We find the argument unpersuasive for several 

reasons. 

{¶24} First, Mr. Parker provided the clerk of courts with the Warren address – 

evidently after he was already in prison. 

{¶25} Second, as the trial court observed, parties bear the burden of informing the 

clerk of courts, and the other parties, of any change in address. Robb v. Smallwood, 165 

Ohio App.3d 385, 2005-Ohio-385, ¶11 (4th Dist.). Mr. Parker did not do so. 

{¶26} Third, as Progressive noted in the trial court, the refiled action was untimely, 

pursuant to R.C. 2305.19(A). 

{¶27} Fourth, Mr. Wilcox had been granted summary judgment in the initial action. 

This means any claims against him are barred by res judicata. 

{¶28} Fifth, in conjunction with his second motion for relief from judgment, Mr. 

Parker filed the affidavit of Barbara J. Brochak, the Progressive adjuster handling his 

claim, stating that he was not insured by Progressive at the time of the accident. We fail 

to see how Progressive could be liable to Mr. Parker for medical payments, or UM/UIM 

coverage, when he was not their insured. 

{¶29} The assignment of error lacks merit.