Interstate Identification

Index Name Check

Efficacy:

Report of the National

Task Force to the

U.S. Attorney General

July 1999
SEARCH

The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics

7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 145

Sacramento, California 95831

(916) 392-2550 • www.search.org

This report was published by SEARCH, The National Consortium for

Justice Information and Statistics, under Cooperative Agreement #95-RU-RX-K001,

with the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.
Interstate Identification Index

Name Check Efficacy

Report of the National Task Force

to the U.S. Attorney General

July 1999, NCJ-179358
Acknowledgments

The National Task Force on Interstate Identification Index Name Check Efficacy

expresses its appreciation to the Honorable Janet Reno for initiating this Task Force effort

and bringing empirical data to bear upon the difficult policy issues associated with the

increasing demand to conduct national criminal history background checks on individual

applicants. Appreciation also is extended to the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information

Services Advisory Policy Board and its Chairman Emeritus Joe Bonino for advocating

the study. In addition, the Task Force wishes to acknowledge the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice for its funding of the study and for serving as a

valuable resource throughout the Task Force deliberations. Finally, special appreciation

is expressed to Cathy Riley, FBI Management Analyst; Sheila Barton and Paul Woodard,

SEARCH staff; and Michael Cahn and Dr. James Tien, Queues Enforth Development,

Inc. for their work in staffing the meetings and carrying out the research study upon

which the Task Force relied for guidance in making its recommendations to the U.S.

Attorney General.

ii
Table of Contents

Preface ................................................................................ 1

Conclusions and Recommendations ................................... 5

Appendix A

National Task Force on Interstate Identification

Index Name Check Efficacy ............................................. 11

Appendix B

SEARCH/Q.E.D. Interstate Identification

Index Name Check Efficacy Study .................................. 15

Appendix C

Interim Report of the National Task Force

to the U.S. Attorney General ............................................ 69

Appendix D

FBI “Analysis of False Negative Data”............................ 79

Appendix E

Florida Statutory Requirements for

Fingerprint Submissions ................................................... 89

iii
iv
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force 1

Preface

This report sets out the conclusions and recommendations of the Task

Force on Interstate Identification Index Name Check Efficacy. A list of

Task Force members and their affiliations is included as Appendix A.

The Task Force was formed to conduct a study to determine the accuracy of identifications resulting from name checks of the Interstate

Identification Index (III) compared to identifications resulting from

fingerprint-based searches of the FBI’s criminal history record files. In

addition, the Task Force undertook to evaluate inaccurate identifications or missed identifications resulting from name checks.

The III Index is an automated index of persons maintained by the FBI

which includes names and personal identification information relating

to most individuals who have been arrested or indicted for a serious

criminal offense anywhere in the country. The Index includes persons

born in 1956 or later concerning whom an arrest fingerprint card has

been submitted to the FBI at any time and persons born prior to 1956

whose first arrest fingerprint card was submitted to the FBI on or after

July 1, 1974, as well as numerous older records, certain fugitives and

repeat offenders. The FBI maintains automated fingerprints and automated criminal history records for these approximately 29 million

individuals. The FBI also maintains about 5 million manual criminal

history records on individuals who were born prior to 1956 and whose

most recent arrest (or background check) was prior to July 1, 1974.

These individuals’ names are not included in the III Index, but their

fingerprints are automated and their names are included in an automated index used internally by the FBI for processing arrest fingerprints and civil applicant fingerprints.

Criminal history background checks based on fingerprints are considered by criminal justice officials to be extremely accurate. Searches of

newer Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems are thought to

result in error rates of only a small fraction of one percent of all

searches. By contrast, criminal history background checks based

solely on non-unique identifiers, such as name, sex, race and date of

birth, are known to result in significant numbers of two types of errors,

generally referred to as “false positives” and “false negatives.” False

positives occur when individuals are erroneously associated with
2 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force

criminal records that actually relate to other individuals with similar

names and other identifiers. False negatives occur when name checks

fail to find the criminal records of individuals who provide inaccurate

identification information either at the time of arrest or when applying

for a job. False negative occurrences also may be attributed to misspellings or other such errors. Prior to the formation of the Task Force,

no study had been undertaken in which both III name checks and FBI

fingerprint searches were conducted for all study applicants in order to

document the frequency of false positives and false negatives resulting

from III name checks.

The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 amended the

United States Housing Act of 1937 to require police departments and

other law enforcement agencies to conduct national criminal history

background checks, upon request, of public housing tenants or applicants. On May 29, 1996, the Attorney General and the Secretary of

Housing and Urban Development (HUD) entered into a Memorandum

of Understanding providing that, upon request by a public housing

authority (PHA), a state or local law enforcement agency shall conduct

a III name check to determine whether a public housing applicant or

tenant may have a criminal history record indexed in the III system.

Under the terms of the agreement, if a III name check reveals that a

tenant or applicant may have a criminal history record (i.e., there is a

name check “hit”), the PHA must obtain and submit the fingerprints of

the individual. If the fingerprints verify the accuracy of the identification,

the criminal history record may be made available to the PHA for use

for authorized purposes.

The Memorandum of Understanding stated that it would remain in

effect for six months, and thereafter, its effectiveness would be evaluated. The Task Force was formed to plan and oversee the evaluation

and to evaluate the efficacy of name checks in performing criminal

history background checks for noncriminal justice purposes generally.

In August 1998, the Bureau of Justice Statistics requested that

SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics (SEARCH) and Queues Enforth Development, Inc. (Q.E.D.) cooperatively plan and conduct the study under the guidance of the Task

Force and prepare a final study report subject to the approval of the

Task Force. Q.E.D. developed a research design for the study that
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force 3

was approved by the Task Force on October 12, 1998. The design

provided for the analysis of criminal history background check outcomes for three types of noncriminal justice applicants: (1) public

housing tenants and applicants from six participating Public Housing

Authorities, (2) volunteer applicants from Arizona, California and Maryland, and (3) applicants for employment or occupational licensing from

Florida. For all applicants for whom fingerprint cards were submitted,1

initial III name checks were performed, followed by FBI fingerprint

searches without regard to the outcome of the name checks. Thus,

name check results and fingerprint search results could be compared

for all cases included in the analysis.

The analysis included criminal history background checks of 93,274

Florida employment or licensing applicants initiated between October

1, 1998 and January 31, 1999; 323 public housing applicants initiated

between November 10. 1998 and February 10, 1999; and 2,550 volunteer applicants initiated between November 12, 1998 and February 12,

1999. The Task Force approved the SEARCH/Q.E.D study on July 13,

1999. It is attached to this report as Appendix B.

The study concluded that the numbers of cases of public housing

applicants and volunteer applicants included in the analysis were

insufficient to yield findings in which confidence could be placed; therefore, no findings for these types of applicants were set out.2

 Moreover,

the study observed that: (1) most of the nation’s public housing authorities are not taking advantage of the law authorizing them to request national criminal background checks, (2) the few that are taking

advantage of the law are in primarily small jurisdictions, and (3) many

of the public housing authorities that are requesting III name checks of

public housing tenants or applicants are not following the procedures

set out in the Memorandum of Understanding–specifically, they are not

always obtaining and submitting the fingerprints of persons whose

1

 In the case of the Florida applicants, if Florida got a name check hit and a confirmation by

Florida fingerprint comparison, the applicant card was not sent to the FBI. This occurred

4,859 times according to the SEARCH/Q.E.D. Study, infra.

2

 It should be noted that attempts were made by HUD to obtain participation of other large,

diverse PHAs, which declined. It also should be noted that the states that were requested to

participate in the volunteer portion of the study fully cooperated. The number of volunteer

applicants during the study period, however, was not numerically large enough to have

confidence in the outcomes.
4 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force

name checks reveal that they may have criminal records indexed in the

III system. These observations were communicated to the Attorney

General in an interim letter report on January 27, 1999, attached here

as Appendix C.

Based upon the large number of Florida employment/licensing applications analyzed during the study, the findings concerning them are

statistically significant. Although the findings relate to Florida applicants only and cannot be generalized with confidence as nationally

representative, the Task Force believes that they can be viewed as

relevant to the efficacy of name checks for civil employment applications generally, particularly since they are the only statistically significant findings available.

In addition to the SEARCH/Q.E.D. study, the Task Force reviewed

other relevant materials, including a January 1997 report by the General Accounting Office on national fingerprint-based background

checks initiated in five states under the National Child Protection Act of

1993;3

 a 1997 FBI analysis of civil applicant fingerprint cards processed by the FBI;4

 an updated analysis of “False Negative Data”

prepared by the FBI; and a February 1999 report by the General Accounting Office on military recruiting.5

 The FBI analysis is unpublished,

but is attached for reference to this report as Appendices D and E. The

findings set out in these reports are generally consistent with and

augment those set out in the SEARCH/Q.E.D. study and provide

additional support for the Task Force’s conclusions and recommendations. In addition, in formulating the findings and recommendations set

out below, the members of the Task Force drew upon their own extensive professional knowledge and experience.

3 Fingerprint-Based Background Checks, Implementation of the National Child Protection Act

of 1993, Report to the Honorable Fred Thompson, U. S. Senate, by the United States General

Accounting Office, Washington, D. C. 20548, # GAO/GGD 97-32, January 1997.

4

 U. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information

Services Division, Washington, D. C., Civil Fingerprint Card “Hit” Survey, Part I, Executive

Summary and Part II, Methodology and Analysis, April 1998-Final.

5 Military Recruiting, Report to the Honorable Wayne Allard, Chairman, and the Honorable

Max Cleland, Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on

Armed Services, United States Senate, General Accounting Office, National Security and

International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C., 20548, # B-28179, February 23, 1999.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

Concerning national criminal history record background checks of

public housing applicants, the Task Force approved the following

conclusion and recommendation:

1. The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact

became effective on April 28, 1999.6 The Compact governs the use of the III system for conducting national

criminal history record searches for non-criminal justice

purposes. Article V provides that all requests for III criminal history record searches for noncriminal justice purposes shall be accompanied by fingerprints.7

 The Article

provides further that all such requests shall be submitted

to a state criminal history repository or to the FBI.8 Since

the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) authorizes

local law enforcement agencies to conduct III name

searches for Public Housing Authorities, the Task Force

believes it may be in conflict with the Compact and thus

6

 By its terms, the Compact became effective when ratified by the federal government and

two states. Federal ratification was completed when the President signed S. 2022 on

October 9, 1998. Montana ratified the Compact on April 18, 1999. followed by Georgia on

April 28, 1999, making the Compact effective. Subsequently, two additional states ratified

the Compact—Nevada on May 14, 1999 and Florida on June 9, 1999.

7

 The Compact Council established by the Compact may at some future time approve the use

of other biometric identification techniques if it determines that such techniques are at least as

reliable as fingerprints in establishing positive identification.

8

 If the FBI or a state repository identifies a record subject as having a III-indexed record, it

may use the III index to obtain any parts of the record maintained by any other Compact

party. Article V provides that:

“Direct access to the National Identification Index [III]

by entities other than the FBI and State criminal history

records repositories shall not be permitted for noncriminal

justice purposes.” Art. V § (c).
6 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force

may be ineffective.9 Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that the issue of the extension of the MOU be

considered moot.

Concerning name check efficacy generally, the Task Force approved

the following conclusions and recommendations:

2. FBI fingerprint searches are highly preferable to III name

checks as a means of criminal history screening. Individual fingerprint patterns are known to be unique.10 For

this reason, fingerprint comparison is, and has for many

decades been, the accepted standard for establishing

positive identification of criminal history record subjects

in the United States. Modern automated fingerprint identification systems are believed to produce identification

error rates of less than one percent. Compared to FBI

fingerprint searches, III name checks result in appreciable

numbers of both false positives and false negatives.

This conclusion is based on the following major findings

set out in the SEARCH/Q.E.D. study concerning the 93,274

Florida employment applicants who were subjected to both III

name checks and FBI fingerprint searches:

9

 The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-120, 110 Stat. 837,

did not indicate the method by which national criminal history record checks were to be

conducted for Public Housing Authorities. The Memorandum of Understanding providing for

name checks for such purposes was approved by the Attorney General as an exception to the

FBI’s longstanding policy requiring that noncriminal justice record searches be fingerprintbased in the absence of explicit statutory authority to the contrary. The fingerprint

requirement is now set out in the Compact, which is federal law and has superceded FBI

policy on this issue.

10 A study conducted by Lockheed Martin Corp. for the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information

Services Division established that the probability that any single fingerprint is identical to any

other fingerprint is one chance in 10 to the 86th power (10 followed by 86 zeroes). The study

was conducted in preparation for a Daubert hearing in the case of United States v. Mitchell,

(E.D. PA), Criminal No. 96-00407.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force 7

(a) 10,673 of those applicants (11.4%) were determined

to have fingerprint-verified criminal history records.

Of those, 1,252 were indicated by III name checks not

to have records (false negatives). This represents

11.7% of those applicants with criminal history records

and 1.3% of all applicants in the study.11

(b) 82,601 applicants were determined by fingerprint

searches not to have criminal history records. Of

those, 4,562 were inaccurately indicated by name

checks to have criminal records (false positives). This

represents 5.5% of persons who did not have criminal

history records and 4.9% of all applicants.

3. Reliance on III name checks alone as a method of applicant criminal history record screening can mean that, on

a national basis, large numbers of persons who do not

have disqualifying criminal records may be unfairly excluded from employment or other positions or entitle11 The FBI analysis of 1997 civil applicants (see footnote 4) found that 11.7% of those

applicants with fingerprint-verified criminal history records had provided false names and/or

other false identification information in their applications. Although it cannot be determined

what percentage of these applicants were false negatives (i.e., how many would have been

cleared by a III name check), the finding is not inconsistent with the results of the SEARCH/

Q.E.D. study.

In addition, the Task Force considered the report by the General Accounting Office on

military recruiting (see footnote 5) that recommended:

“The Secretary of Defense [should] require all national agency checks for

enlistment into the military service to be based on a full fingerprint search to

(1) reduce the risks associated with enlisting individuals who have been

convicted of the more serious misdemeanors and felonies and (2) identify

individuals who have used aliases.” (pp.18-19/GAO Report, Military

Recruiting)

Although, the practice of the Department of Defense (DoD) prior to the GAO report was to

conduct background checks on name-based searches, DoD concurred in this recommendation.

The implementation of the recommendation will be based on availability of automated

fingerprint scanners at Military Entrance Processing Stations. (p. 37/GAO Report, Military

Recruiting)
8 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force

ments. More importantly, large numbers of persons may

be employed or permitted to volunteer in positions for

which they are unfit and in which they pose societal risks

because their criminal records are not discovered.

In this regard, the study suggests that if the 6.9 million

civil applicant background checks processed by the FBI

in 1997 had been processed by III name checks alone,

approximately 346,500 false positives and 70,200 false

negatives would have resulted.12 In addition, it is clear

from the number of name checks being conducted at the

state level against state databases that the absolute number of false positives and false negatives would be significantly higher in a national system that permitted III name

checks in lieu of fingerprint searches. The convenience

of name checks would encourage many more requests for

national criminal record searches than the 6.9 million

received by the FBI in 1997 under current procedures

requiring the obtaining and submission of fingerprints.

4. Since the prospect of fingerprint-based criminal history

record screening deters persons with criminal histories

from applying for positions for which they are not fit,13 it

can be inferred that the incidence of false negatives documented by the study of Florida civil applicants would be

higher in an environment in which name search-only

background checks were permitted.

12 The FBI analysis (see footnote 3) indicated that 600,000 (8.7%) of the 6.9 million civil

applicants had criminal history records and 6,300,000 did not. Applying the false negative

and false positive rates documented in the SEARCH/Q.E.D. study yields the following: 5.5%

of 6,300,000 persons without records equals 346,500 false positives and 11.7% of 600,000

persons with records equals 70,200 false negatives.

13 The January 1997 GAO study of the implementation of the National Child Protection Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 5119a et seq., (see footnote 3) stated that officials of the various national, state

and local organizations contacted by GAO (including the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, camp

groups and other organizations that work with children) said they believed the prospect of

fingerprint-based national criminal history record checks deters an indeterminate but significant number of individuals with criminal records from applying for positions for child

care-related positions. The majority of the members of the Task Force concur in that belief.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force 9

5. The Task Force acknowledges that a number of state

criminal history record repositories have for many years

used name checks as the sole method of searching their

state criminal history files for a variety of noncriminal

justice purposes. A primary rationale for these uses of

name checks is that fingerprint-based searches commonly entail long mailing and processing delays which

are inconsistent with the needs of record users with timecritical requirements. In addition, the process of having

one’s fingerprints taken for back-ground screening purposes may be inconvenient or even impracticable and

usually involves the payment of a fee.

The development and implementation of automated fingerprint identification systems and related technologies

providing for the electronic capturing and transmission of

fingerprint images has made it possible to dramatically

reduce fingerprint transmission and processing delays at

both the state and federal levels. In this regard, the FBI’s

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System

(IAFIS), scheduled for implementation in July 1999 will

enable the FBI to receive civil applicant fingerprints electronically from state repositories and provide search

responses to the repositories within 24 hours. While

IAFIS promises to the solve the problem of federal-level

processing delays for those states that have the capability of linking to the system, the states still must obtain

funding to implement automated technology at the state

and local levels to reduce or eliminate processing and

transmission delays at the state repositories.

6. The increasingly widespread implementation of automated fingerprint technologies at the local, state and

federal levels, together with the National Crime Prevention

and Privacy Compact and recent federal laws requiring
10 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force

that national criminal history record searches be fingerprint-based,14 has created a new technological and legal

environment. This new environment is engendering a

shift away from the use of name checks in favor of fingerprint-based searches within the criminal justice community, for both criminal justice and noncriminal justice

purposes.15 The Task Force believes that this shift toward

positive identification is the wave of the future and presents a challenge that policymakers at all government

levels must meet. The Task Force urges the federal government and the states to give high priority to the implementation at the state and local levels of automated

equipment that will enable the states to link with IAFIS

and provide expedient fingerprint-based national criminal

history record search responses to their noncriminal

justice client agencies.

7. As another way of removing disincentives to fingerprintbased criminal background checks for noncriminal justice

purposes, policymakers should explore ways to subsidize

fees charged to applicants, employers or other agencies

for fingerprint searches. In this regard, it is recommended that Department of Housing and Urban Development officials consider assuming the costs of fingerprint

searches for all public housing tenants and applicants,

thereby removing a possible disincentive to the Public

Housing Authorities’ use of the national criminal history

background check authority.

14 An example is the National Child Protection Act as amended by the Volunteers for Children

Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5119a et seq.

15 This trend coincides with a general evolution toward positive identification in other

national arenas, as evidenced by the extensive and increasing use of biometric identification

methods (such as voiceprint analysis and retinal scanning) within the defense industry, the

American scientific and business communities and many federal agencies.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix A 11

Appendix A

National Task Force

on Interstate Identification Index

Name Check Efficacy
12 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix A
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix A 13

National Task Force

on Interstate Identification Index

Name Check Efficacy

Participants

Cathy L. Riley

Management Analyst

Criminal Justice Information Services

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Department of Justice

Beth Saymon

Acting Unit Chief

Review, Analysis and Development Unit

Criminal Justice Information Services

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Department of Justice

Martha Wright

Bureau Chief

Users Service Bureau

Criminal Justice Information Services

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Staff

Queues Enforth Development, Inc.

Michael F. Cahn

Vice President

James M. Tien, Ph.D.

Vice President

SEARCH, The National Consortium

for Justice Information and Statistics

Sheila J. Barton

Deputy Executive Director

Paul L. Woodard

Senior Counsel

Members

Joseph Bonino

Chairman Emeritus

FBI Criminal Justice Information Services

Advisory Policy Board

Los Angeles Police Department

Jan M. Chaiken, Ph.D.

Director

Bureau of Justice Statistics

U.S. Department of Justice

Gary R. Cooper

Executive Director

SEARCH, The National Consortium

for Justice Information and Statistics

Jay Hoover

Senior Counsel

Office of Policy Development

U.S. Department of Justice

Don M. Johnson

Section Chief

Program Development Section

Criminal Justice Information Services

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Department of Justice

Mark Piccirilli

Director, Drug Information and Strategy

Clearinghouse

U.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development

Donna M. Uzzell

Director

Criminal Justice Information Services

Florida Department of Law Enforcement
14 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 15

Appendix B

SEARCH/Q.E.D.

Interstate Identification Index

Name Check Efficacy Study
16 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 17

Interstate Identification

 Index Name Check

Efficacy Study

June 1999

by SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information

and Statistics and Queues Enforth Development, Inc.

This study is supported under Cooperative Agreements # 95-RU-RX-K001 and # 98-RU-VX-K003, with the

Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in this document

are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the US Department

of Justice. All information contained in this document is Copyright  1999 by SEARCH Group, Incorporated

and Queues Enforth Development, Inc. All rights reserved.

SEARCH, The National Consortium Queues Enforth Development, Inc.

for Justice Information and Statistics 432 Columbia Street

7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 145 Cambridge, MA 02141

Sacramento, CA 95831 (617) 528-9100

(916) 392-2550
18 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge the guidance and expertise provided

by the members of the Task Force on Interstate Identification Index

Name Check Efficacy. In addition, we wish to express our appreciation

for the support of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. In particular, we are

grateful to Dr. Jan Chaiken, Director, and to Ms. Carol Kaplan, Chief,

Criminal History Improvement Programs, for their assistance, insights

and guidance. Finally, we wish to thank Ms. Cathy Riley of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation for her invaluable support and management in

the collection of the study data.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 19

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................. 18

1. Introduction ........................................................................ 21

1.1 Study Background ........................................................ 21

1.2 Study Genesis ............................................................... 27

1.3 Scope of Study .............................................................. 29

2. Study Approach .................................................................. 30

2.1 Study Design ................................................................ 30

2.2 Data Collection ............................................................. 37

3. Study Findings .................................................................... 47

3.1 Employment and License Group Characteristics ........ 47

3.2 Name Check and Fingerprint Search Outcomes........... 48

3.3 Other Findings .............................................................. 52

Appendix 1 .............................................................................. 63

Memorandum of Understanding between the U. S.

Department of Justice and U.S. Department of

Housing and Urban Development
20 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 2-1 .................................................................................................... 41

Employment and License Applicant Background Check Procedure

Exhibit 2-2 .................................................................................................... 42

Public Housing Applicant Background Check Procedure

Exhibit 2-3 .................................................................................................... 43

Volunteer Applicant Background Check Procedure – Arizona

Exhibit 2-4 .................................................................................................... 44

Volunteer Applicant Background Check Procedure – California

Exhibit 2-5 .................................................................................................... 45

Volunteer Applicant Background Check Procedure – Maryland

Exhibit 2-6 .................................................................................................... 46

Sample Public Housing Applicant Supplemental Data Form

Exhibit 3-1 .................................................................................................... 54

Employment and License Applicant Demographics

Exhibit 3-2 .................................................................................................... 55

Employment and License Applicant Background Check Outcomes

Exhibit 3-3 .................................................................................................... 56

False Positives by Sex and Age – Employment and License Applicants

Exhibit 3-4 .................................................................................................... 57

False Negatives by Sex and Age – Employment and License Applicants

Exhibit 3-5 .................................................................................................... 58

Cumulative Age Distribution of False Negatives with Manual

Fingerprints – Employment and License Applicants

Exhibit 3-6 .................................................................................................... 59

Risk of False Negatives as a Function of Demographic Matching –

Employment and License Applicants

Exhibit 3-7 .................................................................................................... 60

Risk of False Negatives by Age as a Function of Demographic

Matching – Employment and License Applicants

Exhibit 3-8 .................................................................................................... 61

FDLE’s “Expedite vs. Don’t Expedite Fingerprints” Decision Process
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 21

1. Introduction

This study was undertaken in support of the work of the Task Force on

Interstate Identification Index Name Check Efficacy. The study

examined the accuracy of identifications resulting from name checks of

the Interstate Identification Index (III) compared to identifications

based on fingerprint comparison, and evaluated the risks of inaccurate

identifications or missed identifications resulting from name checks.

1.1 Study Background

The III is an automated index maintained by the FBI which includes

names and personal identification information relating to individuals

who have been arrested or indicted for a serious or significant1 criminal

offense anywhere in the country. The index is available to law

enforcement and criminal justice agencies throughout the country and

enables them to determine very quickly whether particular persons may

have prior criminal records and, if so, to obtain the records from the

state or federal databases where they are maintained. III name checks

may be made for criminal justice purposes, such as police

investigations, prosecutor decisions and judicial sentencing. In

addition, III requests may be made for authorized noncriminal justice

purposes, such as public employment, occupational licensing and the

issuance of security clearances, where positive fingerprint identification

of record subjects has been made.

A so-called “name check” is based not only on an individual’s name,

but also on other personal identifiers such as sex, race, date of birth and

Social Security Number. Because none of this information is unique to

particular individuals,2 name checks are known to produce inaccurate

results as a consequence of identical or similar names and other

1

 The FBI accepts, processes and files arrest fingerprints (and related disposition, sentencing and

correctional information) submitted by state and federal law enforcement agencies if the arrested persons

were charged with any criminal offense considered to be serious or significant. The FBI maintains a list of

nonserious offenses. Serious offenses for which the FBI will accept fingerprint cards often are referred to as

“criterion offenses.”

2

 Social Security Numbers are supposed to be unique to individuals, but mistakes do occur in their issuance

resulting in the same number being issued to more than one person. Also, it is not difficult for individuals to

obtain Social Security Numbers fraudulently.
22 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

identifiers. Mistakes can also result from misspellings, clerical errors

or intentionally inaccurate identification information provided by

search subjects who wish to avoid discovery of their prior criminal

activities.

Name check errors are of two general types: (1) inaccurate or wrong

identifications, often called “false positives,” which occur when an

applicant’s III name check does not clear (i.e., it produces one or more

possible candidates) and the applicant’s fingerprint search does clear

(i.e., applicant has no FBI criminal record); and (2) missed

identifications, often called “false negatives,” which occur when an

applicant’s III name check clears (i.e., produces no possible candidates)

and the applicant’s fingerprint search does not clear (i.e., applicant has

an FBI criminal record). Although errors of both types are thought to

occur with significant frequency—based on the experience of state

record repository and FBI personnel—at the time this study was begun,

there were no known studies or analyses documenting the frequency of

such errors.3

In contrast, fingerprint searches are based on a biometric method of

identification, the fingerprint patterns of individuals, which are unique

characteristics that are not subject to alteration. Identifications based

on fingerprints are highly accurate, particularly those produced by

automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) equipment, which is

in widespread and increasing use throughout the country. Analyses

have shown that AFIS search results are 94-98 percent accurate when

searching good quality fingerprints.4 For this reason, an identification

based on fingerprint comparison usually is referred to as a “positive

identification.” It should be stated that the study assumed fingerprint

searches to be free of errors.

Fingerprints are obtained routinely from arrested persons as a part of

the booking process and less routinely from persons who are indicted or

3

 There have been documented cases in which name check errors caused dire consequences for public

safety in the criminal justice arena. As an example, a May 28, 1998 article in The New York Times reported

on the case of a fugitive parolee who was arrested by the New York City police department and mistakenly

released because the false name and identification information he provided caused an ensuing name check

to fail to discover his prior record and fugitive status. The individual subsequently shot and killed a police

officer who was sent to arrest him after a fingerprint search revealed the mistake. Following the incident,

the police department changed its policies to require fingerprint-based searches before the release of

arrested persons.

4

Information provided by Robert L. Marx, SEARCH Senior System Specialist, based on state studies

completed in 1990 and 1992. The errors implicit in these accuracy figures are largely attributable to human

errors in assigning fingerprint pattern types as a part of the search process and, to a lesser extent, in

verifying computer matches. Some AFIS systems now employ computer-generated pattern type, or do not

use pattern types at all in the search, and also eliminate the human verification step in favor of computer

verification. For these newer systems, the accuracy rate is thought to be as high as 99-99.5 percent. This

means that if there is a matching set of fingerprints in the file being searched, it will be found 99-99.5

percent of the time. The risk of both false negatives and false positives is reduced to a small fraction of 1

percent of all searches in these newer systems.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 23

cited without previously being arrested. 5 These fingerprints are

maintained in criminal fingerprint files at the local, state and national

levels. Fingerprints maintained by state criminal record repositories

and many of the larger cities are stored in automated databases with

automated search capabilities. The FBI maintains an automated

fingerprint file that contains the fingerprints of approximately 29

million persons whose records are included in the III system and

provides the basis for the positive identification of all such persons.

The FBI also maintains fingerprints of over 5 million persons who were

born prior to 1956 and whose most recent arrest was prior to July 1,

1974. The criminal history records of these persons are not automated

and are not included in the III system.

Because of the inaccuracies of name checks as compared to fingerprint

searches, the FBI and some of the state criminal record repositories do

not permit name-check access to their criminal history record databases

for noncriminal justice purposes.6 In particular, FBI policy does not

permit the use of the III for name checks for noncriminal justice

purposes unless specifically authorized by federal law.7 Instead,

criminal history record searches for such purposes may be obtained

only by submitting the fingerprints of the search subject to a state

repository or to the FBI.

In recent years, the state repositories and the FBI have been subjected

to intense pressure from public and private agencies to permit name

checks for an increasing number of noncriminal justice purposes.

These agencies also have pressured the Congress to enact legislation

permitting III name checks for such purposes. They point out that,

despite the risks associated with name checks, they are cheap and fast

compared to fingerprint searches, which usually require the payment of

substantial fees and entail long processing delays. State record

repositories that permit name checks for noncriminal justice purposes

charge fees ranging from $1 to $25.8 In contrast, the FBI charges $18

for fingerprint searches for volunteer applicants and $24 for other

noncriminal justice fingerprint searches. The state repositories charge

5

 Some states have arrest fingerprinting policies that differ from the FBI’s “criterion” offense policy. Some

require the fingerprinting of all arrested or indicted persons; a few require fingerprinting only of persons

arrested or indicted for felony offenses, and others require fingerprinting for felonies and designated serious

misdemeanors.

6

 Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies are thought to be better qualified through knowledge and

experience to deal with the limitations and risks associated with name search identifications than are

noncriminal justice agencies and are believed to be more accountable for mistakes resulting from name

search errors. As a consequence, the risk of unwarranted harm to record subjects resulting from inaccurate

or missed identifications is thought to be greater when criminal history records are used for noncriminal

justice purposes than when they are used by criminal justice agencies for criminal justice purposes.

7

 Action Memorandum, dated June 22, 1998, from the Deputy Director of the FBI to the Attorney General,

entitled “FBI Statement of Position Regarding the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Proposal to Allow Name

Checks of the Interstate Identification Index (III) for Noncriminal Justice Employment and Licensing

Purposes,” referred to hereafter as “FBI Action Memorandum.”

8

 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Justice Information Policy: Survey of Criminal History Information

Systems, 1997 (April 1999), table 23.
24 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

fees ranging from $7 to $52 for such searches.9 Whereas automated

name checks and related record retrievals require only a few minutes,

fingerprint searches commonly entail processing delays that extend to

weeks or even months, due principally to the lack of adequate

repository personnel to process fingerprint cards and assemble and mail

record responses.10

The expanding implementation of AFIS equipment at the local, state

and national levels is expected to exert a downward pressure on

fingerprint processing fees and processing delays. State and federal

record officials, however, believe that name checks are likely to remain

cheaper than fingerprint searches, and that fingerprint searches are

likely to continue to entail significant processing delays; this will be the

case at least until the implementation of AFIS technology is more

widespread, including the linking of state systems to the FBI’s IAFIS11

system and the provision of live scan devices12 to noncriminal justice

agencies that generate large numbers of search applications.

For these reasons, some noncriminal justice agencies, including state

and federal governmental agencies that need to screen applicants for

public employment and occupational licensing, have sought approval

from the FBI to perform name checks of applicants either in lieu of

fingerprint searches or while fingerprint searches are being processed.

These agencies point out that the pressure to fill vacant employee

positions often forces them to hire individuals provisionally during the

long delays while their fingerprint searches are pending. Although

name checks of these individuals would not identify those with

criminal records who intentionally provide false identification

information, such checks could conceivably provide timely

unsubstantiated identification of those who give accurate information

and would enable the employing agencies to make informed hiring

decisions before applicants begin work.

9

 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Justice Information Policy: Survey of Criminal History Information

Systems, 1997, April 1999, table 23.

10 FBI Action Memorandum, supra at footnote 7, pp. 4-5.

11 The FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), scheduled for deployment in

July 1999, will include updated facilities at the FBI for automated storage, retrieval and search of

fingerprint images, as well as telecommunications facilities that will enable the state record repositories to

link up with the system so as to transmit fingerprints electronically and receive search responses

electronically. FBI processing “turnaround” time is expected to be 24 hours after arrival of the fingerprints

at the FBI. There may be longer processing delays at the state level.

12 Live scan devices permit fingerprints to be obtained by placing the subject’s fingers on a scanning

surface and enable the electronic transmission of such fingerprints to a processing facility.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 25

Other Studies and Analyses

Other studies that provide interesting results and warrant review as

background to this study include the following:

Fingerprint Opinion Poll

In July 1996, Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey

conducted a poll of a statistically representative sample of adult

Americans to ascertain their views on the use of fingerprinting as an

identification technique in noncriminal settings, such as background

screening of persons who apply for jobs, government licenses or

military service. The results, which were published in the October/

November 1996 issue of Privacy & American Business,13 showed that

substantial majorities of Americans support fingerprinting in these

situations. The poll revealed, among other things, that most Americans

(55%) have been fingerprinted for some identification purpose and 87%

of those persons felt that fingerprinting was an appropriate procedure.

Further, substantial majorities of the public say they have read or heard

about situations in which individuals have used fraudulent identities for

illegal purposes and 75% said they would be comfortable being

fingerprinted to prevent someone else from assuming their identity.

When the new process of finger imaging14 was described to them,

significant majorities of those polled supported the use of finger

imaging to verify identity when: applying for government welfare or

other benefits (81%), using credit cards (76%), cashing personal checks

(77%) or entering secured areas (91%). Two out of three persons polled

supported the use of finger imaging in all four situations. Of more

direct relevance for purposes of the Task Force study, substantial

majorities of those polled (79% to 93%) said they supported the use of

finger imaging to check whether persons applying for jobs as police

officers, doctors, bank tellers, stock brokers or casino employees have

criminal records. Further, more than four out of five respondents

(83%) rejected the view that the use of finger imaging to verify identity

is stigmatizing in that it treats people like presumed criminals. Rather,

they viewed identity verification by such means as an appropriate way

to help protect the public from fraud.

FBI Analyses of Civil Fingerprints

In the fall of 1997, the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services

(CJIS) Division conducted an analysis of a statistically representative

sample of criminal record searches conducted by the FBI for

13 “Finger Imaging Survey Charts Public Acceptance,” Privacy & American Business, Vol. 3, No. 4, Oct./

Nov. 1996, pp. 13-16.

14 Finger imaging is a process of photographic scanning of fingertips, entering the digitized record of the

fingerprints in a computer database and then comparing the finger images of someone applying for a job,

benefit or right with the database of authorized or excluded persons. The live scan devices described earlier

(see footnote 13) utilize a form of finger imaging.
26 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

noncriminal justice licensing and employment purposes.15 The sample

was of sufficient size to yield highly accurate16 estimates concerning

civil fingerprint card processing by the FBI.17 Survey results indicated

that the FBI currently processes about 6,900,000 civil fingerprint cards

a year. Of these, 8.7% (about 600,000 annually) yield a fingerprintverified “hit” against the criminal database. Although the published

analysis includes estimates of the number of applicant fingerprints

processed annually by submission purpose, i.e., category of applicant

(child care, law enforcement employment, state/local government

employment, financial institutions, lottery/gambling public housing,

etc.), it does not break down hit rates by category of applicant.

Of particular relevance for the present Task Force study, the analysis

indicates that 11.7% of the applicants in the sample who were found to

have criminal records used names that were sufficiently different from

the names on their criminal records to suggest that they intentionally

used false names to avoid discovery of the records. This means that in

an estimated 70,200 cases annually (approximately 1% of total civil

fingerprint submissions), civil applicants with criminal records would

have escaped detection by giving false names if their background

checks had been based on name checks without follow-up fingerprint

searches. Of further interest, the incidence of false name use was

broken down by category for the five submission purposes for which

the highest numbers of applications were processed, and the breakdown

showed substantial variations from the 11.7% average for all

applicants. This analysis showed that intentionally false names were

used by 17% of persons with criminal records applying to the

Immigration and Naturalization Service for citizenship, residence,

green cards, etc., 11% of persons with criminal records applying to

school systems for jobs as teachers, bus drivers, etc., 6% of persons

with criminal records applying for jobs with financial institutions, 6%

of persons with criminal records applying for jobs as private security

guards or private detectives, and 5% of persons with criminal records

applying to be federally-licensed firearms dealers or for firearms

permits.

15 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services

Division, “Civil Fingerprint Card “Hit” Survey, Part I Executive Summary and Part II Methodology and

Analysis,” April, 1998-Final.

16 The sample was designed to yield a statistical confidence level of 99% and a margin of error of plus or

minus 1%.

17 The processing of noncriminal justice record checks by the FBI is usually referred to as civil fingerprint

card processing or applicant card processing because the search application is actually the fingerprint card

(or electronic equivalent) of the search subject, which bears (in addition to fingerprint impressions) the

subject’s name and other textual identification data as well as the identity and legal authority of the agency

submitting the search application. Processing begins with a name check followed by a fingerprint search, if

necessary.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 27

1.2 Study Genesis

The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 (the

Extension Act),18 enacted on March 28, 1996, amends the United States

Housing Act of 1937 to provide that, “the National Crime Information

Center, police departments, and other law enforcement agencies shall,

upon request, provide information to public housing authorities

regarding the criminal conviction records of adult applicants for, or

tenants of, public housing for purposes of applicant screening, lease

enforcement and eviction.” The Act provides for similar record checks

of juveniles to the extent authorized under the law of the applicable

state, locality or tribe.

Since the law does not specify how criminal history record searches are

to be conducted for public housing authorities (PHAs), the FBI initially

informed the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

that, because the purpose of public housing searches is classified as

noncriminal justice, fingerprints would have to be submitted with all

search applications to insure positive identification. HUD objected to

the fingerprint requirement and appealed to the Attorney General for

authority for PHAs to obtain III name checks. HUD and the PHAs

objected to fingerprinting on three grounds: (1) cost, (2) processing

delays, and (3) the perceived stigma to public housing applicants

associated with fingerprinting.

The Attorney General agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) between HUD and DOJ, dated May 29, 1996, providing that

state and local law enforcement agencies may use the III system to

perform name checks for PHAs to determine whether public housing

tenants or applicants may have criminal history records indexed in the

III system. Under the terms of the agreement, if a check reveals that a

tenant or applicant may have a III record, the PHA must obtain the

fingerprints of the person and submit them to the FBI for “expeditious

processing.”19 If the fingerprints verify the identification, the criminal

history record may be made available to the PHA for use in accordance

with the Extension Act. The MOU stated that it would remain in effect

for six months and that thereafter representatives of HUD, the PHAs,

the FBI and DOJ would evaluate its effectiveness.20

18 Pub. L. 104-120, 110 Stat. 837.

19 Although the MOU states that PHAs “must” obtain and submit fingerprints if notified that a public

housing applicant may have a III record, a subsequent FBI advisory letter to state officials describing the

procedures to be used in implementing PHA name checks stated that fingerprints must be submitted “if the

PHA wishes to obtain the full content of a criminal history record.” (Letter from Bennie F. Brewer, Chief,

CJIS Programs Support Section, dated Nov. 26, 1996, to All CJIS Control Terminal Officers and State

Identification Bureau Chiefs, Subject: Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-

120)). Some state officials and PHAs may have interpreted this statement as making fingerprints optional.

In any case, information compiled by the FBI relating to FY 1998 indicated that, nationwide, there is a

great disparity between the number of name check hits on public housing applicants and the number of

fingerprints submitted, suggesting strongly that not all PHAs are following the procedures set out in the

MOU. Preliminary statistics compiled by FBI, Criminal Justice Information Division, October 1998.

20 The complete text of the Memorandum of Understanding is set out in Appendix 1.
28 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

In response to concern expressed by the FBI’s Criminal Justice

Information Advisory Policy Board (APB) about this deviation from

the long-standing policy, Attorney General Janet Reno addressed the

APB and advised them that:

“[O]ur agreement with HUD in no way signifies a

departure from the belief reflected in the [National

Crime Prevention and Privacy] Compact that fingerprint-based searches are better than name-based ones.

 “I have informed [APB] Chairman Bonino that the

department will examine the HUD name-based check

experiment after several months of operation to see

how it’s working, and we will work with the Board to

try to develop a thoughtful, careful evaluation

process that can give you confidence in this.”21

As a result, the Task Force was appointed to plan and oversee the

evaluation contemplated by the MOU. Task Force members include

representatives of HUD, the FBI, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the

FBI-CJIS Advisory Policy Board, SEARCH, Queues Enforth

Development, Inc. and state criminal history record repositories.

In August 1998, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) requested that

SEARCH, the National Consortium for Justice Information and

Statistics (SEARCH) and Queues Enforth Development, Inc. (Q.E.D.),

cooperatively plan and conduct the evaluation under the guidance of

the Task Force and prepare the final report, subject to the approval of

the Task Force. Q.E.D. developed a research design for the evaluation

that was approved by the Task Force on October 23, 1998.

During 1998, the Task Force met three times in Washington, D.C. The

Task Force also met on April 21, 1999, in Baltimore, Maryland.

SEARCH and Q.E.D. personnel met with FBI personnel in Clarksburg,

West Virginia, on October 1, 1998. In addition, Task Force members

have participated in numerous telephone conference calls throughout

the course of the study.

21 U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, “Address to the Criminal Justice Information Advisory

Policy Board,” St. Petersburg, Florida, June 4, 1997.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 29

1.3 Scope of Study

As noted above, the initial purpose of the study was to evaluate the

efficacy of name checks conducted for public housing tenants and

applicants pursuant to the DOJ-HUD MOU. In early discussions of the

study approach, however, it became evident that there were good

reasons for broadening the scope of the study to include other types of

noncriminal justice name check applications. As pointed out above,

there has been increasing pressure on the FBI and the Congress to

authorize III name checks for a broad range of noncriminal justice

purposes, including various types of private and public employment

and occupational licensing. It was determined that a study that focused

only on public housing applicants would not be viewed as relevant to

other situations in which III name check authority was being sought.

After inquiries to the Department of Justice by a Florida Congressman,

the Attorney General agreed to enter into a pilot project with Florida,

utilizing preliminary name checks as the precursor to fingerprint

submissions. The data derived from the project was to be evaluated

and included in the Name Check Efficacy Evaluation Study.

For this reason, a decision was made to include two additional

categories of noncriminal justice applicants: (1) persons applying for

public or private employment or licensing in Florida for which Florida

statutes authorize national criminal history record checks, and (2)

persons seeking volunteer positions working with children or elderly or

disabled persons in Arizona, California and Maryland, pursuant to laws

in those states authorizing national record checks.
30 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

2. Study Approach

The following sections describe the research design of the study and the

data collected on the study groups.

2.1 Study Design

Ideally, a rigorous and definitive study would validly determine the

efficacy of utilizing only name checks (i.e., without fingerprint

searches) to ascertain the existence of criminal records for noncriminal

justice purposes. Such an encompassing study would be large in scope,

as well as time-consuming and costly to conduct. A more modest goal

would be to consider a smaller but representative set of purposes for

which national background checks are performed while preserving the

study’s rigor. This was the goal of the Task Force on III Name Check

Efficacy, focusing on three common background check purposes or

applicant groups:

1. Employment and License Applicant Checks

2. Public Housing Applicant Checks

3. Volunteer Applicant Checks

Given the stated goal, what research questions should the study attempt

to answer, what would be the attributes of an appropriate research

design, and finally, given the existing constraints, what type of design

is feasible? Before addressing these issues, an outcome framework is

provided within which the issues can be analyzed.

Outcome Framework

The outcome framework in which the study is viewed incorporates an

“outcome matrix.” In this section, the matrix is described and an

explanation is provided on how to interpret it.

Understanding the Outcome Matrix

As depicted in the following diagram, the outcome matrix is a

mechanism for displaying the results of the applicants’ name checks

and fingerprint searches:
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 31

Fingerprint Search Fingerprint Search

Clearance Non-Clearance

FPC FPN

Name Check NCC_FPC NCC_FPN

Clearance True Negative False Negative

NCC

Name Check NCN_FPC NCN_FPN

Non-Clearance False Positive True Positive

NCN

In simplest terms, there are two possible results of an applicant’s name

check: (1) the name check clears (i.e., no candidate is produced), or

(2) the name check does not clear (i.e., at least one candidate is

produced). Similarly, there are two possible results of an applicant’s

fingerprint search: (1) the fingerprint search clears (i.e., the applicant

has not been identified as having a criminal record), or (2) the

fingerprint search does not clear (i.e., the applicant has been identified

as having criminal record). Taken together, the results of the name

check and the fingerprint search comprise the outcome of the

background check of a particular applicant. Collectively, the outcomes

of an entire applicant group (or subgroup) are described by the outcome

matrix.

Since there are two possible results each for the name check and

fingerprint search, in combination there are four possible outcomes,

each occupying one of the four “cells” of the matrix; they are

commonly referred to as:

True Negative The name check clears; the

fingerprint search clears.

True Positive The name check does not clear; the

fingerprint search does not clear.

False Positive The name check does not clear; the

fingerprint search clears.

False Negative The name check clears; the

fingerprint search does not clear.

Of the four possible outcomes, the two of particular interest are the

false cells, containing the false positive and false negative outcomes.

In a hypothetical context in which only name checks determine

eligibility for employment, licensing, housing, volunteer position, etc.,

an applicant with a false positive outcome could suffer an unfair

disqualification. Concomitantly, an applicant with a false negative

outcome could incorrectly avoid disqualification. Of course, this is the

outcome of greatest concern to the study because it addresses the

problem of, for example, accepting an applicant for a child care

position who may have one or more disqualifying convictions for

violent crimes.
32 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

The following hypothetical outcome matrix is presented for purposes of

illustration:

Immediately, it can be observed from the cell in the bottom right corner

of the matrix that a total of 605 cases is represented. The rows labeled

“NCC” and “NCN” refer to cases in which the name check cleared and

the name check did not clear, respectively. Thus, looking at the “Total”

column on the right, one can see that 505 name checks cleared and 100

name checks did not clear. Analogously, the columns labeled “FPC”

and “FPN” refer to cases in which the fingerprints cleared and the

fingerprints did not clear, respectively. Looking at the “Total” row on

the bottom, one can see that 560 fingerprints cleared and 45

fingerprints did not clear.

Because every cell in the matrix is the intersection of a row and a

column, they are referred to by the names of the intersecting rows and

columns; i.e., “row name_column name.” So, for example, the cell at

which the row “NCN” intersects the column “FPN”—containing the

number “40” followed by 40.0%, 88.9% and 6.6%—is referred to

simply as cell “NCN_FPN.” Thus, cell NCN_FPN includes cases in

which both the name check and the fingerprint search did not clear.

This matrix indicates that of the 605 cases, 40 applicants’ name checks

produced candidates whose fingerprints matched those of a person with

a criminal record; i.e., there are 40 true positives.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 33

Finally, there are percentages contained in the cells. As an example,

cell NCC_FPN (i.e., cases where the name check cleared but the

fingerprints did not, or false negatives) can be viewed in three ways:

1. As the row percentage (1.0%) of the 505 cases where the

name check cleared;

2. As the column percentage (11.1%) of the 45 cases where

the fingerprint search did not clear; or

3. As the cell percentage (0.8%) of all 605 cases.

To summarize:

• Cell NCC_FPC contains the true negatives.

• Cell NCN_FPN contains the true positives.

• Cell NCC_FPN contains the false negatives.

• Cell NCN_FPC contains the false positives.

Interpreting the Outcome Matrix

The true cells, containing the true positive and true negative outcomes,

are self-explanatory. While the absolute numbers of false outcomes are

informative, it is more insightful to consider the three percentages that

describe the rates at which these two types of errors occur. More

specifically, they are defined as:

False Positive Row Percentage = (NCN_FPC/NCN)*100

False Positive Column Percentage = (NCN_FPC/FPC)*100

False Positive Cell Percentage = (NCN_FPC/ALL)*100

False Negative Row Percentage = (NCC_FPN/NCC)*100

False Negative Column Percentage = (NCC_FPN/FPN)*100

False Negative Cell Percentage = (NCC_FPN/ALL)*100

These percentages represent three different perspectives on the false

results. None of the three is right or wrong; they differ only in their

orientations. The row percentages are “quality”-oriented in that they

address the performance of the name check process. The column

percentages are “risk”-oriented in that they address the hazards

associated with replacing fingerprint-based background checks with

name checks only. The cell percentages are “incidence”-oriented in

that they address the overall fractions of applicants whose name checks

produced false results.

Consider the false negative percentages. The row percentage relates

the absolute number of false negative outcomes to (i.e., divides them

by) the number of applicants whose name checks cleared (5 ÷ 505 =

1.0%). Its reference point is the outcome of the name check, which is

sometimes in error; therefore, it addresses the quality of the name

check process.

The false negative column percentage relates the absolute number of

false negative outcomes to (i.e., divides them by) the number of

applicants whose fingerprints did not clear (5 ÷ 45 = 11.1%). Its

reference point is the outcome of the fingerprint search, which is

assumed to be correct; therefore, it addresses the risk that an applicant

with a criminal record will elude the name check.
34 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

The false negative cell percentage relates the absolute number of false

negative outcomes to (i.e., divides them by) the total number of

applicants (5 ÷ 605 = 0.8%). It addresses the overall incidence of false

negatives in relation to the total number of applicants.

Analogously, because the denominator of the false positive row

percentage is the number of applicants whose name checks did not

clear (i.e., 100); it too addresses name check quality. Similarly,

because the denominator of the false positive column percentage is the

number of applicants who do not have criminal records (i.e., 560), it

addresses the risk that the name check of an applicant without a

criminal record will not clear. The false positive cell percentage

addresses the overall incidence of false positives in relation to the total

number of applicants.

Finally, it should be stated that while the study findings reported in

Section 3 track quality, risk, and incidence percentages, the risk

perspective is believed to be of greatest policy relevance to this study’s

research questions.

Research Questions

As approved by the Task Force, the study should attempt to address at

least the following research questions:

1. In an operational setting, if fingerprints are not initially

required of applicants whose criminal histories are statutorily

mandated to be checked by the FBI, what results can be

expected in terms of III QH (Query History) name check and

fingerprint search outcomes? More specifically, with what

frequencies should one anticipate the outcomes described in

the outcome matrix to occur?

2. In each applicant group, what is the overall demographic

composition in each of the four cells of the outcome matrix?

3. To the extent it is possible to ascertain them, what factors

(e.g., ethnicity, age, gender, other demographic issues, data

entry, etc.) help to explain the incidence of NCC_FPC,

NCC_FPN, NCN_FPC, and NCN_FPN outcomes among the

three applicant groups?

4. Within the NCN_FPN outcomes, what subgroupings of

outcomes can be identified? For example, the name check

yields a number of possible candidates. However, when the

fingerprint search is performed, there is a hit on the subject but

the person identified was not among the list of candidates.

The FBI refers to this type of outcome as a “Minutia

Identification.”

5. Within the NCN_FPC outcomes, what subgroupings of

outcomes can be identified? For example, the name check

produces a candidate but it is evident from a comparison of the

candidate’s demographics (e.g., age, sex, race) with those of

the applicant that the candidate cannot be the same person as

the applicant.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 35

6. To the extent it is possible to determine, what fraction of the

disqualified applicants could have been identified at the state

level? This is a very important issue that addresses the extent

of the applicant filtering taking place at the state level prior to

the national checks.

Characteristics of a Rigorous Research Design

A rigorous research design would require the following steps for each

of the three applicant groups:

1. Consider the entire population of applicants as a pool of

research subjects from which to draw a stratified random

sample. This pool would include applicants from all

states and all constituent screening agencies.

2. Identify and compile historical data on the characteristics

that describe the population of applicants and

prospectively comprise a set of independent variables

which could serve to explain differences in the outcomes

among applicant sub-groups (i.e., by age, gender,

ethnicity, income, area crime rate and population density,

etc.).

Unfortunately, time and resource constraints preclude implementation

of a rigorous research design. Generating a random sample of study

subjects from the applicant population would require the associated

screening agencies to participate by submitting the requested sample—

as much as 100%—of their respective applicant population’s

fingerprints over a sufficient time to yield a statistically valid sample.

Furthermore, the data collection time frame would have to be of

adequate duration to account for seasonal variabilities, if any. This

would most likely entail mandating agencies that have never submitted

any fingerprints to participate in the study. (Most of the nation’s 3,500

public housing authorities have never submitted a single applicant’s

fingerprints to the FBI.)

While a rigorous research design is not feasible, that does not preclude

gaining extremely useful insights from the conduct of a more limited

study, based on what is available, including previous studies. However,

it is believed that no comparable study has been performed at the

national level. This is not surprising given that the FBI’s III name

check system has historically been separate and distinct from its

traditional fingerprint-based positive identification approach.

Additionally, the states’ criminal history repositories were asked

whether they had ever conducted such a study—in conjunction with an

audit, perhaps. Only Georgia reported conducting even a remotely

related investigation. Unfortunately, Georgia’s study is of limited

relevance because it examined criminal justice checks, not background

checks, and not all subjects received both a name check and fingerprint

search.
36 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

Characteristics of the Current Study

Employment and License Applicants

They are Florida residents applying for noncriminal justice

employment and licenses; as required by Florida statutes, they must

undergo a national criminal history background check.22 Exhibit 2-1

describes the employment and license applicant background check

procedure. The fact that all the employment and license applicants

included in the study are from a single state precludes the possibility of

generalizing the results to the national population.

Public Housing Applicants

They are local residents applying for public housing through six public

housing authorities (PHAs) that agreed to participate in the study.23

HUD categorizes PHAs on the basis of numbers of housing units as

“large” (2,500 or more), “medium” (200-2,499) or “small” (1-199).

The participating PHAs and size classifications are:

1. Big Rapids (MI) Housing Commission—medium

2. Housing Authority of the City of Chandler (AZ)—medium

3. Jefferson City (TN) Housing Authority—small

4. Reading (PA) Housing Authority—medium

5. Thibodaux (LA) Housing Authority—medium

6. Housing Authority of the City of Winston Salem (NC)—large

The background check procedures followed by the six PHAs are

essentially identical, as described in Exhibit 2-2. Given the limited

number of PHAs participating and the fact that none of them represents

a large municipality, the findings cannot be considered representative of

the population of all public housing applicants.

Volunteer Applicants

They are Arizona, California and Maryland residents applying for

various volunteer positions. In Arizona, volunteers working with

children, the elderly or individuals with disabilities are fingerprinted for

background check purposes, including a national criminal records

search. (See Exhibit 2-3.) Commencing January 1, 1999, California

requires background checks, including a national check, on volunteers

working with children. Prior to this time, national checks were

optional. (See Exhibit 2-4.) Maryland requires background checks,

including national checks, on individuals who care for or supervise

children, including volunteers working in child care centers, family day

care homes, child care homes, juvenile institutions, public schools, etc.

22 Pub. L. 92-544, 86 Stat. 1109 (1972) authorizes the FBI to perform national fingerprint-based criminal

record checks for state agencies for employment and licensing purposes if there is in place a state statute

that has been reviewed by the U.S. Attorney General and determined to specifically authorize such checks.

Florida has a number of such statutes covering a broad range of public and private employment.

23 PHAs are independent agencies and are not subject to mandated participation. HUD staff, therefore,

sought volunteers from those PHAs that were utilizing the MOU and requested that they cooperate in the

study by fingerprinting all applicants during a specified period of time.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 37

(See Exhibit 2-5). The results of volunteer applicant background

checks in three states cannot be considered nationally representative.

2.2 Data Collection

For each of the applicant groups, the data collected for the study by the

FBI and the associated data collection time frames are identified.

Employment and License Applicants

Data Collected

The FBI has provided a computerized data set for all III QH name

checks performed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement

(FDLE) with the following 19 key fields in each record:

1. FBI tracking number

2. Date of QH check

3. Name from QH check

4. Date of birth from QH check

5. Sex from QH check

6. Race from QH check

7. Social Security Number (SSN) from QH check

8. Originating agency identification number (ORI) from QH

check

9. Total candidates from QH check

10. Name check result (Yes or No identification of QH

candidate)

11. Sex from fingerprint card

12. Race from fingerprint card

13. Fingerprint search result (identification, nonidentification, rejection)

14. Master record name, if fingerprint search result is an

identification

15. Master record date of birth, if fingerprint search result is

an identification

16. Master record sex, if fingerprint search result is an

identification

17. Master record race, if fingerprint search result is an

identification

18. Wanted person check result (Yes or No Hit)

19. Date case closed

Florida keeps track of those applicants determined by FDLE’s state

criminal history check to have Florida criminal records and who are

therefore excluded from the study. Counts of these by month were

received. Data also were received on cases in which FDLE believed

that a candidate resulting from the QH name check was not the

applicant, and therefore did not ask the FBI to expedite processing of

the applicant’s fingerprint card.

Obtaining additional information regarding the applicants—in

particular, the type of employment or license applied for—was not

possible. FDLE receives bags of fingerprint cards that identify the

source agency via an ORI number and provide a text description of the
38 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

job type. However, FDLE is unable to link this information to the

corresponding III QH tracking number due to the large volume of

fingerprint cards processed.

Time Frame

An applicant’s background check is not considered complete until both

the III QH name check and the fingerprint search have been performed.

When the fingerprints have been checked, the case (i.e., background

check record) is considered to be “closed.” The Florida employment

and license checks began on September 1, 1998; at Florida’s request, all

cases initiated prior to October 1 were ignored since they could be

considered to constitute a phase-in period. (Given that the data set

includes more than 90,000 cases, this has not compromised the study’s

findings.) In sum, the study covers cases initiated October 1, 1998 or

later and closed by January 31, 1999; all data collection ceased on

February 12, 1999.

Summary

Note that the 93,274 cases analyzed include 4,859 (estimated) cases

that were not among the applicant cases transmitted to the FBI. This is

because FDLE first performed a state-level name check on its

employment and license applicants. If the state name check did not

clear, it performed a state-level fingerprint verification. If the

verification resulted in identification, FDLE did not send the

fingerprints to the FBI since it had already been determined that the

applicant has a criminal record. However, failure to account for those

applicants would have biased the set of outcomes. Therefore, in part

because of Florida’s NFF status and for purposes of this study, the

following assumptions were made: (1) if the name check did not clear

in Florida, it would not have cleared in III; and (2) if the fingerprint

verification resulted in an identification in Florida, the fingerprint

search would not have cleared at the FBI. Thus, the 4,859 applicants

belong to the true positive (i.e., NCN_FPN) category. Unfortunately,

because the only available information about this subset of applicants is

its size, the analyses were limited.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 39

Public Housing Applicants

Data Collected

Either the PHA or a local law enforcement agency took the fingerprints

of the applicant and other members of the prospective applicant’s

household over 18 years of age. The FBI performed and recorded the

results of both the III QH name checks and the fingerprint searches.

The FBI provided a computerized data set for all III QH name checks

and fingerprint searches performed; the data set contains the same data

elements as those associated with the employment and licensing data.

In addition, the participating PHAs were asked to record supplementary

demographic data on a separate form (see Exhibit 2-6). The FBI also

recorded the tracking number on the form so that it could be linked to

the correct FBI record.

Time Frame

PHA background checks were planned to commence on October 1,

1998 and to continue for only 60 days. However, unlike Florida where

the state performed the name checks, the FBI performed both the PHA

name and fingerprint searches. Thus, the name check could not be

performed until the fingerprint cards had been received by the FBI.

Therefore, PHA name checks commenced on November 10, 1998, the

original 60-day period was extended, and the last were performed on

February 10, 1999. Data collection ceased on February 12, 1999.

Summary

The total number of cases received and the number of non-closed cases

are estimates since non-closed public housing cases are

indistinguishable from non-closed volunteer cases in the study data

files.

Volunteer Applicants

Data Collected

As with the PHAs, the FBI performed and recorded the results of both

the III QH name checks and the fingerprint searches for the volunteers.

The FBI provided a computerized data set for all III QH name checks

and fingerprint searches they performed; again, the data set contains the
40 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

same data elements as those associated with the employment and

licensing data. As with the employment and license applicants,

information regarding the nature of the volunteer position being sought

is unavailable. (The volunteer agencies send applicants’ fingerprint

cards to their respective states’ central repositories. In turn, the

repositories send the fingerprint cards to the FBI, but the cards contain

no information other than applicant demographics.)

Time Frame

Volunteer applicant data from Arizona, Maryland and California reflect

name checks commencing on November 12, 1998 and continuing

through February 10, 1999. Collection ceased on February 12.

Summary

The total number of cases received and the number of non-closed cases

are again estimates since non-closed public housing cases are

indistinguishable from non-closed volunteer cases in the study data

files.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 41 1. Fingerprints may be taken at a law enforcement agency or capable private entity. 2. An authorized employment agency (AEA) is required by Florida statute to perform national employment background checks. The AEA obtains from the FBI a unique originating agency identifier (ORI) number. The term “AEA” is not standard and is adopted here for convenience. 3. Here an “employer” has statutory responsibility to perform background checks and may or may not be an AEA. If not, the employer has made arrangements with an AEA to interface with FDLE on its behalf. Employers without an AEA affiliation may perform state background checks only.

4. “Green light” indicates applicant does not have a disqualifying criminal record; “red light” indicates

applicant has a disqualifying record.

Exhibit 2-1: Employment and License Applicant Background Check Procedure
42 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 1. Here “PHA” refers to one of the six public housing authorities participating in the study. 2. Fingerprints may be taken by the PHA or by a local law enforcement agency. 3. To perform national background checks, a PHA must obtain an ORI number from the FBI and utilize the state repository or one of four channeling agents. 4. Here “PHA” refers to a public housing authority authorized to perform national checks.

5. The applicant may or may not be a senior citizen.

Exhibit 2-2: Public Housing Applicant Background Check Procedure
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 43 Exhibit 2-3: Volunteer Applicant Background Check Procedure – Arizona 1. AVA = Authorized Volunteer Agency 2. CSR = Central State Repository 3. ID = Identification
44 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B Exhibit 2-4: Volunteer Applicant Background Check Procedure – California
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 45 Exhibit 2-5: Volunteer Applicant Background Check Procedure – Maryland
46 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

ANYCITY PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY

FBI Tracking Number:

Last Name First Name

Middle Name

Race: White, not Latino Asian or Pacific Islander

Black, not Latino Native American

 Latino Undeclared

Relationship to Head of If Head of Household,

Household: Enter Ages of All

 Head Household Members:

 Spouse

 Child

 Parent

 Sibling

 Other

 None

Marital Status: Employment Status:

 Single Employed Full-time

 Married Employed Part-time

 Divorced Unemployed

 Separated Unable to Work

 Widowed

If Head of Household, Enter

Total Monthly Household

 Income:

$ _ _ , _ _ _

Exhibit 2-6: Sample Public Housing Applicant Supplemental Data Form
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 47

3. Study Findings

Before presenting the study findings, the following two critically

important caveats must be stated:

1. Sufficient data to have confidence in the findings exists only for

the employment and license applicant group. For this reason,

findings for the public housing and volunteer applicant groups

are not presented.

2. Because of the design limitations identified in Section 2.1, the

findings cannot be considered nationally representative. That

is, the outcomes cannot be generalized to describe groups of

applicants for employment and licenses in states other than

Florida.

3.1 Employment and License Group

Characteristics

As noted earlier, there are several sources of demographic information

available: the QH query, the fingerprint card, and, if an identification is

made, the FBI’s master record. In addition to a name, a QH name

check requires information concerning date of birth, sex and race.

Thus, for determining the applicants’ demographic characteristics, the

QH-based information was the most complete. Exhibit 3-1 summarizes

the demographic characteristics of the employment and license

applicant group.
48 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

3.2 Name Check and Fingerprint Search

Outcomes

This section presents and explains the outcomes for the employment

and license applicant group.

Aggregate Results

Exhibit 3-2 contains the name check and fingerprint search outcomes

for the employment and license applicants. The results indicate that

11.4% of the applicants have criminal records. Based upon the name

check and fingerprint search outcomes and the data collection time

frame, the projected frequencies of false positives and false negatives

that may occur in a 12-month period are as follows:

Study Time Projected Annual Projected Annual

Study Group Frame False Positives False Negatives

Employment & License 4 months 13,686 3,756

Applicants

False Positive Results

The following false positive percentages and corresponding

probabilities were observed:

From a risk-oriented perspective, approximately 1 out of every 18

employment and license applicants without an FBI criminal record

failed to clear the name check. The corresponding quality-oriented

probability (i.e., that an applicant failing to clear the name check does

not have an FBI criminal record) is 1 out of 3. In terms of overall

incidence, 1 out of every 20 employment and license applicants was a

false positive.

One can think of the false positive incidence percentage as the false

positive risk percentage weighted by the fraction of applicants without

criminal records. That is:

 (NCN_FPC/FPC)*(FPC/ALL)*100 = (NCN_FPC/ALL)*100

However, unlike the false positive risk percentage, the false positive

incidence percentage is influenced by an increase or decrease in the

overall number of applicants with criminal records, a group which

includes no false positives.
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 49

Exhibit 3-3 breaks down the false positive percentages by sex and age.

In terms of risk, the false positive percentage for males appears higher

than that for females. This phenomenon may arise from two factors.

First, the name check process is heavily biased towards same-sex

matches. In other words, the process for the most part seeks to match

male (female) applicants with males (females) in the III. Second, 77%

of the persons in the III are male. Consequently, male applicants face a

much larger pool of potential record-possessing persons with whom

they can be erroneously matched. The age breakdown reveals a similar

effect; applicants in the 31 to 50 age group are at higher risk of being

incorrectly matched than those in the older and younger groups. The

reasoning associated with the sex effect applies here as well, as the age

distribution of persons in the III attests: approximately 19%, 58% and

23% for the under 31, 31 to 50, and over 50 age groups, respectively.

Incomplete data preclude reporting the false positive quality-oriented

results. It is postulated, however, that females would have the higher

false positive percentage. To understand this, note that there are more

males with records than females. Consequently, relative to males,

females who do not clear the name check are more likely to clear the

fingerprint search, simply because of the reduced chance of possessing

a record. For similar reasons, applicants aged 31 to 50 would in all

likelihood have a higher false positive percentage than those in either of

the other two age groups.

The risk-oriented percentage of false positives among Florida’s

employment and license check applicants may be understated. The

reason for this conjecture is that the FDLE usually does not include

Social Security Numbers (SSNs) in the QH name checks it submits

(i.e., only 3% of the name checks include SSNs). Section 3.3 discusses

this finding in more detail.

False Negative Results

The following false negative percentages and probabilities were

observed:

From a risk-orientation, about 1 out of every 9 employment and license

applicants with an FBI criminal record cleared the name check.24 The

corresponding quality-orientated probability (i.e., that an applicant

clearing the name check has an FBI criminal record) is 1 out of 63. In

terms of overall incidence, 1 out of every 75 employment and license

applicants was a false negative.

24 The 1 in 9 probability might lead one to ask what types of offenses applicants with criminal records have

been convicted of. Illustratively, according to ancillary information provided by the FBI regarding

applicants in the false negative category, there were 259 persons who applied for child care-related

employment. Of these, 58 had convictions for assault, 67 persons for dangerous drugs, or both.
50 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

One can think of the false negative incidence percentage as the false

negative risk percentage weighted by the fraction of applicants with

criminal records. That is:

 (NCC_FPN/FPN)*(FPN/ALL)*100 = (NCC_FPN/ALL)*100

However, unlike the false negative risk percentage, the false negative

incidence percentage is influenced by an increase or decrease in the

overall number of applicants without criminal records, a group which

includes no false negatives.

There are two scenarios in which the name check process would clear

an applicant with a criminal record. In the first, the applicant is in the

III but the name check does not find him or her. In the second, the

applicant is simply not in the III, as was the case for approximately

one-third of the 1,252 false negatives among the employment and

licensing applicant group. This can be ascertained by checking whether

the relevant fingerprint record was automated or manual, since persons

with manual records are not in the III.

Exhibit 3-4 breaks down the false negatives by sex and age.

Incomplete data preclude reporting the risk-oriented results. However,

one would expect persons over 50 with criminal records to have a

greater chance of eluding the name check than younger applicants,

because they are more likely than those in the other two (age) groups to

be absent from the III. To see why, note that people in the III fall into

two categories: first, those born in 1956 or later that have FBI records;

and second, those born prior to 1956 whose first arrest card was

submitted to the FBI on or after July 1, 1974. Thus, a person over 50—

i.e., born prior to 1950—would be in the III only if his or her initial

arrest card was submitted in 1974 or later, at which point that person

would have been at least 25 years of age. Since criminal activity

typically diminishes with age, a person age 50 or older whose criminal

activity ceased by age 25 would probably not be in III unless a

background check had been performed on that person after 1974.

Exhibit 3-5 provides further support for this conjecture; it depicts the

distribution of ages for applicants from the employment and licensing

group who had false negative outcomes.

With respect to the quality-oriented false negative findings, just as the

lower percentage of females with records should produce a higher false

positive percentage for females, the higher percentage of males with

records should produce a higher false negative percentage for males.

Similar reasoning suggests that the false negative percentage for the 31

to 50 age group should be highest. The reason why this percentage is

highest in the over 50 age group, especially given the large sample of

employment and license applicants, could not be determined.

The relationship between risk-oriented false negative percentage and

the extent to which the QH demographics of an applicant with a

criminal record match those of his or her criminal record perfectly was

examined. More specifically, the purpose was to determine whether

both, one, or none of the applicant’s last name and date of birth

matched the FBI’s master record. As Exhibit 3-6 clearly indicates, the

incorrect miss percentage exceeds 50% when there are no perfect

matches for name and date of birth, decreases by about 10 percentage

points when there is one perfect match, and drops precipitously when

both occur. Note, however, that even when the applicant’s name and

date of birth match the FBI’s master record exactly, there is still a 10%
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 51

chance of an incorrect miss. This 10% figure appears high. It is

unlikely that the name check would fail to identify so high a percentage

of applicants with criminal records in the face of such excellent

matching information. It is hypothesized that the figure is inflated

because of the incompleteness of the III.

Finally, the data were separated by age group and the previous analysis

repeated; Exhibit 3-7 displays the results. When both the name and

date of birth match perfectly, applicants over 50 have almost a 20%

chance of eluding the name check—more than three times the observed

chances for the other two age groups. This further supports the earlier

observation that applicants over 50 year of age with criminal records

are more likely to elude the name check process because of the

increased chance that their names are not in the III.

Overall Error Incidence

When the false positive and false negative incidence percentages are

summed, the total is the rate at which errors occur in the applicant

name check process. The following table describes the overall error

incidence rate as both a percentage and a probability:

Thus, for the specific group of employment and license applicants

whose background checks were analyzed in this study, the name check

process generated an incorrect result for 1 out of every 16 applicants.
52 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

3.3 Other Findings

Impact of Missing Social Security Numbers

It is postulated that the absence of an SSN from the data submitted to

the name check process influences the rates at which false negatives

and false positives occur. From a quality-oriented perspective, the

absence of an SSN increases the false positive percentage and

decreases the false negative percentage. From a risk-oriented

perspective, the absence of an SSN decreases the false positive

percentage and increases the false negative percentage. Finally, from

an incidence perspective, the absence of an SSN produces the same

effects as it does for the risk-oriented percentages, i.e., it decreases the

false positive percentage and increases the false negative percentage.

Impact on False Positives

It is helpful to restate the three false positive-related percentages:

False Positive Quality Percentage = (NCN_FPC/NCN)*100

False Positive Risk Percentage = (NCN_FPC/FPC)*100

False Positive Incidence Percentage = (NCN_FPC/ALL)*100

Note that all three percentages have the same numerator, i.e.,

NCN_FPC. The absence of an SSN tends to decrease this quantity

because it precludes the possibility of a partial SSN match with an

incorrect candidate. Therefore, the key to explaining the impact of

SSN absence is the denominator.

The denominator of the quality percentage is NCN. SSN absence also

decreases this quantity, again because the lack of the SSN precludes

partial SSN matches. The extent of the decrease, however, tends to be

greater than in the numerator because the denominator is not

conditioned on the result of the applicant’s fingerprint search. In sum,

SSN absence causes both the numerator and denominator of the quality

percentage to decrease, with the greater decrease usually occurring in

the denominator. The net result is the false positive quality percentage

increases.

The denominator of the risk percentage is FPC. SSN absence has no

effect on this quantity. Consequently, SSN absence decreases the

numerator of the false positive risk percentage, causing the percentage

to decrease.

Finally, the denominator of the false positive incidence percentage is

ALL. SSN absence clearly has no effect on this quantity. Therefore,

SSN absence causes the false positive incidence percentage to decrease.

Impact on False Negatives

It is again helpful to restate the three relevant percentages:

False Negative Quality Percentage = (NCC_FPN/NCC)*100

False Negative Risk Percentage = (NCC_FPN/FPN)*100

False Negative Incidence Percentage = (NCC_FPN/ALL)*100
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 53

The three percentages again share a common numerator, i.e.,

NCC_FPN. SSN absence tends to increase this quantity because of the

lack of the powerful matching potential of the SSN. (Indeed, according

to the FBI, an SSN match alone is a sufficient basis for a name check to

produce a candidate.) As with the false positive percentages, the key to

explaining the effect of SSN absence on the false negative percentages

is the denominator.

The denominator of the quality percentage is NCC. SSN absence

causes NCC to increase, again because of the lack of the powerful

matching potential. The extent of this increase, however, tends to be

greater than in the numerator because the denominator is not

conditioned on the result of the applicant’s fingerprint search.

Therefore, SSN absence causes both the numerator and the

denominator of the quality percentage to increase, with the greater

increase usually occurring in the denominator. The net result is the

false negative quality percentage decreases.

The denominator of the risk percentage is FPN. SSN absence has no

effect on this quantity. Consequently, SSN absence increases the

numerator of the false negative risk percentage, causing the percentage

to increase.

Finally, the denominator of the false negative incidence percentage is

ALL. SSN absence has no effect on this quantity. Therefore, SSN

absence causes the false negative incidence percentage to increase.

FDLE Response to Name Check Non-Clearances

As Exhibit 2-1 shows, the FDLE must decide whether to ask the FBI to

“expedite” the fingerprint processing, or not. If the FDLE clerk

believes that a candidate returned by a QH name check that did not

clear is not the applicant, the fingerprint card is processed normally. If

not, expedited processing is requested. Exhibit 3-8 describes the

success with which the FDLE made “do not expedite” decisions.

Excluding the 4,859 state hit applicants already determined to have

criminal records, there are 9,124 (i.e., 13,983 – 4,859) applicants whose

name checks did not clear. Of these, the FDLE did not expedite 4,751,

or 52%. If the prints clear (and 4,452 did), the FDLE would have been

correct in those cases. Further, if the prints do not clear, but turn out to

match a different candidate (i.e., a minutia identification), the FDLE

would also have been correct because the record belongs to someone

other than the III-identified candidate. This happened in 69 cases.

Collectively, the FDLE performed correctly in 4,521 cases, or 95% of

the time.

Finally, it should be noted that the employment and license applicant

outcome matrix remains valid despite the specific FDLE procedure.

State-Level Identification of Disqualified Applicants

As Exhibit 3-2 indicates, there were 10,673 employment and license

applicants whose fingerprints did not clear who would therefore be

disqualified from the employment position or license they sought. As

noted, 4,859 applicants were identified by FDLE at the state level to
54 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

have criminal records and were included in the NCN_FPN (i.e., true

positive) cell. Thus, in Florida, (4,859/10,673)*100, or 45.5%, of the

potentially disqualified employment and license applicants could be

identified at the state level. Of course, if Florida were performing both

name checks and full fingerprint searches, the percentage of

disqualified applicants identified at the state level would be higher.

Exhibit 3-1: Employment and License Applicant Demographics
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 55

Exhibit 3-2: Employment and License Applicant Background Check Outcomes
56 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B

Exhibit 3-3: False Positives by Sex and Age – Employment and License Applicants
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 57

Exhibit 3-4: False Negatives by Sex and Age – Employment and License Applicants
58 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B Exhibit 3-5: Cumulative Age Distribution of False Negatives with Manual Fingerprints – Employment and License Applicants
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 59 Exhibit 3-6: Risk of False Negatives as a Function of Demographic Matching – Employment and License Applicants
60 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B Exhibit 3-7: Risk of False Negatives by Age as a Function of Demographic Matching – Employment and License Applicants
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B 61 Exhibit 3-8: FDLE’s “Expedite vs. Don’t Expedite Fingerprints” Decision Process
62 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B-1 63

Appendix 1

Memorandum of Understanding

between the U.S. Department of Justice

and the

U.S. Department of Housing

and Urban Development
64 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix B-1
COPY

Agreement between the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban

Development and the U.S. Department of Justice Regarding

Access to National Crime Information Center Data
Introduction and Purpose

In March 1996, Congress passed the Housing and Opportunity

Program Extension Act of 1996 (Extension Act). The Extension Act

gives public housing authorities (PHAs) new authority and

obligations regarding screening and evictions. The Extension Act

also requires the Department of Justice (DOJ), police departments,

and other law enforcement entities to make criminal conviction

records available to PHAs upon request and payment of reasonable

costs for purposes of screening, lease enforcement and eviction.

DOJ is working as HUD’s partner to assure effective

implementation of the Act. DOJ and HUD specifically recognize

the importance of providing a simple and workable means of PHA

access to NCIC data as part of the screening process, as well as

the need for safeguards to ensure proper data use and

confidentiality.

Accordingly, HUD and DOJ agree to the following provisions

to facilitate proper and effective use of NCIC data. This

agreement will remain in effect for six months from the date of

the signing of this agreement. After six months, representatives

from HUD, PHAs, DOJ, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

will evaluate the efficacy of this agreement with a view toward

making it permanent.

Procedures for Access to Criminal History Data

State or local law enforcement agencies are permitted access

through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) System to

the Interstate Identification Index (III) for the purpose of

determining whether a tenant of or applicant for public housing

has a criminal history record indexed in the III. Access for

this purpose does not entitle the requesting law enforcement

agency to obtain the full content of automated records through

III. To obtain the full content of a criminal history record,

the PHA shall submit a separate request accompanied by a

fingerprint card to the Identification Records Section of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and shall pay a reasonable fee,

as provided below.

To determine whether the PHA needs to obtain a full criminal

history record, appropriate state and local law enforcement

agencies are authorized to use their NCIC access to perform name

checks. These state and local law enforcement agencies are

authorized to inform a PHA whether a name check reveals that a

public housing applicant may have a criminal history record index

in the III. Such name checks are authorized for adults or for

juveniles to the extent the release of such information is

authorized under applicable state, local or tribal law.
If the state or local law enforcement agency informs the PHA

that the name check reveals no additional information in the NCIC

file for the name, birth date and social security number given by

the public housing applicant, the PHA will not pursue further

inquiries.

If the state or local law enforcement agency indicates that

there is a criminal history record under the name, birth date and

social security number given by the public housing applicant, the

PHA will refer the applicant to the state or local law

enforcement agency for fingerprinting (or otherwise arrange for

fingerprinting). The law enforcement agency then will send the

fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for

expeditious processing.

Fees

PHAs will pay a reasonable fee for the processing of each

applicant fingerprint card.

Records Management

The Extension Act provides that each PHA shall establish and

implement a system of records management that ensures that

criminal records are maintained confidentially, not misused or

improperly disseminated, and destroyed once the purpose for which

the record was requested has been accomplished. HUD is charged

statutorily with the regulation of PHAs and will take appropriate

regulatory steps with respect to implementation of this Extension

Act provision.

Dissemination

DOJ will ensure that all appropriate parties are promptly

informed of the provisions of this agreement.

 /s/_____________________________ /s/______________________________

Henry G. Cisneros, Janet Reno,

Secretary Attorney General

United States Department of United States Department of Justice

 Housing and Urban Development

May 29, 1996
68 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix C 69

Appendix C

Interim Report

of the National Task Force

to the U.S. Attorney General
70 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix C
January 27, 1999

Attorney General Janet Reno

U.S. Department of Justice

Tenth Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Ms. Reno:

At your request, the Task Force on Interstate Identification Index Name Check Efficacy

has been meeting over the past year in both meetings arranged by the FBI and conference

calls. A list of the participants in these meetings is attached.

Although the original idea was to study the efficacy of name searches of the Interstate

Identification Index (III) as a means of criminal history screening of public housing

applicants, the study now includes two additional components: (1) volunteers from three

states, and (2) employment checks for the state of Florida. The purpose of this letter is to

provide you with a report on the progress of this limited, three-month study.

In addition to data relating to the Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) participating in the

study, the FBI has compiled some information relating to the total number of name

searches conducted for PHAs nationwide in FY 1998 and the number of fingerprint

submissions generated by those searches. As you know, the Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) authorizing name searches for PHAs requires them to obtain and

submit applicant fingerprints if name search results indicate that particular applicants

may have criminal history records indexed in the III system.

As of October 1, the FBI had processed 126,741 name searches for PHAs in FY 1998.

Those searches resulted in 35,372 “hits” indicating that applicants might have criminal

history records. However, only 5,520 fingerprint submissions were received from PHAs

during this period. There is no direct correlation between the number of FY 98 hits and
Ms. Janet Reno

January 27, 1999

Page Two

fingerprint submissions, because, among other considerations that may be relevant, name

search hits often occur months in advance of fingerprint submissions, and it is possible

that hits in 1998 will generate further fingerprint submissions that will arrive in early

1999. However, the great disparity between the number of hits and the number of

fingerprint submissions suggests strongly that not all PHAs are following the procedures

set out in the MOU.

The FBI has provided a breakdown of the above numbers by state (attached). This

breakdown strongly implies that there is a significant under-utilization of the name search

authority set out in the MOU. For example, no PHA name searches have been processed

for California and relatively few for other states with large numbers of public housing

units, such as New York, Illinois and Michigan. Clearly, many PHAs, including some of

the largest, are not taking advantage of the name search authority provided by the MOU.

We recommend that you request that the HUD look further into the reasons why the large

PHAs are not taking advantage of the MOU.

In regard to the study, in brief, it will compare name search results with fingerprint search

results to determine how often a reliance on name searches alone would produce false

positive or false negative results. A name search is based not only on the individual's

name, but also includes other personal identifiers such as Social Security number, race,

sex, and date of birth. In contrast, a fingerprint search is based on a biometric method of

identification, that is, the fingerprints of an individual, which establish unique

characteristics that are not subject to alteration.

For various reasons explained below, the sample size of the Public Housing Authorities

will not yield definitive results, but we already know a lot from FBI records. The study

design calls for the participation of six Public Housing Authorities, which agreed to

obtain and submit fingerprints of all applicants for whom criminal history searches were

required during the study period. As noted, the study will also evaluate the efficacy of III

name searches for criminal history screening of applicants for employment and licensing

in Florida and applicants for volunteer positions in Arizona, California and Maryland.
Ms. Janet Reno

January 27, 1999

PageThree

Study data are being collected by the FBI. Data collection began on September 1, 1998

for Florida licensing and employment checks, on October 1 for Public Housing Authority

checks and on November 1, 1998 for volunteer checks. Data collection continued

through January 15, 1999 for PHA applicants and will continue through January 31, 1999

for employment and volunteer applicants. The analysis period for all three groups is yet

to be determined.

As mentioned earlier, the study calls for the participation of six public housing

authorities. Initially, we had sought the participation of two large PHAs (2,500 or more

housing units), two medium-sized PHAs (200-2,500 units) and two small PHAs (less than

200 units). Inasmuch as the PHAs are independent agencies and HUD cannot mandate

participation in a study such as this, and due to the fact that only eight large PHAs, which

unfortunately did not include such cities as Chicago and New York, were taking

advantage of the current MOU between HUD and DOJ, the test group includes only one

large PHA: Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The other participating PHAs are located in

Reading, Pennsylvania; Thibodaux, Louisiana; Chandler, Arizona; Big Rapids, Michigan;

and Jefferson City, Tennessee. As noted, participation by the PHAs is voluntary.

What we do know about the PHA participants at this time is that none of these agencies

generates a large volume of applications for criminal history background screening.

Indeed, based on data collection to date, it appears that the total number of applications

submitted by all six PHAs during the study period will probably not exceed 250.

Applications for Florida employment screening are projected to exceed 60,000, and

applications for volunteers will total about 2,000. Thus, while the sample size of

employment and volunteer applicants will be large enough to produce useful study results

concerning the efficacy of name checks versus fingerprint checks for noncriminal justice

purposes generally, it appears that the nature and number of PHA applicants will limit the

usefulness of the study concerning such applications.

We anticipate forwarding the final report to you in April 1999. We believe that the report

will contain useful information regarding name search versus fingerprint search efficacy
Ms. Janet Reno

January 27, 1999

Page Four

that will provide you with a basis for future policy decisions. If you have any questions

about this interim report, please do not hesitate to let us know. In addition, if you have

comments about the report or the study, we would be pleased to receive them.

Sincerely yours,

For and on behalf of the Task Force:

Gary R. Cooper

SEARCH Executive Director and Member of

Interstate Identification Index Name Check

Efficacy Evaluation Task Force

Enclosures

cc: Task Force Members
Participants on the Interstate Identification Index

Name Search Efficacy Evaluation Task Force

U.S. Department of Justice

Jan M. Chaiken, Ph.D.

Director

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Jay Hoover

Senior Counsel

Office of Policy Development

Don M. Johnson

Section Chief

Program Development Section

Criminal Justice Information Services Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Cathy L. Riley

Management Analyst

Criminal Justice Information Services Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Beth Saymon

Acting Unit Chief

Review, Analysis and Development Unit

Criminal Justice Information Services Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBI-CJIS Advisory Policy Board

Joseph Bonino

(Past) Chairman, Advisory Policy Board

Los Angeles Police Department

U. S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development

Mark Piccirilli

Director, Drug Information and Strategy

Clearinghouse

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Donna Uzzell

Director

Criminal Justice Information Services

Martha Wright

Bureau Chief

Users Services Bureau

Criminal Justice Information Services

SEARCH, The National Consortium for

Justice Information and Statistics

Gary R. Cooper

Executive Director

Sheila J. Barton

Deputy Executive Director

Paul L. Woodard

Senior Counsel
Public Housing Authority III Inquiries, "Hits" and Fingerprint Submissions FY 98

State Name Inquiries FY 98 Name "Hits" FY 98* Fingerprint Submissions FY 98*

Alabama 23,472 5694 682

Alaska 7 3 1

Arizona 6163 2255 582

Arkansas 641 223 65

California 0 NA 59

Colorado 0 NA 0

Connecticut 811 220 0

Delaware 219 68 46

District of Columbia 0 NA 0

Florida 1128 388 0

Georgia 2647 1130 8

Hawaii 7 3 0

Idaho 0 NA 0

Illinois 4008 1120 273

Indiana 3724 1072 101

Iowa 0 NA 4

Kansas 493 137 4

Kentucky 1941 368 98

Louisiana 337 66 22

Maine 407 112 6

Maryland 1891 434 126

Massachusetts 497 96 0

Michigan 2618 643 34

Minnesota 6542 1644 495

Mississippi 12503 267 3

Missouri 5117 1300 121

Montana 2659 842 124

Nebraska 914 255 11

Nevada 2696 1027 320

New Hampshire 237 42 0

New Jersey 4312 367 9

New Mexico 0 NA 2

New York 1486 465 58

North Carolina 5832 1604 286

North Dakota 0 NA 0

Ohio 3637 1163 21

Oklahoma 2113 528 73

Oregon 506 147 31

Pennsylvania 6755 2184 341

Rhode Island 91 22 81

South Carolina 3034 1257 0

South Dakota 0 NA 0

Tennessee 10,171 2683 460

Texas 1= 0 0

Utah 2117 753 0

Vermont 308 56 14

Virginia 0 NA 42

Washington 11,747 343 470

West Virginia 4144 107 447

Wisconsin 61 1 0

Wyoming 0 NA 0

Total 126,741 35,372 5,520

* There is no correlation between name "hits" and fingerprint submissions on a monthly basis since hits on inquiries can occur

 months in advance of actual fingerprint submissions.

=

 Due to technical difficulties, Texas was not able to forward the criminal history inquiries for checks against the Interstate

 Identification Index.
 STATISTICS RE: PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY UNITS

State Number of units available* Percent Occupancy** Average months stay=

Alabama 44,592 89% 68

Alaska 1,629 85 34

Arizona 7,046 96 63

Arkansas 15,156 93 42

California 45,707 93 82

Colorado 9,109 91% 56

Connecticut 18,321 87 99

Delaware 3,373 87 -1==

District of Columbia 11,267 85 99

Florida 43,852 89 69

Georgia 54,998 87% 66

Hawaii 5,262 97 85

Idaho 831 99 45

Illinois 77,835 79 -1==

Indiana 17,976 90 46

Iowa 4,797 92% 49

Kansas 9,358 88 46

Kentucky 24,198 92 51

Louisiana 31,515 88 97

Maine 4,154 96 68

Maryland 24,662 84% -1==

Massachusetts 34,478 91 72

Michigan 26,697 86 67

Minnesota 21,684 93 55

Mississippi 15,483 93 66

Missouri 20,088 82% 56

Montana 2,068 98 30

Nebraska 7,413 96 53

Nevada 4,579 74 54

New Hampshire 4,345 97 66

New Jersey 45,235 88% 99

New Mexico 4,917 91 53

New York 197,021 97 99

North Carolina 39,436 94 69

North Dakota 1,913 94 48

Ohio 56,145 83% 66

Oklahoma 13,187 87 30

Oregon 6,171 96 59

Pennsylvania 78,654 84 76

Puerto Rico 57,107 97 -1==

Rhode Island 10,084 93% 71

South Carolina 16,820 93 63

South Dakota 6,052 99 53

Tennessee 42,565 91 66

Texas 66,222 86 55

Utah 2,212 96% 47

Vermont 1,834 96 75

Virgin Islands 4,280 83 -1==

Virginia 22,905 93 87

Washington 16,884 96 54

West Virginia 7,436 91% 50

Wisconsin 13,840 95 55

Wyoming 716 94 38

 Total 1,304,109

* Number of units under contract for federal subsidy and available for occupancy. Count is as of May 1998.

** Occupied units as percent available.

= Average months since occupants moved in.

== Low reporting or unknown.
78 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D 79

Appendix D

FBI

“Analysis of False Negative Data”

June 1999
80 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D 81

Analysis of False Negative Data

The following section provides insight into the criminal involvement of those individuals

who were missed when using the name-based check, and only identified by the fingerprint comparison. Numbers alone cannot tell the whole story. The gravity of the crimes

represented herein more clearly articulates and personalizes the risk inherent with relying

on name-based background check practice.

Please note that the projected estimates for yearly false negatives used in this section are

slightly different than those quoted previously in the report. This discrepancy is due to

the fact that the charges for the criminal history information were manually collected as a

secondary step in the process, while the actual numbers reported in the outcome matrix

were automatically generated as each fingerprint was completed. This ancillary process

did not allow charge information to be collected in some instances. Consequently, the

figures represented in the following tables will be slightly under-reported.

Due to a difference between the automated and the manual collection process, a total of

19 records were dropped from false negative subset shown in this section. Thus, the

projected yearly estimate for false negatives was adjusted from 3,756 to 3,699 (referenced numbers found on page 28 and page 2 Appendix D, respectively) for estimating

purposes. This study assumes that one-third or 33.3% of the yearly applicants were

sampled for this study, discounting any seasonal variation.

Data collection includes the submission purpose for employment and applicant background checks; the number and type of offenses in matching criminal records for those

applicants who were determined to fall into the false negative category. Analysis of the

disposition data is not included due to known deficiencies in the completeness of this

data.

In brief, the approach of using solely name-based checks would allow some of the most

vulnerable portions of our population to have continual exposure to persons with criminal

backgrounds. Alarming examples based on annual projections indicate that over 900

persons with criminal backgrounds may have gained access to Florida’s public school

system, close to 800 persons to child care facilities, and approximately 800 persons to

secure concealed firearms permits. Consideration should be given to the possibility that

not all of these offenses would be disqualifiers and must be based not only on an arrest

but also a conviction. (See Appendix E for specific information on disqualifiers for

employment purpose.) This data clearly demonstrates that fingerprint searches identify

more persons with criminal records than do name-based checks, thereby providing more

effective screening for licensing and employment purposes. One cannot argue that the

less effective name-based checks places the public at greater risk of exposure to those

previously engaged in criminal activity, which in turn creates an environment conducive

to victimizing the weak and unprotected.
82 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D

Table 1. below shows the results of false negative submissions for employment and

license applicant background checks obtained during the III Name Check Efficacy Study.

Column 1 lists the general type of submission purpose.

Column 2 lists the total persons whose name check produced false negatives

results.

Column 3 lists the submission purpose percentage of all false negatives obtained.

Estimated error = 3% at 95% confidence level.

Column 4 shows the estimated total false negatives by submission purpose (equal

to total false negatives x 3).

Table 1.

Employment and Licensing Applicant False Negative Submission Totals

False Negative

Name Check Percent of All False Estimated Total

Submission Purpose Results Negatives Obtained False Negatives

School system ....................................... 303 .................. 24.57% .................... 909

Concealed Firearm................................ 261 .................. 21.17% .................... 783

Child Care ............................................. 259 .................. 21.01% .................... 777

Insurance Business ............................... 103 .................... 8.35% .................... 309

Real Estate .............................................. 81 .................... 6.57% .................... 243

Alcoholic Beverage ................................ 42 .................... 3.41% .................... 126

Health Care ............................................. 36 .................... 2.92% .................... 108

State/Local Govt. Employment .............. 32 .................... 2.60% ...................... 96

Racing/Pari-mutuel Betting .................... 29 .................... 2.35% ...................... 87

Other or Undetermined ........................... 24 .................... 1.95% ...................... 72

Gaming (Tribal) ...................................... 21 .................... 1.70% ...................... 63

Security/Private Detective Service ......... 18 .................... 1.46% ...................... 54

Motor Vehicle Dealers ............................ 15 .................... 1.22% ...................... 45

Fire Department ........................................ 5 .................... 0.41% ...................... 15

Elderly Care .............................................. 2 .................... 0.16% ........................ 6

Explosives/Hazardous Waste .................... 1 .................... 0.08% ........................ 3

Financial Institutions ................................ 1 .................... 0.08% ........................ 3

Total ................................................. 1,233 .................... 100% ................. 3,699
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D 83

Table 1a. below, further details the false negative submissions for school system applicants.

Column 1 lists the type of offense.

Column 2 lists the number of charges for the type of offense taken from the 303

false negative samples occurring during the study.

Table 1a. School System - False Negative

Total Charges by Offense Type

(303 persons)

Type of Offense Number of Charges

Larceny ...................................................... 112

Dangerous Drugs ......................................... 62

Traffic Offenses ............................................ 59

Fraudulent Activities ..................................... 49

Assault ......................................................... 41

Other ............................................................ 37

Public Peace ................................................ 29

Burglary........................................................ 22

Obstructing Police ........................................ 20

Forgery......................................................... 18

Weapon Offense .......................................... 15

Obstructing Justice ...................................... 15

Immigration .................................................. 14

Family Offenses ........................................... 10

Stolen Vehicle .............................................. 10

Stolen Property ............................................ 10

Gambling........................................................ 8

Sex Offenses ................................................. 7

Sexual Assault ............................................... 6

Damage to Property ....................................... 5

Morals/Decency Crimes ................................. 4

Liquor ............................................................. 4

Robbery ......................................................... 4

Kidnapping ..................................................... 3

Homicide ........................................................ 3

Commercial Sex Offense ............................... 3

Flight - Escape ............................................... 2

Bribery............................................................ 2

Property Crimes ............................................. 1

Threats ........................................................... 1

Total Charges ........................................... 576

Avg. # Charges ......................................... 1.9
84 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D

Table 1b. below, further details the false negative submissions for concealed firearm

applicants.

Column 1 lists the type of offense.

Column 2 lists the number of charges for the type of offense taken from the 261

false negative samples occurring during the study.

Table 1b. Concealed Firearm-False Negative

Total Charges by Offense Type

(261 persons)

Type of Offense Number of Charges

Larceny ......................................................... 61

Public Peace ................................................. 55

Traffic Offenses ............................................. 54

Assault .......................................................... 47

Dangerous Drugs .......................................... 42

Other ............................................................. 42

Weapon Offense ........................................... 38

Fraudulent Activities ...................................... 30

Burglary......................................................... 23

Immigration ................................................... 22

Stolen Vehicle ............................................... 18

Obstructing Police ......................................... 18

Stolen Property ............................................. 17

Obstructing Justice ....................................... 14

Liquor ............................................................ 10

Gambling......................................................... 9

Family Offenses .............................................. 9

Sex Offenses .................................................. 9

Forgery............................................................ 7

Robbery .......................................................... 6

Flight - Escape ................................................ 5

Sexual Assault ................................................ 4

Damage to Property ........................................ 3

Bribery............................................................. 3

Threats ............................................................ 2

Morals/Decency Crimes .................................. 2

Commercial Sex Offense ................................ 2

Obscenity ........................................................ 1

Conservation ................................................... 1

Arson............................................................... 1

Total Charges ............................................ 555

Avg. # Charges ......................................... 2.13
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D 85

Table 1c. below, further details the false negative submissions for child care applicants.

Column 1 lists the type of offense.

Column 2 lists the number of charges for the type of offense taken from the 259

false negative samples occurring during the study.

Table 1c. Child Care - False Negative Total

Charges by Offense Type (259 persons)

Type of Offense Number of Charges

Larceny ......................................................... 86

Dangerous Drugs .......................................... 67

Assault .......................................................... 58

Traffic Offenses ............................................. 52

Fraudulent Activities ...................................... 42

Public Peace ................................................. 36

Obstructing Police ......................................... 25

Weapon Offense ........................................... 24

Obstructing Justice ....................................... 23

Other ............................................................. 18

Forgery.......................................................... 14

Commercial Sex Offense .............................. 13

Stolen Property ............................................. 12

Burglary......................................................... 11

Immigration ................................................... 11

Family Offenses ............................................ 11

Gambling......................................................... 8

Stolen Vehicle ................................................. 8

Damage to Property ........................................ 8

Sexual Assault ................................................ 7

Sex Offenses .................................................. 5

Liquor .............................................................. 4

Threats ............................................................ 4

Morals/Decency Crimes .................................. 2

Tax Revenue ................................................... 2

Robbery .......................................................... 2

Embezzlement ................................................ 2

Homicide ......................................................... 1

Flight - Escape ................................................ 1

Obscenity ........................................................ 1

Kidnapping ...................................................... 1

Conservation ................................................... 1

Total Charges ............................................ 560

Avg. # Charges ......................................... 2.16
86 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D

It has been previously noted that the study findings may not be considered nationally

representative due to the limitations of the study design. However, the following table

indicates there is a high coefficient correlation between this study and another study

which is nationally representative. Table 2 lists the number of samples by submission

purpose for the III Name Check Efficacy Study and then cited a previously compiled FBI

study, the “Civil Fingerprint Card ‘Hit’ Survey.” The “Hit Survey” obtained approximately 16,400 samples of civil applicant hits from all applicant locales. As can be observed from the correlation coefficient of .703, the distribution of false negatives by

submission purpose in the efficacy study approximates the distribution for those of the

“Hit Survey” for those submission purposes listed. Variations can be explained by

differences in statutes from state to state.

Table 2. False Negative Sample correlation with

“Civil Fingerprint Card ‘Hit’ Survey”

Submission Purpose III Study Hit Survey

School System................................................. 303.......................1425

Firearm.............................................................. 261.......................1391

Child Care......................................................... 259.........................835

Insurance Business......................................... 103............................53

Real Estate......................................................... 81.........................123

Alcoholic Beverage........................................... 42.........................166

Health Care........................................................ 36.........................133

Government Employment State/Local ...........32.........................786

Racing/Pari-mutuel Betting..............................29.........................374

Security/Private Detective Service.................18.......................1098

Gaming (Tribal) .................................................. 21.........................198

Motor Vehicle Dealers....................................... 15............................74

Fire Department................................................... 5 ............................22

Elderly Care.......................................................... 2 ..........................21

Explosives/Hazardous Waste............................1 ..............................3

Lottery/Gambling................................................. 1 .........................648

Correlation Coefficient .............................................. 0.70329807

The information presented in the tables above show that the risk to Florida citizens is real

for sensitive employment positions in school, child care, concealed firearm categories,

and others. One should consider that a high profile case from a missed identification

could result in far-reaching repercussions.

At the request of officials from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the following opinion is provided, not withstanding the FBI Analysis of False Negative Data:
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix D 87

“Florida is convinced that fingerprint checks are the most effective mechanism to assure that persons with criminal history records are not allowed

access to sensitive employment positions. Florida believes, however, that

the study indicates that many persons are identified through the name

check process. As a result, Florida’s position is that name-based checks are

preferable to having no search at all, particularly when other background

investigation information is considered.”

The data in Table 3 and Appendix E demonstrate the expansion in submissions received

for applicant background checks, as well as the increased number of statutes enacted for

applicant background checks. Appendix E provides an additional component of information in a non-inclusive listing of disqualifying offenses for particular types of employment. This list illustrates that there are diverse reasons for causing one to be unsuitable

for employment. This information causes one to understand that the public desires access

to national information because of the potential to increase public safety.

Yearly Totals For Florida Applicant/Employment Civil Fingerprint Card Checks

Table 3. shows the number of fingerprint cards processed by CJIS for the State of Florida

for Fiscal Years (FY) 1987 through 1998. Estimates for FY 1999 and 2000 were taken

from a straight-line trend projection from the previous years.

Table 3. Civil Applicant/Employment Total by Fiscal Year

Number of Applicant/

Fiscal Year Employment Processed

FY 1987 ......................................... 180,929

FY 1988 ......................................... 219,748

FY 1989 ......................................... 214,629

FY 1990 ......................................... 255,812

FY 1991 ......................................... 274,467

FY 1992 ......................................... 208,575

FY 1993 ......................................... 236,117

FY 1994 ......................................... 277,227

FY 1995 ......................................... 260,661

FY 1996 ......................................... 248,112

FY 1997 ......................................... 369,588

FY 1998 ......................................... 318,198

FY 1999 (Projected) ...................... 326,998

FY 2000 (Projected) ...................... 338,022

Appendix E is a listing of all current fingerprint submission statutes, both federal and

state that apply to the State of Florida.
88 III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force
III Name Check Efficacy: Report of the National Task Force • Appendix E 89

Appendix E

Florida Statutory Requirements

for Fingerprint Submissions

and accompanying comments and disqualifiers
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Alcoholic Beverage

Statute Name: Division of Beverage

Statute number: 561.17 [1] 561.15 [2]

Date Enacted: 12/29/1971

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 1 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Child Care

Statute Name: Background Check / Child Care

Statute number: CHAPTERS 393, 394, 396, 397, 402, 409 Section 984, 985, and 435 F.S.

Date Enacted: 2/23/1998

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Murder; Manslaughter; Vehicular Homicide; Killing of an unborn child by injury to the mother; Aggravated Assault; Aggravated 

Battery; Kidnapping; False Imprisonment; Removing minors from the state or concealing minors contrary to court order; Sexual 

Battery; Prostitution; Lewd and Lascivious Behavior; Lewdness and Indecent Exposure; Arson; Fraudulent sale or controlled 

substances, if the offense was a felony; Abuse or neglect of a disabled adult or elderly person; Robbery; Incest; Aggravated 

Child Abuse; Child Abuse; Negligent treatment of children; Sexual performance by a child; Obscene Literature; Assault, if the 

victim of the offense was a minor; Battery, if the offense was a minor; and Drug abuse prevention and control, only if the offense 

was a felony or if any other person involved in the offense was a minor.

Page 2 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Subdivider Registration License

Statute number: FS 498.031

Date Enacted: 2/23/1981

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

The subdivider has not, or, if a corporation, its officers, directors, or principals have not, been convicted of a crime involving land 

dispositions or any aspect of the land sales business in this state, the United States, or any other state or foreign country, or 

had a bond forfeited when charged with such a crime, within the past 10 yrs.

Has not had a conviction of a criminal offense prohibited by this chapter and is not the subject of an indictment, information, or 

other formal charge relating to a criminal offense prohibited by this chapter.

Page 3 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Bail Bondmen, under Department of Inv.

Statute number: 648.34 [2] [3]

Date Enacted: 2/24/1981

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

The applicant is a natural person who has reached the age of 18 yrs.

The applicant has been a bona fide resident of the state for 1 yr. last past and will actually reside in this state at least 6 months 

out of each year.

Page 4 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Talent Agency Owners and Operators License

Statute number: FS 468.402 and 468.403

Date Enacted: 1/1/1987

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

1) Obtained or attempted to obtain any license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment;

2) Violated any provision of this part or any rule of the department;

3) Found guilty of or had adjudication withheld with respect to a crime involving moral turpitude or dishonest dealing under the 

laws of this state or any other state or government;

4) Made, printed, published, distributed or caused, authorized, or knowingly permitted the making, printing, publication, or 

distribution of any false statement, description, or promise of such a character as to reasonably induce any person to act to his 

damage or injury, if such statement, description, or promises were purported to be performed by the talent agency and if the 

owner or operator then knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and injury, could have known of the falsity of the statement 

description or promise;

5) Knowingly committed or been a party to any material fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, conspiracy, collusion, trick, 

scheme, or device whereby any other person lawfully relying upon the work, representation, or conduct of the talent agency acts 

or has acted to his injury or damage;

6) Failed or refused upon demand to disclose any information, as required by this part, within his knowledge, or failed or refused 

to produce any document, book, or record in his possession for inspection to the department or any authorized agent thereof 

acting within its jurisdiction or by authority of law;

7) Established the talent agency within any place where intoxicating liquors are sold; any place where gambling is permitted, or 

any house of prostitution;

8) Charged, collected, or received compensation for any service performed by the talent agency greater than specified in its 

schedule of maximum fees, charges, and commissions previously filed with the department;

9) A license to operate a talent agency revoked, suspended or otherwise acted against, including but not limited to, having been 

denied a license for good cause by the licensing authority of another state, territory, or country.

10) Willfully made or filed a report or record which the licensee knew to be false, failed to file a report or record required by state 

or federal law, impeded or obstructed such filing, or induced another person to impede or obstruct such filing. Such reports or 

records shall include only those which are signed in the capacity as a licensed talent agency.

11) Advertised goods or services in a manner which was fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading in form or content.

12) Advertised, operated, or attempted to operate under a name other than the name appearing on the license. 

13) Guilty of fraud or deceit in the operation of a talent agency.

14) Operated with a revoked, suspended or inactive license

15) Permitted, aided, assisted, procured, or advised any unlicensed person to operate a talent agency contrary to this chapter or 

to a rule of the department.

16) Failed to perform any statutory or legal obligation placed on a licensed talent agency.

17) Practiced or offered to practice beyond the scope permitted by law or has accepted and performed professional 

responsibilities which the licensee knows or has reason to know that he is not competent to perform.

18) Conspired with another licensee or with any other person to commit an act, or has committed an act, which would tend to 

coerce, intimidate, or preclude another licensee from advertising his services.

19) Solicited business, either personally or through an agent or through any other person, through the use of fraud, deception, 

or otherwise; the use of misleading statements; or the exercise of intimidation or undue influence.

20) Exercised undue influence on the artist in such a manner as to exploit the artist for financial gain of the licensee or a third 

party, which includes, but is not limited to, the promoting or selling of services to the artist.

Page 5 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Employee Leasing Companies

Statute number: 468.520 - 468.534 FS

Date Enacted: 1/1/1992

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 6 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Yacht and Ship Brokers License

Statute number: 326.004 FS

Date Enacted: 5/5/1992

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 7 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Licensing of Community Association Managers

Statute number: 468.433 FS

Date Enacted: 6/7/1994

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 8 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Professional Guardians

Statute number: FS 744.3135

Date Enacted: 10/1/1997

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 9 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Contributor Requirement

Statute Name: Cigarette, Distributing Agent, Wholesale Dealer to Exporter

Statute number: 210.15[1] [c] [e]

Date Enacted: 10/1/1998

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Any person who has been convicted within the past 5 yrs. of any offense against the cigarette laws of this state or who has been 

convicted in this state, or the United States during the past 5 yrs. of any offense designated as a felony by such state or the 

United States, or to a corporation, any of whose officers have been so convicted. The term "conviction" shall include an 

adjudication of guilt on a plea of guilty of a plea of nolo contendere, or the forfeiture of a bond when charged with a crime.

Page 10 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Explosives/Haz Waste

Statute Name: Explosive - 1. Blasters 2. Dealers 3. User 4. Manufacture - Distribution.

Statute number: 552.092 [2]

Date Enacted: 6/1/1977

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

No license or permit shall be issued, renewed, or be allowed to remain in effect for any natural person:

1) Under 18 years of age;

2) Has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned or had his civil rights restored; or

3) Has been adjudicated mentally incompetent and has not had his civil rights restored.

Page 11 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Explosives/Haz Waste

Statute Name: Motor Fuel License for Refiners, Importers, and Wholesalers

Statute number: FS 206.026

Date Enacted: 1/1/1986

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

1) A felony in this state.

2) Any felony in any other state which would be a felony if committed in this state under the laws of Florida.

3) Any felony under the laws of the United States.

Page 12 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Explosives/Haz Waste

Statute Name: Ether License for Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers of Ether; Ether Permit for Purchasers of Ether

Statute number: FS 499.63

Date Enacted: 10/1/1986

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

If the applicant has possessed a valid Florida license or permit under this part during the prior license or permit year and such 

Florida license or permit has not lapsed or been suspended or revoked, a set of fingerprints shall not be required. If fingerprints 

are required, the set of fingerprints shall be submitted by the department to the Department of Law Enforcement for state and 

federal processing.

Page 13 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Financial Institutions

Statute Name: Licensing of Mortgage Brokers and Mortgage Solicitors

Statute number: 494.04 [4]

Date Enacted: 9/23/1977

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 14 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Fire Department

Statute Name: Fire Fighters

Statute number: 633.34 [2] [a]

Date Enacted: 12/29/1971

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

A high school graduate or the equivalent, as the term may be determined by the division, and at least 18 yrs of age.

Neither have been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought, nor have pled 

nolo contendere to any charge of felony. If an applicant has been convicted of a felony, such applicant must be in compliance 

with s. 112.011 (2) (b). If an applicant has been convicted of a misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment 

sought, such applicant shall be excluded from employment for a period of 4 yrs. after expiration of sentence. If the sentence is 

suspended or adjudication is withheld in a felony charge or in a misdemeanor directly related to the position or employment 

sought and a period of probation is imposed, the applicant must have been released from probation.

Page 15 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Gaming (Tribal)

Statute Name: Licensing of Professional Pugilistic Exhibitions, including Boxers, Managers, Trainers, Seconds, Timekeepers, 

Referees, Judges, etc.

Statute number: FS 548.023, 548.028, and 548.071

Date Enacted: 2/21/1985

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

1) Is guilty of violating this chapter or rules of the commission.

2) Has committed fraud or deceit in securing any license or permit.

3) Has been convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, has entered a plea of nolo contendere to, or has been found guilty of a crime 

involving moral turpitude in any jurisdiction within 10 yrs. preceding the suspension or revocation.

4) Is guilty of unprofessional or unethical conduct.

5) Made a misstatement of a material fact, fraudulently concealed a material fact, or induced or aided another person in 

misstating or concealing any material fact in any application or other proceeding under this chapter.

6) Failed to account for or pay over moneys belonging to others which have come into his possession in connection with a 

match.

7) Failed to furnish to the proper party a copy of any contract or statement required by this chapter or has breached such a 

contract.

8) Has paid or agreed to pay any money or article of value to any licensee or permittee for soliciting or for business secured or 

for rendering any service or the doing of any of the acts forbidden by this chapter and the rules adopted hereunder.

9) Has loaned his license or permit to another person or has borrowed or used the license or permit of another.

10) Has employed a person who does not hold a license or permit as required by law.

11) Has failed to maintain in force the bond required by this chapter or has failed to deposit with the commission the required 

cash, check, or securities.

12) Has been disciplined by the State Athletic Commission or similar agency or body of an jurisdiction.

13) Has failed to pay a fine imposed under this chapter.

Page 16 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Gaming (Tribal)

Statute Name: Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and Seminole Tribe of Florida Police Departments background checks relating to 

applicants for: Tribal Education, Tribal Government, and Tribal Gaming Employees, primary m

Statute number: 285.18[3] FS

Date Enacted: 5/25/1994

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 17 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Govt Employmnt State/

Statute Name: Employees of State Agencies - Includes, but is not limited to, the Florida School of the Deaf/Blind and the 

University of Florida

Statute number: FS 110.1127

Date Enacted: 7/1/1983

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

The conviction or prior conviction of a crime which is reasonably related to the nature of the position sought or held by the 

individual; or

The entering of a plea of nolo contendere or, when a jury verdict of guilty is rendered but adjudication of guilt is withheld, with 

respect to a crime which is reasonably related to the nature of the position sought or held by the individual.

Page 18 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Health Care

Statute Name: Applicants for License from the Arizona Board of Chiropractic Examiners

Statute number: EO 88-4; ARS 41-1750

Date Enacted: 6/23/1988

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Page 19 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Health Care

Statute Name: Medicaid Provider

Statute number: 409.907 FS (SENATE BILL 508 AMENDED)

Date Enacted: 9/9/1997

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

1) A false representation or omission of any material fact in making the application, including the submission of an application 

that conceals the controlling or ownership interest of any officer, director, agent, managing employee, affiliated person, or 

partner or shareholder who may not be eligible to participate;

2) Currently excluded, suspended, terminated from, or has involuntarily withdrawn from participation in, Florida's Medicaid 

program or governmental or private health care or health insurance program;

3) Convicted of a criminal offense relating to the delivery of any goods or services under Medicaid or Medicare or any other 

public or private health care or health insurance program including the performance of management or administrative services 

relating to the delivery of goods or services under any such program;

4) Convicted under federal or state law or a criminal offense related to the neglect or abuse of a patient in connection with the 

delivery of any health care goods or services;

5) Convicted under federal or state law or a criminal offense relating to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or 

dispensing of a controlled substance;

6) Convicted of any criminal offense related to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial 

misconduct;

7) Convicted under federal or state law of a crime punishable by imprisonment of a year or more which involves moral turpitude;

8) Convicted in connection with the interference or obstruction of any investigation into any criminal offense listed in this 

subsection;

9) Found to have violated federal or state laws, rules, or regulations governing Florida's Medicaid program or any other state's 

Medicaid program, the Medicare program, and been sanctioned accordingly;

10) Been previously found by a licensing, certifying, or professional standards board of agency to have violated the standards or 

conditions relating to licensure or certification or the quality of services provided;

11) Failed to pay any fine or overpayment properly assessed under the Medicaid program in which no appeal is pending or after 

resolution of the specific letter of forgiveness or has approved a repayment schedule to which the provider agrees to adhere.

Page 20 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Health Care

Statute Name: Medical Practitioners Licenses and Renewals - Physicians, Osteopathic Physicians, Chiropractors, and 

Podiatrists

Statute number: 458.311 458.313 458.319 459.0055 459.008 460.406 460.407 461.006 461.007 FS

Date Enacted: 10/2/1997

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Description of any criminal offense of which the applicant has been found guilty, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was 

withheld, or to which the applicant has pled guilty or nolo contendere. A criminal offense in another jurisdiction which would 

have been a felony or misdemeanor if committed in this state must be reported. If the criminal offense is under appeal, the 

applicant must submit a copy of the notice and the department must state that the criminal offense is under appeal. It is then 

placed in the applicant's profile. If the applicant indicates to the department that a criminal offense is under appeal, the 

applicant must, upon disposition of the appeal, submit to the department a copy of the final written order of disposition.

A description of any final disciplinary action taken with the previous 10 yrs against the applicant by the agency regulating the 

profession that the applicant is or has been licensed to practice, whether in this state or in any other jurisdiction, by a specialty 

board that is recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties, the American Osteopathic Association, or a similar 

national organization, or by a licensed hospital, health maintenance organization, prepaid health clinic, ambulatory surgical 

center, or nursing home.

Page 21 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Health Care

Statute Name: Agency for Health Care Administration

Statute number: 435.04 - 112.0455 381.60225 383.305 390.015 391.206 393.067 394.875 395.0055 395.0199 400.071 

400.4174 400.471 400.506 400.5572 400.6065 400.801 400.805 483.101 483.30

Date Enacted: 8/17/1998

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 22 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Health Care

Statute Name: Employees of Nursing Facilities Licensed under Part II

Statute number: 400.215 FS and 435.04 FS

Date Enacted: 10/13/1998

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**BECOMES MANDATORY AT LEVEL 2**

That no persons subject to the provisions of this section have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea 

of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offenses prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any 

similar stature of another jurisdiction: Adult abuse, neglect, or exploitation of aged person or disabled adults; Murder; 

Manslaughter, Aggravated Manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult or Aggravated Manslaughter of a child; Vehicular 

Homicide; Killing of an unborn child by injury to the mother; Assault, if the victim of the offense was a minor; Aggravated 

Assault; Battery, if the victim of the offense was a minor; Aggravated Battery; Kidnapping; False Imprisonment; Sexual Battery; 

Prohibited Acts of persons in familial or custodial authority; Prostitution; Lewd and Lascivious Behavior; Lewdness and Indecent 

Exposure; Arson; Theft, Robbery, and related crimes, if the offense is a felony; Fraudulent sale of controlled substance, only if 

the offense was a felony; Abuse, aggravated abuse, or neglect of an elderly person or disabled adult; Lewd or Lascivious 

offenses committed upon or in the presence of an elderly person or disabled adult; Exploitation of an elderly person or disabled 

adult, if the offense was a felony; Incest; Child abuse, aggravated child abuse, or neglect of a child; Contributing to the 

delinquency of dependency of a child; Negligent treatment of children; Sexual performance of a child; Obscene literature; and 

Drug abuse prevention and control, only if the offense was a felony or if any other person involved in the offense was a minor. 

For employees or employers licensed or registered pursuant to chapter 400, does not have a confirmed report of abuse, 

neglect, or exploitation as defined in s. 415.102(5), which has been uncontested or upheld under s. 415.103. Committed an act 

that constitutes domestic violence as defined in s. 741.30.

Page 23 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Insurance Business

Statute Name: Runners (Department of Insurance, Bureau of License)

Statute number: FS 648.37

Date Enacted: 2/24/1981

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Applicant is a natural person who has reached the age of 18 years.

Applicant has been a bona fide resident of this state for more that 6 months last past.

Applicant will be employed by only one bail bondsman, who will supervise the work of the applicant, and be responsible for the 

runner's conduct in the bail bond business.

The application must be endorsed by the appointing bail bondsman, who shall obligate himself to supervise the runner's 

activities in his behalf.

Page 24 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Insurance Business

Statute Name: Fingerprint Submissions from the Bureau of Insurer Examinations, Department of Insurance

Statute number: FS 624.34

Date Enacted: 6/7/1984

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

No Known Restrictions, however, the provisions of this section do not apply to the licensing of general lines agents and 

solicitors, life insurance agents, health insurance agents, and insurance adjusters as provided for under chapter 626.

Page 25 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Insurance Business

Statute Name: Insurance Representatives

Statute number: 626.171 FS

Date Enacted: 9/13/1990

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 26 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Lawyer

Statute Name: State Bar Examiners

Statute number: FS 454.026

Date Enacted: 4/10/1985

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 27 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Lottery/Gambling

Statute Name: Lottery Vendors, Lottery Retailers, and Lottery Employees

Statute number: CH. 87-65, Laws of Florida

Date Enacted: 1/1/1990

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contender to, a felony committed in the preceding 10 years, regardless of 

adjudication, unless the department determines that:

1) The person has been pardoned or his civil rights have been restored; or

2) Subsequent to such conviction or entry or plea the person has engaged in the kind of law-abiding commerce and good 

citizenship that would reflect well upon the integrity of the lottery.

Page 28 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Lottery/Gambling

Statute Name: Bingo Licensees

Statute number: 849.093 FS

Date Enacted: 10/1/1991

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Been convicted of a felony within the last 5 yrs. Has been convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere to any illegal gambling 

activity or forfeited bond for not appearing while charged with such. Directly or indirectly leases promises or sells leases or 

otherwise distributes bingo equipment or supplies. Furnishes any services to a licensee. Violated any provisions of this section 

or any rules adopted pursuant thereto. 

Knowingly caused, aided, abetted, or conspired with another to cause any person to violate this section or any rules adopted 

pursuant thereto; or obtained a license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment; or if any officer, director, stockholder, or 

member of the bingo committee of the licensed distributor or licensed organization is found to be no longer eligible under this 

section.

Page 29 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Lottery/Gambling

Statute Name: Cardroom Occupational License Applicants

Statute number: FS 849.086

Date Enacted: 12/27/1996

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

**Currently No Known Restrictions**

Page 30 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Motor Vehicle Dealers

Statute Name: Motor Vehicle, Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Dealers License

Statute number: FS 320.27 and FS 320.77

Date Enacted: 10/1/1988

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Any prior criminal record or any outstanding warrants.

Page 31 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Other or Undetermined

Statute Name: Union Business Agent

Statute number: 447.04 [2] [3]

Date Enacted: 12/29/1971

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

No person shall be granted a license or a permit to act as a business agent in the state:

1) Who has not been a citizen of and has not resided in the United States for a period of more than 5 yrs. next prior to making 

application for such license or permit;

2) Who has been convicted of a felony and has not had his civil rights restored;

3) Who is not a person of good moral character.

Page 32 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Other or Undetermined

Statute Name: Secondary Metals Recycler License

Statute number: 538.25 FS

Date Enacted: 10/2/1989

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

The applicant or registrant has been convicted of knowingly and intentionally:

1) Violated s 538.20 or s. 538.21;

2) Engaged in a pattern of failing to keep records as required by s 538.19;

3) Made a material false statement in the application for registration; or

4) Engaged in a fraudulent act in connection with any purchase or sale of regulated metals property.

The applicant or registrant has been convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony committed by the 

secondary metals recycler against the laws of the state of the United States involving theft, larceny, dealing in stolen property, 

receiving stolen property, burglary, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses, possession of altered property, or any 

felony drug offense or of knowingly and intentionally violating the laws of the state relating to registration as a secondary metals 

recycler.

Page 33 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Pawnbroker Business

Statute Name: Second - Hand Dealer License

Statute number: 538.09 FS

Date Enacted: 10/2/1989

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with any purchase or sale, or has been or is engaged in or is about to engage 

in any practice, purchase, or sale which is fraudulent or in violation of the law.

Has, within the preceding 5-year period, been convicted of, or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, a crime against 

the laws of this state or any other state of the United States which relates to registration as a second-hand dealer or which 

involves theft, larceny, dealing in stolen property, receiving stolen property, burglary, embezzlement, obtaining property by false 

pretenses, possession of altered property, and felony drug offense, any violation of s. 812.015, or any fraudulent or dishonest 

dealing. 

Has had a final judgment entered against him in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, embezzlement, misrepresentation or 

deceit.

Page 34 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Private Process Server

Statute Name: Special Process Server

Statute number: FS 48.021

Date Enacted: 10/1/1988

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

An applicant who has been convicted of a crime within the last 5 years may not serve.

Page 35 of 40
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Racing/Pari-mutuel Betting

Statute Name: Racing Permits/Racetrack Employees License

Statute number: FS 550.105; FS 550.054

Date Enacted: 8/3/1998

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Deny a license to or revoke, suspend, or place conditions upon or restrictions on a license of any person who has been refused 

a license by any other state racing commission or racing authority;

Deny, suspend, or place conditions on a license of any person who is under suspension or has unpaid fines in another 

jurisdiction; if the state racing commission or racing authority of such other state or jurisdiction extends to the division reciprocal 

courtesy to maintain the disciplinary control.

The division may deny, suspend, revoke, or declare ineligible any occupational license if the applicant for or holder thereof has 

violated the provisions of this chapter or the rules of the division governing the conduct or persons connected with racetracks 

and frontons. In addition, the division may deny, suspend, revoke or declare ineligible any occupational license if the applicant 

for such license has been convicted in this state in any other state, or under the laws of the United States of a capital felony, a 

felony, or an offense in any other state which would be a felony under the laws of this state involving arson; trafficking in, 

conspiracy to traffic in, smuggling, importing, conspiracy to smuggle or import, or delivery, sale, or distribution of a controlled 

substance; or a crime involving a lack of good moral character, or has had a pari-mutuel wagering.

The division may deny, declare ineligible, or revoke any occupational license if the applicant for such license has been 

convicted of a felony or misdemeanor in this state, in any other state, or under the laws of the United States, if such felony or 

misdemeanor is related to gambling or bookmaking, as contemplated in s. 849.25, or involves cruelty to animals. If the 

applicant establishes that she or he is of good moral character, that she or he is of good moral character, that she or he has 

been rehabilitated, and that the crime she or he was convicted of is not related to pari-mutuel wagering and is not a capital 

offense, the restrictions excluding offenders may be waived by the directors of the division.

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FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Real Estate

Statute Name: Applicants for Real Estate License (658)

Statute number: FSA 475.16

Date Enacted: 2/14/1972

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or 

device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in this state or any other state, nation, or territory; 

has violated a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of listing contract, written, oral, express or implied, in a real estate 

transaction; has aided, assisted, or conspired with any other person engaged in any such misconduct and in furtherance 

thereof; or has formed an intent, design, or scheme to engage in any such misconduct, and has committed an overt act in 

furtherance of such intent, design or scheme.

Been guilty of false advertising in, on or by, signs, bill boards, newspapers, magazines, periodical, books, pamphlets, circulars, 

radio, telephone, telegraph, or other means of communication of publicity, of such character as to deceive or defraud investors, 

or prospective investors, in real property or interests therein, as more particularly described in subsection (2) of ss 475.01, 

whether such property is owned, or purported to be owned by the registrant or by another; or,

Failed to account or deliver to any person, including registrants under this chapter, any personal property such as money, fund, 

deposit, check, draft, abstract of title, mortgage, conveyance, lease, or other document, or thing of value, including a share of a 

real estate commission, or any secret or illegal profit, or any divisible share or portion thereof, which has come into his hands 

and which is not his property, or which he is not in law or equity entitled to retain, under the circumstances, and at the time 

which has been agreed upon or is required by law or, in the absence of a fixed time, upon demand of the person entitled to such 

accounting and delivery; provided, however, that, if the registrant shall, in good faith, entertain doubt as to his duty to account 

and deliver said property, or as to what person is entitled to the accounting and delivery, or if conflicting demands therefore shall 

have been made upon him and he has not appropriated the property to his own use or intermingled it with his own property of 

like kind, he may notify the commission promptly, truthful stating the facts, and ask its advice thereon, after notice thereof to the 

commission, shall promptly submit the issue to arbitration by agreement of all parties, or interplead the parties, or otherwise 

seek an adjudication of the question in a proper court and shall abide, or offer to perform, the advice of the commission or the 

orders of the court or arbitrators, no information against him shall be permitted to be maintained; or,

Violated any of the provisions of this chapter, or any lawful order, rule or regulation made or issued under the provisions of this 

chapter; or,

Been guilty of a crime against the laws of this state or any other state or of the United States, involving moral turpitude, or 

fraudulent or dishonest dealing; and the record of a conviction certified or authenticated in such form as to be admissible in 

evidence under the laws of the state, shall be admissible as prima facie evidence of such guilt; or,

Become temporarily incapacitated from acting as a broker or salesman with safety to investors or those in a fiduciary relation 

with him because of drunkenness, use of drugs, or temporary mental derangement, expect that the suspension in such cases 

shall be for the period of such capacity; and,

The registration of a registrant may be revoked if the registrant shall, for a second time, be found guilty of any misconduct that 

warrants his suspension under subsection (1) of this section, or if he shall be found guilty of a course of conduct or practices 

which show that he is so incompetent, negligent, dishonest or untruthful that the money, property, transactions and rights of 

investors or those with whom he may sustain a confidential relation, may not safely be entrusted to him.

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FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: School System

Statute Name: School System Employment/Certification

Statute number: 231.17

Date Enacted: 10/1/1984

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Be of good moral character; and 

The superintendent shall report to the department the name of any person who has been convicted of, or who has pled nolo 

contendere to a misdemeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic infraction, or any act which would 

be grounds or revocation or suspension under subsection (1). The superintendent shall also report to the department the name 

of any person who has been dismissed or severed from employment because of conduct involving any immoral, unnatural, or 

lascivious act.

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FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Security/Private Det Svc

Statute Name: Division of Securities

Statute number: FS 517.12 [6]

Date Enacted: 11/1/1978

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

Conviction of, or plea of nolo contendere to, a criminal offense of his commission of any acts which would be grounds for refusal 

of an application under s. 517.161.

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FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

State Name: Florida REGION NAME: SOUTHERN

Submission Name: Security/Private Det Svc

Statute Name: PI/PIA/Patrol/Deception Detection/Solicitor/Concealed Firearm License

Statute number: CHPT 493 496 790 FS 493.30-493.329 493.561-493.579 496.01-496.40 790.06

Date Enacted: 11/29/1989

Federal, State, County, or City: State

Mandatory

Comments and Disqualifiers:

1) Fraud or willful misrepresentation in applying for or obtaining a license;

2) Use of any fictitious or assumed name by a licensee unless he has department approval and qualifies under s. 865.09;

3) Conviction of a crime which directly relates to the business for which the license is held or sought, regardless of whether 

adjudication was withheld or whether imposition of sentence was suspended. A conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere 

shall create a presumption of guilt to the underlying criminal charges, and the department shall allow the person being 

disciplined to present any evidence relevant to the underlying charges and the circumstances surrounding his plea;

4) A false statement by the licensee that any person is or has been in his employ;

5) A finding that the licensee or any of his or its employees is guilty of willful betrayal of a professional secret;

6) Proof that the licensee is guilty of fraud or deceit, or of negligence, incompetency, or misconduct, in the practice of his 

business for which the license is held or sought;

7) Conducting business without a license or with a revoked or suspended license;

8) Failure of the licensee to maintain in full force and effect the general liability insurance coverage, if required, referred to in s. 

493.31.

9) Impersonating, or permitting or aiding and abetting an employee to impersonate, a law enforcement officer or an employee of 

this state, the United States, or any political subdivision thereof;

10) Commission of assault, battery, or kidnapping or use of force or violence on any person except in self-defense or in the 

defense of a client;

11) Knowingly violating, or advising, encouraging, or assisting the violation of any court order, capias, warrant, or injunction in 

the course of business as a licensee of that relates to the business for which licensure is sought;

12) Acting as a runner or a capper for any attorney; 

13) Falsification or alteration of an inventory or recovered personal property required by s. 493.318;

14) Transferring or attempting to transfer a license issued pursuant to this chapter;

15) Failure or refusal to cooperate with the department's investigation of any suspected violation of this part;

16) Violating any provision of this chapter.

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