Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on the 

Legislative Branch, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, September 15, 2005 CAPITOL VISITOR 

CENTER 

Schedule Delays Continue; 

Reassessment Underway 

Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director 

Terrell Dorn, Assistant Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

GAO-05-1037T 
Page 1 GAO-05-1037T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to assist the Subcommittee in monitoring 

progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will 

focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) progress in managing the 

project’s schedule since the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing on the 

project; (2) our estimate of a general time frame for completing the base 

project’s construction and the preliminary results of our assessment of the 

risks associated with AOC’s July 2005 schedule for the base project; and 

(3) the project’s costs and funding, including the potential impact of 

scheduling issues on cost.1 However, we will not, as originally planned, 

provide specific estimated completion dates because AOC’s contractors 

revised the schedule in August to reflect recent delays, but AOC has not 

yet evaluated the revised schedule. AOC believes that the time added to 

the schedule by its contractors is unreasonable. Until AOC completes its 

evaluation and we assess it, any estimates of specific completion dates 

are, in our view, tentative and preliminary. Similarly, we will wait until the 

schedule is stabilized to update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to 

complete the project. Currently, AOC and its consultant, McDonough 

Bolyard Peck (MBP), are still developing their cost-to-complete estimates. 

Our remarks today are based on our review of schedules and financial 

reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its 

construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; our 

observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and our 

discussions with CVC project staff (including AOC, its major CVC 

contractors, and representatives of MBP), AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal, and 

officials responsible for managing the Capitol Power Plant. We also 

reviewed applicable appropriations legislation. Appendix I provides more 

detailed information on our assessment of the project’s schedule. We did 

not perform an audit; rather, we performed our work to assist Congress in 

conducting its oversight activities. 

In summary, although AOC and its construction contractors have 

continued to make progress since the Subcommittee’s July 14 CVC 

hearing, several delays have occurred and more are expected. These 

delays could postpone the base project’s completion significantly beyond 

 1

See GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Update on Status of Project’s Schedule and Costs, 

GAO-05-910T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005). 
Page 2 GAO-05-1037T 

September 15, 2006, the date targeted in AOC’s July 2005 schedule.2

Although not yet fully reviewed and accepted by AOC, the schedule that 

AOC’s contractors revised in August 2005 shows February 26, 2007, as the 

base project’s completion date. The contractors reported this revised date 

largely because some key activities associated with the heating, 

ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) and fire protection systems had 

not been included in previous schedules and because delays were 

occurring, both in constructing the utility tunnel and in completing interior 

stonework. 

According to our preliminary analysis of the project’s July 2005 schedule, 

the base project is more likely to be completed sometime in the spring or 

summer of 2007 than by September 15, 2006. Unless the project’s scope is 

changed or extraordinary actions are taken, the base project is likely to be 

completed later than September 15, 2006, for the reasons cited by the 

contractors and for other reasons, such as the optimistic durations 

estimated for a number of activities and the risks and uncertainties facing 

the project. AOC believes that the contractors added too much time to the 

schedule in August for activities not included in the schedule and that it 

can expedite the project by working concurrently rather than sequentially 

and by taking other actions. While AOC may not need all of the time added 

for the missing activities, CVC project personnel believe that more time 

will be needed than is currently scheduled for other activities, such as the 

utility tunnel, interior finishes and stonework, and the East Front. Because 

of the uncertainty surrounding the base project’s construction schedule, 

we cannot estimate a specific completion date at this time. Additionally, 

we are concerned about actions that have been, or could be, proposed to 

accelerate work to meet the September 15, 2006, target date. While such 

actions could expedite the project and save some costs, they could also 

increase other costs or adversely affect the CVC facility’s quality, 

functionality, or life safety provisions. The project’s schedule also raises a 

number of management concerns, including the potential for delays 

 2

AOC set September 15, 2006, as the contractual date for completing the base project’s 

construction and for opening the CVC facility to the public. The House and Senate 

expansion spaces were scheduled to be completed after that date. AOC set the September 

contract completion date in November 2004, when it reached agreement with the 

contractor on a new date for starting sequence 2 that reflected the delays experienced on 

sequence 1. On September 6, 2005, AOC informed Capitol Preservation Commission 

representatives that it still expected the base project’s construction to be substantially 

complete on September 15, 2006, but was postponing the date for opening the facility to the 

public to December 15, 2006, so that it could complete system tests, minor punch-list work, 

and preparations for operations. 
Page 3 GAO-05-1037T 

caused by not allowing enough time to address potential problems or to 

complete critical activities. Since the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing, we 

have discussed several actions with AOC that we believe are needed to 

address the CVC project’s schedule problems and our concerns. These 

actions include 

• evaluating the project’s revised schedule, including the activity durations, 

to ensure that adequate time is provided; 

• analyzing the impact of various factors on the schedule and the adequacy 

of the resources scheduled to be applied to meet completion dates; 

• carefully considering the costs, benefits, and risks associated with 

proposals to accelerate work or reduce its scope and ensuring that 

appropriate management controls are in place to prevent or minimize the 

possible adverse consequences of such actions, if taken; 

• proposing a CVC opening date that allows reasonable time between the 

completion of construction and the facility’s opening to address problems 

that may arise; 

• ensuring that delays and their causes are adequately determined and 

documented on an ongoing basis; and 

• advising Congress of any plans for accelerating work or reducing its scope 

so that Congress can be involved in such decisions. 

AOC agreed with our suggestions. 

Fiscal year 2006 appropriations have provided sufficient funds to cover 

AOC’s request for CVC construction funding as well as additional funds for 

some risks and uncertainties that may arise, such as costs associated with 

additional sequence 2 delays or unexpected conditions. Although sequence 

2 delays have been occurring, the extent to which the government is 

responsible for their related costs is not clear at this time. Additional 

funding may be necessary if the government is responsible for significant 

delay-related costs or if significant changes are made to the project’s 

design or scope or to address unexpected conditions. In addition, we and 

AOC identified some CVC construction activities that received duplicate 

funding. AOC has discussed this issue with the House and Senate 

Appropriations Committees. 
Page 4 GAO-05-1037T 

AOC and its contractors have continued to make progress on the project 

since the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing. However, mostly because some 

key activities associated with the HVAC and fire protection systems were 

not included in earlier schedules and because delays occurred in installing 

stonework and excavating the utility tunnel, the sequence 2 contractor’s 

August schedule shows the expected completion date for the base project 

as February 26, 2007. As discussed at the Subcommittee’s July 14 hearing, 

AOC recognized some delays in its June 2005 schedule, which showed the 

base project’s expected completion date as October 19, 2006. Although 

AOC has not evaluated the contractor’s August schedule, it does not 

believe that so much additional time will be needed. Furthermore, as 

discussed in the next section, AOC maintains that work could be 

accelerated to meet the September 15, 2006, target date. 

According to our analysis of the CVC project’s schedule, the base project 

is unlikely to be completed by the September 15, 2006, target date for 

several reasons. AOC believes that it could take actions to complete the 

project by then, but these actions could have negative as well as positive 

consequences. These and other schedule-related issues raise a number of 

management concerns. We have discussed actions with AOC officials that 

we believe are necessary to address problems with the schedule and our 

concerns. AOC generally agreed with our suggestions. 

For several reasons, we believe that the base project is more likely to be 

completed sometime in the spring or summer of 2007 than by September 

15, 2006: 

• As we have previously testified, AOC’s sequence 2 contractor, Manhattan 

Construction Company, has continued to miss its planned dates for 

completing activities that we and AOC are tracking to assist the 

Subcommittee in measuring the project’s progress. For example, as of 

September 8, the contractor had completed 7 of the 16 selected activities 

scheduled for completion before today’s hearing (see app. II); however, 

none of the 7 activities was completed on time. Unforeseen site 

conditions, an equipment breakdown, delays in stone deliveries, and a 

shortage of stone masons for the interior stonework were among the 

reasons given for why the work was not completed on time.3

 Our analysis 

 3

Also see, for example, GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Effective Schedule Management and 

Updated Cost Information Needed, GAO-05-811T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2005). 

Work on the Project Is 

Progressing, but 

Delays Continue 

Project’s Schedule, 

Including Possible 

Actions to Accelerate 

Work, Raises 

Management 

Concerns 

Base Project’s 

Construction Is Likely to 

Be Completed Later Than 

Scheduled for Several 

Reasons 
Page 5 GAO-05-1037T 

of the sequence 2 contractor’s production pace between November 2004 

and July 2005 indicates that the base project’s construction is unlikely to 

be finished by September 15, 2006, if the contractor continues at the same 

pace or even accelerates the work somewhat. In fact, at the current or 

even a slightly accelerated pace, the base project would be completed 

several months after September 15, 2006. To finish the base project’s 

construction by that date, our analysis shows that the sequence 2 

contractor would have to recover 1 day for every 8 remaining days 

between July 2005 and September 2006 and could incur no further delays.4

• We continue to believe that the durations scheduled for a number of 

sequence 2 activities are unrealistic. According to CVC project team 

managers and staff, several activities, such as constructing the utility 

tunnel; testing the fire protection system; testing, balancing, and 

commissioning the HVAC system; installing interior stonework; and 

finishing work in some areas are not likely to be completed as indicated in 

the July 2005 schedule. Some of these are among the activities whose 

durations we identified as optimistic in early 2004 and that we and AOC’s 

construction management contractor identified as contributing most to the 

project’s schedule slippage in August 2005; these activities also served as 

the basis for our March 2004 recommendation to AOC that it reassess its 

activity durations to see that they are realistic and achievable at the 

budgeted cost. Because AOC had not yet implemented this 

recommendation and these activities were important to the project’s 

completion, we suggested in our May 17 testimony before the 

Subcommittee that AOC give priority attention to this recommendation.5

AOC’s construction management contractor initiated such a review after 

the May 17 hearing. Including more time in the schedule to complete these 

activities could add many more weeks to the project’s schedule. 

• AOC’s more aggressive schedule management is identifying significant 

omissions of activities and time from the sequence 2 schedule. AOC’s 

approach, though very positive, is coming relatively late in the project. For 

example, several detailed activities associated with testing, balancing, and 

commissioning the CVC project’s HVAC and fire protection system were 

added to the schedule in July and August, extending the schedule by 

several months. AOC believes, and we agree, that some of this work may 

be done concurrently, rather than sequentially as shown in the August 

 4

This analysis assumes the 60-day delay shown in the project’s July schedule. 

5

GAO, Capitol Visitor Center: Priority Attention Needed to Manage Schedules and 

Contracts, GAO-05-714T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005). 
Page 6 GAO-05-1037T 

schedule, thereby saving some of the added time. However, until more 

work is done to further develop this part of the schedule, it is unclear how 

much time could be saved. Furthermore, the July schedule does not 

appear to include time to address significant problems with the HVAC or 

fire alarm systems should they occur during testing. 

• In August 2005, CVC project personnel identified several risks and 

uncertainties facing the project that they believed could adversely affect 

its schedule. Examples include additional unforeseen conditions in 

constructing the utility and House Connector tunnels; additional delays in 

stonework due to slippages in stone deliveries, shortages of stone masons, 

or stop-work orders responding to complaints about noise from work in 

the East Front; and problems in getting the HVAC and fire protection 

systems to function properly, including a sophisticated air filtration system 

that has not been used before on such a large scale. Providing for these 

risks and uncertainties in the schedule could add another 60 to 90 days to 

the completion date, on top of the additional time needed to perform 

activities that were not included in the schedule or whose durations were 

overly optimistic. 

• Over the last 2 months, AOC’s construction management contractor has 

identified 8 critical activity paths that will extend the base project’s 

completion date beyond September 15, 2006, if lost time cannot be 

recovered or further delays cannot be prevented. These 8 activity paths are 

in addition to 3 that were previously identified by AOC’s construction 

management contractor. In addition, the amount of time that has to be 

recovered to meet the September 15 target has increased significantly. The 

activity paths include work on the utility tunnel and testing and balancing 

the HVAC system; procuring and installing the control wiring for the air 

handling units; testing the fire alarm system; millwork and casework in the 

orientation theaters and atrium; and stonework in the East Front, 

orientation theaters, and exhibit gallery. Having so many critical activity 

paths complicates project management and makes on-time completion 

more difficult. 

AOC believes it can recover much of the lost time and mitigate remaining 

risks and uncertainties through such actions as using temporary 

equipment, adding workers, working longer hours, resequencing work, or 

performing some work after the CVC facility opens. AOC said that it is also 

developing a risk mitigation plan that should contain additional steps it 

can take to address the risks and uncertainties facing the project. Various 

AOC actions could expedite the project and save costs, but they could also 

have less positive effects. For example, accelerating work on the utility 

Possible Actions to 

Accelerate Work Raise 

Concerns 
Page 7 GAO-05-1037T 

tunnel could save costs by preventing or reducing delays in several other 

important activities whose progress depends on the tunnel’s completion. 

Conversely, using temporary equipment or adding workers to overcome 

delays could increase the project’s costs if the government is responsible 

for the delays. Furthermore, (1) actions to accelerate the project may not 

save time; (2) the time savings may be offset by other problems; or (3) 

working additional hours, days, or shifts may adversely affect the quality 

of the work or worker safety. In our opinion, decisions to accelerate work 

must be carefully made, and if the work is accelerated, it must be tightly 

managed. 

Possible proposals from contractors to accelerate the project by changing 

the scope of work or its quality could compromise the CVC facility’s life 

safety system, the effective functioning of the facility’s HVAC system, the 

functionality of the facility to meet its intended purposes, or the life-cycle 

costs of materials. In August, project personnel raised such possibilities as 

lessening the rigor of systems’ planned testing, opening the facility before 

all planned testing is done, or opening the facility before completing all the 

work identified by Capitol Preservation Commission representatives as 

having to be completed for the facility to open. While such measures could 

save time, we believe that the risks associated with these types of actions 

need to be carefully considered before adoption and that management 

controls need to be in place to preclude or minimize any adverse 

consequences of such actions, if taken. 

AOC’s schedule presents other management issues, including some that 

we have discussed in earlier testimonies. 

• AOC tied the date for opening the CVC facility to the public to September 

15, 2006, the date in the sequence 2 contract for completing the base 

project’s construction. Joining these two milestones does not allow any 

time for addressing unexpected problems in completing the construction 

work or in preparing for operations. AOC has since proposed opening the 

facility to the public on December 15, 2006, but the schedule does not yet 

reflect this proposed revision. Specifically, on September 6, 2005, AOC 

told Capitol Preservation Commission representatives that it was still 

expecting the CVC base project to be substantially completed by 

September 15, 2006, but it proposed to postpone the facility’s opening for 3 

months to provide time to finish testing CVC systems, complete punch-list 

work, and prepare for operating the facility. In our view, allowing some 

time to address unexpected problems is prudent. 

Project’s Schedule 

Presents Other 

Management Concerns 
Page 8 GAO-05-1037T 

• AOC’s and its contractors’ reassessment of activity durations in the August 

schedule may not be sufficiently rigorous to identify all those that are 

unrealistic. In reassessing the project’s schedule, the construction 

management contractor found some durations to be reasonable that we 

considered likely to be too optimistic. Recently, AOC’s sequence 2 and 

construction management contractors reported that, according to their 

reassessment, the durations for interior stonework were reasonable. We 

previously found that these durations were optimistic, and CVC project 

staff we interviewed in August likewise believed they were unrealistic. 

• We have previously expressed concerns about a lack of sufficient or timely 

analysis and documentation of delays and their causes and determination 

of responsibility for the delays, and we recommended that AOC perform 

these functions more rigorously. We have not reassessed this area 

recently. However, given the project’s uncertain schedule, we believe that 

timely and rigorous analysis and documentation of delays and their causes 

and determination of responsibility for them are critical. We plan to 

reexamine this area again in the next few weeks. 

• The uncertainty associated with the project’s construction schedule 

increases the importance of having a summary schedule that integrates the 

completion of construction with preparations for opening the facility to 

the public, as the Subcommittee has requested and we have 

recommended.6

 Without such a schedule, it is difficult to determine 

whether all necessary activities have been identified and linked to provide 

for a smooth opening or whether CVC operations staff will be hired at an 

appropriate time. In early September, AOC gave a draft operations 

schedule to its construction management contractor to integrate into the 

construction schedule. 

• As we noted in our July 14 testimony, AOC could incur additional costs for 

temporary work if it opens the CVC facility to the public before the 

construction of the House and Senate expansion spaces is substantially 

complete. As of last week, AOC’s contractors were still evaluating the 

construction schedule for the expansion spaces, and it was not clear what 

needs AOC would have for temporary work. The schedule, which we 

received in early September, shows December 2006 as the date for 

completing the construction of the expansion spaces. We have not yet 

assessed the likelihood of the contractor’s meeting this date. 

 6

See, for example, GAO-05-714T. 
Page 9 GAO-05-1037T 

• Finally, we are concerned about the capacity of the Capitol Power Plant 

(CPP) to provide adequately for cooling, dehumidifying, and heating the 

CVC facility during construction and when it opens to the public. Delays in 

completing CPP’s ongoing West Refrigeration Plant Expansion Project, the 

removal from service of two chillers because of refrigerant gas leaks, fire 

damage to a steam boiler, management issues, and the absence of a CPP 

director could potentially affect CPP’s ability to provide sufficient chilled 

water and steam for the CVC facility and other congressional buildings. 

These issues are discussed in greater detail in appendix III. 

Since the Subcommittee’s July 14 CVC hearing, we have discussed a 

number of actions with AOC officials that we believe are necessary to 

address problems with the project’s schedule and our concerns. AOC 

generally agreed with our suggestions, and a discussion of them and AOC’s 

responses follows. 

• By October 31, 2005, work with all relevant stakeholders to reassess the 

entire project’s construction schedule, including the schedule for the 

House and Senate expansion spaces, to ensure that all key activities are 

included, their durations are realistic, their sequence and 

interrelationships are appropriate, and sufficient resources are shown to 

accomplish the work as scheduled. Specific activities that should be 

reassessed include testing, balancing, and commissioning the HVAC and 

filtration systems; testing the fire protection system; constructing the 

utility tunnel; installing the East Front mechanical (HVAC) system; 

installing interior stonework and completing finishing work (especially 

plaster work); fabricating and delivering interior bronze doors; and fitting 

out the gift shops. AOC agreed and has already asked its construction 

management and sequence 2 contractors to reassess the August schedule. 

AOC has also asked the sequence 2 contractor to show how it will recover 

time lost through delays. 

• Carefully consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with proposals 

to change the project’s scope, modify the quality of materials, or 

accelerate work, and ensure that appropriate management controls are in 

place to prevent or minimize any adverse effects of such actions. AOC 

agreed. It noted that the sequence 2 contractor had already begun to work 

additional hours to recover lost time on the utility tunnel. AOC also noted 

that its construction management contractor has an inspection process in 

place to identify problems with quality and has recently enhanced its 

efforts to oversee worker safety. 

Actions Are Needed and 

Being Taken to Move the 

Project Forward and 

Address Concerns 
Page 10 GAO-05-1037T 

• Propose a CVC opening date to Congress that allows a reasonable amount 

of time between the completion of the base project’s construction and the 

CVC facility’s opening to address any likely problems that are not provided 

for in the construction schedule. The December 15, 2006, opening date 

that AOC proposed earlier this month would provide about 90 days 

between these milestones if AOC meets its September 15, 2006, target for 

substantial completion. However, we continue to believe that AOC will 

have difficulty meeting the September 15 target, and although the 90-day 

period is a significant step in the right direction, an even longer period is 

likely to be needed. 

• Give priority attention to effectively implementing our previous 

recommendations that AOC (1) analyze and document delays and the 

reasons and responsibility for them on an ongoing basis and analyze the 

impact of scope changes and delays on the project’s schedule at least 

monthly and (2) advise Congress of any additional costs it expects to incur 

to accelerate work or perform temporary work to advance the CVC 

facility’s opening so Congress can weigh the advantages and disadvantages 

of such actions. AOC agreed. 

AOC is still updating its estimate of the cost to complete the CVC project, 

including the base project and the House and Senate expansion spaces. As 

a result, we have not yet had an opportunity to comprehensively update 

our November 2004 estimate that the project’s estimated cost at 

completion will likely be between $515.3 million without provision for 

risks and uncertainties and $559 million with provision for risks and 

uncertainties. Since November 2004, we have added about $10.3 million to 

our $515.3 million estimate to account for additional CVC design and 

construction work. (App. IV provides information on the project’s cost 

estimates since the original 1999 estimate.) However, our current $525.6 

million estimate does not include costs that AOC may incur for delays 

beyond those delay costs included in our November 2004 estimate. 

Estimating the government’s costs for delays that occurred after 

November 2004 is difficult because it is unclear who ultimately will bear 

responsibility for various delays. Furthermore, AOC’s new estimates may 

cause us to make further revisions to our cost estimates. 

To date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC construction. (See 

app.V.) This amount does not include about $7.8 million that was made 

Project Costs and 

Funding Provided as 

of September 2005 
Page 11 GAO-05-1037T 

available for either CVC construction or operations.7 In late August, we 

and AOC found that duplicate funding had been provided for certain CVC 

construction work. Specifically, about $800,000 was provided in two 

separate funding sources for the same work. The House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations were notified of this situation and AOC’s 

plan to address it. The funding that has been provided and that is 

potentially available for CVC construction covers the current estimated 

cost of the facility at completion and provides some funds for risks and 

uncertainties. However, if AOC encounters significant additional costs for 

delays or other changes, more funding may be needed. 

Because of the potential for coordination problems with a project as large 

and complex as CVC, we had recommended in July that AOC promptly 

designate responsibility for integrating the planning and budgeting for CVC 

construction and operations. In late August, AOC designated a CVC staff 

member to oversee both CVC construction and operations funding. AOC 

had also arranged for its operations planning consultant to develop an 

operations preparation schedule and for its CVC project executive and 

CVC construction management contractor to prepare an integrated 

construction and operations schedule. AOC has received a draft 

operations schedule and has given it to its construction management 

contractor to integrate into the construction schedule. Pending the hiring 

of an executive director for CVC, which AOC would like to occur by the 

end of January 2006, the Architect of the Capitol said he expects his Chief 

Administrative Officer, who is currently overseeing CVC operations 

planning, to work closely with the CVC project executive to integrate CVC 

construction and operations preparations. 

Work and costs could also be duplicated in areas where the 

responsibilities of AOC’s contractors overlap. For example, the contracts 

or planned modification for both AOC’s CVC construction design 

contractor and CVC operations contractor include work related to the gift 

shop’s design and wayfinding signage. We discussed the potential for 

duplication with AOC, and it agreed to work with its operations planning 

contractor to clarify the contractor’s scope of work, eliminate any 

duplication, and adjust the operations contract’s funding accordingly. 

 7

Public Law 108-447, enacted in December 2004, provided that up to $10.6 million could be 

so transferred upon the approval of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations 

for the use of the CVC project. In June 2005, AOC received approval to use about $2.8 

million of this $10.6 million, leaving a balance of about $7.8 million that can be used in the 

future. 
Page 12 GAO-05-1037T 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Bernard 

Ungar at (202) 512-4232 or Terrell Dorn at (202) 512-6923. Other key 

contributors to this testimony include Shirley Abel, Michael Armes, 

John Craig, George Depaoli, Jr., Maria Edelstein, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, 

Brett Fallavollita, Jeanette Franzel, Jackie Hamilton, Bradley James, 

Scott Riback, and Kris Trueblood. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 13 GAO-05-1037T 

With the assistance of a contractor, Hulett & Associates, we assessed the 

risks associated with the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) July 2005 

schedule for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project and used the results 

of our assessment to estimate a time frame for completing the base CVC 

project with and without identified risks and uncertainties.1

 In August 

2005, we and the contractor interviewed project managers and team 

members from AOC and its major CVC contractors, a representative from 

the Army Corps of Engineers, and AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal to determine 

the risks they saw in completing the remaining work and the time they 

considered necessary to finish the CVC project and open it to the public. 

Using the project’s July 2005 summary schedule (the most recent schedule 

available when we did our work), we asked the team members to estimate 

how many workdays would be needed to complete the remaining work. 

More specifically, for each summary-level activity that the members had a 

role or expertise in, we asked them to develop three estimates of the 

activity’s duration—the least, most likely, and longest time needed to 

complete the activity. We planned to estimate the base project’s most 

likely completion date without factoring in risks and uncertainties using 

the most likely activity durations estimated by the team members. In 

addition, using these three-point estimates and a simulation analysis to 

calculate different combinations of the team’s estimates that factored in 

identified risks and uncertainties, we planned to estimate completion 

dates for the base project at various confidence levels. 

In August 2005, AOC’s construction management and sequence 2 

contractors were updating the July project schedule to integrate the 

construction schedule for the House and Senate expansion spaces, reflect 

recent progress and problems, and incorporate the results to date of their 

reassessment of the time needed for testing, balancing, and commissioning 

the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning, (HVAC) system and for fire 

alarm testing.2

 This reassessment was being done partly to implement a 

recommendation we had made to AOC after assessing the project’s 

schedule in early 2004 and finding that the scheduled durations for these 

and other activities were optimistic. AOC’s construction management and 

 1

We did not include the schedule for work on the House and Senate expansion spaces in 

our assessment because the schedule was not completed in time for analysis before the 

Subcommittee’s September hearing. 

2

AOC’s sequence 2 contractor was unable to integrate the detailed schedule for the 

expansion spaces into the overall project schedule because of a number of problems, but 

plans to do so in the September schedule. 

Appendix I: Risk Assessment Methodology 
Page 14 GAO-05-1037T 

sequence 2 contractors found that key detailed activities associated with 

the HVAC system had not been included in the schedule and that the 

durations for a number of activities were not realistic. Taking all of these 

factors into account, AOC’s contractors revised the project’s schedule in 

August. AOC believes that the revised schedule, which shows the base 

project’s completion date slipping by several months, allows too much 

time for the identified problems. As a result of this problem and others we 

brought to AOC’s attention, AOC has asked its contractors to reassess the 

schedule. AOC’s construction management contractor believes that such a 

reassessment could take up to 2 months. In our opinion, there are too 

many uncertainties associated with the base project’s schedule to develop 

reliable estimates of specific completion dates, with or without provisions 

for risks and uncertainties. 
Page 15 GAO-05-1037T 

Source: AOC’s April 2005 CVC sequence 2 construction schedule for the scheduled completion dates and AOC and its construction 

management contractor for the actual completion dates. 

Note: Actual completion information was obtained on September 8, 2005. 

a

These activities are not critical. All other activities were critical in the April schedule or became critical 

in subsequent schedules. 

Appendix II: Capitol Visitor Center Critical 

Construction Milestones, July-September 

2005 

Activity Location Scheduled completion Actual completion

Wall Stone Area 8 Layout Great Hall 6/20/05 7/25/05

Wall Stone Area 9 Layout Great Hall 6/24/05 7/28/05

Wall Stone Area 3a Great Hall 7/06/05 7/22/05

Wall Stone Area 2a Great Hall 7/06/05 7/25/05

Drill/Set Soldier Piles Sta. 0:00-1:00 Utility Tunnel 6/08/05 

Wall Stone Area 9 Pedestals Great Hall 7/05/05 

Wall Stone Area 1 Cong. Auditorium 8/08/05 

Wall Stone Area 2 Cong. Auditorium 8/22/05 

Bridge Over First Street Utility Tunnel 8/02/05 8/12/05

Wall Stone Area 3 Cong. Auditorium 9/06/05 

Excavate and Lag Stations 1:00-2:00 Utility Tunnel 8/02/05 8/24/05

Wall Stone Area 4a Great Hall 7/15/05 8/30/05

Excavate and Shore Sta. 0:00-1:00 Utility Tunnel 7/21/05 

Concrete Working Slab First Street Utility Tunnel 7/26/05 

Waterproof Working Slab Sta. 0:00-1:00 Utility Tunnel 7/29/05 

Wall Stone Area 9 Base Great Hall 7/15/05 
Page 16 GAO-05-1037T 

Several issues could affect the capacity of the Capitol Power Plant (CPP) 

to provide sufficient chilled water and steam for the CVC facility and other 

congressional buildings. CPP produces chilled water for cooling and 

dehumidification and steam for heating Capitol Hill buildings. 1

 To 

accommodate the CVC facility and meet other needs, CPP has been 

increasing its production capacity through the West Refrigeration Plant 

Expansion Project. This project, which was scheduled for completion in 

time to provide chilled water for the CVC facility during construction and 

when it opened, has been delayed. In addition, problems with aging 

equipment, fire damage, management weaknesses, and a leadership 

vacancy could affect CPP’s ability to provide chilled water and steam. 

More specifically: 

• In July, two chillers in CPP’s East Refrigeration Plant were taken out of 

service because of a significant refrigerant gas leak. The refrigerant, whose 

use is being phased out nationally, escaped into the surrounding 

environment. Because of the chillers’ age and use of an outdated 

refrigerant, AOC has determined that it would not be cost-effective to 

repair the chillers. CPP’s chilled water production capacity will be further 

reduced between December 1, 2005, and March 15, 2006, when the West 

Refrigeration Plant is to be shut down to enable newly installed equipment 

to be connected to the existing chilled water system. However, the 

remainder of CPP’s East Refrigeration Plant is to remain operational 

during this time, and AOC expects that the East Refrigeration Plant will 

have sufficient capacity to meet the lower wintertime cooling demands. 

Additionally, CPP representatives indicated that they could bring the West 

Refrigeration Plant back online to provide additional cooling capacity in 

an emergency. CPP is developing a cost estimate for this option. 

• In June, one of two CPP boilers that burn coal to generate steam was 

damaged by fire. According to a CPP incident report, CPP operator errors 

contributed to the incident and subsequent damage. Both boilers were 

taken off-line for scheduled maintenance between July 1 and September 

15, and CPP expects both boilers to be back online by September 30, 

thereby enabling CPP to provide steam to CVC when it is needed. 

• Several management issues at CPP could further affect the expansion 

plant’s and CPP’s operational readiness: 

 1

The Capitol Power Plant is no longer used to generate electric power, but it does generate 

steam and chilled water to serve the heating and cooling needs of the U.S. Capitol and 23 

surrounding facilities. These facilities include about 16 million square feet. 

Appendix III: Issues Affecting the Capitol 

Power Plant’s Cooling and Heating Capacity 
Page 17 GAO-05-1037T 

• CPP has not yet developed a plan for staffing and operating the entire 

plant after the West Refrigeration Plant becomes operational or contracted 

for its current staff to receive adequate training to operate the West 

Refrigeration Plant’s new, much more modern equipment. 

• CPP has not yet received a comprehensive commissioning plan from its 

contractor. 

• A number of procurement issues associated with the plant expansion 

project have arisen. We are reviewing these issues. 

• CPP has been without a director since May 2005, when the former director 

resigned. CPP is important to the functioning of Congress, and strong 

leadership is needed to oversee the completion of the expansion project 

and the integration, commissioning, and operation of the new equipment, 

as well as address the operational and management problems at the plant. 

Filling the director position with an experienced manager who is also an 

expert in the production of steam and chilled water is essential. AOC 

recently initiated the recruitment process. 
Page 18 GAO-05-1037T 

Dollars in millions 

Factors Cost increase Subtotal Total

Project budget, original (1999) $265.0

 Factors beyond or largely beyond AOC’s control 

5 additional scope itemsa$29.7 

House and Senate expansion spaces 70.0 

Air filtration system funded by Dep’t. of Defense (DOD) 33.3 

Enhanced fire safety and security 13.7 

 $146.7

Bid prices exceeding estimates, preconstruction costs exceeding budgeted costs, 

unforeseen field conditions, 46.0 

 46.0

Other factors (costs associated with delays and design-to-budget overruns) 57.6 250.3

Project budget after increases (as of November 2004) $515.3

GAO-projected costs to complete after proposed scope changes (as of June 2005, excluding 

risks and uncertainties)b 7.2 $522.5

Additional cost-to-complete items (as of August 2005) 

Design of the Library of Congress tunnel (Funds from Capitol Preservation Fund) 0.7 

Wayfinding fabrication and installation 1.0 

Gift shop design 0.1 

Gift shop construction and fit-out 1.3 

GAO-projected costs to complete (as of August 2005, excluding risks and uncertainties)c 3.1 $525.6

Potential additional costs associated with risks and 

uncertainties (as of November 2004)d 43.5 

Less: Risks and uncertainties GAO believes the project faced in 

November 2004 [Congressional seals, orientation film, and backpack storage space ($4.2) + 

US Capitol Police securitymonitoring ($3.0)] (7.2) 

Less: Additional cost-to-complete items (as of August 2005) (3.1) 

Potential remaining costs related to risks and uncertainties 33.2

GAO estimate of total cost to complete $558.8

Sources: AOC and its contractors. 

a

The five additional scope items are the House connector tunnel, the East Front elevator extension, 

the Library of Congress tunnel, temporary operations, and enhanced perimeter security. 

b

The proposed scope changes totaling $7.2 million include $4.2 million for congressional seals, an 

orientation film, and backpack storage space and $3 million for U.S. Capitol Police security 

monitoring. 

c

Because of rounding dollars in tenths of millions, this estimate excludes $2,892 for CVC ceremonial 

groundbreaking activities. 

Appendix IV: Cost Growth for the CVC 

Project 
Page 19 GAO-05-1037T 

d

Risks and uncertainties can include shortages in skilled stone masons and stone, security and life 

safety changes, unknown operator requirements, unforeseen conditions, and contractor coordination 

issues. 
Page 20 GAO-05-1037T 

Dollars in millions 

Project Funding Subtotal Total

Funding as of June 2005 

Base project (as of November 2004) $351.1

Expansion spaces 

House $35.0 

Senate 35.0 

 $70.0

Filtration system 33.3 

US Capitol Police security monitoring 3.0 

 36.3

Transfer of emergency response funds 26.3 

Current funding provided (as of June 2005) a $483.7

Funding provided for FY 2006 b c 41.9

Design of Library of Congress tunnel (funds from the Capitol Preservation Fund) b 0.7

Construction-related funding provided in operations obligation plan: 

Gift shop b0.7 

Wayfinding b c0.3 

Commissioning systems b c 0.2 

Miscellaneous design and construction b c 0.4 

Construction-related funding provided in operations 1.6

Other funding provided 2.3

Additional funding 44.2

Current funding provided (as of August 2005) d $527.9

Sources: Legislation, Conference Reports, and AOC. 

a

Because of rounding dollars in tenths of millions, the $483.7 million does not include $2,892 made 

available by the Capitol Preservation Commission from the Capitol Preservation Fund in October 

2000 for the groundbreaking ceremony. 

b

Fiscal year 2006 CVC construction funding does not include some construction-related items funded 

from other sources. Funds for these items include $700,000 for the Library of Congress tunnel 

provided by the Capitol Preservation Fund and $1.6 million provided in CVC’s June 2005 operations 

obligation plan. The $1.6 million is part of the $10.6 million made available in December 2004 by 

Public Law 108-447 for both CVC construction and operations. 

c

Funds were provided for certain items that duplicated funding already provided in fiscal year 2006 

CVC construction funding. The $41.9 million represents fiscal year 2006 funding made available for 

CVC construction-related activity. Included in this $41.9 million fiscal year 2006 funding are some 

construction-related items (i.e., $150,000 for wayfinding design, $232,000 for commissioning 

systems, and $423,000 for miscellaneous design and construction) totaling $805,000 for which AOC 

received the duplicative funding. These items had also been included in the $2.8 million operations 

obligation plan approved in June 2005. AOC has stated that it will not use fiscal year 2006 funding for 

these items. Thus, $805,000 of the $41.9 million fiscal year 2006 funding will be available for other 

uses. 

Appendix V: Current Funding Provided to the 

CVC Project 
Page 21 GAO-05-1037T 

d

Two construction-related items have not yet been fully funded. These are the gift shop construction 

(approximately $771,000) and wayfinding fabrication and installation (approximately $800,000). 

(543143) 
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