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No. 99-566 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 307 

302 Mont. 408

15 P.3d 379 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM BAKER, 

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade,

The Honorable Marge Johnson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

William F. Hooks, Appellate Defender Office, Helena, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Elizabeth L. Griffing,

Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana

Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney; Susan Weber, Deputy 

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County Attorney, Great Falls

Submitted on Briefs: July 13, 2000 

Decided: December 7, 2000

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant, William Baker was charged in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial 

District in Cascade County with three offenses: robbery; misdemeanor theft; and carrying 

a concealed weapon. He entered pleas of not guilty, and was tried by a jury on April 26 

and 27, 1999. The jury found him guilty of all three offenses. Baker appeals from his 

convictions. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

¶2 The following three issues are presented on appeal:

¶3 1. Did the prosecutor violate Baker's right to due process and privilege against selfincrimination by commenting on his silence?

¶4 2. Did the prosecutor violate Baker's attorney-client privilege by asking him questions 

regarding attorney-client communications?

¶5 3. Did the District Court err by giving a flight instruction to the jury?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶6 On the night of November 26, 1998 and during the early hours of the next morning, 

Richard O'Brien drove to the city of Great Falls. Along the way, he picked up William 

Baker. He took him to two different bars before Baker requested to be driven to another 

location. Then, on the way to the third location, Baker allegedly leaned forward as if in 

pain, pulled out a gun, told O'Brien to give him all his money, and directed him to drive 

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down an alley. Instead O'Brien put the car into park, threw his wallet at Baker and ran 

from the car. A passing truck driver picked O'Brien up and then they called the police.

¶7 The police apprehended Baker five blocks away from where O'Brien left him. Baker 

was visibly intoxicated and seemed out of breath. He told the police that after drinking that 

night at a bar, he was on his way to his daughter's place of employment. The officer asked 

Baker if he was carrying a weapon and Baker denied possessing one. However, when the 

officer began to pat-down Baker, Baker reached behind his back for his gun. The officer 

stopped him and took the gun away from Baker. Baker stated that the gun belonged to 

someone else. 

¶8 The police took Baker into custody. After being advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, 

Baker told the police that someone had given him a ride downtown immediately before he 

was apprehended by the police officers. Additionally, Baker told the police that he did not 

know who owned the gun or how he acquired it.

¶9 At trial, Baker admitted being very intoxicated during that night and unable to clearly 

recall the circumstances surrounding the alleged robbery. He did remember, however, 

believing that he was being sexually attacked by O'Brien. He further claimed that O'Brien 

owned the gun and Baker took it from him in a struggle. He asserted that he did not 

remember these facts until a few days prior to trial and was embarrassed about what 

happened. Baker's explanations were provided in response to questions from his own 

attorney. During cross-examination, the prosecution asked additional questions about 

when Baker recalled these events and when he first told his lawyer about them. 

¶10 On appeal, Baker claims that this line of questioning by the prosecutor violated his 

rights of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and his Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore, he claims that the District Court erred 

by giving a flight instruction to the jury.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE 1

¶11 Did the prosecutor violate Baker's right to due process and privilege against selfincrimination by commenting on his silence?

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¶12 The State of Montana contends that the issues asserted on appeal are not properly 

reviewable because the Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's line of questioning. 

The general rule is that "the defendant is limited to those issues that were properly 

preserved in the district court . . . . " State v. Lafley, 1998 MT 2, ¶ 26, 287 Mont. 276, ¶ 26, 

954 P.2d 1112, ¶ 26. Baker, however, urges this Court to review the claimed errors 

pursuant to the plain error doctrine. We articulated this rule in State v. Finley (1996), 276 

Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208, where we held: 

[T]his Court may discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate a criminal 

defendant's fundamental constitutional rights, even if no contemporaneous objection 

is made and notwithstanding the inapplicability of the § 46-20-701(2), MCA, 

criteria, where failing to review the claimed error at issue may result in a manifest 

miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness 

of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process. 

Finley, 276 Mont. at 137, 915 P.2d at 215. See also, State v. Brown, 1999 MT 31, 293 Mont. 268, 975 

P.2d 321. 

¶13 When we determine the applicability of the common law plain error doctrine, we 

consider the totality of the circumstances in each case. State v. Brown, 1999 MT 31, ¶ 12, 

293 Mont. 288, ¶ 12, 975 P.2d 321, ¶ 12. The plain error rule is reserved for "exceptional 

cases" and should be used sparingly. State v. Sullivan (1996), 280 Mont. 25, 31, 927 P.2d 

1033, 1036. When invoking this doctrine, the court evaluates the nature of the 

constitutional rights implicated, and not the sufficiency of the evidence. Finley, 176 Mont. 

at 137, 915 P.2d at 215. 

¶14 In this case, as in Finley, Baker's claims of error implicate his rights to due process 

and the privilege against self-incrimination. The principle that a defendant's silence cannot 

be used to incriminate him during trial is a core constitutional right. However, Baker failed 

to demonstrate that any fundamental unfairness resulted from the questions to which he 

now objects. The record demonstrates that the Defendant, as part of his direct testimony, 

admitted telling conflicting stories, denied being able to conclusively refute the victim's 

story and was generally unable to precisely remember what and when he told the police 

officers, the court psychologist, or his own attorney with regard to the events of the 

alleged robbery. The State had the right to impeach Baker with follow-up questions 

pertaining to these matters.

¶15 Baker's prearrest silence, as the State suggests, cannot be the basis of a Doyle error 

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and, therefore, does not warrant the application of the plain error doctrine. See State v. 

Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 805 P.2d 537. 

¶16 Furthermore, contrary to Baker's assertions, the Sullivan case does not support his 

argument. In State v. Sullivan, the defendant did not take the stand or make any statement 

to the police about the crime he had committed. Sullivan (1996), 280 Mont. 25, 30, 927 

P.2d 1033, 1036. Likewise, United States v. Tenorio, (11th Cir. 1995), 69 F.3d 1103, 1106, 

involved a defendant who declined to waive his right to remain silent or take the stand. 

¶17 Baker, however, made several statements to the police, both prior to and after being 

given the Miranda warning. In fact, no evidence from the record shows that Baker 

declined to make a statement or appeared reluctant to tell his story. Rather, he told the 

police a different story every time they asked him questions and subsequently proceeded 

to testify to a completely new version of the story. 

¶18 A criminal defendant does not have a right to speak freely during direct testimony and 

then attempt to limit the prosecutor's cross-examination. State v. Wilson (1981), 193 Mont. 

318, 324, 631 P.2d 1273, 1277. Once a defendant makes inconsistent statements on the 

stand, the prosecutor may properly impeach those inconsistent statements. State v. Graves

(1995), 272 Mont. 451, 901 P.2d 549. "If [a defendant] takes the stand and testifies in his 

own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like any other 

witness." Wilson, 193 Mont. at 324, 631 P.2d at 1277 (quoting Brown v. United States

(1958), 356 U.S. 148, 154-55, 78 S. Ct 622, 626, 2 L. Ed. 2d 589, 596-97). 

¶19 Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the fundamental fairness of the 

trial has not been drawn into question and therefore, we will not review Baker's Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims pursuant to the plain error doctrine. 

ISSUE TWO

¶20 Did the prosecutor violate Baker's attorney-client privilege by asking him questions 

regarding the attorney-client communications?

¶21 Baker contends that the prosecutor violated his attorney-client privilege by asking him 

on cross-examination, when he first told his attorney about the events related at trial. No 

objection was made to this question during the questioning. The State asserts that the 

Defendant opened the door to these questions during his direct testimony and if an error 

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did occur, any objection to it was waived. 

¶22 During the direct examination of Baker, Baker's lawyer asked him about his memory 

problems.

Q. And when you and I first talked, your recollection was very fuzzy?

A. Yes

Q. And things have clarified over time; is that correct?

A. Yes.

During cross-examination, the prosecutor simply followed up this line of questioning by 

asking when Baker first recalled events sufficiently to relate them to his attorney. 

¶23 Baker argues that the Court should follow the State v. Quattlebaum (S.C. 2000), 527 S.

E.2d 105, decision in which the South Carolina Court held that a violation of attorneyclient privilege implicates the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. This argument 

is without merit. As the State properly points out, the Quattlebaum decision requires a 

showing of "deliberate prosecutorial misconduct or prejudice" to the integrity of the 

judicial system. Id. at 109. Baker has failed to make such a showing. The prosecutor 

merely followed up on what Baker's own attorney questioned Baker about during his 

direct examination. 

¶24 As with our discussion of the previous issue, we conclude that Baker has not 

demonstrated that his claimed error calls into question the fundamental fairness of the trial 

and, therefore, we decline to review this issue pursuant to the plain error doctrine. 

ISSUE 3

¶25 Did the District Court err by giving a flight instruction to the jury?

¶26 The standard of review of jury instructions in criminal cases is whether the 

instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, 

State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 289, ¶ 28, 291 Mont. 501, ¶ 28, 969 P.2d 925, ¶ 28, and 

whether the District Court abused its discretion. State v. Sullivan (1994), 266 Mont. 313, 

324, 880 P.2d 829, 836.

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¶27 At trial, the State presented evidence that Baker had left the scene of the crime and 

seemed "out of breath" when the police officers approached him about the robbery. Based 

on this evidence, the District Court gave the following jury instruction: If you are satisfied 

that the crime charged in the information has been committed by someone, then you may 

take into consideration any testimony showing, or tending to show, flight by the 

defendant. 

¶28 On appeal, Baker argues that State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, 297 Mont. 111, 991 P.2d 

929, should be applied retroactively. In Hall, we stated that "[t]he interest of justice is 

perhaps best served if [evidence of flight] is reserved for counsel's argument, with little if 

any comment by the bench." Hall, ¶ 45. Instructions on flight are both unnecessary and 

"undesirable in that they tend to inject argument into the judge's charge . . . ." Hall, ¶ 46

(citation omitted). 

¶29 Although Baker objected to the flight instruction at trial, he did so only on the basis 

that it was not supported by evidence at trial. "An objection, to be good, must point out the 

specific ground of the objection." State v. Walker (1966), 148 Mont. 216, 223, 419 P.2d 

300, 304. The District Court should not be put in error when it was never given a chance 

to rule on the specific objection. See State v. Weeks (1995), 270 Mont. 63, 84, 891 P.2d 

477, 490. Therefore, we will not review the instructions on the basis of an objection raised 

for the first time on appeal. See § 46-20-701(2), MCA.

¶30 We decline to address Baker's objection that the flight instruction was a comment on 

the evidence since that objection is raised for the first time on appeal. Pursuant to § 46-20-

104(2), MCA, failure to make a timely objection constitutes a waiver of that objection. 

¶31 For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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