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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 109TH CONGRESS

1st Session

S. PRT.

2005

109–36

ISRAEL’S DISENGAGEMENT FROM

GAZA AND SEVERAL

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

STAFF TRIP REPORTS

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v

I. Report of Kim Savit—Senior Professional Staff Member (Majority Staff) 1

II. Report of Puneet Talwar—Senior Professional Staff Member (Minority

Staff) ............................................................................................................ 8

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Dear Colleague:

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and several West Bank settlements will shape the future of the peace process and the region for

years to come. The committee recently sent two senior professional

staff members, Ms. Kim Savit and Mr. Puneet Talwar, to the Middle East to assess U.S. assistance to Israel’s disengagement from

Gaza and several West Bank settlements.

We are pleased to share with you their trip reports, which highlight concerns about the critical issues that will face all parties on

the ‘‘day after’’ disengagement. The reports also provide a number

of recommendations that may be helpful as the Committee on Foreign Relations considers these issues. As both authors indicate,

there is much at stake in getting the ‘‘day after’’ Gaza disengagement right.

We look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues

and to any comments you might have on these reports.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Chairman.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Ranking Minority Member.

(V)

(1)

ISRAEL’S DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA AND

SEVERAL WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS:

I. REPORT OF KIM SAVIT—SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

(MAJORITY STAFF)

Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and several West Bank settlements proceeded over the past two weeks without the anticipated

Israeli-Palestinian violent clashes or deadly attacks by extremist

Israeli settlers. Successful completion of this historic withdrawal of

Israeli troops and settlers from 21 Gaza and 4 West Bank settlements will shape the future of the Middle East region and the global war on terrorism. In meetings with U.S., Israeli, Palestinian and

international community officials from July 24–31, 2005, I found

that there was consensus on the short-term agenda to facilitate

Israel’s disengagement. Leadership provided by the U.S. under

Lieutenant General William Ward as the U.S. Security Coordinator

and Mr. James Wolfensohn for the Quartet has energized Israeli

and Palestinian Authority coordination efforts. But, there are

major differences and uncertainties over how to address critical

issues that will face all parties on the ‘‘day after’’ disengagement.

To sustain the positive momentum engendered from the disengagement effort thus far, the U.S. will need to intensify its support for

efforts on the ground, in terms of both tangible material assistance

and engagement with the two parties on issues that could derail

progress.

KEY FINDINGS:

1. U.S. leadership to support Gaza disengagement is critical, but

must be followed-up by delivering tough messages to both sides

and actions demonstrating the U.S. long-term commitment to

the peace process.

The Israelis, Palestinians and the international community are

skeptical that the U.S. will continue to be engaged in resolving the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the long-term. U.S. personnel and

resources dedicated to the peace process appear as ad hoc, shortterm and temporary measures. Despite the appointment of General

Ward as Security Coordinator, there is no single U.S. voice for all

aspects of engagement in the peace process and U.S. policy appears

fragmented. This intensifies Palestinian fears of ‘‘Gaza first and

Gaza last,’’ and could undermine those in Israel who support the

two state solution.

• Progress is being made on Wolfensohn’s short-term shared

agenda of six issues and steps are being taken at the MinisteVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:17 Oct 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 23820.TXT SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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rial and agency levels to move forward on each to ensure success of the withdrawal. These include detailed plans to resolve

questions on border crossings and trade corridors; ensuring access between Gaza and the West Bank; addressing internal

mobility and closures; opening of the airport/seaport; disposition of the greenhouses and related jobs and income; and dismantling settler houses and disposing of the rubble. There are

problems in implementation, however, at the field level. Access

and mobility issues, particularly in Gaza, reportedly slow or

prevent provision of U.S. assistance to the Palestinians from

U.S. aid providers.

• General Ward has minimal staff to facilitate reform of the Palestinian security forces (16 in all, including security personnel

and detailees from other countries) and only a few have Arabic

language skills. Given security concerns, General Ward and his

staff also have limited access to, and mobility in, Gaza and the

West Bank. U.S. Security Coordination personnel interaction

with the Palestinian Authority security forces is occurring at

the Ministerial level, but again, is minimal in the field. Without U.S. personnel presence in field activities, progress reported to have been made on consolidation and reorganization

of Palestinian Authority security forces cannot be confirmed on

the ground.

• Moreover, there appeared to be no specific mechanism for

Israeli and Palestinian Authority security forces to interact or

communicate at the ground level to ensure that acts by extremists and terrorists of either side can be differentiated from

actions sanctioned by the Israeli Government or Palestinian

Authority. Issues of control of the border crossings at points

such as Rafah, for example, have been particularly contentious,

exposing severe gaps in coordination among the parties and

raising Israeli fears of increased weapons smuggling and terrorist infiltration.

There is a very real risk that unless there are concrete benefits

that meet rising Palestinian expectations from Gaza disengagement in the short-term, and either an agreed, more formal negotiating framework or plan to move forward on the Road Map in the

longer-term, a ‘‘third intifada’’ could be launched after Gaza disengagement to try to drive the Israelis out of the West Bank. The

U.S. must work to forestall this. Israel must be persuaded to demonstrate in words and deeds that they will return to the Road Map

and to the negotiating table in the near future. The Palestinians

must be persuaded that the path of peace will produce dividends;

that their economic future will be brighter; and that discussions of

final status issues will only occur if there is continued calm.

The U.S. must deliver strong, tough messages to both sides while

recognizing the historic burdens each carries. The Israelis and Palestinians are each facing intense internal political conflicts with

factions positioning themselves for the ‘‘day after’’ disengagement.

Both Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Authority President

Abbas have taken enormous political risks to move the disengagement forward. Over the past few months, however, when the U.S.

has taken tough positions with each side, despite delays, it has

3

achieved results. Israel apparently has been more cooperative and

flexible on disengagement issues such as removal of barriers and

checkpoints. The Palestinian Authority reportedly has taken steps

to arrest terrorists identified as perpetrators of violence. Continued

direct, forceful U.S. engagement, reflected by more permanent

mechanisms for coordination and implementation, will be critical to

maintaining momentum on the ‘‘day after.’’ The continuing expansion of West Bank settlements, particularly E-1 and Maale

Adumin, and the construction of the security fence or barrier must

be at the top of the agenda with the Israelis. Stopping terrorism

must remain at the top of the list with the Palestinians. We should

be insistent in our message to both Israelis and Palestinians that

they live up to their commitments.

2. There is an urgent need for the U.S. to develop a strategy and

a policy for dealing with the growing popular support for

Hamas.

For the Palestinian Authority to do well in the January 2006 municipal and parliamentary elections, it needs to be credited with delivering tangible benefits to the Palestinian people. Specifically, it

needs to compete with Hamas’ social services network in terms of

effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Some aid providers complained that U.S. laws intended to prevent U.S. funding from going

to Hamas, unintentionally leave critical areas vulnerable to Hamas

influence and weaken moderate voices in the Palestinian Authority.

Currently, U.S. laws prohibit aid to Palestinians who are known

to be, claim to be, or are suspected of being members of Hamas,

a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization. Aid is prohibited,

specifically, from going to ‘‘groups or individuals who are or have

been involved in terror.’’ These laws and our policies to implement

them place the onus on U.S. aid providers to judge which Palestinian aid recipients are terrorists or suspected members of terrorist organizations and which are not. Fearing they might break

the law, aid providers reported that few non governmental organizations (NGOs) will work with Palestinian recipients and contractors unless they agree to sign an anti-terrorism certification (ATC)

as required by USAID. Many bona fide Palestinian grass roots organizations—particularly educational and humanitarian organizations—reportedly refuse to sign such certifications based on principles and/or politics. Thus, aid goes primarily where it is legally

uncontroversial rather than where it may be most needed and effective. Even worse, in towns and villages in which Hamas controls

the local municipal councils, U.S. aid providers stay away, ceding

such areas to Hamas dominance without a fight, and thus indirectly bolstering Hamas’ legitimacy and credibility.

• In a roundtable held with Senate Foreign Relations Committee

staff at the Consulate in Jerusalem, several of the six NGO

representatives participating argued that the U.S. policy of isolating Hamas and similar groups is counterproductive. They

argued that Hamas members or terrorists would be more likely

to sign the anti-terrorism certificates to get U.S. aid than decent people from organizations that refused to sign on principle. The NGO representatives also argued that Hamas could

not be eliminated, and U.S. policy should be either to co-opt

4

the organization or to force a split between its military and political arms. Palestinian Authority officials echoed many of

these arguments.

Israeli officials expressed concern that Palestinian Authority

President Abbas lacks the leadership abilities to organize Palestinian security forces against Hamas. The Israelis fear Hamas is

seeking to replace the Palestinian Authority and is following a concerted strategy to do so. One aspect of that strategy is undertaking

terrorist acts to demonstrate that Hamas, and not the Palestinian

Authority, controls Gaza. One Israeli official stated Hamas wants

to paralyze and destroy the Palestinian Authority so it can replace

the current government and establish ‘‘Hamasastan’’ in Gaza.

3. Additional U.S. aid and flexibility in delivering it quickly and

visibly are needed for both the Israelis and Palestinians:

• U.S. Aid to Israel. Israel has requested $2.1 billion ($.8 billion

for security and $1.3 billion for economic aid) to cover part of

the estimated $8 billion total cost of Israeli security forces redeployment and disengagement from Gaza and development of

the Negev and Galilee (Israel estimates it will spend $3 billion

on security and redeployment of security forces and $5 billion

on economic reintegration and development). The administration and Congress will need to review this request carefully,

particularly in light of new demands on U.S. resources with

Hurricane Katrina. The initial Israeli request was timed and

designed politically to help counter those within Israel who

argue Israel gains nothing for its painful withdrawal from

Gaza and West Bank settlements. Additional U.S. aid to Israel

would facilitate the completion of the disengagement from

Gaza and the four West Bank settlements and reflect our

strong commitment to Israel’s security and future. The high

level of aid requested, however, sets a precedent which may become an obstacle to future West Bank disengagement. Additionally, how providing additional economic aid to the Negev

and Galilee is linked to the peace process needs to be clarified.

The U.S. might consider how to construct any Israeli aid package to ensure it facilitates specific steps related to progress on

the Road Map.

• U.S. Aid to the Palestinians. U.S. aid to the Palestinians, totaling an estimated $350 million in FY 2005 Supplemental and

FY 2006 funds requested, is focused on economic improvements

and quality of life issues to build confidence that there will be

a better future on the ‘‘day after’’ for the Palestinians. Yet,

while one of the highest priorities on the ‘‘day after’’ disengagement will be to establish security and rule of law in the newly

controlled Palestinian territory, currently there are no U.S. aid

funds for equipping and training Palestinian Authority security forces to undertake this responsibility. General Ward indicated that it would take 3–5 years to facilitate the transition

and restructuring of the Palestinian security forces, but he had

no authority or funding flexibility to begin the process. The

State Department recently has tapped an estimated $3 million

in community policing funds to help build Palestinian AuthorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:17 Oct 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 23820.TXT SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
5

ity police capabilities, but this may be ‘‘too little too late.’’ The

U.S. and other Quartet members urgently need to develop and

implement a concrete plan to help reform the Palestinian Authority security forces. Such reform will be key to the Palestinian Authority’s ability to govern on the ‘‘day after’’ disengagement.

Several Israeli officials argued that we should not supply

arms and ammunition to the Palestinians to enhance their security forces as they have sufficient arms to equip their estimated 58,000 security force personnel. The issue, they argued,

is not how much lethal military equipment is available to these

Palestinian Authority security forces, but the political will to

use these arms to dismantle the terrorist capabilities. While

sympathetic to Israeli security fears, one expert indicated that

the equipment issue is of concern as the Palestinian Authority

reportedly was paying $3 per bullet on the black market for

ammunition. Given that Palestinian Authority security forces

are critical to success of the disengagement and long-term stability, U.S. aid policies should seek to help Israel find a balanced trade-off between its fears of arming the terrorists and

shoring up legitimate Palestinian Authority security capabilities. Consideration also should be given to how to condition

any U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority on its efforts to consolidate and reform its security forces and achieve progress on

the Road Map.

• Bureaucratic Delays. Current FY 2005 Economic Support

Funds (ESF) for USAID Palestinian assistance programs have

been slowed by bureaucratic processes. These funds were not

cleared for release by the Deputy Secretary of State’s office at

the time of the visit and such delays could complicate any return to the Road Map further. USAID also is running into another potential road block as once funds are released at the

end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2005, all funds must be

obligated within a few weeks or they may have to be returned

as unobligated balances, leaving a funding gap until almost

January 2006. Such bureaucratic delays may be devastating to

U.S. interests. As one official stated: ‘‘Whatever is not done before the Palestinian elections in January 2006 will be too late.’’

4. Greater focus is needed on public diplomacy to demonstrate the

magnitude of U.S. aid (and thus commitment) to the Palestinians; and to reflect the benefits of such aid provided under the

Palestinian Authority.

While the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to non-violence

has been of enormous benefit to the Palestinian people, there is

very little appreciation of this on the streets of Gaza and the West

Bank. The Palestinian Authority continues to be viewed as corrupt,

despite a range of current efforts to clean up and get rid of Arafat’s

old guard cronyism. Successes are not made public and much more

needs to be done to help the Palestinian Authority get its message

of reform to the people. During one meeting, the Palestinian Authority Minister of Social Welfare requested that the U.S. provide

the Palestinian Authority with an ‘‘events coordinator’’ to help get

6

the Palestinian Authority message out. The Consulate took this request for consideration.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Next Steps:

The U.S. must find new ways to prove its long term commitment

to the Road Map and to the peace process. One possibility would

be to establish a more permanent organizational support structure

for Mr. Wolfensohn and General Ward, not only increasing the

number of personnel, but finding the ‘‘right’’ personnel to staff

these missions. Military staffing from the U.S. European Command

(EUCOM) with 90 day rotations has been at the expense of existing

EUCOM missions. Moreover, while military civil affairs personnel

are very capable, the needs to be met in assisting the Palestinian

Authority often go beyond their military training.

• The new State Department office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) with its interagency capabilities might be a useful source of the ‘‘right’’ personnel and experts to support post-conflict transition in Gaza and the West

Bank and to integrate the U.S. aid process. CRS could be designated to support General Ward and the Quartet under Mr.

Wolfensohn to develop a USG strategy and plan to return both

parties to the Road Map, including benchmarks, timetables,

and actions that the USG would undertake to advance the

process. Tapping into the CRS now also may avoid continuity

problems for assisting the Palestinian Authority after the disengagement.

• Another possibility would be to facilitate an exchange of letters

or hold a bilateral or multi-lateral summit meeting among the

parties to build confidence that there is consensus on a process

for returning to the Road Map on the ‘‘day after’’ disengagement.

B. Law and Policy on Hamas:

The U.S needs to reassess our laws and policies intended to prevent terrorism, promote political development and rule of law and

to strengthen reformers (both inside and outside of the Palestinian

Authority) to ensure they are doing exactly that. In the near term,

the administration might consider if providing U.S. assistance to

local and municipal Palestinian governing institutions, regardless

of the political coloration of any democratically elected officials

heading them at the time, would serve U.S. long-term interests.

This approach might take some of the onus of judging who can receive aid off of the U.S. aid providers and while not endorsing

Hamas’ terror activities, it, would recognize realities in Palestinian

politics and steer those politics towards moderation.

• Elections Issue. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon recently indicated that Hamas members should not be allowed to participate in Palestinian elections and Israel would withhold cooperation facilitating the elections process if Hamas candidates

are allowed to take part. Others too have stated that the Palestinian Authority should prevent Hamas or other terrorist

7

group members from running for elective office as under the

Oslo accords, if ‘‘such candidates, parties or coalitions (1) commit or advocate racism, or (2) pursue the implementation of

their aims by unlawful non-democratic means.’’ This may meet

U.S. and Israeli counter terrorism concerns, but would be

viewed as interference in a democratic process which could

weaken the Palestinian Authority among the Palestinian people. The Palestinian Authority might help resolve this issue by

establishing clear benchmarks or conditions for any candidate’s

eligibility to participate in Palestinian elections, including renunciation of violence.

• By advocating for strong, transparent democratic Palestinian

elections, the U.S. would be consistent with its broader policies

to promote democracy, freedom and reform in the Middle East.

Support for transparent, democratic elections by the Palestinian Authority also could help it take the high ground and

raise its credibility in the Palestinian street. Moreover, as the

majority of Palestinians do not support Hamas’ militancy and

want an end to the continued violence, a transparent, democratic legislative election could actually tie any elected members of Hamas’ hands, requiring them, as part of joining the

political process, to meet the demands for non-violence of their

Palestinian constituents.

• Long-Term Policy. It is also worth exploring for the longer

term, whether some of the successes of the Northern Ireland

peace process, including nurturing a political wing on the way

toward an unequivocal renunciation of violence, hold lessons

for the Palestinian case. While controversial, debate on this

issue is clearly needed to develop a coherent, consistent strategy and policy for dealing with Hamas and other terrorist organizations.

C. Additional U.S. Assistance:

The administration should seek additional U.S. assistance resources for the Israelis and Palestinians with sufficient flexibility

to meet urgent needs on both sides. High priority should be placed

on aid to reform the Palestinian Authority security forces as such

aid holds potential long term stability benefits for both Israelis and

Palestinians. The administration might consider using Peacekeeping Operations Funds (PKO) to support aid to Palestinian security forces on an emergency basis; or seek approval for NATO to

provide urgently needed equipment and training to facilitate the

Palestinian Authority security forces transformation and consolidation. NATO may be an acceptable third party for both Israelis and

Palestinians and could act as a military equivalent of the Quartet.

D. Coordination with Other Donors:

Finally, the U.S. should continue to encourage other donors to

provide greater support to the Israelis and Palestinians and should

ensure U.S. assistance resources are coordinated with aid committed by members of the G-8 and other nations to prevent duplication. Any international aid coordination mechanism should enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:17 Oct 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 23820.TXT SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
8

compass economic and technical aid as well as security-related assistance.

These recommendations are not exhaustive, but may be useful

for Committee members to explore in the coming months. There is

much at stake in getting the ‘‘day after’’ Gaza disengagement right.

II. REPORT OF PUNEET TALWAR—SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF

MEMBER (MINORITY STAFF)

DISENGAGEMENT AND BEYOND

This report summarizes key findings and recommendations from

a recent trip (July 5–12) to Israel and the Palestinian areas. It also

reflects subsequent developments in order to provide an account of

the current situation as of early September.

Introduction

There are two main pillars of a successful peace process. First,

Israel must have confidence that the Palestinian Authority is a reliable partner that is capable of exercising control, especially on security-related matters. Second, Palestinians must have improved

economic prospects and believe that they will soon have a viable

state.

Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Northern West

Bank is a politically courageous decision on the part of Prime Minister Sharon and can play a critical role in building both of these

pillars. However, significant gaps in expectations separating the

two sides require continuous active international involvement to

ensure that disengagement does not become a lost opportunity to

breathe new life into the peace process.

This report focuses on five key issues that will determine the

success of disengagement and the future of the peace process: (1)

The gaps in perspective and expectations between Israelis and Palestinians; (2) The progress that has been made on the coordination

of disengagement; (3) The obstacles and difficulties in improving

security in Palestinian areas; (4) The impact of settlement activity

and the construction of the security barrier; (5) The potential of

Israeli and Palestinian political developments to slow progress on

the peace process. The final section will make specific recommendations on a way forward after disengagement.

A Gap in Palestinian and Israeli Perspectives

Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas have an overwhelming common interest in a successful disengagement. Sharon

must demonstrate that disengagement has enhanced, not harmed,

Israel’s security. Abbas must demonstrate to Palestinians that disengagement is accompanied by an improvement in daily life and a

credible path to a final-status solution. Neither Sharon nor Abbas

can succeed in achieving his objective without the other succeeding

as well. While this logic would appear to be self-evident and compelling, it has not necessarily been reflected in actions on the

ground.

9

• Israeli Perspective. The Israeli political and military establishment has been focused on the requirements for a peaceful evacuation of the settlements in Gaza and the Northern West

Bank. Prime Minister Sharon has been highly critical of the

Palestinian Authority’s efforts on security, describing Abbas

and Interior Minister Youssef as well intentioned, but indecisive. As long as Israel is dissatisfied with Palestinian security

performance, it will not begin implementation of the Road

Map. While Israel has not yet made clear its intentions after

disengagement, a key Sharon advisor said that the Prime Minister believes Israel must have time to ‘‘heal the wounds.’’

• Palestinian Perspective. As the date for disengagement nears,

Palestinians have a keen interest in ensuring that Gaza is not

cut off from the outside world. They also are seeking assurances that ‘‘Gaza first’’ does not become ‘‘Gaza last,’’ but is instead a path to renewed negotiations for a final-status solution.

However, close advisors to President Abbas believe that Prime

Minister Sharon does not want a viable Palestinian partner

and is deliberately trying to weaken Abbas. Their fear is that

disengagement and the construction of the West Bank barrier

suggest that Israel is interested in a long-term interim arrangement and further unilateral steps, not a negotiated final

agreement.

• An Acrimonious Meeting. These differing perspectives and the

overall lack of trust were on display during a June 21 meeting

between Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas. While

the meeting did produce some tangible results, it did not build

a foundation conducive to future interaction. Israeli officials

described Palestinians as being unresponsive on security-related matters, while Palestinian officials felt that they were

being lectured. Unfortunately, the short-term effect appears to

have been a deepening of suspicions on both sides.

Progress on Coordination

The Quartet Special Envoy, James D. Wolfensohn, has deftly

used the convergence of both side’s core interests in making

progress toward agreements that they could not have otherwise

achieved on their own.

• The Importance of Coordination. Successful coordination of disengagement is important for two reasons. First, maximizing security for Israelis as they evacuate settlements can help to rebuild trust between Israelis and Palestinians which is essential

to future negotiations. Second, it can improve the quality of life

for Palestinians and bolster the position of President Abbas

and the Palestinian Authority relative to Hamas.

• ‘‘Ownership’’ of Disengagement. Nearly 75% of Palestinians believe Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza is a victory for violence. To

prevent this logic from taking hold in the West Bank, President Abbas must have ‘‘ownership’’ of disengagement. Hamas

gains if disengagement is perceived as more of a unilateral

move, while Abbas gets credit if diplomacy succeeds in delivering results.

10

• Wolfensohn’s Role. This is why the role of Wolfensohn is so

critical. Thus far, the Special Envoy has made progress on a

six-part work program: (1) Border Crossings and Trade Corridors; (2) A connection between the West Bank and Gaza; (3)

Easing movement in the West Bank; (4) Air and Sea Ports; (5)

The disposition of houses in the settlements; and (6) Greenhouses in the settlements.

Of these six issues, two—greenhouses and the removal of

rubble from demolished structures—have been resolved. In the

case of the greenhouses, Wolfensohn creatively mobilized resources from the private sector to avert their dismantlement,

thereby saving thousands of Palestinian jobs. Palestinians and

Israelis also have reached an agreement to dispose of the large

quantities of rubble from demolished settlements.

The other four areas relate to the movement of goods and

people within the Palestinian territories and unimpeded access

to the outside world. Progress on these is essential to improving Palestinian economic prospects. On border crossings and

trade corridors, technological improvements and new terminals

under construction should satisfy Israeli security concerns

while permitting significant reductions in costly delays which

often prevent Palestinian goods from reaching markets. Both

sides have agreed on the goal of this exercise: speedy and efficient transit of goods from door to door.

The two sides also have made progress in creating a reliable

linkage between the West Bank and Gaza, with Israel agreeing

to convoys between the two territories as an interim measure

while discussions continue on more permanent arrangements.

In addition, the UN is working with the parties to identify

major bottlenecks in the West Bank which could be removed

to improve the flow of goods and boost economic activity. Moreover, Israel has agreed to the construction of a Palestinian seaport which will take two to three years, and it has given the

go-ahead for planning to reopen the airport in Gaza.

While progress is being made, some are concerned that if the

outstanding issues are not resolved they effectively could become ‘‘Sheba Farms’’ in Gaza that are a focal point for disputes, thus preventing the focus from shifting to next steps in

the peace process.

• The Rafah Border Crossing. One issue deserving special mention is the Rafah crossing point between Egypt and Gaza. The

two sides have been discussing an arrangement which would

have a third-party—possibly an EU member state—be involved

to provide expertise in customs and border-regime management. It appears, however, that Israel is wary that a technical

mission focused on border management would not hinder arms

smuggling, and has instead proposed that a border crossing at

the meeting point of Gaza, Egypt, and Israel be used so that

Israel can continue to regulate access to and from Gaza. The

United States should focus on supporting an agreement which

meets both sides’ objectives—security for Israel and ease of

movement for Palestinians. This would not only be a huge leap

forward for the Gaza economy, but it also could serve as a

model for arrangements at the airport and seaport.

11

Obstacles to Establishing Security

Although there is a recognition on both sides of the central importance of security, Israel and the PA have strongly differing

views on the performance of Palestinian security services and the

nature of support they require. Without a sustained effort to improve coordination and close the gaps between the two sides, the

security sector could impede further steps in the peace process.

General William Ward has made significant strides in assisting

Palestinians rebuild their security forces, but the challenges are

daunting and time is short.

• Israeli Perceptions. Israel maintains that Abbas and Interior

Minister Youssef are doing little to fight terror. They argue

that Hamas is taking advantage of the ‘‘quiet’’ to rearm and

gain strength. They say that Abbas, during his meeting with

Sharon, refused to move against Palestinian Islamic Jihad—

even when presented with specific evidence of its intent to

carry out operations—arguing that he was too weak to do so.

They dismiss such claims and believe that the PA can disarm

terrorist groups—‘‘we don’t care how he does it, as long as he

does it.’’

• Palestinian Efforts. Interior Minister Nasser Youssef has taken

steps to consolidate the many competing branches of Palestinian security forces. This has included the establishment of

joint operations centers to facilitate coordination among the

previously disparate services. He has developed a 5,000 person

force to secure settlement areas in Gaza after disengagement.

In addition to these specific steps, Youssef and others emphasize the significance of the cease-fire, which they maintain effectively ended the second intifada.

• A Shortage of Arms? Youssef says that his top requirements

are arms and ammunition and is deeply frustrated at Israel’s

refusal to permit their acquisition. He claims that his weapons

and ammunition supplies are so low that if Israel does not permit deliveries, he will soon turn to the black market for smuggled weapons. General William Ward has endorsed Youssef’s

judgment that the Palestinian security services are in need of

additional arms and ammunition. Secretary Rice pressed the

issue on her recent visit, but Israel has not changed its position. It should be noted that several knowledgeable Palestinians—inside and outside the government—do not believe that

a shortage of arms and ammunition are the chief obstacles to

better performance by Palestinian security services. Instead,

they believe the main impediment is the hesitancy of Palestinian leaders to act decisively against corrupt and renegade

elements within Fatah and the PA.

• A Desire for Closer Coordination. Youssef also indicated a keen

interest in improving the level of coordination between Israeli

and Palestinian security services at the field level. This message was conveyed to Israeli officials. The absence of closer coordination may be one of the legacies of the intifada, which left

an enormous gulf in trust between Israeli and Palestinian security services.

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• Law and Order in Palestinian Areas. Closely related to the

issue of security for Israel is law and order in Palestinians

areas. Palestinians, including cabinet ministers, are highly

critical of the security services for their unwillingness or inability to confront common criminals and thugs. The law and

order problem is another legacy of the intifada which empowered local leaders at the same time that Palestinian security

services were rendered ineffective. Those who acquired weapons and a measure of local power are loath to surrender them

now. Palestinians say that these local thugs—many of whom

are members of Fatah-related organizations and some of whom

serve in the security forces—have connections to powerful players in the PA and Palestinian Legislative Council.

• A Need for Decisive Action. The standing of the PA is suffering

because of the perception among Palestinians that it is not

doing all that it can to restore law and order. Many Palestinians believe that President Abbas has to take dramatic steps

to impose his authority. Suggestions heard include replacing

the Police Chief and Attorney General, declaring a State of

Emergency (Abbas did so in response to armed clashes between

Hamas and the PA in mid-July), and the formation of a

slimmed-down national security cabinet to serve through the

period of disengagement.

• The Importance of the Ward Mission. General William Ward

has been playing a crucial role in rebuilding the Palestinian security services and enhancing the chain of command to the Interior Minister. The European Union is also serving an important function through its efforts to develop Palestinian police

capability. Ward has developed a detailed analysis of requirements for international assistance to the security forces in four

sectors: (1) Communications, command, and control; (2) Mobility and transport; (3) Logistics and medical; (4) Force protection. Recently, supplies have begun to arrive from international donors in response to Ward’s list of requirements, and

Israel has been forthcoming in facilitating their delivery.

While Ward has made significant progress, he also has faced

serious challenges in his mission. Until very recently, he

lacked the funds to direct immediate assistance to priority

areas within the four sectors; personalities in the PA have the

loyalty of various branches of the security services which impairs a unified chain of command; and his mandate does not

formally include a coordination role between the two sides even

though his position has inevitably required him to increasingly

act in such a capacity.

The Impact of Settlements and the Security Barrier

Continuing Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and the

construction of the security barrier is leading some Palestinians

and Israelis to believe that disengagement will foreclose the option

of a two-state solution at some point in the near future.

• Settlements and Security. According to knowledgeable Palestinians, there is a direct correlation between Abbas’s ability to improve security and construction and expansion of the settleVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:17 Oct 07, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 23820.TXT SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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ments. One respected pollster suggests that a settlement freeze

would strengthen Abbas’s ability to maintain strong public

support for disarming terrorist and militants groups.

• Status and Plans for Israeli Settlements. The U.S. Consulate in

Jerusalem has reported continuing construction in at least 40

West Bank settlements. Israeli Housing Minister Herzog says

that all construction has been halted in 50 unauthorized outposts in the West Bank. Plans are to authorize construction in

two settlements—Maale Adumim and Betar Ilit. Recently,

Israel announced plans to build an additional 117 housing

units in the Ariel settlement which lies deep inside the West

Bank.

The planned E-1 settlement could affect the prospects for a

two-state solution by essentially dividing the West Bank in

two. Israel says no decision has been made on E-1, which is

undergoing zoning at present. One Israeli official envisages an

eventual compromise with the Palestinians in which part of E1 will be built, but with enough land returned to permit a contiguous Palestinian state.

• The Implications of the Security Barrier. The route of the security barrier will have significant implications for future peace

talks. The greater the percentage of West Bank territory incorporated on the Western side, the more difficult it becomes to

create a viable and contiguous Palestinian state. According to

the Israeli Defense Ministry, the route of the security barrier

will cut into somewhere between 6.4% and 10% of the West

Bank. The two undetermined portions of the route involve the

‘‘Ariel finger’’ in the north-central West Bank and the ‘‘Jerusalem bubble,’’ which would incorporate Maale Adumim.

• Israeli Perspectives on the Barrier. Israel argues that the barrier is purely a security measure and can be moved based on

a final peace agreement. It notes the drop in the number of

suicide bombings as proof that the barrier has served its intended purpose of reducing terrorism. The Israeli Defense Ministry maintains that once the barrier is complete in 2006,

Israeli soldiers will be able to redeploy in large numbers to the

‘‘seam zone’’ along the barrier. This, they argue, will greatly

improve the freedom of movement for Palestinians within the

West Bank. In addition, roughly 34 to 38 crossing points are

expected to be built along the barrier to facilitate the flow of

people and goods. It should be noted that Israel has modified

the route of the barrier in response to Israeli Supreme Court

decisions which require that the route minimize hardships on

Palestinians.

• Palestinian Perspectives on the Barrier. Palestinians say that

the route of the barrier is causing significant disruptions in

their daily lives, especially in the greater Jerusalem area. The

barrier—a system of fences, roads, and other obstacles for most

of its length, but in the form of a wall in Jerusalem and other

built-up areas—slices into the expanded municipal boundaries

of East Jerusalem, leaving some 55,000 Palestinian residents

of Jerusalem cut off from the rest of the city (Israel says that

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rier and that it plans to build new facilities such as schools

and post offices to serve residents ‘‘outside’’ the barrier). Palestinians say that the barrier disrupts long-standing ties between East Jerusalem and nearby cities. Politically, it leads

many Palestinians to believe that Israel is trying to foreclose

the establishment of a capital in East Jerusalem as part of a

final-status agreement.

The Impact of Palestinian and Israeli Politics

Internal Palestinian and Israeli political dynamics could impede

the prospects for peace negotiations after disengagement. There is

unlikely to be overwhelming pressure generated from within the

Israeli body politic for bold steps on the peace process. Political

jockeying and internecine battles among Palestinian factions could

also preoccupy Palestinian leaders. An absence of progress would

exacerbate frustration among ordinary Palestinians. Both Israeli

and Palestinian leaders and key players in the international community must be prepared to take risks to push the process forward.

Israeli Political Dynamics

• Israeli politics are in a state of flux. Prime Minister Sharon

took a courageous decision to pursue disengagement against

the wishes of many within Likud, which historically embraced

the concept of ‘‘Greater Israel.’’ Few in Israel have a sense of

what the political landscape will look like the day after disengagement. While Israel is due to have elections no later than

the Fall of 2006, many believe that Sharon will call early elections.

• One scenario involves an idea gaining ground in Israel for a reorientation of the political map and the creation of a centrist

coalition drawn from Labor, Shinui, and a section of Likud.

Such a coalition would have a majority in favor of moving

ahead with the peace process.

• Another scenario would have Sharon moving to the Right in

order to win a Likud primary against challenger Benyamin

Netanyahu, who recently resigned from the cabinet. This could

create a situation where further peace moves may be suspended at the very moment that Abbas would want them most

in advance of Palestinian legislative elections.

• While there is a consensus emerging in Israel on territorial

issues, there is not yet a similar consensus on whether there

is a reliable Palestinian partner. Some believe that that Israel

should define its borders without a negotiated solution with

the Palestinians. Others believe that Israel has a political interest in seeing Abbas succeed, because failure would likely

lead to more terrorism and chaos.

Palestinian Political Dynamics

• The post-Arafat transition in Palestinian politics is still underway, and the result is a somewhat chaotic political picture. The

political battles being waged are more than simply a question

of ‘‘who’s up and who’s down’’—their outcome will have a direct

bearing on the future of peacemaking efforts.

15

• Palestinians have been disappointed by the lack of performance in key areas of governance by the PA. The main complaints are corruption, a weak economy, a lack of diplomatic

progress, and the absence of law and order. The main beneficiary of the public’s displeasure has been Hamas. Advisors to

Abbas acknowledge these popular perceptions, but blame

Israeli actions, jockeying among rival personalities, and the

difficult task of reforming broken institutions as being responsible for preventing the PA from performing as well as it could.

• Another feature of Palestinian politics is the deepening rift between the ‘‘old guard’’ and ‘‘young guard’’ within Fatah. This

rift was exacerbated by the generally poor showing by Fatah

in local and municipal elections earlier this year. The ‘‘young

guard’’ blamed the poor results on the decision to place discredited figures from the ‘‘old guard’’ on the ballot. A recent Fatah

meeting in Amman apparently further hardened positions in

the two camps.

• The ‘‘young guard,’’ who take their cue from the jailed Marwan

Bargouti, may run on a separate list in legislative council elections set for January 25, 2006 if they are not given a greater

role. This could split the Fatah vote and have a dramatic impact on the outcome. Under a compromise formula, 50% of the

seats in legislative elections will be district-based, while the

other 50% will be allocated through proportional representation. If elections were held today, polls show Hamas—if it is

permitted to participate—would win 33–40% of the vote, with

Fatah receiving roughly 45–50%. Should the Fatah vote split,

then Hamas could conceivably emerge with a majority in the

Legislative Council, winning 50 out of 66 district-based seats

alone. While this scenario is unlikely, an outright Hamas victory would raise significant questions about the future of the

peace process.

Recommendations for a Way Forward

It is vitally important to develop a coherent plan for international involvement after disengagement so that the peace process

does not stagnate. Standing back from the process would be irresponsible and could set the stage for a deteriorating situation and

a costly new round of violence.

• Five Key Steps. Once disengagement is complete, the Quartet

and other key parties should concentrate their efforts on five

areas: (1) Demonstrating clearly that ‘‘Gaza first’’ will not be

‘‘Gaza last’’ by enunciating broad parameters and/or principles

for the way ahead; (2) Outlining next steps including a return

to the Road Map, revising it with new dates for each of the

phases, and establishing a mechanism to monitor compliance;

(3) Endorsing the medium-term plan being developed in cooperation with Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn and solidifying pledges for it; (4) Extending Wolfensohn’s mandate to

continue to assist the parties; (5) Creating a follow-on to the

Ward mission to continue to rebuild Palestinian security forces

and coordinate between the two sides.

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The Quartet could consider endorsing these five steps

through an international summit or through a scheduled meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. It can calibrate them according to political realities on the ground in the

coming months.

• Arab Involvement. It will be important to ensure the sustained

involvement of key Arab states in the peace process after disengagement. Wolfensohn is likely to succeed in gaining new financial commitments for the medium-term plan from the oilrich Arab states as a follow-on to the successful G-8 meeting

in Gleneagles. Convincing them to invest political capital as

well will be challenging, but it is critical to the success of the

peace process.

Israel has sought genuine signs of normalization from the

Arab world as a demonstration that the Arabs accept its existence. The Saudis and others, while offering full normalization

after a peace agreement, have resisted taking steps beforehand

because they are unwilling to expose themselves to that level

of political risk. The United States should press them to take

such steps now, especially after a successful disengagement.

The recent meeting between Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers is evidence that there may be greater willingness on the

part of Islamic countries to engage with Israel.

• No Excuses/Insist on Security. Even as assistance is provided

to the PA to rebuild effective security forces, the international

community must demand that the Palestinians act decisively

to thwart terror and to restore law and order. The PA will not

be viewed as a reliable partner by Israel if it is not seen as

making a full effort on security. The PA’s credibility in the

eyes of its own people is also at stake. The PA must be seen

as capable of exercising control and enforcing law and order,

if it is to maintain the support of the Palestinian public. President Abbas must show a willingness to take the same sort of

risk as Prime Minister Sharon, who proceeded with disengagement despite fierce internal opposition.

• Settlements. There is no moral equivalence between terrorism

and the expansion of settlements. However, given the detrimental impact that settlement activity has on the peace process, it is important to continue to urge the Israeli government

to halt that activity. Israel has committed to the United States

to dismantle unauthorized outposts in the West Bank. While

Israel’s hesitation to fulfill this commitment was understandable during the difficult period surrounding the disengagement

from Gaza, that impediment has been removed. Furthermore,

by meeting its road map obligation to freeze settlement expansion, Israel could significantly improve the standing of President Abbas to simultaneously meet his road map obligations.

• Ensuring Flexibility on the Barrier. The barrier has improved

Israelis’ security by preventing suicide bombings. Nonetheless,

it is important to continue to urge the Israeli government to

minimize the intrusion of the barrier into the West Bank. The

barrier provokes deep suspicions among Palestinians that

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fine its borders unilaterally. Construction in particularly sensitive areas such as Jerusalem and Ariel should not undermine

prospects for a two-state solution.

• NATO Involvement. The member states of NATO should seriously consider endorsing two new missions to support the

peace process. The first would be to offer an outside monitoring

presence at the Rafah crossing point or another location pursuant to an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. This

could complement the technical management of the crossing by

an EU member state. A NATO commitment could satisfy

Israeli security concerns.

The second mission would be to take over the work of General Ward, who is due to rotate out of his current assignment

after disengagement. It is vitally important to ensure continued international involvement in the development of capable

Palestinian security forces.

These missions would not be risk free, and NATO member

states would have to seriously consider the possibility that

their forces could become a target for terrorists. Moreover,

NATO could only take on this role if both Israelis and Palestinians are supportive. Traditionally, Israel has been reluctant to

transfer responsibility for security functions to third parties.

Nonetheless, if NATO were to get the go-ahead for one or both

of these missions, it would send a powerful signal of support

for the peace process.

• Assisting Israel. Israel has taken a considerable risk with disengagement. It should receive the continued backing of the

United States so that this step is seen as benefiting Israel’s security. The United States should respond favorably to Israel’s

request for assistance to partially offset the costs of redeployment from Gaza and to develop the Galilee and Negev regions

as it refocuses its priorities away from settlements in the West

Bank to areas within Israel proper.

• Assisting and Reforming the Palestinian Authority. The international community, including the United States, must make

substantial financial commitments to the Palestinian Authority. Funds which are directed through NGOs, as important as

they are, do not have the same impact in boosting the standing

of President Abbas. At Gleneagles, G8 leaders endorsed up to

$3 billion in assistance per year over three years for the Palestinians. Three Palestinian ministries are developing a medium-term plan in cooperation with the Quartet’s Special

Envoy to give confidence to all donors that aid provided to the

PA will be used for its intended purpose.

In addition to financial contributions, it is important to urge

the PA to proceed with far-reaching institutional reforms, especially in areas that promote the rule of law. Senior members

of the PA who are in favor of deep reforms appreciate the role

of international scrutiny and skillfully use it as leverage to effect change.

• Resources for General Ward. It is critical for General Ward to

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mand, and control; (2) Mobility and transport; (3) Logistics and

medical; (4) Force protection. It is unfortunate that he was not

given control of such resources early in his tenure. Additional

funds should be made available to the Ward mission and its

successor as needs are identified.

Conclusion

This is a pivotal moment in the peace process. There has been

progress in certain areas in recent months, but many of the gains

are fragile. Continuing disputes between the two sides, electoral

issues in Israel, and internecine battles among Palestinians could

pose significant challenges in the months ahead.

The entire process could unravel without international involvement. That involvement may or may not include all of the elements

outlined above, but the core guiding principle is to identify the

areas that are showing promise and to build from them in a resolute manner.

Strategically, the stakes could not be higher. They extend well

beyond the geographic confines of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The peace process represents the best opportunity for progress in

the Middle East region. Iraq will not be stabilized for a considerable period of time. Democratization will be drawn-out and uneven.

Iran and the West appear headed for a protracted crisis over

Tehran’s nuclear program. However, the basic elements for

progress between Israelis and Palestinians are in place and can be

brought together with persistence and determination. Not only is

the peace process the best path to ensure Israel’s security and to

achieve statehood for Palestinians, it also will have a positive spillover effect on the other vexing challenges in the region.

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