U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

39–006 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 109TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REPORT

2005

109–243 

DISAPPROVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT 

COMMISSION 

ADVERSE REPORT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ON

H.J. RES. 65 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 


congress.#13
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JIM RYUN, Kansas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

KEN CALVERT, California 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan 

CATHY MCMORRIS, Washington 

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

IKE SKELTON, Missouri 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

LANE EVANS, Illinois 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 1 

Background .............................................................................................................. 2 

Executive Communication ...................................................................................... 3 

Legislative History .................................................................................................. 3 

Committee Position ................................................................................................. 4 

Fiscal Data ............................................................................................................... 4 

Congressional Budget Office Estimate ........................................................... 4 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................... 4 

Committee Cost Estimate ................................................................................ 5 

Oversight Findings .................................................................................................. 5 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 5 

Statement of Federal Mandates ............................................................................. 6 

Record Vote .............................................................................................................. 6 

Additional and Dissenting Views: 

Additional Views of Joel Hefley and Solomon P. Ortiz ................................. 8 

Additional Views of J. Randy Forbes .............................................................. 10 

Additional Views of Cathy McMorris .............................................................. 12 

Dissenting Views of Solomon P. Ortiz ............................................................ 13 

109TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 109–243 

DISAPPROVING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2005.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HUNTER, from the Committee on Armed Services, 

submitted the following 

ADVERSE REPORT 

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.J. Res. 65] 

The committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the 

joint resolution (H.J. Res. 65) disapproving the recommendations of 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, having 

considered the same, report unfavorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution does not pass. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY 

House Joint Resolution 65, introduced on September 20, 2005, by 

Congressman Ray LaHood, disapproves the recommendations of 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on September 15, 2005. 

The resolution is one of two identical resolutions of disapproval 

introduced by members of the House. It meets the requirements for 

a resolution of disapproval as provided by section 2908(a) of the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 

101–510, as amended). 

Enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval within the 

timeline prescribed by Public Law 101–510 would prevent the base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations made by the 

2005 BRAC Commission from taking effect. 

2 

1 A complete copy of the report, as transmitted by the President on September 15, 2005, is 

available as House Document 109–56. 

BACKGROUND 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 

(Public Law 107–107) authorized the use of amended authorities 

and procedures contained within Public Law 101–510 to conduct a 

round of base realignments and closures in 2005. The 2005 BRAC 

round is the fifth round of base closures since 1988. 

Pursuant to Public Law 107–107 and Public Law 101–510, on 

May 13, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld submitted 

to Congress and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission a list of recommended base closure and realignment actions. The secretary’s list comprised 190 recommendations, including 33 ‘‘major’’ closures (‘‘major’’ installations were defined by the secretary as those with a plant replacement value exceeding $100 

million), 29 ‘‘major’’ realignments, and 775 smaller closures and realignments. According to the BRAC commission, implementation of 

the secretary’s recommendations would have resulted in net savings over 20 years of $47.8 billion, with annual savings after implementation of $5.4 billion. 

On September 8, 2005, the commission submitted an amended 

list of BRAC recommendations to the President. Of the secretary’s 

initial 190 recommendations, the commission approved 119 with no 

change and another 45 with amendments. The commission rejected 

13 recommendations, significantly modified another 13, and made 

5 additional closure or realignment recommendations. Of the secretary’s recommended 33 major closures, the commission approved 

21, changed 7 to realignments, and rejected the remaining 5. Of 

the secretary’s recommended 29 major realignments, the commission approved 25, changed 1 to realignment, rejected the other 3, 

and added 1 not requested by the secretary. 

According to the commission, the revised recommendations will 

result in 20 year savings of $35.6 billion over 20 years with annual 

savings of $4.2 billion. However, a large part of these savings 

would take the form of personnel becoming available to conduct 

other tasks. Discounting the personnel savings, the commission estimates that its recommendations will result in net savings of $15.1 

billion over 20 years with annual savings after implementation of 

approximately $2.5 billion. 

On September 15, 2005, the President concurred with the commission’s recommendations and sent them to Congress for review 1. 

Under the provisions of Public Law 101–510, the commission’s recommendations will become binding unless a resolution of disapproval is enacted. The law specifies the text of the resolution of 

disapproval and does not permit additions, deletions, or amendments to the recommendations affecting installations on the BRAC 

list. Enactment of the resolution would require passage by both 

houses of Congress as well as approval by the President or a veto 

override. 

Public Law 101–510 provides expedited procedures for congressional consideration of the resolution of disapproval. First, it provides for a limited period of time during which the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed 

Services may consider the resolution. Failure to act within this 

3 

time period would result in the resolution being discharged from 

further consideration. 

Second, on or after the third day after the committee has reported the resolution, or has been discharged from further consideration, any Member of Congress may move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, after giving notice the preceding calendar day. 

The commission recommendations will become binding unless the 

resolution is enacted before one of the following occurs: (1) the end 

of a 45–day period beginning on the date on which the President 

transmitted the commission’s recommendations to Congress, but 

excluding any adjournment period of more than three days; or (2) 

the adjournment sine die of Congress for the session. 

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Washington, D.C., Sept. 15, 2005. 

Congress of the United States, Washington, DC. 

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: I transmit herewith 

the report containing the recommendations of the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission pursuant to sections 2903 

and 2914 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990, Public Law 101–510, 104 Stat. 1810, as amended. That report includes changes referenced in errata sheets submitted to me 

by the Commission, including the enclosed errata sheets dated September 8, September 9, September 12, and September 13, 2005. 

I note that I am in receipt of a letter from Chairman Principi, 

dated September 8, 2005, regarding a district court injunction then 

in effect relating to the Bradley International Airport Air Guard 

Station in Windsor Locks, Connecticut. Chairman Principi’s letter 

states that, as a result of that injunction, ‘‘you should consider the 

portion of Recommendation 85 . . . that recommends realignment 

of the Connecticut 103rd Fighter Wing withdrawn from the Commission’s report.’’ The Chairman’s letter further states that ‘‘[i]f the 

court’s injunction is later vacated, reversed, stayed, or otherwise 

withdrawn, it is the intent of the Commission that the entirety of 

the recommendation be a part of the Commission’s report.’’ On September 9, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit granted a stay of the district court’s injunction. Because the 

injunction is no longer in effect, Recommendation 85 in its entirety 

is part of the Commission’s report. 

I certify that I approve all the recommendations contained in the 

Commission’s report. 

GEORGE W. BUSH, 

President. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 

As noted above, H.J. Res. 65 was introduced on September 20, 

2005, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services. 

On September 27, 2005, the Committee on Armed Services held 

a mark-up session to consider H.J. Res. 65. The committee reported 

adversely the resolution of disapproval by a record vote of 43 ayes 

to 14 noes. 

4 

COMMITTEE POSITION 

On September 27, 2005, the Committee on Armed Services met 

in open session and, a quorum being present, reported adversely 

the resolution H.J. Res. 65 to the House by a vote of 43–14. 

FISCAL DATA 

Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 

Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain annual outlays resulting from the resolution during fiscal year 2005 and each 

of the following five fiscal years. The results of such efforts are reflected in the committee cost estimate, which is included in this report pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE 

September 28, 2005. 

HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.J. Res. 65, Disapproving the 

Recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is David Newman. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, 

Director. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE 

H.J. Res. 65 would disapprove the recommendations of the 2005 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, preventing 

the Department of Defense from implementing those recommendations. Enacting the joint resolution would not affect direct spending 

or revenues. It would significantly affect spending subject to appropriation—because implementation of the Commission’s recommendations is likely to cost money in the near term, but save 

money over time. CBO has not prepared an estimate of such discretionary costs and savings; however, a summary of the Commission’s estimates is included below. 

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 set up 

a process by which military installations would be recommended 

for closure or realignment by an independent commission. The Department of Defense (DoD) would implement the recommendations 

unless the Congress were to enact a joint resolution disapproving 

them. Public Law 107–107, the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2002, authorized a new round of base closures and 

realignments for 2005, the first time since 1995, and authorized the 

establishment of a commission to review recommendations from 

DoD and to submit a final list of recommended closures and realignments to the President of the United States. 

On September 8, 2005, the Commission released its recommendations, which called for closing or realigning the activities at 182 inVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:25 Oct 03, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR243.XXX HR243
5 

stallations. When measured in 2005 dollars, the Commission’s 

analysis indicates that these actions would cost $5.5 billion over 

the 2006–2011 period, but would save $4.2 billion annually after 

that implementation period, assuming that appropriations are reduced accordingly. Over 20 years, the Commission estimates that 

DoD could save over $35 billion, including $20 billion in savings associated with eliminating some military personnel positions at 

closed installations. However, since DoD’s current force structure 

plans do not include a reduction in military personnel, the Commission notes that these savings are unlikely to be realized, and estimates that actual savings would be about $15 billion over the 

2006–2025 period. 

The President concurred with the Commission’s recommendations and transmitted them to the Congress on September 15, 

2005. Under current law, if no action is taken by the Congress, 

DoD will begin closing and realigning the affected bases in 2006. 

Therefore, enactment of H.J. Res. 65 would cost money relative to 

current law because savings from the base closures would be forgone. All costs and savings related to those base closures and realignments would be subject to appropriation action. CBO has not 

prepared an independent estimate of the magnitude of the costs involved. 

H.J. Res. 65 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 

would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is David Newman. The 

estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE 

Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 

Representatives, the committee generally concurs with the estimate 

contained in the report of the Congressional Budget Office. 

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS 

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee reports that the findings 

and recommendations of the committee, based on oversight activities pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974, this resolution does not include any new 

spending or credit authority, nor does it provide for any increase 

or decrease in tax revenues or expenditures. 

With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, performance goals and objectives can not 

be explained, because the resolution does not require any new 

funding. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT 

Pursuant to Rule XIII, clause 3(d)(1) of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for this legislation in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. 

6 

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES 

Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104–4, this legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, local, and tribal 

governments, nor with respect to the private sector. Similarly, the 

resolution provides no unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates. 

RECORD VOTES 

In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee sets forth the following 

record vote that occurred during the committee’s consideration of 

H.J. Res. 65. 

As previously noted, the committee ordered H.J. Res. 65 report 

to the House with an adverse recommendation by a vote of 43–14, 

a quorum being present. 

7 


Insert graphic folio-9 HR243.001
(8) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

Although we differed in our positions on reporting H.J. Res. 65 

adversely to the House, we share the belief that the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round must be the final time the 

current BRAC model is used to make closure and realignment decisions. 

We submit the following examples of events that occurred during 

this BRAC round, within the parameters of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, to demonstrate our concerns 

with the existing process. 

• Following release of the Secretary of Defense’s BRAC recommendations, DOD was unprepared to release data that supported its recommendations. Citing security concerns, the Department’s delays not only impacted the ability of Congress, 

local communities, and the commission to review the recommendations, but created the appearance that DOD was 

‘‘slow rolling’’ to prevent the deconstruction of its recommendations. 

• Some observers have noted that certain commission decisions appear to have been influenced by political pressures. 

The spectre of politics within the process raises legitimate concerns whether the BRAC process, particularly the use of a commission within the process, remains a viable one. 

• The commission included an unprecedented number of 

‘‘contingent’’ recommendations in its report. Some recommendations—such as for Cannon Air Force Base—created 

the appearance that commissioners were avoiding making difficult political decisions. Other recommendations—such as for 

Naval Air Station Oceana—make extraordinary demands on 

the local community. It is questionable whether this was an 

appropriate use of the commission’s powers, and it was not our 

intent that the commission attempt to broker land acquisitions, 

build buffer zones, or force states into negotiations to keep 

their bases open. • The commission placed extraordinary emphasis on the 

community impact of closures and realignments. Although 

community impact is one of the selection criteria, BRAC law 

clearly states that military value criteria are of greater priority. Such reordering of the criteria may result in infrastructure with less than optimum military value and raises questions about the commission’s motivations. • The commission’s lack of organization raised questions 

about its credibility. For instance, decisions made by the commissioners during and after markup proceedings relating to 

Otis Air Force Base resulted in DOD, communities, and commissioners alike believing that the base had been closed. Instead, a later review of the amendments voted on revealed that 

9 

the base had been realigned. Such events diminish confidence 

in the commission’s ability to conduct business in a professional manner. 

While we do not agree whether such flaws are sufficient to warrant disapproval of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, each one 

heightens doubts about the credibility of the process. 

Considering that credibility is the foundation upon which the 

BRAC process is built, its erosion is particularly worrisome. In fact, 

as a result, we believe that BRAC 2005 should be the final time 

our nation conducts base realignments and closures through the 

process as we know it today. 

While we believe that further reductions of military infrastructure after the 2005 BRAC round would present an unacceptable 

risk to national security, we also recognize that there may be a desire to make further base closures or realignments in the distant 

future. 

In such an event, we urge that Congress develop a new BRAC 

process that is able to make measured, apolitical, and transparent 

decisions while restoring its credibility. To do less—by relying 

again upon the current BRAC legislation, for instance—will surely 

result in recommendations in which the nation has no confidence 

and may also result in decisions that support political rather than 

national security interests. 

JOEL HEFLEY. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ. 

(10) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE J. RANDY 

FORBES 

I am writing to respectfully express my additional views in opposition to the BRAC process and to further explain my vote supporting H.J. Res. 65 (the Joint Resolution Disapproving the Recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission). 

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have always 

viewed one of my responsibilities and one of my great honors to 

stand with and support the military leaders who defend and protect the United States of America every day. I am proud of them 

and grateful for their service. My vote in support of H.J. Res. 65 

was a vote against the BRAC process and not a vote against the 

recommendations of our military leaders. If my vote would ultimately stop the realignments or closures deemed necessary by our 

military leaders, I would not support H.J. Res. 65. However, I am 

casting this vote to express my feeling that this BRAC process is 

wrong and in hopes that it will not occur again. 

In any realignment or closure process there are winners and losers. In this case, the fourth congressional district of Virginia, which 

I represent, was a winner. In fact, my district fared quite well 

through the BRAC realignments, gaining almost 7,000 military positions and numerous other civilian support jobs. However, the 

process used was flawed. 

This BRAC round was marketed to Congress and the American 

people with faulty and misleading estimates of savings that could 

be realized if the recommendations were implemented. The Department of Defense (DoD) originally claimed that the BRAC recommendations would save $47.8 billion over 20 years after the 

BRAC process was completed. These estimates were based, in part, 

on ‘‘savings’’ that were to be realized from personnel who would be 

eliminated due to bases being closed or units being realigned. However, the BRAC process does not eliminate personnel, only relocating personnel to other locations. These personnel would still be 

paid their salaries and benefits at their newly-assigned bases. So, 

the inflated BRAC savings were based on these faulty assessments. 

The actual savings from BRAC, based on the commission’s recommendations, drop to $15.1 billion over 20 years. This is a considerably different figure than initially advertised and should cause 

some to think carefully before concluding that BRAC is a worthwhile endeavor. Many of us had argued this point when BRAC was 

first proposed. We are saddened that our fears were realized. 

The savings issue becomes all the more important when considering how a wrong decision in BRAC could be all that more costly 

in the future. The BRAC process was accomplished before the 

Overseas Basing Commission Report and the Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) have been completed and fully digested by those exVerDate Aug 31 2005 08:25 Oct 03, 2005 Jkt 039006 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\HR243.XXX HR243
11 

perts who could make sound national security assessments and recommendations with such information. This is exactly the reverse of 

the way the process should work. The Overseas Basing Commission 

Report and the QDR should inform the BRAC process, not the 

other way around. I fear that in the not-too-distant future that 

these reports may indicate that the BRAC process has made the 

wrong determinations with respect to some base closures and realignments recommended in this round of BRAC. If this happens, 

it may be too late to change the BRAC recommendations and we 

may have to spend even more time and money to reestablish a base 

or capability that we thought was disposable in the BRAC analysis. 

In addition, and perhaps most frustrating, the BRAC process, as I 

predicted at the outset, has been too political and the assessment 

standards applied unequally to some regions and installations but 

not to others. 

Finally, I take exception to the basic premise of the Base Realignment and Closure process that allows nine non-elected officials 

to make major strategic and irrevocable decisions regarding our 

military infrastructure. These appointed officials should not be allowed to overturn the decisions made by our uniformed and civilian 

military leaders to which we entrust our national security. Why 

nine individuals, some of whom have no military experience, are a 

better judge of our military needs than our elected officials and 

thousands of career professionals in the DoD makes no sense. We 

entrust the greatest fighting force the world has ever known to the 

hands of our military leaders everyday and ask them to protect 

that force and use it to defend and protect our country. I cannot 

support a process that then allows nine non-elected people who are 

politically appointed to tell those military leaders they are wrong 

and what they must do with their facilities. That is a role for Congress and should not be abdicated when so much is at stake. 

The BRAC round completed in 2005 was untimely, overly political, and marketed with misleading figures. This BRAC round, in 

retrospect, may cause us to make irrevocable mistakes when more 

thorough analyses such as the Overseas Basing Commission Report 

and the QDR are taken into account. While it is tempting for a 

member of Congress who has gained much in the way of military 

personnel allocations through the BRAC process to ignore its 

faults, I am casting this vote in hopes that we will not use this 

process again in the future. 

J. RANDY FORBES. 

(12) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE CATHY 

MCMORRIS 

Mr. Chairman, as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I would like to bring to the committee’s attention a few key 

points as they pertain to the most recent Base Realignment and 

Closure Commission review of our nation’s military installations. 

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the important 

role that Fairchild Air Force Base plays in our national security efforts. Fairchild is home to the 92nd Air Refueling Wing. It is located 10 miles west of Spokane, Washington, is a modern, multimission base that is home to one of the world’s largest air-refueling 

winds and four co-located units. These units include Washington 

National Guard 141st Air Refueling Wing; the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency; the 336th Training Group that operates the Air 

Force’s only survival school; and Air Combat Command 2nd Support Squadron. 

I believe that the BRAC recommendations largely recognize the 

important military assets of Fairchild Air Force Base. However, I 

am concerned about the realignment of all eight Air National 

Guard (ANG) KC–135 Tankers from Washington’s 141st Air Refueling Wing. Fairchild’s active duty and Guard tankers continue 

to serve a number of important state and federal flying missions. 

Those missions include providing important mobility for our national air defense through refueling and providing the Governor of 

Washington and the region with emergency airlift capacity in the 

time of state and regional emergencies. 

Furthermore, this realignment overlooks the critical role that the 

141st ANG plays in ensuring the security of the Pacific Northwest 

and our nation. Air refueling tankers are vital assets in the rapid 

protection of forces around the world. With emerging security 

threats in the North Pacific, this is not the time to be reducing our 

mobility of air assets. Fairchild Tankers fly shorter distances to the 

Pacific Rim—arriving with more fuel in less time—making them a 

valuable part of our nation’s national security efforts. 

I am hopeful that the Department of Defense will reexamine the 

realignment of the eight ANG Tankers from Fairchild Air Force 

Base. This is critical due to their importance not only to our national defense, but also serve Washington State and the Pacific region in a strategic and crucial public safety capacity. 

CATHY MCMORRIS. 

(13) 

DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE SOLOMON P. 

ORTIZ 

I continue to have abiding concerns about the security of the Gulf 

of Mexico in light of the closure of the only two Naval Stations in 

the Gulf of Mexico. This concern extends beyond the fact that 

Naval Station Ingleside, located in my district, is to be closed as 

a result of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. 

Sometimes we forget the importance of the Gulf of Mexico region. 

One third of the continental United States ocean coastline is located along the Gulf of Mexico compared to 40 percent along the 

East Coast and 27 percent along the West Coast. Further, 51 percent of U.S. refining capability is along the Gulf of Mexico compared to 17 percent and 11 percent along the west and east coasts 

respectively. Over 70 percent of all crude oil imports enter the U.S. 

through Gulf ports, where 8 of the top 10 ports (tonnage) are located. The vast majority of domestic oil and gas offshore production 

takes place in the Gulf of Mexico compared to practically none 

along the East Coast. 

Up to this point, the military basing plan put forth by the Department of Defense and approved by the BRAC Commission will 

ensure that there will be an ongoing active Navy presence along 

the 1,900 miles of Atlantic Coast from Portsmouth, NH to Key 

West, FL, including 84 Navy vessels. At the same time, there will 

be ZERO Navy surface bases along the 1,550 miles of the Gulf of 

Mexico with ZERO vessels homeported in the region. 

The U.S. Northern Command has indicated there is an acceptable level of risk to homeland defense in the Gulf of Mexico after 

closure of all surface naval facilities in the Gulf. NORTHCOM has 

also indicated that their actionable intelligence plays a key role in 

the posture of our homeland defense forces. While I have not yet 

obtained requested information on maritime patrol flight and 

steaming hours in the Gulf of Mexico compared to other regions of 

the continental United States, I have obtained information from 

the Department of Homeland Security and the Southern Command 

that cause me great concern about the Gulf region, whether it be 

homeland defense or security. 

Additionally, one of the primary ‘‘feeder’’ areas for maritime 

threat to the Gulf Coast of the U.S. logically stems from Central 

and South America and Mexico. Since FY 2001, U.S. military maritime patrol in this area has dropped dramatically. In terms of days 

and hours of assets assigned to this operating area, Navy surface 

assets available for patrol have been reduced by 53 percent; U.S. 

Army air support for maritime patrol has been reduced by 72 percent; Navy maritime air patrol has shrunk by over 51 percent; and 

Air Force maritime patrol has dropped by 59 percent. If these 

trends continue, this critical area is going to be defended less, not 

14 

more, in this dangerous age. These statistics in and of themselves 

are alarming. However, when coupled with other statistics related 

specifically to our homeland defense strategy, it is very clear that 

the U.S. has a serious threat to its southern coast that is not adequately addressed or resourced. 

Documented information from federal maritime commands operating in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean would seem to contradict the assertion that the Gulf is adequately protected without 

ANY surface operational naval base in the region. For example, of 

the criminal maritime traffic headed north towards the Gulf, 75 

percent of activity known to exist from actionable intelligence is 

never detected—likely due to a lack of maritime patrol assets operating in the Gulf area. Of the detected hostile tracks, 25 percent 

are never intercepted. According to documentation, 84 percent of 

the time this failure is due to a lack of surface assets in the area. 

With open source information clearly documenting the increasing 

number of people with terrorist ties illegally entering the Central 

and South American area, the history of established maritime 

smuggling routes, and the large concentration of national energy 

and food resources bordering the Gulf of Mexico region—common 

sense dictates that the Gulf of Mexico is a primary terrorist target 

and that planned basing decisions do not provide adequate security. 

For these reasons I am compelled to strongly disagree with the 

BRAC recommendations and support House Joint Resolution 65. 

We must ensure the Gulf of Mexico, and particularly the Western 

Gulf, is not left vulnerable to terrorist attack due to inadequate 

homeland defense and security coordination and mission planning. 

Our citizens along the Southern coast of the United States deserve 

the same level of protection as those living along the east and west 

coasts. 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ. 

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