2

UNCLASSIFIED

Among the other key conference conclusions:

Africa is unlikely to become a major supplier of international terrorists due to the profound

differences between Islam practiced in Africa and in the Middle East. Foreign terrorists,

however, may seek sanctuary in Africa or attempt to hide weapons and assets there. The

overwhelming majority of terrorist activity in Africa will involve or be caused by indigenous groups

waging war against local governments and populations.

• The group believed that the most important terrorist-related trend in Africa affecting the

United States is the further development of pockets of radical Islam that actively provide

support and sanctuary to international terrorists.

Most African countries will continue to proclaim a public adherence to democracy and no other

form of government will significantly challenge the nominal allegiance to regular elections;

however, commitment to democracy in Africa will remain a “mile wide and inch thick.” Even

so, relatively few of the old-style authoritarian states will not hold elections at all.

• Those countries that are consolidating democracy will make significant gains: multiparty

elections will become institutionalized and the operations of their parliaments, courts, and other

institutions will improve. By 2020, for this set of African countries, any turnback from

democracy will be almost inconceivable.

Regarding AIDS, even with relatively optimistic assumptions about a vaccine and the roll-out of antiretrovirals (ARVs), it is clear that there will be very large increases in the number of people who will

die in the next ten years given weak medical care distribution systems. At the same time, the

experts judged that it is not clear if AIDS can be directly tied to state collapse in the way that

was feared and anticipated a few years ago.

Some traditional foreign powers, including France and the United Kingdom, probably will

continue to disengage gradually from Africa while newer actors, especially China, are likely to

play larger roles. China already has a significant impact on Africa—raising some commodity

prices—as Beijing searches for secure sources of raw materials. Tensions may be exacerbated,

however, by cheap Chinese goods flooding African markets, with a consequent effect on weak

domestic manufacturing bases, and by the presence of larger numbers of Chinese workers in Africa.

Over the next 15 years, there is probably a greater possibility of India developing a distinct foreign

policy with political interests toward Africa.

Included among the possible “upside surprises” the group identified were: the potential for

improvements in hydrocarbon management; scientific advances in agriculture such as those that

helped Asia in the 1960s and 70s; technological developments that fight AIDS, malaria, and other

infectious diseases and push upward the political and economic trajectory of some countries;

development of regional and internal peacekeeping doctrine and capabilities to allow for more

timely interventions and more decisive resolutions to conflicts; and positive developments in the

debt management that boosts private and public investment levels.

Downside scenarios included: Nigeria as a failed state, dragging down a large part of the West

African region; some type of ecological downturn; and conflict over water.
2

Discussion paper -- does not represent the views of the US Government

Among the other key conference conclusions:

Africa is unlikely to become a major supplier of international terrorists due to the profound

differences between Islam practiced in Africa and in the Middle East. Foreign terrorists,

however, may seek sanctuary in Africa or attempt to hide weapons and assets there. The

overwhelming majority of terrorist activity in Africa will involve or be caused by indigenous groups

waging war against local governments and populations.

• The group believed that the most important terrorist-related trend in Africa affecting the

United States is the further development of pockets of radical Islam that actively provide

support and sanctuary to international terrorists.

Most African countries will continue to proclaim a public adherence to democracy and no other

form of government will significantly challenge the nominal allegiance to regular elections;

however, commitment to democracy in Africa will remain a “mile wide and inch thick.” Even

so, relatively few of the old-style authoritarian states will not hold elections at all.

• Those countries that are consolidating democracy will make significant gains: multiparty

elections will become institutionalized and the operations of their parliaments, courts, and other

institutions will improve. By 2020, for this set of African countries, any turnback from

democracy will be almost inconceivable.

Regarding AIDS, even with relatively optimistic assumptions about a vaccine and the roll-out of antiretrovirals (ARVs), it is clear that there will be very large increases in the number of people who will

die in the next ten years given weak medical care distribution systems. At the same time, the

experts judged that it is not clear if AIDS can be directly tied to state collapse in the way that

was feared and anticipated a few years ago.

Some traditional foreign powers, including France and the United Kingdom, probably will

continue to disengage gradually from Africa while newer actors, especially China, are likely to

play larger roles. China already has a significant impact on Africa—raising some commodity

prices—as Beijing searches for secure sources of raw materials. Tensions may be exacerbated,

however, by cheap Chinese goods flooding African markets, with a consequent effect on weak

domestic manufacturing bases, and by the presence of larger numbers of Chinese workers in Africa.

Over the next 15 years, there is probably a greater possibility of India developing a distinct foreign

policy with political interests toward Africa.

Included among the possible “upside surprises” the group identified were: the potential for

improvements in hydrocarbon management; scientific advances in agriculture such as those that

helped Asia in the 1960s and 70s; technological developments that fight AIDS, malaria, and other

infectious diseases and push upward the political and economic trajectory of some countries;

development of regional and internal peacekeeping doctrine and capabilities to allow for more

timely interventions and more decisive resolutions to conflicts; and positive developments in the

debt management that boosts private and public investment levels.

Downside scenarios included: Nigeria as a failed state, dragging down a large part of the West

African region; some type of ecological downturn; and conflict over water.
Discussion paper -- does not represent the views of the US Government

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Discussion paper -- does not represent the views of the US Government

Discussion

This paper summarizes a one-day conference of US experts on Africa convened in January 2005

and sponsored by the National Intelligence Council to discuss likely trends in Sub-Saharan

Africa over the next 15 years. Participants were asked to consider the recently-released

National Intelligence Council report Mapping the Global Future, although the conference was

not designed to be a point-by-point response to the NIC project which projects global trends and

possible scenarios out to 2020. As with the 2020 study, our focus was not to describe every trend

that will affect Africa but to highlight those issues that will drive important developments and

that therefore must be considered by policymakers.

Marginalization, Differentiation

Over the next 15 years, Sub-Saharan Africa will become less important to the international

economy. The high growth rate projectedfor the global economy in the NIC 2020 study will not

be matchedby African countries, which will fall far below the rates projectedfor the fastgrowing East Asian nations. Hydrocarbon exports will certainly boom but they are limited and

distinctly focusedwithin enclave economies in a few states. Indeedthere is evidence to suggest

that hydrocarbons have retarded African development, promoting patronage and misrule by

African leaders rather than national development. Africa’s overall marginality affects individual

country performance because “neighborhoodeffects” matter. Investment is flooding into

Vietnam today—not only because of Hanoi’s economic policies but because investors are bullish

about Asia in general. More generally, the type of problems that African leaders will confront—

marginal economic performance, weak state structures, poor governance—will be increasingly

different from the issues that even other developing world leaders will confront.

Increasing Differentiation

In the context of increasing overall marginality, the most profoundtrendin Africa will be the

increasing differentiation among African countries across any measurable line of performance.

For instance, a few African countries (such as Botswana andMauritius) have already achieved

high growth while a number of other countries (Nigeria) are in significant ways poorer than they

were at independence. Some countries have established relatively well-functioning democracies

(such as Ghana, Benin, South Africa), while increasedlawlessness andanarchy can be foundin

large parts of West andCentral Africa. Finally, a few states have consolidateda sense of

national identity while others have been fractured by civil war. Of course, a large number of

states remain in the middle of each indicator with performances that tend to be ambiguous.

Generally, in Africa, “all badthings go together,” as those countries that have sufferedinstability

also have seen their growth rates plummet andtheir populations subject to horrific abuses. The

ties that bindall the goodthings together are less clear: Ghana has been both a goodeconomic

performer and has developed a laudable democratic system; Uganda has been an above-average

economic performer but has retainedan authoritarian political system; while South Africa solved

one of the most divisive domestic conflicts of the twentieth century anddevelopedan

extraordinarily liberal political system, but has yet to see economic growth above the continental

mean.
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Globalization will in all likelihoodaccelerate the differentiation among African countries. Those

countries doing well will be able to access an international economy that is extremely buoyant

and will be readily accepting of their goods. Technology flows from the international economy

to those well-performing African countries with relatively high governance standards will allow

some countries to leapfrog over some development challenges. At the same time, those countries

doing poorly will be increasingly subject to the other side of globalization: illegal drug trades,

arms traffickers, anda large global gray market that allows governments that seek to stripmine

their own countries to sell all kinds of goods (e.g., timber, diamonds) to willing buyers outside of

international supervision. It will be ever easier for capital to flee areas of poor performance.

Globalization therefore can promote both virtuous cycles of growth andwhirlpools of decline.

Indeed, the number of countries in the middle on growth and governance performance may

decline as the forces of globalization continually reward success or aggravate failure.

A Stable Hierarchy

In addition, the hierarchy of nations in Africa in terms of their economic, political, and state

performance will be unlikely to change markedly in the next 15 years. Certainly, some countries

will have significant reversals of fortune (for better or worse) due to leadership changes,

exogenous economic shocks, or developments in their regions that cannot be predicted in

advance. However, it would be surprising if, in general, the set of countries that are the current

leading performers in categories were substantially different from those in 15 years. Similarly,

those countries that are lagging substantially below the continental average will, more than

likely, continue to be at the bottom of the league in 15 years.

Part of the reason for this inertia is that while the world can change rapidly in a decade and a

half, countries take much longer to substantially change directions. African countries also are

substantially affectedby structural factors that profoundly influence their economic andpolitical

performance. Coastal countries tend to have tremendous advantages, especially compared to the

landlocked countries of the Sahel and Central Africa. Indeed, there is a class of African

countries—which includes Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and

Niger)—that are so burdenedby their extreme climate, relatedproblems of health anddisease,

andpoor geographic position that it is not clear that any economic model offers them a path

towarddevelopment. Civil society groups that pressure for democracy are also not found

uniformly across the continent, but tendto be disproportionately locatedin coastal states where

there were better universities andwhere they have contacts with international society. The civil

society groups that are relatively powerful have already succeeded in their own countries, while

any new pro-democracy civil society adherents will emerge only slowly.

Paradoxically, other countries may be burdened by their seemingly munificent resource

endowment. It is unlikely that the major oil producers (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sao

Tome, Sudan) wouldhave a future significantly different than the ruinous recordof petroleum

producers to date.

The nature of reform past andfuture also affects the possibility for changes in the African

hierarchy. The most dramatic political developments in the last 15 years in Africa have been the

collapse of the neo-patrimonial state andthe advent of multiparty elections (albeit of enormously

varying quality) almost everywhere on the continent. On the economic front, most African
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countries also eliminatedthe most egregious economic imbalances, notably the black market in

foreign currency. What is left are the much harder, less dramatic, but perhaps more substantive

reforms that will inevitably take a great deal of time andwill only yieldprogress slowly. For

instance, African countries must follow-up the dramatic roll-out of multiparty elections with

difficult reforms to strengthen legislatures, the judiciary, and the developing national cultures of

rights. Indeed, strengthening democratic institutions is particularly important in Africa because

there will inevitably be ethnic andother groups that have mobilized, but have lost in elections

andmust be reassuredthat their interests andrights will be protectedeven if they are not in

power. On the economic front, countries face a complex governance agenda where progress is

necessary but inevitably slow anddifficult to manage. Similarly, apartheidneednot be

overcome again; rather, South Africa now faces the more mundane, but exceptionally difficult,

task of increasing its rate of economic growth while redistributing wealth. The focus of South

Africa’s approach—growth or redistribution—may well decide its economic fate. It will be hard

for countries to significantly change their place in the African performance hierarchy while they

are implementing these difficult but necessary reforms.

There are also important “neighborhoodeffects” that some African countries may not be able to

overcome. As is clear from West Africa, conflict in one country can spill over andinfect an

entire region. Similarly, if one of the large countries that tendto dominate Africa’s regions (e.g.,

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria) go badly wrong—or continue to do so, as

in Congo’s case—the small states surrounding them may have limited degrees of freedom in

which to operate. Thus, the efforts of even extremely well-intentionedgovernments towards

governance anddemocratic government may not transfer into dramatic relative changes in

performance because they are stuck in a “bad neighborhood.” On the other hand, Zimbabwe

proves definitively that governments determined to decline can ignore the positive developments

aroundthem.

Finally, emerging from economic decline—the condition of many African countries since the

mid-1980s—is extremely difficult. Ghana began dramatic reforms in the early 1980s but it took

almost 15 years for it to return to the level it was in the early 1960s. Roads, universities,

agricultural extension systems, judiciaries, andmany other institutions are extremely hardto

reconstitute once they have decayedto the parlous state foundin many African countries. Most

importantly, the brain drain from which Africa continues to suffer means that even good leaders

with considerable political skills will have difficulty turning their countries around because they

essentially have to wait to create entire new cohorts of trainedprofessionals to tackle problem

areas.

African countries therefore will react to andbenefit from different global andregional trends in

many different ways; but they will face substantial structural obstacles to changing substantially

their individual political and economic glide paths in what is, by historical standards, a very short

periodof time. This is not to argue that African countries are destinedfor a particular fate

(although the Sahelian countries face monumental obstacles when trying to overcome their

geography); rather it is to note that in Africa, more so than in perhaps any other region, the

choices leaders make are mediated by a series of structural obstacles that can be enormously

frustrating. It is therefore important not to set the bar too high, or to conflate the long-term

nature of the crisis with cynicism about prospects for change.
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Globalization

Perhaps the biggest difference between the NIC’s 2020 report and its predecessor that examined

prospects out to 2015 is that globalization is now viewedas a “megatrend:” “a force so

ubiquitous that it will substantially shape all the other major trends in the world of 2020.” This

conclusion appears to have been driven in large part by the estimate that the international

economy will be roughly 80 percent larger in 15 years, most notably driven by exceptionally

high growth rates in the populous countries of Asia. Africa has been the continent least

positively affectedby globalization to date andthe challenge to take advantage of the positive

trends in the global economy will be substantial.

This is not to say that the positive effects of globalization will have no effect on Africa. Cell

phones have already causeda communications revolution in Africa andthe Internet is spreading

at an extraordinary rate, albeit beginning from a very low base. The now significant diaspora

communities that many African countries have in western nations will continue to increase the

amount of money sent back to Africa. Remittances in many cases will be among the most

important “export” earners for African countries, reflecting both the magnitude of these flows

but also the failure to develop non-traditional exports. Whether remittances from abroad in the

future will go to investment, as opposedto the current pattern of enhancing consumption and

housing, is unclear andwill dependon the governance trajectories of the countries, the extent of

the ties that bindthese diaspora communities over generations, as well as local perceptions of the

long-term investment climate.

African countries will, of course, also be exposed to the downside of globalization. The

ferocious competition that the international economy will foster in the next 15 years will be a

profound challenge to any attempt at African industrialization. Indeed, the bar continues to be

raisedon what is necessary for a government to do in order to foster a competitive international

economy. Governance practices that might have been acceptable in the 1960s when there was

relatively little competition will not be acceptable in the next 15 years. Even Ghana, an

improvedeconomic performer, has not been able to increase its growth rate above four percent

because of long-standing governance problems, including unclear land tenure that has led to

unending disputes about property rights in the rural areas and a judiciary whose ability to enforce

contracts is questionable.

Corruption will pose a particular challenge to African countries. Some countries will notably

benefit from the increasing official international allergy to corruption. However, those countries

that do not have particular good governance practices will face ever-more temptations from the

international economy that will increasingly include buyers not influenced by national or

international codes of conduct. China, in particular, has not shown much concern with

promoting governance as it expands its economic reach.

Finally, it is also not clear whether the traditional cycle of industrial migration that caused textile

andelectronic firms to move from Japan, to East Asia, to Southeast Asia in search of cheap

workers—as their own work forces became richer—will holdgiven that China andIndia seem to

have essentially an infinite number of low-skill workers. The international economy had
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considerable space for countries to begin export drives in the past, but China and India may now

clog markets for many years to come.

Typology of Globalization: Winners and Losers

Different types of countries will benefit from globalization in different ways. The benefits of

globalization can fall selectively across geographic areas. Cities may benefit because they are

agglomerations of highly-trainedprofessionals but rural areas may be hurt. Similarly, one

country in an area may benefit from being able to access the international economy but this does

not mean the region will benefit. The development of high-speed Internet lines to Accra will not

necessarily have any effect on surfers in Lomé.

South Africa is perhaps unique: It has a substantial technical base, an indigenous business class,

and, probably uniquely amongst African countries, an ability to attract large amounts of talented

individuals from the surrounding region. South African companies are sitting on massive

amounts of capital that, if investedlocally, wouldsignificantly boost growth. South Africa still

has to adopt a myriad of policies to take advantage of the international economy but it has far

more potential than almost any other country on the continent to take advantage of the positive

trends in the international economy. In particular, the social basis for growth largely exists in

South Africa. It is the government that, to date, has yet to commit itself to achieving a high

growth rate andto implementing the necessary redistribution measures within a context of

heightenedparticipation in the international economy.

A secondgroup of countries that will react to globalization in roughly similar ways includes the

oil producers. Global demand for hydrocarbons will be extremely robust in the next 15 years

andthese countries will face the nominally happy chore of disposing of large amounts of export

revenue. However, to date, oil-producers have had very poor development records and much of

the oil revenue that African producers receive has been wasted. In most petroleum producing

countries, the path to wealth for elites is foundin greater access to state-controlledoil revenue

rather than through private sector investment. It is unlikely that the ability of oil producers to

leverage their revenue streams will improve markedly in the next 15 years. Indeed, the

increasing presence of China (which already acquires 25 percent of its oil from Africa) may

actually put a brake on international efforts to promote governance amongst oil producers

because Beijing is so skeptical of any action that interferes with what it views as sovereign

domestic prerogatives.

A thirdgroup of countries are those that will make enough deliberate reforms in governance to

attract international investment, retain trainedmanpower, andtake advantage of new

technological developments. These “better governance” countries are likely to be coastal,

speak English, andalready have a relatively high growth record, although Kenya may be

exceptional in this regard. The current roundof globalization is basedon constantly improving

information technology andtherefore requires relatively large cadres of trainedprofessionals

and, of course, disproportionately benefits this class of people. Ghana demonstrates that Africa

can be a destination for outsourcing and such service jobs will become even more important in

the next few years. How many countries actually join the “high-governance-achieving club” will

dependin goodpart on the social basis for growth in each country. Leaders will have to define

or create a constituency that demands and values high growth and is able to make the necessary
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adjustments in government policy in order to participate in the international economy. It will be

much easier for leaders in coastal countries who have already begun reforms to nurture and

increase this constituency through economic progress tiedto globalization.

Finally, poor governance countries or failed states (those where basic government institutions

have decayed to the point where they cannot make governance decisions) may not be able to

engage the international economy positively because of their poor decisions or because their

geography is so constraining that leadership decisions cannot deflect a downward trajectory. As

a result, negative trends in these countries are likely to be aggravated by globalization. In

particular, highly trainedprofessionals from these countries will findit ever easier to migrate.

Differentiation Within Countries

A final aspect of globalization will be to increase differentiation within many African countries.

Globalization will benefit especially urban areas that can be connectedin real time to the vast

information flows that the international economy will generate andwhere the educatedelite in

each African country will inevitably locate to the urban areas. The rural-urban divide is

therefore likely to be further aggravatedin many countries. In some ways, Africa may return to

an almost colonial model of development where the state and significant economic activity was

foundin the capital but only sporadically elsewhere (“afrique utile” versus “afrique inutile”).

Countries that perform well will be able to push against these trends, but the average African

country may see its rural areas become every more marginalized.

An African Vocabulary for Development?

An important variable over the next 15 years will be if African countries can finally formulate

their own “globalization vocabulary,” which will allow them to successfully tap the opportunities

posedby globalization. Many African leaders have been slow to embrace globalization, even as

they adopt may of the reforms demanded by the international financial institutions, because they

do not know where their economies are heading. Indeed, many African elites, even in the

relatively well-performing countries, have yet to embrace the upside of globalization in ways

commonly foundin East Asia. Few, if any, African leaders tell their fellow citizens that they

must “export or die.” Many African leaders believe that the international economy is still rigged

so that Africans will never prosper. Some accurately perceive a loss of domestic political control

if sources of wealth are hitchedto external forces beyondtheir control.

If African leaders can develop their own vocabularies to explain economic development to their

citizens, the likelihoodof a political consensus developing in favor of growth will be much

higher. If such indigenous perspectives are not adopted, the chances for high growth in most

African countries will be extremely limited. There is a profoundneedto groundglobalization in

local realities.

It is clear that part of the emerging, still inchoate, African perspective on globalization differs

considerably from conventional orthodoxies. The West, and the United States in particular,

places considerable stress on the market forces inherent in globalization, believing (or fearing)

that powerful international markets have compelling political implications. Africans hope that

globalization emerges as a set of international institutions that will promote governance,

especially in the form of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), that will to
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some extent insulate them from the coldwindof the market. Although it is largely ignoredin the

UnitedStates, NEPAD consumes a significant portion of current African discussions on

development and, critically, is a substantial part of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s foreign policies.

It is hardly exceptional for the weak to put their faith in international institutions that they will

influence by fiat, or—as in the case of NEPAD—create outright, rather than in markets that will

be dominated by the strong. There are obviously many obstacles before the peer review

mechanism in NEPAD (the critical part) succeeds; however, Africans are likely to continue to

focus on developing this continental architecture long after the West has given up on it as

another failedprogram.

The African State

Most territorially defined African states will continue to exist formally in 2020. While there may

be boundary changes in Sudan, Somalia, and a few other places, the legal map of Africa will not

change significantly. However, the informal map of power will become more confused. Some

African governments will continue to consolidate administrative capabilities and military might

andwill therefore have substantially more ability to influence their own citizens andneighbors in

the next 15 years. Other countries will continue to lose capabilities, largely because of persistent

revenue crisis and the ability of non-state actors including NGOs, traditional leaders, insurgents,

criminals, andterrorists, to operate in areas where the formal presence of government is limited.

These “archipelago states” may constitute the plurality of all countries in Africa as it will be

relatively common for the capital informally to cede control over parts of their hinterland,

especially since globalization constantly pushes economic activity to the capital, or the few

major urban, agglomerations. A certain number of African states will also essentially be taken

over by the international community. While it is doubtful that any African states will become

long-term trustees of the UnitedNations, international supervision of some failedor failing states

will become more common andaccepted.

Those African countries that fail are unlikely to receive significant assistance from international

peacekeepers. South Africa andother African militaries have only limitedpeacekeeping

capabilities. While international commitment to peacekeeping is likely to increase, it probably

will not keep up with African demand. When foreigners intervene, they are usually best at

reconstituting order in the cities. The rural areas in countries that have been “peacekept” tend to

remain ungovernedfor years. The international community has also foundit easier to intervene

in small countries, for obvious reasons. Large countries that spiral downward are therefore likely

to have especially complicatedmaps of power where vast areas may be formally ungoverned.

A few aspects of state territoriality will “harden” in the next 15 years. It is likely, for instance,

that refugees will findan increasingly hostile reception amongst nominal host governments.

Many African governments have learnedthat conflicts in neighboring countries can drag on for

many years andthat a commitment to house refugees can be a very long-term commitment.

Refugees have also been a cause of destabilization in many areas.

Patterns of Conflict

Africa was the site of much of the military conflict in the worldin the 1990s andthere is no

reason to believe that its share of worldviolence will change appreciably in the next 15 years.
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As in the past, most African conflicts will be internal, although the pattern of outsiders

intervening in civil wars, either to help one of the protagonists or to protect themselves from the

fallout of the conflict, will continue. African governments andrebels will continue to take

advantage of the international market for basic weapons and, increasingly, logistics and higherorder military functions such as aerial reconnaissance.

Most African countries will not be able significantly to increase the prowess of their security

forces, in goodpart because of continuedlow economic growth andthe paucity of foreign

military assistance. The impact of HIV-AIDS on militaries may also constitute a destabilizing

force. Indeed it is likely that formal militaries in many countries will undergo further significant

atrophy, occasionally to be replacedoutright by informal militias that are recruited

opportunistically by leaders when there is a threat. Such armed civilians will inevitably

destabilize their own countries and be an enormous threat to their fellow citizens. However, a

few African countries that already have capable military forces (e.g., Angola) will be able to

continue to increase the prowess and, perhaps, the size of their armed forces, encouraged, in part,

by the departure from African of some traditional powers.

Terrorism

Given that significant portions of Africa—those areas outside the nations’ capitals—will

essentially be ungoverned, there will be many opportunities for terrorist groups that threaten the

West to seek haven across the continent. However, it is unlikely that Africa will become much

of a supplier of international terrorists because of the profounddifferences between the Islam

practicedin Africa andthat in the Middle East. Nor will terrorist groups findsupportive

governments in Africa akin to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, those terrorists

groups seeking sanctuary for their fugitive principals or who want to hide dangerous weapons

may findthe distant regions of some African countries inviting precisely because they are

unlikely to be interruptedby government. The ability of terrorists to use Africa as safehaven

only naturally increases the probability that these armedgroups will seek to attack soft Western

andIsraeli targets on the continent. The likelihoodof foreign terrorist groups operating in Africa

is reduced, however, by the relative absence of effective communication links with the outside

world, essential to international terrorist operations, and by the threat that these foreign groups

wouldbecome miredin domestic conflicts.

Indeed, an overwhelming majority of terrorism in Africa will be caused by indigenous groups

waging war against their own or neighboring governments or against other population groups,

defined by religion or ethnicity. Indeed, most wars in Africa today seldom see armed, uniformed

combatants fighting each other but are much more likely to involve poorly trainedsoldiers or

guerrillas terrorizing local populations. The tendency for those killed in African conflicts to be

women, children, and other civilians is likely to remain or perhaps get worse.

African countries will actively seek the increasing amount of available Western counterterrorism

funding, especially given the threat from international terrorists to their own domestic situations

even if the targets are foreigners. For instance, the attacks in Mombassa on Israeli targets in

2002 undoubtedly hurt Kenya far more than Israel, as international tourism to East Africa was

dealt a stunning blow.
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Everyday Violence

The less understood aspect of violence in Africa is the everyday threats that an increasing

number of citizens face. Africa will continue to become far more dangerous as the supply of

machine guns, rocket-propelledgrenades, andmortars becomes even easier to access. The

increasingly number of unemployedandimpoverishedwill further increase the level of crime

andgeneral insecurity. There is also no reason at present to believe that the police in most

African countries will become more adept, especially given the funding crisis that most African

countries will face. However, states with high levels of violence will not automatically be failed

states; indeed, the ability of African countries to continue to muddle along despite high levels of

violence should not be underestimated. For instance, 20,000 people have been killed in Nigeria

while that country has maintained its democratic façade. Thousands have also died in Congo

during the periodwhen all formal fighting was supposedto have ended.

The NIC 2020 report argues that pervasive insecurity will occur across large parts of the worldas

economic andpolitical processes upset traditional practices. Insecurity will be very high in

Africa, although it is more likely to stem from political conflict andcrime rather than economic

change, which has the potential for a significant upside.

Democracy in Africa

Most countries in Africa will continue to holdmultiparty elections on a regular basis, although

these elections will continue to vary considerably in quality. Almost all countries across the

continent will continue to proclaim a public adherence to democracy and no other form of

government will significantly challenge the nominal allegiance to regular elections. The media

will continue, in most countries, to reflect a variety of viewpoints. The continuedliberalization

of radio and television will produce a cacophonous stream of African political views. The impact

on domestic politics of this liberalization is difficult to assess, although it can be expected to

produce more visibly contentious processes of government, particularly given greater vitality in

the NGO sector. NGOs are increasingly the loyal opposition in the African polity given weak

institutions andimmature methods of parliamentary practice.

Typology of Democratic Achievement

However, commitment to democracy in Africa will remain a “mile wide and inch thick.”

Therefore, the critical determinants of democratic success will be the social coalition that

actually is actively in favor of democracy. The democratic consolidators will make significant

gains in improving their democratic performance. Indeed, multiparty elections will become

institutionalizedin these countries andthey will improve the operations of their parliaments,

courts, andother institutions. By 2020, for this set of African countries, any turnback from

democracy will be almost inconceivable.

It is likely that the countries making the most progress on democracy are the ones that have

already had free and fair elections. Democratic consolidations will, on average, be in the coastal

countries, where relatively strong civil societies are committedto democracy andhave already

spent a decade or more (as was the case in both Ghana and Kenya) pushing authoritarian rulers

aside. The “plateauing” of African states—that is, the difficulty states confront in changing their

relative democratic performance over the next 15 years—is due largely to structural factors that

determine the size of the urban-based elite demanding democratization. In most countries, this
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elite has now exercisedwhatever power that it can. As a result, there are unlikely to be too many

democratic surprises over the next 15 years.

The advantage of coastal countries that have elements of civil society committed to

democratization can be seen when comparing Kenya with Uganda. Although Uganda stabilized

in the late 1980s andhas hadexcellent economic performance for the past 15 years, it has lagged

on democratic performance and is one of the few African countries where there is still an

argument about the benefits of multiparty democracy. Kenya experienced authoritarian rule for a

much longer periodof time but, once the oldrulers were finally removedfrom office, has made

democratic progress at a relatively higher rate.

Another set of approximately 15 to 20 countries will continue to be democratic aspirers. Most

will continue to have multiparty elections, but the quality will vary andcitizens will continue to

believe that there is a significant possibility that their democratic system or certain basic

institutions face the real danger of collapse. Finally, about twenty states—roughly the same

number as today—will experience authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule. These countries

may have regularly scheduled multiparty elections but the outcome of those votes will not be in

doubt. Also includedin this category will be the increasednumber of failedstates in Africa that

will not have even the mechanisms for voting in place.

There will probably be considerable movement between the last two categories of countries that

aspire to democracy and those that have essentially authoritarian rule. Indeed, given that

multiparty elections will continue throughout the continent, there will be relatively few old-style

authoritarian states that do not hold elections at all.

The forms of democracy that African countries adopt or aspire to will not be substantially

different from the current variety of western practices. There is, of course, considerable diversity

in Western democratic practices (compare Switzerlandto the UnitedKingdom) andAfrican

countries will adopt a similar variety of practices. However, there will not be a palpable form of

“African democracy” that is adopted commonly across the continent.

Indeed, it is federalism—a particular form of Western democracy—that is increasingly being

adopted across Africa. Whether federalism is a comprehensive, or even appropriate, answer to

Africa’s problems remains unclear. Federalism is more likely to succeed if the impetus for

conflict is ethnic division that has a strong geographic component. As Africa’s ethnic

communities still have a territorial basis, federalism may well work to devolve the locus of

resource disputes from the center to the periphery. In contrast, if African conflicts are more

centeredon religion, it will be far more difficult for federalism to be effective because religious

identity is less likely to be geographically defined. Indeed, religious identity is changing quickly

in Africa and will therefore thwart many efforts to draw boundaries around defined communities

of believers. The success of federal attempts will depend, too, on the ability and willingness of

central governments to permit funding of regional, alternative centers of power and authority.

AIDS

The AIDS trendin Africa will obviously dependon technological developments, especially the

production of a vaccine. However, even if with relatively optimistic assumptions about a
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vaccine andthe roll-out of anti-retrovirals (ARVs), it is clear that there will be very large

increases in the number of people who will die in the next ten years. The rates of infection in

Southern Africa are remarkable because no one ten years ago hadpredictedthat 35 percent of the

adult population (about the levels in SwazilandandBotswana) couldactually be infected. In

other parts of Africa, rates are much lower. In particular, much of West Africa has yet to see the

disease breakout beyond the 5 to 7 percent infection rate. Why this is so is unclear, but there

appears to be an inverse relationship between infection rates andthe percent of the population

that is Muslim.

Progress will undoubtedly continue in the development and provision of relatively inexpensive

ARV’s. However, it is less clear that African countries have the medical systems to deliver the

medicines effectively, nor, in some cases, the political will to roll these out. African countries

currently do not provide formal medical care to a substantial portion—sometimes a majority—of

their populations. Ramping up to a high level of ARV provision andmonitoring will present

such a substantial challenge that few African countries will be able to meet it in the near term.

Moreover, improper distribution of antiretrovirals may prompt the mutation of even more

virulent forms of the virus.

For years, the impact of AIDS on political andeconomic systems has been a source of immense

speculation. Since AIDS tends to strike the working populations and the relatively affluent, as

opposed to many diseases that afflict the old, the infirm, and the poor, it has the potential to deal

a devastating blow to precisely the parts of the workforce where African countries are the

weakest. Indeed, the figures regarding AIDS prevalence within important institutions are already

shocking: some militaries are reporting that one-thirdof their soldiers are infected, with even

higher rates among combat units.

However, it is not at all clear if AIDS can be directly tied to state collapse in the way that was

feareda few years ago. The militaries that have high levels of infectedsoldiers largely work

aroundthe virus by releasing those who actually become sick andrecruiting others. The virus

also affects rebel groups and other challengers to the state; indeed, the virus may affect those

who threaten the state more because they are less likely to have access to medicines. More

generally, connecting the dots between AIDS prevalence andactual political andeconomic

outcomes is extremely difficult. There is no doubt that having a significant percent of the most

capable people die has economic costs and is a political burden. However, the prevalence of

AIDS is highest in Southern Africa but this is also the region that has performed, overall, the best

in Africa. Zimbabwe andAngola, the two poor performers in Southern Africa, can tie their poor

governance records directly to the decisions made by their governments rather than damage

causedby the virus.

New “Influentials”

The implications of the rise of India and China was another major emphasis in the NIC 2020

report. China already has a significant impact on Africa as it searches for secure sources of raw

materials. This has had the salutary effect of raising some basic commodity prices. China does

not have clear political interests in Africa beyondwaging its continual war against diplomatic

recognition of Taiwan. To date, African leaders have responded to China’s interest in Africa

positively, seeing it as an alternative source of investment andcountervailing force to Western
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interests andinfluence, a perception heightenedby the Chinese practice of offering ‘gifts.’ Over

time, however, African states may begin to realize that China’s interest is motivatedless by

altruism than by hard-nosedbusiness concerns. Tensions may be exacerbatedby the flooding of

African markets by cheap Chinese goods, with a consequent effect on weak domestic

manufacturing bases, andby the presence of larger numbers of Chinese workers in Africa.

Over the next 15 years, there is probably a greater possibility of India developing a distinct

foreign policy with political interests toward Africa. India has the relative advantage of

geography and of speaking English. India also has a strategic interest in the Indian Ocean.

Indeed, it is more likely that India will have a foreign policy toward the Indian Ocean littoral

than to Africa in general, as evidenced by the development of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South

Africa) forum.

At the same time, some of the traditional powers that have engaged Africa are likely to leave the

scene gradually. The generation of French leaders who saw their country’s destiny intertwined

with Africa has now retiredandtheir successors see their future in Asia andCentral Europe. The

United Kingdom has been progressively disengaging since independence, even though it will

continue to influence the policies of international institutions towardAfrica.

As politics abhors a vacuum, other powers will findAfrica an inviting arena. Iran, Egypt, other

middle range powers may find it relatively easy to maneuver in Africa. However, it is likely

that, overall, there will be less foreign involvement in African affairs, leaving more room for

African powers and domestic agents to influence individual countries and the paths of conflict.

Religious Conflict

The NIC 2020 report notes the rise of identity politics everywhere and that communal conflict

will become increasingly important as NGOs andothers vie for attention. Africa has

experiencedsome religious conflict to date, especially in Nigeria, but one of the great

unansweredquestions is how much more violence religious diversity will promote. Africa is at

the center of many proselytizing efforts worldwide: the Catholic Church has made Africa a

priority while Pentecostal andEvangelical Christian movements spendmillions of dollars on

recruiting large numbers of Africans. Iran has also devoted substantial efforts to fostering its

religious andpolitical views in Africa. Finally, Saudi Arabia has spent large amounts of money

to export its exclusionary Wahhabi tradition.

The state system in Africa is unlikely to divide into Muslim versus non-Muslim states, not least

because of the split personality of many African states in this respect. North African states will

continue to identify much more with the Middle East and will probably not have active foreign

policies towardAfrica. The interior African states, composedoverwhelmingly of Muslims, are

unlikely to pose any threat to their neighbors. It is highly unlikely, no matter other domestic

developments, that Nigeria will develop a distinct identity as a Muslim state, although religious

conflict centeredaroundIslam within Nigeria is likely to continue.

On the other hand, the states with significant Muslim populations on the East Coast of Africa

(e.g., Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti) may be drawn into the conflict/terror networks emerging out of
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the Arabian Gulf. There are deep historical links between East Africa and the Gulf and continual

traffic in people, including, possibly, principals in terror networks.

Rather than explicit conflict fueledby religious extremism, it is likely that the most important

relatedtrendin Africa affecting the UnitedStates is the further development of pockets of radical

Islam that are hostile to the West andthat actively provide support andsanctuary to international

terrorists. Radical Islam will find explicit support amongst a small but increasing number of

state officials, as is the case in Northern Nigeria today. More common will be the adherents of

radical Islam who find friendly communities grateful for material support from Iran and/or Saudi

Arabia, andwho can operate with relatively little fear of government detection.

Upside Surprises

While all are low probability, a variety of issues might cause our analysis to be incorrect in

certain areas and, more generally, not optimistic enough. Certainly, if hydrocarbon

management were improvedacross the continent, Africa’s future in 2020 wouldlook distinctly

more positive. If Angola, Nigeria, andSudan—three of Africa’s largest andmost important

countries—actually began to use their revenues from oil in productive ways, these states would

become stronger, tens of millions of Africans wouldbenefit from reducedpoverty, andthe

impact on the region might be significant. Better hydrocarbon management might come about

because of international pressure to promote the transparency of resource flows, aided by

domestic constituencies who have grown tiredof the fraudassociatedwith wasting assets.

Similarly, if agriculture were to show productivity gains in a significant number of countries,

there wouldbe a general boost in growth, but also a change in the urban-rural terms of trade that

we portray above as generally favoring the cities. African agriculture couldbecome more

productive if it was the beneficiary of the kind of scientific advances that helped Asian

agriculture in the 1960s and1970s. Africa currently has the lowest level of inputs andthe lowest

yields compared to genetic potential of any region on earth. Thus, in many areas where there is

substantial “low-hanging fruit” relatively small amounts of investment couldleadto significant

productivity advances. Of course, the same genetic modification technology that might help

African agriculture couldpotentially hurt the comparative advantage of other African countries.

For instance, genetic advances that allowedother countries elsewhere in the worldto grow high

quality tropical beverages (cocoa, tea, coffee) wouldhurt many African countries.

Technological developments that allowed Africa to fight AIDS, malaria, and other infectious

diseases in an appropriate manner wouldalso be extremely significant andwouldprobably

deflect upwardthe political andeconomic trajectory of some countries. It is unfortunate to note

that, primarily because of AIDS andever-more-resistant mosquitoes, Africa has become a far

more unhealthy place than it was 15 years ago. Technological developments in the next 15 years

that allow the continent to regain this lost groundwouldbe vitally important (andprobably

surprising) but wouldonly return the region to where it was in the early 1980s.

Another upside surprise that wouldbe of great significance wouldbe the development of

regional and internal peacekeeping doctrine and capabilities that wouldallow for more

timely interventions in African conflicts andmore decisive resolutions to the wars. Currently,
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peacekeeping efforts in Africa face a variety of problems, from getting rebels to the table, to

supplying the correct number of peacekeepers armedin ways that they can actually project force,

to finding mediators who are actually willing to call an end to negotiations if progress is not

being made. If the necessary continental or international architecture were to be developed so

that war couldbe addressedmore forthrightly, our projections for Africa wouldimprove

considerably. Similarly, if more effective practices of international assistance in developing

local police forces could be found, domestic stability and security may improve, a critical

precursor to greater investment andgrowth.

Finally, positive developments in the management of international debt might be helpful to

Africa. The prospects for increasedlevels of investment, both private andpublic, will be

affected by how the continuing high levels of international indebtedness are addressed over the

periodof our projection. There now seems to be a clear consensus that repayment of

international debt is not consistent with maintaining adequate levels of economic growth and the

international community is exploring different ways to achieve the needed debt relief.

Accomplishing this is a necessary, but likely not a sufficient condition, for private sector

investment in most countries (apart from the mineral sector), while the public sector resources

liberatedby debt relief are in many cases targetedtowardhealth andeducation, among other

areas, by the international organizations organizing andpromoting debt relief efforts.

Downside Risks

Other potential developments might accelerate decline in Africa and reduce even our limited

optimism. The most important wouldbe the outright collapse of Nigeria. While currently

Nigeria’s leaders are locked in a bad marriage that all dislike but dare not leave, there are

possibilities that coulddisrupt the precarious equilibrium in Abuja. The most important would

be a junior officer coup that coulddestabilize the country to the extent that open warfare breaks

out in many places in a sustainedmanner. If Nigeria were to become a failedstate, it coulddrag

down a large part of the West African region. Even state failure in small countries such as

Liberia has the effect of destabilizing entire neighborhoods. If millions were to flee a collapsed

Nigeria, the surrounding countries, up to andincluding Ghana, wouldbe destabilized. Further, a

failedNigeria probably couldnot be reconstitutedfor many years—if ever—andnot without

massive international assistance.

While many other downside risks are imaginable given the precarious state of most African

countries, the possibility of some type of ecological downturn shouldbe noted. Such a large

portion of Africa hovers just above poverty and is still so dependent on the land that the

continent is still especially vulnerable to changes in climate or the outbreak of new diseases.

There is also the possibility for conflict over water among the ten riparian states that comprise

the Nile Basin. The relationship between Ethiopia andEgypt has been tense for years because of

water and, if not handled carefully, this issue has the potential to be the next big conflict in

Africa.
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Conclusion

Perhaps the central message of this report is that in an age of globalization, local factors will

determine Africa’s fate. Geography, decisions by governments past and present, the presence of

trainedprofessionals, the strength of civil society groups promoting democracy, andthe

capabilities of the local police andsecurity forces all have the potential to decisively affect the

performance of individual African countries in the next 15 years. Such forces are not determined

by international markets in the first instance, although the reaction of global forces to local

developments in any of these areas must be considered. As none of these basic aspects of the

political system can be changedeasily, if at all, in as short as 15 years, the most likely prediction

is that the current hierarchy of African performers will continue, albeit distributed across an ever

broader spectrum. Globalization may be the “megatrend” of the 21st century but Africa’s

destiny still is to be determined by African circumstances.