Department of Homeland Security
 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance 

Its Support and Information Sharing 

With Fusion Centers 

OIG-12-10 November 2011
 
November 16, 2011 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 

Fusion Center Characteristics Vary .........................................................................2
 

Past and Current Efforts To Provide
 

Coordinated Support to Fusion Centers ..............................................................6
 

Results of Review ..............................................................................................................14
 

DHS’ Efforts To Strengthen Its Support to the
 

National Network of Fusion Centers.................................................................14
 

Recommendations..................................................................................................20
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................21
 

Efforts To Develop a Department-wide Fusion Center 


Support Strategy Are Ongoing, but Improvements Are Needed ......................22
 

Recommendations..................................................................................................31
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................32
 

Opportunities Exist To Improve Intelligence Officer Deployments ......................33
 

Recommendations..................................................................................................36
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................36
 

Conclusion .........................................................................................................................37
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................39
 

Appendix B: Recommendations................................................................................41
 

Appendix C: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................42
 

Appendix D: DHS Funding Sources for Fusion Centers...........................................47
 

Appendix E: Examples of Fusion Center Activities .................................................49
 

Appendix F: Major Contributors to this Report........................................................52
 

Appendix G: Report Distribution ..............................................................................53
 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 


COC Critical Operational Capabilities 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 


DOJ Department of Justice 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 


FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCIU Fusion Center Integration Unit 

HSDN Homeland Secure Data Network 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IO Intelligence Officer 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SLPO State and Local Program Office 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USCG U.S. Coast Guard 
 

 

OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates activities 

to improve information sharing efforts among federal, state, local, and 

tribal government agencies and the private sector as required by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. To promote greater 

information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, and local 

intelligence and law enforcement entities, state and local authorities 

established fusion centers throughout the country. A fusion center is 

a collaboration of two or more agencies to receive, gather, analyze, 

and disseminate information intending to detect, prevent, investigate, 

and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. DHS’ Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), through its State and Local Program 

Office, is responsible for coordinating federal support to fusion 

centers. 

In July 2009, I&A recognized DHS’ inability to institute a 

coordinated department-wide approach to support and interact with 

the National Network of Fusion Centers. In response to this 

shortcoming, DHS’ Secretary recommitted departmental support to 

fusion centers. 

We assessed DHS’ efforts to coordinate and enhance its support to 

fusion centers as part of our Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Performance 

Plan. Specifically, we reviewed whether: (1) the State and Local 

Program Office satisfies the intent of DHS’ recommitment to the State, 

Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative; (2) planned State and 

Local Program Office efforts will ensure coordinated support of DHS 

and its components to provide needed information and resources to 

fusion centers; and (3) any functional or organizational challenges 

exist within DHS that hinder its successful support to fusion centers. 

Since July 2009, the State and Local Program Office has increased 

field support to fusion centers, worked to improve fusion center 

capabilities, and engaged DHS components. Efforts to develop a 

department-wide fusion center support strategy are ongoing, but 

improvements are needed to enhance I&A field deployments and 

DHS component support. We are making seven recommendations to 

assist the State and Local Program Office in improving DHS’ support 

to fusion centers; I&A concurred with all recommendations. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 1 
Background 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, established and charged DHS 

with coordinating activities and improving information sharing efforts among 

federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies and the private sector.1 

Information sharing has become a primary means to detect, identify, and assess 

terrorist threats and vulnerabilities to our Nation. To promote greater information 

sharing and collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence and law 

enforcement entities, state and local authorities established fusion centers throughout 

the country. The term “fusion” refers to the overarching process of managing the 

flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and 

private industry, and through analysis, provides meaningful intelligence. 

Fusion Center Characteristics Vary 

A fusion center is “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 

provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of 

maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to 

criminal and terrorism activity.”2 Fusion centers are owned and operated 

by state and local jurisdictions, and vary widely across the Nation in 

staffing and facility size, mission focus, partnerships, and funding sources. 

Fusion Center Designation 

Many states have multiple entities capable of interfacing with 

federal agencies and sharing intelligence information. In November 

2007, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General 

sent a letter to Governors requesting that Governors “designate a 

single fusion center to serve as the statewide or regional hub to 

interface with the federal government and through which to 

coordinate the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of 

terrorism, law enforcement, and homeland security information in 

an all crimes approach.” In this letter, the Secretary and Attorney 

General encouraged Governors to develop an information sharing 

strategy that includes any major urban area fusion centers. To 

allocate resources effectively and efficiently, the federal 

government recognizes three categories of state and local 

information sharing entities: primary fusion centers, recognized 

fusion centers, and nodes. As of April 2011, there were 50 

designated fusion centers. Many states have one center, but others 

have additional centers in various urban areas. DHS considers 22 

1

 Public Law 107-296 (November 25, 2002). 


2

 DHS and the Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 


Intelligence in a New Era, August 2006, p. 2. 


DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 2 
of these additional urban area fusion centers as recognized centers. 

Recognized centers serve as information hubs to a state’s 

designated center. These 72 state-designated and major urban area 

fusion centers are known as the National Network of Fusion 

Centers. 

In addition, there are an unknown number of nodes, which are 

intelligence centers that serve similar state and local law 

enforcement, emergency management, and homeland security 

stakeholder functions. Some of these nodes have mature operations 

and strong local support. These nodes play an integral role in their 

state’s homeland security structure and maintain mutually beneficial 

partnerships with DHS and other federal departments and agencies. 

Staffing and Facility Size 

Fusion center staff range in size from four members to more than 

100. According to a 2010 Government Accountability Office 

report, approximately 25% of responding fusion centers had fewer 

than ten people, while slightly more than 25% had more than 50.3 

Some staff at smaller fusion centers fulfill multiple roles, while 

other centers have divisions of staff dedicated solely to information 

and intelligence analysis. In terms of facilities, some fusion centers 

are stand-alone buildings, some occupy multiple building floors, 

and others are single rooms colocated with homeland security or 

emergency management operations. 

Mission Focus 

Fusion centers were established to receive, analyze, gather, and 

share threat-related information. The state, local, tribal, and 

territorial governmental entities that own or are considering 

operating a fusion center define the mission focus and scope of 

activities differently. A fusion center’s mission depends on the 

environment in which it operates. Some fusion centers have 

adopted an “all-crimes” approach, whereas others have also 

included an “all-hazards” approach. Therefore, fusion center 

missions can include: counterterrorism; criminal analysis and case 

support; emergency management; and critical infrastructure 

identification, assessment, and protection. 

3 Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better 

Measure Results, GAO-10-972, September 2010. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 3 
Partnerships 

Fusion centers are primarily staffed by state and local personnel. 

They may include sworn law enforcement officers and civilian 

personnel from police and sheriff’s departments, as well as 

employees from fire service, emergency management, criminal 

justice, and public health departments and agencies. 

To promote greater information sharing and collaboration among 

federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement entities, 

DHS’ I&A has committed funding and resources for its presence at 

all fusion centers. Some fusion centers have representatives from 

other DHS components, including but not limited to U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG). 

In addition, some fusion centers have Department of Justice (DOJ) 

personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and work 

with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office. Several fusion centers are also colocated with High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Investigative Support Centers, the 

FBI’s Field Intelligence Groups, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces.4 

These task forces operate in approximately 104 cities nationwide 

and are composed of highly trained, locally based investigators, 

analysts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement 

and intelligence agencies. This multiple-agency effort is led by 

DOJ and the FBI, and is designed to promote regional information 

sharing to combat terrorism by combining federal, state, and local 

law enforcement resources. Fusion centers forward information 

that appears to have a terrorism nexus to their local Joint Terrorism 

Task Force. 

Funding Sources 

Fusion center funding comes from a variety of sources. For 

example, some fusion center budgets are provided directly from 

state and local law enforcement and homeland security entities, 

while other centers receive state and local grants. States can apply 

for DHS funding to enhance fusion center capabilities through the 

4

 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Investigative Support Centers are sponsored by the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy and aim to support the disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking and 

money-laundering organizations through the prevention or mitigation of associated criminal activity. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 4 
department’s Homeland Security Grant Program.5 DHS awards 

these grants to states to enhance the ability of state, territorial, 

tribal, and local governments to prepare for, prevent, respond to, 

and recover from potential terrorist attacks and other hazards. This 

grant program consists of five sub-programs: the State Homeland 

Security Program; the Urban Areas Security Initiative; Operation 

Stonegarden; the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program; 

and the Citizen Corps Program. However, Operation Stonegarden 

does not support fusion centers. Appendix D describes these DHS 

grant programs in detail. 

In FY 2010, more than $1.7 billion was made available to states 

under the Homeland Security Grant Program. Although fusion 

centers are often part of a state homeland security structure, states 

are not required to provide DHS grant funds to fusion centers unless 

the states specifically apply for fusion center-related projects. In 

addition, until FY 2011, DHS grant guidance language did not 

require specific investment justifications for fusion centers. As a 

result, it is difficult to determine the amount of DHS grant funding 

actually used to support fusion center activities and operations. 

In addition to the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Buffer 

Zone Protection Program is a critical infrastructure protection grant 

that made $48 million available in FY 2010.6

 This program aims to 

increase a jurisdiction’s ability to ensure the safety of communities 

surrounding predetermined nationally significant critical 

infrastructure and key resources. Critical infrastructure are assets, 

systems, and networks, both physical or virtual, which are so vital to 

the United States that incapacitation or destruction would debilitate 

security, national economic security, and public health or safety. Key 

resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to 

the minimal operations of the economy and government. Fusion 

centers with critical infrastructure protection or incident response 

functions have benefited from this grant program in the past. 

Fusion centers also leverage funding from other federal departments 

and agencies. For example, DOJ makes funding available through 

its Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and through 

assistance from the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Funding and 

assistance is also available from the Department of Health and 

Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

5 Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit, U.S. Department of 


Homeland Security, December 2009. 


6 Fiscal Year 2010 Buffer Zone Protection Program Guidance and Application Kit, U.S. Department of 


Homeland Security, December 2009. 


DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 5 
Past and Current Efforts To Provide Coordinated Support to 

Fusion Centers 

In June 2006, DHS designated I&A as its Executive Agent for fusion center 

program management and issued the DHS Support Implementation Plan for 

State & Local Fusion Centers. In 2007, through the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Congress 

acknowledged I&A’s primary responsibility and efforts to share information 

with state, local, and regional officials, but stressed the need to play a 

stronger, more constructive role to provide the maximum amount of 

support for fusion centers.7 Section 511 of this act specified DHS’ 

requirements to support fusion centers. 

I&A performed this role through its State and Local Program Office 

(SLPO). The office focused on managing and deploying I&A Intelligence 

Officers (IOs) to fusion centers and the centers’ access to the Homeland 

Secure Data Network (HSDN).8

 In addition, SLPO hosted state and local 

representatives at I&A and maintained liaison relationships with state and 

local law enforcement to enhance understanding of DHS’ missions, 

capabilities, and role in the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

In response to the department’s efforts to support fusion centers and the 

National Network, the Government Accountability Office, the 

Congressional Research Service, and our office produced reports 

recommending improvements to internal DHS coordination, aligning 

fusion center activities and funding with the department’s mission, and 

deploying personnel to state and major urban area fusion centers in a timely 

9 manner.

In July 2009, Secretary Napolitano approved a request by I&A for the 

Department to recommit to a DHS State and Local Fusion Center Initiative. 

The request recognized DHS’ previous inability to institute a wellcoordinated, department-wide approach to support and interact with fusion 

centers, resulting in a disjointed and ad hoc approach to support and 

interaction. 

7 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Conference Report to Accompany 

H.R. 1, Report No. 110-259, p. 308. 
 8

 HSDN contains Secret-level classified information and serves as an information sharing platform for DHS. 


It is also able to facilitate secure video teleconferences. 


9 Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and 

Local Information Fusion Centers, Government Accountability Office-08-35, October 2007; Fusion 

Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 6, 

2007; and DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers is Evolving, OIG-09-12, December 2008, 

respectively. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 6 
At the time of the recommitment, SLPO had two ways of supporting fusion 

centers: field deployments and headquarters support. In the field, 

deployed IOs and Regional Directors focus on developing and advancing 

fusion center capabilities. IOs are assigned to a fusion center and serve as 

the main point of contact between the center and DHS. Regional Directors 

supervise IOs located at fusion centers within their respective regions. 

Figure 1 shows the 72 fusion centers and SLPO’s field presence as of April 

2011. At headquarters, SLPO support includes providing guidance, 

coordinating with other federal departments and agencies and DHS 

components, and sharing federally generated information with the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. 

Figure 1: State and Local Program Office Fusion Center Deployments as of April 2011 

Source: OIG Analysis 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 7 
State and Local Program Office Restructuring Efforts 

In October 2009, I&A’s Principal Deputy Under Secretary began 

leading a Senior Executive Service Fusion Center Advisory Group 

in meetings that include leaders from all DHS components. Group 

discussions concern how the Department could improve its support 

to fusion centers. Also, on December 7, 2009, Secretary Napolitano 

tasked the Chief Intelligence Officer to determine the feasibility and 

resource requirements necessary to lead the department-wide 

recommitment to more coordinated and effective support. Using 

the Senior Executive Service Fusion Center Advisory Group 

meetings, the I&A Principal Deputy Under Secretary and the SLPO 

worked to complete the study. 

On February 22, 2010, I&A submitted the study results to Secretary 

Napolitano, and recommended new functions to address the prior 

inability to coordinate across DHS components. I&A would aim to 

provide “One DHS” support to fusion centers, and build on and use 

SLPO and other DHS component resources.10 In addition to 

providing support for deployed IOs, new mission areas would 

include assisting fusion centers with the following: 

• Personnel and physical security 

• Training and technical assistance 

• Sustainment and technology 

• Fusion center management and governance 

• Privacy and civil rights/civil liberties 

• Strategic communications and outreach 

• Analysis production and dissemination 

As other federal departments and agencies are required to support 

the National Network of Fusion Centers, the White House issued 

guidance in July 2009 that directed DHS to help identify an office 

to coordinate federal efforts to support fusion centers.11 The 

guidance also directed both DHS and DOJ to develop a permanent 

and recurring capabilities assessment process that would identify 

any gaps and the resources needed to make the National Network of 

Fusion Centers sustainable. In addition, on December 17, 2009, the 

White House tasked DHS as the lead in establishing a multiagency 

office to coordinate all federal support for the growing network of 

10 “One DHS” is the concept of a strong, efficient Department that focuses on the common mission and 


responsibilities that tie the components together within the DHS organization. 


11 White House Memorandum, “FY 2011 Programmatic Guidance for Information Sharing Environment,” 


issued on July 28, 2009, Tab A, “FY 2011 Information Sharing Environment Programmatic Guidance.” 


DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 8 
state and major urban area fusion centers. I&A completed the 

implementation plans for this multiagency office in June 2010. 

The restructured SLPO, as shown in figure 2, now incorporates 

elements of both DHS’ recommitment and the White House 

guidance. Its mission is to “strengthen information sharing and 

fusion centers’ ability to rapidly identify, analyze, and disseminate 

information about homeland security threats by coordinating 

departmental support and providing essential resources required to 

enhance fusion center operations and operate as an integrated 

National Network.”12 

Figure 2: Restructured State and Local Program Office Organization Chart 

Source: OIG Analysis 

As shown in figure 2, SLPO has two divisions: Policy and 

Planning, and Operations. The Policy and Planning Division 

focuses on maintaining fusion center capabilities and coordinating 

interagency federal support to fusion centers, while the Operations 

Division focuses on DHS coordination and support to fusion centers. 

12 SLPO presentation, “Office of Intelligence and Analysis State and Local Program Office: Program 

Overview,” January 2011. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 9 
The SLPO also interacts and collaborates with other departments 

and agencies through the White House-based Information Sharing 

and Access Interagency Policy Committee. For this committee, 

I&A’s Principal Deputy Under Secretary chairs the Fusion Center 

Sub-Committee and SLPO serves as the Executive Secretariat. As a 

result, SLPO coordinates and develops interagency policy for fusion 

centers, develops and manages the Sub-Committee’s work plan, and 

leads staff support efforts. 

Department of Justice Engagement With Fusion Centers 

DHS’ major federal partner in supporting the National Network of 

Fusion Centers is DOJ. FBI field offices and other DOJ agencies 

engage and contribute personnel to fusion centers at varying levels, 

providing liaison and reach-back capability, assigning full-time 

detailed analytical staff, and filling leadership roles at some. The 

FBI field offices coordinate fusion center engagement to ensure that 

its field offices and fusion centers do not duplicate efforts. 

In addition to providing personnel, the FBI supports fusion centers 

by providing “in-kind” contributions, such as having fusion centers 

colocated within FBI buildings or with FBI Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces at no cost to the centers. The FBI also contributes physical 

and technological security infrastructure, including secure rooms 

and T1 lines, to ensure that centers meet FBI space standards and 

requirements.13 

DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency’s National Preparedness Directorate 

collaborate to provide training and resources for fusion centers 

through the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance 

Program. In 2006, these services included assisting fusion centers 

achieve capabilities to receive, gather, analyze, and disseminate 

information; strengthening strategic plans and governance; 

developing concept of operations; protecting privacy and civil 

rights/civil liberties; complying with Criminal Intelligence Systems 

Operating Policies; enhancing administration and management 

practices; and supporting the Fusion Liaison Officer Program.14 

13 A T1 line is a specific type of copper or fiber optic telephone line that can carry more data than traditional 

telephone lines. 

14 A regulation codified at 28 CFR Part 23, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, ensures the 

privacy and constitutional rights of individuals during the collection and exchange of criminal intelligence 

information. It applies to any state or local law enforcement agency that operates a criminal intelligence 

system supported by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 10 
Since 2006, fusion center services have evolved to include 

development services for more mature centers that focus on 

reviewing, refining, and enhancing processes. Additional services 

include providing technology assistance and security; integrating 

and sharing information with fire service and emergency operations 

centers; and facilitating exchange of best practices between fusion 

centers. 

Establishing Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities 

In October 2003, DOJ published the National Criminal Intelligence 

Sharing Plan, which provided direction to fusion centers on ways to 

share criminal intelligence. DOJ and DHS used this plan to 

establish the Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing 

Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Guidelines), which 

were distributed to fusion centers in August 2006. There are 18 

guidelines, each addressing a different element of fusion center 

operation. Overall, the Guidelines seek to improve coordination, 

partnerships, and capabilities among the fusion centers. 

In January 2007, DOJ and DHS met to discuss which of the 

Guidelines were integral to a fusion center’s success. The resulting 

document, called the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 

Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the Fusion Center 

Guidelines (Baseline Capabilities), was presented at the 2008 

National Fusion Center Conference.15 The Baseline Capabilities 

addressed two key areas: the ability to perform the intelligence 

(information fusion) process, and management and administrative 

capabilities. 

In October 2007, the President issued guidance in the National 

Strategy for Information Sharing: Success and Challenges in 

Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, directing the 

federal government to include state and major urban area fusion 

centers as partners in information sharing. This strategy discusses a 

need for the federal government to establish, and, subsequently, for 

fusion centers to maintain, a baseline level of operational capability. 

By developing the Baseline Capabilities, DHS and DOJ have 

worked toward establishing minimum performance requirements 

for fusion centers. 

15 The National Fusion Center Conference, hosted annually by DHS, DOJ, and the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, brings together fusion center directors, homeland security advisors, law enforcement, 

and federal personnel to share best practices, develop partnerships, and discuss center capabilities. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 11 
Source: Critical Operational Capabilities 

In March 2010, fusion center directors worked with federal partners 

from DOJ, DHS, and the Program Manager for the Information 

Sharing Environment to prioritize the capabilities identified in the 

Baseline Capabilities.

16 The 

four prioritized capabilities, 

known as the Critical 

Operational Capabilities 

(COC), were presented at the 

2010 National Fusion Center 

Conference in New Orleans, 

Louisiana. The COCs align 

with the steps of the 

intelligence cycle and the 

fusion process. 

At the conference, fusion 

center and federal partners also 

identified four enabling 

capabilities that contribute to a 

center’s ability to perform the 

COCs. The four enabling 

capabilities relate to (1) privacy 

and civil rights/civil liberty 

protections, (2) a sustainment 

strategy, (3) outreach and 

communication, and 

(4) clearance and security. for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 

Centers Gap Mitigation Strategy, Assessing Fusion Center December 2010 

Capabilities 

From April to September 2010, the Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment, with DHS and DOJ, conducted a 

Baseline Capabilities Assessment to evaluate each center’s ability 

to perform the COCs. The assessment was completed in two parts: 

centers completed a self assessment, and teams of federal, state, and 

local fusion center subject matter experts conducted site visits to 

confirm the survey responses. Fusion centers were given a rating of 

green, yellow, or red in each COC based on the results, with green 

signifying that fusion centers have a plan, policy, or standard 

operating procedure in place to execute the fundamentals of the 

16 The Information Sharing Environment was established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, to facilitate information sharing among all appropriate federal agencies 

and state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 12 
COC. Figure 3 shows the baseline capabilities assessment colorcoded rating scale with corresponding descriptions. 

Figure 3: Baseline Capabilities Assessment Rating Scale 

Source: Short-Term Critical Operational Capabilities Gap Mitigation Strategy 

Progress Report, April 2011 

In September 2010, 28 of the 72 fusion centers had at least a yellow 

rating in all four COCs. By December 2010, 35 centers had 

achieved green ratings for all COCs and 68 had no red ratings. 

Using the assessment results, the fusion center directors and federal 

partners worked together to develop short- and long-term gap 

mitigation strategies as guidance for fusion centers to earn a green 

rating for all COCs. The short-term approach outlined immediate 

actions to help ensure fusion centers are capable of executing the 

COCs during situations involving time-sensitive and emerging 

threat information. Based on the foundation established by the 

short-term approach, the long-term COC gap mitigation activities 

will support fusion center efforts to fully achieve and maintain the 

COCs and privacy and civil rights/civil liberties protections. The 

federal government will also apply lessons learned from the first 

Baseline Capability Assessment to institute a repeatable assessment 

process that measures progress and continued maturity. 

SLPO is DHS’ lead in supporting the National Network of Fusion 

Centers. It provides field and headquarters assistance to the centers, 

coordinates DHS component activities, develops guidance, and 

leads the federal effort to support the fusion centers. We reviewed 

SLPO’s efforts concerning DHS’ recommitment to the National 

Network of Fusion Centers, coordination of DHS and component 

support, and functional or organizational challenges hindering 

effective DHS support to the network. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 13 
Results of Review 

DHS’ Efforts To Strengthen Its Support to the National Network 

of Fusion Centers 

DHS leadership has made supporting the National Network of Fusion 

Centers a priority for the Department, and I&A’s reorganization has 

empowered SLPO to lead the department’s recommitment. Since 2009, 

SLPO has increased field support to fusion centers, worked to enhance 

fusion center capabilities, and engaged DHS components in this 

recommitment. Although SLPO efforts to develop a department-wide 

fusion center support strategy are ongoing, improvements are needed to 

address remaining challenges. 

Supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers Is a 

Priority for DHS Leadership 

In addition to restructuring the SLPO, DHS’ Secretary emphasized 

the department’s recommitted support to the National Network of 

Fusion Centers through congressional testimony, media interviews, 

and remarks at community and 

law enforcement meetings, and to 

the department’s employees. 

On September 10, 2010, the 

Secretary addressed first 

responders at the New York City 

Emergency Operations Center, 

explaining the department’s shift 

to a “hometown-centric” approach. 

By getting departmental 

information, tools, and resources 

to first responders, citizens, community groups, and the private 

sector, DHS can be more effective. The National Network of 

Fusion Centers is crucial to this effort. 

Between February 2009 and March 2011, the Secretary spoke on 

more than 20 occasions concerning the importance of partnerships 

with state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies; the role of fusion 

centers in the homeland security framework; and her vision for the 

department’s support to the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 14 
Reorganization Empowers the State and Local Program Office 

To Support the Department’s Recommitment 

In May 2010 testimony before the House Committee on Homeland 

Security, I&A’s Under Secretary and Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary highlighted the importance of the fusion center initiative, 

and specified how I&A would restructure to support the initiative 

better. As shown in figure 4, in March 2008 SLPO was positioned 

organizationally four levels below I&A’s senior leadership. 

Figure 4: Elevation of SLPO Within I&A 

Source: OIG Analysis 

With the office restructure in November 2010, the Director of 

SLPO now reports directly to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary, 

who has oversight of the department’s overall fusion center 

coordination and support efforts. Stakeholders within and outside 

of DHS agreed that SLPO is appropriately placed within I&A, 

because fusion centers are intelligence organizations, and the main 

DHS representatives in centers are IOs. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 15 
Increased Field Support and Intelligence Officer Deployments 

to Fusion Centers 

As the Executive Agent for the National Network of Fusion 

Centers, SLPO has increased the department’s involvement and 

support to centers. To link fusion centers and DHS, IOs are 

detailed to serve in a liaison capacity and facilitate information 

sharing, communication, cooperation, and collaboration among 

DHS and other governmental partners. IOs are a valuable resource 

to centers because they have experience handling and accessing 

intelligence and information. IOs also assist in achieving 

compliance with the Baseline Capabilities and help develop fusion 

center analysis capabilities. 

Expanding IO fusion center coverage is one of SLPO’s primary 

initiatives. Between FY 2004 and FY 2010, SLPO hired 64 people 

to staff field IO and Regional Director positions. Table 1 shows the 

number of SLPO staff hired by fiscal year. 

Table 1: SLPO Staff Hired FY 2004 to FY 2010 

Fiscal Year Number of Staff Hired 

2004 3 

2005 7 

2006 3 

2007 3 

2008 5 

2009 16 

2010 27 

Source: SLPO 

As of April 2011, 61 IOs and 9 Regional Directors were assigned to 

fusion centers. SLPO plans to deploy a total of 72 IOs and 10 

Regional Directors by the end of FY 2011. 

Intelligence Officers Serve as Liaisons 

IOs complete a 3-week “On-Boarding” orientation program before 

deploying to fusion centers. This training provides participants 

with background information on the department and knowledge of 

its component missions. IOs also conduct outreach with state and 

local stakeholders, such as local law enforcement organizations and 

various working groups. As representatives for both DHS and 

fusion centers, IOs can promote missions and initiatives for both 

groups. For example, an IO can inform local stakeholders and other 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 16 
governmental partners about the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative and the “If You See Something, Say 

SomethingTM” national campaign.17 The Nationwide Suspicious 

Activity Reporting Initiative is an effort to involve state, local, and 

federal partners in identifying, reporting, and analyzing suspicious 

activity reports. As an extension of this initiative, DHS launched 

the If You See Something, Say SomethingTM campaign in July 2010 

to encourage citizens to report suspicious activity. 

Intelligence Officers Provide Expertise and Facilitate Information 

Sharing 

The majority of the IOs we interviewed had more than 10 years of 

experience in the intelligence field; one IO had more than 25 years’ 

experience. IOs can also assist fusion center staff in obtaining 

security clearances. Once fusion center personnel receive security 

clearances, they have the ability to access classified information 

when a legitimate use for such information exists. In FY 2010, 

DHS issued security clearances to 702 fusion center personnel. 

Fusion center staff with appropriate clearances can access Secretlevel information in DHS’ HSDN. In addition to storing Secretlevel information, HSDN can facilitate secure video teleconferences 

with other HSDN-enabled sites. As of April 2011, SLPO reported 

that 45 fusion centers had HSDN access, and it plans to deploy 27 

more HSDN portals by the end of FY 2011. 

State and Local Program Office Provides Training Opportunities 

Fusion center analysts are a key component to establishing centers 

of analytic excellence across the National Network of Fusion 

Centers. As such, their analytical skills need proper development 

through training to help centers succeed. IOs coordinate with SLPO 

to provide various basic training courses, such as Critical Thinking 

and Analytical Methods, Principles of Intelligence Writing and 

Briefing, and Open Source Intelligence Practitioners. Additionally, 

SLPO and the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis 

Center coordinate to deliver the joint Introduction to Risk Analysis 

for Fusion Center Analysts course.18 Despite a decrease in travel 

funding, onsite and computer-based training increased fusion center 

17 This slogan is trademarked by New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 18 The Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center is DHS’ infrastructure-intelligence fusion 

center, incorporating analysts from the Office of Infrastructure Protection and I&A. The center creates 

actionable risk-informed analysis for federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international 

partners. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

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staff access to training. At 9 of the 12 centers we visited, IOs 

arranged or hosted training for fusion center staff. Using DHS 

resources to organize and offer training for centers with limited 

funds can improve centers’ analytic capabilities. 

Training courses offer analysts the opportunity to develop skill sets, 

especially when analysts do not have prior analytic or intelligence 

experience. However, completing select courses does not guarantee 

that analysts nationwide will have the same skill sets. Exhibiting 

analytical excellence requires mastering many skills, from critical 

thinking through report writing. Fusion center staff at five sites 

suggested that DHS select standardized training to enhance 

communication between analysts at centers nationwide. Having all 

analysts complete the same courses could ensure consistency in 

terminology and processes. In addition, fusion center analysts and 

IOs said that analytical training should be offered more frequently. 

One IO explained that there are currently too few offerings for basic 

analytical training, and analysts had to take the three courses over 3 

years because of limited offerings. 

IOs also assist fusion centers in achieving baseline capabilities and 

developing policies that support achieving those capabilities. After 

announcing the COCs and completing the Baseline Capabilities 

Assessment, SLPO asked fusion centers to develop privacy and 

civil rights/civil liberty policies to ensure that citizen rights 

protections are in place. DHS and the Information Sharing 

Environment Privacy Guidelines Committee approve all such 

policies before implementation. 

Efforts To Promote DHS Component and Federal Partner 

Participation 

SLPO leadership has asked appropriate federal departments and 

agencies, and DHS components to assign a full-time employee to 

reside in its headquarters office. By May 2011, three FBI and six 

DHS component staff were assigned to the SLPO full-time. DHS 

component leadership said that they cannot always assign staff to 

support a fusion center full-time because of budgetary and staffing 

limitations. IOs and SLPO coordinate activities and operations with 

fusion centers to assist DHS components and provide expertise. For 

example, the Office of Health Affairs, DHS’ principal authority for 

medical and health issues, detailed a full-time health care liaison to 

SLPO in November 2010 to ensure that public health issues are 

being incorporated into fusion center activities. 

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Another example of SLPO outreach and coordination with DHS 

components, federal partners, and fusion centers is demonstrated 

during the annual National Fusion Center Conferences. These 

conferences are key forums for fusion center representatives to 

receive training, technical assistance, and other support to achieve 

Baseline Capabilities and meet the goals identified in the National 

Strategy for Information Sharing. The conferences support the 

ultimate goal of establishing an integrated National Network of 

Fusion Centers. DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance – Office of 

Justice Programs, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, FBI, 

Community Oriented Policing Services, and Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives sponsored the 

2011 conference. Additional sponsors were the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence and 

Office of the Program Manager – Information 

Sharing Environment, as well as DHS. This was 

the fifth national conference. 

The 2011 conference included speakers from 

seven DHS components and the FBI. Speakers 

also included representatives from fusion centers, 

and an SLPO Fellow detailed from a fusion 

center. The SLPO exhibited its level of 

interaction and coordination with different federal 

departments and agencies, as well as DHS 

components, by organizing and planning this 

conference. At each conference, DHS also 

recognizes a Fusion Center of the Year and a 

Fusion Center Representative of the Year. The 

National Fusion Center Conference has the most 

attendees, but SLPO also hosts regional 

conferences that encourage interaction among 

federal, state, local, and tribal partners. 

SLPO also holds monthly teleconferences with fusion center 

directors and weekly threat teleconferences with fusion center 

analysts to discuss various analytical issues affecting the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. We identified two best practices at 

other meetings. One group’s meetings involved multiple states, 

while another meeting brought together fusion center supporters 

within one state. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

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DHS Component Engagement and Support Varies Because of 

Existing Resources 

DHS components engage fusion centers in varying capacities 

because of existing resources. Although many components with 

field staff consider supporting fusion centers a department-wide 

priority, available resources determine engagement and resources 

support. DHS components must balance primary mission needs 

with other responsibilities. As a result, DHS components support 

fusion centers at various levels, from providing full-time staff 

residing at a fusion center to off-site points of contact who are 

available when needed. Table 2 shows DHS component support to 

fusion centers as reported to Congress in March 2011. 

Table 2: DHS Component Field Support to Fusion Centers 

Component Full-Time Staff Part-Time Staff 

ICE 27 7 

CBP 14 2 

TSA 15 6 

USCG 1 2 

USSS 1 2 

USCIS 2 0 

NPPD 0 1 

Totals 60 20 

Source: SLPO 

As many components with field offices are decentralized and 

generally have their own budgets from which to hire or deploy 

personnel, resources not directly assigned to mission-specific duties 

are limited. Many field staff told us that if funding for fusion center 

support came from I&A rather than from their field office budgets, it 

would allow components to invest resources they currently cannot. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office, 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #1: Establish a plan to expand current analytical 

training opportunities to fusion centers. 

Recommendation #2: Develop a plan that ensures sustainable 

component deployments to the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated DHS’ written comments and have made changes to 

the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of the 

department’s written response to the report recommendations and 

our analysis of the response follows each recommendation. A copy 

of DHS’ response, in its entirety, is included as appendix C. 

In addition, we received technical comments from the Department, 

as well as the FBI, and incorporated these comments into the report 

where appropriate. DHS concurred with all seven recommendations 

in the report. We appreciate the comments and contributions made 

by each entity. 

Management Response to Recommendation #1: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 1. In its response, I&A said the 

that SLPO, in conjunction with the Enterprise and Mission Support 

Directorate and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

National Training and Education Division, is identifying analyst 

training requirements and deploying training courses to address 

these requirements. 

I&A has developed new courses offered through various methods, 

such as deployed training teams, web-based modules, topic-specific 

conferences, workshops, exercises, and seminars. Courses I&A 

offers include the Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course, 

Mid-level Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course, Critical 

Thinking and Analytic Methods, Principles of Intelligence Writing 

and Briefing, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment, Writing for 

Maximum Utility, Open Source Practitioners Course, and the 

Reports Officer Basic Course. In FY 2012, I&A plans to deliver 90 

additional courses, including mobile deliveries in all nine fusion 

center regions. 

Further, I&A has partnered with the Homeland Infrastructure Threat 

and Risk Analysis Center to facilitate additional training 

opportunities and is also sponsoring a workshop to support fusion 

center analysts and enhance analytic expertise across the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s actions responsive to the intent 

of Recommendation 1, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation that supports I&A’s newly developed training 

course offerings. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

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Management Response to Recommendation #2: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 2. In its response, I&A said that it 

will establish and lead a working group composed of DHS 

component personnel to develop a strategy reflecting the 

departmental and I&A’s strategic plan for fusion centers, 

department commitments and ongoing efforts, and future 

engagement plans to support the National Network of Fusion 

Centers. The SLPO conducted the Requirements for Fusion Center 

Survey in spring 2011 to collect data regarding fusion center needs 

for DHS component support and existing DHS resources deployed 

to fusion centers. Components can use this information to develop 

policy and budget recommendations to establish a comprehensive 

fusion center sustainability plan. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the intent of Recommendation 2, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

information that documents a comprehensive fusion center 

sustainability plan. 

Efforts To Develop a Department-wide Fusion Center Support 


Strategy Are Ongoing, but Improvements Are Needed 


In June 2006, the Department released the DHS Support Implementation 

Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers. This plan identified how DHS 

and state and local authorities would benefit from increased DHS 

involvement and support. As of April 2011, the proposed value to DHS in 

supporting the fusion centers has changed little, but the approach to 

supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers has changed greatly. 

Departmental memoranda, policies and strategy, and component integration 

efforts address DHS’ current strategy to provide coordinated and efficient 

support to fusion centers. However, the plan remains the only consolidated 

description of DHS’ strategy to support fusion centers. 

Departmental Memoranda Define Recommitment Efforts 

In July 2009, while serving as the Acting Under Secretary for I&A, 

the current Principal Deputy Under Secretary for I&A recommended 

to DHS’ Secretary that the Department recommit to the fusion 

center initiative. The memorandum, titled Department of 

Homeland Security State and Local Fusion Center Initiative, 

identified milestones that were in line with comments obtained from 

state, local, tribal, and territorial stakeholders. It requested that 

I&A be restructured to serve the needs of the fusion centers better 

by understanding their information needs, streamlining the 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 22 
intelligence dissemination and production process, improving the 

capability of the centers to participate in the intelligence cycle, and 

analyzing locally generated information for threats and trends. 

Other milestones included the following: 

•	 Helping fusion centers achieve and maintain certain baseline 

capabilities; 

•	 Increasing the number of DHS personnel assigned to the 

fusion centers from all components; 

•	 Improving access to classified information through Secretlevel connectivity and clearances; 

•	 Leveraging and integrating DHS’ unclassified but missioncritical networks and databases to support the centers; 

•	 Improving partnerships with other federal agencies; 

•	 Working with the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

and the Privacy Office to ensure that fusion centers 

strengthen their privacy and civil rights/civil liberties 

protections; 

•	 Formalizing partnerships with fusion centers through 


memoranda of understanding; and 


•	 Adopting a One DHS approach when interacting with fusion 

centers by strengthening coordination among components. 

The memorandum described these activities as the minimum 

requirements for the Department to successfully support the centers. 

In addition, the memorandum requested that the Secretary direct 

DHS’ workforce support to the initiative through a communication 

that would be followed by a management directive and eventually a 

plan for implementing a DHS strategy to support the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. 

In December 2009, the Secretary issued a memorandum titled DHS 

Policy for Support to State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. 

This memorandum directed all DHS components to align their 

initiatives, policies, programs, and personnel to support the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. 

DHS leadership’s One DHS approach to supporting fusion centers 

is reflected in a recent communication from the Under Secretary for 

I&A. In a January 2011 memorandum titled Fiscal Year 2013 DHS 

Intelligence Enterprise Programmatic Guidance, the Under 

Secretary instructs all DHS intelligence elements to include 

supporting the development of fusion center capabilities in their 

budgets. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 23 
Policies and Strategy Documents Are Being Developed 

As of April 2011, through federal interagency efforts, SLPO is 

drafting a policy titled Federal Resource Allocation Criteria. This 

draft policy stresses a state’s prerogative to designate fusion 

centers. However, it states that when a fusion center is to 

coordinate the statewide receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of 

threat-related information, it has to demonstrate the ability to 

contribute to the statewide fusion process by meeting baseline 

capabilities. In addition to explaining that states designate fusion 

centers, the policy refers to fusion centers as primary fusion centers, 

recognized fusion centers, and nodes. 

This draft policy describes the federal strategy for engaging fusion 

centers in a way that would promote elevated capability and 

enhance the value and sustainability of the network. It identifies 

what resources federal departments and agencies will make 

available to each designation level and the responsibilities the 

centers have for maintaining certain capabilities at each designation 

level. It also prioritizes federal resources to reinforce success at 

centers that achieve baseline capabilities, and to enable success at 

other centers. For example, primary fusion centers will have a 

“commitment” from the federal government to provide personnel, 

connectivity, and other resources in exchange for maintaining 

baseline capabilities. On the other hand, nodes are encouraged to 

maintain baseline capabilities and are eligible for resources through 

the primary or recognized fusion center. 

At the end of the Baseline Capabilities Assessment, SLPO worked 

with fusion center directors and federal department and interagency 

partners to develop the Critical Operational Capabilities Gap 

Mitigation Strategy. This document describes short- and long-term 

gap mitigation strategies and identifies actions that DHS will take in 

the near term to address gaps in all four COC areas and to strengthen 

privacy and civil rights/civil liberties protections. As of April 2011, 

SLPO officials were drafting which activities DHS will take to 

address the long-term gap mitigation strategies. 

I&A also released its 2011–2018 Strategic Plan in February 2011. 

Among other mission related goals, this document specifies how 

I&A will support stakeholders and customers, including state and 

local partners. It presents goals, objectives, and associated 

strategies, as well as risks outside of I&A’s control that may hinder 

achieving those goals. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

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Some goals and activities align directly with the work that SLPO 

Departmental Coordination Branch officials have identified as 

necessary or currently under way to enhance center support. For 

example, one goal in the strategic plan is to “share the information 

necessary for action.” A corresponding objective is to “standardize 

information sharing policies across the Homeland Security 

Enterprise.”19 Some of the strategies identified to achieve this 

objective are to “develop standardized policies, processes, and 

procedures...that provide partners with a clear understanding of 

how and with whom they can share intelligence and information; 

formalize information sharing relationships; develop an information 

sharing framework for the National Network of Fusion Centers; and 

to increase understanding of roles and missions within the homeland 

security stakeholder community by providing...guidebooks.” 

Component Integration Efforts Are Continuing 

In our December 2008 report, DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion 

Centers is Evolving, we identified major challenges associated with 

internal DHS coordination in supporting the fusion centers. 

Specifically, support levels were inconsistent across components, 

communication among components was informal or ad hoc, 

components were uncertain about their roles, and their field offices 

had not been fully leveraged to support the fusion center network. 

Through formalized meetings with components and the formation 

of a Departmental Coordination Branch, SLPO has made progress 

in addressing these challenges. 

Senior Executive Service Fusion Center Advisory Group Meetings 

Formalize Departmental Discussions 

In response to the findings in our 2008 report, I&A stated that it 

would create a working group to produce an “organized and logical 

strategy that ensures the maximum use of existing DHS resources to 

meet both fusion center and DHS requirements.” SLPO still engages 

the components in Senior Executive Service Fusion Center Advisory 

Group meetings to continue defining the coordinated DHS-wide 

effort to support the National Network of Fusion Centers. These 

bimonthly meetings are led by I&A’s Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary and attended by components’ senior leadership. 

Most of the attendees interviewed considered the meetings 

informative and efficient. In addition, attendees were aware that the 

19 The plan defines the Homeland Security Enterprise as all of I&A’s stakeholders in the Department; the 

Intelligence Community; the private sector; and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 25 
National Network of Fusion Centers was a priority of the Secretary, 

and also were aware of what SLPO wanted from the components. 

At these meetings, senior executives discuss their ongoing efforts to 

support fusion centers and the issues fusion centers are facing, 

including security clearances for state and local personnel, baseline 

and critical operational capabilities, and privacy and civil 

rights/civil liberties policies. Component representatives also have 

opportunities to discuss their contributions and interactions with the 

fusion centers, as well as information sharing and coordination with 

different federal entities. For example, Office of Infrastructure 

Protection officials briefed the Senior Executive Service Fusion 

Center Advisory Group on how they engage the fusion centers 

directly and through their Protective Security Advisor program.20 

An SLPO official explained that the meetings rotate among the 

components to increase component participation. 

Through these meetings, SLPO can identify future DHS component 

resources to enhance the One DHS approach, and ensure alignment 

with Information Sharing Environment programmatic guidance.21 

In addition to discussing component contributions, SLPO is able to 

include components in its planning by presenting timelines for 

certain projects, identifying topics for fusion center conferences, 

and discussing draft policies such as the Federal Resource 

Allocation Criteria. 

Presenters at Senior Executive Service Fusion Center Advisory 

Group meetings reiterate how DHS will support centers in a 

coordinated way. In these meetings, SLPO’s cognizance and 

responsiveness to field issues are best illustrated. For example, in a 

recent meeting discussions included training intelligence analysts to 

craft products that can be shared with fusion center personnel 

without clearances. Fusion center directors and senior analysts also 

raised this issue during our site visits. These officials explained that 

threat information they received was useful only when it could be 

passed to their first responders and emergency managers, who may 

not have clearances. Therefore, creating documents that separate 

classified from unclassified information but provide actionable 

intelligence is critical. 

20 Protective Security Advisors are Office of Infrastructure Protection employees who represent DHS in state 

and local communities as experts in critical infrastructure protection and security. 21 The Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment issues government-wide guidance for the 

development and proper operation of the Information Sharing Environment based on priorities and direction 

from the White House. www.ise.gov 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 26 
State and Local Program Office Establishes Departmental 

Coordination Branch 

As part of its restructuring to meet the needs of the fusion centers, 

SLPO created the Departmental Coordination Branch. One of the 

past shortcomings of the department’s efforts to support fusion 

centers was inconsistent coordination among components. SLPO 

leadership stressed that even though the fusion center initiative was 

led by I&A, it was a departmental effort, and it was imperative that 

all components be engaged, as appropriate, and that components 

allocate resources to support the National Network of Fusion 

Centers. SLPO requested that components detail a liaison to the 

Departmental Coordination Branch to ensure coordinated 

management of DHS assets in the centers. This branch also 

provides support to field offices that want to engage more with 

fusion centers. 

A branch accomplishment is the DHS Resources to Fusion Centers 

flip book, which was in draft as of April 2011. It is intended to 

provide information to stakeholders on each DHS component, their 

programs, mission, and resources, as well as a point of contact, such 

as a tip line or electronic mailing list address.22 Another 

accomplishment is the January 2011 Federal Resource Inventory, 

which identifies all human, educational, and technological assets that 

DHS and other federal stakeholders have in the field that could be 

leveraged to support fusion centers. In addition, SLPO is working 

with DHS components to determine which fusion center locations 

and functions best align with component missions and would add the 

most value to their operations. 

SLPO is also soliciting comments from fusion centers regarding 

which DHS components and federal departments and agencies they 

would find most useful in their centers. However, many fusion 

centers do not have a clear understanding of DHS components’ 

capabilities, missions, and information collection areas. 

As SLPO surveys the centers, there is an opportunity to frame 

questions regarding component resources based on information 

needs and projects, rather than on component or subcomponent 

titles. By focusing on needs, fusion centers can articulate the skills 

and information sets they require, which will allow the components 

to identify individuals or offices with the appropriate expertise and 

22 An electronic mailing list allows a single “cover” email address to send incoming messages to a set of 

email users, which may be changed. This provides continuity similar to a tip line number that may remain 

the same for years, but may be answered by different operators over that time. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 27 
 

 

 

access to relevant information. This will also highlight to 

components the type of work being done at the fusion centers and 

help DHS components better assess which locations may add value. 

As a result, DHS may be able to satisfy multiple needs with one 

individual. 

Challenges Continue in Component Support to Fusion Centers 

Although I&A has improved component engagement, and 

components have in turn increased their support of the National 

Network of Fusion Centers, challenges remain. For example, not 

all components have detailed a representative to the SLPO. As of 

April 2011, ICE, CBP, the Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning, and the Office of Health Affairs are represented, and the 

Federal Protective Service and the U.S. Secret Service have 

identified but not yet detailed individuals to represent their 

components. SLPO officials maintain that if components are not 

ready or able to increase their presence in the fusion centers, they 

should have a representative in the SLPO to increase awareness of 

the fusion centers and determine how components can best support 

the centers. 

In addition, the Departmental Coordination Branch has encountered 

difficulty in getting information from DHS field components about 

resources already deployed to support fusion centers. One 

headquarters component official described sending an email message 

to the office responsible for tasking the component’s field offices. 

The message included a list of questions, the answers to which would 

help determine to what extent field offices in the component were 

supporting the centers. Months later, still awaiting a response, the 

official followed up and was told that the questions were not 

forwarded to the field because the purpose was unclear. The official 

described the situation as unacceptable, but believed that many 

components have difficulty surveying their own field offices on 

interactions with fusion centers. This challenge often causes 

misunderstandings and underestimates the extent to which 

component field operations support fusion centers. 

Currently, component support to fusion centers is measured by the 

number of personnel detailed to fusion centers. For example, in 

quarterly updates to Congress, SLPO provides information 

regarding the number of component personnel detailed to each 

fusion center. However, SLPO officials explained that not all 

fusion centers need full-time deployed personnel. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 28 
In some cases, established relationships with points of contact from 

certain components would be sufficient to provide reachback for the 

fusion center and the component. Although some DHS components 

provide this reachback capability to fusion centers, the quarterly 

updates to Congress provide information only on full-time or parttime detailees. For example, even though the March 2011 quarterly 

update does not mention any Federal Protective Service personnel 

located at fusion centers, all their Regional Intelligence Analysts 

have at least liaison interaction with fusion centers in their areas of 

responsibility. In one area, the Regional Intelligence Analyst has 

formal monthly communication with I&A’s IOs, as well as more 

regular and frequent informal communication. Another Federal 

Protective Service Analyst described daily interactions with some 

centers, whether in person, by email, or by telephone, as well as 

weekly and bi-weekly communications with other centers. In 

another example, USCG has three personnel detailed at least part 

time to fusion centers. However, USCG field offices interact at 

varying levels with 49 fusion centers, as well as other state and 

local intelligence centers. 

Conversely, a large component presence at a fusion center does not 

always reflect fusion center support. For example, at one fusion 

center, there are five representatives from one component. 

However, only one supports fusion center activity; the other four 

work on a separate, component-specific initiative. In some other 

cases, fusion center officials believed the component representative 

assigned was not always appropriate for his or her role at the center. 

Field Offices Need Guidance From Component Headquarters 

Offices 

Although DHS components are aware that cooperation with and 

support of fusion centers is a departmental priority, none of the 

component field staff we spoke with recalled seeing formal written 

instructions or guidelines for supporting fusion centers from their 

headquarters management. In some cases, there was an email 

instruction to make contact or consider building a relationship; in 

other cases, component management routinely reiterated the 

instruction in staff meetings or on conference calls. 

Most component field staff we spoke with agree that formal 

communication from their headquarters leadership, which instructs 

on options, requirements, guidelines, or expectations for such 

support, would help identify the best resources available and ensure 

compliance with expectations. Such guidance could help explain to 

components the benefits of these relationships and the advantages 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 29 
 

of leveraging fusion centers as force multipliers to potentially 

increase field office efficiency. 

Leveraging the FBI’s Fusion Center Engagement Strategy Could 

Help Determine Component Coordination and Support 

These departmental challenges make it difficult to catalog accurately 

DHS’ current component field support to fusion centers. For our 

review, we leveraged the FBI’s efforts as an example of a best 

practice to inform DHS component support and information sharing 

with the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

To standardize its approach to interacting with fusion centers, the 

FBI Fusion Center Integration Unit (FCIU) first evaluated its field 

offices’ engagement with fusion centers. The evaluation included 

engagement with fusion centers that were not currently designated, 

but with which a partnership was mutually beneficial. The FCIU 

defined three levels of fusion center engagement: Liaison, Basic, 

and Enhanced. Figure 5 shows these engagement levels, which 

describe increasing interaction and support. 

Figure 5: FBI Definitions of Different Engagement Levels at Fusion Centers 

Source: OIG Analysis of FBI Documents 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 30 
FBI field offices learned about the process via videoconference 

presentations, and they implemented a self assessment using a 

survey instrument with detailed written instructions. The FCIU 

guided field offices in creating plans to increase interaction with the 

fusion centers in their areas of responsibility, as appropriate, 

including identifying limiting issues that were hindering 

engagement. The FCIU and FBI headquarters then developed a 

mitigation plan to help the field office address these issues. 

Working with the FCIU to determine lessons learned from the 

FBI’s survey, SLPO’s Departmental Coordination Branch could 

similarly assess DHS component field offices regarding their fusion 

center engagement. This would allow SLPO to enhance its support 

of field office engagement by increasing awareness of fusion center 

operations, assisting field offices in leveraging existing resources, 

and detailing their need for additional resources. 

A Performance Measurement Framework Is Being Developed 

DHS’ strategy should also stipulate what performance measures 

SLPO uses to determine whether the Department has achieved its 

mission of strengthening and supporting the National Network of 

Fusion Centers. I&A’s 2011–2018 Strategic Plan already identifies 

some potential performance measures meant to start dialogue 

among stakeholders. 

As of April 2011, SLPO was working with DHS components to 

identify measures for use in determining whether SLPO has been 

successful in supporting fusion centers. In addition, SLPO plans to 

evaluate the National Network to determine what gaps may still 

exist and to test whether actions taken by DHS and fusion centers 

have improved their ability to function as intended. These 

evaluations would assist DHS and its federal partners in allocating 

resources efficiently, and would demonstrate fusion center value, 

which could further enhance center sustainability. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office, 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #3: Develop and publish a strategy that reflects 

the department’s commitments, ongoing work, and plans for future 

engagement to support the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 31 
Recommendation #4: Survey component participation at fusion 

centers to ensure that the department’s presence is appropriately 

reported, and align results with fusion center needs. 

Recommendation #5: Work with DHS component leadership to 

develop and issue written guidance that ensures requirements and 

expectations for supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers 

are communicated and implemented. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #3: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 3. In its response, I&A said that it 

is leading a working group of DHS components to develop a 

strategy that reflects strategic plan alignment, commitments and 

ongoing efforts, and future engagement to support the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. The SLPO established the Department 

Coordination Branch, which is staffed with DHS component 

detailees, in an effort to continue engaging DHS components and 

deploying representatives to fusion centers. I&A also engages DHS 

component leadership through the Senior Executive Service Fusion 

Center Advisory Group meetings and the Homeland Security 

Intelligence Council to present the needs and concerns of fusion 

centers. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s actions responsive to the intent 

of Recommendation 3, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation that a strategy to support the National Network of 

Fusion Centers has been developed and published. 

Management Response to Recommendation #4: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 4. In its response, I&A said the 

that SLPO conducted the Requirements for Fusion Center Survey in 

spring 2011 to identify existing DHS component support to fusion 

centers. The survey also addressed fusion centers’ need for DHS 

component and interagency personnel, system access, and training. 

I&A validated survey responses received from the majority of 

fusion centers and presented the results to DHS component 

leadership at the June 2011 Senior Executive Service Fusion Center 

Advisory Group meeting. The results provided DHS component 

leadership with an understanding of fusion center needs and can be 

used by components to target fusion center support and develop 

policy and budget recommendations in future years. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 32 
In addition, the SLPO developed the Information Sharing 

Environment Guidance: Federal Resource Allocation Criteria 

policy, which defines objective criteria and a coordinated approach 

for prioritizing the allocation of federal resources to fusion centers. 

The policy will ensure that federal support to fusion centers is 

effective, efficient, and coordinated across DHS and interagency 

partners. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s actions responsive to the intent 

of Recommendation 4, which is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

Management Response to Recommendation #5: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 5. In its response, I&A said that it 

envisions that DHS components would follow similar protocols 

established for I&A personnel, such as maintaining an official 

supervisory structure and receiving programmatic guidance from 

their organizations, while acknowledging the I&A IO as the team 

lead at the fusion center. 

To codify this approach, I&A will establish a working group of 

DHS component representatives in the first quarter of FY 2012. 

The group will consider Memorandum of Understanding and 

Agreement and Concepts of Operation used by different 

components to define the roles and responsibilities of deployed 

personnel to fusion centers before establishing documentation of 

deployed assets. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the intent of Recommendation 5, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of written 

guidance that establishes requirements and expectations for 

supporting the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

Opportunities Exist To Improve Intelligence Officer Deployments 

Deploying IOs to fusion centers has benefited the National Network of 

Fusion Centers and the Department. Along with subject matter expertise 

and analytical guidance, IOs provide outreach, coordinate information, 

access additional data sources, and provide a single point of contact for 

DHS operations and resources. The majority of fusion center leadership 

interviewed said IOs are a valuable resource. In addition, components 

without deployed center personnel often use IOs as their point of contact 

with fusion centers. However, some DHS and fusion center staff said that 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 33 
the IO selection process could be improved, and that IOs need additional 

training and guidance. 

Intelligence Officer Selection Process and Training Should Be 

Enhanced 

To support fusion centers, IOs must possess knowledge of DHS 

programs, operations, and resources, as well as state and local 

issues that concern the fusion center officials they serve. Several 

fusion center officials said that centers benefit more from IOs who 

understand all DHS components and available resources, grants and 

requirements, and information systems. IOs familiar with the state 

and local areas and issues are valued as well, but for different 

reasons. IOs who have significant local perspectives, knowledge, 

and contacts may be better attuned to specific needs of a fusion 

center. Leadership at several fusion centers said that they want to 

be involved or have the local perspective represented in the IO 

selection process. 

Although attaining comprehensive knowledge of DHS programs 

and operations might be difficult, efforts to provide deployed IOs 

with additional training on DHS missions, operations, and resources 

would enhance their value to fusion centers and to the Department. 

Several fusion center officials said that IO orientation training is too 

limited in scope to provide a sufficient understanding of component 

interrelationships, and the Department’s operations and functions. 

IOs who had worked in I&A before being deployed to fusion 

centers suggested that a rotation within SLPO would provide new 

IOs a better understanding of DHS operations and the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. 

Many IOs have access to various component information systems, 

but have not received specific training on those systems. Without 

appropriate training, IOs could potentially misuse or improperly 

interpret data in these systems. Therefore, training is critical when 

an IO has access to a component’s system because IOs must protect 

the component’s information and interests. In addition, one 

component official questioned whether the IO’s role was to have 

access to all DHS systems, and said that an IO should be able to 

leverage existing component field resources. Another DHS 

component official said that even with traditional training courses, an 

IO would still require lengthy on-the-job training, because the 

component’s system generally was not flexible or user-friendly. 

When more experienced IOs mentor new IOs, the new IOs develop 

more realistic expectations regarding a center’s role and 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 34 
capabilities. Mentoring also provides an established relationship to 

leverage when necessary. As IOs can work with a variety of fusion 

center staff, from briefing senior leadership to mentoring junior 

analysts, several IOs said that it was helpful before deploying to 

gain an understanding of how another IO makes those diverse 

relationships work efficiently and effectively. IOs who participated 

in short rotations with other fusion centers reported gaining 

additional perspectives and a better understanding of the differences 

among centers. Several IOs said this experience helped them be 

more effective in their own centers. 

Roles, Responsibilities, and Expectations Need Better Definition 

At some fusion centers, IO roles and responsibilities are unclear, 

causing misunderstandings among both DHS and fusion center 

staff. For example, some fusion center directors believed that IOs 

would train analysts or write analytical products, while other 

directors anticipated that their IOs would have expertise in specific 

topics of interest to the state, such as maritime or border issues. 

Defining roles and responsibilities would make relationships among 

IOs, components, and fusion center staff more productive and 

improve information sharing. 

In some cases, IOs were deployed to fusion centers with 

instructions to do whatever the center needs to assist in developing 

its baseline capabilities. However, each center has different needs 

and requires different skill sets. Because some fusion centers are 

nascent, their needs may include activities for which an IO may not 

be well-suited, such as developing privacy and civil rights/civil 

liberties policies. As fusion centers are owned and managed by 

state and local governmental entities, IOs can encourage or 

recommend certain actions to achieve baseline capabilities and 

analytical products, but IOs cannot require that certain actions and 

processes be implemented. 

In addition to supplementing staff and operations, most fusion 

center leadership expect IOs to be able to identify and obtain 

information from any DHS component. As a result, fusion center 

leadership may infer that an IO has authority to direct other 

component representatives. Further, component headquarters and 

field representatives expect IOs to understand the data collection 

and missions of each component, so that the IO can evaluate a 

center’s data requests and identify requests that are not feasible. 

Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) can be useful in defining 

roles and responsibilities, performance measures, and expected 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 35 
support and interactions between DHS personnel and fusion center 

staff. As of April 2011, most MOUs between I&A and fusion 

centers only cover limited IO roles and responsibilities and do not 

specifically define assigned duties. Although MOUs can help to 

formalize DHS’ relationship with fusion centers, standardizing IO 

and component detailee roles across the National Network of 

Fusion Centers would be challenging. Rather, it is necessary to 

develop a process that identifies areas of agreement, outlines fusion 

center needs, communicates DHS’ interests in the area, and defines 

the IO roles, responsibilities, and capabilities. Such a process 

should not standardize the roles and responsibilities across the 

National Network of Fusion Centers, but rather should ensure that 

roles and responsibilities are identified and agreed upon. 

Communicating with the fusion centers and becoming more 

familiar with each center’s functions, operations, relationships, 

mission, and capabilities will help define roles, responsibilities, and 

expectations better. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office, 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #6: Expand the Intelligence Officer orientation 

and training process to include a formal mentoring program where 

Intelligence Officers can network and discuss issues and concerns 

with peers. 

Recommendation #7: In coordination with fusion center 

leadership, develop and document a process to identify and de fine 

roles, responsibilities, and expectations among Regional Director s 

and Intelligence Officers. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #6: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 6. In its response, I&A said that it 

established a mentoring program in March 2010 with the 

publication of the State and Local Program Office Sponsorship 

Program. The program establishes procedures for assigning 

sponsors to deployed IOs and Regional Directors with less than 12 

months of field experience. Sponsors will be assigned to provide 

guidance and support during pre-arrival, on-boarding, and initial 

deployment for up to 12 months. SLPO provides IOs and Regional 

Directors opportunities to network and discuss issues and concerns 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 36 
during regularly scheduled and ad hoc conference calls, 

conferences, and off-site visits. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s actions responsive to the intent 

of Recommendation 6, which is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

Management Response to Recommendation #7: I&A officials 

concurred with Recommendation 7. In its response, I&A said that 

roles, responsibilities, and expectations for deployed IOs and 

Regional Directors are defined in position descriptions and in 

various internal documents. 

IOs leverage fusion center access to the Intelligence Community’s 

capabilities and resources, help fusion centers develop their Critical 

Operations Capabilities, and assist the centers through the 

intelligence cycle. IOs also represent DHS and provide support to 

federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private partners. 

Regional Directors manage the activities of all DHS/I&A personnel 

within their regions, and assist senior state and local leadership with 

developing their fusion process. Regional Directors develop and 

lead regional initiatives that support fusion centers and provide 

regular input and support to SLPO headquarters when applicable. 

In addition, Regional Directors are responsible for relationship 

development, promoting cohesion and collaboration, advocacy, 

mentoring and mediation, and administrative support. 

With the established process to identify and define IO and Regional 

Director roles, responsibilities, and expectations, I&A incorporates 

input from fusion center leadership whenever appropriate. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s actions responsive to the intent 

of Recommendation 7, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of position 

descriptions and other internal documentation that define IO and 

Regional Director roles, responsibilities, and expectations and also 

ensure input from fusion center leadership wherever appropriate. 

Conclusion 

With the DHS Secretary’s announcement to recommit department-wide support to 

the National Network of Fusion Centers, I&A, SLPO, and DHS components have 

increased their efforts to coordinate and enhance support and information sharing 

with fusion centers. SLPO continues to improve its partnership with federal, state, 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 37 
and local entities, and fusion centers have demonstrated their value in local and 

interstate criminal and terrorism related investigations. Appendix E includes some 

examples of fusion center activities. 

Improvements are needed, however, to enhance SLPO field deployments and DHS 

component support. Both DHS and state and local stakeholders need a National 

Network of Fusion Centers capable of gathering, receiving, analyzing, and 

disseminating information. Centers must be capable of providing relevant 

situational awareness and strategic analytical products to DHS. In turn, DHS 

components and other federal partners need to understand how their missions align 

with those of the fusion centers. With a clearly defined and documented DHS 

strategy, the Department can enhance its efforts to support the centers and gauge 

appropriate funding, personnel, training, and additional resources. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 38 
 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We assessed DHS’ efforts to coordinate and enhance its support 

and information sharing with fusion centers as part of our Fiscal 

Year 2011 Annual Performance Plan. Our review focused on 

DHS, I&A, and SLPO efforts to fulfill the department’s goal to 

achieve a renewed, coordinated, and enhanced information sharing 

and communication capability with fusion centers. 

Our objectives were to determine whether (1) the SLPO satisfies 

the intent of DHS’ recommitment to the National Network of 

Fusion Centers; (2) whether planned SLPO efforts ensure 

coordinated support of DHS and its components to provide needed 

information and resources to fusion centers; and (3) whether any 

functional or organizational challenges exist within DHS that 

hinder its effective support to fusion centers. 

To accomplish our objectives, we conducted interviews with 

federal officials, and state and major urban area fusion center 

personnel, and reviewed and analyzed related documents and data. 

Specifically, we interviewed officials and staff from I&A, Office 

of Operations Coordination and Planning, Office of Policy, Office 

of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Privacy Office, National 

Protection and Programs Directorate, CBP, TSA, ICE, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCG, the Federal 

Protective Service, and the U.S. Secret Service. 

We also met with officials from DOJ, including the FBI and the 

Bureau of Justice Assistance, to determine DOJ’s support to the 

National Network of Fusion Centers and to leverage its best 

practices. 

To assess the effectiveness of DHS support to state and major 

urban area fusion centers, we conducted site visits and interviews 

at the following fusion centers and state and local intelligence 

entities: 

•	 Colorado Information Analysis Center, Centennial, 


Colorado
 

•	 Dallas Police Department Fusion Center, Dallas, Texas 

•	 Delaware Information and Analysis Center, 


Dover, Delaware 


•	 Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, Baltimore, 

Maryland 

•	 Miami-Dade Fusion Center, Miami, Florida 

•	 North Central Texas Fusion Center, McKinney, Texas 

•	 Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center, Cleveland, Ohio 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 39 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

•	 Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center, 


Columbus, Ohio 


•	 San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center, San 

Diego, California. 

•	 Texas Fusion Center, Austin, Texas 

•	 Washington State Fusion Center, Seattle, Washington 

•	 West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center, Charleston, 

West Virginia 

We held discussions with officials from the Government 

Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, and 

the National Fusion Center Association to gain their perspectives 

on DHS’ support to the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

In addition, we examined fusion center guidelines and procedures, 

including applicable laws, regulations, and policies. We also 

assessed the resources DHS and its operational components 

provide to fusion centers, including quarterly updates submitted to 

Congress and policies and program information. 

Our fieldwork began in October 2010 and concluded in April 

2011. We initiated this review under the authority of the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality 

Standards for Inspections, issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 40 
Appendix B 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, State and Local Program Office, 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Recommendation #1: Establish a plan to expand current analytical 

training opportunities to fusion centers. 

Recommendation #2: Develop a plan that ensures sustainable 

component deployments to the National Network of Fusion 

Centers. 

Recommendation #3: Develop and publish a strategy that reflects 

the department’s commitments, ongoing work, and plans for future 

engagement to support the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

Recommendation #4: Survey component participation at fusion 

centers to ensure that the department’s presence is appropriately 

reported, and align results with fusion center needs. 

Recommendation #5: Work with DHS component leadership to 

develop and issue written guidance that ensures requirements and 

expectations for supporting the National Network of Fusion 

Centers are communicated and implemented. 

Recommendation #6: Expand the Intelligence Officer orientation 

and training process to include a formal mentoring program where 

Intelligence Officers can network and discuss issues and concerns 

with peers. 

Recommendation #7: In coordination with fusion center 

leadership, develop and document a process to identify and define 

roles, responsibilities, and expectations among Regional Directors 

and Intelligence Officers. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 41 
Appendix C 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 42 

IJ.S. O( I.!Htment nf Ilonu'1ud S(,(,lIri~ 

W!Uhin~tun, JJ(' 10S28 

Carllon L tv[,,"n 

As:-.islant In )J ~etor G~lle al tor Inspections 

1)1 IS Oftieo of Inspector Genom[ 

1 120 VelTnont ""\ vc r\ vV 

\\ia, hin),'ion, U.c. 200n" 

R I': Draft Rcport O[G-I (J-(JJ 5- ISP-[&A, DIIS ' Ejlurls to Co()rt/il1(1{c alld F.lllwllce its Support 

and iJ!/ol'lmrtiof'l Sharing fi(h ,,,"lis/on Cel1l1!rs 

Dcar' Mr. Mann: 

The Ucpallll1cnt of Ilomcland SoclIrity (Dcpartmcnt!DHS) apprecia[c, the oppollunit)' to rel'iew 

and comment on the Office of Inspector General (OIG) draft report for OIG-1O-035-ISP-I&.>\ , 

DH.r:," F..ffh r/s to Coordinate and nh C(J ils Support OJld I,ljormult'oll ,)'/uu"jng wilh Filsion 

Cellfers, The Depallmcnt, pmlicu[arly the Ofticc of Intelligence and Anal ysis 1I&,\), is actiwly 

resolving the is'illt..'s itic:nti fi t!d in lhe r~port. 

The Departlllt.'IlI 'S rl'sponscs to each (lfthe recommendations from the draft report can I)f,~ fouud 

bot"w: 

\Ve recommend that th e Director, State ,lnd Locnl Pro~ ram Offi ~ Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis: 

n,ccnmmcndalioll # 1: Esrahlish a phlll to expand CUH~nt anolytical lrainillg opportllnilic:o; to 

fll;.;iuTi cf.jltlr.:rs, 

I>IIS [{osllonse: Con cur. I&A has recognized the need to impicment " lugh quality and 

standardized training program to support state and local analysts in fusion centers. particularly 

within the fh1l11ework established by the I&A strategic pl.n. Accordingly, I&A h •• initiated a 

strategic approach to identifying analyst training requirements and deploying h'aining courses to 

addres.s th~.se rt!4uirements througll effOlt~ by I&A '5 State (lnd Local Program Oft1cc (S LPO) 

and Enterpri,e and Mission SuppOll Directorate, and in pa.tnership with the Federal Emergency 

\1anagcment Agency's Nation.1 Training and Education Divi, ion (NTED). [&A has developcd 

nt!\\' COll!);!::!:, and C()lltent and expanded its capacity to provide quality analytical training to 

support (he maturaLion of the National )J"etwork of Fusion Centers (""ariona! Nct\vork), This 

training is accumplished through " variety ofmeehanisms, including training team, deployed to 

the field , web-hased tnndliles" and tOpic-speci fit: conferences, workshops, exercises, and 

seminars, I&A designed activities to assist the l\'ationall\'etwork with improving its capabilities 

in accord;mce with nation,al policy and doctrine, including the NtltionaJ Strategy for b~f()rma!io H 
Appendix C 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 43 

- 2 -

Sharing. the Fusion ('elller (~ !lidelin{' . and the HaseJim' Capuhilifiesjhr Slale and Major l./rban 

.. Irea FlI.,loll Cell/ers. Specificall y, 1&,\ delivered these training efforts to help fu sion centers 

build analyti cal capabi lities 10 achieve Critical Operaljollal CuptibiLi~~; 2: Analy=e. which is 

ddined as " tho abilil y 10 assess local implications o[lhr.a' infomlation through the use or a 

lonnal risk ass ~s lT1ent process." 

1&.'1.', suite or,omse, include: the Bilsi, Intelligence Mnd Threat Analysis Course, Mid-level 

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course, Critical Thinking and Analytic Methods, Principle, (If 

ImcJligcnce Writing and Llriefing, Vulnerability and Threat Risk Assessment. Writing for 

.\Iaximum Utility, Open Source Practitioners Course, and RepOIts Officer Llasic Course. field 

training del i,'ered in Fiscal Years (FY) 20 I 0 and 2011 has rcached pcrsollllcl from the vast 

mMjority offusion ,enlefS. In fY 2012, I&A plans to deliver an additional 90 courses, including 

mobile deliveries ill all nine tl on Center Regions. 

I&A hu:'i also parhlcrcd \.\.'ith (hI.! Horm ... land Inli"us1ruClUre Threat and Rt k Analysis \t'-nter to 

t:lciJ i tat e additional t.rai ni ng 0PPCl i1Utl iti e:5. i Dcl udi ng del iverie~ of an IJlfrodltcihlll 10 Hi \ 

Alla(r-...iOis for //.~j ll ("nllrl' It(1~l'SfS Course lI1d pilot deliveries of all h llef'lnedi(l[(' IVsk AJlo(rsis 

COltJ"s('. Adcli tionally: in \lovcmbcl' 20 I I, J&/\ is sponsoring a i\atinnal tusion Center Analyti c 

\V rk h() p f\) Hpport l~ioll c.enlt:r al1nly i:i and ro enhance necessary aJwlj1i<.' cxpct1isc across 

the N:lIional r\ctwork. 

1311 sc'\l Oil the actiolls listed IIbove, I&A believes that it, analytical training program has answered 

the spirit of this rccoITllllcndltlion ami requests that il he doscu. 

I{ecommelldalion #2: [)evelop a plan that ensures sustainable component deployments to tilo 

l1 i]1 jOllal network of fusion t:t!ntcr.;. 

DHS Response: Concu r. 1&1\ ha, not yet <level oped a plall detailing tbe DH S Component 

(Component) efforts necessary for sustainable Component deployments to tbe ~atiollal J\etwork. 

Hm"''C\i(;T, \ ..... c \vill Jcvd op i.Hld lci1d.it \vorking group composed o f"CornponL:nt mt:rnhcrs lo 

J~\ clo p a Slratl:gy that reflects Dcpartlncmal and 1&/\ stratC!gic plan alignment.. Department 

commitments and ongoing t;!! T(.lrlS, and future engagt!ment plans to Slipporllht' NaliullClI elwo . 

An essential pOItioll of this Dcpmll1lcnt-\\o'id(: strategy \\o'ill be fln implementation plan for 

sustaining Component deployments to the fu sion centers. J&i\ \vill present the working group 

com':l:pl and ~t ratc gy dCI,.'clopIncTH at the next SES .:\dvi."iory Group meeting during the ft n;t 

quarter. FY 2012 to obtain Component suppon. The SES Ad visory Group membership includes 

ComporH':Ill leadership and the Principnl De puty Ulldcrsccrclary of Intelligence and \naly ~, 

and the group meets regularl y to discuss [)epanll1ellt-wide efforts in suppol1 affusion cellters. 

Shuuld additional support or (,;on dt;:n1.1i(Jn be needed fnJm ('omptlllent l~adr.:r ~h p, the working 

group concept and strategy may also be presented to the IloIlleland Security Intell igence Council 

(lISIC). 

,\:;. a crilical first step to effectively developing a Component dcplo)111cnt stlstai llability laTl ~ 

SLPO I..:onduch:::u lhl,..~ Rl'qllirc l//('nls.1i)I" Fusion Center Sun'(:v 111 llH.~ spring or ~O ll to colkcl data 

[lnd de1Lmllinc appn.1prialc plan rcquircm(':nt~. TIw :-.urvcy doe-luncnlcd cxi~ting CompollcIH 

resource, deployed to fusi(lll cellter,_ and the re,ults provided Components with an cnhance<l 
Appendix C 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 44 

- J -

DCp"l1lllcnt-wide understanding of fusion center needs for Component support This 

information call be u5cd by ompon~nt leadership in allocating support to fU:':inn centerS and in 

developing the associated policy and budget recommendations in future years, whieh will be 

us~cl to devdop a ('omprehellsive Component ::;ustainability plan to suppmt the National 

Ne twork . 

Recollllllendation #3 : Develop and publish" strategy that [elk",ts the dOp"l1men!'s 

cOlllmitments. ongoing \ ... ·orl.:.. and plans for futul'e engagement to support the national nClv,,'ork of 

fusion ccntcr~. 

1>11 $ Hcsponsc: Concur. I&A i!) committed to lead ing a working, group composed of 

Cornporu.:nl memhers charged \-\o'ilh developing a strategy that rdlecis Departmental an(\ I&A 

strategk plan alignmen ~ Depar1rncnt t:ommitmcnts and ongoing Cfl011 s, and future cngagcment 

plans to support the :\Jallonal Ndwork . fn addi l ion In working with COl11pon(:nr 1t;:',adefShip to 

obtain :-;upporl in lhis t.:nUGI\ior. \VC hav~ al ~ady initiated or ~xecuted ~ever(J1 effim,o.;10 more 

full y lnlt:grak Componenls \\"1111 Itl:)ion ct::'nkr~ and l11(1ximizt::' the U!:i(: of existing 0115 resources 

to mcet both fLl on CGntCI' and OHS ret.luircm nt ~. 

I&A ha.'i ~:-;tab ished the SLPO De partmental Coordination Branch (DeB}. staffed with 

Component detailees, that continues to engage Components to faci litate the deployment of 

C\nnpUl1cnt repre::;entative:s to fu:-)ion centers. These Component det ~ilee s fire a vital conduit for 

ini(mmHion sharing \vi th slate. loc.al , trihal, :md tenitorial rtn~rs present ut the fus,ion centers, 

A~ addilional Cumpommt r~pr~ :sent ali v~:s becume tmgagot!rl. mort! products and knowledge have 

become availahle fi)rdi~t ribution to fu ~ion centers, rurlher supporting (he National f't!hvurk 

mission. sr .PO Component repre::;entatives c.(lntillue 10 collahorate with deployed OJ is 

personnel tn engage and faci litate Component upport, \vhi\e g~uging the future needs of the 

fu sion centers through teleconferences and surveys. This exchange provides iJnportnnt 

in rnnllmion from the field that will he provided to Component leadership f(Jr use in ot!valuating 

their rc:-;ources to he:-;( support fusion centers. 

I&A also lnterat,:i:s \vilh Componenl leadership. such (IS at th~ SES Advisor): Grollp meetings and 

t he IISI( ', to presellt the needs and concerns (lf lh c fusion I;l!rHcrs where appropriate". During 

lhc:-;c mccling~ l&i\ c.ul vlH.:alc:-; Cor ftl:;:inn ct'nh;.'rs. both addn:ssing fusion c,enter SllCCesses .(llld 

l~on('crns and providing a more- fulsomc portrayal of how n.lSlon ccntL.'1"~ nperah:. 

Rccommcndation #4: Survey ~omponen t partir.;ipation :.It H.lsion centers to ensure thut the 

dt!pmtment 's r~senc~ is appropriately r~ported, and align results \vith fusion center needs. 

DHS Response : Cunc ur. In the spring of" 201 I, SLPO l:onuuclcu the Rcquiremem.\·for FU.<iion 

C CH/er SWT!.)' to dctermine the ex tent to \vhich representHtive:,; rrom Comp0I1l:n1S should he 

assigned to fusion ccnkrs. This survey documented Cumpom:nt support to tlisioll centers as well 

a~ fusion centers' rCt.luc:sts j{Jr addit ioTlal Component and 111leragency p~r:-;onnel ~ ~yste111 acce:-;~ , 

and tmining. l&A validated survey responses rceci\.'ccl from (he nH~iorit y of fusiun t:clllcr:-; and 

the results WGrc pre.'iclltcd to Componcnt ~ndcr.:; hip at the June 2011 SES Advisory Crroup 

meeting. These results. provided Component leadership \vith an enhanced l)epartmcllt-\vidc 
Appendix C 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 45 

- 4 -

unde:rstanding of fusion ccnt~r ncc-ci;;; <.llul can h~ used in targeting C\)THponent :support to fliSioll 

~c.:: ntcr., and in dcn loping [It\.: i.l~sot: iah..."{ l poll,,:)' and budget rr.::cl)mmcndations in future YCMii. 

Additionally, SLPO led fhe devdopment of the !J~formalion Sharing Environmenf Guidance: 

Federal Resnurce Allocation Cri{('ria (RAe) policy, which defines objective criteria and a 

conrdinated UI}Pro<1ch for prioritizing the allncalit..)n of federal l'csourccs to rU~1011 centers. The 

goal orthis policy i~ tu enhance the eftectivene", of federal .upport to the National "let work 10 

execute the statewide fusIon process The RAe policy will cllable the Federal Govcl'Ilmcnt to 

concentrate resources in a manner that will improve the efficiency of it:s support 10 fllsion centers 

,mel help bring cons,i:-)tency and transparency to the proce.ss of prioritizing fcderal resourCe 

allocation. The RAe policy pn,l""ides Components with a clearly defined <lpproaeh to as~jgning 

th~ir pcr:;:;Olltlcl to fusion centers and focusing their rcsollrces. This policy will ensurc that 

Componellt SUppOI1 to rhe fusion centers is prioritized and coordinated using defined criteria 

across lJHS and interagency partners. 

Recommendation #5: \Vork with DHS componcnt leadership to de ..... elop anu is~ue \\o'riHen 

guidance that cnsurcs rcquircnlenlS and t:xpectatiolls for supporting the lltltionai network of 

fusion centers are c;;ommunicntcd and implcmented. 

DHS R~s un sc: Concur. We envision that Compunent personnel will fi)ll(lw the same 

protocols established fex J&A personnel- to maintain an nnicial supervisor}.' structure and 

rccei\'e prOh'T<I11l1l1 atic b,Yl.ddancl! from their respective organizations while aeknO\\o'ledging the 

l&A lnldli gence Officers' role as DHS tenrn lead at the fusioll center. To enectjn~ y c;;odify this 

approi.l.ch, we \vill convene a working group of Component rcpr~sentat.ives in the first quarter of 

FY 2012, and the working group will pre ~e l ih recommendations to Component leadership 

through the ~FS Advisory Group. This working group will consider all Memoranda of 

l\gn::eHl~nt. Memoranda of Understanding. and C('lllcepts of Operation currently used by 

different Component$ tu detine tlte roles and rcspon.libilitie, uf deploying Component p~""nnd 

to lusiOl1 centers before a tinill set of document.'> regardi ng th~ presencc o f deployed assets is 

c~tabli;.;!H.:!u. 

Recommendatioll #6: expand the. lntclligen<:e Ofticcr orientation and train ing pft.Kess to 

include i.l I(lnnal mClltoring program v,·here Intell igence Officers C[l11 net\\'ork anu Jiscu~s issues 

and concerns with peers. 

DH S Response : Con cur. SLPO formally I.:st i.1 hl J 11 mcn loring program ()f\ March 14, 2010 

with the publicatil'1') of the "State :l11d Local Program artier.! Spt.Hl:').orship Pmgrillll:' Thi;.; 

program e.-;!ablishcd pnJcL"dmc:'1 tl)r as-signing :-;POll!'Ul'S to ~UppOr1 ncwly hired and currently 

deployed intclligcnl.:t:: OlTicefs (lOs.) nnd Regiollal Dirct..'tors (ROs) with less. tiUHl 12 months of 

field expericllcc. F~)r i.l period lip to 12 months. assigllcd sponsors provide new [Os ant..! RDs 

\vith gu idance- and :support during prc-nnivnl, n-h()anl ng. ami initial dcplQ}111ent. SLPO 

provides 1l1llOs and RD ~ innumeruh1c opportunitics to Ilc[I,\·nrk and di ~l.: uss issUl.'s and COtlCCnlS 

with theil' r~SpCCltVC rl~t!rs through (:01 I abol'atioIt during n.:gLdarly sche(iukd. and (ld hoc 

Cl)llt~ren\c ('aIls. r,. onfl.l'clH.x s. and off-sitt:.':i. and by leveraging IL'chnology (including e-mail, 

telephone and video tcle,,:onfcrcndng). 
Appendix C 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 46 

l'hrough the cxp,ansion of its lO (Uul RD orientation and training process and tbe cstabli:.'ihmcllt 

ofa furmal mel1toring program, I&A believes that it has ;mswcred the spirit oftbis 

rcenmmclluatioTl and requests thal it he closeu. 

Recommendation #7: In L:oon.limuion with fu:sion L:t!nter h::,adership, develop and document a 

process to idL"nfify and uellne roles. respnnsihilities., and expectation:-; among Regional Directors 

alld Intclligcllct:: Otlic:ers. 

DHS Rospunsc; Concnr. I&A has developed roles. responsibilities. and expectations for S [J'() 

employees deployed to the fusion eJ.;oh.;rs; which art; uutlim.:u wi thin -each t'mployee positioll 

description and detailed in other various in(enwl documentation. Inlelligence Onicers serve as 

I&/\ 's immediate, url-the-sccrle pn.:sen(ative~ to leverage the Intelligence Community's 

r.:ap'lbilitics. resources. and expcnise to supporl stale and loca l homeland security priorities. J\ S 

such, they conduct activities in support (lfthe intelligence cycle at fusion centers. support the 

fliSillll centers in developing their Critical Operational Capabilities (CO(,), provide Slip port to a 

fLision ccuh.'T ami its state, lo<.:al , tribal. lerrih.lrial (S r TT) and private sector pm111crs, and 

represent the l)HS to f't:deral , SLIT, and private secto r partners. 

Regional Oirectors are responsible for managing the activities. of <ll l DHS/I&/\ pcn:;()llnd 

stationed ill th ~ir respeL'tivt! regi ... m~ and f~u' a~sisti g senior ~ta te and IOr.:(ll kadcrship with 

Jt:vdoping their rLlsion proct:sscs. RDs tk'vdop anJ lead regional iniliativ~ s t.hat suppot1 the 

fu.sion ct!nje.r~ and pn l\..' id~ reglJ]m input rllld up purt to SLPO JIeadq Llartcrs when 

applieuh\c. Thcir rcsponsihilitics indudc n:lationshir developmenl. pronluting cohesion and 

collah\)ralioll, i.1dVOCi.KY, lllt:nlorillg and mediatiol1, and administrativt:: suppOt1. SI,PO cvdo ~d 

10 ami RD roll.'s ami respol1sihilities 10 provide the most effect ive and effi.cie111 5UPPOl1 possible 

to the fusion center mission and to fusion centcr leadership. 

As a rcsult of the estab lishcd process to idc ntit ~'v' and ddine the roles, rcsponsihilitic:;. and 

expectations for Regional Oirector;s and Infelhgenr.:e Offi~ers. which incorporates input from 

fusion center leadership \vhercvcr appropriate. I&A belicves that it has. arJ:)wered the spirit (Jrthi~ 

rct.:ommendation and rt:qLlL:sts Ihal il be closed . 

Again, we appreciale this opportunity to revie\\-' and comment 011 the draft report, In add ition to 

this rcspon~c. technical comments nnd a sensitivity review \Vcrc provided under separale C()vcr. 

Thc Dcpnrtlllcnt looks fon.vnrd to working \vith you 0 11 fu ture Homclnnd Security cngagement:;. 

Sincercly. 

Caryn. "'"gnc!' 

Under erdary for Inteil

~ Uee 

<lnd alysis 
Appendix D 

DHS Funding Sources for Fusion Centers 

Homeland Security Grant Program Overview 

The major DHS funding source that fusion centers are eligible to 

receive comes from the department’s Homeland Security Grant 

Program. This grant program was created to enhance the ability of 

state, territorial, tribal, and local governments to prepare for, 

prevent, respond to, and recover from potential terrorist attacks and 

other hazards. The program has five sub-programs that target 

different aspects of homeland security. 

State Homeland Security Program 

The largest of these sub-programs is the State Homeland Security 

Program. This program, which consists of a set allotment for each 

state and additional state allocations based on DHS’ risk 

assessment, intends to build state and local capabilities. DHS 

obligates these grant funds to a State Administrative Agency to 

administer and distribute.23 States are required to dedicate at least 

25% of the grant funds to law enforcement terrorism preventionoriented planning, training and exercises, and equipment. Although 

fusion centers often conduct these activities, a state is not required 

to provide State Homeland Security Program funding to fusion 

centers. In FY 2010, $842 million was available in the State 

Homeland Security Program for all 50 states, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 

territories. 

Urban Areas Security Initiative 

Certain centers may receive funding from the second-largest 

funding source, the Urban Areas Security Initiative. The grant 

amount is risk-based. A fusion center in a high-risk urban area 

may be eligible to receive funding from both the State Homeland 

Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative programs. 

In FY 2010, $832.5 million was available for 64 predetermined 

high-risk metropolitan areas. 

Metropolitan Medical Response System Program 

Fusion centers are beginning to include their state or regional 

emergency response and public health functions in existing 

operations. The Metropolitan Medical Response System Program 

23 The State Administrative Agency is the Governor-designated body that applies for and administers 

Homeland Security Grant Program grant funds. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 47 
Appendix D 

DHS Funding Sources for Fusion Centers 

evenly distributes funding to 124 jurisdictions to support medical 

response capabilities to public health crises, including terrorist 

attacks. In FY 2010, $39.4 million was available. A fusion center 

with a metropolitan area’s medical emergency response functions 

may receive funding from the State Administrative Agency to 

support those capabilities. 

Citizen Corps Program 

For fusion centers that support collaboration between community 

and government leaders, and involve the community in emergency 

preparedness, planning, mitigation, response, and recovery, the 

Citizen Corps Program is a potential funding source. Funded at 

$12.5 million in FY 2010, a set amount is distributed to states and 

U.S. territories, with the balance distributed based on population. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 48 
 

Appendix E 

Examples of Fusion Center Activities 

Attempted Colorado Bookstore Bombing 

In June 2011, the Lakewood, Colorado Police Department received 

information that an individual had placed two improvised 

explosive devices at a Borders book store at the Colorado Mills 

Mall. The Police Department notified the FBI, who activated the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives agents responded to the scene and passed 

information to the Colorado Information Analysis Center. A few 

hours later, the Center sent information to fusion centers 

nationwide and Terrorism Liaison Officers statewide, requesting 

information that may relate to the incident. Within 15 minutes the 

Center received vital information from a state trooper, that a 

suspect had crashed his vehicle and was taken into custody for 

felony menacing and driving under the influence of alcohol about 

24 hours earlier. The trooper believed the suspect he arrested was 

also the suspect in the book store bombing attempt. The Center 

received another lead from a different Terrorism Liaison Officer, 

which linked the suspect to another device that partially detonated 

near a hotel a short distance from the book store. The Center 

passed this information to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force to 

further support the investigation. The suspect was held on charges 

stemming from the incident. 

Suspicious Tractor Trailer Travelling to New York City 

On October 8, 2010, a police department released an advisory 

regarding a tractor trailer whose driver reportedly had been given 

$10,000 to divert his route to New York City’s Times Square. The 

IO alerted several fusion centers in the region. The Rhode Island 

Fusion Center was able to determine the origin and owner of the 

tractor trailer, and the Northern California Regional Intelligence 

Center coordinated with the state police to locate and search the 

vehicle. Upon questioning the occupants, officials concluded that 

the vehicle was not a threat. Within hours, the fusion centers, 

working with their IOs and local police were able to de-escalate the 

incident. 

Times Square Bombing Attempt 

Faisal Shahzad planned to detonate a car bomb at New York City’s 

Times Square on May 1, 2010. Following the failed attempt, 

fusion centers across the country provided federal partners with 

other tips relating to Shahzad. These tips resulted in additional 

leads and the development of federal intelligence products. For 

example, the New York State Intelligence Center received a 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 49 
Appendix E 

Examples of Fusion Center Activities 

suspicious activity report on May 2, 2010, from a locksmith who 

called the center and indicated that he had helped Shahzad get into 

the vehicle earlier that day. 

New York City Subway Bombing Attempt 

In September 2009, the Colorado Information Analysis Center 

received a tip on its website and 1-800 hotline number pertaining 

to suspicious activity. Najibullah Zazi was observed purchasing 

large quantities of hydrogen peroxide and acetone from local 

beauty stores. These chemicals can be used to make explosives. 

Zazi planned for multiple people to simultaneously set off the 

bombs, carried in backpacks, at the busiest stops on the New York 

subway system. The FBI already had Zazi under surveillance, and 

the fusion center’s tip confirmed FBI suspicions. The Colorado 

Information Analysis Center worked closely with the FBI 

throughout the investigation, which ultimately resulted in the arrest 

of Zazi and his guilty plea. 

Plotted Murder of Swedish Cartoonist 

In September 2009, the Colorado Information Analysis Center 

received a report regarding a missing woman, Jaime PaulinRamirez, who had recently converted to Islam and was 

communicating with a man from Pakistan. The fusion center 

learned in the report that the missing woman was thought to be 

traveling to New York to meet with this Pakistani national. After 

providing the information to the FBI, the fusion center learned that 

Paulin-Ramirez was conspiring to murder a Swedish cartoonist 

who had depicted an Islamic religious figure as a dog in a cartoon. 

The Colorado Information Analysis Center also learned that 

Paulin-Ramirez was in communication with Najibullah Zazi and 

other suspected terrorists. 

International Kidnapping Attempt 

In May 2008, an IO, the Central California Intelligence Center 

leadership, and a county sheriff’s department collaborated on an 

AMBER Alert for a 3-year-old child.24 The suspected abductor 

was wanted for rape and murder and was a flight risk. Working 

24 The AMBER AlertTM program is a voluntary partnership among law enforcement agencies, broadcasters, 

transportation agencies, and the wireless industry to activate an urgent bulletin in the most serious child 

abduction cases. 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 50 
Appendix E 

Examples of Fusion Center Activities 

with the DHS National Operations Center,25 the International 

Criminal Police Organization,26 and local law enforcement, the 

group determined the suspect was on a flight to the Kingdom of the 

Netherlands. The suspect was detained in Amsterdam and the 

child was found unharmed. 

Attempted Campus Shooting 

In January 2008, the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence 

Center received a tip regarding a man traveling across state borders 

to kill a woman and her boyfriend, and to carry out a campus 

shooting. The Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 

and the Virginia Fusion Center produced and disseminated an alert 

to hundreds of state and local law enforcement officers within 

hours of receiving the tip. The Virginia State Police and local law 

enforcement located and detained the suspect. The case was 

pursued by the FBI and resulted in a guilty plea. 

Intercepted Explosives Transport 

On August 4, 2007, a DHS IO received a call from Florida’s 

Homeland Security Advisor regarding two state university students 

who were being questioned during a traffic stop in South 

Carolina.27 The limited information available included the 

subjects’ ethnicity, news that that a bomb squad was involved, and 

vehicle registration information. The Florida Fusion Center 

employee received background information on the vehicle and 

registered owner from the officer in South Carolina conducting the 

traffic stop. This information was sent to DHS’ National 

Operations Center and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces in each 

state within minutes. The two subjects were charged and 

subsequently tried for providing material support to terrorists. 

25 The National Operations Center coordinates information sharing to help deter, detect, and prevent 

terrorist acts and to manage domestic incidents by providing real-time situational awareness and 

monitoring, coordinating incidents and response activities, and, in conjunction with I&A, issuing threat 

advisories and specific protective measures via the centers Intelligence Watch and Warning element. 26 The International Criminal Police Organization is a worldwide law enforcement organization that 

facilitates cross-border police cooperation and supports and assists all organizations, authorities, and 

services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. 27 A state’s Homeland Security Advisor is, after the Governor, the lead point of contact between the state 

and DHS. The Homeland Security Advisor should be able to access the state’s entire homeland security 

enterprise to make critical decisions during crises and keep the Governor informed of emerging threats, 

events, and responses. A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, NGA Center for Best Practices (2010). 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 51 
Appendix F 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector 

Angela Garvin, Team Lead Inspector 

Katherine Roberts, Senior Inspector 

Kimberley Lake, Inspector 

Morgan Ferguson, Inspector 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 52 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary for Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis 

Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate 

Administrator, Transportation Security Administration 

Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard 

Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Director, U.S. Secret Service 

Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Director of Local Affairs, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 

I&A Audit Liaison 

TSA Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

CBP Audit Liaison 

USCG Audit Liaison 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Audit Liaison 

U.S. Secret Service Audit Liaison 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

GAO/OIG Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

Page 53 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

DHS’ Efforts To Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 


Page 54
 
 

 

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