U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64–317 WASHINGTON : 2000

S. HRG. 106–511

COLOMBIA: COUNTER-INSURGENCY

VS. COUNTER-NARCOTICS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL

NARCOTICS CONTROL

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 1999

(

(II)

SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Delaware, Co-Chair

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

WM. J. OLSON, Staff Director

MARCIA S. LEE, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

OPENING STATEMENT

Page

Sen. Charles E. Grassley ......................................................................................... 1

Sen. Mike DeWine ................................................................................................... 3

Sen. Jeff Sessions .................................................................................................... 6

PANEL I

Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement, Department of State ............................................................ 7

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 11

Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict, Department of Defense ......................................................................... 18

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 20

General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command,

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 30

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 31

PANEL II

Bernard Aronson, Chairman, ACON Investments ................................................ 74

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 79

Michael Shifter, Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue ................................... 85

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 88

SUBMITTED QUESTIONS

Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement, Department of State ............................................................ 105

General Charles E. Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command,

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 161

Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict, Department of Defense ......................................................................... 176

Bernard Aronson, Chairman, ACON Investments ................................................ 185

Michael Shifter, Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue ................................... 187

(1)

COUNTER-INSURGENCY VS. COUNTERNARCOTICS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1999

U.S. SENATE, CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL, Washington, DC.

The caucus met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in room SH– 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Grassley, chairman of the caucus, presiding.

Present: Senators Grassley, Sessions, DeWine, and Graham.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I thank everybody for coming out at a fairly early morning, the first morning after a long weekend break of

Congress. And it is not exactly an ideal time to have an important

hearing like we are having, but the schedule of the Congress dictates, both for policy reasons as well as for the time we are in the

legislative session, to move forward with this very important issue.

We also will have the privilege of having other Members, one of

whom is present, Senator DeWine, but others will be coming who

have urged me to have this hearing. And I appreciate very much

the breadth of interest we have in the situation in Colombia from

all members of the caucus, particularly as it relates to the efforts

we have in this country to combat drugs.

Today’s hearing concerns one of the most important foreign policy issues that we currently face. It is one that directly affects U.S.

interests and the lives of U.S. citizens daily. It is not remote, it is

not abstract, it is not obscure. Yet, we seem to find ourselves in the

midst of a muddle. U.S. policy appears to be adrift and our focus

is blurred.

We are today going to focus on the current situation in Colombia

and the nature of our efforts to stop drug production and

transiting. I must confess some disappointment about that current

situation and the nature of our efforts. On this, one of the most

critical items on our national agenda, what to do about the drug

threat, there does not appear to be a coherent strategy or a consistent policy. And if there is, then there has been a distinct failure

to explain these to Congress or the public, and this is particularly

true when it comes to the country of Colombia that we are looking

at in this hearing today.

There has been a lot of talk about Colombia recently, but there

does not seem to me to be much of a strategy. There might be some

actions taken, but actions do not state policy. I am frankly disappointed in the administration’s failure to engage in a serious discussion with Congress or the public to explain its policy. What we

see is piecemeal engagement in a situation that is not adequately

2

understood. We seem to be bent on asking what color to paint the

helicopters before we ask what it is that we are doing or whether

we should be doing it at all, or if we should, what is needed and

what responsibilities the government of Colombia has.

There are a host of basic questions elemental to a sound strategy

that are going begging. I do not question, though, the sense of purpose or the dedication of the many men and women, Americans and

Colombians, who daily put their lives at risk to stop illegal drugs.

But their actions need to add up to more than the sum of the parts

if we are going to make a difference. Actions need a center and a

focus; they need direction and coherence. And above all, these actions need to be linked in a sensible way to our resources. All of

these things need to be linked to outcomes that purchase a difference. Finally, they need to be explained clearly and

straightforwardly to ensure public support. I am concerned that we

lack these vital connective tissues.

Reporting from Bogota strongly suggests that our whole policy is

in disarray at a time when Colombia is in the midst of a major crisis. There has been drug smuggling from the U.S. embassy. Despite

years of focus on eradication, drug cultivation continues to increase. If preliminary analysis is to be believed, it has almost doubled. Further, our estimates of cocaine production are also seriously

flawed, perhaps underestimating the production by 100 percent.

Colombia today is producing more cocaine than at any time since

we began our efforts there.

The insurgents, while not in a position to seize power, are growing in strength and profiting from drug smuggling. In some cases,

they are better armed and better trained than the military. The

military, conversely, suffers from a variety of systemic and institutional problems, and these are problems of long standing. It lacks

equipment, training, resources, and appropriate manpower. Paramilitary groups with possible links to the military are waging their

own war against the state. The peace process appears to be stalled.

Violence is escalating. The judiciary system appears unable to cope,

and Colombia is in the midst of a major financial recession.

Yet, the U.S. administration seems to be incapable of thinking

about the situation with any clarity or articulating a strategy with

transparency. It seems unwilling to explain its policy or even to explain the lack of one. It seems confused as to what has actually

happened. I would cite just one example. It would appear that the

present tendency in U.S. policy would have us more deeply involved in Colombia’s insurgency. Reports show that the guerrillas

are now engaged in a major way in protecting and profiting from

the drug trade.

If so, and we plan to expand efforts to go after that trade, then

stepped efforts to deal with increased drug production involves us

in confronting the guerrillas. This raises a host of questions that

have yet to be adequately addressed by the administration. It certainly has not explained its policy to Congress or the public, and

we are left with the appearance of a policy of drift and dissembling.

The drug czar, having opposed supplemental drug funding last

year, is now asking other Cabinet members to support a $1 billion

proposal of his own, much of which is to go to Colombia. I hope

that before any such request comes before Congress, if it should,

3

that the proposal has more in it than just a wish list. The President has written to Senator Lott and Speaker Hastert about the

need to work cooperatively to aid Colombia. I agree with that, but

we need to know more about this. We need something to work

with, and this does not mean another long list of goodies without

thought as to purpose and results.

So the situation, as I see it, is past the point when the sort of

ad hoc, Chicken Little strategies that have characterized recent foreign policy will do in this instance. It is embarrassing that we have

so little before the Congress or the American public by way of serious policy or honest discussion on what we are to do.

Yet, we have billion-dollar proposals being floated and emergency

aid requests submitted. I hope the hearing today can help us get

closer to both an understanding that meets the circumstances. If

our witnesses today cannot get us closer to where we need to be,

I am going to look at another hearing where we can hear from witnesses who can tell us more.

I hope, however, that we will hear today more about what a

proper strategy should look like, and I will be offering legislation

later this week specifically requiring the administration to deliver

to Congress a detailed strategy on Colombia. The administration

should have one already on the shelf, so the request, I hope, would

not be burdensome. I hope that we will hear much more about that

policy today.

I am going to explain something about the charts, but before I

do, I think I will go to opening comments from my colleagues, if

they have any opening comments.

Senator DeWine, and then Senator Sessions.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just

want to congratulate you for holding this hearing. I thank our witnesses for being here. We really look forward to your testimony.

I think we all know that this country and this hemisphere faces

a very serious crisis in regard to what is going on in Colombia.

Last November, I again visited Colombia and I had the opportunity, among other things, to meet with President Pastrana, as

well as the police and military leaders, to discuss how our two

countries could work together better to eliminate drugs from our

hemisphere.

The deteriorating situation in Colombia, Mr. Chairman, represents a grave threat to not just the democracy of Colombia, but

regional stability as well, and I think that that is something that

we need to be very concerned about. What we really have here, Mr.

Chairman, maybe to state the obvious, but sometimes you have to

do that—what we have in Colombia is a number of different wars,

a war that is being wage by the government against two separate

guerrilla groups, a war against ruthless paramilitary organizations,

and also against the drug lords who traffic deadly cocaine and heroin into the United States.

For more than three decades, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia, otherwise known as the FARC, and the National Liberation Army, the ELN, have both waged the longest running

insurgencies in Latin America. It is estimated—and, of course, no

one really knows what these figures are, Mr. Chairman, but it is

estimated that the ELN has approximately 5,000 guerrillas, while

4

the FARC is estimated to have a force of approximately 15,000.

They represent a serious threat to the country of Colombia and the

region. The Colombian military frankly may not be up to the task

now to counter these foes; at least at the present time they are not.

They lack a serious communications, intelligence and mobility capability.

Mr. Chairman, the drug traffickers are really the lifeline now for

the ELN and the FARC, and this is something that we have really

not seen, to my knowledge, in world history before. We have insurgency groups’ long commitment, who at some point then become

enabled and funded to degrees that we a few years ago would have

a hard time imagining the amount of money that flows to them.

The drug traffickers are a source for weapons and resources for

these guerrilla groups. In exchange, they provide protection for the

trafficking organizations.

Colombia remains the world’s leading producer of cocaine, and a

growing producer of some of the world’s purest heroin. Sadly, Mr.

Chairman, America’s drug habit is subsidizing anti-democratic

guerrillas in Colombia because the drug traffickers use the rebels

to protect their lucrative industry. To attack drug trafficking headon is a direct attack on the true source of instability in Colombia

and the region.

With the help of my colleagues, Senators Coverdell, Graham,

you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and others, last year we

passed our bill, the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.

This was a much-needed stop toward eliminating the drug problem

at its core, but it was only a first step. This Act authorizes a $2.7

billion, 3-year investment to rebuild our drug-fighting capability

outside our borders.

This law, Mr. Chairman, is about reclaiming the Federal Government’s responsibility—and I might say it is our sole responsibility

as far as the different units of Government. I believe in a balanced

drug approach. I think we have to have drug treatment. I think we

have to have education and we have to have domestic law enforcement. But this is the one area, the fourth component, international

interdiction, where only the Federal Government can act. The

States cannot act. The State of Ohio cannot act, the State of Alabama cannot act. Only the Federal Government can act, and I

think last year we began the process of reclaiming this responsibility that really is solely ours.

Passage of that bill is proof that Congress is providing the leadership in the fight against drugs. We passed this bill because

frankly the administration, sadly, since coming into office has

slashed funding levels for international counter-narcotics efforts.

Last year, however, through our bill we made an $800 million investment in previously under-funded programs.

The facts are, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at the percentage

of our anti-drug budget, what we have seen during the Clinton administration is a cut in the percentage of the dollars that we are

putting toward our anti-drug effort. The actual raw dollars have

stayed about the same, but if you look at our international drug

interdiction effort, what you find is those dollars have remained

fairly constant. But the percentage of our total anti-drug budget

has dropped year after year after year, the percentage of our total

5

anti-drug budget that goes for international interdiction, which is

what I am talking about. Last year, we reversed that trend. I think

it is very important, Mr. Chairman, that we continue to work in

this area this year to continue what we started last year.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to fighting the ELN and the FARC,

Colombia also is waging a war against an umbrella organization of

about, it is estimated, 5,000 rogue paramilitary armed combatants,

whose self-appointed mission is to counter the grip of leftist guerrillas and neutralize anyone suspected of associating with the guerrillas; again, one more war that Colombia has to fight. We have not

focused much attention, at least in public discussions, on the need

to counter the paramilitaries, but they too benefit from the drug

trade and account for a significant number of violent incidents in

Colombia.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the United States must take a

proactive action in Colombia. The question that we will explore

today, however, is what is our role. And I think again, to state the

obvious, this is Colombia’s battle; this is not the United States’.

This is a democratically-elected government in Colombia, and we

must work with them. And much as sometimes we may think we

know better how they should deal with their internal problems, it

is a democratically-elected government and President Pastrana is

working very hard to try to deal with these problems.

We must work with them and we must be there to assist them,

and I think one of the messages that Congress has to send and that

the President has to send is just that. We believe in democracy, we

believe in governments making their own decisions about how they

deal with their own internal problems. There are a number of serious problems that this country has, the country of Colombia has.

What happens in Colombia is vitally important to the United

States. When drugs are found in Cleveland or Dayton, Ohio, the

odds are very heavy they may very well come from Colombia, or

may originate in Colombia.

When we look at the regional stability of the region, all we have

to do is look at the map and see where Colombia is. And we have

already seen some of these battles spilling out and the consequences being felt by other countries in the region. And the other

countries in the region are very, very sensitive to what is going on

in Colombia. So what happens in Colombia is in our own backyard.

It is time, frankly, that this country began to pay collectively, all

of us—Congress, the President, and the American people, began to

pay a lot more attention to what is going on in Colombia because

in many respects what goes on in Colombia has a lot more influence on what happens in the United States, whether it be Iowa or

Ohio or Alabama, than something that happens 2,000, 3,000 miles

away.

So I applaud you for holding this hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on an issue that frankly is not going to go

away. It is going to become more and more important, and I think

the American people are going to understand in the weeks and

months ahead the importance of what is happening in Colombia to

the United States, to regional stability, and to our goal of frankly

seeing democracy flourish in this hemisphere.

6

That is really what is at stake, two things. One is drugs coming

into the United States, from a very selfish point of view and from

a parochial point of view. But what also is at stake is the legitimacy and the survival of the government of Colombia.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you, Senator DeWine.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just briefly

like to associate myself with both of your remarks and to say that

I have been mentioning for some time now Colombia specifically as

an area that this Nation has not given effective attention to. It is

in our neighborhood. It is critical to the Western Hemisphere. It is

a great nation, a longtime democracy of fine people who are suffering the agony of major drug distribution networks, cartels. And

now we are looking at a strong and aggressive guerrilla effort.

We have spent well over $20 billion on the effort in the Balkans

that is not in our backyard. And I have wondered how it is that

we now are sitting by and we have the Chinese communists having

ports at both ends of the Panama Canal that clearly can subject

that canal to sabotage and military attack, whenever they would

choose. And now we are seeing Colombia in agony dealing with a

Marxist guerrilla group and the amount of drugs coming out of Colombia and being produced there increasing. The numbers in the

New York Times showed that we had 165 metric tons of production

in 1993, and it is expected to hit 250 tons this year. That is a big

increase.

So I do not know what is happening, but I believe that this Government has been asleep at the switch. I believe we have not been

alert to this problem. I am not at all sure how we ought to go about

it, but I do believe it is a priority for us as a Nation, Mr. Chairman,

and I thank you for highlighting it.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I am going to call attention to the two

charts—well, one chart and one map. The first chart will show a

tremendous increase in the number of hectares that are in cultivation, the number of acres that have been sprayed, and the amount

of coca that has actually been killed as a result of that activity. It

shows a trend in coca cultivation and cocaine production in the Andean region for 1996 through 1998.

I would also like to have my colleagues today especially focus on

the map of Colombia that we have set up, and we will be talking

a lot about geographic areas around the country and hopefully this

map will be of a lot of help. This map is provided by the General

Accounting Office. The brown areas show where coca cultivation is

concentrated. And then we are going to overlay that now with a red

shaded area showing opium cultivation and how that has grown.

And then with the final overlay, the blue shaded area denotes the

regions controlled by insurgent groups. There are also smaller

versions of this map, including a new one showing where the demilitarized zone is located, in each Member’s packet.

Before I introduce the panel, I also would like to implore, when

we make a request to have our testimony two days ahead of time,

that that does mean two days. I know that obtaining clearance for

some of this hearing from OMB is a very necessary process and we

do not argue with that, but it makes it very difficult for us to be

7

able to prepare for a hearing when we do not have the testimony

on time as we have requested it in our letter.

The first panel consists of Rand Beers, the Assistant Secretary

for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs with the

Department of State. Then we will have Brian Sheridan, Assistant

Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict from

the Department of Defense, and then lastly, General Charles Wilhelm, Commander in Chief of U.S. SOUTHCOM in the Department

of Defense.

I thank you all for being here, and we will start with you, Mr.

Beers, and we will have all of you testify and then we will ask

questions afterwards. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BEERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members

of the caucus. I want to thank you for this opportunity to be here

today to talk about the situation in Colombia and our ongoing policy review. As is almost always the case, you have organized the

hearing with an absolutely appropriate time frame in terms of

where policy deliberations are and where we are in terms of our

discussions with the government of Colombia.

What the United States does or does not do in Colombia over the

next few years, and perhaps over the next several months, will

have a great impact on the future of that country, and I daresay

the United States as well. Colombia’s national sovereignty is increasingly threatened not from any democratic elements in the

military or the political sphere, but from narcotrafficking interests

and the well-armed and ruthless guerrillas and paramilitaries to

whom they are inextricably linked.

Although the central government in Bogota is not directly at

risk, these threats are eroding the authority of the central government and depriving it of the ability to govern in outlying areas.

And it is in these very areas where narcotics traffickers, paramilitary and guerrilla groups flourish that the narcotics industry is

finding refuge, as you have so ably indicated on the map which you

presented at the beginning of the hearing.

The links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrillas and

paramilitary movements are well-documented. Reporting indicates

that the guerrilla groups protect illicit fields and labs, transport

drugs and precursor chemicals within Colombia, run labs, encourage and intimidate peasants to grow coca, accept drugs as payment

from narcotics traffickers and resell those drugs for profit, and

trade drugs for weapons, including the possible shipment of drugs

outside of Colombia to Brazil and Venezuela for such trades. Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers, and obtain much of their funding from those traffickers.

The strength of Colombia’s armed insurgent groups has limited

the effectiveness of joint U.S.-Colombia counter-narcotics efforts.

While aggressive eradication has largely controlled the coca crop in

the Guaviare region and is beginning to make inroads in the

Caqueta region, any gains that have been made have been more

than offset by the explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo,

8

the southernmost area that you have on your map, an area in

southern Colombia which until recently has been off limits from

spray operations because the Colombian National Police have been

unable to secure a base there due to heavy guerrilla presence.

We are also unable to carry out any meaningful alternative development programs in most of the coca-growing region, especially

in southern Colombia, because the Colombian government lacks

the ability to conduct the monitoring and enforcement necessary for

the success of such programs. In order for our counter-narcotics

programs ultimately to be successful, we cannot allow certain areas

of the country, like Putumayo, to be off limits for counter-narcotics

operations.

Fortunately, there are reasons for optimism. The Colombian National Police has continued its superb record of counter-narcotics

activity, and now the CNP’s commitment to counter-narcotics has

also been adopted by the Colombian armed forces. In conjunction

with this change in focus, the current military leadership is guarding the country’s armed forces through a cultural transformation

which, if sustained, bodes well for the future of Colombia.

Defense Minister Ramirez and Armed Forces Commander Tapias

have taken dramatic steps to deal with the legacy of human rights

abuses and impugnity that have clouded our bilateral relations in

the past. Concurrent with this effort to clean up the military is a

renewed effort to counter-narcotics. The new leadership realizes

that one of the best ways to attack the guerrillas is to attack their

financing in the form of narcotics profits, whether through cultivation, processing, or transportation.

The Colombian Army is forming a brand new counter-narcotics

brigade specifically designed to work in conjunction with the Colombian National Police on the counter-narcotics mission, initially

in the sanctuary areas in southern Colombia. The Colombian Air

Force has undertaken an aggressive program to regain control of

their air space and deny its use to traffickers by extending north

coast operations to southern Colombia. The Colombian Navy is

working closely with U.S. forces on maritime interdiction and has

participated in many significant seizures, despite limits on equipment and operating funds. The Navy and Marine Corps are now

ready for interdiction operations on the Colombian river systems,

including in southern Colombia. Overall, cooperation with the Colombian military on counter-narcotics operations has never been

better.

INL is working directly with the Colombian military in two important areas. First, we are coordinating with SOUTHCOM and

the Department of Defense to provide training and equipment for

the Colombian Army’s new counter-narcotics battalion that I mentioned previously. The mission of this unit is to conduct counternarcotics operations initially in southern Colombia and to provide

force protection for the Colombian National Police.

In addition to training and equipment which DoD is providing,

we are providing mobility to that unit in the form of 18 UH–1N

helicopters. We are also working to improve the Colombian security

forces’ ability to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence on

counter-narcotics activities and on insurgent activity which could

threaten counter-narcotics forces.

9

One of the top priorities of the Pastrana government is implementing a peace process to bring an end to violent conflict that has

drained that nation for four decades. One of the key limitations

confronting the Pastrana administration during the negotiations,

however, is that the guerrillas currently feel little pressure to negotiate. Their intransigence is fueled by the perception that the Colombian armed forces do not pose a threat. This is another reason

that we are looking carefully at what we may do to aid the military

in its counter-narcotics mission.

Over the past several weeks, the government of Colombia has developed a comprehensive strategy, the Plan Colombia, to address

the economic security and drug-related problems facing that country. Colombia has invited the U.S. Government to contribute to the

development of this plan and we have worked closely with them for

over a month now.

Clearly, it has resource implications. We understand that the

majority of the resources will come from Colombia itself or from

international financial institutions. Colombia estimates that over

the next 3 years, they need to spend $7.5 billion to deal with the

combination of counter-narcotics issues, the economic problems facing the country, and social development issues related to drug trafficking and corruption.

Of that, they plan to spend or taken on additional debt burden of $4.75 billion, and they are looking to the international community to contribute the remainder of that money and they will be

here in town tomorrow to talk to Members of Congress after talking with the President in New York today.

We are currently involved within the administration in discussions regarding about how we can use existing authorities and

funds to support the counter-narcotics operations in Colombia, and

we are also ready now to work with the Colombians to assess the

additional resource implications of their strategy and the optimum

ways in which the United States can further assist.

But let me say with respect to the issue of a coherent strategy,

Mr. Chairman and members of the caucus, we have been working

with the government of Colombia now for over a month. As Senator

DeWine said, this is a Colombian problem, this is a Colombian

strategy that we have received from them, and we are now in the

posture of working with them to define what our role might be in

association with them.

It is a strategy that engages all elements of the Colombian government. It is a broad-reaching strategy that includes the relationship of the peace process to the economy, to social development, to

the counter-narcotics efforts. The bulk of the resources that they

are looking to devote to this effort will go to the counter-narcotics

effort. That is $4.8 billion over 3 years.

It is a strategy designed to go after drug trafficking, particularly

in southern Colombia, in order to take the resources away from

drug traffickers and to take the resources away from the insurgents who profit from that drug trafficking. If they can move into

that area in southern Colombia, the Caqueta-Putumayo area that

is in the southernmost area of the country that you have defined

on your map, they will have taken on what is currently a sanctuary

and what is currently the largest growing area in Colombia for coVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:32 Mar 22, 2001 Jkt 070923 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\64317 pfrm09 PsN: 64317
10

caine. They will not neglect the other areas in the country, but that

will be the initial area that they will want to be going into.

I think they have given us an outline of a very coherent and directed strategy that we should be able to work with them in order

to deal with. And I hope in the days and weeks ahead that we will

be in a better position to come up to respond to your request, Mr.

Chairman, that the administration and the Congress engage in a

discussion of Colombia, as the President indicated in his response

to Senator Lott and to Speaker Hastert.

The problems of narcotics in Colombia are daunting and complex.

While it is convenient to think of it in criminal terms, it is undeniably linked at a fundamental level to the equally complex issues of

insurgency and paramilitaries, and any action that we take directed at drug trafficking will also have implications for both of

those groups. Because of this, it is all the more important to maintain our focus on the counter-narcotics question at hand.

In Colombia, we have a partner who shares our concerns, and a

leadership that regularly demonstrates a political will to execute

the needed reforms and operations. Our challenge as a neighbor

and a partner is to identify the ways in which the U.S. Government

can assist the Colombian government and to assure that we are

able to deliver that assistance in a timely manner. I look forward

to working with you and other Members of Congress in the challenge that we face ahead.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers follows:]

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Chairman GRASSLEY. Now, we go to Secretary Sheridan.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. SHERIDAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SHERIDAN. Senator Grassley, let me start by echoing Rand’s

comments that your timing was exquisite on this hearing. This is

exactly the right moment to have this dialogue. Let me also thank

Senator Sessions, Senator DeWine and Senator Graham for coming

also this morning.

Senator DeWine, your leadership last year on the supplemental

was very much appreciated by all of us who work in the counterdrug effort. And Senator Graham’s longtime interest in the hemisphere and his leadership is well-recognized.

I have submitted a written statement for the record, so my oral

comments will be very brief. Speaking from a Department of Defense perspective, we are focusing principally on the cocaine threat

that emanates from Colombia. As you well know, approximately 80

percent of the cocaine that enters the United States at some point

transits Colombia, as well as a growing percentage of the heroin

that enters the U.S. And the cultivation of both coca and poppy

continue to flourish in Colombia. That is the threat that we are focused on.

We have been working with the Colombians in counter-narcotics

since 1989, when directed to do so by the Congress. Our policy is

very simple, it is not confused. It is to eliminate the production of

illegal drugs in Colombia, in partnership with the Colombian government. We are not in the counter-insurgency business.

As Rand explained, the situation on the ground in Colombia is

increasingly complicated, but our policy is very straightforward. We

are working with the Colombian government on counter-narcotics

programs. We are not in the counter-insurgency business. Our

work with them for the last 10 years has focused on detection and

monitoring support and to help them interdict illegal flows of cocaine, training, and intelligence support.

Over the last year or two, we have been involved in a number

of initiatives to enhance their air programs, upgrading their aircraft. On the ground, we are focusing on the training of the

counter-drug battalion, and on the rivers we are working with

them on a revitalized riverine program, both to stop the flow of

coca products, but more importantly to interdict the flow of precursor chemicals.

The military has made great strides over the last couple of years

in two very important areas, both in its commitment and improvement on human rights grounds, which I think is very commendable, and I think under-noticed, if I might say, in the United

States, and under General Tapias and Minister Ramirez a real

commitment to reforming the Colombian military to make it more

effective as it performs the tasks that the president directs it to

perform.

Let me close by echoing Rand’s comments that this is a Colombian problem. Senator DeWine, you also mentioned this. They have

come up with what we think is a very good, integrated strategy.

Our policy is very straightforward to support the democraticallyVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:32 Mar 22, 2001 Jkt 070923 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\64317 pfrm09 PsN: 64317
19

elected government of Colombia, and that is our task and that is

what we are doing.

I look forward to your questions.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Sheridan.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheridan follows:]

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Chairman GRASSLEY. Now, General Wilhelm. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES E. WILHELM, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General WILHELM. Chairman Grassley, distinguished members of

the caucus, I am pleased to appear before you this morning to discuss our activities in Colombia. This is a crucial issue and it is one

that we at Southern Command believe is of great importance not

only to Colombia and to the United States, but to the entire hemisphere.

When I arrived at Southern Command 2 years ago, I described

Colombia as the most threatened nation in our hemisphere. Today,

I stand behind that assessment. In fact, over the past 2 years the

situation in Colombia as it pertains to internal security and stability, if anything, the threats have intensified. Despite that, as I

testify before you today, I am cautiously optimistic about Colombia’s future. I am optimistic for three reasons.

The first is leadership. I have been in and out of Colombia for

a variety of military purposes for over a decade. The current leadership in Colombia from the top down, from the president through

the military leadership, is the best, the most ethical, and the most

focused that I have ever worked with. Dealing with people like

General Tapias, General Serrano, General Mora Rangel, the commander of the Army, General Velasco, the commander of the Air

Force, Admiral Garcia, the commander of the Navy, I am dealing

with top-flight professionals. These are men with a deep and abiding sense of ethics. They care about their troops and they know

what they are doing, and they have a vision for the future. So I

am encouraged by the leadership that I see.

The second thing that encourages me and causes me to have

some cautious optimism are recently battlefield successes enjoyed

by the armed forces. There can be no mistake about it. We watch

this very closely. My number was ten; there were ten stinging tactical defeats in succession that were suffered by Colombia’s armed

security forces. But then we saw the July country-wide offensive

initiated by the FARC, and there I saw some not so subtle changes

in the complexion of the battlefield.

I visited Colombia. I talked in great length with all of the military leaders. They presented me with convincing and compelling

evidence that in a significant number of engagements, the military

had prevailed. They prevailed for good reasons. They corrected

some of the mistakes that they have made in the past. Their intelligence and intelligence-sharing was much improved. I saw levels

of cooperation and coordination between the National Police and

the armed forces that I had not seen before. And, finally, I saw unparalleled improvement in air/ground coordination, and that made

a major difference during July.

I share the widely held view that the ultimate solution to Colombia’s internal turmoil lies at the negotiating table and not on the

battlefield. However, for negotiations to succeed, I am convinced

that the government must strengthen its negotiating position and

I believe that increased leverage at the negotiating table can only

be gained on Colombia’s battlefields.

31

The military component of Colombia’s emerging national strategy

that both Rand and Brian have mentioned targets narco-trafficking

as its point of main effort on the military side. I agree with this

approach. The best and most efficient way to eliminate the insurgents and para-militaries who are wreaking havoc on 50 percent of

the countryside is to eliminate their support base. Deprived of the

revenues and other support they derive from their alliance with

narco-traffickers, I believe the insurgents will be weakened to the

point where they will be compelled to participate in meaningful negotiations that will hopefully lead to peace and reconciliation. Denied an adversary and with reassertion of government control over

currently disputed areas, I am equally convinced that the illegal

para-military groups will literally die on the vine.

Colombia is headed in the right direction, in my judgment, but

to reach their destination, they will need our continued help. We

must continue to assist Colombia in its efforts to reform and revitalize its armed forces.

At the same time, we must assure that our own forces are postured to do the job. Accurate and timely intelligence are essential

for success against the narco-traffickers and are a key ingredient

in our own force protection programs.

As we have drawn from Panama, as we must under the provisions of the 1977 Panama Canal treaties, Southern Command has

been required to completely rebuild its theater architecture from

the ground up. We have come a long way in the past year. U.S.

Army South and Special Operations Command South have completed their migration from Panama to Puerto Rico. We will soon

stand up a new Navy component headquarters at Roosevelt Roads.

We have merged the two joint interagency task forces that conducted execution, planning, and supervision of our counter-drug operations in both the transit and source zones into a single integrated organization at Key West.

But this morning, from a counter-drug perspective, and I think

looking widely at our needs in Colombia, the single most critical

part of the architecture is not in place. Probably the most priceless

facility that we had on Panama was Howard Air Force Base. That

runway closed on the first of May of this year. Previously, during

any average year, we had somewhere in the neighborhood of 21 aircraft on the runways and taxiways at Howard Air Force Base, and

every year, they flew about 2,000 detection, monitoring, tracking,

and intelligence missions in support of our important work in the

Andean Ridge.

To compensate for the loss of Howard Air Force Base, we identified a series of forward operating locations, host nation airfields

that we would simply negotiate access agreements to and from

there conduct the operations that we previously conducted from

Howard. Short-term agreements have been reached with the Netherlands and we are operating out of Curacao and Aruba in the

Netherlands Antilles and we are closing on a final long-term agreement with Ecuador for the air field at Manta.

The Manta air field is one that I would really like to focus on

because it is truly the linchpin in the fall apparatus. Manta gives

us the site that we need to provide effective coverage of the crucial

Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador borders, all of Peru, and Bolivia, in

32

simple terms, the deep source where the drugs are grown and produced. It is the linchpin of the apparatus. We need $42.8 million in the next fiscal year and a total of $122.5 million in fiscal year 2000 and 2001 to bring these three

FOLs on line, to give them the capacity, the operating, and the

safety features that they need to sustain operations at roughly the

same tempo that we conducted them previously from Howard Air

Force Base.

That request is going to committee, I believe, within the next

couple of weeks. Anything that the members of the caucus could do

to support this funding would be greatly appreciate and, I think,

would aid enormously—enormously—our shared counter-drug efforts with Colombia and the other nations in the source zone.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter of August 12, you highlighted our

policy goals in Colombia and the counter-insurgency versus

counter-narcotics issue. From a military perspective, I believe our

policy in Colombia has been clear and consistent. We have focused

exclusively on counter-narcotics assistance. The rules are clearly

understood by our troops. We are there to train, equip, and provide

technical assistance. We have strictly avoided involvement in field

tactical or advisory roles. The direction of the new Colombian strategy, I am glad to say, is consistent with this policy.

Our efforts in Colombia are vitally important. We are profoundly

grateful to this caucus for its interest and for your support of our

initiatives and I hope that we can count on it in the important

weeks and months ahead.

Mr. Chairman and members of the caucus, I look forward to your

questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Wilhelm follows:]

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

Chairman GRASSLEY. I will start with Mr. Beers, but I have

questions of other people, as well. What you have described today,

I think my point is to make a point and ask you if what you have

described today is supposed to make a difference. Now, as I outlined in the previous chart that was there, we have had a very ambitious eradication program in Colombia against coca, but the result has been the doubling of the coca crop and increases in the

productivity so that Colombia will be producing more today than

last year or at any time in recent history.

What I think I have heard you say in your statement, it appears

that our policy for Colombia is to be more of the same and lots

more of it, sort of a more of it squared, than what we have had

in the past. Then compare that with the history of increased production we have. Do you describe that as success, and can you tell

us why we should have confidence that the plan you have suggested today is going to make a difference?

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, sir. Let me go into some more detail in

response to your question. Firstly, with respect to the issue of aerial eradication, the numbers which you have indicated in terms of

the overall increase in cultivation of coca in Colombia are our best

estimates of that. What they do not reflect is the detailed breakdown of the areas of concentration of our counter-narcotics effort in

eradication.

There are, or at least there used to be, three major growing areas

of coca in Colombia, the large blob on the right known as Guaviare

and the somewhat smaller blob in the south central which actually

is the merger of both Caqueta and Putumayo growing areas. The

principal area that the United States has supported Colombia in

eradicating has been in the Guaviare area, and for the last two

years, the overall levels of cultivation in that area have declined.

With respect to the Caqueta area, we have begun a serious effort

really only last year, and the increase in the Caqueta area, which

is that section there, as opposed to this section here, in that particular area, there was a less dramatic increase than there had

been before.

With respect to that southern finger, the Putumayo, that is the

area where the increase has been most expansive. That is the area

where we expect the increase to be even more dramatic next year

because that is the area that there has been no counter-narcotics

effort in, and that is the area that we are looking to work with the

government of Colombia in order to take on, additional effort in

Caqueta, more initial effort in Putumayo.

That is the eradication portion only, and that would be an expansion of the existing effort. But I think that there are two very important additional elements in the strategy that I was describing

which are new, which are not extensions of previous activities.

Firstly, the counter-narcotics battalion, which we have all three

described to you, is a new initiative on the part of the Colombian

military to become more involved in these activities. All of that

eradication effort that has occurred heretofore has occurred with

minimal or no involvement by the Colombian military on the

ground in order to secure the ground during and after an eradication effort in order to sustain that eradication effort. This is a

56

new proposal on the part of the Colombian government for which

they are organizing forces in order to take on this strategy.

Secondly, the Colombian air force, which has had some success

up on the north coast with air interdiction, is looking now to move

that effort to the south. Why is that different? Because the effort

in the north was devoted at going after airplanes that had already

acquired finished cocaine and were flying north to deliver that cocaine to drop-off points for further trans-shipment to the United

States or Europe.

In the south, what we are looking at is going after the air traffic

of the narco-trafficking industry at a point in the process where we

are talking about the first and second levels of processing, that is,

to prevent the leaf from being sold, to prevent the base and paste

from being sold and moved to final processing. If you think about

the effort that was undertaken in Peru over the last four or five

years and the dramatic drop in the price of coca leaf for farmers

which caused the 50 percent decease in cocaine production in Peru,

that is the effort that we are looking to try to do similar work in

Colombia. This would represent a new departure on the part of the

Colombian government and we are working with them in order to

affect that.

We do not believe that any single effort, any single strand, or

any single tool in the counter-narcotics effort is, by itself, enough.

This is a joint strategy within Colombia. It is a combined strategy

with the United States. It is an effort to use as many possible tools

as possible in order to go after the trafficking industry, and we

think with the broader-gauged and more comprehensive commitment on the part of the Colombian government and our working together with them, that, yes, this does stand an important, significant chance of making the serious inroad in the trafficking industry in Colombia that you and we and the American people all want.

Thank you very much, sir.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Do I hear you say, then, assuming that we

kind of agree that we have had this dramatic increase in cultivation and production, you are saying that the successes that have

been made in south central, and then my saying more of the same,

that that will have a parallel accomplishment in other growing

areas?

Mr. BEERS. I believe, sir, that increasing some of the things that

we are already doing, together with the new programs, is what will

make the significant difference here. What we have is a comprehensive program. What we had before was a program that did

not have the breadth and vision that this program has, and that

is why we are enormously appreciative of the Colombian government’s ability to pull together this strategy and present it to us and

why we want very much to work with them.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You indicated, Mr.

Beers, that two of the principal elements of the Colombian plan are

the use of the military in drug eradication and shifting air assets

further south so that they would interdict the process before crystallization and not after crystallization, is that correct?

Mr. BEERS. That is correct, sir.

57

Senator GRAHAM. There is some evidence that one of the contributors to the increased production in Colombia has been the fact

that there has been introduced a new strain of coca plant which is

more resistant and which also has a higher overall yield of coca hydrochloride. Is that your information, as well?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. We do not have the final figures on the extent of that shift, but it is correct. We have seen evidence and have

been reporting it for the last several years, that the higher-yielding

variety of coca called e coca coca, which is grown in Peru and Bolivia, appears now to have entered into the Colombian cocaine

equation, whereas before, they had a much lower-yielding, roughly

three-to-one ratio of coca, which was called ipidu. So, yes, we are

looking at not only the increase in the overall hectorage of coca

that is being grown, but we are also looking at the likely increase

in the yield characteristics as we measure and translate that cultivation into actual processed cocaine that will probably be available in this coming year, that is, the 1999 estimate, which will be

available at the beginning of 2000.

Senator GRAHAM. Since this new strain is a relatively new introduction into Colombia, as you say, and we have already seen almost a doubling of coca production in Colombia, what do we anticipate that this new development in the agronomy of coca production

will mean in terms of volume?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, in terms of the tactics of dealing with the drug

trafficking issue, this coca is still susceptible to aerial eradication

in the same way that the ipidu version was. But in addition to

that, we are also looking, as I mentioned, about the introduction

of ground forces to try to maintain the control on the ground once

the eradication has been undertaken and to allow the government

then to extend in the form of their control the option of some kind

of alternative economic activity to the farmers who are currently

drawn into that area by the gold rush mentality created by the

high profits that come from the coca industry.

So we hope, in combination, to present them with a clear deterrent for why they will not be able to take that coca to market and

with some alternative economic activity so that they can consider

other forms of economic work other than growing coca.

Senator GRAHAM. In addition to the focus on eradication and air

interdiction, what does the Colombian plan call for in terms of attacking the crystalline labs where the coca paste is converted into

cocaine?

Mr. BEERS. The Colombia national police will, with now the support of the military, continue their effort to go after those labs. We

have several efforts to see if we cannot identify those labs more effectively by national technical means in addition to the normal

human intelligence, which has often been the way that we have

discovered where those laboratories are. But we believe that the

additional presence of Colombian military along with the police on

the ground in the region will help considerably in terms of going

after those labs.

If you were to look at the statistics that came out of the effort

of Colombian Task Force South, which was located at Tres

Esquinas and the operations that were conducted out of that region

for the last year, you would see a dramatic increase in the number

58

of labs that were taken down, and that is a direct result of the increased presence of Colombian military and police on the ground in

that region. It becomes a lot more difficult when the sanctuary is

no longer a sanctuary to operate with impugnity and lawlessness

in the way that the traffickers had been able to do before.

In addition to that, as I mentioned and others have mentioned,

the Colombian navy and marine corps have stood up an important

riverine force that will operate on the rivers in this area, but more

broadly, throughout Colombia. One of the major activities that they

will be looking at, in addition to the air interdiction effort, will be

to prevent the transit of drugs and precursor chemicals over the

riverine system in southern Colombia. In addition to that, the Colombian national police and the army will also be looking to

dampen the flow of precursor chemicals into this region.

There is one particular chemical, potassium permanganate,

which is part of a major interdiction effort on the part of the Colombian government, to prevent its flow into the region, because it

is the one essential of all of the precursors that cannot be substituted for.

But in addition to that, the Colombian national police and military have been doing an important job in controlling that flow so

that we have discovered, they have discovered, that the traffickers

are now, in an effort to find acceptable chemicals, beginning to use

cement as a substitute for one of the precursor chemicals in the region, so that General Serrano told us recently that the amount of

cement that appears to have been going into the region is actually

greater than the amount of cement being used in the city of Bogota. So they have begun a major effort to now control the flow of

the common building material of cement because they are using

that as one of the precursors. That is part of a broader effort at

precursor control in the region.

Senator GRAHAM. With the increase in production of coca in Colombia, has there been a commensurate increase in the number of

crystalline labs?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, I do not have that figure for you, but I will try

to get it for you from the intelligence community.

Senator GRAHAM. You indicated that we seem to have increased

the number of labs that we have been able to eliminate. Do you

have any sense of what percentage those eliminations were of the

total of operating labs?

Mr. BEERS. No, sir, I do not, but I will get that for you, also.

Senator GRAHAM. I might say, just in conclusion, it has seemed

to me, and I defer to the judgment of people who know a lot more

about this business than I do, that the most vulnerable point in the

production of cocaine is at the crystalline labs. That is where you

have the smallest number of sites which are critical to converting

the relatively raw product into a commercially salable product, and

that that would be a site that ought to get substantial attention in

terms of our effort to break down the chain of operations necessary

to produce this product that does so much evil to the people of the

world.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, I would agree with you, would that we had

perfect knowledge of where all those labs were located, because you

are absolutely right. That would be the funnel point that would

59

allow us the greatest success if we were able to identify where they

were located in their entirety. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Senator DeWine?

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Beers,

just to kind of complete the picture, can you take Senator Grassley’s map and tell me where the DMZ zone is?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. It is located in this area, which touches on

the northern part of the Caqueta growing area and the eastern tip

of the Guaviare growing area. It is an area about of that size there.

It is not centered in any of the major growing areas, but it is on

the periphery of each of those growing areas.

Senator DEWINE. And just for the record, the area that you just

described and just showed us on the map, what percentage of what

Senator Grassley has labeled insurgent controlled area, what percentage of that blue area would that have been, that you described

as the DMZ? Is that a fifth of it a fourth of it or what is it?

Mr. BEERS. No, sir. It is much smaller than that.

Senator DEWINE. Much smaller than that?

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir.

Senator DEWINE. What would you say it is?

Mr. BEERS. We are talking about an area, based on the Senator’s

blue circumscribed area, that is probably less than ten percent of

that area.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you. General Wilhelm, I appreciate your

comments about Manta and the need for Manta and I want to

maybe zero in a little more on the need, as you perceive it, for

Manta and how that directly impacts our overall anti-drug strategy

in the region and how it impacts specifically on what we intend to

do in Colombia, if you could just go through that in maybe a little

bit more detail than you did. You touched on it, and I understand

that, but just in sort of layman’s terms, what difference does that

make as far as what we can do to help Colombia, which is the topic

of this hearing?

General WILHELM. Yes, Senator DeWine. First, I think the most

helpful way to discuss the forward operating locations is to view

them for what they are, which is a network. It is an interdependent

network. No one FOL by itself will adequately answer our needs

to conduct detection, monitoring, and tracking and aerial reconnaissance missions in support of our counter-drug efforts.

I will start, sir, with Curacao and Aruba and then talk a minute

about Central America and then close on Manta, which is the most

important FOL location, in my judgment, given the drug threat

that we face now.

First, Curacao and Aruba. Located where they are, adjacent to

Venezuela, those two locations provide us excellent coverage of

what I call the southern transit zone, the southern Caribbean region, and the northern source zone, Venezuela and northern Colombia.

Then we have identified a need for an FOL in Central America.

I will cover this very briefly. I think our needs could be met from

any of a variety of locations. My preferred site is the Liberia air

field in Costa Rica, but there is a bilateral counter-drug and maritime agreement that needs to be concluded before we can logically

open this next negotiating segment with Costa Rica.

60

But whatever FOL we end up selecting and negotiating in Central America, it will provide coverage of Central America, a large

portion of the important eastern Pacific transit routes, which we

have not been covering adequately in recent years, and it will also

provide us overlapping coverage of a small portion of the northern

source zone, again, looking at the Colombia-Venezuela portion,

which brings us to Manta.

Manta provides us immediate access to the very important PeruColombia-Ecuador border region where the cocaine hydrochloride,

the base is moved to laboratories for refinement. It is a major

movement vector for precursor chemicals. From Manta and only

from Manta can we get what I call coverage of the deep source

zone, which is the rest of the world. I think we would be ill advised

to pursue a Colombia-only strategy.

We need to pay careful attention to the successes that we have

had in Peru and Bolivia and we need to sustain those successes.

I know that the caucus knows the numbers. Last year, Peru reduced its production by 26 percent, Bolivia by 17 percent in terms

of leaf, and in terms of base, about 25 percent in both countries.

So we need to sustain our progress there. From Manta and only

from Manta can we reach down and cover the deep southern portion of the source zone.

If you look at all of that in the aggregate, sir, at the end of the

day, from this network of FOLs, we will have far better and more

efficient coverage of the entire area of interest from a counter-narcotics standpoint than we ever had from Howard Air Force Base

and at a considerable savings. The annual cost of operating Howard Air Force Base in its last full year of operations was $75.8 million. It will take us $122.5 million to develop the FOLs, as I mentioned earlier, to expand their capacities, to improve their operating and safety conditions to the point that we can conduct operations in the frequency and intensity that we need to, $122.5 million over two years, a one-time cost. Thereafter, our annual operating costs, we estimate between about $14 and $18 million a year.

So when the structure is in place, over a ten-year span, and I

suspect we are looking at about a ten-year struggle here, the FOLs

would support our efforts at about 40 percent of the straight-line

costs that we would have incurred operating Howard Air Force

Base as a permanent facility.

So, sir, as a network of operating locations, a brief look at some

of the fiscal implications of what we are talking about, and, of

course, we do escape the sovereignty issues because these remain

host nation facilities and bases to which we simply have access authorization.

Senator DEWINE. General, how long would it take to get Manta

up?

General WILHELM. Sir, we believe that we can do most of the

heavy hauling—to put it in very simple terms, we need to dump

about $30 million worth of concrete into that runway to make it capable of taking our big airplanes. Big airplanes to us are AWACs

and tankers. Those are the long-reach, long-look airplanes that we

need to do the job in the deep-source zone.

Senator DEWINE. It would take how long?

61

General WILHELM. Sir, we can let those contracts and get most

of that done during fiscal year 2000.

Senator DEWINE. What assurance do we have we get to stay

there?

General WILHELM. I talked with Ambassador Rich Brown about

48 hours ago, sir. We have one final point on taxes to resolve with

the Ecuadorians and it looks as though we will either have a tenyear agreement or a five-year agreement with a five-year provision

for automatic extension.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you. Secretary Beers, is there any reason for any optimism in regard to the peace process?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, I——

Senator DEWINE. Is there any good news?

Mr. BEERS. I think that one of the important ways to look at this

is that this is not a short-term process and that time horizons that

are shorter than three or five years are unrealistic with respect to

the resolution. I am not aware of a negotiation with an insurgent

that took less time than that. I think there were enormous expectations that were created when President Pastrana was elected. I

think we are in for the long, slow haul.

So when you ask, am I optimistic, if you give me the privilege

of saying, with a longer time horizon, yes, and I think that this

strategy that the Colombian government has presented represents

a way to push the parties closer together to resolving it, but it is

not going to happen quickly.

Senator DEWINE. My time is up. Thank you very much. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. This is a very troubling

thing for me. I got involved as a young Federal prosecutor prosecuting cocaine cases in the DEA and others in the 1970s, and 12

years as United States Attorney on the Gulf Coast and had some

appreciation for what was happening. I read The Underground Empire and all those books and all that stuff. The things that you are

saying today, Mr. Beers, Mr. Sheridan, were said in this body 15

or 20 years ago. We are making progress. We are going to do this.

We have got a little progress in Peru, 26 percent, 17 percent in Bolivia, reduction. But there is an increase in Colombia that more

than compensates for that and that has been the pattern consistently.

Now, I am not sure how to deal with it, but I think we have got

to be honest about what is happening, and we are not going to stop

the drug problem in the United States by reducing or stopping production in Colombia. That is not going to do it. It is a component

of it, if we can make progress, but it is not going to deal with our

problem. We have a demand that it will be produced somewhere.

Mr. Sheridan, how much cocaine is consumed in the United

States in metric tons per year?

Mr. SHERIDAN. I would have to defer to General McCaffrey on

that. My sense is it is probably 300 or 400 tons a year.

Senator SESSIONS. Is that including what is seized or actually

consumed.

Mr. SHERIDAN. No. You said consumed in the United States.

62

Senator SESSIONS. Do you mean actually coming in, or including

that that is seized——

Mr. SHERIDAN. I can only give you rough orders of magnitude.

The best I can recall, the number is about 400 tons or so, I think,

enter the United States, give or take some, and maybe 100 tons are

then seized somewhere in the United States, and maybe 300 tons

are consumed, somewhere along those lines.

Senator SESSIONS. So it looks like Colombia will supply the biggest part of that next year, with 250 metric tons.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Correct.

Mr. BEERS. There is more than enough.

Senator SESSIONS. It is a very, very frustrating process for me.

And you have Colombia producing what percentage of our heroin

now?

Mr. SHERIDAN. I do not know, but it is a growing percentage.

Senator SESSIONS. Is it not 60 or so percent, I believe, in one of

the——

Mr. SHERIDAN. Well, 60 or 70 percent is of the heroin that is actually seized, although I think people would be careful to say it

does not necessarily reflect what is being consumed. In other

words, our law enforcement may have a bias towards being more

effective in seizing Colombian heroin than perhaps some out of

Southeast Asia or other places. But, clearly, increasing amounts of

Colombian heroin are being found in the United States.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Sheridan, you said that the DEA is not

in the counter-insurgency business, and I believe, General Wilhelm,

you said our military support had been ‘‘exclusively on counter-narcotics assistance.’’

General WILHELM. That is correct. Yes, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. It seems to me, if we are going to lobby Colombia to do something about producing cocaine, they need to be

able to do it, and it seems to me they have got to take control of

their country. I mean, Abraham Lincoln understood that. You cannot have a big chunk of your country under Marxist revolutionary

control and be able to expect the country to be able to do anything

successfully, particularly when they are involved in the narcotics

business. That troubles me.

Is this the policy of the United States, Mr. Beers, and the State

Department, that we are not going to assist Colombia in defeating

the guerilla forces that are threatening its ability to do what we

ask in their own democracy?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, what we are about and what our focus is is on

counter-narcotics, but that——

Senator SESSIONS. My question to you is——

Mr. BEERS. Please, may I finish, sir?

Senator SESSIONS. My time is going to run out.

Mr. BEERS. But that area is also insurgent. Where the insurgents

and the traffickers are together, our assistance supports efforts to

go after insurgents as well as traffickers because there is no difference between insurgents operating in those areas. So we will assist in that area.

The strategy, then, is to deprive the insurgents of their resources. There are insurgents there. There are resources there.

63

This is an effort to go after the traffickers and the insurgents

where there is cultivation—— Senator SESSIONS. Do you agree with the General that Colombia

is not going to have any leverage at the negotiating table until they

start winning militarily some on the battlefield?

Mr. BEERS. That is the general view of this government, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. And does this government have any plans to

assist a longtime ally of the United States, Colombia, in this effort,

to defeat the military insurgents that are in Colombia?

Mr. BEERS. As I have said, our authorization and our strategy is

counter-narcotics. It will also effectively reduce the capabilities of

the insurgents. It is their life blood.

Senator SESSIONS. I just think that is a real bad problem. I think

that my best judgment is that the first thing we need to do is help

Colombia win this civil war to reassert governmental control over

their country and then they can begin to make progress, and it

seems to me it is sort of ironic that the area that the insurgents

control is the very area where the major cultivation is, is that not

true, Mr. Sheridan?

Mr. SHERIDAN. Yes, and as Secretary Beers said, our interests,

our policy is very clear of supporting the Colombian military, allowing it to operate in the narcotics areas, particularly in the

Putumayo and the Caqueta. In the course of them doing counternarcotics work, they will end up denying the FARC the revenue

that the FARC need to engage in their insurgency.

Senator SESSIONS. I understand the DEA’s position. As a matter

of fact, I think DEA is correct. DEA is not a political-military organization. It is an anti-drug organization. You have to maintain that

as your priority. But I am surprised and concerned that the policy

of our military and our State Department and our President is not

to provide direct assistance, where possible, to help Colombia defeat the Marxist guerrillas that are threatening their—— Mr. BEERS. Sir, this is their highest priority.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Senator, also, I am speaking for the Department

of Defense.

Senator SESSIONS. Excuse me.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I am speaking for Secretary Cohen today and I

can tell you, I have gotten very clear guidance from him. I know

where he is.

Senator SESSIONS. Enforcement policy, not DEA. I am sorry.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Right. He is strongly in favor of supporting the

Colombian military as it works in the counter-narcotics area. We

are not interested in a straight counter-insurgency support program in Colombia, nor do we have any authorization or appropriation of any funds from this Congress for that purpose.

Senator SESSIONS. But is that the right policy? Who wants to answer that? Is that the right policy?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, that is the Colombians’ policy.

General WILHELM. This is, as much as anything else, an operational question. Senator Sessions, that is a good question and I

think there is a reasonable answer to it. I have never seen an insurgency quite like the one that we are observing in Colombia right

now. It is the only self-sustaining insurgency I have ever seen.

There is no Cuba in back of it. There is no Soviet Union in back

64

of it. It is this delicate marriage of criminals, narcotraffickers, with

insurgents. So it is kind of a one-of-a-kind phenomenon.

I have always felt that one of the best ways to defeat an enemy

is not to take him on frontally, because you are going to take a

heck of a lot of casualties to do that. A much better way is to cut

his supply lines. The FARC’s supply line are the revenues that

they get from the narcotraffickers, so if we can help them defeat

the narcotraffickers, dry up their cash flow, which is exactly the

commodity they use for recruitment, for arms purchases, for the

adaptive tactics and techniques they have undertaken with the propane canisters, the full range of activities they are involved in, I

think the insurgency will die on the vine. To me, this is a good

military strategy. Cut off their logistics lifeline and let the force die

on the vine.

Senator SESSIONS. General Wilhelm, all I would say to you is, we

have been trying to dry up the money going into Colombia from cocaine for over 20 years. That has been a goal not achieved under

any administration, and I am not sure you can achieve that. I am

not sure that we are going to be able to do anything until they are

defeated on the battlefield. But I guess you have been there, you

know, but those are just my instincts about where we are. I do

hope that we will not be so persnickety about not providing aid

that will help them actually win militarily, and that would help

fight narcotics, I believe.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. My time is over.

Chairman GRASSLEY. General Wilhelm, one of our main concerns

has to be for effective intelligence. General, could you characterize

your current situation as far as intelligence collection is concerned

and the resources necessary for that and how your resources meet

the needs?

General WILHELM. Senator Grassley, I am in trouble. In December of last year, I categorized our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in Southern Command at the lowest

measured readiness level, C–4. That is where we are today. Just

to make our plight perhaps a little bit more measurable, we requested slightly in excess of 900 aerial sorties to paint the intelligence picture that we needed of these narcotics producing regions.

Our fill was less than 400 sorties, or at about a 44 percent fill rate.

I need help. I need it badly. I have no tactical assets that are

dedicated to my theater. The ARL, the airborne reconnaissance

low, an aircraft, of course, which we tragically lost here about a

month ago with a crew of five U.S. and two Colombians on board,

was designed and built for United States Southern Command. I do

not have a single one of them today, but three of them are in

Korea.

I am in urgent need of help on the intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance side. I think we are on the cusp of elevating Colombia to Tier 1 Bravo for intelligence collection, which will certainly

increase our leverage to get assets. But at this moment, that is

probably the largest single problem that I face, sir, always

backwiring into the theater architecture. That is why it is so important that the few assets that I have be at the right locations,

where they can give me the densest possible coverage of the most

65

important areas. Hence, I keep bringing up the FOL structure and

the importance of Manta.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Secretary Sheridan, you have outlined a

number of different projects that you currently have ongoing in Colombia and several of these were funded through Section 1033 of

the DoD appropriation bill. Are there any legislative recommendations that you would make to Congress that would allow your current projects in Colombia to be conducted more effectively?

Mr. SHERIDAN. For the moment, Senator, I think we are fine.

Clearly, the 1033 authority which allows us to buy and transfer

equipment, something that in the past the Congress had not been

willing to provide for us, has been a help. It has a cap in any one

particular year of $20 million. We are bumping up against that

cap. I think for the moment, we are okay, but as we come around

perhaps with next year’s authorization bill, at that point, we may come and ask for that cap to be raised from $20 million to some

higher number. But for the moment, I think we have the authority

from Congress to do the things that we are being asked to do.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Would you suggest how raising the cap, if

you asked for that to be done, would affect your current policy options?

Mr. SHERIDAN. It would not. It would allow us, though, to provide more equipment to those riverine forces, which is what the authority was intended to do.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Then my last question would be to Secretary Beers. I do not know whether it is a point or a question, but

I would ask you to respond either way. You have suggested an ongoing policy review. I do not have any argument with that.

But I guess I would have argument with that if it does not go

beyond policy review, because it seems to me that we have to do

better than just policy review. If this is a review, can we expect to

see a policy come out of it? Will we be seeing that before we see

a wish list of things that we would do if we appropriate money? It

is already going on in the administration, talk about requesting a

supplemental for Colombia, so would we see something more than

just a project list or a grab bag of goods and services that it would

be used for? I said in my opening comment, it seems to me very

important that we have a policy before we go ahead and make

these decisions to spend more money.

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. We have been engaging in this review and

the discussions with the Colombian government for the express

purpose of having a policy before we came to resource decisions.

There were some indications of discussions of numbers, in part derivative of the Colombian visit up here in July with a list of equipment that they were interested in and some indications with respect to the Republican Drug Caucus in the House and with respect to General McCaffrey’s documents that were circulated.

But I can tell you, having participated in the deliberations within

the administration, that the focus has been since mid-July on the

development of a clear, comprehensive strategy for presentation

and discussion with the Congress of the United States and that

that was the intent of the President’s response to the Speaker and

the Majority Leader and that is the intent of the administration,

to present you all with a policy proposal, folding in the Colombian

66

strategy, which has got to be the centerpiece of that. We are not

doing this by ourselves. We are not doing this alone. Then, if that

yields issues or implications that have resources, then we will look

at that in association with the Congress, as is appropriate.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you. I will call on Senator Graham.

I, and maybe other members, I, for sure, will have some questions

that I want to submit for answer in writing, but I do not want to

prolong this meeting longer than necessary. Senator Graham?

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will heed

your advice and may also submit some questions in writing.

Let me pursue three issues. One, General Wilhelm, relative to intelligence and surveillance capabilities, in April, I talked to another

one of your Central Command brethren who expressed similar concern about intelligence surveillance, but he thought that it was episodic, that it was a function of the war in the Balkans and that

there had been a diversion of resources for that purpose. Is your

situation an episode or is this a systemic problem of adequate intelligence surveillance?

General WILHELM. Senator Graham, it is a little bit of both, but

I think at Southern Command, it leans a little bit more toward the

systemic side. We have seen a steady draw-down of the resources

that are available to this theater and it is not only the airborne

platforms that everybody competes for. We had an intelligence brigade, the 470th, the military intelligence brigade that was active

in our theater that has been stood down. A lot of our ground signals intelligence sites have been closed. So it is not just airborne

platforms.

Also, the counter-drug mission, as I know this caucus is well

aware, the global military forces policy is broken down into four increments and counter-drug is number four of four. So three other

things get filled before ours, and so we suffer the kinds of losses

that General Zeni talked to you about when Bosnia and Kosovo

heat up and they draw off these low-density, high-demand assets

that all the CINCs need. So ours is partly a function of world

events and partly systemic.

Senator GRAHAM. In the budget request that General McCaffrey

has presented us, does he adequately address the issue of intelligence resources for this anti-drug campaign?

General WILHELM. Senator Graham, I have got to be honest with

you. I will have to go back and take another look at the resource

outlines that General McCaffrey provided. If I could take that for

the record, I would like to review that again. I know roughly where

the money is, but I will need to take a look at that, if you do not

mind, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Fine. Mr. Beers, in the Colombian plan that

has just been presented, what does it do in terms of internal reform

of the Colombian institutions, the military and the police, which

will carry the bulk of the responsibility? As an example, there has

been concern that there is a policy in Colombia that if you are a

high school graduate, you cannot be used in combat, and that has

substantially reduced the number of potential combatants within

the Colombian military. Does the plan that has recently been submitted deal with that or other institutional reforms?

67

Mr. BEERS. Let me let Mr. Sheridan answer the military portion

but take the opportunity to also expand a little bit on the judicial

side. The plan discusses both. On the judicial side, there is a major

reform effort that is partially underway that would be accelerated

as a result of this plan which would go after dealing with some

general problems with the Colombian judicial system as they transition from the Napoleonic code to something more like the English

system with oral testimony.

In addition to that, there is a major anti-corruption effort that

they are planning on undertaking and a general policy to deal with

human rights abuses across the board, as well as efforts to go after

assets of traffickers and put them back into the public treasury, as

well as efforts to disrupt and dismantle the trafficking organizations. This is a major component of their plan and I appreciate you

giving me the opportunity to stress that important element.

Brian.

Mr. SHERIDAN. On the military reform side, as I said in my opening comments, former Minister Ureda and then current Minister

Ramirez and General Tapias have shown us a willingness and a

recognition of the need to reform the Colombian armed forces,

which for us is very refreshing and, we think, needed. They have

already taken some steps. In our recent discussions with them on

the development of their strategy, they have committed themselves

to taking more. I would anticipate over the next few months we

will work with them in helping them develop further ideas for their

restructuring and reform.

As I also said earlier, the Colombian military has made dramatic

progress on human rights. In fact, very recently, we just had several senior military officials cashiered on human rights grounds. So

General Tapias gets it. The leadership gets it. Reported human

rights violations which are attributed to the military by NGOs

have plummeted over the last few years. They just passed a military judicial reform bill in their congress this past summer. So we

are seeing real progress in those areas and we are seeing progress

in their willingness to restructure thier military to make them

more effective.

I think General Wilhelm can comment on the bachalarias, which

is what you referred to.

General WILHELM. Yes, Senator, and I think this may get somewhat to some of the points that Senator Sessions was referring to

as Colombia reaches out and strives to regain control of its own

territory.

Colombia has got a big army, about 122,000. They have got a big

national police force, about 104,000. I go along with Senator

DeWine’s assessment of the overall strength of the insurgents,

about 20,000. So they have the ten-to-one ratio that we commonly

refer to that you need to defeat an insurgent force, but you need

the right army to do that.

Your point on the bachalarias, Senator Graham, is spot on. As

best I can determine, though, the number is a little bit imprecise.

Somewhere between 30,000 and 35,000 members of that 122,000-

man army, by virtue of their education level, were, by law, exempted from combat operations. That is the wrong kind of army.

68

As Brian mentioned, during his tenure, Minister of Defense

Rodrigo Ureda, before he stood down, developed a personal goal of

really taking a tight comb to the structure of the armed forces and

his goal was to move 15,000 troops per year out of these non-productive capacities, this distorted tooth-to-tail ratio, and put them

out in the interior where they were needed to wrest control of the

countryside from the insurgents. He viewed that as a three-year

proposition, which, if carried through, obviously, to completion,

would put 45,000 more troops with their fingers on triggers instead

of their feet on overpasses.

So this is very, very much a part of the reform and restructuring

efforts that are underway in Colombia right now, and Minister

Ureda’s vision has been adopted by Minister Ramirez, the new

Minister of Defense.

Senator GRAHAM. My time is up, but I will submit a written

question which will basically ask what does the United States military, after its long association with the Colombian military, consider to be the most urgent reforms for the Colombian military to

reach the level of efficiency to be able to carry out the mission that

it has committed to? Second, to what degree does the plan that was

submitted this week meet those diagnosed needs? And third, is

there any U.S. role in seeing that those prescriptions are effectively

applied?

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, you make,

I think, a very compelling and very good point, a very interesting

point, when you talk about SOUTHCOM’s intelligence assets, that

they have been depleted to support ongoing missions in other parts

of the world. It seems to me, and this is a comment and you can

comment on it if you would like, or if you want to pass, that is fine,

it seems to me that this is the world we live in today and that we

face a lack of depth in regard to these assets.

Maybe as we look at where we go into the next century, we need

to be beefing these assets up, because it seems to me they are always going to be needed somewhere in the world. There is going

to be some crisis or someplace where they are needed, and if we

are serious about having any of these assets available or significant

assets available or enough assets available for anti-drug efforts,

that we probably need to add to the depth of these and we need

to look at this from a long-term point of view. Do you want to comment on that or not?

General WILHELM. Senator, I think if—well, I will be bold

enough to speak, because I talk with them all the time, with a

number of my fellow CINCs. I think they all feel the pinch of these

assets that we call low-density, high-demand, and we would like to

see the pool of resources deepened.

The examples are many. One of the examples that comes to mind

that is not part and parcel of my normal theater business is the

aged EA–6B, our sole remaining electronic combat aircraft, which

really needs to precede every tactical strike force, and that is a

hard-pressed asset.

We look at Rivet Joint. I have Senior Scout, the aircraft that

really paint the battlefield picture for us. These are assets that I

69

think we all have a compelling need for and they do not necessarily

always correlate precisely to what we need to fight a major regional

contingency. It is the rest of the world that we have to address, developing regions, places where we are performing some of these

less traditional missions.

So, yes, sir, I think we are probably all in agreement on that,

and I believe that there are some fairly purposeful steps underway

to try to deepen the asset pool so that we can better meet the

CINCs’ requirements for these assets.

Senator DEWINE. Let me address a question to any of the members of the panel who would like to respond to it. Some of you have

already touched upon this, but I want to talk a little bit about the

regional threat that this ongoing crisis in Colombia poses. The

FARC constantly infiltrates the Darien Province, for example, in

Panama. It just goes on and on nad on. They may be responsible

for recent kidnappings inside Ecuador. Another example, the head

of the Colombian paramilitaries has threatened Panama and Venezuela.

How would you describe for the American people the significance

of what is going on in Colombia, besides the drug problem and its

impact on the United States and besides its impact on Colombia?

What is its impact on the region, potentially?

Mr. BEERS. I will take a start, but I think that all my colleagues

are probably going to want to contribute to that question. Sir, I

think you have painted an accurate picture of the concerns that we

all share, which is that, without making too big an issue about how

this might expand, you have painted three adjacent countries who

currently are experiencing some dislocations or problems that stem

directly from the uncertainty and instability that is occurring in

certain areas in Colombia. That is part of the reason the government wants to do something about it, and from our own national

security perspective, with respect to drug trafficking and democratic stability in the region, why we would like to do something

about it.

It is an issue that requires focus and discipline in terms of how

we think about the problem and how we approach it and the kinds

of resources and strategies that we put against it. We do not have

any magic solutions, but it is pretty clear to all of us that we are

going to have to deal with these problems in the adjacent areas

just as much as we are going to have to deal with the problems

that directly affect us in Colombia.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I would just say, Senator, that trying to characterize the regional impact in some ways is similar to trying to characterize the internal situation, where the difficulty for people working the problem is in trying to strike the right balance and understanding what is going on, because it is very complicated.

On the one hand, I think there is a recognition—the FARC have

been around since 1966. There has been a recent spate of press coverage. I think some people pick up the newspaper and they say, my

God, what is going on in Colombia today? It is going to fall apart

tomorrow. That is one extreme. But the other extreme, I think

equally dangerous, is for the long-time Colombia watchers who say,

do not worry about it. This has been going on for so long.

70

We are kind of trying to understand and look at the situation

and understand what is the degree of the slope here. From my perspective, when you talk to the intelligence people and look at the

longer-term trends, what you see is that the FARC today is bigger

than it has ever been. It operates in more provinces than it has

ever operated in before. It conducts more complicated military operations than it has ever conducted before. But then there is the dayin/day-out tactical victories and tactical defeats.

So from my perspective, Bogota is not threatened tomorrow, but

on the other hand, there is clearly something going on with the

growing capabilities of the FARC. When you look at it regionally,

the FARC have been using the Darien Province as an R&R location

for years and years. I remember when I first came to this job about

61⁄2 years ago, in one day, the FARC wiped out a whole Ecuadorian

riverine unit. So they have been using northern Ecuador and have

been familiar with that for quite a while.

So, again, it is trying to understand what is new here and what

has been going on for quite a while, but I would say, as the situation in Colombia goes, so will go the regional threat, and clearly,

I think, the neighboring countries, it is appropriate for them to

focus on their border areas. Virtually all of them are very inaccessible jungle areas, extremely hard for those governments to get at,

and in many cases, there is not a whole lot going on out there except for jungles and guerrillas.

Senator DEWINE. General.

General WILHELM. Sir, as you would appreciate, I spend a lot of

time with the militaries from the five nations that do border Colombia and it has been very interesting over the last 24 months.

When I go to Caracas, Venezuela, right now, the topic of greatest

interest is Colombia. Ditto, Brazil. I was in Brasilia about two

weeks ago.

I refer to it as a spreading stain. I think the sensitivity of the

surrounding countries to the situation in Colombia has changed. It

has intensified. Just sort of anecdotally, looking very, very quickly

at what is happening in the region on any given day, Venezuela

will have about 10,000 troops along the Putumayo River, which establishes its border with Colombia. It is very interesting. I have

visited most of the outposts. About 80 percent of the people living

on the Venezuelan side of the river are Colombians, so it is a displaced population.

Peru and Ecuador for a considerable period of time were really

denied much of an opportunity to do much about the situation on

their border because they were fixated on each other. With the

signing of the peace accords in Brasilia in October of last year, both

countries are now concentrating their military forces near the border to limit incursions there.

Brazil is very important. For a long time, I think Brazil was essentially in kind of a denial mode. That is certainly not what I see

at all in Brasilia now. A laboratory was destroyed on the Brazilian

side of the border, which I believe had an annual output capacity

of about ten metric tons. That is big drug business. Brazil is investing $1.4 billion in the Amazon surveillance system so that they can

get a series of both airborne, ground, fixed, and mobile radars and

71

sensors to better control and surveil the Amazonis Province, which

is very important to them.

Brian did a good job of describing the situation in the Darien

Province of southern Panama. Panama, of course, with no military

after Just Cause, really is left with public forces which are not configured to deal with the kind of threats that the violations of sovereignty posed by the FARC present to them.

So it affects each and every one of the surrounding nations to

some extent in varying and differing ways, but the concern level,

I will tell you, sir, is up significantly.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did notice in the

recent New York Times article that despite their early hopes for

Pastrana, however, U.S. officials generally described his efforts to

negotiate with the guerrillas as a failure that has left the insurgents stronger and more defined. Without going into too much detail, I think you have agreed that the insurgents are stronger and

this negotiation may not have been helpful.

General Wilhelm, is it not true, when you are asking an infantry

company to get out and put their life on the line to confront a military force, that they need to know that the leadership is committed

to victory and that it can undermine the effectiveness of any unit

if the leadership at the top is not perceived as committed?

General WILHELM. Senator Sessions, you could not be more correct. We have events in the last 30 years in our own history, I

think, that bear that out completely. You have just expressed a

sentiment that, quite frankly, was alive and well in Colombia fairly

recently.

I can remember very, very well talking to an old friend shortly

after I took command of Southern Command, a general—name is

not important—in the Colombian armed forces, and he said, do you

know what our problem is? And I said, what is that? He said, the

army is at war and the country is not.

I think a lot of that is changing, sir, and I think a lot of it is

changing because of the activities of the FARC. It is hard to ignore

the kidnapping of an entire church congregation in Cali. It is hard

to ignore the hijacking of an Avianca airliner. It is hard to ignore

the kidnapping of three U.S. nationals and then transporting them

across a river and shooting them in the back of the head.

I think the reality of this struggle is settling in on the Colombian

population at large and I detect a spirit in the armed forces that

this is a shared enterprise. They believe that the president is with

them. I think they believe that the national leadership is with

them.

So I have seen some changes over the last 24 months, sir, and

maybe they will not produce results tomorrow, but looking to the

longer term, I think they probably will. I think we will see a mobilization of national will, but I think the mobilization of national

will will also be tied to an increase in national confidence. That is

why I drew some optimism from the performance of the military

during the July offensive and I hope they can sustain that kind of

performance.

72

Senator SESSIONS. I recall one time that Henry Kissinger said

that nothing clears the mind so well as the absence of alternatives,

and I just do not see how Colombia has an alternative. They have

got to get themselves together and they have got to put forth a

military force that is effective and do something about the drugs

in the process. While I would tend to agree that it would be very

damaging to the narco-rebels if we could reduce their money, historically, I am not sure that is going to be happening. I think it

is going to be almost together, the military and anti-narcotics, to

defeat them.

It would seem to me difficult, as you have described this group

more as outlaws, extortionists, not your traditional groups, it would

be even harder to negotiate with a group like that, to justify negotiating with a group like that. If you were dealing with a group of

ethnic people who wanted more autonomy for their region, that is

one thing. But if we are dealing with nothing more than people

with a Marxist history and a narcotics agenda, it seems to me even

more difficult.

So I would encourage the people of Colombia to come together effectively and do that. Can we help without becoming involved, General Wilhelm? Can we help, effectively, their military to strengthen

itself?

General WILHELM. Senator Sessions, I think we can, and honestly, sir, I think we are. Right today in Tolomida, Colombia, there

are 621 troops in training right now. This is the last increment of

this counter-drug battalion that we started building last April. We

trained 317 troops in the first increment, 621 now. So this is a battalion that is a third again the size of the traditional Colombian

army battalion.

It has got organic indirect fire capabilities, organic reconnaissance, it has got an organic medical capability, it has got civil affairs capability, psychological operations capability. In simple

terms, it is a full-up round. It has been designed from the ground

floor to work effectively with the Colombian national police and we

are helping with this unit, sir, because it is focused on the counterdrug mission.

The Colombian army is not sitting on its hands. They have other

organizations, counter-insurgency or counter-guerilla battalions,

which they have trained on their own hook.

My thought, and I think I am correct, is that once the Colombian

military leadership has the opportunity to observe this first CD

battalion in operation—and sir, they have already told me, next

year, we want to expand this to a CD brigade—I think we are

going to have helped them create the prototype around which they

will redesign the rest of their armed forces. Again, the dedicated

counter-insurgency force, internal problem to Colombia, is theirs to

contend with. We are providing the training, equipment, and monetary support to build the CD battalion. But I think a lot of what

we are doing is going to find transferrence to the rest of the force.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Beers, I have only been in this body a little over two-and-a-half years, so I do not pretend to understand the

ways of all our government, particularly the State Department, but

is there some line here we are talking about? If we assist the miliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:32 Mar 22, 2001 Jkt 070923 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\64317 pfrm09 PsN: 64317
73

tary beyond just counter-narcotics, is that some sort of line we have

crossed that makes us nervous?

Mr. BEERS. Sir, with respect to the authorities of the bureau that

I am in charge of, we have authorities that are counter-narcotics

and that is what I do and I do not do counter-insurgency. But the

Department as a whole has come to this conclusion. That is an internal issue for the government of Colombia. We will help them on

the counter-narcotics side, including where it extends to the FARC

who are acting as narcotraffickers. But, yes, sir, as a policy perspective, we are not of the view that we should involve ourselves

directly in the insurgency. So it is a policy decision.

Senator SESSIONS. I certainly do not want to have American

troops in Colombia now fighting a war, but I think, to me, counternarcotics and counter-guerilla is one in the same and if we can provide, sell, supply the kind of hardware or training that they need

that could help them win this war, we would all be better off. It

is troubling, and I think there is uniform agreement—you can tell

it from the nations around Colombia—we are worried right now.

Things may not be falling apart in a total disaster. It is not a time

to panic, but it is time to be concerned. Ultimately, I believe this

matter will be decided on the battlefield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I hope we can look back at this period of

time and Congressional and administrative deliberation of this

issue as it relates to Colombia and the President Pastrana’s coming

to this country as a point in time when some policy changes and

efforts on our part have pointed to a dramatic change in the situation in Colombia and the export of cocaine and other illegal drugs

to our country.

Before I dismiss you, I would like to make a point, Mr. Beers and

Mr. Sheridan. As you are aware, and I did give a speech on this

on the floor of the Senate a few weeks ago, I have repeatedly asked

the administration for a detailed plan about the helicopters that

are in Mexico. The whole helicopter issue in Mexico has been a

great embarrassment and the lack of a plan seems to deepen that

embarrassment. I am going to ask one last time, and not ask you

to comment now but just to get a plan up here on how these helicopters are to be used, and I hope that we could have that within

a couple of weeks.

In regard to this hearing, this has been a very worthwhile discussion with you three leaders in this area. We thank you very

much for taking time out of your busy schedule to be here with us

and to follow up with us on the questions that this panel will submit in writing. As I have indicated, I hope that the things that

have been expressed here by all of you, both what is hoped for in

the future as well as what you see developing now, makes a significant difference and a follow-through will help with that. Thank you

all very much.

Mr. BEERS. Thank you.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Thank you.

General WILHELM. Thank you.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Our next panel and last panel consists of

Bernard Aronson and Michael Shifter.

74

Mr. Aronson is Chairman of ACON Investments and New Bridge

Andean Partners here in Washington. He was Assistant Secretary

of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1989 to 1993 and was the

principal coordinator of U.S. foreign policy and the principal foreign

policy advisor to the President and Secretary of State on relations

with Latin America and the Caribbean Basin.

Michael Shifter is currently a senior fellow for the Inter-American Dialogue here in Washington. There, he develops and implements strategies in the area of democratic development and human

rights. He served previously as Director of Latin American and

Caribbean Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy

and the Ford Foundation’s Governance and Human Rights Program in South America.

I thank you both for being present for this meeting and discussion and for your contribution in advance. I will start with you, Mr.

Aronson.

STATEMENT OF BERNARD ARONSON, CHAIRMAN, ACON INVESTMENTS, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. ARONSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, I will submit my statement for the record and try

to summarize it.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and Senator

Graham and other members of the caucus for inviting us, but more

importantly, for holding this hearing. We usually get in trouble in

Latin America because we fail to pay attention to problems there

until they become crises and then we seek to do something about

it, and usually the policy choices we face are narrow and difficult.

So I think this hearing is very timely and I think, to some extent,

we have done that with regard to Colombia as a country, both the

administration and Congress, but it is not too late, so it is important that we pay attention.

I guess the only other point I would make, and this is sort of an

old mantra with me, is that I would make an appeal to you and

your colleagues to try to maintain what this hearing has shown,

which is a bipartisan approach to this policy, because when an

issue in Latin America becomes polarized along partisan lines, we

just undermine the effectiveness of the United States. We should

have learned that lesson in Central America. When we came together in 1989 around a bipartisan policy, we were able to end the

war in El Salvador, to democratize Nicaragua, set the stage for a

peace process in Guatemala.

Your focus in the narcotics threat, but I think, as has been evident in this discussion, you cannot separate the issue of counternarcotics from the issue of the war and the larger crisis in Colombia, and that crisis involves many, many issues. It involves corruption. It involves vast areas of the Colombian state in which the government has no presence. It involves civil insurgencies whose roots

go far beyond the drug trade and have deep social and political

background that we need to understand.

I guess one point I would make to the Congress and to this caucus is if we are going to help Colombians resolve these problems,

we are going to have to stay the course and remain engaged for

75

many years, over many administrations, and over many Congresses.

Some of this testimony sounds very familiar to me. I was up here

on this side ten years ago saying some of the same things. Senator

Graham was involved in the first Andean strategy and one of the

things that troubles me is that we tend to charge up the hill and

then back down again when we do not solve our problems quickly.

If you look at the funding for counter-narcotics in the Andean region, we ramped it up in 1990, 1991, 1992, and then it ramped

back down again. Now we are going to ramp it back up.

But these problems are not going to be solved in a budget or

Congressional cycle and we are going to have to develop a longterm strategy that hopefully has a bipartisan underpinning and

then stay the course and show some patience, which we are not always so good as Americans in doing.

With regard to the specific issues that you are discussing, let me

make a few recommendations, and I will try to be brief. First of

all, all those who said that we must help the Colombian state

strengthen its authority and capacity to defend the rule of law are

correct, but the first underpinning of that is to help Colombia economically. Historically, this is the best managed economy in Latin

America. This is the only economy in Latin America or South

America that did not have to renegotiate its debt during the debt

crisis. This country had 50 years of straight real growth, a very

productive entrepreneurial class and hard working people.

But today, it is in the deepest recession of its modern history.

There is huge unemployment. Capital is fleeing. They have had to

devalue their currency twice. Most of that is not of the making of

this government. They inherited a mess from the Samper government, which deliberately spent money to buy political support.

They suffered the spillover of the Asian crisis, the Russian default,

the Brazilian crisis. Coffee prices are at an historic low.

The economic team that President Pastrana has in place is a

very good team. They have done a lot of the right things as far as

reform, but they need some support. So I would urge the caucus

and the Congress to join with the administration in signaling to

the IMF and the World Bank and the IDB that this is a country

that needs support now. They are assembling a support package

with the IMF as we speak. I think they have earned it, but I think

it would be very helpful if Congress sent those institutions a message that now is the time to help Colombia economically.

A second signal that I think would be very helpful to Colombia,

particularly to the business class, which is taking its sons and

daughters out and its capital out and is leaving the country, would

be to join with the administration in a bipartisan manner and signal that the Congress is prepared to renew the Andean trade preference initiative. As you remember—I think both of you were here

at the time if my memory serves me—we passed that legislation in

1991 specifically to help these countries fight the drug trade and

to give them economic alternatives as they made war on the coca

production and heroin production. It has been very important to

Colombia. It is going to expire in the year 2001 and it would send

a very good signal of confidence to the Colombian people and nation if we could get our act together early enough to start renewing

76

that and it would be very nice if President Pastrana could deliver

that news.

Secondly, I hope we do not become polarized in a debate over

whether we should support negotiations or help Colombians fight

the war better and give their army support. We need to do both.

I think the United States should make it clear that we unequivocally support a negotiated solution to this war if it is possible. That

is what the vast majority of Colombians want and I believe at the

end of the day that will be how this war will end, not necessarily

immediately, and we should make it clear that the door to negotiations is open as far as the United States is concerned.

If the guerrillas have legitimate political, social, economic, and

other issues, which they do, then they should be put on the table.

But if they do not negotiate seriously, if they use violence, extortion, terror, kidnapping to make war in Colombian society, then the

United States and the democratic community will help Colombia

defend itself.

Therefore, I think we need what we have been talking about

today, which is a long-term program to help the Colombian armed

forces modernize itself. And again, I would strongly urge that we

take a long view. This is not going to happen in a budget cycle. It

is going to have to be over many years and many Congresses and

many budget cycles, and the worst thing we could do to Colombia

is to ramp up a program and raise expectations and then lose interest or lose will and change our mind and then go back and cut the

legs out from under them. We have done that in the past. I hope

we do not repeat that mistake.

I think that we must make it clear that that commitment to help

Colombia modernize its armed forces is conditioned on strict

human rights standards. They must continue, as President

Pastrana has done with great courage, to root out officers who are

abusers of human rights or tolerate that from the armed forces and

have to do something about the paramilitaries.

The paramilitaries are part of the problem in Colombia, not part

of the solution. Three-quarters of the human rights abuses are attributed to them. They murder priests. They murder journalists.

They murder human rights workers. And they carry out a scorched

earth policy in guerilla territory to just kill anybody who is suspected of being a sympathizer.

Now, in the short run, that does drive the guerrillas out of the

territory. It has also produced more than a million internal refugees in this country, and where they go is straight into the arms

of the FARC and the ELN and the paramilitaries are a very good

recruiting tool for the guerrillas. So I think we need to strictly condition our long-term support for the armed forces on human rights

standards, and particularly doing something about the

paramilitaries.

Fourth, it is good that the United States Government is paying

attention to this country in a serious way, but we cannot be the

sole source of support. We need to rally and mobilize an international coalition of democratic nations, multilateral institutions,

and nongovernmental organizations to support Colombia. That

should include the democratic nations of Latin America, Canada,

Europe, Japan. It should include the United Nations and the OAS.

77

It should include the multilateral development banks. It should include nongovernmental organizations. They need to support Colombia in the peace process, to talk to all the parties, just as we did

vis-a-vis El Salvador. They also need to be mobilized to help this

country defend itself should negotiations fail.

We cannot do this alone, nor should we. Britain has deep economic interests in this country through British Petroleum. All of

the European countries have cocaine and heroin imports that originate in Colombia. We need to do more to bring other nations into

this effort and Colombia needs more support from other nations, as

well.

Fifth, and this is probably not a popular thing to say, but I

learned something from the process in El Salvador. I think we

should continue to keep channels open and talk to the guerrillas.

They are everything that was said about them in this hearing.

They are not boy scouts. The guerrillas started out in this process

40 years ago at a time of political struggle in this country. It had

nothing to do with drugs. They have taken advantage of the drug

trade, there is no question about that. They are complicit in the

drug trade, there is no question about that.

But we and others have to bring these guerrillas out of the world

in which they are living, which is 50 years old, into the modern

world and begin to find ways to pressure, entice, cajole, and talk

to them and get them into the bargaining process. We did that with

the FMLN at a time when it was very risky. It was not popular.

It made a difference in El Salvador. It was not popular to talk to

the PLO when we started to do so, but today, they are part of the

peace process. It was not popular to talk to the IRA, but they are

part of the peace process.

We need to do that particularly as we gear up this effort, because

the FARC believes the United States is going to war with it and

half of Colombia and half of Latin America think we are going to

intervene. I think it is important that they understand why we are

doing what we are doing. We are doing what we are doing because

they do not negotiate seriously and because they are complicit in

the drug trade. But they also ought to understand, as we demonstrate in El Salvador, that if their agenda is real political, social,

economic reform, that the United States can be an ally, because we

are at risk in this country and we have lots of targets there and

this guerilla group is very capable of making life very, very difficult

for Americans.

A corollary to that is that I would urge that as we gear up, that

we limit the on-the-ground involvement of American forces to the

minimum necessary to aid and train and provide intelligence to the

armed forces, as we did in El Salvador. I do not think we should

be a big target here and I think we should make it clear that this

is a Colombian effort and the United States is there to provide support.

A final point is I think we need to be clear about the relationship

between the guerrillas and the narcotraffickers and not be confused

about this. There is no question that the guerrillas sustain themselves through narcotrafficking activity and also extortion from the

pipelines, the ELN does, and that in some cases, they are directly

78

involved in the trade. But the cartels and the mafias that run the

drug trade in Colombia are not the ELN and the FARC.

In many ways, the traffickers benefit from the war. The war undermines the strength of the government. It diverts the army and

the police. It saps the legitimacy of Colombian institutions. The

war is the sea in which the traffickers swim and the best blow we

could strike against the narcotraffickers is to bring the war to an

end.

Now, it may be the case, and it probably is the case, that until

the guerrillas understand that the option on the battlefield is not

open to them, they may not negotiate seriously. I understand that

in these kind of conflicts, the correlation of forces on the battlefield

has a lot to do with progress at the negotiating table. But it ought

to be our national goal to help end this war ultimately through negotiations, and our modernization of the armed forces should be a

tool to pursue that. We should not kid ourselves. The FARC and

the ELN could disappear tomorrow. We would still have homegrown Colombian cartels and mafias running cocaine and heroin

into this country.

The last point is really the point that I began with, is we need

to stay the course and take the long view. This problem is not

going to be solved in a few months or even a few years, probably,

and we have to be willing to sustain our support to Colombia in

the right way, not take over thier responsibility, but to do what we

can and to mobilize others.

I am not a pessimist about this country. This country has enormous strengths and resources and its people have shown great

courage in taking on the traffickers and the guerrillas and the

paramilitaries, but they are in deep trouble today and it is spreading into the region. It is now a regional crisis and we need to pay

serious attention as a country to it because we have deep interests

in it. I would just note, among our interests beyond

narcotrafficking, Venezuela, which is a neighbor, where the war is

already spilling over, where you also have a lot of political instability, is the number one oil supplier to the United States today.

So we have lots of deep interest in this country. We trade more

with Colombia in one week than we do with every country in the

former Yugoslavia in an entire year.

So I think that we need to work with the administration, hopefully in a bipartisan way, to develop a long-term strategy that deals

with all of the aspects of this crisis. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Aronson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aronson follows:]

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

Chairman GRASSLEY. Now, Mr. Shifter.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SHIFTER, SENIOR FELLOW, INTER–

AMERICAN DIALOGUE

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me also

commend you and the caucus for holding this hearing on Colombia.

I think it is extremely important to have a public discussion and

debate on this critical policy question.

I am going to submit my testimony for the record and just make

some brief comments, if I might.

Let me start with the question of what I think the purpose we

want to achieve in Colombia is. The objective, to me, seems clear,

or should be clear. We should do whatever we can to strengthen

the Colombian government’s authority, capacity, and effectiveness.

It is clear that all of the problems that Colombia is dealing with

today can be attributed to the weakness of the government and the

state, whether we are talking about human rights abuses, drug

trafficking, paramilitary operations, or political violence, can be

traced back to a weak authority and a weak state.

The responsibility to strengthen the authority of the state and

the government, Colombians have primary responsibility, but we

can be helpful. We can support their efforts to reach a political solution to the deep internal conflict that has been going on for many

years. We could also do another thing. The Colombian government

will need a consensus within its own country to back and support

any plan or strategy. We can help and encourage different political

forces and sectors—we have a lot of contacts in Colombia—to get

behind the Colombian government in a solid support for its plan.

Pursuing this call, supporting the government makes Colombia a

better partner with us in dealing with the problems that we share,

narcotics being one of several. But Colombia will only be a good

partner, only be effective in working with us if the government can

reestablish and regain authority and greater effectiveness. We cannot be indifferent to Colombia and we cannot disengage from Colombia.

The second point has to do with U.S. policy, and here, Mr.

Aronson, I agree entirely that a bipartisan policy is absolutely essential. Too often in the past, we have dealt with different individuals in the Colombian government, whether it be in the armed

forces or the police. They may be very dedicated, very committed,

but that does not help strengthen our primary objective, which is

enhancing government authority. We need to deal more with the

elected, legitimate head of state of Colombia, President Pastrana.

That will be the best thing to do to enhance that objective.

The third point is that it is critical to have a wide-ranging, comprehensive approach towards Colombia. The peace process, the

drug question, severe economic crisis, and the profound social problems that Colombia faces are connected to one another and need

to be addressed together, not separately. That is also the best way

we can strengthen the authority and the effectiveness of the Colombian government.

All of these problems are interrelated and Colombia already has

a process underway to try to bring an end to its guerilla conflict

and to reconcile the forces in conflict. Their strategy, their plan inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:32 Mar 22, 2001 Jkt 070923 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\64317 pfrm09 PsN: 64317
86

volves a wide-ranging approach and that is the only way that we

can be helpful in strengthening the capacity to move forward and

make progress.

Clearly, over the last year, there have been tremendous problems, set-backs, frustrations, and disappointments. The last year

has not gone as well as many of us had hoped and President

Pastrana himself acknowledges that. But there are three points, I

think, to bear in mind in this connection.

First, despite the tremendous discouragement on the part of Colombians, most Colombians continue to favor the objective of trying

to reach a negotiated settlement and some sort of solution, political

solution, to the internal conflict.

The second point is that the United States is perhaps uniquely

positioned because of its capacity, because of its resources, to be

helpful in the Colombian situation.

The third point is that the other options do not look very good.

Many sustain that it would be very, very difficult, if not impossible,

to defeat the FARC militarily, that it would cost a tremendous

amount that we would not be prepared to commit in terms of resources and time, financial resources and American lives. So to

pursue a strategy that focuses on defeating through military

means, through the use of force, the FARC, in my judgment, would

be misguided and could only make matters worse, including fueling

a civil war and a dirty war in Colombia, which already exists but

could very well get worse.

It seems to me we want to avoid that narrow, single-minded approach. Even though it is understandable that the perception is

that guerrillas and narcotraffickers are one in the same, I agree

with Mr. Aronson it is important to keep that distinction. But if we

confuse that, then we can go down the path that I think could aggravate an already very critical and serious situation.

The final point, again underscoring what Mr. Aronson said, is

that the United States should play a role, a diplomatic role, on the

regional and international stage with respect to Colombia. There

are wider regional concerns. There are concerns of instability in

neighboring countries. There is great concern in countries in Latin

America about Colombia and about the spreading violence and instability. There is also good will to help and be supportive and the

United States, I think, can play an important role in trying to

make a collective, constructive response from the heads of government in neighboring countries.

There is clearly going to be some instrument as this process

moves forward that is viable and that tries to sustain and support

internationally externally this process in Colombia, whether that is

the U.N. or whether that is a group of friends or the Organization

of American States. Clearly, some mechanism, some instrument

will emerge, and I think the United States should be supportive of

that instrument in trying to advance Colombia’s objective.

In short, this instrument would serve the purpose of supporting,

strengthening the Colombian government’s authority and capacity.

That goal is in the interest of all Colombians, it is in the interest

of Colombia’s neighbors, and it is the interest of the international

community, as well, and I think it best serves our interests and our

goals and I think we should give it the support we can. Thank you.

87

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Shifter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shifter follows:]

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Chairman GRASSLEY. I will start with Mr. Aronson. Ten years

ago, you were Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Could you havepredicted the path that Colombia has taken,

and if so, what could have been done to prevent it?

Mr. ARONSON. That is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I did not

predict the path that Colombia was going to take, unfortunately. I

think that, in retrospect, we focused too much on counter-narcotics

to the exclusion of other issues in that country and the fundamental weakness of its democratic institutions and the huge gap

between the state and large parts of the country where campecinos

and rural people live.

Where the FARC operates and has operated for decades is really

a place where there is no government. They are the government.

They enforce the law, as they see it. They enforce justice, as they

see it—it is pretty brutal. They collect taxes. There is no government.

I think that the Colombian elite and maybe the United States,

to some extent, just thought that, somehow, this problem could be

ignored and you could have a democratic society with its pocket of

violence.

But having said that, conditions also changed, Mr. Chairman. I

think the previous Colombian government, which was led by

Ernesto Samper, who himself was complicit in taking

narcotrafficking money, did enormous damage to this country. I

think they enormously weakened the Colombian state—morally,

politically, economically, and every other way—and we also, unfortunately, and I do not disagree with the decision, but by decertifying Colombia on legitimate grounds, we also isolated it at a time.

Then you had an international financial crisis on top of that. So

Pastrana inherited a huge crisis.

Secondly, part of the problem in Colombia is the success in Peru

and Bolivia. It used to be that you did not grow coca leaf in Colombia. They were the value-added chain of the production and they

did the processing and turned it into HCl. But because the coca

leaf is not being grown in Peru and Bolivia because of the success

of counter-narcotics efforts there, it is moving into Colombia and

the guerrillas have taken advantage of that and profit from that

and have become much stronger.

I think that we should have probably focused more on the political and economic and social issues of the country, and that is really part of my message today, which is those are part of this problem and part of this war that have to be addressed. I am not trying

to be naive that these guerrillas are just boy scout reformers. They

are not. But there are deep political roots to this issue that have

to be faced if this country is going to end the war.

Chairman GRASSLEY. General McCaffrey has suggested $500 million to Colombia. Is this too little too late or too much too soon?

Were there warning signs that were ignored?

Mr. ARONSON. I think, as a country, and as I tried to say, I think

we are awfully late in facing the crisis in Colombia. If you looked

just a few years ago, you saw the guerrillas just rolling over the

armed forces. I mean, there were some horrible defeats, including

their rapid reaction battalions were just getting massacred and

100

their inability to have any kind of counter-response or intelligence

was clear.

But I do not want to go through an exercise of pointing fingers.

I think it is a good thing that we are now facing up to the problem.

I do not think the issue, Mr. Chairman, is so much whether $500

million is enough or too much but whether we develop a long-term

strategy and a long-term commitment, because we have a very bad

habit of getting very focused on a problem like drugs in Colombia

and throwing a lot of money at it for a year or two and then we

get impatient or diverted or the politics change and we go somewhere else.

These problems have been growing for 40 years in this country.

They are now spilling over into our country in a serious way and

into Latin America in a serious way and I think we need to join

with the administration in a long-term program to help this country in all its aspects, including its armed forces, and that needs to

be a multi-year commitment. I have not looked at the numbers to say whether $500 million.

I think another key issue is how the money is spent. I think, like

a lot of Latin American armies, the Colombian army was organized

and trained in a very traditional way as a standing army to face

a threat across its borders, which it has not faced and will not face.

It has to be totally retrained and reorganized into small units and

rapid reaction and close air support and a lot of things that it does

not know how to do right now.

This issue Senator Graham mentioned about high school graduates being exempted from combat could not send a worse signal

about who fights this war. You have peasants fighting peasants

and poor people fighting poor people, and the Colombian nation as

a whole has to take responsibility. The sons and daughters of the

elite do not serve in the armed forces and they need to.

So I think there is a thorough strategic, kind of overall has to

be made and it has to be multi-year. I have not looked at the numbers enough to give you an informed answer about the $500 million. I assume that that is a multi-year request, but the main message I would leave, Senator, is that this has to be a long-term commitment.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Mr. Shifter, is negotiations with the insurgent groups a serious possibility or do you think that this might

be a stall tactic by the insurgent groups to gain more support and

particularly more funding?

Mr. SHIFTER. I think that, clearly, the record over the last year

has not been—those who thought that the FARC was interested in

negotiating have not been very encouraged by their behavior and

conduct over the last year. I think what is essential to do is to

begin to change their calculations so that they do go to negotiate

seriously. I think, ultimately, they will, but they have been in a position of great strength, the government has been in a weak position, and we have to reverse that.

I think to reverse that requires attention on all fronts, including

the military front, but just making the government stronger in

every respect. That, I think, will change their calculations. They

are pragmatic. They have interests. They want to defend their interests. They want to see a change in the country. And I think, ulVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:32 Mar 22, 2001 Jkt 070923 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\64317 pfrm09 PsN: 64317
101

timately, once that dynamic is changed, I think there is evidence

that they will go to the bargaining table and settle politically.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Is military force going to be necessary

against the insurgents from an outside force?

Mr. SHIFTER. You mean outside—— Chairman GRASSLEY. Yes.

Mr. SHIFTER. No. I think this is a Colombian responsibility. I

think outside support can be helpful, but I think this is not—an

outside force is not necessary and I would not—I think it could

really have very negative implications.

Chairman GRASSLEY. In the past, the Colombian government had

been successful in negotiating with the M–19s and other smaller

insurgent groups. How has that dynamic changed now that the insurgents are involved with drug trafficking?

Mr. SHIFTER. Well, that has been the major change over the last

decade or so of the military and the financial strength of the insurgents. So that clearly makes it that much more difficult, I think,

to reach a settlement than with the M–19, when the M–19 was a

small group, did not have the kind of resources or military might.

So it was easier to incorporate them into the political system. This

is going to be much more difficult. It is going to take a longer period of time because they are a more formidable force in many respects.

That is why it is essential, I think, for the State and for the government to regain the authority and capacity and their own resources and their own effectiveness, and that will, I think, change

the balance. I think it will create the conditions for a productive

negotiation.

Chairman GRASSLEY. Thank you.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. I want to thank both of you for your testimony.

I think it has been very, very helpful.

Mr. Aronson, you talked about the weakness of the institutions

in Colombia. You have also talked about the problems with the

economy. Can you, based on your experience, compare and contrast

what we are seeing in Colombia versus what you saw in El Salvador and Nicaragua? At first blush, it would seem that, while

there are some similarities, the economy is certainly fundamentally

different. Nicaragua is still the second-poorest country in the hemisphere. El Salvador is not certainly a rich country. Per capita income is not that high. The social injustices, maybe we are just

more aware of them historically in Nicaragua and El Salvador,

going back many, many years.

Compare the situation in Colombia today versus El Salvador and

Nicaragua. Compare and contrast. What is similar, what is dissimilar, what are the lessons that we should take from our experience and your experience in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Mr. ARONSON. I think it is a good question, Senator. Let me just

try to go through the differences and similarities and maybe some

lessons learned.

As far as the differences, as you point out, Colombia is a large,

modern country for Latin America when Nicaragua and El Salvador are not and were not at the time of these insurgencies. In

terms of geography, Colombia is almost as large as France, GerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:32 Mar 22, 2001 Jkt 070923 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\64317 pfrm09 PsN: 64317
102

many, and Italy combined. The space that President Pastrana

agreed to allow the FARC to operate in is twice as large as El Salvador and the country itself is 20 times larger. There are 40 million

Colombians. There are about 5.5 million Salvadorans, 3.5 million

Nicaraguans.

Secondly, Colombia has been a democracy for a long time and

neither Salvador nor Nicaragua were democracies when these

insurgencies grew up. So I think there was more legitimacy in the

early origins of these guerilla movements, even though they became Marxist-Leninists and threatened democracy itself.

Third, as General Wilhelm and others pointed out, the Sandanistas and the FMLN both relied significantly on outside support, ideologically, politically, militarily, economically. The FMLN

got its weapons from the Vietnamese, from the North Koreans, and

others, through the Soviets—so did the Sandanistas—and from

Latin Americans, as well.

The FARC and the ELN, and it is one of the reasons they are

so tough to deal with, basically have a home-grown industry, huge

financial resources. They can buy very sophisticated weaponry.

They are not dependent on any outside government, any outside

movement, and they are very isolated. They had original origins as

pro-Soviet, pro-Cuban groups, but they are very autonomous.

Third, they operate, particularly the FARC, in a part of Colombia

that has sort of been isolated from the central government and the

state it is a relatively—Colombia is really a country of strong regions and the central government has sort of grown in strength,

but the FARC operates in a region where the government just does

not exist and they are a kind of a state within a state. They have

been there for a long time, and for better or for worse, they are the

law and order and governmental structure.

But I think that there are some important similarities, particularly with regard to El Salvador, that I would like to stress. When

we started out in El Salvador, this was part of the East/West struggle. The guerrillas were our enemy. They were the enemy of democracy. We threw a lot of resources and training and efforts into defeating them militarily and they were very hard-core Marxist-Leninists. They were not looking for reform or democratic space. They

wanted to take power.

But because we were able to create a stalemate militarily, because we pressed very hard for changes within the government and

the army that were needed in terms of reforms nad human rights,

because the world changed and the Soviet Union collapsed, there

came a time when the guerrillas also changed in fundamental

ways. They became willing to embrace an agenda of reform that

was within a democratic system and give up their original goal of

taking power through arms.

I think we need to try to create the forces and mechanisms to

make that happen in Colombia. That is my one quarrel and concern with the notion that we can just defeat the FARC. It sounds

good and we will all charge up the battlefield, but we will be back

here in ten years and the FARC will not be defeated, even if we

do everything that General Wilhelm wants. They have been there

for a long time. I am not saying that we need to help the Colombians take them on and make them understand they are not going

103

to win militarily. I believe that strongly. But the goal ought to be

to force them to the negotiating table.

One of the things I think we learned from El Salvador is we need

a huge international effort to do that. It helped that the FMLN

were talking to the Mexicans and talking to other Latins who were

pushing them and prodding them. It helped that we talked to

them, and I understand it was difficult. I got President Bush to

agree to let us talk to the FMLN and the next day, they shot down

a U.S. helicopter and executed two American servicemen in cold

blood. Jim Baker turned to me and said, your friends have a great

sense of timing.

It is not popular to do those things, but those early contacts

made a difference and we built relations with the groups that were

most susceptible to negotiations. I think it was a mistake when the

State Department went and talked to the FARC that some members of the other body accused them of being soft on narco-guerrillas. It sounds good, but you need to start building ties to these

people and bring them out of the cold, and so does the rest of the

world.

The U.N. needs to be in there, and I know President Pastrana

talked to the Secretary General about that, the OAS, other Latin

American countries, while we do all the other things we are talking

about—help the country economically, modernize their armed

forces, and slowly bring these guerrillas out of the isolation in

which they live.

Not all of their demands are illegitimate, and it also is important

to understand one piece of history. Between 1982 and 1986, there

was a peace process involving the FARC, involving the Bettencourt

government, and the FARC formed a political party called the Patriotic Union and 1,000 of its members who came out of the war

when there was a cease fire were massacred and shot to death by

the paramilitaries and other forces. So they have a long memory,

and so when we say, let us talk peace, they remember the last time

they tried to talk peace. It was not a very good ending.

We are going to have to provide security guarantees and do

something about the human rights situation as we take them on

in the battlefield, and that is going to take time. I think Mike is

right. The time will come when they will negotiate seriously and

we need to be there saying the door is open to peaceful negotiations.

Senator DEWINE. Just a quick follow-up question. I appreciate

your answer. You talk about the weak institutions in Colombia.

What institutions are you talking about? Are you talking about

geographically in the region where the guerrillas operate?

Mr. ARONSON. RIGHT.

Senator DEWINE. What else? Are we talking about the judicial

system? Are we talking about what?

Mr. ARONSON. Well, I am talking first about the armed forces,

which do not know how to do counter-insurgency and which high

school students do not go into combat and all the things. They do

not have all kinds of abilities they need, small operations, close air

support, mobility, intelligence.

104

The judicial system, absolutely. Three percent of the people in

this country who are indicted are convicted. There is a lot of corruption. That system needs to be changed.

There is no economic infrastructure in a lot of these guerilla territories, so when we are trying to say, do something besides plant

coca leaves and poppies, well, there need to be roads and bridges

and transport so farmers can take other kinds of crops out. There

needs to be a governmental infrastructure in these countries that

will take the place of the guerrillas or change sort of the nature

of institutions on the ground.

There needs to be protection for journalists in this country, who

are being murdered now just because they support negotiations.

There need to be protections for human rights workers. Probably,

I think, more work needs to be done in cleaning up the corruption

in the congress of this country. The traffickers still have a lot of

influence, and supporting the Colombians who are clean and honest.

So there is a kind of a long-term systemic process. But the institutions I would emphasize are the judiciary and the armed forces

and the police.

Senator DEWINE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GRASSLEY. I have no further questions as chairman of

the caucus and from my staff. You both have cooperated with us

not only during this hour or so that you have been here but also

in the planning. We thank you very much.

The caucus is adjourned.

Mr. ARONSON. Thank you.

Mr. SHIFTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the caucus was adjourned.]

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189