PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_______________________________________ 

I DIG TEXAS, LLC, 

 Plaintiff Counterclaim 

 Defendant - Appellee, 

v. 

KERRY CREAGER, 

 Defendant - Appellant, 

CREAGER SERVICES, LLC, 

 Defendant Counterclaimant 

 Third-Party Plaintiff - 

 Appellant, 

v. 

THOMAS MAREK; MARY 

MAREK, 

 Third-Party Defendants - 

 Appellees. 

DIGITAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, 

 Amicus Curiae. 

No. 23-5046 

__________________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 4:22-CV-00097-CVE-JFJ)

__________________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 12, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Evan W. Talley (Douglas J. Sorocco, Jim V. John, and Jacob Oliphant with 

him on the briefs), Dunlap Codding, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Appellants. 

Zachary A.P. Oubre (Ronald T. Shinn Jr. with him on the briefs), McAfee 

& Taft, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellees. 

Andrew Grimm, Digital Justice Foundation, Omaha, Nebraska, for Amicus 

Curiae. 

__________________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

___________________________________________

BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 

___________________________________________

This appeal involves advertisements pitting competitors against each 

other. In the pertinent advertisements, one seller targeted consumers 

wanting to buy American-made products. To target these consumers, the 

seller used copyrighted photographs of a competitor’s products to 

underscore their connection to China. These advertisements led to claims 

under the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. 

The Copyright Act allows monetary relief when the improper use of 

copyrighted images leads to damages or profits. See Part 3(c), below. The 

profits can be either direct or indirect. See Part 3(c), below. Here the claim 

involves indirect profits. To recover, the claimant needed to show a nexus 

between the improper use of copyrighted images and profits. See Part 3(c), 

below. The question here is whether the claimant could make that showing 

without tying the copyrighted images to any of the infringer’s profits. We 

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answer no because the absence of a proven nexus would require us to 

speculate about the possibility of any profits from use of the copyrighted 

images. 

The advertisements also led to claims under the Lanham Act. These 

claims mainly involve the advertisements encouraging consumers to buy 

products that are American-made. At issue is the truth or falsity of the 

characterization of products as American-made. Is a boast about Americanmade products literally false when the business assembles products in the 

United States but uses some foreign components? We answer no because 

the boast itself is ambiguous. 

1. I Dig Texas uses copyrighted photographs to advertise. 

This appeal involves competition between distributors of 

construction equipment called skid steer attachments.

1

 One company calls 

itself I Dig Texas and sells attachments called Texas Post Drivers. A 

1

 The parties state that 

 “[s]kid steers are construction equipment used for various 

purposes such as digging or hauling materials” and 

 the parties sell attachments to the skid steers, “such as auger 

attachments, brush cutter attachments, and post driver 

attachments.” 

Appellants’ App’x vol. II, at 230 n.1; see also id. at 404. 

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competitor, Creager Services, sells attachments called Montana Post 

Drivers. 

I Dig Texas tried to appeal to consumers’ preference for Americanmade products. To do so, I Dig Texas used Creager’s photographs of 

Montana Post Drivers: 

These products are made in China. 

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I Dig Texas promoted its products by discouraging consumers from 

buying products, like Creager’s, that had been made in China. So I Dig 

Texas advertised by combining Creager’s photographs of its skid steer 

attachments with text imploring consumers to buy products that had been 

made in the United States rather than in China: 

2. The district court grants summary judgment to I Dig Texas on 

Creager’s federal claims. 

In district court, Creager claimed that (1) the use of these 

photographs had constituted copyright infringement and (2) the 

accompanying text had misrepresented the origin of I Dig Texas’s 

products. For these claims, Creager argued that 

 the use of its photographs had violated the Copyright Act and 

 the misrepresentations had violated the Lanham Act. 

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In addition, Creager asserted state-law claims for deceptive trade practices, 

tortious interference, and unfair competition. I Dig Texas had also asserted 

its own state-law claims for deceptive trade practices, tortious interference 

with business relations, unfair competition, and defamation. The district 

court granted summary judgment to I Dig Texas on Creager’s federal 

claims and remanded all of the state-law claims to state court. 

3. Creager failed to present evidence of any profit from the use of 

its photographs.

The elements of a claim for copyright infringement are 

 the plaintiff’s ownership of a valid copyright and 

 the defendant’s violation of an exclusive ownership right. 

Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). In district 

court, I Dig Texas sought summary judgment on this claim based on an 

affirmative defense (fair use) and a failure to establish a nexus between 

profits and the use of Creager’s photographs. 

a. We consider the possibility of affirming based on Creager’s 

failure to establish a nexus. 

The district court relied on I Dig Texas’s affirmative defense of fair 

use and declined to address the existence of a nexus between the use of 

Creager’s photographs and the making of a profit. But we have discretion 

to consider affirming based on the failure to prove a nexus if this “ground 

[is] adequately supported by the record.” Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 

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1162 (10th Cir. 2004). To determine whether to exercise this discretion, we 

consider whether 

 the parties briefed the issue here and in district court, 

 the issue involves a question of law rather than fact, and 

 the parties had an opportunity to develop the record. 

Id. 

All these factors support consideration. The parties briefed the issue 

of a nexus both here and in district court. Because this issue arises on 

summary judgment, the court’s inquiry involves a question of law on the 

existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Wise v. DeJoy, 71 F.4th 

744, 752 (10th Cir. 2023). To answer that inquiry, we have a fully 

developed record because the parties had an opportunity to present the 

district court with all of their material evidence bearing on I Dig Texas’s 

profits from the use of Creager’s photographs. Stewart v. City of Okla. 

City, 47 F.4th 1125, 1132 n.5 (10th Cir. 2022). We thus consider whether 

to affirm the award of summary judgment based on Creager’s failure to 

present evidence of a nexus between I Dig Texas’s profits and use of 

Creager’s photographs. 

b. We consider the availability of summary judgment based on 

the standard applicable in district court. 

Though the district court decided the availability of summary 

judgment, the court didn’t address the issue involving a nexus between 

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I Dig Texas’s profits and the use of Creager’s photographs. Without a 

ruling on the issue of a nexus, we must decide the issue in the first 

instance. 

Summary judgment would be appropriate upon a showing by I Dig 

Texas “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To assess 

that showing, we must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences in 

the light most favorable to Creager. See Wise, 71 F.4th at 748. 

c. The copyright claim required a nexus between the 

infringement and indirect profits. 

For copyright infringement, the plaintiff can recover based either on 

its own damages or on the infringer’s profits. Harris Mkt. Rsch. v. 

Marshall Mktg. & Commc’ns, Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Creager seeks recovery based on I Dig Texas’s profits rather than damages. 

The profits can be either direct or indirect. E.g., William A. Graham 

Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 442 (3d Cir. 2009); Andreas v. Volkswagen 

of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2003); Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 

909, 914 (9th Cir. 2002). The profits would be considered direct, for 

example, when an infringer sells the copyrighted work itself. Haughey, 

568 F.3d at 442; Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 394 n.16 (3d 

Cir. 2016). And the profits would be considered indirect, for example,

when the infringer 

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 enhances operations by infringing on a copyright, Haughey, 

568 F.3d at 442, or 

 adds sales because its advertisements included copyrighted 

images, Andreas, 336 F.3d at 796; Mackie, 296 F.3d at 916. 

Creager relies on indirect profits. To prevail, Creager admittedly 

bore the initial burden to show a nexus between I Dig Texas’s infringement 

and making of a profit. Bonner v. Dawson, 404 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 

2005); Andreas, 336 F.3d at 796; Mackie, 296 F.3d at 915; Univ. of Colo. 

Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see 

Appellants’ Reply Br. at 41–42 (Creager’s acknowledgment that it bore the 

burden to prove a nexus). That showing must go beyond speculation. See 

Mackie, 296 F.3d at 915–16. 

d. Creager didn’t present evidence of a nexus between I Dig 

Texas’s profits and the infringement.

In district court, I Dig Texas argued that Creager hadn’t shown a 

nexus between the profits and use of the photographs. In responding, 

Creager relied on I Dig Texas’s use of two photographs in advertisements. 

But Creager didn’t present any evidence of profits from the use of these 

photographs. 

The photographs did depict Creager’s skid steer attachments. But 

there’s no evidence that I Dig Texas sold any more products because the 

advertisements had included these photographs. Without that evidence, 

Creager failed to show a nexus. 

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Creager argues that I Dig Texas had elsewhere failed to quantify its 

profits from the infringing photographs. But this argument conflates two 

separate inquiries. Creager admittedly bore the burden to show a nexus 

between the use of the copyrighted images and the making of a profit. See 

Part 3(c), above. If Creager had satisfied that burden, the court could 

presume that all of I Dig Texas’s profits had come from the infringement 

without evidence that some of the profits had come from other sources. See

Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2003) 

(“The burden of establishing that profits are attributable to the infringed 

work often gets confused with the burden of apportioning profits between 

various factors contributing to the profits.”). But this presumption doesn’t 

arise until the claimant (Creager) satisfies its threshold burden to establish 

a nexus. See id. 

The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Mackie v. Rieser, 

296 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002). There the claimant alleged an infringing 

image on one page in a promotional booklet. 296 F.3d 909, 912–13 

(9th Cir. 2002). In alleging indirect profit from that image, the plaintiff 

presented expert testimony that the infringer had expected a 1.5% profit 

from the booklet as a whole. Id. The Court of Appeals held that this expert 

testimony wouldn’t satisfy the plaintiff’s threshold burden of showing that 

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anyone bought from the infringer because its promotional booklet had 

included a single infringing image. Id. at 916.2

 

The same is true here. Unlike the claimant in Mackie, Creager 

presented no evidence that I Dig Texas had made any money from the 

advertisements bearing the copyrighted images; Creager showed only that 

I Dig Texas had included copyrighted images in its advertising. But 

Creager didn’t present evidence that anyone had bought something from 

I Dig Texas because of these advertisements. And even if someone had 

bought something from I Dig Texas based on these advertisements, there’s 

no reason to believe that the two photographs would have made a 

difference to any consumers. 

Given Creager’s failure to show a connection between the 

photographs and I Dig Texas’s profits, we affirm the award of summary 

judgment based on the absence of a nexus. 

4. I Dig Texas’s advertisements aren’t literally false. 

Creager also invoked the Lanham Act, claiming false advertising and 

false designation of origin. On these claims, Creager needed to show that 

I Dig Texas had “made a false or misleading description of fact or 

2

 The court explained: “Even if such an aspirational yield percentage 

could be applied to determine how many people subscribed because of the 

brochure, such a rudimentary analysis cannot determine how many of those 

individuals subscribed because of Rieser’s work.” Mackie, 296 F.3d at 916 

(emphasis in original). 

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representation of fact in a commercial advertisement.” Vitamins Online, 

Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc., 71 F.4th 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting 

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Sycamore, 29 F.4th 630, 643 (10th Cir. 

2022)). 

a. We consider literal falsity in the first instance. 

The district court concluded that Creager had failed to show a false 

or misleading fact in I Dig Texas’s advertisements. For this conclusion, the 

district court reasoned that I Dig Texas’s advertisements had explained the 

use of foreign components. Creager argues that this explanation didn’t 

exist in the advertisements underlying the claims. 

But I Dig Texas urges affirmance on alternative grounds, arguing that 

the advertisements weren’t literally false. Again, we may affirm on 

alternative grounds supported by the record after considering whether 

 the parties briefed the issue here and in district court, 

 the issue involves a question of law rather than fact, and 

 the parties had an opportunity to develop the record. 

Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). 

All these factors support consideration of the alternative ground to 

affirm. Both parties briefed literal falsity in district court and on appeal. 

And when we review the grant of summary judgment, we conduct a legal 

inquiry on the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Wise v. 

DeJoy, 71 F.4th 744, 752 (10th Cir. 2023). For that inquiry, our record is 

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fully developed because the parties had a chance to present whatever 

evidence they wished on the truth or falsity of I Dig Texas’s 

advertisements. See Stewart v. City of Okla. City, 47 F.4th 1125, 1132 n.5 

(10th Cir. 2022). 

Because our inquiry differs from that of the district court, we decide 

in the first instance whether I Dig Texas was entitled to summary judgment 

on the issue of falsity. See id. at 1132–36 (concluding that no genuine 

dispute of material fact existed on an issue that differed from the issue 

underlying the district court’s grant of summary judgment). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if I Dig Texas demonstrates that there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact on literal falsity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

We view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in Creager’s 

favor. See Wise, 71 F.4th at 748. 

b. Creager needed to show that the statements were literally 

false.

Under the Lanham Act, a claimant can show falsity in one of two 

ways: 

1. The statement is literally false. 

2. The statement is literally true, but “likely to mislead or confuse 

customers.” 

Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc., 71 F.4th 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 

2023) (quoting Zoller Lab’ys, LLC v. NBTY, Inc., 111 F. App’x 978, 982 

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(10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished)). Creager relies on the literal falsity of 

I Dig Texas’s advertisements. 

A statement can be literally false only if it is unambiguous. See Int’l 

Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes Inc., 43 F.4th 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2022);

Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 198 

(3d Cir. 2014); Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 

737 (6th Cir. 2012). So an ambiguous statement can’t be literally false. See 

Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 

2007) (“[I]f the language or graphic is susceptible to more than one 

reasonable interpretation, the advertisement cannot be literally false.” 

(collecting cases)). For example, a statement without objective meaning 

can’t be literally false. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Sycamore, 

29 F.4th 630, 644–47 (10th Cir. 2022) (stating that a representation can be 

actionable only if it’s objectively capable of being determined to be true or 

false). 

c. The statements about the place of manufacture were 

ambiguous. 

Creager points to various advertisements about where I Dig Texas’s 

products had been made. For example, Creager presented evidence of 

advertisements stating that I Dig Texas’s products had been made in 

America or in the United States. So we must inquire whether these 

advertisements were ambiguous. That inquiry is a question of law. See 

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Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of 

Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 615 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that 

ambiguity of a statement entails a question of law); see also Allsup, Inc. v. 

Advantage 2000 Consultants Inc., 428 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A 

literally false statement can be determined as a matter of law . . . .”). 

We must decide this issue of law based on the undisputed evidence 

about the making of I Dig Texas’s products. Some had been assembled in 

the United States, others in China. Even for the products that I Dig Texas 

had assembled in the United States, some components had come from 

overseas. For example, I Dig Texas had used a nitrogen power cell made in 

China. And some of the nuts and bolts had come from Canada. 

But what does it mean to make a product in the United States or in 

America? Did I Dig Texas make a literally truthful statement because it 

assembled some products in the United States? 

Creager argues that the advertisements were false because some of 

the components had come from other countries. But the term make could 

refer either to the origin of the components or to the assembly of the 

product itself. For example, if Chrysler says that its cars are Americanmade, someone might regard the statement as truthful if Chrysler 

assembles the cars in the United States even if some components came 

from overseas. 

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The same could be true of I Dig Texas’s advertisements. Even if 

some components had come from China or Canada, I Dig Texas assembled 

some of its products in the United States. I Dig Texas’s advertisements are 

thus ambiguous when they say that the products are made in the United 

States or in America. 3

 With this ambiguity, the advertisements cannot be 

literally false. See Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 

736–37 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a statement could not be literally 

false because it was ambiguous on whether it referred to one or multiple 

products). 

But Creager also argues that I Dig Texas represented that all its 

products had been made in the United States. For this argument, Creager 

points out that I Dig Texas sold some products that had been assembled 

overseas or that had included foreign components. The resulting question 

3

 At summary judgment, Creager invoked a Federal Trade Commission 

policy statement on designation that a product had originated in the United 

States. Appellants’ App’x vol. IV, at 880. Even if the FTC policy were 

otherwise instructive, it would not bind us when addressing false 

advertising under the Lanham Act. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 

380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 

168 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1999). And even if we were to consider the 

FTC policy, it acknowledges the absence of a “single ‘bright line’ to 

establish when a product is or is not . . . made in the United States.” 

62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,768 (Dec. 2, 1997). Given the absence of a “bright 

line,” the FTC considers multiple factors, including the place of the final 

assembly and the nature of any foreign components. Id. at 63,768–69. So 

the FTC policy doesn’t remove the ambiguity of the phrase made in the 

United States or American-made. 

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is whether I Dig Texas ever represented that all its products had been made 

in the United States. 

Creager answers yes because I Dig Texas said on its website: “We 

Provide 100% American Made Skid Steer Attachments.” Appellants’ App’x 

vol. III, at 530. Creager argues that by putting this statement on the 

website, I Dig Texas implied that all of its skid steer attachments had been 

made entirely in America, assembled domestically from domestic 

components. 

Granted, a statement can be literally false by necessary implication. 

Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc., 71 F.4th 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 

2023). But again, an ambiguity exists in the reference to 100%. The 

reference could mean, as Creager urges, that 100% of I Dig Texas’s skid 

steer attachments had been assembled in America with American 

components. 

But the reference could also mean that only some of the products 

consist entirely of domestic components assembled in the United States. 

Or 100% could refer only to assembly of the final product rather than 

the origin of the components. So when the assembly takes place in America 

with some foreign components, someone might reasonably consider the 

product 100% American-made. With this interpretation, the statement on 

the website could mean only that I Dig Texas sold some skid steer 

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attachments that had been assembled domestically (without any 

representation about the origin of the components). 

The statement on I Dig Texas’s website is thus just as ambiguous as 

the advertisements.4

 Given that ambiguity, the statement on I Dig Texas’s 

website doesn’t necessarily imply a literal falsehood about the origin of the 

products.5

d. The patriotic symbols are ambiguous because they can’t 

objectively be verified as true or false. 

Creager also argues that I Dig Texas used patriotic symbols (like an 

American flag) to imply that the products had been made in the United 

States. Granted, patriotic symbols could imply that the products were 

4

 I Dig Texas also contends that the statement on its website was not 

literally false because it sold some products made entirely in the United 

States, including American-made components. But I Dig Texas 

 relies on evidence not included in its statement of undisputed 

material facts and 

 made this argument for the first time in its reply brief for 

summary judgment. 

We need not address these procedural aspects, however, because we regard 

the statement as ambiguous. 

5

 The district court reasoned that Creager’s versions of the 

advertisements had been incomplete because the complete versions had 

acknowledged the use of foreign components. Creager disagrees, arguing 

that it relied on advertisements that differed from the advertisements that 

I Dig Texas submitted to the district court. We need not address the 

versions of the advertisements that I Dig Texas submitted in district court. 

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American-made. But the symbols couldn’t objectively be verified as true or 

false. As a result, the use of American symbols was ambiguous and 

couldn’t render the advertisements literally false. 

We addressed a similar issue in Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. 

Sycamore, 29 F.4th 630 (10th Cir. 2022). There a bakery advertised its 

loaves of bread as “Fresh. Local. Quality.” Id. at 646. The issue was 

whether the word local could be considered literally false. We answered 

no. Local could mean different things—local workers, local materials, 

locally based, or involvement with local organizations. Id. at 644. Though 

the word implied that the loaves had been made in the same community, no 

one could verify the objective truth of the advertisement’s reference to the 

loaves as local because the word was ambiguous. Id. at 646–47. 

The same is true of the patriotic symbols in I Dig Texas’s 

advertisements. The symbols bore an implication, like the word local in the 

bakery’s advertisement for its loaves of bread. But no one could verify the 

objective truthfulness of the word local because the word could mean 

different things, and the same is true of I Dig Texas’s patriotic symbols. 

So those symbols are ambiguous and cannot render the advertisements 

literally false. 

* * * 

Viewed in the light most favorable to Creager, the evidence does not 

support a finding of literal falsity. Because Creager has argued only literal 

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falsity, I Dig Texas is entitled to summary judgment on the claims under 

the Lanham Act. We therefore uphold the district court’s award of 

summary judgment on these claims. 

5. The district court did not err in declining supplemental 

jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 

By granting summary judgment to I Dig Texas on the claims of 

copyright infringement, false advertising, and false designation of origin, 

the district court disposed of all the federal claims.6

 With the disposition 

of all the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and 

remanded the case to state court.7

 Creager argues that the district court 

abused its discretion by declining supplemental jurisdiction and remanding 

the state-law claims to state court. 

In addressing that argument, we apply the abuse-of-discretion 

standard. See Cohon ex rel. Bass v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 646 F.3d 717, 

6

 Creager suggests that the district court remanded the claim for an 

injunction under the Lanham Act. But the district court granted summary 

judgment to I Dig Texas on all the claims under the Lanham Act. As a 

result, the grant of summary judgment encompassed the claim for an 

injunction. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 566, 569–70 (10th Cir. 1997) 

(holding that a grant of summary judgment against a defendant seeking 

injunctive relief “amounts to a practical denial of injunctive relief” even if 

the district court does not expressly say so). 

7

 I Dig Texas had initiated the action in state court; Creager removed 

the action to federal court. 

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723 (10th Cir. 2011). The “district court should normally dismiss 

supplemental state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed, 

particularly when the federal claims are dismissed before trial.” Foxfield 

Villa Assocs., LLC v. Robben, 967 F.3d 1082, 1103 (10th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002)). 

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

the remaining state-law claims after considering 

 the parties’ efforts to prepare for a federal trial and 

 the novelty of the issues raised under Oklahoma law. 

Balancing these factors, the court decided to decline supplemental 

jurisdiction and remand the state-law claims to state court. This decision 

fell within the district court’s discretion. See id. at 1102–03 (concluding 

that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in remanding the 

remaining claims to state court even though the parties had extensively 

prepared to litigate these claims in federal court). We therefore affirm the 

district court’s decision to (1) decline supplemental jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims and (2) remand these claims to state court.

* * * 

We affirm. The district court did not err by 

 granting summary judgment to I Dig Texas on the claims of 

copyright infringement, false advertising, and false designation 

of origin, 

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 declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims, and 

 remanding these state-law claims to state court. 

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