Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

September 2005 INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS 

Information on U.S. 

Agencies’ Efforts to 

Address Islamic 

Extremism 

GAO-05-852 

This report was originally issued on September 16, 2005. It was 

reissued on September 22, 2005, with the following changes to 

Results in Brief, page 4, paragraph 1: 

Sentence 2 was revised to read: “Agencies’ efforts focus on Saudi 

Arabia but also attempt to address the propagation of Islamic 

extremism worldwide, including diminishing the underlying 

conditions of extremism.” 

Sentence 5 was revised to read: “In addition, State and USAID 

are implementing efforts to counter Islamic extremism, including 

the South Asia Regional Program, intended to diminish the 

underlying conditions of extremism through education, 

democracy building, economic cooperation and development, 

and conflict mitigation projects.” 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-852.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or at fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-852, a report to

congressional requesters

September 2005

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Information on U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to 

Address Islamic Extremism

The intelligence agencies, DOD, State, and USAID are implementing various 

efforts to identify, monitor, and counter the support and funding of the 

global propagation of Islamic extremism. The intelligence agencies and DOD 

are carrying out identification and monitoring efforts, primarily in 

counterintelligence and force protection. State and USAID are carrying out 

efforts to counter the global propagation of Islamic extremism, with State’s 

efforts focused primarily on traditional diplomacy, counterterrorism, and 

public diplomacy and USAID’s efforts focused on development programs to 

diminish underlying conditions of extremism. We are preparing a classified 

report, to be subsequently released, with a more complete description of 

U.S. efforts to address the global spread of Islamic extremism. 

Examples of Agencies’ Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism 

Agency Efforts to address Islamic extremism 

DOD Collection and All-Source Analysis by Air Force Office of Special Investigations: 

collects, analyzes, and disseminates threat information on Islamic extremism and 

provides threat notifications that could negatively impact the protection of U.S. Air 

Force personnel and resources worldwide. 

State Terrorist Exclusion List: places entities such as al Manar, the media arm of 

Hezbollah, on the terrorist exclusion list to help curb the propagation of Islamic 

extremism. 

State and 

USAID 

South Asia Regional Program: intends to address the root causes of extremism 

through education, democracy, economic cooperation and development, and conflict 

mitigation projects. 

Sources: DOD, State, and USAID. 

A number of sources have reported that Saudi private entities and 

individuals, as well as sources from other countries, are allegedly financing 

or supporting Islamic extremism. For example, in July 2005, a Treasury 

official testified before Congress that Saudi Arabia-based and -funded 

organizations remain a key source for the promotion of ideologies used by 

terrorists and violent extremists around the world to justify their agenda. 

However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Commission found 

no persuasive evidence that the Saudi government knowingly supported al 

Qaeda. The agencies also told GAO that Islamic extremism is being 

propagated by sources in countries other than Saudi Arabia, such as Iran, 

Kuwait, and Syria. The agencies are still examining Saudi Arabia’s 

relationship, and that of other sources in other countries, to Islamic 

extremism. 

The Saudi government has announced and, in some cases, undertaken some 

reform efforts to address Islamic extremism. For example, the government is 

undertaking educational and religious reforms, including revising textbooks 

and conducting a 3-year enlightenment program, to purge extremism and 

intolerance from religious education. However, U.S. agencies do not know 

the extent of the Saudi government’s efforts to limit the activities of Saudi 

sources that have allegedly propagated Islamic extremism outside of Saudi 

Arabia.

U.S. government and other experts 

have reported that Islamic 

extremism is on the rise and that 

the spread of Islamic extremism is 

the pre-eminent threat facing the 

United States. In addition, various 

sources alleged that Saudi Arabia is 

one source that has supported and 

funded the spread of Islamic 

extremism globally. 

GAO was asked to determine 

(1) what efforts U.S. government 

agencies are implementing to 

identify, monitor, and counter 

support and funding for the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism, 

particularly support and funding 

originating in Saudi Arabia; 

(2) what U.S. agencies and other 

entities have reported regarding 

support and funding for the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism, 

particularly any provided by Saudi 

sources (private entities, 

individuals, and the Saudi 

government), as well as sources in 

other countries; and (3) what 

efforts the Saudi government has 

taken to address Islamic 

extremism. 

GAO submitted this report to the 

intelligence agencies, the 

Departments of Defense (DOD), 

State, and the Treasury, and the 

U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) for their 

review and comment. The agencies 

had no formal comments, and their 

technical comments were 

incorporated, as appropriate. 
Page i GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 5 

Agencies Are Implementing Efforts to Identify, Monitor, and 

Counter Islamic Extremism 10 

Various Sources Have Reported That Saudi Sources and Sources 

from Other Countries Support and Fund Propagation of Islamic 

Extremism 16 

The Government of Saudi Arabia and U.S. Agencies Have Reported 

Saudi Efforts to Combat Domestic Extremism, but Extent of 

Saudi Arabia’s International Efforts Is Not Known 18 

Conclusions 21 

Agency Comments 21 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 26 

Related GAO Products 27 

Figure 

Figure 1: Key Areas of Islamic Extremist Activities Since 1992 8 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Abbreviations 

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

DOD Department of Defense 

MEPI Middle East Partnership Initiative 

MWO Muslim World Outreach 

PACOM Pacific Command 

PCC Policy Coordination Committee 

TEL Terrorist Exclusion List 

UN United Nations 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USCIRF U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

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Page 1 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

September 16, 2005 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

 Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Dan Burton 

The Honorable Diane E. Watson 

House of Representatives 

U.S. government and other experts on the issue of Islamic extremism have 

reported that Islamic extremism is on the rise and that the spread of 

Islamic extremism is one of the major threats facing the United States. 

Some U.S. officials and experts believe that Islamic extremism, rather than 

al Qaeda—the organization responsible for the attacks on the United 

States on September 11, 2001—is the pre-eminent threat to U.S. interests. 

The Defense Intelligence Agency and other experts agree that the rise in 

Islamic extremism stems from various factors, including economic 

stagnation; a disproportionate concentration of population in the 

15- to 29-year-old range (“youth bulges”), especially in most Middle 

Eastern countries; repressive and corrupt governments; and anti-Western 

sentiments, particularly due to negative perceptions of the United States’ 

foreign policy. In addition, various sources alleged that Saudi Arabia is one 

source that has supported and funded the spread of Islamic extremism 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

globally. Moreover, according to a report by the 9/11 Commission,1 some 

charitable organizations, such as the Saudi-based al Haramain Islamic 

Foundation, have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of 

violence against non-Muslims.2

 Pursuant to the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998,3

 in September 2004 the Secretary of State designated 

Saudi Arabia, for the first time, as a country of particular concern for its 

severe violations of religious freedom within its borders.4

 The Department 

of State’s 2004 International Religious Freedom Report to Congress states 

that freedom of religion does not exist in Saudi Arabia and that basic 

religious freedoms are denied to all but those who adhere to Saudi 

Arabia’s sanctioned version of Sunni Islam. 

GAO was asked to answer the following questions: 

1. What efforts are U.S. government agencies implementing to identify, 

monitor, and counter support and funding for the global propagation 

of Islamic extremism, particularly support and funding originating in 

Saudi Arabia?5

2. What have U.S. agencies and other entities reported regarding support 

and funding for the global propagation of Islamic extremism, 

particularly any provided by Saudi sources (private entities, 

 1

The 9/11 Commission—formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

upon the United States—is an independent bipartisan entity created by Congress in 2002 to 

prepare an account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks upon the United States. 

2

Charitable giving, or zakat, is one of the five pillars of Islam. Zakat, a form of tithe or 

charity payable for those in need, is an annual flat rate of 2.5 percent of a Muslim’s 

assessable capital. Zakat is broader and more pervasive than Western ideas of charity, 

functioning as a form of income tax, educational assistance, and foreign aid and a source of 

political influence. 

3

Pub. L. 105-292. 

4

Countries so designated are subject to punitive actions, including economic sanctions by 

the United States. This designation applies only to violations in Saudi Arabia and does not 

address any alleged violations related to Islamic extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. 

5

In this report, “propagation of Islamic extremism” refers to the spread of an Islamic 

ideology that denies the legitimacy of nonbelievers and practitioners of other forms of 

Islam and that explicitly promotes hatred, intolerance, and violence that could lead to 

future terrorist activities that threaten U.S. national security interests. We derived this 

definition from various sources, including meetings with U.S. agency officials and outside 

experts, as well as a review of the literature on Islamic extremism and related issues. 
Page 3 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

individuals, and the government of Saudi Arabia), as well as sources in 

other countries?6

3. What efforts has the government of Saudi Arabia undertaken to 

address Islamic extremism? 

For a more complete description of U.S. efforts to address the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism, see our classified report.7

 We obtained 

information from intelligence agencies, the Departments of Defense 

(DOD), State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury),8 and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID). We focused on these agencies 

primarily because of their missions and goals relating to areas such as 

traditional diplomacy (exercising diplomatic relations with other countries 

and international organizations), public diplomacy (engaging, informing, 

and influencing key international audiences), intelligence collection, 

counterterrorism (including terrorist financing), economic and 

humanitarian assistance, and governance (including democracy and 

human rights), as well as our initial review of information indicating that 

these agencies may be involved in efforts to address Islamic extremism. To 

determine what U.S. government agencies are doing to identify, monitor, 

and counter sources and funding for Islamic extremism, we analyzed 

relevant agency documents. To determine what U.S. agencies and other 

entities have reported regarding support and funding for the propagation 

of Islamic extremism provided by Saudi and other sources, we obtained 

and analyzed documents from various U.S. agencies. To identify efforts 

that the government of Saudi Arabia has taken to address Islamic 

extremism, we reviewed public information on the government’s Web site 

and U.S. documents related to this issue. We interviewed officials from 

each of the agencies we reviewed as well as numerous outside experts. 

 6

Throughout the report, distinctions are made when referring to the Saudi government, 

Saudi private entities, and Saudi individuals. 

7

We are preparing a classified report, to be subsequently released, with a more complete 

description of U.S. efforts to identify, monitor, and counter the global propagation of 

Islamic extremism. 

8

Officials from Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control informed us that it identifies, 

monitors, and counters terrorism through the designation of terrorists, terrorist groups, 

and their support structures, including those that are Islamic extremist to the extent they 

engage in terrorist activities or support. Once terrorists, terrorist groups, and their support 

structures are identified, Treasury participates in the U.S. government’s process for 

determining the appropriate U.S. government actions to apply. However, Treasury does not 

identify, monitor, or counter the support and funding for the global propagation of Islamic 

extremism as it relates to an ideology. 
Page 4 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Information on agencies’ efforts is incomplete because some of the 

agencies stated they wanted to ensure the protection of their sources and 

methods and therefore did not share such information. In addition, other 

agencies, such as the National Security Agency and the National Security 

Council, may also be undertaking efforts to address Islamic extremism. We 

performed our work from June 2004 through July 2005 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for further 

details on our scope and methodology.) 

The U.S. agencies we reviewed are implementing a variety of efforts to 

identify, monitor, and counter support and funding for the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism. Agencies’ efforts focus on Saudi Arabia 

but also attempt to address the propagation of Islamic extremism 

worldwide, including diminishing the underlying conditions of extremism. 

Agencies’ efforts to identify, monitor, and counter sources and funding 

focus primarily on counterintelligence, counterterrorism, traditional 

diplomacy, force protection, public diplomacy, and economic and 

humanitarian assistance. For example, DOD is implementing efforts to 

monitor international terrorism that may threaten U.S. interests, as well as 

provide humanitarian assistance and promote civic action programs to 

“win hearts and minds” in areas vulnerable to Islamic extremism. In 

addition, State and USAID are implementing efforts to counter Islamic 

extremism, including the South Asia Regional Program, intended to 

diminish the underlying conditions of extremism through education, 

democracy building, economic cooperation and development, and conflict 

mitigation projects. 

A number of government and nongovernment sources reported that Saudi 

private entities and individuals, as well as sources from other countries, 

are allegedly financing or supporting Islamic extremism. For example, in 

July 2005, a Treasury official testified before Congress that Saudi Arabiabased and -funded organizations remain a key source for the promotion of 

ideologies used by terrorists and violent extremists around the world to 

justify their agenda. In addition, according to State’s 2005 International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Saudi donors and unregulated charities 

have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups 

over the past 25 years. The 9/11 Commission reported that despite 

numerous allegations of the government of Saudi Arabia’s involvement 

with al Qaeda, the commission has found no persuasive evidence that the 

government as an institution or senior officials within the government 

knowingly supported al Qaeda. The agencies we reviewed also told us that 

the threat of the global propagation of Islamic extremism is emerging not 

Results in Brief 
Page 5 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

only from Saudi sources but also from sources in other countries, such as 

Iran, Kuwait, and Syria, as well as from indigenous groups within some 

countries. U.S. agencies we reviewed are still examining Saudi Arabia’s 

relationship, and that of other sources in other countries, to Islamic 

extremism. 

The government of Saudi Arabia has publicly announced and, in some 

cases, undertaken some reform efforts to address Islamic extremism; 

however, U.S. agencies do not know the extent of the Saudi government’s 

efforts to limit the activities of Saudi sources that have allegedly 

propagated Islamic extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. First, the 

government is implementing educational and religious reforms, including 

revising textbooks and conducting a 3-year enlightenment program to 

purge extremism and intolerance from religious education. However, as of 

July 2005, agency officials did not know if the government of Saudi Arabia 

had taken steps to ensure that Saudi-funded curricula or religious 

activities in other countries do not propagate extremism. Second, the 

government is undertaking legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms to 

address vulnerabilities in Saudi financial and charitable systems. For 

example, according to the government of Saudi Arabia, and State and 

Treasury officials, Saudi Arabia is undertaking a number of charity 

reforms, including requiring all private Saudi donations marked for 

international distribution to flow through a new National Commission for 

Relief and Charity Work Abroad. However, as of July 2005, this 

commission was not yet fully operational, according to Treasury. In 

addition, in 2004, Saudi Arabia and the United States announced that they 

had jointly designated as terrorist financiers nine branch offices of the al 

Haramain Islamic Foundation under United Nations Security Resolution 

1267. According to State, the government of Saudi Arabia also announced 

its intentions to close al Haramain Islamic Foundation, but in May 2005, a 

Treasury official told us it was unclear whether the government of Saudi 

Arabia had implemented its plans. State officials also told us that the 

government of Saudi Arabia had undertaken some political reforms, 

including establishing a human rights association to implement human 

rights charters and a center for national dialogue to facilitate discussion of 

issues such as education and extremism. 

U.S. government and nongovernment experts use different terms to refer 

to Islamic extremism. They agree that no single factor accounts for the 

rise of Islamic extremism in the Muslim world and that Islamic extremism 

or its rise stems from underlying factors such as political and economic 

failure resulting in repressive and corrupt governments; external funding 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

and propagation of fundamentalism and extremism, particularly by Saudi 

sources; anti-Westernism, with the United States seen as the primary 

source; the lack of a forum for moderate Muslim voices; and the 

emergence of the new mass media. 

Various government and nongovernment sources report that Saudi funding 

and export of a particular version of Islam that predominates in Saudi 

Arabia has had the effect, whether intended or not, of promoting the 

growth of religious extremism globally. In the 1960s, funding of religious 

outreach activities overseas became a central feature of Saudi policy 

through organizations such as the Muslim World League and the World 

Assembly of Muslim Youth. Activities of these organizations include 

providing medicine and food and building mosques, schools, and shelters. 

The Saudi donations to support its aid efforts and the spread of its 

religious ideology come from public and private sources and are 

channeled through a variety of foundations and middlemen to recipients 

around the world. Saudi Arabia’s multibillion-dollar petroleum industry, 

although largely owned by the government, has fostered the creation of 

large private fortunes, enabling many wealthy Saudis to sponsor charities 

and educational foundations whose operations extend to many countries. 

U.S. government and other expert reports have linked some Saudi 

donations to the global propagation of religious intolerance, hatred of 

Western values, and support to terrorist activities. For example, Osama 

bin Laden and al Qaeda have Saudi roots and have accumulated millions of 

dollars using legitimate charities, nongovernmental organizations, and 

mosques, as well as businesses such as banks and other financial 

institutions, to help raise and move their funds.9

 However, experts agree 

that it is difficult to determine the extent to which donors are aware of the 

ultimate disposition of the funds provided. Although the government of 

Saudi Arabia has undertaken efforts to better monitor Saudi donations, the 

problem of controlling such funds is problematic because much of Saudi’s 

private capital is held and invested outside Saudi Arabia and is beyond the 

government’s control. In addition, the spread of Islamic extremism is a 

global problem and Saudi Arabia is but one source of funding and support 

for Islamic extremism. 

 9

According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Osama bin Laden’s wealth 

came from his family’s construction company, which made its fortune from government 

contracts financed by oil money. The government of Saudi Arabia put strict controls on 

Osama bin Laden’s sources of funding after 1994. 
Page 7 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

According to a 2004 National Intelligence Council report, Mapping the 

Global Future, radical Islamists have aided violent groups in countries 

such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia and are based 

and received militant training or experience in other countries such as 

China, India, Mali, Spain, Russia, and Turkey. Figure 1 shows key areas of 

extremist Islamic activities since 1992. 
Page 8 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Figure 1: Key Areas of Islamic Extremist Activities Since 1992 

Some experts on Islamic extremism believe that a significant factor in the 

rise of Islamic extremism has been the failure of many governments in the 

Muslim world to address the overwhelming challenges of development 

arising from rapid social, demographic, and economic changes over the 

past century. According to the United Nations, many Middle Eastern and 

Spain

Germany

Bulgaria

Greece Turkey

Albania

Bosnia

Kenya

Ethiopia

Sudan

Egypt

Niger

Mauritania

Mali

Nigeria

Libya

Chad

South Africa

Tanzania

Congo

Algeria

Morocco

Uganda

Republic of Congo

Jordan

Syria

Iraq

Iran

Saudi

Arabia

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Myanmar

Thailand

Malaysia

Philippines

Indonesia

Japan

South Korea

United

Kingdom

France

Russia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

China

Bangladesh

Uzbekistan

India

Tunisia

Italy

Yemen

Oman

Somalia

Sources: CIA (data); MapArt (map); Art Explosion (clip art).

Countries and territories where radical Islamists have aided violent groups, including separatist or

insurgent movements

Other countries and territories where radical Islamists are based or with citizens who have militant training

or experience

Terrorist attacks (terrorist attacks in the United States and Argentina are not shown)
Page 9 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

North African countries face enormous human development deficits, 

including limited political and personal freedoms and low economic 

growth. According to USAID, its research and work in the field also find 

that terrorism will continue to flourish as long as weak or predatory states 

fail to guarantee security for their citizens, provide access to basic 

services, and address the issue of political exclusion. Because of concern 

that these issues could sharpen extremism, the U.S. government has 

shown a growing interest in improving socioeconomic and political 

conditions in the region. For example, in December 2002, the U.S. 

Department of State announced the establishment of the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative (MEPI) as a Presidential initiative to support the 

administration’s policy of promoting democracy in the Middle East and 

North Africa. 

U.S. officials and other experts believe that some U.S. policies have 

contributed to the increased threat of Islamic extremism against the 

United States. The 9/11 Commission report of July 2004 stated that 

perceptions of the United States’ foreign policies as anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, 

and pro-Israel have contributed to the rise in extremist rhetoric against the 

United States. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, extremists 

have targeted the United States because of a belief that the United States 

supports authoritarian governments in the Middle East while promoting 

democracy elsewhere. These negative perceptions of the United States 

further stem from issues such as U.S. support for Israel and the U.S. 

military presence in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as from 

other U.S. foreign policy issues related to, for example, the Afghan civil 

war, Gulf War of 1991, global war on terrorism, and Iraq War. Both Pew 

and Zogby surveys have revealed that anti-American sentiment among the 

Muslim population worldwide seems to be growing. 

U.S. agency efforts to identify, monitor, and counter the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism generally emanate from various 

strategies, including the National Security Strategy, National Defense 

Strategy, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and State 

Department and USAID Joint Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009. 

For example, one of the U.S. government’s objectives stated in the 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is to “win the war of ideas,” 

including reversing the spread of extremist ideology. In addition, these 

efforts are often included within broader activities, such as intelligence 

collection, traditional diplomacy, conflict prevention, public diplomacy, 

governance, and the use of instruments of development to diminish the 

underlying causes of extremism. 
Page 10 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

The U.S. agencies we reviewed are implementing a variety of efforts to 

identify, monitor, and counter support and funding for the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism. Agencies’ efforts include Saudi Arabia 

but also attempt to address the propagation of Islamic extremism 

worldwide.10 Agencies’ efforts to identify, monitor, and counter sources 

and funding for the global propagation of Islamic extremism focus 

primarily on counterintelligence, force protection, traditional diplomacy, 

counterterrorism, public diplomacy, governance, and economic and 

humanitarian assistance. 

Several of the U.S. agencies we reviewed are implementing a variety of 

efforts to identify and monitor the global propagation of Islamic 

extremism. Examples of these efforts include the following: 

DOD has implemented several efforts to identify and monitor the threat of 

Islamic extremism, including tracking facilitators and terrorist financing, 

as part of its counterterrorism force protection efforts. For example, the 

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Collections and AllSource Analysis effort was implemented to collect, analyze, and 

disseminate threat information on Islamic extremism as part of its 

counterintelligence effort.11 The purpose of this effort is to increase the 

situational awareness of senior U.S. Air Force leaders and field 

commanders. According to AFOSI, it gathers threat information at 

assigned locations, synthesizes information from all available sources and 

provides timely and reliable notifications of threats that could negatively 

impact the protection of U.S. Air Force personnel and resources 

worldwide. 

State monitors and reports on incidents and patterns of governmental and 

societal discrimination, harassment, and abuse that are primarily or partly 

motivated by Islamic extremism. For example, State’s annual 

International Religious Freedom Report and Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices also cite incidents and patterns of governmental and 

societal discrimination, harassment, and abuse when they are primarily or 

 10Most of the agencies’ efforts are classified and are described in our classified report. 

11According to AFOSI, Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 was a key event that marked the 

beginning of AFOSI’s interest in Islamic extremism. 

Agencies Are 

Implementing Efforts 

to Identify, Monitor, 

and Counter Islamic 

Extremism 

Agencies Are 

Implementing Efforts to 

Identify and Monitor 

Extremism 

DOD 

State 
Page 11 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

partly motivated by Islamic extremism. State also issues an annual report 

on terrorist activities, including terrorist acts that may have been 

motivated by Islamic extremism. 

U.S. agencies are implementing a variety of efforts to counter the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism. In addition, some agencies and outside 

experts have conducted studies identifying particular areas of focus that 

could address Islamic extremism. Many of these areas of focus have 

recurring themes and are similar in nature, and some are being 

implemented by U.S. agencies. 

DOD’s Pacific Command (PACOM) has provided logistical support for the 

U.S. government’s humanitarian assistance and civic action programs in 

Southeast Asia. According to PACOM, apart from having a general 

objective of relieving human suffering, the programs also aim to create a 

better view of the United States, particularly in places where negative 

perceptions of the United States are widespread. By doing so, these 

programs also contribute to the overall public diplomacy campaign to “win 

the hearts and minds” of the Muslim world. 

State and USAID are implementing several efforts, including the Middle 

East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), Muslim World Outreach (MWO), and 

the South Asia Regional Program, to address the root causes of extremism. 

MEPI seeks to expand political participation and increase the economic 

and educational opportunities available to the people of the Middle East 

and North Africa.12 MWO includes a Policy Coordination Committee 

(PCC), comprising representatives from State and USAID; the 

Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice; the 

National Security Council; the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and 

other agencies. MWO/PCC was formed in July 2004 with the objective of 

encouraging informed dialogue with Muslim populations and thereby 

diffusing some of the tensions that might trigger terrorism. While some 

MWO/PCC efforts include Saudi Arabia, they also target Muslims around 

the world. The South Asia Regional Program is intended to address the 

 12For further information on MEPI, see GAO, Foreign Assistance: Middle East Partnership 

Initiative Offers Tools for Supporting Reform, but Project Monitoring Needs 

Improvement, GAO-05-711 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2005). 

Agencies Are 

Implementing Efforts to 

Counter Islamic 

Extremism and, with Other 

Experts, Have Identified 

Particular Areas of Focus 

DOD 

State and USAID 
Page 12 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

underlying conditions that facilitate extremism through education, 

democracy, economic cooperation and development, and conflict 

mitigation projects. 

In addition, USAID implements some programs that seek to provide an 

alternative to political expression through extremism. Some of these 

programs include, among other things, providing former combatants with 

job skills to help reintegrate them into their communities, increasing small 

business loan services, and expanding banking and other systems to help 

businesses thrive. For example, USAID works with the Philippine 

government to strengthen the foundation for peace in Mindanao, where 

Muslim extremists have been engaged in conflict. In addition, in the West 

Bank and Gaza, USAID supports political stability and democratic 

governance through dynamic programs that bolster critical political 

processes such as elections, lay the foundations for the rule of law and a 

viable justice system, and promote a robust civil society. 

As part of its effort to combat terrorism, State has designated the media 

arm of Hezbollah, al Manar, on the terrorist exclusion list13 to help curb the 

propagation of Islamic extremism. State has also worked with other 

governments to try to ensure fairer and more accurate reporting on other 

Arabic language news outlets and to minimize their use as a vehicle for 

propagating extremist messages. 

According to USAID, it has published three parts of a four-part series of 

studies on the Muslim world to better understand the root causes of 

extremism and the dynamics in different regions. Studies on education, 

economic growth, and governance are finished. A fourth on philanthropy 

is near completion. Each study contains recommendations for USAID 

action. The first study was issued in June 2003 and contains 

recommendations for better support of the educational needs of the 

Muslim world.14 This study was conducted by the Center for Development 

Information and Evaluation in USAID’s Bureau for Policy and Program 

Coordination, which examined the strengths and weaknesses of secular 

 13According to State, the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) authorizes the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with or upon request of the Attorney General, to designate terrorist 

organizations for immigration purposes. A TEL designation bolsters homeland security 

efforts by facilitating the U.S. government’s ability to exclude aliens associated with 

entities on the TEL from entering the United States. 

14USAID Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, “Strengthening Education in the 

Muslim World,” issue paper no. 2 (Washington, D.C., 2003). 
Page 13 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

and Islamic educational systems in 12 Muslim countries. According to 

USAID staff, USAID missions in the Muslim world have used this report 

widely in planning their programs—for example, to include Islamic 

education in the Nigeria Mission’s new Country Strategic Plan for 2004-

2009. The study found that the best educational strategies in Muslim 

countries encourage both public (secular) and moderate-Islamic school 

systems to complement each other to reach all learners with enriched 

content. The study also found that, in some countries, public schools are 

the preferred educational choice of most parents, as long as they are 

affordable. In these countries, especially where there is concern about 

extremism being fostered in some Islamic schools, concentrating on 

making public schools more affordable for poor parents and increasing the 

number of schools in rural areas are a reasonable strategy. In addition, for 

the public schools, USAID recommends increasing the number of schoolreadiness programs, establishing a system of incentives to attract and 

retain more qualified teachers, and encouraging greater teacher 

commitment. USAID also said that for Islamic schools, there is a need to 

strengthen the quality of the secular education they provide and to 

encourage moderate religious teachings. 

One objective of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is 

diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by 

enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on 

the areas most at risk. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative is one 

example of a U.S. government multiagency effort involving USAID and the 

Departments of Defense and State that seeks, among other goals, to 

strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and promote democratic 

governance and human rights in the Sahel region of Africa.15 According to 

State, the Sahel region, due to its vast, low density geography, nomadic 

populations, and porous borders, is potentially vulnerable to Islamist 

terrorist groups. The initiative includes development assistance and 

expanded public diplomacy campaigns. 

Several other nongovernment and government experts have also 

conducted studies to identify areas of focus that could address the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism. 

 15The Sahel includes parts of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 

Senegal, and Sudan. 

DOD, State, and USAID 

Other Experts 
Page 14 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Djerejian Report 

A 2003 report, Changing Minds, Winning Peace—also known as the 

Djerejian Report (for diplomat Edward Djerejian)—addresses U.S. efforts 

to communicate with audiences in the Arab and Muslim world.16 Compiled 

at the request of U.S. lawmakers, in part to address the root causes of 

Islamic extremism, the Djerejian Report criticizes the absence of a U.S. 

voice in public discourse in the Muslim world. The report offers a number 

of recommendations to confront the problem and calls for greater human 

and financial resources to be channeled into engaging the Arab and 

Muslim world. The report argues that the United States needs to improve 

its ability to address the people of the region in their own languages, 

particularly focusing on the Internet and other communication 

technologies. In response to the report, State reinvigorated an interagency 

Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), concentrating initially on Muslim 

outreach. 

9/11 Commission 

The 9/11 Commission’s July 2004 report contained various 

recommendations for reforming areas of U.S. public diplomacy. These 

recommendations included increasing resources for satellite television 

and radio outreach to Muslim populations (e.g., broadcasting efforts in 

Afghanistan and Iran); rebuilding scholarship, exchange, and library 

programs to reach out to youths; supporting a new International Youth 

Opportunity Fund; and measuring results from these endeavors. 

RAND Corporation 

In 2004, the RAND Corporation published the results of a study17 that built 

on previous RAND work on counterterrorism. RAND’s study had several 

purposes: (1) to develop a typology of ideological tendencies in the 

different regions of the Muslim world to identify the sectors with which 

the United States can find common ground in promoting democracy and 

stability and countering the influence of extremist and violent groups; (2) 

to identify the factors that produce religious extremism and violence; (3) 

 16This report was prepared by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and 

Muslim world and was submitted to the Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives. 

17RAND, The Muslim World after 9/11 (Arlington, Virginia, 2004). 
Page 15 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

to identify key divisions and fault lines among sectarian, ethnic, regional, 

and national groups and to assess how these divisions generate challenges 

and opportunities for the United States; and (4) to identify possible 

strategies and political and military options to help the United States meet 

challenges and exploit opportunities presented by changed conditions in 

the Muslim world. According to RAND, the outcome of the “war of ideas” 

under way throughout the Muslim world is likely to have great 

consequences for U.S. interests in the region, but it is also the most 

difficult for the United States to influence. RAND suggested a number of 

social, political, and military options that the United States could focus on 

to respond to these challenges and opportunities: 

• promote the creation of moderate networks to counter radical messages; 

• disrupt radical networks and deny resources to extremists; 

• foster an education system that is relevant to the modern world and that 

produces graduates who can find productive jobs in the global economy; 

• foster madrassa (religious schools) and promote mosque reforms; 

• expand economic opportunities; 

• support Islam within civil society; 

• balance the requirements of the war on terrorism and of stability and 

democracy in moderate Muslim countries; 

• seek to engage Muslim diasporas and Islamists in mainstream politics; 

• rebuild close military-to-military relations with key countries; and 

• build appropriate military capabilities. 

Information on the extent of U.S. agencies’ efforts to identify, monitor, and 

counter the sources and funding of Islamic extremism was complicated by 

the following factors: 

• Interviews and documents revealed that U.S. government and 

nongovernment sources use different terms to refer to a form of Islam that 

promotes hatred, intolerance, and, in some cases, violence, fueling 

terrorism and creating threats to U.S. interests and security. These terms 

include “Islamic extremism,” “militant Islam,” “radicalism,” 
Page 16 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

“fundamentalism,” “jihadism,” “Wahhabism,” and “Salafism.” For example, 

DIA defines an “Islamic extremist” as “any individual or group using Islam 

to justify violence or terrorist acts,” whereas the National Intelligence 

Council’s report, Mapping the Global Future, defines “Muslim extremists” 

as Islamic activists who are committed to restructuring political society in 

accordance with their vision of Islamic law and are willing to use violence. 

U.S. agencies are continually refining their respective definitions of 

Islamic extremism as they acquire more information on the identifiers, 

motives, and sources of funding and support of Islamic extremism. 

• The agencies we reviewed do not disaggregate some of their activities to 

address Islamic extremism from broader efforts or goals, such as force 

protection, counterterrorism, and public diplomacy; therefore, it was 

difficult to obtain data regarding funding and staff for specific efforts. 

• The agencies do not distinguish between efforts or programs intended to 

target Islamic extremism indigenous to a country and those intended to 

target outside influences, such as Saudi Arabia. Thus, our reporting does 

not differentiate between agency efforts addressing internal sources of 

support and agency efforts addressing external sources of support; rather, 

we report on efforts to address Islamic extremism globally. 

A number of sources have reported that Saudi private entities and 

individuals,18 as well as sources from other countries, are allegedly 

financing or supporting Islamic extremism. However, U.S. agencies are 

still examining Saudi Arabia’s relationship, and that of other sources in 

other countries, to Islamic extremism. For example, in July 2005, a 

Treasury official testified before Congress that Saudi Arabia-based and -

funded organizations remain a key source for the promotion of ideologies 

used by terrorists and violent extremists around the world to justify their 

agenda. In addition, according to State’s 2005 International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report, Saudi donors and unregulated charities have 

been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups over the 

past 25 years. In July 2003, a former State Department official testified 

before Congress that a Saudi-based charity, al Haramain Islamic 

 18U.S. government officials and outside experts cautioned that it is important to distinguish 

among the Saudi government, Saudi private entities (such as charities and 

nongovernmental agencies), and Saudi individuals when discussing allegations of Islamic 

extremism. However, the distinction between the government’s support and funding versus 

that provided by entities and individuals, especially in the case of Saudi charities’ alleged 

activities, is not always clear. 

Various Sources Have 

Reported That Saudi 

Sources and Sources 

from Other Countries 

Support and Fund 

Propagation of 

Islamic Extremism 
Page 17 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Foundation, had allegedly financed assistance to the Egyptian terrorist 

group Gamma al Islamia. In May 2004, the same former State official also 

testified that some half dozen of the most visible charities, including two 

of Saudi Arabia’s largest, the International Islamic Relief Organization and 

the World Muslim League, have been linked to supporting Islamic terrorist 

organizations globally. In addition, a former Treasury official identified 

Wa’el Hamza Julaidan as a senior figure in the Saudi charitable community 

who provided financial and other support to several terrorist groups 

affiliated with al Qaeda operating primarily in the Balkans. Moreover, the 

9/11 Commission report states that al Qaeda raised money in Saudi Arabia 

directly from individuals and through charities. 

According to the 9/11 Commission report, despite numerous allegations 

about the government of Saudi Arabia’s involvement with al Qaeda, the 

commission found no persuasive evidence that the government of Saudi 

Arabia as an institution, or senior officials within the government of Saudi 

Arabia, knowingly supported al Qaeda. The agencies we reviewed also told 

us that the threat of the global propagation of Islamic extremism is 

emerging not only from Saudi sources but also from sources in other 

countries, such as Iran, Kuwait, and Syria, as well as from indigenous 

groups within some countries.19 A current DOD official and a former 

Treasury official told us that Iran currently poses a larger threat in this 

regard than does Saudi Arabia. In addition, indigenous groups have been a 

source of support for Islamic extremism. For example, the State 

Department terrorist list includes the Filipino group Abu Sayyaf, Algeria’s 

Armed Islamic Group, the Palestinian group Hamas, the Kashmiri militants 

of Harakat ul-Mujahedeen, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. 

 19Further details regarding Saudi Arabian sources’ alleged link to Islamic extremism can be 

found in our classified report. 
Page 18 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

To address Islamic extremism, the government of Saudi Arabia has 

announced and, in some cases, undertaken domestic educational and 

religious reforms; legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms with the 

assistance of State and Treasury; and political reforms. However, U.S. 

agencies do not know the extent of the Saudi government’s efforts to limit 

the activities of Saudi individuals and entities that have allegedly 

propagated Islamic extremism outside of Saudi Arabia.20

The government of Saudi Arabia is implementing domestic educational 

and religious reform efforts, but as of July 2005, U.S. agency officials did 

not know if the government of Saudi Arabia had taken steps to ensure that 

Saudi-funded curricula or religious activities in other countries do not 

propagate extremism. According to the 9/11 Commission report, although 

Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism, 

since the May 12, 2003, bombing in Riyadh, the Saudi Arabian government 

has taken steps to reduce official support for religious activities overseas. 

According to the government of Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Islamic 

Affairs is implementing a 3-year enlightenment program in Saudi Arabia to 

educate imams, monitor mosques, and purge extremism and intolerance 

from religious education. The U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 

Near Eastern Affairs also said that the Saudi government’s religious reform 

initiative involves a multiyear program to educate imams and monitor 

religious education. Treasury reported that the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 

had begun vetting domestic clerics to eliminate the radical extremists 

among them. 

In February 2003, the Saudi government reported that it had recently 

conducted an audit that determined that about 5 percent of school 

textbooks and curriculum guides contained “possibly offensive language” 

 20The National Intelligence Reform Act (P.L. 108-458, Dec. 17, 2004) contains a requirement 

(Section 7120 (b)) that the President submit to designated congressional committees a 

strategy for collaboration with Saudi Arabia, as part of a larger report on U.S. government 

activities to implement the provisions of this act. 

The Government of 

Saudi Arabia and U.S. 

Agencies Have 

Reported Saudi 

Efforts to Combat 

Domestic Extremism, 

but Extent of Saudi 

Arabia’s International 

Efforts Is Not Known 

The Government of Saudi 

Arabia Is Implementing 

Domestic Educational and 

Religious Reform Efforts 
Page 19 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

and that a program was in place to eliminate such material from schools.21

Speaking at the Counter-Terrorism International Conference, which Saudi 

Arabia hosted in Riyadh in February 2005, the Saudi Minister of Foreign 

Affairs said that “we tried to eliminate any flaws or what might hinder 

progress and we tried to ensure that the new curriculum focuses more on 

understanding, humanity, and tolerance.” Further, the final communique 

of the conference, known as the Riyadh Declaration, emphasized the 

importance of enhancing the values of understanding, tolerance, and 

combating ideology that calls for hatred, instigates violence, or justifies 

the terrorist crimes that are denounced by all religions and laws. In March 

2005, a representative for the government of Saudi Arabia reported that 

the Saudi government is working to ensure that textbooks and teachers do 

not espouse intolerance and extremism. 

In an effort to educate imams and monitor mosques, according to the 

Saudi government, when imams preach intolerance or hate toward others, 

they are dismissed, punished, and retrained. In addition, the Saudi Arabian 

government Web site contains “Public Statements by Senior Saudi 

Officials Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation.”22 For 

example, in September 2003, the Saudi government reported that former 

King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, in a message to the 19th session of the World 

Supreme Council for Mosques, emphasized the important mission of the 

mosque in Islam, which is to promote peace, tolerance, moderation, and 

wisdom. 

State and Treasury reported that they have assisted the government of 

Saudi Arabia with implementing domestic legal, regulatory, and 

institutional reforms to address vulnerabilities in Saudi financial and 

charitable systems since about 2001. In May 2003, the Saudi government 

asked the al Haramain Islamic Foundation and all Saudi charities to 

suspend activities outside Saudi Arabia until mechanisms are in place to 

adequately monitor and control funds to prevent their misdirection for 

illegal purposes. According to the government of Saudi Arabia, State, and 

Treasury, in February 2004, the Saudi government created the new 

National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad, requiring all 

private Saudi donations marked for international distribution to flow 

 21The Saudi government statement we reviewed did not elaborate on what is meant by the 

phrase “possibly offensive language.” 

22See http://www.saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/Extremism-Report-January-2005.pdf. 

State and Treasury Have 

Assisted the Government 

of Saudi Arabia with 

Domestic Legal, 

Regulatory, and 

Institutional Reforms 
Page 20 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

through this commission. However, as of July 2005, according to Treasury, 

this commission had not yet become fully operational. In 2004, Saudi 

Arabia and the United States announced that they had jointly designated 

as terrorist financiers nine branch offices of the al Haramain Islamic 

Foundation under United Nations (UN) Security Resolution 1267.23 In 

addition, according to State, the Saudi government ordered the closure of 

the al Haramain Islamic Foundation. However, in May 2005, a Treasury 

official told us that it was unclear whether al Haramain’s offices had been 

closed. 

In addition, according to the Saudi government, State, and Treasury, 

banking reforms have included restrictions against cash disbursements 

from charitable accounts, transfers from charitable accounts outside Saudi 

Arabia, and cash contributions in local mosques and cash collection boxes 

in shopping malls. In December 2002, to ensure that no funds reach 

terrorists, the Saudi government also established a special financial 

intelligence unit to track charitable giving. In July 2005, a State official 

testifying before Congress stated that the department continues to stress, 

in its discussions with the Saudis, the need for full implementation of 

charity regulations, including a fully functioning commission. The State 

official further stated that appropriate regulatory oversight of 

organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, such as the World Muslim 

League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the World 

Assembly of Muslim Youth, is absolutely necessary. 

Finally, as reported in public documents from the Saudi Embassy Web site 

and confirmed by State officials, the government of Saudi Arabia has 

implemented some political reforms, including reforms related to Islamic 

extremism. For example, the government established the National Human 

Rights Association in March 2004 with a mandate to implement 

international human rights charters. The government also established the 

King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue in August 2003 to bring 

together leaders to discuss issues such as education, extremism, the role 

of women, and problems facing young people. According to the Saudi 

 23The UN Security Council 1267 Committee oversees states’ implementation of the 

sanctions imposed by the council on individuals and entities belonging or related to the 

Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and the al Qaeda organization and maintains a list of individuals 

and entities for this purpose. The council obliged all states to freeze the assets; prevent the 

entry into or transit through their territories; and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, 

and transfer of arms and military equipment with regard to the individuals or entities 

included on the list (S/Res/1267, Para. 6, (1999)). 

The Government of Saudi 

Arabia Reports That It Is 

Implementing Some 

Political Reforms 
Page 21 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

government, some of the national discussions on extremism include topics 

such as “Characteristics of the Extremist Personality” and “The 

Relationship between Ruler and Ruled, Rights and Duties of Citizens and 

Their Relationship with Extremism.” In addition, in early 2005, the Saudi 

government held its first nationwide municipal elections, which, according 

to State officials, is an important step toward democracy. 

Recognizing that the global propagation of Islamic extremism represents a 

growing threat to U.S. interests, U.S. agencies are implementing a variety 

of efforts to identify, monitor, and counter its support and funding. 

Agencies’ efforts focus on Saudi Arabia but also attempt to address the 

propagation of Islamic extremism worldwide. Despite the lack of a 

common definition for Islamic extremism, several agencies are working to 

counter it by addressing the underlying conditions that facilitate 

extremism—for example, through programs aimed at humanitarian 

assistance, educational reform, economic assistance, public diplomacy, 

and governance, including the promotion of democracy and respect for 

human rights. 

Determining the resources that agencies have committed for these efforts 

is complicated by the fact that the agencies do not disaggregate data for 

some of their activities addressing Islamic extremism from their broader 

efforts or goals, such as force protection, counterterrorism, and public 

diplomacy. However, since the attacks on the United States in September 

2001, some agencies’ officials told us they have been devoting increasing 

resources to addressing the global propagation of Islamic extremism. 

Moreover, since the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh, the government of Saudi 

Arabia, with some assistance from the United States, has announced and, 

in some cases, reportedly undertaken a number of reform efforts to 

address Islamic extremism, including educational, religious, legal, and 

political reforms. 

The intelligence agencies, the Departments of Defense, State, and the 

Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development did not 

formally comment on this report but provided technical comments, which 

we discussed with relevant officials and included in the report, where 

appropriate. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, State, 

and the Treasury and the Administrator for USAID. We will also make 

Conclusions 

Agency Comments 
Page 22 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be 

available at no cost on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov if you or your staff 

have any questions about this report. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix II. 

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 23 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

We were asked to determine: (1) What efforts are U.S. government 

agencies implementing to identify, monitor, and counter support and 

funding for the global propagation of Islamic extremism, particularly 

support and funding originating in Saudi Arabia?1

 (2) What have U.S. 

agencies and other entities reported regarding support and funding for the 

global propagation of Islamic extremism, particularly any provided by 

Saudi sources (private entities, individuals, and the government of Saudi 

Arabia), as well as sources in other countries? (3) What efforts has the 

government of Saudi Arabia undertaken to address Islamic extremism?2

Our work focused on the efforts of the intelligence agencies; the 

Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). We focused on these agencies 

primarily as a result of the agencies’ missions and goals relating to areas 

such as public diplomacy, intelligence collection, counterterrorism, 

terrorist financing, and democracy and human rights, as well as our initial 

review of information indicating that these agencies may be involved in 

efforts to address Islamic extremism. 

To determine what efforts U.S. government agencies are implementing to 

identify, monitor, and counter support and funding for the global 

propagation of Islamic extremism, particularly support and funding 

originating in Saudi Arabia, we analyzed relevant agency documents, 

including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, State Department and 

USAID Joint Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009; reports of the 

Defense Intelligence Agency; project documents; and specific country 

plans. We also reviewed more than 100 State cables identified through a 

State-performed search using specific search terms provided by GAO. 

Search parameters included cables dating from 1998 through 2004; various 

related terms (including “extremist ideology,” “intolerance,” “hatred,” 

“Wahhabism,” and “Saudi charities”); and countries such as Afghanistan, 

 1

In this report, “propagation of Islamic extremism” refers to the spread of an Islamic 

ideology that denies the legitimacy of nonbelievers and practitioners of other forms of 

Islam and that explicitly promotes hatred, intolerance, and violence that could lead to 

future terrorist activities that threaten U.S. national security interests. We derived this 

definition from various sources, including meetings with U.S. agency officials and outside 

experts, as well as a review of the literature on Islamic extremism and related issues. 

2

Throughout the report, distinctions are made when referring to the government of Saudi 

Arabia, Saudi private entities, and Saudi individuals. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 24 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mali, Nigeria, 

Pakistan, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia. 

To determine what U.S. agencies and other entities have reported 

regarding support and funding for the global propagation of Islamic 

extremism provided by Saudi sources (private entities, individuals, and the 

government of Saudi Arabia), as well as sources in other countries, we 

interviewed agency officials and obtained and analyzed various 

documents. Those documents include State’s cables; State’s Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report; congressional testimonies from 

various departments such as the Treasury and State; the National 

Intelligence Council’s December 2004 report Mapping the Global Future; 

the RAND Corporation’s report The Muslim World after 9/11; and the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2003 Report on Saudi 

Arabia. 

To determine what efforts the government of Saudi Arabia has undertaken 

to address Islamic extremism, we reviewed public information on the 

Saudi government’s Web site and U.S. documents related to this issue. 

We interviewed officials from the intelligence agencies; the Departments 

of Defense, State, and the Treasury; and USAID. In addition, we 

interviewed former U.S. agency officials and numerous outside experts, 

including officials at the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, Georgetown University’s Center for Muslim-Christian 

Understanding, the RAND Corporation, the Middle East Media Research 

Institute, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Middle East 

Institute, and the Muslim Chaplain at Georgetown University. 

As part of our work, we traveled to Indonesia, the world’s most populous 

Muslim country. We interviewed numerous U.S. agency officials, as well as 

officials of the government of Indonesia, including the Ministries of 

Religion, Education, and Foreign Affairs. In addition, we met with officials 

of Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organizations—Nahdatul Ulama and 

Muhammadiyah. In Indonesia, we also met with officials of the Asia 

Foundation, Ford Foundation, International Crisis Group, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, International Center for Islam and 

Pluralism, Liberal Islam Network, State Islamic University Syarif 

Hidayatullah Jakarta, and Australian Embassy in Indonesia. 

On the basis of our document reviews and interviews with agency officials, 

we compiled information on U.S. government agency efforts to identify, 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 25 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

monitor, and counter the propagation of extremist Islam and then vetted 

this information with the respective agencies to ensure accuracy. 

Information on agencies’ efforts is incomplete, because some of the 

agencies stated that they wanted to ensure the protection of their sources 

and methods and therefore did not share such information. In addition, 

agencies other than those we reviewed, such as the National Security 

Agency and the National Security Council, may also be undertaking efforts 

to address Islamic extremism. 

We performed our work from June 2004 through July 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 26 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268 

In addition to the individual named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant 

Director), Laurie Ekstrand, Barbara Shields, Simin Ho, Michelle Cullen, 

Bruce Kutnick, Mark Dowling, Philip Farah, Joel Grossman, Joe Carney, 

and Reid Lowe made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 27 GAO-05-852 Islamic Extremism 

Foreign Assistance: Middle East Partnership Initiative Offers Tools for 

Supporting Reform, but Project Monitoring Needs Improvement. 

GAO-05-711. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2005.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by 

the Lack of a National Communication Strategy. GAO-05-323. 

Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism. GAO-04-1075T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2004. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain. 

GAO-04-1061T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2004. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies Face Continuing Challenges in 

Addressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering. GAO-04-501T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2004. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant 

Challenges. GAO-04-435T. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2004. 

Related GAO Products 

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