a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

October 2005 FORCE STRUCTURE

Assessments of Navy 

Reserve Manpower 

Requirements Need to 

Consider the Most 

Cost-effective Mix of 

Active and Reserve 

Manpower to Meet 

Mission Needs

GAO-06-125
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-125.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-125, a report to 

congressional committees 

October 2005

FORCE STRUCTURE

Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower 

Requirements Need to Consider the Most 

Cost-effective Mix of Active and Reserve 

Manpower to Meet Mission Needs 

In conducting its review of Selected Reserve personnel requirements, the 

Navy established criteria and followed a structured process, but GAO noted 

two limitations that could have potentially affected the quality of the results. 

The Navy did not analyze the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve 

personnel and in some cases used outdated mission documents as the 

baseline for analysis. The Department of Defense personnel directive states 

that missions should be accomplished using the least costly mix of 

personnel. In addition, GAO’s prior work has shown that when reserve 

forces can successfully meet deployment and operational requirements, they 

can perform missions for less cost than active forces, and that decisions 

about the number of personnel needed to perform government functions 

should be driven by valid and reliable data. The 10 activities’ justification 

packages GAO reviewed did not indicate if or how commanders evaluated 

the cost-effectiveness of using active or reserve personnel. A key reason 

why cost-effectiveness was not evaluated is that the Fleet Forces Command 

provided no guidance requiring that such an analysis be conducted or 

submitted as part of the activities’ justification packages. Additionally, 

because the Navy had not devoted the resources to update some of its 

baseline mission documents prior to the start of the review, some of the 

activities’ analyses did not start with the best possible data, which may have 

resulted in inaccuracies in their determinations about capabilities and 

personnel requirements. Including cost-effectiveness in the criteria for the 

zero-based review and documenting such analyses, as well as ensuring data 

accuracy, could have better demonstrated a sound basis for the 

recommended personnel changes and, in some cases, may have led to 

different recommendations. 

The review’s recommendations will result in a change in the force mix, some 

cost savings, and the active force assuming greater command and control 

over reserve forces. The Chief of Naval Operations approved personnel 

changes that would result in a net reduction of over 16,000 reserve positions, 

a net increase of about 880 positions in the active force, and a net increase of

about 450 civilian personnel positions. The reasons for these recommended 

changes varied by activity. The Fleet Forces Command also initially 

estimated that the Navy could save approximately $283.5 million annually by 

implementing the personnel recommendations, although this estimate is 

changing as some activities reexamine their personnel requirements using 

more recent data. In addition to total force personnel changes, the active 

force is assuming greater command and control responsibility for the 

reserve force. For example, the active force is now responsible for the 

training and readiness of the reserve forces and is receiving their status 

reports. This realignment of responsibility is consistent with the Chief of 

Naval Operation’s expectations for creating a more integrated total force. 

In 2004, the Navy completed a 

study of how many selected 

reserve personnel are needed to 

support the active force in meeting 

current and future mission 

requirements. The Ronald W. 

Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for 2005 

mandated that GAO assess several 

aspects of the Navy’s study. This 

report addresses (1) the criteria 

and process the Navy used to 

conduct the review and what 

limitations affected the Navy’s 

analyses and implementation plan; 

and (2) how the recommendations 

from the review will affect the 

reserve’s personnel, funding, and 

command and control relationship 

with the active force. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure that ongoing and future 

reserve personnel analyses 

consider cost-effectiveness in 

determining the mix of active and 

reserve personnel and are based on 

up-to-date data, GAO recommends 

that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretary of the Navy to 

• establish guidance to ensure 

that ongoing and future 

workforce reviews include an 

analysis of cost-effectiveness 

and that such analysis is 

documented and 

• allocate the required resources 

to maintain current Navy 

mission documents that would 

provide a valid baseline for 

ongoing and future workforce 

reviews. 

In written comments, the 

Department of Defense concurred 

with the recommendations. 
Page i GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Zero-Based Review Used a Structured and Participatory Process, 

but Two Limitations Could Have Impacted Results 7

Zero-Based Review Results Would Change the Mix of Active and 

Reserve Forces, Reduce Manpower Costs, and Change Some 

Command and Control Responsibilities 12

Conclusions 14

Recommendations for Executive Action 14

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 15

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 16

Appendix II: Selected Navy Activities Visited 18

Activity 1: Headquarters, Naval Air Forces, San Diego, California 18

Activity 2: Headquarters, Naval Submarine Forces, 

Norfolk, Virginia 19

Activity 3: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C. 20

Activity 4: Naval Security Group, Fort Meade, Maryland 21

Activity 5: Headquarters, Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, 

Texas 22

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 25

Tables Table 1: Planned Changes in Navy Manpower Levels as a Result of 

the Zero-Based Review 12

Table 2: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Aviation Reserve 

Manpower 18

Table 3: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Submarine Forces 

Reserve Manpower 20

Table 4: Zero-Based Review Results for Bureau of Medicine and 

Surgery Reserve Manpower 20

Table 5: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Security Group 

Reserve Manpower 21

Table 6: Zero-Based Review Results for Mine Warfare Command 

Reserve Manpower 22
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Figure Figure 1: Department of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy 6

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Page 1 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

October 18, 2005 Letr

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The role of the Navy Reserve is to provide mission-capable units and 

manpower to support Navy peacetime and wartime operations. In fiscal 

year 2004, the Navy Reserve was authorized 85,900 selected reservists, the 

primary source of reserve mobilization manpower to support the 369,800 

military personnel in the active force.1

 The Secretary of Defense noted in a 

July 2003 memorandum2

 that the balance of capabilities between the active 

and reserve forces was not right to meet future mission requirements. In 

response, the Chief of Naval Operations announced an effort to transform 

the Navy Reserve and create a more integrated total force in which Navy 

Reserve capabilities are tied directly to active units in support of Sea Power 

213

 mission requirements. As part of a continuing process to fully integrate 

1

The Navy Reserve consists of the Ready Reserve (of which the Selected Reserve and the 

Individual Ready Reserve are components), the primary manpower augmentation pool; the 

Standby Reserve which consists of individuals who have a temporary disability or hardship 

and those who hold key defense-related positions in their civilian jobs that may be 

involuntarily ordered to active duty in case of a full mobilization; and the Retired Reserve 

which consists of personnel who are receiving retired pay as a result of their reserve 

service, active service, or both and may be involuntarily ordered to active duty in case of a 

full mobilization.

2

Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Rebalancing Forces (July 9, 2003).

3

Sea Power 21 is the Navy’s vision of how it will organize, integrate, and transform its forces 

to perform missions in the 21st century. Its pillars are (1) Sea Strike, which is projecting 

precise and persistent offensive power; (2) Sea Shield, which is projecting global defensive 

assurance; and (3) Sea Basing, which is projecting joint operational independence. Its 

ForceNet concept integrates the three pillars.
Page 2 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

its active and reserve forces, in August 2004 the Navy completed a zerobased review of the requirements for Navy selected reservists.4

 The 

objective of the review was to determine how many selected reserve 

personnel are needed to support the active force in meeting current and 

future Navy mission requirements. 

In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 2005,5

Congress mandated that we assess several issues related to the Navy’s 

review of selected reserve manpower requirements, including (1) the 

extent that the Navy used clearly defined and consistent criteria and a 

sound methodology in determining the future mix of active and reserve 

components and (2) the extent the Navy’s zero-based review process 

considered operational concepts and emerging mission requirements. As 

agreed with your offices, we provided an interim briefing addressing these 

objectives on March 29, 2005. To summarize the results of our work, this 

final report addresses the following questions: 

1. What criteria and process did the Navy use to conduct its zero-based 

review of reserve manpower requirements, and what, if any, limitations 

affect the Navy’s analyses and implementation plans?

2. How will the recommendations from the zero-based review affect the 

reserve’s manpower, funding, and command and control relationship 

with the active force?

To answer these questions, we analyzed the criteria, process, and guidance 

the Fleet Forces Command used to conduct the zero-based review by 

reviewing the documentation for selected Navy activities. As part of our 

analysis, we examined the review results for 10 Navy activities and visited 

the Naval Air Forces Command and four other selected activities to assess 

the zero-based review process at the activity level and obtain detailed 

information about recommended reserve manpower changes. In addition, 

we obtained information from Navy Headquarters and Navy Reserve 

Headquarters to determine how the review’s results would impact active 

and reserve command and control relationships and reviewed planned 

funding documents to assess the extent that recommended reserve 

4

A zero-based review is a review conducted without consideration of funding requirements, 

availability of personnel, and organizational limitations.

5

Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 518 (2004).
Page 3 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

manpower changes were reflected in future budgets. We also obtained 

information from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs to determine the relationship between the 

Department of the Navy Human Capital Strategy and the Navy’s zero-based 

review. Except for some outdated mission documents used as the baseline 

for manpower requirements, we concluded the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of this report. We conducted our review from 

September 2004 through September 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed description of 

the scope and methodology used in our review can be found in appendix I. 

Results in Brief In conducting its zero-based review of reserve manpower requirements, the 

Navy established criteria for its review and consistently followed a 

structured process that reassessed requirements in light of changing 

mission requirements and strategic goals. However, the review did not 

analyze the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve manpower to 

perform validated missions or always use updated data in conducting its 

analyses. The Department of Defense’s directive that covers manpower 

management states that missions should be accomplished using the least 

costly mix of manpower.6

 In addition, our prior work has shown that when 

reserve forces can successfully meet deployment and operational 

requirements, they can perform missions for less cost than active forces,7

and that decisions about the manpower needed to perform government 

functions should be driven by valid and reliable data that clearly link 

manpower levels and strategic goals.8

 In conducting the zero-based review 

of reserve requirements, the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command developed 

specific criteria and guidance to facilitate a consistent approach by its 

subordinate activities that participated in the review. However, we found 

that the 10 activities’ justification packages we reviewed did not indicate if 

or how commanders evaluated the cost-effectiveness of using active or 

reserve manpower. A key reason why cost effectiveness was not evaluated 

6

Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management, Section 

3.2.3 (Feb. 12, 2005).

7

GAO, Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could Save Millions Without 

Reducing Mission Capability, GAO/NSIAD-98-64 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998).

8

GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of Active 

Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense Strategy, GAO-05-200

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005). 
Page 4 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

is that Fleet Forces Command did not require that such an analysis be 

conducted or submitted as part of the activities’ justification packages. 

Therefore, while the review enabled the Navy to better align reserve 

missions with emerging requirements due to the changing security 

environment, its results may not have reflected the most cost-effective mix 

of active and reserve manpower. Additionally, because the Navy had not 

devoted the resources to update some of its baseline mission documents 

prior to the start of the review, some of the activities’ analyses did not start 

with the best possible data regarding the manpower needed for future 

mission requirements. Including cost-effectiveness in the criteria for the 

zero-based review and documenting such analyses, as well as ensuring data 

accuracy, could have better demonstrated a sound basis for the manpower 

changes recommended or in some cases might have led to different 

recommendations.

When implemented, the recommendations from the Navy’s zero-based 

review will result in a changed mix of active and reserve forces, some cost 

savings, and the active force assuming greater command and control over 

the reserve forces. The Chief of Naval Operations approved manpower 

changes recommended by the activities that would result in a net reduction 

of over 16,000 reserve positions, a net increase of about 880 positions in the 

active force, and a net increase of about 450 civilian personnel positions. 

The basis for these recommendations varied by activity. For example, the 

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery recommended cutting 2,198 reserve 

positions because it had reduced the number of fleet hospitals from three 

to two and had rarely filled all of its specialized medical reserve positions 

in the past. By contrast, the Naval Security Group had a net increase of 156 

manpower positions because the National Security Agency had a need for 

two new capabilities (cryptologic linguists and signal intelligence analysts) 

totaling 200 new positions, while anticipated technology improvements 

allowed it to eliminate 44 reserve positions. The Fleet Forces Command 

initially estimated that the Navy could save approximately $283.5 million 

annually by implementing the initial zero-based review manpower 

recommendations, although this estimate is changing as some active 

component activities are reexamining their manpower requirements using 

more recent data. For example, the Naval Air Forces now plans to 

eliminate 3,120 reserve positions, which is 378 more than in its original 

plan, because the Navy now plans to retire more aircraft due to airframe 

fatigue problems. In addition to total force manpower changes, the active 

force will assume greater command and control responsibility for the 

reserve force. For example, the active force will now be responsible for the 

training and readiness of the reserve forces and the reserve forces are 
Page 5 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

reporting their readiness status to the active force. This realignment of 

responsibility is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operation’s 

expectations for creating a more integrated total force. 

To ensure that ongoing and future reserve manpower requirements are 

based on up-to-date data and cost-effectiveness is a consideration in 

determining the mix of active and reserve manpower, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to (1) establish guidance to ensure that ongoing and future workforce 

reviews include an analysis of cost-effectiveness and that such analysis is 

documented and (2) allocate the required resources to maintain current 

Navy mission documents that would provide a valid baseline for ongoing 

and future workforce reviews. The Department of Defense concurred with 

our recommendations.

Background The Navy has 690,000 men and women in the Ready Reserve, the Standby 

Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve, which at the time of 

the zero-based review, consisted of 85,900 members in the Selected 

Reserve and 65,066 in the Individual Ready Reserve, is the primary 

manpower pool for the Navy Reserve. The Selected Reserve contains those 

units and manpower that are most essential to the wartime missions 

because it provides mission-capable units and individuals to augment the 

active Navy force when required. For example, the Selected Reserve 

consist of Naval aviation units, Naval coastal warfare groups, medical 

personnel, and submarine forces personnel. The Individual Ready Reserve 

consists of individuals who have received training in the active Navy force 

or Selected Reserve. Members of the Selected Reserve receive priority 

over other reservists for training and equipment and they generally are the 

first to be called to active duty by a presidential order. 

In August 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander of 

the Fleet Forces Command9

 to validate the Navy Selected Reserve 

manpower requirements and determine the ability of the Navy Reserve to 

provide required capabilities to the Navy forces. To accomplish this, the 

Fleet Forces Command conducted a zero-based review over a 10-month 

period, from October 2003 to August 2004. Based on the review, the 

Command recommended reducing the size of the Selected Reserve from 

9

The Fleet Forces Command is responsible for manning, training, and equipping naval 

operating forces.
Page 6 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

85,900 authorized positions to about 70,000 by fiscal year 2011—a decrease 

of about 16,000 authorized positions. The Chief of Naval Operations 

approved the zero-based review results for implementation in August 2004. 

The zero-based review is a component of the Navy’s ongoing active/reserve 

integration initiative. This initiative is an essential element of the 

Department of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy, which was announced in 

June 2004. According to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy as well as 

Navy and Marine Corps manpower officials, accelerating manpower costs, 

changes in the global military environment, and evolving military 

requirements prompted the Department of the Navy to develop this 

strategy. The overall goal of the strategy is to have the best people with the 

proper skills, training, and experience in the right jobs. The strategy serves 

as high-level guidance for the Navy and Marine Corps to use in developing 

their own implementation plans. As shown in figure 1, the strategy consists 

of three elements: civilian personnel transformation, naval military 

personnel transformation, and Navy active/reserve integration. 

Figure 1: Department of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy

Global

military 

environment

and evolving

military 

requirements

Best people

in the

right jobs

Civilian 

Personnel

Transformation

Navy 

Active/Reserve

Integration

Navy Active

Military

Personnel

Transformation

Implement

National Security

Personnel

System

Balance Active

and Reserve

Forces

Implement 

Sea Warrior

Initiatives

Source: Department of the Navy.
Page 7 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Implementing the National Security Personnel System will facilitate the 

Department of Defense’s civilian personnel transformation efforts,10 while 

the Navy military personnel transformation is driven by the implementation 

of the Navy’s Sea Warrior Initiative.11 The active/reserve integration 

segment of the human capital strategy is aimed at ensuring the proper 

balance between the Navy’s active and reserve forces. Although the Navy 

initiated the zero-based review prior to the announcement of the human 

capital strategy, the review is intended to satisfy a major tasking of the 

active/reserve integration element—validating the requirements for reserve 

manpower.

Zero-Based Review 

Used a Structured and

Participatory Process, 

but Two Limitations 

Could Have Impacted 

Results

The Navy’s zero-based review process included specific criteria and 

guidance on how to evaluate the number of reservists needed and involved 

consistent reporting and documentation by Navy activities. The Navy’s 

iterative review process allowed extensive communications between Navy 

activities, the Fleet Forces Command, and others to finalize proposals for 

reserve manpower requirements and validate the results. However, our 

analysis showed two review limitations. First, Navy activities identified 

capability gaps by comparing its current active force to mission 

requirements, but did not conduct analyses to determine the most costeffective mix of active and reserve manpower. Second, some activities 

used outdated mission documents which were critical for determining the 

manpower needed to perform missions. These limitations could have 

adversely impacted the results of the review.

Structured Process Included 

Detailed Guidance and 

Specific Criteria, and Was 

Consistently Documented

The Navy’s Fleet Forces Command created a structured process for 

performing the zero-based review by providing detailed guidance and 

specific criteria to determine the reserve manpower needed to augment the 

active forces to perform current and future Navy missions. The guidance 

was provided to 37 active component activities, consisting of 664 functions. 

10The National Security Personnel System is the Department of Defense’s new human 

resource management system. The system will govern basic pay, staffing, classification, 

performance management, labor relations, adverse actions, and employee appeals. The 

department has begun to implement the system with full implementation scheduled for the 

July 2007 through January 2008 time frame. 

11The Sea Warrior Initiative is designed to implement the Navy’s commitment to the growth 

and development of its people and will serve as the foundation of warfighting effectiveness 

by ensuring the right skills are in the right place at the right time. 
Page 8 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

The criteria for assessing reserve manpower requirements included the 

importance of the reserve component to the mission, reserve component’s 

warfighting capability, current status of the reserves’ capability, and the 

reserves’ warfighting capability role in the Sea Power 21 operational 

concept. In following the guidance and applying these criteria, the 

functions conducted a capability gap analysis by determining (1) the extent 

to which the active forces could meet the mission requirement and (2) how 

many reserve personnel would be required to fill any remaining gaps in the 

active forces’ capability.

The zero-based review guidance also required review results to be reported 

and documented in a standardized format. Our review of 10 of 37 activity 

packages submitted to the Fleet Forces Command confirmed that each of 

the 232 functions associated with the 10 activities completed a structured 

electronic spreadsheet containing pertinent information about mission 

capability requirement, current manpower authorizations, and proposed 

manpower changes to justify the reserve manpower needed to perform its 

assigned mission. Each function also cited that its mission linked to one of 

the pillars of Navy Sea Power 21. For example, all eight of the Naval 

Security Group activity’s functions linked their missions to Sea Shield, the 

pillar that provides sea-based theater and strategic defense. The functions 

also considered the manpower needs of emerging mission requirements. 

For example, the Naval Coastal Warfare Groups from the Naval Surface 

Forces activity identified the need for an additional 1,028 reserve positions 

to support homeland defense by increasing port security and harbor 

defense at our port facilities in the United States and overseas. 

Participatory and Iterative 

Process Helped the Navy 

Finalize Proposals and 

Validate Results

The zero-based review involved substantial interaction between Navy 

activities, the Fleet Forces Command, and outside subject matter experts 

to develop the final justification for reserve manpower and perform 

multilevel reviews of proposed reserve manpower changes. While the 

active component conducted the review, the Navy activities occasionally 

relied on the Navy Reserve Command for needed manpower data 

according to a command official. The Commander of the Navy Reserve 

Force also participated in the high-level review of the proposed reserve 

manpower changes. The process allowed multiple two-way 

communications to finalize proposals for reserve manpower requirements 

and validate the results. In instances where the Fleet Forces Command 

disagreed with an activity’s initial proposal, the activity revised and 

resubmitted its proposal or provided additional justification until the 

disagreement was resolved. After the Fleet Forces Command made a 
Page 9 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

decision about the number of authorized reserve positions, it notified the 

activities and allowed them to again officially request reconsideration by 

providing additional documentation and support. For example, the Naval 

Air Systems Command first submitted justification for 652 reserve 

positions. However, after reviewing the justification package, the Fleet 

Forces Command recommended eliminating all of the Naval Air Systems 

Command’s reserve positions because they were not linked to mobilization 

requirements. The Naval Air Systems Command resubmitted justification 

for 226 reserve positions to provide special skills and support for 

contingency operations. The justification convinced the Fleet Forces 

Command to approve 226 reserve positions.

Within the Fleet Forces Command, the activities’ packages were first 

reviewed by analysts and an initial review board. A subject matter expert 

review board then reviewed the proposals before passing them on to an 

executive board of senior officers. After the executive board approved the 

results, they were given to the Commander of the Fleet Forces Command, 

who also reviewed and approved the results. The criteria the Fleet Forces 

Command used for validating the reserve manpower requirements included 

whether (1) the particular mission is suitable for the reserve component, 

(2) the position is required to be filled by a military person, (3) the position 

fills a gap in the active component’s capabilities, and (4) the reserve 

component can perform the mission. The validation process included a 

mission risk assessment by the Fleet Forces Command of how important 

the reserve forces were to performing the mission. The Command then 

assigned a low, moderate, or high-risk designation as to whether the active 

component could perform the mission without the planned contribution 

from the reserve component. For example, the Fleet Forces Command 

assessed that there was a low risk that the Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance 

function could not perform the mission without the reserves’ contribution. 

After the results were validated, they had to be approved by the Total Force 

Flag Steering Group, a group of senior officers, including the Commander 

of the Navy Reserve Force, charged with ensuring continued progress in 

the integration of Navy active and reserve forces. At the end of the review, 

the Fleet Forces Command recommended reserve manpower changes to 

the Chief of Naval Operations for his approval.

Two Review Limitations 

Could Have Adversely 

Affected Results

The Navy’s zero-based review had two limitations that could have changed 

the number of active and reserve manpower recommended to the Chief of 

Naval Operations. The Navy (1) did not assess the most cost-effective mix 

of active and reserve manpower to perform the mission and (2) used 
Page 10 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

outdated critical mission documents as a baseline for manpower 

requirements.

Identifying Capability Gaps in 

the Active Force May Not Have 

Produced the Most Costeffective Mix of Active and 

Reserve Forces

The Navy’s zero-based review process focused on identifying the extent to 

which the active force could perform Navy missions and then determining 

whether reserve manpower could fill any remaining gaps, which may not 

have resulted in the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve forces. 

Given the Department of the Navy’s affordability challenges and the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy’s concern about accelerating manpower 

costs, the service must find ways to ensure it is accomplishing its mission 

with the most cost-effective mix of active, reserve, and civilian forces. In 

his guidance for 2004, the Chief of Naval Operations stated his commitment 

to fully integrating the active, reserve, and civilian forces. However, he also 

noted the need to minimize the total number of personnel on payroll and 

stated, “but we do not want to spend one extra penny for manpower we do 

not need.” Additionally, the Department of Defense’s directive that covers 

manpower management states that missions should be accomplished using 

the least costly mix of manpower.12 We have shown that when the reserve 

force can successfully meet deployment and operational requirements, it 

can generally perform missions at a lower cost than the active force 

because active units have all full-time personnel assigned whereas reserve 

units have mostly part-time personnel assigned.13 By identifying capability 

gaps in the active force as the primary criterion for determining the 

required reserve manpower, the Navy failed to assess whether the lower 

cost reserve force could be used to meet capabilities currently provided by 

the active force. 

While the Fleet Forces Command’s general guidance indicated that the 

manpower requirements review should consider cost in determining an 

adequate return on investment,14 it also stated that the return on 

investment should be based on commanders’ judgment. However, the 

Command did not require the activities to perform cost analyses to 

determine the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve forces needed 

to perform assigned missions as a basis for proposing the future mix of 

active and reserve manpower. If the most cost-effective mix of active and 

12DOD Directive 1100.4.

13GAO/NSIAD-98-64.

14The term “return on investment” included consideration of the total ownership cost of the 

position.
Page 11 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

reserve forces had been a major criterion in the review process, the results 

might have been different and the Navy may have been able to realize 

additional savings for some activities. For example, our current analysis of 

Navy data showed that the manpower costs for a reserve squadron of nine 

P-3 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aircraft would be approximately 

$20 million annually—about $8 million or 29 percent less than the 

estimated manpower cost of $28 million for an active squadron. 

Outdated Mission Documents 

May Have Resulted in Inaccurate 

Manpower Recommendations 

The Navy’s use of outdated critical mission documents as a baseline may 

have resulted in inaccurate recommendations about the Navy reserve 

manpower needed to perform missions in the future. According to the 

Navy’s instruction,15 the documents that provide information about a unit’s 

mission and the specific operating environment of the units are the most 

critical element for developing manpower requirements. Additionally, our 

prior work has shown that decisions about the manpower needed to 

perform government functions should be driven by valid and reliable data.16 

However, in its briefing to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Fleet Forces 

Command acknowledged that many of these critical mission documents 

were outdated. Our analysis confirmed this shortcoming. For example, 25 

of the 31 functions belonging to the five activities we visited did not have 

recently validated mission documents on which to base their manpower 

reviews. The Fleet Forces Command stated that the critical mission 

documents had not been updated because of the large amount and rapidity 

of change and the lack of sufficient manpower analysts to keep up with 

changes. According to a Command official, the activities’ commanders 

generally applied their judgment to update the most recently approved 

mission documents before conducting their analyses to mitigate the risks. 

However, this official agreed that use of these outdated mission documents 

may have increased the likelihood that manning was not correct in the 

associated manpower documents. Without validated and accurate mission 

documents to serve as a baseline for manpower numbers, some of the zerobased review’s determinations about capabilities and manpower 

requirements may have been inaccurate. 

15Department of the Navy Instruction 1000.16J, Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower 

Policies and Procedures (Washington, D.C.: January 1998).

16GAO-05-200.
Page 12 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Zero-Based Review 

Results Would Change 

the Mix of Active and 

Reserve Forces, 

Reduce Manpower 

Costs, and Change 

Some Command and 

Control 

Responsibilities 

Implementation of the Navy’s zero-based review’s recommendations will 

change the mix of active and reserve forces by decreasing the number of 

reserve personnel and increasing the number of active and civilian 

personnel. Some cost savings are projected as a result of the 

recommended changes. The zero-based review’s recommendations will 

also have the active force assume greater command and control 

responsibility over the reserve force. 

Number of Reserve 

Personnel Would 

Substantially Decrease 

While Number of Active and 

Civilian Personnel Would 

Increase Slightly

The Navy’s zero-based review’s recommendations will substantially 

decrease the number of reserve personnel and slightly increase the number 

of active and civilian personnel. As indicated in table 1, the Chief of Naval 

Operations approved a net reduction of over 16,000 reserve positions, a net 

increase of about 880 positions in the active force, and a net increase of 450 

civilian personnel positions.17 

Table 1: Planned Changes in Navy Manpower Levels as a Result of the Zero-Based 

Review

Source: United States Navy.

At the activities we visited, we found that the reasons for these 

recommended changes in manpower varied. For example, the Bureau of 

Medicine and Surgery recommended cutting 2,198 reserve positions 

17Contractors were not assessed as part of the review. 

Reserve component

positions

Active component

positions

Civilian personnel

positions

Positions created 4,338 2,626

About

 450 full-time positions

Positions divested 20,356 1,744 0

Net change (16,018) 882 450
Page 13 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

because it had reduced the requirement for the number of fleet hospitals 

from three to two and had rarely filled all of its specialized medical reserve 

positions in the past. By contrast, the Naval Security Group expected a net 

increase of 156 manpower positions because the National Security Agency 

had a need for two new capabilities (cryptologic linguists and signal 

intelligence analysts) totaling 200 new positions, while anticipated 

technology improvements would allow the Naval Security Group to 

eliminate 44 reserve positions. The Mine Warfare Command will make its 

airborne and surface mine countermeasure units an all active force by 

cutting 1,016 reserve positions from their airborne and surface mine 

countermeasures mission and converting 537 full-time reserve positions to 

active duty positions because the command could not recruit sufficient 

manpower to fill its reserve positions. With the additional active duty 

positions, the Command stated that the airborne and surface mine 

countermeasures missions could be fully accomplished without the reserve 

component’s participation. The Navy’s zero-based review results for the 

five activities that we visited are shown in appendix II.

Manpower Changes Would 

Result in Some Cost Savings 

The Fleet Forces Command initially estimated that implementing the 

manpower changes recommended by the zero-based review would save 

approximately $283.5 million annually. However, these original estimated 

savings are changing. Some active component activities are reexamining 

their manpower requirements and submitting changes to their original 

proposals because of organizational changes and other ongoing 

refinements to manpower requirements. For example, the Naval Air 

Forces now plans to eliminate an additional 378 reserve positions because 

the Navy plans to retire additional P-3 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance 

aircraft due to airframe fatigue problems. In another case, subsequent to 

the zero-based review, the Navy established the Maritime Force Protection 

Command that assumed reserve functions that were previously within the 

Surface Forces and the Military Sealift Commands. However, upon its 

establishment, the Maritime Force Protection Command determined that 

5,250 reserve positions would be needed versus the 5,840 positions the 

Fleet Forces Command originally approved. 

Although the Chief of Naval Operations approved the zero-based review 

results in August 2004, the changes were not included in the Department of 

the Navy’s fiscal year 2005 budget. The Fleet Forces Command has 

required each Navy activity to complete a transition plan and the Navy has 

included the recommended manpower changes in the Future Years 
Page 14 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Defense Program beginning in fiscal year 2006. All changes resulting from 

the zero-based review are to be completed by 2011. 

Active Force to Assume 

Greater Command and 

Control of Reserve Force

The zero-based review prompted changes in the command and control 

relationships between the Navy active and reserve forces, whereby the 

active force will assume greater command and control over the reserve 

force. Under the recommended changes, the active force will assume 

responsibility for the training and readiness of the reserve force. For 

example, the Commander, Navy Reserve Force, will now report to the 

Commander, Fleet Forces Command, for the training and readiness of the 

reserve force. In addition, the Commander, Naval Air Force Reserve, has 

physically moved from New Orleans to San Diego to be colocated with the 

Commander, Naval Air Forces, to whom he reports for readiness and 

training of reserve aviation forces. This realignment of responsibility is 

consistent with the Chief of Naval Operations’ objective to create a more 

integrated total force. 

Conclusions The Navy’s zero-based review was an important first step in its overall 

strategy to assess the role of the Navy reserve in the total Navy force. The 

review is also a critical element in helping the Navy achieve its desire to 

reduce manpower costs and move toward a more affordable total force. 

However, the Navy’s approach of using capability gaps in the active force as 

the means to determine Navy reserve manpower requirements was too 

narrow. Without consideration of manpower cost-effectiveness as directed 

by Department of Defense guidance, this approach did not provide 

assurance that the Navy will have the most cost-effective mix of active and 

reserve forces in the future. Furthermore, using outdated mission 

documents as a baseline for determining manpower requirements 

substantially reduced assurance that the Navy activities started with the 

best data for making quality manpower assessments. As the Navy 

continues to update and review its manpower requirements and identify 

ways to reduce its manpower costs in order to make resources available for 

other investments, it is important that all future assessments consider the 

most cost-effective force mix and be based on current mission documents. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To assist the Navy in meeting its human capital strategy goals and ensure 

that ongoing and future Navy active and reserve manpower requirement 

assessments result in the most cost-effective force, we recommend that the 
Page 15 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following 

two actions:

• develop and implement guidance to ensure that (1) ongoing and future 

workforce reviews include cost analyses to determine the most costeffective mix of active and reserve manpower and (2) the methodology 

for and results of cost analyses are documented and 

• allocate the required resources to maintain current Navy mission 

documents that would provide a valid baseline for ongoing and future 

workforce reviews. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

concurred with our recommendations. The department provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The department’s 

comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Navy, and other interested congressional committees and 

parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov if you or your 

staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our 

Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV.

Janet St. Laurent, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 16 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To determine the criteria and process the Navy used to conduct its zerobased review of reserve manpower requirements and the limitations that 

could affect the Navy’s analyses and implementations plans, we obtained 

and analyzed the guidance and expectations the Chief of Naval Operations 

provided to the Fleet Forces Command concerning the zero-based review. 

We also obtained and analyzed detailed information about the guidance and 

instructions the Fleet Forces Command provided to Navy activities 

concerning (1) the criteria to use for determining the required reserve 

manpower, (2) how the activities should report their review results to the 

Fleet Forces Command, (3) the review and validation process for the 

results reached during the zero-based review, and (4) plans for 

implementing the zero-based review results. Additionally, we met with 

Fleet Forces Command officials, as well as officials from the five activities 

we visited, and analyzed 10 of 37 justification packages the activities 

submitted to the Fleet Forces Command to further understand how the 

zero-based review was conducted at the different command levels, identify 

the extent to which cost-effectiveness of manpower changes was 

considered, and assess the consistency with which the activities reported 

their review results. Moreover, we analyzed prior GAO reports and 

applicable Navy publications for criteria and best practices in conducting 

manpower requirement reviews.

To determine how the recommendations from the zero-based review will 

affect the reserve’s manpower, funding, and command and control 

relationships with the active force, we obtained and analyzed the 

justification packages submitted by the 10 Navy activities, the 

recommended changes in the number of required reserve manpower and 

the cost factors used to calculate manpower savings as well as the 

corresponding projected funding requirements for reserve manpower. We 

also obtained information about, and discussed how the Navy plans to 

implement the results from the zero-based review with officials at the Fleet 

Forces Command and the five activities we visited. Additionally, we 

reviewed communications from the Chief of Naval Operations and 

discussed how the zero-based review would change command and control 

relationships between the active and reserve forces with officials at the 

Fleet Forces Command and the Navy Reserve Command.

We assessed the reliability of pertinent data about information supporting 

the activities’ proposals for reserve manpower changes and projected 

manpower changes. We examined 10 activity justification packages for 

consistency in the Navy’s validation and reserve manpower requirements 

reporting processes. We also verified the manpower budget programming 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 17 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

factors the Navy used to calculate projected manpower savings and 

performed a sample calculation to test the reliability of the projections. 

Except for the problem with outdated mission documents we noted in the 

body of the report, we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for 

the purpose of this report.

We performed our review from September 2004 through September 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 18 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Appendix II

Selected Navy Activities Visited ApendxiI

After performing substantial review work at Navy Headquarters and the 

Fleet Forces Command to obtain overall review results and general 

information about how the Navy conducted its zero-based review, we 

visited five Navy activities to obtain more detailed information: 

Headquarters, Naval Air Forces; Headquarters, Naval Submarine Forces; 

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; Naval Security Group; and Headquarters, 

Mine Warfare Command. We selected these particular activities because of 

special interest from the professional staff of the Senate and House Armed 

Services Committees and because the zero-based review results involved 

major changes to reserve manpower requirements for these activities. The 

purpose of our visits was to understand in detail the review procedures at 

the activity level and assess the consistency with which the activities

(1) followed the guidance and criteria provided by the Fleet Forces 

Command and (2) reported their review results. During our visits at these 

activities, we also discussed with officials the rationale for recommending 

major changes to their reserve manpower requirements.

The information below summarizes the results of the zero-based review for 

each of the five activities we visited. These summaries are based on the 

activities’ justification packages and our discussions with Fleet Forces 

Command and activity officials about the rationale for their changes to 

reserve manpower requirements. All Navy reserve positions have been 

approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as of August 2004. 

Activity 1: 

Headquarters, Naval 

Air Forces, San Diego, 

California

Headquarters, Naval Air Forces provides combat-ready and sustainable 

naval air forces that are trained and equipped to operate in an environment 

that emphasizes safety, interoperability, and efficient resource 

management. As shown in table 2, the zero-based review recommended 

almost a 25 percent reduction in naval aviation reserve manpower.

Table 2: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Aviation Reserve Manpower

Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

Reserve 

positions before 

review

Activity’s

proposed

reserve

positions

CNOapproved

reserve

positions

Change

(before –

approved)

 Percentage

change

11,157 8,843 8,415 (2,742) -24.58%
Appendix II

Selected Navy Activities Visited

Page 19 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Of the 2,742 total decrease in reserve positions in naval aviation forces, 

2,242 (82 percent) are from the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (P-3 

aircraft), Helicopter, and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Division 

communities. The decreases in these three communities were supported by 

different rationales.

First, Naval Air Forces decided to cut 1,323 positions from the Maritime 

Patrol and Reconnaissance units because P-3 airframe fatigue problems 

caused the Navy to remove some aircraft from the active inventory. To 

provide the active force with additional aircraft, the activity 

decommissioned four reserve squadrons, totaling 24 aircraft, and formed 

three fleet response units, totaling 18 aircraft. As a result, the activity 

needed fewer personnel and 6 additional aircraft were provided to the 

active force.

Additionally, the activity cut 491 positions from helicopter squadrons to 

better provide projected surge capability for the Fleet Response Plan. The 

activity combined five reserve helicopter squadrons of 36 aircraft into three 

fleet response units of 24 aircraft. As a result, the activity needed fewer 

personnel.

Finally, the activity cut 428 positions from the aviation intermediate 

maintenance divisions. The Fleet Forces Command decided to eliminate 

all reserve positions from functions in which reserve personnel were not 

able to meet deployment requirements.

Activity 2: 

Headquarters, Naval 

Submarine Forces, 

Norfolk, Virginia

The Naval Submarine Forces provide antisubmarine warfare, antisurface 

ship warfare, precision land strike, mine warfare, intelligence, surveillance 

and early warning, and special warfare capabilities to the U.S. Navy, and 

strategic deterrence capabilities to the U.S. Strategic Command. As shown 

in table 3, the zero-based review recommended more than a 41 percent 

reduction in naval submarine forces reserve manpower.
Appendix II

Selected Navy Activities Visited

Page 20 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Table 3: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Submarine Forces Reserve Manpower

Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

Of the total 1,105 decrease in reserve positions in Naval Submarine Forces, 

1,061 (96 percent) resulted from decommissioning a submarine tender 

(maintenance support ship) and decreasing reserve positions for logistics 

and administrative support operations.

The activity cut 939 positions from an inactive submarine tender because 

the Fleet Forces Command decided that this mission was not essential and 

could be performed by a contractor. The activity also cut 122 positions 

from logistics and administrative support operations because, according to 

officials, the reservists’ part-time duty status would not allow them to 

participate in submarine training deployments.

Activity 3: Bureau of 

Medicine and Surgery, 

Washington, D.C.

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery provides health care to about 700,000 

active duty Navy and Marine Corps members and to 2.6 million family 

members of active duty and retired personnel, while supporting 

contingency, humanitarian, and joint operations around the world. As 

shown in table 4, the zero-based review recommended almost a 29 percent 

reduction in medical reserve manpower.

Table 4: Zero-Based Review Results for Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Reserve 

Manpower

Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

Reserve 

positions before 

review

Activity’s

proposed

reserve

positions

CNOapproved

reserve

positions

Change

(before –

approved)

 Percentage

change

2,669 2,742 1,564 (1,105) -41.40%

Reserve 

positions before 

review

Activity’s

proposed

reserve

positions

CNOapproved

reserve

positions

Change

(before –

approved)

 Percentage

change

7,810 5,619 5,569 (2,241) -28.69%
Appendix II

Selected Navy Activities Visited

Page 21 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Of the total 2,241 decrease in reserve positions for the Bureau of Medicine 

and Surgery, 2,198 (98 percent) are from cuts in medical treatment facilities 

and fleet hospitals.

The activity cut 1,388 positions from medical treatment facilities because 

most of these positions were associated with special medical skills that 

were never filled. The activity also cut 810 positions due to a reduction in 

the number of fleet hospitals. The Navy reduced the number of fleet 

hospitals from three to two because it does not expect to need as many 

hospitals to meet mission requirements under new defense planning 

guidance.

Activity 4: Naval 

Security Group, Fort 

Meade, Maryland

The Naval Security Group performs cryptologic and logistics support 

functions for the fleet. As shown in table 5, the zero-based review 

recommended more than a 16 percent increase in naval security reserve 

personnel.

Table 5: Zero-Based Review Results for Naval Security Group Reserve Manpower

Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

The activity had a net increase of 156 reserve positions, which was 

achieved through reductions of some positions and additions of other 

positions.

The activity added 180 cryptologic linguists and 20 applied research and 

development positions. The number of positions for intelligence collection 

and analysis increased because the National Security Agency agreed to pay 

for the additional positions to meet its operational requirements. At the 

same time, the activity cut 44 information operations positions because 

anticipated technological advances in telephone and computer security 

allowed the activity to reduce the number of personnel. 

Reserve 

positions 

before review

Activity’s

proposed

reserve

positions

CNOapproved

reserve

positions

Change

(before –

approved)

 Percentage

Change

950 1,150 1,106 156 16.42%
Appendix II

Selected Navy Activities Visited

Page 22 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Activity 5: 

Headquarters, Mine 

Warfare Command, 

Corpus Christi, Texas

The Mine Warfare Command develops and evaluates mine warfare 

doctrine, tactics, and equipment to conduct offensive and defensive mine 

warfare operations throughout the world. It is responsible for removing all 

types of mine threats, providing intelligence on foreign mine capabilities, 

and developing tactics to counter other nations’ mining capabilities. As 

shown in table 6, the zero-based review recommended more than a 90 

percent decrease in mine warfare reserve manpower.

Table 6: Zero-Based Review Results for Mine Warfare Command Reserve Manpower

Sources: United States Navy (data); GAO (analysis).

Of the total 1,158 decrease in reserve positions for the Mine Warfare 

Command, 1,016 (88 percent) were taken from the Airborne and Surface 

Mine Countermeasures Units. This decrease was a result of converting 

reserve positions to active positions.

The activity cut 541 Airborne Mine Countermeasures positions by 

reorganizing its two Airborne Mine Countermeasures squadrons, each of 

which consisted of six active aircraft and four reserve aircraft, into two 

squadrons of eight active aircraft each. The activity decided to man the 

two squadrons with only active manpower because the reserve functions 

could not recruit sufficient manpower needed in specific specialties.

The activity also cut 475 Surface Mine Countermeasures positions. The 

activity decided to convert all reserve positions authorized for its 15 ships 

to active positions because it had experienced reduced operational 

effectiveness due to the inability to fill the reserve positions. 

Reserve 

positions before 

review

Activity’s

proposed

reserve

positions

CNOapproved

reserve

positions

Change

(before –

approved)

 Percentage

change

1,280 122 122 (1,158) -90.47
Page 23 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO-06-125 Force Structure
Page 25 GAO-06-125 Force Structure

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 (stlaurentj@gao.gov)

Acknowledgments Richard G. Payne, Assistant Director; George O. Morse; Willie J. Cheely, Jr.; 

Nicole L. Collier; Bethann E. Ritter; Renee S. Brown; Jonathan Clark; and 

Rebecca Shea also made significant contributions to this report.

(350588)
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