The Battle of al-Khafji

by Paul W. Westermeyer

n August 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the

neighboring nation of

Kuwait. The invasion was

part of an expansionist foreign policy that President Saddam Hussein established a decade earlier when he

invaded post-revolution Iran. The Iraqi

invasion of Iran failed, degenerating into

a decade long war of attrition, but Kuwait

was an easier target. Kuwait had financed

the Iraq-Iran War for Iraq, but refused to

forgive the debt, and Iraq accused Kuwait

of stealing oil from the Rumalia Oil Field.

Much smaller than Iran in terms of population and geography, Kuwait had focused its foreign and defense policies on

negotiation and compromise rather than

military force; inevitably, the large Iraqi

Army quickly overwhelmed the small

Kuwaiti armed forces.

Inside Kuwait, Iraqi troops began

wholesale pillaging as security forces

moved to remove all those loyal to the

Kuwaiti royal family. Iraq declared that

Kuwait was now a province, thus eliminating its debt and adding extensive oil

fields to its own. Saddam stationed conscript infantry divisions in Kuwait and

began building extensive defenses along

the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.

While Saddam calculated the military

balance between Iraq and Kuwait correctly, he underestimated the willingness

of the world community, especially the

On The Cover: The crew of a Marine LAV-25

scans the desert. The LAV-25 was the backbone

of the light armored infantry battalions, an untried concept prior to the Battle of al-Khafji.

The battalions were used in a traditional cavalry role, providing a screen in front of the main

body of I Marine Expeditionary Force.

History Division Photo

At Left: A Qatari AMX-30 tank leads two

Saudi V-iSO Commando armored cars, the first

of which is an antitank variant, into al-Khafji

through the town arches. The arches were the

focal point of each Saudi counterattack into the

city. Used with permission of Jody Harmon

(www.jodyharmon.com)

United States and Great Britain, to intervene on Kuwait's behalf. His invasion set

the stage for a military confrontation that

was larger in scope than any similar circumstance since the Cold War. Under

President George H. W. Bush, the United

States assembled a global coalition of concerned nations, first to defend Saudi Arabia against further Iraqi aggression, and

then to eject the Iraqi military from

Kuwait. Early in this "Gulf War" American military commanders designated the

operation to protect Saudi Arabia "Desert

Shield:' and the successive operation to

free Kuwait "Desert Storm:' These military operations were massive undertakings, and they highlighted the paradigm

shift from superpowers in precarious

equilibrium during the Cold War to

American global hegemony in the 1990s.

The Gulf War would be the largest deployment of Marines since the Vietnam

War. It challenged the entire warfighting

establishment of the Marine Corps—aviation, ground, and logistics—forcing a

generation of Marines to put two decades

of planning and training to the test. The

Corps would see many of its tactical and

operational philosophies justified under

combat conditions. The maritime prepositioning ships program, for one, proved

its worth, enabling Marines to be the first

combined arms task force in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Marines tested the airground task force concept within the joint

environment.

Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived in Saudi Arabia

in late August, where they married up

with their equipment from the maritime

prepositioning ships. Under Marine

Forces Commander, Central Command,

and Commander, I Marine Expeditionary

Force, Lieutenant General Walter E.

Boomer, Marines continued to deploy to

the Gulf and solidify the defenses of Saudi

Arabia. They trained, established defensive positions, and watched the diplomatic efforts attempt to resolve the crisis.

As fall turned to winter, the Marine

Corps continued the massive logistical

enterprise, deploying personnel and

equipment of I Marine Expeditionary

Force: 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 1st Force

Service Support Group.

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the

United States Central Command commander, chose the Marines to evict the

Iraqis from Kuwait proper, fighting

alongside Arab members of the Coalition.

As Lieutenant General Boomer's I Marine

Expeditionary Force and its partners prepared to breach the fortifications separating Kuwait from Saudi Arabia, the 4th

and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades

remained afloat in the Persian Gulf onboard the ships of U.S. Navy amphibious

ready groups, providing a seaborne threat

which would eventually tie up many Iraqi

resources along the shoreline.

Despite the threat of a Coalition military intervention, Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam was convinced that the United States could

neither maintain the Coalition, nor intervene militarily in a meaningful way. A

military struggle to free Kuwait thus became inevitable.

On 17 January 1991, Operation Desert

Storm began with massive air strikes

throughout Iraq and Kuwait. Although

the operation had an expected ground

component, U.S. Air Force strategists,

who believed that bombing alone could

compel Iraq to relinquish Kuwait, drove

the first phases. As a result, the primary

focus of the campaign was on achieving

air superiority (accomplished the first

evening), striking strategic targets inside

Iraq, then annthilating Iraq's elite Republican Guard centered in southern Iraqi,

and finally hitting Iraqi forces in Kuwait

proper.

During the air campaign, Marine aviation conducted hundreds of sorties

The Battle of al-Khafji 1
against enemy positions in Kuwait and

Iraq. Aircrews of the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing struck Iraqi command and control

centers, antiaircraft defenses, and strategic targets deep inside Iraq, and later performed traditional reconnaissance, battlefield interdiction, and close air support

missions in Kuwait.

A day after the air campaign began, a

distraction was added when Iraq began

Base 881724 (000373) 4-91 Modified by W. Stephen Hilt

firing SS-1 Scud-B Al Hussein surface-tosurface medium range missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. The political and

military consequences of the Scud attacks

forced Central Command to immediately

2 The Battle of al-Khafji
instigate the "Great Scud Hunt' Although the hunt was unsuccessful, it diverted large numbers of aircraft and

reconnaissance resources away from

Kuwait and into the western Iraqi desert.

In particular, the hunt required the use of

the two prototype Northrup Grumman

E-8C joint surveillance and target acquisition radar system (JSTARS) aircraft.

The E-8C aircraft had arrived in Saudi

Arabia after Christmas and was a new,

untested battlefield technology.2 Central

Command used the planes to track mobile Scud launchers in the western desert,

although originally designed to track

large-scale troop movements, like those

that would precede a major offensive.3

Despite the Scud distraction and the

focus on strategic rather than operational

targets, the air campaign had an obvious

and significant impact on Iraqi forces inside Kuwait. It isolated units from the national command authority, degraded

troop morale, and made even simple

movements difficult, often requiring days

of detailed planning.

With its diplomatic options exhausted,

and enduring the effects of an air campaign much longer than anticipated, Iraq

launched a large spoiling attack centered

on the Saudi town of al-KhaIji on 29 January 1991. Now known as the "Battle of

al-Kha!Ji' it was the first major ground

combat action of the Gulf War.

Saddam Hussein was prepared for a

confrontation with the United States

prior to the invasion of Kuwait, as evidenced by his comments to Palestinian

leader Yasser Arafat in April 1990:

We are ready for it. We will fight

America, and, with God's will, we

will defeat it and kick it out of the

whole region. Because it is not

about the fight itself; we know that

America has a larger air force than

us... has more rockets than us, but

I think that when the Arab people

see real action of war, when it is real

and not only talk, they will fight

America everywhere. So we have

to get ready to fight America; we

are ready to fight when they do;

when they strike, we strike.5

But Iraq's president was convinced the

United States would not fight, in part because of the muted response to the Iraqi

Aérospatiale AM39 Exocet antiship missile attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) in

1987. The massive military buildup in

Saudi Arabia throughout the fall of 1990

did not change his mind. Moreover, he

believed that even if the United States desired a military confrontation, the Soviet

Union would intervene to prevent it.

If an attack did occur, Saddam was

equally convinced that his massive military could inflict sufficient losses on the

Americans to force them to abandon the

struggle. He considered the American

withdrawal from Vietnam indicative of

America's lack of resolve. The United

States suffered 58,000 dead in the Vietnam War; in comparison Iraq had lost

51,000 in a single battle with the Iranians

on the al-Faw Peninsula in 1986.6 He beMap by W. Stephen Hill

lieved then, as he stated after the war,

"America is not in the prime of youth.

America is in the last stage of elderliness

and the beginning of the first stage of old

age'7

Iraq had survived the long, 10-year

slaughter of the "Khadisya Saddam' as

the Iraqis termed the Iran-Iraq War, and

Saddam believed that the conflict over

Kuwait, if it came to blows, would follow

a similar pattern.8 Air power would be

relatively ineffective; the main conflict

would be a set piece battle as American

forces impotently tried to breach the defenses built along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. American losses would be severe, the

American people would demand an end

to the bloodshed, and the American government would then negotiate a peace. In

the aftermath, Iraq would become the

undisputed regional power, while AmerThe Battle of al-Khafji 3
ican, and Western, influence in the Middle East would suffer a near fatal blow.

Events did not follow Saddam Hussein's expectations. The United States was

determined not to allow the Iraqi aggression to stand and Iraq's Arab neighbors

recognized the degree to which Iraq's invasion of Kuwait would upset the regional

balance of power. The Soviet Union was

unwilling and unable to support Iraq in

an aggressive adventure that offered no

tangible benefits. The United States was

able to form an international coalition

that included an impressive variety of nations; notable members included Great

Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and

Syria. Despite its variety, the Coalition's

unity was never seriously challenged by

Iraqi attempts to fracture it.

The United States and its allies began

the war with the air strikes Saddam and

his generals had predicted, but these attacks were far more effective than expected. Later, Iraqis would master the art

of proofing their country against aerial attack, but in January 1991, the Coalition

air campaign was something the Iraqis

had never experienced.

Saddam responded quickly with Scud

missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel,

and while these strikes were unquestionably the most effective military and political tactic employed by Iraq during the

conflict, they did not end the raids, noticeably decrease their severity, spur the

United States into a premature ground assault, nor bring Israel into the war and

thus splinter the multinational Coalition

which Iraq faced.

In addition to the Scud attacks, Iraq

tried to provoke Coalition ground operations by setting Kuwaiti oil fields afire and

by creating a large oil slick in the Persian

Gulf that threatened Saudi water desalination facilities. But these actions were

no more effective than the Scud attacks.

Saddam expected the air campaign to

last a week, and then be followed by the

ground war, the "Mother of All Wars:'

which would produce the desired massive

American casualties. Instead, the bombing showed no sign of stopping, and was

inflicting serious damage on the Iraqi

forces without any corresponding ability

to produce the desired Coalition casualties. Something needed to be done in

order to goad the United States into the

planned Kuwaiti "meat-grindet"

An Iraqi War College study, completed

later, highlighted the Iraqi understanding

of the situation in late January 1991:

In military practice, there are principles. One of the important principles is that the attack is the best

defense. In the Mother of Wars this

principle is particularly important,

because the enemy of Iraq and the

Arab nation has deployed a large

number of airplanes, rockets and

modern equipment, from which it

seems they are prepared for a total

war. They deployed the most modern equipment for their field forces,

which consist of the armies of 28

nations totaling half a million men.

But for all this great power, they

hesitate to attack the Iraqi field

forces because they realize how well

the Iraqi forces can defend against a

ground attack. And, they know already, the military genius of Iraq's

leader, Saddam Hussein.9

The Iraqis believed they understood

American intentions: "Like we say, they

intend to destroy our forces and the infrastructure of our country through the

air attack, by airplanes and long range

missiles. And they want to avoid the

losses of a ground war as much as they

can."° Moreover, "George Bush will not

be able to handle the heavy responsibility

of heavy casualties in front of Congress

and public opinion:"1 In this case, the

Iraqis did understand American intentions, although they underestimated

American resolve, and gravely overestimated the ability of the Iraqi military to

inflict losses on the attacking Coalition

forces.

The al-Khafi operation was intended

to spark the ground battle of the "Mother

of Wars" which Saddam felt was the prerequisite for his eventual victory. It was

intended as a provoking raid that would

draw the Americans into a hasty and massive military response and result in significant American casualties. Despite his

deficient military acumen, he correctly

identified that the center of gravity in the

Coalition war effort was the willingness

of the American people to suffer casualties, and he designed his operational

plans to strike directly at that willpower.

President Saddam chose al-Kha!i as

the target of the attack for several reasons.

The Iraqi War College analysis noted that

it had two harbors: one designed specifically for exporting oil, and the other the

Iraqis believed was a base for Coalition

forces. An Iraqi force occupying the town

would be able to threaten Coalition naval

forces in the Gulf. Al-Kha!ji was also

within range of Iraqi supporting artillery

in Kuwait. The attack also would force

4 The Battle of al-Khafji

The arches into the Saudi city of al-Khafji proclaim that "The municipality and residents

of Khafji welcome the honorable visitor." Because the city was within range of Iraqi artillery in Kuwait, it was ordered evacuated on 18 August 1990.

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie
the Saudis to respond; he knew they could

not permit him to hold any part of their

kingdom for long. It seemed likely that

the attack would force the Coalition into

the bloody ground war Saddam wanted.'2

The operational plan for implementing

Iraq's strategic goal was relatively straight

forward, Five Iraqi infantry divisions defended the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from the

coast to the "elbow": from east to west,

they were the 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry,

29th Infantry, 14th Infantry, and 7th Infantry Divisions. These commands would

not take part in the offensive, instead they

would continue to defend the fortifications along the border. These border fortifications, called the "Saddam Line" by

U.S. forces, consisted of a belt of minefields, antitank obstacles, and triangular

brigade strong points. Iraqi engineers had

designed and constructed the belt based

on lessons learned in their 10-year war

with Iran.

The attacking forces would be drawn

from the 3d Armored and 5th Mechanized

Divisions of III Corps, under Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, and the 1st

Mechanized Division of IV Corps under

Major General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki. Major

General Salah Aboud had over all command of the operation; III Corps, considered one of the better organizations in the

Iraqi Army, had successfully conducted

similar operations during the Iran-Iraq

War, as well as performing successfully

while defending the Iraqi city of Basrah.'3

The armored battalions of these divisions were equipped with a combination

of T-54/55 and T-62 main battle tanks

while their mechanized infantry battalions were equipped with BMP- 1 armored

personnel carriers supported by BRDM-2

scout vehicles. Their divisional artillery

was lavishly equipped with various models of 152mm and 155mm howitzers.14

The plan called for the 1st Mechanized

Division to pass through the lines of the

7th and 14th Infantry Divisions between

the border's "heel" just south of Umm

Hajul and the "elbow" at al-Manaqish (see

map on page 12). This maneuver was intended to protect the flank of Brigadier

General Hussan Zedin's 3d Armored Division as it traversed the al-Wafrah oil

fields and the lines of the 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions. The 3d Armored Division would then take up a blocking

position to the west of al-Khafi. AlKhafi itself was the target of the 5th

Mechanized Division, which was to seize

and fortify the town. Once the 5th Mechanized Division had secured al-Khafji, the

1st Mechanized and 3d Armored Divisions

would withdraw back into Kuwait. In

theory, after the Coalition ground response was provoked, the 5th Mechanized

Division would retire from al-Khafi and

move safely behind the massive fortifications along the Saudi-Kuwait border.'5

The attack was set to be launched at 2000

on 29 January 1991, and al-Khafji was to

be occupied by 0100 on 30 January 1991.

General Salah Aboud ordered that the

forces be "dug in" and "hidden underground" by the morning of 30 January. He

provided some insightful tactical advice

as well: "I emphasized the use, and the

importance of shoulder fired anti-aircraft

weapons in ambush in the front and

flanks of the fortified positions. And I

emphasized how the snipers should be

active and effective against the helicopters

of the enemy" He instructed his men to

light tire fires, as the smoke would confuse the infrared sensors of the Coalition

forces. Finally, he ordered his troops "to

be economic with the ammunition which

is in the tanks and the carriers. Because

the enemy air will be focused on the battle territory, especially the transportation,

so movement will be very limited."6

Whatever Saddam's understanding of the

battle, at least one of his generals anticipated the difficulties the Iraqis would face

trying to maneuver against overwhelming Coalition air superiority.

The capture of American personnel

was a high priority. Saddam had deterThe Battle of al-Khaf)i 5

Iraqi Armored Vehicles

Vehicle Type Armament Top

Speed

T-54/55

100mm main gun

1300m effective range

Coax 7.62mm MG

Bow 7.62mm MG

12.7mm MG

Sokph

T-62

115mm main gun

2000m effective range

Coax 7.62mm MG

Bow 7.62mm MG

12.7mm MG

sokph

0 0 0

BMP-1

73mm smoothbore

cannon

7.62mm MG

AT-3 Sagger ATGM

8troops

8okph

BRDM-2

14.5mm MG

7.62mm MG

4 troops lOOkph
mined from the American prisoner of

war experience during the Vietnam War

and the Iranian hostage crisis that the

United States was vulnerable to hostage

taking. He held many Westerners hostage

early in the crisis, but released them in

December 1990 with little obvious advantage. He felt, however, that American

soldiers would still be excellent bargaining chips in the confrontation. An Iraqi

prisoner from the battle later told American interrogators: "The sole purpose of

the raid on al-KhaIJi was to capture Coalition personnel. The loss of all Iraqi equipment and personnel involved in the raid

was of no importance as long as POWs

were captured:"7

When giving orders for the attack to

his corps commanders, Saddam summed

up Iraqi goals: the "enemy in front of us, if

he faces this time our willingness to cause

severe damage to him, he won't be able to

handle it. He will be destroyed and the

news will be heard. And all the chairs of

the enemy governments will shake."8 For

Iraq, the Battle of al-Khai was not intended as a skirmish; it was intended to

win the war by destroying the Coalition's

will to fight. At the heart of the Coalition

was the alliance between the United States

and Saudi Arabia.

The United States began providing the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with military

assistance in the 1940s, and as the decades

passed the relationship grew. The United

States assisted the kingdom as a bulwark

first against communism and secular ethnic Arab nationalist movements, and later

against radical Islamic movements. In

addition, a strong, stable Saudi Arabia

was seen as the key to preventing a general war in the Middle East. For the

House of Saud, the close relationship and

military assistance of the United States

acted as a counter to Saudi Arabia's more

powerful neighbors Iraq and Egypt, as

well as aiding in the suppression of internal rebellious movements. '

As the decades passed, however, and

hostility against the United States increased in the broader Islamic world,

American military assistance became

nearly as much of a liability as it was an

asset. This paradox was neatly summarized by leading Egyptian journalist, Mohamed Heikal: "the first responsibility of

a Saudi monarch is to keep intimate relations with Washington, and the second is

to do all he can to hide it"2°

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced

a near catastrophe in foreign relations for

the Saudis, as it was clear they could not

stop any Iraqi encroachment into their

territory without American aid, yet that

aid would have to be very public. The intimate relationship between the United

States and Saudi Arabia had long been an

open secret, but now it would truly be exposed. The presence of a massive "infi6 The Battle of al-Khafji

I' 'c& !+

—-I

.

Iraqi Training Pamphlet, Battle of al-Khafii (ISGQ-2003-00054592)

Part of the Iraqi plan for the Battle of al-Khafji, as shown in an official Iraqi history of the battle. This sketch indicates that 6th Armored Brigade's attack on Observation Post 4 was not intended as the main Iraqi effort.