* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/21/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MARY J. MEYER,

Defendant-Appellant. No.96-5052 (N. Dist. Oklahoma) (D.C. No. 92-C-697-B)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

BeforeANDERSON , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 Meyer also moves this court to grant her a certific ate of probable cause,

which this court hereby does. We note that Meyer f iled her notice of appeal on February 20, 1996. This date is prior to the Presi dent’s signing of significant amendments to habeas corpus proceedings in the formof the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.” As a result, we do not consider the effect of these new provisions to Meyer’s appeal. Edens v. Hannigan , 87 F.3d 1109, 1111 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996). -2- Mary J. Meyer brings her pro se claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate her convictions and sentences. Meyer claims that as a result of two separate forfeitures of property, her convictions and sentences constituted double jeopardy. 1 The district court denied her motion. This courthas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and affirms the distri ct court’s dismissal of Meyer’s habeas petition. A twenty-three count indictment was returned agains t Meyer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. On December 20, 1991, Meyer was convicted by a jury on all counts, which included twenty counts of interstate transmission of wagering information, or aiding and abetting in its transmission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084 and three counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Subse quently, the United States sought the forfeiture of certain items of property in connection with the criminal violations. Two separate forfeiture proceedings we re brought under 18 U.S.C. § 981. The first resulted in a judgment of forfeitur e against a vehicle, entered on July 17, 1992. The second proceeding resulted in the forfeiture of $6142.33,-3-

which is a portion of the proceeds from the sale of real property known as 7606 East 80th Place, Tulsa, Oklahoma. This second judg ment of forfeiture was entered February 24, 1993. Meyer asks this court to hold that her convictions and sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and seeks their vacation . Meyer’s convictions and sentences, however, could not have constituted doub le jeopardy, occurring, as they did, prior to the forfeiture actions. But nei ther can the forfeiture proceedings have placed Meyer in double jeopardy because these actions were in rem, civil proceedings which are not forms of punishment. In United States v. Ursery , the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 981 was intende d to be an impersonal, in rem, civil proceedings. No. 95-345, slip op. at 20 -21 (U.S. June 24, 1996). The Court determined that proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 981 were not punitive in nature and did not serve as “punishment” for Doubl e Jeopardy Clause purposes. Id. at 22, 24. The forfeiture proceedings here occurred pursuant t o 18 U.S.C. § 981 and they were thus not punishment which would have subj ected Meyer to double-4-

jeopardy. The district court is thus AFFIRMED and Meyer’s habeas petition is hereby DISMISSED. Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge