U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

75–671 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–149] 

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN THE 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND 

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

AUGUST 1, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN GARRETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, August 1, 2012, United States Force Posture in the United States 

Pacific Command Area of Responsibility ........................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, August 1, 2012 .................................................................................... 37 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2012 

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC 

COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Berteau, David J., Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ......................... 7 

Green, Dr. Michael J., Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies ................................................................................... 5 

Helvey, David F., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East 

Asia, U.S. Department of Defense ...................................................................... 24 

Scher, Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 23 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Berteau, David J., joint with Dr. Michael J. Green ....................................... 43 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 41 

Scher, Robert, joint with David F. Helvey ...................................................... 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Comments from Hon. Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, on ‘‘U.S. Force 

Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment’’ (CSIS) ................................................................................................. 178 

‘‘U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent 

Assessment,’’ by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(David J. Berteau and Michael J. Green, Co-Directors) ............................ 69 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 185 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 185 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 185 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, a Delegate from the Northern Mariana Islands ................................................................................................... 185 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 189 

Mr. Sablan ......................................................................................................... 196 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 194 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 191 
(1) 

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN THE UNITED 

STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, August 1, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:22 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the 

Pacific Command and an independent assessment of the U.S. defense posture in the region. 

I have had the opportunity to review the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies’ report and was very impressed with the 

thoroughness of the assessment and the depth of study associated 

with the recommendations. The ability to pull together such a comprehensive document in the short time provided is indicative of the 

expertise provided to this report and the value the think-tank community can play in the policymaking process. 

My compliments to both of our witnesses. 

To quote the report, ‘‘Today, six of the 10 fastest-growing major 

export markets for the United States are in Asia, and 60 percent 

of U.S. goods exported abroad go to the region.’’ Meanwhile, the region is home to five of the eight states recognized as being in possession of nuclear weapons, three of the world’s top six defense 

budgets, six of the world’s largest militaries, continuing tensions 

between India and Pakistan, and territorial disputes stretching 

from the northern territories of Japan through East and South 

China Seas and into South Asia. 

It is for these reasons and many more that a rebalance to the 

Pacific theater is in our strategic interest. Our subcommittee has 

long supported this strategic rebalance, and I believe that a forward-based credible presence is essential to supporting our economic interests. 

In previous discussions of the Marine Corps realignment from 

Okinawa, I had expressed my concern on the overall cost associated 

with the realignment of forces. However, earlier this year, the Department of Defense offered an alternative force structure proposal 

that includes a reduction of forces in Okinawa and realigns the Ma-
2 

rine Corps into Marine air-ground task force elements in Okinawa, 

Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. 

I am pleased to note that the overall costs appear to have been 

significantly reduced while security posture may be further enhanced. Rarely in Washington do we encounter a proposal that 

both saves money and expands capabilities. But I think that we 

have encountered such a proposal in the latest agreement between 

the United States and the Government of Japan. 

I am glad that our witnesses today appear to have reached the 

same conclusion. 

I believe in maintaining peace through strength. I believe that a 

strong economy requires a strong military to protect the free flow 

of goods around the world. And I believe that the Asia-Pacific theater provides a valuable key to the continued prosperity of the 

United States, and it is in our strategic interest to ensure peace in 

the region. 

I must admit, I do wonder whether such a Pacific rebalance as 

we are discussing today will be hollowed by the debate associated 

with sequestration and the decisions associated with the Budget 

Control Act. I think that we internalize the impacts of sequestration to the force structure of the United States, but I am equally 

worried as to the message that could be provided to our partners 

and allies. 

I look forward to also discussion how our withdrawal of forces 

from overseas that could follow a sequestration decision and the 

additional reductions already included in the Budget Control Act 

could be perceived by our partners and allies. 

As to our hearing today, we intend to have two panels of witnesses. The first panel will be the principal authors of the report 

entitled, ‘‘U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: 

An Independent Assessment.’’ The second panel will be representatives of the Department of Defense. 

Joining us on the first panel are two distinguished witnesses and 

authors of this independent report from the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, Mr. David J. Berteau, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Program, and Dr. Michael J. Green, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair. 

Gentlemen, we thank you both for being here and for the expertise that you bring to our subcommittee this afternoon. 

I would now like to recognize the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo, 

for any remarks that she may have. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for calling this hearing to order. We have waited 

for some time for this much-anticipated report to be released. So 

I am glad that we have a chance to begin to dissect its findings in 

this hearing. 
3 

To our witnesses, I thank you also, and I look forward to our 

question-and-answer period. 

The recently released report by the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies on U.S. force posture strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was authorized by Section 346 of last year’s defense authorization bill. And this report has cost our taxpayers about $1 

million to complete. But the results were helpful, informing our 

dialogue in Congress about the refocus in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Broadly speaking, the report reaffirmed the Obama administration’s refocus on the Asia-Pacific region. The report states that 

overall the Department of Defense is reasonably well positioned to 

align and focus U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region. This 

conclusion is critical to ensuring that our country remains engaged 

in this region of the world. 

U.S. engagement in this region of the world is so important to 

our country’s economic and political security. I, too, believe that 

more U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is critical. The report helps to contextualize the commitments that we must make to 

our allies in the region to meet a wide range of military requirements, including contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, humanitarian and disaster response in Southeast Asia, support for our Pacific Island allies, as well as for ensuring the free flow of goods in 

the maritime domain. 

While the report discusses a broad range of issues regarding our 

military posture in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to note 

that the report validates the distributed laydown for the Marine 

Corps in this region. 

In fact, the report clearly states that the Department of Defense 

must implement the April 2012 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee’s agreement to disperse four Marine air-ground task 

forces across the Pacific. The report reaffirms that our country and 

leaders in Congress must move forward implementing the distributed laydown. Not doing so would have dire consequences for the 

trust of our allies in the region. And among those lines the report 

states, and I quote—‘‘The current impasse between the Department 

of Defense and the Congress is not cost-free in terms of U.S. strategic influence in the region.’’ 

While there do remain several questions about the specifics of 

the realignment in the Pacific that I hope the Department will be 

able to address, the distributed laydown as validated by this report 

supports our country’s strategic interest in the region. 

We must get on with realignments in the Pacific or risk undermining our efforts in this critical region. 

So I hope that our witnesses will be able to comment on the 

broader implications to our posture in the Pacific should the Congress refuse to take concrete actions that demonstrate our commitment to the region, such as funding projects associated with the 

distributed laydown. 

I would also highlight that the report concluded work is needed 

to support civilian infrastructure on Guam. The report cautions of 

the impact of creating two worlds. We don’t want to develop a situation where the military has the best of everything and our civilian 

community is left with the impact of their presence without adequate infrastructure. 
4 

I hope our witnesses can comment on the importance of addressing civilian infrastructure on Guam and how that could further enable a robust Marine Corps presence on our island. 

I also hope that our witnesses can touch on why the report indicates that it is important for DOD [Department of Defense] to take 

the lead on addressing these civilian infrastructure challenges. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the efforts of the 

CSIS’s [Center for Strategic and International Studies’] report, lead 

co-authors Mr. Green and Mr. Berteau. I know there was a significant effort put in place to meet the very stringent deadlines of this 

very report. 

And, again, I appreciate that this report broadly validates the 

Obama administration’s refocus on the Asia-Pacific region and the 

importance of this strategic initiative. 

It cannot be emphasized enough how important it is to get our 

strategic posture right for this region to ensure safety and stability 

for the years to come. 

And Mr. Chairman, I would also like to mention the fact that we 

have present during this hearing my fellow congressman from the 

Northern Marianas, Mr. Kilili Sablan. 

And I yield back, and I look forward to the questions and the answer period. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. 

As we discussed prior to the hearing, I asked unanimous consent 

that it be made in order to depart from regular order so that members may ask questions that follow the train of thought from the 

proceeding member. 

I think this will provide a roundtable-type forum and will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I also would like to ask unanimous consent that other committee 

and non-committee members be allowed to participate in today’s 

hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity 

to ask questions. 

Is there any objection? 

Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Sablan, we are glad to have you join us today and be with 

us. 

And I also ask unanimous consent that the entirety of the independent assessment and the comments provided by the Department of Defense that were provided in the official transmittal of 

the report also be included in the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 69 and 178.] 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, so ordered. 

And Dr. Green, it is my understanding that you are going to be 

going first. And we look forward to your statement. 

And with that, we turn the floor over to you and recognize you 

for your remarks. 
5 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL J. GREEN, SENIOR ADVISOR 

AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bordallo and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity for us to 

report on our findings from the independent assessment of U.S. 

force posture strategy in the Asia-Pacific. 

Let me also thank our colleagues in the Department of Defense 

and the commands within the Pacific and the allied and partner 

governments and military forces we met with. We had almost 300 

interviews, weeks of travel time in the region, and couldn’t have 

completed this in a timely way without their help. 

We conclude in the report that the American people continue to 

receive enormous dividends from our forward posture in Asia, but 

that much of the force posture is based on Cold War legacy basing 

arrangements and that it needs to be realigned. 

And we agree in the report that the Department of Defense is 

moving in generally the right direction to do that and that most of 

the known elements of their plan will get us there. But we do have 

in the report some specific areas where we recommend either reconsideration or refinement, and we thought that more could be 

done to articulate the strategy comprehensively to the Congress 

within the U.S. Government and to our allies and partners. Let me 

focus on that strategic piece, and my colleague will talk about the 

specific recommendations. 

Asia has never been more important to our future than it is 

today, but we also face significant challenges: North Korean proliferation, natural disasters like the one we saw in Japan last 

March. But in many ways the central question we face is how China’s growing power is going to affect regional order, stability and 

progress. And our view was that our strategy for force posture has 

to have this as one of the guiding essential tenets for how we think 

about our forces and our partnerships in the region. 

We do not believe that this requires a strategy of containing 

China or that the sole or even central purpose of our force posture 

should be to prepare to fight with China. 

I thought President Obama put it well early last year when he 

said, ‘‘We have a stake in China’s success; they have a stake in our 

success.’’ 

But in order to build a mutually respectful and beneficial relationship with China, it is critical that our forces are part of a strategy that help us win the peace, that create an environment where 

countries want to cooperate. They don’t want to challenge the status quo. They don’t want to challenge the rules that have been 

championed by the U.S. and our allies for many decades. 

This involves more than just military forces: trade, diplomacy, 

the attraction of our political values are all important instruments. 

But a central pillar has to be how we position our forces in the region. 

Part of what our forward posture does for us is shape a more cooperative peacetime environment; and part of what it does is position us to deter challengers from taking us on. 

And let me briefly mention how we fill those requirements in 

both areas. 
6 

In terms of shaping the peacetime environment, we think a persistent forward engagement does several things for us. First, it 

assures our allies and partners of our security commitments. It encourages solidarity among them and with us so that no one will 

challenge them, and they won’t feel they have to hedge, capitulate, 

or perhaps unilaterally escalate. 

Second, it helps us dissuade China from thinking—or North 

Korea or anyone from thinking that coercion will pay off, by demonstrating our commitment and our solidarity with allies and partners. 

Third, it helps to shore up the capacity of states to deal with 

their own security problems. The Philippines are an excellent example of this. We need all of these countries to be able to deal with 

internal challenges, natural disasters, terrorism, to have maritime 

domain awareness, so that we don’t have vacuums or instability 

that creates larger disorder that in a way exacerbates our relationship with Beijing. 

A forward posture that is persistent and engaged also helps us 

get ready in case we need to use force. It allows us to shape the 

doctrine, requirements, tactics, techniques of our allies—critical 

part of this. 

It allows us to network with allies and among allies; for example, 

the U.S., Japan, and Korea. It allows our forces to get much greater familiarity with the security environment and the counterparts 

they would work with. None of this you can do from the continental 

U.S. alone. You have to have forward posture. 

It increases maritime domain awareness for our allies and partners, but for everyone who has a stake in open and secure sea 

lanes; complicates the planning of adversaries, because it demonstrates through access arrangements, prepositioning, overflight 

arrangements that we are prepared to fulfill our security commitments. And it can help us identify off-ramps and ways to manage 

crises with countries as we interact with their military forces, in 

particular China. 

A few guiding principles as we go forward. First, we have to be 

careful not to ask for access arrangements or commitments where 

the answer will be no, because if the answer is no we lose influence. We lose the ability to shape the environment. 

Second, we have to show that the U.S. has skin in the game. As 

Congresswoman Bordallo noted, if we are not willing to invest ourselves in some of these new facilities, it is going to be a hard case 

for us to make to allies and partners that they should do it or that 

we are committed to our Asia-Pacific strategy. 

At the same time, we were not able to validate many of the longterm budget estimates in the DOD planning we saw. So there is 

going to have to be an interactive, iterative process, we think, between Congress and the Defense Department to deal with these 

issues. 

And finally there are certain areas—lift, for example—where we 

think more needs to be done to enhance our force structure, because as we distribute our posture more, we are going to have more 

requirements for lift, and we also face new challenges such as A2/ 

AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial], and these are areas that my colleague David Berteau will get into. 
7 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Green and Mr. Berteau can 

be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Green. 

Mr. Berteau. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID J. BERTEAU, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Waiting for my mike 

to pick up here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bordallo, members 

of the subcommittee. 

I am going to talk briefly about not the strategic framework, 

which Dr. Green just covered, but the specific recommendations 

that we made in our report. 

We were directed by Section 346 of the National Defense Authorization Act to look at options. And what we did is we actually came 

up with a set of four different options that we evaluated. We ended 

up not recommending an option. We used the evaluation of those 

options to develop our recommendations. 

And we evaluated them on four sets of criteria. The geostrategic 

impact, which gets back to the strategic framework that Mike just 

talked about. The operational impact in terms of our military capability and our ability to executive our operational plans, both at the 

high end and at the low end. The affordability question—how does 

it fit with the budget and what are the budgetary impacts. And the 

issue of how feasible they are—whether or not you actually can implement these kinds of recommendations. 

So that was our criteria. We then had four options that we 

looked at. One is status quo: What if you just stayed ‘‘As Is, Where 

Is.’’ Everybody is where they are. Because that is your baseline, 

that is your benchmark that you start from. 

The second option was implementing all of the announced plans 

from the Administration. This would include the April 2012 U.S.- 

Japan agreement, as modified. It would include plans in Korea, et 

cetera. 

The third option was a more robust option: adding additional capability, adding additional U.S. force capability to the Pacific region. 

And then the fourth and final option was what we referred to internally as the sequestration-friendly option, which is big reductions. Right? 

So let me cover those. I am not going to go into the options. Let 

me cover that by way of our five recommendations, if you will. 

The first recommendation, and as Dr. Green suggested, a huge 

opportunity at the engagement level, at the lower end of the spectrum, with nearly 30 potential partners and allies in the region. 

We need to take advantage of that opportunity, if you will. 

We recommend that the way you do that is a more integrated 

strategy involving more from the Pacific Command, connected back 

to Washington, not only to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and the Joint Staff, but the broader interagency community, including the State Department, connecting to the Services, con-
8 

necting to the Component commands, and connecting to the allies 

and the partners; needs to be developed better, articulated better. 

That was our first recommendation. 

At the same time, though, we have got to live up to the commitments we have already made or we lose credibility with those very 

partners with whom we are trying to increase our engagement. 

And so you live up to that capability in part by executing those 

commitments, by moving forward on the transfer of the Marines 

from Okinawa to Guam, Australia, Hawaii, et cetera. And we recommend that as our second recommendation, with a couple of caveats. 

We think there ought to be sort of implementable milestones that 

are reported on regularly to the Congress, so you can see the 

progress on these as you go forward. 

We think that with respect, for example, to investments in Guam 

and the Marianas Islands, that you prioritize those investments 

and start now with the things that are not only most important, 

but that you are going to want to do no matter what the long-term 

force posture is. And that gives you more capability to engage with 

our partners and allies, do combined training, do joint exercises, et 

cetera. 

And then finally, with respect to the relocation from Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa, which is currently agreed 

that it will be moved to Henoko on a new facility that we built, we 

think you got to go forward with those plans, but we also think 

there needs to be a little bit of thinking about a Plan B. What if, 

in fact, you need to maintain operations and you aren’t there yet? 

And so there has got to be some thinking go into that. Those are 

the kinds of caveats that we put in. 

Our third recommendation had to do with Korea, where we recommend moving forward again with the existing agreement, the 

strategic agreement for 2015. This is the called OPCON [Operational Control] transition, if you will, but with a little more robust 

set of checklists that monitor along the way to make sure that the 

kind of joint capability we need to develop is in place. And we also 

recommend some other basing options with respect to Korea. 

Then our fourth recommendation really draws on the expanded 

capability, if you will, because at the same time that you are building partnerships, you are executing your current commitments, you 

have to look at really the fundamental of the strategic rebalancing. 

And we have a series of recommendations there. For instance, we 

recommend at least one additional attack submarine in Guam. We 

recommend deployment of an amphibious ready group to support 

the distributed marine air-ground taskforce arrangements across 

the Pacific and transferring that rather than global resourcing it. 

We recommend some additional munition stockpiles and 

prepositioning stocks, if you will, again to support the existing 

plans, as well as the future plans. And we recommend some survivability options for the forces that are already deployed there. 

Then finally, in our fifth option, which really derived from the sequestration impact, and regardless of whether you believe sequestration happens or not, the possibility that some future further reductions may occur in the defense budget, if you will. 
9 

And what we found there particularly is that you wouldn’t save 

much money, even with pretty big force structure reductions in the 

Pacific, but you would lose a heck of a lot of capability. And we 

think that is a pretty bad tradeoff. That is kind of the opposite of 

what you had alluded to in your opening comments, Mr. Chairman. 

You would save very little money, you would lose a lot of capability; 

as opposed to invest just a little money and gain a lot of capability. 

So we don’t recommend that you do that. We actually think 

that—we strongly recommend that you sustain and build on the 

current force posture in the Pacific region. 

But there are a few places where in fact you could look at some 

efficiencies and some consolidations that might make sense, and we 

recommend that as our fifth and final recommendation. 

That is pretty much where we stand on that process. We would 

be happy now, I think, to proceed to your questions and amplify 

and characterize things in any way we can. 

Thank you very much. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Berteau and Dr. Green can 

be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you both. And I will start off with two 

concepts that I would like to run by you. 

With regard to the new Marine Corps distributed laydown, there 

are many elements of the plan which need further development, including the movement of forces to Australia and Hawaii. There are 

also elements related to strategic lift that also need to be better 

analyzed. 

Should the United States move forward with the plans associated 

with the Guam realignment or should we wait for a complete plan? 

And then second part of that, what are the implications associated with our partners and allies if we continue to delay the overall 

alignment? 

Mr. BERTEAU. We will consult periodically as who will talk first 

here. 

With respect to the implementation, I think that our conclusion—and we have got some detail on this in the report—is that 

there are some initial steps that we ought to proceed with right 

away. We have already got a number of marines in Australia working initially. The evolution of that engagement, I think, will take 

a few years to become fully realized in terms of the full Marine AirGround Task Force. 

There are some initial investments in Guam and the Marianas 

that make sense, both in terms of robust infrastructure and in 

terms of training capability that are to some extent not dependent 

on the total number of marines that are going to move. They make 

sense regardless of how many marines move and what the schedule 

is for moving those. 

There are, of course, a number of issues associated with timing 

that tie back to environmental impact statements. We actually 

have a modest recommendation that we advise the Department 

they could probably come up with some perhaps improved ways of 

approaching that to remove some of those time lines and come to 

some decisions more quickly, if you will. Those are kind of internal 

process questions. 
10 

But I think there is a core of both military construction and 

other associated infrastructure and project investments that could 

be done almost immediately. You could actually start those this 

year if the money were available. They are not huge. They also 

would allow us, in fact, to begin to take advantage of some of the 

matching funds from the Japanese Government as part of that 

transition and you do want to take advantage of that opportunity. 

Dr. GREEN. On the question of how our allies and partners would 

view delay, the short and simple answer is it will have a negative 

effect. Prime Minister Noda in Japan committed in April to provide 

over $3 billion for the overall distributed MAGTF [Marine AirGround Task Force] plan, and in particular for the Guam move, in 

cash. And it was not an easy lift politically, and I think it now has 

pretty robust consensus, and we want to sustain that. 

As David said, there are opportunities to leverage that, to build 

what we think are the first and most important elements of this, 

which is the training opportunity, Tinian and CNMI [Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands] and so forth. 

Those are particularly important because the Marine Corps’—all 

the Services will have an important role in this, but the Marine 

Corps’ role is worth focusing on for just a moment. 

The Marines are in many ways, I think, going to be a kind of a 

central clearinghouse for a lot of the engagement we do with allies 

and partners. 

Japan, Australia, Korea, Canada, New Zealand are all working 

on creating their own versions of amphibious-ready groups and expeditionary capability, because of the importance of island chains; 

because of the challenges from humanitarian disasters and so 

forth. 

And the training opportunities in Tinian, CNMI, Guam can be 

realized fairly quickly and create opportunities, together with the 

training area in Australia, for getting a variety of forces working 

together on a variety of missions, and in a way that is joint and 

where we share information, and in a way that a variety of countries that don’t have the capabilities of an Australia or a Japan can 

plug into. 

So you get a lot of engagement and partnership-capacity-building 

payoff for moving forward, in particular on the Marine piece. 

Mr. FORBES. In your report, you indicated that, and I quote— 

‘‘The top priority of U.S. strategy in Asia is not to prepare for a 

conflict with China. Rather, it is to shape the environment so that 

such a conflict is never necessary and perhaps someday inconceivable’’. 

What if our efforts to shape the environment in the region fail? 

Do we not ensure a conflict is avoided precisely by preparing for 

it and letting everyone know we are prepared? 

And then the second part of that question is, is there a difference 

between the capabilities, training and regional engagement that 

are focused on shaping the environment for peace and those on 

winning a conflict with China? 

Dr. GREEN. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is absolutely yes and absolutely right. 

I would focus on a distinction between what some people call dissuasion and what you might call deterrence. Dissuasion is where 
11 

we are trying to convince, in this case, China, that they are much 

better off, as a strategic matter, operating within the system as 

they have been, focusing on economic interdependence, cooperation 

within the region. And that is where the peacetime cooperation and 

engagement matters. 

Deterrence is if our relationship with China gets to a point where 

Beijing decides it needs to consider military force. We want to 

make it clear that when the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] goes 

into the Central Military Commission to brief, in the future, Xi 

Jinping, they cannot say, ‘‘We can win this one, boss.’’ That is critical. 

So how do you strike a balance between these two? 

Well, in the dissuasion, or peacetime, phase, it is very important 

that our friends in Beijing see that the region is committed to the 

existing order, supports U.S. forward presence, and will not accept 

uses of coercion or force to resolve disputes, particularly territorial 

disputes at sea. 

So we need partners. We need engagement. We need access. If 

we push too hard on forcing allies and partners to commit to warfighting cooperation or access for a China scenario, we are going to 

lose a lot of them. And if we lose a lot of them, we are going to 

find that that dissuasion phase, where we are really working on 

building a cooperative relationship with China, is going to be much 

weaker. 

So we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. And in our 

report, we thought the adjustments that David mentioned, submarines, missile defense, lift, that is the kind of thing we need to 

do to ensure we can engage in peacetime, but also that we are credible; and not only to potential adversaries but to our allies, in case 

we find deterrence fails. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Mr. Chairman, if I could add to that, a little bit. 

We looked very hard at the question of the connection between, 

sort of, phase zero engagement and partnership capacity and the 

larger operational plan warfighting capability across the region. 

And what we found, in fact, was, at the strategic level, the connection is that, at the low end, where you are building, you have 

got, maybe, 25 countries you can build and improve your relationships with. And in doing so, you actually have the potential to reduce the probability of that large-scale war, because you are complicating the planning for the other guys. 

There are a lot more moving parts out there, a lot more things 

that are uncertain to them, a lot more questions in their mind 

about what capability gets brought to bear and when and the timing and that sort of thing. Obviously, you can’t go into too much 

of that in an unclassified environment. So, at the strategic level, 

you have got a lot to gain just by complicating things. 

At the tactical level, in the event you ever get to implementing 

a large operational conflict plan, if you will, you have got a whole 

host of new capabilities that you bring to bear that are not just 

ours unilaterally. And those ebb and flow over time. And some of 

that is just access, overflight rights. Some of it is backfill of people 

who do other things so you can free up your forces as well. Some 

of it is actual capability at the high end that you would bring to 

bear. 
12 

So it is not like a see-saw where it is just us and the other country going up and down, right, it is just U.S. and China. It is actually one of those see-saws, if you will, that has a single pivot point 

in the middle, but a whole bunch of seats around the edge, and it 

is really balancing 30 different pieces simultaneously in a way that 

sustains our ability to not only do what we need to do, but to shape 

what China does and what other potential adversaries do. 

I am a veteran of the Cold War. That is my professional childhood is growing up in the Cold War, where it was very black and 

white. We knew who the other guys were. We weren’t really trying 

to shape them; we were just trying to stand off with them. This is 

a much more complex and difficult environment, and one that I 

think we are going to have to learn as we do and do way better 

than we have in the past. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Now I would like to recognize the 

gentlelady from Guam, who has obviously been very concerned 

about these issues for a number of years. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. For a number of years, yes, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a question for either one of you can answer it. 

The CSIS study emphasizes the toll uncertainty can exact in our 

strategic partners’ confidence in the strength of the U.S. commitment to the Pacific. 

I understand that the report says that we need to move the debate beyond that of simple military construction to a broader strategic discussion. 

Now, with that in mind, is authorizing and appropriating funds 

for certain MILCON [Military Construction] projects directly associated with the realignment a clear and tangible sign that the U.S. 

is committed to strategic engagement in the region? 

And, secondly, could you elaborate on what strategic capital has 

been lost by the U.S., given the several years of impasse by the 

Senate in approving certain projects associated with this refocus? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Congresswoman, let me respond to that question. 

I think that there is a direct association, as you suggest in your 

question, between the authorization and appropriation into the necessary military construction and other operation and maintenance 

funds to move forward. 

I think there are very powerful signals that get sent. 

I think the degree to which those moving forward of funds cannot 

be connected to a 6-year plan that is still being developed puts 

some boundaries on it. In other words, you only want to commit to 

those things that you are confident are going to make sense over 

the long run. We believe there are a number of those that the committee should engage in and look at for fiscal year 2013, as we 

move forward. 

I think, in terms of the signals that that sends, rather than look 

backwards to say what opportunities have we lost, the question is 

what opportunities do we have to gain by moving forward? And I 

think those signals are not only for the countries involved but really cut across the entire region. 

So it is not just signals to Japan with respect to movement of 

Marines from Okinawa, but it is really a signal for all the countries 

in the region. I think it is very powerful. 
13 

Ms. BORDALLO. And the second part of the question? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Well, I am sorry. I thought that was actually the 

second part of the question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, it was on—could you elaborate on the strategic capital that has been lost by the U.S.? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Right, I can’t really measure what has been lost. 

I think we are where we are and we need to focus on what we gain 

by moving forward. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Is there anything further you would wish to—— 

Dr. GREEN. Well, I mean, it is a matter of record that, whenever 

the Guam relocation plan has stumbled in the Congress, it is big 

news in Japan, because this is a heavy political lift for any Japanese Government. We are including going back to the Liberal 

Democratic Party. So in that sense, it costs us. 

As I mentioned, though, we weren’t able to validate the budget 

planning for the comprehensive overall distributed Marine Corps 

laydown plan. There are a lot of variables in this. We have multiple 

foreign and local governments, environmental impact statements in 

a fluid strategic environment and a fluid defense budgetary environment. 

And that is why we thought, A, it is important to move forward. 

Momentum matters. We have benefited, in a way, from Beijing’s 

missteps. And there is a lot of appetite for engagement with us. 

That won’t be the case, necessarily, forever. We have to show that 

we are committed to this. So that is why we think it is important 

to move forward. 

But the variables in this plan are going to require much greater 

interaction, as David said, milestones reporting between the Congress and the Department of Defense, so that there is consensus 

and confidence moving forward. 

Because what we don’t want is unanswered and almost unanswerable questions about where we will be in 15 years stopping us 

from doing things we need to do now. 

I have a map in my office of a Navy map from 1910 that shows 

Guam as a critical strategic hub in 1910. We came across a report 

when we were doing our work by a young Marine captain named 

Jim Webb on the importance of Guam in U.S. forward strategy in 

the Pacific. The Jim Webb you are thinking of. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Oh, yes, yes—— 

Dr. GREEN [continuing]. And we are there again. So Andersen 

Air Force Base—we recommended some work on survivability for 

the fuel line, a few other things. No matter what happens exactly 

with the plan for the Marine laydown, these are things we are 

going to want. It is a historic and geostrategic imperative. 

So we couldn’t sign on to everything, but we think momentum 

really matters. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you. 

Along the lines of the previous question, how important is it that 

we begin to utilize some of the Government of Japan funds that we 

have already received? 

And how could spending these funds on construction projects directly associated with the realignment of Marines help enhance our 

strategic capital? 
14 

Dr. GREEN. Well, it will help. I think some of the early investments should focus, as we put in our report, on the training opportunities, which benefit Japan strategically and operationally, I 

would argue, and also other allies and partners. This is going to 

require, I think, negotiations. The specific amounts and the timing 

of the funding is a matter that has to be worked out with the Government of Japan, and they get a vote. But I think there are some 

opportunities there that the Department should be exploring. 

Ms. BORDALLO. We haven’t drawn down on the $800 million that 

is already deposited in our banks, have we? 

Mr. BERTEAU. To the best of our knowledge, no. You would probably have to ask the DOD witnesses afterwards for the latest on 

that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Again, I have another question, Mr. Chairman, 

for either witness. 

The report looks at expanded roles and missions for Andersen 

Air Force Base on Guam. And I would note that, to my dismay, 

several military construction projects associated with the Guam 

strike were cut last year. 

How important is Andersen Air Force Base to the distributed 

laydown strategy? And what are the practical implications of further delay in obtaining the Guam strike capacity? 

Mr. BERTEAU. We took a look at a number of those elements, including the actions by the Congress last year on the request. And 

in particular, we looked at some of the military construction 

projects associated with Andersen from the perspective of what is 

the most effective way to gain operational capability across the region for the dollars there. 

We concluded that there is a tradeoff, if you will, between some 

of the MILCON projects and looking at expanded ability for dispersal in the event of conflict. And we probably came down on a 

place in that tradeoff that is different than where the Department’s 

budget request is. We concluded that in fact higher investment in 

dispersal capability across the region is better use of near-term dollars than hardened facilities proposed there. 

That, however, should not be taken in any way to reflect upon 

the lack of the value of Andersen Air Force Base. We think, in fact, 

it is one of the strategic hubs going forward for the entire region. 

And if you look at the capability that Guam offers to force posture, 

it is much more than a home base for, you know, the Marines and 

the MEUs [Marine Expeditionary Unit] it is moving out of Okinawa. It is also a strategic hub for both long-range Air Force capability and in fact for naval forces as well, and that Guam should 

be seen in that context across the board. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to give others a chance to ask questions, but I do have a couple more if you have a second round. 

Mr. FORBES. We will be glad to let you finish out with some questions, Ms. Bordallo. 

Dr. Heck is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In the report, there seems to be some support for certain civilian 

infrastructure improvements in Guam, things that would be outside the fence line of the military installation. 
15 

Could you elaborate on what types of infrastructure projects or 

roadway projects you are referring to when we look at—if they 

move the 4.7 thousand troops, it is roughly going to be a 5 percent 

increase in Guam’s total population? And whether or not that is 

going to require significant infrastructure that DOD should be paying for to support that outside the wire? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you, sir. There are sort of three elements 

to that question, if you will. One is what kinds of infrastructure 

support would be required almost no matter what in terms of 

troops moving in. And there, we focused particularly on a couple 

of items—road improvements so that you can actually move back 

and forth between the port and Andersen, and that is really almost 

independent, if you will, of the number of marines; the pipeline 

that clearly needs to be strengthened and bolstered along the way. 

The second has to do with the kinds of infrastructure support 

that would be needed to support the population. And clearly, the 

change in the number of marines moving, and particularly the 

number of family members and dependents that would be moving 

as well—the pretty dramatic reduction—hasn’t yet been reflected 

in the off-the-base requirements, if you will, the outside-the-wire 

requirements in Guam. We didn’t come up with an independent assessment of what those ought to be. 

And the third question, then, is once you settle on what those requirements will be, who should pay for them, if you will. And there, 

we struck a kind of an interesting balance. It is clearly not always 

in the purview of the Defense Department to pay for those kinds 

of improvements, if you will. 

But the history of base improvements across not only the region, 

but across America, is that if it is in the Defense Department’s interests and if you can’t operate without those kinds of improvements, ultimately DOD faces a choice. Either we pay for it ourselves, or we suffer the consequences of it not being done, because 

there is nobody else to pay for it. 

So across America where we have done things, for instance when 

we put the submarine base into Kings Bay, Georgia and the other 

one into Bangor, Washington, an awful lot of Defense Department 

resources were expended outside the wire to build up the capability, because we needed to have it. 

And that is a question really that the committee has to deal with 

that is a little above and beyond the purview of our study, but I 

think history says that if it matters a whole lot to DOD, ultimately 

you have to figure out how to pay for it. 

The real question, though, is what is that requirement and that 

is still an open-ended question. We found some things that matter 

right now. You should get started on those—the road, the pipeline. 

There are others where I think we need to wait until we see what 

the total laydown plan is in detail and the timetable before we can 

determine what those are. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Hanabusa is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

In reading the introduction of your report, it is interesting that 

you, of course, cite to Secretary Panetta, who said that I guess the 

forces in the future are going to have to be geographically distrib-
16 

uted, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable—almost in 

and of itself one of the most difficult things to even begin to comprehend how we are going to do that. 

And then you list things like focus on air superiority and mobility, long-range strike, nuclear deterrence, maritime access, space 

and cyberspace, and ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] capabilities. The question is have it, in reading through your 

report, there is a lot of emphasis, of course, on Marines or MAGTF, 

as we call it; also of the Navy and its presence. But what is lacking 

is the discussion of the Army and not so much directly, the Air 

Force, but definitely lacking the Army. The only real mention I 

could really find was in reference to South Korea and the potential 

drawdown of many of the troops. 

So am I led to believe by reading the report that the—what I call 

‘‘the military of the future’’—I have asked all the people who sat 

in those chairs, ‘‘What does the military of the future look like?’’ 

Am I beginning to understand the military of the future is going 

to probably look more like expeditionary forces? We have a lot of 

emphasis on the littoral, or however you pronounce it, types of 

ships planned for Singapore. 

And of course, a good part of the report, though we are not looking at conflict with China, we still cannot ignore the fact that we 

do have the A2/AD issue, which then brings in the economic components. So who wants to answer first whether this issue of what the 

force looks like in the future is, in your mind, has changed and 

that is why the emphasis on the Marines and the naval forces. And 

believe me, 52 percent of the earth’s surface, the Pacific Ocean, is 

PACOM [United States Pacific Command]. I understand that, and 

maybe that is part of the answer, but please proceed. 

You can do what we do in Hawaii, which is junk and pull, which 

is paper and stone. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BERTEAU. We have a couple of places where I think a careful 

reading of the report probably is needed to be able to determine 

how we saw the possibility for the Army here. One is actually we 

see an enormous potential for regional dedication of units that the 

Army is already proposing, and but it is pre-decisional inside the 

Pentagon, so we are not quite sure where that goes. 

But we strongly supported the idea of a dedicated core headquarters associated with PACOM. That would allow PACOM as it 

builds its plans for engagement in the region to draw upon CONUS 

[Continental United States]-based forces for a whole host of reasons—planning purposes, et cetera. 

We looked in particular, I think, at the robust capability that we 

have of trained brigades and units, with a lot of capability. These 

are veterans now who really know what they are doing, both within the active force and within the National Guard. 

And that is part of the basis of our recommendation that we look 

hard at using more rotational brigades in Korea so that you draw 

upon the capability that is already existing in the Army today and 

you actually keep that capability up. It gives you much more to 

draw from in the event that we ever get to a conflict, if you 

will—— 
17 

Mrs. HANABUSA [continuing]. And I don’t mean to interrupt you, 

but that is what I meant. I saw the Army reference in Korea, but 

drawing down from the total force structure that we have there. 

But I didn’t see a mention of Army in all the other types of discussion. 

Mr. BERTEAU. There is a mention in the engagement in terms of 

what Army’s relationship is with PACOM. And in fact, increasing 

the capacity of the U.S. Army-Pacific capability and stature, if you 

will, as part of that process. In addition, we saw some opportunities 

for the Army at the engagement end. 

And Mike, you may want to add a little bit on that. 

Dr. GREEN. Just to amplify the point about the Army aligning 

itself post-OEF/OIF [Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi 

Freedom] to the Pacific. There is enormous potential for enhancing 

the role of the Army if I Corps becomes a joint task force-capable 

command, and is training forces, mostly at the brigade level, but 

at all levels, with Pacific—not just Korea, but Pacific missions in 

mind. 

And beefing them up with foreign affairs officers, enhancing joint 

training in the U.S., so that we are doing it with our partners and 

allies at the joint training center and so forth. And really kind of 

taking one of the three big corps in the Army and making it an 

Asia-Pacific Corps based in—the headquarters in Washington. 

Huge potential there. 

We were actually quite impressed, I have to say, with USARPAC 

[United States Army Pacific], with the U.S. Army-Pacific, where 

there is a lot of quite sophisticated thinking and country expertise. 

And it is also worth remembering that most of the chiefs of defense 

in this region, even though it is a maritime theater, most of them 

are Army generals. 

So in the engagement phase-zero shaping and partnership-building phase, a lot at the platoon, company, brigade level that the 

Army could do, we think that potentially with rotations of Army 

brigades to Korea, you could actually increase the capabilities that 

we are bringing. For example, the aviation brigade of the Second 

Infantry Division is short Apache helicopter squadrons. You could 

actually have more potential there. 

We didn’t have time in this report to really go through whether 

that would work in terms of readiness. You know, when you take 

a brigade, move then to Korea for a year, there may be some 

issues, you know, there is a seam there, sort of a month when they 

come in, are they going to be ready to go if something happens. 

There are some issues that we just didn’t have time to get into, but 

we thought it was really worth exploring. 

And then the last thing I would say about the force structure is 

because of air-sea battle, because of the more difficult operating environment in the Western Pacific within the first island chain, it 

is my own personal view—David can disagree if he wants—you 

know, the air-sea battle dialogue that the Army—the Air Force and 

the Navy have started is good. 

But really, we are going to need a jointness among the Army and 

Marine Corps as well, and we are going to need our allies and partners to similarly develop jointness among their Services, because it 
18 

is going to be a much more intense environment. We are going to 

need more capacity, redundancy, distribution of opportunities. 

Mr. FORBES. And we thank you for those questions. The 

gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Missouri is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

I just wanted to ask: What are the U.S. objectives in the Pacific? 

And how does the distributed laydown of Marine Corps forces in 

Australia, Guam, Hawaii and Japan accomplish these objectives 

and enhance our security posture in the Pacific? 

Dr. GREEN. For over 150 years, our objective has been to have 

access to the region and to make sure that the Pacific is an ocean 

that is a conduit for our commerce and our ideas, and not a conduit 

for threats to Guam, Hawaii, the western and continental United 

States and Alaska. That has been our strategy since the middle of 

the 19th century. 

The Marines have always been an important part of that. For the 

past 10 years, a large chunk of those marines have been operating 

in Southwest Asia. And as they come back to the region, they are 

going to return to the historic role they have played. 

The base in Okinawa is a legacy of history. And it is recognized 

in both governments as too much of a burden for the Okinawan 

people to take. 

Okinawa itself is geo-strategically prime real estate, right in the 

middle of the first island chain, geographically close to all the challenges we might face. But it is a heavy burden for the Okinawan 

people. 

And for a variety of reasons, dispersing the Marines to some extent would help us. I would take the burden off Okinawa, it would 

position them—for example in Australia—to be closer to areas 

where we need to help shore up the capacity of states and deal 

with different crises. It would give us redundancy in dispersal. 

So it brings a lot of advantages why we were comfortable endorsing the plan in principle. 

It also raises some real questions about whether we have sufficient lift and logistics when we spread out our forces a bit more, 

which we can get into if you like. Because it is going to mean we 

have to do some things differently and add some more resources. 

Mr. BERTEAU. If I could add one thing to that. Dr. Green has laid 

out the historical connection very well. But there is also kind of a 

unique opportunity going forward that goes beyond the historical 

value. 

A number of our potential partners and our current allies there 

would like to develop more expeditionary capability. And we think 

it is in our interest for them to do that because it helps bolster the 

security of the region across the board. And the Marines play a 

unique role in there. 

Congresswoman Hanabusa’s question about the Army does warrant, if you will, a comment that in fact the Pacific is a more expeditionary environment. It does require a capability that most of the 

Army does not bring to bear. And that much of what we talked 

about for the Army is not a justification for additional Army force 

structure. 
19 

But the Marines can play a role with our partners and allies, 

with the Koreans, with the Japanese, with the Australians, with a 

number of nations in the Southeast Asia area that goes beyond the 

historical value and actually looks at expeditionary capability for 

defensive purposes as well as offensive purposes. And we think 

that brings an enormous value at pretty low cost in terms of force 

structure and long-term investment. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I see in the report that on the Department of 

Defense’s summary their comments from the Secretary regarding 

the report says, ‘‘I disagree with the CSIS’s suggestion that the Department should consider moving fewer than approximately 5,000 

Marines to Guam.’’ 

Could you expound on your thoughts on that criticism? 

Mr. BERTEAU. I think that the Secretary has a plan that is still 

being developed. The baseline for that plan will be done perhaps 

the end of this year, perhaps early next year, in terms of how many 

marines move where. We don’t prejudge the outcome of that plan. 

And we think that, in fact, there are some investments worth making in Guam, even if the ultimate outcome of that plan is a different number. 

I am not saying we are walking away from the number that has 

been agreed to and it was announced back in April. That number 

is probably still the right number to be planning for. But in the 

event that that number changes, we still think there are things 

that make sense to be done, and that is the basis of our comment 

there. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you think with the growing threats that are 

out there with the aggressive military from China and the threats 

from North Korea—how comfortable do you feel with this plan that 

it would still meet our security needs? 

Dr. GREEN. It has definite advantages for both scenarios that you 

mentioned, China and North Korea. 

In terms of China, I think that the real focus is on the peacetime 

shaping environment and engaging with other countries, particularly those that want similar expeditionary capability. The Marines 

can really play a role. A lot of that is in South and Southeast Asia, 

which is why the move to Darwin of approximately of 2,500 marines makes a lot of strategic sense. 

Operationally, I mean, we could settle so much in this session, 

but in the Korean Peninsula, given the possibilities of instability, 

uncertainty about how WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] might 

be used, there is a definite renewed advantage to having deep sea 

maneuver capabilities. In other words, to have options beyond just 

going up the middle, so to speak. 

For that to work, the Marines are going to have to have sufficient lift, which is why we focused on that. Because the operational 

advantages work only if you have the lift. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentlelady for her comments. 

The gentleman from Connecticut is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was looking at the pieces of this report and the rundown of all 

the countries regarding undersea warfare and—I mean, the only 
20 

reference that I could see was in Australia, the discussion about 

trying to help with their Collins class program. I mean, that is 

about it, in terms of really any other navies in the area that—you 

know—I guess you would describe as allies. 

Is that an accurate representation? 

Dr. GREEN. I would say a couple things about that. 

We mentioned the Collins class, the Australian navy. The Royal 

Australian Navy is thinking through how they are going to develop 

a new class of attack subs [submarines]. They need longer range 

than most of the subs available from our European friends. 

There is enormous potential for collaboration on the development 

of these submarines with us with Japan, which makes outstanding 

world-class attack subs. We probably should have mentioned that 

in the report. We also mentioned in the recommendation, and my 

colleague highlighted this in his summary, that one of our real advantages in the Pacific is undersea warfare. We have—we are good 

at it. Our key maritime allies like Japan and Australia are good 

at it. 

And it is a reminder why for Beijing, you know, a coercive scenario or option really isn’t very good. Because China depends on 

global sea lanes even more than we do for energy resources and so 

forth. And submarines and a capable undersea warfare capability 

are a reminder that we will, in a sense, own the oceans under any 

scenario. 

It is also an asymmetrical advantage as we look at the A2/AD 

environment. So you will see in the recommendation, sir, that we 

recommended additional attack sub or subs. We weren’t specific. 

That is, again, beyond what we could determine exactly in 3 

months. 

Mr. BERTEAU. I would take that—I think there is a lot of integrated capability that we can bring with a couple of our key allies 

there. I think it is in our interest—in the U.S. interest to build on 

that capability. 

And, quite frankly, if I were going to try to defend one thing in 

the Defense Department budget it would be building two attack 

submarines a year for as far out as the eye can see. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. That won’t come as any great surprise to 

the chairman—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. There is no disagreement from this 

corner of the table here. 

Mr. Green, as long as I have got a couple more minutes and you 

are here, there are press reports this morning about a defense report that came out this morning in Japan, which raised some concern about sort of the command-and-control of the Chinese military. 

I mean, is that big news or is that really kind of pretty standard 

conventional wisdom out there? I mean, does it deserve sort of the 

breathless headlines that it received today? Or is that some kind 

of new discussion or new development? 

Dr. GREEN. The only thing new about it is the candor about a 

problem that I think everybody in the region and many within the 

Chinese system recognize. 
21 

The Central Military Commission, which is chaired currently by 

Hu Jintao and vice chaired by Xi Jinping, his successor and the 

vice president, has exactly two civilians on it—and I just mentioned 

them. And below the Central Military Commission, there is no subcommittee on readiness. There is no committee with oversight over 

defense decisions. The Foreign Ministry has no idea—when I was 

on the National Security Council staff we often surprised our Foreign Ministry counterparts when we would raise issues involving 

the PLA. They had no idea. 

So civilian oversight is a challenge for all of us. And it is further 

complicated by the fact that in this maritime domain, especially out 

to the first island change and the contested waters in the East 

China Sea and South China Sea. It is not just the PLA navy. It 

is the fisheries police. It is the coast guard. There are five Services 

competing and whipping up support domestically for increased resources and more boats. 

Our engagement strategy has to involve two pieces. We have to, 

you know, convince our Chinese friends that if they keep pushing 

in this direction our partnerships will only grow stronger. And the 

rest of the region will be more unified in expressing concern and, 

in many cases, cooperating with us to protect those maritime areas. 

The other part is we have to find a strategy, and forward-deployed forces are a part of this, where we are talking to the PLA. 

We are talking to the Chinese. In my own personal view, a military-to-military dialogue is not sufficient. Our national leaders 

have to have dialogue with China’s national leaders and hold them 

accountable for the actions of the PLA to sort of help in our own 

diplomacy the Chinese start getting some grip over what their own 

forces are doing, particularly at sea. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. Sablan is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SABLAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank you and Ranking Member Bordallo and the 

members for allowing me the courtesy of joining you this afternoon. 

Welcome, Dr. Green and Mr. Berteau. 

I am going to—the phrase ‘‘jointness’’ among Services, but I will 

wait for the second panel to appear. But I just have one question 

here that either one of you or both of you could address. 

The report makes the recommendation to, and I quote—‘‘move 

forward with funding necessary for the development of training 

ranges at Tinian Island and other CNMI locations, work with the 

Government of Japan to leverage Japanese funding commitments 

in order to realize early joint bilateral training opportunities.’’ 

I know where Tinian is. They say ‘‘other CNMI locations.’’ I am 

assuming that this is islands north of Saipan. And I couldn’t agree 

more with you with that recommendation. 

So can either one of you comment on the strategic value where 

there is in developing this training ranges? What capabilities does 

Tinian and other locations, other islands in the Northern Marianas 

offer our military that they don’t currently have? And what value 

would these training ranges provide to our allies in the region? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you. That is a good key set of questions, sir. 
22 

One of the key strategic advantages, of course, is that these territories are in fact part of the United States, and so they offer us 

a stability, if you will, and a predictability over time not only allows us to invest in them, but then to realize the benefits of that 

investment over time. 

The second, of course, is they have the geostrategic location, if 

you will, so that they can serve as not only training capacity for 

United States forces, but for combined training of partners and allies in the region in a way that none of them can develop that capability for themselves. 

And it is to our advantage for them to take advantage of that capability, train with us, practice with us, exercise with us, both at 

the command post level and in terms of live fire training. 

And so the investment pays back not only for us in enhanced 

readiness and capability for U.S. military, but for our allies and 

partners as well. So it gives you both the stability and a capability 

that we think well warrants the investment. 

Mr. SABLAN. You are talking about not just Tinian, then, you are 

talking about—— 

Mr. BERTEAU [continuing]. Right, we are talking about Pagan, we 

are talking about Tinian, we are talking about other islands—— 

Mr. SABLAN [continuing]. And, you know, just from the chart 

that you have—table 8 actually—the only minor negative you have, 

but you also have a caveat next to it is affordability. And this is 

my—why I agree with your recommendation that we work with the 

Government of Japan in making those funds available. 

That is all I have for this panel. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, we want to thank you both. And Ms. Bordallo and 

some of the other members may have some written questions if you 

don’t mind we would like to submit to you for your answers for the 

record. But we are going to move on to the next panel because we 

have got some votes coming up down the road. 

So thank you so much for your expertise and your willingness to 

share that with our subcommittee. We appreciate you being here 

today. 

Mr. BERTEAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will be happy to 

take any questions for the record and be glad to provide additional 

information as needed. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you both. 

And we are going to switch our panels out now and we will get 

started immediately with our next panel. 

Representing the Department of Defense and to provide their 

thoughts and comments to the PACOM report, I am pleased to 

have two distinguished individuals, Mr. Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, and also Mr. David F. 

Helvey, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East 

Asia. 

Gentlemen, thank you both, one for being here, but secondly your 

patience in having the first round and a little bit of delay with 

those first votes. But we certainly appreciate your comments and 

your willingness to share those with our subcommittee this afternoon. 
23 

And I don’t know which one wants to start, so we are going to 

let you guys decide. And whoever wants to start, we are looking 

forward to your comments. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SCHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SCHER. Terrific. Thank you, Chairman and members. 

I will start, and I want to first of all thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and everyone on the subcommittee. We really appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and appreciate the chance to follow two good friends of mine, Dave 

Berteau and Mike Green, to be able to discuss the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ independent assessment of U.S. defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region. 

We have submitted a written statement for the record, but we 

will highlight some key points here. 

As you know, the U.S. strategy calls for rebalancing defense, diplomatic, and economic resources towards the Asia-Pacific region. 

While this hearing focuses on expanding our military presence in 

the region, the Administration-wide initiatives include diplomatic 

and other efforts, to include strengthening of our bilateral alliances, deepening working relationships with emerging powers, engaging with multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, and advancing principles of democracy and human rights. 

Apart from force posture, another key aspect of our defense strategy is our effort to strengthen alliances and partnerships in the 

Asia-Pacific. Rebalancing to achieve these ends requires enhanced 

U.S., allied, and partner military capabilities throughout the region, the U.S. forward presence of forces, and a more resilient military infrastructure to support effective U.S. power projection operations in the face of current and future security threats. 

We are heartened that the CSIS assessment supports these tenets of the U.S. defense strategic guidance and draws conclusions 

consistent with the Department’s own analysis about the challenges and opportunities likely to present themselves in Asia over 

the coming decade. 

Of note, the CSIS assessment also supports the Department’s approach to enhancing U.S. defense posture as a key element of the 

overall policy, and highlights appropriately some of the challenges 

to implementing and sustaining the U.S. defense presence and posture in this critical region. 

The Department continues to pursue a defense posture in the 

Asia-Pacific region that is geographically distributed, operationally 

resilient and politically sustainable, as was noted. 

More broadly, we are investing in defense activities, presence, 

posture and capabilities necessary to reassure allies and partners 

in the region and shape the security environment, while also providing forward capabilities appropriate to deter and defeat aggression. 

In the coming years the Department will continue to build up 

Guam as a strategic hub in the Western Pacific, expand access to 

locations in Southeast Asia, Oceania and the Indian Ocean region, 

invest in capabilities appropriate for deterring and defeating ag-
24 

gression, and reassuring allies and partners, and expand our exercises, assistance efforts and other engagements with allied partner 

states in order to build trust, capability and interoperability. 

This includes necessary near-term investments to establish fully 

capable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, or MAGTFs, in Japan, 

Guam, Australia and Hawaii, our plans to deploy up to four Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, and our plans to increase the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force units in northern Australia. 

In parallel with these posture enhancements, the Department is 

also making key capability investments that undergird our efforts 

to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region. Steps include the development of a new penetrating bomber and long-range prompt 

conventional strike system, the sustainment of the Navy’s carrier 

fleet and their associated air wings, and investments in a variety 

of resiliency initiatives. 

Pursuing these and other capabilities offers the best prospect for 

protecting U.S. interests, not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but 

also elsewhere in the world. 

As the Department looks to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific 

region, it is mindful of pressing priorities in other regions and 

across the defense program which compete for scarce defense resources. The fiscal year 2013 President’s budget request provides 

an initial set of investments towards fulfilling the defense strategic 

guidance’s vision of enhanced defense capabilities and activities in 

the Asia-Pacific region, while addressing threats and opportunities 

in other key region. 

However, fully realizing these plans for future defense activities, 

presence and posture in the region will not happen in one budget 

cycle. Although the Department differs with CSIS’s claim that 

there is a disconnect between DOD’s strategy and resources, the 

Department agrees with the assessment’s finding that continued 

appropriate budgeting will be essential to properly executing this 

strategy. 

In this vein, and as Secretary Panetta noted in his comments, sequestration would place at risk the bipartisan goal of sustaining 

this rebalance. 

I now pass the statement over to Mr. Dave Helvey, who will 

focus on how our presence is a part of our approach to strengthen 

our partnerships in the region. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Scher and Mr. Helvey can 

be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Mr. Helvey, we look forward to your 

comments. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID F. HELVEY, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HELVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman 

Bordallo and distinguished members of the subcommittee. To pick 

up where my colleague left off in our discussion of the CSIS report, 

I would like to focus my remarks this afternoon on what we are 

doing in the Asia-Pacific region today, both in terms of strengthening our alliances, as well as our partnerships. 
25 

The CSIS report comes against the backdrop of an increasingly 

dynamic Asia-Pacific security environment. President Obama has 

stated that as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger 

and long-term role in the Asia-Pacific over the decades to come, 

and this effort will draw on the strengths of the entire U.S. Government. 

In his speech before the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this past June, Secretary Panetta outlined how we in the Department of Defense are 

approaching a rebalanced Asia by presenting four key principles. 

One, promoting international rules in order to advance peace and 

security in the region. 

Two, deepening of bilateral and multilateral partnerships. 

Three, enhancing and adapting U.S. military’s enduring presence 

in the region. 

And four, investing in the capabilities needed to project power 

and to operate in the Asia-Pacific. 

Looking across this vast region today we see that it is home to 

some of the world’s largest and fastest-growing economies, the 

world’s largest populations and the world’s largest militaries. The 

Asia-Pacific region provides unprecedented opportunity for trade 

and investment, as well as access to cutting-edge technology. 

It also contains several and varied challenges, whether through 

maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea and maintaining robust deterrence against North Korean aggression or provocation; 

ensuring transparency in the military activities of key regional 

players, such as China; or addressing traditional and nontraditional security challenges, such as counterterrorism, counter-piracy 

and disaster relief. 

A central, indeed essential part of the strategy are our efforts to 

strengthen alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region to 

advance a common vision for the future. In this context, the CSIS 

report includes an important discussion of the Department of Defense plans for the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces. 

The realignment plan sustains a U.S. Marine force presence in 

the Asia-Pacific region, establishes multiple fully capable Marine 

Air-Ground Task Forces, and importantly increases our ability over 

time to train and exercise with allies and partners throughout the 

region. 

The realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces enhances the political sustainability of our presence in Japan by enabling the early 

movement of some of those forces to Guam independent of progress 

on the Futenma replacement facility, while relocating others to the 

less populated northern part of Okinawa. 

This approach maintains our forward capabilities, reduces our 

footprint in Okinawa, and in combination with other measures 

should reduce the political pressures associated with our presence 

there, all while sustaining robust Government of Japan financial 

support for the Marine Corps move to Guam. 

By providing for the possibility of shared ranges in Guam and 

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, this agreement supports deeper operational cooperation with the Japan Self- 
26 

Defense Forces and our larger bilateral review of roles, missions 

and capabilities. 

In this context, the Department of Defense continues to work 

closely with the Government of Japan to implement the provisions 

of the April 27th, 2012, two-plus-two joint statement. In order to 

demonstrate to the region that we have a credible plan, congressional support is essential. And the Department is incredibly appreciative of the committee and this subcommittee’s continued cooperation and counsel as we move forward on the realignment. 

The Department agrees with the CSIS assessment there are opportunities to move forward with Guam and to send an important 

signal to the region. For much the same reason, the Department 

believes that to rotate fewer marines to Guam, as suggested by the 

CSIS assessment, would bring into question the stability of our 

basing arrangements with Japan and would run counter to our 

plan to establish multiple fully capable MAGTFs in multiple locations within the Asia-Pacific region. 

Turning to the Republic of Korea, the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. defense partnerships and 

posture in Northeast Asia. 

In accordance with the 2009 joint vision statement, we are realigning our forces on the Korean peninsula to prepare for transition of wartime operational control to the ROK [Republic of Korea] 

in December, 2015. This transition will allow for the ROK to take 

the lead role in the combined defense of Korea, supported by an enduring and capable U.S. military force presence on the Korean peninsula, in the region, and beyond. 

Central to this effort is the need to evolve U.S. and Republic of 

Korea capabilities to provide for a stabilizing presence on the peninsula and in the region, including rotational deployments of U.S. 

Army units to the Republic of Korea in support of a range of peacetime and contingency response activities. 

The Department is working in partnership with Republic of 

Korea to implement the bilateral strategic alliance 2015 plan, including the caveats proposed by CSIS, which are already part of a 

series of planning milestones toward which the Department is 

working to ensure OPCON transition occurs as planned with no 

loss of readiness to our combined forces. 

Other significant posture changes are under way in Southeast 

Asia, in addition to the rotational deployments of the Marine Corps 

and U.S. Air Force aircraft units to Australia, which Mr. Scher has 

already highlighted. These initiatives will strengthen one of our 

most important alliances by providing opportunities for high-end 

combined training in Australia and through working together to 

build up partnerships in Oceania and Southeast Asia to build regional capacity to address common security challenges. 

Littoral Combat Ship deployment to Singapore will strengthen 

U.S. engagement in the region through port calls and engagement 

in regional navies through activities such as exercises and exchanges. It will also support the Department’s effort to counter 

transnational challenges and build partner capacity for maritime 

security, among other missions. 
27 

The Department continues to explore opportunities with our treaty ally in the Philippines to deploy forces rotationally to priority 

areas in order to enhance their maritime security. 

Supporting these planned and potential posture changes are enhancements to U.S. training ranges in the region. Investments in 

training ranges in Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and other locations will enhance U.S. joint training 

opportunities, as well as combined training opportunities with our 

allies and partners. 

In conclusion, the Department of Defense is devoting substantial 

effort to the United States Pacific Command area of responsibility, 

consistent with the U.S. strategic priority to rebalance to the AsiaPacific region and to build a defense posture that is geographically 

distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. 

The Department appreciates the efforts of the CSIS in conducting the independent assessment and looks forward to continuing a dialogue with Congress on this key national security 

issue. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, we look forward to taking your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Helvey and Mr. Scher can 

be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. FORBES. I want to once again thank you both for being here 

and for your service to our country. 

My first question is for either or both of you, however you feel 

appropriate to answer, but the distributed laydown proposed in the 

April 27, 2012, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee agreement carries significant cost to support. It appears that these costs 

are not adequately reflected in the budget plan for fiscal year 2013. 

Can you tell me what the current timeline and cost estimate to 

support the Marine Corps distributed laydown is? And is the Administration committed to the distributed laydown if the Department has not supported even a modest investment in the fiscal 

year 2013 budget plan? 

Mr. HELVEY. Mr. Chairman, we do not have a timeline for executing the full distributed laydown. One of the advantages of the 

plan is that each piece, though, is discrete and can be pursued 

independent of the others. For now, we are focused on beginning 

with the move to Guam and we are eager to get started. Although 

the most significant construction cannot begin until the supplemental environmental impact statement is complete, there are a 

number of projects that we can execute in the meantime and we 

would seek congressional support in moving forward with these. 

If the congressional restrictions are lifted, we can initiate a few 

projects which are already appropriated with funds or with the 

Government of Japan funds, at Andersen Air Force Base, Apra 

Harbor, and the non-livefire training location. As I understand it, 

these previously determined locations will not be reviewed under 

the supplemental environmental impact statement. 

Mr. SCHER. And I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that I think 

there are—we believe that we have for the overall rebalancing already started to see some things that we have reflected in the fiscal 

year 2013 budget, especially in terms of technologies and approaches that we have saved and have made sure remained. 
28 

We, in the fiscal year 2014 budget, will look to continue to holistically move towards the rebalancing. It may not be seen in all the 

MILCON requests because many of those, as Mr. Helvey said, must 

wait for some of the environmental impact statements. But we 

would appreciate the opportunity to move forward on some of the 

things that we do know that we can do, and believe very strongly 

that this will tangibly demonstrate to the region that the rebalance 

is something that we are committed to. And that it will be more 

than just technology and more than just rhetoric, but that we can 

see posture movements throughout the region. 

I also believe that in other funding authorities you will see that 

we are continuing to move forward on the Australia part of moving 

MAGTFs and looking at how we can make sure that the Marines 

are more capable of operating in and around Australia as part of 

that piece of the laydown. 

Mr. FORBES. Do either or both of you think it is unreasonable for 

this subcommittee to expect or request a timeline on what we are 

expected to do? 

Mr. SCHER. Certainly, it is not unreasonable. And I think we can 

provide you with a generalized timeframe, recognizing, sir, that 

there are going to be many things that we simply will not be able 

to predict in terms of timing for various reasons, either they being 

bilateral negotiations or they being environmental impact statements that we don’t have the end to. But certainly, we could put 

together a generalized timeline and approach to what we need, as 

well as what we could start to do right now. 

Mr. FORBES. I think that would be helpful for our committee 

members if you would strive to see if you could put that together. 

Also, while the overall costs have been reduced, the Marine 

Corps distributed laydown plan represents a significant investment 

in the region. Could you describe for me the current state of host 

nation discussions with regard to offsetting overall costs in Guam 

and Australia? And also, how would our allies and partners perceive not proceeding with the plans as outlined in the April, 2012 

security agreement? 

Mr. SCHER. In terms of the discussions on Australia, as you 

know, the President and the Prime Minister announced moving towards the establishment of a MAGTF in Darwin in November of 

last year. And we are now engaged in discussions with the Australians about what that would look like, what kinds of facilities 

would we be using within Australia. 

To be clear, we are not looking to establish a U.S. base in Australia or anywhere outside of U.S. territory. We are looking to 

share facilities and use facilities as we have, frankly, in Australia 

for a number of years under the overall approach of shared knowledge and concurrence between both of our governments. 

So that is how we are approaching these discussions. But as yet, 

we do not know the full extent of the infrastructure needed or required for our presence and what Australia has to offer, and what 

we are looking to do. So it is premature, unfortunately, to be able 

to talk about cost sharing as we honestly do not have a measure 

of the costs. 

We are very close to that and we expect that we will see progress 

between now and the meeting of our ministers and secretaries at 
29 

the AUSMIN [Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations] 

consultative talks in November. We will have a better idea then. 

So we are making progress in terms of identifying costs, but not 

yet obviously having any cost-sharing piece of that for Australia. 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, with respect to Japan, you 

have correctly pointed out the April 27, 2012, U.S.-Japan Security 

Consultative Committee agreement did identify that the Government of Japan would provide a direct contribution of $3.1 billion 

to support the Guam realignment. And in addition to that, we are 

also talking to the Japanese, of course, about the types of projects 

that we would have to do on Okinawa as part of the sustaining the 

current Futenma location. And those conversations are ongoing. 

We have also got a series of conversations with the Government 

of Japan with respect to training ranges, both on Guam and in the 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. 

Mr. FORBES. Could you also just address how you think our allies 

and partners would perceive not proceeding with the plans as outlined in the April 2012 security agreement? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, sir, I am hesitant to speak on behalf of our 

allies and partners, but I think from our perspective, it would call 

into question the credibility of the U.S. commitment to do our part. 

As the previous panel had highlighted, there is some political risk 

on the part of Japan in making some of the investments that they 

have had in entering into this agreement. And so I think there is 

an expectation that we would live up to our part of the bargain. 

Mr. SCHER. I would just add I think broadly from the regional 

perspective, the region understands and appreciates and believes 

that we are committed to the rebalancing towards Asia across all 

of the spheres, both diplomatic, economic and defense. 

Not following through on the commitments that we have made 

and on the promises that we have made to our various friends and 

allies, I think would indicate to them that we were not serious 

about this rebalancing; that we were not ready to tangibly back up 

those assertions; and I think it would have a negative effect overall 

on how we are perceived by our friends and allies. And I think it 

would also be troubling for anybody who would be a potential adversary. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for any 

questions she may have. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I really want to thank you very much for holding this hearing. A lot of questions in this move, and some of them—we are getting to the bottom of them this afternoon. 

I want to thank you, Secretary Scher and Secretary Helvey, for 

being with us. 

This is important to me, and I want to hear from both of you. 

The report highlights an apparent disconnect between OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense] and PACOM with regards to planning 

and strategic direction. What is being done to better synchronize 

these elements with DOD? 

From time to time, I have remained concerned that the Department is not speaking with one voice or executing major programs 
30 

in the Pacific with a coordinated focus. Now, this is very important 

to me. 

And Mr. Chairman, I know you have heard me speak about this. 

We have been working on this military move to Guam and now to 

other areas for nearly 10 years—10 long years. And why is there 

so much discord? We are moving to U.S. territories. We are trying 

to enhance the bases there. We are moving into something that belongs to us. 

And now, of course, we are moving into CNMI with training 

areas. We are moving to Hawaii with some of the marines, and of 

course, to our ally Australia. I just can’t understand why we—and 

I know that Congress—one of the houses here in Congress is part 

of the blame. They simply just want to keep wanting more reports 

and more reports. But this has been 10 long years that I have been 

at it, and I just want to know if you could answer, how can this 

problem be mitigated with our renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific 

area, the discord between OSD and PACOM? 

Mr. SCHER. Congresswoman Bordallo, I actually believe that—I 

did not—as I think noted in my statement, we don’t see the same 

level of disagreement between the Pacific Command and the Department of Defense in Washington. 

I think certainly we are still working through many of these 

issues in terms of implementing. The defense strategic guidance 

came out in the beginning of this year. That was then translated 

into various guidance documents that guide the Department of Defense. It is, as you know, a very large organization and I think it 

takes time to make sure that these are all put forward throughout 

all the Components and agencies of the Department of Defense. 

That is certainly our job, to make sure that that gets done. And 

I believe that it is getting done and that we will see the fruits of 

that as we look to the fiscal year 2014 budget submissions that 

come in, as well as the theater campaign plans that come in from 

the combatant commanders that talk about how they are planning 

on implementing the process. 

So I believe that there is a better connection that the CSIS assessment talked about, but certainly there is always the opportunity to communicate better within the Department of Defense 

and ensure that we will. And I certainly ensure that we will continue to do that in terms of providing guidance. 

I don’t know, the actual issues about how we are where we are 

with some of the moves in particular I think is a many and circuitous route we have gotten here. But certainly the Department of 

Defense now, I feel very confident, and all of the Services and Components are committed to this plan, making sure this plan works 

and is very workable. 

We have commitments from all of the Service Components that 

this is the plan that they approve from the Pacific commander. And 

I think that within the Administration, there is no doubt that this 

is the appropriate approach, and that we should begin implementing as soon as possible, assuming that we are given the appropriate funds to do so. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I want to add, too, that I join the chairman in 

requesting a time line. We just haven’t had anything. So I do join 

him in requesting that you send that. 
31 

Secretary Helvey. 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, Congresswoman Bordallo, I—like Bob, I—pardon me, Mr. Scher—I don’t think that we see the same disconnects 

between OSD and PACOM that is referenced in the CSIS report, 

quite the contrary. We have a very good relationship with our colleagues and counterparts in the United States Pacific Command. 

And we are committed to continuing to work very closely with 

PACOM and with Admiral Locklear as we move forward. 

We rely very heavily on the advice, recommendations and counsel that we receive from U.S. PACOM across a variety of issues, 

whether it is thinking about the security situation in the Asia-Pacific, working very closely with PACOM on engagement plans, 

whether it is with China or with other countries in the region. I 

mean, this is something that is very tightly integrated with U.S. 

PACOM, Joint Staff and with OSD. 

And with respect to this plan, the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific and, in particular, the distributed laydown for U.S. Marine 

Corps forces in the Asia-Pacific, we will continue working with 

PACOM as we move forward and implement this plan. This is 

something that everybody is behind, and we are looking forward to 

move forward. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And I do want to—I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a project 

that it is not an ordinary project. We are working with a foreign 

country, the country of Japan. They have been very good partners. 

And they have come across with their commitments. And I do feel 

that, you know, we have to work together, but I don’t think it 

should have taken this long. I do realize that there have been problems. We have the budget problems now. Japan has had their 

tsunamis and their nuclear fallout and other situations have come 

about. But I just wish I could see a little more action in this area. 

Now, the next question I have, the report discusses some additional capabilities that could enhance the United States military 

posture in the Asia-Pacific region, like hosting additional attack 

submarines or permanently stationing bombers on Guam. 

Are there additional possibilities as well? And how could such 

recommendations be coordinated with DOD? 

Mr. SCHER. I think they see it, as described by Mr. Berteau and 

Dr. Green, the CSIS assessment, consciously looked out both—first 

of all, from only an Asia-Pacific perspective; and secondly, to look 

at an option that has more than—with an unconstrained budget 

environment, if you will, understanding that budgetary issues are 

a part of it. 

Certainly, that is something that we are going to—that we can 

consider. People have talked about that. And certainly now that the 

CSIS assessment talks about that, we will take another look. 

Part of the issue, however, of course, is that the Department 

must look at this from a global perspective and ensure that we 

have the capabilities to address our interests, support our friends 

and allies, and deter threats throughout the region. So we will 

have to look at this from a broader perspective in terms of resources and where they can be committed. 

But certainly, I think everyone understands that there continues 

to be great value in Guam as a strategic hub. And we will always 
32 

be open to looking at ways that we can enhance our posture in the 

Pacific along the lines of ensuring as well that we can deal with 

the interests that we have globally. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do you want to make any further comments? 

Mr. HELVEY. No, madam. Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And then I have one further question, Mr. Chairman. 

What impact, in your estimation, would occur to our bilateral relationship with Japan, as well as other allies in the Asia-Pacific region, if the Congress does not approve MILCON directly associated 

with the realignment of the Marines or reduce the restrictions on 

spending Government of Japan contributions? 

And further, what can we expect the Congress to formally receive 

a schedule—or when can we, as I mentioned earlier, receive a 

schedule and a list of projects required to support the buildup? And 

when could we expect to see these projects reflected in the future 

years’ defense program? 

Secretary Scher. 

Mr. HELVEY. I think with respect to the first question, madam, 

I think if we fail to do our part, I think it would call into question 

in Japan’s mind whether or not they ought to be able to move forward. So I think the real risk here is that if we don’t take further 

steps, then it will be hard for us to expect that the Government of 

Japan will do its part. 

This also has broader implications and ramifications across the 

region as other countries beyond Japan look at the United States, 

and look at not only the strength of our alliance with Japan, but 

the credibility of our obligations and commitments with them as 

well. And as Mr. Scher noted as well, potential adversaries will 

also take note if we have challenges in living up to these obligations, and that can have deeper implications for our long-term security interests in the region. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHER. And we will endeavor to get you the outlines of a 

timeline as soon as possible. I simply don’t want to promise you a 

date because I don’t want to get that wrong. And I would rather 

be incomplete than incorrect. So we will try to get that as soon as 

possible, recognizing that different levels of detail will be difficult 

to get, as I have said, due to environmental impact statements and 

ongoing negotiations with other countries. But certainly, that is 

something that we can get you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 185.] 

Mr. SCHER. I think that there is money that we already have 

asked for that we could put to use right now, as noted by our statements and by the CSIS—by the witnesses as well. And we will continue to look and fund wedges within the budget as we see that 

there is an opportunity to do more. But obviously, we need to make 

sure that we do this in conjunction with both houses of Congress. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentlelady. 

And if the gentlelady from Hawaii would just allow me one follow-up question from my good friend from Guam. The gentlelady 

from Guam asked about the disconnect between the Department 
33 

and PACOM. Obviously, it is always difficult when you are the person that someone is alleging has a disconnect, for you to see that. 

An objective party sometimes can see it better. 

Why do you feel that they would make that conclusion if you do 

not see it? What do you think objectively they were looking at 

which would lead them to conclude that there was such a disconnect? 

Mr. SCHER. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, that is a great question for 

them to answer. 

Mr. FORBES. Unfortunately, they have left the building. 

Mr. SCHER. Yes, and to be honest, I want to talk to both Mike 

and Dave to figure out exactly how they got there. I don’t want to 

hazard a guess, but I certainly do know that as new strategic approaches, new policies are developed, that is only the first stage. 

And making sure that it is promulgated and then understood appropriately takes a little while, especially in an organization as 

large as the Department of Defense. 

And I think we are at the point where I feel very confident that 

we have appropriately articulated it; that we have promulgated it 

well. But clearly, there is still a discussion to be had. So in fact, 

sir, I did go out to Pacific Command just last week. And part of 

my purpose in going out there was to make sure that we had no 

gaps between the guidance that has been given from the Secretary 

and from his staff to Pacific Command. And I feel very confident 

after having extensive discussions with Admiral Locklear and others on his staff that there is not a gap. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, we don’t want to belabor it, but I think the 

ranking member and I would both feel comfortable if you would 

have that little chat with them and perhaps respond to us on the 

record what do you think those objective criteria are, so we can just 

make sure that is not taking place and we have done whatever we 

can to iron that out. And we appreciate you looking at that and 

getting back to us. And we will ask them to do the same thing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 185.] 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Helvey, during your responses to Ms. Bordallo, you kept saying, ‘‘If we don’t do our part, Japan will not do their part.’’ Can you 

give me an example of what you meant by ‘‘do our part’’ and ‘‘they 

will not do their part’’? What are you talking about? 

Mr. HELVEY. I think we are talking about, you know, moving forward with the realignment plan. You know—— 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Futenma Replacement Facility and so forth—is 

that what you are talking about? 

Mr. HELVEY. Yes, madam. And we have made some, I think, 

really good progress in the April two-plus-two statement in providing a delinkage between forward progress on moving towards 

the Futenma Replacement Facility and the realignment of Marines—— 

Mrs. HANABUSA. That was my next question. When you say— 

well, it was said after that meeting that they delinked. So what 

does that give you, in your mind, or either of you, on our part? 
34 

When that delinkage took place, what does it permit us to now do 

that we couldn’t do before? 

Mr. HELVEY. Well, what that allows us to do is to be able to 

make progress, on both issues—the moving to a new Futenma Replacement Facility and moving to Guam have strategic value independent of each other. And so what the delinkage allows us to do 

is to be able to make progress where we can make progress. 

So we can begin the movement of forces, for example, from Okinawa to Guam, while at the same time we are continuing to work 

with the Government of Japan to make sure that all the right 

things happen on Okinawa so we can move forward with the beginning of the construction and move to the replacement facility in 

Henoko Bay. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. We have been calling it Camp Schwab, so is 

that correct? 

Mr. HELVEY. Yes, madam—— 

Mrs. HANABUSA. But is the Camp Schwab portion of it linked to 

Futenma? In other words, we have delinked part of it, but is the 

delinkage between us making the move to Guam, or is it also that 

we can proceed to do whatever we need to do, like another runway 

or whatever it may be, to Camp Schwab as well? 

Mr. HELVEY. Yes, we can—there are things that have to happen 

on Okinawa first. There has to be—they have to, I think, finish 

some work on their environmental impact statement. There has to 

be a landfill permit. But once that happens, then presumably construction can begin for that replacement facility. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. The other discussion that we have been having 

is on training ranges. And this, sort of, ties to my prior question 

about the view of the new military. And of course, that then will 

also determine what we need in terms of training facilities, area 

mass, what is it. 

So when we talk about training ranges, whether it is Mr. 

Sablan’s area or wherever you may else go, what exactly are the 

requirements that you see that we need in terms of training? And 

are we talking about training expeditionary forces primarily? 

Mr. SCHER. I think, in terms of specific needs of units and requirements, that is really a question that we can certainly take for 

the military services. Title 10 is their responsibility for manning, 

equipping and training. 

From a broad perspective, what is very clear is that, when you 

deploy forces and distribute around an area, one of the things you 

want to try to make sure to do, as a general rule, is to have them 

near training facilities. If not, then they have to go elsewhere to 

train before they can be ready forces to deploy and back. 

So we want to make sure that, as we look at the operational deployment of forces, in this case the Marines particularly, that they 

have training available near and around them. And that is one of 

the key pieces that should not and cannot be forgotten in the distributed laydown, to ensure that we have operationally ready forces 

in these geographically distributed areas. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. So it would be whatever the Marines need in 

terms of the training, if they were to move to—when they move to 

Guam? Is that what you are talking about? 
35 

Mr. SCHER. Yes, and the joint force requirement. We try to look 

at all of these in terms of the joint force requirement, and looking 

at many of the training ranges will be valuable not only for one 

Service. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. You were here when I had my discussion with 

the CSIS gentleman about Secretary Panetta’s positions regarding 

what this new military is going to have to do. And I don’t think 

that is something, in the time that I have remaining, that you are 

going to be able to answer, so I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, 

if they could take that for the record. 

How do you intend to accomplish all that Secretary Panetta said 

we would have to do? 

And that means political sustainability and the geographically 

distributed, as well as, I think, what is the middle one? 

Mr. SCHER. Operationally—— 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Operationally resilient. That is the one I am 

really interested in. How do you do operational resilience? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentlelady. 

And I think both you gentlemen heard the gentlelady’s question. 

If you could just acknowledge that you understand the question 

and that you will respond back to her so we have that on the 

record? 

Mr. SCHER. We will take for the record the question about how 

do we accomplish our geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and political sustainable force posture in the Pacific. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 185.] 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Thank you so much. 

I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Sablan is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SABLAN. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Scher and Secretary Helvey, thank you very much 

for your service. 

Let me just associate myself and get to my real question. For my 

observation—and Ms. Bordallo brought this up and then Chairman 

Forbes brought this up. And I think it was Dr. Green who said that 

lack of jointness of service among Services—it was also in the CSIS 

report—that indicated there seemed to be a disconnect. 

And for me, my observation is—and maybe, if it helps, is that— 

at the moment, there are currently several EIS—environmental impact studies—going on in the region in just where, you know, you 

have these divert EIS going on and, you know, a supplemental EIS 

for Guam, and the Pacific Com EIS for the Pacific AOR [Area Of 

Responsibility], among others. I will take your word that there is 

somewhere within our Government or in the Department of Defense that will coordinate all of this. I am actually—because I had 

mentioned to you the divert EIS—we still recommend that you 

have the divert—but let me say this. Secretary Panetta agrees with 

the CSIS report’s assessment that the training ranges in the region 

are of significant military readiness and potential military operations in the PACOM area of responsibility. One recommendation 

is to have training areas and facilities on the island of Pagan in 

the Northern Mariana Islands. 
36 

So can you tell us your plans, or the Department’s plans for 

Pagan, including the plans on the necessary funding required to 

develop Pagan into a suitable training area? 

Are there any potential barriers to the use of Pagan, for example? Have you had consultations with the Northern Marianas Government officials? 

And what exactly are your plans for Pagan? 

Mr. SCHER. I know that we have done some initial work on this, 

but I admit to not knowing the full range of where we are in these 

discussions or in the considerations within the Department. So I 

will take for the record the question of giving you an update on all 

of the activities in regard to the training in CNMI. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 185.] 

Mr. SABLAN. Then, Mr. Chairman, that answers all my questions. 

You will get back to us? I am not a member of the committee, 

so hopefully, you will get back to us. 

And, Mr. Chairman, again, I am very grateful to you and Ms. 

Bordallo and the members of the committee for the courtesy, sir, 

for allowing me to join you this afternoon. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. We thank you for being here. We thank you for your 

questions. And you have sat today and asked that question. It will 

be responded to and we will get you the answers when it comes 

back. 

Gentlemen, as you heard from our earlier panel, we may have 

some members of the subcommittee who have some written questions for you. If you would be courteous enough to look at those and 

get us your responses back for the record for doing that. But without that, or other than that, we want to thank you again for being 

here, for your time. And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(41) 

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness 

Hearing on 

United States Force Posture in the United States 

Pacific Command Area of Responsibility 

August 1, 2012 

I want to welcome all our members and our distinguished panel 

of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the Pacific Command and an independent assessment of the U.S. defense posture 

in the region. 

I have had the opportunity to review the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies report and was very impressed with the thoroughness of the assessment and the depth of study associated with 

the recommendations. The ability to pull together such a comprehensive document in the short time provided is indicative of the 

expertise provided to this report and the value the think tank community can play in the policymaking process. My compliments to 

both of our witnesses. 

To quote the report, ‘‘Today, six of the ten fastest growing major 

export markets for the United States are in Asia, and 60 percent 

of U.S. goods exported abroad go to the region. Meanwhile, the region is home to five of the eight states recognized as being in possession of nuclear weapons, three of the world’s top six defense 

budgets, six of the world’s largest militaries, continuing tensions 

between India and Pakistan, and territorial disputes stretching 

from the Northern Territories of Japan through the East and South 

China Seas and into South Asia.’’ It is for these reasons and many 

more that a rebalance to the Pacific theater is in our strategic interests. 

Our subcommittee has long supported this strategic rebalance 

and I believe that a forward-based, credible presence is essential to 

supporting our economic interests. 

In previous discussions on the Marine Corps realignment from 

Okinawa, I had expressed my concern on the overall costs associated with the realignment of forces. However, earlier this year, the 

Department of Defense offered an alternative force structure proposal that includes a reduction of forces in Okinawa and realigns 

the Marine Corps into Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements on 

Okinawa, Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. I am pleased to note that 

the overall costs appear to have been significantly reduced while 

security posture may be further enhanced. 

Rarely in Washington do we encounter a proposal that both 

saves money and expands capabilities, but I think that we have en-
42 

countered such a proposal in the latest agreement between the 

United States and the Government of Japan. I am glad that our 

witnesses today appear to have reached the same conclusion. 

I believe in maintaining peace through strength. I believe that a 

strong economy requires a strong military to protect the free flow 

of goods around the world. I believe that the Asia-Pacific theater 

provides a valuable key to the continued prosperity of the United 

States and is in our strategic interests to ensure peace in the 

region. 

I must admit, I do wonder whether such a Pacific rebalance as 

we are discussing today will be hollowed by the debate associated 

with sequestration and the decisions associated with the Budget 

Control Act. I think that we internalize the impacts of sequestration to the force structure of the United States, but I am equally 

worried as to the message that could be provided to our partners 

and allies. I look forward to also discussing how a withdrawal of 

forces from overseas, that could follow a sequestration decision and 

the additional reductions already included in the Budget Control 

Act, could be perceived by our partners and allies. 

As to our hearing today, we intend to have two panels of witnesses. The first panel will be the principal authors of the report 

entitled ‘‘U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An 

Independent Assessment.’’ The second panel will be representative 

of the Department of Defense. 

Joining us on the first panel are two distinguished witnesses and 

authors of this independent report, from the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies: 

• Mr. David J. Berteau, Senior Vice President and Director of 

International Security Program; and 

• Dr. Michael J. Green, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair. 

Representing the Department of Defense and to provide their 

thoughts and comments to the PACOM report, I am pleased to 

have two distinguished individuals: 

• Mr. Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Plans; and 

• Mr. David F. Helvey, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for East Asia. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(69) 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(185) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. SCHER. We have had several engagements with PACOM, including conversations with Admiral Locklear, regarding the United States’ defense strategy in the 

Asia-Pacific region and how PACOM’s activities best support it. To ensure we are 

resourcing and executing the strategy, PACOM is aligning its joint exercises, exchanges, and operations, among other activities, to the strategy over time. It is also 

developing measures for and evaluating how its activities produce outcomes consistent with the Department’s strategy and the broader United States Government 

effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. 

More broadly, the Department, led by the Deputy Secretary, has established a 

group of the Department’s senior leadership to focus on implanting the rebalance 

toward the Asia-Pacific region. The PACOM Commander will be an active participant in these senior leader engagements. [See page 33.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. DOD is in the process of finalizing the next version 

of the implementation timeline for the distributed laydown. Once complete, the implementation timeline will be briefed to you and your staffs. [See page 32.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. The Department of Defense must keep pace with 

changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment that pose profound challenges to 

international security, such as the rise of new powers, threats to free and open access to the maritime, air, and space domains, piracy, and the potential spread of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Department will maintain an enduring 

military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides a tangible reassurance 

that the United States is committed to Asia’s security, economic development, and 

the prosperity that is essential to the region’s success. 

In order to do so, the Department must continue to transition over time to a defense posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Although the threat of conventional conflict remains, U.S. military 

forces must also be positioned to respond to a wider range of challenges and opportunities in Asia. This requires a more geographically distributed presence for U.S. 

forces, with a focus on near-term opportunities to enhance our presence and access 

with our allies and partners in Southeast Asia and Oceania. 

The Department is also investing in the capabilities to ensure the ability of our 

forces to operate in a security environment in which access to and freedom of movement within the region are challenged. This includes taking steps to disperse key 

capabilities throughout the region, as well as strengthen our missile defense capabilities and those of our allies and partners. We must ensure that our allies and 

partners in the region are confident in the continued strength of our deterrence of 

the full range of potential threats to regional peace and stability. 

As we work to develop a geographically distributed and operationally resilient 

posture in the region, we are doing so in a way that is politically sustainable for 

us and for our allies and partners in the region. Domestically, this means that we 

have an obligation to clearly communicate to the American people and Congress our 

interests and objectives. This is the key to sustaining the domestic support necessary to make critical resource investments. In the region, this means pursuing 

and sustaining a presence that is sustainable for the host governments and the local 

communities that support us. [See page 35.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SABLAN 

Mr. SCHER. We are currently continuing general discussions with the Government 

of Japan on the possibility of contributing to the development of land training 

ranges in the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, including Pagan. The 

April 2012 2+2 Statement indicated that a decision would be made by December 

2012. We are considering a number of non-live fire and live-fire ranges that would 
186 

enable vastly improved Air, Sea, Land and Subsurface training in the western Pacific. [See page 36.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

AUGUST 1, 2012 

(189) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has congressional ambiguity, and in some cases 

inaction, potentially emboldened forces that are opposed to a continuing Marine 

presence in Okinawa? In other words, has U.S. congressional action, or inaction for 

that matter, made a local matter more difficult to navigate? 

Dr. GREEN. Both the United States and Japan will have to secure respective legislative approval for various aspects of the April 2012 Security Consultative Committee Agreement and members of the U.S. Congress still have questions about Department of Defense (DOD) plans to implement that agreement. That said, delays 

on the part of the U.S. Congress will eventually have a negative impact on Japanese 

Diet support for the roughly $3 billion Japan has committed to the distributed 

MAGTF plan. It is already a matter of record that when the Guam relocation plan 

has hit political obstacles in the United States, it is big news in the Japanese media. 

For these reasons, we argue in the report and Dr. Hamre emphasizes in his cover 

letter to the Secretary of Defense that it will be important to demonstrate momentum to our allies in order to reassure them of the U.S. commitment to implement 

a geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable forward presence. We also acknowledge in the report that we cannot independently 

validate the cost estimates or operational merit of the distributed MAGTF plan, 

though there are some positive elements geostrategically and operationally. The key 

will be to find ways to move forward on initial investments, while retaining flexibility as the Congress and Department of Defense are able to incrementally validate 

cost and operational estimates going forward. 

Ultimately, as we note in the report, the U.S. ability to shape the security environment will depend on continued momentum in commitments made to align force 

posture to the evolving security dynamics in the region. The current impasse between DOD and the Congress is not cost-free in terms of U.S. strategic influence 

in the region. At the same time, the scope and cost uncertainties associated with 

some of DOD’s realignment proposals have raised important concerns in the Congress that must be addressed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The report, as well as the DOD, talk a lot about ‘‘engagement’’ 

in the Asia-Pacific region. In your opinion what does this mean and how does it support U.S. objectives? How can you measure the effectiveness of such engagements? 

Dr. GREEN and Mr. BERTEAU. Before exploring the role of engagement in supporting U.S. national security objectives, it is important first to define those objectives. As the CSIS report mentions, ‘‘the underlying geostrategic objective for the 

United States in Asia and the Pacific has been to maintain a balance of power that 

prevents the rise of any hegemonic state from within the region that could threaten 

U.S. interests by seeking to obstruct American access or dominate the maritime domain.’’ (page 13) Today, the most significant challenge is China’s rising power, influence, and expectations of regional pre-eminence. Other challenges include North Korean saber-rattling and possible instability, the region’s vulnerability to natural 

‘‘mega-disasters’’, terrorism, and partner nations’ economic dependence on maritime, 

cyberspace, and space commons. U.S. objectives require the ability to deter where 

possible and respond when necessary to each of these challenges. 

Engagement is a critical element of the overall U.S. approach to addressing these 

challenges and achieving U.S. objectives in the region. Courses in professional military education discuss what the Department of Defense calls ‘‘elements of national 

power’’, which include diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools that 

allow the United States to advance national interests and shape the strategic environment. The full complement of these tools enables the United States to pursue 

national security objectives, and they allow the U.S. military to partner, plan, exercise, and operate with the military (and sometimes security) forces of friendly foreign governments. Such activities constitute what we call ‘‘engagement,’’ which also 

may include the careful provision of equipment, education and training, and advice 

to these foreign forces. As the report states: 

U.S. forces that are forward deployed and persistently engaged shape the strategic environment in the Asia Pacific region by: 
190 

Assuring allies and partners of U.S. security commitments, which encourages solidarity against challenges to their interests and discourages unilateral escalation in a crisis; 

Dissuading Chinese coercion or North Korean aggression by demonstrating solidarity with and among allies and partners; 

Shoring up the security and self-capacity of vulnerable states so that they 

are neither targets of coercion or expansion nor havens for violent extremists; and 

Reassuring China where possible through engagement in bilateral and 

multilateral security cooperation and confidence-building on common challenges (e.g., counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism). 

U.S. forces that are forward deployed and persistently engaged set the stage for 

more effective deterrence and better contingency capabilities by: 

Shaping requirements, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of 

U.S. allies and partners for more competent coalitions across the range of 

possible contingencies (with Australia, Japan, and the ROK at the higher 

spectrum of intensity and with other allies and partners at the lower spectrum of intensity); 

Networking those allies and partners with each other to enable more effective coalitions when needed (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-ROK); 

Gaining familiarity with the immediate security environment and with 

joint and/or interoperable interaction with other allied and partner forces; 

Increasing overall maritime domain awareness for individual countries as 

well as across the Indo-Pacific littoral and ensuring the integrity of the 

First and Second Island Chains with respect to adversaries in a conflict; 

Complicating the military planning of potential adversaries by identifying 

and developing arrangements for access, prepositioning, over-flight, and 

other needs, thereby dispersing possible targets and providing redundancy; 

and 

Identifying what planners call ‘‘off ramps’’ for crisis avoidance and de-escalation, if necessary, through regular direct and indirect military-to-military engagement. (page 17) 

Though various Components of the U.S. military do already engage with friendly 

foreign nations, the CSIS study notes that ‘‘legacy planning processes, focus on Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn, and the complexity of 

planning simultaneous missions for shaping and deterrence have combined to create 

a series of apparent disconnects in conceptualizing and implementing U.S. strategy.’’ 

(page 90) The development and implementation of a robust engagement plan, one 

that allows U.S. forces to create and maintain valuable relationships with partner 

nations, is critical to shaping the security environment of the Asia Pacific region. 

Thus, the CSIS report’s first recommendation is that the Department of Defense 

better align its engagement strategy under the Pacific Command and across the Department to shape the environment in such a way that the United States can continue to pursue its national security objectives. 

In terms of metrics for engagement effectiveness, it is important to recognize that 

engagement—like diplomacy or defense—is a concept. It may be measured in numbers of military events (e.g., a training exercise, planning conferences, operations), 

military equipment provided, flows of commercial goods through the region, and 

numbers of troublesome security events (e.g., attacks on fishing vessels, missile 

launches), but such quantifiable measures are insufficient for considering the full 

impact of building relationships and assuring security. Assessing improvement in 

the overall environment must involve opinion polls of local residents regarding their 

feelings of safety and security, as well as feelings toward the United States as a 

reliable partner and toward China, North Korea, terrorism, and other security challenges. Also, do U.S. military planners find it easier or harder to work with foreign 

partners? What are intelligence analysts noting about nations’ policies, leaders, and 

rhetoric? The answers to questions like these enable the United States to measure 

the value of specific engagement activities. In the long run, measures also need to 

cover the entire region, not just the engagement with one country at a time. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The report, as well as the DOD, talk a lot about ‘‘engagement’’ 

in the Asia-Pacific region. In your opinion what does this mean and how does it support U.S. objectives? How can you measure the effectiveness of such engagements? 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. Forward engagement is about the United States 

working with our friends, allies, and partners to ensure that we can further U.S. 

interests and address any threats. We seek to remain the security partner of choice 
191 

in the region, while encouraging others to share the burden of furthering common 

interests. Our forward presence and engagement play an essential role in promoting 

strong partnerships that strengthen the capabilities of the Pacific nations to defend 

and secure themselves. Building strong partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region also 

requires us to sustain and enhance U.S. military strength there. 

Engagement includes increased military-to-military engagement with China, with 

whom we will seek to deepen our partnership in areas such as humanitarian assistance, counter-drug, and counter-proliferation efforts. 

The Secretary has directed all of the geographic Combatant Commanders to think 

and plan strategically when it comes to security cooperation, including all their regional activities—from joint exercises, exchanges, and operations to more traditional 

forms of security assistance. This direction also requires them to develop measures 

for and evaluate how their engagement activities produce outcomes consistent with 

the Department’s Strategic Guidance and the broader United States Government effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Berteau, how are our allies measuring our commitment to the 

region? Are some of these same metrics increasing China’s security concerns or defense development? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Allies in the Asia Pacific region examine closely the U.S. level of 

commitment and have heightened sensitivities to changes, whether real or perceived, in this commitment. In addition to economic and diplomatic engagement 

with nations in the region, U.S. force posture through Asia and the Pacific figures 

prominently as a reflection of U.S. commitment. One needs only to read news headlines in Japan and the Republic of Korea, especially when the U.S. presence in those 

nations is under negotiation, to witness the significant role that such presence plays 

across the region. Other nations also host or otherwise support U.S. forces, ranging 

in footprint from small, rotational units that provide humanitarian or 

counterterrorism training to larger deployments that participate in multilateral exercises or disaster relief operations. 

In fact, the type and costs of force posture—including its attendant capabilities— 

are also important reflections of U.S. commitment. As noted in the CSIS report, 

‘‘U.S. force posture must demonstrate a readiness and capacity to fight and win, 

even under more challenging circumstances associated with A2/AD (anti-access/area 

denial) and other threats . . . Demonstrating such capacity is not automatic; one 

way to undercut dramatically the regional confidence in the U.S. commitment and 

the American ability to shape decisions and preserve peace would be to adopt a posture that pulled back from the Western Pacific and focused only on the survivability 

of U.S. forces and reductions in annual costs of forward presence.’’ (pages 17–18) It 

is not enough to have U.S. forces in the region. Allies and partners watch closely 

to gauge whether those forces provide the needed capabilities to help address security concerns, from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to conflict prevention to 

more kinetic activities (should the need arise). 

Regarding Chinese reactions, it is a challenge to convince leaders in Beijing that 

the overarching U.S. goal in the region is to shape a peaceful environment and not 

to contain an adversarial China. As the CSIS report states, 

Beijing is well aware of U.S. strategies to shape the regional environment and has 

developed counter-containment and counter-intervention strategies in parallel. The 

counter-intervention strategies are usually thought of in terms of A2/AD military capabilities (described below) but also include diplomatic, information, and economic 

sources of leverage against the U.S. political system and particularly weaker regional states in order to complicate U.S intervention in Taiwan, South China Sea, 

or other regional crises that could involve China. The counter-containment strategies aim at weakening U.S. alignment with other states in the region and involve 

instruments that range from trade agreements and diplomacy to bribery and individual coercion. (page 40) 

However, it is important to note that economic and diplomatic engagement between China and its neighbors does not necessarily threaten U.S. interests. In a 

globalized economy, Chinese economic cooperation is critical to the success of many 

neighbors that might otherwise be subject to problems linked to poor or struggling 

economies, such as terrorism and crime. Moreover, while the United States and 

China will continue to vie for influence, Beijing has premised its counter-containment strategies on a mistaken interpretation of U.S. shaping activities as ‘‘containment’’ in the Cold War sense of the word. The report notes that ‘‘in fact, the United 

States does not seek to limit China’s development or international engagement, as 

was the case vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus far, efforts to 
192 

reassure the Chinese elite and people of this fact have had mixed success . . . Distinguishing between legitimate and manufactured concerns in dialogue with Beijing 

will require careful attention.’’ (page 40) For that reason, the CSIS study team recommended that the Department of Defense better align engagement strategy under 

the Pacific Command and across the Department and highlighted areas for further 

investment, including ‘‘more reliable mechanisms with the PLA [China’s People’s 

Liberation Army] for military-to-military dialogue, crisis management, transparency, and avoiding incidents at sea and in cyber and outer space.’’ (page 22) 

Ms. SPEIER. How can we measure our successes when it comes to capabilities? 

Mr. BERTEAU. The United States may measure military capabilities by considering three layers of analysis: 

What are the resources brought to bear; 

What are the ‘‘conversion capabilities’’; and 

What is the U.S. combat proficiency? 

(Note: For a more detailed explanation of how to measure military capability, 

please see Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age by Ashley J. Tellis, 

Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson, RAND Corporation, 

2000.) 

On the resource side, one can determine quantitative aspects of capabilities. These 

elements include: defense budgets; manpower (numbers and types); infrastructure; 

research, development, testing, and evaluation institutions; industrial base; and 

equipment inventory, logistics support, and other investments. 

To convert these elements into military capability, one can also consider, inter 

alia: the geostrategic environment and threats therein; Department of Defense 

strategies and plans; relations with nations in the region; doctrine, training, and organization of military assets; and innovation. These ‘‘conversion capabilities’’ allow 

the U.S. military to translate resources into capabilities. 

Finally, it is not enough to have the manpower, equipment, infrastructure, strategies, doctrine, training, and other elements already mentioned. To realize military 

capabilities, U.S. forces must also have the readiness levels and demonstrated proficiency to achieve the missions assigned to them. 

Ms. SPEIER. How can we measure our successes when it comes to capabilities? 

Mr. BERTEAU. Please see the answer to the previous question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Scher, as you’ve acknowledged, our strategy encompasses many 

facets, including diplomatic and economic objectives. These different approaches, 

however, can sometimes undermine each other, and military force is frequently the 

signal that drowns out our other efforts. What are you doing to prevent this from 

occurring, and how are you measuring whether our growing military capabilities are 

undermining our economic well-being? 

Mr. SCHER. As I highlighted in my opening statement, the Defense Department’s 

efforts to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region are part of a broader United 

States Government effort to increase attention and investment there. The Department’s investments in its forward defense posture, presence, and activities in the 

region are thus not simply about the application of military force, but about positively shaping the security environment and ensuring regional peace and stability. 

We will continue to work with our interagency partners to synchronize a whole-ofgovernment approach to ensure we enhance our defense capabilities and activities 

in the region in support of our economic well-being, as well as the well-being of our 

allies and partners in the region. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Scher, the CSIS report raises concerns about a gap between 

strategy and defense resources. Is the Defense Department pursuing any strategies 

to control costs? 

Mr. SCHER. Today and into the future the United States faces security challenges 

across the globe. As we look to implement our rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, we must be mindful of pressing priorities elsewhere in the world and across 

the defense program, which compete for scarce defense resources. We are working 

to ensure that we do have the resources identified and in place to fully resource our 

rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, but fully realizing our Defense Strategic 

Guidance will not happen in one budget cycle. The Secretary has directed the Military Departments and other Components to build on our Fiscal Year 2013 investments in the Fiscal Year 2014 budget proposal now under development. The Department will continue to assess priorities across regions and make appropriate, deliberate choices to align our defense strategy to resources. 

Ms. SPEIER. How receptive are our allies to non-military strategies and cooperation? 

Mr. SCHER. The Defense Department’s rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region 

is only part of a broad U.S. Government effort to focus more attention and coopera-
193 

tion there; this includes non-military strategies to promote strong partnerships in 

support of common interests. From our discussions with allies and partners, it appears that they are quite receptive to non-military strategies and cooperation. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Scher, how is the Defense Department mitigating the challenges 

of capability risks and declining defense resources? What would you consider to be 

the Defense Department’s top acquisition priority? What is the highest priority for 

our allies, in terms of foreign military sales? 

Mr. SCHER. As Secretary Panetta noted in his comments on the CSIS report, 

DOD’s efforts to implement the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, including its key 

tenet of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, will require judicious investment in the highest payoff initiatives and capabilities. The Defense Strategic Guidance and the President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2013 have placed the Department on a path to meet this challenge, and the Deputy Secretary has created 

a process to ensure the Department continues to make appropriate, deliberate 

choices to align our defense strategy to resources. 

If the United States is to remain a credible security partner in the Asia-Pacific 

region, we must be able to retain our ability to credibly deter potential adversaries, 

to prevent them from achieving their objectives, and to advance common interests. 

Accordingly, the U.S. defense program is investing in capabilities across a range of 

missions, as outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance, to include maintaining the 

unique ability of the Joint Force to project power even in areas in which our access 

and freedom to operate are challenged. To this end, investments include stealthy, 

multi-role aircraft; more capable long-range strike systems; modern, VIRGINIAclass submarines; more capable theater missile defense systems; enhanced airfield 

damage repair capability; a new, penetrating bomber; and enhancements to the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities and our computer network defense, network exploitation, and network attack systems. These and other 

capabilities are central to reassuring allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region 

and shaping the security environment, while also providing forward capabilities appropriate to deter and defeat aggression. No one program can provide this critical 

capability. 

There is also no singular priority for our allies and partners in terms of foreign 

military sales. Rather, we will continue to work with allies and partners to address 

common security challenges, one piece of which will be to building their capability 

and capacity in the areas most appropriate to how we will address these common 

security challenges. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Helvey, while we in Congress frequently struggle to think beyond 

the next fiscal year, the Chinese tend to have a longer view of time and national 

competition. As the Chinese continue buying our debt and we continue to pursue 

unsustainable deficit spending—including defense spending that exceeds China’s 

budget six times over—how do China’s strategic thinkers measure their national 

strength against the United States? How could our significant deficit undermine 

this pivot to the Pacific? 

Mr. HELVEY. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders and strategists often discuss 

China’s strategy in terms of building ‘‘comprehensive national power’’ (zonghe guoli). 

Comprehensive national power (CNP) is the concept by which China’s strategic 

planners use qualitative and quantitative variables to evaluate and measure China’s 

standing in relation to other nations. CNP incorporates both soft, internally-oriented 

indicators of strength (e.g., economic prosperity, domestic cohesion, and cultural influence) and hard, externally-oriented measures (e.g., the size of a state’s nuclear 

arsenal, territory, military capability, diplomatic influence, economic influence, and 

international prestige). 

The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ effort, comes at a time 

when the United States confronts a serious deficit and debt problem that is itself 

a national security risk that is squeezing both the defense and domestic budgets. 

Even facing these considerable pressures, the U.S. Government must not lose sight 

of national security interests as it makes difficult fiscal decisions. Instead, the U.S. 

Government seeks a balanced approach. 

During the last year, we conducted an intensive review to guide defense priorities 

and spending over the coming decade, in light of strategic guidance from the President and the recommendations of this Department’s senior military and civilian 

leadership. This process has enabled us to assess risk, set priorities, and make difficult choices. The Department would need to make a strategic shift regardless of 

the nation’s fiscal situation. 

The U.S. Armed Forces will remain capable across the spectrum. We will be fully 

prepared to protect our interests, defend our homeland, and support civil authorities. We will continue to strengthen key alliances, build partnerships, and empha-
194 

size building their capacity to defend their own territory and interests more effectively through better use of diplomacy, development, and security force assistance. 

Whenever possible, we will develop low-cost and small-footprint approaches to 

achieve our security objectives, emphasizing rotational deployments and exercises, 

and other innovative approaches that maintain presence. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Helvey, do you believe that you have enough personnel with experience living in China and speaking Chinese to underpin our assumptions and 

strategy moving forward? 

Mr. HELVEY. Yes. The Department has exceptionally well-qualified country directors, including several who speak and read Chinese and have experience living in 

China and Taiwan. 

Ms. SPEIER. How receptive are our allies to non-military strategies and cooperation? 

Mr. HELVEY. U.S. alliances are based not only on shared security interests, but 

also on shared economic and political goals. Our relationships with U.S. allies are 

broad-based, underpinned by trade arrangements, membership in economic 

groupings like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and shared respect for democracy and human rights. In part because of these dynamics, the U.S. rebalance to 

the Asia-Pacific is based on a whole-of-government approach emphasizing the importance of the region to the security, economic, and political future of the United 

States. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Helvey, how have our allies responded to the Pacific Pivot in 

their own defense budget decisions? 

Mr. HELVEY. Given that Department announcements regarding the rebalance only 

took place in January 2012, the budget cycles of many U.S. allies have not occurred. 

We are working with our allies to encourage them to prioritize capability development that supports shared goals in the Asia-Pacific region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. You commented on the need for avoiding multiple points of failure 

in our posture. Can you comment on how the organic base and our arsenals specifically can aid in this need? 

Dr. GREEN and Mr. BERTEAU. Throughout the history of the United States, the 

military has relied on a combination of support from the private sector and from 

organic, in-house capabilities. That balance changes over time, depending on factors 

such as technical capabilities, the economics of supply and demand, and cost. The 

balance also depends on the requirements of the Department of Defense (DOD). In 

part, the presence of capable in-house organic DOD capacity provides some insurance against points of failure in private sector capability, and the reverse is also 

true. The requirements on the books today, however, have not been updated to reflect the future force demands that the U.S. military will face. This disconnect of 

requirements to capability has already led to problems. For example, in the 2005 

round of DOD base closures, decisions to close ammunition plants were made using 

data that were not updated for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. 

The most important aid that the DOD organic base and arsenal community could 

provide to DOD would be to push hard for an update on requirements, a better and 

forward-looking determination of what needs to be sustained as core DOD in-house 

capability, and an alignment of resource allocations in the budget and across the 

Future Years Defense Program to focus first on supporting that core. Instead, decisions are made more on the lines of marginal cost and contracting convenience than 

on core capability requirements and avoiding single points of failure. 

Mr. SCHILLING. In your fourth recommendation you stated the need to increase 

stockpiles and replenish and upgrade equipment and supplies. Can you speak to 

how vital the organic base is to this work? 

Dr. GREEN and Mr. BERTEAU. The CSIS report highlights the importance of increased stockpiles of critical ammunition and of replenished, upgraded equipment 

and supplies to enable U.S. forces to address the myriad of security challenges in 

the Asia Pacific region. As noted in the report: 

Global force presence is assisted by prepositioning personnel and equipment in 

crucial areas to resupply ships and aircraft, as well as provide havens for 

equipment repairs. Prepositioning facilitates the fast deployment of equipment 

and supplies to personnel in areas of contingency operations. Positioned stocks, 

both afloat and ashore, support timely movement of essential military supplies 

between operating areas with decreased travel time, transport cost, and without reliance on other nation’s transportation networks into theater. 

Prepositioning stocks also permits the swift arrival of personnel to theater 
195 

while supplies are transported separately to a specified link-up point once a 

port or airfield has been secured by early arriving forces. (page 59) 

The U.S. defense industrial base is well-positioned to assist in activities to increase stockpiles and replenish and upgrade equipment and supplies. The answer 

to the previous questions speaks to the need to identify Department of Defense requirements for core capabilities. That same logic applies to this question. In particular, ammunition requirements for both production capacity and stockpile requirements are in need of updating. It would be useful for the Congress to engage 

with the Department of Defense to identify ways to support that updating. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Your statement talked about creating an effective deterrent by 

working closely with allies. Does this include greater support for U.S. foreign military sales? 

Dr. GREEN and Mr. BERTEAU. The CSIS report reflects the conviction that working with allies and partner nations is essential in the Asia Pacific region. U.S. forces 

rely on access, basing, and overflight rights. They also leverage capabilities that 

friendly foreign nations can bring to bear along the full spectrum of military operations, from humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts to counterterrorism activities to combat operations. To be effective and efficient, the United States must 

be familiar with allies’ and partners’ military capabilities and must highlight interoperability as a shared goal. 

That familiarity and interoperability can be achieved through the use of several 

foreign assistance tools. The vast majority of these tools are subject to the direct 

oversight of the Department of State, as codified in title 22 of the United States 

Code. These tools include foreign military sales (FMS) and international military 

education and training. They also include, but are not limited to, provision of excess 

defense articles—meaning, equipment that U.S. forces no longer require or that no 

longer meets U.S. requirements—and assistance in direct commercial sales of military goods and services to foreign governments. As the United States rebalances its 

force posture to the Asia Pacific region, it is sensible that the Department of State, 

in consultation with the Department of Defense, analyze the needs of allies and 

partners in that region and support foreign assistance, including FMS, where such 

assistance makes sense. 

Further, the CSIS report is predicated on a more integrated U.S. approach to both 

FMS and foreign direct sales. This integration is part of the larger recommendation 

that the Department of Defense better align engagement strategy under the Pacific 

Command and across the Department and the entire Federal Government. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You stated that the strategy for the DOD force posture must be 

better articulated. How do you recommend we do this? 

Dr. GREEN and Mr. BERTEAU. In the course of the CSIS study, we interviewed 

hundreds of current and former U.S. civilian and military officials, subject matter 

experts, and foreign officials. Based on these interviews and a rigorous literature 

review, the CSIS study team concluded that the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) 

focus on the Asia Pacific region—implied in the Secretary of Defense’s June 2011 

speech in Singapore and reinforced by Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 

for 21st Century Leadership and the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal 

earlier this year—has not yet been publicly articulated in ways that enable resource 

decisions within the United States and by U.S. partners and allies. While there may 

have been general agreement between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Pacific Command leadership, stakeholders at various levels throughout the Department and the interagency, as well as from various countries, had vastly different interpretations of what ‘‘rebalancing to the Asia Pacific region’’ means in 

practical terms. Those different interpretations will remain until a better articulation of the overall strategy is made public, and that strategy can be tracked to specific resource decisions in the Federal budget and in DOD force posture decisions. 

In addition, it appears that the public and legislative bodies, both in the United 

States and abroad, have various interpretations of the force posture strategy. These 

diverse interpretations indicated a lack of successful articulation. DOD cannot expect the U.S. Congress to align its decisions with a strategy that has not been laid 

out in sufficient detail. The Congress is correct in its desire to require such detail 

before decisions are made. 

At the same time, however, the situation in the Asia Pacific region is fluid and 

continually changing. Neither DOD nor the Congress can wait until the last fact is 

known before making the decision to take initial steps. For that reason, the CSIS 

report recommends that Congress approve initial steps, including funding for improved training facilities in the Pacific. These initial steps make sense regardless 

of the long-term evolution of U.S. forces or changes in the defense budget. 
196 

Mr. SCHILLING. What exactly would Sequestration do to the ability for the DOD 

to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

Mr. SCHER. As Secretary Panetta noted in his comments on the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessment, sequestration would devastate the Department’s ability to advance and sustain enhancements to our defense presence 

and posture in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How important is a strong industrial base to DOD efforts to 

under-gird re-balancing efforts towards the Asia-Pacific region through capability investments? 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. A strong industrial base is essential to the Department’s efforts to invest in the capabilities appropriate to reassure allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region and shape the security environment, while also providing forward capabilities appropriate to deter and defeat aggression. The Department needs, and will continue to invest in, a strong industrial base to implement 

the vision that we have for our future armed forces, including their growing role 

in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Mr. SCHILLING. What exactly would Sequestration do to the ability for the DOD 

to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

Mr. HELVEY. As Secretary Panetta noted in his comments on the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessment, sequestration would devastate the Department’s ability to advance and sustain enhancements to our defense presence 

and posture in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. Because the sequestration 

statute does not propose to make cuts strategically, we remain more focused on preventing the sequester from occurring than assessing its effects. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SABLAN 

Mr. SABLAN. The CSIS report makes the recommendation to ‘‘Move forward with 

funding necessary for the development of training ranges at Tinian Island and other 

CNMI locations. Work with the Government of Japan to leverage Japanese funding 

commitments in order to realize early joint-bilateral training opportunities.’’ Can the 

witnesses comment on what strategic value there is in developing these training 

ranges? What capabilities does Tinian, and other locations in the Northern Mariana 

Islands, offer the U.S. military that they don’t currently have? Further, what value 

will these training ranges provide to our allies in the region? 

Dr. GREEN and Mr. BERTEAU. The strategic value of developing training ranges 

in places like Tinian and other Commonwealth islands is based on three elements. 

First, the ranges are on territory controlled by the United States and therefore are 

not subject to political developments in other countries. Second, they provide essential training capacity for U.S. forces that are dispersed across the Asia Pacific, reducing the need for additional training investments elsewhere. Third, these training 

facilities enable more combined training with forces from U.S. allies and partners 

across the region. Increased combined training increases the capability of partners 

and allies, enables the United States to expand and focus engagement activities 

with those allies and partners, and familiarizes military personnel and forces with 

the requirements for joint and combined operations. This is particularly true with 

respect to joint training for amphibious operations, for which purpose ranges like 

Tinian are well suited. We note that Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and 

Canada are seeking to develop U.S. Marine Corps-type expeditionary and amphibious capabilities. 

Mr. SABLAN. There are currently several environmental impact statements being 

conducted in the Pacific region. What is being done at the OSD level to ensure appropriate coordination among all these EIS actions? For example, there may be 

synergies by establishing a Divert Field at Tinian which could also enable better 

training opportunities for the Marines and other Services. I ask this because the 

CSIS report indicates that there seems to be a disconnect between PACOM’s desired 

actions and what the Department is currently budgeting and how it’s articulating 

strategic requirements. 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. There are a number of environment impact statements (EIS) being conducted in the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands 

(CNMI) and Guam. The Marine Corps’ planned relocation to the Marianas and Pacific Air Forces’ expanding mission requirements in the western Pacific have many 

common requirements, including airfield facilities, port facilities, and associated logistics. This commonality may present the opportunity for significant savings. The 

Military Departments coordinate directly in areas of potential mutual benefit/use, 

with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) oversight as appropriate. 
197 

As part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, the Department of the Navy is evaluating a range of alternatives through the development of 

a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for a proposed Live Fire 

Training Range Complex, Marine Corps cantonment, and family housing on Guam. 

The training complex is necessary to support training requirements for the Marines 

relocating from Okinawa to Guam. The Notice of Intent for this effort was published 

in February 2012. 

The consideration of training ranges in the CNMI will be incorporated in a 

USPACOM-led Environmental Impact Statement that would enable vastly improved 

air, sea, land, and subsurface training in the western Pacific. There is a variety of 

non-live-fire and live-fire ranges being considered under this EIS, and a determination will not be made until the completion of that study. 

U.S. Air Forces Pacific (PACAF) recently published the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Divert Activities and Exercises, Guam and the CNMI. The EIS 

listed Saipan International Airport and Tinian International Airport as the two primary alternatives, with Saipan selected as the current preferred alternative. 

Mr. SABLAN. Can you comment on the current status of negotiations with Japan 

on ensuring that direct contributions could be used to create and improve current 

training ranges in Tinian? What projects is the Department currently contemplating 

on constructing to enhance training opportunities in Tinian? 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. We are currently continuing general discussions with 

the Government of Japan on the possibility of contributing to the development of 

land training ranges in the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands. The April 

2012 2+2 Statement indicated that a decision would be made by December 2012. 

Mr. SABLAN. Secretary Panetta agrees with the CSIS report’s assessment that the 

training ranges in the region are of significance to military readiness and potential 

military operations in the PACOM AOR. One recommendation is to add training 

areas and build facilities on the island of Pagan in the Northern Mariana Islands. 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. There is consideration of Pagan as a location for amphibious and live-fire training on ranges in the western Pacific. 

Mr. SABLAN. Can you comment on DOD’s plans for the island of Pagan, including 

plans on the necessary funding required to develop Pagan into a suitable training 

area? Are there any potential barriers to the use of Pagan, and have consultations 

with CNMI Government officials resulted in support of Pagan’s use for military 

training? 

Mr. SCHER and Mr. HELVEY. I understand that Government officials in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are broadly supportive of the concept 

of developing ranges on Pagan. 

Æ