August 2012 

NASA/TM−2012-217599

NESC-RP-12-00779

 

Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Shock Test and 

Specification Experience for Reusable Flight 

Hardware Equipment 

Curtis E. Larsen/NESC 

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
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August 2012 

NASA/TM−2012-217599

NESC-RP-12-00779

 

Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Shock Test and 

Specification Experience for Reusable Flight 

Hardware Equipment 

Curtis E. Larsen/NESC 

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
Available from: 

NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 

7115 Standard Drive 

Hanover, MD 21076-1320 

443-757-5802 

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Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Shock Test and Specification 

Experience for Reusable Flight Hardware Equipment

April 26, 2012
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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Report Approval and Revision History 

NOTE: This document was approved at the April 26, 2012, NRB. This document was 

submitted to the NESC Director on April 29, 2012, for configuration control. 

Approved: Original Signature on File 5/1/12 

NESC Director Date 

Version Description of Revision Office of Primary 

Responsibility 

Effective Date 

1.0 Initial Release Dr. Curtis E. Larsen, NASA 

Technical Fellow for Loads 

and Dynamics, JSC 

4/26/12 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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Table of Contents 

Technical Support Report 

1.0 Signature Page ....................................................................................................................4

2.0 Team List ............................................................................................................................5

 2.1 Acknowledgement .................................................................................................. 5

3.0 Executive Summary ...........................................................................................................6

4.0 SSP Experience Introduction ............................................................................................8

 4.1 STS Mission Profile ................................................................................................ 8

5.0 Environment Prediction and Test Criteria Derivation ..................................................9

 5.1 Component Refurbishment ..................................................................................... 9

6.0 Early Component Qualifications ......................................................................................9

7.0 Flight History ...................................................................................................................10

 7.1 Water Impact Damage .......................................................................................... 10

 7.2 Test Criteria Revision and Qualification .............................................................. 11

8.0 Rationale for Flight after STS-51L ................................................................................11

9.0 Flight History from STS-26 to End of Program ...........................................................12

10.0 Experience Summary and Conclusions .........................................................................13

11.0 Acronyms List ..................................................................................................................14

12.0 References .........................................................................................................................14

 

List of Figures

Figure 4.1-1. STS SRB Re-entry Sequence .................................................................................. 8

Figure 7.0-1. SRB System Components ..................................................................................... 10

Figure 9.0-1. Water Impact Shock Measurement at the ET Attach Ring Location Showing 

Cavity Collapse. Accelerometer was oriented in the Flight Direction. ............... 13
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1.0 Signature Page 

Submitted by: 

Team Signature Page on File – 5/2/2012 

Dr. Curtis E. Larsen Date 

Prepared by: 

Mr. Robin C. Ferebee Date 

Signatories declare the findings, observations, and NESC recommendations compiled in the 

report are factually based from data extracted from Program/Project documents, contractor 

reports, and open literature, and/or generated from independently conducted tests, analyses, and 

inspections. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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2.0 Team List 

2.1 Acknowledgement 

Mr. Robin Ferebee of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Shuttle Propulsion Chief 

Engineer's Office, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Resident Office, provided primary leadership 

for the completion of this task and authored this paper on the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) solid 

rocket booster (SRB) shock qualification experience. 

Name Discipline Organization/Location 

Core Team 

Curtis Larsen Loads and Dynamics JSC 

Saverio D’Agostino Materials JPL 

Robin Ferebee Loads and Dynamics MSFC/KSC Resident Office 

Vincent Fogt Loads and Dynamics JSC 

Tom Irvine Loads and Dynamics DCI, Huntsville 

Mo Kaouk Loads and Dynamics JSC 

Daniel Kaufman Loads and Dynamics GSFC 

Rhonda Smith Deputy Manager, MTSO LaRC 

Administrative Support 

Christina Williams Technical Writer LaRC/ATK 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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3.0 Executive Summary 

As commercial companies are nearing a preliminary design review level of design maturity, 

several companies are identifying the process for qualifying their multi-use electrical and 

mechanical components for various shock environments, including pyrotechnic, mortar firing, 

and water impact. The experience in quantifying the environments consists primarily of 

recommendations from Military Standard (MIL-STD)-1540, Product Verification Requirement 

for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space Vehicles. Therefore, the NASA Engineering and Safety 

Center (NESC) formed a team of NASA shock experts to share the NASA experience with 

qualifying hardware for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and other applicable programs and 

projects. Several team teleconferences were held to discuss past experience and to share ideas of 

possible methods for qualifying components for multiple missions. 

At one of the teleconferences, Mr. Robin Ferebee discussed how the Marshall Space Flight 

Center (MSFC) calculated shock criteria based on enveloping available data rather than 

calculating probability levels, and the analysts’ latitude in selecting the level of conservatism that 

was used. Mr. Saverio D’Agostino explained that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory methodology is 

to generally use a 6-decibel (dB) margin to calculate their criteria. He described results from soil 

impact tests which, in some cases, led to extremely high shock levels. 

Mr. Ferebee described several SSP solid rocket booster (SRB) rate gyro pivot failures from 

either pyrotechnic or water impact shock, although NASA was never able to determine the cause. 

Mr. Ferebee also described the Space Transportation System (STS)-4 failure when both SRBs 

were lost when the parachutes released prematurely due to a g-switch that falsely sensed water 

impact during the frustum deployment. The only other failure was a structural failure of an 

electronic box due to the water force from cavity collapse on the SRB motor case. No other 

reported failures were identified by the team. However, Mr. Tom Irvine of Dynamic Concepts 

Inc., identified a reference paper by Moening1

 on industry pyrotechnic shock failures. 

Test methodology was also discussed during the teleconferences. Although the anvil test method 

can be used for convenience, achieving the required levels in the 100-Hz region can be difficult. 

Instead, the NESC team recommends shaker testing. Difficulties in achieving shaped spectra 

when using a pyrotechnic plate were also discussed. The SRB Project maintained the same 

spectrum shape even when calculations showed that it should have lower frequency content, 

knowing that in actual testing the hardware would likely be exposed to levels that would 

encompass the calculated levels. 

Mr. Irvine described the idea of exposing test hardware to one shock at the qualification level of 

6 dB above the maximum expected, and then the remaining shocks at the maximum expected. 

However, the NESC team had discussed this possibility of accelerated testing for shock and 

 

1

Moening, C.J., "Pyrotechnic Shock Flight Failures,” IES Pyrotechnic Shock Tutorial Program, 31st ATM, 

Institute of Environmental Sciences, April-May 1985. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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collectively recommended against it because there are no known material fatigue curves that 

would apply. 

The importance of post-flight inspection and hardware recertification before re-flight was 

emphasized. Recertification includes hardware inspection followed by environmental 

acceptance and functional tests at the component and system levels. The SRB Project performs 

this activity on electrical and thrust vector control hardware through exposure to a system level 

hotfire to exercise the system. 

In summary, the NESC recommends shock qualification for the expected number of reuses, and 

hardware recertification prior to each flight, including environmental acceptance tests and 

functional tests at the component and system level. 
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4.0 SSP Experience Introduction 

The SSP had many unique characteristics that were previously unexplored in other programs, 

one of which was reusability. The majority of the SSP stack, with the exception of the external 

tank (ET), was designed for reusability. The SRB structural elements were designed for 

40 missions, and the electrical and mechanical components were designed for 20 missions. 

Predictions of the environments that the components would experience were based on previous 

vehicle history and sub-scale testing. The electrical and mechanical components were qualified 

for the appropriate predicted environments. 

4.1 STS Mission Profile 

Two SRBs provide about 83 percent of the thrust at liftoff and during the first stage ascent. They 

are jettisoned approximately 2 minutes after launch at a height of about 150,000 feet, and then 

parachutes are deployed and land in the ocean to be recovered. Figure 4.1-1 illustrates the 

complex re-entry and landing sequence. The major shock events during SRB flight are 

holddown bolt release, booster separation, frustum separation, parachute deployment, nozzle 

extension separation, and water impact. Water impact occurs at about 75 feet per second, 

although past impacts have been estimated as high as 110 feet per second due to parachute 

failures. The boosters are then towed back to Cape Canaveral Air Force Station to begin the 

refurbishment process. 

Figure 4.1-1. STS SRB Re-entry Sequence 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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5.0 Environment Prediction and Test Criteria Derivation 

Sub-scale testing using 6- and 12-inch diameter models was conducted to determine loading and 

acceleration of the SRB structure during water impact [ref. 1]. While the 12-inch model was 

constructed to simulate the dynamic effects of the structure, no effort was made to simulate the 

equipment mounting structure (e.g., ring frames and equipment panels). Consequently, the rigid 

body and low frequency dynamic effects were included in the initial environments, but not the 

response of the secondary structures. 

Pyrotechnic shock environments were calculated using the shock database produced by the 

Goddard Space Flight Center and the Martin-Marietta Corporation [ref. 2]. Hundreds of 

measurements on various launch vehicles were compiled into this database and crude scaling 

techniques were used to account for shock dissipation through the structures and for attenuation 

through joints. 

Qualification criteria were based on maximum expected environments with no added margin, 

based on a 97.5 percent probability level. There was no benefit to adding margin above 

maximum expected because the predicted levels appeared sufficiently conservative based on the 

available database and associated assumptions. Since there was a relatively limited amount of 

shock data, all of the applicable data was enveloped rather than using a probability level. One 

shock per mission was specified, depending on the test method. For testing performed on a 

shaker table, one shock per axis per mission was required. For pyrotechnic plates, one shock per 

mission was required and at least one axis must have met the test criteria. It was felt that the 

plate testing more accurately reproduced the flight service shock in each axis so it was not 

necessary to rotate the component and expose it to more events. 

5.1 Component Refurbishment 

A key aspect of the qualification philosophy of reusable hardware is that the SRB Project 

had the ability to examine, refurbish, and retest key components before they returned to 

service. It was hoped that as the flight rate increased in the early 1980s, the engineers 

would gain sufficient confidence from multiple flight exposures so they would be able to 

“wash, dry, and fly” the reusable hardware, thereby greatly reducing the time and cost 

associated with booster refurbishment and assembly. The STS-51L and STS-107 

accidents eliminated that possibility. The result was that each critical component was 

examined after flight. In some cases, components were sent back to the manufacturer to 

be disassembled, rebuilt, and exposed to a series of environmental acceptance and 

checkout tests before being reflown.

6.0 Early Component Qualifications 

In the mid-1970s, the SRB Project decided that, with the predicted flight rate and the 

available budget for hardware procurement, each reusable component should be qualified 

for a 20-mission lifetime. To get the initial set of hardware ready to fly, qualification was 

performed in stages: 1, 7, and then 12 missions. The two major shock events that 
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required qualification testing were water impact and pyrotechnic shock. The original 

water impact shock was predicted to be a half-sine pulse of about 22 g peak amplitude 

and 150-millisecond duration. Testing on a shaker was impractical because of the high 

displacement so a special hydraulic fixture was developed [ref. 3]. Typical shock 

methods using a steel plate with a linear-shaped charge on the back were used for 

pyrotechnic shock testing.

7.0 Flight History 

Several high frequency flight measurements were made on the first STS flights in the 

early 1980s, but SSP emphasis was placed on random vibration and acoustic 

measurements. These were ranged to capture accelerations in the 20-60 gravity rootmean-squared range and were usually saturated by the high amplitude shock events. 

Most of the instrumentation was located next to component installations in the forward 

and aft skirts (see Figure 7.0-1). 

Figure 7.0-1. SRB System Components 

7.1 Water Impact Damage 

Instrumentation to capture shock events was added to STS-5 and STS-6 to measure the 

input to the forward integrated electronics assembly (IEA), located on a ring-frame in the 

forward skirt. As flight experience began to accumulate, several of the rate gyros located 

near the forward IEA experienced damage to the pivots that held the gyros in place. It 

appeared the pivot damage correlated with unusual water impact conditions, such as 

parachute failures or extreme sea conditions. A review of the vibration instrumentation 
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showed that the accelerometers were clipped at water impact, which should not have 

happened if the acceleration levels were 22 g peak as predicted. More instrumentation 

was added to flights STS-41D, STS-51A, and STS-51F at the rate gyro location to 

investigate the pivot damage, which showed that the previous water impact criteria at that 

location were not adequate. 

These added measurements showed that on the rigid steel motor case the original criteria 

were accurate. However, at the equipment locations, the local structure was responding 

in a more energetic manner. A third set of instrumentation was added at all component 

locations on STS-26, STS-27, and STS-29, which showed that similar differences in test 

criteria versus flight measurements were common to all locations on the secondary 

structures. 

7.2 Test Criteria Revision and Qualification 

Water impact criteria for all areas of the SRB and solid rocket motor were revised based on the 

measurements made subsequent to the early development flight instrumentation flights. Shock 

response spectra (SRS) were chosen as the best method to document the test criteria because of 

the relatively complex time history compared to the earlier half-sine time histories. Testing was 

initiated on the rate gyros to determine if water impact or pyrotechnic shocks were responsible 

for the pivot breakage. Early attempts to achieve the SRS levels on a shaker were unsuccessful, 

so a fast sine sweep was initiated in an attempt to achieve the same damage potential as the SRS. 

The rate gyros were tested to these criteria and the pyrotechnic shock due to frustum separation 

with no failures. The rate gyros were redesigned in the late 1980s using a different type of 

damping fluid and these gyros subsequently have not experienced pivot breakage. 

SRB pyrotechnic shock criteria, in the form of shock response spectra with Q=10, range from 

1,875 g peak (4-10 KHz) to 300,000 g peak. Components with pyrotechnic shock criteria less 

than 1,000 g peak were not tested to those criteria based on the 50-inch per second standard that 

is well documented. Water impact criteria, based on SRS, are generally 250 g peak from 

70-5,000 Hz, rolling down to about 70 Gp at 20 Hz, but vary based on location [ref. 4]. The 

300,000 g peak criteria are for the nozzle actuator from nozzle extension severance during SRB 

re-entry. A vendor that could generate those levels could not be contracted so at least one 

mission certification was demonstrated by severing the nozzle extension after a static motor 

firing. The actuators were returned to the vendor after every flight for refurbishment and retest. 

8.0 Rationale for Flight after STS-51L 

As the water impact criteria were being revised based on the flight measurements, the SRB 

Project began to evaluate the impact to the component qualification and flightworthiness. 

Attempts were made to test the range safety battery and the IEA components, which experienced 

structural failures during testing. The batteries have a plastic composite case with mounting feet, 

which sheared during the attempted test and the IEA, which weighs over 200 pounds, and 

cracked its mounting lugs during the testing. Neither had experienced such failures during flight. 
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The SSP and the SRB Project decided that qualification for existing SRB hardware could be 

done by analysis using the following rationale: 

Existing SRB hardware withstood actual water impacts without damage. 

- Water impact shock is an overstress environment rather than fatigue, so if 

hardware survives initial impact it will likely survive at least 19 more cycles. 

- There have been no failures attributed to normal (i.e., 75 feet per second) 

water landing. 

SRB components have been exposed to water impacts approximately 46 percent 

higher than normal due to parachute failures. 

- Only component damage was due to cavity collapse water geyser effects on 

aft IEA. 

All components exposed to random vibration and pyrotechnic shock were qualified 

for those environments and demonstrated adequate design margins during the 

qualification test program. 

- Pyrotechnic shock is more severe in high frequencies where most shock 

failures occur. 

All critical components are subjected to post flight assessment where potential water 

impact damage will be discovered. 

- Acceptance testing consists of random vibration and thermal tests. 

The last point was particularly important because most components had completed their 

function before water impact occurred so failures after that could be corrected before the 

next use. 

9.0 Flight History from STS-26 to End of Program 

Shock measurements made on STS-26, STS-27, and STS-29 verified the preliminary criteria 

based on the earlier measurements. No hardware failures have been attributed to shock or 

random vibration, even though there have been flights (i.e., parachute failure) where the test 

criteria were exceeded. The qualification test methods that are used have enough inherent 

conservatism in them to be sufficient to qualify the designs, rendering arbitrary test margins 

unnecessary. 

The aft IEA, which is attached to the aft ET attach ring with a fiberglass enclosure, is 

occasionally damaged due to the water geyser effect. When the SRBs hit the water they displace 

the water, which rushes back in and runs up the side of the case on the lee side. If the box is on 

the side where the cavity collapses, it can be knocked off its mounting by the force of the water. 

Figure 9.0-1 is a measurement at that location showing the initial impact and the cavity collapse 

event about a second later. Rubber snubbers were added between the IEA and the fiberglass 

enclosure to mitigate this effect. 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

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Figure 9.0-1. Water Impact Shock Measurement at the ET Attach Ring Location Showing Cavity 

Collapse. Accelerometer was oriented in the Flight Direction. 

Hardware designed and qualified after STS-51L return to flight was successfully tested for water 

impact for up to 20 missions using the new shock criteria. The units were tested on vibration 

shakers using the SRS software. The first attempts often under tested in the 70-100 Hz region 

where displacements were high and in the 2-5 KHz region. The MSFC purchased larger shakers 

and subsequent attempts have been more successful. Comparisons of the time histories produced 

by the shakers and flight measurements do not show much similarity so some effort will be 

expended in the future to try to match the time histories [ref. 5]. 

10.0 Experience Summary and Conclusions 

The SRB Project has successfully flown and reused hardware up to 17 missions after qualifying 

the hardware to shock criteria based on maximum expected flight environments. Refurbishment 

and acceptance testing on the recovered hardware before reuse was a key element in the 

acceptance of the qualification philosophy. After flight measurements showed that the time 

histories were exceeded, early water impact qualification test criteria, based on half-sine time 

histories, were replaced with shock response spectra. Early attempts to qualify hardware to the 

new criteria were not successful until sufficient experience was gained in generating the SRS and 

new shaker hardware was purchased. Testing large components to these water impact criteria 

will present a challenge and more work must be done to demonstrate this capability. 
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11.0 Acronyms List 

ATK Alliant Techsystems Inc. 

dB Decibel 

DCI Dynamic Concepts Incorporated 

ET External Tank 

g Gravity 

GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 

IEA Integrated Electronics Assembly 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

JSC Johnson Space Flight Center 

KSC Kennedy Space Center 

LaRC Langley Research Center 

MIL-STD Military Standard 

MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 

MTSO Management and Technical Support Office 

NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 

SRB Solid Rocket Booster 

SRS Shock Response Spectra 

SSP Space Shuttle Program 

STS Space Transportation System 

12.0 References 

1. Madden, R., Wright, H. A., and Kross, D. A. “Scaling of Water Impact Data for Space 

Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster,” The Shock and Vibration Bulletin, Vol. 46, 

September 1976. 

2. Kacena, W., McGrath, M. B., Rader, W. P. “Aerospace Systems Pyrotechnic Shock Data 

(Ground Test and Flight),” Final Report Contract No. NAS5-15208, March 1970. 

3. Seco-Dyn Inc., “Water Impact Shock Test System,” Final Report Contract 

No. NAS8-31945, November 1977. 

4. Anonymous. “SRB Vibration, Acoustic and Shock Design & Test Criteria,” NASA MSFC 

Document SE-019-049-2H. 

5. Ferebee, R., Clayton, J., Alldredge, D., and Irvine, T. “An Alternative Method of 

Specifying Shock Test Criteria,” NASA/TM-2008-215253, April 2008.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

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Technical Memorandum

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Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Shock Test and Specification Experience for 

Reusable Flight Hardware Equipment 

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

 6. AUTHOR(S)

Larsen, Curtis E.

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NASA Langley Research Center

Hampton, VA 23681-2199

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14. ABSTRACT

As commercial companies are nearing a preliminary design review level of design maturity, several companies are identifying 

the process for qualifying their multi-use electrical and mechanical components for various shock environments, including 

pyrotechnic, mortar firing, and water impact. The experience in quantifying the environments consists primarily of 

recommendations from Military Standard-1540, Product Verification Requirement for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space 

Vehicles. Therefore, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) formed a team of NASA shock experts to share the 

NASA experience with qualifying hardware for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and other applicable programs and projects. 

Several team teleconferences were held to discuss past experience and to share ideas of possible methods for qualifying 

components for multiple missions. This document contains the information compiled from the discussions.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

NASA Engineering and Safety Center; Space Shuttle Program; Shock test; Reusable flight hardware

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gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 

collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 

Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 

shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

01- 08 - 2012