Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT, PRO SE

Maher Abuelreish

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

James J. Ammeen Jr.

Mark J. Liechty

Ammeen Valenzuela 

 Associates LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Maher Abuelreish,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Hind M. Abuelreish,

Appellee-Petitioner

November 5, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-DC-2899

Appeal from the 

Hamilton Superior Court

The Honorable 

Jonathan M. Brown, Judge

The Honorable 

Jack A. Tandy, Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D02-1702-DC-1097

Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 2 of 14

Case Summary 

[1] Following the divorce of Maher Abuelreish (“Husband”) and Hind M. 

Abuelreish (“Wife”), each party filed petitions alleging that the other party was 

in contempt of their settlement agreement. The trial court largely found for 

Wife, and Husband now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s order that 

Husband must pay $15,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees but affirm in all other 

respects.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2017, Wife filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Husband.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, which the trial court 

incorporated into its August 23, 2017 decree of dissolution. Relevant here, the 

settlement agreement addresses several pieces of real estate and the parties’ 

business: 

Marital Residence. The parties own a parcel of real estate

located at 11711 Rolling Spring[s] Drive, Carmel, Indiana 46033 

(“Marital Residence”). Husband and Wife agree to list the 

Marital Residence for sale within thirty (30) days of the date of

entry of the Decree of Dissolution and agree to divide the net 

proceeds from the sale equally between them. Husband and Wife 

acknowledge there is a mortgage on the Marital Residence in 

favor of GSF Mortgage Corporation and Husband shall make the 

mortgage payments on the Marital Residence until it is sold and 

the mortgage balance shall be satisfied at the closing on the sale 

of the Marital Residence. Husband shall pay all expenses and 

obligations of the Marital Residence, including but not limited to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 3 of 14

the remaining mortgage, home equity line of credit, insurance, 

taxes, and Utilities as of the Effective Date of this Agreement.

Fishers Residence. Wife shall retain ownership of the real estate 

located at 8829 Moll Drive, Fishers, Indiana 46038. Wife shall be 

responsible for the mortgage indebtedness on the Fishers 

Residence to Nationstar Mortgage.

Oak Lawn Properties. Husband owns two (2) properties in Oak

Lawn, Illinois, commonly known as 9739 Oak Park Avenue, 

Oak Lawn, Illinois 60453 and 9650 Merton Avenue, Oak Lawn, 

Illinois 60453. 

Husband agrees to list the 9650 Merton Avenue property for sale 

within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the Decree of 

Dissolution, with the proceeds from the sale going first to satisfy 

the mortgage indebtedness to Nationstar Mortgage and the 

remaining net proceeds to be divided equally between Husband 

and Wife. Husband and Wife are to be responsible for mortgage 

payments to Nationstar Mortgage and expenses of maintaining 

the property pending the sale. 

Husband shall retain ownership of the 9739 Oak Park Avenue 

[property] and shall be solely responsible for the mortgage 

indebtedness thereon to Bank of America. 

Abby’s Market, Indianapolis. Husband and Wife agree to share 

equally in the net profits of their operation of Abby’s Market, 

located at the City Market on East Market Street, Indianapolis, 

Indiana. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 22-24 (formatting altered). In addition, the 

settlement agreement addresses attorney’s fees in the event of a “default”:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 4 of 14

If either Husband or Wife defaults in the performance of any of

the terms, provisions or obligations herein set forth, and it 

becomes necessary to institute legal proceedings to effectuate the 

performance of any provisions of this Agreement, then the party 

found to be in default shall pay all expenses, including reasonable

attorney’s fees, incurred in connection with such enforcement 

proceedings.

Id. at 28-29.

[3] On December 5, 2018, Husband, representing himself, filed a petition alleging

that Wife was in contempt for “refus[ing] to cooperate in listing the [Marital 

Residence]” and asked the court for permission to list it. Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II p. 32. The next day, Husband filed a Petition to Modify Respondent’s 

Obligation to Pay the Mortgage and Expenses of the Marital Residence. He 

asked the court to order Wife to pay the mortgage on the Marital Residence 

(although the settlement agreement required him to pay it) since Wife was 

living in the house and not trying to sell it. Wife then filed a petition alleging 

that Husband was in contempt for selling Abby’s Market without her 

permission or giving her any of the proceeds and for not selling the Merton 

Avenue property in Illinois. The trial court set a hearing for January 3, 2019. 

Wife requested a continuance, and the court reset the hearing for March 21. In 

response to the resetting, Husband requested an emergency hearing. 

Specifically, Husband alleged that Wife “had the police remove [him] from” the 

Marital Residence and “moved into that home to the exclusion of [him],”

leaving him “homeless.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 24-25. The court set a 

hearing on Husband’s emergency motion for January 31.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 5 of 14

[4] Following this hearing, the trial court entered an order noting that the 

settlement agreement was “silent” as to who was to live in the Marital 

Residence until it was sold. Id. at 18. Finding that neither party had made a 

“meaningful effort to cooperate on the sale of the home,” the court ordered the 

Marital Residence to “be placed for sale” “no later than March 22, 2019.” Id. at

18-19. In addition, the court ordered the parties to “select a Realtor, sign the 

appropriate listing agreement, decide upon a listing price and work together to 

get the home sold.” Id. at 19. The court cautioned the parties:

9. If the home is not on the market (listing agreement signed) by 

midnight on March 22, 2019, the Court will appoint a 

Commissioner to sell the home. If a listing contract is signed after 

midnight on March 22, 2019, it shall be held for naught as the 

parties no longer have the authority to sell the home. 

* * * * *

11. If the commissioner finds that Mother’s presence in the home 

is hindering the sale in any manner, he/she may petition [the] 

Court to remove Mother from the home forthwith.

Id. at 19-20.

[5] On March 18, Mother filed a notice of compliance, alleging that she had listed

the Marital Residence with a realtor for $575,000. Husband filed a response, 

alleging that Wife did not consult him about a realtor or the listing price. The 

trial court set a status hearing for March 27. Following the hearing, the court 

ordered:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 6 of 14

The Court has reset the hearing on all pending matters [to] 

September 5, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. Further, the Court has directed 

[Wife] to sell the [Marital Residence] and she may choose the 

realtor for the sale of this property. Further, [Husband] shall sell 

the property located at 9650 Merton Avenue, Oak Lawn, IL and 

he may choose a realtor for this sale. Both parties shall provide 

each other with copies of the respective listing agreements and 

notify each other with regards to closing dates/times. All closing 

documents shall be available to both parties.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11.

[6] At the September 5 hearing, the trial court asked Father, who was still 

representing himself, if he wanted to present his case first, as he filed his

contempt petition first. Tr. p. 5. When Father had difficulty with the motions he 

wanted to address, the court asked Father to “cut to the chase.” Id. at 8. The 

court told Father it had reviewed the motions and that it appeared the issues 

concerned the parties’ real estate and business. Husband agreed those were the 

issues, and the court directed him to “focus on those things.” Id. When 

Husband continued to struggle, the court said:

Okay. Okay. Here’s what I'm going to do. We’re going to shift 

gears here a little bit. So, just so -- And, Mr. Abuelreish, you’re 

not represented by an attorney, which is fine. That’s your ——

that’s your decision, your business. But so I can kind of make 

heads or tails of what’s going on here, I’m going to have [Wife]

go forward with their contempt action first, even though it was 

filed second in time, and I think that will help me kind of 

understand the issues. And then I’ll be glad to give you full 

opportunity to make your case after they’re done. Okay?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 7 of 14

Id. at 11-12. When Husband asked if he could finish talking about Abby’s 

Market, the court said:

Do you understand what I’m going to do? I’m going to let them 

go forward with . . . their evidence on their contempt motion, 

and then I’ll come back to you and you can present your 

evidence on yours. Okay? All right. Mr. [Abuelreish]? 

Id. at 12. Husband responded, “Thank you, Your Honor.” Id.

[7] After Wife presented her evidence, her attorney argued that “both parties are in 

contempt of the Court's August 23, 2017, order.” Id. at 48. When Husband

finished presenting his evidence, the court told the parties what it was thinking 

about ordering. Specifically, the court suggested that the parties reduce the price

of the Marital Residence to get it sold, pay off that mortgage, and put the net 

proceeds in Wife’s attorney’s trust account. Then, the court suggested that the 

parties sell the Merton Avenue property in Illinois and use the proceeds from 

the sale of the Marital Residence to make up any deficit. Finally, the court 

suggested that Wife would receive $10,000 from the remaining Marital 

Residence proceeds for the sale of Abby's Market and that the parties would 

split whatever was left. When the court asked the parties if its suggestion was 

acceptable, Wife’s attorney responded that his attorney’s fees needed to be 

addressed. Id. at 58. Wife’s attorney said Wife’s fees “are about $27,000 right 

now, net of what she’s paid,” and asked Husband to pay half. Id. at 59.

Although Wife’s attorney said he had copies of his bills, he never introduced 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 8 of 14

them into evidence. Husband disagreed with having to pay any of Mother’s 

attorney’s fees but agreed with everything else.

[8] Following the hearing, the trial court issued the following order:

1. Both Parties have failed to perform obligations required of 

them under the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and Mediated 

Property Settlement Agreement dated August 23, 2017. In 

particular, the defaults include:

a. The former marital residence, located at 11711 Rolling 

Springs Drive, Carmel, IN 46033, which is titled in the 

name of [Wife], has not been sold;

b. The rental property located at 9650 S. Merton Avenue, 

Oak Lawn, IL 60453, which is titled in [Husband’s] name, 

has not been sold;

c. The business, Abby’s Market, which was to provide, 

and which has provided income to both parties was sold 

by [Husband] for $20[,]000.00, without consent of or 

accounting to [Wife]; and

d. [Husband] has not paid any part of the $20,000.00 

proceeds of the Abby’s Market sale to [Wife].

2. [Wife], by her attorney, James Ammeen, shall sell the [Marital 

Residence]. The proceeds from this sale will be held in escrow in 

the trust account of [Wife’s] counsel, James Ammeen. Mr. 

Ammeen is hereby empowered to engage the services of a real 

estate broker of his choosing and to pay expenses reasonably 

necessary to market the asset for its highest and best use.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 9 of 14

3. [Husband] shall sell the property located at 9650 S. Merton 

Avenue, Oak Lawn, IL 60453. [Husband] is hereby empowered 

to engage the services of a real estate broker of his choosing and 

to pay expenses reasonably necessary to market the asset for its 

highest and best use. The proceeds from this sale will be held in 

escrow in the trust account of [Wife’s] counsel, James Ammeen. 

If there is a deficiency with regard to a mortgage balance in 

connection with the sale of the property, the deficiency balance 

will be paid from the escrowed funds.

4. The Court received evidence that a reasonable attorney’s fee in 

this matter would be between $15,000.00 and $30,000.00 and 

that [Wife] has incurred approximately $30,000.00 in attorney’s 

fees. In equity, the court concludes that [Wife] should recover 

half of her attorney’s fees. From the escrowed funds, $15,000.00 

will be first distributed to [Wife’s] counsel for partial payment of 

[Wife’s] attorney’s fees. 

* * * * *

6. Once the accounting has been accepted, after notice and an 

opportunity for the parties to be heard, $10,000.00 shall be 

deducted from [Husband’s] share and distributed to [Wife] as her 

half of the proceeds from the sale of Abby’s Market.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 15-17. On November 4, Husband filed a combined 

Motion to Correct Error and Verified Motion for Contempt Regarding 

Delisting of the Marital Property, which the trial court denied on December 2.1

1 Husband contends that the trial court erred in denying the contempt portion of his motion (which alleged 

that Wife was in contempt for “delisting” the Marital Residence) because it did not hold a hearing. In support 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 10 of 14

[9] Husband now appeals.2 On August 14, 2020, while this appeal was still in the 

briefing process, Mother filed a notice in the trial court that the Marital 

Residence sold on August 10 for $290,000 and that the proceeds were being 

held in her attorney’s trust account.

Discussion and Decision

I. Order of Presentation

[10] Husband first contends that the trial court erred by allowing Wife to present her 

case first at the September 2019 hearing. Indiana Trial Rule 43(D) provides that 

trial courts have discretion in determining the order of the proceedings:

The trial shall proceed in the following order, unless the court 

within its discretion, otherwise directs: First, the party upon 

whom rests the burden of the issues may briefly state his case and 

the evidence by which he expects to sustain it. Second, the 

adverse party may then briefly state his defense and the evidence 

he expects to offer in support of it. Third, the party on whom 

rests the burden of the issues must first produce his evidence 

of his argument that a hearing was required, Husband cites Indiana Code section 35-47-3-5, which provides 

that a person charged with contempt must be served with a rule to show cause, which must specify the time 

and place at which the defendant is required to show cause. The “rule to show cause” provision of Section 

35-47-3-5 “fulfills the due process requirement that a [contemnor] be provided with adequate notice and an 

opportunity to be heard.” Akiwumi v. Akiwumi, 23 N.E.3d 734, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). 

This is protection for the person charged with contempt, not for the person filing the contempt. In any event, 

as explained below, the Marital Residence has since sold.

2 Husband filed his notice of appeal on December 11. On December 23, he filed a motion for change of judge 

in the trial court. The trial court denied that motion on January 8, noting that Husband’s “appeal is currently 

pending under cause 19A-DC-02899 at the Indiana Court of Appeals.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19.

Husband asks us to review the trial court’s order, but he did not file a notice of appeal with respect to that 

order. As such, it is not properly before us.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 11 of 14

thereon; the adverse party will then produce his evidence which 

may then be rebutted.

(Emphasis added). Similarly, Indiana Evidence Rule 611(a) provides that trial 

courts should exercise reasonable control over the order of the proceedings:

The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and 

order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:

(1) make those procedures effective for determining the 

truth;

(2) avoid wasting time; and

(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 

embarrassment.

See also Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036, 1042 (Ind. 1995) (stating that trial 

courts are provided wide latitude to control the flow of the trial proceedings, 

including the discretion to determine the order of proof and the presentation of 

evidence), reh’g denied. 

[11] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Wife to present her case 

first. Husband, who was representing himself, and Wife, who was represented 

by counsel, each filed a contempt petition, with Husband filing his first. At the 

hearing, the court initially allowed Husband to present his case first. However, 

when Husband had difficulty doing so, the court had Wife present her case. The 

court tried the customary order of presentation, assessed that it was confusing 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 12 of 14

and inefficient, and then exercised its discretion by allowing Wife to present her 

case. This is exactly the process envisioned by the above rules.

II. Receiver 

[12] Husband next contends that the trial court erred in appointing Mother’s 

attorney as a “receiver” over the Marital Residence. Appellant’s Br. p. 19. In 

support of his argument, Husband relies on Indiana Code section 32-30-5-2, 

which provides that a court may not appoint an attorney representing a party as 

a receiver. But the court did not appoint a receiver. Instead, it ordered that 

“[Wife], by her attorney, James Ammeen, shall sell the [Marital Residence].” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 16. Accordingly, there is no violation of Section 32-

30-5-2.

3

III. Ruling on Motion to Modify Agreement 

[13] Husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to rule on his December 

6, 2018 Petition to Modify Respondent’s Obligation to Pay the Mortgage and 

Expenses of the Marital Residence, which asked the court to order Wife to pay 

the mortgage on the Marital Residence even though the settlement agreement 

required him to pay it. Wife responds there is no error on this issue because 

Husband withdrew this petition on May 13, 2020. See Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 

75. Although Husband filed a motion to withdraw, it was a motion to withdraw 

3 Husband also argues that he doesn’t “trust” Wife’s attorney to sell the Marital Residence. Appellant’s Br. p. 

19. However, as noted above, the Marital Residence sold on August 10, 2020.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 13 of 14

his Motion to Modify the Dissolution Decree on the Basis of Fraud and 

Grounds Set Forth in Trial Rule 60(B) filed on December 23, 2019, not his

December 6, 2018 petition.

[14] Even assuming the trial court did not formally rule on Husband’s December 6, 

2018 petition, he is not entitled to any relief on this issue. Husband argued at 

the September 2019 hearing that Wife should have to pay the mortgage on the 

Marital Residence, but the court said Husband had to pay it until the house 

sold. Tr. p. 64. The court was correct. A property-settlement agreement “may 

only be modified according to the terms of the agreement, if the parties[]

consent, or if fraud or duress occurs.” Snow v. England, 862 N.E.2d 664, 668 

(Ind. 2007) (citing Ind. Code §§ 31-15-2-17(c), 31-15-7-9.1). Here, the settlement 

agreement provides that the parties must agree to any modification, and the 

parties did not agree to one. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 26. In addition, 

Husband did not allege fraud or duress in his December 6, 2018 petition.

Accordingly, Husband—not Wife—was responsible for paying the mortgage on 

the Marital Residence until it sold (which it did on August 10, 2020).

IV. Attorney’s Fees

[15] Finally, Husband contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay 

$15,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees. As set forth above, the decree addresses

attorney’s fees in the event of a “default”:

If either Husband or Wife defaults in the performance of any of

the terms, provisions or obligations herein set forth, and it 

becomes necessary to institute legal proceedings to effectuate the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2899 | November 5, 2020 Page 14 of 14

performance of any provisions of this Agreement, then the party 

found to be in default shall pay all expenses, including reasonable

attorney’s fees, incurred in connection with such enforcement 

proceedings.

Id. at 28-29. The court found that both parties were in default and ordered 

Husband, who was representing himself, to pay half of Wife’s attorney’s fees. 

Husband challenges this award on multiple grounds, one of which we agree 

with. Husband argues that Wife’s attorney presented no evidence to support 

Wife’s attorney’s fees. Although Wife’s attorney said he had copies of his bills, 

he never introduced them into evidence. In addition, Wife’s attorney didn’t

testify about his hourly fee or how many hours he spent “in connection with”

Husband’s default (as opposed to Wife’s default). Although he said Wife’s 

attorney’s fees were “about $27,000 right now, net of what she’s paid,” he never 

explained whether those fees were for post-dissolution matters or included any 

pre-dissolution matters.

4 We therefore reverse the trial court’s attorney’s fee 

award and remand this case for the court to determine a reasonable attorney’s 

fee.

[16] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

4 Wife claims that Husband agreed that $30,000 was a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees. At the hearing, 

Husband said he “saw three, four lawyers, and each one of them, he said, is going to be between 15- to 

30,000, and I don’t have that money.” Tr. p. 62. Husband, however, did not say what this amount included.