PUBLISH
UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

______________________ _________________ I DIG TEXAS, LLC, Plai ntiff Counterclaim Defendant - Appellee,

v. KERRY CREAGER, Defe ndant - Appellant, CREAGER SERVICES, LLC, Defend ant Counterclaimant Third-Party Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. THOMAS MAREK; MARY MAREK, Third- Party Defendants - Appellees.

DIGITAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, Amicus Curiae. No. 23-5046

______________________ ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. No. 4:22- CV-00097-CVE-JFJ)

______________________ ____________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 12, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 12 Evan W. Talley (Douglas J. Sorocco, Jim V. John, and Jacob Oliphant with him on the briefs), Dunlap Codding, P.C., Oklahoma Ci ty, Oklahoma, for Appellants. Zachary A.P. Oubre (Ronal d T. Shinn Jr. with him on the briefs), McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, Ok lahoma, for Appellees. Andrew Grimm, Digital Justice Foundat ion, Omaha, Nebraska, for Amicus Curiae.

______________________ ____________________ Before BACHARACH , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

______________________ _____________________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

______________________ _____________________ This appeal involves advertisements pitting competitors against each other. In the pertinent advertisements, one seller targeted consumers wanting to buy Amer ican-made products. To targ et these consumers, the seller used copyrighted photograph s of a competito r’s products to underscore their connection to China. These advertisements led to claims under the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. The Copyright Act allows monetary relief when the improper use of copyrighted images leads to damages or profits. See Part 3(c), below. The profits can be either direct or indirect. See Part 3(c), below. Here the claim involves indirect profits. To recover, the claimant needed to show a nexus between the improper use of copyrighted images and profits. See Part 3(c), below. The question here is whether th e claimant could make that showing without tying the copyrighted images to any of the infringer’s profits. We Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 23 answer no because the absence of a prov en nexus would require us to speculate about the possibility of any profits from use of the copyrighted images. The advertisements also led to cl aims under the La nham Act. These claims mainly involve the advertisements enco uraging consumers to buy products that are American -made. At issue is the truth or falsity of the characterization of products as American-made . Is a boast a bout Americanmade products literally fals e when the business assembles products in the United States but uses some fo reign components? We answer no because the boast itself is ambiguous.
1. I Dig Texas uses copyrighted photographs to advertise. This appeal involves compet ition between distributors of construction equipment called skid steer attachments

. 1 One company calls itself I Dig Texas and sells atta chments called Texas Post Drivers . A

1 The parties state that

 “[s]kid steers are construction equipment used for various purposes such as digging or hauling materials” and

 the parties sell attachments to th e skid steers, “such as auger attachments, brush cutter a ttachments, and post driver attachments.” Appellants’ App’x vol. II, at 230 n.1; see also id. at 404. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 34 competitor, Creager Services , sells attachments called Montana Post
Drivers

. I Dig Texas tried to a ppeal to consumers’ pr eference for Americanmade products. To do so, I Dig Texas used Creager’s photographs of Montana Post Drivers:

These products are ma de in China. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 45 I Dig Texas promot ed its products by disc ouraging consumers from buying products, like Crea ger’s, that had been made in China. So I Dig Texas advertised by combining Creage r’s photographs of its skid steer attachments with text imploring cons umers to buy product s that had been made in the United States rather than in China:

2. The district court grants summary judgment to I Dig Texas on Creager’s federal claims. In district court, Creager clai med that (1) the use of these photographs had constituted copyr ight infringemen t and (2) the accompanying text had misrepresented the origin of I Dig Texas’s products. For these claims , Creager argued that

 the use of its photographs had vi olated the Copy right Act and

 the misrepresentations had violated the Lanham Act. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 56 In addition, Creager assert ed state-law claims for deceptive trade practices, tortious interference, and unfair competition. I Dig Texas had also asserted its own state-law claims for deceptive trade practices, tortious interference with business relations, unfair competition, and de famation. The district court granted summary judgment to I Dig Texa s on Creager’s federal claims and remanded all of the stat e-law claims to state court.
3. Creager failed to pres ent evidence of any pr ofit from the use of its photographs. The elements of a claim for copyright infr ingement are

 the plaintiff’s ownership of a valid copyright and

 the defendant’s violation of an exclusive ownership right. Diversey v. Schmidly , 738 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). In district court, I Dig Texas sough t summary judgment on th is claim based on an affirmative defense (fair use) and a failure to establis h a nexus between profits and the use of Creager’s photographs.

a. We consider the possibility of affirming based on Creager’s failure to establish a nexus. The district court relied on I Dig Te xas’s affirmative defense of fair use and declined to addr ess the existence of a ne xus between the use of Creager’s photographs and the making of a profit. But we have discretion to consider affirming base d on the failure to prov e a nexus if this “ground [is] adequately support ed by the record.” Elkins v. Comfort , 392 F.3d 1159, Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 67 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). To de termine whether to exerci se this discretion, we consider whether

 the parties briefed th e issue here and in district court,

 the issue involves a question of law rather than fact, and

 the parties had an opportunity to de velop the record. Id. All these factors support consideration. The pa rties briefed the issue of a nexus both here and in district court. Because this issue arises on summary judgment, the cour t’s inquiry involves a question of law on the existence of a genuine di spute of material fact. Wise v. DeJoy , 71 F.4th 744, 752 (10th Cir. 2023). To answer that inquiry, we have a fully developed record because the parties had an oppo rtunity to present the district court with all of their materi al evidence bearin g on I Dig Texas’s profits from th e use of Creager’s photographs. Stewart v. City of Okla. City , 47 F.4th 1125, 1132 n.5 (10th Cir. 2022). We thus consider whether to affirm the award of summary judgment based on Creager’s failure to present evidence of a nexus between I Dig Texas’s profits and use of Creager’s photographs.
b. We consider the availability of summary judgment based on the standard ap plicable in district court. Though the district court decide d the availabili ty of summary judgment, the court didn’ t address the issue invo lving a nexus between Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 78 I Dig Texas’s profits and the use of Creager’s photographs. Without a ruling on the issue of a nexus, we must decide the issue in the first instance. Summary judgment would be approp riate upon a showing by I Dig Texas “that there is no ge nuine dispute as to any ma terial fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a ma tter of law.” Fed. R. Ci v. P. 56(a). To assess that showing, we must vi ew the evidence and all ju stifiable inferences in the light most favo rable to Creager. See Wise , 71 F.4th at 748.

c. The copyright claim requir ed a nexus between the infringement and indirect profits. For copyright infri ngement, the plaintiff can recover based either on its own damages or on th e infringer’s profits. Harris Mkt. Rsch. v. Marshall Mktg. & Commc’ns, Inc. , 948 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991). Creager seeks recovery based on I Dig Te xas’s profits rather than damages. The profits can be either direct or indirect

. E.g. , William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey , 568 F.3d 425, 442 (3d Cir. 2009); Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. , 336 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2003); Mackie v. Rieser , 296 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2002). The pr ofits would be considered direct , for example, when an infringer sells the copyrighte d work itself. Haughey , 568 F.3d at 442; Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc. , 834 F.3d 376, 394 n.16 (3d Cir. 2016). And the profits would be considered indirect , for example, when the infringer Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 89  enhances operations by infringing on a copyright, Haughey , 568 F.3d at 442, or

 adds sales because its advertis ements included copyrighted images, Andreas , 336 F.3d at 796; Mackie , 296 F.3d at 916. Creager relies on indirect profits . To prevail, Cr eager admittedly bore the initial burden to show a nexus be tween I Dig Texas’s infringement and making of a profit. Bonner v. Dawson , 404 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005); Andreas , 336 F.3d at 796; Mackie , 296 F.3d at 915; Univ. of Colo. Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co. , 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Appellants’ Reply Br. at 41–42 (Creager’s acknowledgment that it bore the burden to prove a nexus). That showing must go beyond speculation. See Mackie , 296 F.3d at 915–16.
d. Creager didn’t present eviden ce of a nexus between I Dig Texas’s profits and the infringement. In district court, I Dig Texas argued that Creager hadn’t shown a nexus between the profits and use of the photo graphs. In responding, Creager relied on I Dig Te xas’s use of tw o photographs in advertisements. But Creager didn’t present any eviden ce of profits from the use of these photographs. The photographs did depict Creager’s skid steer attachments. But there’s no evidence that I Dig Texa s sold any more products because the advertisements had included these photographs. Without that evidence, Creager failed to show a nexus. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 910 Creager argues that I Dig Texas had elsewhere failed to quantify its profits from the infringing photographs. But this argument conflates two separate inquiries. Creager admittedl y bore the burden to show a nexus between the use of the c opyrighted images and th e making of a profit. See Part 3(c), above. If Creager had satis fied that burden, the court could presume that all of I Dig Texas’s profits had come from the infringement without evidence that some of the profits had come from other sources. See Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. , 336 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The burden of esta blishing that profits are at tributable to the infringed work often gets confused with the bu rden of apportioni ng profits between various factors contributi ng to the profits.”). But this presumption doesn’t arise until the claimant (C reager) satisfies its thres hold burden to establish

a nexus. See id. The Ninth Circuit addre ssed a similar issue in Mackie v. Rieser , 296 F.3d 909 (9 th Cir. 2002). Ther e the claimant alle ged an infringing image on one page in a promotional booklet. 296 F.3d 909, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2002). In allegi ng indirect profit from that image, the plaintiff presented expert testimony that the infringer had expected a 1.5% profit from the booklet as a whole. Id. The Court of Appeals he ld that this expert testimony wouldn’t satisfy the plaintiff’s threshold burden of showing that Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1011 anyone bought from the infringer because its promotional booklet had included a single infringing image. Id. at 916. 2
The same is true here. Unlike the claimant in Mackie , Creager presented no evidence that I Dig Texas had made any money from the advertisements bearing the copyrighte d images; Creager showed only that I Dig Texas had included copyrighted images in its advertising. But Creager didn’t present evidence that anyone had bought something from I Dig Texas because of these adver tisements. And even if someone had bought something from I Di g Texas based on these ad vertisements, there’s no reason to believe that the tw o photographs woul d have made a difference to any consumers. Given Creager’s failure to show a connection between the photographs and I Di g Texas’s profits, we affirm the award of summary judgment based on the absence of a nexus.
4. I Dig Texas’s advertisements aren’t literally false. Creager also invoked the Lanham Act, claiming false advertising and false designation of origin . On these claims, Creage r needed to show that I Dig Texas had “made a false or misleading de scription of fact or

2 The court explained: “Even if such an aspirational yield percentage could be applied to determine how many people subscribed because of the brochure, such a rudimentary analysis cannot determine how many of those individuals subscribed because of Rieser’s work .” Mackie , 296 F.3d at 916 (emphasis in original). Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1112 representation of fact in a commercial advertisement.” Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc. , 71 F.4th 1222, 1233 (10t h Cir. 2023) (quoting Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Sycamore , 29 F.4th 630, 643 (10th Cir. 2022)).

a. We consider literal falsit y in the first instance. The district court concluded that Creager had failed to show a false or misleading fact in I Dig Texas’s ad vertisements. For th is conclusion, the district court reasoned that I Dig Te xas’s advertisements had explained the use of foreign components . Creager argues that th is explanation didn’t exist in the advertisements underlying the claims. But I Dig Texas urges affirmance on alternative grounds , arguing that the advertisements weren’ t literally false. Agai n, we may affirm on alternative grounds support ed by the record afte r considering whether

 the parties briefed th e issue here and in district court,

 the issue involves a question of law rather than fact, and

 the parties had an opportunity to de velop the record. Elkins v. Comfort , 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). All these factors support consideration of the alternative ground to affirm. Both parties briefe d literal falsity in distri ct court and on appeal. And when we review the grant of summary judgment, we conduct a legal inquiry on the ex istence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Wise v. DeJoy , 71 F.4th 744, 752 (10th Cir. 2023). For that i nquiry, our record is Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1213 fully developed because the parties had a chance to present whatever evidence they wished on the truth or falsity of I Dig Texas’s advertisements. See Stewart v. City of Okla. City , 47 F.4th 1125, 1132 n.5 (10th Cir. 2022). Because our inquiry differs from that of the district court, we decide in the first instance wh ether I Dig Texas was en titled to summary judgment on the issue of falsity. See id. at 1132–36 (concludi ng that no genuine dispute of material fact existed on an issue that differ ed from the issue underlying the district court’s grant of summ ary judgment). Summary judgment is appropriate if I Dig Texa s demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact on literal falsity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in Creager’s favor. See Wise , 71 F.4th at 748.
b. Creager needed to show that the statements were literally false. Under the Lanham Act, a claimant can show falsity in one of two
ways: 1. The statement is literally false.
2. The statement is literally true, bu t “likely to misl ead or confuse customers.” Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc. , 71 F.4th 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Zoller Lab’ys, LLC v. NBTY, Inc. , 111 F. App’x 978, 982 Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1314 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublishe d)). Creager relies on the literal falsity of I Dig Texas’s advertisements. A statement can be literally fa lse only if it is unambiguous. See Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes Inc. , 43 F.4th 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2022); Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC , 774 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2014); Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc. , 694 F.3d 723, 737 (6th Cir. 2012). So an ambiguous statement ca n’t be literally false. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. , 497 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]f the langu age or graphic is suscep tible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the adver tisement cannot be literally false.” (collecting cases)). For example, a statement without objective meaning can’t be literally false. See Bimbo Bakeries US A, Inc. v. Sycamore , 29 F.4th 630, 644–47 ( 10th Cir. 2022) (stating that a representation can be actionable only if it’s obj ectively capable of being determined to be true or false).

c. The statements ab out the place of manufacture were ambiguous. Creager points to vari ous advertisements about where I Dig Texas’s products had been made. For example, Creager presented evidence of advertisements stating that I Dig Texas’s produ cts had been made in
America or in the United States . So we must inqu ire whether these advertisements were ambiguous. That inquiry is a qu estion of law. See Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1415 Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Phys icians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc. , 185 F.3d 606 , 615 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that ambiguity of a statement en tails a question of law); see also Allsup, Inc. v. Advantage 2000 Consultants Inc. , 428 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8 th Cir. 2005) (“A literally false statement can be determined as a ma tter of law . . . .”). We must decide this issue of law based on the undisputed evidence about the making of I Dig Texas’s products. Some had been assembled in the United States, others in China. Even for the products th at I Dig Texas had assembled in the United States, some components had come from overseas. For example, I Dig Texas had used a nitrogen power cell made in China. And some of the nuts and bolts had come from Canada. But what does it mean to make a product in the United St ates or in America? Did I Dig Texas make a liter ally truthful st atement because it assembled some products in the United States? Creager argues that the advertisem ents were false because some of the components had come from other countries. But the term make could refer either to the origin of the co mponents or to th e assembly of the product itself. For example, if Chrysl er says that its cars are Americanmade, someone might regard the stat ement as truthful if Chrysler assembles the cars in th e United States even if some components came from overseas. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1516 The same could be true of I Dig Texas’s advertisements. Even if some components had come from China or Canada, I Dig Texas assembled some of its products in the United States. I Dig Texas’s advertisements are thus ambiguous when they say that the products are ma de in the United States or in America. 3 With this ambiguity, th e advertisements cannot be literally false. See Innovation Ventures , LLC v. N.V.E., Inc. , 694 F.3d 723, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2012 ) (concluding that a statem ent could not be literally false because it was ambiguous on whethe r it referred to one or multiple products). But Creager also argues that I Dig Texas represented that all its products had been made in the United States. For this argument, Creager points out that I Dig Te xas sold some products that had been assembled overseas or that had in cluded foreign components . The resulting question

3 At summary judgment, Creager i nvoked a Federal Tr ade Commission policy statement on de signation that a product had originated in the United States. Appellants’ App’x vol. IV, at 880. Even if th e FTC policy were otherwise instructive, it would not bind us when addressing false advertising under the Lanham Act. See FTC v. Colgat e-Palmolive Co. , 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Fi nlay Fine Jewelry Corp. , 168 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1999). And even if we were to consider the FTC policy, it acknowledges the absence of a “sin gle ‘bright line’ to establish when a product is or is not . . . made in the United States.” 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63, 768 (Dec. 2, 1997). Given th e absence of a “bright line,” the FTC considers multiple factor s, including the pl ace of the final assembly and the nature of any foreign components. Id. at 63,768–69. So the FTC policy doesn’t remove the ambiguity of the phrase made in the United States or American-made

. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1617 is whether I Dig Texas ever represente d that all its products had been made in the United States. Creager answers yes because I Dig Texas said on its website: “We Provide 100% Americ an Made Skid St eer Attachments.” Appellants’ App’x vol. III, at 530. Creager argues that by putting this statem ent on the website, I Dig Texas implied that all of its skid steer attachments had been made entirely in America, asse mbled domestically from domestic components. Granted, a statem ent can be literally false by necessary implication. Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc. , 71 F.4th 1222, 1235 (10th Cir. 2023). But again, an ambiguity exists in the reference to 100% . The reference could mean, as Creager urges, that 100% of I Dig Texas’s skid steer attachments had been assemb led in America with American components. But the reference could also mean that only some of the products consist entirely of domesti c components assembled in the United States.
Or 100% could refer only to assembly of the final produc t rather than the origin of the compon ents. So when th e assembly takes place in America with some foreign components, some one might reasonab ly consider the product 100% American-made . With this in terpretation, th e statement on the website could mean only that I Dig Texas sold some skid steer Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1718 attachments that had been asse mbled domestically (without any representation about the orig in of the co mponents). The statement on I Dig Texas’s website is thus just as ambiguous as the advertisements. 4 Given that ambigu ity, the statement on I Dig Texas’s website doesn’t necessarily imply a literal fals ehood about the origin of the products. 5
d. The patriotic symbols are am biguous because they can’t objectively be verified as true or false. Creager also argues that I Dig Texas used patriotic symbols (like an American flag) to imply that the pr oducts had been ma de in the United States. Granted, patriotic symbols could imply that the products were

4 I Dig Texas also contends that the statement on its website was not literally false because it sold some products made entirely in the United States, including Amer ican-made components. But I Dig Texas

 relies on evidence not included in its stat ement of undisputed material facts and

 made this argument for the firs t time in its reply brief for summary judgment. We need not address these procedural aspects, however, be cause we regard the statement as ambiguous.

5 The district court reasoned that Creager’s versions of the advertisements had been incomplete because the complete versions had acknowledged the use of foreign components. Crea ger disagrees, arguing that it relied on advertis ements that differed from the advertisements that I Dig Texas submitted to the district court. We need not address the versions of the advertisements that I Dig Texas submitted in district court. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1819 American-made. But the symbols couldn’t objectively be verified as true or false. As a result, the use of American symbols was ambiguous and couldn’t render the advertis ements literally false. We addressed a similar issue in Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Sycamore , 29 F.4th 630 (10th Ci r. 2022). There a bake ry advertised its loaves of bread as “F resh. Local. Quality.” Id. at 646. The issue was whether the word local could be considered liter ally false. We answered

no . Local could mean different things—lo cal workers, local materials, locally based, or involvement with local organizations. Id. at 644. Though the word implied th at the loaves had been made in the same community, no one could verify the objective truth of the advertisement’s reference to the loaves as local because the word was ambiguous. Id. at 646–47. The same is true of the patr iotic symbols in I Dig Texas’s advertisements. The symbols bore an implication, like the word local in the bakery’s advertisement for its loaves of bread. But no one could verify the objective truthfulness of the word local because the word could mean different things, and the same is true of I Dig Texas’s patriotic symbols. So those symbols are ambiguous and cannot render the advertisements literally false.
* * * Viewed in the light most favorable to Creager, the evidence does not support a finding of literal falsity. Because Creager has argued only literal Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 1920 falsity, I Dig Texa s is entitled to summary j udgment on the claims under the Lanham Act. We th erefore uphold the distri ct court’s award of summary judgment on these claims.
5. The district court did not e rr in declining supplemental jurisdiction over th e state-law claims. By granting summary judgment to I Dig Texa s on the claims of copyright infringement, false advertising, and false designation of origin, the district court disposed of all the federal claims. 6 With the disposition of all the federal claims, the dist rict court declin ed to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over th e remaining state-law claims and remanded the case to state court. 7 Creager argues that the district court abused its discretion by declining supple mental jurisdiction and remanding the state-law claims to state court. In addressing that argument, we apply th e abuse-of-discretion standard. See Cohon ex rel. Bass v. N.M. Dep’t of Health , 646 F.3d 717,

6 Creager suggests that the distri ct court remanded the claim for an injunction under th e Lanham Act. But the district court granted summary judgment to I Dig Texas on all the claims under the Lanham Act. As a result, the grant of summary judgm ent encompassed th e claim for an injunction. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil , 105 F.3d 566, 569–70 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a grant of summary judgment agains t a defendant seeking injunctive relief “amounts to a practical denial of injunctive relief” even if the district court does not expressly say so).

7 I Dig Texas had ini tiated the action in stat e court; Creager removed the action to fe deral court. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 2021 723 (10th Cir. 2011). The “district court s hould normally dismiss supplemental state law clai ms after all federal claims have been dismissed, particularly when the federal claims are dismissed before trial.” Foxfield Villa Assocs., LLC v. Robben , 967 F.3d 1082, 1103 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Botefuhr , 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002)). The district court declined to exer cise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law cl aims after considering

 the parties’ efforts to prep are for a federal trial and

 the novelty of the issues raised under Oklahoma law. Balancing these factors, the court decided to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand th e state-law claims to st ate court. This decision fell within the district court’s discretion. See id. at 1102–03 (concluding that the district court didn’t abuse its discre tion in remanding the remaining claims to state court even though the partie s had extensively prepared to litigate thes e claims in federal court) . We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to (1) decline s upplemental jurisd iction over the remaining state-law claims and (2) remand these claims to state court.
* * * We affirm. The district court did not err by

 granting summary judgm ent to I Dig Texas on the claims of copyright infringement, false advertising, and false designation of origin, Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 2122  declining to ex ercise supplemental ju risdiction over the remaining state-law claims, and

 remanding these state-law claims to state court. Appellate Case: 23-5046 Document: 010111031168 Date Filed: 04/12/2024 Page: 22