a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Secretary of Defense

September 2005 DEFENSE 

TRANSPORTATION

Air Mobility Command 

Needs to Collect and 

Analyze Better Data to 

Assess Aircraft 

Utilization

GAO-05-819
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-819.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Solis at 

(202) 512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-819, a report to the 

Secretary of Defense 

September 2005

DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION 

Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect 

and Analyze Better Data to Assess 

Aircraft Utilization 

Because the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the Air Force agency 

responsible for managing airlift, does not systematically collect and analyze 

operational factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does 

not know how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as 

efficiently as possible. AMC collects data about short tons transported and 

information about operational factors, such as weather and runway length, 

when planning and executing airlift missions. AMC does not capture data 

about these variables in a manner that allows officials to determine 

historically whether aircraft capacity was used efficiently. Historical mission 

planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System that is 

used to track mission data could provide some information about 

operational factors that affect mission payloads, but limitations associated 

with these data sources do not allow officials to determine whether DOD 

used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data about 

operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, GAO 

calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and 

compared these to historical average payloads, known as payload planning 

factors. GAO found that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and more than 81 

percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below DOD’s payload planning 

factors, as shown in the table below. However, because data on operational 

factors that impact payloads were not available, GAO was not able to 

determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of aircraft capacity. 

Without adequate information about operational variables and how these 

impact mission payloads, AMC officials do not know the extent to which 

opportunities exist to use aircraft more efficiently and whether operational 

tempo, cost, and wear and tear on aircraft could be reduced. In addition, 

DOD officials do not have the benefit of such analysis to determine future 

airlift requirements for planning purposes. 

Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding AMC’s Payload Planning 

Factors 

Type of

aircraft

Number

of missions

Number of 

missions meeting 

or exceeding 

the payload 

planning factor

Percentage of 

missions below 

the payload

planning factor

Payload

planning

factor

(in short

tons)

Percentage of 

missions meeting 

or exceeding 

the payload 

planning factor

Number of 

missions 

below 

the payload

planning factor

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

2.71

18.5

2.2

26

18.3

20

120

1,646

12

133

34

22

1,967

4,425

8,909

551

511

186

110

14,692

71.5

45.0

12.0

19.0

32.6

13.0

4,305

7,263

539

378

152

88

12,725

97.3

81.5

97.8

74.0

81.7

80.0

C-5

C-17

C-130

C-141

KC-10

KC-135

Total

Notes: This analysis does not consider operational factors used for mission planning because data 

were not available. Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift 

aircraft, GAO has included them in its analysis in those instances when AMC used these aircraft in 

strategic airlift roles. Because C-5 aircraft have separate compartments for passengers and cargo, 

we use a 71.5 payload planning factor (the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads). 

Airlift is a flexible, but expensive, 

transportation method. From 

September 2001 to April 2005, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has 

spent about $9.5 billion using airlift 

to transport equipment, supplies, 

and troops for Operations Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF). As of December 2004, airlift 

accounted for about 13 percent of 

all cargo and passengers 

transported for these operations. 

DOD has stated that high demand 

for available airlift assets requires 

the department to use airlift assets 

as efficiently as possible. However, 

DOD’s primary objective 

emphasizes delivering “the right 

items to the right place at the right 

time” over using aircraft capacity 

as efficiently as possible. 

Under the Comptroller General’s 

authority, GAO sought to 

determine whether DOD used 

capacity on strategic military 

aircraft transporting cargo and 

passengers between the United 

States and overseas theaters for 

OEF and OIF as efficiently as 

possible. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to improve DOD’s collection and 

analysis of information on 

operational factors that impact 

payloads transported on strategic 

airlift missions. DOD concurred 

with our recommendations. 

However, based on DOD’s 

comments, GAO has modified one 

recommendation. 
Page i GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible 

on Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained 7

Conclusions 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II: Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for Strategic Airlift 23

Appendix III: Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft Capacity 

Utilized 29

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 37

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Tables Table 1: Payload Planning Factors and Allowable Cabin Loads for 

Strategic Aircraft 7

Table 2: Load Message Utilization Data Field Codes and

Definitions 10

Table 3: Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or 

Exceeding Payload Planning Factors, by Plane Type, 

October 2001 to September 2004 12

Table 4: Missions Carrying No Cargo and Not Meeting the Minimum 

Requirements for Use of Strategic Airlift 13

Table 5: Payloads Transported by Type of Aircraft, October 2001 to 

September 2004 15

Figures Figure 1: Percentage of Cargo Transported by Sealift and Airlift for 

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 

September 2001 to December 2004 6

Figure 2: C-5 Aircraft 23

Figure 3: C-17 Aircraft 24

Figure 4: C-141 Aircraft 25

Figure 5: C-130 Aircraft 26

Figure 6: KC-10 Aircraft 27

Figure 7: KC-135 Aircraft 28
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Figure 8: Unloading of a HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopter from a 

C-17 in Support of OIF 31

Figure 9: Loadmasters Chain Down Cargo on a C-17 32

Figure 10: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting How Placement of Cargo 

Can Decrease Payloads 33

Figure 11: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting Placement of Cargo to 

Accommodate Passengers 33

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Abbreviations

AMC Air Mobility Command

DOD Department of Defense

GATES Global Air Transportation Execution System

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

TRANSCOM United States Transformation Command
Page 1 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 29, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

When deploying forces overseas for the United States, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) uses a variety of means to transport equipment, supplies, 

and troops to a theater of operations, including rail, trucks, ships, and 

aircraft. From September 30, 2001, through April 30, 2005, DOD spent more 

than $19 billion to transport equipment, supplies, and troops in support of 

the Global War on Terrorism, including Operations Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).1 Of this, DOD has spent about $9.5 billion 

to transport equipment, supplies, and troops for OEF and OIF via airlift, 

which is a fast and flexible, but expensive, transportation method relative 

to sealift. At the end of December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 

percent (464,239 short tons) of the more than 3.4 million short tons 

transported via airlift and sealift for these operations.2 According to U.S. 

Air Force doctrine, high demand for limited airlift assets requires the 

department to use airlift as efficiently as possible while still meeting 

combatant commanders’ delivery time frames. Because DOD emphasizes 

delivering the “right items to the right place at the right time” for the 

warfighter, this doctrine states that meeting mission needs is the Air 

Mobility Command’s (AMC) primary objective, while the efficient use of 

aircraft capacity is a secondary goal. Nevertheless, United States 

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and AMC officials are looking for 

ways to decrease costs and use aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible 

while continuing to meet mission needs. These officials acknowledge that 

they need information that helps decision makers understand whether 

aircraft capacity was used efficiently while meeting mission needs, 

especially when the pace of operations is high, and to plan for future airlift 

transportation needs. 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller General. 

We sought to determine whether DOD used strategic military aircraft 

efficiently during OEF and OIF. Specifically, our objective was to assess 

1

OEF began in October 2001 in Afghanistan and OIF began in March 2003 in Iraq.

2

A short ton is equivalent to 2,000 pounds. 
Page 2 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

the extent to which DOD used all available space and weight on these 

aircraft when transporting equipment and supplies—hereafter referred to 

as “cargo”—and passengers for OEF and OIF to the extent possible. 

In performing our work, we reviewed applicable DOD guidance, 

interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials, and analyzed AMC aircraft 

mission data. For purposes of this report, we focused our review of 

strategic airlift missions on contingency and special assignment airlift 

missions in support of OEF and OIF.3

 We excluded channel missions—

scheduled flights over established worldwide routes on government-owned 

or chartered aircraft under the operational control of AMC that are used for 

cargo and troop movements—because these occur on a regular schedule, 

and it is possible that payloads would regularly be light. To obtain a better 

understanding of operational factors, such as weather, fuel considerations, 

and aircraft and airfield characteristics, that can impact payloads on 

individual missions, we reviewed a limited number of historical mission 

planning files for OEF and OIF and a Global Air Transportation Execution 

System (GATES) data field that could provide some information about 

operational factors on individual missions. However, limitations associated 

with these data sources prevent using these for analysis to determine 

whether DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the 

absence of reliable data about operational factors, we obtained and 

analyzed strategic military airlift mission data for missions occurring from 

October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2004, for the two operations to get an 

indication of how well AMC utilized aircraft capacity. To determine 

whether DOD used capacity on these aircraft as efficiently as possible, we 

analyzed whether payloads transported for OEF and OIF met historical 

average payloads, known as payload planning factors. We compared 

average payloads transported by each aircraft type to the payload planning 

factors for each aircraft type. We also assessed the reliability of these data 

by reviewing existing documentation related to the data sources, 

electronically testing the data to identify obvious problems with 

completeness or accuracy, and interviewing knowledgeable agency 

officials about the data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable 

for calculating average payloads transported on each type of aircraft. 

However, data were not sufficiently available to determine how operational 

3

Contingency missions involve deployment, sustainment, and redeployment by airlift. 

Special assignment airlift missions are aircraft operated to satisfy a requirement needing 

special pickup or delivery at locations other than those with regularly scheduled service or 

to satisfy a requirement needing special consideration because of the number of passengers, 

weight or size of the cargo, urgency, or sensitivity of movement. 
Page 3 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

factors impacted payloads transported on individual missions. Without 

information about operational factors that impacted payloads on these 

airlift missions, we are unable to determine whether DOD used aircraft 

capacity as efficiently as possible. We discussed our methodology with 

AMC officials who agreed that such an analysis was appropriate. We 

conducted our review from September 2004 through July 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A 

detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in 

appendix I. 

Results in Brief Because the AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational 

factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know 

how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as 

possible. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, high demand for limited 

airlift assets requires the department to use airlift as efficiently as possible 

while still meeting combatant commanders’ delivery time frames. Although 

the AMC collects data about short tons transported and information about 

operational factors, such as weather and runway length, as it plans and 

executes airlift missions, the command does not capture data about these 

factors in a manner that allows officials to determine historically whether 

DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. Historical mission 

planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System, a 

database that is used to track mission data, could provide some 

information about operational factors that impact mission payloads for 

individual missions. However, limitations associated with these data 

sources—such as the completeness and format of mission files and 

unknown accuracy of a Global Air Transportation Execution System data 

field—prevent using these for analysis of aircraft capacity used. Without 

information about operational factors that impacted payloads on these 

airlift missions, we are unable to determine whether DOD used aircraft 

capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data about operational 

factors that impact payloads on specific missions, we calculated the 

average payloads for each type of aircraft and compared these to payload 

planning factors—the historical average payloads transported on each type 

of aircraft. Our analysis of 14,692 strategic airlift missions flown in support 

of OIF and OEF showed that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and more than 

81 percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below the relevant payload 

planning factors for these types of aircraft. Also, nearly 19 percent of the 

missions did not meet the minimum requirements of 15 short tons or 100 

passengers to qualify for use of strategic airlift. However, AMC is required 

to provide airlift whenever cargo and passengers are approved for 
Page 4 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

movement, even if minimum requirements for using strategic airlift are not 

met or the requirement will not use an aircraft’s available capacity as 

efficiently as possible if this is the only way to accomplish the mission. 

Given the absence of information about operational factors that could 

explain why heavier payloads were not transported on specific missions, 

command officials do not know the extent to which opportunities exist to 

use aircraft capacity more efficiently. Potentially inefficient use of aircraft 

could cause higher operational tempo and may increase costs as well as 

wear and tear on aircraft. In addition, this lack of information could cause 

DOD to understate or overstate future lift requirements for planning 

purposes, and the right mix and number of aircraft may not be available for 

future contingencies. 

We are making recommendations to improve the department’s collection 

and analysis of information on operational factors that impact payloads 

transported on aircraft used for strategic airlift. DOD provided written 

comments on a draft of this report and concurred with each of our 

recommendations. Based on DOD’s written comments, we modified one 

recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments on this report, 

and we made changes where appropriate. We have reprinted DOD’s 

comments in appendix IV.

Background TRANSCOM, located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is a unified 

combatant command that provides air, land, and sea transportation for 

DOD, both in peacetime and wartime.4

 AMC, one of TRANSCOM’s three 

component commands, provides strategic airlift, among other services—

such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet through which contracted commercial 

aircraft support DOD airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for 

airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft—for deploying, sustaining, 

and redeploying U.S. forces worldwide.5

 Strategic airlift moves cargo and 

passengers between the continental United States and overseas theaters or 

between overseas theaters. AMC operates military aircraft that constitute 

4

An unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more services and has a 

broad and continuing mission. 

5

TRANSCOM’s other component commands are the Surface Deployment and Distribution 

Command that is responsible for providing global surface distribution services, and the 

Military Sealift Command that provides ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies 

and ammunition to sustain U.S. forces worldwide. 
Page 5 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

the U.S. strategic airlift fleet, including the C-5, C-17, and C-141 aircraft 

(app. II describes each aircraft).6

 In addition, AMC can use aerial refueling 

aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-135, for transporting cargo. Although the 

C-130 is primarily used for intratheater airlift missions, AMC sometimes 

uses it in a strategic airlift role to transport cargo from the United States to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, especially if the aircraft is being moved into the 

theater and assigned to the United States Central Command. AMC’s Tanker 

Airlift Control Center plans, schedules, and tracks tanker and airlift 

worldwide. The Fusion Cell, a division within AMC’s Tanker Airlift Control 

Center, was created following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

to provide senior decision makers with information about the movement of 

air mobility assets, especially for those missions associated with 

contingency operations. The Fusion Cell is charged with collecting and 

analyzing cargo and passenger data from completed missions using 

TRANSCOM- and AMC-owned and controlled databases, such as the Global 

Transportation Network, GATES, and the Global Decision Support System, 

and ensuring data quality.7

 

TRANSCOM uses the combatant commander’s delivery date at the final 

destination as well as information about the number and type of troops and 

cargo—the requirement—needed to accomplish a specific mission to 

determine the appropriate type of transportation needed to meet that date, 

develop feasible transportation schedules for deploying forces, assign 

ports of embarkation, and determine the best mode of transportation. AMC 

uses 15 short tons or 100 passengers as the minimum requirement for 

strategic airlift and may combine cargo loads to meet this requirement. 

However, AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo and passengers 

are approved for movement even if minimum requirements for using 

strategic airlift are not met or the requirement will not use an aircraft’s 

available capacity as efficiently as possible if this is the only way to 

accomplish the mission. If airlift is required, TRANSCOM tasks AMC with 

assigning and scheduling airlift. TRANSCOM reserves the use of airlift for 

6

The Air Force retired its C-141s from the active duty inventory in September 2004. DOD 

plans to retire C-141s used by the Reserves and Air National Guard before 2006. 

7

TRANSCOM’s Global Transportation Network collects and integrates information from a 

number of transportation systems to support transportation planning and decision-making. 

GATES provides AMC with automated capability to process and track cargo and passenger 

airlift data and facilitates payment for services. AMC’s Global Decision Support System 

provides aircraft schedules, arrival and departure, and aircraft status data to support intransit visibility of aircraft and aircrews.
Page 6 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

(1) short notice and emergency requirements, (2) intelligence-related or 

sensitive cargo, and (3) when operational security considerations preclude 

the use of sealift. AMC assigns aircraft to move cargo and passengers based 

on (1) mission urgency and sensitivity, (2) cargo and passenger 

characteristics, and (3) other special factors. Currently, DOD transports the 

majority of cargo by sealift, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Percentage of Cargo Transported by Sealift and Airlift for Operations 

Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, September 2001 to December 2004

AMC officials use the average historical payload transported on each type 

of aircraft (see table 1), known as payload planning factors, to develop 

broad estimates of the types and number of aircraft initially needed to meet 

mission requirements. The payload planning factors are generally less than 

the maximum payload capacity, including the weight of unit personnel, 

equipment, and material that an aircraft can carry, known as the allowable 

cabin load.

Percentage

Year

Airlift

Sealift

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2001 2002 2003 2004

97.51

37.34

62.66

2.49

87.06

12.94

5.86

94.14

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 7 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Table 1: Payload Planning Factors and Allowable Cabin Loads for Strategic Aircraft

Source: United States Air Force. 

Notes: The payload planning factor assumes loads contain only cargo or only passengers, not a 

mixture. For all aircraft types except the C-5, mixed loads usually would have payload planning factors 

in between the cargo and passenger payloads listed above. Because C-5s have separate 

compartments for passengers and cargo, the mixed payload planning factor would be the sum of the 

cargo and passenger payloads (71.5 short tons). Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not 

considered strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in those instances when 

AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. 

The Extent to Which 

AMC Used Capacity as 

Efficiently as Possible 

on Strategic Military 

Aircraft Cannot Be 

Readily Ascertained 

Because AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational 

factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know 

how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as 

possible. Historical mission planning files have limitations that prevent 

DOD officials from using the files to determine whether AMC used aircraft 

efficiently. In addition, data on operational factors captured in the GATES 

database are not useful because codes that could provide AMC officials 

with information about why aircraft flew with the payloads they did are 

neither well-defined nor comprehensive, and the accuracy and reliability of 

the data cannot be determined. In the absence of data about operational 

factors that impact payloads on individual missions, we calculated the 

average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to 

the payload planning factors. Our analysis of AMC data showed that more 

than 86 percent of these missions flew with payloads that were lighter than 

established payload planning factors, and some of these did not meet the 

minimum requirement of 15 short tons or 100 passengers needed to qualify 

for use of strategic airlift. However, because AMC lacks data to determine 

how operational factors impact payloads, we are not able to determine 

whether these payloads indicate efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity.

In short tons

Aircraft type

Payload planning factor

Cargo Passenger Allowable cabin load

C-5 61.3 10.2 89.0

C-17 45.0 18.0 65.0

C-130 12.0 16.0 17.0

C-141 19.0 24.0 30.0

KC-10 32.6 13.6 60.0

KC-135 13.0 9.2 18.0
Page 8 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Historical Mission Planning 

Files Have Limitations That 

Prevent Their Use to 

Determine Whether AMC 

Used Aircraft Capacity as 

Efficiently as Possible 

Historical mission planning files identify mission data and operational 

factors that may impact aircraft payloads, but we found limitations with 

using these files to determine whether AMC used an aircraft’s capacity as 

efficiently as possible. We reviewed 25 historical mission planning files for 

OEF and OIF to gain an understanding of how operational factors could 

impact payloads. We found these files were not retained in a format that 

facilitates manipulation of data for analysis to determine whether an 

aircraft’s capacity was used efficiently, and the files were not always 

complete or accurate. Although the historical mission planning files 

contain some information that could help identify operational factors that 

impacted aircraft payloads, the data are not easy to manipulate for analysis 

because the historical mission planning files are paper based. Currently, 

AMC stores the files in binders and boxes categorized by the operation, 

such as OEF, and the month and year of the flight. Officials told us that this 

organization system makes it difficult to access data for specific missions. 

We also found that some of the files we reviewed were incomplete or 

inaccurate. For instance, 3 of the 25 mission files we reviewed were 

missing load plans that AMC officials use to identify appropriate aircraft 

with which to transport cargo and passengers. According to a command 

official, time constraints, among other factors, can impact whether load 

plans were sent to AMC. An official told us that units sometimes make 

changes to the load plans and do not inform AMC, which could cause 

aircraft to be underutilized if the allowable cabin load of the available and 

scheduled aircraft is too large for the size and weight of the requirement to 

be moved. AMC officials did not provide data on the frequency with which 

units make such changes. However, because of concerns about the 

accuracy of load plans, especially from units that do not deploy frequently, 

AMC officials told us that they always call units before scheduling aircraft 

to request load plans and confirm the accuracy of validated Time Phased 

Force and Deployment Data that identify the forces, sequence, and priority 

of unit deployments; the locations of ports of debarkation for a specific 

unit; and the number of pieces of cargo, cargo dimensions, and numbers 

and weights of passengers. 

Despite these limitations, the mission planning files are the only combined 

source of mission information that includes load plans, diplomatic 

clearances, and air refueling requests and shows what was planned to be 

transported on an aircraft used for OEF and OIF. An AMC official told us 

that the historical mission planning files capture operational data that 

could be valuable for helping DOD understand the implications of moving 
Page 9 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

to a lighter and faster force and projecting airlift assets needed to transport 

this force. 

One AMC Database Is Also 

Not Useful for Assessing 

Whether Aircraft Capacity 

Was Used as Efficiently as 

Possible

Operational data captured in one of AMC’s databases, GATES,—the 

“system of record” database that provides AMC with automated capability 

to process and track cargo and passenger airlift data and facilitates 

payment for services—is also not useful for assessing whether AMC used 

an aircraft’s capacity as efficiently as possible. When GATES was 

automated in 2000, command officials retained a data field called “Load 

Message Utilization” that consists of 13 codes that could provide AMC 

officials with information about why an aircraft flew with the payloads it 

did. AMC requires GATES users to manually enter a primary and, if 

relevant, a secondary code from the 13 codes presented in table 2 before 

transmitting mission data to AMC, although the command does not review 

or use this information for analysis. 
Page 10 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Table 2: Load Message Utilization Data Field Codes and Definitions 

Source: GATES Data Dictionary.

Although command officials could use some information captured in the 

“Load Message Utilization” data field to understand why aircraft flew with 

specific payloads, codes in this data field are neither well defined nor 

comprehensive, and the accuracy and reliability of the data are not known. 

There may be similar data fields in other transportation information 

systems such as the Global Transportation Network and Global Decision 

Support System that could be used to capture operational data. However, 

we are unaware of similar fields in these databases that could be modified 

for this use.

Code

A Pallet positions or seats not fully used due to substitute aircraft that provided more 

pallet positions or seats than the aircraft originally scheduled.

B Excess seats. Scheduled or programmed passenger airlift capability in excess to 

station requirements.

C Gained from previous station. All programmed seats used. Additional capability 

available to an en route station due to previous stations not using allocated seats.

D Late passenger cancellations or no-show passengers.

E Insufficient processed or palletized cargo on hand for downline stations, including 

cargo for other destinations that is authorized to be transshipped at downline 

stations (to be used if sufficient cargo is in the port, but not yet processed or 

movement ready).

F Low port level. Insufficient cargo in port (both processed and unprocessed), for 

downline stations, including cargo for other destinations which is authorized to be 

transshipped at downline stations.

G Additional crew members. Used when additional crew members preclude use of 

installed passenger seats or pallet positions.

H Unsuitable cargo. Hazardous or other special handling cargo which precludes 

optimum utilization of cargo space or passenger seats.

J Light pallets or cargo. All pallet positions used, but allowable cabin load not fully 

utilized due to light pallets or rolling stock or pallets with overhang which 

precludes full utilization of space.

K Space block. Space not fully used due to passenger or cargo space blocks for 

downline stations.

V Aircraft fully utilized, cargo mission only. Used when the percent utilized is 95 to 

100 percent. Use the following formula: Payload/Allowable cabin load x 100 = 

percent utilized.

W Aircraft fully utilized, passenger missions only. Used when 95 percent or more of 

available passenger seats were used for space required (duty) passengers.

Z No other code applies. Provide short explanation in remarks.
Page 11 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

According to AMC officials, some of the codes are not well defined and are 

inconsistently interpreted and applied by users. For example, the “V” code 

indicates that the aircraft is considered fully utilized only if the payload is 

95 to 100 percent of the allowable cabin load. However, as we previously 

reported, an aircraft may be fully utilized with lighter payloads if the 

maximum volume of cargo that will fit into an aircraft is reached before the 

maximum cargo weight is reached.8

 AMC officials told us that most airlifted 

cargo loads reach maximum volume before reaching maximum weight. 

Additionally, an AMC official who reviewed the “Load Message Utilization” 

codes believes that users may have inappropriately applied the codes. We 

were not able to determine the extent to which users may have done this 

because we could not determine the reliability of data. 

We also found that the codes are not as comprehensive as they could be. 

For example, there are no codes to indicate that an aircraft was fully 

utilized because the maximum volume of cargo that could fit into the 

aircraft was reached before the maximum cargo weight was reached. In 

addition, there are no codes that indicate if payloads were decreased to 

accommodate poor weather conditions; airfield characteristics, such as 

short runways; or aircraft characteristics, such as structural fatigue. 

Finally, no codes identify whether an aircraft’s capacity was underutilized 

because the only available aircraft was too large for the size and weight of 

the requirement to be moved within the time frame required. Although 

GATES users could enter such information using the “Z” code and 

associated remarks, this would not guarantee consistent remarks or allow 

for AMC officials to manipulate these data for analysis.

Finally, we were unable to assess the reliability or accuracy of “Load 

Message Utilization” data. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Manual recognizes that data quality is directly linked to data 

collection and entry at the port of embarkation and requires appropriate 

commander emphasis to ensure accuracy, aerial port supervisors are not 

required to review the “Load Message Utilization” code for accuracy prior 

to transmission to AMC. AMC officials told us that although they require 

this data field to be completed by users, AMC does not use this information 

and officials do not verify or validate the data entered in this data field. 

According to AMC officials, GATES users frequently use the “Z” code (no 

other code applies) as a placeholder. 

8

GAO, C-17 Globemaster: Support of Operation Joint Endeavor, GAO-97-50 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 14, 1997).
Page 12 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Analysis of AMC Data 

Showed That a Significant 

Number of Strategic Airlift 

Missions Flew with 

Payloads Lighter Than 

Established Planning 

Factors 

Our analysis of 14,692 strategic airlift missions for OEF and OIF showed 

that more than 86 percent flew with payloads that were lighter than 

established payload planning factors; nearly 19 percent did not meet the 

minimum requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers needed to qualify 

for use of strategic airlift; and average payloads for strategic airlift missions 

were less than historical average payloads. For example, we found that 

over 97 percent of missions on C-5 aircraft, nearly 98 percent of missions 

on C-130 aircraft, and 80 percent of missions on KC-135 aircraft had 

payloads that were below the payload planning factors for these types of 

aircraft, as shown in table 3. In contrast, almost 19 percent of C-17 

missions, about 18 percent of KC-10 missions, and 26 percent of C-141 

missions met or exceeded the relevant payload planning factors. 

Table 3: Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding Payload Planning Factors, by Plane Type, October 

2001 to September 2004 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: This analysis does not consider operational factors used for mission planning because data 

were not available. Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, 

we have included them in our analysis in those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic 

airlift roles. Because C-5 aircraft have separate compartments for passengers and cargo, we use a 

71.5 payload planning factor (the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads) rather than the 61.3 short 

tons published in Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403. For a C-5 aircraft to be fully utilized, DOD would need to 

fully utilize available space in both the cargo and passenger compartments.

However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors 

impact payloads (see app. III for details on some of these factors), we are 

not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of an 

aircraft’s capacity. 

Type of aircraft

Number of

missions

Payload

planning factor 

(in short tons)

Number of

missions below

the payload

planning factor

Percentage of

missions below

the payload

planning factor

Number of

missions

meeting or

exceeding the

payload

planning factor

Percentage of

missions

meeting or

exceeding the

payload

planning factor

C-5 4,425 71.5 4,305 97.3 120 2.71

C-17 8,909 45.0 7,263 81.5 1,646 18.5

C-130 551 12.0 539 97.8 12 2.2

C-141 511 19.0 378 74.0 133 26

KC-10 186 32.6 152 81.7 34 18.3

KC-135 110 13.0 88 80.0 22 20

Total 14,692 12,725 1,967
Page 13 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Our analysis also showed that about 4 percent (524) of strategic airlift 

missions carried no cargo and nearly 19 percent (2,734) of all strategic 

airlift missions transporting cargo and passengers for OEF and OIF did not 

meet the minimum requirements for use of strategic airlift, resulting in light 

payloads and, potentially, underutilization of aircraft (see table 4). Missions 

that did not meet minimum requirements for strategic airlift carried an 

average of about 5 short tons of cargo and 26 passengers. 

Table 4: Missions Carrying No Cargo and Not Meeting the Minimum Requirements for Use of Strategic Airlift

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, we have 

included them in our analysis in those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. 

However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors 

impact payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads 

indicate efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity.

Although aerial port officials may know why individual flights flew empty 

or with light payloads, AMC does not collect these data, and available data 

collected by AMC were not sufficient to determine why this occurred. AMC 

officials told us that data show that some aircraft flew empty, possibly 

because the command tracks mission data for aircraft without cargo on 

board that were moved into the theater and assigned to the United States 

Central Command. According to these officials, the lack of technology at 

austere locations also prevents capturing mission data, including payloads 

transported. AMC officials further explained that although their databases 

also track classified missions, they do not capture payloads or other data 

for these missions. 

Type of 

aircraft

Number of

missions

Operation Enduring Freedom Operation Iraqi Freedom

Number of

missions with

no cargo

Number of missions not

meeting minimum

requirement for strategic

airlift

Number of

missions with

no cargo

Number of missions not

meeting minimum

requirement for strategic

airlift

C-5 4,425 49 123 21 131

C-17 8,909 185 1,175 36 468

C-130 551 80 48 112 237

C-141 511 4 175 6 181

KC-10 186 2 20 3 99

KC-135 110 21 46 5 31

Total 14,692 341 1,587 183 1,147
Page 14 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

There may be legitimate reasons why AMC flew missions that did not meet 

minimum requirements for the use of strategic airlift. For instance, aircraft 

transporting light but bulky cargo could have light payloads. Charleston Air 

Force Base officials told us that they had transported rolls of bubble wrap 

to package Patriot missiles for return to the United States by airlift. For this 

mission, the payload was light, but the aircraft was fully utilized because 

the rolls used all available locations where cargo can be placed. AMC 

officials also told us that they attempt to use capacity as efficiently as 

possible by scheduling an aircraft that is sufficient for the size and weight 

of the requirement to be moved, scheduling en route stops to consolidate 

smaller loads, and negotiating delivery dates when possible. However, 

unlike commercial cargo carriers such as Federal Express, AMC officials 

cannot decline to deliver a customer’s order if it does not fully utilize the 

aircraft. AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo and passengers 

are approved for movement even if minimum requirements for using 

strategic airlift are not met or the requirement will not fully utilize an 

aircraft’s available capacity. A command official also told us that DOD 

guidance permits the use of strategic airlift even if the minimum 

requirements of 100 passengers or 15 short tons of cargo are not met if this 

is the only way to accomplish the mission. Therefore, AMC may fly aircraft 

with reduced payloads in order to meet combatant commanders’ delivery 

time frames. While we believe this may cause aircraft to be underutilized, 

AMC officials emphasized that the command’s primary objective is to 

deliver “the right items to the right place at the right time” and that 

optimizing capacity is a secondary goal. Furthermore, according to a 

command official, DOD established these minimum requirements as a way 

to identify large enough loads to justify sending a C-141 or C-17 aircraft to 

complete a mission. 

However, without information about operational factors that impacted the 

payloads on these airlift missions, we are unable to determine whether 

DOD used an aircraft’s capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of 

such data, we calculated the average payloads for each type of aircraft and 

compared these to relevant payload planning factors to get an indication as 

to how well AMC utilized aircraft. We found that aircraft payloads for OEF 

and OIF were, on average, less than historical average payloads. Table 5 

shows the average payloads transported for both OEF and OIF by each 

type of strategic aircraft and how they compare to each aircraft’s payload 

planning factor.
Page 15 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Table 5: Payloads Transported by Type of Aircraft, October 2001 to September 2004 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, we have 

included them in our analysis in those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. 

a

The payload planning factor assumes loads contain only cargo or only passengers, not a mixture. For 

all aircraft types except the C-5, mixed loads usually would have payload planning factors in between 

the cargo and passenger payloads listed in table 1. Because C-5s have separate compartments for 

passengers and cargo, the mixed payload planning factor would be the sum of the cargo and 

passenger payloads (71.5 short tons). 

Because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors impact 

payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads indicate 

efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity.

In general, in the absence of information about operational factors that 

could explain why heavier payloads were not transported, command 

officials do not know whether and where opportunities existed to use an 

aircraft’s capacity more efficiently or if there is the opportunity to reduce 

operational tempo, costs, and wear and tear on aircraft. By not collecting 

information about and analyzing the factors that impact aircraft capacity 

utilized, DOD officials could also be understating lift requirements for 

planning purposes, and the right mix and number of aircraft may not be 

available for future contingencies. 

Conclusions Because DOD emphasizes delivering the “right items to the right place at 

the right time” over the efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity, AMC has a 

reason for underutilizing aircraft capacity on some missions. However, we 

believe that AMC officials need more data about operational factors, which 

can also impact aircraft capacity, and that these data need to be maintained 

in a manner allows officials to determine whether DOD used an aircraft’s 

capacity as efficiently as possible. Furthermore, we believe it is important 

In short tons

Type of 

aircraft

Average payload for Operation

Enduring Freedom

Average payload for

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Average payload for

both operations

Payload planning

factor

C-5 47.8 48.0 47.9 71.5a

C-17 27.5 29.8 28.3 45.0

C-130 4.5 5.4 5.0 12.0

C-141 15.7 16.6 16.5 19.0

KC-10 12.9 17.9 17.3 32.6

KC-135 6.5 7.6 6.9 13.0
Page 16 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

that reliable and complete data are collected to allow DOD and the 

Congress to make informed decisions about future airlift requirements. We 

have reported that a key factor contributing to the usefulness of data is the 

degree to which officials are confident that information is credible.9

 Useful 

practices for helping decision makers assess the quality and value of data 

include assessing the reliability and verifying and validating data to ensure 

that they adequately represent actual performance. Such data could help 

officials make informed decisions about the capacity of aircraft utilized

when transporting cargo on strategic missions as well as planning for 

future strategic lift requirements. Because they do not collect information 

about and analyze the factors that impact payloads, DOD officials do not 

have adequate information about aircraft capacity and do not know 

whether capacity is utilized to the maximum extent possible. Potentially 

inefficient use of aircraft capacity could cause higher operational tempo 

and may increase cost as well as wear and tear on aircraft. In addition, this 

lack of information could cause DOD to understate or overstate future lift 

requirements for planning purposes, and the right mix and number of 

aircraft may not be available for future contingencies. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To help officials determine whether they used an aircraft’s capacity as 

efficiently as possible and improve the reliability and completeness of data 

on operational factors that can impact payloads, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the 

Commander, Air Mobility Command, to take the following two actions:

• Revise and clarify relevant data fields in GATES, and work with DOD 

entities that support other transportation information systems, such as 

the Global Transportation Network and service deployment systems, to 

capture comprehensive, well-defined data on operational factors that 

impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to 

review these data fields for accuracy. These factors include—but are not 

limited to—number of pallet positions used, cargo dimensions, fueling 

decisions, and altitude constraints. 

• Systematically collect and analyze information on operational factors 

that impact payloads transported on strategic airlift missions to identify 

9

GAO, Defense Management: Tools for Measuring and Managing Defense Agency 

Performance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-04-919 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2004).
Page 17 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

ways that DOD may be able to use an aircraft’s capacity as efficiently as 

possible. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV. In commenting on a draft of 

this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations. It also provided 

technical comments, which we included in the report as appropriate. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to revise and clarify GATES data 

fields to capture a more comprehensive, well-defined list of operational 

factors that impact payloads for individual missions. In concurring with our 

recommendation, DOD made two additional comments. First, DOD noted 

that some contingency missions are often processed through service 

deployment systems and that other systems are also used to collect data 

regarding aircraft utilization. We agree with DOD that contingency 

missions are processed through systems other than GATES. However, as 

noted in our report, we used data on completed missions obtained from the 

Tanker Airlift Control Center’s Fusion Cell database, which compiles and 

validates data obtained from GATES as well as the Global Transportation 

Network and the Global Decision Support System. AMC officials agreed 

with this methodology and these sources for our analysis. Second, DOD 

stated that data shortfalls are not only in GATES and that data such as 

altitude constraints, fueling decisions, and other operational decisions 

conducted outside the aerial ports do not belong in GATES. We agree with 

DOD that GATES is not a full-spectrum airfield and airlift planning and 

execution system, and that GATES may not be the only system that could 

capture the necessary information needed for a more comprehensive 

analysis of aircraft utilization. During the course of this review, we were 

not made aware of data fields in other information systems that captured 

information similar to the “Load Message Utilization” field in GATES. As a 

result, we focused our recommendation on GATES to identify how 

improvements could be made to transportation information systems to 

capture data on operational factors that could provide a more 

comprehensive picture of how well AMC and the combatant commanders 

are utilizing aircraft. In response to DOD’s comments, we also reviewed 

user guides and data dictionaries for these other systems and identified a 

number of data fields that could provide additional operational data. 

However, in further discussions, DOD officials told us that data in these 

fields are not always easily accessible or complete and reliable. Therefore, 

to recognize that there may be other systems that could also be used to 

capture operational data, we have revised our recommendation for DOD to 
Page 18 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

revise and clarify data fields in GATES and any other transportation 

information systems. 

DOD concurred with our second recommendation to systematically collect 

and analyze information on operational factors that impact payloads 

transported on strategic airlift missions and stated that AMC’s Tanker 

Airlift Control Center already collects and analyzes mission data from 

several transportation information systems, including allowable cabin load 

utilization by aircraft type. As noted in our scope and methodology, for our 

analysis of aircraft utilization we used data obtained from the Tanker Airlift 

Control Center’s Fusion Cell database, which compiles data obtained from 

GATES as well as the Global Transportation Network and the Global 

Decision Support System. However, this database did not include the 

operational data we believe is needed by DOD to analyze and better 

understand how operational factors impact these payloads, to determine 

whether all available space and weight on these aircraft was used in light of 

such operational factors, and to plan for future airlift transportation needs. 

DOD also stated that any audit of contingency aircraft utilization must 

include the Time Phased Force Deployment Data validation process. We 

acknowledge that this process plays an integral role in determining what 

needs to be moved and how it is moved. However, our objective was to 

determine how efficiently AMC utilized its airlift assets after that validation 

process is completed; therefore, the process is outside of the scope of our 

review. As we discuss in the background and appendix III, AMC is required 

to provide airlift whenever cargo and passengers are approved for 

movement even if minimum requirements for using strategic airlift are not 

met or the requirement will not use an aircraft’s available capacity as 

efficiently as possible, if this is the only way to accomplish the mission. 

This means that if a combatant commander puts forward a requirement 

through the Time Phased Force Deployment Data validation process and it 

is designated by TRANSCOM for airlift, AMC will fly the mission, even if it 

does not meet the minimum requirements or allow the most efficient use of 

capacity.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a federal agency to 

submit a written statement on actions taken to address our 

recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and 

the House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after 

the date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the 

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first 
Page 19 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this 

report. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

William Solis

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 20 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) used an 

aircraft’s capacity as efficiently as possible while transporting cargo and 

passengers for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF), we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and defense transportation 

regulations and interviewed knowledgeable officials from the following 

offices, commands, and services:

• 13th Corps Support Command, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. 

• 3rd Army Corps, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. 

• 437th Aerial Port Squadron, Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina.

• 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. 

• 819th Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron 

Engineer, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana.

• Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

• I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California.

• II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

• Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, Arlington, 

Virginia.

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 

Arlington, Virginia.

• United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, 

Florida.

• United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. 

• United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

• United States Army Installation Management Agency, Arlington, 

Virginia. 

• United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

To gain an understanding of how operational realities can affect aircraft 

payloads, we reviewed a limited number of historical mission planning 

files. The files that we reviewed were sometimes missing load plans that 

would assist in explaining operational factors that may have impacted 

payloads. When load plans were present in the mission files, AMC officials 

were able to identify a number of factors that could plausibly impact 

mission payloads; however, they could not be certain that these factors did 

impact payloads when the mission was executed. We also reviewed 

information about the “Load Message Utilization” data field in the Global 

Air Transportation Execution System and discussed the reliability and 

accuracy of these data with AMC and aerial port officials. We determined 

that this data field was not sufficiently reliable for this purpose. We also 

met with officials concerning AMC’s Global Transportation Network and 

Global Decision Support System. 

We limited our review of airlift missions to strategic contingency missions 

and special assignment airlift missions for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps as well as joint missions flown on AMC-owned and AMCoperated aircraft in support of OEF and OIF. The U.S. strategic airlift fleet 

includes the C-5, C-17, C-130, and C-141 aircraft. Because aerial refueling 

aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-135, are also capable of transporting 

cargo for strategic airlift missions, we also included these aircraft in our 

analyses. We initially obtained mission data for 37,622 airlift missions1 

occurring from October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2004 from AMC’s Fusion 

Cell. 

Because we focused on strategic missions, we excluded intratheater 

missions from our analyses. In addition, we excluded channel missions—

regularly scheduled flights on government-owned or chartered aircraft 

under the operational control of AMC that are used for cargo and troop 

movements—because these occur on a regular schedule, and it is possible 

that payloads would regularly be light. We also excluded missions on 

commercial aircraft because these are not owned by AMC. By applying our 

selection criteria identified earlier, we narrowed the number of missions 

that we reviewed to 14,692. To assess the reliability of these data, we

(1) reviewed existing documentation related to the data sources, 

1

When selecting missions to analyze, we used the mission leg with the greatest short tons on 

board, including passenger weight. The approximately 170,000 mission legs that AMC flew 

during this time frame resulted in 37,622 unique missions prior to application of our 

selection criteria. Based on discussions with Fusion Cell staff clarifying our analysis results, 

we eliminated 6 missions from our analysis that showed improbably high payloads.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

(2) electronically tested the data to identify obvious problems with 

completeness or accuracy, and (3) interviewed knowledgeable agency 

officials about the data. We determined that the Fusion Cell’s data were 

sufficiently reliable to summarize the actual cargo and passenger payloads. 

We then compared Fusion Cell average payload data for OEF and OIF 

strategic aircraft with payload planning factors and determined whether 

payloads for OEF and OIF met the payload planning factors. We also 

calculated the average total short tons transported on each type of aircraft, 

and determined the percentage of aircraft that carried short tons in excess 

as well as below the payload planning factors. Additionally, we determined 

the number of missions that did not meet the minimum strategic airlift 

requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers. DOD guidance permits the 

use of strategic airlift even if minimum payload and passenger 

requirements are not met if this is the only way to accomplish the mission. 

Furthermore, AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo and 

passengers are validated for movement even if the minimum requirement 

to use strategic airlift is not met. However, we were not able to determine 

the reasons why the minimum requirement was waived for nearly 

19 percent of all missions we reviewed. We also identified a number of 

missions that carried no cargo or passengers; however, we were not able to 

identify all of the reasons why these aircraft flew empty. 

We conducted our review from September 2004 through July 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 23 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Appendix II

Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for 

Strategic Airlift ApendxiI

The AMC is responsible for providing global airlift services and air 

refueling operations. To carry out its mission, the command has a strategic 

airlift fleet comprised of the C-5, C-17, and C-141. In addition, AMC can use 

aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-135, for transporting 

cargo. Although the C-130 is primarily used for intratheater airlift missions, 

AMC sometimes uses it in a strategic airlift role to transport cargo from the 

United States to Iraq and Afghanistan, especially if the aircraft is being 

moved into the theater and assigned to the United States Central 

Command. This appendix briefly describes these aircraft (figs. 2 through 7 

are photographs of the various aircraft).

C-5 Aircraft

Figure 2: C-5 Aircraft

The C-5 is one of the largest aircraft in the world. It can carry outsize and 

oversize cargo over intercontinental ranges and can take off or land in 

relatively short distances. A C-5 with a cargo load of 135 short tons can fly 

2,150 nautical miles, off-load, and fly to a second base 500 nautical miles 

away from the original destination without aerial refueling. With aerial 

refueling, the aircraft's range is limited only by crew endurance. The C-5 

can carry nearly all of the Army’s combat equipment, including large heavy 

items such as the 74-ton mobile scissors bridge. Ground crews can load and 

off-load the C-5 simultaneously at the front and rear cargo openings. The 

landing gear system permits lowering of the parked aircraft so the cargo 

Source: DOD.
Appendix II

Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for 

Strategic Airlift

Page 24 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

floor is at truck bed height or to facilitate vehicle loading and unloading. 

The aircraft length is about 247 feet, its height is approximately 65 feet, and 

its wing span is about 223 feet.

C-17 Aircraft

Figure 3: C-17 Aircraft

The C-17 aircraft is capable of transporting substantial payloads over long 

ranges without refueling. The C-17 is intended to deliver cargo and troops 

directly to forward airfields near the front lines or to main operating bases; 

fly into small, austere airfields; land on short runways; transport outsize 

cargo, such as tanks; and air-drop troops and equipment. The C-17 can take 

off and land on runways as short as 3,000 feet long and 90 feet wide. With a 

payload of 80 short tons and an initial cruise altitude of 28,000 feet, the C-17 

has an unrefueled range of approximately 2,400 nautical miles. The aircraft 

length is 174 feet, its height is about 55 feet, and its wing span is almost 170 

feet. The C-17 will be AMC’s primary military airlift aircraft once the C-141s 

are retired from service.

Source: DOD.
Appendix II

Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for 

Strategic Airlift

Page 25 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

C-141 Aircraft

Figure 4: C-141 Aircraft

The C-141 was AMC's first jet aircraft designed to meet military standards 

as a troop and cargo carrier, and is used to airlift combat forces over long 

distances, deliver those forces and their equipment either by landing or 

airdrop, resupply forces, and transport the sick and wounded from a hostile 

area to medical facilities. The aircraft length is approximately 168 feet, its 

height is about 39 feet, and the wing span is 160 feet. The Air Force retired 

its C-141s from the active duty inventory in September 2004 and began 

transferring C-141s to the Air Reserve and Air National Guard forces in July 

1986. DOD plans to retire C-141s used by the Air Reserves and Air National 

Guard before 2006. 

Source: DOD.
Appendix II

Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for 

Strategic Airlift

Page 26 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

C-130 Aircraft

Figure 5: C-130 Aircraft

The C-130 is the primary transport aircraft for air-dropping troops and 

equipment into hostile areas. Other roles include airlift support, Antarctic 

ice resupply, and aeromedical missions. Using its aft loading ramp and 

door, the C-130 can accommodate oversized cargo, including utility 

helicopters and six-wheeled armored vehicles, as well as standard 

palletized cargo and military personnel. Additionally, the C-130 can be 

rapidly reconfigured for various types of cargo, such as palletized 

equipment, floor-loaded material, airdrop platforms, container delivery 

system bundles, vehicles and personnel, or aeromedical evacuation. In an 

aerial delivery role, it can airdrop loads up to 21 short tons or use its 

high-flotation landing gear to land and deliver cargo on rough, dirt strips. 

The C-130 has a length of about 97 feet, a height of approximately 38 feet, 

and a wing span of about 132 feet. Depending on the aircraft model, 

the C-130 can carry a maximum of 6 to 8 pallets, 92 to 128 combat troops, 

or a combination of any of these up to the cargo compartment capacity or 

maximum allowable weight.

Source: DOD.
Appendix II

Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for 

Strategic Airlift

Page 27 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

KC-10 Aircraft

Figure 6: KC-10 Aircraft

Although the KC-l0’s primary mission is aerial refueling, it can combine the 

tasks of a tanker and cargo aircraft by refueling fighters and simultaneously 

carrying the fighter support personnel and equipment on overseas 

deployments. The KC-10 can transport up to 75 people and nearly 85 short 

tons of cargo a distance of about 4,400 miles without refueling. The large 

cargo-loading door can accommodate most Air Forces fighter unit support 

equipment. Powered rollers and winches inside the cargo compartment 

permit moving heavy loads. The cargo compartment can accommodate 

loads ranging from 27 pallets to a mix of 17 pallets and 75 passengers. The 

aircraft’s length is almost 182 feet. It has a height of approximately 58 feet 

and a wing span of about 165 feet.

Source: DOD.
Appendix II

Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for 

Strategic Airlift

Page 28 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

KC-135 Aircraft

Figure 7: KC-135 Aircraft

The KC-135’s principal mission is air refueling. However, a cargo deck 

above the refueling system can transport a mixed load of passengers and 

cargo. The KC-135 can carry up to 41.5 short tons of cargo or 37 passengers. 

The aircraft length is about 136 feet, its height is approximately 42 feet, and 

it has a wing span of nearly 131 feet. 

Source: DOD.
Page 29 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized ApendxiI

The extent to which an aircraft’s capacity is utilized on any mission 

depends on the interrelationship of a number of operational factors, 

including (1) operating constraints, such as the flight distance and aircraft 

availability; (2) environmental factors, such as airfield altitude and 

temperature; and (3) DOD policies, including regulations for use of 

strategic airlift and initiatives to improve the supply distribution process. 

This appendix describes some of these factors. 

Operational Constraints There are several operational factors that can affect the capacity utilized, 

including (1) aircraft availability, (2) aircraft characteristics, (3) cargo 

characteristics and loading configuration, and (4) route and fuel needs, 

among other factors. According to AMC officials, these factors, among 

others, contribute to capacity limitations.

Aircraft Availability Because airlift aircraft are normally in high demand and usually highly 

tasked, they are reserved for movement of forces and cargo critical to the 

successful execution of campaign plans. However, competing demands can 

limit the availability of aircraft to meet specific mission needs, forcing AMC 

planners to potentially use larger aircraft, such as the C-5, to transport 

payloads that cannot maximize the available space. Operational tempo and 

the number of aircraft undergoing maintenance and assigned for training 

needs and crew certification drive the total number of aircraft available to 

AMC officials at any given time. User requirements and threat situations 

may allow little or no flexibility in the delivery times, locations, and load 

configurations. Although exact numbers fluctuate daily, AMC generally has 

about 85 C-5 and C-17 aircraft available daily for strategic airlift missions. 

However, special events and maintenance problems can reduce the number 

and type of aircraft available for these missions. Officials told us that at the 

beginning of OEF, 17 C-5 aircraft were broken and grounded at Guam for 

maintenance. Efforts to improve the readiness rate of C-5 aircraft from 

65 percent reduce the availability of these aircraft further and increase the 

need for C-17s. According to an AMC official, three C-17s are needed to 

replace each C-5. Because C-17 aircraft are also being used for intratheater 

airlift in Iraq, United States Central Command officials expressed concern 

about having enough C-17s to meet strategic airlift demands. 

Aircraft Characteristics Aircraft characteristics, such as the size and shape of the aircraft’s cargo 

compartment and strength of the aircraft floors and ramps, operational 

tempo, and chronological age, can impact an aircraft’s capacity and the 

payload that can be transported. Aircraft have weight, height, and width 
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 30 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

restrictions that can limit the amount or type of cargo that can be 

transported. For example, the maximum weight limit on a C-5 ramp is 

7.5 short tons, and some locations within the aircraft require a 14-inch 

safety aisle to allow aircrew members clearance while securing cargo. Our 

review of mission planning files showed that sometimes cargo was not 

placed on the aircraft ramps because of weight constraints, thereby leaving 

some available space unused. Moreover, aircraft differ on what they can 

carry. For instance, the C-5 and C-17 can carry all cargo types as well as 

troops, while the C-141 can carry troops, cargo loaded on a standard-sized 

pallet (bulk), and oversized cargo—nonpalletized cargo that is larger than 

bulk, such as vehicles. In addition, an aircraft’s contours can limit the 

height of pallets and rolling cargo placed in certain areas. For example, the 

KC-10 has a rounded cargo compartment that requires pallets be built to 

accommodate this shape; as a result, the pallets may have less cargo on 

them than they could theoretically transport. 

The high operational tempo, number of flying hours, and the chronological 

age of aircraft can limit the payload that an aircraft can carry because these 

factors contribute to structural fatigue, corrosion, cracking, wear and tear 

on systems, and aircraft obsolescence. For example, United States Central 

Command officials told us that C-17 aircraft are being used extensively for 

both intratheater and strategic airlift for OIF, causing the aircraft to wear 

out and reach their retirement dates sooner than expected. As a result, 

these aircraft cannot carry payloads as heavy as would be expected. 

Cargo Characteristics and 

Loading Configuration 

Cargo dimensions, characteristics, and placement in an aircraft can impact 

capacity utilized. AMC categorizes cargo as (1) bulk—liquid or dry cargo 

that can be loaded on a standard-sized pallet without exceeding the pallet’s 

dimensions; (2) oversized— nonpalletized rolling stock that is larger than 

bulk that exceeds the dimensions of a standard-sized pallet, but can be 

transported on a C-5, C-17, C-141, C-130, or KC-10; and (3) outsized—cargo 

that exceeds dimensions of oversized cargo and requires the use of a C-5 or 

C-17 aircraft. When scheduling airlift, AMC attempts to match cargo 

dimensions with the appropriate type of aircraft; however, a specific type 

of aircraft may not be available. Cargo characteristics can also affect 

aircraft capacity utilized. For example, ammunition is dense cargo that can 

be loaded with little wasted space, but helicopters are large, light, and 

irregularly shaped, and thus use cargo space less efficiently, as shown in 

figure 8.
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 31 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Figure 8: Unloading of a HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopter from a C-17 in Support of 

OIF

Note: A single Pave Hawk helicopter takes up most of a C-17’s cargo compartment and uses multiple 

pallet positions. Thus, the helicopter’s dimensions do not permit loading the C-17 to its maximum 

allowable cabin load. 

Further, if hazardous material is transported, other types of cargo and 

passengers may not be loaded on the aircraft. If enough hazardous material 

is not available at the aerial port, payloads may be lighter. Each aircraft 

also has a specific number of positions—referred to as pallet positions—

where cargo or passengers can be placed. For example, the C-5 aircraft has 

36 pallet positions, and the C-17 has 18. Aerial ports—airfields that have 

been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and cargo as 

well as authorized ports for entrance into or departure from the country 

where located—track the placement of cargo and passengers on the 

aircraft and the number of pallet positions used for each mission. The 

dimensions and type of cargo can require the use of more than one 

position, decreasing the amount of cargo or number of passengers that can 

be transported. Although all pallet positions on an aircraft may be used, the 

pallets may still have space for additional cargo to be placed on them. As a 

result, all pallet positions may appear to be used, but the pallets may not 

have met weight or volume limits. Cargo dimensions may also require the 

Source: DOD.
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 32 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

use of multiple partial pallet positions. In addition, all airlifted cargo must 

be secured in place using rollers and tie-downs, as shown in figure 9. 

Figure 9: Loadmasters Chain Down Cargo on a C-17

Some cargo must be transported in containers or with two or more pallets 

linked together. To secure these items, additional space on the aircraft may 

be needed, thus limiting the placement of additional cargo on board. Also, 

large equipment, such as helicopters, can take up a lot of space and result 

in lighter payloads. For example, in figure 10 (an actual load plan used 

during OEF), the total payload for cargo and passengers was 

approximately 30 short tons. Of this, the two helicopters took up about half 

of the C-17’s cargo hold and accounted for about 19 short tons of the C-17’s 

payload. Also, one helicopter’s tail hangs over the ramp, preventing the use 

of this area. According to this load plan, it appears that the space available 

on the aircraft was efficiently used assuming that there was no additional 

cargo available to be loaded that would meet the ramp’s weight limitations. 

Source: DOD.
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 33 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Figure 10: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting How Placement of Cargo Can Decrease Payloads

Figure 11 (an actual load plan used during OEF) shows how the presence 

of passengers can impact aircraft capacity utilized. When passengers are 

present, cargo must be placed down the center of the aircraft to provide an 

aisle for passengers. For this load plan, the total payload was 

approximately 23 short tons. 

Figure 11: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting Placement of Cargo to Accommodate 

Passengers

Fuel Considerations Aircraft range and payloads are greatly affected by a mission’s fuel 

requirements. As the distance increases, the fuel requirements increase and 

Source: AMC.

MH-60 Probe 

(helicopter blades) 

Roll-on/roll-off cargo 

(MH-60 helicopter disassembled for transport) Ramp

Saginaw Passengers

Passengers Roll-on/roll-off cargo 

(Kawasaki Mule all-terrain vehicle)

Pallet

Source: AMC.

Passengers

Passengers

Utility truck

Container

Ramp

Cargo trailer Pallets Ammunition
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 34 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

the allowable payload decreases. For instance, if an aircraft must divert 

around a country because it does not have permission to fly over that 

nation’s airspace or it must fly at higher altitudes due to security concerns, 

the aircraft may need to carry more fuel and less cargo and passengers. We 

have reported that an aircraft’s range is significantly reduced with only 

minimal additional weight or due to security concerns. For example, for 

Stryker brigades every additional 1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted 

reduces aircraft range by 250 nautical miles and adds 15 aircraft loads. 1 We 

have also reported that a C-130 aircraft’s range may be reduced if 

operational conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route 

deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed under these 

conditions. Even under ideal flight conditions, such as daytime, low 

headwind, moderate air temperature, and low elevation, adding just a ton 

onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission equipment, 

personnel, or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft’s takeoff-to-landing 

range to 500 miles. Sometimes, the amount of cargo and distances involved 

in strategic airlift operations make air refueling necessary. AMC officials 

told us that air refueling is routinely done for aircraft flying to Iraq; 

Afghanistan; and Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Air refueling may reduce 

the aircraft’s initial fuel requirement, allow for heavier cargo loads, 

increase aircraft range, and reduce the need for ground refueling. If 

refueling is not possible at the off-load station, such as in Khandahar, 

Afghanistan, potential payloads could be reduced or additional enroute 

stops could be required. 

Environmental Factors Environmental factors, such as altitude, pressure, weather, and 

temperature, can also affect the capacity utilized on an aircraft by forcing 

planners and operators to adjust mission payloads and timing to ensure 

effective, efficient, and safe mission accomplishment. High altitudes could 

prevent the use of certain types of aircraft or require lighter payloads and 

less fuel so that the aircraft can take off. For example, the Sierra Army 

Depot in Amadee, California, is located at a high altitude, and it is difficult 

for C-5s to get the lift they need to take off if carrying more than 30 short 

tons; this payload is about 42 short tons less than the payload planning 

1

GAO, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army 

Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003), and Military 

Transformation: Fielding of Army’s Stryker Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations 

for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified, GAO-04-925

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2004).
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 35 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

factor. As a result, AMC officials try not to use C-5 aircraft at this and 

similar locations unless C-17 aircraft are not available. AMC also needs to 

consider temperature changes during the winter and summer months. For 

instance, the allowable cabin load for aircraft flying into Rota Naval Base, 

Spain during the summer decreases by about 10 to18 short tons because 

the temperature is too high for aircraft to maintain enough lift.

DOD Policies Some DOD transportation-related policies, such as the pure pallet initiative 

and the primacy of commanders’ decisions, may result in lighter payloads. 

DOD officials told us that the lighter payloads are acceptable in some 

instances because initiatives reduce risk and customer wait time in theater 

and AMC must meet commanders’ time frames for delivery of cargo and 

passengers.

Pure Pallet Initiative While DOD’s pure pallet initiative delivers palletized cargo to customers in 

the theater more quickly, it can result in lighter pallets and payloads. 

Initiated in March 2004 at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; Charleston Air 

Force Base, South Carolina; and Ramstein Air Base, Germany, DOD’s pure 

pallet initiative is intended to simplify and speed up airlift shipments into 

the United States Central Command’s area of responsibility by building and 

shipping individual aircraft pallets with cargo for a single customer. The 

pure pallet initiative decreases the time needed on the receiving end to 

distribute palletized cargo to individual customers by transferring the 

sorting of cargo to the originating aerial port. Normally, a customer’s cargo 

is loaded onto an aircraft pallet with cargo for other customers within the 

same region. Under this system, a single pallet could contain cargo for 

dozens of customers. The pallet would be broken down when it arrived at 

the destination aerial port, sorted, repalletized, and distributed to 

individual customers. When a pure pallet arrives at the deployed aerial 

port, it can be pulled from the aircraft and immediately handed off to the 

customer or placed on a truck or another aircraft for transport to remote 

locations. In addition, the initiative recognizes that in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

aerial ports are restricted as to the amount of cargo processing facilities, 

amount of equipment, and number of people because of the threat of 

attack. However, DOD officials acknowledge that having enough cargo to 

fill an entire pallet is problematic. To maximize pallet and aircraft 

utilization, the aerial ports can hold cargo for up to 5 days for the Army and 

up to 3 days for the Marine Corps. However, cargo is palletized when it 

reaches 120 hours of port hold time or enough cargo is available to fill a 

pallet causing it to either cube out or weigh out. As we reported in April
Appendix III

Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft 

Capacity Utilized

Page 36 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

2005,2 the result is potentially longer processing times at the originating 

aerial ports in order to reduce customer wait time in theater. AMC tracks 

pure pallet weights each week, aiming for an average of 1.4 short tons per 

pallet. AMC data show that all three aerial ports generally met or surpassed 

the average pure pallet weight goals. 

Combatant Commander 

Decisions 

According to AMC officials, the most efficient way to move passengers and 

cargo is not always the most appropriate during contingency operations. 

During OEF and OIF, combatant commanders frequently required AMC to 

transport troops with their equipment on the same aircraft. According to 

AMC officials, it would have been more efficient to move the troops on one 

aircraft and transport their equipment on a second aircraft immediately 

following the first. However, commanders fear that passengers would 

arrive at their destinations and equipment sent on the second aircraft 

would be delayed due to maintenance problems or, if sent on a military 

aircraft, the mission might be canceled. As a result, AMC may fly aircraft 

with reduced payloads in order to meet combatant commanders’ delivery 

time frames. However, these decisions take into account the expected 

situation at the destination; some units, such as special operations forces 

and the Marines, immediately require their equipment, so separating 

passengers and equipment is not the preferred transportation method. 

Although the aircraft may be underutilized, AMC is meeting its primary 

objective to deliver “the right items to the right place at the right time.”

2

GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
Page 37 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation
Page 39 GAO-05-819 Defense Transportation

Appendix V

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiV

GAO Contact William M. Solis (202) 512-5140

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact name above, Ann Borseth, Assistant Director; 

Krislin M. Bolling; Virginia A. Chanley; Karen N. Harms; Linda S. Keefer; 

Ronald La Due Lake; Renee McElveen; Maria-Alaina I. Rambus; Vanessa R. 

Taylor; and Robert K. Wild also made key contributions to this report.

(350587)
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