NO. 12-15-00245-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

JEFFERY WAYNE BATSON, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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APPEAL FROM THE 145TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jeffrey Wayne Batson appeals his conviction for abandoning a child. In one issue, 

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 2, 2014, Appellant became involved in an altercation with his wife, Kimberly 

Batson. At trial, Kimberly testified that Appellant had been drinking, was not in a good mood, 

became angry that she had not prepared dinner, and began pushing and punching her. Adellah 

Batson, the daughter of Appellant and Kimberly, became upset. When Kimberly attempted to 

console Adellah, Appellant kicked Kimberly in the face. Kimberly then ran from the house with 

Adellah, who was two years old. 

Appellant pursued Kimberly, grabbed Adellah, and placed Adellah in his car. Kimberly 

feared that Adellah was in danger. She attempted to seek help from Jennifer Shipman, who lived 

across the street, but Appellant used his car to block her path. Shipman testified that she

contacted 9-1-1 after hearing screams and finding an hysterical Kimberly. Because Adellah was 

not with Kimberly, Shipman assumed she was inside the couple’s home. According to Shipman, 

Appellant drove onto the road and began revving his car engine and flashing his headlights. This 
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behavior made Shipman afraid to try to retrieve Adellah. Shipman testified that her husband 

approached Appellant and did not see Adellah in Appellant’s car. 

Shipman testified that deputies arrived around twelve minutes after she first encountered 

Kimberly, who testified that a sheriff’s deputy took her home. Kimberly found Adellah, who 

was wearing only a diaper, inside the house. Deputy Austin McDonald testified that Adellah 

was crying, unclothed, and looking for her parents. He testified that the house was unlocked and 

a space heater was turned on and within Adellah’s reach. Although the record is unclear as to 

how Adellah ended up in the house by herself, McDonald testified that Appellant admitted to 

leaving Adellah alone in the house.

Kimberly testified that the weather was cold that night, the space heater turns on 

automatically, and she would not have left Adellah alone with the heater. She explained that 

Adellah had to be told to stay out of things and that she could have touched the stove, turned on 

the heater, or left the house. Shipman did not believe that Adellah would leave the house or turn 

on the space heater, but she would not have left Adellah alone in the house. She believed that 

twelve minutes is a long time for a two-year-old to be left alone. Kimberly believed that Adellah 

was placed in danger that night. She testified that Adellah now has nightmares.

Deputy McDonald testified that Appellant smelled of alcohol and appeared intoxicated. 

McDonald opined that Adellah’s being left alone could have been dangerous and that a 

reasonable person would not have left her alone in the house. He testified that the risks of 

leaving a two-year-old child alone, such as exposure to a space heater and access to an unlocked 

front door, are unreasonable. According to McDonald, it could have been difficult to find 

Adellah had she wandered outside the house. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant 

guilty of abandoning a child. The trial court sentenced Appellant to confinement for two years in 

a state jail facility.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction for abandoning a child.1 Appellant contends that Adellah would have been exposed 

 

1 Appellant argues that the evidence is factually insufficient. However, the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals has abandoned the factual sufficiency standard of review. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010). The standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 

(1979) is now “the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is 
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to greater risk had she remained outside with her parents during a violent confrontation. He 

maintains that Adellah was not exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm when she was left inside 

her home. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, considering 

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally justified in 

finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given 

their testimony. Id. We give deference to the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve evidentiary 

conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. 

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as 

probative as direct evidence in establishing the accused’s guilt. Id.

A person commits the offense of child abandonment when, having custody, care, or 

control of a child younger than fifteen years, the person intentionally abandons the child in any 

place under circumstances that expose the child to an unreasonable risk of harm. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.041(b) (West 2011). “[A]bandon” means to leave the child without providing 

for the child’s reasonable and necessary care, under circumstances in which a reasonable, 

similarly situated adult would not leave a child of that age and ability. Id. § 22.041(a). A person 

subject to Section 22.041 has assumed the responsibility to act reasonably with regard to the 

child’s safety. Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Section 22.041 

imposes a duty upon the party responsible for a child to refrain from unreasonably subjecting the 

child to danger. Id. The conduct criminalized by Section 22.041, i.e., the neglect of this duty, is 

per se dangerous. Id. 

Analysis

Section 22.041 is intended to protect vulnerable individuals. Rey v. State, 280 S.W.3d 

265, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Children under the age of six, like Adellah, are particularly 

vulnerable. See Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The record 

indicates that Adellah was found alone in her home, which was unlocked. The jury also heard 

evidence that Adellah was upset and unclothed during cold weather and had easy access to a 

 

sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. Accordingly, we will review any legal or factual sufficiency challenge in a criminal case under that 

standard. See id.; see also Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). 
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space heater. This evidence supports an inference that Adellah was susceptible to intruders, 

could have been injured inside the home, or could have wandered outside the unlocked home. 

Additionally, the jury heard Kimberly and Shipman testify that they would not have left Adellah 

alone, as well as McDonald’s testimony that a reasonable person would not have left Adellah 

alone. Appellant’s act of leaving Adellah without supervision and protection, even for a short 

time, constitutes a violation of his duty to act reasonably with regard to her safety. See Schultz, 

923 S.W.2d at 4; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001(a)(2) (West 2014) (parental duties 

include care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline). 

As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the jury could conclude 

that a reasonable, similarly situated adult would not have left a child of Adellah’s age and ability 

alone in her home. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(a). Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the jury could find, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that Appellant intentionally abandoned Adellah in a place under circumstances that 

exposed her to an unreasonable risk of harm. See id. § 22.041(b). Because the evidence is 

legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

GREG NEELEY

Justice

Opinion delivered June 15, 2016.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 15, 2016

NO. 12-15-00245-CR

JEFFERY WAYNE BATSON,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 145th District Court 

of Nacogdoches County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F1420617)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.