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THE WESTERN BALKANS: POLICY RESPONSES TO

TODAY’S CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

[CSCE 111–1–8]

(

Available via http://www.csce.gov 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida,

Co-Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland,

Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ROBERT F. WICKER, Mississippi

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

MICHAEL H. POSNER, Department of State 

ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense 

MICHAEL C. CAMUN ̃ EZ, Department of Commerce 

(II) 

THE WESTERN BALKANS: POLICY RESPONSES 

TO TODAY’S CHALLENGES 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 1

Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 3

Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .......................................... 4

WITNESSES 

Hon. Stuart Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................... 5

Bjo ̈rn Lyrvall, Director-General for Political Affairs, Swedish 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs ..................................................... 17

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 31

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking 

Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........................................................................................... 33

Prepared statement of Stuart Jones .......................................... 34

Prepared statement of Bjo ̈rn Lyrvall ......................................... 51

(III) 

(1)

THE WESTERN BALKANS: POLICY RESPONSES 

TO TODAY’S CHALLENGES 

September 29, 2009

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The hearing was held at 10:37 a.m. in SVC 212/210, Capitol Visitor Center, Washington, DC, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Alcee L. 

Hastings, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe; and Hon. Robert B. Anderholt, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Hon. Stuart Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for European Affairs, U.S. Department of State; and Bjo ̈rn Lyrvall, 

Director-General for Political Affairs, Swedish Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs. 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Let me welcome everybody to this hearing of the 

Helsinki Commission, the Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe. On behalf of my Co-Chairman, Congressman Hastings, 

and myself and Congressman Aderholt, we welcome all—everyone 

here today for the second hearing that we’re having on the Western 

Balkans, which has been a major focal point of this Commission for 

many, many years. 

We had a hearing in April, the Commission, on this subject 

which Chairman Hastings conducted and requested that we pay attention to this area, which I think was very important for us to do. 

Expert witnesses had brought to our attention disturbing trends, 

particularly in Bosnia, but also in Kosovo and some of the neighboring countries. 

In May, we know Vice President Biden and the Secretary-General of the European Council visited Sarajevo. The Vice President 

gave a stirring speech to the Bosnian Parliament urging an end to 

nationalistic rhetoric and forward movement on reforms. And 

shortly thereafter, I had the opportunity to lead a delegation to 

Bosnia, where we met with the political leadership. 

The delegation got an ample look at the wide and sometimes 

sharp division between the three groups. Meeting some Bosnian 

students of all ethnicities later in our visit I think was very enlightening to all members of our delegation. They saw the gap beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
2

tween what is necessary for a nation to survive and the active concerns of each of the ethnic groups. 

I must tell you that my observations in visiting Bosnia were 

clear, and that is that there needs to be constitutional reform so 

the country can function as a country. Now, that’s not to be confused with the dangers of nationalism. They need to have a functioning national government that respects the rights of all of the 

ethnic groups within that country, and to date, that formula has 

been missing. There needs to be pride in a unified nation, and that 

simply was not being promoted by the leaders during our visit, and 

that was very clear. And we left that country urging them to move 

forward with constitutional reform. 

The Obama administration grasped right away the situation in 

the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia, and remains unsettled. This 

concern prompted the Vice President’s mission to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina. We have not seen Bosnia move forward with 

vigorous constitutional-reform efforts. Instead, we have learned of 

the continued gridlock in the central government with ethnic disputes over appointments and hear charged rhetoric at the highest 

level suggesting that Bosnia’s very existence could well be in jeopardy. The commission takes these continued slides very, very seriously. 

Meanwhile, in Kosovo, there have been additional bilateral recognitions of an independent statehood, which obviously is extremely positive, but we do not hear of much progress in other 

areas that are important, even with the deployment of the statusneutral E.U. rule-of-law mission. Recent incidents suggest the need 

for more active and vigorous work to build institutions and foster 

dialogue. 

Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia also have their own 

challenges, some related to Bosnia and Kosovo and some unique to 

their own internal dynamics. Even Croatia, which has made enormous strides in the last decades, still needs to contend with issues 

related to earlier conflicts. This past year I was in Croatia and saw 

a very vibrant country that is making incredible progress, and 

when I reflect that it’s just a few years ago there was active war 

in that country, they’re clearly making the type of progress we 

would like to see. 

I also had a chance to visit Montenegro. I took a Commission delegation into Montenegro. What a country, what potential—a small 

country and population that could have an incredible impact. They 

seem to get a long with all their neighbors; that formula is one that 

we would like to duplicate in the region. 

So we are encouraged by the recent breakthrough in Slovenia on 

border issues. That hopefully will pave the way for Croatia soon to 

enter the E.U. E.U. and NATO accessions remain the foundation 

of western strategy for the entire region. Our hearing today will 

touch on some of these problems. Most importantly, we’ll focus on 

what the United States and the European Union are doing, or 

should be doing, in response. 

Is there a plan to break the continuing deadlock that threatens 

Bosnia’s stability? Is it possible to make progress on badly needed 

constitutional reform? Will the high representative remain in place 

until the job is done? What is being done to overcome Kosovo’s ethVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
3

nic divide, particularly in the north, and to bring the Albanians 

and Serbs together at least to find some common ground? Is the 

international presence there an effective deterrent to renewed violence? These are just a few of the questions that I hope that we 

will be able to discuss at today’s hearing. I hope our discussion 

today sends a strong signal to the Western Balkans that is positive 

and encouraging. 

Our two witnesses are key players in U.S. and E.U. policy development and coordination. First, we’ll hear from Stuart Jones, the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and holder of the department’s Balkan portfolio. Our second witness will be 

Mr. Lyrvall, the Director General for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Sweden. Sweden currently holds the Presidency of 

the E.U. and speaks collectively for its members. Let me turn to 

the Co-Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Hastings, for comments 

that he might want to make. 

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, and I thank you for 

convening this hearing today. As you mentioned, for the hearing in 

April on the Western Balkans and Bosnia, we had Paddy Ashdown 

as well as a panel of experts based in the Balkans, and their presentations about the challenges facing the region revealed disturbing trends, particularly in Bosnia, but also in Kosovo. And I 

concluded that hearing with a call for a part two, and Mr. Chairman, before we even get into this one, I can tell you that there’s 

going to be a need for a part three. 

I also want to thank our witnesses for being present today. I believe that if asked, practically every diplomat would generally express a preference that Parliamentarians go away and leave them 

alone, but Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones in the State Department, however, understands not only the necessity, but also the advantages of partnership in foreign-policymaking across the 

branches of government. Over the years, it has also become clear 

that this bicameral and bipartisan Commission is perhaps the best 

example of that partnership in action. 

The goal of this hearing today is not to criticize policy but to 

share views and ideas on improving policy to the benefit of the people in the countries of the Western Balkans. As one witness noted 

in April, the mere holding of a hearing in the U.S. Congress sends 

a signal of interest that she felt could have its own positive reverberations in the countries of concern. Let’s hope that today’s hearing will have that effect. 

Finally, I want to thank our witness from the Swedish Foreign 

Ministry, Mr. Lyrvall, for being here today. Sweden currently holds 

the E.U. presidency, and it must be a very difficult task to speak 

for all 27 member states. It is important to have Europe’s views on 

the Western Balkans, however, because U.S. policy in the region is 

so closely tied to that of the European Union. 

I want to express the Commission’s particular appreciation that 

you responded to our invitation on fairly short notice, after some 

officials from Brussels declined our invitation to testify today. Your 

Embassy here in Washington was very helpful in facilitating your 

4

presence here today, and as I said to you, I know that my good 

friend, the Chair of Foreign Affairs in Sweden, will be here with 

a delegation of Parliamentarians, and we intend to accommodate 

them in appropriate fashion. 

I’ll refrain from discussing specific policy options right now at the 

opening, but let me conclude by noting that I’ve traveled, as you 

heard the chair and I know our colleague Mr. Aderholt, as other 

members of the Commission have, throughout the Balkans. I’ve not 

only met with senior officials, but also talked to citizens voting on 

election days, most recently in Albania. I visited camps for displaced persons such as those that still exist for Roma in Kosovo. 

I actually watched people scramble for cover away from sniper fire 

in Sarajevo during the war, and I met courageous human-rights activists. 

The people of the Balkans are, regardless of their various 

ethnicities, some of the most sincere, hospitable and friendly people 

I have met. In Albania, Mr. Chairman, honest to goodness, I saw 

more American flags there than we have here on the Fourth of 

July, and it was very interesting to me. I didn’t know much about 

Albania—I’d been to Kosovo and Bosnia and Croatia a lot, but I 

had only been there at that time, and as citizens of OSCE states 

that have pledged to respect their rights and dignity, they are—

they deserve to be treated as such by their leaders and by the 

international community. I hope that as we look at policy options 

to bring stability and encourage integration in the Balkans, the 

people in the region need to be—the people in the region need to 

be our priority concern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARDIN. Congressman Aderholt. 

HON. ROBERT B. ANDERHOLT, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION 

ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank 

the Chairman and the Co-Chair for their vision of bringing this 

hearing today before us to concentrate a little bit on the Balkan region. The Balkan region is a very intriguing place, a real beautiful 

place. I, too, like my colleagues, have had the opportunity to travel 

over there, most recently traveled to Bosnia—actually, twice this 

year—and also, as well, as I traveled to Albania and Macedonia. 

But the entire Balkan region is a—really a beautiful part of the 

world. It has so much to offer, and it impacts the entire world. 

So I’ll probably have some more comments a little bit later, but 

I just want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look 

forward to your testimony and look forward to a good hearing. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. Secretary Jones, we appreciate very 

much that you are with us today. As I pointed out earlier, Secretary Jones is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and holds the department’s Balkan portfolio. Thank 

you for being here. You may proceed to your full statement; it will 

be included in our record and you may proceed as you see fit. 

5

HON. STUART JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Sec. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Commission for this invitation today. The Helsinki 

Commission has played, and I’m reassured to hear you say it today, 

that you will continue to play—ah, thank you—that you will continue to play a significant role in fostering stability and development in the Balkans. So I welcome this opportunity to discuss with 

you the challenges ahead. 

A decade of hard work has brought us much closer to realizing 

our goal of including the Western Balkans in a Europe whole, free 

and at peace. All of the countries have undergone dramatic political 

and social transitions in recent years. With Kosovo’s declaration of 

independence in February 2008, the final chapter in the breakup 

of the former Yugoslavia was closed. In April of this year, Croatia 

and Albania became members of the NATO Alliance. Macedonia too 

will receive an invitation to join the Alliance as soon as the dispute 

with Greece over its name is resolved. Serbia and Montenegro completed an orderly separation and are developing their democracies. 

All of these countries are committed to and have taken steps toward eventual membership in the European Union. Perhaps even 

more fundamentally, publics and political establishments throughout the region today embrace a vision of their region’s integration 

into the European mainstream. They also recognize that reform is 

the only path that will lead to this goal. 

The United States commitment to the region is steadfast. Vice 

President Biden’s May visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and 

Kosovo underscored our commitment to work to help the countries 

of the region realize their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Together, we 

have told the parties that the United States and our European 

partners will assist where we can to facilitate resolution of bilateral 

and internal disputes that obstruct integration and reform. But in 

the final analysis, as Congressman Hastings said, the burden of 

achieving their aspirations rests on these countries, their leaders 

and their people. Mr. Chairman, to save time for the committee’s 

priority concerns, I would like to highlight conditions in just three 

of the countries in the Western Balkans. 

To Bosnia first, and I would like to associate myself with your 

remarks on the situation in Bosnia. I agree with you analysis, and 

as the Vice President made clear during his May 19th speech before the Bosnian Parliament, we are concerned with conditions in 

Bosnia today. Political discourse is polarized, reforms have ground 

to a halt and in some cases are being rolled back. Twelve months 

away from their next national election, political leaders appear to 

have quit trying to find the compromises that would create momentum toward European integration. 

In an effort to reverse this dynamic, we are focused on two areas: 

The first is completing the so-called 5+2 objectives and conditions 

established by the Peace Implementation Council. Fulfillment of 

5+2 is fundamental for Bosnia to advance its goals of NATO and 

E.U. membership. Two of the five objectives remain outstanding. 

These are resolving ownership of state and defense property between the levels of government. It’s essential that these be resolved 

6

in full prior to OHR’s closure to ensure the E.U. Special Representative can begin with a clean slate. 

The Peace Implementation Council must also make a positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia based on full compliance with 

the Dayton Agreement. The second core area, as you mentioned, 

Mr. Chairman, is constitutional reform. The Dayton constitution’s 

basic elements, such as the two-entity structure, can and should remain intact. However, Dayton can be updated to allow Bosnia to 

meet the obligations of E.U. and NATO membership. 

Apart from 5+2 and transition of the Office of the High Representative, we have begun formal conversations with the parties 

about possible reforms, with the goal of achieving a modest initial 

package of reforms well in advance of the October 2010 elections. 

These would be—to improve the functionality of the state and better position Bosnia for E.U. candidacy and the NATO membership 

process. We are collaborating closely with our European partners 

to develop reforms that would achieve this goal, and I’m delighted 

that you are going to hear from my colleague from Sweden, Bjo ̈rn 

Lyrvall, the Political Director from the Foreign Ministry of Sweden. 

Moving next to Kosovo. Kosovo’s success as an independent 

multiethnic democracy within its borders is now contributing to region-wide stability. A year-and-a-half after Kosovo’s declaration of 

independence, its leaders have made tremendous progress in implementing Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Plan. They are building 

roads and schools as well as ministries and agencies. Sixty-two 

countries now recognize the Republic of Kosovo as an independent 

state, and many more support its membership in the World Bank 

and the IMF. 

Kosovo’s independence is irreversible. Of course, much remains 

to be done. Vice President Biden urged the government to redouble 

efforts to strengthen governing capacity, develop a sound economy, 

strengthen rule of law and tackle crime and corruption when he 

visited in May. Equally importantly, he urged outreach to Kosovo’s 

Serb community to build dialogue, establish strong protections for 

Serbs and other minorities and improve conditions for the return 

of the displaced. We are actively engaged with Serbs all over 

Kosovo to provide assistance and encourage their interaction with 

Kosovo institutions in order to enhance the sustainability of their 

communities as part of a secure, democratic, and multiethnic 

Kosovo. 

Third, a stable, prosperous, democratic Serbia is essential to regional stability and cooperation. Vice President Biden’s visit to Belgrade in May underlined our desire to see a reinvigorated United 

States-Serbian relationship. We support Serbia’s European and 

Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Our military-to-military relationship is 

becoming more robust. Serbia’s partnership with the Ohio National 

Guard is a model for the region. President Tadic cemented these 

ties when he visited and was warmly received in Cleveland last 

week. As the Vice President conveyed to President Tadic, we can 

agree to disagree with Serbia over Kosovo. But together, we should 

also pursue pragmatic solutions to improve the lives of Serbs in 

Kosovo and to ensure that they have a voice in their communities. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains a major assistance 

donor to the Western Balkans. In 2009 alone, we allocated more 

7

than $116 million in support of programs aimed at promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Our continued strong 

support for the OSCE missions in the region adds a multiplier effect in helping the Western Balkans develop stable institutions and 

societies. 

Ensuring governments uphold protections and rights of minorities so that they may have an equitable voice and stake in their 

country’s future remains a focus of our work. Although governments have made strides, ethnic and religious minority communities continue to face instances of abuse and discrimination. The 

region’s Roma still remain among the most imperiled, and nowhere 

is this program more salient than in Kosovo, where we are working 

to relocate Roma living in a lead-poisoned camp in North Mitrovica. 

The region as a whole has also made progress in combating trafficking in persons. All the Western Balkan countries either comply 

fully with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum requirements or are making significant efforts to bring themselves 

into compliance. We will continue working to improve their efforts. 

The conduct of elections in the region has also seen overall improvement. March elections in Montenegro met almost all OSCE 

and Council of Europe commitments. Although in Macedonia 2008 

elections fell short, 2009 elections were judged by ODIHR to have 

met most international standards. Albania’s June 28 elections also 

showed tangible progress over previous elections, including improvements in voter registration and identification and in the legal 

framework. ODIHR judged that they met most OSCE commitments 

but fell short of Albania’s potential to meet the highest standards 

for democratic elections. 

Areas for improvement were identified in ballot counting and 

tabulation, media bias and pressure on public servants by political 

parties in government during the campaign. But the new government of Albania has acknowledged these shortcomings and has 

committed itself to address them in future legislation and procedures. Looking ahead, Kosovo will hold municipal elections this November, its first as an independent country, and we are providing 

significant support. 

Crime and corruption remain serious problems hindering political and economic development in the region. Many of our assistance programs are aimed at reducing opportunities for bribery, 

building oversight and audit capabilities and also bolstering an 

independent judiciary and other activities. To cite just one example, our Model Court Initiative in Bosnia, completed in May, helped 

to institute European standards in 33 local courts, upgrade court 

infrastructure and improve customer service. This resulted in a reduction in case backlogs by up to 75 percent. Bosnia is now implementing the Model Court standards throughout its court system. 

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 

continues to play a central role in promoting peace, justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. Since 1993, the ICTY has 

brought 161 indictments and concluded proceedings against 116 

persons, with 57 convictions and 10 acquittals. Two fugitives, 

Ratko Mladic ́, and Goran Hadzic, have yet to be captured. They 

will not escape justice by outlasting the Tribunal. Our strong support for the ICTY will continue until its work is completed. 

8

In sum, the region has come a long way, but the journey is not 

complete. America has a deep and abiding stake in the region’s success. In concert with our European partners bilaterally and 

through the OSCE and NATO, the Obama Administration is intensifying our engagement with the region, pressing to accelerate reforms that will move the Balkans toward the European mainstream. We will continue to build on this hard-won foundation until 

democracy, openness and modernity eclipse ethnic nationalism, intolerance, and discrimination, so that all the countries in the region 

may take their place in Europe. Thank you for this opportunity, 

and of course I would welcome any questions you may have. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, Secretary Jones, let me thank you for your 

comprehensive statement. [Laughter.] 

You’ve covered just about every point that I would have wanted 

you to cover, so I thank you for the comprehensive nature. 

And just to make an observation before asking a few questions, 

if this hearing would have been a year ago, I think our concerns 

would have been different. And that’s to point out that things have 

gotten, in some cases, much worse than we had anticipated a year 

ago, requiring us to place priority on it. So I’m glad you mentioned 

Bosnia first in your list of concerns. We obviously are very concerned about what’s happening in Kosovo and Serbia, and I appreciate you putting a spotlight on that, and you mentioned many 

other countries—every country in the region of which we have concerns. 

Let me just share with you a story about my visit to Montenegro. 

It was the first U.S. congressional delegation to Montenegro since 

its recent independence. And in preparation for that visit, the Helsinki Commission gives me my normal background materials and 

they says, you know, you’re going to be asked about economic ties 

between the United States and Montenegro because it’s a country 

that is just starting to emerge and Americans don’t know much 

about it; it’s a beautiful country on the Adriatic. And, yes, that was 

raised, but it was not their main focus. 

And then I got all of these briefing documents about how Montenegro has been able to become independent of Serbia, maintain a 

relationship with Serbia yet recognize Kosovo and have a good relationship with every country in the region. 

So we were expecting that their leadership would sort of boast 

about that issue, about how they’ve done that and know that they 

would want to talk to us about the U.S. commitments in the region. 

And, yes, that was brought up; it was not their top priority. 

By far they were focused on Bosnia—focused on Bosnia. They 

said, if we don’t work out Bosnia, it threatens Montenegro. There 

is a significant refugee issue of people coming across the border 

from Bosnia into Montenegro that could affect the stability of that 

country. Remember, it’s a country of under a million people so a 

small shift in population can have a major impact on that nation. 

So they mentioned to me Bosnia. And then we look at what is 

happening; we see the statements from the leadership of the 

Republika Srpska, which are obviously fueling the flames of nationalism in that region, and we sort of wonder. They also question 

whether the high representative should leave immediately knowing 

full well that that’s been, in some cases, our only break from 

9

changes that could move that nation backward and could lead it to 

potential conflict. 

So I guess my question to you is, what do we expect from Europe 

and the United States to make sure that the country of Bosnia can 

survive? And I really think we’re at that point where its survival 

is in question. 

Just a year ago, we were talking about moving forward toward 

integration. Now we’re talking about trying to save a nation. 

Sec. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Of course, I share your 

concerns and I appreciate this opportunity to talk about the situation in Bosnia. We are very concerned about the situation in Bosnia. We are worried about the divisive nature of the political discourse. 

So what can be done? That is the question. First of all, I think 

we have to work in concert with our European partners. And I 

think that not only the symbolism but also the substance of the 

Vice President’s trip to Bosnia in May with Javier Solana, the E.U. 

High Representative, sent a very important message to the parties, 

that the United States and Europe are in this together, that we are 

invested in finding solutions for Bosnia as we go forward and that 

there will be no space between us. I think that’s an important message for all of the parties there. 

Second, obviously, we should be moving Bosnia toward transition. The people across the board, regardless of ethnic group, support European integration there. So that’s a common thread that 

we can build on. 

We also find surprising support for NATO membership, though 

certainly not as widespread. So I think we need to tap into the aspirations of the Bosnian people for European and trans-Atlantic integration. 

Mr. CARDIN. Just for 1 second, I agree with what you’re saying, 

including NATO membership. But there is no way that they are 

going to become NATO members unless they have a national government that can function. We’re not going to open up NATO unless we know that there is a country that can speak for its people—

and they’re moving in the wrong direction from that today. 

Sec. JONES. I agree. And—this comes back to your original point, 

which is the need for constitutional reform. And we think that the 

parties need to come together to discuss a package of constitutional 

reforms in the time remaining before they get into the electoral 

season for their October 2010 (sic) elections. And the reforms 

should be aimed specifically at functionality, that the state needs 

to be able to function, looking toward the day when the OHR goes 

away. So that is the focus of our attention: working with the parties, thinking about which constitutional reforms will address this 

issue of functionality and how we can move the parties toward 

compromise and solution on these issues. 

Mr. CARDIN. Let me just turn quickly to Kosovo and Serbia and 

how we are progressing in our relationship with both of those countries. Kosovo has made some progress; there is no question about 

it. It seems to be at sort of a standstill right now as far as some 

of the reforms that we would like to see and, of course, with the 

relationship with Serbia vis-a-vis Russia, it is still unclear as to 

whether Russia will let the international community move forward 

10

with total recognition of Kosovo, particularly in the United Nations. 

I appreciate your observations here. I do want to make—want to 

underscore two points that you made. In regards to the International Criminal Court and the fact that two indictees have been 

long-avoiding accountability, I concur in your conclusion that we 

will not yield on this. 

But it will be helpful if we send a very clear message on that to 

Serbia including the conditionalities that we put that Congress continuously puts in the appropriations bill including the fact that for 

complete integration, this issue needs to be successfully resolved so 

that we can conclude our commitment to bring justice to the victims who were victimized by these war crimes. 

And the second point I appreciate you mentioning is the Roma 

population. It has been a high priority for this commission. And in 

Kosovo that is an issue that needs to be dealt with and addressed. 

And we’ll be watching that closely. And I am pleased to see the initiative in regards to the community whose health is at risk. 

Could you just update us a little bit more as to what role you 

think Russia is playing as it relates to both the U.S. and Europe’s 

involvement in Kosovo and Serbia? 

Sec. JONES. Thank you. Certainly Russia’s view on Kosovo is different from ours. They do not recognize Kosovo as a new republic. 

They believe that it should still continue to be treated as part of 

Serbia. On this point, we just have a fundamental disagreement. 

And I don’t see any prospect for these points of view to come together in the near future. 

Nonetheless, as we are with Serbia, I think we can agree to disagree on the issue of Kosovo’s independence and work with the 

Russians to recognize the rights of Serbs in Kosovo and to recognize that the stability of the region is paramount. And that’s been 

the nature of my conversations with my Russian counterparts. 

In Bosnia, Russia, of course, is a member of the peace implementation council. And they are a part of our discussions on the 5+2 

conditionality and the eventual transition of the Office of the High 

Rep. And in my conversations, again, with my Russian counterpart, 

there is no disagreement between us that the 5+2 needs to be fulfilled and has not yet been fulfilled. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, let me ask you one final question on Macedonia. Your optimism about that issue—do you know something 

about the Greek elections that we don’t know? 

Sec. JONES. You know better than me not to bet on elections, 

Senator. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, I take it that regardless of what party wins 

in the Greek elections, this issue would be difficult to resolve before 

an election. So I take it that the elections in Greece will provide 

a new opportunity to engage this issue and hopefully get a successful resolution. 

Sec. JONES. We certainly hope so. We have had, as you know, extensive contact with both the Macedonian and Greek Governments 

on this issue over a period of several months and years, of course. 

We have been gratified by the statements and the behavior of the 

Macedonian Government, particularly in the last 8 months. And I 

think that the Macedonian Government should be commended for 

11

improving the atmosphere—the bilateral atmosphere—that would 

facilitate a solution. So we’ll wait for the elections and then we will 

pick up where we left off and encourage both governments to work 

forward. 

I would also like to take note of the U.N. process that is being 

led by U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz. He, of course, has the responsibility for advancing this process. He takes it very seriously and 

he had very constructive contact with both governments through 

the course of the summer. So hopefully that will bode well for the 

post-election atmosphere in Greece and Macedonia. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. Congressman Hastings? 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Jones. Mr. Chairman, I do very much thank you. You have covered 

a lot of ground in a short period of time. And, Mr. Jones, thank 

you for being as forthright as you have been. 

I was handed a piece of paper just in the last 15 minutes and 

I haven’t had a chance to fully digest it. But the takeaway from 

the head note says, ‘‘Late-breaking developments: Serbs Repudiate 

Decisions by High Representative of Brcko District Supervisor in 

Latest Sign of Serious Deterioration.’’ It goes on to say the 

Republika Srpska repudiates all decisions by this supervisor. And 

then in the second section, third paragraph, I’ll read from it. It 

says: ‘‘The Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik is apparently preparing the ground for a showdown with the international community on the radicalization of nationalist sentiment 

that invariably accompanies the advent of an election year.’’

Bring us current. This took place, these statements, on September 22nd and, in addition, he alleges that he is going to, if they 

have not already, file suit, including against Paddy Ashdown who 

we had here previously. What is the upshot of all of this? 

Sec. JONES. Well, thank you, Congressman. We are very concerned about the recent political rhetoric in Bosnia, particularly 

surrounding the national electric company, Transco, which is 

owned by the state. And recently the High Representative exercising his Bonn Powers has reorganized that company to make it 

more functional. We support that decision, but this has drawn a 

very sharp reaction from Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad 

Dodik. 

There are a lot of elements to the politics. I think it’s enough to 

say that we support the High Representative’s decision. We regret 

the sharp rhetoric along nationalistic lines that has been employed 

by the prime minister. And our Ambassador in Sarajevo is working 

to find solutions to these problems. 

But nothing that has been done is outside—in our view—is outside of the executive mandate of the High Representative. And, indeed, the measures taken by the Deputy High Representative, who 

of course is an American, were pre-ordained in the final award surrounding Brcko at the end of the war. 

So we think that all of this has been done, handled in a careful 

and legalistic manner. We regret the political difficulty that has ensued. We hope that we’ll be able to find a swift solution to it. But 

certainly using nationalistic themes to address these problems is 

not the best way forward. 

12

Mr. HASTINGS. Have we taken a position regarding any timetable—and I’m not suggesting one—for the closure of the Office of 

the High Representative? 

Sec. JONES. What we have said is that when the five conditions 

and two objectives are completed, then, and only then, will we support the idea of transition from the high representative to the E.U. 

Special Representative. 

Now, I should say, I look forward to the day when we can make 

that transition. I think that will be a positive transition. But certainly the conditions and objectives need to be met. And, of course, 

the second condition is paramount, which is that the Peace Implementation Council, together decides that there is stability in Bosnia under the Dayton Agreements. 

Mr. CARDIN. I would like to get your views before we hear from 

Europe. Do you think Europe shares that commitment of standing 

behind the high representative until the goals have been met? 

Sec. JONES. Well, of course, Europe has 27 members and there 

is a range of views. But, overall, I think that there is an understanding that we have agreed that the 5+2 has to be honored. That 

was what the Peace Implementation Council—which includes several members of the E.U.—agreed in 2007. 

So that is the assumption with which we are moving forward. 

Perhaps some individual members have a different position and of 

course they are entitled to it. But any decision by the Peace Implementation Council will have to be by consensus. 

Mr. HASTINGS. And while the E.U. has immense responsibilities, 

just as a general observation, it would seem to me that there have 

been as many things to delay further enlargement and not exert 

political pressure toward implementing the process that everybody 

seems to suggest that the European and Euro-Atlantic integration 

of the Balkans that the United States and the E.U. are sharing in 

that regard. 

Ambassador, here is where my problem is: Talk is cheap. And I 

came to Congress with this issue being a vital issue and I’m sure 

that it has been a vital issue of concern all of my lifetime. But in 

order to achieve the objectives of the 5+2 just as a for example, it 

would seem to me that it would require a term that I use that I 

don’t believe is a term of art, ‘‘hot diplomacy.’’ And I use that because I believe there have to be coordinated efforts. 

And I’ve seen too many places in the world where world powers 

let small areas down and those areas fomented into additional difficulties for world powers. That said, in this particular region, it 

would seem to me that the United States and the European Union 

would be coordinating serious ongoing efforts. I am appreciative of 

the fact that the Vice President visited, but if I could use an analogy—and I mean this because I’ve seen this in my lifetime—I’ve 

seen when major civil rights problems were going on, major civil 

rights national leaders whose names were in the newspaper would 

show up at the little areas and they would make the big statements about what they were going to do and then they’d leave and 

wouldn’t a damn thing be done. 

So the fact that there is no followup is what I’m talking about. 

When I was in Albania, there is added reason right there for us 

to be encouraging the Albanians to complete that highway that 

13

they take great pride in going into Kosovo. If I were to move back 

into the other area, I don’t hear very much in the way of summitry. 

And one of the things that happens to us that the E.U. needs to 

get straight is, in my judgment, we have a lot on our table. I mean, 

you know, we are talking about this area and it’s critical we have 

actually had boots on the ground there for a substantial period of 

time. Hopefully we are able to keep the peace in bits and places. 

I was impressed in Kosovo by the U.N. mission there, one of the 

best that I’ve seen operating around the world. But then, at the 

same time, you know, our president right now is having to deal 

with Afghanistan, the finishing up of whatever is happening in 

Iraq; Iran is right around the corner. And yet I don’t see the intense effort that I would like to see in Bosnia or in Serbia or Croatia or Montenegro or certainly Kosovo, which I see—me, personally—as a tinder box that could explode at any minute. 

And unless we get to that and stop fiddling around with technical talk and start building some roads and some schools and 

some implementation of these measures then I think that all we 

are doing is setting up part three, part four and part ad infinitum. 

OK? Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you for your comments. Congressman 

Aderholt? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One core issue I think 

you started out in your comments talking about was Bosnia. And 

I think this question would particularly apply not only to Bosnia, 

but also to all of the Balkan countries. In regard to the global economic downturn, what particular impact have you seen it having 

on Bosnia and the other Balkan countries and what do you expect 

to see in the future? 

Sec. JONES. I think that the Balkans has been impacted by the 

global economic downturn, though in different ways than much of 

the rest of Europe. Because some of these economies were not as 

integrated into the European banking system as, say, countries in 

Central Europe, they have not been affected in quite that way. 

And, yet, they are all seeing a reduction in remittances sent back 

by foreign workers living in other parts of Europe. They have certainly run into now a greater difficulty in obtaining credits. For the 

most part, they are adapting. And Serbia and Bosnia are working 

now closely with the IMF. Croatia and Albania have been able to 

find credits on the commercial market. 

So they are moving through it. But we have seen a significant 

downturn in the economy in commercial activity and governments 

peeling back, cutting government salaries. There is a real hardship 

there. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Well, I know that I—as I mentioned, I was in the 

Balkans twice earlier this year. And it was, of course, at that time, 

everything was still in flux and was still—hadn’t really gelled as 

far as the economic downturn. 

But when I was in Albania, you know, I was very encouraged to 

see the construction of the highway there. And I have not heard 

updated recently—do you have an update of when that is to be 

completed, the Kosovo-Albania highway? 

Sec. JONES. Well, the highway is largely complete. It was inaugurated in June and it is now possible to drive from the Port of Dures 

14

all the way up to the Kosovo border. And I agree with you, Congressman; this is a tremendous asset for the entire region because 

it’s going to facilitate transport not only for Albania and not only 

for Kosovo, but for all the countries in the region. 

I think that there is now some additional work being done on 

some of the tunnels and there is another tunnel to be opened. So 

it’s not—it hasn’t reached its full scope of completion, but it—cars 

are going back and forth. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. That’s great. That’s great to hear. When I was 

there earlier this year, the tunnel was being worked on. And so I 

know it was a major construction project, probably one of the most 

major construction projects in all of Europe. 

Sec. JONES. And, of course, we’re delighted that it—being—was 

engineered and created by a U.S. firm. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Absolutely, absolutely. But also, too, a country 

that also sometimes—that is not mentioned; there are so many aspects of that country I think should be applauded—and that’s Macedonia. You know, the information that I have received is that 

World Bank now has ranked Macedonia as the third in the world 

for being among the best reformers, to have it approved as far as 

a business climate. 

Also I understand that they’re continuing to work on combating 

human trafficking and, of course, the issue that I think we think 

of most closely when we think of Macedonia, we think of the name 

issue, which is the big issue right now. 

But I was over—as I mentioned—I was in Macedonia earlier this 

year and met with our Ambassador over there and had a good discussion with our U.S. Ambassador over there. I’ll continue to have 

a good relationship with our—with the Macedonian ambassador 

here to the United States. 

But I think their continued good faith with their—with Greece 

as far as the name issue; I know it’s a very difficult issue and I 

think they’ve been showing real courage to work with U.N. Secretary-General Special Envoy on this and to try to resolve this. So 

again, the troop involvement that they have in Afghanistan should 

not go unnoticed. So again, Macedonia has done tremendous good 

things and we have had a great working relationship with them 

and so we continue to look forward to working with that country. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Congressman Aderholt. We have been 

joined by the longest-serving member on the Helsinki Commission, 

the former Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, the ranking Republican, the Congressman from New Jersey, Chris Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for 

being late. I would ask that my full statement be made a part of 

the record. 

Mr. CARDIN. Without objection. 

Mr. SMITH. And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. 

I’ve just read it and I really appreciate your insights and the comprehensiveness of your statement, and also your leadership. 

Let me just ask you, when you talked about the elements of the 

two-entity structure, the need to keep that intact because of the 

sharp differences between the disparate parties, you do make the 

point that eventually there needs to be change and initial package 

15

reforms need to be put into place. Could you elaborate on what is 

really essential for E.U. and NATO membership and where we are 

in terms of that state of play in terms of the various parties? 

What really has to be done quickly in order to—because I, like 

you, and I think like everybody on our commission believes that 

constitution reform is absolutely essential if Bosnia is to emerge as 

a flourishing democracy. The idea of very small numbers of Parliamentarians stopping legislation from growing forward just hinders 

progress beyond recognition. But if you could talk about that package of reforms and where we are in terms of putting those forward, 

and what has to be done, maybe with even some timeline focus. 

Sec. JONES. Thank you, Congressman. Certainly to qualify for 

E.U. membership Bosnia is going to have to undertake some reforms to address shortcomings in the Dayton Agreement that are 

at odds with the European Convention on Human Rights. So the 

Venice Commission has done an analysis of the Dayton Agreement 

and has made a series of proposals. And I think that’s largely 

agreed by all the parties that that should be undertaken. This 

would allow, for example, a Bosnian citizen who is not a member 

of any of the largest three ethnic groups to rise to a senior office 

in the government to the presidency, et cetera. There are several 

other elements of that nature. 

We would also favor a look at executive powers and we think 

that in order to move Bosnia forward on its European track, we 

think that the issues of state competencies and entity competencies 

should be addressed. Now, I should be clear—Bjo ̈rn Lyrvall, who 

will speak after me, can be more direct an expert on this than 

me—but those measures are not required for European accession. 

And so this is really about getting the parties together to decide 

what kind of state they want to have. 

But they need a functional state. They need a state that’s able 

to make decisions and move toward Europe. They need a state that 

is going to take responsibility for both the NATO accession process 

and the E.U. accession process. And I think by looking at those 

three areas, the European Commission of Human Rights, the issue 

of executive powers and the issue of competencies, they can make 

great headway in that regard. 

Certainly we would want to get that accomplished as soon as 

possible, but if we are to get it accomplished before October elections, they have to be done by March because of the legal provision 

in the Bosnian structure that requires that all constitutional 

amendments be completed 6 months prior to the next elections. So 

that’s our minimum timeframe. 

I was in Sarajevo in August and people were already talking 

about those October 2010 elections. So I think our room for maneuvering is very short. 

Mr. SMITH. Are there any demands being made by the Bosnians 

in the area of social policy? And I point to the problems that we 

had with Romania and adoption. At a time when we have the 

Hague Convention on Adoption, which provides a blueprint for 

intercountry adoption, Lady Nicholson, who was in charge of accession for the E.U., put an onerous—and I think a totally unjust—

demand upon Bucharest to end foreign adoptions, leaving over a 

thousand people in the pipeline, including 200 Americans. Are 

16

there are any social policy impositions like that that are being put 

on Bosnia? 

Sec. JONES. Not that I’m aware of. But Bosnia, again, is very 

early in the process. It has its SAA, it’s agreement to begin the 

process, but it’s only in the very beginning of the E.U. process. And 

again, I think this is something that Bjo ̈rn can speak to more effectively than I can. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you—what is the E.U.’s attitude toward the so-called Yellow House Case, where Serbs captured by 

Kosovar Albanians were taken to Albania as part of an alleged 

organ trafficking scheme? 

Sec. JONES. There have been reports for several years of alleged 

organ trafficking in association with the conflict in Kosovo during 

that conflict. We have not seen any reliable evidence that this trafficking occurred, though war crimes prosecutors continue to look 

into it, as they should. I can’t speak to the issue of the most recent 

investigations and arrests on these bases. But we’re monitoring 

them closely. 

Of course, it’s very divisive when you have a Serbian prosecutor 

looking into possible events inside Kosovo; there’s going to be a lot 

of political tension surrounding that. We’re going to continue to 

talk to both parties about it, but to a great degree the Serbian judicial processes will go forward, the Kosovo judicial processes will go 

forward and the international community will observe them and 

shine a light on them to ensure transparency and fairness. 

Mr. SMITH. And finally, with regards to Kosovo and the upcoming elections. How robust will be the participation on the part of 

the Serb minority? And you indicated in your testimony that our 

U.S. Embassy reps are working very closely with the Orthodox 

Church. Has that situation improved? Many have met over the 

years with Bishop Artemije and others who felt totally left out for 

years as churches and seminaries and the like were being burnt to 

the ground, literally. Has that situation improved somewhat, a lot, 

in your opinion, or what? 

Sec. JONES. I think it’s improved a lot since the time that you 

are describing. Clearly there’s a lot of work yet to be done. And the 

government of Kosovo is engaged through the so-called RIC, which 

is—they put aside $10 million for the reconstruction and restoration of Serbian heritage buildings and monasteries. The United 

States is participating with our million-dollar contribution to 

UNESCO, and there are various programs working for it in a positive way. Not to say that this work is—this needs continued attention on our part; there are still some political obstacles to overcome. But there’s no ambiguity about the U.S. view, which is that 

these are sites that need to be protected, and honored and should 

certainly be restored. And that Serbs should be able to visit them 

and because they are an important element, as we know, of Serbian culture. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much, and Secretary Jones, thank 

you for your testimony. We appreciate it very much and we look 

forward to continuing working with you on these issues. 

We will now hear from Mr. Lyrvall. I have already indicated that 

he is the Director General for Political Affairs, the Foreign Ministry of Sweden. We welcome you to our Commission and we thank 

17

you very much for arranging your schedule so you could be with 

us today. I need to point out, as you know, that your country has 

been extremely active in working with our Commission and the 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and in the OSCE. And Mr. 

Lenmarker has made an incredible contribution to the Parliamentary Assembly; we know that he will be returning to the United 

States for some meetings, and we look forward to his visit. Please 

express our appreciation to your government for your involvement 

with our Commission on so many areas of mutual interest. 

BJO ̈ RN LYRVALL, DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL 

AFFAIRS, SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 

Mr. LYRVALL. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, 

Mr. Co-Chairman, members of the Commission. I’m honored to 

have been invited here to address you representing the Swedish 

Presidency of the European Union. I think that the Helsinki Commission is indeed a very dynamic and highly valued forum for 

trans-Atlantic dialogue. And it undertakes very important work in 

relation to democracy, rule of law, human rights and security in 

Europe. 

So I’d like to thank you all collectively for the work that you are 

doing, the long-standing engagement and commitment in these 

issues, and I think these are vital and important for Europe as a 

whole. 

I’d like to say also that the trans-Atlantic relationship constitutes 

to be a cornerstone of the E.U.’s external policies, and is based on 

shared values, such as democracy, human rights, as well as commitment to open and integrated economies. Some would even say 

that the similarity in policy outlook across the Atlantic is the greatest in decades, and we indeed look forward to the upcoming E.U.-

U.S. summit in Washington later this fall. 

Now, it might be a little bit confusing for an outsider that there 

are such a number of different E.U. actors speaking on behalf of 

the European Union. We have the Commissioner for External Affairs, we have the Commissioner for Enlargement and the Western 

Balkans, we have the Secretary-General/High Representative 

Javier Solana who personifies the E.U. Common Foreign Security 

Policy and then there is the rotating E.U. Presidency which my 

country, Sweden, holds until the end of the year. 

Mr. CARDIN. It’s not confusing to us; we have 535 people speak 

in the U.S. Congress. [Laughter.] 

All Secretaries——

Mr. LYRVALL. Well, then you know where we are and what we 

are dealing with. It’s indeed a challenging task now, to lead a 

union of 27 member states but there is indeed a great diversity between the different countries. But at the same time, the fact that 

the number of member states have increased in recent years, I 

would say, has contributed to the strength of the E.U. We may discuss a lot internally, but in the end, the E.U., when united, we 

have a powerful voice and a big influence in many fields: in trade, 

development, foreign and security policy, environmental issues, 

consumer policy, et cetera. 

Now, we have many big issues on the plate of the Swedish Presidency for the coming months. The overriding priorities, as you are 

18

probably well aware, have to do with economic situation in the 

world, employment and climate. Also, the issue of the E.U. treaty 

is likely to dominate the Brussels agenda after the Irish referendum this Friday. 

We also focus on maintaining a secure and open Europe. We 

want to enhance the E.U.’s role as a global actor, and enlargement 

is also very high on our agenda. And one of the challenges of our 

times, of course, is the situation in the Western Balkans. I think 

it’s fair to say that E.U. has come a long way since its origin as 

a post-Second World War peace initiative in the 1950s. The E.U. 

and its 27 member states stand as a success story in the creation 

of peace and prosperity within its borders. 

The wider challenge of extending that peace and prosperity beyond its borders is clearly seen in the Western Balkans. In fact, the 

European Union’s Common Foreign Security Policy has developed 

largely in response to the challenges presented by the repercussions of the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the former 

Yugoslavia. In fact, it was the failure to respond adequately to war 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s that prompted E.U. member states to enhance and reinforce the E.U.’s ability to conduct a 

credible and effective common foreign security policy. And this 

process is still ongoing. 

My own Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, as the E.U. mediator at 

Dayton and subsequently the international community’s first international high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, played an 

active role, both pre- and post-Dayton, to push for a sharper E.U. 

policy when involved in crisis, and also formulating a post-war program for conditional E.U. integration. What we then called the regional approach, and which was the forerunner to E.U.’s stabilization and association process of today. 

In the aftermath of the Kosovo war in 1999, we saw violent crisis 

emerging in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That was 

in 2001 as a result of unsolved ethnic and social tensions. And the 

Swedish E.U. Presidency at the time, in 2001, used the still-untested Common Foreign Security policies to contain the crisis. The E.U. 

troika involving High Representative Solana and then-Commissioner Patten showed readiness to create the circumstances for negotiations, which later resulted in the Ohrid Agreement, to be implemented in its turn, by E.U.’s first European Security and Defense Policy mission. 

Given this background, which has not always been encouraging, 

I have to say—Bosnia was certainly not E.U.’s finest hour. The 

E.U.’s common foreign security policy has developed gradually into 

a more coordinated rapid and targeted set of instruments, both 

military and civilian. The E.U. police monitors and regular combat 

missions, as well as advisory missions, have proved to be effective, 

although challenges still remain. 

Since 1991, the E.U. has been the largest donor to the region, 

having provided roughly Ö13 billion in assistance, among others, 

for infrastructure, for institution building, for regional and cross 

border cooperation, for strengthening protection of minorities and 

for enforcing human rights. When you include humanitarian and 

the bilateral assistance of individual member states, please double 

that figure. Until 2013, we will spend more than Ö900 million each 

19

year in the region. This figure did not include the costs of ESDP 

missions which have been launched since 2003, and of which there 

are still three missions ongoing. 

Our political investments are immeasurable: Thousands of E.U. 

personnel in the institutions are working in and with the region, 

in the headquarters in Brussels, in the delegations of the European 

Commission, in the region and in the three offices of the E.U.’s 

Special Representatives in different countries of the Western Balkans. 

But I’d like to say that even more importantly, the history of the 

European Union and its enlargement tells us that E.U. membership is a strong guarantor of lasting peace and social progress. 

With an enormous promise and incentive to change the European 

perspective of the Western Balkans, these countries have embarked 

on the same journey from war and mistrust to peace and reconsolidation that reunified Europe after World War II and after the cold 

war. 

The Western Balkans is on its way from the era of hard power 

to the era of soft power, from the era of Dayton to the era of Europe. And I dare to say that the forces of disintegration are finally 

about to give way to the forces of integration. 

The European perspective, with the ultimate goal of E.U. membership, once the conditions have been met by each country on its 

own merits, releases the E.U.’s transformative potential, where our 

democratic way of life and prosperity exercises a strong magnetic 

pull that provides hope and drives reform. Despite a certain enlargement fatigue, there is still a strong commitment of the E.U. 

member states to the objective of the Western Balkans countries 

becoming members of the European Union. 

And the E.U. enlargement of Southeastern Europe is more than 

a historic mission to finish the job of reunifying the continent; it 

is a matter of enlightened self-interest and of enhancing our own 

economic growth, our security and our freedom. It also creates opportunities to broaden the common E.U. approach in crucial areas 

such as energy, security and migration. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to a few countries’ specific comments, starting with our most advanced partner, Croatia. Croatia 

has indeed traveled the far—the longest road to membership of the 

European Union. A remarkable transition toward a stable democracy, rule of law and a functioning market economy has taken 

place that should act as a positive example for the Western Balkans region to follow. Clearly, it is the attractive forces of European and trans-Atlantic cooperation structures that have underpinned this momentous societal change. 

Since the start in 2005, Croatia has closed seven out of 35 negotiating chapters in this process toward E.U. membership. Negotiations could be finalized by mid-2010 based on Croatia’s own merits, 

I need to add. This would enable Croatia to join the E.U. as a full 

member by 2011 or 2012. Regretfully, however, the border dispute 

between Croatia and Slovenia has stopped Croatia from making 

formal advances in the process for almost a year now. 

On September 11, however, Prime Ministers Kosor and Pahor 

announced an agreement, in principle, on how to proceed with solving the border dispute and simultaneously deblocking accession neVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
20

gotiations. And the Swedish presidency has confirmed its readiness 

now to support further talks on the border issue to be resumed on 

October 2. In overcoming the heated arguments on both sides, and 

re-establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust, the leaders of the 

two countries have shown admirable statesmanship. 

The key requirement for membership in the European Union is 

full cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. Since there have been no positive developments in this area, 

the relevant negotiating chapter on democracy and human rights 

remain blocked. Croatia needs to credibly demonstrate that it is 

making every effort to fulfill the needs of the chief prosecutor. Concerted pressure from the E.U. and the United States is advisable 

on this issue. 

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we are encouraged by this year’s Presidential and local elections, which, according to observers, met most international standards. E.U. relations 

with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have intensified 

steadily over the past few years. In 2004, a stabilization and association agreement came into force, and the year after, the country 

was officially recognized as a candidate for E.U. membership. End 

of this year, the E.U. is scheduled to lift visa obligations. 

For opening accession talks, eight benchmarks must be met. The 

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia must, inter alia, demonstrate proper implementation of judicial and police reforms, 

anticorruption legislation and take measures to ensure a depoliticized civil service. It’s also essential that the authorities foster and 

facilitate a true political dialogue between the various groups in society. According to the European Commission, the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia is close to fulfilling the benchmarks and a 

recommendation to open accession talks may well be issued during 

the Swedish Presidency. 

The countries should be rewarded for their reform efforts. The 

unresolved name dispute with Greece should not be an impediment 

to initiating negotiations; this is a matter which must be resolved 

bilaterally under the auspices of the U.N. 

Montenegro has made impressive progress along its European integration agendas in its declaring independence from the union 

with Serbia in June 2006, encouraged by the E.U. Montenegro’s 

E.U. perspective has been quickly embedded in a series of formal 

agreements. The momentum continues as Montenegro submitted 

its formal application for E.U. membership in December 2008, and 

after a decision by the council, a report is now being prepared by 

the European Commission. That will be the basis for deciding 

whether Montenegro can become formally a candidate country for 

E.U. membership. 

At the same time Montenegro is likely to be granted visa liberalization with the E.U. in the coming months. E.U. membership will 

be the logical conclusion of this process and the timing will largely 

depend on Montenegro’s ability to carry out the necessary reforms 

and fulfill the criteria for E.U. membership. 

Albania has been gradually moving toward European integration, 

a process that has received momentum in the recent years. At the 

E.U. Foreign Ministers’ meeting in a couple of weeks’ time, we 

hope to reach an agreement to forward Albania’s membership apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
21

plication to the commission for its assessment. However, as the 

June 2009 elections in Albania have shown, the path to E.U. membership will not be easy. Elections were marked by unfortunate political interference in the post-election process and that was noted 

by the international election observers. Besides more efforts to 

meet democratic standards, Albania also needs to strengthen its 

public administration, reform its judiciary and more efficiently 

fight organized crime and corruption. 

Serbia—well there is a stable, pro-E.U. government in place in 

Belgrade, which was elected in order to bring Serbia closer to the 

E.U., and it shows a new maturity and commitment in terms of fulfilling the obligations for E.U. accession. All E.U. member states 

agree that in order for the government to keep its credibility, the 

country must be allowed to make progress on its path toward the 

European Union. As soon as the cooperation with ICTY is judged 

to be satisfactory, the contractual agreement for the accession process between Serbia and the E.U. will come into force. 

Progress has been considerable. This will also pave the way for 

a membership application toward the end of the year. In the meantime, Serbia shows its E.U. commitment by unilaterally implementing the relevant agreement. Furthermore, we hope to be able 

to grant Serbia visa freedom as of early 2010. 

Then to Bosnia, which is of course, currently the main challenge. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina has also expressed its intention to apply 

in the near future for a membership of the E.U. In fact, in a country that remains deeply divided on most issues, the prospect of 

E.U. integration is one of the few unifying factors. There is, however, a major obstacle to this ambition: As long as the Office of the 

High Representative remains in place, a Bosnian E.U. membership 

application cannot be considered. 

It is quite obvious for all of us that the OHR cannot take Bosnia 

to where it wants to go. This is why it’s important that the country, 

as soon as possible, reaches a situation where the political landscape allows it to move from OHR to a reinforced E.U. office, 

strengthening, at the same time, the local political ownership when 

continuing to reform itself in accordance with E.U. requirements. 

The Bosnian stabilization agreement has been in place since 

June 2008. Part of that agreement includes a favorable free trade 

arrangement with the E.U. It’s called the Interim Agreement, 

which has seen a rather satisfactory implementation. On the one 

hand, the progress in implementing key partnership priorities of 

the agreement has unfortunately, been rather limited. Only then, 

and once the conditions have been met, can BiH make the transition from Dayton stabilization to European integration. 

There is a window of opportunity to proceed with this transition 

before the 2010 elections. Otherwise, there is a considerable risk 

that Bosnia will be slipping behind the rest of the region. In order 

to achieve this transition, we need to have a joint E.U.-U.S. actionoriented approach this autumn. We are working closely with the 

U.S. to take steps in this direction. 

Let me also say that outstanding constitutional reform in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina neither is a precondition for OHR closure, nor required in order to apply for E.U. membership. Nevertheless, it is 

an integral part of any efforts to create a functional state, and it 

22

would incrementally constitute a fundamental part of E.U. accession. Constitutional amendments must therefore be brought into 

line with the European Convention of Human Rights in order to 

end the ongoing discrimination between the constituent and nonconstituent citizens of the country. 

Following the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR mission, 

the European Union has, since December 2004, been responsible 

for the international military presence in Bosnia through the operation ALTHEA, currently deploying more than 2,000 troops in theater. And if needed, that could be reinforced. 

At some point, EUFOR must be transformed into a non-executive 

mission with focus on training of the Bosnian forces. Any decision 

will be discussed thoroughly with the United States. From our perspective it is of the utmost importance that a decision on the future 

of EUFOR is synchronized with the ongoing efforts to move forward on the political issues in the country. For the E.U. police mission, which operates in an advisory capacity, supporting the fight 

against organized crime, is moving forward and remains a priority 

for us as well. 

And finally, Kosovo. A year-and-a-half has passed since Kosovo 

declared its independence. Countries now faced with great challenges are building a democratic and multiethnic state. These challenges include decentralization, rule of law, economic development 

and engagement in regional and international fora. Kosovo needs 

to buildup a long-term capacity to assume responsibility over the 

rule of law. The E.U. rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, can 

support this process. EULEX is a visible expression of the European Union’s determined engagement for Kosovo. During its first 

almost 10 months of operation, EULEX has deployed in all of 

Kosovo and begun to implement its mandate. 

The American contribution is a crucial component for which the 

E.U. is most appreciative. In such a complex political context there 

are, of course, difficult challenges. In the north, EULEX is moving 

slowly to re-establish control over customs and to fully reopen the 

court in Mitrovica. The police in northern Kosovo continue to report 

to EULEX. 

There’s a fruitful dialogue with the authorities in Pristina on reforms regarding justice and police. The E.U. remains committed to 

its long-term engagement in the development of Kosovo. The fact 

that E.U. is divided about the status of Kosovo does not prevent 

a fully engaged approach as regards Kosovo’s political and socioeconomic development in line with the European perspective of the 

region. 

It is clearly in the interest of the E.U. that Kosovo develops in 

accordance with the rest of the region. In October, the European 

Commission will present a study examining means to further 

Kosovo’s political and socioeconomic development. This study will 

hopefully provide a framework for concrete measures to be taken 

by Kosovo in order to move forward on its E.U. integration. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, members of the commission, 

thank you for giving me, as the Swedish Presidency of the E.U., 

the opportunity to address you here today. Thank you. 

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Lyrvall, first of all, thank you for that very comprehensive report. I think it’s very helpful to us to understand that. 

23

We’re in total agreement about the importance of integration in 

each of the countries in the Western Balkans, and we certainly 

agree with your assessments as to what needs to be accomplished 

for that to occur. And we also are in agreement that we need a 

joint U.S.-E.U. strategy as it relates to Bosnia; I think that’s our 

best chance of success. 

I want to start off with Bosnia. You’re not going to get any disagreement from any member of our Commission about wanting the 

High Representative office to go away. I mean, that’s certainly not 

how a country can function. We want to Bosnia to integrate into 

Europe; we understand you can’t integrate into Europe unless you 

have a functioning government and the High Representative was 

meant to be a temporary situation. But it seems like it’s better 

than any other option that we have to bring about constitutional 

reform and to stop the regression that is taking place in the country by the nationalists that are bringing about changes within their 

own sectors that make it more difficult for Bosnia to have the types 

of reforms necessary to be able to integrate in Europe, and to protect the country and its people. 

So I guess I am somewhat concerned about the replacement of 

the High Representative before the constitutional changes have 

been made in Bosnia that put in place the type of respect for national authority that is necessary for the country to be respected 

and eligible to enter into Europe and the E.U. 

So I’m somewhat concerned about looking at a different mechanism that would give us a chance to prevent the breakup of Bosnia. 

So I appreciate the fact, though, that you intend for it to be a E.U.-

U.S. strategy, because I think we have to be united on this, and 

we certainly need to listen to all points of view, but I tell you, if 

it weren’t for the High Representative’s office, I think we would be 

in worse shape today. You would see the independent actions, particularly by Republika Srpska, but also beyond that that would 

make it difficult to put the country back together again. 

Mr. LYRVALL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed the problem is, in our view, that the current situation is preventing Bosnia 

from moving ahead. We are indeed as concerned as you are and I 

fully rally to support what my friend Stu Jones has said as well 

about the situation in Bosnia on the ground. 

There is a climate of retributions, of mutual accusations between 

the different parties, nationalistic rhetoric. We’ve seen this reoccurring crisis of the kind that we are witnessing and observing today. 

And you see the High Representative trying to deal with the problem through employing his Bonn powers. We are obviously behind 

and supportive of the work of the high representative, but in the 

long-term this is not a solution for Bosnia. The long-term solution 

spells integration with the European Union because, as I tried to 

indicate in my first intervention, the only thing that potentially 

unites the different parties in Bosnia is the prospect of E.U. integration. 

And the train is leaving the station. We have, this year, to deal 

with applications from Albania and Montenegro. We have already 

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia waiting for a date to 

start their negotiations. We have Croatia well underway. Serbia, 

once it resolves its outstanding issues we draw in relation to the 

24

ICTY, and I think that is within grasp, will be on its way they will 

apply as well, and with their very strong administrative capacity, 

they will probably catch up rather quickly. 

That would leave Bosnia and Kosovo, which is a little bit of a 

special case—I’ll come back to that, certainly, separately—would 

leave Bosnia alone, waiting for the next train, if there will be one. 

Bosnia will have to come along, and the way to do it would be 

through resolving, obviously, the outstanding issues: the 5+2, 

which I think we all would wish to see fully implemented, and we 

also need to see a beginning of a constitutional reform that would 

not be seen as a new precondition for the transition, but which 

would be making Bosnia a more functional state. 

Then, the very day that you get the transition, when you get the 

other opportunities to move as far as the E.U. application for Bosnia, then there will be a cumbersome, very long process started 

throughout which you would see the real constitutional reform efforts carried out. Because it’s only—I think, in our view—that by 

getting Bosnia inside the E.U. transformatory process toward membership, you can actually achieve the changes of the constitution 

that you really require. It’s not going to happen on prompt——

Mr. CARDIN. I’ll just make another observation, and that is, I 

agree with you that the one unifying factor is the desire to integrate into Europe, but if you talk to particularly the young people 

of Bosnia, from all ethnic communities, all regions, they want their 

country to survive. They want to talk about Bosnia, not about their 

regions, not about their ethnic identification. And I think there’s 

stronger support in the country than their leaders are perhaps willing to go for. 

My concern is that if we were to weaken or replace the Office of 

the High Representative, it could be interpreted as a reward for the 

nationalists, making it even more challenging for Bosnia to bring 

about the types of reforms necessary to get back on track on a 

game plan for integration into Europe. And we just need to be careful that we send the right signals. 

You’re correct in the history here; we were all late to get the attentions necessary in that region, and there was a heavy price paid 

as a result of that. The office was set up for a specific reason, and 

I would just urge us to make sure that the seeds are there for development before we reward those would like to prevent the maturing of the nation. 

Mr. LYRVALL. Yes, indeed. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think 

perhaps when discussing Bosnia I need to say one positive word 

about development as well, because it’s indeed a very different 

country today than it was when we arrived with the Office of the 

High Representative in December 1995, after Dayton. Things have 

indeed progressed, and I don’t think that we fear that we would 

have a relapse into a conflict—a violent conflict—in Bosnia. It 

should be recalled that the E.U. mission has never fired a shot in 

anger and it’s been there for several years. 

At the same time, what we want is responsible Bosnian leadership, we want Bosnian ownership, and we fear that the utility of 

the OHR is coming to and end. We need to try to move into a new 

gear, and that gear will have to be through a European integration 

process. And for that to start, we need to achieve a certain transiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
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tion of the current support structures of the international community in Bosnia. 

Mr. CARDIN. I’ll make one last observation. I agree with your assessment about, particularly the ability for armed conflict. But I 

would suggest that listening to the rhetoric when I was in Bosnia, 

I think that probably as a result of the great progress we’ve made 

in the surrounding countries that would not support that type of 

activity in Bosnia—that’s to our credit. That’s part of our strategy, 

and you’ve given a very positive assessment in every other country, 

even though obviously Kosovo is a special class and Serbia has 

been of great interest to us—but there’s been progress made in 

every one of these countries. 

Bosnia has lost ground, and it’s a major concern to all of us. And 

we think it cries out for leadership, and we don’t see that at the 

present time. And we’re going to do everything we can—working 

with the EU—to encourage that type of leadership that’s necessary 

in Bosnia so they can get back on track, because we strongly agree 

with you: Integration is the only course that they can go, and it is 

one country, and the country needs to act as a nation. 

I’m going to turn the gavel over to Mr. Smith. I need to be on 

the floor, actually, for another Helsinki issue on the floor of the 

U.S. Senate, and I apologize for not listening to Mr. Smith’s questioning. I’m sure that I will hear from Mr. Smith as to his concerns; 

he’s always very vocal. And just complete it as you see fit. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Director General, thank you very much for your testimony, for your leadership. 

I noted that you were with Carl Bildt between ’95 and ’97 and it 

would be helpful for the Commission to get your assessment as to 

the attitudes on the ground with regards to the key players. I 

mean, obviously everything was law and coming out of the war in 

’95, the animosity was very, very thick. So your thoughts on that. 

Second, you couldn’t have said it better about the reaction of the 

international community, and that’s the late part of the Bush administration/early Clinton administration. And the European 

Union—I remember Cy Vance and Lord Carrington and many 

other key players—and Larry Eagleburger—all distinguished, very 

smart and savvy leaders, missing one cue after another; one clear 

indication that this conflict was about to go nuclear—not nuclear 

per se but in terms of the death and the maiming of people. 

I think we all missed it and, you know, we were a day late and 

a dollar short. And frankly, in our own case, it wasn’t until Elie 

Wiesel, at the Holocaust dedication, turned to President Clinton 

and he said, do something, Mr. President! And then, I think, our 

engagement became much more robust after that. 

But many of us lived it like you did—not in-country for, especially those few years, but made frequent trips back and forth. And 

it has always concerned me that we kind of look at all of the new 

entities that emerged, from Croatia to Bosnia—we almost take a 

cookie-cutter approach. 

And I wonder if you might speak to the issue—many of those on 

the ground in Bosnia have expressed to me—and to other members 

of the Commission—that when Serbia seemingly leapfrogged in the 

queue—and they were making the right moves to do so—in terms 

of E.U. ascension, that the aggressor—and there’s no doubt in my 

26

mind, even though, in Congress there was grave doubt when this 

all started as to who was the aggressor—Milosevic, clearly, and 

Mladic and the others were all the aggressors—that somehow the 

victimized state, the Bosnian state, is being treated with the same 

sense of equality in dealing with ascension issues where they’re left 

with all the residue—all the angst and the bile that’s spilled over 

from this terrible conflict. So they have a much higher bar to overcome, if you will, because of all of that residue that was left over. 

And I’m wondering if there’s any thought by the E.U. of looking 

at Bosnia as a, quote, ‘‘special case,’’ where criteria could be further 

streamlined—I mean, to me—and maybe I’m wrong, but the 

quicker the ascension into the E.U., even if all of the X’s are not 

checked off, would have a positive and healing effect on a country 

that has been so victimized. 

There are those who’ve suggested to me on trips to Bosnia, as 

well as their trips to the U.S. Capitol when their leadership would 

come here, that it had the appearance—or at least a perception—

that the fast track, if you will—it’s probably not the right word—

for Serbia was somehow linked, directly or indirectly, with Kosovo; 

that it was a way of telling Belgrade that, you know, your interests 

are being taken care of even though that’s a very bitter pill for you 

to swallow. So whether it be direct or indirect, I don’t know, you 

know, maybe that put Serbia on a faster track than would have 

normally been the case. You might want to speak to that, if you 

would. 

But this idea of a special case for Bosnia—and I would agree 

with our distinguished Chairman that, you know, if they’re not 

ready, please, the special rep, which you know so intimately, having served right along with the first one, really plays a vital role. 

We all want constitutional reform as well, but maybe a little 

more healing needs to take place. But it would seem to me, a parallel view of moving toward E.U. ascension would help out in our 

special case. 

Mr. LYRVALL. Thank you very much. Well, with regard to the 

own historical experience of the Bosnia file, indeed, we did set up 

the Office of the High Representative back in ’95, and we met a 

country which was ravaged by war and people extremely tired; lots 

of hostility sentiments were completely different than they are 

today. I would still have to say, despite the fact that you still see 

the tension in Bosnia, now, I think if you speak to people—I’m not 

traveling as frequently now as I did before to Bosnia—I still sense 

that people would like Europe; they would like normalcy. They 

would like the national rhetoric to go away. They would like responsible political leadership by their own leaders, regardless if 

they are Croats, Serbs. or Bosniaks. And they expect more from 

them than we have seen so far. They’re tired with the culture of 

the international community running business for them rather 

than their own leaders taking responsibility. 

So at least in our mind, there’s a time for change. It cannot continue like it has for the time we have seen; it hasn’t brought Bosnia to where it wants to be. And the Bosnian people where they 

want their country to be. 

So indeed, there’s a need for change. We need to find and devise 

the arrangements which make this possible; Bosnia will need to 

27

fulfill the criteria, as I’ve said before, and then move swiftly into 

a new process of E.U. integration where there is a hope that the 

different parties would see eye-to-eye and find that they have a 

common interest in taking their country forward. 

I would also like to add that in case you see an application of 

membership from Serbia—for membership of the European 

Union—that would also close out some of the options that Mr. 

Tadic might be contemplating as far as going it alone, he will see 

that the whole region is opting for the European track. And he has 

nowhere to go but to join that road, as well. So this is what we are 

hoping for, and this is what we are working toward. 

I mean, you ask whether one should look for a special track for 

Bosnia. I think it wouldn’t serve the process long term to give some 

kind of shortcuts. Because if they want to become members of the 

European Union, they will have to deliver on the different criteria 

there—we have very clear Copenhagen criteria which will have to 

be implemented or fulfilled. Now, having said that, obviously, I 

don’t think that besides Kosovo, there is any country in the region—perhaps not even in the world—that has been receiving as 

much support and aid as Bosnia-Herzegovina from the European 

Union as far as annual financial aid, but also with personnel, with 

military forces, police—through our own E.U. Special Representative on the ground, who happens to be double-hatted, also as a 

High Representative. 

So I see that there will be a lot of readiness to continue to work 

extremely closely with a more responsible Bosnian leadership 

throughout an E.U. integration process. And we are very grateful, 

I would like to say, to your commitment here—to the U.S. commitment and the commitment of this Commission—that you’ve put 

Bosnia so firmly on the agenda because it is necessary; it’s very difficult and it’s an issue that sometimes gets off the radar screen. We 

need to have it firmly placed there. And to deal with it, it’s clearly 

an issue which needs to get more political attention; we agree with 

that. 

But I also would like to reassure you that we are working hard 

together with our U.S. partners to see if we could use the window 

of opportunity in the run-up to the elections next year to take this 

next decisive step for Bosnia’s long-term European integration. 

You also mentioned the question of Serbia and jumping the line. 

I would wish to say that we do not share that view. I mean, there’s 

been a long way for Serbia to get where they are now—as far as 

their contractual relations with the European Union. And it should 

also be kept in mind that they have not been implemented yet. 

They are doing it unilaterally on the part of the Serb side to implement an agreement which has not yet entered into force because 

of the lack of implementation of their ICTY commitments. 

Now, we think that in this regard, we will all be united in the 

E.U. and find a day when we’ll be able to take the next step, as 

far as implementation of this interim agreement with Serbia. But 

there, I think we also agree that the Serbs are on a good track toward fulfilling the criteria. Indeed, the reports from the chief prosecutor, Brammertz, are very positive about the Serbian implementation of the ICTY commitments. So we hope that we will be able 

28

to move swiftly toward the next steps of Serbia’s E.U. integration, 

as well. 

One should also recall that the conditionality of the European 

Union is progressive. It becomes more difficult the closer you get 

to the day when you will actually become an E.U. candidate member; when you start to negotiate for full membership. So we will 

have ample opportunity to revisit the cooperation of Serbia with regards to the ICTY throughout the process, as we have with the 

other applicants, as well. 

I also want to say that, of course, there’s no question about the 

fact that Milosevic was running Serbia. They were the aggressors. 

Having said that, of course, one should also recall that the government after the overturn—handed Milosevic over to the Hague during 2001, and there is a new pro-European government in Serbia 

since some years back, which have had their difficulties but which 

I think, overall, are showing a good performance with regard to reform; with regard to cooperation with the international community. 

And also the very sensitive issue of Kosovo, I think, has been handled—particularly recently—in a constructive way by Belgrade. 

So we are dealing with a new team in Belgrade. I think this is 

worth noting. We cannot victimize the whole Serbian nation for 

what their leaders did back in the ’90s. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. And let me make it very clear that 

my view on Serbia has been—even during the war because I remember we had one particular activist who testified at our commission, the journalist Slavko Curuvija, who was killed, like, on day 

2 by some of Milosevic’s thugs when the bombing began, initiated 

by NATO. 

So I mean, we knew, and know—all of us, I think, on this commission—there were many pro-democratic and pro-human rights 

individuals. We remember all the individuals who didn’t want anything to do with Milosevic’s thuggery. 

But let me just ask you a question, if I could—just two final 

questions. We see some headlines, at times, suggesting, in Bosnia, 

that there could be a powder keg somewhere. One headline recently read, there will be war if it continues like this. 

And I wonder if the E.U. force is sufficient to deter what could 

be, you know, catastrophe No. 2 if the right alignment of the stars 

is there and there’s enough frustration on the part of certain individuals. 

And second, just a brief question on the—2 years ago in July, I 

was in Srebrenica for the reinterment of several of those who were 

brutally murdered in a genocide action. And I was struck by both 

Haris Silajdzic’s statement and by Ceric’s statement—the grand 

mufti who you know very well; that it was a call for reconciliation, 

for true mourning. But the continued outreached hand appears to 

be there on both of their parts. 

But even en route to Srebrenica by car, I went by a stand that 

was selling fruits and vegetables, and there was a big picture of 

Mladic, you know, as if he was some kind of hero rather than 

someone who needed to be behind bars for the rest of his life. 

And I’m just wondering—I know you understand it, given your 

background, but does the European Union have sufficient—again, 

making that special case perspective about why Bosnia needs to be 

29

looked at; it is a victimized nation rather than an aggressor nation. 

And we want, obviously, Serbia to have the Konrad Adenauer 

view—you know, post-Germany, post-Serbia aggression—so that 

they can matriculate into a full-fledged membership with you and 

with us; where democracy and human rights are respected. 

But I’m concerned still about, you know, the victim nation still 

feeling the wounds of Srebrenica; they’re still reinterring hundreds 

of those who were brutally murdered during those fateful days in 

July. Again, I make the case for special case—at least to keep that 

under consideration—but maybe your thoughts on Srebrenica. 

And, finally, I mentioned earlier to Secretary Jones how concerned I and so many others—I held three hearings—three Helsinki hearings—two hearings and one in my subcommittee when I 

chaired the human rights committee on the Foreign Affairs Committee—on the problem of what was imposed on Bucharest with regards to inter-country adoption. 

Now, I take—and members of this commission know—a backseat 

to no one on human trafficking. And yet, the E.U. Special 

Rapporteur—I think would be the right turn—put such a demand 

on local legislation in Bucharest precluding all inter-country adoptions. And still, that’s the situation, which I find horrific. 

Kids are still languishing in orphanages, who could be in a very 

happy home, fully checked out, you know, with proper home studies, because E.U. ascension and Lady Nicholson thought that adoption somehow was equated with child abduction and child trafficking. So are there any kinds of impositions being put on Balkan 

countries—on Bosnia, for example—in the social area? 

Mr. LYRVALL. I will have to look into the laws question. I’m not 

absolutely sure, to be quite frank with you. Not to my knowledge, 

at least. But I would be happy to do that, and perhaps I could report back to you with some more details on that particular issue. 

On E.U. force, well, indeed, it’s there still with some 2,000 

troops. As said, there has been no shot in anger fired throughout 

the years of its presence there. At the same time, of course, we still 

keep the E.U. force as a deterrent in some potential hotspot areas. 

At the same time, I think it should be noted that defense reforms 

have been relatively successful, and we sense that there’s no real 

risk at the moment for another armed conflict. 

However, I think the E.U. force is designed to be able and capable of handling the kind of foreseen security threats that you would 

have in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The strength is not random; it’s based 

on a thorough assessment of the military requirements. And if necessary, there is also going to be the strategic reserves available to 

further support the mission. 

It’s mandated by a number of Security Council resolutions. And 

I think as long as it continues as an executive mission, this mandate will be required. At some point in time, we expect the E.U. 

force to be transformed into some kind of security sector reform 

mission, but frankly, as I tried to say in my first remarks, we will 

not take that step without a thorough look at the current state of 

the political process. 

Any steps, I think, will be duly discussed with the E.U. and others in the steering board before they are being taken, although, obviously, they will be autonomous E.U. decisions. I think we have 

30

what we need for the moment, and we do not foresee an immediate 

threat. We have to be vigilant at the same time, obviously. 

The big question you’re raising about the victim status of the 

country and the legacy of Srebrenica is a very difficult one to address. And, I mean, we are acutely aware of this and I wanted to 

underline that we have no reason to be proud of the policies of the 

European Union or the international community back in the ’90s. 

Now, at the same time, in our view, there is a need to move on. 

We will have to not forget but to move on; at the same time, 

through cooperation inside the country, we have to try to take the 

country forward. And I mean, I’m coming back again to the full factor of the European Union in this respect. 

We are very much aware of the sentiments in parts of Bosnia, 

but I think that the best way to heal the country long term, to 

make it a viable country, is to give it the necessary support, the 

kind of support we have been giving so far. But we must also to 

strengthen this perspective for Bosnia; to make that more visible; 

more viable. 

Mr. CARDIN. Director-General, thank you so much for honoring 

us with your presence and your insights. Let me just say that the 

hearing, then, is adjourned and I thank you again. 

[Whereupon, at 10:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

31

APPENDICES

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION 

IN EUROPE 

Today’s hearing continues the Helsinki Commission’s focus on 

the Western Balkans. In April, the Helsinki Commission held a 

hearing on the challenges facing the Western Balkans today. Expert witnesses brought to our attention disturbing trends, particularly in Bosnia but also in Kosovo and some neighboring countries. 

In May, Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary General of the 

European Council Javier Solana together visited Sarajevo. The Vice 

President gave a stirring speech to Bosnia’s parliament, urging an 

end to nationalist rhetoric and forward movement on reforms. 

Shortly thereafter, in June, a Commission-led delegation visited 

Sarajevo and met with Bosnia’s political leaders. The delegation got 

an ample look at the wide and sometimes sharp divisions among 

the three peoples. Meeting some Bosnian students of all ethnicities 

later in the visit, the congressional delegation also saw a gap between young people who want to enjoy the opportunities of the 21st 

century, and their country’s leaders who are mired in conflict and 

divisiveness. 

The Obama Administration grasped right away that the situation in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia remains unsettled. This 

concern prompted the Vice President’s mission to Sarajevo, Belgrade and Pristina. Unfortunately, since that visit, however, we 

have not seen Bosnia move forward with a vigorous constitutional 

reform effort. Instead, we learn of continued gridlock in the central 

government, with ethnic disputes over appointments, and hear 

charged rhetoric at the highest levels suggesting that Bosnia’s very 

existence is in jeopardy. The Commission takes this continued slide 

very seriously. 

Meanwhile, in Kosovo, there have additional bilateral recognitions of independent statehood, but we do not hear of much other 

progress. Even with the deployment of the status-neutral EU Ruleof-Law Mission, EULEX, recent incidents suggest the need for 

more active and vigorous work to build institutions and foster dialogue. 

Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia also have their own 

challenges, some related to Bosnia and Kosovo and some unique to 

their own internal dynamic. Even Croatia, which has made enormous strides in the last decade, still needs to contend with issues 

related to the earlier conflicts. We are encouraged by the recent 

breakthrough with Slovenia on border issues that hopefully will 

pave the way for Croatia to soon enter the European Union. EU 

and NATO accession remain the foundation of Western strategy for 

the entire region. 

Our hearing today will touch on some of these problems but, 

most importantly, will focus on what the United States and the European Union are doing—or should be doing—in response. Is there 

a plan to break the continuing deadlock that threatens Bosnia’s 

stability? Is it possible to make progress on badly needed constituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
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tional reform? Will the High Representative remain in place until 

the job is done? What is being done to overcome Kosovo’s ethnic divide, particularly in the north, and to bring Albanians and Serbs 

together at least to find some common ground? Is the international 

presence there an effective deterrent to renewed violence? 

These are just a few of the questions we would like to have answered here today. I hope our discussion today sends a strong signal to the Western Balkans that is positive and encouraging. Our 

two witnesses are key players in U.S. and EU policy development 

and coordination. First, we have Stuart Jones, a Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for European Affairs and holder of the Department’s Balkan portfolio. Our second witness will be Bjorn Lyrvall, 

the Director General for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of 

Sweden. Sweden currently holds the Presidency of the European 

Union and speaks collectively for its members.

33

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to everyone here this 

morning. 

Mr. Chairman, our government and the European governments 

are not actively promoting constitutional reform in Bosnia, and this 

inaction is partly to blame for rising ethnic tension in Bosnia and 

the region. 

The Dayton Accords were signed 14 years ago. They achieved 

their purpose in stopping the genocide—they were never meant to 

do more than this, certainly not to become a permanent constitution. But somehow that has become the question: will Bosnia continue to be governed by the Dayton Accords or a Dayton-like constitution that provides for so-called ‘‘entity-voting’’? Or will it become a one-person, one-vote democracy? 

Bosnia has reached a fork in the road, and it has stopped there. 

Under Dayton, with its mutual vetoes, neither the Bosnian Serbs, 

who will accept nothing less than ‘‘entity voting’’, nor the Bosnian 

and Croatian advocates of democracy, have the authority to resolve 

the question. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is time for our government to exercise 

real leadership by re-engaging in Bosnia and promoting the only 

possible solution: a constitution providing for a one-person, onevote democracy. The current policy, of both the US and the European governments, seems to be, in effect, to tell the Bosnians to 

simply ‘‘work it out’’ among themselves. 

Yet we see very well that, in practice, ‘‘work it out yourselves’’ 

means that the Serbs prevail, Dayton continues, and separatists 

continue to stir the pot. In Bosnia, time not on the side of democracy. 

The separatist testing of the waters was unmistakable this summer when Srpska Prime Minister Dodik introduced in the Srpska 

parliament a resolution obliging Srpska officials to oppose constitutional reform. This very month Serbian President Tadic traveled to 

Bosnia to participate in ceremonies opening a grade school: he did 

not even inform Bosnian officials of his visit; and the school, named 

‘‘Serbia,’’ was in Srpska, on the very hill from which Karadzic’s militias bombarded Sarajevo for three murderous years; Srpska Prime 

Minister Dodik showed up, and addressed Tadic as ‘‘our’’ president. 

Worst of all, the international response to this has been muted. We 

can now be sure that the separatists will increase their troublemaking. 

Mr. Chairman, it is very sad to see that the tragically mistaken 

Balkan policy of the 1990s—the neutrality/non-engagement policy—has become our current policy. We all hope and believe that 

this won’t lead to human tragedy on the same scale as the 1990s 

Serb genocide of the Bosniaks. But in any case our policy should 

be to provide real leadership toward democratic reform, and to give 

the Serbs every reason to participate in it—certainly never to encourage separatists.

34

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STUART JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman Hastings, Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. The 

State Department places great importance on our cooperation with 

the Helsinki Commission in advancing our core values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in Europe. Nowhere else has 

this cooperation been more important or more promising than in 

Southeast Europe, where we have witnessed—and, more importantly, we have actively supported—tremendous strides and overall 

improvement in recent years. The sustained commitment and focus 

of the U.S. Government, across successive Administrations and 

Congresses has produced the progress we have seen in the Balkans 

in moving beyond the bloody and divisive zero-sum thinking that 

tore apart the region in the 1990s. Several countries in the region 

now contribute forces to help advance stability in other regions of 

the world, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 

A snapshot is telling: Ten years ago in 1999, the United States 

and its NATO partners had just succeeded in an air campaign to 

halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; no country of Southeast Europe 

was a member of NATO or the European Union, and stability in 

the region was at great risk. Our work was only beginning to break 

the cycle of violence provoked by the Milosevic regime and shift the 

backward looking focus of governments and political leaders in the 

region toward the future, and to galvanize public and private energies toward reforms to cement democratic principles, enshrine 

human rights, and anchor their societies on a foundation of law. 

Through a decade of hard work, we have come much closer to realizing our goal of including the western Balkans in a Europe whole, 

free and at peace, with the lasting stability and prosperity this 

would bring with it. 

The region is moving forward: All of the countries have undergone dramatic political, economic and social transitions. With its 

declaration of independence in February 2008, Kosovo’s status—the 

final chapter in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia—was resolved. Serbia and Montenegro completed an orderly and generally 

amicable separation and have moved forward in the development 

of their democracies. In April of this year, Croatia and Albania became members of NATO; Macedonia too will receive an invitation 

to join the Alliance as soon as the dispute with Greece over the 

name issue is resolved. All of the countries of the region have become valuable partners of the United States and Europe, contributing, or planning to contribute, to international security operations. And all of the countries of the region are committed to, and 

have taken steps toward, eventual membership in the European 

Union. 

But perhaps even more fundamentally, publics and political establishments throughout the region today embrace a vision of their 

region’s full integration into the European mainstream and have 

understood that the path of reform is the only path that will lead 

them to this goal. We can finally state that this vision for their future is shared by all but fringe elements of the region, which today 

35

have neither a compelling nor viable alternative to a European future to offer. 

This is not to say that our work in the Balkans is complete. Critical challenges remain—challenges compounded by the pressures of 

a global economic crisis and the significant demands placed on the 

Euro-Atlantic partnership by other priorities around the world, 

which limit resources available for accomplishing our shared objectives while at the same time exacerbating social pressures within 

the region. 

Many of these remaining challenges are issues central to the 

mandate of the Helsinki Commission. Interethnic reconciliation remains a work in progress in all of the countries of the Western Balkans, but nowhere to a greater degree than in Bosnia, where nearly 14 years after the Dayton accords, the forces of ethnic nationalism still square off against those who recognize that peace, security, and prosperity are the fruits of cooperation, compromise and 

reform. Crime and corruption throughout the region sap precious 

economic potential, challenge the capacities of the state, and 

threaten peoples’ trust in government. The Balkans continue to be 

a source, transit and destination area for the heinous crime of trafficking in persons. Discrimination, inequality and violence against 

ethnic minorities and women still demand our continued attention 

and concerted efforts. Religious freedom too often remains circumscribed by entrenched nationalism or ethnic discrimination. 

With nearly half of a million victims of conflict still in displacement, work remains to establish conditions conducive to safe, voluntary, and dignified return for all displaced persons who wish to 

return to their homes and to integrate those who will not return. 

Although there have been notable arrests and convictions for war 

crimes, two persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia are still at large and trials continue in The Hague. The role and ability of the media to be a free 

and independent ‘‘fourth estate’’ in advancing democratic good governance requires further attention. Judiciaries remain overburdened, their independence, transparency and effectiveness are inadequate. In too many instances, police fail to uphold the rule of 

law, and problems of corruption and a lack of professionalism persist. More efforts are needed to nurture nascent civil societies and 

NGOs that can advocate effectively for public reform and actively 

contribute to the protection of citizens’ interests. Electoral standards throughout the region have risen and today processes are 

much improved, but developing a reliable track record of compliance with international commitments remains a work in progress 

for several countries. 

But through continued engagement and collective action in concert with our European partners we can build on the progress 

made and tackle these and other remaining challenges. In recognition of this, the Obama Administration is reinvigorating U.S. leadership in the Balkans. Vice President Biden’s May visit to the region and public speeches in Bosnia and Kosovo made clear our renewed commitment to helping the countries of the region to overcome debilitating legacies and realize their aspirations. More than 

ever before, credible prospects of membership in the EU and NATO 

remain the most powerful incentive for continued reforms. We 

36

must continue to make the case that the integration of these countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions is critical to ensuring lasting 

stability in the region. We must assist where we can to facilitate 

resolution of bilateral disputes that impede this integration. But in 

the final analysis the burden of achieving their aspirations rests on 

the countries themselves—on the responsibility, commitment and 

follow-through of political leaders, and on the citizens of the region 

to demand results from their governments, legislatures, and political parties. Allow me to lay out some of the problems we are working on, the progress that has been made, and where we want to 

see more from the countries of the region. 

BOSNIA

To Bosnia first. We remain committed to supporting post-conflict 

efforts to confront nationalism, promote reconciliation and restore 

a culture of tolerance. But, as the Vice President made clear during 

his May 19 speech before the Bosnian parliament, we are worried 

about the direction that Bosnia is taking; that reforms are at an 

impasse; that it is straying off the path to Europe, spurred by a 

rise in polarizing nationalist rhetoric, attacks on state institutions, 

and the rolling back of reforms. Efforts at reconciliation between 

the three ethnic groups have made little headway. Despite progress 

on refugee returns, more than 100,000 people remain displaced 

within Bosnia, and the three constituent peoples are largely segregated from one another, with far less interaction with one another than before the war. Bosnia’s human rights record remains 

poor, and divisive politics feed discrimination and exacerbate the 

political and economic pressure independent media outlets face. 

The most recent and most tangible consequence of these trends was 

Bosnia’s failure to meet the EU’s criteria for visa liberalization in 

time to join Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro’s entry into the 

program. 

In an effort to reverse this dynamic, we are focused on two areas. 

The first is completing the so called ‘‘5+2’’ objectives and conditions 

established by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board 

before the Office of the High Representative (OHR) can transition 

to an EU Special Representative mission. OHR has played a key 

role over the past fourteen years to stabilize Bosnia and ensure 

compliance with Dayton. But with most of Dayton implemented 

and Bosnia seeking membership in the EU, OHR’s presence is increasingly incompatible with Bosnia’s European aspirations. The 

EU has made clear that that OHR needs to close before Bosnia can 

become a formal candidate for EU membership. 

Completion of 5+2 also is fundamental for Bosnia to advance its 

goal of NATO membership. We support Bosnia’s NATO aspirations 

and will increase our bilateral engagement, in parallel with expanded NATO engagement, to strengthen Bosnia’s candidacy. Bosnia’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces have advanced significantly, resulting in one of the most integrated ministries in the 

government, but political and ethnic divisions prevent further reform and much work remains to be done. 

Of the five objectives, two remain outstanding—resolving ownership of state and defense property between the levels of government. Clarifying these issues is essential to ensure that the State 

37

has the resources it needs to implement its constitutional obligations, and to complete implementation of defense reforms required 

for the Armed Forces of Bosnia to meet NATO standards. We also 

believe it is essential to resolve these issues prior to OHR’s closure 

to ensure the EU Special Representative can begin with a clean 

slate. This includes condition two—being able to certify compliance 

with Dayton. We are urging the Bosnians to resolve these issues 

as soon as possible, but have made clear that OHR will remain 

open until the criteria are met in full. 

The second core area of focus is renewing discussions on constitutional reform. This is not a formal part of the PIC endorsed 5+2 

agenda. But it has become clear from our numerous discussions 

with the Bosnian parties that they need to see some progress on 

constitutional reform before OHR closes. The Dayton constitution 

served Bosnia well in the immediate post war period. Given the 

still sharp differences between the ethnic groups over how Bosnia 

should be governed, its basic elements, such as the two-entity 

structure, will need to remain intact for the foreseeable future. 

However, it is clear that Dayton needs to be modernized for Bosnia 

to advance towards, and eventually meet, the obligations of EU and 

NATO membership. We believe a process of reform should begin 

immediately, with a goal of achieving a modest initial package of 

reforms well in advance of the October 2010 elections. This package 

will not solve all of the issues Bosnia must address to qualify for 

NATO or EU membership, but it should be sufficient to address 

basic functionality issues and enable Bosnia to become a formal 

candidate for EU membership and advance reforms needed to meet 

NATO’s standards. This process must be led, and its results must 

be agreed upon, by Bosnians, but we have made clear our willingness and desire to play a facilitating role. We are coordinating 

closely with the EU and with NATO to make clear to the Bosnians 

what kinds of changes will be required. We are pleased that a 

former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia, Cliff Bond, having finished his 

work with your distinguished committee, has agreed to facilitate 

these efforts. We look to Croatia and Serbia as influential neighbors to help us and the EU promote stability in Bosnia and look 

to both to exercise their influence and play a constructive role in 

support of constitutional reform. 

SERBIA

A stable, prosperous, democratic Serbia, is integral for regional 

stability. The Serbian people, through the last three elections, have 

chosen a democratic, reform-oriented centrist and Europe-leaning 

President and governing coalition. The Radical Party, still mired in 

Milosevic-era thinking, has lost traction and membership, as the 

pro-European integration Serbian Progressive Party broke off last 

year to form a more pragmatic, right-of-center party that, according 

to surveys, is now the principal opposition to the governing coalition. The Vice President’s visit to Belgrade in May underlined our 

desire to see a reinvigorated U.S.-Serbia relationship, one based on 

our common interest in seeing a democratic Serbia succeed in realizing its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. That may include 

eventual membership in NATO, if Serbia decides to pursue it and 

does the necessary work to qualify. We have made progress in 

38

building a military to military relationship with Serbia which has 

enhanced our relationship and assisted Serbia in preparing for closer cooperation with NATO. We stand ready to support Serbia along 

this path, while building upon our bilateral relations, for instance 

in the fields of trade, investment, military cooperation, and cultural 

exchanges. At the same time, however, the Vice President underscored to Belgrade that we expect Serbia to uphold its commitment 

to cooperate with the international community in Kosovo and Bosnia and to contribute to regional stability. The Vice President also 

emphasized that we expect Serbia to continue its efforts to capture 

and transfer to The Hague the remaining war crimes fugitives 

Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic. 

The Vice President noted that we can disagree with Serbia over 

Kosovo’s status as an independent state, but Serbia must cooperate 

with the international community, including the EU’s rule of law 

mission EULEX, on practical solutions that will help all of Kosovo’s 

citizens, including ethnic Serbs. Together, we need to pursue pragmatic measures that will improve the lives of the people of Kosovo 

and avoid making them victims of political disagreement. Serbia’s 

rejection of such measures called for under the Ahtisaari plan and 

its continued support for parallel institutions in Kosovo only serve 

to isolate and disenfranchise Kosovo Serbs and undercut efforts to 

solve their real, everyday problems. We believe that Serbia’s leaders and people can look beyond the issue of Kosovo’s independence 

and set their sights on their future: an engaged, constructive, modern, democratic and market-oriented Serbia, constructively engaged 

with all of its neighbors, and fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic 

community. 

KOSOVO

Kosovo’s success as an independent, tolerant, multi-ethnic, democratic state within its current borders remains a critically important factor for stability in the Balkans. With its declaration of independence in February 2008, an issue that was holding back the entire region was resolved. It was evident to all involved that independence for Kosovo would bring with it significant and enduring 

challenges, not the least of which would be overcoming a legacy of 

deep mistrust and enmity to build truly multiethnic democratic institutions that would protect the rights of Serbs and members of 

other communities. However, as President Ahtisaari recognized, reintegration into Serbia or partition were not viable options, and 

continued international administration was neither acceptable to 

the population nor conducive to sustainable economic development. 

And let me be clear again here, that the United States today, just 

as then, will not support any partition of Kosovo. 

A year and a half on, Kosovo has made tremendous progress. Its 

leadership is upholding its commitments to implement the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan, building ministries, agencies, infrastructure, reaching out to neighbors, strengthening diplomatic ties 

around the world, and demonstrating that a democratic, independent Kosovo is a force for regional stability, willing and able to 

play a constructive role as a responsible member of the international community. Sixty-two countries formally recognize Kosovo, 

and many more have indicated their acceptance of Kosovo as a 

39

member of the international community by voting for Kosovo’s 

membership in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 

Its independence is irreversible. 

Of course, much work remains. While praising Kosovo’s progress 

and pledging continued U.S. support, the Vice President urged the 

government to re-double efforts to strengthen governing capacity, 

develop a sound economy and environment for investment, build 

strong, transparent and effective institutions, advance decentralization and other measures that will give ethnic communities greater 

degrees of control over their local affairs, and build on a record of 

free and fair elections. He also stressed that strengthening rule of 

law and the judiciary, and tackling crime and eliminating corruption must remain top priorities. Equally importantly, Vice President Biden urged greater government outreach to Kosovo’s Serb 

community, to build dialogue and establish strong protections for 

that and other non-majority communities, in order to promote reconciliation, build a more tolerant, peaceful and integrated multiethnic society, and improve conditions for the return of displaced 

minorities. His visit to Decani monastery highlighted the importance of preserving cultural heritage and safeguarding religious 

freedom and the continuing, indispensable role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. 

Supporting Kosovo’s efforts to build a multi-ethnic society in 

which all communities thrive, and notably in which the Serb community is able to enjoy full rights and privileges, must and will remain a central part of our approach to Kosovo. The U.S. Embassy 

in Kosovo is actively engaged with Serbs from all parts of Kosovo, 

including with representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, to 

provide assistance and encourage their interaction with Kosovo institutions. The Embassy has worked on behalf of Serb returnees 

and internally displaced persons (IDPs), taken up property rights 

issues with the Kosovo government on behalf of ethnic Serbs, and 

funded commercial, infrastructure, cultural, educational and other 

efforts to help sustain existing Serb communities. U.S. assistance 

for Kosovo Serbs is aimed at enhancing the sustainability of Kosovo 

Serb communities and encouraging them to see their long-term future in a secure and democratic Kosovo. 

The violent confrontations between Kosovo Serb demonstrators 

and Kosovo police, EULEX and KFOR over Kosovo Albanian housing reconstruction in Kroi i Vitakut this summer highlighted the 

sensitivities and tensions inherent in building a multiethnic society 

throughout Kosovo. We have strongly supported a role for EULEX 

in finding solutions that support the rule of law and the right of 

IDPs to return and would allow them to reconstruct their houses, 

but in a manner that ensures the safety and security of all parties. 

In general, we have advocated a robust EULEX role in the north, 

in support of rule of law, and we support EU plans to open an office in the north to facilitate its conflict mitigation activities. 

To this day, five EU members do not recognize Kosovo. This split 

within the EU has caused the EU Special Representative, EULEX, 

and other EU institutions to adhere to ‘‘status neutral’’ positions, 

limiting their direct engagement in support of implementation of 

provisions of the Ahtisaari plan. Nevertheless, we and the EU 

share and pursue the goal of strengthening the capacity of Kosovo 

40

institutions and assisting their progress towards sustainability and 

accountability and adherence to internationally recognized standards. Like the rest of the Western Balkans, Kosovo’s future lies in 

becoming a fully integrated part of Europe. To this end, our coordination with Brussels, key EU Member States, and European institutions on the ground to advance Kosovo’s progress will remain 

very close. As part of the EU’s next report on enlargement in October, it plans to release a ‘‘feasibility study’’ on Kosovo, which we 

hope will reinforce a pragmatic EU perspective for Kosovo. 

MONTENEGRO

In its few years of independence, Montenegro has demonstrated 

a strong commitment to taking the necessary steps that will advance its EU and NATO membership aspirations. The relative harmony that Montenegro has created for its various ethnic groups 

and its progress on reforms are positive examples in the region. 

The country is making great strides on an ambitious reform agenda 

that will facilitate the quickest-possible integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, evidenced by the recent passage of a new Council of Europe-compliant Criminal Procedure Code. Montenegro’s reform agenda also includes development of legislation and mechanisms important to the fight against corruption and organized 

crime. During his May visit to Podgorica, Deputy Secretary of State 

Steinberg reaffirmed our support for Montenegro’s continued reform progress, encouraging the government to step up efforts to 

strengthen rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and police and prosecutor investigative capacity, as well as enhance government transparency and accountability. We are confident the 

government will continue on this path. We will continue to support 

its efforts to implement these important reforms and to support 

Montenegro’s close cooperation with NATO. 

MACEDONIA

In Macedonia, we continue to strongly support full implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. We applaud the 

progress made by Macedonian authorities, but urge their continued 

work. Full implementation of Ohrid—both in word and spirit—remains the foundation for Macedonia’s future as a strong, stable 

multiethnic democracy. In parallel, we are assisting in efforts to increase the effectiveness and accountability of political institutions, 

and strengthen and enhance the professionalism, transparency and 

independence of the judicial sector and police. Macedonia’s integration into NATO and the EU remains a vital ingredient for lasting 

peace and stability in the region. As a matter of policy we believe 

bilateral disputes should not be allowed to factor in EU and NATO 

membership processes. We continue to support a near-term mutually acceptable solution to the issue of Macedonia’s name through 

the ongoing UN process led by the UN Secretary General’s Special 

Envoy, Ambassador Matthew Nimetz. 

ALBANIA

The government of Albania has shown greater willingness to confront pervasive corruption, reflected in improvements in TransVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
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parency International’s annual Perceptions of Corruption index. 

Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Program, the U.S. Government has helped the Albanian government 

to achieve important, initial benchmarks in fighting corruption. A 

tangible sign of progress is the ‘‘e-government’’ program, requiring 

e-filing of business taxes, a much improved business registration 

process, and strengthening of licensing procedures. Increased efficiency in procurement systems has also enhanced transparency. 

The Joint Investigative Unit in the Tirana Prosecutor’s Office, comprised of prosecutors and law enforcement officials, has been operational for two years and has had several notable corruption convictions of public officials. Satellite units in six major cities will 

open in the coming months, concentrating their efforts on corruption and financial fraud. We continue to encourage the government 

further to increase its support for independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions and the lifting of parliamentary immunity in 

relevant cases. More broadly, we will be working with Prime Minister Berisha, who formed a new government earlier this month, to 

sharpen Albania’s focus on fighting official corruption and dismantling organized crime networks, improving its record on trafficking 

in persons, and building and sustaining independent, transparent 

and effective democratic institutions. Such reforms will also advance Albania’s bid for EU candidate status, which it submitted in 

April. 

CROATIA

Croatia continues to demonstrate impressive progress on reforms, and is an example in the region for the positive force of 

Euro-Atlantic integration. It became a NATO ally in April this 

year, and is well on its way to joining the European Union. We applaud the agreement reached between Croatia and Slovenia earlier 

this month that will allow Croatia’s EU accession negotiations to 

move ahead. Croatia continues to support defense modernization in 

the midst of a severe budgetary crisis. Although Croatia’s rapid development is remarkable and its commitment remains strong, Croatia still has work to do in some areas. We are encouraging the 

government to accelerate its judicial reform efforts and continue efforts to resolve remaining refugee and war crimes issues where significant strides have already been made. We are working with the 

Croatian authorities to step up its fight against corruption and organized crime, issues on which the Croatian government also 

places the highest priority. 

MINORITY PROTECTIONS

Ensuring that governments uphold protections for minorities and 

promote their rights is necessary so that they may have an equitable voice and stake in their countries’ future; this must remain 

a theme of our work throughout the region. Although governments 

have made some important strides, ethnic and religious minority 

communities continue to face both official and societal discrimination in employment, social services, language use, freedom of movement, and other basic rights. At times, there have been failures to 

fully investigate acts of discrimination or abuse against minorities. 

42

The U.S. government is working with governments and international organizations to increase and facilitate minority representation in the civil service, judiciary, central government, and elected bodies. Our assistance to minorities includes providing advice 

and financial backing to ensure that all communities have access 

to local news and information in their native languages. For instance, in Serbia, U.S. assistance efforts relating to decentralization, particularly civil society advocacy, and our efforts to support 

Albanian, Bosniak, Hungarian, and Roma parties and their efforts 

to gain representation in government and parliament are helping 

to address the needs of the multi-ethnic province of Vojvodina and 

of marginalized ethnic populations in Sandzak and the valley encompassing Presevo and Bujanovac in Southern Serbia. 

ROMA

Roma, along with the Ashkali and Egyptian communities, remain 

among the most marginalized minority communities in the region 

and continue to suffer disproportionately. The U.S. Government 

has engaged consistently on behalf of the Roma in the region. Nevertheless, societal discrimination, harassment by police, and lack of 

access to basic services such as education, health care, and housing 

persist. Secretary Clinton, formerly a Member of this Commission, 

has made it clear that the Administration—and she personally—remains strongly committed to promoting the rights of Roma. On 

International Roma Day, embassies throughout the region hold 

events and activities to highlight the plight of Roma, and they continue to press governments to work to end discrimination and ensure equality of opportunity for these communities. 

Nowhere is this problem more salient than in Kosovo, where we 

are working to relocate the Roma living in lead-poisoned camps in 

north Mitrovica. To this end, the USG launched a $2.4 million intensive effort to relocate the 50 most distressed families from the 

camps to locations in south Mitrovica and elsewhere, in cooperation 

with the Government of Kosovo. Meanwhile, we are working with 

camp residents and authorities to achieve full camp closure and resettle the 90 families that will remain. We have adopted a joint position with the European Commission to cooperate and to coordinate all efforts towards the implementation of this solution. A final 

decision on a joint plan for the sustainable resettlement of all remaining camp residents taking into account all aspects of the intervention is expected within weeks. 

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY AND FIGHTING CRIME

The USG remains a major assistance donor to the western Balkans in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 

In 2009 alone the United States allocated more than $ 116 million 

to these activities. Of this amount, support for fair elections, development of a vibrant nongovernmental sector, and effective and 

transparent government totaled $44 million. Establishing justice 

systems that effectively combat crime while preserving due process 

and ensuring full access by citizens to legal remedies remains a 

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cluding training and capacity development for police, totaled more 

than $70 million in 2009. 

Across the region, we are promoting effective, accountable, and 

independent democratic institutions. USG programs provide operational support to parliaments to introduce and improve practices 

such as public hearings, legislative review, and research. USG 

training aims to enhance parliamentarians’ ability to represent citizens’ interests in the legislative process, for example by establishing local constituency offices. 

Free and fair elections and electoral processes are critical 

underpinnings to democracy. USG programs focus on improving the 

efficiency of elections administration, promoting transparency, ensuring equal media access for governing and opposition parties and 

activists, and promoting participation of women, minorities, and 

youth in political institutions. The conduct of elections in the region 

has improved overall. Montenegro’s March parliamentary elections 

met almost all OSCE and Council of Europe commitments, although the process again underscored the need for further democratic development. Elections in Macedonia in 2008 fell short in 

some key areas, but 2009 presidential and local elections were generally well-administered and met most international standards. 

Kosovo will hold municipal elections this November, its first as an 

independent country, and we are providing support to the Central 

Election Commission. Albania’s June 28 parliamentary elections 

saw tangible progress over previous elections in several areas, including improvements in voter registration and identification and 

the legal framework; they too met most OSCE commitments, notwithstanding a number of important shortcomings, including in 

ballot counting and tabulation, media bias in favor of the main political parties, and pressure on public servants by political parties 

and the government during the electoral campaign. 

Good democratic governance must go hand in hand with respect 

for rule of law and strong, sound, transparent judiciaries. While the 

region’s justice systems have undergone significant transformation, 

further reform is needed to ensure that these systems are characterized by greater judicial independence, equality of arms between 

prosecution and defense, respect for human rights and accountability for corruption. To this end, U.S. programs are providing 

technical expertise, training, and material assistance to develop 

independent judiciaries, improve the functioning of courts and access to justice, reform Communist-era laws that are not compliant 

with international human rights, and strengthen the capacity of 

police and prosecutors to conduct investigations and prosecutions of 

crime and corruption cases in a professional, nonpartisan, and accountable manner. Our support for the OSCE Missions in the region adds a multiplier effect in helping the Western Balkans develop stable institutions and societies based on the rule of law. 

Crime and corruption remain one of the most serious problems 

hindering political and economic development in the region, despite 

extensive internal reforms and international support. Key areas of 

USG focus include reducing opportunities for bribery; building 

oversight and audit capabilities; increasing capacity to investigate 

and prosecute corruption and financial crimes; empowering civic 

groups, associations, and media to scrutinize government operVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Oct 09, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\WORK\092909.TXT KATIE
44

ations; and reforming the judicial system by increasing accountability, transparency, and independence. 

Our Model Court Initiative in Bosnia, completed in May of 2009, 

worked to institute European standards in 33 local courts, upgrade 

court infrastructure, and improve customer service, resulting in a 

reduction in case backlogs (unrelated to utility bill cases) by up to 

75 percent. Bosnia’s High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council is now 

implementing the model court standards throughout Bosnia’s court 

system. Our support for reform and renovation of the court in 

Srebrenica, which has great symbolic value given that Srebrenica 

was the site of the worst genocide in Europe since World War II, 

has provided returnees with an institution capable of dispensing 

justice in a fair and efficient manner and is another step on the 

road towards healing the wounds inflicted by war. 

In Serbia, USG assistance supported the establishment of specialized Anti-Corruption Departments within the Republic Prosecutor’s Office and four District Offices and a Victim Witness Coordinator’s Office. Over the past two years, more than 700 witnesses 

received support, both during investigations and during trial. 

In Kosovo, USG technical assistance supported the development 

of the constitution and more than 50 pieces of legislation to implement the constitution and provisions of the Ahtisaari plan crucial 

to Kosovo’s integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, the proper 

functioning of the justice sector, and the reform and restructuring 

of the court system. This legislation and related administrative instructions and strategies will improve the efficiency and deterrent 

effect of criminal justice system, leading over time to effective use 

of plea bargaining and asset-forfeiture as important tools in the 

fight against organized crime and corruption. The United States is 

pleased to be participating in the EU’s EULEX Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, which is monitoring, mentoring and advising 

Kosovo police and judicial institutions. 

PRESS FREEDOM

While countries in the region now offer a wide range of media 

across print, television, radio and internet outlets, there remain 

challenges in fostering a media environment in which independent 

outlets can provide objective public affairs content and minority 

media outlets can survive. Too many outlets are linked to political 

parties and business interests, or come under direct or indirect 

pressure from governing authorities. In Serbia, the parliament 

passed a controversial new law in August 2009 that critics maintain establishes draconian fines for violation of rules of conduct 

that could lead to self-censorship. We are working to advance 

media freedom and to enhance the media’s watchdog role by promoting investigative journalism and providing training, legal, and 

technical support to independent media outlets. For instance, the 

USG has helped to create a regional network of investigative journalists in Southeast Europe (SEE) via the Crime and Corruption 

Reporting Project (CCRP), which is greatly expanding the reach of 

investigative journalism and has garnered support from other donors, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 

45

CIVIL SOCIETY

While thousands of international and local NGOs across the Balkans are working on issues ranging from political reform to disability rights, it is still a difficult financial and political environment for civil society organizations. Through small grants and technical assistance programs, the USG is working to help build the capacity of local and regional NGOs to represent citizen interests, 

monitor government compliance with human rights, undertake 

public education campaigns about important public policy issues, 

advocate for policy reform, build partnerships with public and private sectors, and promote inter-ethnic dialogue and understanding. 

One program in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia works with teachers 

and youth to increase civic education and provide students with the 

tools necessary to work together to solve community problems, and 

in Serbia a nationwide coalition of local NGOs mobilized to bring 

public attention to environmental issues with USG support. 

EDUCATION

Education remains highly politicized, reflecting the region’s 

struggles to overcome ethnic division. To cite some examples, in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, the three major ethnic groups maintain 

their own curricula and have established generally mono-ethnic 

school systems with little interaction with peers from other ethnic 

groups. In Macedonia, the education system is also struggling to 

bridge the gap between ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian 

communities and is trending towards a ‘‘separate but equal’’ education system, especially in high schools, to avoid student violence. 

WAR CRIMES AND RECONCILIATION

The legacies of the wars of the 1990s still loom large over parts 

of the region. Together with our international community partners, 

we have worked closely with local political, religious, and ethnic 

community leaders to promote truth and reconciliation as well as 

justice for victims of war crimes, to prosecute war criminals, and 

to identify the remains of those still missing. To break what would 

become a self-perpetuating cycle of fear and hatred, we have sponsored programs to foster dialogue at all levels between and among 

citizens of the Balkans. In this effort, youth are a particular focus, 

as we seek to link young people of the region across ethnic, national, and religious lines. We have provided significant support to 

the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) to locate 

gravesites and help provide closure to the families of the missing. 

In Bosnia alone, U.S. Government support has contributed to postconflict healing by recovering over 1200 remains from mass graves 

and identifying over 1500 missing individuals using DNA technology. 

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY) continues to play a central role in promoting peace, justice, 

and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia by holding individuals 

accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. From the 

outset, we have been strong political and financial backers of the 

Tribunal, calling for all ICTY fugitives to face justice and for all 

countries under the Tribunals’ jurisdiction to fully cooperate with 

46

the ICTY. Since 1993, ICTY has brought 161 indictments and concluded proceedings against 116 persons, with 57 convictions and 10 

acquittals. Some of its most high profile cases are underway or in 

pre-trial stage, as in the trial of Radovan Karadzic. 

Two fugitives—Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic—have yet to be 

captured. They will not escape justice by outlasting the Tribunal. 

Until they are apprehended and tried, justice will not be done and 

reconciliation cannot fully take root. We have worked to increase 

regional capacity to investigate and prosecute domestic war crimes 

cases through training, mentoring, and material donations to 

courts, prosecutors and police. The USG has also worked hard to 

promote regional cooperation on war crimes cases. In 2008, USG 

assistance to the State Court in Bosnia helped bring about the 

first-ever genocide convictions there. 

We will continue our strong support for the ICTY until its work 

is complete, and we are working with our UN colleagues on a residual judicial mechanism to handle those core functions of the ICTY 

that must continue even after trials and appeals have been completed. As part of a closeout strategy, we are providing financial, 

technical, and political support to develop individual countries’ capacity to investigate and try war crimes and other serious cases. 

HOLOCAUST ISSUES

As in other parts of Europe, unfinished business left over from 

World War II continues to need attention in the Balkans. Croatia 

is still trying to deal with the restitution of both private and communal property confiscated during the war. It is expected that 

upon resolution of a pending supreme court case the Croatian government will introduce new legislation on private property. The 

Croatian government is in discussion with the World Jewish Restitution Organization about Jewish communal property. Serbia recently passed legislation, despite U.S. objections, which would adversely impact many outstanding property restitution claims in 

that country. We are continuing our dialogue with Serbia on that 

subject, and have urged the Serbian government to pass and implement a clear and transparent property restitution law. In late 

2007, the Macedonian government concluded an agreement with 

the Jewish Community for restitution of all heirless Jewish property. 

RETURNS

Overall, on returns, too, there has been good progress. The vast 

majority of those displaced by conflict in the Balkans have returned 

home. Last year UNHCR closed the last official collective center for 

refugees in Montenegro. Approximately1,700 refugees, asylum 

seekers, and persons of concern from Kosovo and Bosnia remain in 

Macedonia, and new legislation should provide durable solutions 

for their integration, successfully closing a chapter on the refugee 

situation there. The number of refugees and displaced in Serbia 

has decreased by more than 80% between 1996 and 2008, with successful returns to Bosnia and Croatia, local integration efforts, and 

voluntary resettlement abroad. Yet pressing challenges remain, 

and nearly 500,000 people continue to live in displacement 

47

throughout the Balkans, often in substandard—sometimes wretched—conditions. The USG continues to provide assistance for returns through its contribution of 25%, or $8.8 million, to UNHCR’s 

regional budget for the Balkans this calendar year, $14.7 million 

to the International Committee of the Red Cross’s European Operations, and another $2.2 million for various NGO-implemented 

projects in the region. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Of the 1.2 million refugees and approximately 1 million IDPs displaced in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 

more than 1 million of the displaced have returned to Bosnia, and 

nearly 470,000 members of minority communities have returned to 

their place of origin. To date, approximately 98 percent of post-conflict property restitution claims have been adjudicated. Work reconstructing or repairing homes still lies ahead, and approximately 

135,000 IDPs remain displaced within Bosnia, unable to return to 

their homes. As returns dwindled over the past few years, the government focused efforts on closing Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, 

which covers refugees and IDPs. The Bosnian national government 

has brought together both entities and created 10 working groups 

that will seek to create the economic conditions for sustainable return, which is of great concern in Bosnia’s weak economy. 

Croatia: Croatian authorities also have made significant progress 

in finding durable solutions for returnees. However, around 80,000 

Croatian Serbs, primarily residing in Serbia and Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, maintain refugee status. Inconsistent implementation 

of laws and lack of strong economic prospects remain deterrents. 

The Croatian government has taken steps to address other key impediments, including the convalidation of pension rights and providing housing, but has not fully achieved either. Its Housing Care 

program has provided approximately 6,500 homes for returnees 

from all ethnic groups through June 2009, although the program 

has failed to meet its benchmarks each year. Croatian authorities 

have begun to review and, in some cases, reverse rejected applications to the Housing Care Program. UNHCR has identified the refugees from Croatia residing in Serbia as one of five protracted refugee situations worldwide upon which to focus international attention and resources. The High Commissioner is exerting efforts to 

help Croatian authorities accelerate the processing of individual 

refugee applications for housing and contribute to the transparency 

and fairness of administrative proceedings related to housing assistance programs. The United States has contributed $1 million in 

response to this appeal. In addition, we are encouraging the government of Croatia to find a durable solution for those refugees 

who cannot or will not return. 

Serbia: At the end of 2008, more than 206,000 displaced persons 

from Kosovo and approximately 86,000 refugees from Croatia and 

Bosnia and Herzegovina resided in Serbia. Serbia and Croatia had 

halted diplomatic contact following the recognition of Kosovo by 

Croatia. We want to see both countries resume their dialogue on 

how to resolve this issue. A U.S. contribution of $1 million over two 

years will support a UNHCR appeal focused, inter alia, on securing 

durable solutions for refugees from Croatia that reside in Serbia. 

We are also funding an $850,000 livelihoods and legal assistance 

project being implemented by an NGO throughout Serbia. Returns 

48

from Serbia to Kosovo have slowed and the vast majority of those 

displaced from Kosovo into Serbia could choose to remain there. We 

are gratified to note recent indications that the Serbian government supports integration of individuals displaced from Kosovo 

within Serbia, while supporting their pursuit of restitution of lost 

property and other legal rights in Kosovo. 

Kosovo: Of the approximately 260,000 displaced from Kosovo—

primarily Serbs, but also Roma and other minorities—approximately 20,000 have returned, and Kosovo still hosts approximately 

20,000 internally displaced persons. Following Kosovo’s declaration 

of independence, minority returns to Kosovo slowed to fewer than 

700 in 2008. In 2009, the return trend has picked up but continues 

to be slow. A UNHCR project to register interest in returning 

should result in numbers rising again. But, ten years since the conflict, the younger displaced population has gravitated elsewhere, 

and the working age population has sought employment in the 

areas where they currently reside. Individual returns have been 

fairly successful, if limited in number. Large group returns have 

been less successful over the past ten years, due to political, economic and other reasons. For example, in Srpski Babus, south of 

Pristina, a larger group return of 75 families had been planned and 

housing was completed; however, the group refused to return to its 

housing. While political reasons have influenced some, fear of harassment and lack of employment or Serb-language schools have 

kept others away. 

The international community is supporting a UNHCR-led initiative to register interest among IDPs in Serbia to return to Kosovo, 

and then to return them, and we expect returns to rise. Vice President Biden underscored to the Kosovo leadership the importance of 

sustained efforts to facilitate more returns. We are pleased that 

Prime Minister Thaci has been outspoken in support of returns, 

but some municipalities have shown reluctance to cooperate. In recognition of these challenges, the Kosovo government will be shifting funding towards community infrastructure and livelihoods 

projects, is about to issue a new manual for sustainable returns, 

and is developing operational guidelines to standardize the implementation work of municipalities. The agreement earlier this year 

between the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA) and UNHCR that allows for the re-opening of KPA offices in Serbia is major step forward. Serbia’s discouragement of Kosovo Serbs from engaging with 

Kosovo institutions, and its support for parallel structures, make 

coordination and cooperation between the government and those in 

need difficult and undermine the role of the responsible Kosovo authorities. 

TRAFFICKING

Trafficking trends in the Balkans are complex and vary from 

country to country within the region. Some countries, such as Albania, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, are source, transit, and destination countries for men, women, and children for purposes of 

sexual exploitation and forced labor, including forced begging. Others like Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are primarily source, transit, and destination countries for women and 

children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Victims are 

49

trafficked within the region and also to Southeastern and Western 

Europe. The USG is working with local governments, NGOs and 

international organizations in the region, including the International Organization for Migration and UNHCR, to increase local 

capacity to identify and assist victims, such as funding crisis hotlines and women’s shelters, improving training to help law enforcement better identify and treat victims, and expanding public 

awareness and education efforts to prevent vulnerable individuals 

from becoming victims in the first place. Another USG program 

complements these bilateral efforts by working with governmental 

and non-governmental actors across the Southeast European region 

to develop transnational referral mechanisms for trafficked persons 

as well as guidelines and model standard operating procedures for 

use by national governments. 

Although the problem of trafficking in persons remains very serious, the region’s governments generally have made significant 

progress in combating this scourge. All of the Western Balkan 

countries either fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards or are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. 

Montenegro has been placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a second consecutive year, because the government did not adequately punish 

convicted traffickers and did not proactively identify trafficking victims among vulnerable populations. We are working closely with 

the government to improve its record. Nevertheless, both sex and 

labor trafficking remain a problem, and inadequate punishments 

for convicted traffickers, corruption, and weak victim protection 

and assistance remain key deficiencies throughout the region. Ethnic Roma women and children in particular remain at high risk for 

being trafficked. We will continue working with our partners in the 

region to improve individual and collective efforts to combat human 

trafficking. 

CONCLUSION

Chairmen, Members of the Commission, in sum, the region has 

come a long way and is moving ahead, but the journey is not complete. America has a deep and abiding stake in the region’s success. 

We have sent our sons and daughters to serve there in diplomatic, 

development and military missions. We have invested significant 

material, financial, and technical assistance. And we have learned 

a key lesson: durable solutions demand sustained U.S. leadership. 

In concert with our European partners, bilaterally, and through 

multilateral organizations like the OSCE and NATO, the Obama 

Administration is intensifying U.S. engagement with the region’s 

leaders and pressing for accelerated reforms that will advance their 

states toward the European mainstream. Our message to them is 

clear: the door is open for the countries of this region to be a part 

of that Europe—and the United States will be there to help you—

but you must take the steps to walk through that door. 

Prospects for completing this historic endeavor of helping to 

achieve a Europe whole, free, and at peace are better than ever. As 

Jim Hoagland recently wrote in the Washington Post, the self-perpetuating cycle that mired the region in grievances and feuds is 

now being challenged in countries that ‘‘look ahead more than they 

50

look back.’’ We will continue to build on this hard-won foundation, 

until democracy, openness and modernity eclipse ethnic nationalism, intolerance and discrimination, and all of the countries of 

the region take their place in Europe.

51

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BJO ̈ RN LYRVALL, DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, members of the Commission, 

I am honoured to have been invited to address you here today representing the Swedish Presidency of the European Union. The Helsinki Commission is a dynamic and highly-valued forum for transatlantic dialogue and undertakes important work in relation to democracy, rule of law, human rights and security in Europe. I want 

to thank you collectively for your longstanding engagement and 

commitment in these issues, which are of vital importance for Europe as a whole. 

The transatlantic relationship constitutes a cornerstone of the 

EU’s external policies and is based on shared values such as democracy, human rights as well as a commitment to open and integrated economies. Some would even say that the similarity in policy outlook across the Atlantic is the greatest in decades and we 

look forward to the upcoming EU-US Summit in Washington later 

on this fall. 

It may seem confusing to an outsider that there are a number 

of different actors speaking on behalf of the EU. There is the Commissioner for External Affairs, the Commissioner in charge of Enlargement and the Western Balkans, there is the Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana who personifies the EU 

Common Foreign and Security Policy. And there is still the rotating Presidency, which my country Sweden holds until the end of 

the year. 

It is indeed a challenging task to lead a union of 27 member 

states. There is great diversity between the different countries. At 

the same time, the fact that the number of member states has increased in recent years has, I would say, contributed to the 

strength of the EU. We may discuss a lot internally, but in the end 

the EU, when united, has a powerful voice and a big influence in 

many fields: trade, development cooperation, foreign and security 

policy, environmental issues, consumer policy etc. 

There are many big issues on our agenda for the coming months. 

The overriding priorities of the Swedish Presidency, as you are 

probably well aware, have to do with the economic situation in the 

world, employment and climate. The issue of the new EU Treaty 

is likely to dominate the Brussels agenda after the Irish referendum on Friday. We also focus on maintaining a secure and 

open Europe. We want to enhance the EU’s role as a global actor. 

Enlargement is also very high on our agenda. 

One of the challenges of our time is, of course, the situation in 

the Western Balkans. 

CONTEXT

The European Union has come a long way since its origins as a 

post-Second World War peace initiative in the 1950s. The European 

Union and its 27 Member States stand as a success story in the 

creation of peace and prosperity within its borders. The wider challenge of extending that peace and prosperity beyond its borders is 

clearly seen in the Western Balkans. 

52

In fact, the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has developed largely in response to the challenges presented 

by the repercussions of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. In fact it was the failure to respond 

adequately to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990’s that 

prompted EU member states to enhance and reinforce the EU’s 

ability to conduct a credible and effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and this process is still ongoing. 

My own Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, as the EU-mediator at 

Dayton and subsequently the international communities’ first 

international High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, played 

an active role both pre and post Dayton, pushing for a sharper EU 

policy when involved in crises and also formulating a post war programme for conditional EU integration—The Regional Approach 

which was the forerunner of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association 

Process. 

In the aftermath of the Kosovo war in 1999 we saw violent crises 

emerging in FYR Macedonia in 2001 as a result of unsolved ethnic 

and social tensions. The Swedish EU Presidency at the time used 

the still untested Common Foreign Security policies to contain the 

crises. The EU troika involving High Representative Solana and 

Commissioner Patten showed readiness creating circumstances for 

negotiations which later on resulted in the Ohrid agreement, to be 

implemented by the EU’s first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission. 

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) 

Given this background, which has not always been encouraging—

Bosnia was certainly not EU’s ‘‘finest hour’’—the EU’s Common 

Foreign and Security Policy has developed gradually into a more 

coordinated, rapid and targeted set of instruments—both military 

and civilian. EU Police Monitors and regular Combat Missions as 

well as advisory missions have proved to be effective although challenges still remain. 

Since 1991, the European Union has been the largest donor to 

the region, having provided roughly around Ö 13 billion in assistance, among others, for infrastructure, for institution building, for 

regional and cross-border cooperation, for strengthening protection 

of minorities and enforcing human rights. 

When you include humanitarian and bilateral assistance of our 

Member States, please double the figure. Until 2013 we will spend 

more than Ö 900 million each year in the region. This figure does 

not include the costs of the ESDP missions which we have 

launched since 2003 of which three are still ongoing. 

Our political investment is immeasurable: Thousands of EU personnel in the institutions are working in and with the region, in 

the headquarter in Brussels, in the delegations of the European 

Commission in the region and in the three offices of the EU Special 

Representatives. 

But even more importantly, the history of the European Union 

and its enlargement tells us that EU membership is a strong guarantor of lasting peace and social progress. With the enormous 

promise and incentive to change that the European perspective 

holds for the Western Balkans, these countries have embarked on 

53

the same journey from war and mistrust to peace and reconsolidation that reunified the European continent after World War II and 

the Cold War. The Western Balkans is on its way from the era of 

hard power to the era of soft power, from the era of Dayton to the 

era of Europe. The forces of disintegration is finally about to give 

way to the forces of integration. 

The European perspective—with the ultimate goal of EU membership once the conditions have been met by each country on its 

own merits—releases the EU’s transformative potential, where our 

democratic way of life and prosperity exercise a strong magnetic 

pull that provides hope and drives reform. Despite a certain ‘‘enlargement fatigue’’ there is a strong commitment of the EU member states to the objective of the Western Balkans countries becoming a members of the EU . 

And the EU’s enlargement to Southeastern Europe is more than 

a historic mission to finish the job of reunifying the continent. It 

is a matter of enlightened self-interest and of enhancing our own 

economic growth, security and freedom. It also creates opportunities to a broaden the common EU approach in crucial areas such 

as energy security and migration. 

Mr Chairman, 

Let me now turn to a few country specific comments, starting 

with our most advanced partner. 

Croatia has traveled far along its road to membership of the European Union. A remarkable transition towards stable democracy, 

rule of law and a functioning market economy has taken place that 

should serve as a positive example for the Western Balkans region 

to follow. Clearly, it is the attractive forces of European and transatlantic cooperation structures that have underpinned this momentous societal change. 

Since the start in 2005, Croatia has closed 7 out of 35 negotiating 

chapters in its process towards EU membership. Negotiations could 

be finalised by mid-2010, based on Croatia’s own merits. This 

would enable Croatia to join the EU as a full member by 2011 or 

2012. 

Regretfully, the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia has 

stopped Croatia from making formal advances in this process for 

almost a year now. However, on September 11 this year, Prime 

Ministers Kosor and Pahor announced an agreement in principle 

on how to proceed with solving the border dispute and simultaneously de-blocking accession negotiations. The Swedish Presidency 

has confirmed its readiness to support further talks on the border 

issue, to be resumed on October 2. In overcoming the heated arguments on both sides, and re-establishing an atmosphere of mutual 

trust, the leaders of the two countries have shown admirable 

statesmanship. 

A key requirement for membership of the European Union is full 

cooperation with the war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 

ICTY. Since there have been no positive developments in this area, 

the relevant negotiating chapter—on Democracy and Human 

Rights—remains blocked. Croatia needs to credibly demonstrate 

that it is making every effort to fulfill the needs of the Chief Prosecutor. Concerted pressure from the EU and US is advisable on 

this issue. 

54

In Macedonia—or the FYR Macedonia—we are encouraged by 

this year’s presidential and local elections which according to observers met most international standards. 

EU relations with FYR Macedonia have intensified steadily over 

the past few years. In 2004, a Stabilisation and Association Agreement came into force, and the year after, FYR Macedonia was officially recognised as candidate for EU membership. End of this 

year, the EU is scheduled to lift the visa obligation for FYR Macedonia. 

For opening accession talks, eight benchmarks must be met. FYR 

Macedonia must, inter alia demonstrate proper implementation of 

judicial and police reforms, anti-corruption legislation and measures to ensure a depoliticised civil service. It is also essential that 

the authorities foster and facilitate a true political dialogue between the various groups in society. According to the European 

Commission, FYR Macedonia is close to fulfilling the benchmarks, 

and a recommendation to open accession talks may well be issued 

during the Swedish Presidency. FYR Macedonia should be rewarded for their reform efforts. The unresolved name dispute with 

Greece should not be an impediment to initiating negotiations. This 

is a matter which must be resolved bilaterally, under the auspices 

of the UN. 

Montenegro has made impressive progress along its European integration agenda since declaring independence from the union with 

Serbia in June 2006. Encouraged by the EU, Montenegro’s EU perspective has been quickly embedded in a series of formal agreements. The momentum continues as Montenegro submitted its formal application for EU membership in December 2008 and after a 

decision by the Council, a report is now being prepared by the European Commission that will be the basis for deciding whether 

Montenegro can become formally a candidate country for EU membership. At the same time, Montenegro is likely to be granted visa 

liberalisation with the EU in the coming months. EU membership 

will be the logical conclusion of this process and the timing will 

largely depend on Montenegro’s ability to carry out the necessary 

reforms and fulfill the criteria for EU membership. 

Albania has been gradually moving towards European integration, a process that has received momentum in recent years. At the 

EU foreign ministers meeting in a couple of weeks’ time, we hope 

to reach agreement to forward Albania’s membership application to 

the Commission for its assessment. 

However as the June 2009 elections in Albania have shown, the 

path to EU membership will not be easy: elections were marked by 

unfortunate political interference in the post-election process, as 

noted by the international election observers. Besides more efforts 

to meet democratic standards, Albania also needs to strengthen its 

public administration, reform the judiciary and more effectively 

fight organised crime and corruption. 

Serbia. There is a stable, pro-EU government in place in Belgrade, which was elected in order to bring Serbia closer to the EU 

and it shows a new maturity and commitment in terms of fulfilling 

the obligations for EU accession. All EU Member States agree that 

in order for the Government to keep its credibility, the country 

must be allowed to make progress on its path towards the EU. As 

55

soon as the cooperation with ICTY is judged to be satisfactory, the 

contractual agreement for the accession process between Serbia 

and the EU will come into force. Progress has been considerable. 

This would also pave the way for a membership application towards the end of the year. In the meantime Serbia shows its EU 

commitment by unilaterally implementing the Interim Agreement 

of the SAA. Furthermore, we hope to be able to grant Serbia visa 

freedom as from early 2010. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina—currently the main challenge—has expressed its intention to apply in the near future for membership in 

the EU. In fact, in a country that remains deeply divided on many 

issues, the prospect of EU integration is one of the few unifying 

factors. There is however a major obstacle to this ambition. As long 

as OHR remains in place, a Bosnian EU membership application 

cannot be considered. 

It is quite obvious for all of us that OHR cannot take Bosnia to 

where it wants to go. This is why it is so important that the country as soon as possible reaches a situation where the political landscape allows it to move from OHR to a reinforced EUSR, strengthening at the same time the local political ownership, when continuing to reform itself in accordance with the EU acquis. 

The Bosnian SAA has been in place since June 2008. Part of that 

agreement includes a favourable free trade agreement with EU—

the Interim Agreement (IA)—which has seen a rather satisfactory 

implementation. On the other hand, the progress in implementing 

key partnership priorities of the agreement has unfortunately been 

rather limited. 

Only then and once the conditions have been met, can BiH make 

the transition from Dayton stabilisation to European integration. 

There is a window of opportunity to proceed with this transition before the 2010 elections. Otherwise, there is a considerable risk that 

Bosnia will be slipping behind the rest of the region. 

In order to achieve this transition we need to have a joint EUUS action-oriented approach this autumn. We are working closely 

with the US to take steps in this direction. 

Let me also say that outstanding constitutional reform in BiH 

neither is a precondition for OHR closure nor required in order to 

apply for EU membership. Nevertheless, it is an integral part of 

any efforts to create a functional state and will incrementally constitute a fundamental part of EU accession. Constitutional amendments must therefore be brought into line with the European Convention on Human Rights in order to end the ongoing discrimination between constituent and non-constituent citizens of BiH. 

Following the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR mission, 

the European Union has since December 2004 been responsible for 

the international military presence in BiH through the operation 

ALTHEA currently deploying more than 2.000 troops in theatre, 

and if needed they will be reinforced. At some point EUFOR must 

be transformed to a non-executive mission with focus on training 

of the Bosnian forces. Any decision will be discussed thoroughly 

with the US. From our perspective it is of outmost importance that 

a decision on the future of EUFOR is synchronized with the ongoing efforts to move forward on the political issues in the country. 

For the EU Police Mission which operates in an advisory capacity, 

56

supporting the fight against organised crime is moving forward and 

remains an important priority. 

Kosovo. A year and a half has passed since Kosovo declared its 

independence, and is now faced with the great challenges of building a democratic and multiethnic state. These challenges include 

decentralisation, rule of law, economic development, and engagement in regional and international fora. 

Kosovo needs to build up long term capacity to assume responsibility over the rule of law. The EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, 

EULEX, can support this process. EULEX is a visible expression 

of the European Union’s determined engagement for Kosovo. During its first almost 10 months of operation, EULEX has deployed 

in all of Kosovo and begun to implement its mandate. The American contribution is a crucial component of which the EU is most 

appreciative. 

In such a complex political context, there are of course difficult 

challenges. In the north, EULEX is moving slowly to reestablish 

control over customs and to fully reopen the court in Mitrovica. The 

police in northern Kosovo continue to report to EULEX. There is 

a fruitful dialogue with the authorities in Pristina on reforms regarding justice and police. 

The EU remains committed to its long term engagement in the 

developments of Kosovo. The fact that the EU is divided about the 

status of Kosovo does not prevent a fully engaged approach as regards Kosovo’s political and socio-economic development—in line 

with the European perspective of the region. It is clearly in the interest of the EU that Kosovo develops in accordance with the rest 

of the region. In October, the European Commission will present a 

study examining means to further Kosovo’s political and socio-economic development. This study will hopefully provide a framework 

for concrete measures to be taken by Kosovo in order to move forward on its EU integration. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, members of the Commission, 

thank you for giving me, as the Swedish Presidency of the EU, the 

opportunity to address you today.

Æ

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