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76–581 2012

UPDATE ON TOYOTA AND NHTSA’S RESPONSE 

TO THE PROBLEM OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED 

ACCELERATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 20, 2010 

Serial No. 111–126 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Vice Chairman 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANE HARMAN, California 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 


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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

Vice Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

Ranking Member 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, opening statement .................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 12 

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement ....................................................................................... 20 

Hon. Phil Gingrey, a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 21 

Hon. Parker Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Alabama, opening statement .................................................................................... 21 

Hon. Bruce L. Braley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24 

Hon. Robert E. Latta, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 27 

Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, opening statement .............................................................................. 28 

Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Tennessee, opening statement ............................................................................ 28 

WITNESSES

David L. Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ................................................................................................................. 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32 

James E. Lentz, President and Chief Operating Officer, Toyota Motor Sales, 

U.S.A., Inc ............................................................................................................. 52 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of February 22, 2010, from the Committee to the United States Department of Transportation, submitted by Mr. Stupak ........................................... 74 


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UPDATE ON TOYOTA AND NHTSA’S RESPONSE 

TO THE PROBLEM OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION 

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stupak, Braley, Schakowsky, Christensen, Dingell (ex officio), Waxman (ex officio), Burgess, Blackburn, 

Gingrey, Griffith, Latta, and Barton. 

Also present: Representative Gonzalez. 

Staff present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director; Bruce Wolpe, Senior 

Advisor; Dave Leviss, Chief Oversight Counsel; Allison Cassady, 

Professional Staff Member; Molly Gaston, Counsel; Anne Tindall, 

Counsel; Scott Schloegel, Investigator; Ali Neubauer, Special Assistant; Karen Lightfoot, Communications Director, Senior Policy 

Advisor; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant; Lindsey Vidal, Special 

Assistant; Earley Green, Chief Clerk; Mitchell Smiley, Special Assistant; Melissa Bartlett, Minority Counsel, Health; Karen Christian, Minority Counsel, Oversight; Kevin Kohl, Minority Professional Staff Member; Alan Slobodin, Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order. Today we have a 

hearing titled Update on Toyota and NHTSA’s Response to the 

Problem of Sudden Unintended Acceleration. The chairman, ranking member, and the chairman emeritus will now be recognized for 

5-minute opening statement. Other members of the subcommittee 

will be recognized for a 3-minute opening statement. I will begin. 

Today’s hearing will serve as a progress report on where Toyota 

and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA, 

are in terms of diagnosing and correcting sudden unintended acceleration. We will also examine what Toyota has done since our February 23 hearing. During our February 23 hearing, we heard from 

Toyota Motor Sales President Jim Lentz, Department of Transportation Secretary, Secretary Ray LaHood, consumer advocate Sean 

Kane, and from an expert witness, Professor David Gilbert of 


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Southern Illinois University about sudden, unintended accelerations, SUA, in Toyota vehicles. 

We also heard from Rhonda and Eddie Smith about their experience with sudden unintended acceleration in their Lexus. Committee members asked many questions but we were left with more 

questions than answers. Toyota engaged in damage control almost 

immediately following our hearing by continuing asserting confidence that the extensive testing proves the safety of the electronics systems and attacking those individuals who disagreed with 

them. But as Chairman Waxman noted in his opening, the record 

doesn’t support Toyota’s statements that it conducted extensive 

testing. The truth is that we don’t know whether electronics plays 

a role in sudden unintended acceleration and Toyota doesn’t know 

either. What is disappointing to me is learning that Toyota seems 

to have focused more on discrediting its critics than on resolving 

the problem. 

When Dr. Gilbert testified before this subcommittee in February, 

he explained that he found a way to induce sudden, unintended acceleration in a Toyota vehicle without triggering an error code in 

the vehicle’s computer. Committee staff has spoken with several 

academics who describe Dr. Gilbert’s experiment as sensible and as 

a reasonable way to begin to study unintended acceleration. Dr. 

Christian Gerdes, a professor at Stanford University who Toyota 

asked to review Dr. Gilbert’s work, told the committee that Dr. Gilbert’s approach was a legitimate starting point for a more in-depth 

inquiry into the causes of sudden unintended acceleration. 

Unfortunately, Toyota appears to have been more interested in 

messaging then scientific inquiry. After the hearing, Toyota hired 

a public relations firm to advise the company on its public response 

to lawsuits claiming that electronics plays a role in sudden unintended acceleration. We know from the committee’s investigation 

that the PR firm, Benenson Strategy Group, or BSG, conducted a 

poll to learn more about what Toyota could do to repair damage to 

the company’s image among educated consumers known as opinion 

elites. A presentation by Benenson’s Strategy Group shows that, 

among the key findings from the poll, Toyota learned the following. 

Debunking Kane/Gilbert’s testimony will be critical for restoring 

confidence among elites and reassuring audiences that electronic 

throttle control is in fact not an issue. That is a document of March 

5. We reviewed an updated BSG document showing the results 

from another Toyota poll to test some aggressive messages for possible use in future public statements or advertising. This poll referred to Dr. Gilbert’s experiments as phony, shoddy science, a 

hoax, and a parlor trick that would never happen in real life. We 

have a document on that. 

BSG summarized the results from this new poll in a presentation, dated March 8, 2010, suggesting that Toyota should try to 

damage Dr. Gilbert’s credibility by accusing him of having ‘‘monetary or self interested motives.’’ Toyota told the committee that the 

company did not follow its pollster’s suggestion to attack Dr. Gilbert, but the documents suggest otherwise. On March 8, a Monday, 

Toyota held a press conference and released a report by Exponent 

criticizing Dr. Gilbert’s work. Two days before the press conference, 

the vice president of Toyota’s public relations firm noted in an 


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email to a colleague the importance of finishing the poll before this 

event, saying, I am quoting now, ‘‘We really, really need to get this 

done, especially with elites. Toyota has a press conference on Monday and need our data to know what to say.’’ That is the document 

we have right here. 

At that press conference, before Exponent presented its findings, 

Toyota spokesman Mike Michels disparaged Dr. Gilbert’s work and 

said it was ‘‘paid for by an advocate for trial lawyers.’’ The Exponent report on Dr. Gilbert’s research was a hit job, not solid 

science. Exponent confirmed the key conclusions that Dr. Gilbert 

had drawn in his report, but then disparaged Dr. Gilbert for not 

testing the likelihood of the faults he identified even though Exponent never did this analysis either. Exponent added new steps to 

Dr. Gilbert’s experiment and mischaracterized others, all in an attempt to make his outcome seem unlikely and to invent flaws in 

his analysis, but independent experts have defended Dr. Gilbert’s 

approach, including a Stanford University professor who reviewed 

the report at Toyota’s request and described Dr. Gilbert’s experiment as a perfectly reasonable starting point. 

When I look at Toyota’s approach, I do not understand why the 

company is attacking Dr. Gilbert for trying to find a root cause of 

sudden unintended acceleration. Toyota ought to be undertaking a 

comprehensive review and encouraging automotive experts to come 

forward with ideas of what could be causing the problem. Based on 

the committee’s review of Exponent’s work for Toyota in this regard, we remain concerned that this is not occurring. The committee asked Toyota and Exponent to produce all reports, analyses 

or communications describing the result of Exponent’s work for 

Toyota related to unintended acceleration or electronic throttle control. We also asked for all contracts, agreements, memoranda or 

correspondence concerning the scope of Exponent’s work for Toyota. 

From these responses, we have learned that only direction for additional studies reside in the minds of Exponent employees. It appears that Exponent’s only public written work to date is the incomplete, interim study and report attacking Dr. Gilbert’s credibility. I find this extremely troubling given the fact that Toyota and 

Exponent have both informed the committee they are taking a comprehensive look at the issue of sudden unintended acceleration in 

Toyota and Lexus vehicles. 

To be fair, Toyota has made progress on processing their recalls. 

They have completed 80 percent of the sticky pedal recalls, and 

they have completed 30 percent of their floor mat recalls. They 

have also made some management changes that we hope will lead 

to improved safety culture. One of the most significant improvements that Toyota could make would be to install brake override 

technology in all of their vehicles. Brake override technology ensures that if both the accelerator and the brake are pressed at the 

same time the brake will override the accelerator. Toyota told the 

committee that beginning in 2011 all vehicles will have this feature, but the company is being more selective about which older 

models will receive the software upgrade. 

Despite the fact that installing brake override technology on 

older vehicles would only cost $50 per vehicle, Toyota does not plan 

to offer this option even at the owner’s expense to owners of certain 


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models. I look forward to hearing why Toyota won’t offer brake 

override to their customers with older vehicles even if the customer 

pays for it. Since our February hearing NHTSA and Toyota appear 

to have improved their working relationship. NHTSA officials tell 

us that Toyota has shown more willingness to address issues of 

concern. NHTSA has informed us it has commissioned 2 studies to 

examine unintended acceleration in vehicles. The first is a study to 

be conducted by NASA scientists who examined Toyota’s electronic 

throttle control systems for possible problems associated with their 

hardware and/or software. This report is targeted to be completed 

by the end of August. 

The second study will be conducted by a panel of independent 

scientists selected by the National Academy of Sciences. The NAS 

study will offer a comprehensive examination of unintended acceleration and electronic control systems across all automobile manufacturers. This study should be completed by fall of 2011. I would 

like to thank both Mr. Strickland and Mr. Lentz for their testimony 

today and for their ongoing cooperation with the committee’s investigation. Mr. Lentz, we appreciate Toyota and its outside counsel, 

Ted Hester, for the company’s responsiveness to our several requests for documents and for substantive briefings. 

I wish I could say we received the same level of cooperation from 

Toyota’s consultant, Exponent. Unfortunately, Exponent has withheld responsive documents and information from the committee, 

and has even modified responsive documents before producing 

them to us, in direct violation of the committee’s instructions. It is 

ironic that the firm Toyota has hired to conduct an independent investigation has behaved like it has something to hide from this 

committee. I will next turn to Mr. Burgess for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Chairman Stupak, and, as always, 

thank you and Chairman Waxman for convening this important 

hearing, and welcome to our witnesses who are here with us today. 

Our first hearing on the Toyota problems was almost 3 months ago 

to the day. At that time we had a lot of questions but not a lot of 

answers as to what was causing the sudden unintended acceleration events in Toyotas. So today we are here for answers but it also 

appears that we will not be getting those. I was hoping this hearing was called because there was some new information that was 

coming to the fore, but, in fact, we may be having this hearing because we found out that Toyota did a poll. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, if polling is found to be at the level of a 

high crime or misdemeanor this dais would be suddenly and irrevocably silent because we would all go away. We are not going to 

get those answers today. I am concerned that we continue to have 

hearings where we literally go in circles because this is an important issue that needs to be resolved. It needs to be resolved for the 

safety of Toyota’s customers, and it needs to be resolved for the future of auto sales by that manufacturer. This hearing does seem 

premature. Toyota has commissioned Exponent, an engineering 


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and scientific firm, to do a top to bottom review of its cars to figure 

out cause of these events. 

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has asked 

for NASA’s failure analysis experts to take a look at Toyota’s electronics. As of today, both of those studies are ongoing. That is a 

good thing. We just don’t have answers yet. According to Exponent, 

they haven’t found the answer to what is causing these events and 

NASA’s work is just getting started. In fact, at the hearing previous, Ranking Member Barton asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to not just find the car that was in question that day, the car of Rhonda and Eddie Smith, but find it and 

tear it apart to find out what the problem was. Now NHTSA has 

found the Smith’s car and has had it for almost 3 months. According to NHTSA’s e-mails to the minority staff, engineers have run 

some tests on the car and do plan to do more, but here is what they 

found to date. And let me quote, so there will be no question about 

it. ‘‘Nothing remarkable.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that these e-mails from NHTSA and 

the minority staff be included in the record. Apparently, the 

Smiths’ car was delivered on February 26, and that is the time that 

it has been under study. Three months later, we don’t have an answer to what went wrong with the Smiths’ car, never mind answers 

to all of the other Toyotas that have experienced events that are 

so far inexplicable. And that is not really surprising because these 

are after all very complicated problems that potentially involve 

electronics, software, and mechanical issues. Finding the right answer is going to take time but the important part is finding the 

right answer and not rushing to an answer because otherwise it 

will be impossible to identify the right solution. 

If you don’t find the right solution, the cars are not safe and the 

public is not protected, and Toyota’s reputation continues to suffer. 

As this subcommittee is an investigative body, we should be careful 

not to draw conclusions about the nature of the comprehensiveness 

of these investigations while they are ongoing. Both NASA and Exponent have laid out a number of areas to examine including software, hardware, systems interaction and magnetic interference. My 

understanding is that NASA and Exponent are looking at many of 

the same issues. Mr. Chairman, that is called independent 

verification. That is actually part of the scientific method, and it 

is a good thing. 

I do want to impress upon the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration and on Exponent that our patience in this committee is not endless when it comes to getting answers. Exponent 

has recently provided the committee with a working graph of their 

work. I will accept that this graph is incomplete that the information in it has not been thoroughly tested and that Exponent has 

not identified the causes of these events. That is fine. But when it 

comes to the scope of Exponent’s work, we have seen test results 

and raw data but no paper that sets out their plans for testing Toyotas. Essentially, we have been told to take their word for it as to 

what exactly they are doing. 

Exponent is not here today to speak for itself. Since our last 

meeting, we have met with one of the Exponent engineers working 

on the Toyota case. Perhaps we still don’t have a full picture of 


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their work. Mr. Lentz, what I hope to hear from you today is what 

Toyota’s strategy is going forward for solving this problem and that 

Toyota is committed to working and sharing with this committee 

and the public whatever Exponent finds when it finds it. I would 

also like to welcome Administrator Strickland from NHTSA. 

NHTSA has opened a number of different inquiries into Toyota’s 

responsiveness when it comes to recall and safety concerns. The 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has also penalized 

Toyota over $16 million with respect to the timeliness of Toyota’s 

recall, which Toyota paid yesterday without admitting fault to the 

underlying charges. 

Mr. Strickland, I know you recently traveled to Japan with Secretary LaHood to meet with Toyota. Before that meeting Secretary 

LaHood said Toyota was safety deaf. After that meeting, Secretary 

LaHood said Toyota is now listening and paying attention to 

NHTSA’s warnings, and that is quite a turnaround in one meeting’s time. Mr. Strickland, I would like to know if you agree with 

the Secretary’s assessment and why you are confident that now 

today Toyota has gotten the message that before seemed to have 

some difficulty getting through. 

I would also like to learn from Administrator Strickland how 

Toyota’s working relationship with NHTSA has improved since our 

last hearing. Based on Secretary LaHood’s testimony at our last 

hearing and on your testimony before the Commerce, Trade, and 

Consumer Protection Subcommittee in March, I believe it is 

NHTSA’s view that it had the necessary authorities and data to do 

the proper oversight of Toyota. If that is true, was the only problem 

Toyota? Are you still confident today that NHTSA’s investigations 

weren’t as thorough as they should have been and that NHTSA 

had the necessary skills and expertise to perform same. Is NHTSA 

doing a systemic review of other recalls to assure itself that other 

manufacturers are being responsive? 

On that note, Mr. Lentz, I do want to make sure recent improvements that Toyota has announced like smart team inspections of 

cars and quality panels are not a matter of form over substance. 

I hope you can offer us some specifics about how this has improved 

Toyota’s responsiveness to its drivers, to our constituents and to 

NHTSA. Mr. Chairman, you have been indulgent. I will yield back 

the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:] 


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Opening Statement of the Honorable Michael C. Burgess 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Hearing on 

"Update on Toyota and NHTSA's Response 

To the Problem of Sudden Unintended Acceleration" 

May 20, 2010 

Thank you, Chairmen Stupak and Waxman, for convening 

this hearing. 

Our first hearing on the Toyota problems was almost three 

months ago to the day. At that time, we had a lot of questions, but 

not a lot of answers, as to what was causing the sudden unintended 

acceleration events in Toyotas. 

I am afraid that we won't get those answers today. It's 

important that this Committee keeps the heat on Toyota and 

conducts continued oversight of both the company and NHTSA. 

However, I am concerned that this hearing may be a bit premature. 

Toyota has commissioned Exponent, an engineering and 

scientific firm, to do a top-to-bottom review of its cars to figure out 

the cause of these events. NHTSA has asked NASA's failure 
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analysis experts to take a look at Toyota's electronics. As of 

today, both ofthose studies are ongoing. According to Exponent, 

they haven't found an answer as to what is causing these events. 

NASA's work is just getting started. 

In fact, at that hearing, Ranking Member Barton asked 

NHTSA to "tear apart" the car of Rhonda and Eddie Smith, two of 

the witnesses at that hearing, to see if it could find some answers. 

NHTSA found the Smith's car and has had it for almost three 

months. According to NHTSA's emails to the Minority staff, 

engineers have run some tests on the car, and plan to do more, but 

so far, they have found "nothing remarkable." 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that these emails be included in 

the record. Three months later, we don't have an answer about 

what went wrong with the Smiths' one car, never mind answers 

about all the Toyotas that have experienced these events. And 

that's really not surprising. These are complicated problems that 

potentially involve electronics, software, and mechanical issues. 

Finding the right answer is going to take time. But the important 

part is finding the right answer, and not rushing to an answer, 

because otherwise, it will be impossible to identifY the right 

solution to make these cars safer. 

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As this Subcommittee is an investigative body, we should be 

careful not to draw conclusions about the nature or 

comprehensiveness ofthese investigations while they are ongoing. 

Both NASA and Exponent have laid out a number of areas to 

examine, including software, hardware, systems interaction, and 

magnetic interference. My understanding is that NASA and 

Exponent are looking at many of the same issues. 

I do want to impress upon NHTSA and Exponent that our 

patience is not endless when it comes to getting answers. 

Exponent recently provided us with a working draft of their work. 

I accept that this draft is incomplete, that the information in it has 

not been thoroughly tested, and that Exponent has not identified 

the causes ofthese events. That's fine. But when it comes to the 

scope of Exponent's work, we have seen test results and raw data, 

but no paper that sets out their plans for testing Toyotas. 

Essentially, we have been told to take their word for it as to what 

they are doing. 

Exponent is not here today to speak for itself. Since our last 

hearing, we only met with one of the Exponent engineers working 

on the Toyota case. Perhaps we still don't have a full picture of 

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their work. Mr. Lentz, what I hope to hear from you today is 

Toyota's strategy for solving this problem and that Toyota is 

committed to sharing with this Committee - and the public -

whatever Exponent finds, when it finds it. 

I would also like to welcome Administrator Strickland from 

NHTSA. NHTSA has opened a number of different inquiries into 

Toyota's responsiveness to NHTSA when it comes to recalls and 

safety concerns. NHTSA also penalized Toyota $16.4 million with 

respect to the timeliness of Toyota's recall, which Toyota paid 

yesterday without admitting fault to the underlying charges. Mr. 

Strickland, I know you recently traveled to Japan with Secretary 

LaHood to meet with Toyota. Before that meeting, Secretary 

LaHood said Toyota was "safety deaf." After that meeting, 

Secretary LaHood said Toyota is now listening and paying 

attention to NHTSA's warnings. That's quite a turnaround in one 

meeting's time. Administrator Strickland, I would like to know if 

you agree with the Secretary's assessment, and why you are 

confident that Toyota now gets the message. 

I also want to learn from Administrator Strickland how 

Toyota's working relationship with NHTSA has improved since 

our last hearing. Based on Secretary LaHood's testimony at our 

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last hearing, and on your testimony before the Commerce, Trade 

and Consumer Protection Subcommittee in March, I believe it is 

NHTSA's view that it had the necessary authorities and data to do 

proper oversight of Toyota. If that's true, was the only problem 

Toyota? Are you still confident today that NHTSA's 

investigations were as thorough as they should have been, and that 

NHTSA had the necessary skills and expertise to do them? Is 

NHTSA doing a systemic review of other recalls to assure itself 

that the manufacturers are being responsive? On that note, Mr. 

Lentz, I want to make sure that the recent improvements Toyota 

has announced -like SMART Teams inspections of cars and 

quality panels - are not a matter of form over substance. I hope 

you can offer specifics about how this has improved Toyota's 

responsiveness to its drivers and to NHTSA. 

I yield back the balance of our time. 

5 
12 

Mr. STUPAK. Chairman Waxman, for opening statement, please, 

sir. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Chairman Stupak, I want to thank you for holding 

today’s hearing on sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota-made 

cars and trucks. This is our second hearing on the subject since 

Toyota had already recalled millions of vehicles due to consumer 

complaints about sudden unintended acceleration in their vehicles. 

A key question that was raised at our first hearing was whether 

the thousands of complaints of these vehicles reported by consumers for sudden acceleration could be linked to electronic defects 

in the vehicles, and that is still the subject of our hearing today. 

In February, we had our hearing on this and I asked Toyota Motor 

Sales President James Lentz whether he was certain that the recalls Toyota had ordered, which involving replacing floor mats and 

sticky accelerator pedals, would solve the problem of Toyota cars 

racing out of control. He replied not totally. 

This appears to have been a rare moment of corporate candor because the very next day, Toyota Motor Sales issued a press release 

entitled Clarification of Testimony Regarding Effectiveness of Recalls, in which the company reiterated that extensive testing made 

it confident that no problems exist with the electronic throttle control systems in its vehicles. The same day, before a different House 

committee, the President of Toyota Motor Company, Akio Toyoda, 

testified he is absolutely confident there is no problem with the design of Toyota’s electronic throttle control system because very rigorous testing identified no problem or malfunction. A few days 

later, Toyota ran a full page advertisement, among others, in the 

Washington Post declaring that floor mat and sticky pedal recall 

solutions are effective and durable, and that Toyota is confident 

that no problems exist with the electronic throttle control system. 

Well, these assurances are baffling. In preparation for our last 

hearing, we had received over 100,000 pages of documents from 

Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

What was most notable about those documents was what was missing. There was no evidence that Toyota or NHTSA took a serious 

look at the possibility that electronic defects could be causing the 

problems. In the months since that hearing, the committee has investigated the basis for Toyota’s repeated assertion. We asked Toyota to bring from Japan the engineers most familiar with the testing of the throttle system, and we did a lengthy transcribed interview with these officials. We took a transcribed interview with the 

person most knowledgeable of the testing Toyota is doing in the 

United States, and this is through a firm called Exponent, and we 

reviewed many more documents. 

What we have learned is deeply troubling. There is no evidence 

that Toyota has conducted extensive or rigorous testing of its vehicles for potential electronic defects that could cause sudden unintended acceleration. Our colleague, Mr. Burgess, said there is a top 

to bottom review. We shouldn’t jump to conclusions. Well, Toyota 

has already jumped to the conclusion and made it over and over 


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again that they have ruled out any problem with the electronics. 

We asked Toyota for the basis of this assertion that vehicles do not 

have electronic defects, and they pointed to 2 primary justifications. One is the testing that was done in recent months by this 

consulting firm, Exponent. That is being done here in the United 

States. 

The other is the pre-market testing done over the years by its engineers in Japan, so we focused our attention on these 2 areas. We 

looked at Exponent’s work, which is claimed to have been comprehensive and independent but the documents reviewed by the 

committee don’t support these assertions. On the screen, I hope we 

will see, a record that neither Toyota or Exponent produced to the 

committee that explained the relationship between the scope of Exponent’s work. It is a contract. And it is a contract by Toyota and 

their consulting firm for engineering consulting services related to 

class actions filed against Toyota. 

Nowhere in this document do the lawyers ask Exponent to conduct a comprehensive examination of sudden unintended acceleration. In fact, the words sudden unintended acceleration do not even 

appear, so our committee interviewed Dr. Shukri Souri, the Exponent engineer who oversaw the work, and what we learned from 

him was astonishing. Exponent has no written work for this 

project, no written time line, no written specifications for the experiments it has run or plans to run. They have no written list of 

the potential causes of sudden unintended acceleration that it 

plans to study. And though he is personally responsible for the 

hardware, software, and electronic interference testing that Exponent has done or will do for Toyota, Dr. Souri has no written notes 

on Exponent’s work. 

We asked him to explain this. How could there be this remarkable lack of documentation? And he explained that writing down 

what Exponent does would limit the creativity of the engineers 

working on the project. That is preposterous. A former Exponent 

engineer told the committee staff that the reason they didn’t write 

anything down is to avoid creating documents that might have to 

be produced in a lawsuit. Toyota’s lawyers appear to be involved 

in every aspect of Exponent’s work. The lawyers have the right to 

approve the publication of Exponent’s work. Dr. Souri reported to 

committee staff that all communications with Toyota have counsel 

present. The 2 reports Exponent has issued both state that they 

were prepared for Bowman & Brooke, the law firm, defending Toyota in litigation. 

Exponent has issued 2 public reports to date, and they are not 

a comprehensive examination of sudden unintended acceleration. 

The first was an interim report. It was requested by the lawyers 

for use at our February hearing. And Dr. Souri told our staff that 

this report was unusual because Exponent had not completed its 

work, and outside experts criticized this report because it had unclear methodology and an overly narrow focus. They have a second 

report. This was even narrower designed only to rebut the testimony provided by our expert witness at the committee’s first hearing. It did not offer any discussion of Exponent’s investigation of 

sudden unintended acceleration other than its replication of a laboratory experiment conducted by the committee’s witness. 


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Well, these reports do not even come close to supporting Toyota’s 

contention that Exponent has thoroughly examined Toyota’s electronic throttle control systems. Now the other basis for their assertions is that they did pre-market testing by their own engineers in 

Japan. We interviewed those engineers and they told us that their 

testing is done before there is mass production. But once the design 

is completed, they didn’t do any additional testing. Now the premarket testing has significant limitations. The company’s durability testing is done only on prototype vehicles and components. 

They don’t test cars and parts that are actually used by drivers. 

The sample sizes are very small. In fact, only a single vehicle was 

tested. Independent experts consulted by our committee have told 

us that Toyota would need a much larger sample size to rule out 

potential causes of a rare and intermittent event like sudden unintended acceleration. In addition, Toyota acknowledged to committee 

staff that it does not control the testing performed on critical parts 

of the electronic throttle system that are done by its suppliers. 

They have no documentation to confirm the results of any tests 

that these suppliers chose to perform. The pre-market testing regime may be appropriate for testing the design of Toyota vehicles 

before manufacturing starts, but no amount of pre-marketing tests 

can be a substitute for a rigorous examination either to identify a 

post-manufacturing defect, and there is no evidence Toyota has 

done this post-manufacturing testing. 

The results of our examination raise serious questions. Toyota 

has repeatedly told the public that it has conducted extensive testing of its vehicles for electronic defects. We can find no basis for 

these assertions. Toyota’s assertions may be good public relations, 

but they don’t appear to be true. Even more confounding is why 

Toyota has not done more. If they are serious about putting safety 

first, how can they justify hiring a litigation consulting firm that 

takes no written notes to lead its investigation into potential defects? The public has a right to expect that Toyota will do everything possible to find any potential electronic defects. But Toyota 

didn’t do that. Instead, Toyota asked its defense counsel to hire a 

firm whose mission appears to be the exact opposite, to obfuscate 

and find no problems. 

I want to be clear about what we know and what we don’t know. 

I am not an engineer and I am not a scientist, but I do know that 

dozens of people have died in accidents linked to runaway Toyota 

vehicles. Many of these incidents have occurred in vehicles that did 

not have faulty floor mats or sticky pedals. Toyota’s priority should 

be to do everything it can to figure out what is causing these frightening events, not to protect itself from lawsuits, and I do not believe Toyota has met this obligation. Chairman Stupak, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and thank you for convening 

the hearing. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barton, for opening 

statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Chairman Waxman took his time and my time. He certainly gave an extensive 


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statement. I am just going to submit my statement for the record 

and make a few extemporaneous remarks. I share Chairman Waxman’s concern about finding this problem. I am not omnipotent 

though, less complicated. It is easy to sit up here on the podium 

and point fingers and demand results and act as if we know what 

the answers are, but that is not how life is and that is not how engineering is. It is in the best interest of NHTSA to solve this problem as quickly as possible. It is obviously the best interest of Toyota and the entire automobile industry. 

I agree with Chairman Waxman that I don’t believe this is a 

sticky pedal-floor mat problem but having said that trying to fight 

a bug in millions of lines of software or find a glitch in a hardware 

system for the electronic ignition and steering system is very, very 

difficult. I am happy that NHTSA purchased the vehicle or obtained the vehicle that had the runaway acceleration problem that 

the Smiths talked about in our hearing here several months ago. 

It is my understanding that NHTSA engineers have been evaluating that vehicle and haven’t yet found the problem. I am also 

pleased that NASA is involved. I am pleased that Toyota has hired 

an independent firm to try to figure out the problem. 

Hopefully, today we will get some answers from our NHTSA administrator and the president of Toyota. This is a serious problem. 

There is absolutely no question that people have less confidence in 

Toyota vehicles that have experienced most of the runaway acceleration problems, and they expect the company and the government to solve that problem as quickly and expeditiously as possible, but it is very, very difficult in the real world. We just have 

to keep giving our best faith efforts. And under the leadership of 

Mr. Waxman and Mr. Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess and 

myself, we will use our resources so that the American people know 

what the issues are, and if there is something we need to do legislatively, we will certainly try to do that. I thank you, Mr. Stupak 

and Mr. Waxman, for continuing this investigation, and we will be 

very supportive that the facts are put on the table so the American 

people know what the facts are. And with that, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:] 


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Opening Statement of the Honorable Joe Barton 

Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Hearing on 

"Update on Toyota and NHTSA's Response to Problem of 

Sudden Unintended Acceleration" 

May 20, 2010 

Thank you, Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess, 

for convening this second hearing on Toyota and the events of 

sudden unintended acceleration experienced by some of its 

drivers. 

It has been just three months since we heard from Rhonda 

and Eddie Smith from Tennessee, who testified about Rhonda's 

experienced in her Lexus. With her brake pedal smashed to the 

floor and her car shifted into reverse gear, she continued to 

barrel down the highway. 
17 


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We also heard from Mr. James Lentz from Toyota at that 

hearing and he is back today. During the February hearing, I 

explained to Mr. Lentz that Toyota should have bought the 

Smiths' car, taken it apart, and used it to figure out the problem 

and how to fix it. I understand that NHTSA took possession of 

the car three months ago, but hasn't found anything. I would 

like to know what other testing NHTSA and Toyota are going to 

do to the Smiths' car, and when they expect to find an answer. 

I welcome NHTSA Administrator David Strickland to the 

hearing. It is my understanding that NHTSA is working with 

failure analysis experts at NASA in a review of the Toyota 

electronics. In addition, NHTSA has asked the National 

Academy of Sciences to examine unintended acceleration and 

electronic vehicle controls across the entire automotive industry. 

I hope that Toyota and NHTSA are doing everything in their 

power to get to the bottom ofthis. Toyota hired an outside 

2 
18 


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testing firm called Exponent and gave them an unlimited budget 

to determine the possible causes of unintended acceleration in 

their cars. 

My understanding is that Toyota, Exponent, NHTSA, and 

NASA continue to test and look for answers. I am told that 

NASA is in the very earliest stages of its examination, and the 

National Academy of Sciences has not even appointed its panel 

of experts to begin to study the problem across all vehicles. 

I am all for pressing Toyota's and NHTSA's to get on the job 

and I certainly expect our committee to conduct continued 

oversight of this issue, but I also want to say a brief word on 

behalf of common sense: Conclusion-jumping only seems to 

produce questionable results. 

As I understand the status of things, no one actually knows 

the cause of the problem yet. Until the engineers who are doing 

3 
19 


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the detective work can tell us what went wrong, it seems 

unlikely that we'll be able to assess the adequacy of the steps 

taken by Toyota and NHTSA to prevent runaway acceleration in 

the future. 

As we've heard, being the driver of a runaway car is 

terrifYing at best and deadly at worst. As some of us up here 

know from our recent experience with the Toy Bill, unintended 

acceleration in policymaking can have undesirable 

consequences, too. That's why I hope we can find a way to 

wait for the engineering to catch up with our desire to help. 

I thank you and yield back the balance of my time. 

4 
20 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton. Mr. Dingell for an opening 

statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I commend you for 

your continuing vigilance in the matter of Toyota’s recall related to 

sudden unintended acceleration. I am delighted to welcome our witnesses today, Administrator Strickland and Mr. Lentz of Toyota. I 

commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your insistence on vigorous, yet 

fair, oversight in this matter, for as you are well aware thorough 

oversight leads to effective legislation, and this subcommittee has 

been doing that for a long time. In view of that, I note that the 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection will 

mark up the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2010 this afternoon. 

Section 101 of that bill requires the Secretary of Transportation 

to promulgate a motor safety vehicle standard on electronic systems, which should enable him to determine whether such standard is reasonable, practicable, and appropriate. Our hearing today 

affords us the opportunity to examine the state of research both by 

government and private industry on these systems and to assess 

the feasibility of promulgating and implementing a federal motor 

vehicle safety standard covering them. To that end, Mr. Chairman, 

I intend to ask candid questions of our witnesses about the 

progress of their restrictive organizations that has been made in 

determining what, if any, effects surrounding environments have 

on electronic components in vehicles. 

While I believe that Section 101 of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act 

is written with sufficient administrative discretion for the Secretary of Transportation, I want to be able to be sure that the department will be able to perform the research necessary to comply 

with the requirements of that section. That is an important question to be addressed. I would also note that the surrounding environments have in the past affected motor vehicle safety, and I 

would remind that electronic flux was a source of potential danger 

from unintended explosions of airbags in times past, something 

which caused injury and death to American people. Further, I will 

seek strict assurances from Toyota that it is taking seriously 

charges that electronic interference may have caused sudden unintended acceleration in the vehicles recalled late last year and early 

this year, and that Toyota is working diligently to assess them as 

well as correct them if need be. 

And I want to be sure that they are doing the necessary research 

on the question of safety as opposed to just defensive measures for 

the corporation. I look forward to productive conversation today. 

And I thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I observe again 

that your work here in this subcommittee has led to better legislation, good fact-finding, and far better service to the public interest. 

Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. Mr. Gingrey, for opening 

statement, please, 3 minutes. 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PHIL GINGREY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA 

Mr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today’s hearing on 

Toyota and NHTSA’s response to the problem of sudden unintended acceleration while topically important, I think from reading 

the provided testimony that this hearing will likely yield more 

questions than answers. In fact, many of the fundamental questions that members of this committee and that consumers have will 

likely remain unanswered today as both Toyota and NHTSA discuss the ongoing status of their reviews, the potential connection 

between unintended rapid acceleration and the electronic throttle 

control system. Mr. Chairman, the American people are certainly 

owed answers about the safety of their vehicles. 

However, what the American people do not deserve is another 

hasty legislative response in the form of a bill that few have read, 

nobody understands, and that bears unintended consequences 

much worse than the consequences of inaction. However, once 

NHTSA and Toyota actually complete their various reviews of the 

potential flaws of automotive electronic systems, I believe that it 

will be very important for this committee to review those results, 

understand those results, and then act in a manner appropriate to 

those findings. Certainly, with automation and electronic engineering continuing to replace the traditional mechanisms, we must also 

ensure that we have the proper metrics to conduct diagnoses and 

ask the right questions to flush out the potential impacts of these 

systems on the safety of our automobiles. With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Mrs. Christensen for opening statement, 

please. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Chairman Stupak. Again, given 

that my 2 daughters, 3 grandchildren and I drive Toyotas, I am 

really pleased that we are having this hearing today to monitor the 

response of Toyota to the accidents and deaths attributed to the 

sudden unintended acceleration of the vehicles. I look forward to 

the testimony of Mr. Strickland and Mr. Lentz on what the testing 

has shown thus far, what responses and remedies are being employed, and also to hear that they are being applied in the U.S. territories, which are often overlooked, as well as in the 50 states. 

With that, I will yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Mr. Griffith for opening statement, 

please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PARKER GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 

you and the ranking member for calling this important hearing 

today. In Huntsville, Alabama, the middle of my district, Toyota 

employs 777 people, build 6 cylinder and 8 cylinder engines, and 

recently has added the 4 cylinder engine to the plant. We employ 

approximately 1,000 people in this district. Toyota had done more 

than just be a good employer in Huntsville. They have given back 

to the community in many ways. In fact, during the recent slow 

down in production in response to the recession, Toyota did not lay 

off one permanent worker. During this time, they sent some emVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:21 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076581 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A581.XXX A581

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ployees out into the community while others stayed at the plant 

and worked together to streamline and improve the daily functions 

in both quality and safety. 

Since this subcommittee has met to discuss Toyota the number 

of vehicle recall remedies is nearly 3–1/2 million. They have also 

taken steps to deal with communication problems between North 

America and Japan and commissioned a study to investigate the 

sudden unintended accelerations issues. I believe that Toyota has 

shown a good faith effort to fix problems and learn from these 

events to better serve consumers in the future, and it seems evident by recent sales that customers have faith in Toyota’s ability 

to correct past problems. 

I might add that the chairman of the committee seemed upset 

that there was no agreement from Toyota with Dr. Gilbert’s findings. I find that not only acceptable but we have no one to corroborate Dr. Gilbert’s findings either, so if we are going to base our discussion on a single individual’s experiment and not a scientific 

method, I think we are maybe on the wrong track there. I don’t 

think there is anyone more interested in making sure that their vehicles are safe than Toyota. I don’t think there is anyone more interested in the safety of the public then Toyota as far as this situation is concerned. So it seems to me that there is an attitude that 

somehow we are not here in good faith to do what is best for the 

public, and I think we need to examine our attitude and maybe 

take a different approach. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley, opening statement. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent 

to submit my written statement and then just make some brief extemporaneous remarks. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Mr. Latta. 

Mr. BRALEY. No, no. I was asking for unanimous consent to submit my full statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. BRALEY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Mr. BRALEY. During our last hearing on this very important 

issue, Ranking Member Barton drew on his experience as an engineer to challenge both Toyota and NHTSA to get to the bottom of 

this problem and to do so with a sense of clarity and purpose that 

had been missing in Toyota’s approach to the possibility of an electronic component to the problem of sudden unanticipated acceleration. So when the ranking member stated at the conclusion of his 

remarks today, he was pleased that Toyota had hired an independent firm, I think it was based upon the representations that 

Toyota made at our last hearing that, in fact, it had hired Exponent and given it a mission to get to the bottom of this problem 

with an unlimited budget. 

The only problem with that perception is it is contrary to the documents that I have been provided and the committee has been provided in response to requests for information I made at our last 

hearing because the documents we have been provided with show 

that Toyota’s trial lawyers, not Toyota, engaged Exponent to conVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:21 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076581 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A581.XXX A581

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duct this work on December 7, 2009, and did not engage Exponent 

for the purpose of getting to the bottom of this problem but for the 

purpose of defending class action claims filed against Toyota and 

that is the problem with Toyota’s response since our last hearing. 

If you look at what has been done, it has been primarily an effort 

to try to attack the credibility of the sole witness who testified on 

the connection, the possible connection, between an electronic or 

computer failure and the problem of sudden unanticipated acceleration in Toyota’s vehicles. And that is the disturbing question that 

we need answers to at this hearing today. We need to look at the 

financial relationship between Exponent and Toyota and try to get 

to the bottom of why so much time has been spent focusing time 

and resources attempting to discredit the work of Professor David 

Gilbert instead of getting to the root cause of this problem and determining once and for all whether electronic failure is a cause of 

the problem. That is why I look forward to the testimony of our 

witnesses, and I hope that eventually everyone involved in this investigation gets to that problem, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braley follows:] 


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Statement of Congressman Bruce Braley 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

DUBUQUE D!STRICT OFFICE 

"Update on Toyota and NHTSA's Response to the Problem of Sudden 

Unintended Acceleration" 

May 20,2010 

Thank you, Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess, for 

holding this important follow-up hearing examining Toyota and the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration's response to the problem of sudden 

unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. At our February hearing on 

this issue, it became clear that Toyota and NHTSA's response to the 

deadly problem of sudden unintended acceleration was slow and 

insufficient, and that Toyota was publicly denying the possibility that 

electronics could be playing a role in the problem without having conducted 

a thorough and credible investigation. Unfortunately, nearly three months 

after that hearing, it seems that Toyota has still failed to comprehensively 
25 


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and credibly investigate Toyota's electronic throttle control system to find 

potential flaws. 

At our February hearing, I raised questions about the work of 

Exponent, which Toyota hired to conduct an analysis of its electronic 

throttle control system with an unlimited budget, and about the financial 

relationship between Toyota and Exponent and its predecessor, Failure 

Analysis Associates. Unfortunately, it appears that Exponent has failed to 

conduct a comprehensive investigation of Toyota's electronic throttle 

control system, and has instead focused its time and resources on 

attempting to discredit the work of Southern Illinois University Professor 

David Gilbert, who testified at our last hearing that he was able to induce 

sudden unintended acceleration in a Toyota vehicle without the vehicle's 

computer recording the event through a diagnostic trouble code. 

I'm seriously concerned about Toyota and Exponent's ongoing failure 

to conduct a credible investigation of Toyota electronics, and by reports 

that Toyota may have sought to develop a PR campaign to discredit Dr. 

Gilbert and Sean Kane, who also testified before the Subcommittee in 

February. It's outrageous to think that, at a time when Toyota should have 

a laser-like focus on definitively identifying and fixing a problem which has 

been linked to as many as 52 deaths, the company has instead been 
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focused on discrediting and questioning the integrity of other Subcommittee 

witnesses. I look forward to discussing these troubling allegations and to 

further exploring the work of Exponent and the financial relationship 

between Toyota and Exponent at today's hearing. 

Shortly after our February hearing, I also wrote to Administrator 

Strickland and Secretary LaHood expressing my concerns about reports 

that NHTSA had received complaints from Toyota owners alleging that 

they'd experienced sudden unintended acceleration even after their 

vehicles underwent recall service to modify pedals and replace floor mats. 

I also inquired about all the steps NHTSA is taking to review Toyota 

electronics to determine whether they are a potential cause of the problem 

and to ensure effective repairs in all affected vehicles. I look forward to 

hearing from Administrator Strickland on these critical issues today. 

The top and urgent priority of Toyota, NHTSA, and all of us here 

today must be to ensure the deadly problem in Toyota vehicles is identified 

and fixed, and to ensure the safety of all Americans on the road. Thank 

you, Chairman Stupak, for your continuing attention to this important issue. 

I hope that we will continue to follow this issue and hold any appropriate 

follow-up investigations and hearings until this dangerous problem is 

resolved once and for all. 
27 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley, I am sorry I didn’t hear you before 

when you had asked for your opening statement to be made part 

of the record. It should be noted that all opening statements of 

members of the committee, their opening statements will be part 

of the record. I also move that the contents of our document binder 

be made part of the record. Without objection, so be it. My intent 

is, as members know, we have the President of Mexico speaking 

around 11:00. Let us try to get through all opening statements and 

if we go over a little bit, let us try to get our opening statements 

done before we have to recess for a bit. Now, Mr. Latta, for an 

opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. LATTA, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Mr. LATTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Burgess, 

thanks very much for holding this hearing today. First and foremost, I believe it is important that these hearings are held to get 

to the facts regarding the sudden unintended acceleration. Tragically, according to NHTSA, 52 people have died in the past decade 

due to the incidents of the sudden unintended acceleration of Toyota vehicles. NHTSA has initiated several queries into Toyota recalls and the agency has leveled a $16.4 million fine on the company. Additionally, NASA and the National Academy of Sciences 

has been enlisted by NHTSA to undertake a study of the issue. 

Specifically, NASA will examine unintended acceleration in Toyota 

vehicles and the National Academy of Sciences will analyze that acceleration and the role of the electronic vehicle systems across the 

automobile industry. 

It is also my understanding that neither is complete at this time. 

Through its recall and deployment of swift market analysis response or smart teams, third party analysis, and the addition of industry-leading safety features to new models Toyota is working to 

provide quality and safe vehicles. I hope this translates into increased safety level and assurance for Toyota drivers. Safety is extremely important especially when it comes to the automobile industry. I am concerned by any precedent that is set by the government that the government knows best when it comes to vehicle design. Later today, I will participate in a markup of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2010, which will attempt to dictate to auto manufacturers the design of certain parts. Government mandates have 

a detrimental effect on the industry and turn the economy. 

I represent the 5th congressional district of Ohio, which is the 

largest manufacturing district in the state and home to many auto 

suppliers. The technology involved in automobile engineering certainly has changed and advanced over the years, and it is important that Toyota customers and the American public and policymakers understand the electronically controlled throttle system 

and the potential for unintended acceleration in Toyotas and all 

other vehicles. While I was not yet a member of the Energy and 

Commerce Committee for the February hearing, I look forward to 

the hearing today and hearing the testimony from the witnesses on 

the panel. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Latta. Ms. Schakowsky, for an 

opening statement, please. 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Three months ago 

this subcommittee held a hearing about sudden acceleration but 

many questions remained unanswered. In particular, we are still 

unclear about cases where sticky pedals and flawed floor mats were 

ruled out as possible causes. One of the few people who proposed 

a possible answer, as has been mentioned, was David Gilbert, an 

associate professor of automotive technology at Southern Illinois 

University in my home state. Dr. Gilbert testified about research 

he had done in which he was able to replicate a situation where 

sudden unintended acceleration was caused by electronic signals 

but not recorded on the vehicle’s event data recorder. 

At the same hearing, Mr. Lentz, who is also here today testified 

on behalf of Toyota saying, ‘‘In December we asked Exponent, a 

world class engineering and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a 

comprehensive, independent analysis for electronic throttle control 

system with an unlimited budget.’’ But what did Exponent come 

back with? In March they released a report that did not conduct 

a comprehensive report of Toyota’s electronic throttle control system and possible flaws. Instead, their report was entirely a critique 

of Dr. Gilbert’s experiment. Of course, scientific research can be 

questioned and disputed but Exponent’s efforts did not even attempt to find out what the American people or this subcommittee 

want to know. Our constituents want answers and they want an 

in-depth investigation that identifies the causes of potentially fatal 

malfunctions in their vehicles. 

I am glad that NHTSA has moved forward and has asked both 

NASA and the National Academy of Sciences to help conduct an investigation that encompasses not just Toyota but all vehicles with 

electronic throttle systems. I look forward to hearing from Mr. 

Strickland about that research and when we can expect to hear 

some results. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Blackburn, for 

opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our 

witnesses. I will have to say, and I know you have heard it from 

many others, we have got concerns over the timing, and I have concerns over the tone of this hearing, and it seems like we may be 

a little bit premature in convening this today. For the record, Mr. 

Chairman, I would like to submit a letter that I sent to Chairman 

Dingell in October, 2007, asking for a hearing to look into the serious concerns in Tennessee over sudden acceleration in the Toyota 

Tacoma. That letter again was in October, 2007. Perhaps if we 

were a little more proactive in investigating this issue 3 years ago, 

we would not be in the position that we are now. 

All too often, Congress is reactive instead of taking action in a 

timely manner when something is brought to our attention. As a 


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result, we still don’t have definitive answers as to what precisely 

caused the sudden unintended acceleration, and it is naive to believe any of the important answers are going to come to light in 

this hearing today. I fear that what we are doing is putting the 

cart before the horse. Many of our constituents look at these hearings and they see this as grandstanding in an attempt to try and 

vilify a corporation. I have heard from constituents who are employees or suppliers to Toyota. They are very concerned that this 

may be something again that is being done to vilify and to score 

cheap political points instead of productively moving forward in an 

effort to actually fix and effectively address this serious issue that 

was first brought to the attention of this committee in October, 

2007. 

From what I understand from NHTSA and Exponent, there is 

not even a viable hypothesis put forward as to this issue and a resolution. That being said, again I want to welcome our witnesses, 

and I am looking forward to hearing from them. And I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. It should be noted that Mr. Gonzalez, 

a member of the full committee, is here, cannot give an opening 

statement, but when we go to questions he will certainly be allowed 

to ask questions, so thank you for being here, Mr. Gonzalez. That 

concludes the opening statements by all of our subcommittee members. We will now move to our first panel. On our first panel we 

have the Honorable David Strickland, who is the Administrator of 

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Mr. Strickland, as you know, it is the policy of this subcommittee to take all 

testimony under oath. Please be advised that you have the right 

under the rules of the committee to be advised by counsel during 

your testimony. Do you wish to be represented by counsel? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No, I do not. 

Mr. STUPAK. I am going to ask you, please rise and raise your 

right hand to take the oath. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect the witness replied in the affirmative. You are now under oath. If you would like to begin with 

an opening statement, Mr. Strickland, we would appreciate it. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID L. STRICKLAND, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, and members of the committee. We appreciate this opportunity to update you on the activities of the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration with regard to unintended acceleration involving Toyota vehicles. NHTSA has been very active on this 

subject since Secretary LaHood testified before this committee in 

February. Last week, Secretary LaHood and I traveled to Japan to 

meet with officials of the Japanese government and Toyota. Toyota 

officials informed us of changes they have recently made in their 

management and processes to ensure that Toyota officials here in 

the U.S. have a direct role in making vehicle recall decisions. 

The Secretary and I made it very clear to Toyota, including 

Chairman Toyoda himself, that the value of these organizational 

changes will be determined by the company’s future safety actions. 


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NHTSA and the Department of Transportation will be watching. 

As you know, we initiated 3 separate actions in February. The 

timeliness query related to the pedal entrapment recall, a timeliness query related to the sticky pedal recall, and an overall recall 

query looking at both of those recalls, if they were sufficient in 

scope and whether there other matters related to unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. On April 19, Toyota agreed to pay $16,375,000 in civil penalties 

in connection with the sticky pedal timeliness query. This is the 

maximum penalty that NHTSA can access under current law. We 

believe the penalty was warranted because Toyota failed to inform 

us in a timely way about that safety defect. Concurrently, we continue to review the large number of documents submitted by Toyota in response to the pedal entrapment query. We have not 

reached a decision yet on whether the facts of that case warrant 

a penalty. NHTSA is also reviewing an extremely large volume of 

documents received in response to the recall query. We have contracted with the Department of Justice to help us categorize and 

analyze those documents. That task will take us some time, but it 

is well underway. 

NHTSA has also started 2 research efforts to address the issue 

of unintended acceleration. The National Academy of Sciences, the 

nation’s most respected independent body of top scientific experts 

will examine the broad subject of unintended acceleration and electronic vehicle controls across the entire automotive industry. The 

academy has begun the process of identifying panel members and 

the panel will be established by July. The panel then expects to 

complete its work within 15 months. The results of the work of the 

National Academy of Sciences will be important to NHTSA, not 

only because of unintended acceleration but also to provide advice 

on a range of electronics issues that might affect motor vehicle 

safety as new electronic crash avoidance and other technologies are 

rapidly proliferating within the vehicle fleet. 

Separately, we have enlisted NASA scientists with expertise in 

areas such as computer controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic interference, and software integrity to help tackle the 

issue of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. NASA’s review 

will be comprehensive and it will assist us in determining whether 

Toyota vehicles may contain safety defects that would warrant a 

formal investigation. We believe that the pressure applied by 

NHTSA has been instrumental in bringing about all the recalls 

Toyota has undertaken to address unintended acceleration. We will 

go wherever the evidence leads us to address the root causes of unintended acceleration. We will open additional investigations and 

push for recalls where warranted. 

It is our hope that Toyota’s recently revamped approach to more 

effectively deal with safety defects will reveal a Toyota that is 

quick to respond to all vehicle safety issues including sudden unintended acceleration. Of course, NHTSA is working and will continue to work with this committee and with the Senate Commerce 

Committee on legislative proposals that would address the unintended acceleration issue across the industry. If enacted, this legislation would significantly increase and enhance NHTSA’s authority 

and the agency’s leverage in dealing with all manufacturers. This 


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leverage would be particularly important in cases where manufacturers are reluctant to perform the necessary safety recalls or who 

are not completely truthful in submitting information to NHTSA. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Burgess, and I look forward to answering the committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Strickland follows:] 


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STATEMENT OF 

THE HONORABLE DAVID L. STRICKLAND 

ADMINISTRATOR 

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

HEAR/NGON 

UPDATE ON TOYOTA AND NHTSA 'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF 

SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION 

May 20, 2010 

Chainnan Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to provide the committee an update on the activities of the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerning unintended acceleration incidents 

involving Toyota vehicles. Since Secretary LaHood testified before this committee on this 

subject in February, NHTSA has been very active. 

Last week, Secretary LaHood and I traveled to Japan to meet with officials of the Japanese 

government and Toyota. We have a very good working relationship with our counterparts in the 

Japanese government and had a productive meeting with them. Our meeting with Toyota 

provided another opportunity to emphasize to the company's leadership the importance of 

making the safety of its vehicles the company's highest priority. The company has recently 

made changes in its organization and processes that are designed to ensure that Toyota officials 

here in the United States have a direct role in making vehicle recall decisions for the company. 

We reinforced with Toyota officials, including Chainnan Toyoda himself, that the value of these 

organizational changcs will be detennined by the company's future safety actions. 

As you know, we initiated three separate actions in February: a timeliness query (TQ) related to 

the pedal entrapment recall; a TQ related to the "sticky pedal" recall; and a recall query (RQ) 

looking at whether those two recalls were sufficient in scope and whether there are other matters 

related to unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles that should have been addressed by the 

company. On April 19, Toyota agreed to pay $16,375,000 in civil penalties in connection with 

the sticky pedal TQ. This is the maximum penalty available under current law. NHTSA 

believed the penalty was warranted due to the company's failure to infonn the agency in a timely 

way about the safety defect involved in that recall. 
33 


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We are continuing to review the large number of documents submitted by Toyota in response to 

the pedal entrapment TQ. We have not reached a decision yet on whether the facts of that case 

warrant a civil penalty. We have recently begun to review the huge volume of documents 

received in response to the RQ. The documents are so numerous that we have entered into an 

agreement with the Department of Justice to help us categorize and analyze the documents. 

That task will take some time. 

At the same time we have undertaken two important reviews related to unintended acceleration. 

The first is a review of the electronic throttle control (ETC) system in Toyota vehicles. This 

review entails in-depth research into the design, function, and safety measures associated with 

that system, including all of its electronic components and software. The National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) is assisting us in this effort, which is well underway. NASA 

brings its great expertise in electronic control systems, forensic analysis, and fail-safe design to 

the project. NASA's expertise is being complemented by specific automotive electronics and 

safety systems expertise from both inside and outside of NHTSA. The team is working to 

identify any vulnerabilities and possible failure modes in the ETC system that can lead to 

unintended acceleration and that involve conditions that can realistically be expected to occur in 

consumers' use of these vehicles. However, as is typical in any review of the design and 

operation of very complex systems, we and our partners on this project are finding the search for 

possible flaws quite time consuming. We are hoping to complete this review of the ETC system 

by the end of August, but that will depend on just how quickly the necessary analysis and testing 

can be done. If we do find such possible failure modes that might explain any of the unintended 

acceleration events reported to NHTSA, we will open a defect investigation. 

The second review will be conducted by an independent panel of experts chosen by the National 

Academy of Sciences. This group will study the broad subject of unintended acceleration and 

electronic control systems across the automotive industry. They will look at subjects such as 

electronic vehicle control systems' design and reliability (including hardware and software 

issues), electromagnetic compatibility and electromagnetic interference, existing relevant design 

and testing standards, human factors and the possibility of human error, and mechanical failure. 

The panel will make recommendations to NHTSA on research, rulemaking, and enforcement 

activities and the personnel, infrastructure, and financial resources required for NHTSA to help 

ensure the future safety of ETC systems and other electronic vehicle control functions. NAS has 

begun the process of identifying panel members, and we have been infonned that the panel will 

be established by July and will complete its work within 15 months. We think this group's work 

comes at a very opportune moment, not only to provide advice to the agency on the unintended 

acceleration issue, but also to provide such advice on the range of electronics issues that might 

affect motor vehicle safety as new electronic crash avoidance and other technologies rapidly 

proliferate in the vehicle fleet. 
34 


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The major recalls that Toyota has initiated concerning unintended acceleration involved two 

distinct issues, pedal entrapment by floor mats and "sticky" pedals resulting from a particular 

defective pedal. Some consumers who have had their vehicles repaired under these recalls have 

complained to NHTSA about incidents of unintended acceleration occurring after the repairs. 

NHTSA has spoken to nearly a hundred vehicle owners and inspected a number of vehicles 

involved in these incidents. We have found just a few instances where a dealer apparently 

performed a recall remedy incorrectly and have worked with Toyota to ensure corrections were 

made. We have not found evidence that properly perfonned recall repairs did not address the 

problem they were intended to address. That is, we have not seen pedal entrapment in a vehicle 

that has had the correct pedal entrapment repair or a sticky pedal in a vehicle that has had the 

correct repair. Nor have we yet found evidence from these recent vehicle inspections that gives 

us the basis for opening a new defect investigation of unintended acceleration in these vehicles. 

We will continue to look for such evidence through field inspections, review of incoming 

complaints and early warning data and, of course, the comprehensive review of Toyota's ETC 

system discussed above. 

Pressure applied by NHTSA has been instrumental in bringing about all of the recalls Toyota has 

undertaken thus far to address unintended acceleration. We will go wherever the evidence leads 

us to address the root causes of this phenomenon, including additional investigations and recalls 

if necessary. Toyota's recently revamped approach to its recall responsibilities will hopefully 

result in the company's being very proactive in addressing the unintended acceleration issue 

wherever it sees opportunities for improvement. 

Of course, we are working with this committee and the Senate Commerce Committee on 

legislative proposals that would address the unintended acceleration issue across the industry 

through various requirements for new standards. The legislation would also give NHTSA 

enhanced authority to address situations where manufacturers are reluctant to perform necessary 

safety recalls or not completely truthful in submitting information to the agency. 

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions. 
35 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Strickland. We are going to stand 

in recess for 1 hour. The President of Mexico is here. They are 

gathering on the House Floor. We must recess during this period 

of time, so we will recess for 1 hour. We will have you come back 

in 1 hour. We will go right to questioning then by members of the 

committee. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. This subcommittee stands in recess for 1 hour. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. STUPAK. The committee will resume. When we left off, Mr. 

Strickland had testified, so we will begin with members’ questions. 

I will begin. 

Mr. Strickland, in our first hearing on sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles, an automotive expert, Dr. Gilbert, who 

was mentioned a couple of times today, testified before the committee about an experiment he had run on Toyota cars and trucks. 

Dr. Gilbert reported that he had been able to induce sudden unintended acceleration without having the vehicles’ computers detect 

a problem. In briefings with committee staff, several academics, 

and independent engineers have described Dr. Gilbert’s work as a 

sensible, reasonable, and legitimate starting point for an investigation into potential causes of sudden unintended acceleration. These 

academics and engineers have discussed with the committee a variety of real-world events that could lead to this sort of resistive— 

to the sort of resistive Dr. Gilbert induced in his lab. 

But Toyota’s response to Dr. Gilbert’s testimony was not to investigate his work seriously. Instead they have aggressively attacked 

Dr. Gilbert’s credibility and motives. It is my understanding that 

NHTSA has taken a different approach with Dr. Gilbert and has, 

in fact, invited him to its testing facility so that he can discuss his 

work with federal officials investigating the sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles and cars. Is that correct? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir, that is correct. Actually, the engineers 

at NHTSA have been in fairly regular conversation with Dr. Gilbert to arrange a time, and it is my understanding that Dr. Gilbert 

will be visiting our facility in East Liberty, Ohio, within the next 

2 weeks where he will be given access to our laboratory and our 

facilities to replicate his work, to discuss with our engineers and 

also with the NASA folks as well this—this work in addition to 

other experts. It is very important for us to get to an answer, and 

we are welcoming Dr. Gilbert’s participation. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, you know, Toyota described Dr. Gilbert’s 

work as being phony, parlor trick, words like that. I expect you 

would not invite Dr. Gilbert to participate unless you thought he 

had something to offer to this discussion. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No. Absolutely not. We believe that Dr. Gilbert 

has created—has replicated a situation where as you described, Mr. 

Chairman, that he could have an incident of unintended acceleration without there being a FALCO being picked up in the ECM. 

That is the core of everyone’s question, and we have to take his 

work very seriously. 

Mr. STUPAK. In—the last time you testified and Secretary 

LaHood testified you were in the process of hiring engineers. Has 

NHTSA hired more engineers? 


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Mr. STRICKLAND. We are right now in the process of recruiting 

several. We have our certifications on them, and we are beginning 

the interview process. We hope to get a number of folks across electrical engineering, software engineering, and other electronics 

issues onboard very soon. 

Mr. STUPAK. The White House in this last week or two put out 

an initiative which they are trying to speed up, if you will, the hiring process—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK [continuing]. From 5 months to about 5 weeks or 6 

weeks. Have you found that hiring process to be a burden in trying 

to obtain the expertise that you need in NHTSA? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We are in the process of executing through the 

quick-hire process of the Administration’s reforms. We definitely 

appreciate these new reforms, and we are using them to advantage 

or how to get folks onboard as quickly as we can. The normal process does have—does require some energy, and the reforms are very 

helpful. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this. Earlier this week Toyota indicated it would recall Lexus LS vehicles. Has there been a recall 

issued yet? They said it might be as early as tomorrow. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. My understanding, sir, is that Toyota will be 

issuing their required documents to NHTSA on Friday. We will—— 

Mr. STUPAK. So they haven’t—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. They haven’t officially announced a recall to 

NHTSA, but it is my understanding that will happen tomorrow, 

but they have informed NHTSA of the issue that arose in Japan 

and their plan of action. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. The issue rose in Japan, and I think there 

is about another—this is their top line of the LS Lexus vehicles. 

Those vehicles were also sold here in the United States. Correct? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. Have you worked with NHTSA on this recall? I 

mean, I am sorry. Have you worked with Toyota on this recall? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No. Toyota actually—their work was with the 

Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, and 

through their work found that there was a defect regarding the 

steering mechanism. Once that was found, they reported to NHTSA 

about their plans in Japan and planned to take the same steps 

here in the United States and were working through the issues of 

the remedy, which we—I would imagine that will be announced on 

Friday. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Have you gone back through your database to see if there have been steering problems with these Lexus 

LS? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have. To explain it a little more fully, the vehicle population involves the Lexus LS for the, 

I guess, end-of-model year 2009, through 2010, which is a vehicle 

population of 3,800 vehicles here in the United States. The Office 

of Defects Investigation has gone—is going through and has gone 

through our database to see if there were similar steering issues. 

We have not found a complaint as of yet, but we are continuing to 

search the database. 


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Even absent that, we appreciate Toyota being forthright and taking action in and of our own work, but we are looking to make sure 

that if we have had a similar issue. There were only 12 of these 

incidents in Japan if I am not mistaken. 

Mr. STUPAK. The last hearing in February I asked the question 

of all the witnesses, Mr. Lentz in particular indicated that the 

mats and the sticky pedal accounted for about 16 percent of the unintended acceleration. Have you found—have NHTSA through its 

investigation found any other cause for the other 84 percent of the 

sudden unintended acceleration that remains unexplained? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We are working through several field investigations. We have 38 field investigations ongoing looking at the span 

of Toyota’s unintended acceleration issues. We are leaving no theory unquestioned or unturned. We have found no evidence of additional causes of the defect, but that does not mean we have stopped 

looking. We are going to turn over every stone. Not only our research ongoing but NASA and the upcoming National Academy of 

Sciences’ study but our work is also ongoing as to any other possible issues that could be creating this fault. 

Mr. STUPAK. So we are no closer to resolving the unexplained 84 

percent of the sudden unintended accelerations? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Burgess for questions. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Strickland, the last 

hearing we had the—Secretary LaHood said that Toyota was—had 

made some improvements and was going to be—and Toyota stated 

they had appointed a chief quality officer. Then we had the whole 

issue come up with the 2010, Lexus GS460. So did that give you 

an ability to evaluate Toyota’s responsiveness to the problem with 

the Lexus as compared to the earlier responses? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, Mr. Burgess, it has, and I made a comment after the Lexus GS460 recall, the Consumer Reports recall 

with the electronic stability control issue. I have found since I have 

taken office in January that Toyota has been much more responsive in—— 

Mr. BURGESS. I don’t mean to interrupt but my time is going to 

run out quickly. Did the quality officer make a difference then in 

that environment? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, the quality officer—I was just informed of 

his hiring. They changed the process. Overall the result is we have 

seen better responses. Toyota is working through the organization 

issues, but these past two recalls have been—I have been very 

happy with the responsiveness. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. One of the issues with Professor Gilbert’s testimony last time, one of the questions that he couldn’t answer 

when I asked was how—to give us a real-world scenario of how 

that situation that he described to us would exist. Would it be 

chaffing of a cable holder, how would you get the correct amount 

of resistance placed across the two wires, and I never really got a 

straightforward answer to that. 

In what you have seen so far has—is that a question that has 

been satisfactorily answered in your mind? What is the real-world 

situation that would have to occur in order to meet the conditions 

that Dr. Gilbert outlined? 


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Mr. STRICKLAND. That is, I mean, I will definitely have my staff 

and my engineers get back to you after the hearing for, I guess, a 

more technical response, but we are inviting Dr. Gilbert out to East 

Liberty for him to replicate his tests. So we haven’t had an answer 

in terms of what would be the real-world situation to create this 

fault, but that is something that we want to talk to Dr. Gilbert 

about and have him replicate the—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Will NASA evaluate—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. That real-world scenario also? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Absolutely. 

Mr. BURGESS. Can this committee expect to see the results of 

that evaluation? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. Absolutely. All of the work will be made 

public and provided to the committee. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, in addition to meeting with Dr. Gilbert, are 

you planning to meet with Exponent? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. My understanding is the staff is going to be 

contacted by Exponent, and we will be having conversations with 

every expert working in this area, but we have not had a conversation with Exponent as of this point. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, your contract with NASA states that it will 

provide all coordination with independent groups offering opinions 

on possible causes of unintended acceleration. Have any of the 

independent groups asked to meet with NASA? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. My understanding is that there have been numerous conversations with experts around the country and universities. I will be happy to get back to you on the record about which 

conversations have happened and which ones are to be scheduled. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. Has NHTSA or NASA refused any meetings 

with any particular groups? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No. Absolutely not. 

Mr. BURGESS. The—and you will make that other information 

available to us? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, when we—and I don’t have the data in front 

of me unfortunately any longer, but if we could just look at the 

timeline for the unintended acceleration and the introduction of 

electronic throttle control. The two seem to be superimposed events 

that occurred about in 2002. 

But to the best of my understanding there really—through all of 

your work there has not been a problem identified with the electronic throttle control other than the testimony we have had from 

Professor Gilbert. 

So is that the only avenue that is of pursuit that is occurring 

right now? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, we are looking at the whole, the entire 

Toyota fleet regarding this issue through our field investigations, 

but in terms of how we found a defect regarding the electronic auto 

control system from our past work, we have not at this point, but 

that is also the reason why we are investing so heavily into making 

sure that we have a full scope of every answer. So that work is ongoing continually, but our past work hasn’t shown a defect. 


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Mr. BURGESS. Now, was my email correct that I alluded to about 

the Rhonda Smith car? Chairman Barton, Ranking Member Barton 

said find the car and tear it apart and find out the problem. You 

did look and right now nothing remarkable. Is that still the answer? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is still correct. The Smith’s vehicle is one 

of our test fleet. There is over 20 vehicles total. We have begun 

work on looking at her vehicle in addition to the rest of the fleet, 

and we will be continuing work as part of our investigation with 

NASA. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, when—as I recall Ms. Smith’s testimony, it 

was very compelling when she gave it here in committee. One of 

her complaints, if you will, was that no one at Toyota would listen 

to her, but in fact, no one at NHTSA would listen to her. 

In light of what you have found with looking at the car, are you 

comfortable that NHTSA’s previous evaluation of the vehicle shortly after the incident was as thorough as it needed to be and that 

the consumer’s complaints were adequately addressed? Or should 

more care have been taken at the time that the complaint actually 

occurred? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I am very confident of the work that the Office 

of Defects Investigation did for the Smith vehicle. We deployed one 

of our best investigators, and it was a very extensive record of his 

work and his conversations. I reviewed it, and I believe that everything that should have happened in that investigation was—did 

happen, and I am very happy with the work. 

Mr. BURGESS. And that was the work that occurred right after 

the incident? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let me ask you this. When Secretary LaHood was 

here, I had—I have a copy of the publicly available NHTSA report 

on the inspection of a Lexus that was damaged in a catastrophic 

accident in San Diego, the Mark Saylor accident. There is a portion 

of the report that is redacted, paragraph five. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS. I had asked Secretary LaHood if I could—I don’t 

need to have a copy in my hands, but I would like to look at the 

unredacted report. I am willing to come down to the Department 

of Transportation or to your agency to make that review. I understand there may be sensitive information that the family would not 

want out in the public domain, but I do think it is important that 

members of this committee be able to review an unredacted report 

of this accident. 

Will you help me get that information that I have asked Secretary LaHood to provide to me as a member of the committee? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Absolutely. I will definitely refer you to our 

Chief Counsel, Kevin Vincent, to—I believe there is Privacy Act implications with that information, but anything that—as long as we 

are doing everything within the law and the provisions and the information to the Congress, we will definitely assist you in that regard. 

Mr. BURGESS. I would remind you the committee has subpoena 

power. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I understand that. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. BURGESS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield 

back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Yield back? You are over 2 minutes. 

Ms. Christensen for questions, please. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Strickland, in your testimony and we have heard it from several 

members that Toyota paid $16,375,000 in civil penalties, and in 

your testimony you say that is the maximal penalty available 

under current law. 

Do you think that that is an adequate cap? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No, madam. I believe that the size of the regulated manufacturers under NHTSA’s regime is some of the largest 

multi-national corporations on the planet, and on occasion I think 

a $16 million fine may not necessarily give the correct deterrent affect. 

I have testified several times that I believe that the cap should 

be significantly raised. I know in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 

2010, the committee thought to remove the cap and allow NHTSA 

the discretion to properly size a penalty. I believe that is the correct approach. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. You also say in your testimony 

that you haven’t found a basis for opening up any new defect investigations on unintended acceleration. What is the threshold? What 

would trigger a reopening of the investigation? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, the two investigations are ongoing in regards to time limits. So what we are looking for is any document 

or indication that Toyota knew of a defect that posed an unreasonable risk to safety, and if they did not inform NHTSA within 5 

business days of that discovery, they are in violation of the Safety 

Act and therefore, we would take action. We are reviewing several 

hundred thousand documents in that regard. When we have completed our review, if we had made a finding that there may be an 

issue regarding a violation of the timeliness of mandates of the Act, 

we will take action once again, but that is—we have made no conclusions. The work is ongoing. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. Just one other question. As I recall in the last hearing a lot of the decisions were being made in 

Japan, at Toyota in Japan, and in your testimony you talk about 

meeting with the counterparts, your counterparts in the Japanese 

government. 

So how do you—how would you assess their effectiveness, their 

independence, their commitment to strong oversight? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The Road Transport Bureau and the Japanese 

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation is a very vigorous agency that has a very different approach and mandate 

under Japanese law. They are very committed to safety. They do 

have a different relationship with the manufacturers. It is statutorily more collaborative than the—how NHTSA’s relationship is 

with the manufacturing, manufacturers here in the United States. 

However, they are great public services, great engineers, and 

they do a solid job for the Japanese people in terms of making sure 

they create a safe environment in terms of the handling of their vehicles. 


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But we do have different approaches, but I have every confidence 

that our counterparts are just as involved and just as intent upon 

making sure that the fleet that Toyota puts on the road is safe. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. I don’t have any other questions, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. Christensen. 

Mr. Braley for questions, please. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome back, Administrator Strickland. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Braley, thank you. 

Mr. BRALEY. It has been awhile since our last hearing on this 

topic where you testified, and I am going to start with a little 

housework. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. Since that last hearing I have sent you three letters, one on March 3, one on April 22, and again last week on May 

14, requesting information on complaints by Toyota owners who 

said they had experienced sudden unintended acceleration even 

after their vehicles underwent recall service to modify pedals and 

replace floor mats. And in those letters I also requested information about the steps NHTSA was taking to review Toyota electronics and ensure effective repairs in all affected vehicles, and to 

this date I have yet to receive a response from you or your department. 

Can you give me some indication as to when I can expect a response to those inquiries? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Monday or Tuesday. If it is Tuesday, you will 

get it very early Tuesday. Mr. Braley, it is my responsibility to 

make sure that you, any member of this committee, or any member 

of the Congress, gets a timely response. It is my responsibility that 

it happens. I apologize that you have not received that response. 

I will make sure that happens immediately and on a foregoing 

basis that you get a timely response. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Do you have a sense as you sit here today how many reports 

NHTSA has received of sudden unintended acceleration in previously serviced Toyota vehicles? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I—we have had a number of reports, especially 

within, I guess within the February, March timeframe period after 

repairs were executed. We have conducted numerous interviews 

and done field investigations. I will definitely get back to you on 

the record with the specific number. 

I do know for a fact that the number of those remedy repairs of 

complaints have markedly decreased since March. I know that our 

staff has worked very closely with Toyota and informed them of our 

findings. There were some issues with how the dealers were applying repairs that—and I know that Toyota made upon our request, 

made several modifications to the instructions to the dealers on 

how they apply the remedies, and we have seen a marked decrease 

in the complaints. 

But we are continuing to making sure that the remedy is properly applied and any consumer that is still having issues, that we 

follow up. 


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Mr. BRALEY. Are those complaints on previously serviced vehicles 

being forwarded to the entities such as Exponent or the NASA investigators who are looking into the potential link between an electronic problem and the issue of sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I can’t speak to Exponent getting direct access 

to our work or our data on request. I mean, they are positioned as 

any private citizen in terms of a FOIA request or anything of that 

nature. We are not collaborating with Exponent. 

NASA is getting everything that we have in regard to our work 

on sudden unintended acceleration, including those remedy repair 

issues and in addition to all the documents from Toyota. So we 

are—NASA is getting those documents. I don’t know if Exponent 

has made a request of that. 

Mr. BRALEY. Now, have you been provided with copies of the materials that Exponent has submitted to the committee in response 

for request for information about their work product in connection 

with this investigation? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I have not, Mr. Braley, but I have been made 

aware of some of the responses by my staff. 

Mr. BRALEY. Were you aware that the committee has been provided with a report from Exponent that is titled, ‘‘Evaluation of 

Gilbert Demonstration?’’ 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, I am aware of it, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. And that we have also been provided with a 

PowerPoint presentation with a similar title, ‘‘Evaluation of Dr. 

Gilbert’s Demonstration?’’ 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. I am aware of it. 

Mr. BRALEY. Have you seen any other reports in any—in either 

a preliminary, a draft, or a final form from Exponent detailing its 

work analyzing the potential problem of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No, sir, I have not. 

Mr. BRALEY. Were you aware that Exponent has billed approximately 11,000 hours of work since the beginning of this year on 

this particular investigation? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I was not aware of that, but that is a significant amount of work. 

Mr. BRALEY. And because it is a significant amount of work, do 

you find it at all surprising or disturbing that the documents we 

have received to date from Exponent are limited specifically to the 

testimony of one witness who testified at our previous hearing on 

February 23? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That would not be NHTSA’s approach if what— 

our work plan and our work would be incredibly detailed in 

aspecting every minute of what we do. I would imagine that the 

committee would have the expectation, the same expectation of Exponent. The fact that you don’t have it I would imagine it being 

very troubling to the committee. 

Mr. BRALEY. All right. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Waxman for questions, please, sir. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes. Mr. Strickland, I am just following up on that 

line of questioning. Do you believe it is possible to conduct solid engineering work if you don’t have a written plan for the research, 


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you don’t keep a record, the written record of the work, which is 

apparently the situation with Exponent? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. It would be my expectation of NHTSA, 

NHTSA’s engineers that we have a proper workflow plan, engineering analysis. Everything should be properly documented and also 

in terms of our work with NASA, we have to be prepared for a peer 

review to be conducted by our Volpe Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

So that would be an incredibly different cap, how we would execute a research plan. So I would say that that would not be my expectation if I was dealing with it on the private sector. 

Mr. WAXMAN. We have learned that Toyota’s defense counsel controls Exponent’s work. They review everything that Exponent does, 

and they have the right to prevent Exponent from releasing unfavorable results. 

Does this concern you? Toyota is relying on Exponent to do its 

research, and Exponent is being directed by Toyota’s defense counsel. Is this the way you think an investigation ought to be handled? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, there is two components, I mean, not to 

speak for Toyota. They can clearly speak for themselves. 

Mr. WAXMAN. They are going to speak for themselves soon. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. But there is, you know, preparation for a litigation, and then there is also a scientific investigation into the cause 

of a problem, and those could be mutually exclusive. Perhaps Exponent may be doing that additional work to deal with answering the 

question, but from what I have understood, all the work has been 

in preoperational litigation, but it is not a scientific analysis or 

dealing with a hypothesis of the problem. 

So I would say that at this point they have not fulfilled—it is 

part of the, I guess, the solution in terms of trying to find the answer from what you have just described. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Brake override is a vehicle software technology 

that many auto safety experts say would address the sudden unintended acceleration. With brake override if a driver applies both 

the accelerator and the brake at the same time, in most situations 

the car will disregard the accelerator and apply the brake. 

I understand that NHTSA is currently evaluating the brake override technology and is considering updating its standards to require 

that technology in all cars. 

Do you consider brake override to be a safety feature? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We believe at NHTSA that safety—that brake 

override has huge implications for safety. It is something that we 

believe has great promise. We are doing our research, and we do 

anticipate that it could have a great value to implementation in the 

fleet, but we have to do our work preliminarily. 

But, yes, we consider it a safety feature. 

Mr. WAXMAN. We have been told that in the course of discussing 

complaints of the sudden unintended acceleration with Toyota, 

NHTSA suggested to Toyota that Toyota retrofit some of its models 

with this brake override. Toyota advised the committee that it has 

decided to make brake override a standard feature in all of its cars 

for the 2011, model year forward. Toyota also told us it will upgrade the software in certain earlier models during service for 

other recalls. 


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Mr. Strickland, after 2011, when Toyota is done with its retrofitting, will there be Toyotas on the road that will not have the 

brake override? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I would imagine from your answer, sir, no, 

there will be some vehicles that will not have brake override. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you support making brake override a mandatory feature for all cars in future model years? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. As I said, we at NHTSA, we are beginning our 

research to justify that such a move, but in a preliminary fashion 

the one thing, the one goal we want to have is this. Any driver that 

presses the brake should be able to stop the car, and that—with 

that goal we believe it has great promise. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes. Well, Toyota has reached a conclusion that 

they want to have this brake override. They think it is important. 

Is there any reason why if they have decided a brake override is 

important for the future cars and some of the existing cars that 

they wouldn’t want to make brake override available in all cars 

that are compatible with this feature? 

I will ask them that myself, but can you imagine any reason they 

would not want to do that? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. From a consumer standpoint I would imagine 

that every driver of a Toyota that may have an issue regarding 

sudden unintended acceleration would like to have this feature on 

their car. Speaking as, you know, as a—just speaking as a consumer. 

Toyota’s decisionmaking in terms of how they implement it is an 

ongoing question, but to answer your question, sir, I believe that 

it would be a positive move for safety and for their own driving 

public. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I am going to look forward to hearing Mr. 

Lentz’s explanation for why it won’t be available in all Toyotas, because I don’t see a reason not to make it all available—make it 

available in all the Toyotas, but we will get his response to that. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. 

Ms. Schakowsky, questions, please. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Strickland. 

Toyota relies on two primary justifications for its assertion that 

electronics plays no role in sudden unintended acceleration. We 

have already discussed one of the shortcomings, one of the justifications, the work, the engineering firm, Exponent, has done for Toyota and the problems with that. 

The other justification Toyota relies on is the pre-market testing 

that Toyota’s own engineers do before manufacturing vehicles for 

sale to the public. Our committee staff conducted a transcribed 

interview of two Toyota engineers from Japan and asked them multiple questions about the company’s testing protocols. We learned 

that this pre-market testing has significant limitations. Toyota only 

conducts these—this test during the design phase of the vehicles. 

As one of the Toyota engineers we interviewed told the committee, ‘‘Once mass production is initiated, then that means that 

the design is completed so we don’t conduct anything additional.’’ 


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So, Mr. Strickland, does this pre-market testing strike you as 

adequate to identify a cause of sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, Representative Schakowsky, there is sort 

of—there is two components here that NHTSA has concerns about. 

It is compliance. Before a vehicle is put into the stream of commerce, it has to be compliant with all the federal motor vehicle 

safety standards, and that is one set of issues that has to be taken 

care of. 

The second part after the vehicle is on the road we worry about 

any defects ex post. Pre-market—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I understand what you are saying, but now we 

are talking about before, but this is before mass production. Let me 

go on. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Toyota engineers also told us that Toyota does 

not perform these design phase tests on a large number of vehicles—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY [continuing]. And as a result, samples may not 

be representative enough to test for the risk of a rare event such 

as a sudden unintended acceleration. Some of the tests that Toyota 

relied on for its claim that the electronic system had undergone, 

‘‘extensive testing,’’ involved sample sizes of just one or two vehicles. 

So, Mr. Strickland, does Toyota’s approach strike you as adequate? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The approach—every manufacturer has a different approach. The only—what we are concerned about is what 

happens on the road. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, I understand, but you said that there 

was a pre-market phase that you required. Is the test of one or two 

cars in the design phase in your view sufficient? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I would have to compare that with other manufacturers’ testing protocols, and I don’t have that—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. OK. 

Mr. STRICKLAND [continuing]. At hand, but I will definitely get 

back to you on the record. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. OK. Furthermore, we—well, let us see. Sudden unintended acceleration occurs rarely and intermittently. Do 

Toyota’s tests involving—oh, I asked you that. One or two vehicles. 

OK. 

Furthermore, we learned that fail-safe mechanisms in Toyota vehicles are designed to detect single point, single event faults. In 

other words, faults that occur in isolation—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY [continuing]. And affect only one vehicle component. Toyota’s testing of critical components of the electronic 

throttle control system reflects this focus in that they do not test 

for multiple event or multiple component faults. Numerous academics and independent experts told committee staff that rare multiple event faults could play a role in sudden unintended acceleration. 


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It seems to me that Toyota should try to identify all potential 

faults, not just the most frequent ones and develop tests to prevent 

them. 

So, Mr. Strickland, do you agree that Toyota should take a comprehensive approach for—to test for potential causes of sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. They should take a comprehensive approach. 

NHTSA’s work with NASA is going to be a multiple fault causation 

study which takes into account possible multiple intervening 

events which could cause this. That is our study. That is our approach, and we would have the expectation for our findings that if 

we do find a vehicle defect, that that will be part of our response 

to Toyota if that is the case. 

But NHTSA’s approach is a multi-causal analysis in how we 

could replicate that fault. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Based on the description of Toyota’s pre-market testing that you have heard today, do you believe Toyota’s premarket testing provides a sufficient basis to conclude that there are 

no potential electronic causes of sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I don’t think you can use a pre-market analysis 

as a determinative factor that there is no problem. I think you 

have to not only do pre-market testing, but you have to do long 

term, you know. I guess long-term studies of how your vehicle reacts, you know, in the real world as a number of manufacturers do. 

So I don’t think that NHTSA would say that a pre-market test 

validates a long-term answer of impossibility of there being a failure. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, I am concerned about the pre-market 

testing itself, and it seems that Toyotas is not an adequate substitute for thorough testing needed to identify potential defects 

after manufacturing is complete and it is time for Toyota to stop 

making public assurances about the infallibility of their electronic 

systems when they don’t have comprehensive testing to back it up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Mr. Strickland, if I may, I have a couple 

questions. 

Would you give Mr. Strickland the documents? 

In response to some of the questions from Mr. Burgess and 

Chairman Waxman, a couple of questions. The first one is a letter 

dated February 22, 2010, sent to Secretary LaHood by myself and 

Mr. Waxman. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. And on page four, sub-part B asks that NHTSA reopen its investigation of PE, that is preliminary examination. 

Right, 04021? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Which had 37 consumer complaints on sudden unintended accelerations in the Camry, 2002, 2003, Camry, Solara, and 

Lexus. We have yet to have a response. Are you going to reopen 

that investigation as requested? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The Universe of Test Vehicles subsumes these, 

all of these parts that you asked for, so in terms of a defect investigation as part of the NHTSA study that is ongoing, that we will 

have done in the—by the end of the summer. 


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So to answer, the short answer to your question is we are reevaluating all this work in light of the NHTSA study in addition 

to—that is going to be included in the NAS study, but we will definitely get back to you on the record in direct response to Sub-part 

B. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, if we are looking at that in response to 

Mr. Waxman’s question, you said this brake override system is a 

huge safety issue. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Why wouldn’t NHTSA require Toyota then to have 

the brake override system in 2002, and 2003, Lexus ES300s, the 

Toyota Camry, and the Toyota Camry Solara from 2002, 2003, 

since we got at least 37 consumer complaints, and we have asked 

that it be reinvestigated? 

Why wouldn’t you require the brake override system be put in 

all vehicles or Toyota models of vehicles that have this sudden unintended acceleration that we have unexplained answers for? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. It is still an ongoing investigation, Mr. Stupak. 

If we make a finding that it is a vehicle defect based upon that, 

then yes, we would, as part of the mandatory recall of those vehicles, we would ask for a remedy and that—and brake override 

could be a mandated part of that remedy because it is an investigation that is ongoing, which is inclusive. And the key to the NASA 

study we are not in a position to make that demand at this time. 

Mr. STUPAK. If Toyota is putting it in some of the vehicles now 

and it will be in all the vehicles in 2011—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK [continuing]. Then by putting it in certain vehicles 

now, is that admission then that you have a defect in those models 

and that is why you got to put in this brake override? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That isn’t an admission. That is a decision that 

Toyota made independently for whatever reason, and you can 

have—ask Mr. Lentz those questions. But the—from NHTSA’s perspective we can only force a mandatory recall if we believe that 

there is a defect that we can prove in court and we haven’t been 

able to do that yet, but the fact that Toyota feels that they need 

to install this in some vehicles may be indicative of what they feel 

is to be a proper solution until they can come to their own answers. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. I guess I will save those questions for Mr. 

Lentz. 

Let me ask you the other document I put before you. It is dated 

5/2/2007. It is a memorandum from Scott Yon, and this is on the 

Smith vehicle that Mr. Burgess has asked about. In the last paragraph, first line it says, ‘‘Discoloration, rust, and surface damage 

to brake, rotors visible through all four wheel apertures.’’ If you go 

on, next page, second paragraph, lower part of that paragraph it 

indicates, ‘‘the brake components exhibit wear and damage inconsistent with normal operation and inconsistent with the indicated 

vehicle mileage.’’ 

Then they have a number of photographs which show the damage indicates excessive brake temperatures is consistent with the 

brakes being applied vigorously over an extended period while the 

vehicle is moving at speed. 


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So the Smith vehicle, while maybe every time you turn the key 

you don’t find the sudden unintended acceleration, obviously there 

was some damage there that was outside the normal wear and tear 

on a vehicle of this age. Is that correct? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK, and you have never found any vehicles that has 

been considered to have SUA, sudden unintended acceleration? You 

haven’t been able to turn the keys. You said you had 20 models, 

and you haven’t found this sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We have not had an event where we turned on 

the—where the engineer turned on the car, was able to replicate 

the fault specifically because of something outside of the parameters of a floor mat entrapment issue. 

Mr. STUPAK. And we don’t know when that occurs? That is why 

we give it this name, sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There is—yes. Absolutely. We basically have to 

categorize all of those events. There could be multiple causes for 

that, and that is the reason why we are having our long-term investigation for the National Academy of Sciences and having NASA 

specifically look at Toyota’s electronic throttle control system for 

the study that we are accomplishing and will finish at the end of 

summer. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. My time is up. Mr. Burgess for questions. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On the—Mr. Strickland, on the order of the brake override that 

now is receiving so much attention, you mentioned I think that installing it, the brake override, in Toyotas would be a positive move. 

Was that—correctly state your feelings? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. I think it would be a very positive 

move. 

Mr. BURGESS. What other manufacturers have installed a brake 

override system on their cars? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There are several manufacturers that have 

brake override systems. 

Mr. BURGESS. Are there some that don’t? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There are some that don’t. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, why is that not a requirement if you think 

it would be a good move for Toyota? Would it be a good move for 

other manufacturers? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We believe that brake override has a tremendous amount of promise, which is the reason why we are undertaking our preliminary research for possible rulemaking. 

In terms of dealing with this issue, I guess, across the rest of the 

fleet, that is going to be part of a study and part of the—one of the 

answers will be possible long-term solutions, either from the National Academy of Sciences, which may include—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Rough numbers, what percentage of the fleet has 

the brake override right now? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That I am not sure. I would have to get back 

to on the record for that. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK, but why isn’t it more widely used? What are 

the barriers to the implementation? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There is—well, there is different systems in 

terms of how the brake and the accelerator work in terms of their 


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software configuration, the mechanical linkages. I am sure every 

manufacturer has different strategies in manufacturing construction which may lead to different decisions. 

Mr. BURGESS. I don’t want to over-simplify, but if you are thinking about rulemaking, then presumably you are looking at cars 

with electronic throttle control, would have a requirement for a 

brake override system so that if the brake is applied, the throttle— 

the default is for the throttle to stop action. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. We are absolutely looking at. 

Mr. BURGESS. And so if that is good for Toyota, then it is good 

for X percent of the fleet that does not have the brake override system. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The goal for all regulations promulgated by 

NHTSA is for the safety of the entire fleet, not one manufacturer. 

Mr. BURGESS. When we had the other hearing, and I don’t have 

the information in front of me today, but it was a list rated, a numerical list of complaints received by the—your agency—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. About cars, and Toyota showed up on 

the list, but they were like, I don’t remember, 16, 17, 18 on the list. 

That means there were 16 other big car manufacturers where the 

cars had more complaints than Toyota and yet here we are involved in a series of hearings over Toyota. 

Have you looked at the cars and the complaints that scored higher than Toyota or worse then Toyota, if you will, on that list, and 

are we actively pursuing the complaints that came into NHTSA for 

those vehicles as well? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. NHTSA looks at all trends across all manufacturers. In terms of how the focus on Toyota, there was clearly an 

anomaly in acceleration events during the period that we are talking about, which is the reason why NHTSA has opened, you know, 

up until this point we had, I believe we opened eight investigations 

into this issue prior to the Santee crash. So we have not taken a 

look at—we have treated Toyota as we would treat any manufacturer. 

Yes, there are other manufacturers with similar complaints, 

more complaints. We look at them just as vigorously as we do Toyota. It is just that in terms of the actual profile and in terms of 

trend analysis, Toyota in this area did have a higher tendency towards the later years of the Camry run after 2002. 

Mr. BURGESS. And was that all related to models that has the 

electronic throttle control? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let me ask you this. Let us talk about NASA for 

just a minute before I run out of time, and you referred to the research plan. Has—have you submitted a research plan to—for 

NASA’s work? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is—we are—we will be meeting with 

NASA next week. It required a huge amount of work to get the 

Toyota source code. There is lots of proprietary issues we had to 

overcome. There has been a tremendous amount of documents that 

NASA had to receive in addition to our automotive experts working 

with NASA. 


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So our hope is to have a test plan done fairly soon and hopefully 

we will be submitting, once we get that finalized, we will submit 

it to the Volpe Center for peer review. But we have not finished 

our plan yet. 

Mr. BURGESS. So you will submit this analysis also for evaluation 

by this committee when you have it in hand? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Absolutely. 

Mr. BURGESS. The time limit on the NASA review is for it to be 

completed by the end of August. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is our hope. 

Mr. BURGESS. And we don’t have a plan yet, but we are going 

to get one. Is that correct? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes. You will get that. 

Mr. BURGESS. So what if we get to the end of August and we 

haven’t gotten there? What happens then? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, we have a timeline and a goal to make 

sure that we have results, but, you know, Mr. Burgess, the primary 

objective is to make sure that we get it right. So if it requires— 

there is some issues that may require it take us more time, we will 

update the committee about those issues as they arise, but our 

hope is to be done by the end of the summer. 

Mr. BURGESS. Have you got enough funding to do what you need 

to do, because we, after all, have not done a budget this year. We 

are not going to do any appropriations until late in the year. Are 

you going to be able to pay for the things that you need to do to 

get this information? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We are, at the time we are properly resourced 

right now. If there is any resource issues that confront us in our 

work, we will definitely come back to the Congress and inform 

them. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let the record show that NHTSA is awash in cash 

and needs no more money. I think that is what he just said. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I wouldn’t say that, Mr. Burgess, but thank you 

for the implication. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Burgess. 

Ms. Christensen, any questions? 

Mr. Braley, any further follow-up questions? Mr. Braley. 

Mr. BRALEY. Yes. Administrator Strickland, one of the things I 

am curious about is the work that your agency is doing looking at 

other types of analysis that are being done by manufacturers in 

other parts of the world. Looking into the problem of evaluating 

electronic throttle control systems, are you aware of any of the 

work that is being done by the European manufacturers in terms 

of education and training to analyze potential problems with those 

systems? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Braley, I am not, but I am certain that my 

staff is. I am more than happy to have them come and speak to 

you and your staff and get back to you on the record on any questions regarding the differences on approaches between the European Union or the Japanese or any other manufacturer. 

Mr. BRALEY. Be happy to do that and would also encourage your 

staff as part of its work on the investigation of those specific problems, to look at what is happening with those other manufacturers, 

what lessons they have learned and what their safety record is on 


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the issue of sudden unintended acceleration after those programs 

have been implemented. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Absolutely. 

Mr. BRALEY. One of the other questions I wanted to ask you 

about is throughout this process, Toyota has represented to the 

committee that it retained Exponent to conduct an independent investigation of the underlying causes related to these problems with 

sudden unintended acceleration, and you have been here when we 

have talked about that. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. And they have made similar representations to you. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. Now, the company that they have retained to do 

that analysis, Exponent, do you know much about them and what 

they do? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I am fairly familiar with the company and its 

prior name and the issues that it has worked on over the years. 

Mr. BRALEY. Its prior name being Failure Analysis Associates. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. Are you aware of any instance where Failure Analysis Associates or Exponent has been retained to do an independent analysis on behalf of a consumer who was injured in a defective automobile? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. My recollection of Exponent or Failure Analysis 

probably goes back to 1993. So that is the figure that I have knowledge of. I am not aware of them doing work for an injured consumer or a victim of the product. 

Mr. BRALEY. All right. Thank you. Those are all the questions I 

have. 

Mr. STUPAK. This concludes the questions for this witness. Administrator, thank you. 

For the record I would like to enter into the record the two documents I presented to the Administrator on questions of February 

22, 2010, letter from Chairman Waxman and myself to Secretary 

LaHood and also the memorandum dated May 2, 2007, concerning 

the Smith vehicle that we asked questions of. 

[The letter appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. STUPAK. So without objection they will be entered in the 

record. 

Thank you, and Mr. Strickland, thank you for being here. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Lentz, thanks for being here. You are on our 

second panel. We have James E. Lentz, who is the President and 

chief operating officer of Toyota Motor Sales in U.S.A. Incorporated. 

As you know it is the policy of the subcommittee to take all testimony under oath. Please be advised that you have the right under 

the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do you wish to be represented by counsel? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Ted Hester is behind me. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Mr. Hester is here then, and you may consult 

with him during any time. If he testifies, we will place him under 

oath at the appropriate time. 

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you. 


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Mr. STUPAK. So I would ask you to please rise, raise your right 

hand to take the oath. Do you swear or affirm the testimony you 

are about to give to be the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the 

truth in the matter pending before this committee? 

Mr. LENTZ. I do. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect our witness is under—replied 

in the affirmative, and he is now under oath. Mr. Lentz, if you 

would like to begin with an opening statement, 5 minutes. If you 

have a longer statement, we will be happy to submit it for the 

record. 

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES E. LENTZ, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

OPERATING OFFICER, TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. 

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you, Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me 

here today. My name is Jim Lentz. I am the President and Chief 

Operating Officer of Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. 

I am honored to return here to represent the 30,000 Americans 

who work for Toyota and the many thousands more from our dealerships and suppliers that bring great dedication and spirit to their 

jobs each and every day. 

Three months ago I told this committee that Toyota is committed 

to strengthening our focus on safety and quality assurance and 

communicating effectively with our customers and regulators. In 

subsequent hearings four of my senior colleagues from the U.S. and 

Japan, including our President, Akio Toyoda also pledged to improve Toyota’s response on safety issues. 

Today I would like to update the committee on substantial 

progress we have made in honoring those commitments. We are 

taking major steps to become a more responsive, safety-focused organization. Listening closely to our customers, responding more 

quickly to their concerns, and those of our regulators and taking 

concrete actions to ensure that we are among the industry leaders 

in safety. 

Mr. Toyoda has made improving quality assurance his top priority, and our entire company is mobilized to ensure that Toyota 

vehicles are safe and reliable for our customers, not only when they 

are first sold and leased but as they are on the road for many years 

to come. 

Under Mr. Toyoda’s personal leadership we have undertaken a 

top to bottom review of our quality assurance process in all aspects 

of our global operations. Importantly, Toyota has appointed a new 

chief quality officer for North American, a U.S. executive with more 

than 3 decades of manufacturing expertise to act as the voice of the 

customer in this region. 

North America now has a greater say on recalls and other safetyrelated issues that affect vehicles sold here in the United States. 

In fact, the chief quality officer has a direct line to Mr. Toyoda 

when it comes to ensuring our customers’ safety. 

These changes are having a real impact as reflected in the speed 

and decisiveness of our response last month when Consumer Reports identified a potential software issue with the vehicle stability 

control in the 2010 Lexus GX460. 


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In addition, our SMART evaluation process has significantly improved the speed of our response to the customer reports of unintended acceleration. SMART stands for Swift Market Analysis Response Team, and at its core are 200 highly-trained engineers and 

field technicians who can be deployed anywhere in the U.S. to investigate customer reports of unintended acceleration onsite. 

Under this new evaluation process the company has completed 

more than 600 onsite vehicle inspections. In our dealership technicians have completed an addition 1,400 inspections. These examinations are giving us a better understanding about the reasons for 

unintended acceleration complaints. 

Significantly, none of these investigations have found that our 

electronic control system with intelligence, or ETCSI, was the 

cause. We are now making an extraordinary effort to service our 

recalled vehicles and equip all of our new cars and trucks with 

even more advanced safety technologies, including our star safety 

system, brake override, and improved event data recorders or 

EDRs, that will read both pre- and post-crash data. 

Our dealers have completed nearly 3.5 million recall remedies. 

That is more than 70 percent of the sticky pedal modifications and 

will continue to reach out to the affected owners to make sure that 

they bring their vehicles to their dealer’s attention. We are grateful 

to our customers, for the way that they are standing by Toyota. 

Consistent with our pledge to Congress, we now have 150 EDR 

read-out units in North America and have delivered 10 EDR readers so that they can conduct their own data retrieval from Toyota 

vehicles during their investigations. 

Additionally, Toyota is well on its way to being the first full-line 

manufacturer to feature brake override technology as standard 

equipment on all the vehicles sold in the United States. Brake 

override will be available across our entire product lineup by the 

end of 2010. We are also taking the extraordinary step of retrofitting brake override on seven existing models involved in the recalls as an additional measure of confidence for our customers. 

Toyota remains confident that our ETCSI system is not the cause 

of unintended acceleration. Toyota and Lexus vehicles are inherently designed so that real world, uncommanded acceleration of the 

vehicle cannot occur. We test our vehicles extensively to make sure 

that the fail safes and redundancies work. 

Nonetheless, we are making a major scientific effort to further 

validate the safety of our vehicles by opening up our technology to 

an unprecedented level of independent review by respected safety, 

quality, and engineering experts. The engineering and scientific 

consulting firm, Exponent, has already completed more than 11,000 

hours of testing and the analysis of the ETCSI system, and its comprehensive evaluation is ongoing. 

I have been advised by Secretary Slater that the Quality Advisory Panel he chairs will invite a rigorous peer review of that process as part of its assessment of exponent findings, and it will be 

one of the topics of discussion when the panel meets with Mr. 

Toyoda next week in Japan. 

As Mr. Toyoda told Secretary LaHood, we are pleased to cooperate fully with NHTSA and through NHTSA with the engineers 

from NASA and their independent evaluation of our ETCSI system. 


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We also cooperate with the National Academy of Sciences on 

their evaluation of Toyota and Lexus vehicles as they study the industry-wide issue of automotive safety. 

Members of the committee, at Toyota we are committed to doing 

more than just correcting mistakes from the past. We are learning 

from them, and we are making major steps to avoid them in the 

future. 

I would like to quote the words of Mike Getz, Toyota team member for 22 years in Georgetown, Kentucky, plant. In One Team on 

All Levels, a book which is—means what it is to work at our plant 

in Kentucky, and it is written by the team members of the Georgetown plant, and Mike writes, ‘‘Toyota makes mistakes, but we are 

expected to take ownership to find out why and ensure that we 

learn from them and prevent reoccurrence.’’ And we don’t just say 

that. We actually do that. That has been the Toyota way for 70 

years. 

For the future, by acting swiftly on safety issues whenever they 

arise, we are determined to set a new standard for quality customer care for vehicles on the road. Our goal is to lead the way for 

our industry. 

Thank you very much, and I am happy to answer any of your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lentz follows:] 


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WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF JAMES LENTZ 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER 

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS 

MAY 20,2010 

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

inviting me here today. My name is Jim Lentz, and I am the President and Chief Operating 

Officer of Toyota Motor Sales, USA. 

I am honored to return here to represent the 30,000 Americans who work for Toyota and the 

many thousands more at our dealerships and suppliers who bring great dedication and spirit to 

their jobs each day. 

Three months ago, I told this Committee that Toyota is committed to strengthening our focus on 

safety and quality assurance and communicating effectively with our customers and regulators. 

In subsequent hearings, four of my senior colleagues from the U.S. and Japan - including our 

President Akio Toyoda also pledged to improve Toyota's responsiveness on safety issues. 

Today, I would like to update the Committee on the substantial progress we have made in 

honoring those commitments. We are taking major steps to become a more responsive, safetyfocused organization - listening more closely to our customers, responding more quickly to their 

concerns and those of our regulators, and taking concrete actions to ensure that we are among 

the industry's leaders in safety. 

Quality Assurance is Top Priority 

Mr. Toyoda has made improving quality assurance his top priority, and our entire company has 

mobilized to ensure that Toyota vehicles are safe and reliable for our customers, not only when 

they are first sold or leased, but also when they are on the road. 

Under Mr. Toyoda's personal leadership, we have established a Special Committee for Global 

Quality, which is undertaking a top-to-bottom review of our quality assurance processes in all 

aspects of our global operations including design, manufacturing and after-market support. 

Importantly, Toyota has appointed a new Chief Quality Officer for North America - a U.S. 

executive with more than three decades of manufacturing expertise - to act as the "voice of the 

customer" in this region. North America now has a greater say on recalls and other safetyrelated issues that affect vehicles sold here in the United States. In fact, our Chief Quality 
56 


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Officer, Mr. Steve St. Angelo, has a direct line to Mr. Toyoda when it comes to ensuring our 

customers' safety. 

These changes are having a real impact, as reflected in the speed and decisiveness of our 

response last month when Consumer Reports identified a potential software issue with the 

vehicle stability control system in the 2010 Lexus GX 460. We immediately suspended sales 

and within a week we had replicated the test, developed a software fix, communicated our 

findings to NHTSA and initiated a voluntary recall. 

Aggressively Investigating UA Reports 

Our new SMART evaluation process has significantly increased the speed of our response to 

customer reports of unintended acceleration. SMART stands for "Swift Market Analysis 

Response Team." At its core are 200 highly trained engineers and field technicians who can be 

deployed anywhere in the U.S. to investigate customer reports of unintended acceleration onsite. 

Under this new evaluation process, the company has completed more than 600 on-site vehicle 

inspections and our dealership technicians have completed an additional 1 ,400 inspections. We 

have submitted 701 field technical reports to this Committee, including on-site SMART team 

evaluations. These examinations are giving us a better understanding about the reasons for 

unintended acceleration complaints. Significantly, none ofthese investigations have found that 

our Electronic Throttle Control System with intelligence, or ETCS-i, was the cause. 

As a result of these evaluations, we now understand that we need to improve our 

communication with customers about the features, characteristics and normal functions of our 

vehicles. Issues that have prompted unintended acceleration claims and concems have 

included: 

Vehicles that have not yet received the floor mat entrapment or sticking accelerator 

pedal remedy; 

Cases requiring an explanation of vehicle characteristics where an increase in engine 

speed is nomnal, such as higher engine idle speed after a cold start, a slight increase in 

engine RPM when the air conditioning compressor cycles on, or a slight surge when the 

vehicle accelerates to the set speed once the cruise control is engaged; 

• Concerns or questions about slight differences in the driving experience following a 

driveability programming update while the adaptive memory adjusts to the wear of 

certain components and their current operating characteristics; 

The presence of double or triple-stacked floor mats; 

Dissatisfaction with the feel of the accelerator pedal after the reinforcement bar remedy 

was fitted to address the potential for sticking pedals (in which case a new pedal was 

installed); and 

• In rare cases, vehicles that were not correctly remedied during a recall. 

In cases where no problem with the vehicle was found, Toyota will monitor any complaints of 

the vehicle identification number (VIN) closely so that any future report can be investigated with 

the benefit of the cumulative knowledge of the previous information related to that VIN. 

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Equipping Vehicles with Advanced Safety Features 

We are also making extraordinary efforts to service our recalled vehicles and equip all of our 

new cars and trucks with even more advanced safety technologies, including our Star Safety 

System, brake override and improved event data recorders, or EDRs, that read both pre- and 

post crash data. 

Our dealers have already completed nearly 3.5 million recall remedies. These modifications 

include: 

1.67 million to address the potential for sticking accelerator pedals 

1.62 million to address the potential for floor mat pedal entrapment 

118,000 program updates to the anti-lock brake systems (ABS) in certain 2010 Prius and 

Lexus models. 

To date, more than 70 percent of the sticking pedal modifications have been completed on the 

2.3 million vehicles that have been recalled, for an average of approximately 120,000 remedies 

performed per week. Approximately 30 percent of the floor mat entrapment modifications have 

been completed on the 5.4 million vehicles that were recalled for this issue, and approximately 

80 percent of the ABS program updates have been performed on the 147,500 Prius and Lexus 

models that were recalled. 

We continue to reach out to all affected owners to make sure they bring their vehicles to dealers 

for attention. We are grateful to our dealers for their outstanding commitment to quality service 

and grateful to our customers for the way they are standing by Toyota. 

Consistent with our pledge to Congress, we now have 150 EDR readout units in North America 

and the U.S. territories and are actively training our internal and field staff on their use. We 

have delivered 10 EDR readers to NHTSA so that it can conduct its own data retrieval from 

Toyota vehicles during investigations. 

By the end of 2010, all new Toyota and Lexus vehicles will have EDRs that can record both preand post-crash data. Additionally, Toyota has developed new policies and procedures for 

responding to direct customer requests for EDR readouts and data hand-off to help ensure a 

smoother, more informed process for all parties involved. 

The company plans to provide additional information to customers on how to make these 

requests, as well as on the process itself, on 'the Toyota website in the near future. Toyota is 

also actively developing plans to transition to a commercially available EDR readout device and 

software package, and remains on track to have this in place by September 2011, ahead of the 

2012 federal deadline for automakers regarding EDR data capture and data accessibility. 

And, Toyota is well on the way to being the first full line manufacturer to feature brake override 

technology as standard equipment on all our new models sold in the United States. Brake 

override will be available across our entire product line by the end of 2010. Our hybrids already 

have a braking system that achieves a similar result and we have taken the extraordinary step 

of retrofitting brake override on seven existing models involved in the recalls - some 3.3 million 

vehicles - as an additional measure of confidence for our customers. 

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Validating Safety of ETCS-i 

Toyota remains confident that our electronic throttle control system is not a cause of unintended 

acceleration. Toyota and Lexus vehicles are inherently designed so that a real world 

uncommanded acceleration of the vehicle cannot occur. This is achieved by a redundant 

system design with dual computers and sensors as well as by robust fail safe architecture. We 

test our vehicles extensively to make sure that the fail safes and redundancies work. Indeed, 

Toyota's ETCS-i has been subjected to comprehensive testing over more than a decade without 

a Single unintended acceleration event. Toyota has never discovered or been provided with any 

evidence that the ETCS-i can cause unintended acceleration in a real world scenario. 

Nonetheless, we are making a major scientific effort to further validate the safety of our vehicles 

by opening up our technology to an unprecedented level of independent review by respected 

safety, quality and engineering experts, including our new North America Quality Advisory Panel 

headed by former Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater. The Panel will work closely with 

Toyota's leadership team and the new North American Quality Task Force, headed by our Chief 

Quality Officer for North America, and will have unfettered access to information concerning 

Toyota's quality and safety procedures. Its members are: 

Rodney E. Slater, former U.S. Secretary of Transportation; 

Norman Augustine, former chairman and CEO, Lockheed Martin Corporation; 

Patricia Goldman, former Vice-Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board; 

• Mary Good, Dean of Engineering and Information Technology, University of Arkansas at 

Little Rock, and former President, American Association for the Advancement of Science 

(MAS); 

• Roger Martin, Dean, Rotman School of Management; 

• Brian O'Neill, former President, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety; and 

• Sheila Widnall, Professor, MIT and former Secretary of the U.S. Air Force. 

The engineering and scientific consulting firm Exponent has already completed more than 

11,000 hours of testing and analysis of our ETCS-i and its comprehensive evaluation is 

ongoing. Engineers from Exponent have on several occasions in the past assisted the federal 

government itself in a wide variety of complex and high profile engineering evaluations. 

Earlier this week, Steve St. Angelo, our Chief Quality Officer for North America, assumed the 

role of the senior Toyota executive responsible for the Exponent relationship. Mr. St. Angelo 

stated in his letter to Subbaiah Malladi, Exponent's Chief Technical Officer: "As is already the 

case, Toyota will not limit the scope or budget of Exponent's evaluation. Toyota remains 

committed to the proposition that Exponent be allowed to conduct its own independent analysis 

of the ETCS-i. I will do my best to make sure you continue to have unfettered access to the 

information and resources that Exponent's scientists and engineers require from the company." 

Mr. St. Angelo further reaffirmed in his letter that Toyota intends to publish Exponent's findings 

irrespective of Exponent's conclusions. In addition, I have been advised by Secretary Slater 

that the Quality Advisory Panel he chairs will be initiating a rigorous peer review process as part 

of its assessment of Exponent's findings. 

A copy of Mr. St. Angelo's letter to Exponent is attached. Also attached is a DRAFT Interim 

Status of Exponent's Investigation of Toyota ETCS-i Vehicle Hardware and Software. 

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As Mr. Toyoda has told Secretary LaHood, we are pleased to cooperate fully with NHTSA and 

through NHTSA with engineers from NASA in their independent evaluations of our ETCS-i. We 

will also cooperate with the National Academy of Sciences on its evaluation of Toyota and 

Lexus vehicles and on its industry-wide study of automotive safety. 

Setting New Standard for Quality Customer Care 

Members of the Committee; at Toyota, we are committed to doing more than just correcting the 

mistakes of the past We are learning from them and taking major steps to avoid them in the 

future. 

I would like to quote the words of Mike Goetz, a Toyota team member of 22 years standing at 

our Georgetown, Kentucky plant In "One Team On All LevelS," a book about what it means to 

work for Toyota written by Georgetown team members, Mike writes: "Toyota makes mistakes 

but we are expected to ... take ownership to find out 'why' and ensure we learn from them and 

prevent reoccurrence. We don't just say that, we do it" 

That has been the Toyota Way for 70 years. For the future, by acting swiftly on safety issues 

whenever they arise, we are determined to set a new standard for quality customer care for 

vehicles on the road. Our goal is to lead the way for our industry. 

Thank you and I am happy to answer your questions. 

### 

5 
60 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Lentz, and thank you, again, for 

being here. 

Let me start, I asked Mr. Strickland, but let me ask you this 

question. Last time you were here in February you testified that 

the mats and the sticky pedal accounted for about 16 percent of the 

sudden unintended accelerations, and that is 84 percent of them we 

cannot—we have no answer for. 

Are we any closer to finding out what about those other 84 percent of the sudden unintended acceleration? What is the cause of 

it? 

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I think part of it is it depends on the database 

that you are looking at. In the case of NHTSA’s database it is 

lumped together as speed control. So it includes not only events of 

sudden unintended acceleration, but it includes any other type of 

surge or hesitation event. So when we spoke last, I am confident 

of three things. 

I am confident that the sticky pedal is being repaired. We are already almost 70 percent repaired. 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. 

Mr. LENTZ. I am confident that we are going to be under control 

on the mats. I am confident that ETCSI—— 

Mr. STUPAK. But even if you do 100 percent mats, 100 percent 

sticky pedal, we still have 84 percent of—and these are numbers 

we used last time. Here is our 2,262 sudden acceleration reports 

since 1999. Eight-hundred and 15 crashes, 341 injuries, 19 deaths 

in the United States. 

So the 84 percent was from the 2262. So that means 84 percent 

of them, even if you did 100 percent mats, even if you did 100 percent sticky pedal, we still have 84 percent we don’t have an answer 

for. You tell us you have 11,000 hours that Exponent has done. 

What did they conclude? What did those tests show? We have no 

reports. They won’t give us any reports. 

So what did the 11,000 hours of testing, what was it about? 

What was done? Was it on the computer, was it on the microprocessors? We don’t know because Exponent won’t provide us any 

information. 

Mr. LENTZ. Well, a couple different questions in there. 

Mr. STUPAK. A lot of questions there. 

Mr. LENTZ. There are a lot of questions in there. First off, in 

terms of surges and hesitations, the possibility of pedal misapplication, even though we are going to do these two mechanical 

fixes, those are still going to exist, and they still can be reported 

to NHTSA as speed control because it is such a broad category. 

That is part of that 84 percent number that is in that number. 

In terms of Exponent and the scope of their work, they provided 

the committee back, I believe, around the time that I testified. 

Mr. STUPAK. An interim report. That is all we received. 

Mr. LENTZ. From very, very preliminary—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. 

Mr. LENTZ [continuing]. On a small portion of what they are testing. I believe yesterday they provided a second report to you all 

with more information, but they are testing not only vehicle electronics, they are testing EMI, they are testing everything that 

could possibly create unintended acceleration. 


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Mr. STUPAK. I guess I would agree with you, but you come and 

say we are doing everything, and Exponent has this open-ended 

ability to do what needs to be done. You testified there is 11,000 

hours, and what Exponent says and all we have this February. It 

says, ‘‘It is important to know that at this stage of our work we 

neither claimed to have looked at all issues, nor have opined on the 

cause of the incidents of unintended acceleration that have been reported.’’ 

We agree that further work needs to be performed before we 

reach such opinions and further work is underway, and when we 

asked, we received no reports. They just said, well, work is underway. Is all this in some engineers’ or scientists’ head? No one 

writes down what they are doing for 11,000 hours? How would you 

even pay them? I mean, we have their payment schedule, $485 for 

this person or that person. How in the heck do you know if you are 

getting anything for your money? 

Mr. LENTZ. Well, you know, I am convinced that in the end when 

we see the final report, and it is going to be made public, it would 

be peer reviewed, and Secretary Slater is also going to review what 

is taking place. I am confident that with what they are doing we 

will see a very independent report, number one. 

Number two—— 

Mr. STUPAK. When are we going to see a final report? 

Mr. LENTZ. I don’t have an exact date. We are—— 

Mr. STUPAK. We are holding NASA to the end of the August. Can 

we have Exponent’s final report by the end of the August? 

Mr. LENTZ. I don’t think that they have committed to me a given 

date, but I will tell you this. That in the case of Exponent you are 

right. I have listened to the comments in the past, that they were 

reporting through product liability attorneys. That changed this 

week. Steve St. Angelo, as we continued to expand the quality officer’s job in North America, Steve St. Angelo, Exponent is now reporting to Steve St. Angelo, and all of their work will report 

through Steve St. Angelo. And I know we have a conference call 

next week as we do every week with the Quality Task Force, and 

I am sure Steve, being from—he is from the manufacturing, engineering side, he is going to demand that we have a work process 

with Exponent going forward, and as soon as we have that, you 

will have that. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Your counsel has sort of indicated that the Exponent contract did not change at all, so is this going to be a new 

change that is bringing about, or is it going to be reduced to writing about who they are going to report to and how they are going 

to get this to your safety—— 

Mr. LENTZ. A letter has already gone to Zabia at Exponent from 

Steve St. Angelo. 

Mr. STUPAK. When you get a chance, would you get it to the committee if you don’t mind? Can we just see the document? 

Mr. LENTZ. It was submitted with our written statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. All right. Now, let me ask you this one last 

question. My time is up. Is there going to be a recall tomorrow on 

these Lexus LS vehicles? 

Mr. LENTZ. I don’t know for certain the timing. 


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Mr. STUPAK. OK, but there is going to be a recall on some of 

these vehicles—— 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK [continuing]. On a steering problem. Correct? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, and it is because of the experience in Japan. The 

steering component that creates this is standard in Japan on all 

LS’s. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right, and then that is a computer-driven steering 

issue? 

Mr. LENTZ. It is computer driven. 

Mr. STUPAK. Have you had any complaints here in this country 

about the steering on these? 

Mr. LENTZ. We have not had any complaints but now that Japan 

has had the issue, we are combing through our files to see if there 

is anything. It is on roughly 50 percent of the LS’s in the United 

States. It is not standard on all vehicles in the U.S.—— 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. 

Mr. LENTZ [continuing]. Like it is in Japan. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, 3,800 vehicles here in the United States I 

think it is. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. About—I think 24, 2,500 that have been sold, 

and about 1,400 that are either in dealer stock, core stock, or on 

their way to us that could be impacted. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Mr. Burgess for questions, please. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lentz, thank you 

for being with us again this afternoon. 

Chairman Stupak’s opening statement made a lot of reference to 

polling. He didn’t have any questions on it. I am not sure that I 

do, but would you care to respond to some of the things that—some 

of the statements that were made in the opening statement by the 

chairman of the subcommittee? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. We have the polling company of—I don’t recall 

their name right now, but they have done polls for us for about 3 

years. 

Mr. BURGESS. Benenson Strategy Group? 

Mr. LENTZ. That is—yes. I am sorry. They have done polls for us 

for about the last 3 years. They have probably done at least 2 

dozen polls in the past. The poll that is in question was done soon 

after my testimony. It was done soon after the ABC expose ́ ran 

about unintended acceleration, and there were questions within 

that that asked questions about Dr. Gilbert and about Shawn Kane 

and about ABC. There were a lot of other questions of the things 

that we are measuring as well, but, yes, we did do research polling 

about the work done by Dr. Gilbert. 

Mr. BURGESS. Can you, if it is not proprietary, can you give us 

an idea of the sample size? 

Mr. LENTZ. I believe it was around 1,000. I may not be exact. We 

will find it was 980 or 990. 

Mr. BURGESS. But, of course, you would have no reason to publicly state the fact that you are doing a poll. Typically a company 

would not publicize that it is polling because that might influence 

the results of the poll. Is that correct? 

Mr. LENTZ. Correct. 


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Mr. BURGESS. Now, have you—you did this in response to the 

ABC news piece. Have—is it unusual for your company to do polling-related—do other issues of the day that may relate to your particular industry? 

Mr. LENTZ. Well, I think it is, but I think the ABC news piece 

was very unusual as well. I mean, it was a clear attack on the reputation of the company, and it really caste out about electronic 

throttle control systems. So we felt it was very, very important to 

our customers, to our dealers. 

Mr. BURGESS. But, sir, if you didn’t make it public, then it was 

obviously in your best interest not to go public with that information. Well, who did? 

Mr. LENTZ. Made which public? 

Mr. BURGESS. The poll on the ABC news hit piece, ABC news 

piece. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. I don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. BURGESS. But you did not. Your company did not. 

Mr. LENTZ. Not to my knowledge. No. 

Mr. BURGESS. So it was leaked to a usually-reliable source 

and—— 

Mr. LENTZ. It could possibly be. I don’t know. I mean, at the time 

that we were using that—doing that polling, we didn’t know how 

much damage that ABC report had done to our reputation, and we 

were contemplating whether or not we would have to do newspaper 

advertising to try to explain our side, and quite frankly, the results 

of the polling indicated that the consumers really didn’t know 

much about what they had said, and quite frankly, didn’t care a 

lot about it. 

So we didn’t end up doing anything about it. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, you have had your engineering firm, Exponent, to review and try to replicate the conditions that Professor 

Gilbert outlined—— 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. To us here on the committee. Was 

that the decision made before you commissioned the poll from the 

Benenson Strategy Group? 

Mr. LENTZ. That actually took place the evening before my testimony. So when we found out that ABC was running that, Exponent 

worked that night to see how many other vehicles they could replicate. So that would have been before the polling. 

Mr. BURGESS. Did you run any ads based on the information you 

received, retrieved from the polling data? 

Mr. LENTZ. Not that I know of. I mean, there have—some of our 

advertising in terms of in America has been run based on some of 

that polling information, but to my understanding with regard to 

Gilbert and Kane I don’t believe we have run anything on that. 

Mr. BURGESS. On the—we have had some talk about the brake 

overrides and fixes for the sudden unintended acceleration. Last 

fall your company announced that it will be installing brake override on certain models. Will this cover all models of Toyotas that 

have been the subject of sudden unintended acceleration? Going 

back and retroactively installing the brake override system? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Not on every single vehicle. The first cut to decide where we would put those were really on all vehicles that had 


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the pushbutton start, stop. So Camry is an example. Some models 

do. We put it across the entire Camry line. Same with IS, same 

with ES, same with, I believe, Avalon. 

We then took a second cut and took a look at based on NHTSA’s 

data of high incidence of sudden acceleration, what other vehicles 

might we add to that for additional consumer confidence. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, why wouldn’t you just add it to all models 

for consumer confidence? 

Mr. LENTZ. Well, it is an additional eight million vehicles. In 

some cases some of those models when you look at the NHTSA 

database, actually has a much less-than-average incident rate of 

sudden acceleration. It is not the same across all vehicles on the 

Toyota or Lexus side. 

And I think part of it is the tremendous amount of engineering 

resource and time that it takes to do that. 

Mr. BURGESS. You are trying to rebuild consumer confidence 

after a very damaging—— 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BURGESS [continuing]. Series of events the past eight months 

that does seem like it would make sense if that is the way to repair 

consumer confidence, add the feature and then none of the rest of 

us have to worry. 

Will that brake override system prevent every and all instance 

and type of sudden unintended acceleration? 

Mr. LENTZ. It only works if you step on the brake. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. Let me ask you this if I could. You have been 

very indulgent. I just want to say at least in my part of the world 

that your dealerships have done an excellent job opening early, 

staying late. I have had multiple, anecdotal experiences from people, my own experience with your dealership in Lewisville. I think 

they have done very well by your company in what was a pretty 

tough time. They stepped up, met the challenge, and have taken 

it—have met it head on. So a lot of it is to your dealers in the 

North Texas area. They are doing a great job. 

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you. They are tremendous partners of ours, 

and they understand the value of taking care of customers. So 

thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Waxman for questions, 

please. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lentz. I am 

still confused, because as I hear what you are saying, Exponent is 

continuing to do research for you, but they are not going to do it 

for the trial lawyers, they are going to do it for one of your corporate executives. This will be—— 

Mr. LENTZ. I don’t think they are necessarily exclusive. I think 

as it has evolved—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. So they are still doing research? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And you have told them to do a comprehensive 

evaluation, spare no budget? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Do everything that needs to be done. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Have they completed their research? 


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Mr. LENTZ. No. 

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. Now, when you were here last, they had done 

an interim report. That is all we had at that point. That interim 

report didn’t tell us much, yet you and—not as much you but others from Toyota assured the American people that it is not the— 

that the whole electronic system that it could possibly be the cause 

of sudden acceleration. 

How could you be so sure about that? 

Mr. LENTZ. The only way that we can be sure, and I am more 

confident today than I was in the past, is that we know that we 

do a lot of work and a lot of research before we put the vehicles 

on the road, and I know I will have additional questions on that. 

As well, today as these SMART teams are going out and investigating these—we have had 600—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. But we were told that you were relying on Exponent’s research and their conclusions, but you weren’t relying on 

their conclusions because they hadn’t finished their report. They 

still haven’t finished that report. 

Mr. LENTZ. No. They still haven’t finished, but they are—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. So you are relying on what you were told about the 

work that was being done in Japan before the products were put 

into mass production. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, and let me—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. And I raised some concerns about that in my opening statement, but let us go back to explain it because it has been 

held out to us that Exponent has put this issue to rest. That is why 

Exponent’s doing this work. 

And I just can’t understand why you are so absolutely certain, 

you say you are even more certain now than you were then. 

But still you haven’t had an Exponent’s report. You are going to 

have a peer review. Why are you bothering to do all that if you are 

absolutely convinced based on the other work that you are doing? 

Mr. LENTZ. Because we want to ensure that the public and our 

customers, that they have the confidence, that this has been reviewed independently, scientifically, peer reviewed, even having 

Secretary Slater review the process. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Hold on a second. Former Secretary Slater. 

Mr. LENTZ. Former. Yes. I am sorry. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, we heard from the head of NHTSA, Mr. 

Strickland, and he doesn’t feel that he can rely on what he knows 

of Exponent’s work. Exponent seems to be working for the lawyers. 

He says it is not mutually exclusive for doing work for your corporations, but everything that they have shown us by way of documents gives us no sense that they have come to any conclusions. 

In fact, we have no sense they are even looking at this issue because they haven’t even had it on the list of things that they were 

evaluating. 

If Exponent is doing the job you describe in your testimony, providing a comprehensive assessment, it presumably would be undertaking a complicated, multi-disciplinary investigation involving numerous rounds of testing and analysis, but Dr. Sori told our staff 

that at any given time that ten to 25 people could be working on 

the Toyota project, and there is no written communication among 

these people. There is nothing by way of any written notes. 


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Science is what we need to have evaluated, so I just raise that 

issue. I still am not satisfied because you are now relying on something other than Exponent to give you that certainty. 

I want to ask you a different question before my time is up, and 

that is this question of the brake override. Why are you doing a 

brake override? What is the purpose of it? 

Mr. LENTZ. It is to help with added consumer confidence in our 

products. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Is it for safety? 

Mr. LENTZ. I think for some people it could be safety. I can’t 

speak for all the consumers to say that 100 percent of the consumers will see that as safety. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, not how they see it. I don’t care how they see 

it. Is it going to make the car safer? 

Mr. LENTZ. There are other redundancies within a car today that 

will make that car stop. Today, even at full throttle, full brake 

pressure will stop a car. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And you don’t think there is any safety need for 

it? 

Mr. LENTZ. I believe there is. Otherwise we wouldn’t be putting 

it on future models, but it does add consumer confidence. I can’t 

tell you every consumer—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. No. It seems to me you are saying something different here. You are saying it will make people feel better. That is 

consumer confidence. But are you willing to say that it is going to 

make the cars safer? 

Mr. LENTZ. I can’t say 100 percent that it necessarily makes cars 

safer. It is—they are different. It is just like cars—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me—they said it costs around $50 to do this, 

but you are not doing it for all your cars. You are not going back. 

You are retrofitting some of the cars but not others. Why have you 

made that decision? Don’t you feel that those who are driving lessexpensive Toyotas would sense that they have a brake override 

that is going to protect them? 

Mr. LENTZ. It is not a question of what people pay for their cars. 

We started, as I mentioned before, we started with the four vehicles that had pushbutton start. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Are you going to get to the other vehicles? 

Mr. LENTZ. We then went to an additional three models that 

were high on the overall NHTSA complaint list. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Are you going to get to all the other vehicles? 

Mr. LENTZ. We are not—we will not get to all the other vehicles 

going back. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you have a brake override in your car? 

Mr. LENTZ. I drive a hybrid that has the equivalent of it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And why shouldn’t—— 

Mr. LENTZ. My son does not in his, and I don’t feel—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. What? 

Mr. LENTZ. My son does not have brake override in his vehicle, 

and I do not feel that he is not safe. 

Mr. WAXMAN. OK, but what if I as a Toyota owner wanted to spend $50 and get that in my car? 

Mr. LENTZ. If it hasn’t been developed, it is a totally new software. If it is not developed, it is not developed. 


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Mr. WAXMAN. Well, it is developed enough that you are putting 

it in most of the Toyotas. 

Mr. LENTZ. It is unique to each and every vehicle. 

Mr. WAXMAN. But you are going to put it on future Toyotas. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Each and every vehicle for Toyota in the future. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, but it is unique—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. And you are retrofitting it for some of them but 

not all of them. 

Mr. LENTZ [continuing]. To each and every vehicle going backwards. The amount of time that it would take to be able to do it 

is just not—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Lentz, with all due respect, what I hear you 

saying is you want people to feel good so you tell them Exponent 

has said that it is not the electronics. They should be assured, and 

I don’t believe you can say that. That was the past testimony. You 

are saying people ought to feel good about the brake override, but 

you are not willing to say that that is really for safety. 

I don’t see that you are giving us assurances on safety. It seems 

to me you are working around attitudes. That attitude you want 

to develop is people should feel good about Toyota. I want people 

to feel good about their safety. 

Mr. LENTZ. I understand, but understand, it is an extraordinary 

effort. I don’t know of another manufacturer that has gone back to 

retrofit vehicles with any type of safety like this. 

So even to do three million going back on these seven models, is 

an extraordinary effort for any manufacturer to do and—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. My time—I didn’t want to interrupt you if you are 

finished. 

Mr. LENTZ. No. That is fine. Thank you. 

Mr. WAXMAN. My time has more than expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for letting me go over, but as you can tell I am still not 

satisfied. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. Christensen for questions, please. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lentz, in the 

prior hearing it seemed and I sort of asked a question related to 

this before, all the major decisions are being made in Japan. Toyota, Japan, and there seems to be a disconnect between what was 

happening with Toyota-made cars in different parts of the world. 

No communication for example. What was happening in Europe 

with Toyota? You and Toyota U.S. for example. 

How would having a special committee on global quality and a 

chief quality officer have made a difference if those offices existed 

back then? 

Mr. LENTZ. The biggest difference is not only that we have a 

global quality officer, but we have an individual who is responsible 

for recalls now in the United States. The world has been divided 

up now into I believe it is six different regions. So Europe has a 

representative, China has a representative, the U.S. has a representative. They will share in all the information and all the data 

that is going on on a global basis. 

So if there was—— 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. That didn’t happen before? 


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Mr. LENTZ. That did not happen before. The decisions were made 

in Japan and communicated to us. Now that information will be 

visible to this individual, and this individual will work with one 

other person in Japan to make that decision whether or not that 

there is a recall or not. If he is not satisfied, Steve St. Angelo has 

the ability to go directly to Akio Toyoda and discuss the situation. 

So not only do we have input now, but we can go all the way to 

the President of the company if we are not satisfied with what the 

decision is. 

So that is very, very different than before. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And you have the North American Quality 

Advisory Panel. They are appointed and paid by Toyota? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. Mr. Slater was initially suggested by Toyota, 

and he basically handpicked the rest of the representatives on that 

committee. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. So, I mean, other than relying on the high 

respect that we have for the stewardship and the integrity of Rodney Slater, who may not always be, I mean, for any number of reasons he could leave, how do we ensure that there is adequate independence in this advisory panel? 

Mr. LENTZ. You know, I think you have to look at the results of 

what happens over the next few years. We are very confident 

that—and not only Mr. Slater but the additional members of his 

panel. I believe they have already spent time with our people. They 

have already spent time with Exponent, and they seem to be very, 

very independent, very upfront and are asking tremendous questions, and I think the yare going to add tremendous value to our 

overall organization. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. And my last question, the initiatives such as 

SMART, are they happening in the territories as well as in the 

states? We have a big Toyota market in the Virgin Islands. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. I can’t tell you specifically in the Virgin Islands. 

Our SMART team has not been requested to go, but after your 

comments today, I am going to make sure that Japan understands 

if they need technical expertise, we will give them that assistance. 

I know on the engineering side from the team aside, that they do 

cover the Caribbean. Our SMART team does not outside of Puerto 

Rico, which is under TMS control. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. OK. Well—— 

Mr. LENTZ. We will—— 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN [continuing]. Puerto Rico covers the U.S. Virgin Islands. 

Mr. LENTZ. OK. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley for questions. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you. Mr. Lentz, welcome back. 

Mr. LENTZ. Thank you. 

Mr. BRALEY. I want to explore in a little more detail Toyota’s relationship with Exponent. When you appeared before the subcommittee on February 23 of 2010, you submitted a written statement. Do you remember that? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. And on page two of your written statement you 

said, ‘‘We asked Exponent in December, a world-class engineering 


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and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a comprehensive, independent analysis of our electronic throttle control system with an 

unlimited budget.’’ Do you recall making that statement? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. And at the conclusion of that hearing I requested 

a copy of any documents that would verify the nature of the relationship between Toyota and Exponent, and in response to that request we received from your attorneys, King & Spaulding, a copy 

of a document listed as attachment A, which we will put up on the 

screen and which you have in front of you, and this is an agreement dated December 7, 2009, between Joel Smith at Bowman & 

Brooke Law Firm in Columbia, South Carolina, with Exponent. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. And under the term subject, it says Toyota class actions. Do you see that? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. You know what a class action is. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. It is a group of claims against a manufacturer that 

have been accumulated for the purpose of pursuing relief. Did I 

state that correctly? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. And then in the first paragraph it says, ‘‘Dear Joel,’’ 

and then it outlines the scope of services under the agreement. It 

says, ‘‘Our scope of services is anticipated to include engineering 

consulting services related to class actions filed against Toyota.’’ 

Do you see that? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. And you would agree that class actions filed against 

Toyota are separate and distinct from an independent analysis of 

what is causing this problem. 

Mr. LENTZ. I understand that, but I can tell you that—— 

Mr. BRALEY. Well, let me just go on then to the rest of this letter. 

Down in paragraph three it says, and this is an agreement between 

Bowman & Brooke, a law firm in California, and Exponent. It says, 

‘‘It is our understanding that Exponent’s retention on this project 

is solely with your organization,’’ and the organization that Exponent is referring to is the law firm of Bowman & Brooke. You 

would agree with that. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. And it says, all charges incurred by Exponent on 

this project, and that is the Toyota class action project, will be the 

responsibility of Bowman & Brooke, independent of other parties 

involved. Do you see that? 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. So it is clear that when Exponent was first retained 

they entered into an agreement with a law firm in South Carolina, 

not with Toyota directly, and the subject of that agreement was to 

investigate class action claims against Toyota. 

Mr. LENTZ. I understand. 

Mr. BRALEY. Correct? And we heard from Administrator Strickland, he put this in perspective when he said there is preparation 

for litigation and there is scientific analysis consisting of a detailed 


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analysis of the cause of a problem and eliminating it. You would 

agree. There is a distinction. 

Mr. LENTZ. I don’t know that for certain. 

Mr. BRALEY. Well, let us look at it, because we also received an 

attachment D, a summary of what Exponent had been paid by Toyota over the years, and it says that between 2000, and 2009, Toyota 

paid Exponent about $11 million for consulting services and during 

the period between 2004, and 2009, it was $9.1 million, and there 

is a statement here, ‘‘Exponent believes the result of the search 

provides a reasonable estimate of the gross revenues from Toyota,’’ 

but they note that if that agreement does not specifically refer to 

Toyota by name, it may not show up in those revenues. 

So it is clear that Toyota in that decade had paid a substantial 

amount of money to Exponent, and my question for you is how can 

you claim that Exponent was retained by Toyota to conduct an 

independent investigation when this agreement we have been provided with makes it clear that they were retained by your defense 

law firm, and it was for contested litigation which is in no way considered an independent analysis. 

That is how the relationship began. But as this has evolved, well, 

as of this week, before you came here, you testified that they were 

reporting through product liability attorneys, and that changed this 

week. 

Mr. LENTZ. Correct. Correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. And then the other thing I want to point out is we 

also asked questions from Toyota and received responses, and I 

want those put up on the screen, question and request number 15, 

it says, ‘‘The overall amount that Exponent has billed for work-related to Toyota since exponent was retained by Bowman & Brooke 

on December 7, 2009, the answer the committee received was Exponent has billed $3,330,552.36. 

So you indicated in your written statement today that Exponent 

has already completed more than 11,000 hours of testing and analysis. That means that at 11,000 hours that they are billing about 

302 an hour for this, in the incredible amount of work that they 

have done on this project. 

Mr. LENTZ. I don’t know. I don’t know what the specific contract 

is. All I can say I understand the perception that this is not a very 

transparent process. 

Mr. BRALEY. But you also provided us in your written statement 

today with this letter to Mr. Sobi—— 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY [continuing]. Who you have indicated will be communicating directly with Mr. St. Angelo—— 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY [continuing]. And when Toyota’s counsel talked to 

committee staff yesterday, they said that the letter to Exponent 

that you provided with your attachment does not change Exponent’s contractual relationship with Bowman & Brooke. 

Mr. LENTZ. Not yet. 

Mr. BRALEY. Is it your understanding that it will? 

Mr. LENTZ. I do not know that for a fact. 

Mr. BRALEY. Will you commit to the committee today that if it 

does, you will provide us with any documents that change the conVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:21 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076581 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A581.XXX A581

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tractual relationship between Exponent and Bowman & Brooke or 

Toyota and any of its various entities related to the project that we 

have been talking about during these two hearings? 

Mr. LENTZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. BRALEY. I see my time has expired. I will yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Braley. 

We wanted to go another round of questions, but we have got 

four votes on the floor plus a committee markup on the bill, on the 

NHTSA bill that takes place at 2:00, and the members can’t be at 

two places, so we are going to have to cut it short. 

Mr. Lentz, before I go, though, I did want to get into questions 

about the polling, but I can do that in writing, and I will follow 

these up, but last time you were here in February I asked you 

about—and a lot of discussion about the event data recorders. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. We received no information yet on anything from 

the event data recorder, other than you provided some, but I had 

asked, Mr. Rush has asked, and others had asked specifically about 

the November 27, 2009, accident involving the 2010, Camry in Auburn, New York. I asked about December 26, 2009, accident in 

South Lake, Texas, involving a 2008, Toyota Avalon. I asked about 

the Jeff Pepsky of Minnesota, 2007, Lexus ES350, about their black 

box recorder. 

I also asked and questioned you on the February 20, 2010, Washington Post article on the Camrys in 2005. In fact, Camrys, three 

fatal accidents in the course of the 2005, Camry is not subject to 

any sudden unintended acceleration, even those three fatal accidents here did. 

We were looking for the information on the black box recorders. 

I will follow it up in writing, but that and then other questions I 

have. 

Mr. LENTZ. I apologize that we haven’t submitted that to you. I 

can tell you that the black box recorders, we lived up to the commitment that we made that we will—we have 150 of the devices, 

the data retrieval devices in the marketplace. I can also tell you 

that—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct, but we want to know what they say. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, but I can also tell you that they will be made 

commercially available by probably about September of 2011, to 

make it much more readily available for police across the United 

States. 

Mr. STUPAK. And consumers, I hope. 

Mr. LENTZ. Yes, and consumers will have access. 

Mr. STUPAK. Because they will be part of the bill today. 

Mr. LENTZ. To their data. 

Mr. STUPAK. So—but we will follow those up. 

Mr. Braley, quickly because we are going to run out of time. 

Mr. BRALEY. Yes. Before you close this hearing I would just ask 

that the response from King & Spaulding that we received with all 

of the relevant attachments and the email that we had up on the 

screen dated Wednesday, May 19, with the answers to questions 

number 15 and 16, be included as part of—— 


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Mr. STUPAK. I would have no problem as long as we had some 

redactions on some of the names. That would be the only thing I 

would have to insist upon. Other than that I have no objection. 

Do you have any objection as long as you redact the names? 

Mr. BRALEY. I just—I have a question for the Chairman why we 

would redact names that have been provided in response to an official request. 

Mr. STUPAK. Because we have—that has been our policy in the 

past if they are not subject to—if the names of those individuals, 

those engineers by Exponent, their names don’t need to be in the 

public record. 

Mr. BRALEY. Then the only exception I would request then, Mr. 

Chairman, is there are people, Mr. Sobi is listed as the very first 

person in that answer. Since he has been the subject of the discussion at the hearing and there is no question based on the letter 

that he—that the—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. 

Mr. BRALEY [continuing]. Witness has provided that his name be 

left and not—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct. OK. Without objection. So be it included 

with redactions of the professional engineers who were not subject 

to or signed that letter. 

[The information was unavailable at the time of printing.] 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. That concludes all—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, just one observation since everyone 

else has gone over. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. 

Mr. BURGESS. We are going to—well, you are going to a markup 

at Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection. I am no longer on 

that subcommittee, but you are going to mark up legislation, and 

we haven’t finished our work here that is supposed to inform the 

legislation that is being marked up this afternoon. 

I mean, there are huge discrepancies and huge holes that need 

to be filled with—they need to get this done so—— 

Mr. STUPAK. The legislation we are marking up does not just include the subject of this hearing, Toyota. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, I would—— 

Mr. STUPAK. There are also others. There have also been hearings on the legislation that witnesses have testified. I know you are 

not on the subcommittee but reports come—— 

Mr. BURGESS. But do we—reclaiming my time, we do this time 

and time again. 

Mr. STUPAK. You don’t have any time. 

Mr. BURGESS. We did it with clean water, we—now we are doing 

it with this bill this afternoon. It just seems like the committee 

should take things in a methodical way and not be doing these 

things in a haphazard arrangement that seems to be so prevalent 

right now in the committee. 

Mr. STUPAK. We—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you for your indulgence. I will yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. You will have a chance to voice those objections 

when it comes to the full committee, because as you know, when 

it goes for the subcommittee level, it must come to the full comVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:21 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076581 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A581.XXX A581

tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with HEARING
73 

mittee before we have a markup at full committee level. So you will 

have a chance to participate then. 

Well, that concludes all questioning. I want to thank all of our 

witnesses for coming today and for your testimony. The committee 

rules provide members have 10 days to submit additional questions 

for the record. 

I ask unanimous consent that the contents of the document binder be entered in the record provided, that the committee staff may 

redact any information as business proprietary, relates to privacy 

concerns or law enforcement sensitive. 

Without objection, the documents will be entered into the record. 

Before I close this hearing, let me acknowledge two key staff persons. Anne Tindall of the Democratic staff and Karen Christian of 

the Republican staff. Both these women are expecting a child very 

soon. We appreciate the work they put in on this hearing and previous hearings for this committee and our subcommittee. We wish 

them well in the coming days and weeks ahead as they transition 

from work exhaustion to childbirth exhaustion. 

That will conclude our hearing. The meeting of this subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 


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HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA 

CHAIRMAN 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

C!tongtt~~ of tbc Wnitcb $tate~ 

~ou5e of .!\epre5tntatibt5 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 

(202) 225-2927 

(202)225-3641 

February 22, 2010 

The Honorable Ray LaHood 

Secretary 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, 9th Floor 

Washington, DC 20590 

Dear Secretary LaHood: 

JOE BARTON, TEXAS 

RANKING MEMBER 

In response to the Conunittee's requests, the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) has provided thousaods of pages of internal agency documents. 

Conunittee staff also met with NHTSA officials on Jaouary 27 aod February 18,2010. 

We thank you for this cooperation. 

Our preliminary review of the documents aod the information learned from the 

meetings with NHTSA officials raises two significaot concerns. First, NHTSA appears 

to lack the expertise needed to evaluate defects in vehicle electronic controls. In recent 

years, vehicles have made increasing use of sophisticated electronic controls. According 

to some accounts, autos now contain more computer code thao some fighter jets, nearing 

100 million lines of code. Yet, NHTSA officials told the Conunittee staff that the agency 

does not employ aoy electrical engineers or software engineers. As a result, NHTSA 

appears to lack the technical expertise necessary to analyze whether incidents of sudden 

unintended acceleration are caused by defects in the cars' electronic systems. 

Second, NHTSA's response to complaints of sudden unintended acceleration in 

Toyota vehicles appears to have been seriously deficient. Since 2000, NHTSA has 

received 2,600 complaints of sudden unintended acceleration, as well as six defect 

petitions requesting investigations, Despite these warnings, NHTSA conducted only one 

cursory investigation in 2004 into the possibility that defects in electronic controls could 

be responsible for these incidents. This investigation was led by Scott Yon, who 

infonned Toyota in ao e-mail that he was "not very knowledgeable" about the electronic 

throttle control system used in Toyota vehicles. This investigation was marred by highly 
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The Honorable Ray LaHood 

February 22, 2010 

Page 2 

questionable assumptions and was closed after the agency failed to identify a defect 

trend. 

These concerns are explained in more detail below. We expect that members of 

the Subcommittee will ask you about these concerns during your testimony tomorrow, 

and we ask that you come prepared to address them. 

I. NHTSA's Lack of Expertise 

Computers have become central to the operation of cars in recent years. 

According to one report, modern vehicles contain between 30 and 100 microprocessorcontrolled devices, known as electronic control units, and now have more lines of code 

than some military fighter jets. I These computers control the most essential operations of 

the vehicle, including acceleration, braking, and cruise control. As the agency 

responsible for ensuring that the vehicles on the road are safe, it is essential that the 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration have ample expertise to test and analyze 

these electronic systems and to evaluate the sufficiency of tests and analyses the 

automakers perform. 

It appears, however, that NHTSA lacks this expertise, hampering the ability of its 

Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) to examine possible electronic defects in vehicles. 

In the briefing on February 18, NHTSA officials told the Committee staff that the agency 

has no electrical engineers or software engineers on staff. 

NHTSA officials maintained during this briefing that they have the authority to 

contract for such services as needed. But it appears that NHTSA has not done so. 

NHTSA has conducted only one investigation that examined whether electronic throttle 

controls could cause or contribute to sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. 

This was a preliminary investigation that occurred in 2004. NHTSA staff told Committee 

staff that the agency did not seek contract assistance during this investigation. 

The documents provided to the Committee indicate that this lack of expertise may 

have undermined the thorouglmess of the 2004 investigation. During the investigation, 

Toyota held a technical meeting with NHTSA to provide information and demonstrations 

of the electronic throttle control system. In preparation for this meeting, Mr. Yon, 

NHTSA's principal investigator, wrote in an e-mail to Chris Santucci, a senior Toyota 

official and a former NHTSA employee, that Toyota could "supplement or disregard" 

some of the suggested agenda items proposed by NHTSA because "I'm not very 

knowledgeable on this system.,,2 

I The Dozens ojComputers That Make Modern Cars Go (and Stop), The New 

York Times (Feb. 5,2010). 

2 Email from Scott Yon to Chris Santucci (May 12,2004). 
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The Honorable Ray LaHood 

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Page 3 

According to press accounts, NHTSA is now planning to "meet for the first time 

with outside safety experts, as well as manufacturers and suppliers, to review the 

potential that electronic defects are part of the problem,,,3 

II. NHTSA's Response to Reports of Sudden Unintended Acceleration 

NHTSA has been aware of reports of sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota 

vehicles for many years. Between January 2000 and January 2010, the agency received 

approximately 2,600 complaints that allege a form of sudden unintended acceleration of 

Toyota vehicles. 4 These complaints increased after the introduction of electronic throttle 

controls. In June 2004, NHTSA sent Toyota a chart that showed a 400% increase in the 

rate of complaints regarding "vehicle speed" upon introduction of electronic throttle 

control in Toyota Camrys.5 

The documents provided to the Committee by NHTSA raise questions about 

whether NHTSA gave these reports the attention and thorough investigation they 

deserved. 

A. The 2003 Defect Petition 

In April 2003, NHTSA received the first of six defect petitions from consumers 

urging the agency to investigate sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota and Lexus 

vehicles. The petition was filed by Peter Boddaert, a Lexus owner, who asked NHTSA 

to conduct an analysis of 1997 through 20PO Model Year Lexus vehicles for a defect 

relating to "sudden, unexpected excessive acceleration.';6 He claimed to have 

experienced three such events and found 271 similar reports in the Office of Defects 

Investigation database of consumer complaints. 

Relying on a restrictive definition of "Sudden Acceleration Incident" developed 

by the agency in 1989, NHTSA denied Mr. Boddaert's petition. The agency concluded: 

The information gathered does not indicate the Lexus vehicles are overrepresented in the NHTSA database for consumer complaints concerning sudden 

acceleration and/or problems with vehicle speed controL Based on the foregoing 

analysis, there is no reasonable possibility that an order concerning the . 

3 Toyota inquiries take a new turn; lawmakers, regulators want answers on 

electronic throttles, Los Angeles Times (Feb. 3,2010). 

4 Letter from David Strickland to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Feb. 15,2009). See 

Attachment 3. 

5 Email from Scott Yon to Chris Santucci (June 3, 2004). 

6 Letter from Peter Boddaert to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(Apr. 25, 2003). 
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The Honorable Ray LaHood 

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Page 4 

notification and remedy of a safety related defect would be issued as a result of 

granting Mr. Boddaert's petition. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and 

prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety 

mission, the petition is denied.7 

B. The 2004 Preliminary Evaluation 

In 2004, NHTSA conducted its only investigation to date that examined 

"allegations that the electronic throttle control system fails to properly control engine 

speed" in Toyota vehicles. This Preliminary Evaluation examined the model year 2002 

and 2003 Lexus ES300, Toyota Camry, and Toyota Camry Solara. A Defect Petition 

urging NHTSA to investigate sudden acceleration in 2002 and 2003 Lexus ES300 

vehicles was deemed to be within the scope of the investigation and was folded into it.s 

The Preliminary Evaluation, known as PE04-021, was opened on March 3,2004, citing 

37 consumer complaints as the basis for the investigation.9 

On March 23, 2004, in a memorandum to the file, NHTSA investigator Scott Yon 

limited the definition of the possible defect in a way that eliminated 27 of the original 

consumer complaints from the scope of the investigation. Mr. Yon's memo states: 

aD! has opened this investigation based on owner reports alleging that: A) an 

engine speed increase occurred without pressing on the accelerator pedal or, B) 

the engine speed failed to decrease when the accelerator pedal was no longer 

being depressed. In either event, ODl's position is that if such a failure were to 

occur the driver would be able to control or stop vehicle movement by pressing on 

the brake pedal.... Longer duration events involving uncontrollable acceleration 

where brake pedal application allegedly had no affect are not within the scope of 

this investigation. 1 0 

In a briefing with Committee staff on February 18,2009, NHTSA staff explained 

that aD! limited the investigation to eliminate instances of pedal misapplication. 

NHTSA staff asserted that a combination of a thiottle opening and a brake failure is 

consistent with pedal misapplication and that no single defect would lead to both of these 

failures occurring simultaneously. NHTSA staff further stated that in 2004, NHTSA had 

not seen the long'duration highway events, like the Lexus crash in San Diego in August 

7 Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP-03-003, 68 Fed. Reg. 55076 (Sept. 22, 

2003). 

8 NHTSA, OD! Resume, DP04-003 (Mar. 5,2004). 

9 NHTSA, ODl Resume, PE04-021 (Mar. 3,2004). 

10 Memorandum to File from Scott Yon, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, Filefor PE04-021, Toyota Throttle Control (Mar. 3, 2004). 
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The Honorable Ray LaHood 

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Page 5 

2009, and was focused only on shorter duration events in which the driver did not have 

time to apply the brake. II 

The Committee's investigation raises questions about the validity ofNHTSA's 

approach. Contrary to the contention ofNHTSA staff, it appears that NHTSA was aware 

in 2004 of reports of incidents of sudden unintended acceleration of long duration. One 

of the complaints referenced in the March 3, 2004, document initiating the Preliminary 

Evaluation but removed from the scope of the investigation following the March 23, 

2004, memorandum was from the owner of a 2003 Camry who wrote that he was driving 

on an interstate highway at about 60 mph when another car began to enter his lane just 

ahead of him: 

As I braked and swerved to the right, the Camry suddenly and unexpectedly 

accelerated. As a consequence, my swerve to the right was far more severe than 

anticipated or expected. The car continued to accelerate as I steered to the left 

and attempted to brake to correct the initial swerve to the right. I then steered 

back to the right, then left, then right, in an attempt to control the vehicle. All of 

that time I was also applying the brakes. In wrestling to gain control of the car, I 

crossed three lanes of traffic before the car finally slammed sideways into the 

concrete median. The engine was still running fast and the car was lurching 

forward. I looked down to make sure I was applying the brake. My foot was 

squarely on the brake pedal. I was only able to stop the car from moving forward 

by tuming off the ignition. 12 

During the time that NHTSA performed this review, the agency received 

additional complaints regarding sudden unintended acceleration. One complaint in 

particular, number 10065362, involving a fatal crash in Evansville, Indiana, appears to 

contradict NHTSA's assumption that an unintended acceleration event could be 

controlled or stopped by "pressing on the brake pedal" because the decedent apparently 

attempted unsuccessfully to use the brakes. According to a complaint submitted to 

NHTSA on March 31, 2004: "when coming out ofa parking lot, the accelerator [on the 

subject vehicle 1 stuck, causing the vehicle to accelerate out of control. Vehicle grazed 

another vehicle, went across a street, grazed a building, and drove straight into another 

building .... At the scene [the driver of the car] was conscious and claimed the car surged 

out of control. EMTs at the scene stated both feet were 'jammed' on the brake.,,13 

II Briefing by NHTSA staff to House Energy and Commerce Committee Staff 

(Feb. 18,2010). 

12 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Defects 

Investigation, Consumer Complaint 10059571 (Apr. 15,2003) (italics in original). 

13 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Defects 

Investigation, Consumer Complaint 10065362 (Mar. 31, 2003). 
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Documents provided to the Committee reveal that the investigators looking into 

Toyota sudden acceleration were aware of this crash. On April 5, 2004, Mr. Yon 

memorialized a conversation he had with another NHTSA employee in which the other 

employee "stopped by to give me a copy of 10065362, State Farm complaint that reports 

a fatality ina 2003 Camry. I explained investigation to him, what it was looking at.,,14 

Two weeks later, Mr. Yon memorialized a phone conversation with Chris Santucci at 

Toyota in which they "briefly discussed ... case 10065362.,,15 The official files for the 

investigation do not mention this complaint. Moreover, the reported circumstances 

surrounding this fatal crash apparently did not impact NHTSA' s position that the brakes 

can always stop or control sudden unintended acceleration. 

Despite the fact that this investigation was focused on the possibility of a defect in 

the electronic throttle control system, Toyota's intemal documents reflect the impression 

of Toyota officials that the NHTSA investigators - Scott Yon, Bob Young, and Jeff 

Quandt - were more interested in mechanical and human explanations for the incidents 

than electronic ones. In an internal Toyota memorandum describing a June 24, 2004, 

briefing and demonstration Toyota provided for NHTSA, Toyota officials noted the 

NHTSA investigators' belief that the failsafe modes for the electronic throttle system 

worked as intended The Toyota officials wrote: 

Mr. Young also drove the vehicle iIi such a way that he was able to apply both the 

accelerator and the brake pedal at the same time. He referred to this as "Dual 

Pedal Application." He expressed his opinion that the complaints that the agency 

has received were most likely dual pedal applications. He also stated that it was 

very difficult to achieve this dual pedal application condition because the Camry 

... utilizes a wide spacing between the accelerator pedal and the brake pedaL 

After Mr. Yon completed his demonstration, Mr. Young took him and Mr. Quandt 

into the V6 Camry and, without TMA or TMC personnel present, demonstrated 

the dual pedal application while pulling into a parking spot. Later, Mr. Yon was 

noted as saying that this type of condition was more closely related to what 

consumers had told him had occurred to them. 16 

m another internal document that Toyota provided to the Committee, Chris Tinto, 

Toyota's Vice President for Regulatory Affairs and a former NHTSA staffer, described 

this same briefing, and suggested that NHTSA staffers seemed interested in gathering 

14 Scott Yon, Discussion with Al Jiminez, PE04021-Toyota Throttle Control (Apr. 

5,2004). 

15 Scott Yon, Phone Call with Chris Santucci, PE04-021-Toyota Throttle Control 

(Apr. 22, 2004). 

16 Toyota Motor North America, Technical and Regulatory Affairs, TMA-Report, 

Camry Defect Investigation(PE04-02I): Meeting with NHTSA (June 24,2004) (undated 

document) (TOYEC_00041374). 
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Page 7 

information they could use to close the investigation. Following the technical briefing, 

Mr. Tinto e-mailed his colleagues with a summary of the day's events: 

NHTSA explained to the group that their database of complaints shows that 2002 

and 2003 Carnry vehicles have more complaints of surge andlor sudden 

acceleration than the 2000 and 2001 Camry's, and they need to understand why 

this is so, as it will help in their investigation (i.e it will help them close). 17 

In that same e-mail, Mr. Tinto noted that Toyota's goal was "ultimately closing 

this investigation within the next 4-6 weeks.',18 Toyota's goai proved to be attainable, as 

NHTSA closed the investigation on July 22, 2004, less than four weeks later. 

NHTSA explained its decision to close the Preliminary Evaluation as follows: "A 

defect trend has not been identified at this time and further use of agency resources does 

not appear to be warranted.,,19 The summary of the investigation cites the technical 

meeting with Toyota and the demonstration of the failsafe modes as evidence that the 

system will work and that any fault would be revealed in a diagnostic trouble code. The 

NHTSA records offer no indication that any NHTSA staff consulted with experts in 

electronic systems during this investigation or critically evaluated Toyota's claims about 

the operations of its electronic throttle controls.2o . 

C. Actions Since the 2004 Preliminary Investigation 

NHTSA has opened two Preliminary Evaluations of sudden unintended 

acceleration since 2004. Both focused on accelerator pedal interference and did not 

consider electronics or any other nonmechanical defects unrelated to the interference. 

The first, PE07-014, examined floor mat interference in model year 2007 Lexus vehicles. 

It led to the first voluntary recall of Lex us floor mats in March 2007. The second, PE08-

014, involved a small number of model year 2004 Sienna vehicles in which the trim panel 

to the right of the accelerator pedal could become loose and trap the pedal. This 

investigation also led to a voluntary recall. 

Since it completed its 2004 investigation, NHTSA has rejected four more defect 

petitions calling for investigations into sudden unintended acceleration in Toyota 

vehicles. In 2005, Jordan Ziprin, the owner of a 2002 Camry, filed a petition urging 

NHTSA to reopen its 2004 investigation. In its denial of his petition, NHTSA noted that 

while 168 of the complaints Mr. Ziprin compiled in his petition fit within the scope of the 

17 E-mail from Christopher Tinto to Irv Miller et al. (June 28, 2004). 1 

18 Id. 

19 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. ODI Resume, PE04-021 (July 

22,2004). 

20 NHTSA, ODI Resume, PE04-021 (July 22, 2004). 
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The Honorable Ray LaHood 

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Page 8 

2004 inquiry, the agency found no evidence suggesting "that a vehicle based cause may 

exist.,,21 In 2006, William B. Jeffers, the owner of a 2006 C~, filed a defect petition 

urging NHTSA to examine "engine surging" in Camry vehicles. 2 That petition was 

denied because "om has not identified a vehicle-based defect that would have produced 

the alleged engine surge in the Petitioner's vehicle, nor was it able to witness such an 

event when road testing the Petitioner's vehicle.,,23 om similarly rejected petitions in 

2008 from William Kronholm, the owner of a 2006 Tacoma, and in 2009 from Jeffrey 

Pepski, the owner of a 2007 Lexus ES320?4 

In August 2007, Chris Santucci, the Toyota official who had previously worked at 

NHTSA, e-mailed his colleagues updating them on a visit he made to NHTSA to discuss 

potential floormat interference. Mr. Santucci wrote that while he walked around the 

building during his visit: 

I ran into a lot of different investigators and OD! staff and when asked why I was 

there, when I told them for the ES350 floormats, they either laughed or rolled 

their eyes in disbelief.25 

IV. Conclusion 

Sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles is a serious and highly dangerous 

event. Our preliminary assessment is that NHTSA has lacked the expertise needed to 

address this serious defect and has conducted only cursory and ineffective investigations. 

We hope that tomorrow's hearing gives you the opportunity to address these concerns 

and provides the Committee with additional information about NHTSA's response to 

incidents of sudden unintended acceleration over the past decade. 

21 Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP-05-002, 71 Fed. Reg. 164 

(Jan. 3, 2006). . . 

22 Letter from William B. Jeffers to NHTSA (July 3, 2006). 

23 Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP-06-003, 72 Fed. Reg. 10815 

(Mar. 9,2007). 

24 Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP-08-001, 73 Fed. Reg. 51551 

(Sept. 3, 2008); Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP-09-001, 74 Fed. Reg. 56686 

(Nov. 2, 2009). 

25 E-mail from Chris Santucci to Christopher Tinto et al. (Aug. 23,2007) 

(TOYEC62783 to 62787). 
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The Honorable Ray LaHood 

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Page 9 

~4.W~II_ Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman 

cc: The Honorable Joe Barton 

Ranking Member 

Sincerely, 

~ Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

cc: The Honorable Greg Walden 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations 

o