1330 Broadway, Suite 1426, Oakland, CA 94612

Phone (510) 763-1499/Fax (510) 763-1599

www.spra.com

THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT

AFTER FIVE YEARS:

RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE 

IMPLEMENTATION OF WIA

A Report Prepared as Part of the

National Evaluation of the Implementation of WIA

June 2004

Prepared by:

Social Policy Research Associates

with contributions by

TATC Consulting

Prepared for:

U.S. Department of Labor

Employment and Training Administration

Office of Policy Development, Evaluation and Research

DOL Contract No. G-7681-9-00-87-30
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND ATTRIBUTIONS

This project was conducted by Social Policy Research Associates, with 

contributions from SPR’s subcontractor, TATC Consulting. The project was directed 

by R. D’Amico of SPR, but depended for its success on the strong contributions of the 

numerous field staff and analysts from both firms who worked on this project over the 

past five years, including the primary authors of the Briefing Papers contained in this 

report. These authors are:

From SPR From TATC Consulting

Ronald D’Amico Gardner Carrick

Kate Dunham Dan Weissbein

Jennifer Henderson-Frakes

Deborah Kogan

Vinz Koller

Melissa Mack

Micheline Magnotta

Jeffrey Salzman

Andrew Wiegand

We wish to acknowledge as well the contributions and support of DOL staff, 

especially our project officers, Eileen Pederson and Tom NaSell. Their advice and 

steadfast support are much appreciated. Thanks, too, to the invaluable contributions of 

the DOL Regional Office staff, who designed and collected data for the national 

tracking system. 

Finally, we are enormously grateful to the administrators and staff from the 21

states and nearly 40 local areas who were very gracious in accommodating our site 

visits and very frankly described to us their implementation practices and challenges. 

These states and local areas are:

State Local Areas

1. Arizona a) City of Phoenix

b) Balance of Maricopa County 

c) Santa Cruz County

d) Yuma County

2. California a) San Diego

3. Colorado a) Adams County

b) Arapahoe-Douglas

4. Connecticut a) the Workplace

5. Florida a) Dade and Monroe 

b) Polk County

6. Georgia a) NE Georgia
ii

State Local Areas

b) SW Georgia

c) NW Georgia

7. Illinois a) Chicago Mayor’s Office

b) DuPage County

8. Kentucky a) Cumberlands

b) Eastern Kentucky CEP

9. Maine a) Coastal Counties

10. Michigan a) Capitol Area

11. Minnesota a) Rural MN CEP

12. Montana a) Balance of Montana

13. New York a) Erie County (Buffalo)

b) Suffolk County

14. Oregon a) The Medford Area Job Council

b) Portland Worksystems

15. Pennsylvania a) Northern Tier 

b) Three Rivers

16. Texas a) Dallas Worksource

b) East Texas

c) Lower Rio Grande

17. Utah Single LWIA State

18. Vermont Single LWIA State

19. Virginia a) Area 1-Southwest VA (Russell)

b) Area 13-Bay Consortium

c) Area 16-Hampton Roads (Norfolk)

20. Washington a) Pacific Mountain

21. Wisconsin a) North Central

b) Northwest Wisconsin CEP
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CONTENTS

I. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW.......................................................... I-1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................. I-2

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES ........................................................... I-4

Streamlining Services through Integration ..................................... I-4

Promoting Universal Access in a One-Stop System .......................... I-6

Empowering Individuals through Choice......................................I-10

Promoting State and Local Flexibility .........................................I-12

Promoting Performance Accountability .......................................I-13

Engaging the Private Sector.....................................................I-16

Improving Youth Programs .....................................................I-19

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................I-20

OVERVIEW OF THE BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................I-21

II. A COMPARISON OF JTPA AND WIA CLIENTS AND

SERVICES .................................................................................. II-1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................ II-1

OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY, AND LIMITATIONS ................................... II-8

A COMPARISON OF DATA FOR THE ADULT PROGRAM .............................II-11

A COMPARISON OF DATA FOR THE DISLOCATED WORKER 

PROGRAM ................................................................................II-15

A COMPARISON OF DATA FOR THE YOUTH PROGRAM.............................II-16

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................II-18

III. PARTNERSHIP BUILDING UNDER WIA....................................... III-1

IDENTIFYING REQUIRED PARTNERS .................................................. III-2

MOUS AND COST SHARING............................................................ III-2

State MOUs....................................................................... III-3

State and Federal Guidance on MOUs and Cost-Sharing .................. III-3

General Form and Content of MOUs......................................... III-4

Cost-sharing Agreements ....................................................... III-4

Difficulties in Developing MOUs and Cost-Sharing 

Agreements....................................................................... III-6

OVERALL EXTENT OF PARTNER INVOLVEMENT .................................... III-8

Employment Service and Other SESA Partners............................. III-8

Adult Education and Literacy .................................................III-10

Welfare-to-Work and TANF..................................................III-11
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Vocational Rehabilitation ......................................................III-11

Other Partners...................................................................III-12

CREATING A SEAMLESS SYSTEM OF SERVICE DELIVERY .........................III-12

Coordinating Services Dependent on Staff Proximity .....................III-14

Coordinating Services Not Dependent on Staff Proximity................III-16

Coordination Through Governance ..........................................III-19

FACTORS ASSISTING PARTNERSHIPS .................................................III-22

State Guidance and Policy Direction.........................................III-22

Prior History of Workforce Development...................................III-23

A Collaborative Approach to Decision-Making ............................III-23

SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES ........................................III-24

Benefits...........................................................................III-24

Challenges .......................................................................III-25

IV. MIS AND OVERSIGHT..............................................................IV-1

INFORMATION SYSTEMS ................................................................IV-1

Operations in the Functional Areas ...........................................IV-3

Integrating Functions and Covering Multiple Programs ...................IV-6

OVERSIGHT............................................................................. IV-12

On-Site Monitoring............................................................ IV-13

Desk Monitoring............................................................... IV-14

Oversight Modes: Compliance and Technical Assistance................ IV-14

Local Response to Oversight................................................. IV-15

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION ....................................... IV-16

V. PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND CAPACITY 

BUILDING..................................................................................V-1

PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY .....................................................V-1

The Negotiation Process.........................................................V-2

Issues Regarding the WIA Performance Measures...........................V-9

Other Issues Relating to Performance ....................................... V-14

Additional Measures............................................................ V-17

Use of Unemployment Insurance Wage Records........................... V-19

Incentives and Sanctions....................................................... V-21

Continuous Improvement...................................................... V-22

CAPACITY BUILDING................................................................... V-25

State Efforts ..................................................................... V-25
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Local Efforts .................................................................... V-26

SUMMARY............................................................................... V-27

VI. SERVICES FOR ADULTS AND DISLOCATED WORKERS................VI-1

OVERALL DESIGN ISSUES ..............................................................VI-1

State and Local Roles ...........................................................VI-2

Emphasis on Training ...........................................................VI-3

CUSTOMER FLOW .......................................................................VI-6

The Point of Registration .......................................................VI-6

How Customers Move Through Service Levels.............................VI-7

Priority and Eligibility for Services...........................................VI-9

THE CONTENT OF CORE AND INTENSIVE SERVICES .............................. VI-10

Group Workshops ............................................................. VI-12

The Vision and Content of Intensive Services............................. VI-14

DESIGNING AND DELIVERING TRAINING SERVICES............................... VI-15

ITA versus Non-ITA Training ............................................... VI-15

Time and Dollar Limits on ITAs ............................................ VI-17

Defining Demand Occupations .............................................. VI-19

Helping Customers Make Training Choices ............................... VI-19

Coordinating the ITA with Pell Grants..................................... VI-21

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................... VI-22

VII. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES IN WIA TITLE I 

ADULT AND DISLOCATED WORKER SERVICES.............................VII-1

KEY PROVISIONS REGARDING SERVICES IN WIA ..................................VII-1

ESTABLISHING THE ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE..................................VII-5

Funding and Staffing One-Stop Centers.....................................VII-6

Developing Appropriate Tools for Performance Management...........VII-7

Developing the ETP List and Consumer Report System................ VII-10

BALANCING DIVERSE SERVICE NEEDS ............................................ VII-12

Emphasis on Training and Other Service Tiers........................... VII-13

Establishing Customer Access to WIA Services.......................... VII-15

Limits on Training Choices ................................................. VII-17

CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................ VII-21

VIII. WIA YOUTH SERVICES........................................................VIII-1

BACKGROUND .........................................................................VIII-1
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STATE GUIDANCE ON YOUTH SERVICES IMPLEMENTATION .....................VIII-2

ACCESS TO SERVICES .................................................................VIII-3

Eligibility Criteria .............................................................VIII-3

Emphasis on Serving Out-of-school Youth ................................VIII-4

Integration with the One-Stop System ......................................VIII-5

SERVICE DESIGN ......................................................................VIII-7

From Stand-Alone Summer Program to Year-Round Services..........VIII-8

Implementation of the Ten Required Service Elements ..................VIII-9

SELECTING YOUTH SERVICE PROVIDERS ........................................ VIII-13

CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................... VIII-15

IX. SCHOOL-TO-WORK AND ITS LINKAGES WITH WIA.....................IX-1

OVERVIEW OF STW.....................................................................IX-1

OVERVIEW OF STW PROGRAMS AND PLANS FOR SUSTAINABILITY ..............IX-2

Views Toward STW.............................................................IX-6

Efforts Toward Sustainability ..................................................IX-8

LINKAGES BETWEEN STW AND WIA PLANNING ................................. IX-11

Planning......................................................................... IX-11

Service Design and Delivery................................................. IX-14

FACTORS INFLUENCING LINKAGES ................................................. IX-18

SUMMARY.............................................................................. IX-20

X. WIA GOVERNANCE...................................................................X-1

STATE GOVERNANCE ....................................................................X-1

Composition of the State Workforce Investment Boards....................X-1

Role of State Workforce Investment Boards..................................X-4

Involvement of State Elected Officials.........................................X-7

LOCAL GOVERNANCE.................................................................. X-10

Composition of Local Workforce Investment Boards ..................... X-10

Role of the Local Workforce Investment Boards........................... X-12

Local Youth Councils.......................................................... X-17

Involvement of the Chief Local Elected Official........................... X-19

THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP................................................... X-20

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ........................................................ X-22

XI. THE ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE: VISION AND 

IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................XI-1
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VISION AND GOALS GUIDING THE ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE .................XI-2

Linking Workforce Development and Economic 

Development .....................................................................XI-3

Coordinating the Workforce Development Needs of 

Businesses and Jobseekers......................................................XI-3

Using Automated Tools to Reach a Large Customer Base.................XI-4

Improving System Visibility and Reputation ................................XI-4

Building Coordinated Systems.................................................XI-5

Providing Balanced Attention to the Needs of the Universal 

Customer and Customers Requiring Intensive Services....................XI-5

ORGANIZING LOCAL ONE-STOP CENTERS AND SYSTEMS..........................XI-6

Role Played by the State in Certifying One-Stop Centers..................XI-7

Comprehensive One-Stop Centers vs. Satellite and Affiliated 

Sites................................................................................XI-8

One-Stop Operators..............................................................XI-9

Managing One-Stop Centers and Networks................................ XI-10

APPROACHES TO SERVING THE UNIVERSAL CUSTOMER ......................... XI-11

Framework for the Delivery of Core Services............................. XI-12

Responsibility for the Delivery of Core Services ......................... XI-13

Role of Wagner-Peyser Staff vs. WIA Title IB Staff in the 

Delivery of Core Services.................................................... XI-15

Tracking the Delivery of Core Services.................................... XI-16

STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO CORE SERVICES .......................... XI-17

Flexible Hours of Operation ................................................. XI-18

Increasing Geographic Access ............................................... XI-18

Serving Customers with Disabilities ........................................ XI-19

Serving Non-English Speaking Customers................................. XI-20

ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE DELIVERY OF INTENSIVE 

AND TRAINING SERVICES ............................................................ XI-21

Coordinated Assessment and Entry into Intensive Services ............. XI-21

Coordinated Enrollment and Case Management........................... XI-22

Mutual Referral and Purchase of Service Agreements ................... XI-23

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS .......... XI-25

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION....................................................... XI-27

XII. SERVING THE HOMELESS THROUGH THE ONE-STOP 

SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY ...........................................................XII-1

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................XII-2
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LOCAL PROFILES .......................................................................XII-5

OUTREACH & ENROLLMENT........................................................ XII-11

SERVICE DELIVERY .................................................................. XII-15

Stabilization and Pre-Employment Services .............................. XII-15

Job Placement & Training Services........................................ XII-17

Case Management & Supportive Services................................. XII-18

Major Service Delivery Challenges and Modifications.................. XII-20

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR SERVING THE HOMELESS ........................... XII-25

SUMMARY OF KEY LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS ................................ XII-29

XIII. SERVING MIGRANT AND SEASONAL FARMWORKERS 

THROUGH THE ONE-STOP SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY.....................XIII-1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................XIII-2

LOCAL PROFILES ......................................................................XIII-5

OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT......................................................XIII-9

SERVICE DELIVERY ................................................................. XIII-14

Pre-employment and Emergency Services ............................... XIII-14

Training and Placement Services.......................................... XIII-17

Case Management & Supportive Services................................ XIII-19

Services to Employers....................................................... XIII-21

Primary Challenges and Adaptations to Service Delivery ............. XIII-22

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS.............................................................. XIII-28

SUMMARY OF KEY LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS ............................... XIII-33

XIV. SERVING LIMITED-ENGLISH SPEAKERS THROUGH THE 

ONE-STOP SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY ...........................................XIV-1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................XIV-2

LOCAL PROFILES ......................................................................XIV-5

PLANNING PROCESS...................................................................XIV-8

OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT.................................................... XIV-10

Outreach and Recruitment.................................................. XIV-10

Intake and Enrollment....................................................... XIV-12

SERVICE DELIVERY ................................................................. XIV-13

Emergency and Basic-Need Services ..................................... XIV-13

Pre-employment Training .................................................. XIV-14

Job Training Services ....................................................... XIV-14

Job Matching and Placement Services.................................... XIV-16
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Case Management ........................................................... XIV-17

Employer Services........................................................... XIV-18

Primary Challenges and Modifications to Service Delivery........... XIV-19

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS.............................................................. XIV-21

SUMMARY OF KEY LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS ............................... XIV-24

APPENDIX: DESIGN OF THE EVALUATION OF THE 

IMPLEMENTATION OF WIA..........................................................A-1
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I. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW

In the summer of 1999, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) awarded Social 

Policy Research Associates (SPR) and its subcontractor, TATC Consulting, a contract 

for the national Evaluation of the Implementation of the Workforce Investment Act

(WIA). The evaluation consisted of multiple data collection and analysis components, 

using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. These included:

 Multi-day site visits to 21 states and 38 local workforce investment areas, 

conducted in three distinct waves, beginning in the fall of 1999 and

concluding in January 2004.

 A national tracking system of WIA implementation progress, covering all 

states and territories receiving WIA formula funding, that charted progress 

towards establishing the key infrastructure that WIA mandates.

 An analysis of data from the client-level reporting systems of WIA (the 

WIASRD) and JTPA (the SPIR) to describe changes in client characteristics 

and services associated with the transition from JTPA to WIA.

Findings from the first wave of site visits, to six early implementing states and 

nine local areas within them, were described in two reports: State Implementation 

Profiles for Six Early Implementing States Under WIA (September 2000) and A Report 

on Early State and Local Progress Towards WIA Implementation (February 2001). 

Results from the national tracking system were reported in a series of seven reports, 

including six volumes of the Workforce System Information and Evaluation (WSIE) 

Reports (March 2000 through November 2000) and A Report on the WIA 

Implementation Readiness Guide (March 2001). More recently, we conducted targeted 

site visits focused on local areas’ strategies for engaging businesses in strategic planning 

and serving businesses as a customer of the workforce development system; findings 

from this effort are described in Business as Partner and Customer under WIA: A Study 

of Innovative Practices (submitted in June 2004). Each of these reports was submitted 

to DOL under separate cover.

Additional findings were detailed in a series of 13 short Briefing Papers, which 

we submitted to DOL on a flow basis from April 2002 to June 2004. These Briefing 

Papers, which are compiled in this Report, are each on narrowly focused topics, 

including (among others) WIA governance structures, partnership development, the 

One-Stop infrastructure, adult and dislocated worker services, youth services, 
I-2

performance accountability, management information systems, and One-Stop services 

to special populations, including migrant farmworkers, the homeless, and limitedEnglish speakers. A synopsis of these Briefing Papers is included later in this chapter, 

and the Briefing Papers themselves follow. Meanwhile, a fuller description of all 

project activities, data collection methods, and reports and products is included in this 

Report’s appendix.

Drawing on these Briefing Papers and the evaluation’s other reports, we next 

discuss key achievements with respect to establishing a workforce system consistent 

with WIA and highlight remaining implementation challenges. We first begin by 

establishing an overall context for the evaluation.

BACKGROUND

WIA’s key objective, articulated in the preamble to the law itself, is to 

“consolidate, coordinate, and improve employment, training, literacy and vocational 

rehabilitation programs in the United States.” The impetus for this change grew out of 

concern that the then-existing public workforce system was made up of an array of 

separately funded employment and training programs—by some counts over 150 

separate programs—that typically operated without effective coordination or 

collaboration. The resulting system, it was claimed, resulted in redundancies and 

inefficiencies and confronted customers with a confusing maze of programs through 

which they found it difficult to navigate.

1

WIA was designed to lend coherence to this disorder and make the public 

workforce system customer-focused and demand-driven. It aimed to do so by 

promoting seven key underlying principles.

1. Streamlining services through integration. To redress service fragmentation, WIA 

mandates the establishment of a One-Stop service delivery system, by which key 

partners involved in providing workforce development assistance are to come 

together to plan and coordinate their services. To the extent that doing so is 

consistent with their authorizing legislation, each partner is to contribute to the 

costs and maintenance of the One-Stop system in a way that is reflective of the 

partner’s usage and benefits.

 

1

 See, for example, a series of reports issued by the General Accounting Office, such as “Multiple 

Employment Training Programs: Overlapping Programs Indicate a Need for Closer Examination of 

Structure” (1994).
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2. Providing universal access to services. As a means to “improve the quality of the 

workforce ... and enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the Nation” 

(WIA Section 106), the Act gives every adult access to basic services made 

available through the One-Stop system. Such universal access represents a sharp 

departure from the eligibility criteria imposed under the former Job Training 

Partnership Act (JTPA).2

3. Empowering individuals through a customer-focused approach to services. The 

development of the One-Stop system is seen as a major method of facilitating 

customer access to services, in that customers should be able to utilize a broad 

array of services through convenient physical access points or remotely via the 

Internet. Moreover, customers can take charge of their own career planning and 

career development by accessing of their own accord whatever core services—

labor market information, job search assistance, and career planning tools—they 

feel they need. Finally, those who need training services to upgrade their 

occupational skills can do so through the use of Individual Training Accounts, 

which are voucher-like vehicles designed to promote customers’ choice in selecting 

training programs and providers.

4. Promoting state and local flexibility. Under the premise that states and local areas 

know best what service designs and delivery strategies are optimal for their 

communities, DOL deliberately devolves decision-making authority. Thus, local

officials have wide latitude in determining the emphasis they give to various 

services (e.g., training vs. core services) and which customers they wish to target.

5. Promoting system accountability. WIA enhances the focus on accountability and 

continuous improvement. One aspect of this is holding states and local areas 

accountable for the performance of their workforce investment systems through 17 

core performance and additional customer satisfaction measures that track 

customers’ outcomes following service receipt and their satisfaction with services. 

Additionally, training providers must meet performance criteria in order to be 

deemed “eligible” to serve ITA holders; these criteria relate to the program 

completion rates and employment outcomes of previous cohorts of trainees. 

6. Engaging the private sector. As a means of building a world-class public 

workforce system and keeping America competitive in a global economy, WIA 

endeavors to meet the needs of businesses as well as job seekers. WIA attempts to 

engage the business community in both strategic planning, through its 

representation on workforce boards, and as a customer of the workforce system. 

 

2

 Virtually all participants in JTPA’s adult program needed to be economically disadvantaged, and

(after the JTPA Amendments of 1992) at least 65% needed to be hard to serve, by virtue of having at 

least one barrier to employment from a list of seven that were specified in the legislation. However, job 

matching services funded under Wagner-Peyser were available without regard to income or other 

eligibility criteria.
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7. Improving Youth Programs. Recognizing that previous formula-funded youth 

workforce programs have failed to realize their promise, WIA calls for a 

substantial redirection of effort. Among these, the legislation promotes 

comprehensive youth service strategies, driven by a youth-development 

framework, in place of the short-term interventions—such as summer youth 

employment as a stand-alone activity—that were typical under JTPA. 

Additionally, WIA mandates the establishment of Youth Councils, as an adjunct of 

the local workforce Board, to coordinate youth activities and provide a broad 

vision of purpose.

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

With these key principles as a backdrop, and with WIA reauthorization on the 

horizon, we draw on findings from the evaluation to reflect on chief accomplishments 

to date and challenges to implementation that pending new authorizing legislation might 

address.

Streamlining Services through Integration

The need for reform to lend some coherence to the welter of separately funded 

and operated federal programs providing employment and training assistance was 

obvious. In an effort to do so, WIA requires that 17 federal programs, with total 

funding of about $15 billion annually, become mandatory One-Stop partners that are to 

help support the One-Stop system, make their core services available through it, and 

participate on local workforce investment boards. 

Despite numerous challenges that have been encountered along the way (and 

sometimes outright resistance), partnership formation represents a highly successful 

and, in the long-term, potentially critically important accomplishment engendered by 

WIA. Through our site visits, we discovered that local areas are using various methods 

of coordinating services, such as through co-locating staff and services, cross-referring 

customers, developing electronic linkages such as through joint management 

information systems, developing common intake systems or other front-end services 

(e.g., shared reception and orientation), cross-training staff, and carrying out teambuilding exercises. 

Although none of these is sufficient by itself to give rise to fully seamless 

services, unquestionably meaningful change has occurred in a way that has had farreaching consequences for client services. Nearly everywhere, partners express a newfound understanding of each others’ programs and a commitment to work together 

collaboratively. Showing the full potential of service integration, a few local areas have 
I-5

gone much further, by forming multi-agency teams and melding programs and 

providers into a highly integrated system for delivering client services.

One huge difficulty that emerged at the outset, though, is determining each 

partner’s fair contribution to support the One-Stop infrastructure, and inducing them to 

make financial (as opposed to merely in-kind) contributions. Partners identified a 

variety of reasons for their inability or unwillingness to contribute, including their own 

funding limitations and what they perceive as federal restrictions on how they may use 

their funds. The bottom line, though, is that local areas have sometimes struggled to 

find funds to support the One-Stop infrastructure in the way they would like. More 

generally, they cited a continuing difficulty in working with partners in providing selfservices and staffing the Resource Rooms.

Among other challenges to partnership-formation that we have identified are:

 Different visions of what integration means. Integration can imply little more 

than co-location or cross-referrals, on the one hand, to the full integration of 

service delivery, on the other. Partners do not always share a common vision 

of what is desirable or intended.

 Unique program goals and customers’ needs. Related to the above, partners 

worry that the uniqueness of their program goals will become diluted in a 

One-Stop context and that their ability to meet their customers’ needs may 

suffer as a consequence.

 Unique corporate cultures. Staff from the various partner agencies—

including employees of state and local governments and non-profit 

organizations—have unique organizational cultures that make working 

together very challenging, a situation that can be further aggravated by 

agencies’ different pay scales and union rules.

 Practical and logistical difficulties. Co-location, typically an important first 

step in effective partnership, is often difficult to arrange for purely logistical 

reasons, such as existing leases that are difficult to break and the absence of 

suitable alternative space that can comfortably accommodate the multiple 

partners.

 Constraints of existing management information systems. In a multi-program 

environment, an MIS that supports common intake and eligibility 

requirements, provides unified case management, and produces the reports 

that each program needs for program management is a powerful impetus for 

change and can even be viewed as essential for the effective integration of 

services. States have pursued a variety of strategies for realizing this vision—

participating in a consortium, purchasing software from commercial vendors, 
I-6

or upgrading existing systems—but most such systems have been subject to 

repeated delays and/or have fallen short of their promise.

 Separate performance and reporting requirements. As it currently stands, 

each partner is subject to separate federal performance and reporting 

requirements. Not only does this fact cause confusion and duplication that 

may, by itself, constitute a hindrance to coordination, but it may also cause 

partners to strive for achievement on disparate measures that may be in 

conflict. Moreover, currently no federal performance measures reward 

“systemwide” performance, further reducing incentives to integration.

Proposed WIA legislation holds the promise of addressing some of these issues. 

For example, current proposals would allow Governors to withhold a portion of the 

federal funds of One-Stop partners and allocate them to local areas to support One-Stop 

system development. Additionally, the proposed legislation stipulates that one of the 

criteria to be used in deciding whether to certify One-Stop centers should be the degree 

of partner integration. These steps seem likely to establish at least minimal thresholds 

of expectations regarding the coordination of services and secure baseline funding for 

supporting the One-Stop infrastructure.

In a much more dramatic move, one current proposal would consolidate ES and 

WIA adult and dislocated worker funding, which could substantially improve the 

integration of core services and resolve some difficult funding and staffing issues.

Furthermore, DOL’s Performance and Results Office, under overall prodding from 

OMB, is working to establish common performance measures across programs.

But whatever steps are taken at the federal level, the effective integration of 

partner services is a long road that will necessarily be traveled in incremental steps at 

the local level as partners work out effective ways of collaborating with each other and 

gain confidence that their efforts to do so will not undermine their ability to meet the 

needs of their target populations. As has been apparent to date, strong state leadership 

and a collaborative and inclusive approach to decision-making at the local level are 

essential to move this process further along.

Promoting Universal Access in a One-Stop System

In a dynamic, fast-moving economy, all workers arguably need access to an array 

of workforce services throughout their work lives, if periodically they need to hone 

their work skills or seek new employment. Given this, perhaps in no way was the need 

for reform more urgent than to streamline the delivery of workforce services through 
I-7

the establishment of a One-Stop system, so that customers would have easy access to an 

array of high-quality workforce services. 

We found that states and local areas have made great progress in responding to

this need. Not only does every local area have at least one comprehensive center,

many have pursued additional strategies designed to promote universal access 

including: establishing satellite centers to provide broader geographic access, providing 

remote access to One-Stop self-services, offering extended hours of operation during 

evenings and on weekends, and facilitating access to individuals with disabilities or 

others who may be otherwise challenged in their ability to access services.

As evidence of these efforts, as of the end of 2003, the nation included a network 

of almost 2,000 One-Stop centers, and an extensive network of satellite centers (see 

www.servicelocator.org). Based on other data we have collected, more than 40% of 

local areas have six or more separate physical access points, and several have very 

extensive networks, such as Utah (with 36 comprehensive centers) and the Chicago 

Mayor’s Office (with 35 sites, of which 4 are comprehensive centers and 31 are 

satellites).

These two areas demonstrate two very different considerations behind the logic of 

how many access points to establish and where to locate them. One very obvious 

consideration relates to the geographic expanse of the service area. Thus, Utah, a 

single-LWIA state, needs to provide physical access points throughout the state. 

Accordingly, it has established an average of a little more than one comprehensive 

center per county. 

Chicago demonstrates that aggressive outreach to target populations represents 

another set of considerations. This local area is very concerned about establishing 

access to services for special populations and target groups. Accordingly, in addition to 

establishing 4 comprehensive centers throughout the city, it established 31 satellites, or 

affiliates, located throughout Chicago’s neighborhoods. These affiliates represent a 

variety of service models, including neighborhood community-based organizations 

(CBOs), agencies targeting specific language or cultural groups, and others established 

to link WIA services to programs specializing in addressing specific barriers or social 

service needs.

Beyond the extensive network of physical access points through comprehensive 

centers or satellites, states and local areas have also emphasized remote access to 
I-8

services through the Internet. Thus, substantial percentages of local areas (80% or 

more) report that basic informational services—such as LMI, information on training 

providers, job listings, and the like—are available remotely.

These remarkable accomplishments in establishing the One-Stop infrastructure 

notwithstanding, some limitations have been apparent. To begin with, special 

challenges have emerged in operationalizing the One-Stop vision in some contexts, such 

as in rural areas, which often encompass vast geographic scales, low population 

densities, and tight program budgets that make it difficult to establish and staff physical 

access points that are convenient for very many customers. These challenges can be 

overcome, but only through adaptations of the typical One-Stop model, such as by 

establishing fewer comprehensive centers in favor of numerous smaller satellites, 

emphasizing distance learning and remote access, and utilizing mobile access points 

(such as through trailers that can be moved periodically from community to 

community).3

Other implementation challenges to promoting universal access that we have often 

encountered include: 

 Narrow reputation and limited visibility. As part of the One-Stop vision, the 

public workforce system is to be among the first resources that customers 

think of when they are interested in help with career planning or information 

about available jobs. However, in many communities One-Stop centers have 

an image as “the place where poor people go,” a hold-over from an earlier 

era that may have been fostered by JTPA’s restricted eligibility criteria. 

Aggressive efforts by many One-Stop centers to widely market themselves, 

present a professional appearance, and provide high-quality services have 

been only partly successful in overcoming this image. Local areas report that 

national efforts to promote a brand-name, and burnish the image of the OneStop system in the minds of the public, would be helpful.

 Funding limitations. Many local areas report that it is difficult to find the 

resources to fully support the One-Stop infrastructure. Funding is a particular 

challenge in light of the limited financial contributions often made by WIA 

Title I’s mandatory partners (as was discussed above) and the lack of set-aside 

funding.

 

3

 See K. Dunham, “Rural One-Stops: Issues in WIA Implementation” (2003), prepared for U.S. 

DOL by Social Policy Research Associates under a separate contract. 
I-9

 Tension between emphasizing training services vs. services at lower tiers. 

Given resource constraints, local areas struggle with establishing an 

appropriate balance between meeting the needs of a wide and diverse 

customer base with low-cost services, while still making training services 

available to those who need them to gain marketable skills. Local areas vary 

greatly in how this balance is struck.

 Tension between serving high-priority groups vs. promoting wide access to the 

universal customer. While establishing universal accessibility to One-Stop 

services, WIA also provides that public assistance recipients and low income 

individuals should receive priority for intensive and training services in the 

adult program whenever funds in a local area are limited. In actuality, lowincome customers remain a focal point for WIA adult training dollars, though 

there has been something of a drop-off from JTPA (see the Briefing Paper 

later in this report that uses client-level data to compare JTPA and WIA 

service levels). However, these averages mask substantial variability across 

local areas in service emphases.

 The need for workforce systems to be responsive to customers with diverse 

service needs. Universal access in a One-Stop environment implies that tools 

and resources and staff capacities must be adept in serving a wide range of 

customers with greatly varying needs, including well-educated workers 

looking for a career change, new labor market entrants, and special 

populations with specific needs. Meeting these diverse service needs is a 

daunting challenge for workforce systems and for workforce professionals.

 Serving those with limited computer literacy. Providing universal access 

given limited budgets to provide staff-intensive services means that local areas 

must rely heavily on self-services. However, many customers have limited 

computer literacy that limits the extent to which they can access resources and 

information tools on their own.

 Serving those with limited English literacy. With upwards of 750,000 

immigrants entering the country annually, immigrants are expected to 

constitute a large and increasing share of the nation’s working-age population 

in the decades ahead. Yet many lack English-language proficiency, which 

severely hampers their ability to be competitive in the labor market or access 

workforce development services. Some local areas are ill-equipped to serve 

this population, although many others have made extraordinary efforts to do 

so (see the Briefing Paper on this topic later in this report).

 Linking the One-Stop network. One of the key challenges in establishing 

locally-chartered access points is whether and how they will work together as 

part on an integrated system. States vary in the criteria they impose in 

designating an access point as a “comprehensive” One-Stop center, and some 

states devolve this authority completely to local areas. Only a few states thus 

far have developed consistent chartering criteria and foster a brand-name 
I-10

image that provides marketing leverage and conveys to customers a consistent 

level of service and quality. The challenge of extending such branding on a 

national scale remains largely untouched.

 Limited ability to track customer usage and outcomes. Self-services, 

including those accessed remotely, constitute the only practical way for the 

One-Stop system to ensure universal access in the face of severe budget 

constraints. However, local areas currently have a limited ability to track 

customer usage of, or outcomes from, self-services, including who uses self 

services, with what objectives in mind, and to what effect. This informational 

vacuum makes it difficult to know how to tailor these services to better meet 

customers’ needs or even to establish whether the enormous investments being 

made in self-services are worth the cost.

Several facets of proposed reauthorizing legislation are intended to address some 

of these concerns, including provisions:

 Authorizing Governors to withhold federal funds from partners’ programs to 

fund the One-Stop infrastructure, as was mentioned above.

 Requiring State Boards to establish criteria and procedures for certifying OneStop centers.

 Authorizing local areas to provide additional support and guidance to 

customers facing special barriers to employment.

This final point is consistent with, and would serve to reinforce, additional federal 

initiatives that are already underway. For example, to promote compliance with the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 13166 formally commits the federal 

government to improve the accessibility of government services to limited-English 

speakers. Similarly, prompted by President George W. Bush’s pledge to end 

homelessness, DOL is participating in an inter-departmental workgroup at the federal 

level to explore how workforce services delivered in a One-Stop context can help the 

President’s vision to be realized. Finally, DOL has been working aggressively to assist 

states and locals in promoting the customer-friendly electronic access to tools and 

information resources for customers with varying needs and aptitudes. However, the 

tension in WIA—between an emphasis on low-cost services for all versus staff-intensive 

and expensive services geared towards a targeted clientele—remains inherent. 

Empowering Individuals through Choice

Based on our site visits, it appears clear that the mandate to promote customer 

choice is being taken very seriously in One-Stop centers and is in evidence nearly 

everywhere. Choice begins with customers’ first introduction to One-Stop system 
I-11

services. For example, those who enter a One-Stop center are typically met by a 

“greeter” who quickly elicits from them the reason for their visit and outlines the range 

of services that customers might want to access. Often this introduction is followed by 

a One-Stop orientation further describing the array of available services.

Opportunities for choice are evident as well in the broad range of resource and 

tools that are available to self-service users, including those enabling customers to 

conduct self-assessments, view job listings, gain tips in searching for jobs, engage in 

career planning, view labor market projections and trends, and research training 

providers.

But the philosophy of customer choice is perhaps clearest in the process by which 

eligible customers select training providers. Consistent with the legislation, Individual 

Training Accounts (ITAs), a voucher-like system that enables customers to select 

training programs that seem right for them, are the predominant mode for delivering 

training services and have been enthusiastically embraced by One-Stop administrators 

and staff. Just as importantly, the way in which ITAs have been implemented shows 

that customer choice with respect to training selection is taken very seriously. Thus, 

we observed clear evidence that case managers adopt a coaching approach to helping 

customers make training choices, prodding them to conduct appropriate research and 

think through their training selection but without being overly directive.4

However, while embracing customer choice, local areas have been grappling with 

how to accommodate its requirements to other service priorities. For example, to 

husband scarce training dollars, local areas have established caps on ITA awards that 

vary from a low of about $1,500 per ITA-holder in some local areas to $10,000 or 

more in others. Little is currently known about how these varying cap amounts affect 

customer choice or how the workforce system’s return on investment is impacted.

Another consideration related to delivering training services is under what 

circumstances alternatives to ITAs should be used. Although the legislation envisions 

the ITA as being the predominant training vehicle because of its protection of customer 

choice, local areas have recognized that alternatives to ITAs, which are allowable under 

 

4

 In addition to the Briefing Paper on adult and dislocated worker services in this report, see also 

the results of the ITA/ETP Demonstration (R. D’Amico and J. Salzman, An Evaluation of the Individual 

Training Account/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration: Final Report, December 2002). This report 

was prepared for DOL by SPR under a subcontract from Mathematica Policy Research.
I-12

WIA, have their rightful place. For example, a small number of local areas are heavily 

investing in customized training, because it meets the needs of local businesses directly 

and provides trainees with an income to support themselves through training and a 

nearly guaranteed job afterwards. Similarly, others have noted the important role that 

contract training plays in meeting the needs of their hard-to-serve customers, for whom 

an ITA might be less effective. The challenge local areas face, then, is deciding under 

what circumstances these alternatives to ITAs should be used and how to use them in a 

way that still provides wide latitude for customer choice.

Finally, as another challenge to empowering customers, the Consumer Report 

System and performance and reporting requirements associated with the eligible 

training provider list have not worked as well as might have been hoped (for reasons 

that are discussed below). Thus, ITA holders often find themselves needing to make 

training choices without good or complete information about vendor quality, a concern 

that is magnified given the prevalence of “reverse referrals” from vendors. By the 

same token, local areas worry about the implications of poorly informed customer 

choice for their performance-accountability requirements.

Promoting State and Local Flexibility

After conducting site visits to nearly 40 local workforce areas in 21 different 

states over the past five years, our field researchers come away struck by the enormous 

diversity in WIA service designs and delivery structures across the county. Thus, 

within the broad constraints of the legislation, local areas vary markedly in their 

governance and administrative structures, the way local boards operate, the procedures 

for designating One-Stop operators and the responsibilities with which the operator is 

charged, the way partners work together to staff various services, how adult and 

dislocated worker customers move through the service levels, how priority for target 

groups is established, whether or not training is emphasized, caps placed on ITA 

amounts, and so forth. To this extent, then, the goals of WIA to devolve authority 

seem clearly in evidence.

We also found that states and local areas are becoming more comfortable with 

this local flexibility. During our early rounds of site visits, shortly after WIA was first 

enacted, we sensed that state and local administrators would have liked more guidance 

from the level above them on how to interpret the legislation and how to shape their 

One-Stop systems. However, their search for greater direction largely seemed to stem 

from their uncertainty as to how to proceed and a fear that the systems they devised 
I-13

would be found to be out of compliance for one reason or another. Over time, though, 

both states and local areas have come to realize that much of the flexibility and 

discretion offered by WIA—under DOL’s conscious execution—are real, and they have 

come to appreciate their ability to shape their systems to meet their local needs and 

priorities.

At the same time, local decision-makers could benefit from greater insights 

generated from empirical research on what works and could learn from findings 

gleaned from innovative examples. DOL has been moving to fill this information 

vacuum. For example, the Department has supported a peer information exchange of 

“promising practices” (www.promising-practices.org). To provide evidence on a 

firmer footing, Mathematica Policy Research, with SPR as a subcontractor, was 

recently funded by DOL to conduct an evaluation of alternative approaches to providing 

guidance to ITA holders to help them make training choices. These are the sorts of 

studies that can be of enormous help to program planners and case managers by 

providing them with some firm basis for deciding on the appropriate way of working 

with clients of different types. Additional research along these lines would doubtless be 

of help to workforce practitioners.

Promoting Performance Accountability

In an effort to develop a world-class workforce development system, WIA places 

substantial emphasis on performance accountability and continuous improvement. 

Based on our data collection, we come away convinced that a focus on performance and 

accountability now permeates the workforce system. Thus, local areas endeavor to 

ensure that the services they provide are customer-focused and performance driven, and 

they recognize their obligation to continually monitor their outcomes with an eye to 

improving the services they provide.

WIA engenders these results largely through its performance-measurement 

system, including performance requirements for states and local areas and those for 

training providers. Overall, this system has achieved its objectives of focusing on 

performance for results. Moreover, the specific performance measures are recognized 

as being meaningful and conceptually appropriate. However, some specific operational 

aspects have not worked as well as planned.

First, the performance accountability system built into the eligible training 

provider (ETP) list has encountered substantial implementation challenges. The ETP 
I-14

list represents a compilation of training providers that have been deemed by the state 

and local area to be “eligible” for purposes of providing training services to ITA 

holders. To establish continuing eligibility, training providers will generally need to 

meet performance thresholds established by the states on the outcomes attained by their 

previous cohorts of trainees. Note that providers submit an application for eligibility, 

and meet performance criteria, separately for every program for which they are seeking 

certification. 

The vision embedded in WIA is that the ETP list will ensure system 

accountability, promote high performance, and serve as a valuable source of 

information that ITA holders (and others) can use to select programs of study. 

However, among the practical problems that have been encountered:

5

 High standards can limit choice. High standards for ETP eligibility may 

serve to promote system accountability but also can severely limit customer 

choice to the extent that many vendors who apply for eligibility fail to achieve 

their performance requirements.

 Vendors may decide not to seek eligibility. More generally, many vendors—

especially community colleges, an important source for low-cost, high-quality 

training—have openly expressed their dislike of the ETP application process 

and have announced their intention to refrain from applying for eligibility. To 

the extent they do so, consequences for customer choice could be devastating.

 Data are sometimes of questionable reliability. Data measurement issues are 

sometimes difficult to sort out and could lead to reported performance results 

for vendors that have limited reliability. For example, thorny definitional 

issues are not always completely resolved at the state level, leaving vendors 

some discretion in deciding (for example) what counts as a program, an 

enrollee, or a completer. Additionally, although most states rely extensively 

on Unemployment Insurance wage matching to measure employment 

outcomes for ETP purposes, some performance data—and in some states, 

virtually all data—are self-reported by vendors, with only weak verification 

requirements. Finally, regardless of how carefully performance data are 

measured, their utility for helping consumers make prudent training choices is 

 

5

 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see R. D’Amico and J. Salzman, An Evaluation of the 

Individual Training Account/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration: Final Report, which was 

prepared for DOL by Social Policy Research Associates under subcontract to Mathematica Policy 

Research.
I-15

not always clear, due to difference across vendors in local labor markets and 

participant pools.6

In recognition of these concerns, proposed legislation substantially revamps ETP 

requirements, by giving Governors broad discretion to establish eligibility guidelines 

for providers. However, the challenge comes in making ETP requirements less 

onerous without eviscerating vendors’ performance accountability requirements or 

diluting the meaning of performance results such that customers lack a firm basis for 

making performance-driven training choices. 

Another area relating to performance accountability that has met with 

implementation challenges has been the use of the 17 core elements of state and localarea performance mandated in the legislation and the way they have been 

operationalized. These measures generally relate to the postprogram employment 

outcomes attained by WIA program participants. States negotiate performance goals on 

each of these measures with the federal government, and the states in turns negotiate 

with their local areas. Those that fail to meet their performance goals can be subject to 

sanctions (e.g., the withholding of funds) under some circumstances.

The performance measures are generally viewed as reasonable at a conceptual 

level, and help direct the attention of workforce professionals on the critical 

employment and earnings goals that the legislation views as being most important. At 

the same time, respondents we spoke with voiced some concerns of a practical nature:

 The measures are numerous and complex. The 17 measures are viewed as too 

numerous, confusing and complex.

 Definitions are vague and reliability is uncertain. The definitions of some 

measures are seen as vague and are inconsistently measured across local 

areas. For example, the credentialing rate is defined with greatly varying 

degrees of rigor across the country. Similarly, the trigger for WIA 

registration (which causes a customer to be included in performance 

measurement calculations) varies from one local area to the next as well. For 

these reasons, comparisons of performance across local areas are seen as 

being less meaningful than might be desired.

 The performance system promotes creaming or can otherwise undermine 

service quality. The WIA performance-measurement system is seen as 

 

6

 The legislation makes mention that performance thresholds established for vendors should take 

into account extenuating factors of this sort, but, in actuality, this rarely occurs.
I-16

producing inducements for creaming (i.e., serving participants who are seen 

as more likely to achieve high outcomes on measured performance, rather 

than those who are viewed as needing services the most). More generally, 

local areas admit to expending effort “managing” the performance 

measurement system to make the numbers come out right, which to some 

degree undermines the importance of remaining customer focused.

 Limited use for program management. Because of the long time delays 

inherent in using Unemployment Insurance wage records to measure 

postprogram performance outcomes, a local area’s most current evidence of 

performance will typically be measured for cohorts of customers that were 

served a long while ago. To this extent, the core measures are of limited use 

as tools that local areas can use in managing their programs to promote 

continuous improvement. 

 Conflicting measures across programs hinder partnership development. WIA 

core measures do not necessarily align well with performance measures for 

which partners are accountable, which acts as an impediment to collaboration 

and the coordination of services.

DOL’s Performance and Results Office (PRO) is working hard to address these 

concerns. For example, they are intending to phase in “common” performance 

measures across all ETA programs. These efforts should substantially simplify the 

performance accountability system and remove a major impediment to coordination 

among program partners. 

Engaging the Private Sector

Although the publicly funded workforce system has long recognized that 

businesses were an important partner in carrying out its labor exchange functions, 

recent developments have given business engagement a more central function. First, 

there has been increasing recognition that, to restore their credibility in the public’s 

eye, workforce programs need to be conducted in a more business-like fashion, with 

greater emphasis on efficiency and results. Second, major changes in labor markets 

created practical opportunities for strengthening the relationship between business and 

the public workforce development system. Most important, the gradual shift towards a 

fast-paced global economy, with consequent implications for labor turnover and skill 

shortages, made the links between economic development and workforce development 

very obvious. 

The passage of WIA both reflected the increasing importance of business 

relationships with the workforce system and accelerated the trend. The Act maintained 

JTPA’s business majority on local workforce development policy boards, thus 
I-17

upholding the recognition that business had an essential role to play in guiding and 

overseeing the operation of the workforce development system. Under DOL’s 

direction, the legislation was also used as an opportunity to engage business both for 

strategic thinking about the direction of the workforce system and as a key user of 

workforce services.

Local workforce areas are embracing business engagement in principle, but in 

practice they are lagging in their ability to engage businesses seriously in strategic 

planning or serve them as customers with high-quality services. One challenge relates 

to involving businesses on local WIBs. Because business WIB members serve as 

volunteers and are typically very busy running their own companies, many local areas 

have difficulty getting business members to participate in a meaningful way.

The development of business services also typically involves a number of 

challenges. One challenge is building and maintaining a reputation among businesses 

for providing quality, value-added services. Another challenge is coordinating the 

business services provided by separate One-Stop partners, particularly WIA providers 

and the Employment Service. If services provided by these programs are not 

coordinated, businesses may receive duplicate calls, and poor quality services provided 

by one program will affect the reputation of the others. The need to develop and 

provide high quality services with limited staff and funding is another major challenge.

Finally, although WIA emphasizes the importance of being business-focused, the 

legislation provides no special funding for developing business services; thus, local 

areas feel that funds for developing business services are limited. 

The innovative local areas we highlight in a separate report we prepared as part 

of this evaluation (see Business as Partner and Customer under WIA: A Study of 

Innovative Practices) show that these challenges can be overcome with strong local 

leadership, commitment, and concerted effort. Seemingly successful strategies we 

identified with respect to engaging business in planning and serving business as a 

customer are:

 Engaging Business in Workforce Planning

 Ensuring effective use of business WIB members’ time, such as by 

holding short but effective Board meetings and choosing a few priority 

items for Board members to tackle.

 Using mutual appointments to boards of partner organizations to improve 

trust and help define a common vision among potential partners. 
I-18

 Developing sectoral initiatives where the needs of economic development 

and workforce development intersect very clearly. 

 Engaging Business as a Customer

 Developing an understanding of individual businesses’ needs and 

providing customized services to meet those needs, rather than relying on 

a predetermined menu of services.

 Focusing on building and maintaining credibility among businesses, such 

as through successful “gateway” services that demonstrate the workforce 

system’s ability to deliver on what it promises.

 Using single point-of-contact account representatives to provide business 

services, which allows staff to develop in-depth knowledge of their 

customers and increases accountability.

 Focusing on developing strong, long-lasting relationships with businesses. 

 Targeting key groups of businesses for services, in recognition of the fact 

that resources for providing business services are limited. 

 Making sure that labor exchange services are effective. Unless these 

services are performed successfully, businesses will not return for 

additional services. 

 Ensuring good coordination between different entities providing business 

services to ensure consistently high levels of quality.

 Making sure that business services and job seeker programs are 

integrated. 

 Ensuring that staff have a “whatever it takes” attitude. Responsive, 

creative staff who are willing to go the extra mile for employers are 

critical to effective business services. 

Despite the successes that many local areas have realized by adopting these 

principles, our respondents suggested additional system-wide changes that would 

further foster strong business engagement. These include:

 Creating performance measures directly tied to the provision of business 

services. 

 Providing funding especially earmarked for business services, either 

through the creation of a separate funding stream or a competitive pool 

of seed money to support the development of innovative business 

services or business involvement practices. 

 Providing assistance with marketing and developing services, possibly 

including the creation of a national “brand” for One-Stop services that 

would be recognizable around the country. 
I-19

 Providing additional guidance and clarification regarding what business 

services should look like and how they should be delivered.

Improving Youth Programs

The evaluation team paid relatively little attention to youth programs and the 

issues associated with their implementation and operation. However, during the initial 

rounds of site visits, field researchers elicited basic information about the progress that 

local areas were making in moving towards WIA’s new eligibility guidelines and the 

legislation’s provisions for comprehensive year-round services for youth drawing on ten 

required program elements.

At the time of our earliest site visits, we found that states and local areas were 

lagging badly behind in their implementation of youth programming, partly because of

the time delays inherent in needing to appoint a Youth Council and competitively select 

service providers. However, substantial progress had been made eighteen months later. 

Thus, every local area we studied during program year 2001 had all ten required 

program elements in place and few seemed to be having difficulty expending 30% of 

their youth funds on out-of-school youth.

However, the transition to a WIA service design was difficult. Particularly 

challenging was the need to move away from a large-scale stand-alone summer youth 

program and replace it with comprehensive youth services. Associated with this were 

the following issues:

 Dealing with the absence of a summer youth program. Respondents noted 

that community influentials were strongly concerned about the demise of 

stand-alone youth programming. Local areas also needed to deal with the 

barrage of media coverage about the termination of the program, especially 

given that there was little mention made of the new program of 

comprehensive year-round services under WIA.

 Streamlining the eligibility determination process. Many local areas found 

that WIA’s eligibility requirements, particularly the absence of presumptive 

eligibility for recipients of free and reduced school lunches, posed a 

substantial administrative burden.

 Creating a comprehensive whole out of the ten required program elements. 

Local areas made significant progress in developing all ten service elements. 

However, turning them into a comprehensive youth-development service 

strategy proved challenging. Particularly difficult was developing strong 

instances of program elements that were not well developed under JTPA, such 

as mentoring, leadership development, and long-term follow-up services.
I-20

 Attracting new service providers. Some local areas struggled with finding and 

recruiting a sufficient number of high-quality service providers that could 

adequately cover the ten required service elements. 

 Accepting the trade-off between quality and volume. Local sites were 

accustomed to serving large numbers of youth in the JTPA summer-youth 

program. The move to a comprehensive youth services model meant 

accepting the reality that far fewer youth could be served than previously.

 Establishing linkages with the One-Stop System. Much youth programming 

was completely divorced from the One-Stop system. Yet some youth, 

particularly older youth, could benefit from exposure to a system that could 

provide life-long job search and career advancement opportunities.

CONCLUSIONS

When WIA was enacted, it was typically described as a major overhaul of the 

nation’s publicly-funded workforce development system. Key objectives included 

streamlining services, developing easy access to an array of workforce services for the 

universal customer, and devolving authority to states and local areas under the 

condition that they would be held accountable for results.

As we have pointed out in this chapter and the Briefing Papers to follow, some 

implementation challenges have emerged as states and local areas have worked to 

operationalize this vision, and additional work remains to be accomplished. This can 

scarcely be a surprise given the magnitude of the changes that WIA called for. Thus, 

building strong partnerships in a way that makes the effective coordination or 

integration of services possible is years in the making. Similarly, establishing highquality information tools for customers and performance management systems for 

program operators that are aligned with the One-Stop vision take extraordinary 

investments of resources that build incrementally from best-practice examples and 

technological and other developments. Clearly, full realization of these goals will 

inevitably take time to achieve. Many of the proposed changes associated with WIA 

reauthorization should help pave the way.

Nonetheless, based on a review of the implementation experience over a five-year 

period using multiple data sources, we have found that extraordinary progress has been 

made to date. Among the most remarkable changes is the emergence of a One-Stop 

infrastructure offering the universal customer not only an extensive, nationwide 

network of physical access points but also remote access to a wide array of workforcerelated resources and tools. What makes this infrastructure so impressive from the 
I-21

standpoint of promoting customer access is that it represents a single point of entry to a 

diverse set of separately-funded employment and training services, including those 

provided by Wagner-Peyser programs, WIA services, and Adult Education and 

Literacy programs, among others. To have made this structure possible, partners have 

needed to work together in ways that would have been largely unheard of even a decade 

ago. 

Additional key tenets underlying the legislation—for example, customer choice, 

state and local flexibility, and streamlining services—seem well in evidence. Thus, 

workforce professionals can take justifiable pride in their accomplishments to date, 

while girding themselves for the additional work that lies ahead.

OVERVIEW OF THE BRIEFING PAPERS

The broad findings and implications for WIA implementation that have been 

discussed above have been drawn from the series of reports and papers prepared as part 

of the national Evaluation of the Implementation of the Workforce Investment Act. 

Many of these were written as short, focused Briefing Papers, each on a selected topic 

of interest. These Briefing Papers have been assembled in the chapters to follow. 

They were prepared as stand-alone documents and are meant to be read as such. 

In reading the papers, note that they were prepared to inform DOL about the 

ongoing evolution of WIA implementation and were therefore submitted to DOL on a 

flow basis from mid-2002 to mid-2004. They thus represent a snapshot of the 

workforce system at the time of the data collection (the date the paper was prepared is 

noted in parentheses). Because WIA was enacted in 1998, and was expected to be 

implemented by the summer of 2000, some of these papers thus reflect observations 

gleaned from data collection that occurred several years ago, or only a year or two after 

WIA’s full implementation was to occur. Doubtless additional systemwide progress has 

been made since then, and some of the practices we describe as occurring in specific 

States or local areas might no longer apply. However, the implementation challenges 

and range of variation that we describe with respect to program practices doubtless 

remain valid.

Below we provide a brief introduction to each paper. With the exception of the 

first, the papers are listed in approximate chronological order. 

1. A Comparison of JTPA and WIA Clients and Services (March 2003). This paper 

uses the WIA and JTPA client-level reporting systems to chart changes from PY 98 
I-22

(JTPA) to PY 2001 (WIA) in the characteristics of customers who were served in 

the adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs, and the services they received. 

For the adult program, the results show that WIA was associated with modest 

changes in client characteristics (e.g., towards less of an exclusive focus on those 

who are low income) and somewhat shorter spells of participation on average; these 

changes are as one would expect given WIA’s broader service emphasis. In the 

youth program, WIA was much more likely to be serving youth who are still 

attending school than was the case in JTPA’s Title II-C program, and the duration 

of WIA youth services was much more variable than was the case under JTPA, with 

many very short spells (which occur primarily during the summer months) but also 

many very long spells. Changes in clients and services in the dislocated worker 

program were very modest.

2. Partnership Building under WIA (April 2002). This paper points to the substantial 

progress that was made in building strong partnerships among WIA’s mandated 

partners. Tangible benefits that have resulted included faster action on referrals and 

improved communication among partners that improved the efficiency and 

responsiveness of services. Challenges included partners’ existing leases and the 

difficulty in finding appropriate new space to accommodate co-location, perceived 

statutory constraints or conflicting program goals, and the fact that each partner has 

its own performance and reporting requirements.

3. MIS and Oversight (April 2002). Strong management information systems, in 

evidence in some states, can substantially enhance service delivery and greatly 

facilitate the ability of One-Stop partners to work together. However, this paper 

reports that, despite some bright spots, problems with existing state management 

information systems were widespread and were a subject of frequent complaints by 

local-area staff, while efforts to develop new, comprehensive systems met with long 

delays and high costs. 

4. Performance Accountability and Capacity Building (April 2002). This paper 

reviews the case-study sites’ experience under WIA’s performance system. It 

explores the process by which performance targets were negotiated, ranging from 

“equitable and good,” according to some areas’ reports, to “arbitrary” according to 

others. The measures themselves were described by respondents as being generally 

sensible, useful, and in line with program goals, and the performance system as a 

whole seemed to be successful in promoting accountability and continuous 

improvement. However, problems or concerns were also voiced, such as vague 

definitions (e.g., the point of WIA registration, the credentialing rate), challenges 

the performance measurement system posed for partnership-development and 

meeting the needs of the hardest-to-serve, and—given the time delays inherent in the 

reliance on Unemployment Insurance wage matching—the limited utility of the 

measures as a program management tool. The paper also notes the efforts that 

states and local areas were making to promote continuous improvement through 

capacity building. 
I-23

5. Services for Adults and Dislocated Workers (April 2002). This paper reports that 

local areas are substantially responsive to customers’ individual needs and that 

customer choice was widely in evidence. Start-up problems and initial confusion 

regarding WIA’s focus limited the use of training in WIA’s first year; however, 

local areas retained a strong interest in supporting training and gave it renewed 

emphasis subsequently. ITAs were widely embraced, though some areas 

recognized that customized training and contract training have an appropriate place. 

Intensive services appears to be the service level that was the most ill-defined; the 

richness of service offerings provided at this tier varied markedly from one local 

area to the next. Local areas varied as well in their policies regarding when 

customers should be registered in WIA and how they defined the various service 

levels. 

6. Implementation Challenges in WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Services

(December 2002). Building on the above findings, this paper notes the challenges 

that local areas faced in balancing some of WIA’s key tenets. Thus, customer 

choice must be balanced with the need to ensure performance accountability and 

promote efficiency; resources devoted to developing self-services tools must be 

balanced with the need to adequately fund training services for those who are not

employable with existing skills; and serving the universal customer must be 

balanced with the need to identify and serve priority target groups. Evidence 

suggests that local areas balanced these sometimes conflicting considerations in 

different ways. Thus, local areas varied in the emphasis they gave to training 

services, the caps they imposed on ITA amounts, and the types of customers they 

enrolled for services. Additional implementation challenges included developing an 

integrated MIS, funding and staffing One-Stop centers, tracking self-service usage, 

and developing the ETP list and Consumer Report System.

7. WIA Youth Services (May 2002). This paper reports that local areas made 

substantial progress in reshaping youth services in conformance with WIA. Thus, 

most areas offered all ten required service elements, though developing strong 

services in areas not traditionally provided under JTPA was difficult. Among the 

implementation challenges the paper notes were documenting youth eligibility under 

the WIA guidelines, attracting new service providers, creating comprehensive 

service regimens drawing on the ten required elements, and developing strong 

linkages between youth services and the One-Stop system.

8. School-to-Work and its Linkages with WIA (May 2002). This paper was prepared 

with funds contributed by the former National School-to-Work Office and examines 

the influence that school-to-work (STW) principles, practices, and service-delivery 

structures had on emerging WIA youth services, and vice versa. In general, there 

was substantial overlap between STW and workforce board (or Youth Council) 

planning bodies. Evidence of linkages with respect to service design and delivery 

were less plentiful, though there were some isolated instances of co-funded or 

coordinated services. 
I-24

9. WIA Governance (May 2002). This paper looks at the composition and operation of 

state and local workforce boards and state-local relationships. Among its findings, 

the paper points to mixed success in successfully engaging business in strategic 

planning and notes that the large size of some boards made them unwieldy. In 

general, state and local five-year plans were not viewed as valuable documents to 

guide program planning.

10. The One-Stop Infrastructure: Vision and Implementation (May 2003). This paper 

examines the One-Stop infrastructure that has been established, including how many 

and where comprehensive centers and other access points were located, who was 

designated as the One-Stop operator, and how core services were funded and 

staffed. The paper points to the challenges in fully integrating program services 

given separate funding streams, but notes ample evidence of coordination and 

collaboration, the substantial reach of physical access points, and the broad array of 

core services available in a user-friendly fashion. 

11. Serving the Homeless through the One-Stop System: A Case Study (June 2004). One 

challenge frequently mentioned is meeting the needs of special customer groups in 

the context of a workforce system that also promotes universal access and 

performance accountability. This paper, and the two that follow, examine 

innovative strategies that some local areas were using to target hard-to-serve 

groups. This paper examines innovative efforts that three local areas were making 

in providing workforce services for the homeless. It points to effective strategies 

relating to outreach and recruitment, service design and delivery, and partnership 

development.

12. Serving Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers through the One-Stop System: A Case 

Study (June 2004). Also exploring innovative strategies for serving special target 

groups, this paper examines innovative efforts that three local areas were making in 

serving migrant and seasonal farmworkers in the One-Stop context. 

13. Serving Limited-English Speakers through the One-Stop System: A Case Study (June 

2004). Recognizing that those who have limited-English proficiency are an 

important and growing service population, this paper examines innovative efforts 

that four local areas were making in serving this population.

In addition to these Briefing Papers, the evaluation team prepared additional 

reports that are available separately. These are:

 State Implementation Profiles for Six Early Implementing States Under WIA

(September 2000). This report provides brief profiles of the six early 

implementation states that the research team visited as part of the evaluation’s 

first round of site visits.

 A Report on Early State and Local Progress Towards WIA Implementation

(February 2001). This report, in eight chapters, represents a cross-site 
I-25

synthesis of the major findings gleaned from the first round of site visits to 

nine local workforce areas in six early-implementing states.

 The Workforce System Information and Evaluation (WSIE) Reports: Volumes I 

to VI (March 2000 through November 2000). These reports represent a 

tabulation of WIA implementation progress at six discrete points in time, 

using a checklist developed jointly by SPR and representatives from DOL’s 

National and Regional Offices.

 A Report on the WIA Implementation Readiness Guide (March 2001). As the 

WSIE Reports described above, this report documents nationwide 

implementation progress using the WIA Implementation Readiness Guide 

developed by DOL.

 Business as Partner and Customer under WIA: A Study of Innovative Practices 

(June 2004). This report was prepared after site visits to nine local workforce 

areas that were nominated by DOL Regional Offices and others as having 

innovative strategies for engaging the business community. These practices—

with respect to engaging businesses on workforce Boards, developing 

partnerships between businesses and workforce systems, and serving 

businesses as a customer—are highlighted in this report.


 
II-1

II. A COMPARISON OF JTPA AND WIA

CLIENTS AND SERVICES

This briefing paper is one of a series developed as part of the National Evaluation 

of the Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates. 

As part of the evaluation, team members have engaged in various data collection and 

analysis activities, including site visits to 14 states and 23 local workforce investment 

areas conducted over an 18-month period, and the analysis of data from a national 

tracking system of states’ progress towards WIA implementation. From these 

activities, we have produced a series of reports, including a series of Briefing Papers on 

various aspects of WIA implementation and operations (a complete list of papers and 

reports prepared as part of the evaluation is included in the Appendix). 

In this briefing paper, we continue the examination of the WIA implementation 

experience by comparing data from the JTPA and WIA client-level reporting systems to 

profile changes in who is being served, and with what services, in the adult, dislocated 

worker, and youth programs. A summary of our major findings is included in the 

paper’s concluding section.

BACKGROUND

WIA represents an important restructuring of the nation’s approach to delivering 

federally-funded workforce services, and was designed with several key tenets in mind:

 Streamlining services through integration. WIA requires the 

establishment of a One-Stop delivery system, to streamline services, 

promote greater system efficiency, and make access to an array of 

services easier for customers.

 Empowering individuals. WIA aims to allow customers meaningful 

choices about when and how they receive services. It seeks to achieve 

this goal by providing for self-access services and by transforming the 

delivery of training services to adults and dislocated workers through 

the use of Individual Training Accounts, or ITAs.

 Universal access. Through the One-Stop system, every adult will have 

access to employment-related services, including Wagner-Peyser 

services and core WIA services. These core services will be 

supplemented with intensive and training services, which can be 

provided to adults and dislocated workers who cannot obtain suitable 

employment or achieve self-sufficiency otherwise.
II-2

 Improved youth programs. To improve youth services, WIA calls for 

the establishment of a Youth Council, which is to be responsible for 

developing plans for, and coordinating, youth activities. WIA also calls 

on states and local areas to enhance the effectiveness of youth services 

by requiring comprehensive service strategies undergirded by a youth 

development framework.

 State and local flexibility. WIA is intended to substantially enhance state 

and local flexibility in designing and operating workforce development 

programs. 

With these general principles as a backdrop, WIA has reshaped the rules 

regarding program eligibility and substantially recast service design and delivery 

strategies, compared to the rules that applied under the Job Training Partnership Act 

(JTPA). These major differences are summarized in Exhibit 1 (for the adult program), 

Exhibit 2 (for the dislocated worker program), and Exhibit 3 (for the youth program).

Turning to Exhibit 1 first, we see changes in eligibility and targeting rules that 

could lead to potentially profound changes in who actually receives program services. 

JTPA’s Title II-A (adult) program incorporated rules that largely restricted program 

eligibility to adults who were economically disadvantaged, and further required that 

65% of them should be in hard-to-serve target categories. In so doing, it aimed to 

ensure that job training dollars would be focused on those who were deemed to be most 

in need of program services. By contrast, WIA opens program services—at least core 

services—to all adults, and thereby furthers the goal of promoting a seamless 

integration of services between those provided with Wagner-Peyser and WIA funds. 

Recognizing, though, that program services need to be carefully husbanded, WIA 

stipulates that priority for adult intensive and training services should be given to those 

who are low income, and, further, that only those with a demonstrable need for 

services at a higher tier should be able to access them. WIA thus embodies a balance 

between promoting universal access while, at the same time, not forsaking the needs of 

JTPA’s traditional clientele. How far the pendulum swings towards one end of this 

continuum rather than the other remains an empirical question, but, in comparison to 

JTPA, certainly one can expect to see at least some shifting away from those who are 

low income or with substantial barriers to employment.

In keeping with their respective eligibility rules, WIA and JTPA differ profoundly

as well in the way that program services are structured. With a focus on serving those 

who are economically disadvantaged with substantial barriers to employment, JTPA 

emphasized that program services should entail substantial skill building activities that 
II-3

stand the chance of redressing employment deficiencies. Accordingly, this program 

emphasized direct training services and, further, required that basic skills training or 

occupational skills training should be provided where an objective assessment suggested

that those services were appropriate and needed. In this sense, JTPA Title II-A was 

presumptively a training program, and job search assistance was discouraged as a 

stand-alone activity. WIA, by contrast, with its effort to make services available to the 

universal customer, starts customers off with light-touch core services available to 

everyone. Job search and placement assistance are acceptable services as a first 

recourse, and only those who are deemed unable to meet their employment objectives 

through core services should be given access to higher-cost intensive and training 

services.

Differences are much more modest overall in the dislocated worker program. 

For example, eligibility rules for this program are quite similar in both JTPA’s Title III

and WIA. However, in an important difference, WIA classifies displaced homemakers 

as eligible, while JTPA does so only if they are so defined by the state. By contrast, 

JTPA defines eligibility as including the long-term unemployed with limited 

opportunities for reemployment, while WIA does not. The array of services in the two 

programs is also largely similar. Thus, unlike in the JTPA adult program, the JTPA 

dislocated worker program authorized local areas to provide basic readjustment 

services, and, to this degree, parallels to WIA core services seem clear.

Finally, differences between the JTPA and WIA youth programs are modest in 

terms of who is targeted for services, but are quite different with respect to the services 

that are emphasized. In both JTPA and WIA, eligibility for program services is largely 

restricted to those who are low income, and WIA and the JTPA Title II-C (year-round) 

programs also make clear that youth with barriers to success should be targeted for 

services. However, there is some difference in how these provisions are 

operationalized. Thus, demonstrating low income status was somewhat easier in JTPA, 

in that participation in a free-meals program under the National School Lunch Act was 

taken as evidence of low-income status, while no such allowance is permitted in WIA. 

Additionally, in WIA all enrolled youth must have at least one from a list of barriers 

that make them hard to serve, while JTPA Title II-C adopts the looser requirement that 

65% of enrollees have such a barrier (moreover, JTPA’s Title II-B summer program, 

which accounted for almost 90% of the total youth JTPA appropriation in PY 98, had 
II-4

Exhibit 1: Adult Program

Side-by-Side WIA and JTPA Comparison Regarding Eligibility and Services

WIA JTPA (Title II-A)

Eligibility and 

Targeting

 All adults (ages 18 and over) are eligible for core services.

 Intensive and, then, training services are available to those 

who have had at least one service at a lower tier and are 

deemed unable to meet their employment goals without 

services at the higher tier.

 Priority for intensive and training services must be given to 

recipients of public assistance and other low-income 

individuals, in local areas where funds are limited.

 Eligibility generally restricted to economically disadvantaged 

adults (ages 22 or older)

 65% must be in specified “hard-to-serve” categories (e.g., 

basic skills deficient, dropouts, welfare recipients, offenders, 

homeless, those with disabilities) 

 10% need not be economically disadvantaged, but they must 

still be in a “hard-to-serve” category or be a displaced 

homemaker, veteran, or alcoholic or addict

Services  Customers must receive at least one core services before 

receiving intensive services, and at least one intensive service 

before receiving training services.

 Core services consist of, among other things:

o Outreach, intake, and orientation to services

o Job search and placement assistance, including career 

counseling where appropriate

o Providing labor market information (e.g. job vacancy 

listings, occs and skills in demand, etc.)

o Providing performance & cost info on training providers

 Intensive services consist of, among other things:

o Comprehensive and specialized assessments, to identify 

employment goals and barriers

o Developing the individual employment plan

o Group & individual counseling and career planning

o Short-term prevocational services

 Training services consist of, among other things:

o Occupational skills training

o On-the-job training

o Skill upgrading and retraining

o Entrepreneurial training

o Job readiness training

o Adult education and literacy services provided in 

combination with other training services

 Training services should be provided through Individual 

Training Accounts, except for on-the job training and 

customized training, training programs of demonstrated 

effectiveness for those with multiple barriers, or if there are 

too few eligible training providers

 Services shall include an objective assessment of skill levels 

and service needs

 Basic skills training, occupational skills training, and 

supportive services should be provided, either directly or 

through referral, where the assessment indicates they are 

appropriate.

 Authorized direct training services include, among others:

o Basic skills training and GED training

o On-the-job training and customized training

o Assessment, counseling and case management

o Work experience

o Skill upgrading and retraining

o Bilingual training

o Entrepreneurial training

o Vocational exploration

o Training to develop appropriate work habits

o Preapprenticeship programs

o On-site industry-specific training

 Authorized training-related and supportive services include, 

among others:

o Job search assistance and outreach

o Supportive services and needs-based payments

 Work experience, job search assistance, job search skills 

training, and job club activities are to be accompanied by basic 

and/or occupational skills training, unless the latter services 

are not appropriate and the former are not available through 

the Employment Service

 Services to older individuals (ages 55 and older) can be 

separately provided as part of Section 204(d)
II-5

Exhibit 2: Dislocated Worker Program

Side-by-Side WIA and JTPA Comparison Regarding Eligibility and Services

WIA JTPA (Title III)

Eligibility and 

Targeting

A dislocated workers is defined to include an individual who:

 has been terminated or laid off (or received notice), has 

demonstrated a strong attachment to the workforce, and is 

unlikely to return to their previous industry or occupation

 has been terminated or laid off (or received notice) as a result 

of any actual or impending permanent closure of a plant or 

facility or due to a substantial layoff

 was self-employed (including as a farmer or rancher) but is 

now unemployed as a result of general economic conditions or 

because of a natural disaster

 is a displaced homemaker

Eligibility provisions are very similar to those established in 

WIA, except that:

 Unlike in WIA, displaced homemakers are not recognized as 

“eligible dislocated workers” (though they can be served if the 

State so authorizes)

 JTPA adds a category of eligible dislocated workers not found 

in WIA, consisting of individuals who are long-term 

unemployed with limited opportunities for employment or 

reemployment in the same or similar occupations, including 

older individuals who may face employment difficulty by 

reason of their age

Services Services to be provided to dislocated workers are the same as are 

authorized in the WIA adult program, except that statewide rapid 

response activities are also authorized.

Services may include:

 Rapid response assistance, including emergency assistance and 

information about program services on-site

 Basic readjustment services, including providing:

o Outreach and intake activities

o Early readjustment assistance

o Job or career counseling and assessment

o Orientation

o Labor market information

o Job clubs, job search, and job development assistance

o Prelayoff assistance

o Relocation assistance

o Supportive services

 Retraining services

o Classroom training

o Occupational skills training

o On-the-job training

o Basic and remedial education

o Literacy and English for non-English speakers

o Entrepreneurial training

 Needs-related payments
II-6

Exhibit 3: Youth Program

Side-by-Side WIA and JTPA Comparison Regarding Eligibility and Services

WIA JTPA (Title II-B & C)

Eligibility and 

Targeting

 Must be ages 14-21, low income, and meet at least one of six 

specified barriers to success, including:

o Deficient in basic literacy skills

o A school dropout

o Homeless, a runaway, or a foster child

o Pregnant or a parent

o An offender

o An individual who otherwise requires additional assistance

 5% may be non-low income if they have one from a specified 

list of barriers to success (quite similar, but not identical to, 

the list of barriers presented above)

 At least 30% of funds in each local area must be spent on outof-school youth

Funding is provided in two separate titles, II-B (the summer 

program) and II-C (the year-round program).

 Eligibility for the II-B program is restricted to those who are 

ages 14-21 and are economically disadvantaged

 Eligibility for the II-C program is defined to include:

o Those ages 16-21 (under some circumstances those ages 

14-21) and are economically disadvantaged (though 10% 

may be non-low income, so long as they have another 

barrier)

o 65% or more must have one from a list of specified 

barriers, including being basic skills deficient, pregnant or 

parenting, school dropouts, with a disability, homeless or 

run-away, offenders, or another barrier approved by the 

Governor

o At least 50% of participants in each local area must be outof-school youth

Services Each of the following ten services are authorized and must be 

available in the local area:

 Tutoring, study skills training, and dropout prevention

 Alternative secondary school services

 Summer employment linked to academic and occupational 

learning

 Paid and unpaid work experiences, including job shadowing

 Occupational skills training

 Leadership development opportunities, including community 

service

 Supportive services

 Adult mentorship

 Comprehensive guidance and counseling

 Follow-up services, which must be provided to all youth 

participants in some form for a minimum of 12 months

Funding is provided in two separate titles, II-B (the summer 

program) and II-C (the year-round program).

 Funds for Title II-B may be used for basic and remedial 

education, institutional and on-the-job training, work 

experience, employment counseling, occupational training, 

preparation for work, job search assistance and other 

appropriate activities

 Funds for Title II-C 

o Must include basic skills training, occupational skills 

training, and preemployment and work maturity skills 

training, either directly or through referral, where the 

assessment indicates they are appropriate.

o May include direct training services, such as basic skills 

training or GED preparation, on-the-job training or 

customized training, assessment and counseling, work 

experience, skill upgrading, bilingual training, vocational 

exploration, training to develop appropriate work habits, 

tutoring and study skills training, alternative high school 

services, mentoring, instruction leading to high school 

completion, limited internships in the private sector, and

school-to-work transition services, among others
II-7

no such provision whatever). Thus, WIA’s provisions to target those with barriers seem

somewhat tighter. Similarly, both programs have provisions for targeting out-of-school youth, 

though they do so in a way that might make out-of-school youth more prevalent in JTPA’s Title 

II-C than in WIA—WIA requires that at least 30% of youth funds in each local area be spent on 

out-of-school youth, while JTPA Title II-C required that 50% of enrollees in each area be out-ofschool youth. Finally, in one additional difference, JTPA’s Title II-C restricts enrollment to those 

ages 16-21 unless the local area extents eligibility to those as young as 14; by contrast, WIA 

extends eligibility to 14-21 year olds as a matter of course (so long as the youth also meet the low 

income and other guidelines). Thus, though the differences are small, there might be a modest 

shift in WIA towards serving younger youth and those with more definable barriers to 

employment, and possibly away from serving out-of-school youth.

Although there might thus be modest differences in the characteristics of youth participants, 

differences in the services that youth receive are likely to be pronounced. On the one hand, the 

lists of allowable activities in WIA and JTPA are quite similar, in that both programs authorize 

basic skills training and occupational skills training, work experience, mentorships, and guidance 

and counseling, among other things. However, given that the bulk of youth funds in JTPA were 

expended to provide youth with summer jobs ( as part of the JTPA Title II-B program), and that 

summer jobs are not intended to be a stand-alone program element in WIA, differences in the 

services that youth actually receive should be substantial.1

Apart from these differences in eligibility rules and allowable services, another notable

difference between JTPA and WIA across the adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs is in 

the way performance measures are applied, and this difference too might give rise to changes in 

who is enrolled and the services they receive. Both JTPA and WIA have outcome-based 

performance measures as a way of promoting continuous improvement, and the measures 

themselves are broadly similar. However, JTPA made widespread use of a modeling approach to 

setting required performance levels for local areas that assigned lower levels to areas serving a 

harder-to-serve clientele. In this way, it aimed to reduce incentives for “creaming;” i.e., the 

proclivity of local areas to enroll easier to serve individuals with the expectation that their 

performance outcomes would be more favorable. By contrast, WIA sets performance levels on 

 

1

 Even in Title II-B, a full range of youth activities were allowable. Moreover, DOL encouraged services 

beyond summer jobs alone, such as by emphasizing the provision of basic educational skills and academic enrichment 

as a major component of summer jobs (see, for example, Training and Employment Guidance Letter 4-97.). 

However, a study conducted by SPR for DOL suggests that summer jobs, with at best very modest academic 

enrichment components, continued to predominate (see An Evaluation of the Educational Component of the Summer 

Youth Employment and Training Program, 1998).
II-8

the basis of negotiations between the DOL regional offices, states, and local areas. Although the 

negotiated levels are expected to take into account customer characteristics, there are no explicit 

mechanisms for doing so, leading some to claim that creaming may be more widespread than 

previously.2

OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY, AND LIMITATIONS

The above discussion points to some substantial differences between JTPA and WIA in who 

is targeted for services and what services are authorized or emphasized. The objective of this 

Briefing Paper is to document the extent to which these differences have in fact led to concrete 

changes in the characteristics of program enrollees and the services they are provided. 

We do so by accessing and comparing data from the JTPA and WIA client-level reporting 

systems. Both the JTPA and WIA data systems are exiter based, in that each year’s data file 

includes records on all those who exited the program during that year, regardless of when they 

enrolled. For JTPA, this reporting system is the Standardized Program Information Report

(SPIR), the required vehicle through which states and service delivery areas were to report the 

characteristics, services, and outcomes of their program exiters. The SPIR for PY 98 was chosen

for the analyses in this paper, because this represents the last full program year in which JTPA 

was operating nationwide. Results from the PY 98 SPIR are then contrasted with data drawn 

from WIA’s mandatory client-level reporting system, the Workforce Investment Act Standardized 

Record Data (WIASRD), which replaced the SPIR. PY 2001 WIASRD data have been chosen

for this study, because PY 2001 represents the most recent year for which national WIASRD data 

are currently available.3 

In presenting and interpreting the results that follow, we must note several caveats and 

cautions. First, as noted, both the SPIR and WIASRD are exiter-based systems, in that they 

include records for those who exited during the program year, regardless of when they enrolled. 

This poses a special problem in using the PY 2001 WIASRD, because of the presence of JTPA 

 

2

 See our earlier Briefing Paper for more on this topic, Performance Accountability and Capacity Building 

(April 2002).

3

 WIA was enacted in 1998 and was to be phased in nationwide with the start of PY 2000. However, PY 99 

was designated as a transition year, in that some states had the option of beginning WIA operations at the start of, or 

sometime during, this program year. Thus, PY 99 data would provide a clear picture of neither JTPA nor WIA 

operations. Similarly, WIA was just being phased in during PY 2000, and data for this year thus would not represent 

WIA as a fully functioning and mature system. Moreover, a substantial number of PY 2000 exiters were JTPA 

carry-overs (i.e., individuals who exited during PY 2000, but who were enrolled prior to the start of WIA 

implementation, and, hence, when JTPA rules were still in effect). Thus, we choose PY 98 (for JTPA) and PY 01 

(for WIA) for comparison purposes.
II-9

carry-overs, defined to be those included in the PY 2001 WIASRD who enrolled prior to the start 

of WIA. Thus, in using the PY 2001 WIASRD, we must make a distinction between WIA 

registrants (i.e., defined to be PY 2001 exiters who registered after the start of WIA 

implementation—generally, July 1, 2000—and, hence, who were enrolled and served under WIA 

guidelines) and JTPA carry-overs (i.e., those who exited in PY 2001 but who enrolled, and thus 

likely had their service plan developed, while JTPA was still in operation—i.e., in most states, 

those who enrolled before July 1, 2000) .

4

 As a consequence, those we classify as WIA 

registrants will include a slightly lower proportion of very long-term participants than might be 

the case if the full complement of exiters were being considered.

5

Among additional cautions, we note that both the SPIR and WIASRD record information 

only for those who are considered JTPA/WIA registrants. This limitation is especially important 

in interpreting data for WIA, because this program explicitly allows adult and dislocated-worker 

funds to be used to serve those who access WIA self-services or informational services (i.e., 

services requiring minimal staff involvement), which do not require WIA registration. Thus, 

potentially a substantial number of persons served with WIA funds would not be recorded as 

registrants and hence would not appear in the tabulations to follow.

Related to this, the guidelines regarding what constitutes self-services vs. services requiring 

WIA registration (i.e., staff-assisted core services, intensive services, or training services) vary 

markedly from one local area to the next, as we discussed in an earlier Briefing Paper.6 Indeed, 

as we pointed out, some local areas deliberately defer the point of WIA registration as long as 

possible, to limit who becomes a registrant, and, hence, who is subject to WIA’s performance 

measurement system. Moreover, in some local areas most staff-assisted core services, and 

 

4

 For purposes of these tabulations, those in the PY 01 WIASRD who enrolled prior to July 1, 2000 are 

considered to be JTPA carry-overs, except those who enrolled in Utah, Vermont, Kentucky, Texas, Indiana, and 

Florida, the so-called WIA early implementing states. As early implementers, these states began operating under 

WIA guidelines prior to July 1, 2000. In keeping with information posted on the ETA website during the fall of 

1999, dates of WIA implementation are taken to be July 1, 1999 for Vermont; October 1, 1999 for Florida, Utah, 

and Kentucky; January 1, 2000 for Texas; and April 1, 2000 for Indiana. Thus, those enrolled before these dates in 

these states are taken to be carry-overs, while the date of July 1, 2000 was used in all other states.

5 As we will shortly show, JTPA carry-overs represent approximately 10% of all PY 2001 exiters, with the 

exact figure somewhat higher in the dislocated worker program and lower in the adult program. Thus, the extent of 

any bias should not be large. 

6

 See our earlier Briefing Paper, Services for Adults and Dislocated Workers (April 2002), and findings we 

reported as part of a different study, The Evaluation of the Individual Training Account and Eligible Training 

Provider Demonstration: Final Report (December 2002).
II-10

sometimes even many intensive services, are funded by Wagner-Peyser, further limiting who is 

classified as a WIA registrant for purposes of being recorded in the WIASRD.

This latter point draws attention to the larger consideration that, as One-Stop system 

building has advanced considerably, looking at the characteristics of WIA registrants alone

becomes increasingly misleading, in that ignores the fact that many individuals who seek services 

from the One-Stop system could be enrolled and served by one of the partner programs. For 

example, responsibility for providing basic skills training, which was emphasized as part of the 

JTPA adult program, might—in a One-Stop system—be carried out predominantly by Adult 

Education programs, one of the required One-Stop partners. Thus, a comparison of SPIR and 

WIASRD data might show that basic skills training is much less common than it once was, but 

this finding may merely reflect the fact that such trainees are less likely to be served in WIA than 

JTPA, and not that the training itself is any less likely to occur. The more general point is that to 

fully evaluate services being provided in a One-Stop system one is best served by looking at the 

system as a whole rather than any one partner in isolation.

A substantial additional limitation in making comparisons across JTPA and WIA youth 

programs is that JTPA’s SPIR system does not include information on those who were enrolled in 

the Title II-B (summer) program, which accounted for nearly 90% of JTPA youth expenditures. 

Thus, we are able to provide a comparison between WIA youth and JTPA Title II-C youth only.

Finally, the figures we report could to some degree lead to the mistaken impression that 

change has occurred, simply as an artifact of measurement. For example, although we recode 

data items to be as comparable as possible in the SPIR and WIASRD systems, the specific 

definitions of similar items in each system differ to some degree. For example, both the SPIR 

and the WIASRD provide an indication of whether youth participants are basic skills deficient;

both systems take test scores at or below the 8th grade level (scores of 8.9 or below) as evidence 

of a skill deficiency, but the WIASRD additionally allows a youth to be given this designation if, 

in the judgement of the local area, the individual is unable to compute, read, or write “at a level 

necessary to function on a job, in the individual’s family or in society.” Similarly, mis-reporting 

doubtless occurs in each data system to an unknown, and perhaps not constant, degree. For 

example, the incidence of concurrent participation, when it occurs, might be more likely to be 

recorded in the WIASRD than it would in the SPIR, because of WIA’s great emphasis on OneStop partnerships. Where such nuances occur, we try to point them out as factors that might lead 

to an overstatement (or understatement) of the degree of actual change.
II-11

A COMPARISON OF DATA FOR THE ADULT PROGRAM

We these cautions in mind, we start off our comparisons with Table 1, which presents 

tabulations of the characteristics of program exiters for the WIA and JTPA adult programs

(including, in JTPA, those served under Section 204d, the older worker program).7 This table, 

and others to follow, shows results from the PY 98 SPIR in the first column. The remaining 

columns are all based on date from the PY 01 WIASRD. These show, first, PY 01 data for the 

JTPA carry-overs. The final four columns present results for WIA registrants (i.e., those in the 

PY 01 WIASRD who registered after WIA took effect), first, for the total of all WIA registrants, 

and, next, separately for those who received only staff-assisted core services, intensive services 

but no training, and training services.8 The figures for JTPA carry-overs are presented for 

reference, but are typically not interpreted in the text to follow. Thus, our comparisons are

typically of the PY 98 JTPA SPIR results with data for PY 01 WIA registrants.

Looking at the top row of the table, the PY 2001 WIASRD (including JTPA carry-overs) 

shows a slight increase from JTPA in the number of persons who exited, which could represent a 

shift towards providing somewhat less expensive services, in keeping with WIA’s expanded use of 

core and intensive services.

9

 

As the table shows, there appears to be a decided tilt towards serving a higher proportion of 

males (44% male in WIA vs. 32% in JTPA), making the gender balance more nearly equal in 

WIA than it was in JTPA (but still tilted in favor of serving more females). An age shift is also in 

evidence. Largely, this shift can be accounted for by the fact that WIA defines eligibility for the 

adult program as including those ages 18 and over while JTPA established the floor at 22 years of 

age. Thus, WIA shows services to a younger cohort than JTPA does (12% are ages 18-21 in 

WIA vs. none in JTPA). At the other end of the age spectrum, there has been a fall-off under 

WIA in the proportion of exiters who are older (ages 55 and over), possibly reflecting the fact 

 

7

 Of the approximately 163,000 such participants in Title II-A, about 7.1% were served under Section 204d. 

All tabulations from the SPIR are restricted to those who received more than only an objective assessment. 

8

 This distinction is operationalized according to whether dates the individual received intensive or training 

services are listed. The tables presenting results for youth do not break out WIA registrants by those who received 

core, intensive, or training services, because these concepts are not applicable in the youth program.

9

 Allotments to States for JTPA Title II-A and for WIA adult programs have remained approximately constant, 

in nominal dollars, at about $950 million (in PY 2001) to $955 million (in PY 98). The slight decline in actual 

allotments is heightened once one accounts for an inflationary adjustment that makes the $950 million figure closer to 

$881 million in PY 98 real dollars. These figures should in any case not be used to calculate per participant 

expenditures, because the dollar figures represent allotments rather than actual expenditures (and, thus, do not 

account for unspent dollars carried in from the previous program year or carried over to the next year).
II-12

that JTPA placed a special emphasis on serving older workers as part of Section 204d, while WIA 

does not (6% are age 55 or over in WIA vs. 9% in JTPA).

Comparisons across racial and ethnic categories are hampered to some degree, because 

WIA allows participants to be recorded in multiple race and ethnic categories, while JTPA did 

not. In an effort to increase comparability, we eliminated multiple mentions in WIA as best we 

could.10 After doing so, we find that service to African-Americans has declined somewhat, as 

persons of this racial group constituted about 35% of exiters in PY 98 but just about 30% in PY 

2001. Meanwhile, Hispanics are served in slightly higher proportions than they once were.

Comparisons across educational categories are hampered because the participant’s highest 

grade completed is a required WIASRD item only for those who obtain intensive or training 

services (and not for those who receive only staff-assisted core services).11 A comparison of the 

JTPA figures with those for WIA participants who received intensive or training services reveals 

fairly small differences. However, WIA exiters are very slightly less likely to be high school 

dropouts. Similarly, those who receive WIA intensive services are more likely to have some 

post-secondary education, reflecting the workforce system’s success in providing access to a 

broader customer base.

As we discussed earlier in this paper, the JTPA adult program requires that nearly all 

participants be economically disadvantaged and that at least 65% of them have at least one of a 

number of characteristics that would cause them to be classified as hard-to-serve; WIA, by 

contrast, relaxes these stipulations considerably to allow service to the universal customer. Thus, 

it comes as no surprise to see a fall-off in the proportion of exiters with any of these 

characteristics. Again, comparisons are hampered because many of the relevant characteristics 

are not required reporting items in the WIASRD for those who received only staff-assisted core 

services, but evidence of change seems clear.

 

10 JTPA classifies participants in a racial category only if they are non-Hispanic. Thus, to increase 

comparability, we gave Hispanic ethnicity precedence over membership in a racial category for WIA participants who 

denoted both. Similarly, a substantial number of Hispanic individuals in WIA are missing a racial designation, and 

we coded them as not being a member of any racial group, to conform to JTPA coding guidelines. WIA could still 

classify an individual as belonging to more than one racial category, and we made no effort to eliminate these 

multiple mentions. In fact, though, the sum across the racial and ethnic categories for WIA in Table 1 is just 

100.7%, suggesting that few multiple mentions remain once ethnicity is given primacy over race.

11 For this item, and several others in the WIASRD (e.g., income status, welfare recipiency, limited English 

proficiency, status as a single parent, UI claimant status), reporting is not required for those who received only staffassisted core services. Accordingly, we withhold reporting statistics for the WIASRD “Total” column.
II-13

For example, nearly all JTPA exiters (96%) are low income, while just about three-quarters 

of WIA exiters who received intensive or training services are in this income category.12 

Although this represents a substantial drop-off, the fact that it is as high as it is, despite not being 

an eligibility criterion, speaks clearly to the priority that the workforce system is still giving to 

this group. Elsewhere, cash welfare recipients constitute a much lower proportion of exiters than 

was once the case (31% in JTPA vs. fewer than 20% among WIA customers receiving intensive 

or training services). This decline may be due to a combination of the general fall-off in welfare 

recipiency in the nation as a whole over these years, the use of TANF or Welfare-to-Work funds 

to serve welfare recipients, and changes in WIA’s targeting provisions as compared with JTPA. 

With respect to other barriers, WIA exiters are much less likely to be single parents (44% are 

single parents in JTPA vs. fewer than 30% in WIA), but they are about as likely as those who 

exited under JTPA to be individuals with a disability or to be limited English speakers.

13 Overall, 

then, there has been some drop-off in service to the sorts of hard-to-serve groups that were 

explicitly targeted by JTPA, on at least some measures.

Finally, we can use this table to examine how the characteristics of PY 2001 WIA exiters 

vary depending on whether they received only staff-assisted core services, intensive services but 

not training, or training services. Overall, one might expect that those receiving higher levels of 

service would demonstrate characteristics that make them more in need of services, but this does 

not appear to be the case, presumably reflecting local areas’ suppositions about who can best 

benefit from training. Thus, those receiving training services are in fact less likely than are those 

who received intensive services to be high school dropouts, low income, cash welfare recipients, 

limited English speakers, single parents, or to have a disability, and they are much more likely to 

have been employed at registration. Among other findings, African-American WIA exiters are 

more likely to have received only services at a lower tier.

Table 2 continues this comparison by examining differences in services that were provided. 

In contrast to the tabulations reported in Table 1, those in Table 2 are hampered to a greater 

 

12 The relevant SPIR item denotes whether the individual is economically disadvantaged, but the definition of 

this item is substantively identical to the WIASRD item for whether a participant is low income.

13 SPIR and WIASRD definitions of these items are slightly different, which could account for some of the 

variation in incidence rates. The SPIR defines single parents as a category of family status for those who have “sole 

custodial support” for one or more dependent children; the WIARD, by contrast, speaks of those having “primary 

responsibility” for children under age 18. With respect to limited English speakers, in JTPA this term would refer to 

those whose native language is not English with an inability to communicate in English, resulting in a barrier to 

employment; the WIA definition seems somewhat broader, including those with a limited ability to speak, read, write 

or understand English and whose native language is not English or who live in a family or community where English 

is not dominant.
II-14

degree by a lack of comparability between JTPA and WIA in how services are defined and 

classified and what aspects of services are required reporting items. Nonetheless, we show in 

Table 2 a selected number of items for which comparisons are most sensible. First, among WIA 

registrants and exiters, about 22% exited after receiving only staff-assisted core services, 36% 

after intensive services, and 42% after training services.14 No comparable figures are available in 

the PY 98 SPIR. Nonetheless, JTPA’s heavier emphasis on training can be deduced in that the 

incidence of basic skills instruction, on-the-job training (OJT), and other occupational training 

were all substantially higher in JTPA than they are in WIA. Thus, the incidence of basic skills 

instruction went from 18% to 2% (though potentially much more basic skills instruction is now 

being carried out by Adult Education), OJT from 9% to 5%, and other occupational training from 

67% to 33%.15 Similarly, the average length of participation was longer in JTPA than in WIA, 

with very short spells of participation (participation of less than 3 months) substantially more 

common now than previously (26% in JTPA vs. 34% in WIA).16 All this is in keeping with 

WIA’s allowance that a wider range of services should be made available to program participants 

than was common in the JTPA adult program. Supportive services are also much less common in 

WIA, with the rates of needs-based payments and other supportive services being cut by nearly 

50%.

By contrast, concurrent participation is much more common in WIA, especially instances of 

co-enrollment in non-WIA programs.17 Thus, about 14% of JTPA adult participants were coenrolled, primarily in other JTPA programs. In WIA, on the other hand, about 23% are coenrolled, mostly in non-WIA programs (and, primarily, in Wagner-Peyser, which accounts for 

 

14 These figures would be slightly more tilted towards training services if JTPA carry-overs were included in 

the tabulations.

15 SPIR and WIASRD definitions of “other occupational training” are not strictly comparable. For the SPIR, 

this category was coded to represent the incidence of either occupational skills training or work experience. In the 

WIASRD, this category represents occupational skills training, skill upgrading and retraining, entrepreneurial 

training, job readiness training, and customized training.

16 In both programs, length of participation is calculated as time elapsed from date of registration to date of 

exit. Differences in the average length of participation between JTPA and WIA can partly be due to differences in 

events that trigger registration or exit in the two programs. The computation of average length of participation in 

WIA is biased downward somewhat, because of the exclusion of JTPA carry-overs, who by definition have had very 

long spells of participation. If the percentage of WIA exiters who had a spell of participation of less than three 

months were re-calculated after including JTPA carry-overs, the figure would be approximately 31% rather than the 

34% shown.

17 In calculating rates of concurrent participation from the WIASRD, we excluded instances where the 

individual was coded as having participated in the Food Stamps Employment and Training Program. The rather high 

incidence of participation in this program that is recorded in the WIASRD (about 4% of all adult WIA registrants) 

leads us to suspect that participation in Food Stamps was being mistakenly captured here.
II-15

about one-half of the total). We caution, though, that these differences could be partly an artifact 

if WIA data management systems are more likely to record an instance of concurrent participation 

if it occurs than JTPA data systems were.18

Finally, as one would expect, spells of participation in WIA are longer, and the incidence of 

supportive services and concurrent participation are greater, as one moves across the three service 

tiers, from staff-assisted core, to intensive services, and to training.

A COMPARISON OF DATA FOR THE DISLOCATED WORKER PROGRAM

We anticipated that differences between JTPA and WIA would be less pronounced among 

dislocated workers, and indeed that appears to be the case. As Table 3 shows, the age 

distribution has changed only very little, as have the breakdowns by highest grade completed, the 

incidence of a disability, and other barriers to employment, such as limited English proficiency, 

or being a displaced homemaker. Among the few differences, service to single parents and those 

who were employed at registration seems to have very slightly declined, as has service to AfricanAmericans. Additionally, WIA includes slightly more males than females (52% male vs. 48% 

female in WIA), while the proportions were almost exactly reversed in JTPA. 

As in the WIA adult program, the characteristics of dislocated workers across WIA’s three 

service tiers vary modestly, but high school dropouts and those with limited English are slightly 

less likely to receive training than just intensive services.

As Table 4 shows, WIA dislocated workers who received only staff-assisted core services 

make up 15% of the total, while those who received intensive services and training services 

constitute 39% and 45%, respectively. The comparable figures for WIA adults were fairly

similar, at 22%, 36%, and 42%. As with adults, dislocated workers in WIA are less likely than 

those in JTPA to have received basic skills instruction (11% vs. 3%), OJT (4.4% vs. 3.9%), and 

other occupational training (53% vs. 39%). Other differences, while still apparent, seem less 

substantial among dislocated workers than they were among adults. Thus, very short spells of 

participation and very long spells occur at about the same rate in both WIA and JTPA (very long 

spells appear according to the table to be somewhat less common in WIA than they were in JTPA, 

 

18 On the one hand, states’ data management systems have recently been striving for greater integration across 

partner programs, so that information about instances of concurrent participation will be readily at hand; thus, the 

WIASRD might be more likely to capture the incidence of concurrent participation when it occurs than the SPIR did. 

On the other hand, the incidence of concurrent participation was a required data field in the SPIR, while it is an 

optional field in the WIASRD; for this reason, the extent of concurrent participation might have been more likely to 

be captured by the SPIR rather than the WIASRD.
II-16

but this is largely an artifact of our having removed JTPA carry-overs from the PY 01 figures).

19

 

Elsewhere, the use of supportive services has declined appreciably (34% in JTPA vs. 21% in 

WIA), but still less so than in the adult program. Meanwhile, concurrent participation is more 

common in WIA, especially participation in non-WIA programs; again, enrollment in WagnerPeyser accounts for the bulk of this.

A COMPARISON OF DATA FOR THE YOUTH PROGRAM

Subject to the constraint that PY 98 JTPA data reflect the experiences of youth in the Title 

II-C program only, Tables 5 and 6 compare JTPA and WIA youth participant characteristics and 

services, respectively. Some findings that we report in these tables are very much in keeping 

with what we might anticipate given our discussion earlier in this chapter regarding differences 

between JTPA and WIA eligibility and services. For example, those ages 14 or 15 are 

substantially less likely to be served in JTPA Title II-C than in WIA (8% in JTPA vs. 33% in 

WIA), in keeping with the fact that WIA extends eligibility to this age group as a matter of 

course, while JTPA Title II-C served those ages 14 or 15 only if the local area extended eligibility 

to them. 

Reflecting the difference in the age range, WIA is much more likely to be serving youth still 

attending school than was JTPA’s Title II-C (71% in WIA vs. 42% in JTPA). This difference 

likely occurs partly because in-school youth were predominantly served in the JTPA Title II-B 

(summer) program rather than in Title II-C, and because Title II-C explicitly required that 50% of 

participants be out-of-school youth.

20

 

Related to this, many more WIA youth have a highest grade completed of less than high 

school, in comparison to JTPA Title II-C youth (87% vs. 71%). However, these primarily 

represent in-school youth in WIA, rather than dropouts. In fact, the table shows that JTPA was

much more likely to serve school dropouts than is WIA (31% in JTPA vs. 18% in WIA). The 

incidence of other barriers to employment was also generally higher in JTPA Title II-C than in 

WIA. Thus, JTPA youth in PY 98 were much more likely to be pregnant or parenting (23% vs.

10%) and somewhat more likely to be basic skills deficient (70% vs. 63%), to have a substantial 

disability (12% vs. 6%), or to be an offender (13% vs. 9%) or a single parent (20% vs. 8%). 

 

19 Including JTPA carry-overs, results from the PY 01 WIASRD show that 20% of exiters had a spell of less 

than three months, while 30% had a spell of longer than a year. As shown in the table, comparable figures for JTPA 

are 25% and 26%, respectively.

20 The definition of being in-school vs. out-of-school is not quite the same in JTPA and WIA, nor is it 

synonymous in either program with whether or not the youth is still attending school. Thus, for comparability, we 

use the designation for whether or not the youth is still attending school, rather than in-school/out-of-school status.
II-17

The consistent fall-off in the incidence of these characteristics is somewhat surprising, given that 

both JTPA and WIA emphasize services to those with identified barriers. On the other hand, 

WIA youth are much more likely to have another non-specified barriers (51% in WIA vs. 32% in 

JTPA Title II-C) and to be limited-English speakers (14% vs. 4%). 

Elsewhere, the table show that there has been a slight shift towards more gender balance 

(60% female in JTPA Title II-C vs. 53% in WIA). Service to white non-Hispanics has fallen off 

dramatically in WIA (38% vs. 28%), in favor of WIA’s higher levels of service to Hispanics 

(24% in JTPA vs. 35% in WIA).

Table 6, which shows services received, is hampered by the lack of comparability in the 

way a number of the service activities are defined in the two programs. Nonetheless, using our 

best approximations, we see that educational services were received by about 46% of JTPA Title 

II-C terminees, as opposed to the slightly higher 54% in WIA, while rates of receiving 

employment services are about the same (57% in JTPA Title II-C vs. 56% in WIA).21

Elsewhere in the table, the use of supportive services has fallen from JTPA to WIA (40% 

vs. 24%). Lengths of participation in JTPA Title II-C were heavily clustered in the categories

representing 3 to 9 months (accounting for about 55% of all exiters), while the distribution in 

WIA seems more dispersed, with more short spells of less than three months (26% in WIA vs. 

19% in JTPA), but also more very long spells (25% vs. 18%; the latter difference would be even 

more pronounced if JTPA carry-overs were included in the WIA totals). We examined when 

these short spells of WIA participation tend to occur and found that they predominantly represent 

participation during the summer months. Specifically, of WIA youth who participated less than 

three months, about 60% registered during the months of either May or June, as compared to

about 32% of youth with spells of participation longer than three months. Moreover, 70% of 

youth with short spells are listed as having participated in summer youth employment 

opportunities, as compared to just 40% of youth with longer spells. Thus, short spells of 

 

21 In the SPIR, educational achievement services is defined as the SPIR variable denoting whether basic skills 

training was received; in the WIASRD, the most closely comparable item specifically mentions that tutoring, study 

skills training, dropout prevention strategies, and alternative secondary school should be included. In the SPIR, 

employment services is defined to include occupational skills training, OJT, and work experience, entry employment, 

or private internships; the comparable WIASRD item mentions preparation for and success in employment that can 

include paid and unpaid work experiences, including internships and job shadowing, and occupational skills training. 

None of the other service categories between the SPIR and WIASRD is close enough in definition that they can be 

directly compared. 
II-18

participation are predominantly represented by youth engaged in summer youth opportunities, 

though they typically engage in other activities as well.22

Finally, rates of concurrent participation were higher in JTPA than they are in WIA (19% 

in JTPA Title II-C vs. 9% in WIA). Concurrent participation represents mostly other JTPA/WIA 

participation in JTPA Title II-C, but mostly non-JTPA/WIA participation (Wagner-Peyser and 

other non-WIA programs) among WIA exiters.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We began this paper with a brief discussion of legislative differences in eligibility criteria 

and service strategies between JTPA and WIA. Some of these differences include:

 In the adult program,

 Dramatic changes in eligibility guidelines that represent a movement away from 

restricted eligibility criteria. In JTPA, eligibility was focused on the economically 

disadvantaged with characteristics that make them hard-to-serve, while WIA 

provides access to the universal customer (but with a priority for intensive and 

training services given to low-income individuals).

 Dramatic changes in service strategies. JTPA’s adult program heavily emphasized

training services and discouraged job search assistance as a stand-alone activity, 

while WIA adopts service tiers that aim to match services to what customers need to 

realize their employment objectives. 

 In the dislocated worker program, there were fairly minor changes in both 

eligibility rules and service strategies.

 In the youth program, at least if one compares JTPA Title II-C (the year-round 

program) with WIA, 

 Modest changes in eligibility guidelines. WIA defines eligibility to include those 

ages 14-21, in contrast to JTPA’s primary focus on those ages 16-21. Both 

programs target services intently on those with specified barriers to success, but 

everyone who is served must have such a barrier in WIA, while only 65% must have 

one in JTPA. Both programs restrict eligibility (with minor exceptions) to those 

who are low income. JTPA’s Title II-C required that 50% of enrollees be out-ofschool youth, while WIA requires that 30% of youth funds be spend on out-ofschool youth.

 

22 Of WIA youth with spells of participation of shorter than three months who participated in summer youth 

employment opportunities, 33% also participated in educational achievement services, 38% participated in 

employment services, 16% participated in additional support, 20% participated in leadership development, and 62% 

participated in follow-up services. Thus, these short spells of participation appear to represent something more than 

summer employment alone, in keeping with DOL’s Training and Employment Guidance Letter No. 3-99.
II-19

 Limited changes in allowable services. Both programs allow a broad range of youth 

services. However, WIA emphasizes the provision of comprehensive services to 

youth.

We additionally noted that changes between JTPA and WIA in the way performance levels are 

established for local areas have led some to claim that creaming is more widespread in WIA, 

although this is a charge that, fairly or not, has been leveled to some extent at both programs. To 

the extent their claims are true, additional differences between the two programs in who is served 

and with what services should also be expected.

We accessed data from both programs’ client-level reporting systems to see what changes 

these legislative and policy differences have caused in the types of customers that are enrolled and 

the services that are provided. Both data systems include records for all persons who exited the 

program during a given program year. We used data for PY 98 for JTPA, from the Standardized 

Program Information Report (SPIR), and for PY 2001 for WIA, from the Workforce Investment 

Act Standardized Record Data (WIASRD); for the latter data set, we tabulated JTPA carry-overs 

separately (i.e., those who exited during PY 2001, but who were first enrolled before WIA took 

effect).

The changes in participant characteristics and services that we observed can be summarized 

as follows:

In the Adult Program

1. Two-thirds of customers in JTPA’s adult program were female, while WIA’s registrants are 

more nearly gender balanced (68% female in JTPA vs. 56% female in WIA).

2. WIA allows enrollment in the adult program to those ages 18 and over, while JTPA restricted 

eligibility to those at least age 22. Thus, WIA shows service to those ages 18-21 (12% of 

registrants in WIA), while JTPA does not. 

3. Nearly all JTPA exiters are low income, while about 70% of WIA registrants who received 

intensive or training services are low income (this figure is not available for WIA registrants 

who received only staff-assisted core services). Similarly, cash welfare recipients constitute a 

much lower proportion of registrants in WIA than JTPA.

4. Among WIA participants, those who receive training services are slightly more likely than 

those receiving only intensive services to have attained a high school degree or post-secondary 

education (82% among those who received WIA training services, but 78% among those who 

received WIA intensive services). Those receiving WIA training services are also slightly less 

likely to be cash welfare recipients, low income individuals, or single parents, when compared 

with those who receive WIA intensive services but no training.

5. With respect to services received, about 23% of WIA adult exiters received only staff-assisted 

core services, 36% received intensive services but no training, and 42% received training 

services (these figures are slightly tilted towards less intensive services because WIA 
II-20

registrants who were JTPA carry-overs are excluded from the computations, and carry-overs

will tend to be very long-term participants). Thus, local areas are using all three service tiers 

as points of exit from WIA, although intensive and training services, as opposed to staffassisted core services, clearly predominate.

6. Reflecting WIA’s broader service emphasis, JTPA exiters were more likely than WIA exiters 

to have received basic skills instruction (18% in JTPA vs. 2% in WIA). On-the-job training 

was also more common in JTPA than WIA (9% vs. 5%), as was other occupational training 

(67% vs. 33%). However, the coding categories are not strictly comparable between the

JTPA and WIA data systems, making these comparisons somewhat imprecise.

7. Also reflecting WIA’s broader service emphasis, WIA exiters are somewhat more likely to 

have very short spells of participation (defined as time elapsed from date of registration to 

date of exit).

8. The incidence of supportive services is substantially lower in WIA than it was in JTPA (25% 

in WIA vs. 47% in JTPA).

9. WIA registrants are much more likely to be shown as being concurrent participants than was 

the case under JTPA (23% in WIA vs. 14% in JTPA), primarily because of the high rates of

participation among WIA registrants in Wagner-Peyser (at 13%). However, these figures

could to some degree reflect the greater ability of WIA’s data management information 

systems to capture and record instances of co-enrollment when they occur than were JTPA’s 

systems.

In the Dislocated Worker Program

10. Differences in participant characteristics among dislocated workers in JTPA and WIA are very 

minor. Thus, WIA serves very much the same mix of dislocated worker customers—with 

respect to age, education, and other characteristics—as was the case in JTPA.

11. WIA shows a lower incidence of basic skills instruction (3% vs. 11%) and other occupational 

training (39% vs. 53%).

12. With respect to the three service tiers, 15% of WIA exiters received only staff-assisted core 

services, 39% received intensive services but no training, and 45% received training. These 

figures are somewhat biased away from training because they exclude WIA exiters who were 

JTPA carry-overs, most of whom received training.

In the Youth Program

JTPA served youth through two separate funding streams, the Title II-B (summer) program 

and the Title II-C (year-round) program, while WIA has only a single comprehensive youth 

services program. The SPIR captures information about the Title II-C program only. In 

comparing the WIA comprehensive youth program to JTPA Title II-C, we find that:

13. WIA serves a much higher proportion of youth ages 14 to 15 (8% in JTPA vs. 33% in WIA), 

in keeping with WIA’s broader eligibility criteria.

14. WIA is much more likely to be serving youth who are still attending school than was JTPA’s 

Title II-C program (71% in WIA vs. 42% in JTPA). This change likely reflects the fact that, 
II-21

in JTPA, in-school youth were served heavily in the Title II-B (summer) program (the SPIR 

does not capture information about Title II-B participants). Moreover, JTPA Title II-C 

required that 50% of participants be out-of-school youth (although WIA has a similar 

requirement that at least 30% of funds be used for serving out-of-school youth).

15. Given that WIA serves many more younger youth and in-school youth, unsurprisingly, a 

much higher proportion of this program’s exiters had attained less than a high school 

education at enrollment (87% in WIA vs. 71% in JTPA). On the other hand, JTPA served a 

higher proportion of dropouts than does WIA (31% in JTPA vs. 18% in WIA).

16.JTPA and WIA both served high proportions of youth who were identified as having other 

barriers, in keeping with both programs’ targeting provisions. However, the specific barriers 

that were represented in the participant populations changed somewhat. For example, in 

addition to serving more high school dropouts, JTPA recorded a somewhat higher incidence 

of youth with basic skills deficiencies (70% in JTPA vs. 63% in WIA), and youth who were 

pregnant or parenting (23% vs. 10%). On the other hand, WIA served more youth with 

limited English proficiency (14% in WIA vs. 4% in JTPA) and with other barriers identified 

by the local area (51% vs. 32%). However, slight differences in the definitions of key terms 

make these comparisons mere approximations of the true extent of change.

17. WIA is slightly more gender balanced than was JTPA Title II-C (53% female in WIA vs. 60% 

in JTPA Title II-C). White non-Hispanics are less likely to be served in WIA (28% white 

non-Hispanic in WIA vs. 38% in JTPA), in favor of greater service to Hispanics (35% vs. 

24%).

18. A comparison of services received is severely hampered by the fact that the SPIR and 

WIASRD record youth services very differently. Nonetheless, using our best approximations, 

it appears that educational achievement services are somewhat more common in WIA (54% 

vs. 46%), while employment services are provided at about the same rate (about 56% in each 

program).

19. A small proportion of WIA youth participate only during the summer months, though they 

typically receive summer youth employment as well as other services.

20.Rates of providing youth with supportive services seem much lower in WIA (24% in WIA vs. 

40% in JTPA).

21. Overall rates of concurrent participation are substantially higher in JTPA (19% in JTPA vs. 

9% in WIA). Among concurrent participation that occurs, in JTPA it primarily represented 

youth enrolled in other JTPA programs, while in WIA in mostly represents participation in 

non-WIA programs.

We caution that subtle differences in the definitions of similar items and the accuracy with 

which information is recorded in the SPIR and WIASRD make all these figures mere 

approximations of the true extent of change. Moreover, the WIASRD excludes those served with 

WIA funds who received only self-services or informational services, and neither program 

captures much about the ways in which customers of the public workforce systems might be 

served by partner programs, whether or not they are also JTPA/WIA registrants. This latter point 
II-22

underscores the fact that the SPIR and WIASRD capture only a slice of services that are being 

provided by the workforce system as a whole.

Despite these limitations, these figures tell us something important about the ways in which 

WIA funds are being used, including who the funds are used to serve and with what services, and 

they suggest how this differs from what occurred in JTPA. Reflecting on the changes as a whole, 

it appears that legislative intent has largely been realized. Thus, in the adult program, a broader 

spectrum of customers is being served, in keeping with WIA’s provisions for serving the 

universal customer. At the same time, WIA clearly retains a strong focus on JTPA’s traditional 

clientele consisting of the economically disadvantaged, as these still comprise a substantial 

majority of WIA adult participants. Also in keeping with the legislation, our results suggest that 

all three WIA service tiers are being used as points from which customers may exit; thus, the

workforce system is apparently carefully identifying which levels of service are appropriate for, 

and needed by, which types of customers.

Similarly, in keeping with its status as a comprehensive youth services program, WIA 

serves a broader spectrum of youth, including many more young youth (ages 14-15) and in-school 

youth than did JTPA’s Title II-C. However, reflecting their targeting provisions, both programs 

serve predominantly low-income youth with substantial barriers to success.
II-23

Table 1: Adult Program 

Comparison of the Characteristics of Exiters

PY 2001 WIASRD Data

JTPA JTPA WIA Adult Registrants

SPIR

PY 98

Carry 

Overs Total

Core 

Only

IntensiveNo Trng Training

N of cases 163,223 11,898 160,529 36,344 57,648 66,537

Gender

Female 67.7 75.3 55.8 54.1 55.9 56.6

Male 32.3 24.7 44.2 45.9 44.1 43.5

Age

18 to 21 --- 5.9 11.7 13.4 9.5 12.5

22 to 29 37.7 37.7 26.8 25.2 24.1 30.0

30 to 44 43.2 41.8 39.5 38.9 40.4 38.9

45 to 54 9.7 10.0 16.0 16.3 18.6 13.5

55 or more 9.3 4.5 6.1 6.1 7.3 5.1

Race/Ethnic

American Indian 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.7 1.7 1.6

Asian/Pacific Islander 2.9 1.8 3.9 2.5 4.7 3.9

Black (not Hispanic) 34.5 30.6 30.0 31.3 31.9 27.7

Hispanic 17.1 14.6 21.2 16.8 25.0 20.4

White (not Hispanic) 43.9 51.3 43.7 47.5 37.4 47.1

Highest Grade Completed

Less than high school 22.4 15.4 na na 22.2 18.4

High school graduate 56.1 57.7 na na 51.3 60.0

Post high school 21.6 27.0 na na 26.6 21.6

Low Income

Yes 96.0 85.2 na na 73.2 70.0

No 4.0 14.8 na na 26.8 30.0

Cash Welfare Recipient 30.7 22.3 na na 19.9 14.3

TANF/AFDC 25.7 18.0 na na 9.7 10.2

GA, SSI, RCA 5.8 4.7 na na 9.9 4.2

Disability

Yes 10.4 9.7 7.6 6.4 9.9 6.3

No 89.6 90.3 92.4 93.6 90.1 93.7

Other Characteristics

Limited English 6.5 4.8 na na 7.3 6.0

Single parent 43.7 43.7 na na 29.0 26.0

Veteran 6.5 5.1 7.6 5.9 8.7 7.7

Labor Force

Employed 18.2 27.6 18.3 13.8 12.4 25.9

Not employed 81.8 72.4 81.7 86.2 87.6 74.1

UI Status

Claimant 8.8 11.7 na na 17.6 14.7

Exhaustee 3.3 2.9 na na 4.2 4.4

Neither 87.9 85.5 na na 78.2 80.8

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages, except N of cases. SPIR data represent figures for adults (Title 

II-A) and older workers (Section 204d) who received more than only an objective assessment. Data from 

the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures. A ‘—‘ represents a percentage near zero.
II-24

Table 2: Adult Program 

Comparison of the Services Received by Exiters

PY 2001 WIASRD Data

JTPA JTPA WIA Adult Registrants

SPIR

PY 98

Carry 

Overs Total

Core 

Only

IntensiveNo Trng Training

N of cases 163,223 11,898 160,529 36,344 57,648 66,537

Highest Tier of Service

Core only na 5.2 22.6 100 --- ---

Intensive (no Trng) na 12.0 35.9 --- 100 ---

Training na 82.8 41.5 --- --- 100

Service Received

Basic skills instruction 18.1 7.3 2.1 --- 0.1 5.1

On-the-job training 9.4 3.2 5.1 --- --- 12.8

Other occ trng 66.6 74.7 32.9 --- --- 82.1

Other training 12.7 na na na na na

Months of Participation

Up to 3 months 26.4 --- 34.1 52.9 38.5 20.1

3 to 6 months 26.6 --- 24.1 21.2 24.0 25.7

6 to 9 months 16.6 --- 16.3 11.7 15.4 19.7

9 months to 1 year 10.0 --- 10.6 6.3 10.2 13.5

More than 1 year 20.4 100 14.8 7.9 12.0 21.1

Supportive Services, Any 46.5 36.8 25.3 15.9 21.8 33.5

Needs-payments 11.5 7.2 2.9 0.1 3.0 4.4

Other supp. services 42.1 33.0 23.7 15.9 19.7 31.5

Concurrent Participation, 

Any 14.4 28.9 22.8 14.7 22.7 27.2

Other JTPA/WIA 10.3 6.2 2.8 1.7 2.6 3.5

Non-JTPA/WIA 5.7 24.1 20.8 13.3 20.9 24.8

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages, except N of cases. SPIR data represent figures for adults (Title 

II-A) and older workers (Section 204d) who received more than only an objective assessment. Data from 

the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures. A ‘—‘ represents a percentage near zero.
II-25

Table 3: Dislocated Worker Program 

Comparison of the Characteristics of Exiters

PY 2001 WIASRD Data

JTPA JTPA WIA Dislocated Worker Registrants

SPIR

PY 98

Carry 

Overs Total

Core 

Only

IntensiveNo Trng Training

N of cases 240,896 20,792 109,169 16,667 42,966 49,536

Gender

Female 53.9 60.4 47.9 48.1 50.7 45.3

Male 46.1 39.6 52.1 51.9 49.3 54.7

Age

18 to 21 3.5 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.1

22 to 29 15.7 14.7 13.5 13.0 12.4 14.6

30 to 44 45.1 46.5 43.5 42.8 41.9 45.1

45 to 54 25.4 26.5 29.1 29.2 30.4 28.0

55 or more 10.3 9.8 11.8 12.7 13.3 10.1

Race/Ethnic

American Indian 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.3

Asian/Pacific Islander 3.6 4.2 4.7 4.1 5.1 4.4

Black (not Hispanic) 18.2 18.3 14.1 13.8 13.6 14.7

Hispanic 15.5 13.9 16.9 13.0 20.7 15.0

White (not Hispanic) 61.7 62.5 63.7 68.4 60.1 65.1

Highest Grade Completed

Less than high school 12.3 11.5 na na 14.2 11.3

High school graduate 50.9 52.2 na na 47.6 54.3

Post high school 36.8 36.6 na na 38.3 34.4

Disability

Yes 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.3 3.7

No 95.4 95.7 96.0 95.9 95.7 96.3

Other Characteristics

Limited English 6.1 4.8 na na 7.6 4.8

Single parent 15.4 14.6 na na 11.2 10.9

Veteran 11.2 10.1 10.3 10.5 9.4 11.1

Displaced homemaker 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.4

Labor Force

Employed 13.3 22.0 8.2 8.0 7.7 8.8

Not employed 86.7 78.0 91.8 92.0 92.3 91.2

UI Status

Claimant 65.8 53.5 na na 71.2 68.3

Exhaustee 6.3 7.2 na na 4.5 5.5

Neither 27.9 39.3 na na 24.3 26.3

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages, except N of cases. SPIR data represent figures for the 

dislocated worker (Title III) program. Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures.
II-26

Table 4: Dislocated Worker Program 

Comparison of the Services Received by Exiters

PY 2001 WIASRD Data

JTPA JTPA WIA Adult Registrants

SPIR

PY 98

Carry 

Overs Total

Core 

Only

IntensiveNo Trng Training

N of cases 240,896 20,792 109,169 16,667 42,966 49,536

Highest Tier of Service

Core only na 5.4 15.3 100 --- ---

Intensive (no Trng) na 13.7 39.4 --- 100 ---

Training na 80.9 45.4 --- --- 100

Service Received

Basic skills instruction 10.9 5.4 2.6 --- 0.4 5.3

On-the-job training 4.4 1.4 3.9 --- --- 8.7

Other occ trng 53.4 71.7 39.1 --- --- 86.0

Months of Participation

Up to 3 months 24.9 --- 24.3 40.2 28.9 14.9

3 to 6 months 24.6 --- 26.5 26.7 26.7 26.2

6 to 9 months 15.2 --- 19.3 16.1 18.2 21.3

9 months to 1 year 9.6 --- 12.8 8.5 11.7 15.2

More than 1 year 25.7 100 17.2 8.5 14.5 22.4

Supportive Services, Any 34.1 26.8 20.9 11.9 15.3 28.8

Needs-payments 4.5 4.7 1.0 --- 0.8 1.6

Other supp. services 32.0 24.3 20.4 11.9 14.8 28.2

Concurrent Participation,

Any 16.3 26.0 26.0 17.6 25.8 29.1

Other JTPA/WIA 12.9 2.5 2.2 0.9 2.3 2.6

Non-JTPA/WIA 4.0 24.1 24.6 17.1 24.2 27.5

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages, except N of cases. SPIR data represent figures for the 

dislocated worker (Title III) program. Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures.
II-27

Table 5: Youth Program 

Comparison of the Characteristics of Exiters

JTPA Title II-C

SPIR PY 98

JTPA 

Carry-Overs

WIA 

Registrants

N of cases 72,050 11,042 115,260

Gender

Female 59.5 54.6 52.7

Male 40.5 45.4 47.4

Age

14 to 15 8.4 33.9 32.5

16 to 17 33.5 38.5 36.7

18 or more 58.1 27.6 30.8

Race/Ethnic

American Indian 2.1 2.5 2.1

Asian/Pacific Islander 2.9 2.4 2.7

Black (not Hispanic) 33.2 31.9 33.4

Hispanic 23.6 23.6 34.8

White (not Hispanic) 38.2 40.0 27.7

Highest Grade Completed

Less than high school 70.8 82.5 86.6

High school graduate 26.0 14.6 12.2

Post high school 3.2 2.9 1.2

Student Status

Attending school 42.1 77.2 71.0

Not in school 57.9 22.8 29.0

Low Income

Yes 95.4 91.4 94.6

No 4.6 8.7 5.4

Cash Welfare Recipient 22.7 17.9 19.4

TANF/AFDC 19.0 12.3 12.6

GA, SSI, RCA 4.3 6.4 7.5

Disability

Yes 15.4 21.2 14.8

No 84.6 78.8 85.2

Other Specified Barriers

Basic skills deficient 69.6 55.3 63.4

Pregnant/parenting 22.8 9.6 10.2

School dropout 31.4 9.8 17.8

Disability (substantial) 11.9 11.4 6.2

Homeless or runaway 1.5 1.6 2.3

Offender (inc misd) 12.9 6.8 8.7

SDA/Other Barrier 31.5 24.9 51.2
II-28

Table 5 (continued) 

JTPA Title II-C

SPIR PY 98

JTPA 

Carry-Overs

WIA 

Registrants

Other Characteristics

Limited English 4.0 8.5 14.2

Single parent 19.5 7.5 8.1

Veteran 0.0 0.4 0.5

Labor Force

Employed 13.3 9.6 5.7

Not employed 86.7 90.4 94.3

UI Status

Claimant 1.1 10.0 14.8

Exhaustee 1.0 0.7 3.6

Neither 97.9 89.3 81.5

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages, except N of cases. SPIR data represent figures for 

youth in the year-round (Title II-C) program who received more than only an objective 

assessment. Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures.
II-29

Table 6: Youth Program 

Comparison of the Services Received by Exiters

JTPA Title II-C

SPIR PY 98

JTPA 

Carry-Overs

WIA 

Registrants

N of cases 72,050 11,042 115,260

Services Received

Educational achievement 

services 45.6 55.9 53.7

Employment services 57.3 53.8 55.9

Summer youth employment 

opportunity na 61.8 48.3

Additional support na 24.3 24.4

Leadership development na 18.3 22.3

Follow-up services na 36.9 36.4

Other employment skills trng 34.2 na na

Supportive Services, Any 40.3 29.5 24.0

Needs-payments 8.7 8.5 4.4

Other than needs-payments 37.2 25.2 21.3

Months of Participation

Up to 3 months 18.7 --- 25.8

3 to 6 months 29.2 --- 20.6

6 to 9 months 22.5 --- 13.5

9 months to 1 year 11.9 --- 14.9

More than 1 year 17.7 100 25.2

Concurrent Participation, Any 18.6 13.2 8.9

Other JTPA/WIA 15.3 2.9 1.9

Non-JTPA/WIA 5.1 10.6 7.3

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages, except N of cases. SPIR data represent figures for 

youth in the year-round (Title II-C) program who received more than only an objective 

assessment. Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures.


 
III-1

III. PARTNERSHIP BUILDING UNDER WIA

This briefing paper is part of a series developed as part of the Evaluation of the 

Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates and 

Technical Assistance and Training Corporation. The evaluation consists thus far of two 

rounds of site visits: the first round of site visits was conducted to six states and nine 

local workforce areas in the spring of 2000, and the second round was conducted to an 

additional eight state and fourteen local areas in the summer and fall of 2001. An 

overview of the evaluation is included as an appendix to this report. 

Partnership building, the theme for this briefing paper, is central to the 

implementation of WIA and the development of One-Stop systems, because strong 

partnerships represent one of the primary methods envisioned by the Act to develop a 

“seamless system of service delivery that will enhance access to programs’ services and 

improve employment outcomes for individuals receiving assistance.” 1 To reach this 

goal, the Act requires 17 federal programs to participate in One-Stop systems, including 

to:

 Make core services available to participants through the One-Stop 

system.

 Use a portion of their funds, in a way consistent with their authorizing 

legislation, to create and maintain the One-Stop delivery system and 

provide core services.

 Enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the local 

Board regarding the One-Stop system.

 Participate in the operation of the One-Stop system “consistent with the 

terms of the MOU and requirements of authorizing laws.”

 Provide representation on the Local Board.2

Although nearly all States and local areas that we visited in this study are in 

compliance with these requirements, the extent to which these mandatory partners and 

other optional partners are working together to create a “seamless system of service 

delivery” varies widely. 

 

1

 Workforce Investment Act, Final Rules, Section 662.100, Federal Register, August 11, 2000.

2

 Final Rules, Section 662.230.
III-2

This briefing paper will discuss the extent of partnership among the States and 

local case-study sites in both rounds of data collection and the methods these 

partnerships used to create seamless systems of service delivery with the aim of 

improving services for customers. We discuss the formal elements of partnerships, 

such as the development of MOUs and cost-sharing agreements, and some of the 

practical ways that partnerships develop and take hold. Finally, the paper summarizes 

the benefits and challenges associated with partnership development.

IDENTIFYING REQUIRED PARTNERS 

As noted, WIA identifies 17 Federal programs as required One-Stop partners.3 In 

addition, States had the authority to designate additional mandatory partners.4 Only 

five of the 14 case study States we visited across both rounds of site visits chose to do 

so; these were Florida, Illinois, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas. All five chose to 

mandate their State’s TANF program as a required partner, and four of the five also 

mandated participation by Food Stamp Employment and Training programs. The 

rationale for their involvement was that these partners serve similar customers and have 

similar goals involving employment. Illinois also mandated transportation agencies and 

the Bureau of Apprenticeship Training, while Pennsylvania also mandated economic 

development partners and organized labor.

MOUS AND COST SHARING

One of WIA’s requirements is that all One-Stop partners enter into an MOU with 

their local Board. At a minimum, these MOUs should include “a description of 

services, how the cost of the identified services and operating costs of the system will 

 

3

 Required partners include: WIA Adult, Dislocated Worker and Youth Programs, Job Corps, 

Native American Programs, Veteran’s workforce programs, Wagner-Peyser Act programs, Adult 

Education and Literacy activities authorized under WIA Title II, Programs authorized under Parts A and 

B of the Rehabilitation Act (Vocational Rehabilitation programs), Welfare-to-Work programs, Senior 

Community Service Employment activities under Title V of the Older American Act of 1965, 

Postsecondary Vocational Education activities under the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied 

Technology Education Act, Trade Adjustment Assistance and NAFTA Transitional Adjustment, local 

veteran’s employment representatives and disabled veteran’s outreach, Community Services Block Grant 

employment and training programs, Housing and Urban Development employment and training 

activities, State unemployment compensation programs. Ibid. 662.200.

4

 Optional partners could include TANF programs, Food Stamp Employment and Training 

programs, National and Community Service Act programs, and “other appropriate Federal, State or local 

programs, including programs related to transportation and housing and programs in the private sector.” 

Ibid. 662.210.
III-3

be funded, and methods for referrals.”5 In addition, each partner is required to 

contribute “a fair share” towards supporting the One-Stop system and providing core 

services as long as doing so is “not inconsistent with the Federal law authorizing the 

partner’s program...”.6 However, in actuality, both MOUs and cost sharing varied 

greatly among case-study sites.

State MOUs 

Although MOUs were not required at the State level, several case-study States 

developed MOUs between State-level workforce development partners. These 

agreements were designed to smooth out barriers to collaboration at the State level and 

set a positive example for local areas. 

Of the eight round-two States, Oregon, New York, Arizona and Montana all 

developed MOUs or interagency agreements between multiple State agencies. These 

agreements typically were between State workforce development agencies (which often 

included both ES and WIA Title IB programs), State education departments, State 

economic development or commerce departments, and sometimes the State department 

that administered the TANF program. In two other States, officials said that no Statelevel MOUs were signed because most of the key partners were already located under 

one State agency. Only one State reported major difficulties in developing an MOU at 

the State level and was able to negotiate only a single MOU between two agencies.

State and Federal Guidance on MOUs and Cost-Sharing

Most States provided local areas with very little guidance and technical assistance 

on developing MOUs and negotiating cost-sharing agreements. Typically, they just 

restated the Federal requirements. There were exceptions, however. One State, 

Oregon, mandated very specific language to meet the requirements of the State’s 

Attorney General, and two others, Texas and Minnesota, developed MOU templates for 

local areas to follow. Minnesota also required local areas to develop a detailed service 

matrix that specified all administrative and service activities taking place at the OneStop centers. One other State went further, providing extensive guidance and technical 

assistance to local areas by developing an MOU resource guide and sending teams to all 

 

5

Ibid. 662.230 (c).

6

 Ibid. 662.230 (b).
III-4

local areas to help with the MOU negotiation. Unfortunately, neither of the two local 

areas we visited in that State found these teams very useful.

With respect to cost allocation, again a majority of States passed on minimal 

guidance. Among the exceptions, Minnesota provided the most comprehensive 

guidance to local areas, developing a framework that requires one agency to be the lead 

for billing and invoice purposes and recommends the use of one or more of four 

specific cost-sharing methods: (1) direct charges when costs can be billed to one 

program; (2) allocation based on the percentage of space being used by each partner; 

(3) allocation based on the percentage of staff FTEs each partner has on-site; and (4) 

estimated use based on studies of actual usage. Minnesota also requires that all OneStop center costs must be accounted for through one of these methods, and that costsharing agreements must be reviewed annually by the State. Georgia was also in the 

process of trying to create a “resource-sharing methodology” for use by local areas that 

would require resource contributions to One-Stop centers proportionate to the benefits 

received by each partners’ customers. 

Other guidance that locals received was DOL’s cost-allocation paper. Although 

locals thought it made good sense in principle, most felt that it was generally not very 

useful in assisting them with the difficult process of actually negotiating cost-sharing 

agreements. 

General Form and Content of MOUs

As noted above, the WIA legislation requires each mandatory One-Stop partner to 

enter into an MOU with the local board. One local area had yet to finalize its MOUs, 

because it had not yet negotiated specific agreements about staff co-location or cost 

allocation. The others areas had MOUs in place, and they included relatively specific 

information on the number and duties of co-located staff and coordinated services, but 

often little or no information about cost-sharing. 

These MOUs could be umbrella agreements including all partners, or local 

Boards could negotiate individual agreements with each partner. In the case-study 

sites, the majority of local areas opted for negotiating umbrella MOUs, although some 

went on to develop individual cost-sharing agreements.

Cost-sharing Agreements

The WIA legislation requires that One-Stop partners “contribute a fair share of 

the operating costs of the One-Stop delivery system proportionate to the use of the 
III-5

system by individuals attributable to the partner’s program.”7 WIA regulations further 

describe a number of methods that can be used to allocate costs, including “direct 

charges, cost pooling, indirect cost rates, and activity-based cost allocation plans.”8 

The legislation, however, does not specify whether this support should be in-kind 

or through financial contributions. Because it is typically much easier for partners to 

contribute in-kind resources, such as staff time and equipment, rather than funding, 

many local areas have negotiated cost-sharing agreements that are primarily based on 

these in-kind resources. Of the round-two local areas, about half had negotiated costallocation agreements that were entirely or almost entirely based on in-kind 

contributions. Most of these cost allocation agreements consisted of partners’ 

contributing staff time, equipment, or printed materials. 

Other round-two local areas developed cost-sharing agreements that involved a 

mixture of financial and in-kind contributions. The methods used by these local areas 

to allocate costs among the partners varied. The most common method for allocating 

costs, used by three local areas, was based on the amount of space occupied by each 

partner at the One-Stop center, which was usually determined by the number of colocated staff. In another area, Portland Worksystems, one One-Stop center allocated 

costs to partners based directly on the amount of time staff were co-located. Chicago 

and Suffolk County were the only two local sites that specifically attempted to 

determine at least a portion of partners’ “fair share” based on the use of the One-Stop 

system by their customers.9 Suffolk County allocated costs based on both the amount of 

space utilized by partners and by the percentage of each partners’ customers served by 

the system. Chicago has a more complicated scheme, in that five partners agreed to 

contribute $37,650 each, with additional expenses needed to support the Resource 

Rooms apportioned such that half of all costs are shared equally and half are paid in 

proportion to customer usage. 

One of the most comprehensive systems for sharing One-Stop center costs was 

developed over ten years ago by partners in the Medford Job Council local area. In 

 

7

 Ibid. 662.270.

8

 Ibid.

9

 Although, as noted above, Georgia is attempting to create a method to do so for its local areas to 

use.
III-6

that local area, partners pay a full or part-time10 annual One-Stop membership fee, 

which is determined annually by partners. Although this amount was not huge, (the full 

time membership fee was $12,500 in 2001), because all partners contribute it is 

sufficient to cover the One-Stop center’s newsletter, website, rent, utilities, internet 

connection, maintenance and janitorial fees, basic telephone, books & periodicals, 

postage, copier & marketing materials. Partners who need special space or access pay 

more and those who are only on-site for short periods pay a lesser “desk fee.” 

Regardless of the method used to apportion costs, in only four local areas did 

more than two or three partners make major cash contributions to the One-Stop system, 

largely because other partners were not willing or able to do so. Moreover, two local 

areas had yet to develop cost-sharing agreements largely because they had not yet 

developed agreements with partners regarding co-location of staff.

Difficulties in Developing MOUs and Cost-Sharing Agreements

The process of developing MOUs and cost-sharing agreements among round-two 

sites was generally very difficult with only a few exceptions, and only two local areas 

said that they thought MOUs and cost-sharing agreements had been beneficial to OneStop partnerships. By contrast, officials in two States alleged that the process had 

actually harmed partnerships. Officials in one of those States said that forcing local 

partnerships to formalize cost-sharing agreements led to unnecessary conflict once all 

the partners could see how much others were contributing. Another local area 

described the process of developing MOUs as “painful” and said that it had created 

“hard feelings” between local partners. Another noted that one of the first times that 

partners had gotten together was because they needed to negotiate cost sharing and, 

hence, before relationships—and trust—had been established and the benefits of strong 

partnerships had been explored. Other local areas said that the MOUs themselves were 

not useful to partnerships, because they were either too vague, overly focused on 

compliance, or simply detracted from the process of trying to bring partners closer 

together.

This was quite different from the experience of a majority of round-one casestudy sites who said the process of developing MOUs had gone smoothly. This 

difference may be at least partly due to the fact that at the time of the site visits, few of 

 

10 Full or part-time membership is based on the number of co-located staff at the center.
III-7

these round-one local areas had developed cost-sharing agreements, which are typically 

far more difficult to develop than MOUs. 

Local areas offered several explanations for why they found the development of 

MOUs and cost-sharing agreements so difficult and unhelpful. While some of these 

problems were due to overall challenges to partnering, which are discussed later in this 

paper, two challenges specifically related to MOUs and cost sharing were States’ 

stringent requirements and partners’ lack of flexible funding. 

Despite the fact that most States provided little guidance for developing MOUs, a 

few had very stringent requirements for approving them. For example, in two States 

the process of getting MOUs and cost-sharing agreements approved by the State was 

particularly onerous, because State Attorneys General either required very specific legal 

language to be inserted or refused to approve State agencies’ commitments to costsharing that the locals had negotiated. This resulted in MOUs having to be revised 

several times before they were approved and caused significant extra work for local 

area staff, which they felt detracted from other more important service delivery tasks. 

In another State, MOUs and cost-sharing agreements had to go through numerous 

iterations before they were approved because the State wanted to set extremely stringent 

requirements for cost-sharing that needed to include cash contributions. As a result of 

these requirements, one of two local case-study sites in the State still had not had its 

MOU approved by the State by the time of our site visit and had given up on trying to 

do so because trying to get partners to contribute additional resources was causing 

unnecessary tensions in the partnership. The other local area we visited in the same 

State also refused to try and replace in-kind contributions with cash contributions, 

because staff felt the process would harm partnerships and was unrealistic.

The other major challenge specific to cost sharing was caused by partners’ lack of 

flexible funding to contribute to One-Stop partnerships. For example, veterans’

programs and VR partners both claimed that their authorizing legislation prohibited 

them from using their funding to support non-eligible customers, which made it difficult 

for them to support One-Stop centers that provide benefits to universal customers. 

Similarly, in one round-one local area, adult education partners noted that only a 

limited amount of their funding could go to support administrative costs, such as 

overhead for One-Stop centers, which limited the amount they could contribute overall. 
III-8

Other, more practical considerations came into play. For example, some partners 

felt that they could not provide funding to pay for One-Stop centers because they could 

not get out of their current leases for building space and could not afford to support rent 

on two buildings at one time. 

OVERALL EXTENT OF PARTNER INVOLVEMENT 

MOUs and the negotiations that accompanied their development set the stage for 

partnership formation in a formal way, but the various agencies still needed to begin the 

process of working together to create a One-Stop system. Overall, as a result of WIA, 

and particularly due to the creation of State and local Workforce Investment Boards, 

many One-Stop partners said that they now felt like they were a part of a workforce 

development system. However, we found that different partners generally seemed to be 

affected in different ways and to different degrees. Not surprisingly, WIA 

implementation has resulted in somewhat greater involvement by workforce 

development agencies, with lesser involvement by others. These general patterns are 

discussed below. 

Employment Service and Other SESA Partners

State Employment Security agencies (SESA)—which typically administer 

Wagner-Peyser labor exchange (Employment Service), Unemployment Insurance (UI), 

Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance 

programs, and Veterans Employment and Training Services—are generally the most 

significant partners, with WIA Title IB, in the One-Stop system. Their heavy 

involvement stems from the fact that the Employment Service (ES) shares the mandate 

with WIA Title IB to serve the broadest array of workforce development customers. 

Despite this partially shared mandate, the amount of SESA integration into WIA 

implementation and One-Stop systems varied greatly. For example, about as many of 

the WIA State and local staff that we visited in the second round complained about the 

lack of collaboration with SESA as said they have a good relationship with SESA. 

Sometimes, even when workforce development officials at the State level talked about 

how integrated SESA was with WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs and the 

One-Stop system, local areas still complained about SESA’s lack of interest in 

partnering.

SESA staff are almost always regular participants in WIA State and local 

Workforce Investment Boards. However, the clearest measurement of involvement of 
III-9

SESA agencies noted by local case-study sites was the extent of SESA, particularly ES, 

staff co-location at One-Stop centers. Usually, the more SESA program staff colocated at One-Stop centers, the more likely SESA was to support the One-Stop system 

with financial and in-kind resources. ES staff were more likely to be co-located at OneStop centers in greater numbers when the One-Stop system was primarily controlled by 

the SESA, as was the case in 8 of the 14 States we visited in both rounds of data 

collection and an even larger proportion of local areas.

Most SESA staff who are co-located at One-Stop centers provide services through 

Wagner-Peyser programs. Largely because most States have shifted to remote UI filing 

via phone or the Internet, there usually is much less UI program involvement. Thus, 

although WIA registration requires customers to be given access to UI programs at 

comprehensive One-Stop centers, this generally involved providing customers with 

basic instructions on how to file via the phone or Internet, except in Virginia and 

Illinois (which require customers to file in person) and to a lesser extent Oregon and 

Minnesota.11

Overall, WIA has not had a major effect on the way services were provided by 

SESA. The major effect of WIA on SESA was the increase in the number of SESA 

staff who were co-located at One-Stop centers and the increased number of SESA or ES 

offices that were either comprehensive or affiliate One-Stop centers themselves. This 

has resulted in many SESA employees taking on new duties and learning more about 

other workforce development programs. According to one ES manager, this has caused 

her agency to focus on better educating ES workers about other workforce development 

services so they can do a better job of referring customers to the services they need. 

Only in Georgia did ES officials note that the passage of WIA had prompted the agency 

to shift the way it provided employment services, such as by providing different levels 

of service to customers based on their needs. 

Veterans’ workforce programs were less affected. Veteran’s program staff 

typically spent some time at most comprehensive One-Stop centers, including those 

operated by non-SESA entities. But they were usually on-site for very limited periods 

and they almost never provided services to customers who were not specifically eligible 

 

11 Oregon allows initial applications to be filed in person or through the mail, and Minnesota 

requires UI applicants to file remotely but requires that they attend an orientation at a One-Stop center 

before they can receive benefits.
III-10

for veterans’ workforce programs. They also rarely provided funding or resources to 

support One-Stop systems beyond in-kind staff time used for serving veterans. Even 

getting these commitments from veterans’ programs was often described as a challenge.

However, in a step in a more positive direction, an agreement between the 

Oregon SESA and the Oregon Governor’s Office outlined a number of steps to better 

integrate veterans’ workforce programs with the State’s One-Stop system, including by 

having veterans’ program staff ensure that One-Stop staff were knowledgeable about 

programs available to veterans and their eligibility rules. 

Adult Education and Literacy

Adult education and literacy providers who receive WIA Title II funding are also 

mandated One-Stop partners according to WIA, but had varying levels of involvement 

in practice. In several States and local areas—including in Suffolk and Erie Counties in 

NY, the Medford and Portland areas in Oregon, and the Chicago Mayor’s Office and 

DuPage County in Illinois—adult education and literacy programs had very strong 

relationships with One-Stop systems and also often contributed in-kind or financial 

resources to support the One-Stop system. However, in States whose One-Stop systems 

tended to be dominated by workforce agencies that included most other mandatory 

partners, adult education and literacy tended to be less well integrated. In addition, 

although adult education and literacy providers were often key partners in One-Stop 

systems and were typically represented on State and local Boards, they typically colocated few staff.

Several adult education providers reported that WIA had affected them in a 

positive way by helping them to become better integrated into the evolving workforce 

development system. For example, in Suffolk County, adult education providers noted 

that WIA had helped them to move from being workforce development “vendors” to 

becoming true “partners.” In the Medford Job Council local area, one of the primary 

providers of adult education and literacy services also said that its participation on both 

the local Board and in the One-Stop system had helped it to stop being an “isolationist”

and work better with both workforce development agency partners and employers. In 

DuPage, an adult education provider commented that having staff co-located at OneStop centers had helped them to take more of a case management approach with their 

customers.
III-11

Welfare-to-Work and TANF

Although Welfare-to-Work (WtW) programs are mandatory One-Stop partners 

under WIA, TANF programs are not (except in certain States). As a result, while 

WtW programs were often well integrated into One-Stop systems, the relationship with 

TANF programs was less close and depended on the local area, even in States where 

TANF was a required One-Stop partner. Several case-study sites where TANF and 

WtW connections were the strongest were in States and local areas where welfare 

agencies had long collaborated or contracted with workforce development agencies for 

the provision of employment-related services to TANF customers. In these areas, 

numerous TANF staff were typically co-located, TANF managers were more likely to 

participate in local and State Boards, and the TANF program contributed financially to 

One-Stop centers. 

Vocational Rehabilitation

Although Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) programs are also mandatory One-Stop 

partners under WIA, they were rarely well integrated into local One-Stop partnerships. 

For example, in only three of the 23 local areas that we visited could VR be considered 

a strong partner. By contrast, in other case-study sites VR was often described by local 

Board staff as a less willing partner, and VR staff were typically only co-located at 

One-Stop centers for very limited amounts of time. In addition, as with veterans’ 

program staff, VR staff were unable to serve any customers except those who were 

specifically eligible for VR services. 

More broadly, several VR staff in round-two sites had concerns about 

participation in One-Stop systems. One VR staff person mentioned a concern that OneStop centers were less accessible to the disabled than VR offices were. This individual 

also raised concerns about the confidentiality of customer data and the need to educate 

One-Stop staff about VR eligibility. Another VR staff person questioned whether OneStop staff would be able to serve VR customers as well as VR staff could, particularly 

in the area of assessment. These concerns were similar to those expressed by VR staff 

in some of the local areas we visited in round-one, who were worried that co-location at 

One-Stop centers would result in less attention being paid to customers with disabilities. 

Yet, VR staff were still optimistic that these concerns could be solved and VR 

programs would eventually become better integrated into One-Stop systems.
III-12

Other Partners

Respondents also mentioned a number of other required partners as playing a role 

in One-Stop systems. These partners typically had staff co-located at One-Stop centers 

only a few hours per week and were less likely than other partners to be members of 

local or State Boards or contribute to One-Stop centers. 

Among these, Job Corps was mentioned as a partner in several round-two sites. 

In those sites, Job Corps typically had a representative on the local Youth Council and 

had outreach and admissions staff co-located at One-Stop centers for a few hours a 

week. Programs providing Title V Older Workers services were also occasionally 

members of local Boards and sometimes had staff co-located at One-Stop centers or 

even had customers working there. For example, in the Balance of Maricopa County 

local area, Older Worker program customers provided clerical support to One-Stop 

centers, such as by answering phones, monitoring the resource room, working in the 

reception area, or performing other clerical duties.

Only three case-study sites said that Indian and Native American programs were 

members of their Boards and had staff co-located at One-Stop centers for a few hours a 

week. Programs supported by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban 

Development were also only occasionally reported as being involved with One-Stop 

systems and few of them had staff even occasionally co-located at the One-Stop center.

CREATING A SEAMLESS SYSTEM OF SERVICE DELIVERY

To promote the development of a broader workforce development and human 

service system that included the programs discussed in the previous section, DOL 

outlined a broad range of possibilities that would satisfy WIA requirements. These 

ranged from “simple co-location with coordinated delivery” to “full integration” that 

would involve coordinating and administering all partner programs under a single 

management structure and accounting system.12 

The discussion of involvement by the various mandatory and suggested partners 

illustrates the fact that States and local areas had different notions of what a One-Stop 

system should look like and varied in the extent to which they were willing or able to 

 

12 Resource Sharing for Workforce Investment Act One-Stop Centers: Methodologies for Paying 

of Funding Each Partner Program’s Fair Share of Allocable One-Stop Costs; Notice. Federal Register, 

June 27, 2000.
III-13

create a “seamless system.” Many sites focused on developing One-Stop systems 

where all partners would have staff co-located on-site, because they felt that doing so 

was efficient for both customers and the agencies themselves. For example, staff at one 

site asserted that co-location was critical because, even with extensive cross-training, no 

one staff person could learn enough about partner programs to make things truly 

seamless. Another local area talked about the importance and benefit of being able to 

walk customers over to a staff person from a partner agency, rather than having to do a 

paper or phone referral that may sit on someone’s desk for weeks.

Other case-study sites focused on other ways of improving their State or local 

area’s workforce development system. For example, some sites were attempting to 

make the system seamless through developing better electronic linkages and referral 

systems. Although they felt that co-location was important, they noted that there were 

circumstances that might make it very difficult or even impossible to do so, such as the 

constraint of existing leases and the need to find new space that was large enough and 

configured appropriately. Faced with these circumstances, these sites found that it was 

not so important for agencies to be located in the same building so long as services 

were well integrated and customers could access them efficiently. 

Most case study sites were interested in trying to develop both physical One-Stops 

with most partners co-located on-site and more integrated workforce development 

systems. Several sites specifically mentioned that although they had succeeded in 

having many partners co-located, they were striving for much more. For example, the 

Illinois WIA plan indicates that the State wants “to establish a system with seamless 

integration of services that moves beyond co-location.” And in one local area, one 

agency with staff co-located at a One-Stop said that, although co-location was 

important, they would like to see a common management information system (MIS) to 

help partners become better integrated. Other sites talked about the need to develop a 

common intake system and eliminate paper referrals. 

With these varying visions in mind, case-study sites utilized a variety of different 

service delivery and other methods to bring about the development of a seamless system 

of service delivery among partners through the One-Stop system. These methods 

usually centered on physical One-Stop centers, including shared reception, intake and 

orientation, and multi-agency teams, but sometimes extended beyond the centers 

themselves. Although each of these methods could be used separately, generally, the 

more of them that are used together the more seamless the system was likely to be.
III-14

Coordinating Services Dependent on Staff Proximity

As the discussion above suggests, most of the case study sites saw co-location of 

partner staff at One-Stop centers as central to developing strong partnerships and 

integrated services. In keeping with this, all round-two sites had staff from at least two 

required partner programs (usually one was the provider of WIA Adult and Dislocated 

Worker programs) co-located on-site at their comprehensive One-Stop centers. 

Nonetheless, fewer sites—including those in Suffolk and Erie Counties in New York, 

DuPage in Illinois, and the Medford and Portland local areas in Oregon, among 

others—had succeeded in co-locating staff from most or all One-Stop partners. 

Moreover, four local areas had only limited co-location from few partners, with colocated staff typically on-site for minimal periods of time and interacting little. Part of 

the reason why co-location was not more common were the practical difficulties 

involved, as we will discuss later in this paper.

Where it did occur, co-location was generally viewed as very beneficial, because 

it helped partners get to know each other better and made client referrals easier. 

However, it also made possible the sharing or coordination of certain functions or 

duties that occur at the One-Stop center, such as intake and orientation and service 

delivery. 

Shared Intake, Orientation, and Reception. Even where States and local areas 

had been successful in developing relationships with partners that led to extensive colocation, many did not think co-location was enough to guarantee seamless services. In 

fact, unless other methods were used with co-location, service delivery may have been 

only marginally improved. For example, in two local areas we visited, partners were 

located in the same building, but maintained separate offices with no shared reception 

area, and the partners interacted little. The result has been only marginal improvement 

in convenience for customers. In a few other local areas, although partners shared 

office space, there was little coordination among them and each partner still carried out 

services separately, in one case even to the point of having separate resource rooms. 

In an effort to move beyond simple co-location, nearly all local areas 

implemented shared intake, orientation, and a common reception area in One-Stop 

centers. The most common of these methods was the use of a shared receptionist or 

greeter. While only occasionally is the staffing of this position shared among colocated partner staff, the greeter is almost always cross-trained on all partners’ services 

available at the One-Stop so that she or he can help customers find what they need. 
III-15

Some local areas and States were also jointly providing staff to work in Resource 

Rooms. These staff typically also play a role in directing customers to appropriate 

partner services.

Common intake forms and processes were also used by several case study sites 

and sometimes required partners to develop a confidentiality form to share participant 

data. Use of a joint orientation was also somewhat common, and sometimes involved 

co-located staff presenting information about their own programs. 

Multi-agency Teams. Multi-agency teams represent another method used to 

integrate services at One-Stop centers by a few local areas. These teams were both 

formal and informal. Among the informal arrangements, in two local areas partners 

had created informal teams centered around serving common customers, and, in other 

local areas, co-located staff were informally sharing assessment information for 

common customers. 

By contrast, other areas established formal teams made up of staff from an agency 

that administers multiple workforce development programs, and the teams were 

charged with providing services for these multiple programs in an integrated fashion. 

For example, Rural Minnesota established 11 teams of eight caseworkers and a 

manager who work in the local area’s various One-Stop centers and are responsible for 

assessment, intake and providing services for all programs administered by the 

Concentrated Employment Program, including WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker 

Programs, WtW, and TANF, among others. Similarly, in Utah, One-Stop staff from 

the Department of Workforce Services with expertise in various areas, such as training, 

TANF requirements, placement and eligibility, are assigned to integrated services 

teams. All team members work with customers in all areas and rely on their teammates to assist them with providing services in areas where they have less expertise. 

The Northern Tier of Pennsylvania has also fully embraced the concept of multiagency teams that included staff from partner agencies. Supervisors assign One-Stop 

center staff to the following functional units: a Primary Services Unit that focuses on 

conducting WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Program intake and eligibility, 

assessments, and basic career counseling; a Job Seeker Unit that focuses on job 

readiness training and supportive services; an Employer Services Unit that conducts 

marketing to employers and provides most employer services; and a Career Resources 

Unit that assists customers in the Resource Room and with accessing the system. The 
III-16

only co-located staff who are not involved with these teams are VR and veterans’ 

program staff, who could only work with customers eligible for their programs. The 

Three Rivers local area in Pennsylvania was also planning to develop similar teams at 

the time we visited it in PY 2000.

Coordinating Services Not Dependent on Staff Proximity

Local areas developed other methods of coordinating service delivery or in 

partnering that were not dependent on being physically co-located in One-Stop centers. 

These included joint referral systems, staff cross-training, and electronic linkages.

Referral Systems. A key aspect of ensuring that the workforce development 

system is seamless involves the implementation of smooth and effective referrals, to 

ensure that customers, and information about them, get to the right place. Effective 

referral systems are particularly critical where partner staff are not co-located at OneStop centers and staff making a referral cannot just walk a customer over to a partner 

agency staff-person’s desk. 

We found evidence of referral systems originating at both the State and local 

levels. For example, the Georgia Employment Service, which has a contract to provide 

employment services for TANF recipients, developed an electronic intake and referral 

system with the TANF program. In Oregon, the State developed the concept of “valueadded referrals,” which means providing each customer with an annotated listing of 

partner services and assisting them with making an appointment with the appropriate 

partner program. 

In addition, many other local areas said they had or were developing referral 

systems. Moreover, about half of all local areas we visited in round two said that there 

was extensive co-enrollment between various One-Stop partners, although none said 

they kept exact records

Training and Cross-training. Another important aspect of making the system 

seamless, and a critical part of making good referrals, is the cross-training of staff, a 

basic step in ensuring that customers can go to any partner in the One-Stop system and 

be assured of being accurately referred or directed to whichever services they need. 

Because cross-training is so fundamental to One-Stop systems, cross-training or other 

training between partners was mentioned in all but one of the 23 local areas we visited. 

We observed various instances of this, which can be summarized as follows:
III-17

 Information-sharing about one another’s programs. To facilitate the 

referral process and generally keep partners up-to-date, some local areas 

provide partners with the regular opportunity to give updates on their 

programs. For example, at the comprehensive One-Stop Center in the 

Medford Job Council local area, co-located partners have the 

opportunity to provide both oral and written updates on their programs 

at the center’s weekly staff meeting. For this reason, the local area has 

found that cross-information training is more effective among co-located 

staff who have the opportunity to make and receive these regular 

updates. In Portland Worksystems, one One-Stop partnership has dealt 

with the issue of keeping information up-to-date by creating a website 

for staff, which can be updated at any time with detailed information on 

each partner’s programs. According to one partner, they did this 

because, despite extensive cross-training, some staff had trouble being 

able to retain enough information about all of the partners’ programs to 

provide accurate referrals. 

 Team-building to improve the general capacity of staff, usually colocated, to work together.

 Cross-training in which staff are able to provide specific services for 

another program. For example, in the Balance of Maricopa County and 

Yuma County, State ES staff have provided training to Adult and 

Dislocated Worker program staff at One-Stop centers on how to use the 

online ES system and Unemployment Insurance (UI) program 

procedures, to enable those staff to assist customers with accessing these 

two ES functions when no ES staff are available.

Electronic Linkage. Developing electronic linkages between partners was 

another important means of making the workforce development system more seamless. 

These electronic linkages can include shared management information systems (MIS), 

shared case management, shared intake and referral systems, and Internet linkages (see 

the companion paper on MIS and Oversight for information about efforts to create 

shared MIS capabilities). 

There are a number of ways electronic linkages can lead to more seamless 

services. For example, a shared MIS would lead to more integrated systems by 

allowing partners to examine program results throughout the workforce development 

system. This could help policymakers make strategic decisions about where to focus 

resources. Shared reporting systems could also save staff time because some basic data 

would only have to be entered once. Similarly, shared case management systems allow 

partners to work together more closely on shared customers by allowing staff to see 

what other services customers have received and read case notes and thereby prevent 
III-18

the duplication of services. Joint intake and referral save staff time entering basic 

customer information and make it easier for staff who are not co-located to share this 

information and make sure customer referrals do not get lost between agencies. 

Unfortunately, because most of these systems are either in development or very new, it 

is not yet clear how much they have assisted partnerships or resulted in improved 

services to customers. 

As the companion briefing paper on MIS and Oversight suggests, developing joint 

MIS capabilities was often carried out as a State function. Thus, four round-two States 

and three round-one States are developing a joint One-Stop operating system. For 

example, among the round-two states, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, and New York 

have developed or are developing shared MIS for reporting for all or most DOL-funded 

programs. However, thus far only Minnesota will cover non-DOL Federal programs, 

such as TANF, Food Stamps, and subsidized childcare. Oregon is also in the process 

of creating a shared workforce development system that will include reporting for 

numerous State, Federal, and even local programs, including TANF, WIA Title IB, ES 

and Title II Adult Education providers. Finally, one local area, Portland Worksystems, 

has developed a shared reporting and customer information system for its local area and 

is now in the process of bringing in local partners, beginning with the Portland Housing 

Authority.

Five round-two States and four round-one States are also developing shared case 

management systems among One-Stop partners. However, in five of these States, this 

case management function will only be available within the State’s consolidated

workforce development agency that typically includes ES, WIA Adult and Dislocated 

Worker Programs, and other DOL funded programs. Rural Minnesota has also 

developed its own local case management system, which it shares with State ES agency 

staff who work in the local area. All seven States that are developing One-Stop 

Operating Systems are also creating shared intake systems. 

A few other local areas are using shared websites to further link partners. For 

example, in Southwest Georgia, the local Board’s website shows the schedule for all 

partner staff at the Albany One-Stop center, which allows both customers and staff to 

determine exactly when they can meet with those staff members. A Portland 

Worksystems One-Stop partnership has also developed a website with information on 

each partner’s program. Finally, the Medford Job Council requires all One-Stop
III-19

centers and affiliate sites in its local area to have Internet access in order to allow staff 

and customers to link directly to partners’ websites.

Coordination Through Governance

Governance bodies also have become an effective vehicle for partnership 

building, including State and local WIBs (and their subcommittees), state administrative 

teams, and governance bodies established especially at One-Stop centers.

Overall Workforce System Governance. An important means of developing a 

seamless workforce development system is to create governance and organizational 

structures that provide a forum for partners to meet and discuss issues related to 

partnership and service integration. The creation of State and local Workforce 

Development Boards has generally been successful in creating such forums. 

More important than the Boards themselves are the Boards’ subcommittees, 

where much actual planning and decision-making take place. Subcommittees focused 

on system integration or One-Stop system-building have been especially important from 

the standpoint of strengthening partnerships. Most State and local case-study sites have 

one or more such committees. These committees have been found to be a better place 

for discussions between partners, because they are typically smaller and meet more 

often, and One-Stop partners who are not members of the full Board are sometimes able 

to participate.13 These committees are also able to focus more specifically on 

partnership and One-Stop issues than the full Board would have time for. For example, 

in Chicago, the Service Delivery Integration committee is looking at integrating 

workforce development programs through referral and bridge programming and even at 

changing GED testing practices to better fit with the needs of customers in other 

programs.

State Inter-Agency Teams. At the State level, interagency administrative teams 

or bodies have also assisted partners in working better together. For example, several 

case-study States formed such teams, and charged then with developing an integrated 

workforce development system. As Table 1 shows, these teams include representatives 

from State ES agencies, WIA Title IB, VR, TANF, higher education, and secondary 

vocational and technical education. Oregon, Kentucky and Pennsylvania have teams 

 

13 A drawback, though, is that, because of time constraints, employers are less likely to 

participate in committees, so their input is likely to be missed.
III-20

made up of both agency leaders who are charged with making policy decisions and 

teams made up of program managers who focus on implementation issues. 

Unfortunately, the existence of interagency teams alone does not guarantee smooth 

collaboration at the State level. However, when they meet regularly, these teams 

provide additional forums for coordination and communication, which make service 

integration more likely.

Some States have also strengthened partnerships between programs and increased 

the likelihood of a more seamless system of services through consolidation of State 

workforce development programs into a single workforce agency. Some consolidation 

is very common. For example, of the 14 States we visited in both round one and two, 

all but one located Wagner-Peyser and WIA Title IB administration in the same state 

agencies. In fact, two States used WIA implementation as an opportunity for moving 

the administration of WIA Title IB programs into the same agency that administers ES 

to increase collaboration between the two programs. Three other States, Florida, Utah, 

and Texas, have also integrated TANF programs into the State’s consolidated 

workforce agency that administers most workforce development programs.

However, just locating programs under the same department or agency is not 

always an effective way to increase service integration unless other steps are taken to 

ensure increased coordination. One key strategy used by several States to make agency 

consolidation more likely to lead to closer collaboration between programs was to 

accompany consolidation with service delivery reforms. For example, in several States 

where agency consolidation has increased program integration, organizational 

consolidation was accompanied by a re-organization at the service delivery level, 

including the formation of consolidated local offices. In these States, the co-location of 

staff from these programs at One-Stop centers and the development of cost-allocation 

agreements to support One-Stop centers was much smoother, since the programs had 

already begun the process of service integration prior to WIA implementation. 

However, in States where agency consolidation was primarily a bureaucratic 

shuffle and programs maintained primarily separate systems of service delivery and 

administration, consolidation made little difference in improving program integration or 

partnership. In addition, because VR is administered as part of a consolidated 

workforce development agency in only three States, and adult education programs are 

never located in those agencies, coordination with these two key partners was not 

typically improved.
III-21

Table 1. State Interagency Workforce Development Teams

States Composition of State Interagency Teams

Arizona Arizona Interagency WIA Planning & Implementation includes 

Department of Economic Security, Department of Commerce (staff to 

the WIB), and the Department of Education

Illinois Governor’s Interagency Team includes Department of Employment 

Security, Department of Human Services, Office of Rehabilitation 

Services, Illinois Community College Board and the Illinois Board of 

Education

Kentucky WIA Implementation Team includes Office of Training and 

Reemployment, Employment Services, Vocational Rehabilitation, 

Department for the Blind, Welfare to Work, Adult Education, 

Vocational and Technical Education, Secretary for Workforce 

Development, a representative from the Governor’s office, and the 

State’s Chief Information Officer. Operational Steering Committee 

includes program-level representatives of these same agencies.

Montana State Management Team includes the Department of Labor and 

Industry, Department of Public Health and Human Services, 

Department of Commerce, Office of Public Instruction and the Office 

of the Commissioner of Higher Education.** 

Oregon Governor’s Workforce Policy Cabinet includes Oregon Employment 

Department, Department of Community Colleges and Workforce 

Department, Department of Human Services and Department of 

Education. Program Implementation Team includes program 

managers from each of these agencies.

Pennsylvania Workforce Development Core Team includes the deputy secretary and 

policy director for the Departments of Aging, Community & 

Economic Development, Education, Labor & Industry, Public 

Welfare, and a representative from the Governor’s Office. 

Operational Core Team includes bureau directors and program 

managers from the same agencies, chairs of planning groups and 

representatives from key state and local stakeholders. Technology 

Leadership Team also includes representatives from these same 

agencies and the Office of Administration’s Information Technology 

Chief.

____________________

** Note: This Team had not yet met as of the time of our data collection.
III-22

One-Stop Center Governance Bodies. Another method used by most local areas 

to maintain strong partnerships and integrate services was to form One-Stop system or 

center governance bodies or structures. These governance bodies typically served as a 

forum for partners to meet regularly and discuss how to work better together at OneStop centers and to discuss specific issues regarding management of centers. These 

bodies were typically in addition to local Board committees that provide overall 

oversight duties to the One-Stop system.

Some local areas had multi-level One-Stop center governance. In Chicago, for 

example, there were three levels: an Executive Team made up of agency heads with 

responsibility for making policy decisions for the One-Stop system, a City-Wide 

Implementation Team in charge of on-going monitoring of the One-Stop system by 

partners, and a Center Level Operations Team which focuses on day-to-day operations 

at individual centers and is made up of co-located staff or their immediate supervisors. 

While higher-level teams tended to meet only monthly or quarterly, the center-level 

teams were likely to meet more often, because of the need for more regular 

communication between co-located staff. Indeed, this opportunity for regular 

communication was described as critical for more seamless services, because it allows 

partners to regularly communicate about changes to their programs.

FACTORS ASSISTING PARTNERSHIPS

Several factors strengthened partnerships between workforce development 

programs and resulted in more integrated service delivery systems, including state 

policy direction and a prior history of collaboration.

State Guidance and Policy Direction

One important determinant of how effectively partners work together was State or 

local guidance and policies that encouraged or mandated increased coordination. 

Although most States said that they encouraged coordination, only a few took concrete 

steps to force recalcitrant State agencies to become more involved or were willing to 

put major resources behind coordination. One example of a State that compelled 

regional managers of State agencies to collaborate was Pennsylvania. In this state, 

regional managers were given the ability to negotiate specific service delivery roles in 

each local partnership. However, if the State felt that a regional manager was not being 

fully supportive, agency leaders in the central office would step in to mandate a higher 

level of partnership. 
III-23

Other States have preferred to use incentives to encourage collaboration rather 

than mandates. For example, the State ES agency in Oregon provided local ES offices 

with a small pool of flexible funding for local managers to use in developing One-Stop 

partnerships. Arizona also set aside 70% of its incentive funds to be awarded to local 

areas based on the quality of their partnerships and collaboration. Some States have 

also adjusted ES service boundaries to match LWIA boundaries to ensure that it would 

be easier for the two programs to work together. 

Prior History of Workforce Development

States and local areas with a history of successful workforce development 

partnerships also had an easier time developing and maintaining the strong partnerships 

that lead to integrated services. This relationship demonstrates that it is much easier to 

build on already existing successful partnerships than to begin from scratch. In many 

case-study sites, these partnerships stemmed from the development of One-Stop 

partnerships beginning in the mid to late 1990s. However, in some cases they predated the receipt of One-Stop Implementation Grant funding—in fact some States and 

local areas had began developing integrated workforce services centers as early as the 

late 80s and early 90s. By contrast, States and local areas that did not begin developing 

One-Stop systems until the late 1990s typically had a much more difficult time trying to 

bring all partners together. Unfortunately, just as a successful history of partnerships 

helped to develop successful partnerships, a history of problems between partners made 

partnership formation difficult. Both the benefits of prior successful partnerships and 

the problems resulting from past conflicts seemed stronger in rural and suburban areas 

where most staff are likely to have known and worked with each other for a long time 

A Collaborative Approach to Decision-Making

One important aspect of successful partnerships stemmed from the use of 

inclusive decision making processes that were not dominated by any one agency. Thus, 

States and local areas that involved all partners from the outset in a collaborative way 

(such as in planning for WIA) often had an easier time developing strong partnerships. 

This was true, for example, in Illinois, Kentucky and Pennsylvania, where the use of 

collaborative WIA planning helped to create a shared framework that made it easier for 

State agencies to work together successfully. This could be contrasted with the 

experience in one State, where a single agency briefly held both oversight and 

administrative powers over local areas, resulting in major conflict between this agency 
III-24

and local Board staff that has seriously hindered WIA implementation at both the State 

and local levels.

SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES

An examination of the experiences in the States and local areas we studied 

highlights a number of important benefits and challenges associated with partnership 

building.

Benefits

The most important goal of partnership development and the creation of 

integrated workforce systems is to improve services to customers. Many of the service 

delivery methods discussed above may be too new for staff or customers to see 

benefits. Thus far, most tangible benefits to customers have stemmed from the colocation of staff at One-Stop centers. These benefits can be summarized below.

1. Faster Action on Referrals. One benefit mentioned by staff in several local 

areas was that co-location has significantly improved referrals between 

partners. For example, in Chicago, a One-Stop partner described how the 

ability to walk customers over to partner agency staff has greatly improved 

services because the customer begins receiving services from the partner 

immediately rather than having to wait days or weeks while a referral form 

sits on someone’s desk. In Southwest Virginia, a One-Stop staff person also 

noted that having partners on-site, particularly adult education partners, has 

made customers more likely to actually follow through and attend GED or 

other classes that are critical to achieving their employment goals.

2. Easier for Customers with Transportation Barriers. Another benefit mentioned 

by some local areas was that having more partners co-located in a central area 

has made it easier for customers with transportation barriers to receive all the 

services they need. In DuPage, staff found that this was particularly true for 

TANF customers. 

3. Clear Focus on Employment. TANF program staff in another local area 

commented that providing work-related services to TANF customers at OneStop centers was particularly effective because there were more resources 

available for job search and the entire environment was more focused on 

employment. 

4. Improved Communication between Partners. Increased formal and informal 

communication between partners was another benefit of partnering mentioned 

by local areas. This communication includes cross-training sessions, formal 

One-Stop governance meetings, or even informal conversations around the 

water cooler. This regular communication helps co-located staff stay updated 

on partner programs and learn from each other, resulting in better services to 
III-25

customers. In one Vermont One-Stop center, this kind of “cross-pollination” 

between staff from the State’s Vocational Rehabilitation Office and the

Vermont Department of Employment and Training led the latter to better 

understand the importance of job retention. In Yuma County, having State ES 

staff co-located at the One-Stop center led to an overall improvement in the 

provision of core services to customers due to their expertise in resume 

updating and job search. In the Medford Job Council local area, staff praised 

the ability of co-located employees to be able to “put a face on a name” and 

develop trust in partner agency staff by working together. This in turn has 

helped them to function more efficiently because they are not afraid to use 

each other’s skills and services to serve customers more effectively. Finally, 

in Chicago, one partner described a One-Stop meeting that directly led to 

increased benefits for customers due to improved communication between 

workforce agencies. During this meeting, one agency providing services to 

the elderly said that, although they encouraged their customers to get a GED, 

the customers had a lot of trouble paying for GED classes. At that point, 

another partner spoke up and said that his agency provided free GED training 

to seniors and described how partners’ clients could take advantage of these 

services. 

Challenges 

Despite these benefits, the development of partnerships and integrated services 

was very challenging to most sites. While some of these challenges related specifically 

to the co-location of staff at One-Stop centers, others related to partnering in general. 

Although the challenges discussed below are based primarily on round-two sites, many 

similar challenges arose in our earlier round of data collection.

1. Limitations of Co-Locating on Client Services. There were a number of challenges 

specifically related to partners working together at physical One-Stop centers. 

Several local areas and one State said that they do not think that co-located OneStops make sense in rural areas. They pointed out that, in many rural areas, 

residents have to travel long distances to a comprehensive One-Stop, when a 

partner’s agency office might be much closer. Southwest Georgia, a very rural 

area, was establishing a number of mini-One-Stop centers in partner office locations 

scattered throughout the local workforce area as a supplement to a single large, 

One-Stop center in the area’s largest city. Others used itinerancy to address the 

absence of transportation. WIA staff in Northeast Georgia, another largely rural 

area, travel to public facilities throughout the service area. In addition, that local 

board has several recreational vehicles fully outfitted with computers and Internet 

access and WIA staff to provide at least some One-Stop services.

2. Finding Suitable Buildings. Another major challenge to co-locating staff at OneStop centers was the difficulty in finding suitable buildings with low rents. For 

example, three local areas reported that not all partners could be co-located in some 
III-26

of their present One-Stop centers because of a lack of space. One of those local 

areas said that although it had located a building of the right size, the cost of 

refurbishing it was too high so they have stayed in their present small building. 

Another challenge is finding suitable buildings with sufficient parking and access to 

convenient public transportation. Ensuring that buildings were accessible to 

customers with disabilities was another concern, especially to VR. One-Stop 

centers must also be in locations acceptable to their neighbors. This was a problem 

mentioned in one urban area where the perception that One-Stop centers serve 

primarily low-income customers caused neighborhood groups to oppose plans to 

locate a center there. Finally, the process of finding suitable buildings to house 

One-Stop centers was made even more difficult in one round-one State where State 

law does not allow ES offices to be located in private buildings.

3. Leases. There were also many problems with co-location related to leases. For 

example, some partners are unable to co-locate staff and contribute to support for 

One-Stop centers because they were stuck in long-term leases elsewhere. In one 

round-one State, there were also problems with requirements that each co-locating 

partner needed to negotiate a separate lease, which resulted in some landlords 

refusing to lease buildings to One-Stop partnerships. Another problem mentioned in 

one local area was the requirement that some public agencies are prevented by State 

law from entering into leases longer than 60 days, which is much shorter than most 

landlords would prefer.

4. Partners’ Limited Abilities to Participate in Partnerships. Another barrier to 

partnering at One-Stop centers is that some partners are seriously limited in their 

ability or desire to participate in these partnerships. We saw four general 

objections. First, staff from VR and veterans’ programs feel that they are unable to 

serve universal customers or provide general support to One-Stop centers due to 

restrictions on how they can use their resources. This makes it difficult for these 

staff to participate in multi-agency teams or share greeting, intake or orientation 

functions at One-Stop centers. Second, in some local areas agencies serving 

targeted customers, such as TANF and VR agencies, were reluctant to encourage 

their customers to use One-Stop centers, because they worried One-Stop staff were 

not as well trained in working with their customers as were their own staff. Third, 

some partners also worried about whether One-Stop systems could share customer 

and employer data but still maintain adequate confidentiality protections. Finally, 

the organization of workforce development services on a tiered basis, as required by 

WIA, was not really compatible with the way in which other agencies organized 

services. Thus, although the law requires that the mandatory partners deliver their 

core services through the One-Stop center, none of the partners organized its 

services in that way. Further, some agencies viewed workforce development as 

simply one small component of their much broader mission, and thus typically 

committed limited numbers of staff to the One-Stop centers.

5. Short Time Frame. One challenge to overall partnership development was the very 

short timeframe allowed for new partnerships to develop before being required by 
III-27

WIA implementation to talk about very specific service coordination or resource 

commitments. For example, several officials in one State talked about how the 

need to focus on implementation of the basic provisions of WIA legislation 

prevented them from focusing enough on the overall development of One-Stop

partnerships. Another local area said that this short timeframe made MOU 

development very difficult because sometimes partners were having to talk about 

sensitive issues like cost sharing and budgets during their first meetings together.

6. History of Conflict. A history of conflict between agencies was another barrier to 

partnership development. When State agencies don’t get along well, this conflict 

often makes it more difficult for local staff from these agencies to work together in 

local partnerships. For example, in one State, the offices that administer WIA and 

ES programs do not have a good relationship, despite being in the same agency. As 

a result, ES has been slow to integrate its staff into the One-Stop system and has 

continued to maintain its own offices. Conflict at the local level can also make 

partnership-building problematic and was a barrier in some local areas. 

7. One-Stop Systems or Centers Dominated by One Partner. A somewhat related 

problem occurred when certain State or local partners were perceived by other 

partners as dominating the One-Stop system or individual centers. This tended to 

make other agencies somewhat less likely to participate in the system. For 

example, one State workforce development agency created a system of integrated 

local offices prior to WIA on its own; both local areas we visited only reluctantly 

agreed to charter the State offices as One-Stop centers and there is still only limited 

co-location from other partners at those sites. In another State where most

mandatory partners are administered under the State workforce development agency 

and nearly all One-Stops are administered by that agency, participation in the OneStop system by partners not part of that agency (such as adult education and literacy 

providers) is limited. This was also an issue in some local areas where One-Stop 

centers were dominated by their operator.

8. State-controlled One-Stop Partners and Local Boards. A contradiction in the nexus 

of control between local Boards and many required One-Stop partners was also a 

challenge to partnership development. Although WIA is designed to devolve 

control over many workforce development policies to the local level through local 

Boards and One-Stop partnerships, most required One-Stop partners are 

administered by State agencies, with most control maintained at the State level. 

This creates a problem because local managers of these agencies, who typically 

participate on local Boards, often do not have the flexibility to create local 

partnerships without going through an extensive approval process. This approval 

process can create lengthy delays and frustrate other partners who see this as 

bureaucratic intransigence or unwillingness to partner. In one State, the State ES 

managers attributed this seeming lack of flexibility to the need for State agencies to 

provide a certain level of services state-wide in order to meet Federal and State 

requirements and standards. They said these agencies often have a very difficult 

time balancing state-wide requirements with the need for local flexibility.
III-28

9. Each Partner has its own Funding, Requirements and Performance Goals. The fact 

that each Federal program and funding stream has its own requirements and 

performance goals and receives funding separately has made it more difficult for 

programs to partner. For example, local Board staff in one local area said that 

partners have not bought into the development of an integrated workforce 

development system under the local Board because they do not see WIA as “their 

own.” In one State, some officials commented that local Board staff and WIA Title 

IB programs are the only ones who will be penalized for not meeting performance 

goals even though they are reliant on partnerships with other agencies to meet them. 

Another local area said that local Boards have all the responsibility for making local 

workforce development systems more integrated, but none of the power needed to 

make it happen. Several case study sites also questioned the Federal government’s 

commitment to developing an integrated workforce system and blamed this lack of 

commitment for many partnership challenges. For example, some case-study sites 

wondered why Wagner-Peyser and Perkins-funded programs needed to have 

performance goals different from WIA’s if all of the partners are supposed to be 

working together. Separate funding streams was also mentioned as a constraint. A 

number of case study sites felt that the WIA legislation should have included 

methods to overcome many of these barriers. For example, they suggested that the 

legislation should have required more of mandatory partners, such as set funding 

contributions to the One-Stop system, and held them specifically responsible for 

WIA outcomes.
IV-1

IV. MIS AND OVERSIGHT

This briefing paper is part of a series developed as part of the Evaluation of the 

Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates and 

Technical Assistance and Training Corporation. The evaluation consists thus far of two 

rounds of site visits: the first round of site visits was conducted to six states and nine 

local workforce areas in the spring of 2000, and the second round was conducted to an 

additional eight state and fourteen local areas in the summer and fall of 2001. An 

overview of the evaluation is included as an appendix to this report. This briefing 

paper for the most part draws on findings from the second round of site visits, because 

these capture developments associated with WIA that were the most recent at the time 

this Briefing Paper was written in mid 2002 (note that states and local areas might have 

made substantial progress on MIS development since then; thus, these findings should 

be viewed as point-in-time snapshots of systems and system challenges). 

In this briefing paper, we discuss two key issues in program administration: the 

use of information technology in the management and delivery of services and the 

related topic of oversight, one component of which—desk monitoring—uses the 

products of information systems. We focus principally on how States are implementing 

their information systems and oversight responsibilities, although we cover local 

response to the State actions. The paper begins with individual discussions of three 

general functions that information technology performs for workforce development, and 

then it moves on to examine how the States are building new, more comprehensive 

systems created for a One-Stop environment, the so-called One-Stop operating systems, 

that unify all the functions into a single system. The paper looks at the scope of these 

systems and the challenges in development. The paper then shifts to oversight, where 

we discuss, in turn, on-site monitoring and desk reviewing. This section includes a 

discussion of different oversight orientations—technical assistance and compliance—that 

States are using in carrying their oversight responsibilities.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

Information technology supports the Workforce Investment Act in three broad 

functional areas:

 General management. The general management function serves two 

principal purposes: 1) it is the basic means by which the leadership of a 
IV-2

local workforce investment area—its executives and the Local 

Workforce Investment Board—learns about characteristics of customers 

and the services they receive so that they can manage local workforce 

activity and costs; and 2) it is the tool to report to the State (and in turn 

to the Federal government) customer outcomes for performance 

accountability systems and expenditures so that States can manage subState allocations and the Federal level can manage State allotments.

 Serving Customers. Information is central to searching for jobs 

(among job-seeking customers) or finding employees (among employer 

customers), so information technology systems that increase the amount, 

quality, or accessibility of information are quite valuable to WIA 

customers. All States and local areas now use one or more information 

systems to provide direct services to customers, such as assessment, job 

matching, LMI, and recently, the eligible provider list. Customers can 

serve themselves through self-services or use those services indirectly 

when staff use computerized tools to provide these services for their 

customers.

 Supporting Staff. Information systems can support staff in two ways 

that may improve both efficiency and effectiveness. First, these systems 

can take over or assist with the important functions of intake and 

determining eligibility, both of which have substantial clerical content 

and key entry. Automating this task or having the customer perform the 

data entry increases staff efficiency and frees up frontline staff to 

provide customers with professional support on job searching, career 

planning, and other services. Second, information systems can increase 

both effectiveness and efficiency of frontline staff by providing 

immediate access to information about their customers—their 

demographic characteristics, results from assessment and service 

planning, services received, case notes, and outcomes—that they need in 

order to manage a customer’s case effectively. In addition, automating 

scheduling or providing templates or form letters facilitates more 

efficient service to customers.

In this section we examine how the States and local areas in the study have 

addressed these functional areas individually and the extent to which they have brought 

multiple functions together into a unified system, commonly known as a One-Stop 

operating system. In addition, we examine whether States and local areas, pursuant to 

One-Stop activities, have applied any or all of these functions across multiple program 

areas, both within DOL-funded programs and partner programs funded by other 

agencies. Throughout this section we emphasize State-level information systems. 

States are the focus for reporting, the irreducible function because it has a specific 

statutory mandate, and systems for serving customers with labor exchange and LMI are 
IV-3

State functions as well. However, we do gauge the local reaction to these systems. We 

conclude the section with a discussion comparing the use of information technology in 

the eight States we visited in PY 2001 to the six early implementing States we examined 

in PY 2000. 

Operations in the Functional Areas

General Management. The general management function has been evident in 

the management and oversight of employment and training programs for quite some 

time. For reporting, JTPA required that States have a management information system 

to facilitate reporting and other forms of oversight to support the law’s emphasis on 

performance measurement and the State’s responsibility to manage the Federal funds 

allotted. Pursuant to the law, States and SDAs organized the reporting function in a 

variety of ways. There were two general approaches to carry out the statutory 

requirements: (1) a Statewide system in which local staff entered data directly (this 

could be a terminal-based mainframe or a Windows-based, PC system) or (2) fully local 

systems that reported data through various electronic or paper means to the State. Both 

the State and local systems varied significantly in the extent of technical modernity. 

The general trend under JTPA and into WIA implementation for reporting has 

been to use a State-level system for reporting purposes. Four of the second-round 

States we studied currently (as of 2002) require their local areas to use the State 

management information system, either a dedicated mainframe-terminal system, as in 

Virginia, or a software application that runs in Windows and communicates with the 

State computers over the Internet, as in Georgia. In three other States, local areas had 

their own systems and could report performance data through a variety of electronic 

linkages. One other State had terminated an old state mainframe system and was 

requiring local areas to report on paper temporarily until a new system was completed. 

However, the day-to-day management function appears to have been largely a local 

matter and many of the LWIAs steadily enhanced their capacity to manage their 

programs through internal development or acquisition of software and increasingly 

powerful PC hardware. Not a single local area in our study indicated that it relied on 

the State system for basic management information.

WIA maintained the general requirements for management information systems 

virtually intact from the JTPA requirement (the language in the two statutes is virtually 

identical). However, within WIA, both internal and external factors led to substantial 

changes in how the general management function would be carried out. Internal factors 
IV-4

include changes in the structure of services such that customers might receive services 

from multiple programs, especially Wagner-Peyser and WIA; the potential need to 

expand the customer database because local workforce investment areas were now 

serving the universal customer; and a major change in the performance accountability 

system. Thus, these internal changes in what data needed to be collected and what 

would be the sources for that data created an imperative at least to modify the JTPA 

management information system. The external factor was the integration of services in 

One-Stop centers such that some One-Stop operators might be managing multiple 

programs. With integration of services in the One-Stop system added to the internal 

changes, many states and DOL felt that an effective adaptation to the WIA environment 

and the intended increased level of One-Stop integration would require a much more 

ambitious change in the information system, that is a One-Stop operating system, which 

we discuss below. 

The States responded to these new WIA requirements in a variety of ways that 

ran the gamut of cost and complexity. At a minimum, they could patch or upgrade the 

JTPA MIS. At least initially, three States—Arizona, Oregon, and Virginia—were 

making only enough changes so that the existing JTPA systems could continue to do 

basic reporting and provide minimal state-level management capability. Although they 

made the least amount of changes, each of these States was considering more 

comprehensive change in the future. Virginia, for example, was waiting for one of the 

State consortia building a One-Stop operating system to complete its work. Arizona 

was considering a proposal from two of its three largest local workforce investment 

areas to purchase a proprietary One-Stop operating system that these areas had already 

purchased for local use. Oregon was moving in a slightly different direction altogether. 

The State was beginning to develop an information system that would be tailored to 

serve the State’s own performance management system. Oregon has been working for 

over a decade in developing State-based performance measures for both State- and 

Federally-funded programs in workforce development and outside that field to help the 

State attain its own unique goals. One other State, Illinois, took a middle road by 

substantially revising its system so that it could better handle the new reporting tasks 

and provide the State with periodic reports on registrations, services received, and 

customer characteristics to facilitate active State oversight. Finally, the other four 

States—Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, and New York—decided to invest in new, more 

comprehensive systems. We discuss these below in the section on One-Stop operating 

systems. In this context, though, New York temporarily did very minor patching of its 
IV-5

JTPA system in anticipation of an imminent completion of its One-Stop operating 

system. However, even though the new system was not yet completed at the time of 

our site visit, the State decided to terminate the old system in August 2001. This forced 

both State and local organizations to file all their respective reports on paper, at least 

temporarily. 

A major limitation of comprehensive management information during the early 

years of WIA implementation is the absence of financial information in the older 

systems. It appears likely that financial tracking was not included in the programmatic 

management information system because accounting and payment systems were more 

closely integrated into the financial systems from local governments that are the WIA 

grant sub-recipients. However, the new One-Stop operating systems all had financial 

management modules, as we will discuss below.

Serving Customers. The customer-service function—providing access to labor 

exchange, assessment and other tools, labor-market information, and the other 

components of America’s Career Kit--has its roots in the development of self-service 

concepts from the One-Stop initiative in the 1990s. Supported by grants from DOL and 

extensive work by DOL staff, consortia of State workforce development agencies 

created a set of technical specifications to facilitate this function. There were two 

general goals. One was to enrich the quality of job searching by job seekers (and 

filling job orders by employers) by providing the tools for thorough job and applicant 

searches. The second was to provide an infrastructure for self-service, which makes it 

possible for the workforce development system to serve the universal customer. 

Universal service would not be possible (given generally flat or declining appropriation 

levels from Congress) without the dramatic increase in staff labor productivity that 

computerization and self-service offer. To reach these goals, all the States in our study 

developed modern, computerized systems to make these tools available to customers 

through self-service, both in resource rooms and remotely on the Internet. Overall, this 

function evolved out of previous work and appeared little changed as a result of WIA 

implementation.

Supporting Staff Operations. The third broad functional area in which 

information technology intersects with the workforce development system is the direct 

support for front-line staff operations. As we noted in the description of staff support 

in the introduction to this section of the paper, there is potential for gains in both 

efficiency and effectiveness when automation can be applied to intake, eligibility 
IV-6

determination, and access to case-management information. This function is essentially 

local in nature and local areas have been developing or purchasing systems to carry out 

this function dating back to JTPA. In addition, the new State-level One-Stop operating 

systems are developing this component for local use.

Among the local areas that had purchased or developed systems with staff-support 

capabilities were Rural Minnesota, Balance of Montana, Balance of Maricopa, and both 

Oregon sites (the Medford Job Council and Portland WorkSystems). Staff from several 

of these areas indicated they were so satisfied with the functionality of this component 

that these areas were reluctant to use the State One-Stop operating system once it came 

on line. On the other hand, both local sites in Georgia, SW Georgia and NE Georgia, 

were satisfied with the staff-support functions of the Georgia’s statewide One-Stop 

operating system. In these local sites, this function had previously been conducted 

largely by paper.

Integrating Functions and Covering Multiple Programs

Perhaps the most important development in workforce development information 

technology is the effort to bring all the functional areas together into a single One-Stop 

operating system. In addition to including the three functional areas in support of WIA 

Title I services, the One-Stop operating system efforts are also concerned with 

broadening coverage beyond the programs funded by WIA Title I to other DOL-funded 

workforce development programs and to programs funded by other State and Federal 

sources. The One-Stop vision for cross-program partnerships expected that successful 

One-Stop partnerships would create a need to integrate information systems across 

program lines. Consequently, along with its One-Stop planning and implementation 

grants, DOL sponsored consortia of State workforce development agencies that would 

develop the information technology to support the convergence of multiple programs in 

a One-Stop center. In a multi-program environment, an operating system that would 

support common intake and eligibility determination, unified case management, and the 

ability to provide the necessary reports for each program would be a powerful tool to 

facilitate more comprehensive services to customers, efficiency, and coordination 

across program lines. 

Four of the eight States in our study—Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, and New 

York—have built or are building a One-Stop operating system. There is, however, 

considerable disparity in the strategies for creating them. New York is the lead State in 

the DOL-sponsored consortium to produce a national One-Stop operating system,
IV-7

Minnesota had been a member of the consortium in the past but withdrew and is 

customizing its own system through purchase of a proprietary system from a 

commercial vendor, Montana is acquiring a system developed by Washington State, and 

Georgia developed its system internally. In addition, Virginia is planning eventually to 

buy into the One-Stop operating system produced by the Mid-Atlantic consortium, a 

regional group of States led by Pennsylvania.

All the States are integrating DOL-funded programs in their systems. Exhibit 1 

reflects the coverage of DOL programs in the One-Stop operating system in the four 

States as of early 2002.

Exhibit 1

Cross-Program Coverage of DOL Programs in 

State One-Stop Operating Systems

Georgia Minnesota Montana New York

Workforce Investment Act Yes Yes Yes Yes

Employment Service Yes Yes Yes Yes

Unemployment Insurance Yes No Yes Yes

Trade Programs No Yes Yes Yes

Welfare-to-Work Yes Yes Yes Yes

Veterans Employment and 

Training Service

Yes Yes No Yes

Senior Community Service No Yes No No

All of these systems included WIA and both employment security system programs 

(Employment Service and Unemployment Insurance). Most also included Welfare-toWork, Trade programs, and the Veterans program. Only Minnesota included the 

Senior Community Service Employment Program. 

There was substantially less integration of partner programs from other Federal or 

State funding sources. Among the exceptions, Minnesota had a specific commitment 

from non-DOL programs to participate. Its system will cover 23 Federal and State 

programs, including TANF, Food Stamps, and subsidized child care. In fact, 

Minnesota’s decision to leave the DOL consortium was partially based on the 

consortium’s initial design that supported only a limited number of DOL-funded 
IV-8

programs. The other systems had some capability to handle these programs, but 

partners had either rejected participation or had not yet committed. 

Georgia’s design anticipated the inclusion of a few other programs, but initial 

discussions with other State agencies did not bear any fruit. However, the Georgia 

system was expecting to cover intake for Vocational Rehabilitation, a step that was 

facilitated by the reorganization of that program into the Georgia’s workforce 

development agency. The Adult Education and Literacy program also expressed 

interest in moving its data onto the One-Stop operating system, but State officials 

characterized the status of the move as “uncertain.” Nevertheless, a Georgia MIS 

official suggested that there was increasing interest from other State agencies who were 

observing the successful implementation of the system for the DOL-funded programs. 

He stated that the other agencies looked favorably on the system’s stability and cost 

effectiveness. 

Difficulties in Implementing One-Stop Operating Systems. Developing a OneStop operating system for multiple programs faces several formidable challenges. 

These challenges include technical complexity, differing levels of interest in the OneStop system, and cost allocation. First, there is the inherent technical complexity of 

integrated systems. Each program may require, for example, different data, 

definitions, and reports. Further, these systems must be able to interface with a variety 

of different software and hardware technologies ranging from the very modern to very 

old mainframe-based systems, known as “legacy” systems. Delays often intensified 

because of the difficulty during the late 1990s in hiring and retaining qualified computer 

professionals to design the systems and write the software code during what was a 

boom period for information technology. The long duration for development of the 

various State and consortia projects is ample testament to these difficulties. Even States 

like Minnesota that are acquiring commercial systems have substantial difficulties in 

customizing the application to their requirements. Accordingly, a number of our local 

respondents, who are the intended users for these systems, were quite frustrated with 

the slow pace of progress. 

Second, there are a number of potential obstacles deriving from the broader 

programmatic needs of participating programs that may limit their level of commitment 

to the One-Stop system in the first place. For example, welfare or vocational 

rehabilitation agencies in some of the sites we visited have only a limited portion of 

their staff and clients who need to use workforce development services at any given 
IV-9

time. Agencies also have different data needs and Federal rules governing system 

design. For example, welfare agencies have substantially different data needs, and thus 

only one of the four One-Stop operating systems in this group of states is incorporating 

its welfare program into its system. A further obstacle for some potential partners, 

such as child support enforcement, child welfare, and food stamps, is that Federal rules 

for these programs require States to submit an advanced planning document before 

developing information technology systems. Although some critics have argued that 

these advanced planning documents, which were introduced when the States were 

developing large, mainframe computing projects in the 1970s and 1980s, are no longer 

as well suited to the needs of States where the system are often small and change is 

incremental, these requirements still apply and may be obstacles to integrating their 

data systems into One-Stop operating systems.1

Finally, there is a problem of cost allocation between programs. Developing a 

cost-allocation plan for any One-Stop service is challenging, as we discuss in the paper 

on partnership that we have produced as part of this evaluation. However, allocating 

costs for a One-Stop operating system is especially difficult. Respondents noted several 

reasons for these difficulties:

 The cost of communication over the Internet is completely separate from 

any One-Stop operating system transactions and is difficult to measure

for any particular use.

 It is difficult to value transactions with the One-Stop operating system. 

These transactions may vary substantially in the benefit—the primary 

criterion for cost allocation under the DOL methodology—they bring to 

the programs. For example, one case manager may connect to get 

personal background information on a general labor-market issue while 

another may connect for the same length of time listing a service 

received or making extensive case notes for a registrant. 

 Marginal costs for transactions are very small compared to the costs of 

development and basic maintenance, thus increasing the difficulty of 

attributing benefit by any of the suggested cost-allocation 

methodologies.

Our respondents noted that the cost-allocation issues remain unresolved. 

 

1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Human Services Integration: Results of a GAO Co-Sponsored 

Conference on Modernizing Information Systems. Washington, D.C., 2002. 
IV-10

Factors Affecting the Design and Scope of Information Systems. Our State 

respondents in the study gave two types of reasons for building or considering a OneStop operating system. The first was improving the quality of customer service and 

fostering One-Stop integration. The second type of reason was technological: namely 

that their existing information systems were inadequate to meet the needs in each of the 

functional areas and that the underlying technologies were sufficiently obsolete that they 

were unlikely to be effective even if they were modified to meet WIA requirements. 

Technological reasons for creating a new system were cited in nearly all the States. In 

six States, the existing systems were predominantly characterized by our respondents as 

obsolete. These systems, whether they were terminal and mainframe systems, such as 

the system in use in Georgia or local PCs reporting to State mainframes or 

minicomputers, lacked flexibility to meet successfully the requirements of the three 

functional areas described above. Thus, these States concluded that investment in a 

modern integrated system was worth the difficulty, cost, and risk. 

Georgia MIS staff, for example, believed that its former dumb-terminal and 

mainframe architecture was so outmoded that any attempt to modernize the system 

would be a poor investment. Minnesota’s old system had no Internet-based connection, 

so its local areas reported information by sending floppy disks through the regular mail. 

New York’s system was considered so inadequate that State officials terminated its 

operation even before its One-Stop operating system became operational. 

The only States that were not considering a One-Stop operating system were 

Illinois and Oregon. Illinois used a more modern, client-server architecture that could 

be adapted to meet the State’s reporting and general management needs, while the other 

functions of customer service and staff support could be left to local option. Oregon 

State officials felt that a modified system could adequately carry out the reporting 

function and interface smoothly with more modern, comprehensive systems from the 

local areas we visited. In addition, Oregon’s funds for information technology were 

already committed to development a new system to support a series of State goals, of 

which workforce development formed only one component.

Local Responses to State Systems. As was the case with a number of other 

WIA-implementation issues, the application of information technology to WIA 

operations was an arena for some conflict between State and local levels. There was 

substantial opposition to the State systems from local respondents in each of the eight 

States. Criticism ran the gamut from inadequacy of the data fields, inability to track 
IV-11

universal customers, slow operational speeds, clumsy user interfaces, and State 

technical staff who were not familiar with employment and training programs. The 

specific objections varied widely, but the common thread was that our local respondents 

believed that these State systems were not fully functional or as effective as they would 

like. 

Not surprisingly, local respondents in the States that made minimal or 

intermediate upgrades to the JTPA system sharply criticized the State systems. These 

respondents felt that investments in revising JTPA-based mainframe applications to 

meet WIA requirements were fruitless. And they contrasted these obsolete State 

systems with investments that their own local areas had made in newer technologies to 

provide the general management and staff-support functions. In fact, three local areas 

suggested to their respective States that the States adopt their local systems for 

statewide use. Each of these local workforce investment areas had developed or 

purchased systems that could perform both general management and staff-support 

functions and felt that their local systems would certainly be more effective than the 

minimally modified state systems. Developing a newer, more comprehensive system 

offered little refuge from local critiques, as the emerging One-Stop operating systems 

were also spurned for the long delays in their development, poor performance to date, 

and frequent down-time.2

Although our local respondents generally criticized the general management 

function of State systems, there were a few local areas that were satisfied with these 

State systems for both reporting and general management. Staff in Russell, Virginia, 

for example, found that the old State system was acceptable. Staff in Northeast 

Georgia, who were using a new State One-Stop operating system, were also generally 

satisfied with the system.

In contrast to the criticism from local respondents about State information systems 

related to the general management and staff-support functions, the local respondents in 

our study were uniformly very positive about the benefits of the customer-serving 

function. The services provided by automated labor exchange and labor-market 

information and assessment systems were clearly net benefits to customers. The only

significant critical comments on this function were about the content—several 

 

2

 We note that, given the rapid pace of technological developments, these States have doubtless 

made substantial progress since the time this report was written.
IV-12

respondents indicated that they would like to see richer or timelier labor market 

information—rather than about the structure of the delivery system.

Comparisons with the Early Implementation States. Two concerns that we 

identified in the second round of this study include (1) the difficulty of creating OneStop operating systems, and (2) the dissatisfaction of locals with State information 

systems. These echoed concerns that we heard during the site visits to the first round 

States. In our Interim Report issued in late 2000, we noted that four of the six early 

implementation States that we visited in the first round were at various stages of 

implementing a One-Stop operating system. Three of the four States were still in the 

development stage—Utah was developing its own system, while Kentucky and 

Pennsylvania were participating in separate consortia of States. Only Texas, which 

developed its own system in conjunction with its pre-WIA reorganization of its 

workforce development system, had already implemented its system at the time of the 

site visits. Thus, the fact that the second round States were no farther along than their 

counterparts were in the earlier round of site visits implicitly acknowledges the 

substantial challenges to complex system development that we noted in the preceding 

section. Further, it does not appear that the experiences of the early-implementing 

States provided much guidance for their later-arriving counterparts.3

OVERSIGHT

WIA generally maintains JTPA’s State-level oversight requirements. States are 

responsible for ensuring that the activities paid from WIA grants conform to regulatory 

requirements, including OMB’s cost principles. The WIA regulations require State 

oversight systems to have the following components:

 Annual on-site monitoring of Local Boards, including a review of how 

the local workforce investment area is meeting the uniform 

administrative requirements (cost allocation, procurement, and financial 

procedures established by OMB circulars and other general 

requirements).

 

3

 Data collection we have conducted in some of these early implementing states subsequent to this 

report’s being written suggests that they have made substantial progress. For example, Kentucky’s 

EKOS system finally became fully operational as of the end of 2003 and is meeting with widespread 

praise.
IV-13

 Policies to ensure that local workforce investment areas meet the 

objectives of the law, including provision of service to One-Stop centers, 

eligible providers of adult training services, and youth service providers.

 Policies and procedures to ensure that Local Boards and contractors 

comply with WIA requirements.

 Policies and procedures to enable the Governor to ensure that

 A local plan will meet deficiencies.

 Non-discrimination provisions are met.

States carry out these oversight requirements through two general strategies: 1) on-site 

monitoring, which may include programmatic monitoring in addition to the explicit 

administrative monitoring requirement, and 2) desk monitoring of the data reported 

from the management information system.

On-Site Monitoring

Nearly all of the States are meeting the regulatory requirement for an annual onsite monitoring visit and most indicated that they were conducting the same type of onsite monitoring that they used under JTPA. One State conducts its three-day visits 

using the same monitoring instruments that it used for JTPA, although staff added 

questions on tiered services and other new topics. Six States monitor both 

administrative and program activities. For example, Minnesota looks at each WIA 

funding stream for both program and administrative management. Its review of 

administrative components includes an examination of cash management, procurement, 

grievance, and equal employment opportunity procedures, while the review of program 

components examines tiered services and performance accountability. Illinois also 

monitors each local area on site at least once a year for both fiscal and program issues, 

but it changed its strategy to use a team approach and to focus on more specific issues. 

Each team visit specializes in a specific subject, such as WIA implementation, that 

pertains to both program and administrative activities. The State expects to reduce the 

frequency of program monitoring in the future by reducing the number of site visits but 

increasing the size of the monitoring team so that it can cover more topics during this 

longer visit. 

The States varied in the extent to which they monitored the One-Stop system. 

Several included monitoring of the One-Stop system in their visits to local areas, while 

others did not look at their One-Stop sites during monitoring. 
IV-14

Two States sharply reduced the level of on-site monitoring. Virginia had not yet 

done any WIA monitoring because it needed to hire new monitoring staff. Those staff 

members were mostly in place at the time of the site visit, and the State expected to 

develop a monitoring schedule soon. Georgia, on the other hand, changed strategies 

altogether and was no longer conducting on-site, program monitoring. Staff indicated 

that even the mandatory administrative review was sharply reduced in extent from what 

it was under JTPA. State officials attributed reductions in monitoring to having a 

smaller State staff and the fact that WIA was supposed to increase local responsibility 

for all aspects of the program.

Desk Monitoring

Several States indicated that they used desk monitoring—the review of data from 

the management information system and other sources—in the State offices as a 

complement to on-site monitoring. They could oversee program and administrative 

issues in between the monitoring visits. Illinois had the most comprehensive deskmonitoring program of the States we visited in the second round. On a weekly basis, 

State staff reviewed a summary of performance on all 17 indicators of performance for 

each local workforce investment area and the number of planned versus actual 

customers in each service tier. On a monthly basis, State staff reviewed program 

information for the characteristics of registrant, exiters, and customers in intensive 

services and fiscal reports for expenditure levels. Minnesota staff members monitored 

local program and financial affairs through reports sent in by the local areas. The State

then sent out monthly and quarterly reports to all the local workforce investment areas 

so they could compare their performance to that of other local workforce investment 

areas. 

Georgia, because of the lack of programmatic monitoring, had the greatest overall 

reliance on desk monitoring. Working from its One-Stop operating system, State 

officials could conduct a desk review without requiring any local reporting burden. 

The principal objective of the desk reviews, in keeping with the State’s overall strategy 

of deference to local control, was to assure that the Local Boards were meeting at least 

80 percent of their performance-accountability goals.

Oversight Modes: Compliance and Technical Assistance 

Although compliance is clearly stressed in the law and regulations, several States 

have varied their approaches to oversight. We observed two types of approaches, 

oriented to either compliance or technical assistance. In a compliance approach, State 
IV-15

officials emphasized strict compliance with the regulatory framework and looked for 

violations of regulatory requirements. They cited the deficiencies and required the 

local boards to remedy those violations independently. In a technical assistance 

approach, on the other hand, the oversight staff, when they identified a deficiency, 

worked collaboratively with local officials to develop a remedy that met the regulatory 

requirement and the operational needs of the local area.

Three of the States we visited in the second round indicated that they use a 

technical assistance approach. Georgia, for example, felt that with its smaller Statelevel staff and increased local responsibility under WIA, it had neither the means nor 

the need to conduct the same type of compliance-based monitoring that it used under 

JTPA. Under the new law, the State used an individual on the State staff who served as 

the single point of contact for one or more local areas. That person was responsible for 

convening other staff into a technical assistance team if any problem arose from an 

oversight activity. However, no such problems had yet arisen at the time of the site 

visit.

Only one State indicated that it was taking a strong compliance approach. This 

State’s officials said that they did annual reviews of all local areas and would withhold 

funds if a local area were to violate a regulation and fail to take corrective action. 

However, no local area to date has failed to take corrective action, so the State has not 

yet issued any financial sanctions.

Other States indicated that they used a blend of technical assistance and 

compliance. For example, Illinois State respondents indicated that the two approaches 

were not mutually exclusive and that their approach to monitoring combines the two 

elements. In addition, the State has a Workforce Partners Policy Committee composed 

of local-area executive directors who reviewed monitoring instruments before these 

instruments were field-tested and put into use.

Local Response to Oversight

Local respondents generally had mixed views of State oversight efforts. Some 

respondents complained that their State monitors were using a compliance approach and 

had a “gotcha” mentality. Others, however, found their respective State monitoring 

programs acceptable or even beneficial. For example, the Balance of Maricopa County 

generally found that the State’s monitoring efforts complemented the local area’s own 

continuous improvement initiative and noted that the State monitoring reports were 
IV-16

especially helpful to the Local Board in determining the programmatic changes that 

would be desirable under the new law. 

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

We observed one common theme in the area of program administration. Many 

local respondents were critical of State efforts to develop and use information 

technology, and they were only slightly less critical of the way in which the States carry 

out their oversight responsibilities. Both of these issues are well-known sources of 

local criticism of States going back to JTPA. We also found a similar level of criticism 

in our first round of site visits regarding management information systems.4

In examining how this level of criticism relates to WIA implementation, one 

cannot avoid recognizing the potential for State-local conflict that inheres in both 

components of program administration. For example, management information 

systems that serve only the general management function are already complex systems 

that must bring together workforce development and technology disciplines and, in 

some cases, multiple agencies. These system development efforts that must meet a 

variety of objectives are likely to require compromises that may not satisfy any partner. 

In addition, the reporting function is a high-stakes issue that has real consequences for 

the local areas in terms of incentives and sanctions, so it is not surprising that local 

officials at all levels pay close attention to these systems. If some systems perform so 

poorly that they yield inaccurate results, as respondents in one local area alleged, sharp 

criticism should be expected from those who stand to lose. And, when States move to 

develop One-Stop operating system, technical complexity—the number of organizations 

involved and goals that must be served—increases dramatically. This, in turn, raises the 

number of potentially unsatisfying compromises. Further, the rapid evolution of 

computer technology in general, and the promise of new One-Stop operating systems in 

particular, may be raising expectations that are difficult to meet, especially given the 

long development period that such systems require. 

Thus, it appears that the implementation of WIA had somewhat less effect on the 

manner and methods of program administration than 1) the general difficulty of 

applying emerging technology to serve the needs of the workforce development system, 

and 2) certain enduring flash points between state and local levels of the system.

 

4

 We did not specifically inquire about oversight during the visits to the Round 1 States.
V-1

V. PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 

AND CAPACITY BUILDING

This briefing paper is part of a series developed as part of the Evaluation of the 

Implementation of WIA, being conducted jointly by Social Policy Research Associates 

and Technical Assistance and Training Corporation. The evaluation consists thus far of 

two rounds of site visits: the first round was conducted to six states and nine local 

workforce areas in the spring of 2000, and the second round was conducted to an 

additional eight state and fourteen local areas in the summer and fall of 2001. An 

overview of the evaluation is included as an appendix to this report. This paper for the 

most part draws on findings from the second round of site visits, because these capture 

the more recent developments associated with WIA. 

In this briefing paper, we will discuss strategies associated with WIA that are 

intended to hold the workforce system accountable for providing good quality services 

and for building capacity within workforce organizations to promote quality 

performance. In our analysis of the first of these topics, we will focus on the 

performance measurement system identified in the WIA legislation, including the ways 

performance goals were established on the WIA core measures and whether States and 

local areas adopt additional measures. We will also discuss the ways performance 

goals for States and local areas were established, what data are used to measure their 

performance, and what policies provide incentives and sanctions. Finally, as State and

local workforce agencies often engage in capacity building as a way of spurring good 

performance, we conclude this paper with a brief discussion of these efforts.

PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY

As part of an effort to promote performance accountability, WIA establishes 

seventeen specific performance measures: four core measures apply to adults, four to 

dislocated workers, four to older youth participants, and three to younger youth. In 

addition, two measures of customer satisfaction apply across the three WIA funding 

streams. These measures are listed in Table 1.

In its guidance (TEGL 7-99), DOL noted that the accountability system should 

establish performance goals for these measures at the State and local levels, ensure 

comparability of results for purposes of awarding incentives and issuing sanctions, and 
V-2

provide information for system-wide reporting and evaluation related to program 

improvement. 

Table 1: WIA Performance Measures 

by Funding Stream

Category of 

Measure Performance Measure

Adult Core 

Measures

1. Entered Employment Rate

2. Employment Retention Rate 

3. Earnings Change

4. Employment and Credential Rate

Dislocated 

Worker Core 

Measures

5. Entered Employment Rate

6. Employment Retention Rate 

7. Earnings Replacement Rate 

8. Employment and Credential Rate

Older Youth 

(age 19-21) 

Core Measures

9. Entered Employment Rate

10. Employment Retention Rate 

11. Earnings Change

12.Credential Rate

Younger Youth 

(age 14-18) 

Core Measures

13. Skill Attainment Rate

14. Diploma or Equivalent Attainment Rate

15.Retention Rate

Customer 

Satisfaction

16. Participant Customer Satisfaction 

17. Employer Customer Satisfaction 

The Negotiation Process

WIA requires that States negotiate performance goals on the seventeen measures 

with DOL and with their local areas. DOL clarified (TEGL 7-99) that goals for the 

first three program years were to be negotiated initially, and that States should use UI 

wage record information to calculate performance on the WIA measures for JTPA 

exiters to form baselines for negotiation. States reported using data for JTPA 
V-3

participants going back one to four years to establish these baselines. Other data they 

used included State studies of Perkins-funded programs for establishing credential rates. 

During the first round of site visits (in early 2000) we visited States that had 

implemented early, and they noted that the negotiation requirements were still being 

established and that the process was therefore to some degree unclear. These States 

reported varied negotiation experiences, with most reporting a smooth process, but 

others feeling that DOL was not very accommodating. 

The States we examined during the second round of data collection, which form 

the basis for this briefing paper, also had mixed experiences negotiating with DOL. 

Although one State noted that it perceived the process as fair, most felt that there was 

very little real negotiation between themselves and DOL. A common perception was 

that DOL handed down the performance goals, or at most allowed only minor 

adjustments based on the State’s proposals or arguments that its goals should be 

lowered due to prevailing economic conditions. A few States also noted that they felt 

that some of the goals arrived at were unrealistic, given the State’s particular economic 

conditions and the lack of appropriate baseline data to support the new measures. 

Likewise, one State expressed disappointment that DOL appeared to assume that 

performance levels would increase from the baselines that had been calculated based on 

JTPA data, which this State felt was unwarranted given that WIA serves a different 

population than JTPA. 

With respect to States’ negotiations with local areas, the early implementing 

States that we studied during the first round of data collection generally used a topdown approach, and little negotiation ensued. In the subsequent sample, the States’ 

experiences were more varied. One rural State had a single negotiation with all local 

areas to establish a common set of State and local benchmarks together. Two States 

simply proposed performance goals and offered the local areas the opportunity to 

discuss them or propose changes. Showing a different pattern, Illinois put forth 

considerable effort to prepare local areas to negotiate: in addition to providing four 

years of local JTPA performance data, the State created a “Guide for Local Negotiating 

Teams” that explained differences between JTPA and WIA, and included a worksheet 

that could be used to estimate performance on new measures. The State required local 

areas to provide proposed goals with a rationale for them, and show the worksheet 

calculations. This information served as a starting point for negotiation between the 

State and local areas.
V-4

In conducting our data collection, we also asked local areas about their 

perceptions of the negotiation process. Among the sites we visited in the first round of 

data collection, most local areas felt that there was little real negotiation with the State. 

In the sites we visited in the second round, five local areas we visited reported a 

generally positive negotiation process with adequate State flexibility. The Medford Job 

Council, for example, reported that the State was honest and flexible in its negotiations. 

However, consistent with the earlier findings, many local areas felt that their 

performance goals were either entirely or substantially dictated to them. For example, 

when negotiating with local areas, some States appear to have used JTPA-based data to 

hand down goals or set a “floor” for WIA performance. Another local area reported 

that, after a series of unsuccessful negotiations with the State, it finally simply asked the 

State to tell it what its goals should be. The State later came back and reset some of 

the goals with no room for discussion due to goals that the State had subsequently 

negotiated with DOL.

The above example highlights that a difficult decision that States had to make was 

when to negotiate with the local areas—before or after their negotiation with DOL. 

States that negotiated with local areas first but were then given higher than anticipated 

goals by DOL had to renegotiate with the locals. On the other hand, those that 

negotiated with DOL first found that they had less flexibility in negotiating with their 

locals. 

As with the early implementing States, most States we visited in the second round

of data collection negotiated with DOL first. On this basis, they determined the level 

of performance local areas needed to reach for the State to meet its agreed-upon State 

goals. Some States specifically noted that they built in some margin for error by 

negotiating slightly elevated performance levels with their local areas. 

However, one State in our sample used the bottom-up approach, in which it 

negotiated with the local areas first, and used these results to negotiate performance 

levels with DOL. This State reported building in margin for error by trying to 

negotiate DOL’s proposed levels down, as opposed to negotiating local area levels up. 

As mentioned, at least one local area in this State noted that the State had to renegotiate 

with them after negotiating with DOL, and the latter negotiation involved little 

flexibility.
V-5

In terms of the performance goals that resulted for local areas in the eight States 

we visited in the second round, two States established statewide negotiated rates with 

the locals that were at or slightly above the goals the State had negotiated with DOL. 

The other six States negotiated different rates with their various local areas, based on 

the goals proposed by the locals and taking into account the areas’ prior performance 

and economic characteristics. However, in almost all cases, both State and local areas 

viewed the negotiated goals as preliminary. The general feeling was that, because the 

process was new, States and local areas expected to be able to re-negotiate performance 

levels if they proved unrealistic, or if economic conditions changed drastically.

Table 2 provides the ranges in first-year negotiated performance goals for the 

States and local areas we sampled. Specifically, all eight states we visited in the second 

round are represented in the table, but, because not all local areas provided data on all 

measures, the final column represents data from between seven and eleven local areas 

depending on the measure. 

The small sample size limits the extent to which these results can be used to 

generalize the findings. However, consistent with the WIA goal of providing local 

control, and with the intent that the negotiation process should allow for local factors to 

be taken into account, the table demonstrates considerable variability in the goals that 

were negotiated at both the State and local levels. As one would expect, the ranges for 

the local areas are broader than those of the States, given the within-state variability in 

the goals that were established. 

Table 3 shows the average State performance goals for the three years that were 

negotiated, and the average increase between years. Note that this table includes data 

for only six of the eight States, because two of the States we visited did not provide us 

with their negotiated goals for all three years, and the data could not be obtained from 

other sources.
V-6

Table 2: State and Local First-Year

Negotiated Performance Level Ranges

Adults

State-level Range

Low - High

Local-level Range

Low - High

Entered Employment Rate 63 % - 73 % 62 % - 80 %

Employment Retention Rate 72 % - 83 % 65 % - 85 %

Earnings Change in Six Months $2,500 - $4,207 $2,000 - $4,012

Employment and Credential Rate 30 % - 60 % 38.2 % - 60.7 %

Dislocated Workers

Entered Employment Rate 72 % - 80 % 70.5 % - 82 %

Employment Retention Rate 70 % - 90 % 65.5 % - 93 %

Earnings Replacement Rate 80 % - 97 % 76.9 % - 105 %

Employment and Credential Rate 30 % - 60 % 36.5 % - 63.4 %

Older Youth

Entered Employment Rate 54 % - 68 % 59 % - 80 %

Employment Retention Rate 60 % - 81 % 60 % - 85 %

Earning Change in Six Months $1,500 - $3,304 $1,500 - $3,200

Credential Rate 30 % - 50 % 31.1 % - 60 %

Younger Youth

Retention Rate 39 % - 59 % 50 % - 70 %

Skill Attainment Rate 60 % - 72 % 37.5 % - 60.1 %

Diploma/Equiv. Attainment Rate 31 % - 56 % 53.2 % - 1.7 %

Customer Satisfaction

Participants 63 % - 72 % 50 % - 85 %

Employers 60 % - 70 % 50 % - 85 %
V-7

Table 3: State Level 

Negotiated Performance Goals

Adults Year 1

Avg

Year 2 

Avg

Year 3

Avg

Avg

Change 

Yrs 1-2

Avg

Change

Yrs 2-3

Entered Employment Rate 68.8% 70.0% 71.4% 1.2 1.4

Employment Retention Rate 77.8% 78.8% 79.8% 1.0 1.0

Earnings Change in Six Months $3,060 $3,160 $3,233 $100 $73

Employment and Credential Rate 53.8% 55.8% 58.0% 2.0 2.2

Dislocated Workers

Entered Employment Rate 76.5% 77.6% 78.6% 1.1 1.0

Employment Retention Rate 83.5% 85.0% 86.3% 1.5 1.3

Earnings Replacement Rate 87.7% 89.0% 90.4% 1.3 1.4

Employment and Credential Rate 55.8% 57.1% 59.7% 1.3 2.6

Older Youth

Entered Employment Rate 64.1% 65.5% 66.8% 1.4 1.3

Employment Retention Rate 72.3% 73.4% 74.7% 1.1 1.3

Earning Change in Six Months $2,433 $2,511 $2,580 $78 $69

Credential Rate 46.8% 47.9% 50.7% 1.1 2.8

Younger Youth

Retention Rate 55.0% 56.3% 57.6% 1.3 1.3

Skill Attainment Rate 67.0% 68.0% 69.6% 1.0 1.6

Diploma/Equiv. Attainment Rate 51.8% 53.6% 54.3% 1.8 0.7

Customer Satisfaction

Participants 67.3% 68.6% 69.9% 1.3 1.3

Employers 67.3% 68.4% 69.5% 1.1 1.1

Again, the small sample size limits the extent to which these results can be 

generalized. Nonetheless, at least in these States it is notable that, in keeping with the 

WIA goal of promoting continuous improvement, in all cases the average goals increase 

across the three years. Also interesting is that the percentage point (or dollar) increase 

is sometimes greater between years one and two than it is between years two and three, 

but that for other measures, especially the various facets of credentialing, the reverse is 

true. 

Table 4 provides similar information about the performance goals established for 

local areas; these tabulations are restricted to the seven local areas that provided us with 

their performance goals on all measures for all three years. As with the State goals, the 
V-8

average local goals increase across the three years, consistent with continuous 

improvement expectations. Also as with the State-level figures, the expected increase 

for some measures is greater over the first two years than over the second two, with the 

reverse pattern true for other measures. However, the measures showing the greater 

increases among local areas are not necessarily the same ones that show the greater 

increase among States. This lack of correspondence could be attributed to the fact that 

only a small number of local areas within the six States included in Table 3 are covered 

in Table 4.

Table 4: Local Level 

Negotiated Performance Goals

Adults Year 1

Avg

Year 2 

Avg

Year 3

Avg

Avg 

Change 

Yrs 1-2

Avg

Change

Yrs 2-3

Entered Employment Rate 66.1% 67.2% 69.0% 1.1 1.8

Employment Retention Rate 74.1% 75.6% 77.1% 1.5 1.5

Earnings Change in 6 Months $2,845 $2,909 $2,988 $64 $79

Emp. & Credential Rate 52.1% 54.0% 55.7% 1.9 1.7

Dislocated Workers

Entered Employment Rate 75.6% 77.2% 78.9% 1.6 1.7

Employment Retention Rate 79.6% 82.4% 85.5% 2.8 3.1

Earnings Replacement Rate 86.0% 87.5% 89.0% 1.5 1.5

Emp. & Credential Rate 54.3% 56.0% 58.2% 1.7 2.2

 Older Youth

Entered Employment Rate 64.6% 66.7% 67.9% 2.1 1.2

Employment Retention Rate 67.8% 71.1% 73.8% 3.3 2.7

Earning Change in 6 Months $2,048 $2,286 $2,361 $238 $75

Credential Rate 45.1% 48.0% 51.3% 2.9 3.3

Younger Youth

Retention Rate 54.2% 55.9% 57.4% 1.7 1.5

Skill Attainment Rate 68.2% 69.9% 71.3% 1.7 1.4

Diploma/Equiv. Attainment 49.7% 52.7% 54.1% 3.0 1.4

Customer Satisfaction

Participants 67.0% 68.1% 69.5% 1.1 1.4

Employers 64.4% 65.8% 67.0% 1.4 1.2
V-9

Issues Regarding the WIA Performance Measures

DOL intended that the performance measures provide objective information for 

reporting and evaluation purposes. The general opinion of the States and local areas we 

sampled was that most measures, particularly those directly tied to employment and 

earnings, were fully appropriate and in line with their expectations about how their 

performance should be judged. For example, one local area noted that its local board 

members found the measures useful and were using them as a basis for promoting 

continuous improvement. Another area noted that it used the performance measures to 

set internal goals and provide staff with clear expectations regarding necessary levels of 

performance, and the School-to-Work representative from another commented that the 

youth measures were reasonable and feasible. Still another local area’s community 

college representative noted that having these WIA performance measures has forced 

teachers in the community colleges to design their classes with an eye towards 

outcomes, and the measures have forced the community college to do a better job with 

placement. These positive sentiments suggest the general appropriateness of the 

performance measures, and to some degree their acceptance among diverse community 

representatives. 

Notwithstanding these generally positive appraisals, our respondents noted quite a 

number of concerns or frustrations that they were experiencing with putting the 

measures into practice. Some of these were issues with the measures themselves, and 

others involved their implementation. These issues and concerns are discussed below.

Credential Rates. Credential rates are included as performance measures for the 

adults, dislocated worker, and older youth programs. Their use represents an attempt 

to capture an outcome specifically associated with participation in training services, and 

to reflect attainment of a recognized, portable measure of skills. Without such a 

criterion, the performance measurement system might miss the fact that WIA 

participants gained important employment-related skills, or attained certifications that 

made them more marketable as a result of WIA services. 

While deliberately allowing States and local areas considerable flexibility in how 

credentials would be defined in practice, DOL’s TEGL 7-99 provided some operational 

guidelines by defining a credential as:

A nationally recognized degree or certificate or State/locally recognized 

credential. Credentials include, but are not limited to, a high school diploma, 

GED or other recognized equivalents, post-secondary degrees/certificates, 
V-10

recognized skill standards, and licensure or industry-recognized certificates. 

States should include all State Education Agency recognized credentials. In 

addition, States should work with local Workforce Investment Boards to 

encourage certificates to recognize successful completion of the training services 

listed above that are designed to equip individuals to enter or re-enter 

employment, retain employment, or advance into better employment. 

Perhaps because this was a new measure and States and local areas are still 

adjusting to it, credential rates were some of the least popular performance measures 

and were described by some as problematic or unimportant. An initial concern was 

that, because it was a new measure, there was no suitable baseline for establishing 

performance goals. This problem was compounded by disagreements about what 

exactly constitutes a credential. Guidance from DOL intentionally leaves considerable 

room for interpretation, but some States and local areas appeared frustrated with this 

ambiguity. 

Moreover, respondents expressed concern about an apparent lack of equity that 

arose because credentials were defined very differently from one local area to the next. 

With respect to this issue, the flexibility inherent in this measure appears to have led to 

two extremes: adopting broad, lenient definitions of what constitutes a credential (e.g., 

something as simple as a certificate of completion), on the one hand, and adopting a 

very stringent definition that required an industry-recognized certification, on the other. 

Each approach has obvious strengths and weaknesses. Definitions of credential that are 

broader or more lenient make it easier for local areas to find programs that provide a 

credential while still promoting customer choice; however, the loose definitions dilute 

the meaning of the credential rate itself, possibly causing it to lack any real import as a 

measure of marketable and transferable skills. In fact, two local areas with looser 

definitions of credential expressed that sentiment. 

At the other extreme, some States and local areas have created very clear, 

stringent definitions regarding what constitutes a credential, but so much so that many 

training programs on the eligible training provider list are found not to award 

credentials that meet the local definition. For example, in one State the local 

Workforce Investment Board has not yet settled on a definition, but some members are 

pushing for a definition that recognizes only nationally or industry recognized 

certificates. Although such stringent definitions can create clarity and set high 

standards for the credential rate criteria, they also will detract from the areas’ measured 

performance. In some areas, they also influence decisions about what training 
V-11

programs should be included on the eligible training provider list, potentially implicitly 

limiting customer choice. For example, one local area adopted a stringent definition of 

what constituted a credential, relying on programs that merited college or union 

recognition, because it believed that credentials needed to be assured of broad 

recognition to be meaningful. However, due to this stringent definition, this local area 

failed to meet its negotiated performance goal on this measure, representing the first 

time that this area had ever failed to meet one of its performance requirements. This 

area has subsequently been encouraged by the State to lower its criteria regarding what 

constitutes a credential and is considering doing so. Another State initially developed a 

policy that only training programs that offered a credential should be included on the 

eligible training provider list, and consequently found that it needed to classify many 

short- or medium-term training programs as an intensive service to meet customers’ 

needs.

In addition to the difficulties resulting from trying to define what a credential is, 

adoption of this measure also raised practical concerns for some local areas regarding 

how to capture the necessary data about participants’ performance. For example, one 

local area failed to meet its negotiated goals on the credential measure and believed that 

part of the reason was that it could not capture information about the credentials that 

some of its participants might have attained. Another issue mentioned was that 

credential rate goals were difficult to meet because employers were enticing participants 

to begin work before they had attained their certifications. Another problem was 

capturing skill attainments associated with on-the-job training, which in many instances 

cannot be construed as leading to a certificate even in areas adopting a looser definition. 

Overall, it appears that a learning process is still underway. States and local 

areas are experimenting with the tradeoffs associated with adopting broader or tighter 

definitions of credentials, and are learning how or when to put credentialing processes 

in place and collect the necessary data about customers’ attainments.

Youth Skill Attainment Rate. Another measure that caused some concern was 

the younger youth Skill Attainment Rate, representing a measure of the percentage of 

youths’ skill goals—relating to basic skills, work readiness skills, or occupational 

skills—that were met during the year. This measure is similar to JTPA’s YEC 

attainment measure, but instead of being an exit-based measure, as YEC was, it is an 

in-program measure. As such, the intention was to create an intermediate measure of 

youths’ progress for those who require additional services (such as academic and soft-
V-12

skills development) prior to attaining a diploma or GED, or obtaining employment or 

post-secondary education. 

As with the credential rate, DOL deliberately allows flexibility in what should 

constitute a goal, and this flexibility is causing some local areas some concern 

regarding how to define “skill attainment” and measure it. One local area noted that, 

because its program for younger youth focused mostly on the disabled, skill attainment 

focused on youths’ “staying in school, and maintaining their grades.” Another local 

area defined success as a measurable increase in part of a grade level as determined 

through testing. As with credential rates, lenient definitions make the meaningfulness 

of this measure questionable, and variability in definitions across States and local areas 

make comparisons difficult. 

In addition to definitional concerns, there were also practical concerns about the 

ability to influence and measure youth skill attainment. Also as with the credential rate, 

some of these concerns appear to be products of local policy and perhaps of 

inexperience in how to apply this measure to the WIA context. 

 One concern expressed by a local area was that DOL’s guidance 

stipulates that skill goals established for youth should take no longer 

than one year to attain, but that the goals it wants to establish for youth 

will sometimes take longer than that. 

 At the other extreme, other local areas noted that even an intensive eight 

to ten week course (e.g., such as during a summer program) will often 

not be long enough for youth to show measurable skill increases. 

 One urban area noted that many of the in-school youth it served had 

difficulty maintaining progress in school, making this measure more 

difficult for it to meet than for other local areas in the State. 

 Another practical consideration was that the quarters used for WIA 

measurement do not align with the grading periods of the school year, 

which makes collecting skill attainment as measured through satisfactory 

school performance a problem. 

Some of these concerns, however, appear to relate to how the local area has 

decided to operationalize the goals and measure attainment more than with the measure 

itself. As with the credential rate, local areas are thus undergoing a learning process to 

adjust their definitions and measurement strategies.

Customer Satisfaction. Customer satisfaction measures are assessed for 

participants and employers as part of WIA’s performance accountability system. 
V-13

According to TEGL 6-00, three specific items from the American Customer 

Satisfaction Index (ASCI) are required to be asked of participants and employers via 

telephone survey, and each item is rated on a 10-point scale. A statewide random 

sample of 500 is required for all WIA-funded programs, unless the state served fewer 

than 1,000 eligible respondents, in which case it must attempt to reach all of them. A 

minimum 50% response rate is required.

The early implementing States we studied for the Interim Report all saw the value 

of customer service measures, and because of this several had been gathering data 

pertinent to this measure prior to WIA. States and areas we visited during the second 

round of data collection also appreciated the merit of this measure, though some 

practical difficulties were still being worked out. 

One practical issue with which States had to grapple was how to collect the 

information about customers' satisfaction and how to do so in a way that would allow 

the measurement of customer satisfaction for local areas, as well as for the State as a 

whole. We saw various sampling and data collection methodologies in evidence. Of 

the eight States we visited during the second round, five contracted out their customer 

service data collection to a university or institute. One State, Montana, reported 

phoning 100% of both job seekers and employers; it received an 80% response rate and 

shared results with the local areas. Illinois contracted Northern Illinois University to 

randomly sample from each local area; the State then shares the satisfaction results with 

the locals. By contrast, two States reported sampling the required 500 job seekers and 

500 employers statewide, limiting their ability to produce accurate local-area estimates. 

Some local areas specifically mentioned that the States’ data collection plan was 

statewide and could not be used to generate local-area estimates. 

Some local areas were consequently taking it upon themselves to measure the 

satisfaction of their customers, because they attach so much importance to doing so. 

Thus, five local areas we visited are gathering their own customer service data, and 

others are considering doing so (it is unclear whether these were strictly local area 

efforts, or whether they were a part of the larger State effort). One such local effort to 

collect customer satisfaction data was being undertaken by Portland Worksystems, 

which reported gathering data on satisfaction from 15% of its core customers, and 

100% of registered adults, dislocated workers, and youth who exit; each One-Stop 

center in this area also collects customer satisfaction data when the customer completes 

an activity. 
V-14

With respect to the survey instruments, it appears that some States viewed the 

required ACSI questions as merely a starting point (this is permissible according to 

DOL guidance, as long as the required questions are included first). Thus, one State 

mentioned adding additional questions to the ACSI. Other States indicated that they 

were developing their own survey instrument, and one State had not yet finished 

developing the survey instrument it was creating with help from a contractor. 

Other Issues Relating to Performance

Beyond the specific measures themselves, several other issues relating to 

performance arose.

Registration. Under WIA, performance data are only required to be collected for 

registered participants. DOL provided guidance in TEGL 7-99 that indicated that 

tracking and monitoring should begin when services involving significant staff attention 

were first provided, and identified that two factors that should be considered in 

determining when registration was appropriate: 1) the level of staff involvement with 

the customer; and 2) the purpose of service. Services that involve significant staff time 

and that are intended to impart job seeking and/or occupational skills to the customer 

require registration. 

States generally passed this federal guidance to their local areas and added little to 

it. However, the way these policies were implemented at the local level varied 

considerably. For example, two local areas in one State noted that, in practice, almost 

all non-training activities are funded through non-WIA funds. Therefore, only 

participants receiving training services typically require WIA registration, which 

generally occurs in intensive services at the point the prospective trainees begin to 

develop their training plan. Local areas in other States indicated that intensive services 

are the accepted point of registration. Along these lines, one local area felt that it was 

“unrealistic” to register participants who only receive staff-assisted core service and 

track their performance. 

In some local areas, registration practices are consistent with State policy of 

registering at the point of staff-assisted core service, but what is considered “staffassisted” differs from one area to another. In one local area, people can go through a 

three-day workshop on employment skills before being registered, whereas in other 

local areas participation in even shorter workshops would trigger registration. 

Elsewhere, another local area classifies any interaction with clients that involve more 
V-15

than about fifteen minutes of staff time as a staff-assisted service that requires 

registration. (See the companion Briefing Paper, Services for Adults and Dislocated 

Workers, for a fuller discussion of differences across local areas in the point of 

registration)

Some of the variability in registration points across local areas appears to be more 

a matter of how a service is categorized than real programmatic differences. For 

example, one local area may classify a resume workshop as staff-assisted core service 

and register participants at that point. Meanwhile, another local area might classify the 

equivalent workshop as an intensive service and register participants then. Such 

differences do not matter for performance measurement, since persons receiving 

equivalent service are counted towards performance in both cases. 

However, even discounting such differences in categorization, it is clear that local 

areas vary widely in what types of services will trigger WIA registration, complicating 

the interpretation of performance measures from one local area to the next. 

Complexity of the Measures. A common critique of the measures was their 

complexity. Along these lines, half of the States we visited and many local areas noted 

that the measures were complex and confusing. For example, one State called the 

measures “not understandable” by most staff. Two issues that were particularly 

frustrating to some States were that time frames and cohorts for measurement varied 

from measure to measure, and that the measures were complex to calculate due to 

exclusions in who was being counted in the base of the various measures (these issues 

were also highlighted in the General Accounting Office’s February 2002 report on 

performance measure improvements, GAO-02-275). 

The timing issue relates to the fact that different performance measures require 

data to be collected for different quarters prior to the customers’ registration and after 

their exit (e.g., data need to be collected for one quarter after exit for the entered 

employment rate, for the second and third quarters both prior to registration and after 

exit for the earnings change rate, and so no). Accordingly, respondents noted a 

difficulty in keeping track of for what periods data needed to be captured, for which 

participants, and for which of the measures. This difficulty was particularly 

pronounced for local areas that use many contractors, who each must also be schooled 

in the complex data collection needs, and for data collection that is not easily 
V-16

automated, such as for the credentialing rates and when supplemental data are used for 

measuring employment outcomes. 

Once data are collected, the calculation of the measures is also very involved. 

For example, in calculating various of the adult performance measures, one includes in 

the base, variously, those employed at registration, those employed at registration or in 

the first quarter after exit, and those who were enrolled in training. 

Given these complexities, performance measurement was a commonly mentioned 

area for capacity building efforts.

Unintended Consequences. Some States and local areas expressed concern over 

possible unintended consequences of the performance measures that involved learning 

how to optimally “play” the new system to maximize performance. Along these lines, 

some local areas mentioned that they were assessing the optimal time during a quarter 

to “exit” a participant from the program to maximize measured performance. For 

example, one local area has learned to only officially exit customers at the end of a 

quarter to minimize the time between exit and measurement. 

Another, more pervasive concern we heard about was that the measures 

introduced possible disincentives to serve certain types of clients. One State was 

concerned that its high performance goals would encourage local areas not to serve the 

neediest job seekers (presumably the ones with the biggest barriers to employment), but 

to hand them off to other partner programs. This circumstance, it feared, would create 

an “obstacle to collaboration” if it occurred frequently enough. Another State noted 

that it felt there was a disincentive to serve dislocated workers coming from high 

paying jobs, as their high pre-program earning rates might be difficult to replace. This 

concern seemed especially to weigh on respondents’ minds for site visits that occurred 

subsequent to the September 11th terrorist attacks, which damaged key industries in the 

State with high paying jobs. Similarly, one local area was concerned about the lack of 

incentive to serve those currently employed, since (because they have a job at intake) 

staff cannot be credited for getting these participants a job at exit. Another State 

worried that retention measures created a disincentive to serve those seeking temporary 

employment. 

One interesting aspect of some of these concerns is that they are to some degree 

in seeming contradiction with one another. For example, some respondents expressed 

concerned about disincentives to serve the neediest, while others were concerned that 
V-17

previously high-wage dislocated workers would not be served. This fact highlights the 

WIA program’s multiple goals and target populations. Similarly, although the 

measures seemingly create disincentives to serve some potential customers, other 

measures provide incentives to serve them. For example, it might be harder to place 

the very hardest to serve in employment, but those who are placed might realize a 

dramatic earnings increase. Thus, the performance measures need to be viewed as a 

package that provides a balanced set of measurement criteria.

Lack of Partners Adopting Similar Measures. As TEGL 7-99 notes, a major 

emphasis of WIA was improving coordination between the workforce investment 

system and adult education, literacy, and vocational rehabilitation and education 

programs. One way to encourage such collaboration is by having the various partner 

programs adopt common or similar performance measures to ensure that the various 

programs and agencies are working towards the same goals. In keeping with this goal, 

Wagner-Peyser performance measures were recently changed in order to better align 

with WIA performance measures. Similarly, TEGL 7-99 also notes that some WIA 

measures may be used by other related programs; for example, NAFTA/TAA will use 

the WIA dislocated worker measures. At least one State saw these as very positive 

steps that should encourage stronger partnerships. 

Nevertheless, some of our respondents expressed frustration that the aligning of 

performance measures across partner programs did not go further. Moreover, some 

specifically pointed to the lack of system-wide measures as being a serious deficiency to 

the current criteria for gauging performance accountability. Current efforts being 

spearheaded by DOL to more closely align measures across programs may address 

some of these concerns.

Additional Measures

WIA required data collection and reporting for seventeen performance measures, 

but gave States and local areas the flexibility of adopting additional measures if they 

chose. Of the early implementing States we sampled for the interim report, only one 

State decided to collect additional measures. This State, Florida, established a uniform 

measurement system to be applied to all agencies and programs involved in the State’s 

workforce development strategy, even before WIA was enacted. The State developed 

three tiers of outcome measures:
V-18

 One tier involved measures applied across all workforce programs and 

initiatives to gauge system-wide performance, such as placement or 

retention. 

 The second tier involved outcomes applicable to the State’s strategy to 

provide successful entry into the workforce, and align education and 

training with occupations. In addition, this tier involved a set of 

standards for One-Stop centers, youth employment activities, and the 

State’s Work and Gain Economic Self-Sufficiency (WAGES) program. 

 The third tier involved specific operational output measures used by 

each program.

Florida has continued to use this tiered system even with the adoption of WIA.

In the second round of data collection, we learned that two other States had 

adopted additional performance measures, as part of their efforts to promote systemwide performance and foster cross-agency cooperation and coordination in serving 

customers.

One of these States, Oregon, began implementing a State-level, system-wide 

workforce development accountability system under the jurisdiction of the State 

Workforce Investment Board in 1989. The State is currently collecting data on five 

indicators, and will phase in the rest over time. The indicators are:

 Employment placement

 Employment retention

 Wage gain

 Placement in post-secondary education or training

 Demonstrated competency in workforce readiness skills

 Increase in basic skills competency

 Completion of educational degree or certification

 Completion of occupational skills training

 Employer investment in workforce development

 Customer satisfaction

 Welfare caseload reduction

 Recidivism

 Return on investment
V-19

These indicators were not included in the State’s WIA plan as supplemental 

measures, but represent a separate effort. However, efforts are underway to align them 

with the required WIA measures.

In Minnesota, the other State we studied that was adopting additional measures, 

the State Workforce Council is working with local Workforce Investment Boards to 

develop measures in seven broad outcome areas to capture system-wide performance. 

These outcome areas include:

 Competencies of the workforce

 Economic vitality

 Earnings

 Productivity

 Reduced poverty

 Customer satisfaction

 Return on investment

These measures had not been finalized by the time of data collection, but are 

scheduled to be phased in by July of 2002.

Elsewhere, we learned of a few local areas’ efforts along these lines. For 

example, the Workforce Investment Board in one area adopted a measure of return on 

investment, which is calculated by adding the increases in pay, added tax contributions, 

and reductions in welfare benefits for the participants served and comparing this figure 

to the costs of providing service. According to this measure, the WIB estimates that for 

every dollar spent by the adult and dislocated worker programs, $7.93 was returned to 

the taxpayers.

Overall, then, most States and local areas have focused on the core WIA 

performance measures at this stage of WIA implementation, but a few additional efforts 

are underway. Those adopting additional measures have done so to capture either 

system-wide performance across partners or One-Stop centers, or to calculate benefits 

of the system such as return on investment, decreases in welfare caseload, or 

recidivism.

Use of Unemployment Insurance Wage Records

WIA requires that UI wage records be used to track and report on the 

performance of adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs. This requirement was 
V-20

imposed to provide a high degree of validity and comparability in performance 

measurement, and was recognized by our respondents as satisfying these objectives. 

However, those we interviewed noted two key problems with the use of UI wage record 

data.

The first key problem we heard about related to the considerable delays in 

obtaining UI wage records. These delays can be as long as six months to over a year 

for some measures. These delays were recognized and anticipated by DOL, and its 

reporting guidelines reflect this reality. However, many of the States and local areas 

we sampled specifically mentioned that this time delay represents a problem for them in

using performance data to manage their program. For example, one local area that 

uses a network of contractors to provide services noted that the performance data often 

come back too late to be useful for renegotiating contracts based on performance. 

Other local areas generally noted that, due to the delays, they cannot use UI data to 

manage their programs’ performance, but must use other data for that purpose. For 

example, one State noted that it produces its own monthly, quarterly, and ad hoc 

reports on performance to help local areas with performance management and compare 

their performance with that of other local areas. The limitations of using UI data for 

program management have been recognized by DOL, and it consequently encourages 

States and local areas to adopt other measurement strategies and indicators for that 

purpose.

A second key problem noted by our respondents is that not all relevant 

participants who obtain employment are covered by the UI wage record system, 

including the self-employed, independent contractors, military personnel, Federal 

workers, or postal workers. This problem too has long been recognized by DOL, and, 

as such, it permits the use of supplemental data to document participants’ employment 

outcomes in some circumstances. Nonetheless, this limitation of the UI system 

continues to be frustrating for some of the respondents we spoke with. One local area 

representative even expressed concerns that an incentive exists not to serve people who 

want jobs in uncovered areas, or that staff might discourage participants away from 

seeking employment in non-covered occupations. 

Another factor that relates to limits on UI coverage is that State databases contain 

information only about persons employed in that State. Thus, participants living in one 

State who find employment in a different nearby State will not show up in the UI wage 

record system for the State providing WIA services. DOL recognized this limitation as 
V-21

well, and has been supporting development of the Wage Record Interchange System 

(WRIS), designed to allow States to obtain UI wage record information on WIA 

participants employed in other States. The wider adoption of WRIS may eventually 

alleviate the problem, but currently relatively few States are participating and questions 

remain regarding how States will finance their participation once DOL seed money is 

scaled back.1 

Thus, although the UI wage record system is useful for validating performance on 

placement, retention, and earnings, the time delays and lack of coverage or accessibility 

of records of some participants limits the utility of the system and the reports generated 

from it. 

Incentives and Sanctions

WIA provides for incentives and sanctions to be issued based on performance 

relative to negotiated goals. States that exceed their performance levels (and those 

under the Department of Education’s Vocational Education and Adult Education and 

Literacy programs) are eligible for financial incentive grants; conversely, States that do 

not meet their performance levels under WIA are subject to sanctions. Meanwhile, 

each State is empowered to formulate incentive and sanction policies for its local areas 

to determine how the State would pass on incentives or sanctions to the local areas that 

exceed, or fail to meet, their negotiated performance goals. This section addresses the 

State incentive and sanction policies.

Three States we visited had not yet finalized their incentive policies. For those 

that had them in place, the policies varied considerably from State to State. For 

example:

 Arizona will provide incentive money based 30% on performance and 

70% based on the quality of partnerships and collaboration. The 

performance requirements were not yet in place, but the partnership 

portion of the formula requires locals to submit a report describing their 

partnerships in terms of purpose and mission, organization and 

management, and workforce system development. 

 Another State distributes incentives by funding stream; to receive an 

incentive award, the area’s average performance on the program’s 

 

1

 Since this report was written, DOL has agreed to financially support WRIS indefinitely, greatly 

easing States’ concerns. Moreover, State participation in WRIS is now widespread.
V-22

measures must exceed 100% of the goal levels and its performance on 

each measure must reach at least 80% of the goal. For areas that 

qualify, the incentive money is given based on the amount spent on the 

funding stream relative to the total spent by all areas.

 Still another State provides incentives in two ways. First, it uses nonmonetary recognition for success in reaching Baldrige continuous 

improvement criteria. Second, it distributes monetary awards, one for 

local coordination and one for regional coordination. For each, the 

local area must meet the State’s definition of exemplary performance, 

which means meeting all of the seventeen performance goals and 

exceeding these six—adult employment and credential rate, dislocated 

worker employment and credential rate, youth diploma or equivalent, 

youth entered employment rate, and the two customer satisfaction 

measures.

 Finally, one State does not give incentives per se, but uses the incentive 

funds to distribute competitive grants. This State feels that doing so not 

only rewards high performers but also provides incentives for others 

who propose innovative ideas for improvement. 

Sanction policies were much less established at the time of our site visits. At that 

time, four States had no articulated policy for sanctions. One State indicated that the 

only sanction in place now is technical assistance. Another State essentially used the 

Federal guidance and indicated that TA and an improvement plan are required for 

failing the first year, and after that corrective action may be required. Finally, one 

State indicated that sanctions are not based on performance, but on administrative or 

financial mismanagement. 

Local areas did not seem particularly worried about sanctions. There are 

probably several reasons why sanctions received little attention, including historically 

strong performance in the areas we visited, the lack of State sanction policies yet in 

place, the expectation that the negotiated goals could be renegotiated if problems 

occurred, and the primary reliance on technical assistance as a sanction in the first year 

consistent with the law.

Continuous Improvement 

Continuous improvement is fundamental to the performance accountability system 

under WIA. Indeed, the legislation notes that the purpose of the performance 

accountability system is to establish a means to assess the effectiveness of States and 

local areas in achieving continuous improvement of workforce investment activities. 
V-23

This section describes the continuous improvement activities as described by the State 

and local areas we sampled.

One of the ways in which continuous improvement is promoted is through the 

increase over time in negotiated performance levels for States and local areas, which 

we described earlier in this paper. These increases represent one way to encourage the 

striving for continuous improvement. At the same time, one caution mentioned by 

some States and local areas was that continuous improvement should not mean 

constantly “ratcheting up” performance levels. Concern was also expressed that 

improvement will not always be directly reflected in performance on the core measures, 

and that performance can eventually reach natural ceilings. 

On that basis, some States and areas were developing other means of promoting 

continuous improvement, although few of these were fully developed as yet. Among 

the more advanced examples, however, Illinois created a “Promising Practices” website 

to capture best practices, a One-Stop center benchmarking project, a One-Stop center 

chartering system to assure excellence, and the Illinois Community Colleges Quality 

Improvement System with on-going reviews of programs to ensure excellence. 

Elsewhere, one of the most comprehensive, systematic State efforts was taking 

place in Virginia, which has adopted a Malcolm Baldrige program. This program has 

seven dimensions, relating to leadership, strategic planning, customer and market 

focus, information and analysis, human resources, process management, and business 

results. Each dimension has six to nine criteria for performance that areas strive to 

meet.

As at the State level, continuous improvement efforts at the local level were 

mostly still developing. In fact, a number of areas had no formal continuous 

improvement process. However, seven local areas were either considering using the 

Malcolm Baldrige framework or had already adopted it. For example, the Balance of 

Maricopa County has been using the Baldrige criteria since 1998. This area trains staff 

in the quality criteria, conducts staff self-assessment, identifies and prioritizes facets of 

its operation that need improvement, and creates action items. In addition, it 

supplements these efforts with a systemwide assessment of quality and responsiveness 

to customer needs, and an employer services team that uses data to set improvement 

goals. 
V-24

Beyond Baldrige, local areas have come up with other improvement processes. 

For example, Yuma County links its efforts to capacity building, which it bases on 

these seven tenets:

 Every employee is a valued asset, and can make contributions

 Defect inspection should be replaced by defect prevention

 Process decisions should be based on objective, statistical analysis

 Quality of product or service should come before other considerations

 Comparative benchmarks should be used to identify excellence

 Employees have an obligation to continuously improve their work 

processes

 Employees must be extensively trained 

Some staff in this area also attended an Advanced Public Executive Program, 

and, as a result of this training, overhauled the evaluation system to ensure that 

evaluation criteria match actual work performed and to allow for feedback from staff 

that can further improve the system. 

Among other efforts:

 Suffolk County has established a continuous improvement workgroup 

with one representative from each department or unit. The workgroup 

meets monthly and examines one issue at each meeting—the issue is 

discussed, data are examined, suggestions for improvement are made, 

and improvement plans are developed. The area reports having good 

results with this process. 

 Portland Worksystems examines improvement on two levels. At the 

broad level, it assesses the labor market and economic developments to 

ensure that the workforce system’s efforts adapt to changes. At the 

more micro level, the area engages in constant monitoring and TA to 

contractors. 

 The Balance of Montana area has created a continuous improvement 

plan that gives system-wide direction to community service providers 

and includes best practices from seven States. It also has developed a 

business guide for local community management teams to help them 

develop business and continuous improvement plans based on Baldrige 

principles. 

 Other local areas are using swipe-card information to improve One-Stop 

center services, using prestigious State award programs, or have service 

teams set performance goals. 
V-25

CAPACITY BUILDING

Having a strong performance accountability system and encouraging continuous 

improvement are two ways that WIA promotes excellence in performance. An 

additional way to promote excellence is by encouraging efforts at capacity building. 

Capacity building activities are those that promote improved knowledge, skills, 

abilities, or capacities by the system staff to improve system effectiveness. 

WIA allows States to allocate funds for providing capacity building and technical 

assistance to local areas, One-Stop operators, One-Stop partners, and eligible providers, 

including by developing and training staff and developing exemplary program activities. 

Similarly, DOL can provide funds or grants for supporting efforts aimed at capacity 

building at the State and local levels, such as technical assistance in program planning, 

assessment, evaluation, and monitoring. This section examines the State and local 

capacity building efforts described by our sample.

State Efforts

States’ capacity building efforts have primarily taken the form of training and 

technical assistance. Most specifically mentioned providing training or workshops to 

the local area staff, and six States mentioned providing technical assistance. Technical 

assistance has taken the form of on-site sessions or sometimes guidebooks on specific 

topics. For example, Montana noted that it provided onsite TA sessions at 14 locations 

on MIS and performance issues. Illinois has created TA guidebooks on topics such as 

credentialing and daycare for One-Stop centers. 

Training is being provided on a broad range of topics. Some of the most 

commonly mentioned by States were MIS or specific computer systems, performance 

accountability, financial management, and partnership building. Some States are 

offering an even wider variety of training courses. For example, during 2001-02 

Arizona is offering “Seminars in Excellence” on 15 different topics. Likewise, Illinois 

conducts a training needs assessment and prioritizes topics. The State provided a three 

page list of training seminars offered since 1999 that covers the spectrum of WIA 

implementation topics, such as WIA itself, quality, resource rooms, partnerships, 

administration, local Workforce Investment Boards, planning, responding to complex 

customer barriers, nondiscrimination, continuous improvement, customer flow, grant 

writing, and many more. They are also creating an Employment Specialist Course with 

the community college system. Other States, such as New York, noted that they take 
V-26

full advantage of the training DOL provides, particularly for capacity building for their 

State staff.

In addition to technical assistance and training, another capacity building effort 

commonly mentioned was to bring together workgroups or hold regular meetings to 

address important topics. For instance, Arizona reported having a “Workforce 

Development Summit” every two years. Minnesota mentioned that it holds a 

“practitioner’s group” with representatives from each local area. The group meets 

quarterly on hot issues, and the State conducts briefings. The State also held a group 

for resource room staff. Other State-level capacity building efforts include developing 

sector specialists to work on high wage, high demand jobs, or providing funds to local 

areas for their own capacity building.

Local Efforts

Local capacity building efforts targeted all levels of WIA personnel, including 

One-Stop center staff, local Workforce Board members and staff, and contractors or 

service providers. 

Training is the most common capacity building method described by local areas. 

Almost all of the local areas mentioned providing some level of training, and most 

indicated that they take advantage of the State training programs as one method of 

building capacity. Several local areas determined training needs through a needs 

assessment process, such as a training needs survey. Other areas have staff members 

create an individual development plan, and a few mentioned providing individual 

learning accounts, funds for individual training needs, or tuition reimbursement. Rural 

Minnesota has even created a network of peer trainers to train on issues relating to 

quality. Some of the most common staff training topics across the local areas we 

visited included WIA itself, performance measures, customer service, stress 

management, fee for service, case management, client flow, ITAs, computer skills, and 

serving or providing access to disabled customers. Some areas also offer advanced 

training opportunities. For example, Yuma County sponsors a “Workforce 

Development Executive” certification program at the State university, and provides 

training through the university’s Advanced Public Executive program on topics such as 

leadership, supervisory skills, or process evaluation and change. 

Partner programs were involved in capacity building through cross training or 

“all staff” training efforts for One-Stop center staff in several local areas. This cross 
V-27

training typically covered partner services, client flow, coordination, or common 

functions like job registration and labor exchange. 

Contractor training generally involved topics relevant to WIA service provision 

such as eligibility and performance measurement. One local area, Portland 

Worksystems, has set up contractor meetings that serve as a forum for sharing best 

practices as well as training. Chicago has agency liaisons to work with contractors and 

conducts training at monthly meetings.

Other capacity building efforts described by the local areas we visited included 

attending or co-sponsoring conferences, creating TA manuals, taking part in State 

taskforces, holding regular meetings at which staff or providers can discuss problems or 

issues, and conducting retreats for Workforce Investment Board members. 

SUMMARY

Based on the data we collected for this study, it appears that the WIA 

performance measures are generally recognized as being meaningful and appropriate. 

They represent a framework for assessing and comparing performance for each funding 

stream across States and local areas, using data that provide valid, comparable 

information for most measures. In general, the measures were seen as useful and 

important for creating accountability and encouraging continuous improvement. The 

performance measures also appear to have successfully embodied the WIA principle of 

State and local control and flexibility. This was demonstrated by the variability we 

found in negotiated performance goals, the way the measures were operationalized, and 

the way data were being collected and used.

Some general concerns were express about some of the measures, which to some 

degree represent tradeoffs involved in applying various levels of rigor and specificity, 

while allowing for local flexibility. These issues include:

1. Balancing the need for a meaningful negotiation process with the reality that 

States and local areas should be held to the highest levels of performance.

2. Lack of consistency in how credentials are measured and difficulties that areas 

are experiencing in capturing the necessary data.

3. Confusions about how to match goals established for youth as part of the 

youth skill attainment rate to youths’ natural learning progression.
V-28

4. Using appropriate sampling and data collection strategies that would allow for 

the reliable measurement of customer satisfaction at both the State and local 

levels.

5. Lack of consistency across local areas in what services trigger WIA 

registration, which can make it difficult to compare measured performance 

from one local area to the next or over time.

6. Concerns that some of the performance measures are confusing and difficult 

to track, as they involve complex definitions and entail varying measurement 

periods before and after program registration for different customers.

7. Potential unintended consequences of the various measures, including 

disincentives to serve some populations

8. Lack of consistency in performance measures across partner programs, which

can inhibit collaboration and coordination. 

9. A concern that the WIA measures do not adequately capture broad dimensions 

of systemwide performance. 

10. Limitations in the use of UI wage records for measuring employment 

outcomes, including those caused by time lags in when data become available, 

lack of coverage of certain sectors of employment, and lack of coverage for 

those employed in another State. 

Overall, then, it appears that performance accountability as mandated by WIA is 

conceptually on target, but that States and local areas are still adapting to the new 

requirements, recognizing and dealing with the systems’ limitations, understanding the 

new measures and their implications, and recognizing the various tradeoffs involved in 

the decisions they make. As the system develops, one would expect many of the 

problems discussed here to be resolved. As this learning and system development takes 

place, staff will become more comfortable with the WIA measures and how they 

operate, and the performance accountability system will realize its promise of 

promoting high, comparable, and valid standards of performance.

Moreover, we observed a range of innovative State and local efforts that have 

been established to further promote system accountability, including, among other 

things, through efforts at conducting additional data collection to serve program 

management functions, developing measures of systemwide or cross-program 

performance, and adopting novel incentive policies that promote continuous 

improvement and foster the formation of strong partnerships. 

Also as a way of improving system performance, we saw States and local areas 

engage in serious and concerted efforts to promote capacity building, such as by 
V-29

developing training tools, conducting workshops on a range of topics, and providing 

numerous other opportunities for staff to improve their skills or gain new ones. 


 
VI-1

VI. SERVICES FOR ADULTS AND 

DISLOCATED WORKERS

This briefing paper is part of a series developed as part of the Evaluation of the 

Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates and 

Technical Assistance and Training Corporation. The evaluation consists thus far of two 

rounds of site visits: the first round of site visits was conducted to six states and nine 

local workforce areas in the spring of 2000, and the second round was conducted to an 

additional eight state and fourteen local areas in the summer and fall of 2001. An 

overview of the evaluation is included as an appendix to this report. This briefing 

paper for the most part draws on findings from the second round of site visits, because 

these capture developments associated with WIA that are the more recent. 

In this briefing paper, we discuss services for adults and dislocated workers that 

would normally require WIA registration, including staff-assisted core service, 

intensive services, and training services (a companion briefing paper discusses services 

for the universal customer that do not require registration). We first discuss some 

overall design issues, including the emphasis that sites place on training (as opposed to 

other levels of service) and the interplay between state and local roles. We next discuss 

how clients flow through the service levels, including who is given priority for services 

(in the adult program) and when WIA registration occurs. We then discuss issues 

related to the content of services, with an emphasis on ways that local areas differ from 

each other. We conclude with some general observations and identify some special 

challenges with which sites seem to be grappling.

OVERALL DESIGN ISSUES

As part of an effort to devolve authority to States and local areas, WIA 

establishes only the broad outlines of how customers should move through the various 

service levels and what procedures should be established to guide access to training. 

States, in turn, may devolve this authority largely to local areas, or they may, at their 

discretion, establish more prescriptive policies that they expect to be followed 

throughout the State. In this section we discuss the interplay of State and local roles 

and the general issue of the balance given to training versus service at the other levels.
VI-2

State and Local Roles

Our site visits in both rounds of data collection almost uniformly reflect that 

States took a “hands-off” approach with respect to the service design for adult and 

dislocated worker services. Many did so explicitly as part of a sincere commitment to 

regional autonomy and local control. Local flexibility is of course an underpinning of 

the WIA legislation, and, to this degree, the States’ vision for WIA implementation as it 

relates to local control was well in line with the principles that WIA embodies. Others 

noted that, at least at this early stage of the operation of WIA, they needed to see how 

the system unfolded before considering whether more restrictive State guidelines should 

be issued. 

Thus, regarding adult and dislocated worker services, most of the guidance that 

States issued to local areas at this point simply took the form of reiterating or clarifying 

the key stipulations pertaining to service delivery drawn from the WIA legislation or 

regulations. For example, they might describe the factors that must be considered in 

having adults move through service tiers (e.g., giving priority for public assistance 

recipients or low-income individuals, making a determination that a customer needed 

and could benefit from services at the next higher service level, etc.), without 

specifying how these criteria should be operationalized. Thus:

 None of the States we visited in either the first or second round 

specified for the local areas the length of time that a customer needed to 

remain at one service level before advancing to the next, 

 Only one State stipulated the proportion of the local area’s WIA budget 

that should be devoted to training. Florida, a State we visited in the 

first round of data collection, was the exception, as it required that 50% 

of funds be used for training.

 States gave minimal guidance beyond paraphrasing the legislation as to 

how the service levels should be defined. Oregon is an exception in that 

it initially developed a fairly specific framework for defining service 

levels, especially the distinction between intensive and training services.

 Beyond reiterating the tenets of the legislation, few States gave more 

than vague guidance on when customers should be registered under 

WIA. At most, States issued statements based on DOL’s guidance, 

such as:

 Illinois, which noted that local areas should adopt a point of 

registration that takes into account (a) the level of staff 

involvement, and (b) whether the service was primarily intending 

to impart job-seeking skills or something more, and
VI-3

 Oregon, which noted that registration was required “when a core 

service is delivered in an individualized way.”

 None established time or dollar limits on the amount of ITAs that could 

be issued.

 Almost none established guidelines for when alternatives to ITAs (e.g., 

contract training or customized training) could be used for delivering 

training, or even how commonly they should be used. Among the 

exceptions: 

 Oregon clarified that contract training for hard-to-serve 

populations would be appropriate for individuals with substantial 

disabilities or substance abuse or mental health problems, victims 

of domestic violence, or “individuals in other categories 

approved by the local board.” 

 Virginia noted its expectation that alternatives to ITA should be 

used infrequently.

Different local areas reacted in different ways to the autonomy they were being 

given. On the one hand, some emphasized that they zealously guarded local 

prerogatives and thus greatly appreciated the freedom they were being given to 

establish their own service policies and practices. On the other hand, many local areas 

struggled with how to interpret and implement various WIA provisions and some were 

thus eager for more direction from their State counterparts. 

Emphasis on Training

WIA can be construed as a dramatic shift in thinking about the role of training in 

serving program participants. JTPA, which WIA supersedes, was intended to be 

almost strictly a training program (an important exception being that rapid response 

activities for dislocated workers were allowed), while WIA establishes separate levels 

of service—core services and intensive services—apart from training. In the absence of 

clear State guidance (except in Florida), local areas were left to their own thinking as to 

how much to emphasize training as opposed to service at the other levels. As well, 

they have in some cases faced practical or other difficulties that have made it difficult to 

devote as many resources to training services as they might have liked. 

Based on actual or projected budget figures we were able to gather from 12 of the 

14 local areas we visited in the second round, we can characterize them on the basis of 

the percentage of their WIA adult and dislocated funds that they have devoted to 

training. As shown in Table 1, below, there seems to be a pronounced split between 

the local areas we studied, with some devoting fairly little of their WIA budget for adult 
VI-4

and dislocated worker services to training and others devoting nearly all of it to 

training.

Table 1: Percent of WIA Budget

Devoted to Training

Pct Devoted to Training No. of Local Areas

Very little (about 10%) 4 local areas

Little (15% to 25%) 1 local area

About half (40% to 65%) 5 local areas

Almost all (90% to 100%) 2 local areas

Reasons for the variation across sites can be attributed to a number of factors, 

both practical and conceptual. Among the conceptual reasons, a very few of the local 

areas we visited in the second round of site visits implicitly adopted a “work-first” 

approach to WIA. These areas thus emphasize job placement services and will consider 

training only as a last resort. Interestingly, several additional States and local areas 

initially adopted this approach, but have since come to take a much more balanced 

view. For example, officials in two States told us that they at first interpreted guidance 

on WIA as encouraging a work-first approach, but, based on clarifications that have 

been issued in very clear language more recently, now realize that WIA allows them 

much more flexibility and in fact requires them first and foremost to be focused on 

clients’ needs. 

With these few exceptions, then, the view that WIA implies “work-first” was 

little in evidence. The most common perspective was that services under WIA should 

represent a balance of training and other services. This approach was expressed well 

by one of our respondents in the Balance of Maricopa County, who remarked that there 

was no longer the presumption that training is right for everyone, as there was under 

JTPA, but that it was still necessary to ensure that customers could easily access 

training if they needed it. This view was widely shared among the sites we visited.

Nonetheless, sites grappled with practical difficulties that made access to training 

more difficult than they might have liked or than they intended. Some of these 

difficulties are listed below.

1. Confusions and other problems related to start-up. For example, two sites 

mentioned that they weren’t at first sure how to use ITAs and for what types 
VI-5

of services they were appropriate. Five others made reference to a variety of 

other difficulties, such as establishing the eligible training provider list, which 

also caused few ITAs to be issued at first.

2. Caution in using funding or overall inadequacy of funding. Some sites 

complained that their total amount of funding wasn’t nearly enough to support 

One-Stop system building and to fund intensive and training services too. 

Others feared that this would be so at the outset, but have since realized 

under-expenditures for PY 2000, which is causing them to re-think their 

service mix.

3. Responding to customers’ needs in a booming economy. Until fairly recently, 

economic conditions have been quite strong nationwide. Under this 

circumstance, jobs were plentiful, job seekers wanted to find employment 

quickly, and employers were clamoring for workers to fill their hiring needs. 

Accordingly, local areas found that, regardless of what their predisposition 

might have been, they could best meet customers’ needs (both job seekers and 

employers) by emphasizing short-term interventions that would lead to 

employment quickly.

4. Taking a broad view of intensive services. Many local areas offer a range of 

short computer skills workshops as part of pre-vocational intensive services. 

These courses are viewed as imparting general skills that can benefit workers 

in a broad range of occupational positions, rather than instances of specific 

occupational preparation. For example, Suffolk County, NY offers dozens of 

very short (no more than 2 weeks) computer classes that it makes available as 

part of intensive services. Taking an even broader view of intensive services, 

Oregon issued guidance to its locals that classified courses of less than 600 

hours duration as intensive services, on the grounds that ITAs should be 

reserved for only longer-term training that could lead to a credential or a 

degree (it has since been corrected on this interpretation by DOL). 

Overall, then, a variety of factors have caused expenditures for training to be 

quite low thus far. However, a close look at these reasons suggests that resources 

devoted to training should grow in the months ahead. Thus, some local areas that 

started out with a “work-first” emphasis have since shifted to a more balanced view, 

the confusions that plagued some local areas during PY 2000 have by now been largely 

resolved, areas now have a better sense of how much in WIA funds they can devote to 

training and thus do not need to be as cautious as they were at first, and the changing 

economic climate suggests that customers’ demand for training services will be much 

stronger than it once was. With respect to the latter, we heard in a few local areas that 

the demand for services in general, and training in particular, had surged since the 
VI-6

tragedy of 9/11.1 For all these reasons, training levels might be much different in PY 

2001 than they were in PY 2000.

The above discussion speaks to reasons why training was previously underemphasized. Yet we found two local areas that devoted almost all of their WIA adult 

and dislocated worker budgets to training. These two areas, both located in Georgia, 

heavily emphasized training services under WIA, just as they had done under JTPA. 

They did so partly because they felt that training was what their customers needed the 

most. Two additional considerations made this approach practical. First, they were 

able to devote so many resources to training services because the One-Stop systems in 

these two areas relied almost exclusively on Wagner-Peyser to provide core and 

intensive services. Thus, at NE Georgia, ES staff provide core services and refer 

individuals who are identified as needing training to the WIA case managers, who 

almost immediately begin helping the customers to develop a training plan (this 

arrangement has caused ES in Georgia to think more carefully about how it handles 

individual customers and to develop a more variegated menu of core and intensive 

services involving varying levels of staff assistance). The second practical 

consideration is that the State of Georgia provides residents with scholarships and 

grants for education and training from State Lottery funds, thus substantially reducing 

the costs associated with WIA training. In these two local areas, much of the WIA 

funds actually are used to provide supportive services to trainees.

CUSTOMER FLOW

In thinking of the three levels of WIA services as constituting a clear hierarchy, 

local areas must establish policies regarding how clients should move through the 

service levels and, as we have already seen, were left to do so without much State 

guidance. 

The Point of Registration

The first point in the flow-through process (beyond providing the universal 

customer with self-help or information services) is ostensibly deciding when enough 

staff assistance has been involved so that a customer should become a WIA registrant. 

Because the decision about when to register customers in WIA has an important 

 

1

 In one local area, the demand for services has increased so dramatically in the last few months 

of calendar year 2001 that the wait to see a case manager could be as long as a month.
VI-7

influence on measured program performance, local areas thought very carefully about 

when participants should be registered. Some adopted a fairly strict interpretation and 

registered customers quite soon in the process of delivering them services. For 

example, the two local areas we visited in Oregon attempted to adhere to state guidance 

by using a rough rule of thumb that registration should occur when a customer receives 

“more than about 15 minutes of individualized attention” or “whenever a counselor 

provides individual attention.” At the other extreme, some delayed the point of 

registration as long as they could, typically when the customer began intensive services 

or, in two local areas, when they were about to undertake training. They were able to 

do so either because they relied on other sources of funds, such as Wagner-Peyser, to 

support services at the lower tiers (as in the two local areas we visited in Georgia and in 

Vermont, a State we visited during the first round), or because they defined selfservices very broadly, to include group workshops and some individual counseling. 

With respect to the latter, some areas classified services such that by definition there 

was no such thing as staff-assisted core services, or it was encountered only rarely.

How Customers Move Through Service Levels

All customers must start out in core services and will advance up the service 

hierarchy only if they need the next higher level of service to attain a job that promises 

self-sufficiency. Overwhelmingly, the local sites we visited during both rounds of data 

collection were very client-focused in determining who was in need of further services 

and emphasized that decisions were made on a case-by-case basis. There were a few 

exceptions. In one local area, customers could move to intensive services only if they 

had an identifiable barrier or if they remained in job search for at least 30 days. In still 

another area, with perhaps the strictest sequence for moving to intensive services that 

we encountered, customers must have completed a six-week job search in core services 

and document that they applied for at least three jobs per week (although this 

requirement could be waived at the discretion of the counselor).2

These exceptions aside, local areas emphasized to us their flexible approach and 

noted that they treated all customers individually according to their needs. 

Nonetheless, some basic steps were almost always required, such as (depending on the 

local area’s policy) registering in ES, attending a One-Stop orientation, undertaking an

 

2

 We visited this site during the first round of data collection, so it is also possible that this 

requirement is no longer in place.
VI-8

assessment of occupational skills and interests, or attending a workshop on job search 

skills. In general, though, staff endeavored to quickly identify those who were 

demonstrably in need of more intensive services, so that customers could move from 

core to intensive services, and even on to training, in quite a short period of time—a 

matter of days in some cases. 

Moving along this quickly depended greatly on the case managers’ ability to 

identify a low-skill customer for whom job search alone was likely to be futile. They 

used various mechanisms to do so. Some sites held regular One-Stop orientation 

sessions during which the full range of One-Stop services was described; customers 

who were interested in something beyond self services could arrange to make an 

appointment with a case manager during which an initial assessment was undertaken 

and training options could be explored. In other areas, an initial screening was 

conducted of all customers and was used to quickly identify those who were likely to 

need something beyond self-services. Finally, staff monitored Resource Room usage 

fairly closely to keep a sharp eye for those who seemed to be struggling. 

Another factor that influenced how quickly customers could move through the 

service levels was their own motivation for doing so and their initial preferences. 

Thus, it appeared that customers who knew they wanted and needed training, expressed 

this preference early in the intake process, and were prompt in completing any 

necessary paperwork (e.g., demonstrating evidence that they had researched labor 

market information, if this was a requirement of the local area) could move from one 

service level to the next very rapidly.

As a way of demonstrating what the client-flow might look like in practice, we 

present a common service sequence that a customer might encounter in Portland 

Worksystems:

1. Customers who seem to need more than self-services are encouraged to 

attend a One-Stop orientation workshop, which describes the services 

available at the center and through the various partners.

2. Those interested in finding out more about services will meet briefly (up 

to 15 minutes) with a WIA staff member, who helps customers decide 

whether they should undertake staff-assisted services. Most of these 

meetings result in the customers’ being registered for WIA services.

3. Following registration, customers meet with a Career Specialist who 

helps them determine appropriate next steps. This might entail having 

the customer remain in staff-assisted core services, and continuing to 
VI-9

use the Resource Room with more individualized assistance and perhaps 

attending a self-assessment workshop.

4. Customers that seem to need something more than this will be assigned 

to meet with a case manager who, over one or more meetings, helps the

customer develop an IEP as part of intensive services.

5. As part of the process of developing the IEP, most customers participate 

in a week-long career exploration workshop, which is classified as an 

intensive service. This workshop involves more intensive personal and 

skill assessment and presents opportunities to explore career options.

6. Based on the IEP and the outcome of the assessment workshop, some 

customers will remain in intensive services, attend other workshops as 

needed (e.g., on job search skills, basic computer skills, etc.), and 

continue the job search process until they find a job. Others will be 

determined to need training to attain a job that offers the prospect of 

self-sufficiency.

7. Those for whom training seems appropriate will be required to research 

occupations in demand, carry out informational interviews, research 

eligible training providers, and develop a budget demonstrating that they 

can support themselves while in training. 

Respondents in Portland noted that departures from the above sequence are 

common, based on customers’ obvious needs and preferences. Moreover, the amount 

of time individual customers spend in one level of service varies greatly, with some 

moving through very quickly while others spend months at each level.

Priority and Eligibility for Services

A key feature of adult services under WIA is that there is no means test (as there 

was under JTPA), thus allowing program services to be accessible to the universal 

customer. WIA nonetheless is clear in asserting that, whenever funds for employment 

and training services are limited, priority for intensive and training services in the adult 

program should be given to those who are public assistance recipients or are low 

income. 

Local areas that we studied operationalized this priority guideline in different 

ways. Only three areas established a specific quota to ensure that sufficient slots were 

reserved for low-income individuals; Yuma County set this figure at 65%, the Chicago 

Mayor’s Office set it at 85%, and East Texas set it at 70%. Some areas, such as one of 

the areas we visited in Virginia and another in Utah, broadened the priority criteria by 

including on the priority list those with specified barriers to employment, such as 

lacking a GED or high school diploma, having a disability, being a profiled UI 
VI-10

claimant, having a substantial language barrier, or being a non-custodial parent. On the 

other hand, in four local areas we visited in the second round of data collection we 

were assured that funds were not then scarce, so that WIA’s priority restriction did not 

need to be invoked

Related to their priority criteria, local areas also needed to operationalize how 

they would define self-sufficiency, since employed individuals cannot be served with 

intensive or training services unless they need further services “...to obtain or retain 

employment that allows for self-sufficiency.” Based on information that we collected 

from the WIA evaluation, as well as through the Evaluation of the Implementation of 

the ITA/ETP Demonstration, another study we are conducting, we have assembled the 

information listed in Table 2, describing how self-sufficiency is being operationalized. 

As this table shows, the definition of self-sufficiency used by local areas ranges from 

the poverty level or 70% of the lower-living standard income level (LLSIL) on the one 

hand, to 200% of the LLSIL on the other, with various variants for dislocated workers 

relating to their pre-dislocation earnings.

Practically speaking, though, and regardless of how areas established priority 

criteria or defined self-sufficiency, virtually all the areas we studied served 

predominantly low-income individuals as part of their intensive and training services in 

the adult program. This came about because the local areas served communities that 

were predominately low–income, or, in one case, because they had a reputation as 

“being a place where poor people go.” 

THE CONTENT OF CORE AND INTENSIVE SERVICES

The legislation provides lists of services that should be included under each of the 

three service levels, including:

 As core services, outreach and intake, initial assessment, job search and 

placement assistance, and provision of labor market information and job 

vacancy listings; 

 As intensive services, comprehensive and specialized assessments, 

diagnostic testing, in-depth interviewing and evaluation, development of 

the individual employment plan, group counseling, individual 

counseling, case management, and short-term prevocational services.

 As training services, occupational skills training, on-the-job training, 

customized training, entrepreneurial training, and job readiness training.
VI-11

Table 2: Definition of Self-Sufficiency in Selected LWIAs

State Local Area Definition

MD Baltimore 200% of the Lower Living Standard Income Level (LLSIL). 

This applies for adults and dislocated workers. 

GA Atlanta Regional 

Commission

The poverty level or 70% of the LLSIL, whichever is lower. 

For dislocated workers, lacking self-sufficiency can be 

demonstrated if the person is at a wage or skill level 

significantly lower than job of dislocation.

IN Indianapolis 100% of poverty level

MI Detroit 100% of poverty level

MO Western MO 100% of the Lower Living Standard

NE Greater Lincoln 170% of the poverty level; for dislocated workers, earnings that 

are 80% of the layoff wage

OH Ottawa County Individuals are not self-sufficient if they receive food stamps, 

housing assistance, medical benefits or cash assistance, or 

income is below 200% of poverty level. 

For dislocated workers, threshold is 82% of layoff wage. 

PA Three Rivers For welfare recipients: no longer in need of government aid, or 

total family income is no longer below the poverty level.

For dislocated workers: have returned to employment at 93% of 

former wage

Is considering raising threshold to $8-$10 for adults, and 105% 

of layoff wage or $10 (whichever higher) for dislocated workers

PA Philadelphia Uses a matrix that shows projected budgeted amounts for 

housing, child care, food, and other expenses, for families of 

different sizes. Self-sufficient hourly wages for:

-- a single adult are $7.10

– an adult and infant are: $12.39

– an adult and preschooler are: $16.61

– an adult and school-age teen are: $11.23

– two adults and preschooler are: $9.22 per adult

TX Dallas Full-time employment at $7.50/hr. For dislocated workers, 

defined as 75% of prior wages or satisfaction with wages and 

benefits of new employer.

TX East Texas Annual earnings of $13,539; for dislocated workers, 85% of 

pre-layoff wage.

TX Texamo 100% of LLSIL
VI-12

Most of these basic services were provided by all of the local areas we visited, 

but there was variation in the breadth of offerings made available and how the 

boundaries between the service levels were defined. Among these key differences, 

which we explore in this section, were the extent to which group workshops were 

offered and how intensive services were conceptualized and defined.

Group Workshops

Almost every local area we visited during the second round of site visits offered a 

mix of group workshops covering a range of topics that, depending on the workshop 

and the local site, could last a half-day or up to two weeks (and occasionally a bit 

longer). Topics covered included:

 Orientation sessions to the One-Stop Center. 

 Pre-employment and work maturity skills, including job search training. 

We were told about workshops covering topics that included 

interviewing skills, resume preparation, listening skills, problem-solving 

skills, sociability, phone etiquette, interpersonal skills, communication 

skills, and setting goals.

 Life skills. These included workshops geared towards building selfesteem and imparting skills in money management, assertiveness, 

attitude and stress management, budgeting, surviving and coping, time 

management, and public speaking.

 Group assessments. These include workshops designed to help 

customers assess their skills and occupational interests. For example, at 

the Medford Job Council this workshop consisted of a two-week session 

involving numerous assessments, including CAPS, COPS, COPES, and 

others.

 Job Clubs. Nearly every local area reported the use of Job Clubs. 

 Computer skills. This category was very broad, encompassing dozens 

of separate courses on topics that included computer fundamentals, 

introduction to the PC, Windows, Internet usage, and training in basic 

software applications.

 GED and ESL classes.

Suffolk County (NY) had the greatest range of group workshops that we 

observed, including some covering virtually all the major categories listed above. 

These include several dozen half-day to full-day focus group sessions available at the 

One-Stop Center and focused on job search skills and career exploration, with titles that 

include: 
VI-13

 Interviewing for Success  Networking into a Job

 Interview Practice  How to Create a Winning Resume

 Moving up with your Employer  Career Decisions

 Obtaining a Job and Keeping It  Salary Negotiations

 Job Strategies for People Over 40  Effective Letter Writing

 Marketing Your Skills  Telephone Techniques

 Budgeting Finances  Surviving and Coping

 How to Use the Internet as a Job 

Search Tool

 Using Employment Agencies and 

Search Firms

 Staying Motivated During your Job 

Search

 Handling the Stress of the 

Job Search

 How to Start your Job Search  Relocation: Is it Right for You

 Key Steps in the Job Search  Job Retention

This local area also offers dozens of separate computer workshops, lasting 

anywhere from a half-day to two weeks. Topics include a basic introduction to 

computers, various Microsoft applications, more specialized software packages, and 

basic Web design.

The extensive menu of group workshops offered by Suffolk County is classified 

as intensive services. However, other areas, with a narrower range of offerings, 

classify workshops differently. Almost everywhere, Job Clubs are classified as a core 

service, and GED/ESL classes are offered as an intensive service. But even this 

general pattern had its exceptions, and there was little commonality in how computer 

workshops and job search classes were classified. For example, in two local areas, 

workshops on job search skills, career exploration, basic computer skills, and basic 

literacy skills are classified as self-service, because both areas are eager to defer the 

trigger for WIA registration as long as possible. In three other areas, job search and 

computer literacy workshops are classified as staff-assisted core services. In several 

areas, such as in Suffolk County, most workshops are classified as an intensive service, 

and specifically as a pre-vocational service. In still others, different workshops are 

classified differently; for example, at the Medford Job Council, job search workshops 

are classified as self-service, but group assessments are considered to be an intensive 

service.
VI-14

The Vision and Content of Intensive Services

At the time we wrote our Interim Report, we noted that local areas were 

struggling with how intensive services should be conceived and, specifically, whether 

this service level represented a way-station for people on their way to training or 

encompassed a rich service offering in its own right. To some degree, local areas are 

still grappling with this issue. At one extreme, such as in the two local areas we visited 

in Georgia, almost all those who register in WIA as part of intensive services 

eventually go on to training. In these areas, ES funds and staffs almost all of what 

would be considered core and intensive services. As part of their responsibilities, the 

ES staffers provide job search services and, in the course of doing so, identify and refer 

those who need training to the WIA case manager. The intensive services provided by 

WIA thus consist of administering brief assessments, completing the individual 

employment plan, and otherwise helping the customer develop a training plan. As a 

consequence, very few individuals exit WIA without having received training services, 

and intensive services can very much be considered a prelude to training.

Other areas have much richer service offerings as part of intensive services and 

fully expect that many customers will receive intensive services and nothing further. 

Suffolk County, with its extensive array of computer workshops (as was described 

above), is perhaps the clearest example of this. Generally, this local area orients its 

computer workshops to the customers who may have marketable skills but “just need a 

brush up” before they are fully ready to seek employment. Thus, those who take one 

or a few of the computer workshops are assumed not to need training services and it is 

expected that they will typically exit WIA at the intensive-service level. Training 

services, by contrast, are viewed as appropriate for those undertaking skill-building for 

specific occupations.

As another example, the State of Oregon was promoting a vision of intensive 

services that was very expansive, at least initially. This State found that, especially 

during the boom economic times of a year ago, few of its customers were interested in 

long-term training, but instead wanted short courses that would give them basic 

marketable skills quickly. The State, with a strong customer focus, wanted to 

accommodate their needs but, at the same time, was worried that its performance on the 

WIA Employment and Credentialing Rate might be negatively impacted because many 
VI-15

of the shorter courses that customers wanted did not lead to a credential.3 Its solution 

was to classify these courses as an intensive service. Thus, according to its plan, 

Professional Development and Individual Employment courses were defined as 

intensive services, with the former consisting of all programs of instruction of less than 

210 hours and the latter consisting of programs of instruction lasting between 210 and 

600 hours. Under pressure from DOL, Oregon now classifies these courses as a 

training service. Nonetheless, it (as well as many other local areas) still classifies an 

array of basic and intermediate computer classes as an intensive service, on the grounds 

that these courses provide general skills useful in a broad array of occupations, rather 

than providing training for a specific job.

With these extremes as the end points, local areas are thus arrayed along a 

continuum whereby intensive services consists of little more than assessment and 

counseling oriented towards those intending to undertake training, to a well-developed 

service level in its own right. An important difference between these extremes seems 

to relate to how short-term pre-vocational services is defined—one of the legislation’s 

allowable activities under intensive services—and, specifically, to the array of group 

workshops, primarily on computer skills, that are offered as a part of it. 

DESIGNING AND DELIVERING TRAINING SERVICES

In this section, we consider several aspects relating to the design and delivery of 

training services, including the extent to which alternatives to ITAs are used, time or 

dollar limits on the use of ITAs, ways in which demand occupations are determined, 

and the ways that customers are assisted in choosing a training program. 

ITA versus Non-ITA Training

Consistent with its strong emphasis on customer choice, WIA promotes the idea 

that training should be primarily supported through the use of individual training 

accounts (ITAs) that customers can use to procure training services from eligible 

training providers. However, local areas can use alternatives to ITAs, in the form of 

issuing contracts for training services, in certain specified circumstances. These 

include their efforts to fund:

 

3

 The base for the Adult Employment and Credentialing Rate includes only participants who were 

enrolled in training.
VI-16

 On-the-job training (OJT) or customized training provided by an 

employer,

 Training programs by community-based organizations or other private 

organizations that are of demonstrated effectiveness in serving “special 

participant populations that face multiple barriers to employment,” or

 Other providers, if it is deemed that there are too few providers in the 

area to fulfill the intent of ITAs. 

Most of the local sites we visited made little use of these alternatives to the ITA—

indeed, of the 14 local areas we visited in the second round of data collection, 10 noted 

that they relied on ITAs exclusively, or almost so. 

However, the remaining four local areas point out the important use that non-ITA 

training has under some circumstances. For example, one local area, Yuma County, 

Arizona, does not use ITAs at all. Respondents that we spoke with in Yuma pointed out 

that the service area was very rural and held few eligible training providers. Under this 

circumstance, the Board decided that there was an insufficient number of eligible 

providers to constitute the sort of competitive training market that WIA contemplated. 

Accordingly, all of the WIA training for adults and dislocated workers carried out in 

Yuma takes the form of OJTs and other contract training. 

Customized training is also relied on heavily in several other local areas we 

studied, including Erie County, which estimates that about 60% of its training takes this 

form, and Philadelphia and Detroit, which approach this figure.4 These areas 

mentioned that they were interested in closely aligning their workforce development 

and economic development initiatives. They see customized training as an important 

means for carrying this out, as it directly supports the labor needs of the areas’ 

employers and ensures that the training is tailored to the jobs they have available. 

Other advantages of customized training that they cited are: (1) that jobs are virtually 

guaranteed at the training’s conclusion, (2) that customized training is often cheaper on 

a per unit basis than ITAs are, because the employers defray a portion of the training 

costs, and (3) that it meets customers’ needs for immediate income, because in some 

cases participants are hired by the employer, and draw a salary, while they are being 

trained.

 

4

 We visited Philadelphia and Detroit not as part of the WIA Evaluation, but in association with 

the Evaluation of the ITA/ETP Demonstration, which we are also carrying out for DOL (under a 

subcontract with Mathematica Policy Research).
VI-17

Finally, we encountered several local areas that, although they rely on ITAs 

predominantly, use contract training to some degree, because they find it to be the best 

training strategy for serving customers with special needs. For example, Medford Job 

Council arranges contract training for some customers with disabilities. Similarly, 

Philadelphia arranges contract training for serving several special populations, 

including the homeless and those with hearing impairments; each of these training 

courses is jointly funded with other city agencies.

Time and Dollar Limits on ITAs

In keeping with provisions in the WIA regulations (Section 663.420), States and 

Local Boards are entitled to set dollar or time limits on the training they will support 

through an ITA. As we discussed earlier in this paper, no States that we visited 

invoked this authority; instead, they completely devolved such policy-making to their 

local areas. However, nearly all the local areas we visited do set such limits, as Table 

3 shows.5 As the table also shows, time limits are generally 1 or 2 years, but dollar 

limits per trainee vary widely, even within the same State. For example, in New York, 

Erie County has established a dollar cap of $2,500 per ITA, while Suffolk County set 

its cap at $10,000. 

Reasons for this variation relate to characteristics of the local marketplace for 

training and the area’s philosophical emphasis. For example, Suffolk establishes its 

relatively high dollar limit because of its commitment to provide customers with access 

to training of the very highest quality. At the other extreme, some areas, such as West 

Central, Missouri, have established quite a low cap, because they find that training in 

their area is relatively inexpensive (e.g., because it is dominated by community 

colleges) and because they have a commitment to stretch their training dollars by 

serving as many customers as possible.

 

5

 Data in this table were gathered from site visits we conducted as part of either the WIA 

Evaluation or another evaluation that SPR is conducting for DOL, the Evaluation of the ITA/ETP 

Demonstration (we are conducting the latter study under subcontract to Mathematica Policy Research).
VI-18

Table 3

Local Limits on Amount or Duration of ITA

State Local Area (Grantee) Dollar Cap Time Limit

AZ Balance of Maricopa $3,500 None

CT Southwest Connecticut $3,000 1 year

CA SELACO $5,500* None 

GA Atlanta Regional Commission $8,000 2 years

NE Georgia $5,000 2 years

SW Georgia $7,000 2 years

IL Chicago Mayor’s Office $5,000 None

DuPage County $5,500 1 year*

IN Indianapolis PIC $2,500 2 years

Tecumseh Area None 2 years

MD Baltimore OED $7,000 1 year

MI Macomb/St. Clair $5,000 None

MN Rural MN CEP None 2 years

MO West Central/Sedalia $1,700 2 years

MT Balance of MT None None

NC Capital Area/Raleigh $5,600 2 years

NE Greater Lincoln $5,000* 2 years*

Greater Omaha $4,000 2 years

NY Erie County $2,500 None

Suffolk County $10,000 None

OH Cincinnati $5,000 None

OR Medford Job Council $4,500* 1 year*

Portland Worksystems $1,200** None

PA Northern Tier $4,000 2 years

Philadelphia $6,000 2 years*

Three Rivers $8,000 2 years

TX Golden Crescent None 2 years

Heart of Texas $5,000 2 years

VA Hampton Roads $6,000 2 years

________________

Note: Some of these local areas were visited more than two years ago and might have changed their 

limits in the interim.

*These limits can be waived with approval

**The Local Board allows each One-Stop operator to set its own limits. These caps were those 

imposed by one of the centers that we visited in this area, and can be waived.
VI-19

Defining Demand Occupations

Another way in which customer choice can be constrained is through limits on the 

occupations for which training will be supported. WIA explicitly allows this authority 

and, in fact, makes clear that training should only be funded for those “who select 

programs of training services that are directly linked to the employment opportunities in 

the local area involved or in another area in which the (customer is) willing to relocate” 

(WIA Title I.B.134). Local areas meet this requirement in different ways. Some rely 

on a list of demand occupations developed by the State or use the States’ occupational 

growth projections. For example, one State compiled a list for each of its local areas of 

occupations that were expected to have a 20% growth rate from 1996-2000. Another 

State was much more inclusive, and established lists of all occupations expected to have 

at least 25 new openings per year. Still another defined demand occupations as those 

with annual growth rates of at least 1.5%. 

Where such State lists were used, some local areas adhered to them rigidly, by 

not funding training for occupations that were not on the list. By contrast, others 

allowed some flexibility so that exceptions could be made if a customer could 

demonstrate a reasonable prospect of attaining employment in the field for which 

approval for training was being sought.

Finally, another group of local areas did not rely on State lists of demand 

occupations at all. Typically, case managers in these areas relied on their own 

knowledge of the local economy and required customers to do their own research (such 

as by searching through newspaper want ads) to present evidence that jobs were 

available.

Helping Customers Make Training Choices

Aside from these permissible limits on the types, duration, or costs of training 

that would be supported, local areas are expected to provide access to training in a way 

that “maximizes customer choice” (WIA Title I.B.134). At the same time, case 

managers have a professional obligation to lend customers the benefit of their expertise 

by helping them to make appropriate training choices. Local areas too have an interest 

in ensuring that customers choose wisely, because customer choices that result in poor 

outcomes will negatively affect the local areas’ performance. 

Overwhelmingly we found that local areas balance these potentially conflicting 

objectives by promoting a model of informed customer choice. According to this 
VI-20

approach, One-Stop centers ensure that those authorized to undertake training receive 

ample information and assistance, so that they themselves are led to make prudent 

choices. Operationally, it meant that customers would normally be required to 

undertake an assessment of their skills and abilities, possibly attend a workshop on 

career exploration, and engage in research (e.g., about the labor market or eligible 

training providers) before an ITA would be issued. Case managers, meanwhile, played 

the role of facilitators. As one of our respondents in Rural Minnesota CEP put it, 

“case managers guide, but customers decide.”

This general approach of promoting informed choice seemed to be embraced 

virtually everywhere we visited, although the specific mechanisms that local areas 

adopted differed somewhat. For example, customers who want to undertake training in 

SW Georgia are required to participate in a 12-hour assessment workshop as part of 

intensive services, and those who express some uncertainty about their career choice 

are encouraged to undertake a brief job shadow before making a final decision. In a 

number of local areas—including the Balance of Maricopa County and the Chicago 

Mayor’s Office, among others—customers are expected to visit two or three separate 

training providers to gain a feel for which one might be most suitable. In the Balance 

of Maricopa County they must as well prepare a Statement of Justification for their 

training plan before it will be approved, as a way of ensuring that they have thought 

through the key elements of their decision. Other areas, such as Portland Worksystems 

and Baltimore Office of Economic Development, expect customers to carry out 

informational interviews (e.g., with employers, former trainees, and training providers) 

and prepare a budget to demonstrate that they can support themselves through training. 

Based on these processes, it was felt that customers were coming to identify appropriate 

training choices on their own. Very encouragingly, then, it appears that almost 

everywhere customer choice is being taken very seriously. 

There were nonetheless some potentially important constraints on choices that we 

observed during the course of our site visits:

 Limited numbers of training providers in the area. In Yuma County, 

the Local Board decided that there was such a paucity of eligible 

training providers in the area that it made no sense to rely on ITAs as a 

way of delivering training services to customers; accordingly, this area 

used contract training exclusively. This extreme example aside, many 

of the other local areas we visited for this study could be characterized 

as sparsely populated rural areas that had a dearth of training choices. 
VI-21

Although they still supported ITAs, practically speaking customers’ 

training choices were narrower than might have been desired.

 Potential contraction of the ETP list under subsequent eligibility. 

Although few of the States we visited had yet to make the transition to 

subsequent eligibility for their eligible training providers, respondents 

that we talked with in several local areas were fearful that the State’s 

eligible training provider list would contract dramatically once 

subsequent eligibility began. For example, Illinois, which was just 

making the transition to subsequent eligibility when our site visit took 

place, was witnessing a drop in its number of eligible providers from 

800, under initial eligibility, to about 300. Similarly, Texas, a State we 

visited during the first round of data collection, was also anticipating a 

sharp drop in the number of its eligible providers, especially among 

community colleges.6

 Dollar caps on ITAs. Local areas confront the difficult decision of 

wanting to promote long-term quality training, while rationing training 

funds so that they can serve as many customers as possible. Depending 

on their local circumstances (e.g., the average costs of training in the 

area, and the demand for training services), they balance these 

objectives by setting different dollar caps on the amount of an ITA that 

they will fund. Although all these decisions must be viewed as 

reasonable given the various local contexts and priorities, practically 

speaking low caps in some areas will limit access to certain types of 

training.

 The prevalence of reverse referrals. In at least a couple of the local 

areas we visited, training vendors are marketing heavily to those who 

are potentially eligible for WIA (one local area estimated that as many 

as 75% of the training customers it served came to the One-Stop center 

because of a reverse referral by a training vendor). Although local 

areas have procedures in place to ensure that customers are making 

informed choices (as we discussed above), one wonders if in at least 

some cases customers are unduly swayed by vendors’ appeals. 

Coordinating the ITA with Pell Grants

In an effort to promote seamless services and eliminate duplication, WIA requires 

that training funds committed under WIA be coordinated with funds available from 

other sources, and that, in fact, WIA training dollars should be used only for those who 

 

6

 ETP issues were addressed in detail as part of SPR’s Evaluation of the Individual Training 

Account/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration: Final Report, prepared for DOL under subcontract to 

Mathematica Policy Research.
VI-22

“require assistance beyond the assistance made available under other grant assistance 

programs, including Federal Pell Grants” (WIA Title I.B.134).

The majority of local sites we visited interpreted this provision to mean that Pell 

funds should be used to cover tuition when it is available, so that WIA dollars would be 

used for tuition or other training expenses beyond the amount of the Pell grant or for 

those who are not Pell eligible. Operationally, because the ITA amount could be 

determined and committed much more quickly than decisions about Pell grants are 

normally made, training vendors typically are expected to reimburse the local area for 

the amount of the Pell if and when a Pell grant is awarded. 

We encountered a few local areas whose policies were exceptions to this, 

however. In these areas, the ITA would be used for tuition and related expenses, and 

customers could keep their Pell grants for living expenses.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The review of adult and dislocated worker services that we undertook as part of 

this evaluation uncovered a number of general patterns that can be summarized below:

1. States are devolving almost all authority for setting policies regarding adult 

and dislocated worker services to their local areas. This pattern is fully in 

keeping with WIA’s emphasis on local control. Local areas are generally 

embracing this local autonomy, but it has made the transition to WIA a bit 

more time-consuming and difficult in some cases, as areas need to gradually 

come to see for themselves what policies will work best for their area. 

2. This local-area flexibility is reflected in the systems that are developing. 

Thus, although there are obvious broad similarities, local areas are making 

unique decisions regarding key features of adult and dislocated worker 

services, such as in developing service offerings as part of intensive services, 

using non-ITA training, setting dollar limits on ITAs, and so on.

3. Local areas generally retain a strong interest in supporting training under 

WIA, while recognizing that there needs to be an appropriate balance between 

meeting the needs of the universal customer and providing training services 

for those who need it. A very few local areas are exceptions, however, and 

are promoting a strong “work first” emphasis.

4. Notwithstanding the general interest in supporting training, expenditures for 

training services have been very modest or even quite low in some areas thus 

far, due to a number of factors, including: (a) the areas’ initial confusions 

regarding for whom ITAs were appropriate and how they should be used, or 

other start-up problems, (b) their caution in using WIA funds for training until 

they could see how much it would cost to support the One-Stop infrastructure, 
VI-23

(c) an erstwhile booming economy that reduced the demand for training, and 

(d) a somewhat expansive view of what intensive services could encompass.

5. Decisions regarding when WIA registration should occur (e.g., what services 

should trigger registration) vary widely across the local areas we visited. 

6. Local areas are quite attuned to quickly identifying customers who need 

something beyond self-services. Thus, those who show an obvious need for 

intensive or training services can be moved from one service level to the next 

without much delay. Consistent with this, few local areas impose 

requirements that customers remain in prolonged job search before being 

determined eligible for intensive or training services.

7. One important way in which the menu of services varies across local areas is 

in the array of group workshops that are offered. In some areas, these 

number into the dozens and cover a range of topics, including preemployment and work maturity skills, life skills, group assessments and 

career exploration, and basic or intermediate computer skills. These 

workshops last anywhere from a half-day to about two weeks, and are viewed 

as providing general skills appropriate across an array of occupational areas. 

They help enrich service offerings available to those who do not need specific 

occupational skills training.

8. In the large majority of local areas that we visited, ITAs are relied on 

exclusively or predominantly as the way in which training services are 

delivered. However, some areas point out the important use that alternatives 

to ITAs have in some circumstances, such as in serving customers with 

special needs. Customized training is also identified as an attractive 

alternative to ITAs in some areas, because it supports their efforts to tightly 

link workforce development with economic development.

9. Almost all local areas establish time limits or dollar limits on the ITAs that 

they will issue. Time limits typically are either one or two years, but dollar 

limits vary widely across areas, even within the same State. Thus, in some 

areas, dollar limits were as low as $1,700; in other areas they were as high as 

$10,000.

10.Customer choice, informed by good information, is clearly apparent in the 

way that sites are working with customers to help them select training 

programs and vendors. At the same time, this choice is structured within a 

framework that requires that customers undertake an assessment of their skills 

and abilities and conduct labor market or other research. To this degree, 

customers are making choices only after it has been assured that they are 

being exposed to a range of good information.

11. Nonetheless, there were some potentially important constraints on choice in 

some areas, such as those caused by: (a) limits on the number of providers 

that are available in some areas, (b) a potential contraction of the eligible 
VI-24

training provider list under subsequent eligibility, (c) low dollar caps on 

ITAs, and (d) the prevalence of reverse referrals.

Based on our data collection, we have also identified some challenges regarding 

adult and dislocated worker services that the workforce system might need to address as 

it moves forward. These include:

1. An upsurge in the demand for services since the fall of 2001. Some areas 

have seen greatly increased customer loads since the tragedy of 9/11. In one 

case, this has caused a lengthy waiting time for customers to schedule 

appointments with case managers. Thus, some local areas may need to 

reconsider the way they determine the priority with which different customers 

should be served, re-orient their funding to enable them to hire additional 

staff, or otherwise find ways of serving customers more efficiently. 

2. Developing additional ways of tracking customer usage or establishing more 

uniform guidelines as to when customers should be registered in WIA. The 

dramatic differences across areas in the events that trigger WIA registration 

will seriously impair the ability of the WIASRD data management system to 

adequately reflect the extent of services that are being provided overall or to 

compare one local area with another. Perhaps other or additional tracking 

systems should be explored so that the full use of One-Stop services can be 

captured.

3. Meeting customers’ diverse needs. WIA explicitly poses the challenge of 

serving both the universal customer and low-income individuals who may lack 

even rudimentary work skills. These two groups clearly need different mixes 

of services, placing tremendous demands on service designs. Such diversity 

also taxes the abilities of staff providing services, who must possess a broad 

range of occupational counseling skills and knowledge to be effective with all 

they serve. This challenge will become even more acute, given the upsurge in 

the demand for services that some areas have realized in recent months.

4. Struggles with how to conceptualize intensive services. Some local areas have 

implemented a rich array of service offerings as part of intensive services and 

fully expect that customers will exit from WIA at the intensive-service level. 

Other areas, however, have a much more limited view of intensive services, 

and treat it as providing individualized job search assistance to some 

customers and preparing others for training. Local areas could perhaps 

benefit from additional DOL guidance on how intensive services can or 

should be conceived.

5. Balancing the needs of employers and job seekers. WIA promotes the ITA as 

a strong mechanism for ensuring customer choice. At the same time, 

customized training has clearly proven valuable in some areas in meeting 

employers’ specific needs for skilled workers. Local areas will need to 

develop strategies for adequately balancing these twin objectives.
VI-25

6. Ensuring that customers with special needs are being adequately served 

through training services. WIA explicitly allows contract training to be used 

for programs of proven effectiveness in meeting the needs of special 

populations (e.g., those with disabilities, the homeless, farmworkers, etc.). 

Yet we saw little evidence of this during our site visits. Local areas must be 

certain that the needs of special targeted populations are not being lost in the 

rush to embrace ITAs as a preferred training vehicle.


 
VII-1

VII. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES IN WIA TITLE I

ADULT AND DISLOCATED WORKER SERVICES

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) represents a potentially important 

reshaping of the federal government’s approach to publicly funded workforce 

development services. First applied nationwide in program year 2000 (PY 2000), the 

Act’s key provisions were to some extent initially greeted with confusion and 

uncertainty by workforce practitioners charged with implementing them. Moreover, 

PY 2000 represented a period of rapid economic growth and extremely tight labor 

markets that limited the demand for services among what would normally have been the 

program’s traditional clientele. Both these facts combined to make WIA’s first full 

year of implementation rather tentative. Subsequently, WIA has moved to a greater 

level of maturation, as the workforce development system has gained greater 

confidence and comfort with implementing WIA and changes to the economic climate 

have increased the demand for services.

In this paper, we profile this trajectory with regard to the adult and dislocated 

worker programs. We begin by delineating the legislation’s key provisions regarding 

services for adults and dislocated workers and contrast them with previous approaches. 

We next identify some key challenges that states and local areas have encountered 

during WIA’s first few years of implementation. We conclude by drawing attention to 

the inherent tension between some of WIA’s key provisions and suggest some next 

steps through which these tensions might be resolved.

KEY PROVISIONS REGARDING SERVICES IN WIA

WIA replaced and repealed the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and 

amended the Wagner-Peyser Act in response to a variety of concerns about how the 

existing public workforce development system was designed and operated. Among 

these concerns, it was noted that a multitude of employment and training programs—by 

some counts over 150 separate programs, including those operating under JTPA, 

Vocational Rehabilitation, Vocational Education, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, 

and the Wagner-Peyser Act, among just a few—operated often without effective 

coordination or collaboration. The resulting system, it was claimed, resulted in 

redundancies and inefficiencies and confronted customers with a confusing maze of 
VII-2

programs through which they found it difficult to navigate (U.S. General Accounting 

Office, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 2000).

Second, JTPA services were limited to those who met narrowly circumscribed 

eligibility criteria. Virtually all participants in JTPA’s adult program needed to be 

economically disadvantaged, and (after the JTPA Amendments of 1992) at least 65% 

needed to be hard to serve, by virtue of having at least one barrier to employment from 

a list of seven that were specified in the legislation. These stipulations arguably served 

to target services on those who needed them the most. However, as the public 

workforce development system moved towards a One-Stop service delivery over the 

several years before JTPA’s repeal, these eligibility restrictions caused awkward 

problems regarding funding and staffing support and hampered the ability of JTPAsupported programs to operate effectively with its partners (Kogan, et al., 1997). 

Moreover, in a dynamic, fast-moving economy, all workers arguably need access to an 

array of workforce services throughout their work lives.

Third, JTPA was presumptively a training program. Although the requirements 

were somewhat looser in the dislocated worker program, virtually all persons enrolled 

in the adult program were expected to receive comprehensive services that could 

include basic skills training and occupational skills training, among other things. 

Moreover, at least 50% of funds for the adult program needed to be spent on direct 

training services, and job search assistance or pre-employment skill building as standalone activities were discouraged. 1

 Given the hard-to-serve clientele that JTPA was 

targeting, these restrictions seemed sensible. At the same time, they arguably 

handcuffed practitioners and, if results from recent welfare-to-work evaluations are an 

indication, might have promoted training services when less costly interventions might 

have been more effective in leading to employment quickly (e.g., Freedman, et al., 

2000).2

Fourth, because of JTPA’s heavy use of contract training, participants’ choices 

among courses of study and available training providers were often limited to a 

preselected vendor or set of vendors with whom the local workforce area had worked 

 

1

 Basic readjustment services, including job search services, as stand-alone activities were 

encouraged in the JTPA dislocated worker program, but not in the adult program.

2

 However, the longer-term efficacy of these less costly strategies is less clear (Friedlander and 

Burtless, 1995; Grubb, 1996).
VII-3

out prior agreements. In the worst cases, participants were sometimes assigned to a 

course of study by a case manager primarily because a training slot in a program for 

which the local area had developed a contract needed to be filled. For these reasons, 

JTPA was sometimes criticized for not being sufficiently customer focused (Levitan and 

Gallo, 1988; U.S. DOL, 1991).

Finally, JTPA was sometimes decried as being inattentive to the needs of the 

business community. According to these arguments, the role that publicly-funded 

workforce development programs should play in promoting the nation’s economic 

competitiveness and ensuring a supply of skilled workers for emerging industry needs 

was too little appreciated.

WIA was enacted to address these concerns, after much anticipation and delay 

caused by a protracted policy debate within Congress. Building on reforms that some 

states and the federal government had already begun (D’Amico et al., 2001; Grubb et 

al., 1999), it does so by attempting to improve system integration and service 

coordination, providing universal access, rationing services to promote efficiency, 

promoting customer choice and system accountability, and bringing business to the 

focal point as a key customer of the workforce system. 

Among the ways it attempts to accomplish these purposes is by mandating the 

establishment of a One-Stop service delivery structure, by which key partners involved 

in providing workforce development assistance are to come together to plan and 

coordinate their services. To the extent that doing so is consistent with their 

authorizing legislation, each partner is to contribute to the costs and maintenance of the 

One-Stop system in a way that reflects the way that their own customers benefit.

To promote universal access, WIA abandons JTPA’s rigid criteria regarding 

eligibility for services by allowing all adults to access WIA services without regard to 

income status. To this degree, the public workforce system must become equipped to 

meet a diverse array of needs, and in so doing can play a critical role in promoting the 

efficient matching of workers with job openings and enhancing workers’ careers and 

work skills. At the same time, recognizing the need to husband scarce resources, WIA 

also promotes system efficiency by establishing a hierarchy of three service tiers—core 

services, intensive services, and training services—with limited access to the more 
VII-4

expensive higher tiers of service.3 Thus, in keeping with the notion that these three 

service tiers constitute a hierarchy, only those who have been determined to be unable 

to achieve their employment objectives at a lower level of service can advance to the 

next higher level. Moreover, priority in the adult program for intensive and training 

services is to be given to public assistance and other low-income individuals, whenever 

funds are deemed to be scarce. Thus, the intent of these provisions taken together is to 

provide access to basic core services to all adults and dislocated workers, while limiting 

the more costly services to those whose need is demonstrable and most pressing.

Customer choice and empowerment are also key watchwords under WIA. In the 

first instance, this objective is achieved by allowing the universal customer free and 

open access to a vast array of informational tools and resources that they can use on a 

self-help basis. As well, customers undertaking training are to be provided with 

opportunities to choose the training program and provider that they feel best meet their 

needs. In this regard, although WIA still allows contract training under some 

circumstances, it aims to empower customers by instead relying heavily on Individual 

Training Accounts (ITAs), which can be likened to vouchers that customers are 

generally free to use to procure training services of their choice, subject to certain 

limitations. Among these limitations, local workforce agencies can place caps on the 

duration of training that customers can undertake and the costs that will be approved. 

Second, the training generally must provide skills for jobs that are deemed to be in 

demand in the local economy (or in another location to which the customer intends to 

relocate). Finally, the training program selected by the customer must have been 

certified by the state and local area as meeting acceptable standards of quality. The 

latter restriction will typically mean that the vendor has provided basic information 

about the training program and that previous cohorts of the program’s trainees have met 

state standards for successful training outcomes.

 

3

 Broadly speaking, at the lowest level of the hierarchy, core services consist of basic 

informational services, self-services, or light-touch staff-assisted services primarily designed to assist 

individuals in conducting job search or researching training or other services on their own. Intensive 

services, the next level of the hierarchy, consist of activities involving somewhat greater staff 

involvement, but the focus is still on providing short-term assistance—such as pre-vocational services or 

assessment and counseling—designed to help customers access available job opportunities given their 

existing occupational skills. Finally, training services, including on-the-job training and classroom 

occupational skills training, consist of generally longer-term skill-building activities designed to provide 

participants with occupationally-specific skills or credentials.
VII-5

By virtue of these provisions, WIA offers the basis for a substantial systemwide 

transformation. The extent to which it in fact achieves its objectives of greater system 

integration, customer empowerment, and efficiency, however, will depend on the ways 

its key stipulations are implemented in each of the nation’s over 600 local workforce 

investment areas. Moreover, whether it does so without undermining a decades-long 

federal commitment to improving the employment prospects of those who are 

economically disadvantaged by investing substantially in their occupational skills 

development remains an important question.

In the remainder of this paper we provide a glimpse of the early WIA experience, 

drawing attention to some of the key challenges that local areas have faced as they 

implement WIA’s key provisions. These have included challenges in developing the 

infrastructure that WIA requires and in providing services that balance the needs of 

diverse participants. 

In addressing these issues, we draw on recently available data for PY 2001 from 

WIA’s client-level reporting system (the Workforce Investment Act Standardized 

Record Data, or WIASRD), which records client characteristics, services, and 

outcomes for those who exited WIA during that program year. We also draw on 

information we have available from multi-day site visits that we conducted to nearly 

fifty separate local workforce areas from PY 1999 through PY 2001 as part of a 

number of separate evaluations that we have conducted on behalf of the U.S. 

Department of Labor.4 Because not all of these local areas were selected randomly, 

they cannot be construed necessarily as representative of the workforce system as a 

whole. Nonetheless, they provide substantial coverage across the nation by including 

both largely rural and urban sites in all regions of the country and 23 separate states 

and, as such, provide important evidence about the range of variation across the WIA 

workforce development system in its early years.

ESTABLISHING THE ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE

Central to WIA is the notion that workforce services should be accessible to 

customers through a One-Stop delivery system, including at least one comprehensive 

center in each local area. Building on the very promising experiences of states and 

 

4

 In addition to the Evaluation of the Implementation of WIA, site visits were also conducted by 

SPR as part of the Evaluation of the ITA/ETP Demonstration, being carried out for DOL under 

subcontract to Mathematica Policy Research. 
VII-6

local areas that received One-Stop implementation grants issued by DOL in the last half 

of the 1990s,

5

 One-Stop system-building represents an effort to create a seamless 

workforce delivery structure that is intended to both eliminate the administrative 

inefficiency that was said to plague JTPA and provide a customer-focused approach to 

providing workforce services. 

Key challenges that have arisen in building this system include funding and 

staffing One-Stop centers, developing performance management tools and MIS 

capabilities, and making available an array of resources and information tools including 

the eligible training provider list.

Funding and Staffing One-Stop Centers

To promote seamless services, WIA requires that agencies providing services 

through over a dozen separately funded federal programs should become partners in the 

One-Stop system, by, among other things, making their core services available to 

participants through the One-Stop system and using a portion of their funds (in a way 

not inconsistent with their authorizing legislation) to create and maintain the One-Stop 

delivery system (Code of Federal Regulations §662.230).6 Furthermore, Memoranda 

of Understanding are to be forged between the partners and the local workforce board 

that identify each partner’s obligations in support of the One-Stop system.

As we have reported in other reports prepared as part of this evaluation, One-Stop 

systems clearly can be very effective in simplifying customers’ access to services, and 

there are many extremely strong examples across the nation of partnerships that have 

achieved a high level of service coordination or integration. Notwithstanding these 

accomplishments, funding and staffing issues for One-Stop systems have been among 

the most difficult for partners to resolve. In keeping with this, many of the case study 

sites we visited described the MOU process—and particularly its cost-sharing 

provisions—as painfully difficult. Partners note how difficult it is to develop equitable 

cost-allocation methodologies that reflect the complexity of One-Stop systems. 

Moreover, in some local areas some partners, such as Vocational Rehabilitation and 

veterans’ programs, point out that their authorizing legislation prohibits them from 

 

5

 See this project’s Interim Report, A Report on Early State and Local Progress Towards WIA 

Implementation.

6

 Consistent with OMB cost principles, partners are to make financial contributions that are 

proportionate to the use of the system by their customers
VII-7

using their funding to support non-eligible customers, which would make it difficult or 

impossible for them to staff joint One-Stop functions, such as reception or intake. 

More broadly, many of WIA’s mandated partners express concern that 

participating in the One-Stop system will drain resources from the targeted populations 

that they were mandated to serve. They note that they already have well-developed 

service networks that they feel work quite well for serving their targeted participant 

pools; relocating in One-Stop centers, they feel, might require a retrenchment from 

these existing service hubs with a concomitant degradation of services to their 

customers. Moreover, partners in some contexts, such as those in rural areas, question 

whether establishing a physical One-Stop location even makes sense, given a service 

population that is widely dispersed.

Apart from these concerns grounded in principle, practical constraints also have 

come into play. These include existing leases that bind partners to separate office space 

for at least some period of time, and the difficulty and expense of finding and 

remodeling new space to accommodate multiple partners in a One-Stop setting. Staff 

from the various partner agencies—including employees of state and local governments 

and non-profit organizations—also have unique organizational cultures that make 

working together very challenging, a situation that can be further aggravated by 

agencies’ different pay scales and union rules.

None of these problems is necessarily unsolvable. Indeed, local areas around the 

country have demonstrated flexibility and creativity in overcoming these challenges, 

and extremely strong partnerships have been developed in some instances as a 

consequence. Thus, we could point to examples of comprehensive cost-allocation 

strategies, effective cross-training of staff, arrangements for sharing responsibility for 

joint One-Stop functions, and so on. Nonetheless, each of these problems has caused

obstacles that in different contexts have substantially impeded effective One-Stop 

system-building.

Developing Appropriate Tools for Performance Management

The move towards a One-Stop structure that involves multiple partners and aims 

to serve the universal customer gives rise to associated challenges for performance 

management. Three of these will be highlighted here: the need for an integrated MIS, 

the value of tracking services used by the self-service customer, and the desirability of 
VII-8

a performance measurement system that reflects and promotes the integrated nature of 

service delivery.

Developing an Integrated MIS. To realize the promise of coordinated service 

delivery among partners, WIA implicitly places substantial demands on management 

information system (MIS) capabilities that have often been very difficult to meet. In 

this regard, a well-functioning MIS that supports the One-Stop structure should reflect 

that fact that customers might receive services from multiple program partners, either 

simultaneously or in sequence. This fact in turn has implications for the sorts of 

functionality the MIS should encompass, as coordinated services are likely to be much 

easier to achieve with an MIS that supports intake, eligibility determination, and case 

management for multiple programs. Moreover, local-area and state administrative 

functions can best be served through an operating system that facilitates the tracking of 

performance and reporting requirements necessary for the effective program 

management of each of the partners’ separate programs.

Although the vision seems clear and substantial resources have been devoted to 

the task of creating integrated operating systems that serve these multiple needs, in 

actuality achievements thus far have often been far short of the promise. One 

formidable challenge stems from the sheer technical complexity of the systems that 

must be developed. Thus, for example, each partner may rely on different data, 

definitions, or reports to support their program’s requirements. Further, these software 

systems must be able to interface with a variety of different other software and 

hardware technologies, ranging from the very modern to very old “legacy” systems. 

Finally, in keeping with the discussion above, issues over the allocation of the costs for 

developing these systems have often been highly contentious, as program agencies find 

it difficult to agree on how the electronic transmission of information should be valued 

by various program partners. As a consequence of these problems, a number of states 

have encountered substantial delays and disappointments in bringing their systems on 

line, leading to substantial frustration on the part of front-line staff who are becoming 

quite skeptical that their information needs will ever be wholly met. 

Tracking Self-Service Usage. Related to the problem of developing adequate 

MIS capabilities is tracking the usage and outcomes of customers who access selfservices. Under WIA, self-services become an important hallmark of the public

workforce development system and a key mechanism by which the needs of the 

universal customer can be met cost effectively. Indeed, given limited public funding 
VII-9

available to support staff-intensive workforce development systems, self-services 

become a critical means by which WIA’s vision of universal access can be realized. In 

light of this, substantial amounts of resources have been expended in developing the 

infrastructure to support self-services, such as by establishing physical facilities in 

which “Resource Rooms” can be housed, developing an array of tools and resources to 

meet diverse needs, ensuring that these tools and resources are user-friendly and can be 

accessed from remote locations and through the Internet, and promoting access and use 

for customers with special needs. 

Clearly, improving self-service systems is enhanced to the extent that local areas 

have good information on who accesses self-services (and who does not) and with what 

effect. As a consequence, some local areas have developed sophisticated mechanisms 

for tracking self-service usage—at least on-site usage--such as through swipe-card 

systems. However, these systems are quite rare, as a consequence of their cost and 

complexity and concerns about intruding on customers’ privacy rights. Thus, currently 

little is known about how frequently customers use self-services and for what purposes, 

whether they are satisfied with the tools at their disposal, and whether use of these 

services improves their employment outcomes. This information vacuum is a 

substantial impediment to further system development.

Aligning Performance Measurement. Finally, incentives to develop a wellintegrated One-Stop system have been hampered because of a performance 

accountability system that still reflects silo funding. Overall, states and local areas 

believe that WIA’s core performance and customer satisfaction measurement system 

focuses attention on meaningful and appropriate outcomes and provides a reasonable 

basis for promoting continuous system improvement. That said, a number of important 

concerns and complaints have been lodged against it—e.g., the long time lag between 

service delivery and the measurement of outcomes that makes its use as a performance 

management tool very limited, questions about the lack of consistency with which some 

outcomes (such as the credentialing rate) are being measured, and efforts to exceed 

performance goals that might give rise to creaming. But more important for the 

concerns being addressed in this paper, some elements of WIA performance 

measurement impair—or at least in no way promote—effective One-Stop systembuilding. These limitations include, first, the fact that the WIA core performance 

measures and their operational definitions are not perfectly aligned with those being 

adopted by partner programs and, second, that they do not capture anything about 
VII-10

systemwide measures of performance. DOL, in cooperation with other federal 

agencies, has been undertaking efforts to address these concerns, by aligning 

performance requirements across programs more closely and developing systemwide 

measures of performance. These efforts hold substantial promise in promoting further 

system integration and efficiency.

Developing the ETP List and Consumer Report System

One-Stop system-building requires that local areas make available to the universal 

customer an array of resources and information tools that can be used for career 

planning and related purposes. These include developing and providing access to job 

listings and electronic job matching, software designed to help customers prepare 

resumes, comprehensive career information delivery systems, labor market 

information, and self-assessment software packages, among others. The development 

of these tools and facilities was substantially promoted through DOL’s One-Stop 

implementation grants, which were awarded to states and local areas in JTPA’s waning 

years, and they are now routinely available throughout the nation’s One-Stop system.

However, the eligible training provider (ETP) list and associated Consumer 

Report System (CRS) are elements of the One-Stop infrastructure that were newly 

required with WIA and have proven to be much more difficult to develop. The ETP 

list represents a compilation of training providers that have been deemed by the state 

and local area to be “eligible” for purposes of providing training services to WIA 

customers. To establish eligibility for ETP purposes—at least under the requirements 

for subsequent eligibility—training providers will generally need to demonstrate 

satisfactory performance in their service to previous cohorts of trainees, including those 

that were WIA funded as well as all others. These performance criteria relate to 

training completion rates, employment rates measured both just after the conclusion of 

training and six months later, certification rates, and post-training earnings. These 

performance data, as well as other information about the providers’ training programs 

(e.g., course schedules, tuition costs, etc.), are to be assembled in a Consumer Report 

System.

The vision embedded in WIA is that the CRS and ETP list will ensure system 

accountability, promote high performance, and serve as a valuable information tool for 

both ITA holders as well as for the universal customer accessing core services. 

However, a number of conceptual and practical issues have bedeviled efforts to develop 

these resources.
VII-11

To begin with, developing data systems for measuring vendors’ performance has 

proven to be enormously complex and difficult. Most states are measuring at least 

employment-related performance outcomes for vendors by conducting matches with 

Unemployment Insurance wage files. This strategy certainly makes good sense, both 

from the standpoint of easing the vendors’ burden for data collection and ensuring good 

quality data for populating the Consumer Report System. Nonetheless, this approach 

has logistical and other difficulties associated with it that have hampered efforts to some 

degree. Along these lines, some states point to the problems they have encountered in 

developing data sharing agreements and protocols for data transfers between state 

agencies. Confidentiality concerns also come into play, as when training vendors 

express reluctance to supply students’ social security numbers for data matching 

purposes. 

Beyond these logistical difficulties, concerns relating to data reliability surface as 

well. For example some states, rather than relying on UI matching, are asking vendors 

to self-report their performance data. Not only does this approach impose a huge data 

collection burden on vendors, it gives rise to important questions about resulting data 

reliability (notwithstanding that these states have typically issued guidelines regarding 

data collection and reporting to vendors).7 Related to this, key concepts—such as what 

constitutes a program of training and who should count as a trainee, a completer, or 

employed—need to be hashed and have been resolved with varying degrees of clarity 

that in some states will compromise the within-state comparability of performance data 

for vendors and will greatly undermine across-state comparisons. Similarly, small cell 

sizes also plague data reliability, as some training programs for which performance data 

are being reported have had only handfuls of students for which outcomes are being 

measured.

Additionally, given the different labor market conditions within which different 

training vendors operate, and their unique student populations (e.g., with respect to 

 

7

 Of course, although it undoubtedly represents the best of the available alternatives, UI matching 

has well-known limitations from the standpoint of data reliability as well. These include incomplete 

coverage across all sectors of employment and the difficulty of arranging for data matching to capture the 

employment of those who receive training in one state but might work in another. DOL has recently 

announced that it plans to continue to fund the Wage Record Interchange System (WRIS), an important 

effort to develop a data clearinghouse for sharing UI wage information between states. This move might 

substantially mitigate some of the data limitations of the UI system for purposes of measuring vendors’ 

performance.
VII-12

ability levels, motivations, etc.), some vendors caution that the effort to assemble data 

that can be used by customers to compare one vendor’s performance against another 

may not be at all practical. For example, many community colleges complain that, due 

to their open-admissions policies, their performance is being unfairly characterized in 

comparison to proprietary vendors with more selective admissions policies.

Finally, apart from issues of data integrity, many training vendors that are 

presumed to be of high quality and that were used extensively under JTPA may not 

seek eligibility under the ETP system, or, if eligible, may not remain financially viable. 

For example, many public postsecondary institutions, such as community colleges, have 

expressed unwillingness to undertake the difficulty and expenditure of time and 

resources necessary to apply for ETP subsequent eligibility, when they expect that only 

a trickle of ITA customers will result. Elsewhere, many community-based 

organizations that have filled an important niche in training hard-to-serve customers in 

JTPA are thinly capitalized and are finding it difficult to secure a sufficiently stable 

customer flow of ITA holders to maintain financial viability. Because of these factors, 

some states expect a substantial attrition of training vendors from their ETP lists once 

subsequent eligibility begins, which could ironically work to undermine customer 

choice, rather than promote it, as was the intent.8

Thus, the tension that WIA establishes between customer choice and system 

accountability is an uneasy one whose resolution can apparently sometimes lead to 

unexpected and perhaps unwelcome consequences.

BALANCING DIVERSE SERVICE NEEDS

As we have suggested, WIA can be construed as a dramatic shift in thinking 

about the proper role for workforce development programs. To begin with, JTPA was 

intended to be predominantly a training program (at least in the adult program), while 

WIA establishes a sequence of service levels that will culminate in training only if core 

and intensive services are found not to meet the customer’s employment needs. 

Secondly, JTPA imposed the requirement that (for the most part) only those who were 

economically disadvantaged could be served in the adult program and stipulated that 

most customers should additionally be identified as hard-to-serve; WIA, by contrast, 

 

8

 See SPR’s Evaluation of the Individual Training Account and Eligible Training Provider 

Demonstration: Final Report for more detail on these issues. This report was prepared for DOL under 

subcontract to Mathematica Policy Research.
VII-13

provides access to the universal customer but does require that priority for intensive and 

training services be given to low-income individuals when funds are limited. Third, 

WIA emphasizes customer choice and customer empowerment. And finally, this 

legislation as well aims to bring the business sector to the fore as local areas make 

strategic decisions about service planning.

In light of these changes, states and local areas face a number of difficult 

decisions about how they will balance WIA’s sometimes competing objectives. Four 

such issues will be highlighted here: the degree to which local areas will emphasize 

training services as opposed to the lower service levels, how they will serve the 

universal customer while providing priority for those who are low-income, how they 

allow room for customer choice while ensuring high levels of program accountability, 

and how the needs of business and job seeker customers are balanced. 

Emphasis on Training and Other Service Tiers

In enacting WIA, Congress recognized the competing needs to serve both the 

universal customer with lighter-touch services and harder-to-serve customers with more 

staff-intensive services. Thus, on the one hand, given constraints of available funding, 

service strategies need to rely on less costly interventions to accompany WIA’s broader 

scope for eligibility. At the same time, the legislation recognizes as well that customers 

with very poor labor market prospects are likely to need intensive interventions in order 

to achieve self-sufficiency. Implicitly, then, there is a tension between serving the 

universal customer with low cost services, without forsaking customers who need 

training services.

Table 1 provides a preliminary answer to how this tension is being resolved. 

Using WIASRD data for PY 2001, it tabulates the percentage of WIA registrants in the 

adult and dislocated worker programs who exited after using only core services, 

intensive services but no training, or training services. One complication in using these 

data is that a small number of PY 2001 exiters are those who are JTPA carry-overs—

that is, generally those who enrolled prior to PY 2000, and hence under JTPA’s 

requirements.9 In recognition of this, PY 2001 exiters who are JTPA carry-overs are 

tabulated separately from those who are WIA registrants.

 

9

 Some states—the so-called early implementers—began implementing WIA prior to July 1, 2000. 

In recognition of this, those classified as JTPA carry-overs are those who enrolled prior to the date the 

state formally began WIA implementation, whether that date is July 1st or earlier.
VII-14

Table 1

Service Emphases in PY 2001

Adult Program Dislocated Worker Program

JTPA CarryOversWIA 

Registrants

JTPA CarryOversWIA 

Registrants

Number of exiters 11,898 160,529 20,792 109,169

Percent of exiters who received:

Core services only 5.2% 22.6% 5.4% 15.3%

Intensive services, no training 12.0 35.9 13.7 39.4

Training services 82.8 41.5 80.9 45.4

_____________

Note: Figures represent the percentage of customers that exited WIA after receiving only core 

services, intensive services but no training, and training services. Data are based on the PY 2001

WIASRD data.

As the table shows, local areas are making use of all three service levels as tiers 

from which customers might exit. Thus, among WIA registrants in the adult and 

dislocated worker programs, about 40%-45% exited after receiving training, but 

another one-third exited out of intensive services and the remainder from core services. 

For PY 2001, then, program operators were clearly making full use of the three levels 

of service activity that WIA allows.

Table 2 shows, though, that local areas vary greatly in the extent to which they 

relied on one service level rather than another. This table uses PY 2001 WIASRD data 

to show the percentage of local workforce areas that heavily emphasize core services, 

intensive services, or training services. For purposes of this tabulation, we define a 

local area as having an emphasis on a service level if more than 50% of its registrants 

participate at this level (and no higher level) before they exit.10

This table shows that training services receive the highest emphasis, in that about 

55% of local areas exited more than half of their registrants after they received training 

services. Thus, in keeping with the discussion above, training continues to receive 

substantial emphasis. At the same time, about 20% of local areas are classified as 

having an emphasis on intensive services, and another 10% emphasize staff-assisted 

core services. Somewhat surprisingly, relatively few local areas are classified as

having a mixed emphasis; that is, few areas emphasize no single service activity. It 

 

10 JTPA carry overs have been excluded from these tabulations.
VII-15

seems, then, that local areas seem to have very focused service designs, with some 

emphasizing core services, some intensive services, and others training services. 

Table 2

Service Emphasis Among LWIAs

Adult Program

Dislocated 

Worker Program

High emphasis on core services 11.5% 9.4%

High emphasis on intensive services 18.0 21.5

High emphasis on training services 56.8 54.7

Mixed emphasis 13.7 14.4

________________

Note: Figures represent the percentage of local areas. “High emphasis” is 

defined as having more than 50% of WIA exiters, exclusive of JTPA carryovers, exit at the service level indicated. Data are from the PY 2001 WIASRD.

This variability is quite consistent with observations we gleaned from multi-day 

site visits we conducted to 48 separate local areas from PY 1999 to PY 2001. As 

reported to us by local WIB directors and One-Stop administrators, these areas too 

varied greatly in the extent they were emphasizing the different tiers of services. Partly 

these differences reflected deep-seated disagreements about how WIA should be 

interpreted, but very practical considerations came into play as well (see the Briefing 

Paper on Services for Adults and Dislocated Workers for a discussion of these). 

Establishing Customer Access to WIA Services

While eligibility in the dislocated worker program is largely the same in WIA as 

it was under JTPA, a key feature of WIA adult services is that there is no means test 

(as there was under JTPA), thus allowing program services to be accessible to the 

universal customer. WIA nonetheless clearly asserts that, whenever funds are limited, 

priority for intensive and training services in the adult program should be given to those 

who are public assistance recipients or are low income. How local areas balance the 

obligation to provide universal access while ensuring adequate service levels to the 

public workforce system’s traditional customers represents an important policy concern.

Table 3 provides evidence to suggest how these objectives are being balanced. It 

does so by comparing the characteristics of PY 2001 WIA adult exiters—including 

those who received core services only, intensive services but no training, and training 
VII-16

services—with JTPA adult exiters from PY 98, the last full year in which JTPA was 

operating.11 Given the constraints of available data, most of the WIA data elements 

shown in the table reflect the characteristics of WIA exiters who received intensive or 

training services, because they are not required reportable data items for WIA 

registrants who receive only staff-assisted core services. As before, PY 2001 WIA 

exiters are subdivided into JTPA carryovers and WIA registrants.

The table shows some substantial differences in the characteristics of program 

exiters that are consistent with what one might expect. Thus, given JTPA’s eligibility 

rules, virtually all PY 98 JTPA adult exiters were classified as low income. This 

percentage dropped among PY 2001 JTPA carry-overs, and dropped still further among 

WIA registrants, to about three-quarters of the total. Similarly, there has been a 

pronounced drop in service to cash welfare recipients, with about one-third of exiters 

classified as such in PY 98, a rate that is a good bit larger than it is among WIA exiters 

in PY 2001.

12 Overall, then, the data suggest local areas’ ability and willingness to 

serve a wider customer base than they once did. At the same time, their priority for 

serving those who are low-income still seems clearly in evidence.

Other characteristics of participants that could be construed as barriers to 

employment are also examined in Table 3 for their trend over time as well. However, 

changes on these indicators are quite modest. Thus, high school dropouts are being 

served at about the same rate as previously, as are those who are limited-English 

speakers. The one notable exception is that single parents seem to be served at a 

somewhat lower rate than previously.

 

11 WIA did not officially begin until PY 2000. During PY 99, however, some states, the early 

implementers, began operating under WIA regulations during some part or all of the program year. 

Thus, PY 98 represents the last program year during which JTPA was operating everywhere. Data for 

PY 98 JTPA exiters are calculated from JTPA’s client-level data system, the Standardized Program 

Information Report (SPIR), and include data for Title II-A (the adult program) and Section 204d (the 

older worker program); these two groups are jointly referred to as adults for purposes of this discussion.

12 Potentially, some part of the drop-off in both these measures represents an effect of declining 

poverty and welfare roles nationwide during this period (the poverty rate was 12.7% in 1998 and 11.3% 

in 2000, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002; similarly, there was a substantial decline in 

the rates of TANF recipiency during this same period). 
VII-17

Table 3

A Comparison of Recent JTPA and WIA Adult Exiters

PY 2001 WIASRD Data

JTPA JTPA WIA Adult Registrants

SPIR

PY 98

Carry 

Overs Total

Core 

Only

IntensiveNo Trng Training

Low Income

Yes 96.0 85.2 na na 73.2 70.0

No 4.0 14.8 na na 26.8 30.0

Cash Welfare Recipient

TANF/AFDC 25.7 18.0 na na 9.7 10.2

GA, SSI, RCA 5.8 4.7 na na 9.9 4.2

Highest Grade Completed

Not a high school grad 22.4 15.4 na na 22.2 18.4

High school graduate 56.1 57.7 na na 51.3 60.0

Post high school 21.6 27.0 na na 26.6 21.6

Additional Barriers

Disability 10.4 9.7 7.6 6.4 9.9 6.3

Limited English 6.5 4.8 na na 7.3 6.0

Single parent 43.7 43.7 na na 29.0 26.0

_______________

Note: All figures are given as percentages. PY 98 SPIR data represent figures for adults (Title II-A) and 

older workers (Section 204d) who received more than only an objective assessment. Percentages are based 

on those with non-missing data on the item in question.

WIASRD does not require the reporting of many of the characteristics of participants who receive only 

staff-assisted core services. Thus, many of the figures for this column, and the total column, are not 

available (na).

Table 3 is also useful for suggesting which sorts of WIA registrants receive 

intensive services but not training and which receive training. Thus, high school 

graduates are relatively more likely to receive training than either dropouts or post-high 

school attendees, possible because they are deemed to be viewed as both in need of and 

able to benefit from training services, or because of the lack of suitable training 

opportunities for those without a high school diploma.

Limits on Training Choices

Notwithstanding their obvious efforts to promote customer choice, nearly all local 

areas implicitly limit choice in a variety of ways by exercising their legitimate authority 

to determine access to services. For example, they establish guidelines regulating the 

flow of customers into intensive and training services, as WIA allows. Similarly, they 

set limits on the dollar amount or duration of training that will be funded and establish 
VII-18

procedures for certifying training programs as eligible to be considered by an ITA 

holder. The decisions that local areas make reflect a balance between the need to 

promote customer choice and sometimes competing objectives, such as system 

efficiency and accountability.

For example, in keeping with provisions in the WIA regulations (Section 

663.420), states and local boards are entitled to set dollar or time limits on the training 

they will support through an ITA. Of the 19 states for which we have data, each 

devolved this authority completely to their local areas. In turn, nearly all the 57 local 

areas we researched do set either dollar or time limits, or both. 

These limits were very variable, though, often even within the same state. Thus, 

as Table 4 shows, dollar limits ranged from under $2,000 per ITA holder in a small 

number of local areas, to a high of $7,500 or more in others, with a modal value of 

$5,000. Similarly, 8 local areas set a time limit of one year, 36 set a limit of up to two 

years, and the remaining 13 set no limit (at least not a formal one). However, some 

areas that set dollar or time limits noted that these limits could be waived under special 

circumstances.

Table 4

Dollar Caps Imposed on ITAs

No. of 

LWIAs Percent

Less than $2,000 2 3.5%

$2,000 to $3,500 8 14.0

$3,501 to $5,000 19 33.3

$5,001 to $7,500 12 21.1

Greater than $7,500 (or no 

limit)

16 28.1

____________

Note: Figures represent the number (percentage) of LWIAs that 

established their dollar ITA caps at various levels, of 57 local areas 

(in 19 separate states) for which this information was collected.

In setting their dollar caps, representatives from local workforce boards made 

note of conflicting considerations. On the one hand, they recognized that lower caps 

would serve to ensure that a greater number of customers could be served overall, 
VII-19

given the area’s overall funding constraints. Similarly, they wanted to maintain some 

financial discipline, both for customers who otherwise have no incentive to economize 

in their choices and for vendors that might price their programs at whatever cap the 

local board set. At the same time, board members recognized that setting dollar caps 

too low would serve to exclude from consideration many longer-term and higher-quality 

training opportunities, especially those offered by private vendors, and would thereby 

sharply curtail customer choice. Clearly, local areas balance these considerations in 

very different ways, presumably after taking into account the needs of their customers 

and the mix of training providers in their area.

Similarly, as we have discussed in an earlier section of this paper, states and local 

areas set performance requirements that training vendors must meet in order to attain 

subsequent eligibility on the eligible training provider list. To the extent that states set 

high performance standards, some training vendors will fail to achieve eligibility, and 

customer choice could be curtailed. At the same time, higher certification requirements 

will promote greater system accountability and (arguably) improved program 

performance, which have also clearly been identified as important objectives under 

WIA.

The states we studied were very interested in developing a very inclusive list of 

eligible programs during WIA’s first year or two (during the so-called “initial 

eligibility” period).13 Accordingly, they actively marketed the ETP list to vendors and 

established requirements for initial eligibility that were quite easy for vendors to meet 

(D’Amico and Salzman, 2002). Thereafter, however, subsequent eligibility was to take 

hold, which, the WIA legislation suggests [WIA Section 122(c)], should involve the 

application of performance requirements calculated for seven measures that are based 

on how well the training program’s previous cohorts of students performed, either 

while in training (i.e., program completion rates) or in the labor market thereafter 

 

13 According to WIA, initial eligibility lasts for 12-18 months, though a 6-month extension can be 

granted. During this period, degree-granting post-secondary institutions and apprenticeship programs are 

granted automatic eligibility, so long as they apply; other providers may need to meet performance levels 

established by the state, at the state’s discretion. During subsequent eligibility, by contrast, no provider 

is considered automatically eligible and, in general, all would be expected to meet levels of performance 

established by the state on some or all of seven measures that relate to how well prior cohorts of trainees 

succeeded (including some measures that apply just to prior WIA-funded trainees and others that apply to 

all trainees).
VII-20

(e.g., employment, retention, and wage measures). Of these seven measures, three 

apply generally and four apply among prior students who received WIA funding. 

As we have already discussed, the application of these performance measures 

involves thorny definitional issues (e.g., how to define key terms, such as “completion” 

and “enrollee”), difficulties in data measurement (e.g., who should gather the 

necessary data and by what means), and complaints from many vendors who are wary 

about potentially burdensome reporting requirements, among many other concerns and 

issues. Doubtless for these reasons, of the thirteen states whose subsequent eligibility 

requirements we examined in detail, two requested a waiver from DOL to defer 

subsequent eligibility for at least a few more years (i.e., until 2004 or 2005), and two 

others were intending to establish requirements for subsequent eligibility but had not yet 

done so when we visited them around the beginning of calendar year 2002. 

The remaining seven states had reached decisions about what their performance 

requirements for vendors’ programs would be during subsequent eligibility, but only 

after protracted discussion and debate. The performance levels they established for 

subsequent eligibility show substantial disparity, however, both with respect to 

approaches taken and performance levels established. Thus, two states set standards on 

just a few of the seven performance measures; three states set performance levels on all 

or most of them, but expect vendors to meet the standards on just some of them (e.g., 

four of the seven); and two states established standards on all seven measures and 

expected vendors to meet them all. Not only did the general approach vary across 

states, but the absolute levels of performance that vendors were expected to meet for 

their programs on each of the measures varied widely across states as well. For 

example, some states required vendors’ programs to record a program completion rate 

as low of 25% and others required a 70% rate, and the required all-student employment

rates ranged from 40% to 74%.

14

Rationales for the decisions that states made with respect to their approaches 

reflected some similar themes, even if they did often lead to very different decisions. 

Among the most common considerations was the states’ effort to strike a balance by 

establishing performance criteria that are rigorous enough to ensure high quality, while 

 

14 These policies are described more fully in SPR’s draft Final Report, An Evaluation of the 

Individual Training Account and Eligible Training Provider Demonstration (D’Amico and Salzman, 

2002).
VII-21

not establishing them so high that customer choice will be impaired by having many 

vendors excluded from eligibility. Clearly, though, states are striking this balance in 

different places, with potentially profound implications for customer choice.

CONCLUSIONS

Since WIA was enacted in 1998 the workforce development system has been in 

the midst of a profoundly important transformation. From an emphasis on providing 

training services geared towards a narrowly targeted customer pool, as in JTPA, WIA 

promotes universal access within a hierarchy of service levels that aims to ration more 

costly interventions to those whose service needs are clearest. System accountability, 

efficiency, customer choice, and market-based approaches are key tenets underlying the 

new emerging system.

As with a transformation of this magnitude, implementation challenges are 

inevitably to be expected. Thus, establishing the One-Stop infrastructure, building 

strong partnerships, and establishing performance management and information tools 

aligned with the One-Stop vision are achievements that will take time to reach full 

maturation. The accomplishments of some vanguard states and areas, though, convince

us that indeed the WIA vision is within reach, given appropriate system incentives and 

attention to capacity building. 

Additionally, though, much of the discussion in this paper also leads to the 

conclusion that some of WIA’s key underlying principles are to some degree in an 

uneasy balance. Thus, promoting accountability and high system performance (such as 

by establishing high standards for subsequent eligibility for training providers) comes at 

the expense of limiting customer choice. Providing universal access to a range of 

workforce services (such as by generously funding an array of core and intensive 

services through a well-developed One-Stop infrastructure) serves to limit funds that 

would otherwise be available to serve WIA’s high priority low-income customer. 

Promoting efficiency by husbanding resources (such as by adopting a work-first 

approach in a sequence of service tiers or establishing sharp limits on ITA costs or 

durations) can serve to undermine efforts to remain customer focused.

What is clear is that local areas are making unique decisions about how best to 

balance these competing objectives. Thus, the result so far is a matrix of service design 

and delivery systems that looks vastly different throughout the nation. To this extent, 
VII-22

WIA’s effort to devolve control for policy decisions to the local level has clearly been 

realized.

No doubt additional important changes and system transformations lie ahead. 

WIA’s first few years have been fraught with some confusions and start-up problems 

that are understandable in light of the legislation’s intended quick pace of 

implementation and the magnitude of the changes that are underway. These years have 

as well been a learning experience whose important lessons are only now coming to 

light. The next few years will thus be important for judging whether WIA’s success in 

establishing a first-class workforce development system—access to an array of career 

tools for the universal customer’s, coupled with concerted efforts to meet the needs of 

those who need extensive training services to attain self-sufficiency—can be realized.
VII-23

Bibliography

D’Amico, Ronald, Deborah Kogan, Suzanne Kreutzer, Andrew Wiegand, Alberta 

Baker, Gardner Carrick, and Carole McCarthy. 2001a. A Report on Early State 

and Local Progress Towards WIA Implementation. Report prepared by Social 

Policy Research Associates under contract to the U.S. Department of Labor.

D’Amico, Ronald, and Jeffrey Salzman. 2002. An Evaluation of the Individual Training 

Account/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration: Draft Final Report. Report 

prepared by Social Policy Research Associates under contract to Mathematica 

Policy Research and the U.S. Department of Labor.

Freedman, Stephen, Jean Tansey Knab, Lisa A. Gennetian, and David Navarro. 2000. 

The Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN Evaluation: Final Report on a Work First 

Program in a Major Urban Center. 

Friedlander, Daniel and Gary Burtless. 1995. Five Years After: The Long-Term Effects 

of Welfare-to-Work Programs. New York: Russell Sage.

Grubb, W. Norton. 1996. Learning to Work: The Case for Reintegrating Job Training 

and Education. New York: Russell Sage.

Grubb, W. Norton, Norena Badway, Denise Bell, Bernadette Chi, Chris King, Julie 

Herr, Heath Prince, Richard Kazis, Lisa Hicks, Judith Combes Taylor. 1999. 

Toward Order from Chaos: State Efforts to Reform Workforce Development 

Systems. National Center for Research in Vocational Education, University of 

California at Berkeley.

Kogan, Deborah, Katherine P. Dickinson, Ruth Fedrau, Michael J. Midling, and 

Kristin E. Wolff. 1997. Creating Workforce Development Systems that Work: An 

Evaluation of the One-Stop Implementation Experience. Report prepared by 

Social Policy Research Associates under contract to the U.S. Department of 

Labor.

Levitan, Sar and Frank Gallo. 1988. A Second Chance: Training for Jobs. Kalamazoo, 

MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

O’Shea, Daniel and Christopher T. King. 2001. The Workforce Investment Act of 

1998: Restructuring Workforce Development Initiatives in States and Localities. 

Rockefeller Report No. 12. The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, 

Albany, NY.

Social Policy Research Associates. 2000. PY 98 SPIR Data Book. Report prepared by 

Social Policy Research Associates under contract to the U.S. Department of 

Labor.
VII-24

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2002. Current Population Survey: Historical Poverty 

Tables. 

U.S. Department of Labor. 1991. Improving the Quality of Training Under JTPA. 

Research and Evaluation Report Series 91-A.

__________. 1999. Dislocated Worker Program Report: Findings from the Career 

Management Account Demonstration.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 1994a. “Multiple Employment Training Programs: 

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Programs Indicate Need for Closer Examination of Structure.”
VIII-1

VIII. WIA YOUTH SERVICES

This briefing paper is one of a series developed as part of the Evaluation of the 

Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates and 

TATC Consulting. Thus far, the data collection has consisted of two rounds of site 

visits: the first round was conducted to six states and nine local workforce areas in the

spring of 2000, and the second round was conducted to an additional eight state and 

fourteen local areas in the summer and fall of 2001. An overview of the evaluation is 

included as an appendix to this report. This briefing paper for the most part draws on 

findings from the second round of site visits, because these capture developments 

associated with WIA that are the more recent. 

In this briefing paper, we discuss how States and local areas have been 

implementing youth services under WIA. After a brief background, we review four 

key areas of youth services implementation. The first of these is the level of guidance 

that States have provided to local areas. We then take a look at challenges local areas 

have experienced in ensuring youths’ access to services, and next review their efforts at 

developing a comprehensive service design. Finally we review how service providers 

were selected under the new system and how that selection has impacted the quality and 

type of services available to youth.

BACKGROUND

WIA fundamentally restructured the delivery of youth services. It consolidated 

the summer and year-around programs into a single formula-based funding stream and 

thereby ended a thirty-six year tradition of stand-alone summer youth programs that had 

been a key feature of its predecessors, CETA and JTPA. Although combining the 

funding streams allowed local areas more flexibility in their allocation of resources, the 

change also came with a new set of requirements and performance measures. Among 

these new requirements, WIA called for enhanced youth services by requiring local 

areas to offer a more comprehensive array of services that followed youth development 

principles and included long-term follow-up to all participants. Local areas were also 

required to fully integrate summer employment opportunities with year-round services 

and were encouraged to expand and enhance youth connections to the One-Stop System. 

Furthermore, in an effort to focus services where they are needed most, there was also 

increased emphasis on serving hard-to-serve and at-risk youth. 
VIII-2

As we noted after the first round of site visits, such a large system transformation 

posed major challenges for States and local areas. This was the case partly because the 

reorganization was to happen at a time when States and local areas were simultaneously 

reorganizing local governance of the workforce development system, by setting up 

Workforce Investment Boards and Youth Councils. Several sites indicated that the 

youth service redesign was slowed, because these organizational features needed to be 

established before youth services could be developed. 

STATE GUIDANCE ON YOUTH SERVICES IMPLEMENTATION

In common with the development of adult and dislocated worker services under 

WIA, States issued only limited guidance on the implementation of youth services. 

To provide State-level guidance on the implementation of youth services, two of the 

States included in our sample of eight set up youth committees under the State 

Workforce Investment Boards, and one decided to establish a statewide Youth Council. 

The other five States did not have statewide planning bodies devoted to youth issues. 

Only three States issued criteria for selecting youth service providers. These 

minimum criteria ranged from requiring specific program components to establishing 

performance accountability standards. In addition, some States required partnerships 

with other youth-serving organizations and encouraged the leveraging of non-WIA 

funds. For example, in Arizona, local areas were required to base their selection of 

youth services providers on the following criteria (among others):

 Ability to measure and attain performance levels as measured by WIA 

core youth indicators.

 Appropriate levels of customer satisfaction.

 Process for conducting skills and needs assessments and performance 

goals and objectives for each youth participant.

 Coordination with local secondary and post-secondary institutions.

 Prior experience in working with disadvantaged youth and special 

populations.

In addition, three States prepared youth-related resources, such as tool kits, 

manuals and resource guides to help their local areas. New York, for example, 

developed a Youth Council tool kit that compiled regulatory requirements for the 

establishment of Youth Councils and recommendations regarding their scope of work. 

Minnesota developed a network of youth practitioners to foster exchange of best 
VIII-3

practices and peer training. The network is an informal group consisting of State 

representatives and youth service representatives from each local area. They meet 

regularly to discuss implementation issues. 

These exceptions aside, States mostly played the role of simply transmitting 

federal guidance to local areas. Some respondents indicated that their States were 

reluctant to issue State-level guidance and wanted to leave strategic decisions to local 

areas. Another State reported that the State WIB had not met in over a year leaving all 

youth-related policy guidance to a State School-to Work team. 

ACCESS TO SERVICES

WIA included several requirements that affected access to youth services. In 

addition to tighter eligibility guidelines and an emphasis on serving out-of-school (OSY) 

youth, local areas were also expected to link some of their youth services to the OneStop career center system. 

Eligibility Criteria

Under WIA, income eligibility guidelines for youth participants were tightened in 

three ways. WIA reduced the window for youth who qualify without being from lowincome families from 10% to 5%. Second, the law eliminated the presumptive WIA 

eligibility for recipients of free and reduced school-lunches. And third, all participants

needed to have at least one of six federally specified barriers to employment1 to qualify.

A majority of States and local areas reported that tighter income eligibility 

guidelines increased their administrative burdens and shifted resources away from the 

provision of services. Respondents in several States were very frustrated that eligibility 

for free or reduced school lunches could no longer be used to document WIA 

eligibility. This method had been used widely in some areas because it was simple to 

administer and placed few reporting burdens on applicants. By removing this option, 

according to some respondents, applicants had more difficulties furnishing all the 

necessary eligibility documentation. As an incentive, the Youth Council in one area 

established cash payments ranging from $20 - $100 to help motivate youth to provide 

the necessary eligibility documents. Still, partly because of the greater paperwork 

 

1

 The barriers include the following: basic skills deficient; school dropout; homeless, runaway, or 

foster child; pregnant or parenting; offender; or in need of additional assistance to complete education or 

secure employment. 
VIII-4

requirements, this area and others experienced delays in meeting their enrollment goals, 

and most made full use of the 5% window to qualify youth who did not meet income 

requirements. 

However, there were exceptions. Some of the local areas we studied, typically 

those in poorer or urban areas, reported having little difficulty filling their program 

slots and needed to make little use of the 5% window. 

Emphasis on Serving Out-of-school Youth 

During the first round of site visits, local areas reported that they anticipated 

having some difficulties in recruiting out-of-school youth (OSY) to meet the 

requirement that they spend at least 30% of youth funding on OSY. Although 

recruiting OSY was indeed difficult, most local areas we visited in the second round 

had little difficult meeting the spending requirement. Indeed, some local areas reported 

that they spent in excess of 50% of their funds on OSY, while local areas in only two 

States, Montana and Virginia, reported difficulties in meeting the requirement.

2

 In 

Oregon, State and local officials were particularly positive about the shift in focus 

under WIA. State respondents noted that, although local areas were initially nervous 

about meeting the funding requirement, they saw it as a prod to change their 

recruitment procedures and focus more on those youth who needed help most. One 

local area characterized it as the most positive effect of WIA youth implementation. 

Two primary factors contributed to the local areas’ success in meeting the OSY 

requirement. First, several local areas indicated that serving OSY was significantly 

more expensive than serving in-school youth. They noted that OSY tended to have 

multiple risk factors and more barriers to employment. Consequently, their needs for 

education, training, counseling, and supportive services were generally found to be 

greater. This circumstance resulted in higher costs per OSY participant and thus in 

higher relative spending on OSY than some areas had anticipated. 

A second factor explaining areas’ ability to meet the OSY funding requirement 

was that many of them had significantly modified their recruitment strategies to find 

and attract OSY. States and local areas reported several helpful strategies:

 

2

 In Virginia these difficulties can be explained at least partly by the State OSY definition, which 

makes it unlikely for anyone under 18 to be considered an OSY. According to this definition, a student 

under 18 who is not attending school is not considered an out-of-school youth unless he/she is 

emancipated or has been expelled from school.
VIII-5

 States provided guidance and technical assistance. For example, 

Minnesota offered technical assistance to local areas through their 

Practitioners Network. In addition, it prepared an out-of-school youth 

resource list that included relevant articles and guides and a brief 

description of strategies in use by Job Corps to attract OSY.

 Close collaboration with education providers. Several local areas are 

working closely with school districts and are using the schools’ dropout 

lists to contact youth for OSY program participation. Some have hired 

dedicated staff to maintain close contact with school districts. In one 

site, Suffolk County, NY, staff developed a training manual for high 

school counselors and teachers to help them understand the services 

available under WIA. 

 Recruiting OSY where they congregate. Several local areas succeeded in 

recruiting youth at popular youth hangouts such as malls and fast food 

restaurants. 

 Contracting with providers who specialize in serving OSY. Some local 

areas are contracting with service providers who have experience in 

working with OSY and offer youth a package of services that is tailored 

to their needs. Such services commonly are centered on a GED or High 

School diploma program and include vocational training in subjects such 

as automotive skills, cosmetology, childcare, nursing, graphic arts, and 

computer skills.

These successes notwithstanding, areas noted how much more difficult it was to 

recruit out-of-school than in-school youth. This difficulty was especially notable in one 

area that reported poor linkages with the local school system. A particular problem too 

was enrolling OSY before they were enrolled in an alternative educational program 

(when the youth would no longer meet the definition of being out of school).3

Integration with the One-Stop System

Linking youth services to the One-Stop career center system is encouraged by 

DOL because doing so has several advantages: (a) local areas may be able to leverage 

services funded from other sources by accessing some of the required youth service 

elements through the One-Stop system; (b) One-Stop centers are potential sources of 

referrals, especially of older youth and out-of-school youth; and (c) centers offer an 

opportunity to refer non-eligible youth to related services that are universally accessible

 

3

 SPR prepared a separate report on strategies for recruiting and serving out-of-school youth, as 

part of a separate project carried out for DOL. See Services Provided to Out-of-School Youth under 

WIA: Challenges and Effective Strategies (2002)
VIII-6

as One-Stop core services (such as the basic labor exchange, assistance and resources to 

facilitate job searches assistance and career exploration, use of career resource centers, 

and referral to youth providers who are not subject to WIA eligibility guidelines).

Thus far, youth connections to the One-Stop system remain largely untapped. Of 

the local areas we visited, only two sites in New York State had strong linkages in 

place. In Suffolk County, a Youth Career Center is located in the same building as the 

One-Stop center. The youth center offers a series of workshops focusing on LMI, 

interviewing techniques, job retention, and work habits, geared towards youth and 

emerging workers rather than seasoned job seekers. The youth center also has two 

dozen computer terminals with Internet access where youth can conduct job search or 

engage in computer-guided career exploration and assessments. In Erie County, 

another area with strong One-Stop linkages, the year-round in-school program is 

primarily offered through the two comprehensive One-Stop Centers. For example, in 

Buffalo, the second floor of the One-Stop Center is devoted entirely to youth services. 

This configuration has allowed staff to create a friendly and casual environment that 

appeals to youth. 

Although their connections were not as strong, other local areas had linkages 

between their youth programs and the One-Stop system that served the following 

objectives:

 A few sites offered preliminary assessment, referral and job search 

workshop through One-Stop centers. In several sites, youth who first 

access services through One-Stop centers received a preliminary 

assessment there and, based on the outcome, were then referred to the 

appropriate youth service provider. In at least one site, youth also 

participate in a job search workshop if they access services there first. 

 Some sites co-located youth staff at One-Stop centers. In an effort to 

strengthen linkages, some sites decided to co-locate youth services staff 

at the One-Stop center. For example, in two local sites in Georgia youth 

coordinators are stationed at the local One-Stop centers, and older youth 

are served primarily through the One-Stop centers. 

 One site is using a charter high school on the One-Stop center campus. 

In Yuma the local area has set up a charter high school to serve as an 

alternative education option for out-of-school youth. 

In contrast to these examples, most local areas had only limited linkages between 

their youth services and the One-Stop system. This was the case even in several local 

areas that used the same providers to serve youth and adults. Youth service providers 
VIII-7

noted that One-Stop centers generally did not have a youth-friendly atmosphere, and, as 

a result, they were less likely to send youth there for services. One reason cited by 

some is the fact that One-Stop centers in many communities were developed with adults 

and dislocated workers in mind. Moreover, given the history of separate adult and 

youth programming, there is little history of strong linkages and each program already 

has a separate service infrastructure in place (e.g., separate physical locations). 

At the very least, though, representatives of most local areas indicated that they 

would like to familiarize youth with the One-Stop system. The most common strategies 

under consideration were to (1) to take youth on a tour of a local center, (2) allow them 

to use the resource centers and computer terminals for online job searches, and (3) 

offer them job search workshops at the One-Stop centers. 

SERVICE DESIGN

States and local areas faced formidable challenges in transitioning their youth 

service designs to meet the more comprehensive requirements called for under WIA. 

The most publicly visible change was the end of large-scale stand-alone summer youth 

programs. Under WIA, summer employment is one of ten mandatory program 

elements with the same performance measures and long-term follow-up requirements as 

all the others. All ten program elements must be made available to youth participants 

in the local area. The program elements follow recognized youth development 

principles and are designed to (1) improve the educational achievement of youth, (2) 

prepare them for employment success, (3) offer a variety of supports including 

supportive services, mentoring, and comprehensive counseling, and (4) offer leadership 

development opportunities. In addition, all participants are to receive one year of 

follow-up services. This redesign is designed to “fuse youth development activities 

with traditional workforce development.”

4

Based on our first round of data collection, it seemed that local areas were 

generally experiencing a slow start-up of youth services. The second round of site 

visits, however, suggests that most local areas had put in place most of the provisions 

WIA called for. Most had significantly reduced their summer youth program, but a 

few sites had found alternate funding to keep it going at a similar level as under JTPA. 

 

4

 U.S. DOL “Implementing the Workforce Investment Act of 1998,” A White Paper, November 

12, 1998.
VIII-8

Most local areas also had been able to overcome start-up difficulties and had found 

ways to provide the ten required service elements.

In this section we will discuss how States and local areas (1) responded to the 

shift from a stand-alone summer youth program to year-round services, (2) 

implemented the ten required service elements, and (3) applied youth development 

principles to their overall service designs. 

From Stand-Alone Summer Program to Year-Round Services

Losing the summer youth program that had been a mainstay of youth 

programming posed a major challenge for most sites. Enrollments during the summer 

dropped in most areas by 50% - 90% compared to previous years. This circumstance 

created a public relations challenge for local areas and made the change unpopular with 

local elected officials who were keenly aware of the popularity of the summer program. 

States and local areas used a variety of strategies to soften the impact of the shift in 

funding and to keep youth “off the streets.”

One State and several local areas secured additional funding to keep the summer 

youth program going, using corporate, city and State funding. For example, some 

local areas asked employers to pay the wages of the youth they were employing. 

Another area used TANF funds to supplement funding for summer employment 

opportunities. In urban areas—where the political pressure to keep a summer jobs 

program was greatest—cities and counties contributed from the general fund to keep the 

summer program going. In Chicago, for example, the Mayors Office of Workforce 

Development created the Summer Youth Initiative for 3,500 youth that is now funded 

by the private sector. Similarly, Portland contributed resources from the general fund 

so that non-WIA youth could receive the same services as WIA-funded youth.

Local areas also were challenged to make programmatic changes. The shift was 

especially difficult for local areas that had not had much of a year-round program under 

JTPA. There, program design had to start nearly from scratch. Some States indicated 

that their local areas had difficulties accomplishing such major youth program redesign 

given their funding levels. To help local areas, two States allocated 15% funds to 

encourage local areas to pilot and document effective models of innovative summer 

youth programs that were well integrated into effective year-round programming. 

The reduction in summer youth funds notwithstanding, several sites expressed 

satisfaction and even enthusiasm for the youth service approach under WIA. They 
VIII-9

pointed to the research that supported the importance of more comprehensive services 

for youth and appreciated that they had increased flexibility. 

Implementation of the Ten Required Service Elements

WIA requires that local boards make all ten program elements available to all 

youth participants in the local area (although individual youth participants need not 

participate in all ten). Providers have the discretion to determine which services a 

youth will receive based on the objective assessment and the ISS. Furthermore, not all 

ten elements have to be funded with WIA funds if they are already available in an area 

and funded by other means, but in this case the local area is responsible for ensuring 

that there is a close connection to the non-WIA funded services.

We reported after the first round of site visits that many local areas were not able 

to provide the full range of youth services. Since then, local areas made significant 

progress in implementing youth services, which is suggested by the fact that almost all 

local areas included in the sample were able to offer all ten service elements. At the 

same time, some local areas indicated that some of the required elements were not yet 

fully developed, so much so that one local area retained its stand-alone summer youth 

program because it was significantly delayed in starting up its WIA youth activities.

We provide a brief description of the implementation of each element below.

Tutoring, Study Skills, and Dropout Prevention: In most local areas these 

services are provided by local high schools, adult schools and other institutions that 

have traditionally offered them, such as Boys and Girls Clubs and teen centers. One 

site designed its in-school program to serve as the dropout prevention program. 

Alternative Secondary School Offerings: In many local areas access to alternative 

secondary schools was provided through agreements with local school districts or 

community colleges. In one site, the youth service provider operates a charter school 

on site adjacent to a local One-Stop center. At another site, the Youth Council decided 

to fund participants to enroll in an intensive year-round private alternative education 

program that prepares youth through a project-based curriculum. 

Summer Employment Opportunities: As mentioned previously, summer 

employment opportunities must be directly linked to academic and occupational 

learning and can no longer be stand-alone programs. Given the magnitude of the 

required redesign, we found that design and development of this program element is 
VIII-10

still very much in flux in most States. Local areas seem to have used three approaches 

to meet the WIA requirements:

 Many local areas maintain a fairly traditional summer youth program, 

albeit on a smaller scale and with a new emphasis on the attainment of 

specific occupational, work maturity, and citizenship skills and a link 

between academic and occupational learning. Some of these programs 

emphasize work experience through competency-based instruction 

provided at the work site. In some cases, youth receive high school 

credit for work experience based on work-based project portfolio 

assessments. This approach has the advantage that relatively little 

redesign is necessary, but carries the risk that the summer programs are 

still not well integrated into year-round activities.

 A smaller number of local areas substantially revamped their summer 

program by extending services to youth year-around. This approach 

allows local areas to provide similar (and in some cases more intensive) 

services to youth in the summer as during the year, and clearly links 

summer and year-round activities.

 Several local areas decided to supplement their WIA summer program 

by securing non-WIA funding to compensate for the loss of a large-scale 

summer youth program. Officials in urban areas were especially 

concerned about the potential reductions in summer enrollments and 

found ways to keep youth engaged. 

Paid and Unpaid Work Experiences: The purpose of work experience (which 

includes internships and job shadowing) is to provide youth with opportunities for 

career exploration and skill development. At most sites work experience occurs in 

conjunction with other services to increase the basic educational and occupational skills 

of the participant. For example, internships are sometimes combined with classroom 

instruction relating to a particular position, occupation, industry, or the basic skills and 

abilities to successfully compete in the local labor market. Placement in internships or 

other work experience projects is typically based on participant interest and the work 

skills needing development that were identified during the objective assessment process. 

The following serve as examples: 

 The Portland area has developed strong connections with employers 

through its Employer Participation Model. Using this approach, 

selected large employers create work-based learning positions for WIA 

youth by paying a portion of their wages and by providing assistance 

with supervision and other issues. 
VIII-11

 In Du Page County, Illinois, the local area has developed paid and 

unpaid work experiences in information technology occupations, such as 

web-design and computer maintenance. 

Occupational Skill Training: All but one local area offered occupational skill 

training. Local areas provided these services in different ways. Many restricted 

training to a certain list of occupations and selected providers, such as adult schools and 

community and technical colleges. In some cases training is reserved for older youth 

only. One area restricted training to that offered by providers on the Eligible Training 

Provider list. 

Leadership Development Opportunities: This program element includes 

community service and peer-centered activities that encourage responsibility and other 

positive social behaviors. Local areas developed and funded a wide range of programs 

under this general description:

 In Chicago, leadership opportunities include workshops on employer 

relations, communication, and employment skills;

 Southwest Virginia emphasizes team building during a summer camp;

 Hampton Roads, Virginia designed a program where older youth serve 

as peer mentors to younger participants and teach them anger 

management and mediation. 

Some leadership programs were operated as stand-alone programs. In many 

others, leadership development elements were just one component of a series of 

services.

Supportive Services: The type and scope of supportive services do not seem to 

have changed significantly as a result of WIA implementation. During the objective 

assessment process individuals are typically assessed for financial and non-financial 

support service needs. Supportive services cover such costs as childcare, transportation, 

work clothing and equipment, utility bills, emergency housing, food, and medical 

expenses.

Adult Mentoring: Interestingly, youth who participated in a focus group at one 

local area ranked mentoring as the WIA element they valued the most. Despite this 

strong youth support, however, several local areas reported difficulties developing and 

integrating mentoring into their overall youth strategy. Partly the difficulty was due to 

the fact that, as a new requirement under WIA, mentoring is a service with which some 

local areas have limited experience. One local area also indicated that it has difficulties 
VIII-12

recruiting volunteer mentors due to onerous State requirements regarding adult contact 

with youth under eighteen that have discouraged people who might otherwise have been 

willing to become volunteer mentors.5 

Because of these challenges, the extent and composition of mentoring services 

varied widely across areas. Taking a minimalist approach, some local areas consider 

interactions between youth and their regular staff or worksite supervisors to be 

sufficient mentoring for youth participants. On the other hand, others require 

experienced mentors to enter into a committed formalized agreement to interact with a 

youth on a scheduled basis. As part of their interaction, mentors and mentees discuss 

such topics as educational opportunities, occupational opportunities, and barrier 

resolution. 

Follow-up Services: Under WIA this program element includes regular contact for 

at least 12 months, including some of the following services: leadership development 

and supportive services, assistance in securing better paying jobs, career development 

and further education, work-related peer-support groups, and adult mentoring. 

Local areas indicated that this more comprehensive follow-up model required by 

WIA has been difficult to develop. A particular challenge that respondents mentioned 

was how to stay in touch with youth during the follow-up period. Surprisingly, some 

staff found e-mail to be the best way to reach many youth for follow-up, because many 

youth have free portable e-mail accounts. One local area plans to contact youth during 

the follow-up period by telephone and to encourage them to come to the service 

provider and meet with their counselor. Another area offers an incentive if participants 

contact their counselor 90 days after they obtain employment to let them know if they 

are still employed and if they need any other services.

Comprehensive Guidance and Counseling: Under WIA, drug and alcohol abuse 

counseling and other counseling appropriate to the needs of youth must be available. 

Most providers are able to offer guidance and counseling related to specific program 

activities. However, local areas have difficulty finding providers that can offer 

specialized mental health counseling. In some communities there is only one provider 

 

5

 In Arizona these requirements include fingerprinting, reporting any past crimes, and providing 

letters of recommendations from three community members.
VIII-13

with the required capabilities, and obtaining an appointment for a program participant is 

difficult.

SELECTING YOUTH SERVICE PROVIDERS

The intent of WIA is to include a wide variety of youth service providers that are 

competitively selected using a market-based system. Up-front services such as intake, 

objective assessment, individual service strategy development, information and referral, 

and summer employment opportunities are exempt from such a procurement process, 

and instead may be provided directly by the grant recipient. DOL emphasized that 

procurements need to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest,6 which

thereby required local areas to create a firewall between those who prepared and issued 

solicitations and those who bid on them. 

Among the procurement challenges reported by local areas were: (1) firewall 

issues in the procurement process, (2) uncertainty about how best to structure requests 

for proposals (RFPs) to ensure that all of the ten required elements were covered, (3) 

poor response rates to RFPs, and (4) difficulties identifying new program providers of 

certain program elements, such as tutoring, mentoring, and leadership development. 

Establishing a firewall that meets WIA requirements presented a challenge 

especially for those local areas with only a limited number of youth experts who could 

serve on the Youth Council. In those areas, many Youth Council members were also 

youth providers in the local community. This situation poses a dilemma between two 

competing interests under WIA that guide the procurement process. The first interest is 

to gather a wide range of youth experts to serve on the Youth Council and ensure that 

the Council plays a significant role in selecting youth service providers. The second is 

to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest in the procurement of services. To 

avoid such conflicts of interest, a number of Youth Council members at some local 

areas had to recuse themselves from procurement decisions. In one area, so many 

council members had a conflict of interest on a given vote that only three council 

members were left to cast a vote.

A second major procurement challenge was uncertainty about how best to 

structure RFPs to ensure that all of the ten required elements were covered. Two 

 

6

 Training and Employment Guidance Letter (TEGL) 9-00, January 2001.
VIII-14

distinct strategies were in evidence. Some local areas required all providers to offer all 

ten program elements. Among the reasons for adopting this approach, some 

respondents mentioned that it would otherwise be too difficult to coordinate services or 

be sure that youth could obtain a complete service package to meet their needs. By 

contrast, other areas funded separate providers to deliver one or more of the ten 

elements, reasoning that in this way providers could be contracted to deliver just those 

services that drew on their special areas of expertise. 

A related issue regarding the way RFPs should be structured was identifying 

whether some services were already being provided through non-WIA funding and 

hence did not need to be supported through WIA dollars.7 In keeping with this, some 

local areas were planning on undertaking a community resource mapping with regard to 

youth services, but, in the interim, felt obliged to provide all program elements as part 

of WIA services.

A third difficulty mentioned by several sites was an inability to find enough 

respondents to RFPs to be able to provide all required service elements. For example, 

two local areas only received a single response to their RFPs, and another received no 

responses at all. This poor showing was due partly to the fact that some potential 

providers were unfamiliar with WIA requirements, but also because, especially in rural 

areas, there was a lack of qualified youth providers to begin with. Additionally, certain 

procurement requirements also seemed to affect RFP response rates; areas that required 

each provider to offer all ten elements had a particular difficulty.

A fourth procurement challenge was that many local areas had difficulties finding 

new youth service providers. The most common providers were school districts, 

county-run youth programs (former JTPA youth service providers), community-based 

organizations and community colleges. Many local areas noted that they had not been 

able to expand their pool of providers, and some even reported losing providers as a 

result of new WIA requirements. Furthermore, they noted that it was especially 

difficult to find providers for certain program elements such as tutoring, mentoring, 

leadership development, and comprehensive counseling. 

 

7

 Training and Employment Guidance Letter (TEGL) 18-00, April 2001. This TEGL makes clear 

that local areas need not provide all ten elements with WIA funds if certain of them are already otherwise 

accessible to eligible youth in the area. Instead, Youth Councils should identify which of the ten 

program elements are already available in the local area, and use WIA funds to fill remaining gaps. 
VIII-15

There were some notable exceptions. For example, Portland Worksystems took 

advantage of the flexibility allowable under WIA and added a wide range of 

neighborhood-based youth providers to cover the ten program elements. Others 

established strong linkages with School-to-Work partnerships and expanded the range of 

youth services that way.

CONCLUSIONS

Our review of youth services found that States and local areas have made 

substantial progress in implementing WIA youth programs and that virtually all 

elements that WIA requires are in place. However, we also found that some local areas 

were still struggling with some transition issues, including recruiting participants, 

developing service designs, and procuring services from providers. Below is a 

summary of some key findings: 

1. States allowed local areas maximum flexibility in their implementation 

decisions. We found that most of the major policy decisions were being made 

at the local level. Only a couple of States decided to issue statewide guidance 

on youth-related issues. Instead, most States simply transmitted federal 

guidance documents to their local areas. 

2. As anticipated, WIA did force local areas to change some of their recruitment 

strategies to meet the new eligibility guidelines and the requirement that they 

spend at least 30% of their funds on out-of-school youth. 

3. Some local areas complained that they spent too much time documenting 

eligibility and that the required documentation was too onerous on youth. As 

a result, local areas reported that many potentially eligible youth do not follow 

through and thus do not qualify for the program. It is still too early to 

determine conclusively what impact this might have on the characteristics of 

WIA youth overall. 

4. Most local areas did not have difficulties meeting the requirement that they 

spend at least 30 % of their funds on OSY. We found that local areas did 

better than expected in this area because many of them substantially modified 

recruitment strategies to attract OSY. Many youth programs also reported 

higher per-participant-costs for OSY, which boosted overall OSY spending. 

5. With only a few exceptions, we did not find that linkages between youth 

providers and the One-Stop system have evolved very much since WIA 

implementation. Most local areas reported that their One-Stop centers were 

not very youth-friendly and were primarily geared to serve adults and 

dislocated workers. However, most States and local areas also indicated that 

they are planning to expand such linkages in the future. Moreover, a few 

local areas already had very strong One-Stop connections.
VIII-16

6. As anticipated, local areas faced the most significant challenges in moving 

from a service design dominated by a large-scale stand-alone summer 

program to a more comprehensive year-round program. Especially some 

urban areas experienced significant pressures to keep a traditional summer 

youth program in place and secured alternate public and private funding to do 

so. 

7. Most local areas were successful in offering all ten required service elements 

to youth participants, but some areas had difficulties in securing services that 

had not traditionally been provided under JTPA, such as mentoring,

leadership development, and comprehensive counseling. 

8. Some local areas also reported that they had difficulties in finding new service 

providers and often had an insufficient number of respondents to RFPs they 

had issued. Especially sites with little experience in procuring services using 

an RFP process said that this slowed down their program start-up 

substantially. 

These findings point to some key challenges regarding youth services faced by the 

workforce system. They include:

1. Streamlining eligibility determination. In order to meet the WIA requirement 

of good customer service, local areas need to find ways to help youth and 

their parents navigate eligibility requirements so that such requirements are 

not overly cumbersome and do not pose undue barriers to participation. 

Many local areas may be able to benefit from further federal guidance on this 

issue. 

2. Enhancing linkages between the One-Stop system and WIA youth programs. 

WIA calls for such linkages because especially older youth could benefit from 

attachment to a service that can provide life-long job search and career 

advancement services. Local areas could benefit from additional guidance 

and best practice examples on how to make One-Stop centers more youth 

friendly and how to link One-Stop centers with WIA youth programs. 

3. Creating a comprehensive whole of ten required program elements. Local 

areas made significant progress in developing all ten service elements. 

However, turning them into a comprehensive youth-development service 

strategy proved challenging. Through a combination of further dissemination 

of effective programming practices (such as PEPNet) and the funding of pilot 

and demonstration programs, DOL might be able to accelerate capacity 

building in this area. 

4. Attracting new service providers. Given the limited success that local areas 

have had in finding new service providers, this area may also benefit from 

further federal guidance. Local areas could benefit from an exchange of best 

practices and capacity building. Especially rural areas with few local 
VIII-17

providers need examples of how to recruit them or how to “grow” them if 

they do not currently exist in the local area. 


 
IX-1

IX. SCHOOL-TO-WORK AND ITS 

LINKAGES WITH WIA

As part of the evaluation of the implementation of WIA, we were asked by the 

National School-to-Work (STW) office to examine the extent to which STW programs 

and principles were being linked to WIA. In the first two rounds of site visiting, we 

asked WIA representatives about the involvement and influence of STW representatives 

and programs and also conducted separate interviews with STW representatives asking 

them to gauge their level of involvement in WIA. Possible linkages that we explored 

included involvement in WIA planning or policy development, oversight through sitting 

on State or Local Boards or Youth Councils, sharing lessons learned from STW 

implementation, and involvement in service delivery by either coordinating with WIAfunded programs or serving as the youth service provider. This briefing paper 

summarizes these linkages between STW programs and WIA implementation in the 14 

States and 21 local areas we visited during the first two rounds of data collection. In 

this paper, we follow the same format as the earlier STW Chapter presented in our 

Interim Report for this evaluation. The format is the same because we view the second 

round of site visits to be largely an addition to the first – the issues to be explored and 

discussed remained the same and thus this paper largely updates and supplements the 

earlier synthesis. In this paper we begin by providing a brief overview of STW, 

including its goals, structure, and legislative relationship to WIA. Following this 

section, we describe the STW systems and programs in the States and local areas in our 

sample, and provide an overview of their relationship to WIA implementation.

OVERVIEW OF STW

The 1994 School-To-Work (STW) Opportunities Act was designed to help all 

young people make the transition from school to careers and lifelong learning by 

promoting the integration of work-based and school-based learning and academic and 

vocational curricula, and creating formalized links between high schools and postsecondary educational institutions. The intent of the legislation was not to create a 

variety of new programs, but rather to build on the experience of existing models and 

efforts, such as TechPrep, Career Academies, and Youth Apprenticeships. To do so, 

the initiative provided funds to create systems that enable youth to receive education 

that is more closely linked with real-world opportunities and that provides better 

preparation both for future educational endeavors and for future careers. 
IX-2

STW Federal funds were distributed to States through five-year grants awarded in 

response to State proposals. States used this money to fund local STW partnerships 

ranging from multiple counties or districts with dozens of schools to single school 

districts. There is a sunsetting period after the five-year funding for each State, and no 

more Federal funds were intended to be spent on STW activities beyond this period. 

The award of the Federal grants began in 1994, implying that many States’ funding had 

already passed the sunset point by the time of our site visits and, thus, had either to find 

new avenues to fund their programs or allow them to end with the funding. The 

explicit sunset provision demonstrates that the initiative was not intended to create new 

add-on programs but instead was intended to consolidate efforts already underway and 

systemically infuse schools with new principles better linking academic learning and 

workplace skills and experience.

Although not a required partner under WIA, STW systems can potentially offer 

assistance in WIA efforts because of their experience in developing partnerships – and 

providing access to already-existing partnerships - and collaboration efforts, as well as 

their knowledge of system-building, service coordination, and services available to 

youth. However, specific language in section 129 of the WIA regulations asserts that 

“None of the (WIA) funds...may be used to provide funding under the School-to-Work 

Opportunities Act...or to carry out...activities that were funded under the STW 

Opportunities Act unless (they) serve only those participants eligible to participate in 

the programs under (WIA).” As will be seen below, although early on some States 

and/or local areas interpreted this language to imply that the two programs are 

incompatible, our subsequent site visits have not found that this remains a substantial 

impediment. 

OVERVIEW OF STW PROGRAMS AND PLANS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

For this study we examined in each of the case-study States and local areas the 

STW systems, including their history, context, and focus, as well as the extent to which 

STW officials were involved in the planning or governance of or service provision 

under WIA. As may be expected, the STW programs and the involvement in WIA of 

STW officials and/or programs varied dramatically across the States and local areas. In 

this section, we provide an overview of STW efforts to date across the fourteen States 

and 21 local areas, and describe the degree to which STW officials or systems have 

been involved in the planning, governance and service delivery under WIA. The 

results are divided into three primary sections. First, we provide an overview of the 
IX-3

STW programs themselves, including whether their Federal funding has ceased, and a 

summary of the degree to which there are or were plans to sustain the efforts after 

Federal funding ended. Next, we describe the specific linkages in each of the sites 

between STW and WIA planning and service delivery. Finally, we provide a few brief 

observations across the States and local areas we visited in the two rounds of data 

collection.

Most of the States we visited had well-established STW programs that had been 

operating for several years. Nearly all of the States in our sample had received STW 

funding by 1997 and thus STW had been in operation for at least 3 or 4 years by the 

time of our visit. One important aspect of this relative maturity of the programs is that 

it implies most were nearing the end of their 5-year Federal grant allocations and, thus, 

had to face the decision to either eliminate STW efforts or sustain them in some way. 

Indeed, many of the States visited in the second round had already seen their funding 

cease, and thus were either operating using funds from alternative sources or had 

largely disbanded their STW programs. 

In those sites in which interest in sustaining STW was high, there were a variety 

of reasons cited. One intriguing finding was that in a few sites that we visited in the 

second round of site visits, the State legislature had adopted goals for their overall 

educational system that incorporated some STW principles, or emphases that can easily 

be construed as fitting within STW. Although it is not clear that these legislative 

efforts were in response to the STW funds received by the State, the relationship is 

quite clear. In those areas in which overall educational goals were put in place that 

were consistent with or mirrored STW principles, there was a much greater likelihood 

that these principles were sustained after the cessation of Federal STW funds. For 

example, in Oregon, as of December 2001, all high school students are required to 

achieve nearly all aspects of the Certificate of Advanced Mastery before they can 

graduate. Among the components that students must demonstrate are:

 “Developing an education plan and building an education profile,”

 “Applying and extending academic and career-related knowledge and 

skills in new and complex situations,” and
IX-4

 “Demonstrating career-related learning experiences as outlined in their 

educational plan by connecting classroom learning with real life 

experiences in the workplace, community, or school.”1

Although sites with such legislation were clearly in the minority, that they exist at all 

bodes well for ensuring that STW principles are sustained in the future.

Similarly, another common theme that emerged during our first round of site 

visits, but also was consistent with findings from the second round, was that in those 

areas in which STW efforts were linked seamlessly into the overall educational context, 

rather than added onto already-existing educational activities as a separate and discrete 

program, there was greater interest in sustaining STW. This fits generally with STW 

from the Federal perspective in that STW was intended as a systemic reform rather than 

simply an added program attached to an otherwise unchanged curriculum. Typically, 

this integration was found in sites in which STW was being implemented with or at 

approximately the same time as other forms of educational reform. In some cases these 

other reform efforts involved overhauling the entire educational system while in others 

they involved adding or replacing old standards or graduation requirements, as noted 

above. In either case, the fact that they were associated with greater willingness to 

sustain STW is somewhat surprising given that often reform efforts (i.e., rigorous 

accountability or performance reforms) are thought to undermine STW. However, it 

seems clear from our site visits that in many of these sites a larger context of 

educational reform may have expanded the site’s willingness to consider new methods 

of education, and allowed the area to see the potential for STW to play a significant 

role in educational reform. Often, respondents in these sites noted that STW was so 

linked with other educational and community agencies and programs that it would be 

very difficult to try to remove STW. In those areas in which STW was simply an addon program rather than an integrated approach, a more typical result was that several 

employees were laid off as STW funds dried up.

Further, in a few sites, STW was established in a larger agency that gave it 

enough authority to link educational and labor policies and programs. This stability and 

substantial authority may allow STW systems to more easily impact educational efforts 

in the area. For example, Kentucky’s STW system was originally placed within a 

cabinet that includes both educational agencies as well as labor agencies, and was 

 

1 1Oregon State Board of Education, Board Meeting Notes, Dec. 6 2001
IX-5

relatively directly under the authority of the Governor. Thus, STW officials both had 

access to relevant partner agencies and they also had the authority of these agencies as 

well as the Governor in their efforts. In contrast, though, still other States established 

STW in a multi-agency department, but this caused confusion over who was to take the 

primary leadership role and led to STW being less effective because no one agency was 

responsible for its implementation. In one State, respondents noted the fact that STW 

was placed in the Workforce Development Division, which involves a collaboration of 

several different agencies, led the State’s education officials to view STW as a 

workforce initiative rather than an educational reform effort.

In most sites, STW has remained in a single location, but this has been in, for 

example, the Department of Education, rather than in an inter-agency consortium. 

Although this arrangement provides some stability, it may be more difficult from within 

this agency to make necessary linkages to businesses or other outside agencies, 

including those in the community, that help to increase the effectiveness of STW, and 

make the impetus for sustaining STW efforts stronger. For example, in one State in 

which STW is located within the Department of Education, respondents noted that there 

was a misperception by outside agencies that it was strictly an educational program, 

rather than an inter-agency one. Further, there was little direct contact between STW 

and outside agencies, particularly WIA and other workforce development programs. It 

seems plausible that the relative isolation of the STW agency helped in part to create 

this situation.

Thus, States varied in both the location in which STW was housed, as well as 

what the effect of this decision was. Most States that located STW within an interagency cabinet or division were somewhat more positive about the impact STW had on 

their educational system, as compared to those States in which STW was placed 

squarely in the Education Department. But in at least one case this decision led 

education officials to keep from embracing the program as important to their overall 

efforts. Thus, housing STW in an inter-agency cabinet with access to representatives 

from both the education and workforce development fields may increase the likelihood 

of STW being seen as a success, but it does not guarantee this result. 

Finally, STW efforts in at least three States suffered dramatically from political 

pressure or fighting that either held up implementation efforts or caused them to be 

implemented in ways that differ substantially from what might be viewed as typical 

STW. These political pressures varied, from lack of support from key leaders, such as 
IX-6

the Governor, to fighting between political candidates using STW as one issue over 

which the candidates fought. Additionally, pressure from constituents led political 

leaders to implement STW in much more narrow ways, targeting specific students 

rather than embracing the perspective that all students can benefit from better 

connections between academics and the workplace. These pressures typically centered 

on a feeling that STW infringed upon local control by placing too many demands on 

schools without providing ample resources to accomplish its objectives. Regardless, as 

may seem obvious, in those areas in which STW was the victim of political fighting or 

the target of political opposition, implementation efforts proceeded far more slowly and 

incompletely than in other States.

Views Toward STW

Not unlike the actual structure of the agencies, the views toward STW expressed 

among officials in the sites we visited varied dramatically. A few officials expressed 

nearly total satisfaction with and optimism about STW and its efforts, while a 

substantial portion of others were more tepid in their appraisal of STW. This general 

variance was noted during round one of our visits, and the sites in round two also 

varied widely along this dimension. However, more of the sites in round two of our 

visits were pessimistic about STW’s impact and about the likelihood that any STW 

efforts would be sustained. Perhaps because several of these States had already seen 

their Federal funds end, they expressed less optimism that STW would continue. 

Often, they noted that a few components might remain in place, but generally their 

view was that STW had been tried and now it was up to local areas to find ways to 

sustain it if they wanted to.

Continuing a trend seen in round one of the site visits, local areas were generally 

more positive about STW than were States. Although local area variation is one likely 

reason for this, another is that it is local areas that actually deliver STW and can 

therefore see its impact more directly. Thus, local areas may be in a better position to 

understand just how STW differs from previous approaches, and how students respond 

to the opportunities presented by STW. The fact that local areas were somewhat more 

positive about STW than were States, then, is a welcome result for STW advocates.

Several local areas were quite positive in their assessments of the effects of and 

possibilities for STW, though most such areas were among those in our first round of 

site visits. Many of these areas had established well-developed STW systems, either 

through the impetus of businesses in the area or through strong local planning 
IX-7

concerning STW. Additionally, many of the areas expressing more positive views 

toward STW were rural locales that had a relative paucity of businesses in the area. 

Perhaps because of this, there was great cooperation among the schools and the 

business community in an effort to ensure that youth exiting schools would be well 

prepared for the jobs that would be available to them. 

A substantial number of other areas seem less satisfied with the impact of STW 

and less optimistic about its future. In many cases there were no more Federal funds 

for the program and, as a result, the program had been discontinued. Often in these 

sites, some of the principles of STW had been maintained (e.g., internships for 

students, career-related information available at the schools, etc.) but rarely in these 

sites was there a consistent effort toward maintaining the central tenets of STW in a 

coherent and systematic manner. One State in round one of our site visits refused 

comment on whether or not STW would continue in any significant form after the 

cessation of STW grant funds. Officials in this State expressed some disappointment 

with what they perceived to be the Federally driven nature of STW, arguing that to be 

successful, STW must be a “locally-grown” program. Other areas agreed with this 

proposition, but lamented that even in situations in which it was locally driven, it still 

often was unsustainable after Federal funds disappeared. 

Continuing the trend noted in round one of our visits, urban sites generally 

seemed less favorable toward STW than did rural ones. In one of the larger urban 

areas we visited, although one individual suggested there were several STW efforts 

underway, and that the mayor had strongly endorsed linkages between STW and WIA, 

most respondents could not identify what, if anything STW had accomplished or even 

tried. The funds seemed to get lost in the larger educational system and there were few 

identifiable programs or activities related to STW. Although these respondents were 

not extremely close to STW, it is somewhat instructive to note that we could not get an 

appointment with anyone who did have intimate knowledge of STW in this local area, 

despite repeated efforts. Officials in another urban area described the STW program as 

having been “unsuccessful,” resulting in a good deal of talking, meeting, and planning, 

but little actual change. Echoing a common theme, respondents in this area felt that 

STW never even got off the ground. In still another urban area, officials were having 

trouble even spending the money they were allocated, in part because of the relative 

lack of activities being sponsored or implemented by STW. Overall, then, there are 

few examples of positive attitudes toward STW among larger, urban local areas. This 
IX-8

is not to suggest that favorable opinions do not exist in such areas. Rather, among the 

relatively limited number of urban sites in our sample, the general feeling is that STW 

has not had much of an impact at all, much less a particularly favorable one.

Efforts Toward Sustainability

As mentioned above, in many cases there seemed to be little effort to sustain the 

program, based on unfavorable impressions of STW or its impacts. But in those sites 

in which views were more positive, several strategies have been attempted or put in 

place to ensure the sustainability of either STW programs or principles. Through both 

rounds of site visits, these strategies fell into one of three categories: folding STW into 

the larger educational system; securing additional outside funding; or supporting STW 

services through contributions or fees paid by participating schools or businesses. 

The first of these approaches involves incorporating the principles and system of 

STW into the larger educational system and budget. This is done not to terminate the 

activities paid for by STW but, rather, to ensure that even after STW funds end many 

of the core principles will continue within the educational system. For example, in 

Oregon, the State has mandated that all students must demonstrate several key skills 

and abilities, many of which relate to connecting school to careers, in order to 

graduate. Several respondents at the State and local levels insist that this will best 

sustain the efforts and principles of STW, because they have been made an integral 

component of the educational system. As a second example, the public school Board in 

Miami/Dade County agreed to incorporate the costs for the existing STW staff once the 

STW grant ended. In this area, officials anticipated little if any change in overall STW 

activities or goals upon cessation of STW funding. Additionally, in Rutland, VT, one 

of the major programs emerging from STW, the Capstone Initiative, which is an 

ambitious STW effort, has been fully integrated into the local school system and no 

longer relies upon STW grant money for operation. Here, too, then, efforts begun as a 

result of STW funds have been adopted by the larger school Board or into the school 

budget and thus are ensured of remaining even after STW funds disappear.

A second strategy for sustainability involves securing other sources of funding, 

outside of the Federal STW grant. This generally has been accomplished by obtaining 

grant money from other sources that are either STW-related or youth-focused, and 

applying some of these funds to further STW activities. For example, in the 

Cumberlands area of Kentucky, some funds from a Youth Opportunities (YO) 

Demonstration Grant have been used to promote STW activities. These YO funds 
IX-9

apply over several years and, thus, STW activities can be promoted to some degree 

over that period despite the fact that STW grant money will no longer be available. 

Kentucky’s STW officials, generally, have encouraged their local partnerships to 

identify alternative sources of funding in an effort to sustain the STW activities that 

already have been implemented, but for which STW-specific funding will soon cease. 

Further, in Lewiston, Montana, STW officials secured funds for their Job Coach 

position from the school district’s special education monies. Although these funds are 

from the general educational budget, this differs in approach from the first category 

above because there is no attempt to integrate STW with the larger educational budget 

but, rather, they have allocated a separate stream of funds for this position.

A final strategy involves securing funds from the actual recipients of STW 

services. One approach, observed primarily among the sites visited during the first 

wave of data collection, was utilized by a few areas that have established plans to 

sustain their STW systems by promoting contributions by individual schools to support 

the local system. For example, the Northern Tier area of Pennsylvania requires 

participating schools to “buy into” the STW system by paying $1 per student and 

$1,000 per apprenticeship utilized by its students up to a maximum payment of $10,000 

per year. There is no limit on the number of apprenticeship opportunities a school can 

have within a year, but no school is required to pay more than $10,000 per year. 

Similarly, in Texas, many local areas collect $4 per student to a maximum of $12,000 

per school as a way for participating schools to support the local STW system. This 

method ensures that funds are secure for STW activities, even beyond those injected 

from a national STW grant. Thus, collecting financial support from participating 

schools is one way that STW programs in the areas we studied can be sustained.

An alternative approach to secure funding from recipients, seen primarily in our 

second round of visits, is to draw resources from the businesses participating in STW 

activities. For example, businesses in the Southwest Georgia local area support the 

Choices program, which enables business people to speak to school classes to inform 

students about their business and the types of workers and skills that are required to 

obtain employment in it. Participating businesses pay the licensing fee for this 

program, and will continue to do so after Federal STW funding ceases. Additionally, 

the Chamber of Commerce in this local area subsidizes the cost of job shadowing, 

enabling students to shadow an employee in their area (each year on Groundhog Day). 

Similarly, the STW representatives in Suffolk County, NY developed a strong 
IX-10

relationship with the Long Island Association, a sort of super-Chamber of Commerce 

for the Long Island area. The Association has devoted some funds to STW, and also 

has helped to solicit funds from participating businesses.

Several of the areas we visited, however, were less focused on STW 

sustainability, and suggested there simply was not much interest in sustaining STW 

efforts. In some cases, respondents lamented that although STW had made a big splash 

early, or had established lofty expectations, little had changed as a result of the 

program, and this disappointment led to less enthusiastic support for STW generally. 

In a few instances, no one could truly identify what STW had done at all, and the most 

prevalent reaction in such cases was one of ambivalence about sustaining efforts. In 

one case, both State and local officials described how they expected additional funding 

to be added to the initial five-year grant, and thus had done little to create 

sustainability. Only after the funds had disappeared did they comprehend that no more 

money would be available, and thus they are attempting to piece together funds from a 

variety of sources to sustain their STW activities. Thus far, though, they have been 

unable to secure the necessary funds.

Other sites have bowed to the tremendous pressure of very hostile anti-STW 

campaigns organized by advocate groups who believe STW is an inappropriate 

approach for educating youth. In some of these sites, it seems clear that area officials 

have grown weary of defending the program and thus have made little effort to identify 

avenues for sustaining the efforts that have been made to date. In other sites, as noted 

above, fighting between political rivals or lack of support among key elected officials 

has contributed to an ambivalent attitude toward the program and prevented much in the 

way of sustainability.

In few cases have there been any changes made to STW programs in direct 

response to WIA. For many of the sites, WIA simply came too late to instigate any 

changes in STW, as funds had already ended, or were so near ending that it made no 

sense to alter the program. Indeed, at least three States in our sample had used their 

entire Federal STW funds prior to implementing WIA. Thus, there was no opportunity 

for overlap between the two programs. Even among those sites in which there was 

overlap, several indicated that there was little need to alter STW, although STW could 

provide some useful resources and information to WIA planners and policymakers. 

Thus, while they are not acting to revise STW, they are attempting to apply the lessons 
IX-11

learned from STW efforts toward planning under WIA. Some of these efforts are 

described in the following section.

LINKAGES BETWEEN STW AND WIA PLANNING 

As was true after our first round of site visits, STW has been linked with WIA in 

a variety of ways, including by having key STW officials serve in the WIA planning 

process or on planning Boards both at the State and local levels, and through the 

coordination of services or activities between STW efforts and those geared toward 

youth under WIA. Of course, the degree to which these linkages have been established 

varies by site, and in a few sites there is little or no overlap at all. A description of 

some of these efforts, including both those sites that have established linkages with 

WIA and those that have not, is provided below.

Planning

In several sites, there was a great deal of overlap between STW representatives 

and WIA planning bodies. Often, STW representatives sat on the State planning teams 

and, in some cases, have a seat on the State Board. Additionally, STW often has a 

representative on Local Boards and on the Youth Councils who offers input into the 

planning and operations of local services. Thus, there are opportunities in these sites 

for the lessons learned by STW to be incorporated into WIA planning. Specifically, 

respondents cited STW’s knowledge of youth service delivery as critical to successful 

planning under WIA, and this represents a prime opportunity for STW to help guide the 

planning and implementation based on their own experience. Additionally, STW often 

has already established partnerships among agencies and community organizations that 

serve youth, and these partnerships can be leveraged by WIA to provide a readily 

available source of information or services. As might be expected, there was a wide 

range of overlap across the various sites in our sample. 

At one end of the spectrum, there were a number of sites in which there was 

substantial overlap between STW officials and WIA planners. Nearly all of these sites 

were in the first round of our site visits and, thus, have already been summarized in the 

earlier Interim Report. We include their summaries here to provide a comprehensive 

overview of the range of linkages we identified in our two rounds of visits.

First, in Polk County, Florida, there is considerable overlap between the STW 

partnership and the local WIA Youth Council. According to both STW and WIA 
IX-12

officials, the leaders of the STW partnership have quite successfully directed the 

Council toward implementing many STW goals and principles. 

Similarly, in Cumberlands, Kentucky, there has been substantial overlap between 

STW officials and planners both on the local Board and the Youth Council. This 

emphasis on STW within the planning bodies under WIA may have influenced the 

Board to identify the STW partnership as the youth service provider under WIA. 

Follow-up with this site suggests that the lessons learned from STW’s efforts to build

partnerships and create broad-based cooperative teams of agencies has provided them 

with a blueprint for developing youth services under WIA. One respondent noted that 

they saved at least half the time they would have had to spend developing partnerships

or identifying agencies with useful resources because they could just rely on the already 

developed STW system.

In Rutland, Vermont, the STW partnership and the local planning Board are 

actually the same agency. Because Vermont is a single-area State, there are no local 

workforce investment Boards. But the State has nonetheless identified agencies to serve 

as local planning bodies for WIA, and in the Rutland area the Rutland Region 

Education Alliance (RREA) was tabbed for this duty. Despite the fact that they serve 

as a local planning body for WIA, however, they receive no WIA funds. This body 

also is responsible for overseeing and coordinating STW in the region, and it is STW 

funds that support the various efforts of this alliance. Clearly, there is ample 

opportunity here for the principles of STW to be incorporated into or at least influential 

in planning for WIA.

In the Miami local area, prior to the passage of WIA the Jobs and Education 

Partnership Board already was in charge of the STW systems in Miami-Dade and 

Monroe counties. Upon passage of WIA, the Youth Council was established as an 

expansion of the STW committee simply by adding to the pre-existing committee 

additional representatives from a slightly broader range of organizations whose services 

impact youth in the region. Thus, the core of the Miami Youth Council is the STW 

partnership that was in place before WIA was even passed. The influence of STW 

therefore is likely to be felt through planning for WIA. Indeed, in its request for 

proposals to select a youth services provider for the area, the Council asked for 

explanations of how the principle of work-based learning and the integration of work 

experience with education would be accomplished. 
IX-13

Each of these sites was visited in round one of our data collection. The eight 

States and 12 local areas visited as part of round two did not display such broad 

overlap, often according to respondents because the STW grant money had expired 

before WIA was being put in place. Nonetheless, in most sites, there was at least some 

overlap between STW and WIA. 

For example, in Arizona, the agency and the specific individual responsible for 

evaluating the State’s STW programs was also responsible for drafting the five-year 

State Plan for WIA. Although numerous respondents indicated that this created 

substantial overlap in terms of the philosophical approach to youth services under WIA, 

the individual most responsible passed away shortly after drafting the State Plan. There 

were other sources of overlap in Arizona, as well. Specifically, the former Director of 

the Office of Workforce Development Policy also served as the STW Director. This 

individual was one of the team who developed much of the initial policy under WIA, 

thereby ensuring that there was some overlap between the two programs. Further, in 

both local sites in Arizona, there was some overlap between STW Project Directors and 

those serving on the Youth Council.

Similarly, in Oregon, a number of STW representatives participated in initial 

WIA planning committees at both the State and, to a lesser extent, the local levels. 

Further, one individual from the office overseeing STW co-chaired the youth planning 

committee and also co-chaired the State Youth Council in its first year of operation. 

Despite these overlapping representatives, though, respondents still asserted that the 

influence was minimal, largely because the two are viewed as serving fundamentally 

different populations.

In most other areas, at least one member of STW sits either on the State or Local 

Boards or on the Youth Council, or both. In Southwest Georgia, for example, the 

STW Coordinator for the area is on the Youth Council, and several of the STW partner 

agencies also had representation on the Youth Council. The commissioners of the three 

agencies collaborating on STW in Minnesota are all members of the WIB, with one of 

them serving as the staff person who oversees youth services. STW had similar 

representation at nearly all the remaining sites in our sample as well. Common among 

these sites, though, was that although a STW representative served on the Board or 

Youth Council, they did so without necessarily wearing their “STW hat.” In other 

words, they served as someone with local knowledge, but were not specifically asked to 

inject lessons learned from STW, or to promote the principles of STW. As a result, 
IX-14

they may have had some influence, but the extent to which STW was promoted as a 

result of their participation is less clear.

Finally, in one site there were active attempts (described as firewalls) to separate 

STW from WIA. This was done to eliminate any connection, or even perceived 

connection to Federal oversight from the STW program. The concern of these State 

officials was that some would feel that vocational learning was being promoted, and 

they worried about the perception that it was being promoted “by entering the back 

door.” As a result, there are no STW officials involved in WIA, either on the Boards 

or the Youth Councils, and any linkages between the programs are strongly 

discouraged. 

Service Design and Delivery

As noted above, there is generally at least some overlap in membership between 

STW and WIA. Although the extent of this overlap varies substantially across the sites, 

nearly every site had at least one individual who served both as a STW representative 

and was involved in planning for WIA. Somewhat in contrast to membership overlap, 

there are relatively fewer formal linkages between the programs in service provision. 

Typically, even where STW was seen as a strong system that could potentially inform 

WIA planners and policymakers, the two systems were seen as separate and serving 

different clientele. A typical response was that the two systems do many similar things, 

but STW is for all in-school youth while WIA is focused on harder-to-serve and out-ofschool youth. Thus, services are rarely linked between the two, because the view is 

that different youth are eligible in each program. 

Where services were linked in some way, this coordination occurred at the local 

level since this is where services are delivered. Generally, service coordination took 

one of several forms, including examples where: 

 STW and WIA each contributed support for specific programs thereby 

enabling greater numbers of youth to be served and ensuring 

cooperation between the two programs. 

 STW funds were used to pay for centers or activities promoted under 

WIA. 

 WIA funds are used to pay students enrolled in STW for their workbased learning opportunities. 

 The STW partnership was awarded the contract and funded to actually 

provide youth services under WIA. 
IX-15

 The STW partnership and WIA agencies cross-refer individuals between 

the two programs, with each program picking up an individual at 

varying points in their service history; 

 One-Stop centers refer to the local STW partnership those youth who 

could benefit from STW opportunities. 

Each of these will be discussed briefly below.

First, in at least two cases, STW and WIA each contributed support for specific 

programs thereby enabling greater numbers of youth to be served. For example, in 

Southwest Georgia, STW and WIA have collaborated to jointly fund a program called 

Tech Start, which is a two-tiered program offering variations for both in-school and 

out-of-school youth. The WIA funds actually are drawn from Statewide reserve funds, 

rather than the local area’s budget. For out-of-school youth, adult education funds are 

provided to help students obtain their GED, and WIA funds are used to provide 

occupational training. These two sets of training are provided simultaneously such that 

the occupational training is triggered to progress at the same pace as the GED training, 

thereby ensuring academic skills built in the GED training are applied via the 

occupational training. For in-school youth, by contrast, STW funds are used to provide 

students who are deficient in basic skills with the opportunity to go to the area 

Technical College in the late afternoon (a down time for the college staff) and gain 

exposure to the faculty and the computers and technology at the college. The college 

faculty then works with these students in small groups to address their reading and math 

deficiencies. For both sets of youth, career portfolios are developed to help them look 

for employment (full-time employment for the OSY and part-time for the ISY).

Another example of such joint cooperation occurred in Pine-to-Prairie, 

Minnesota. Using Cooperative Centers established nearly 20 years ago to provide 

coordinated and consolidated vocational programs among neighboring school districts, 

STW and WIA efforts are coordinated to provide services to the maximum number of 

youth eligible for each program. The local STW representative stated that “activities 

get mixed, and funds are leveraged” in an effort to provide the best possible services. 

As one example, the school districts sponsor a summer enrichment program for school 

students who are not attaining their graduation standard. According to one respondent, 

about 90% of these students are eligible for WIA youth services. Thus, funds from 

WIA are used to provide work-based learning opportunities, while STW funds are used 

to promote academic skills linked to these opportunities.
IX-16

A second way in which services are coordinated involves using the funds of one 

program to support efforts of the other program. For instance, in Suffolk County, New 

York, STW funds were used to help build the Youth Service center at the One-Stop 

center. At this Service center, which was described as a “cornerstone” of youth 

services in Suffolk County, students and out-of-school youth can access the services 

offered under WIA, and look for opportunities for work-based learning and other STW 

activities. A second example of this type of coordination took place in Yuma, Arizona. 

In this area, the local STW system had traditionally sponsored a conference on nontraditional careers, in which approximately 20 local organizations offered workshops to 

students and out-of-school youth to encourage them to look beyond traditional male and 

female job roles. Since STW funds have ceased, the local WIB has taken over 

sponsorship of this program. 

Yet another example of service linkage occurred in Rural Montana. In this case, 

STW and WIA combine to co-enroll Special Education students. These students 

receive work-based learning opportunities at local businesses, for which they are paid 

using WIA funds. Additionally, the students receive specialized one-on-one job support 

and training from a Job Coach, funded through STW. Indeed, the linkages run even 

deeper, as a third partner, Vocational Rehabilitation, provides some additional 

employment and training support for these youth.

In addition to these examples drawn from our second round of site visits, we also 

observed a few prominent examples of service coordination during our first round of 

data collection.

For example, in two of the local sites we visited, the STW partnership was 

awarded the contract to provide youth services under WIA. Thus the partnership can 

link services under WIA with those under STW, to the extent this benefits the youth 

being served. In both cases, we visited the sites prior to the time when many WIA 

youth services were being delivered so it is difficult to determine exactly whether such 

coordination exists. We conducted some follow-up discussions with one of these sites 

during our second round of data collection. At this site, although the services provided 

under WIA did draw heavily from STW principles and programs, there was no explicit 

linkage of services between the two programs. 

In one of these sites, Polk County, Florida, the local STW partnership, in 

conjunction with the local Board of Education, formed the Polk County Young Leaders 
IX-17

Consortium, which was awarded the WIA youth services contract in the area. The 

STW partnership developed an extensive set of goals and objectives for their program, 

many of which were to be incorporated into the WIA youth services contract as well. 

Because STW is intended for all youth, while WIA youth money is focused on 

disadvantaged youth, the two programs are not entirely interwoven. But the resources 

and partnerships that are so vital to STW can be leveraged as local workforce 

development planning bodies modify their services to serve disadvantaged youth under 

WIA.

The STW partnership in the Cumberlands region of Kentucky also was designated 

as the youth services provider under WIA.2 Here, too, there was great optimism about 

the potential for coordination between the two programs, as well as some concern about 

just how to modify STW activities to accommodate WIA’s mandate that the focus in 

youth services must be on disadvantaged youth. Much of the partnership’s effort at the 

time of our visit had been on planning, as no WIA services for youth had actually been 

delivered at the time of our site visit. But there were plans to provide year-round 

activities for approximately 50-60 youth who will also receive work experience during 

the summer.

Another site, the local area of Rutland, Vermont, provides an example of a 

program that integrates and coordinates services between STW and WIA for both adult 

and youth services. This dropout recovery program is managed by a team of 

individuals representing both the STW agency as well as One-Stop centers in the area. 

This team works to identify students who are at risk of dropping out or who have 

already dropped out of traditional schools. Participants receive case management and 

are either enrolled in a customized program attempting to help them obtain their GED 

while also working, or encouraged to attend one of the alternative high schools in the 

area. The case management stretches across programmatic boundaries, and enables 

individuals to have access to services under STW or WIA, including those services that 

are available through the One-Stop center. As individuals’ needs change, they can be 

referred to other programs or services that better match their interests.

 

2

 This partnership actually covers only 12 of the 13 counties in the WIA local area, but because it 

represents the vast majority of the area and for simplicity we refer to it as the STW partnership for the 

area.
IX-18

A final example of service coordination or integration may well emerge in the 

Northern Tier area of Pennsylvania. Although our visit pre-dated actual service 

provision under WIA in this area, and thus the description is based on what the area 

planned to do, rather than specifically what was occurring, there were several plans in 

place that would link STW with WIA services. For example, although there were no 

plans to have a STW representative located at the One-Stop center, youth who are 

looking for services from the One-Stop center will be referred to their local STW 

Coordinator to identify available services or resources. According to STW officials, 

they planned to ensure that all STW resources or services were available to any youth 

that enters the One-Stop center. Additionally, there were plans to install computers in 

the schools to enable youth to have electronic access to the One-Stop centers. This 

would allow students to use the self-service function much as any adult actually at the 

center would use it. While funds remain separate between STW and WIA, then, there 

clearly were plans at this site to ensure that youth receiving services under one program 

had access to the services of the other. 

Outside of these several examples, however, there was not much evidence of 

service coordination between STW and WIA. In most areas, the overlap between the 

two programs existed only at the planning level. Indeed, a far more common response 

was that although the two programs were similar in their approaches, they served 

mutually exclusive populations, with STW targeting all in-school youth and WIA 

focusing on out-of-school youth who are harder to serve. For many sites, this seemed 

to conclude the conversation, because they could not see how the two programs might 

be able to link to provide more comprehensive services. In these cases, respondents 

usually referred to the programs as complementary, but separate. Thus, we 

encountered little active resistance to the idea of linking STW and WIA but, rather, it 

seemed that few saw how the two could be fully coordinated to achieve the goals of 

each program and reach a broad range of youth. 

FACTORS INFLUENCING LINKAGES 

In the STW Chapter of our Interim Report, we noted that areas in which the 

optimism for collaboration between STW and WIA was high shared three primary 

characteristics, including that the areas:

 Had strong STW systems in place prior to the implementation of WIA, 

including having established resources and linkages within the 
IX-19

community, being viewed favorably by the community, and being well 

known in the community.

 Were primarily rural, which implies there are fewer available employers 

with whom to link, and that there is greater recognizability of the STW 

officials in the area.

 Had below average educational achievement and were undergoing a 

period of educational reforms which often included STW as a key 

component.

 These findings were gleaned from the sites visited in the first wave of our data 

collection. Results from our second wave of site visits largely confirmed these basic 

points. For the most part, those areas in which STW and WIA were linked more fully 

than having STW representatives serving on Boards or Youth Councils were rural areas 

with few employers that faced the daunting challenge of providing opportunities for 

youth in areas in which there were not ample employment openings. Further, a critical 

factor in whether STW and WIA are linked clearly is the strength of the STW system 

prior to WIA implementation, and the vigor with which STW officials promote their 

programs. In no case have we seen a fledgling STW program that suddenly realized 

that WIA represented a prime opportunity to kick-start their program. Rather, those 

sites in which there are strong linkages between the two programs are characterized by 

having energetic STW officials who are well recognized in their communities, 

programs that have track records of successful placements with employers, and a 

tradition of strong linkages with business and other community partners. In those areas 

in which STW never got off the ground, or struggled to achieve a place at the table of 

key stakeholders, WIA has largely shrugged off any contributions the program might 

offer, looking instead to alternative sources for quality youth services. Perhaps this is 

not surprising, but it does suggest that WIA provides little opportunity to revive 

struggling STW programs, but may well be able to capitalize on the strengths of 

successful STW efforts. 

One aspect of our earlier conclusions did not hold up as well through the second 

round of data collection. Specifically, several of the sites in round two that had in 

place effective linkages between STW and WIA do not seem to have a history of poor 

educational achievement. Nor was STW implemented alongside other major efforts to 

reform the educational system, or seen as the primary reform necessary to improve 

academic performance. This tentative conclusion from our earlier paper is thus largely 

refuted. 
IX-20

The areas did share a common characteristic, though, in that nearly all 

respondents remarked that educators and community members had begun to realize that 

students exiting from high schools were largely unprepared for the types of jobs 

available to them. STW efforts in each of these sites were focused heavily on the 

notion that the principles embodied by STW would help students to recognize the link 

between what they learn in school and what they need to know to obtain high-quality 

employment. Perhaps, then, areas that were grappling with this issue as STW emerged 

were better situated to embrace STW as a large-scale effort aimed at improving the 

linkage between school and work.

One critical factor in our findings that was clearly different between rounds one 

and two of data collection was the fact that by the time we visited many of the sites in 

round two, Federal STW funds had ceased, and STW programs were on their own for 

funding. In a few cases, this meant that there was no one available to speak with us 

about the STW program and we thus had to piece together information available from 

the several sources we did interview. In such instances, it seemed clear that there was 

little linkage between STW and WIA, simply because there was no STW to speak of.

SUMMARY

Although some local areas we visited had seen their Federal STW funds cease, 

and many others were nearing this point, several sites have been able to sustain their 

STW efforts by identifying alternative sources of funds, including obtaining outside 

grants or business contributions, developing school buy-in programs, and, in a few 

cases, by linking with WIA. The most common form of sustainability, though, 

occurred in areas in which STW will survive largely intact by folding the necessary 

resources into the basic education budget. Often in these cases, some employees are 

laid off or reassigned, but many of the basic principles remain, and thus can be 

continued indefinitely as part of the regular schooling. Typically, areas in which this 

has occurred do not have significant linkages between WIA and STW, though, perhaps 

because there is no longer any clearly identifiable STW with which to partner. At the 

very least, however, these sites ensure that the core tenets of STW, including 

establishing a link between school and careers, will remain in place. 

In contrast, a substantial number of sites simply are not continuing much of STW 

once they reach the sunset of Federal funds. These sites never seemed to embrace 

STW in the first place, or were so large that any efforts made at implementation 

seemed too insignificant to truly effect change in the area. Indeed, respondents in many 
IX-21

of the more urban sites in our sample spoke of the potential utility of STW, but when 

pressed for the specific activities that STW sponsored, or the goals of the STW system, 

there was little they could identify. It is easy to see why STW may fail in areas that 

never embraced it, or even had a desire to implement it. Why it should struggle so 

mightily in urban areas is less clear, as employers are presumably plentiful, potential 

partners are often well-established, and the needs so great. Yet few of the urban sites 

in our sample can be described as highly favorable toward STW, and none showed 

strong linkages with WIA.

Despite these patterns, we often observed substantial overlap between STW and 

WIA in planning and policy formulation. Most often, this took the form of a STW 

representative serving on the State or local Boards, or the Youth Council. In some 

cases, the STW official chaired these Boards or Councils. In a few sites, in fact, the 

overlap was quite substantial. For example, in Rutland, Vermont, the STW partnership 

and the local planning Board were the same agency. In Arizona and Kentucky, a STW 

representative played the central or at least a key role in drafting the five-year WIA 

State Plan. Similarly, in Oregon, the STW representative co-chaired the Youth Council 

during the first year of operation. And in Cumberlands, Kentucky, the overlap was 

quite apparent, and may have contributed to the STW partnership’s being selected as 

the WIA Youth service provider for the area. Across nearly every site, then, there was 

at least some STW representation on WIA planning committees. Though the reported 

impact of these representatives varied significantly, it is clear that STW was given a 

place at the table of key stakeholders in WIA planning.

Although there were far more linkages in the areas of planning and policymaking 

bodies than in service provision, we did observe a few prominent examples of service 

coordination between STW and WIA in our second round of site visits. In at least two 

cases, STW and WIA co-funded services, and tailored those services to the populations 

that are their target group. Such examples offer evidence that the two programs can be 

linked, and that doing so may enhance the ability of each by enabling them to reach 

greater numbers of clients and providing services shaped to meet the individual needs of 

their clientele. But such efforts clearly were the exception and not the norm. 

In other cases, we observed that WIA funds could be used to support programs 

that had been supported by STW, or that STW funds could contribute resources that are 

utilized extensively under WIA. These examples, too, reflect strong coordination 
IX-22

designed to meet the needs of a variety of clients, while leveraging resources as 

efficiently as possible.

In addition, we observed in our first round of site visits a few areas that at least 

had planned to coordinate services between STW and WIA. For example, in two local 

areas in round one the STW partnership had been awarded the contract to provide youth 

services under WIA. Thus, the same agency responsible for STW also was given 

responsibility for providing youth services under WIA. 

Still another site had developed plans to enable students in schools to access 

electronically the information at the One-Stop centers in the State. Thus, youth 

participating in STW at one of the local schools could identify what other services they 

might receive from WIA-sponsored programs, among others. Further, representatives 

at the One-Stop centers planned to refer youth back to their school STW program. 

And another local area had established a Drop-Out Recovery program, managed 

by a team of individuals representing both the STW agency as well as One-Stop centers 

in the area. Participants receive case management crossing programmatic boundaries, 

which enables them to have access to services under STW or WIA, including those 

services that are available through the One-Stop center. As individuals’ needs change, 

they can be referred to other programs or services that better match their interests. 

The remaining sites generally have less extensive coordinating efforts. Often, 

respondents in these areas described the programs as complementary, but fundamentally 

separate programs serving different populations. This view may have led them away 

from establishing or exploring potential linkages. In other cases, officials cited the 

language in the WIA regulations preventing WIA funds from being used to further 

STW efforts. While this language clearly scared many officials away from even 

considering a link between the two programs, this response was given nearly 

exclusively in the first round of data collection. Perhaps, then, areas received some 

technical assistance, or gained clarification in other ways as no respondent in our 

second round of site visits was under this impression. 

Overall, then, the results from these sites remain mixed. Although nearly every 

site displayed some overlap between STW and WIA in terms of membership and input 

into local WIA decision-making and service planning, it was not always clear that STW

had a prominent role, nor that WIA planners were exceedingly interested in learning 

any lessons from STW. It is also difficult to discern whether the fact that a STW 
IX-23

representative was involved necessarily means that STW principles were incorporated 

into the implementation of WIA. What we can say, however, is that for nearly every 

site, STW was seen as a potential contributor, and was offered an opportunity to 

participate in WIA planning, either on the State and/or Local Boards or on the Youth 

Councils and, in many cases, both. 

Finally, even though there was somewhat less evidence of coordination between 

STW and WIA in providing services or serving clients, the several examples in which 

this was happening do suggest that in those areas in which STW had developed a strong 

and recognizable program, WIA has been able to capitalize on the knowledge, 

resources, and experience of these systems. The extent to which this capitalization 

leads to significant impacts on youth in these local areas remains to be seen, but at the 

very least these linkages serve to ensure that some aspects of STW and the principles it 

embodies will continue as WIA is implemented fully. 


 
X-1

X. WIA GOVERNANCE

This briefing paper is one of a series developed as part of the National Evaluation 

of the Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates 

and TATC Consulting. Thus far, the data collection has consisted of two rounds of site 

visits: the first round was conducted to six states and nine local workforce areas in the

spring of 2000, and the second round was conducted to an additional eight states and 

fourteen local areas in the summer and fall of 2001. An overview of the evaluation is 

included as an appendix to this report. This briefing paper for the most part draws on 

findings from the second round of site visits, because these capture developments 

associated with WIA that are the more recent. The states we visited in this second 

round are: Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oregon, and 

Virginia.

In this briefing paper, we will examine the composition and role of Workforce 

Investment Boards and discuss the involvement of elected officials and the effects they 

have on governance structures. We will first focus on State-level issues, then move to 

local-level issues, and conclude with a review of the relationship between States and 

local areas.

STATE GOVERNANCE

In this section, we consider the composition of State Boards and their roles, as 

well as the extent of involvement of state elected officials.

Composition of the State Workforce Investment Boards

The cornerstone of the State governance structure, as envisioned by the Act, is 

the State Workforce Investment Board (SWIB). The SWIBs are business-led Boards 

tasked with setting the overall direction and strategy for workforce investment 

programs within each State. Specific responsibilities of the SWIBs include: developing 

the State’s five-year strategic plan and setting performance goals for the State’s 

WIA Title I programs, continuously improving the statewide system, designating the 

local workforce investment areas, determining funding allocations to those areas, 

reviewing the local areas’ strategic plans, and providing advice to the Governor on 

workforce investment issues. All of the SWIBs in this study have performed those 

duties and most have moved on to consider the larger overall strategy of workforce 

investment and its place in the economy.
X-2

The membership of the State Workforce Investment Board as prescribed in the 

Act is to consist of the Governor or Governor’s designee, two members of each 

chamber of the state legislature, and other persons appointed by the Governor who 

represent business leaders, locally elected officials, labor organizations, state agency 

heads, and individual with experience in youth issues. The majority of SWIB members 

and the Chair of the SWIB are to be from the business community. The Act also 

permits States to grandfather in existing Boards so long as they are substantially similar 

to the SWIB as prescribed by the Act. 

Of the eight states we studied in the second round, six chose to form new Boards 

as part of the initial implementation, while two grandfathered in their existing Boards. 

They were all successful, though, in attracting high-level businesspersons to serve on 

the Boards. A review of the Boards’ membership shows a preponderance of CEOs and 

Senior Executives serving as the business representatives. In fact, the SWIBs in three 

States include several senior executives from Dow Jones and Fortune 500 companies, 

whose headquarters are located in the States. The other States were not as successful at 

attracting executives from high name recognition companies, but included CEOs from 

companies whose industries are important to the States’ economies.

This finding is consistent with results we reported from the first round of site 

visits, which we described in the evaluation’s Interim Report.1 The six States from the 

first round each had a strong history of private sector involvement in the planning and 

governance of workforce investment programs and had little trouble seating high quality 

business representatives on their SWIBs.

Of the eight States in the current study, only one had an SWIB with business 

representatives not in the majority. It was a grandfathered Board that had only six of 

thirty-two members from the business community. These members were said to be 

very active, though, and successful in advocating the business perspective.

While all the States were successful in initially attracting strong business 

representatives to the Board, several of the States encountered difficulty keeping many 

of them actively engaged. Two reasons were most often mentioned for this. First, the 

size of the SWIBs grew to substantial and, in some cases, unwieldy numbers. Two of 

the States had Board membership consisting of approximately seventy persons. At this 

 

1 A Report on Early State and Local Progress Towards WIA Implementation, February 2001.
X-3

size, some individuals do not feel that their contribution makes a difference and the 

States had trouble maintaining a quorum at Board meetings. The other States held 

membership levels to the mid-thirties but still felt that there were too many people to 

run effective planning meetings. 

As a result of these large Board sizes, much of the work that the SWIBs 

undertook was accomplished through a sub-committee structure. While using 

subcommittees is a common way for Boards of all kinds to delegate work, in this case 

the result was often that the private-sector members were less involved in the crafting 

of policies and decisions because they were unable to dedicate the additional time that 

serving on subcommittees required. Some of the States have gone to lengths to 

alleviate this problem, such as by holding teleconference meetings and requiring issues 

to be examined twice by the SWIB as a whole prior to voting on them. 

The other reason why some of the SWIBs have had trouble maintaining business 

involvement is that the Boards have too often focused on the minutia of implementing 

the WIA program rather than focusing on strategic issues. Because of the amount of 

work required at the State level to set up the systems required by WIA, the SWIBs too 

often got mired in the details of the programs, and public-sector members used 

acronyms and jargon that were unfamiliar to the private-sector members. Since many 

of the private-sector members were new to the Board and the workforce investment 

system in general, they sometimes found the SWIB meetings were hard to follow, and 

some members soon lost interest and disengaged. 

Not all the States experienced these problems though. Two of the states 

maintained business involvement by delegating much of the detail work of 

implementation to the staff of the WIB and the agency responsible for WIA at the State 

level, while allowing the Board to focus on strategic thinking and other issues of their 

choosing. Another State, one that grandfathered in its existing Board, stated that the 

key to keeping employers engaged was strong leadership, strategic thinking, and a 

small Board. 

Finally, even those States that had difficulty engaging employer members felt that 

the SWIBs were finally moving away from the details of system implementation, now 

that most elements of WIA were operational, and thus could spend more time focusing 

on strategic issues and “big picture” thinking. They hoped that this would reenergize 

the Board and, in particular, the business representatives.
X-4

Several issues relating to membership that were thought to be potential areas of 

concern turned out not to affect the functioning of the SWIBs. First, all the States 

indicted that there was minimal disruption caused by turnover of members of the Board. 

There were changes in Board membership, but these resulted either through a slow rate 

of attrition or through the resignation of members who had disengaged and were 

minimally involved in the Board anyway. Only one State voiced any major concern 

that Board operations were suffering due to turnover and that was attributed to the 

turnover of public-sector officials, not business members. By contrast, there were 

several examples of how new members brought fresh ideas and new leadership to the 

SWIBs.

Secondly, there was very little tension between public-sector and private-sector 

members of the SWIBs over the levels of performance expected from the workforce 

system. Two states mentioned that there had been some brief disagreement over one or 

two of the performance measures, but these were resolved quickly and easily. 

Role of State Workforce Investment Boards

One of the first roles that the new State Workforce Investment Boards undertook 

was the development of the State’s five-year strategic plan, as required by the Act. 

This plan was envisioned by the Act as being the primary framework for guiding 

strategic planning for workforce investment activities. The reality, however, was often 

considerably different.

No State that participated in this study uses the five-year strategic plan as the 

guiding document for workforce investment activities. One State used it to start some 

strategic planning, but other issues intervened and the State governance structure 

collapsed, leaving the plan in limbo. Two other States were already in the process of 

developing strategic plans for workforce investment at the time the WIA legislation was 

enacted. They completed these plans and rely on them as the main vision for their 

workforce systems. The WIA five-year plan was prepared later, but more as a function 

of requirement rather than as another opportunity to plan for the future. 

In the other five of the eight States, officials saw the required strategic plan as 

having little or no value to the workforce system. They viewed it as primarily a 

compliance document that had to be submitted in order for WIA operations to begin and 

have rarely revisited it in the months following its submission. It was seen as too long 

and too prescriptive and offered little opportunity to include true strategic thinking. 
X-5

Four of these States have since developed, or are in the process of developing, a true 

strategic plan to guide the direction of the system. 

With respect to strategic planning more broadly, the States varied in the role the 

SWIBs played and where they focused their attention. Some examples highlight this 

diversity. For example, the Arizona SWIB has focused attention on two main 

concerns, system integration and employer involvement. The Board members felt that 

workforce investment programs were too fragmented, even after consolidation under 

WIA, and have been exploring ways to better integrate programs to leverage resources. 

They have found their attempt to be frustrating, though, because the SWIB does not in 

fact have statutory control over any programs other than WIA. In a recently completed 

study, they found that the SWIB had control over only 5% of the $230 million coming 

into the State through WIA and the partner programs. Its increased attention to 

employer involvement, another area of its focus, occurred through the appointment of a 

new SWIB Chair, whose main objective was to engage businesses, and from a feeling 

by many SWIB members that the private sector was inadequately involved under the 

JTPA system and must be included more actively under WIA to make it successful.

In Illinois, the SWIB has set out to implement the recently completed Strategic 

Priorities, Objectives, and Strategies. The Board realigned its committee structure to 

match the priorities established in the strategic plan and has sent staff to the local areas 

to explain what the State’s vision is and the steps needed to implement that vision. The 

focus on strategic planning has been credited to the strong leadership provided by the 

Governor.

The Minnesota SWIB has chosen to focus on two strategic goals, system building 

and system excellence. The SWIB hosts an annual conference to bring local WIBs, 

elected officials, and local agency managers together to disseminate the State’s 

priorities and share experiences on a range of topics. It is also training many of the 

local WIBs on the Baldrige principals. Concurrently, the State Legislature is devising 

statewide performance measures across the partner programs to encourage greater 

integration and improved performance.

In New York, the SWIB has utilized the 15% set-aside funds to issue a series of 

competitive grants to the local areas to develop new and innovative programs. As part 

of this effort, the SWIB recently issued two Requests for Proposals focusing on youth 

services. The first offers State businesses funds to establish or expand programs with 
X-6

local educational institutions or local WIBs that expose youth to current or anticipated 

demand occupations or provide experiences that will lead to gainful employment. The 

other grant is for local areas that establish or expand innovative summer youth 

programs supported by multiple funding streams as an integrated component of 

effective year-round youth programming.

The Oregon SWIB is in the process of establishing system-wide indicators to 

measure the success of workforce investment programs beyond WIA. The Board is 

also organizing an economic development summit that will bring together business 

leaders, economic development organizations, and workforce investment officials to 

coordinate efforts more effectively.

In Virginia, part of the SWIB’s mission is to act on the strategies and goals 

designed by a Governor’s Advisory Committee to integrate economic development with 

workforce investment. Now that the initial WIA implementation effort has been 

completed, the Board is focusing on ways to make those strategies and goals a reality.

Despite the above examples of strategic thinking and system integration, in reality 

the SWIBs have limited authority over partner programs when it comes to 

implementing policies. Not one State WIB in this study had authority over any partner 

programs outside of WIA. Indeed, the only example of an SWIB being given statutory 

control over any partner program was from the first round of site visits in the State of 

Florida. There, the Boards overseeing the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 

(TANF) and WIA programs were merged into a single Board with authority over both.

There were frequent expressions of frustration by many of the State officials we 

interviewed for this study over this lack of control. They questioned how the SWIBs 

could strategically plan workforce investment activities with no authority to impose 

their findings and such limited budgetary control. They felt that the SWIBs were given 

all the responsibility for overseeing workforce activities but none of the authority. 

Another area in which some Boards took action was to create State Youth 

Councils, or equivalent oversight bodies. In our study, three States had committees 

that focused on youth issues. Minnesota’s is known as the Emerging Workforce 

Committee, and its focus is on encouraging youth to pursue education, training, and job 

opportunities in Minnesota. Illinois formed a Youth Council at the State level to guide 

youth programs statewide; the Council was very helpful in assisting local areas to 
X-7

develop their own Youth Councils, with each member of the State Council responsible 

for one of the local areas. 

New York provides an example of an active and engaged Youth Council at the 

State level. Formed as the Emerging Worker sub-committee of the SWIB, the body 

issued several RFPs encouraging the development of innovative programs to serve the 

State’s youth, as was described earlier in this paper. Staff in New York described it as 

the most active of the sub-committees to the SWIB.

Involvement of State Elected Officials

The Workforce Investment Act mandates the inclusion of elected officials on the 

State Workforce Investment Board, including two members of each chamber of the 

State Legislature and at least two local elected officials. In the States participating in 

this study, there was little mention of the role that these elected officials played on the 

SWIB. In fact, partly due to term limits present in many of the States, the turnover of 

these members was greater than the rate for the Board as a whole. Respondents in 

several States offered reasons why they viewed the elected officials as disengaged, and 

most had to do with the fact that workforce investment is typically not a high-priority 

area for politicians, particularly legislators. They also noted that the party affiliation of 

the elected officials was often different from that of the Governor and that politics often 

played a part in how active these representatives were. In no case, though, did any 

State respondent indicate that the officials tried to undermine or in anyway obstruct the 

work of the SWIBs.

While the State Legislators and local officials play a role on the SWIB, the 

Governor acts as the chief elected official. Governors appoint all SWIB members to 

the Board and can shape the policies and direction of the SWIB through their 

leadership. In each of the States in this study, the involvement or lack of involvement 

of the Governor has had a direct impact on the Board and its functions and priorities.

In Arizona, the Governor was not an active participant on the SWIB or in the 

workforce investment system in general, but the decisions she made at the outset of 

WIA implementation affected how the Board functions. In designating staff to the 

SWIB, she chose persons from the Department of Commerce to lead the staffing effort. 

She also directed the Departments of Economic Security and Education to allocate staff 

and resources to the Board. These actions had the duel effect of ensuring a business 

focus to the Board and encouraging cooperation among the primary partners, each of 
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which had officials both on the Board and staffing the Board. Another influential 

decision she made was in deciding whom to appoint as the most recent Chair of the 

SWIB. Her appointee’s vision is clearly one of business integration, and it coincides 

with her earlier decision to draw the Board’s staff from the Department of Commerce.

The Governor of Minnesota created a Workforce Development Cabinet, whose 

members consist of all the Commissioners from the major State departments that have a 

role in education and workforce investment. The Cabinet developed a series of 

strategies and tactics to achieve the Governor’s goals of increasing individual income 

and keeping Minnesota’s businesses competitive. These strategies and tactics frame the 

work of the SWIB. Because the heads of all the WIA partner programs were a part of 

this overall planning process, the programs have bought into the strategy and are strong 

partners in the system.

In New York, the Governor had been less directly involved in the leadership of 

the SWIB, but, several years prior to the passage of WIA, he directed the State 

Departments of Labor and Education to develop a plan to build consensus and support 

for an integrated workforce investment system. The final strategic plan was issued only 

months prior to the passage of WIA and still forms the basic strategy for the workforce 

investment system and its partners in the State.

In Virginia, the Governor made some significant changes to the administrative 

structure that influenced the priorities under WIA. The administration of the JTPA 

program was carried out by the Department of Health and Human Resources. After 

WIA was passed, he moved its administration to the Department of Commerce and 

Trade. He viewed the old system as ineffective and thought that, by moving WIA’s 

administration to the Commerce Department, WIA would be viewed less as a social 

program and more as an integral part of economic development. At the same time, he 

formed the SWIB and tasked it both with oversight of the WIA program and with 

implementing a strategy (designed by another body) to integrate workforce investment 

and economic development. 

In Illinois, the Governor has shown a strong commitment to workforce investment 

activities. He created a position of Deputy Governor for Education and Workforce, 

whose incumbent is to oversee the activities of WIA and its partner programs and serve 

as the co-chair of the SWIB. This action helped to attract some strong business 

representatives to the Board by showing the commitment of the Governor, and sent a 
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message that the Governor was interested and watching what the Board was doing. He 

also created an inter-agency team consisting of persons from the departments 

administering WIA and its partner programs. This team helped with the design of WIA 

implementation, but also continues to meet and has been instrumental in the 

development of the strategic plan for all workforce investment activities in the State. 

Officials and Board member reported that these moves ensured that the SWIB could 

maintain a strategic focus, leading to the creation of a strong and meaningful strategic 

plan.

The Governor of Oregon has made workforce investment one of his priorities. 

He created an Office of Education and Workforce Security within the Governor’s 

Office to oversee and direct workforce investment activities. When WIA passed, he 

designated personnel from that office to serve as staff to the SWIB and appointed the 

office’s director to the SWIB. He also created a Workforce Policy Cabinet that 

includes the high-level managers from key workforce investment-related agencies. 

The workforce investment systems in Oregon and Illinois seem the most 

susceptible to change due to a change in the Governorship. They are the only two 

States where officials from the Governor’s office take a prime role in leading and 

staffing the SWIB. Both States have gubernatorial elections this autumn, and neither of 

the Governors is on the ballot, so these States may offer some insight into how a 

change in the political power structure affects the workings of the SWIB under these 

circumstances.

The one State in this study that has already seen a change in Governorship during 

WIA is Montana, but it is difficult to project its experience onto any other State. As 

previously described, there was intense conflict about the SWIB and its staff resulting 

in the dissolution of the Board and the suspension of State governance activities for 

more than a year. 

The remaining State in this study, Georgia, is in the unique position of having an 

elected Commissioner of Labor, one of only two in the country. He is responsible for 

the Georgia Department of Labor and provides very active leadership for the SWIB. 

The Governor is also on the SWIB, but tends to be less involved with workforce 

investment activities. One drawback to this situation is that the prestige and the 

visibility of the Board are diminished by the marginal role afforded the Governor.
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LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Composition of Local Workforce Investment Boards

Just as the State Workforce Investment Boards are envisioned by the Act to guide 

statewide workforce investment activities, the local Workforce Investment Boards 

(LWIB) are charged with directing activities at the local level. Their duties, as 

specified by the Act, are more tailored to local area concerns and include the following: 

developing the five-year strategic plan for the local area, selecting One-Stop operator(s) 

to manage and coordinate services at individual One-Stop centers, determining the 

budget for WIA Title I programs, overseeing WIA programs, negotiating WIA 

performance measures, coordinating linkages with local economic development and 

employer organizations, and promoting employer involvement in all areas of the local 

system. 

The Act is very prescriptive concerning the membership requirements of the 

Local Workforce Investment Boards. The required LWIB members include multiple 

representatives from the following areas: businesses that offer employment 

opportunities in the local area; educational institutions, including local school boards, 

post-secondary education, and adult education and literacy; labor organizations; 

community-based organizations; and economic development organizations. There also 

must be at least one representative from each of the required One-Stop partners. As 

with the SWIBs, the Local Boards must have a majority of businesspersons and the 

Chair must also be from the business community. WIA also provided an option to 

grandfather in existing Boards that were substantially similar to the Local Boards 

described in the Act, but only one of the fourteen local areas in this study chose that 

option.

The LWIBs that we studied averaged between thirty-five and forty members, with

the largest Board found in Erie County, NY, with fifty-nine members, and the smallest 

in Rural Minnesota, with a grandfathered Board of nineteen members. The differences 

in LWIB sizes were not attributable to any common characteristic and seemed to be a 

function of local priorities and circumstances. 

The ability of these local areas to recruit high-level and/or locally important 

business community members and keep them engaged in LWIB operations varied 

significantly across the study. The majority of the local areas were able to initially 

recruit business executives to be on the LWIBs. The best example of this was in 

Tidewater, VA, where the Chief Local Elected Officials (CLEOs) selected 22 business 
X-11

representatives from over 150 nominations. Tidewater officials attributed their success 

to the unique importance that the LWIB possesses in the local area through the Board’s 

control of a significant amount of funding beyond the WIA program. The other areas 

offered a variety of reasons for their success, including the active involvement of the 

CLEO(s), the sense of civic duty felt by area employers, and the desire of employers to 

help their bottom-line. 

The common theme among areas that struggled with recruitment of employers to 

serve on the LWIBs was the negative perception in the local areas of the former Private 

Industry Council. Employers were reluctant to serve on another government Board 

where it was perceived that they had little or no power. Even some of the areas that 

were ultimately successful in recruiting strong businesspersons stated that they had to 

overcome initial concerns about the role that employers would play on this new Board.

Even though most of the local areas were successful in recruiting strong business 

representatives, only half of the local areas that we studied were successful in both 

retaining employer representatives and keeping them engaged in the functions of the 

LWIB. Some of this success was credited to retaining Board focus on larger strategic 

issues even while WIA implementation was occurring. Others stated that they had 

carefully recruited business members who were willing to be engaged even in 

implementation issues. 

One area that is particularly successful in maintaining business involvement is 

DuPage County, Illinois. DuPage recognized very early that there were potential 

challenges to keeping employers involved and took action to mitigate these hazards. 

Because the early stages of implementation required heavy attention to detail, the LWIB 

and its staff quickly delegated these issues to appropriate sub-committees and allotted 

only minimal agenda time during LWIB meetings for review of the details. Instead, the 

LWIB gained a sense of accomplishment and empowerment by focusing on strategic 

issues that it felt it could control, such as the performance of the WIA system. The 

Board is now taking steps to create system-wide measures in areas such as customer 

satisfaction and employer involvement. Notably, the DuPage WIB is one of the only 

Boards where there is tension between the private-sector and public-sector members 

over the setting of performance measures, and where the average attendance of privatesector members (90%) far exceeds the average attendance of public-sector members 

(65%).
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While half of the local areas have been successful in maintaining private sector 

engagement, the other half have struggled. In complaints similar to those expressed at 

the State level, respondents in some local areas stated that the size of the Board 

contributed to frustrations felt by individual Board members, and that the role of the 

LWIBs during the early stages of WIA implementation was unsuited for high-level 

business executives. A common complaint was that employers were expecting to 

provide strategic guidance for the workforce investment system, but instead found 

themselves expected to make determinations on One-Stop operations. They also 

became frustrated with the LWIBs when it was learned that they had no real authority 

over the vast majority of programs that they were asked to oversee. 

To overcome some of these problems, one area introduced several innovative 

solutions that helped to reengage employers. In The Medford Job Council Area in the 

State of Oregon, business members were attending LWIB meetings less frequently and 

participating sparingly when they did attend. The local area took the initiative and 

created a Business Members-Only Group. The Group meets for breakfast on a bimonthly basis to discuss issues of common interest and develop ideas for specific 

initiatives that meet their needs. Several ideas that they proposed have been undertaken 

by the LWIB, showing them that they can affect issues that interest them. The local 

area also invested in videoconferencing equipment to make it easier for the business 

members to participate when they were unable to travel to the meetings. These steps 

have reinvigorated the business members and improved the overall functioning of the 

Board.

Role of the Local Workforce Investment Boards

The role of the Local Workforce Investment Boards under WIA, as previously 

specified, is to provide direction and oversight for the local areas’ workforce 

investment activities. One way they might do so was by crafting the five-year local 

plan for workforce investment activities to be submitted to the State, one of their initial 

responsibilities as required by WIA. Some details of these local plans were prescribed 

by the Act, and, in most cases, States chose not to make additions to those 

requirements. Broadly speaking, the plans contained an assessment of the local labor 

market and a description of all facets of the planned local One-Stop system. 

Though the Act assigned responsibility for the development of the local plan to 

the LWIB, in nearly all cases staff from the local organization charged with 

administering WIA actually wrote the plan. Only one local area, The Medford Area 
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Job Council of Oregon, specifically stated that the Local Board was involved in the 

development of the plan, and it did so through the Board’s sub-committee structure, 

with disproportionate responsibility taken on by the public-sector members. 

The reasons why the Local Boards did not more fully participate in plan 

development varied across the areas and included the fact that the Local Boards had not 

yet been constituted at the time the plan was due, that the Boards that were in place did 

not have enough knowledge of the WIA system to produce the required content of the 

local plan, and that the process of developing the plan was very time-consuming and 

could only be undertaken by persons whose full-time job was to implement the 

Workforce Investment Act. In the areas where the Local Board had yet to be 

constituted, the Chief Local Elected Official approved the plan and the LWIB later 

ratified this decision upon its establishment. In all cases, the Local Board approved the 

local plan, and in no instance was there an indication that any Board took major 

exception to any of the plans’ provisions. 

The impact of local plans at the time of their creation was quite different across 

the fourteen local areas in this study. Seven of the local areas found the process of 

developing the local plan to be very helpful. Respondents in these areas stated that 

developing the plan allowed them to take stock of where the workforce investment 

system stood in their area and forced them to prepare for the transition to WIA. Some 

of the areas also used the plan as a tool to educate new members of the LWIB.

However, only two of the local areas used the required WIA planning process as 

an opportunity to do real strategic planning. One of the areas, the Medford Area Job 

Council in Oregon, was required by the State to submit a Unified Plan, not just a WIA 

Title I Plan. This requirement helped them to break down some of the program silos 

that existed under the Job Training Partnership Act, move more towards integrated 

services, and develop overarching goals and strategies, which staff viewed as extremely 

useful. This area also happened to be the only one in our study where the LWIB was 

active in the development of the plan. 

While seven of the local areas found the planning process useful, four of the other 

areas were ambivalent about it. They created plans as required by the Act, but did not 

seem to view them as important planning tools. The plans were just another 

requirement under the new system.
X-14

The final three areas held very strong negative feelings about the local plan 

requirements and the planning process in general. Respondents in these areas stated 

that the local plan was nothing but a bureaucratic compliance document that added no 

value to the local system. It was written because the State required it and was 

completely ignored once submitted to the SWIB. In fact, two of the areas found it to be 

of such little worth that they declined to provide us with copies because the plan in no 

way described the reality of the local system. Paradoxically, those same two areas are 

also generally considered by us to be among the strongest examples of local governance 

that we studied.

The usefulness of the local plans past the initial stages of WIA implementation 

also varied greatly across the local areas. In addition to those three areas that disliked 

the plan from the start, five others stated that the plan held little value now that they 

were eighteen months into the WIA program. There were no consistent reasons for 

why the plans were not used and updated, but several of the areas did undertake 

comprehensive strategic planning unrelated to the official WIA local plan (see below).

On the other hand, two of the local areas stated that the local plan still guides the 

workforce system, but they have not updated the plan since its creation. One of those 

areas, DuPage County, Illinois, expressed concern about the plan because it was written 

during very different economic times. Respondents stated that they had tried to follow 

the plan, but some of the strategies and goals developed in it were reflective of the 

economy at that time and are no longer feasible or desirable in the current economy. 

Indeed, their focus and priorities have changed since then, and they are now forced to 

serve more dislocated workers and participate in more rapid response activities than 

they had planned. This area was one of only two in which the change in economic 

conditions was specifically cited as affecting the plans, strategies, or goals of the 

LWIB.

The remaining four areas are the only ones of the fourteen we studied that have 

updated their official WIA local plans in any way since its original completion. Two of 

these local areas, the Medford Area Job Council in Oregon and Suffolk County, NY, 

are the same two that utilized the planning process to develop comprehensive strategic 

plans for the local area. They revisit and update the plan when conditions warrant. 

The other two areas are required to submit updates to the State on a yearly basis. In 

one of these, Southwestern Virginia, local officials use this occasion to make significant 

changes. The area’s original plan was formulated to conform to what was perceived 
X-15

were State expectations and that would allow the area to meet minimum compliance 

standards; in other words, the plan contained little of strategic value. Because the State 

requires its locals to update their plans on a yearly basis, local officials used the first 

update period to clarify and expand on its original local plan. In anticipation of the 

next required update, they are developing a truer strategic plan that commits the local 

area to goals and objectives for the system. The business members of the LWIB have 

been particularly active in this planning process and see it as an opportunity to create a 

“business plan” for the local system.

As we discovered for State Boards, several of the LWIBs have undertaken 

strategic planning for their local workforce investment system outside of the official 

WIA planning process. Four sites in particular are worth discussing in this regard.

The Chicago LWIB undertook an extensive strategic planning process that greatly 

affected the structure and functions of the Board. To organize itself in a way to meet 

its own strategic goals, the LWIB dissolved its WIA Title I committee, which was seen 

has having served its purpose of initially implementing the workforce system such that 

its functions could now be subsumed by other committees. The Board created two new 

committees, an Information and Communication Committee, to better market the 

system and its services, and an Oversight sub-committee of the Executive Committee, 

to improve the administration and operation of the Board as a whole. The Board then 

established three overarching priorities that reached far beyond just WIA programs and 

would guide the work of the Board and its committees. The actions in support of the 

Board’s priorities are discussed in greater detail later in this section.

In Montana, there are only two local areas in the State and they have aligned their 

operations and Boards such that they function essentially as a single entity. In a 

structure similar to what we found in the single workforce investment area States that 

we visited during the first round of site visits (Vermont and Utah), the State is divided 

into twenty-three sub-state regions with Community Management Teams (CMT) that 

guide the operations of the One-Stop Centers in those regions. The CMTs are not 

official LWIBs, and in fact are required to report to the LWIBs, but they give a degree 

of local control to the individual One-Stops. This delegation of authority is much 

appreciated, because the two LWIBs each cover such a vast area. The joint Board 

developed a continuous improvement plan that is based on the best practices that staff 

found in visits to several other States. From this plan, a Business Plan Guide was 
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developed to assist the CMTs in their development of a Business Plan to align the local 

One-Stops with the priorities of the LWIB. 

In Portland, Oregon, the LWIB and the local administrative entity, a quasi-public 

non-profit organization, engage in a biennial planning process. They conduct 

interviews with area stakeholders (job seekers, employers, and local agencies) and 

analyze demographic and economic conditions and trends to determine the area’s needs. 

They then develop a plan to align their services to meet those needs. They also identify 

other potential sources of revenue and actively pursue them to increase their resources.

In the Tidewater area of Virginia, the administrative entity for the WIA program 

is a non-profit organization called Opportunity, Inc. This entity has been tremendously 

successful at securing grant funds for a variety of workforce investment activities—so 

successful, in fact, that the WIA allocation to the local area comprises only 20% of the 

overall budget of the organization. As a result of its success, OI is an extremely 

important player in the local community. During the development of a region-wide, 

five-year strategic plan, the LWIB and Opportunity, Inc. held a retreat for all the local 

leaders of business, education, government, and the military (there is a large military 

presence in this area) to gain their input and buy-in. They also conducted a series of 

town hall meetings to inform the public of the plan and gain their feedback. The final 

plan established a series of goals for themselves and a broader community agenda for 

workforce investment. The agenda designates roles for the citizens, secondary schools, 

post-secondary schools, businesses, non-profit organizations, and the area government. 

This plan represents a truly integrated strategic vision for workforce investment and 

economic development in the entire Tidewater area. It also carries the weight of the 

area’s Chief Elected Officials and top business executives behind it, such that its goals 

and strategies were adopted by all of the strategic partners. It is by far the most 

comprehensive strategic plan that we studied in any State in either the first or second 

round of site visits.

As part of their efforts to carry out strategic planning, many of the Boards were 

interested in better coordinating and integrating services across the partner programs. 

However, none of them was given policy-making authority over any of the required 

WIA partners that were not already under the administrative entity’s control. This was 

an often-cited point of frustration for many of the Local Board members and, in 

particular, the employer members.
X-17

A few Boards also undertook additional innovative actions designed to carry out 

their strategic thinking, and these are worth noting. Of all the local Boards, the 

Chicago Workforce Board was undertaking the widest variety of initiatives beyond the 

LWIB’s duties as specified by the Act. For example, the LWIB created a task force to 

work with the Mayor’s Council of Technology Advisors and agreed to serve as the 

policy arm and private sector recruiter for the Chicago Federation of Labor’s 

Manufacturing Workforce Development Project. The Board also teamed with other 

LWIBs from the surrounding area to focus on workforce and economic development 

issues as they related to the health care, manufacturing, and technology industries. 

They recently hosted a regional One-Stop Strategic Planning Conference for all 

interested stakeholders from the Greater Chicago area, and have planned a conference 

focusing on youth issues for this autumn. These and other initiative undertaken by the 

Chicago LWIB are all in concert with the three major priorities established in their 

strategic plan: (1) the reinvention of the One-Stop Career Centers to meet a new 

strategic vision, (2) the focus on skills as the key to Chicago’s economic vitality and the 

stability of the families, and the creation of a skills-development agenda for Chicago, 

and (3) the connection of at-risk youth to the labor market. 

In Erie County, NY, the LWIB has made the integration of workforce investment 

with economic development its major priority. In addition to the increased membership 

of economic development representatives on the LWIB (there are five), the Board has 

earmarked 60% of its training dollars for customized training programs. The WIB and 

its staff actively seek out companies that need assistance in upgrading their workers’ 

skills or in training potential hires. The Board also regularly petitions the State for 

funds to help avert plant closings and layoffs. These efforts are all part of the Western 

New York strategy of stemming the loss of manufacturing jobs that have so depressed 

the area’s economy over the last two decades.

Local Youth Councils

As part of the Local Board structure, the Workforce Investment Act requires the 

establishment of an entity that focuses specifically on youth issues, the Youth Council. 

Each local area’s Youth Council is charged with developing the youth portion of the 

local plan, coordinating youth services under WIA, and selecting and overseeing youth 

service providers. Its membership is to be drawn from individuals within the 

community who possess expertise in youth services, and can include persons who are 

not members of the larger Local Workforce Investment Board.
X-18

All but one of the local areas participating in this study had fully functioning 

Youth Councils that were conducting the functions delegated to it by the Act. They all 

operated with a fair degree of autonomy, but were required to report to the LWIB on a 

regular basis and have their major decisions reviewed and ratified by the Local Board. 

Although the Youth Councils were performing their duties for the WIA program, 

in most cases there was little evidence that they had assumed a larger role in 

coordinating youth services beyond the scope of WIA. A number of the local areas 

attempted to develop a region-wide youth services strategy through the mapping of 

area-wide youth services and strategic planning sessions, but they have not as yet been 

very successful in implementing a comprehensive youth service strategy. 

However, several areas are exceptions and have had some success in this area. 

For example, the three urban areas that were part of this study, Buffalo (in Erie 

County), Portland, and Chicago, were all successful in obtaining additional funding to

continue a summer youth employment program that had been a feature of the JTPA 

youth program that was eliminated under WIA. In Erie County, the local 

administrative entity for WIA was also the administrative entity for the TANF program. 

This overlap enabled the area to leverage TANF funds to offer summer employment 

opportunities to a wider range of youth without the required year-round services. In 

Portland and Chicago, the local government had appropriated additional county/city 

funds to ensure that the summer program continued. In all three cases, the Chief Local 

Elected Official was very involved in the decision to continue some form of summer 

youth employment. 

Two of these areas, Buffalo and Portland, were also recipients of Youth 

Opportunity grants. In both cases, the Youth Council had oversight authority for the 

grants and worked to coordinate those resources. However, since the YO grants came 

with very narrow specifications of who could be served, based on the census tracts of 

the youths’ residences, the YO grants had a relatively small effect on youth services for 

the local area as a whole.

Several of the areas were also successful in establishing linkages to the school-towork program or its successor. The strongest example of this was in Suffolk County, 

NY, where the school-to-work program had established a strong working relationship 

with the workforce investment community. This relationship laid the foundation for the 

strong partnerships between the school system and the WIA Youth program that the 
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area currently enjoys. It also served as a model for some of the youth programs, such 

as Juvenile Justice, to utilize the services offered through the WIA program. While the 

Youth Council does not have operational control over any of these programs, there is 

considerable cross-membership on the various oversight Boards and a shared sense that 

partnering between programs benefits all. (For further discussion on WIA youth 

services and the coordination with other youth service programs, see the Youth 

Services and STW Linkages Briefing Papers, which were issued previously).

Involvement of the Chief Local Elected Official

The role of the Chief Local Elected Official (CLEO) as defined by the Act is to 

appoint the members of the Local Workforce Investment Board, approve the local 

areas’ WIA local plan, and assume fiduciary responsibility for the funds awarded to the 

local area under WIA. Beyond that, the CLEO’s involvement is voluntary and of 

his/her own making.

The CLEOs for the fourteen local areas of this study vary significantly because of 

the political jurisdictions that are encompassed by the local areas. In five of the local 

areas, the political boundaries matched the local area boundary, and the county 

executive or mayor of the city was the obvious Chief Elected Official. In the other nine 

local areas, there were multiple political jurisdictions that required either a CLEO 

Board, consisting of the respective political leaders, or a designation by the set of LEOs 

of one or more representatives who would speak for the group. 

How the CLEO was selected or how many CLEOs there were seems to have little 

effect on the role that CLEOs played in the workforce investment system. That role 

was either very active or nearly non-existent, with examples of both single CLEOs in 

single political areas and multiple CLEOs from multiple county areas found on both 

sides of the spectrum. In eight of the areas, the CLEO(s) showed a strong commitment 

to the LWIB and the workforce system as a whole. They regularly participated in 

LWIB meetings, were strong advocates for workforce investment, and guided the 

direction of the system. In contrast, respondents in the other six local areas stated that 

the CLEOs were uninvolved and played almost no role in guidance or oversight.

Unlike the State governance structure, where we could easily identify the effects 

that the Governor’s involvement had on the State Board, it is difficult to generalize how 

the Chief Local Elected Officials’ involvement affected the local systems. The 

strongest cases of strategic planning coincide with highest levels of CLEO involvement 
X-20

and may in fact be causal in those areas. However, there are examples of strong 

strategic planning without CLEO involvement and vice-versa. The same pattern (or 

lack of one) holds true for whether businesses were strong players on the LWIB—there 

are examples of strong and weak business composition and involvement regardless of 

the role of the CLEO(s).

This finding is consistent with that from the first round of site visits as well, 

where we also found varying degrees of involvement by local elected officials with little 

consistent impact on the LWIB or the workforce system in general.

THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP

The State can interact with its local areas in two primary ways: (a) having the 

State Board communicate with the Local Boards through a variety of different means, 

and (b) having the agencies that staff the Board and administer WIA and partner 

programs at the State level interact with their corresponding colleagues at the local 

level. The following section reviews the first type of relationship in depth, but 

discusses the second type only where applicable to the governance of the system. (For 

more details on the relationship between the agencies that administer the WIA and 

partner programs at the State and local level, see the Partnership Building Briefing 

Paper, in this series.)

In general, the communication between the State and Local Boards was found to 

be rather weak in most of the States that we visited. Partly this might be because, in 

general, State WIBs devolved substantial authority to their local areas. In any event, 

most of the local areas in the States we visited had very little to say about the State 

Board, and there was little evidence that the SWIB affected the priorities of the LWIB. 

Only two State Boards had established a vehicle through which they could 

actively and regularly receive feedback from the Local Boards. This vehicle was a subcommittee to the SWIB that specifically dealt with LWIB issues and whose membership 

included LWIB Chairs from each of the local areas. In Illinois, for example, there are 

several examples of the SWIB taking a proactive role in providing information to and 

receiving feedback from the local areas:

1) After the State completed its comprehensive strategic planning process 

(described earlier in this paper), it sent representatives to each of the 

local areas in the State to explain the strategies and goals of the SWIB, 

answer questions about the State’s plan, and assist the local areas in 

devising a strategy to align their goals with the SWIB’s,
X-21

2) Though not required, the SWIB created a State Youth Council to focus 

on and provide leadership for youth issues. Each of the State Youth 

Council members was assigned a local area to shepherd through the 

process of establishing local Youth Councils and designing youth 

services. 

In New York, the SWIB did not originally have an LWIB committee, but made a 

subsequent determination that it was important to have clear and open lines of 

communication to the local areas. The SWIB also decided that a good way to 

encourage the local areas to adopt programs that aligned with their goals was to offer 

financial inducements for them to do so. Thus, the Youth Council to the SWIB 

recently issued grants to local areas for innovative approaches to youth services, and 

the other committees of the SWIB plan to follow suit with grant offerings that 

encourage and mirror the State’s priorities.

In both of these States, though, the local areas’ opinion of the State was dictated 

more by its interaction with the State administrative agency rather than by the steps 

taken by the State Board. There was, in fact, little notice of the actions that the SWIB 

had taken to increase the involvement of the local areas in state decision-making. 

Though the communication between the State Board and Local Boards was 

generally weak, the communication between the state agencies and their local 

counterparts was regular and often confrontational. An examination of the planning 

process demonstrates this. All the States issued some form of planning guidance to the 

local areas to assist them in the creation of their local plans. The large majority of the 

local areas we studied, though, found the planning guidance to be some combination of 

confusing, repetitious, and unhelpful. In fact, only three of the local areas viewed the 

actions taken by the State concerning local planning as helpful, and in one case this 

reaction was attributed primarily to the fact that the State largely took a hands-off role. 

Respondents in the remaining local areas stated that the State’s actions amounted to 

little more than reissuing the guidance developed by the U.S. Department of Labor and 

did little to specifically assist them. Moreover, local areas complained about States’ 

delays in the issuance of both the planning guidance and the other directives pertaining 

to WIA program issues.

Beyond planning guidance, there were few other examples of structured 

communication between the State and local areas concerning system governance. One 

State, Oregon, established Statewide Action Teams, consisting of officials from the 

State and local levels that would gather to share information about problems and 
X-22

solutions concerning the programs. If it was determined that action by the SWIB could 

improve a certain situation, then the SWIB staff that served on those teams would bring 

it to the attention of the Board. Otherwise, though, it acted more as a roundtable forum 

than an official body. 

The issue that caused the most strain on the State-Local relationship related to 

MOU/Cost Allocation. In several local areas, we learned that local respondents were 

very frustrated by what were perceived to be unreasonable dictates by the States as to 

how MOUs should be structured and costs shared. (See the Partnership Building 

Briefing Paper for more details on this.)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The review of WIA governance structures that we undertook as part of the second 

round of data collection associated with this evaluation leads us to a number of general 

summary statements pertaining to State-level and local-level governance issues:

State-Level Governance

1. State Workforce Investment Boards in general have had no trouble attracting 

high-level business representation. However, some States have had difficulty 

keeping business members engaged, because some State Boards were of 

unwieldy sizes (which some members felt diluted the value of their 

contributions) and because the Boards’ initial meetings often focused on WIA 

implementation issues that business members found dull.

2. In general, State WIA plans were not viewed by respondents as valuable 

documents to guide strategic planning. However, most State Boards 

nonetheless have turned to considering strategic issues once initial decisions 

regarding WIA implementation had been approved. Among the strategic 

issues that the Boards we studied had been pursuing were: improving system 

integration, heightening employer involvement, developing system-wide 

measures of performance, and aligning workforce development with economic 

development.

3. Elected officials have generally not been very engaged in State Board 

activities on an ongoing basis. Nonetheless, Governors in many States have 

had a notable influence, through their appointments to the Board, designating 

staff to the Board, and decisions about the WIA administrative structure.

Local-Level Governance

4. Local Workforce Investment Boards ranged in size from one having 19 

members (a Board that had been grandfathered), to others that had up to 59 

members. Concerns about Board sizes that were unwieldy were raised by 

local-level officials, as they were by State-level officials.
X-23

5. In recruiting high-level business representatives to serve on the Boards, local 

areas needed to overcome a negative perception of many potential business 

appointees of the former Private Industry Councils. 

6. Even though most local areas were nonetheless successful in recruiting strong 

business representatives, only about half of the ones we studied were 

successful in retaining employer representation and keeping business members 

engaged. Areas that had the most success in this regard ensured that their 

Boards focused on strategic issues rather than details of WIA implementation. 

Doing so, however, meant that implementation issues were often addressed by 

committees of the Board, which tended to have scant business representation.

7. Business and public-sector Board members alike expressed frustration that 

they were charged with workforce system building, but in fact had little 

authority over WIA partner programs’ operations or budgets.

8. In most local areas, the areas’ WIA five-year plans seemed to have little value 

as strategic planning documents. In these cases, plans were characterized as 

compliance documents, and were not being updated on an ongoing basis as the 

local Boards’ priorities changed. In several of the areas, in fact, the 

development of the plan was itself seen as having had little value. A few 

areas are exceptions in this regard, however. In these areas, local plans were 

viewed as having strategic value and were updated regularly. Sometimes 

these updates occurred because doing so periodically was mandated by the 

State.

9. Whether or not the official WIA plan was viewed as having strategic value, 

several of the local Boards (of the fourteen that we studied) could be said to 

have engaged in real strategic planning, including through regional planning 

with adjacent local Boards. One area, in particular, stands out in this regard. 

This area held a retreat for local leaders of business, education, and 

government, and established a series of goals and an agenda with designated 

roles for citizens, secondary schools, post-secondary schools, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and local government.

10. Local Youth Councils were fully functioning in all but one of the fourteen 

areas we studied. In general, they are performing their functions as mandated 

by the WIA legislation, but are not engaged in wider youth planning. 

11.In general, communication between State and Local Boards was perceived as 

being weak. Partly this might be because State WIBs devolved substantial 

authority to their local areas. In any event, in most of the local areas we 

visited there was little evidence that the SWIB affected the priorities of the 

LWIBs to any appreciable degree.


 
XI-1

XI. THE ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE: VISION 

AND IMPLEMENTATION

This briefing paper is one of a series developed as part of the National Evaluation 

of the Implementation of WIA, being conducted by Social Policy Research Associates. 

Thus far, the data collection has consisted of two rounds of site visits: the first round 

was conducted to six states and nine local workforce areas in the spring of 2000, and 

the second round was conducted to an additional eight states and fourteen local areas in 

the summer and fall of 2001. This briefing paper for the most part draws on findings 

from the second round of site visits, because these capture developments associated 

with WIA implementation that occurred more recently. The states visited in the second 

round were: Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oregon, and 

Virginia.

In this briefing paper, we examine the progress that has been made to date by 

local areas to support the comprehensive workforce investment system that WIA 

envisions. A previous briefing paper has addressed the process of building state and 

local One-Stop partnerships and developing memoranda of understanding that specify 

partner responsibilities and contributions to shared One-Stop systems. In this issue 

paper, we examine the resulting framework that has emerged for the delivery of OneStop services to individuals and business customers, and identify challenges that have 

been encountered in developing seamless services. 

First, we review the vision and goals that have driven the design and development 

of One-Stop services at the state and local levels. Second, we describe the resulting 

service delivery networks—consisting of comprehensive One-Stop centers, satellite 

centers, affiliated sites, and remote access opportunities—that have been woven 

together to make One-Stop services accessible to customers throughout local workforce 

investment areas. Third, we analyze the varied approaches that have been developed 

by local One-Stop systems to respond to the needs of “the universal customer” through 

the design and delivery of core services by One-Stop operators and other system 

partners. Fourth, we discuss how One-Stop systems have arranged for customers to 

access the more intensive services offered by a wide range of workforce development 

partners. Fifth, we describe the ways that local One-Stop systems have designed and 

implemented a shared system of services for employer customers. Finally, we 
XI-2

summarize the accomplishments achieved and challenges still facing local workforce 

investment areas in developing their One-Stop infrastructure.

VISION AND GOALS GUIDING THE ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE 

In preparing its WIA state or local five-year plan, each of the case-study states 

and local areas specified the goals it wanted to further through the development of a 

comprehensive workforce development system. The goals set by each case-study site 

are generally consistent with, and supportive of, the seven federal principles embodied 

in the Workforce Investment Act (i.e., streamlined services, customer choice, universal 

access, increased accountability, strengthened role for local workforce investment 

boards, state and local flexibility, and improved youth programming). However, the 

particular priorities set by each case study site are influenced by locally identified 

needs, local economic conditions, and levels of customer satisfaction or dissatisfaction 

with the workforce development resources and services available to jobseekers and 

businesses immediately prior to the implementation of WIA.

The case study sites identified the following goals for the creation of their 

comprehensive workforce development systems. The goals are listed roughly in order 

of the frequency with which they were identified in state and local plans:

 Linking workforce development and economic development strategies.

 Coordinating the workforce development needs of businesses and 

jobseekers.

 Delivering employment and training services to a large customer base 

using self-service automated tools and an electronic infrastructure.

 Improving system visibility to, utilization by, and reputation among both

employers and the universal customer.

 Building a coordinated system that does a better job of:

 Communicating employers’ skills development needs to 

education and training providers who can meet those needs.

 Maintaining open communication among system partners.

 Developing regional approaches to addressing workforce 

development and economic development goals.

 Providing balanced attention to the needs of the universal customer and 

identifiable customer segments such as new labor market entrants, 

incumbent workers, and other targeted groups (e.g., welfare recipients, 
XI-3

at-risk youth, individuals with basic skills deficiencies, and individuals 

with disabilities).

Linking Workforce Development and Economic Development

Most of the state and local WIBs emphasized that their WIA systems must 

recognize the necessary connection between regional economic vitality and growth and 

improved employment and earnings opportunities for workers. Planners in these local 

areas stated that to promote regional economic growth effectively, local workforce 

investment areas must maintain an accurate and up-to-date understanding of the needs 

and interests of local businesses and think strategically about how to “add value” to the 

labor market, e.g., by ensuring that workers offer the skills currently needed by local 

employers as well as the skills that will help drive future economic growth. To further 

this goal, the local workforce investment areas we studied are planning some of the 

following activities: 

 Surveying local employers about their workforce needs and goals.

 Collaborating with employers to develop new customized training 

programs that will help jobseekers enter the labor market.

 Developing improved labor market information organized around 

occupational sectors targeted for job and economic growth (e.g., 

information technology, senior living, health technology, tourism).

 Developing workers’ skills relevant to the needs of particular industries 

(e.g. manufacturing).

 Placing an increased focus on training opportunities for incumbent 

workers, including skills relevant to both job retention and career 

advancement.

 Organizing a summit on economic development and business issues.

Coordinating the Workforce Development Needs of Businesses 

and Jobseekers

This goal was phrased differently by different local areas, depending on the 

perceived balance or imbalance in the previous system’s focus on the needs of 

employers versus jobseekers. Most often, local areas expressed this goal as a desire to 

increase customer satisfaction for both sets of system customers—employers as well as 

individual jobseekers or workers. Perhaps to address a past imbalance between 

attending to the needs of local businesses versus individual workers, one local site set a 

goal of helping customers access jobs with benefits that pay enough to offer workers 

financial security. Another local area set a goal of helping employers “in developing 
XI-4

high performance workplaces.” In one local area in which the state Wagner-Peyser 

agency currently operates the only existing comprehensive One-Stop center, the director 

of the WIA Title IB agency indicated that she is working to redress the local area’s 

current employer focus by developing additional One-Stop centers that are more 

responsive to the needs of jobseeker customers.

Using Automated Tools to Reach a Large Customer Base

One of the goals of One-Stop systems embraced by most states and local areas is 

to realize the potential of using technology-based tools and an electronic infrastructure 

to reach large numbers of system users. Both jobseekers and employers can be 

encouraged to obtain information about labor markets, education and training 

providers, and available jobs by coming to One-Stop centers and affiliated sites to 

access automated information systems or by using Internet-linked computers from home 

or work to access the same databases online. The One-Stop implementation grants 

awarded to states by the U.S. Department of Labor prior to the passage of the WIA 

legislation provided the opportunity for many states to develop a wide range of 

technology-based products that are often packaged for easy customer use with an 

integrated menu and crosswalks between different applications. To further this goal, 

several state and local workforce investment boards are planning one or more of the 

following activities:

 Continuing to recruit affiliated sites that can offer jobseekers, workers, and 

students access to One-Stop automated tools at locations throughout the 

community.

 Continuing to promote the use of virtual One-Stops, by using technology to 

improve system connections and increased access.

However, one very large rural area, in which individuals do not have transportation to 

One-Stop centers but like face-to-face contact, has selected a different strategy to make 

services accessible—having One-Stop staff drive to small towns to provide services on a 

prearranged roving schedule. 

Improving System Visibility and Reputation

This was mentioned as a goal by several of the case study local areas. One local 

area said that in order to reach local goals, they needed to convince more employers 

offering high-wage jobs to use the public labor exchange system. Several local areas 

indicated that they would not be able to reach the universal customer until the One-Stop 
XI-5

center changed its reputation from the program serving low-income people to the 

program serving the general workforce.

Building Coordinated Systems

The local areas we visited during the second round of this study recognized that 

full integration of WIA partners and services was not likely to be accomplished in the 

short-run. As examples of achievable short-term goals, local areas called for improved 

information sharing, multiple access points to partner services (“no wrong door”), 

increased community awareness of the system and its partners, achievement of as full 

co-location of partners as possible given the limits of available facilities, and use of 

consensus planning among partners to make partners work more efficiently and 

effectively within the One-Stop partnership. 

Among the areas selected for study, several set three- and five-year goals that 

called for the development of a unified menu of services and the emergence of the OneStop system as being a centralized “bridge between jobseekers and employment 

opportunities” and the emergence of comprehensive One-Stop centers as the “broker of 

all employment services.” The calls for improved coordination among workforce 

development partners within these local plans were real but modest, and built around 

incremental changes in the way of doing business within One-Stop centers rather than 

radical reorganization of service delivery roles and responsibilities across agency lines.1 

Providing Balanced Attention to the Needs of the Universal 

Customer and Customers Requiring Intensive Services

This local goal has caused among the greatest challenges in practice, in terms of 

the ability of local partnerships to weave together the resources and culture of laborexchange programs with the resources and culture of education and training programs. 

Traditionally, labor-exchange programs have set goals of high volumes of service, high 

rates of market penetration, the delivery of “light touch” services with rapid customer 

turnover, and an expectation that individuals will change jobs over time, as a result of 

 

1

 Where different agency identities do not pose administrative barriers, agencies that are 

responsible for multiple funding streams have sometimes made substantial progress in integrating 

program operations. For example, in Minnesota’s 19-county Workforce Service Delivery Area 2, the 

Rural Minnesota Concentrated Employment Program (CEP)—which is the local partner responsible for 

administering 34 different state and federal programs, including WIA Title IB services and the federal 

Welfare-to-Work program—uses integrated service delivery teams to serve One-Stop customers eligible 

for any of the programs it administers.
XI-6

layoffs and individual job mobility. In contrast, education and training programs have 

traditionally recruited, screened, and enrolled a much smaller number of customers into 

more intensive services over longer periods of time, with the expectation that services 

will be case managed and tracked, and that job placement outcomes will be carefully 

nurtured and supported with ongoing follow-up services. Weaving these two different 

cultures of service design and delivery into a coherent approach to serving customers 

under One-Stop systems is causing among the greatest growing pains to emerging 

workforce development systems under WIA. To further these goals, several local 

partners specified the following strategies:

 Using a combination of Wagner-Peyser and WIA resources to ensure that 

customers are registered into the system(s)—ES and/or WIA—that make the 

most sense in terms of service needs, resource accountability, and required 

tracking of customer outcomes.

 Using a wide range of different partners as “feeder programs” to draw 

customers with a wide range of special needs (e.g., welfare recipients, 

individuals with disabilities, individuals with basic skills deficiencies, at-risk 

youth) into the One-Stop workforce development system, which offers 

customers access to services with varied content and of varying intensity, 

depending on customer needs and interests.

ORGANIZING LOCAL ONE-STOP CENTERS AND SYSTEMS

The local One-Stop systems developed in response to the WIA legislation vary 

widely in their structure and organization. Among their different organizational 

features are the following variables:

 Whether One-Stop centers are certified by the state, in response to state 

established criteria, or solely at the discretion of the local workforce 

investment board.

 How many comprehensive centers have been established in different local 

areas and whether the state or local area has devised a system for designating 

satellite or affiliated sites.

 How One-Stop operators have been designated and what types of entities have 

been designated as One-Stop operators.

 How the roles of One-Stop operators have been defined, and how One-Stop 

operators relate to other on-site agency partners.

 If there are multiple One-Stop centers or affiliate sites, whether individual 

sites are organized into an organized network or system.
XI-7

Below we describe some of the key variations among the case study sites on these 

organizational variables and discuss how these organizational differences influence the 

delivery of One-Stop services.

Role Played by the State in Certifying One-Stop Centers

Across the eight states we visited during the second round site visits, state-level 

One-Stop leaders played very different roles in the process of certifying local One-Stop 

centers. States that had already begun to certify One-Stop centers prior to the passage 

of the Workforce Investment Act had the option of “grandfathering in” preexisting 

centers and their existing operators, although, in most respects, existing centers were 

expected to meet the requirements of the Act (with the exception of the procedure to be 

used to select the One-Stop operator). 

Three of the eight case study states—Oregon, Minnesota, and Arizona—took 

advantage of the above option to certify some or all of the One-Stop centers that had 

been established prior to WIA. Minnesota certified all 53 existing Minnesota 

Workforce Centers as comprehensive One-Stop centers. Oregon certified at least one 

comprehensive One-Stop in each of the state’s six local workforce investment areas, but 

allowed local WIBs to certify additional centers if they so decided. Arizona certified 

eight pre-existing One-Stop centers and stated its intention to continue to certify all 

One-Stop centers in the state as part of its review of local plans. 

In Montana, where state-local conflicts nearly paralyzed the early WIA 

implementation process, respondents expressed a difference of opinion about what 

entity should certify One-Stop centers. The State Department of Labor and Industry, 

which is responsible for administering both the Wagner-Peyser and WIA Title IB 

programs at the state level, wants to certify all Job Service offices as One-Stop centers, 

while the two local WIBs are battling for the right to certify One-Stop centers locally. 

In the remaining four study states, the state Workforce Investment Boards have 

deferred to local WIBs on the certification of One-Stop centers and selection of OneStop operators. Two states left the certification of comprehensive One-Stop centers 

completely up to the discretion of local workforce investment boards. The state 

Workforce Investment Boards in the two remaining states have established various 
XI-8

criteria and guidelines for local WIBs to follow in certifying One-Stop centers and 

chartering One-Stop operators.2

The varying types and levels of state involvement in the certification of One-Stop 

centers reflect different views about the appropriate state role in building and 

overseeing networks of One-Stop centers. At one end of the spectrum, several states 

have been heavily invested in building a state “brand” of One-Stop center, in which a 

standardized approach to customer service was reinforced by a shared name (e.g. 

Minnesota Workforce Center), a shared logo, and a shared look and feel of One-Stop 

facilities and resource rooms throughout the state. At the other end of the spectrum 

were states that did not attempt to influence the emerging local One-Stop systems 

beyond ensuring that federal requirements (e.g., for the creation of at least one 

comprehensive center in each local workforce investment area) were met. In several 

states that had begun by playing a major role in certifying early One-Stop centers prior 

to WIA, the states were ready to stand aside and let local workforce investment boards 

take over the certification and administration of local centers.

Comprehensive One-Stop Centers vs. Satellite and Affiliated 

Sites

Six of the 14 local workforce investment areas studied had implemented only a 

single comprehensive One-Stop center at the time of the Round 2 site visits. The 

remaining local areas had from two to nine comprehensive centers in place. Because 

the local areas varied widely in geographic size and population density, it is difficult to 

draw conclusions about the adequacy of the existing center infrastructure. However, in 

two local areas a single full-service center appeared to be inadequate to provide access 

to all residents: one of these local areas consists of 46 counties; another includes 12 

counties. Several local areas were in the process of expanding the number of 

comprehensive One-Stop centers to provide fuller geographic coverage. For example, 

Southwest Georgia Local Workforce Investment Area, with 14 counties, started with a 

single comprehensive center in 2000, certified five additional centers in 2001, and 

hopes eventually to have a center operating in each of its fourteen counties.

 

2

 For example, Illinois encourages local areas to use a consortium structure in designating local 

One-Stop Operators. However, in designating operating consortia, an agency can count as only one 

partner, even if it controls more than one of the required funding streams.
XI-9

There is no uniform terminology used to describe satellite or affiliate One-Stop 

centers. Some local areas have designated all local offices operated by partner agencies 

as affiliate sites, because these sites provide access to face-to-face services for at least 

one partner program as well as information about how to access additional services. 

Other local areas reserve the label satellite One-Stop for a facility in which several 

mandated One-Stop partners are co-located. 

At least five local sites have set up a formal certification process for affiliate or 

satellite sites. In order to qualify as a One-Stop affiliate in these local areas, local 

centers must offer electronic access to self-service tools and coordinated referrals to 

other One-Stop partners’ services. In some local communities, a wide range of 

community offices have secured certification as affiliate centers, including libraries, 

schools, community colleges, and partner-agency offices. Two of the most elaborate 

networks of community affiliates are located in Chicago, where the local workforce 

investment board has designated 33 adult and dislocated worker affiliates and 52 youth 

service affiliates. Similarly, in the local workforce area containing Medford (Oregon), 

11 affiliate agencies have agreed to have job postings available, provide resource 

rooms, offer some core services by ES or WIA staff, have at least one person trained to 

greet and refer customers, and participate in One-Stop network meetings.

One-Stop Operators

As shown in Exhibit 1, eight of the 14 local workforce investment boards studied 

in Round 2 selected organizational consortia to operate local One-Stop centers. Three 

local areas designated the public or non-profit agency responsible for the delivery of 

WIA Title IB services as the One-Stop Operator of one or more comprehensive centers 

in the local area.3 Two local areas designated the state agency responsible for the 

delivery of Wagner-Peyser services as the local operator of one or more comprehensive 

centers. The remaining local WIB issued a competitive RFP and awarded contracts to 

several different types of entities—including four community colleges and three nonprofit community-based organizations—to operate a network of seven comprehensive 

One-Stop centers.

 

3

 Two of these agencies requested and received waivers from the Governor to enable them to 

provide direct services under WIA.
XI-10

Local WIBs found it attractive to designate local consortia to operate One-Stop 

centers for several reasons. First, where local partnerships had come together prior to 

WIA to operate One-Stop centers, WIA allowed these operating partnerships to 

continue without interruption. Second, agencies designated as One-Stop operators were 

more likely to make in-kind contributions of facilities and equipment to support the 

operation of One-Stop centers than partners not so designated. Finally, the Title IB 

adult services administrative agency, as one member of a multi-agency One-Stop 

operating consortium, often was able to continue to staff the delivery of WIA adult 

services within One-Stop centers without highlighting its dual role of overseeing OneStop systems and providing WIA services.4

 

The responsibilities of One-Stop operators usually include coordinating the 

delivery of services by One-Stop partner agencies, managing and maintaining the OneStop facility (to which the One-Stop operator agency often held the lease), and 

providing some part of core and/or intensive services. 

The consortium designated as the One-Stop operator by the Chicago WIB was an 

exception to this pattern. Although the ten mandated One-Stop partners in Chicago 

were designated as the consortium responsible for the operation of the city’s five 

comprehensive One-Stop centers, a separate contractor was hired with WIA funds to 

provide core and intensive services in each of these centers. We provide more detailed 

information on the roles played by One-Stop operators and other partners in the 

delivery of core and intensive services in another section of this briefing paper.

Managing One-Stop Centers and Networks

The comprehensive One-Stop centers we visited as part of Round 2 are still at an

early stage of co-location and coordination of partner services. As a result, One-Stop 

partners have not needed to develop very elaborate management or governance 

mechanisms to guide day-to-day operation of the One-Stop centers. The most common 

organizational arrangement is for a single agency to hold the lease on the One-Stop 

facility and “host” small numbers of on-site staff from other partners, with or without 

collecting a rental payment. Usually, the host agency is the designated One-Stop 

operator or a member of the operator consortium. Because the comprehensive One-

 

4 The agency designated by local elected officials to administer Title IB adult services was a 

member of the One-Stop operating consortium in all eight consortium sites and played a role in providing 

WIA services in six of the eight sites.
XI-11

Stop centers we visited had not developed very complex ways of sharing facility costs, 

they usually let the host agency handle all facility management decisions.

Many local areas went through the formality of designating a single individual to 

be the director or manager of a shared One-Stop center. In these sites, the manager’s 

salary was typically paid as an in-kind contribution from one of the partners, even 

though the manager was responsible for coordinating day-to-day operations for all onsite partners. Because the One-Stop staff from different agencies did not work in crossagency functional teams, issues about the supervision of staff from one agency by a 

manager from another agency had not yet arisen. Most often, respondents said that 

although programs were co-located within One-Stop centers, each program continued to 

operate autonomously.

Several sites had arranged to involve participants from all on-site partners in 

weekly or bi-weekly staff meetings held at the One-Stop center. The purpose of such 

meetings was to share information about individual partners’ programs and to discuss 

any center-wide issues relating to center operations and services. Interagency 

operations teams had also been formed in two centers to oversee shared center 

operations, identify operational issues, and make shared decisions about day-to-day 

center operations.

An interagency management body responsible for overseeing the entire local 

network of One-Stop centers has been formed in three local workforce investment 

areas. Although in one instance the One-Stop Network Board (in the Medford area in 

Oregon) is officially a subcommittee of the local WIB, each of these three network 

management bodies operate as a day-to-day managing board of the interagency OneStop partnership, with participation from One-Stop operators, local officials, One-Stop 

partners, and other public and community agencies concerned about building an 

effective local One-Stop system.

APPROACHES TO SERVING THE UNIVERSAL CUSTOMER

In this section of the briefing paper, we describe how different One-Stop 

partnerships have organized the design and delivery of core services, how partners 

track the delivery of core services, and what strategies have been developed to promote 

access to core services by individuals with disabilities, geographically remote 

customers, and individuals for whom English is not their primary language. (It is not 

our purpose in this briefing paper to describe the types of core services provided in 
XI-12

One-Stop centers. Information on the content of different tiers of customer services 

and how customers move through these tiers is found in the briefing paper entitled 

“Services for Adults and Dislocated Workers”.)

Framework for the Delivery of Core Services

Access to core services under the Workforce Investment Act is to be provided 

through the coordinated resources of all mandatory One-Stop partners as well as by 

One-Stop operators funded under WIA Title IB. In the local areas we visited in Round 

2, customers could usually access core services via several distinct entry paths, 

including the following:

 Receipt of staff assistance with labor exchange services, such as applying for 

UI benefits, registering in an automated job matching system, or receiving a 

job referral. These services may be available from Wagner-Peyser staff in a 

One-Stop center or stand-alone Job Service office, or from One-Stop center 

staff cross-trained in the use of labor exchange services.

 On-site visits to Resource Rooms within One-Stop centers, which specialize in 

self-service tools and multi-media resources and offer “light touch” staff 

support from designated Resource Room guides and specialists.

 Remote access to automated core services available through user stations in a 

variety of One-Stop affiliated sites or via the Internet from a customer’s home 

or work computer.

 Attendance at an orientation session and/or receipt of an initial needs 

assessment from cross-trained staff within One-Stop centers or from staff 

associated with individual One-Stop partner programs.

 Participation in one or more services from a menu of assisted core services 

provided by WIA Title IB staff or other One-Stop partners and available to the 

general public.

The One-Stop centers we visited vary substantially in how much effort is being 

made to consolidate or coordinate the different entry points to core services. At one 

end of the spectrum, several comprehensive One-Stop centers have designed an 

integrated “front-end” for all customer services, consisting of a shared greeter who is 

familiar with the entire range of services offered by all on-site partners and who assists 

all visitors to the center in determining what services they need and how to get to where 

they want to go. In one variant of integrated front-end services, highly trained greeters 

at the reception desk or resource specialists assigned to the Resource Room conduct 

initial discussions with all visitors to help identify individuals for whom intensive 

services may be needed. For example, in the Balance of Mariposa County (AZ), all 
XI-13

visitors to the Mesa One-Stop center meet briefly with a core career guidance specialist 

who provides a tour, conducts an intake evaluation, and makes an initial determination 

of services needed.

In another variant of integrated front-end services, all visitors are invited to use 

the Resource Room and offered basic assistance in using the various automated tools 

and written materials available in the Resource Room as a core service available to all 

customers. In this service design, customers are provided with a detailed orientation to 

the One-Stop center and an overview of all partner services only if they inquire about 

the availability of additional staff assistance. In the Capital Career Center (in 

Beaverton, Oregon), for example, customers who are interested in moving from the 

self-service tier of core services to the assisted tier of core services are encouraged to 

attend a One-Stop orientation and meet with a career specialist to help them decide 

whether to register with WIA to receive staff-assisted core services (which typically 

consists of a group assessment workshop and more individualized assistance in the 

Resource Room).

In the majority of the comprehensive One-Stop centers we visited, however, 

integrated front-end services end shortly after the customer receives the initial greeting 

from the shared receptionist, leaving staff from individual partner programs to address 

customers’ service needs. Thus, the delivery of services to One-Stop customers is 

most often the result of coordinated efforts among different partners operating as 

independent programs, rather than the result of an integrated service design and 

delivery system.

Responsibility for the Delivery of Core Services

In eleven of the fourteen local case study sites we visited in Round 2, a single 

program partner had primary responsibility for the delivery of core services to OneStop customers.5

 In all but one instance, this agency was either the designated OneStop operator or a member of the One-Stop operating consortium. In the Chicago 

local workforce investment area, the WIB hired separate contractors to provide core 

 

5

 As part of the development of MOUs among on-site partners, One-Stop partners in many of the 

comprehensive One-Stop centers have agreed to contribute limited amounts of staff hours as an in-kind 

contribution to support the operation of the Resource Rooms. Participating agency staff include 

Wagner-Peyser staff, Older Worker Program participants, and other members of One-Stop operating 

consortia.
XI-14

and intensive services in each of five comprehensive One-Stop centers using WIA 

funds, but did not designate these contractors as One-Stop operators. Instead, a 

consortium of ten mandated One-Stop partners share the operation of each of the OneStop centers using a center-level management operating team.

In contrast, One-Stop centers in three local case-study sites in Round 2 shared 

responsibility for the delivery of core services among several members of the One-Stop 

operator consortium. The design of core services in these three sites ranges along a 

continuum from loose coordination among core service partners to more highly 

structured coordination. In the mostly loosely coordinated site, three agencies that have 

a local history of not getting along each operate their own Resource Room and offer 

their own staffed services in separate offices in the same building. 

In a local One-Stop center that is beginning to build a more coordinated approach, 

Wagner-Peyser and WIA Title IB staff are both available to serve walk-in customers. 

Although these two agencies do not have a history of working together, they have found 

that serving customers together in the One-Stop center has led to closer collaboration 

between the two agencies. As part of these experiences in helping out in the Resource 

Room, the Wagner-Peyser staff member assigned to work in the One-Stop center has 

begun to help customers update their resumes and carry out their individual job search 

efforts.

The comprehensive One-Stop center in DuPage County (IL) offers a model of the 

collaborative design and delivery of an integrated menu of core services by a fouragency One-Stop operating consortium that includes the Wagner-Peyser and WIA Title 

IB agencies, a community college, and a nonprofit community-based service provider. 

Although each of the participating agencies is responsible primarily for providing 

services under its own program and funding stream, the partners have come together to 

offer a consolidated menu of Core A and Core B services available to the general 

public. Core A services include the provision of assistance and supervision in the 

resource room as well as participation in a job club. Core B services include a series of 

short group workshops on general employment skills topics, such as attitude 

management, goal setting, communication, interview simulation, stress management, 

resume clinics, assertiveness, computer fundamentals, and internet searching. As a 

result of this collaborative approach, a wide range of core services are available to the 

general public.
XI-15

Role of Wagner-Peyser Staff vs. WIA Title IB Staff in the 

Delivery of Core Services

In this project’s Interim Report, Early State and Local Progress toward One-Stop 

Implementation, we reported that Wagner-Peyser staff were dominant in the delivery of 

core services in the majority of the case study sites visited during the first study phase. 

The Interim Report, which summarized WIA implementation progress in six states that 

were “early implementers,” found that the Wagner-Peyser program was the designated 

funder as well as the primary provider of core services in 4 of 9 sites. In several of 

these cases, the Wagner-Peyser agency agreed to take sole responsibility for the 

delivery of core services, even though it was not the designated One-Stop operator. In 

the remaining 5 early implementation sites, Wagner-Peyser staff participated as 

members of local One-Stop consortia in the funding and delivery of core services.

The second round of implementation site visits suggests that the role of WagnerPeyser agency staff in the delivery of core services is less dominant than previously 

thought. Among the 14 local sites studied during the study’s second phase, WagnerPeyser staff are dominant in the delivery of core services in only 4 sites (29% of the 

total). In two of these sites, the Wagner-Peyser agency is the designated One-Stop 

operator. In the remaining two sites, it is a member of the local One-Stop operator 

consortium. In three sites with a dominant Wagner-Peyser role in the delivery of core 

services, the comprehensive One-Stop center is located at a former standalone Job 

Service facility and Wagner-Peyser funding is reported to be the sole funding source for 

core services for One-Stop customers. In the fourth site, each local partner provides its 

own core services with its own funds from its own separate office in a shared building; 

the Job Service partner has the most well-developed and most utilized resource room.6

In the remaining 10 sites (71% of the total), staff paid with WIA Title IB funds 

are the primary staff responsible for the delivery of core services in One-Stop centers. 

In seven of these sites, the state Wagner-Peyser agency is neither the designated OneStop operator nor a member of the local One-Stop operator consortium. In three other 

sites, even though the state Wagner-Peyser agency is a member of the local One-Stop 

operator consortium, Wagner-Peyser staff play only a subordinate role in the delivery 

of core services. 

 

6

 Case study respondents in this local site opined that the One-Stop center we visited should not 

really be considered a One-Stop center, due to the lack of even minimum levels of coordination among its 

partners.
XI-16

A review of the local service delivery arrangements suggests several reasons why 

Wagner-Peyser staff play only a limited role in the funding and delivery of core 

services within these local One-Stop systems. First, it is common for only a limited 

number of Wagner-Peyser staff to be “outstationed” at the One-Stop centers in these 

local areas. Most often, the state Wagner-Peyser agency still operates one or more 

stand-alone Job Service offices, sometimes located only a short distance from the OneStop center. Thus, only one or a handful of Wagner-Peyser staff are available at the 

One-Stop center to help staff Resource Rooms or assist customers with job search or 

job placement issues. 

Second, several of the case-study sites commented that the Wagner-Peyser 

program throughout their local area or state had embraced a self-service model of 

meeting jobseeker needs by making an automated job matching system available to 

onsite and remote users. In these areas, staff-assisted labor exchange services for 

jobseekers are no longer emphasized, even at full-service Job Service offices. 

Third, in a number of sites where Wagner-Peyser staff are available within OneStop centers to assist in the delivery of core services, they tend to specialize in the 

delivery of a discrete menu of labor-exchange services, including the following: 

working with employers to get job orders, providing local labor market information, 

helping with mass hiring requests from new or expanding businesses, responding to 

notices of large-scale layoffs, helping customers register for unemployment benefits, 

and helping jobseekers get registered in the state job matching system. Other One-Stop 

partners in these sites take most responsibility for staffing resource rooms, responding 

to job-seekers who want individualized assistance with job search, and providing group 

workshops as part of a menu of assisted core services.

Tracking the Delivery of Core Services

WIA permits local One-Stop partners to serve customers without WIA 

registration if they receive only self-service core services or if they receive only 

services funded from non-WIA sources. Since even the use of automated tools in a 

One-Stop Resource Room usually involves some level of staff support, there is usually 

room for interpreting the line at which self-service core services end and staff-assisted 

core services begin.

The partner agency responsible for operating the on-site Resource Room and/or 

staffing the reception desk is usually responsible for maintaining some kind of tally, 
XI-17

log, or other measure of the extent to which walk-in customers use self-service core 

services. In the comprehensive One-Stop centers we visited, such logs are usually 

maintained manually, rather than as part of automated databases. A common procedure 

for maintaining these records is for the One-Stop greeter to ask all Resource Room 

visitors to sign in and report what services they want to use. A few One-Stop centers 

have implemented an elaborate automated tracking system that measures which 

software programs Resource Room users opened, or a “swipe card” system that 

automatically tallies which work stations or offices a One-Stop visitor approached. 

Tracking systems are used to generate weekly and monthly totals of the number of OneStop visitors and to assess which services or tools are receiving the most customer use. 

Only two sites reported that they track the number of “hits” relevant websites receive 

from remote users.

Registration into the state Employment Service system offers another way to track 

customer usage, though this captures only of a portion of the assisted core services 

available to One-Stop customers. Thus, several local One-Stop centers in which 

Wagner-Peyser is an on-site local partner have arranged to use ES registration as an 

alternate way to track customer flow into core services. For example, in the 

Southwest Georgia Local Workforce Investment Area, the greeter encourages as many 

customers as possible to register in the ES system; respondents estimated that about 

75% of all One-Stop visitors are so registered. In Suffolk County’s (NY) One-Stop 

center, the Wagner-Peyser and WIA Title IB program staff have agreed to use ES 

registration for all One-Stop customers who receive staff-assisted services focused on 

job placement only. WIA registration is used for customers who are tracked into a 

fuller services plan.

Only five of the 14 local case-study sites included in Round 2 visits reported that 

they track customers who receive assisted core services using WIA registration. In the 

remaining sites, assisted core services are provided only using Wagner-Peyser funds 

(for which WIA registration is not required) and tracking is thus provided by 

registering such clients into the Wagner-Peyser system, rather than into WIA. 

STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO CORE SERVICES

One-Stop partnerships appear to be aware of different actions they could be taking 

to make comprehensive One-Stop centers and affiliate sites accessible to a wide variety 

of customer groups and are responding to the needs of special customer groups when 

feasible. Below, we describe the efforts they are making: (1) to provide flexible hours 
XI-18

of operation, (2) to increase geographic access using affiliate sites, remote access, and 

roving service staff; (3) to provide assistive technology to support the use of One-Stop 

services by individuals with disabilities, and (4) to develop the capacity to serve nonEnglish speaking customers.

Flexible Hours of Operation

Although a number of comprehensive One-Stop centers said they had explored the 

feasibility of providing night and weekend hours of operation to ensure that working 

people and students could access center services, only five of the fourteen local sites we 

visited during Round 2 had regularly scheduled evening hours (with centers open at 

least one evening a week until 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m.). Barriers to offering extended 

hours included opposition by one or more labor unions or state agencies responsible for 

affected staff, and a perceived low benefit in terms of increased customer usage 

compared to the high cost needed to implement extended hours. Saturday hours, in 

particular, had been attempted in one or two local areas, but had been abandoned due to 

low customer response.

The most responsive One-Stop centers in terms of flexible hours of operation 

include the comprehensive One-Stop centers in Suffolk County (NY) and Erie County 

(NY), both of which are open every weekday until 8:00 p.m. However even the 

centers that maintain regular business operating hours have sometimes made 

arrangements to offer services during extended hours to make them accessible to 

particular target groups. Examples include several centers that schedule evening 

classes targeted to TANF recipients and a center that sometimes opens on Saturdays to 

take UI claims from workers affected by large-scale layoffs.

Increasing Geographic Access

As previously discussed, some local One-Stop partnerships have encouraged the 

development of a number of affiliate and satellite sites to make automated One-Stop 

services available throughout the local community. Additionally, many One-Stop 

networks encourage customers to access automated services from individual homes and 

businesses, via the Internet by providing user-friendly linked web pages with a variety 

of informational and job matching tools. However, other sites believe that face-to-face 

customer contact is important, at least initially, to orient customers to the services 

available within the One-Stop system.
XI-19

Particularly notable are the following strategies designed to increase face-to-face 

access to One-Stop services:

 WIA Title IB staff from the comprehensive and satellite One-Stop centers in 

Lewiston and Round Up (MT) take one day each week to travel to remote 

locations in their six-county service area, where they serve customers by 

appointment and through walk-ins at a number of previously announced local 

community sites.

 Several One-Stop networks have created satellite locations at churches and 

local housing projects to reach out to residents who might not be able to come 

to services at comprehensive One-Stop centers.

 The local workforce investment board in Chicago has contracted with dozens

of community-based organizations around the city to serve as affiliate 

agencies. Not only are these affiliates spread out geographically, but they 

also specialize in conducting outreach and serving a wide variety of cultural 

and language groups and special needs populations. 

Serving Customers with Disabilities

Every comprehensive One-Stop center visited during Round 2 has made sure that 

its physical facility is compliant with the requirements of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, which describe 

accommodations that must be made to ensure that public facilities are accessible to 

individuals with disabilities. The participation of the state Vocational Rehabilitation 

agency in the local One-Stop partnership has been beneficial in nearly every local site, 

leading to complete assessments and assistance in making needed adjustments to the 

physical facility.

Local Vocational Rehabilitation partners have also been instrumental in helping 

One-Stop centers select and purchase assistive technology to make Resource Room 

tools accessible to customers with visibility, hearing, and other sensory or motor 

impairments. Among the technology adaptations purchased by the local case-study sites 

are computer monitors with zoom text options, touch-screen computers, voice-activated 

computer software, and text telephones (TTY). One local One-Stop center reported 

that its Vocational Rehabilitation partner has contributed over $25,000 worth of 

equipment to the Resource Room to make services available to hearing- and sightimpaired customers.

However, it will take more than physical and technology accommodations to 

enable comprehensive One-Stop centers to be effective in serving individuals with 
XI-20

disabilities. Staff at One-Stop centers seem to be at various points in terms of their

readiness to address the needs of customers with disabilities. Two of the less-prepared 

centers indicated that they will continue to refer individuals with identified disabilities 

to the separate local Vocational Rehabilitation office for assessment and service 

planning. In contrast, two other centers are building an impressive on-site staff 

capacity to serve One-Stop customers with disabilities. For example, the Medford

(OR) Education Resource Center has outfitted one of its classrooms as an assistive 

technology room that provides computer training and job search instruction for 

individuals with disabilities. This comprehensive One-Stop center has also provided a 

training session to staff from all partner agencies on serving customers with disabilities. 

In the DuPage County (IL) One-Stop center, one of the members of the operating 

consortium has received a grant that not only funded the purchase of assistive 

technology but covers the time of agency staff who assist individuals with disabilities in 

using the Resource Room.

Serving Non-English Speaking Customers

Depending on the characteristics of One-Stop customers and the size of the nonEnglish speaking population in the local workforce investment area, One-Stop centers 

have very different levels of demand for services to customers with limited English 

fluency. Strategies being used to respond to the needs of non-English speaking 

customers include the following:

 Two sites said that they maintain a list of local interpreters or are able to use 

the services of a local “translation phone line” to help staff communicate with 

non-English speaking customers. 

 A One-Stop center located at a community college says it uses the services of 

bilingual college students to respond to the needs of non-English speaking 

adult education students.

 One site has translated its marketing brochure into Spanish. Another provides 

both English and Spanish language materials in the resource room.

 In the Portland, Oregon local area, One-Stop Operators are required to have 

bilingual staff appropriate to the needs of the local community. Because 

bilingual workers are in high demand and short supply in the local labor 

market, the local WIB is exploring the feasibility of training and hiring 

bilingual youth as interpreters in One-Stop centers.

 One local One-Stop partnership offers free space at the comprehensive OneStop center to a nonprofit agency that serves Latino customers and has two 
XI-21

bilingual staff. In exchange, these staff assist in serving all One-Stop 

customers with limited English skills.

ONE-STOP INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE DELIVERY OF INTENSIVE AND 

TRAINING SERVICES

As with the design and delivery of core services, most comprehensive One-Stop 

centers can be characterized as having the coordinated delivery of intensive services 

provided by independent programs, rather than as having an integrated menu of 

intensive services. It is not clear whether the current stage of “co-location plus 

coordination” is a final stage in the development of a One-Stop infrastructure or 

whether it is part of a transition toward closer service delivery relationships among 

program partners over time. As described at the end of this briefing section, program 

partners seem to be optimistic about the benefits of the current level of co-location and 

coordination within One-Stop systems.

Coordinated Assessment and Entry into Intensive Services

Among the 14 local case-study sites we visited in Round 2, only two local areas 

have developed a shared intake form that is used across multiple One-Stop partners to 

determine from which categorical programs a customer is likely to be eligible to receive 

services. In the Medford (OR) One-Stop center, if customers are interested in 

receiving intensive services, they fill out a one-page intake form and attend an 

orientation sessions which describes all partners’ services. The intake form uses 20 

different questions to screen eligibility for different programs. Similarly, in the 

comprehensive One-Stop centers in the Portland (OR) local workforce investment area, 

the One-Stop Operator and other One-Stop partners share a reception, orientation, and 

initial intake process, although official program enrollment is completed by staff from 

each individual program.

At the remaining sites, where unified written intake forms have not been 

developed, One-Stop systems depend on the staff that interfaces with One-Stop visitors 

at reception desks and in resource rooms to conduct informal initial assessments and 

identify persons who could benefit from more intensive services. Staff in these 

positions have usually received formal training on the services available from, and 

eligibility rules for, each of the One-Stop partners’ programs. In addition, at most 

sites, orientation is a voluntary service that One-Stop visitors can sign up for, if they 

want more information about the intensive services available from different programs.
XI-22

At several sites without coordinated intake processes, both Wagner-Peyser and 

WIA Title IB staff offer intensive services to individuals for whom self-service 

resources are not sufficient. In two of these sites where the state Employment Service 

is the One-Stop operator, One-Stop customers usually start out receiving services from 

Wagner-Peyser staff. Individuals requesting staff-assisted services (such as 

individualized help with job development/job placement) will be referred to an intensive 

services case manager within the Wagner-Peyser system. If a customer subsequently 

indicates interest in education or training, the Wagner-Peyser case manager will refer 

the individual to staff from the WIA program. 

In the Suffolk County (NY) One-Stop center, staff from the Wagner-Peyser and 

WIA programs coordinate more closely with each other during the initial intake process 

to determine which individuals are likely to receive job placement services only, and 

which are likely to participate in training. One-Stop staff register individuals in the 

first group with Job Service for intensive services related to job search and job 

placement; they enroll individuals from the second group into WIA and offer them a 

menu of intensive services consisting of career-preparation workshops, focus groups, 

and training.

Coordinated Enrollment and Case Management

Formal integration of caseloads and the creation of a consolidated case 

management system across multiple programs has taken place within some One-Stop 

centers, but generally it occurs only when the same agency is responsible for 

administering multiple programs. In these instances, consolidated case management 

systems generally pre-dated the implementation of WIA. For example, in the Suffolk 

County (NY) One-Stop center, the Suffolk County Department of Labor and the County 

Department of Social Services have succeeded in creating a truly seamless service 

system for the delivery of services under WIA Title I, TANF, and the federally-funded 

Welfare-to-Work program. Similarly, in rural Minnesota, the Concentrated 

Employment Program—which administers thirty-five different state and local programs 

including WIA Title IB—has completely consolidated the staffing for the programs it 

operates internally by creating integrated case management teams across all programs.

Where separate department and agency identities exist, agency boundaries have 

prevented the implementation of consolidated program services. However, a number of 

One-Stop partners have identified a variety of formal and informal opportunities to 
XI-23

coordinate their resources for customers who are likely to need services from more than 

one program, as described below. 

 In several sites, the agencies responsible for Vocational Rehabilitation and 

TANF services are encouraging customers enrolled in their programs to use 

the Resource Rooms, job matching systems, and other core services available 

at the One-Stop center. 

 In two different local areas (DuPage County, Illinois, and Northeast Georgia), 

the local TANF program is interested in developing a shared intake process 

that would immediately link individuals applying for public assistance to 

employment services provided by other One-Stop partners. In Northeast 

Georgia, this would be accomplished via the use of a teleconferencing 

connection between the two offices.

 Informal staff coordination and case conferencing are emerging as effective 

solutions in the Southwestern Georgia local area. In the comprehensive OneStop center, individual staff often consult with each other about specific 

clients to develop coordinated services. In a satellite site, this process takes 

place during weekly staff meetings when case managers discuss how funds 

and services from partner programs can be coordinated to serve individual 

clients.

 In several local sites, resource sharing agreements have been developed 

between TANF, WIA, the Wagner-Peyser program, and the Vocational 

Rehabilitation agencies to coordinate services designed to meet the needs of 

shared clients. 

 In Northeast Georgia, the TANF agency pays the Vocational 

Rehabilitation agency to provide intensive assessment and 

sheltered work experience to certain long-term welfare recipients 

with psychological and other disabilities. 

 In Yuma (AZ), the WIB contracts with the TANF agency to 

provide a two-week long life-skills workshop at the One-Stop 

center as an intensive service for WIA enrollees.

 In Suffolk County (NY), the county agency responsible for 

administering WIA Title IB and federal Welfare-to-Work funds 

and the agency responsible for the TANF program are jointly 

operating a One-Stop satellite center that is specifically targeted 

to the workforce development needs of TANF recipients and 

former TANF recipients. 

Mutual Referral and Purchase of Service Agreements

Even when programs are co-located and operating independently, the 

relationships between and among One-Stop partner programs under WIA are 
XI-24

characterized by increased information sharing about program services and features and 

gradually increasing staff familiarity with the resources available from other partner 

programs. Co-location also appears to dramatically increase the level of day-to-day 

communication and good-will between staff from different agencies. At a minimum, 

the increased awareness of and familiarity with each others’ programs makes it possible 

for One-Stop partners to make improved mutual referrals of customers. 

In a number of cases, increased familiarity with community resources has led to 

the development of close referral relationships between WIA Title IB program 

operators and a variety of entities providing adult basic education services and prevocational training. Sometimes these relationships are formalized using purchase-ofservice agreements, whereby WIA enrollees are referred to on-site or off-site adult 

basic education or GED training paid for with WIA funds. Computer training classes 

offered by public and private vendors is another intensive service that is often provided 

to individual WIA enrollees as a pre-vocational service through a purchase-of-service 

agreement with a local community provider. In other instances, adult basic education 

and pre-vocational services are available to WIA enrollees through informal referral 

arrangements, at no cost to the WIA system. 

As One-Stop partners become familiar with each others’ programs, they can begin 

to identify service gaps and look for improved services that can better meet their 

clients’ needs. Additionally, some of the One-Stop partners we met during on-site 

visits indicated that their services are now more consistent with the WIA program’s 

emphasis on successful employment outcomes as a result of their increased contact with 

One-Stop staff. In one local site, for example, adult education and literacy providers 

said that they now viewed themselves as One-Stop partners, responsible for 

coordinating services with other partners, rather than just as vendors of their own 

service. In another site, community college staff said they are now paying more 

attention to providing case management and support services to their clients to ensure 

that participants have successful outcomes.

As they gain increased familiarity with the staff and services associated with other 

One-Stop programs by working together in the same facility or developing resource 

sharing arrangements, staff from multiple partner programs also report that they are 

getting along better with other programs, that there is less miscommunication and illwill among and between agencies, and that co-location and improved coordination of 
XI-25

core and intensive services appear to be leading to improved outcomes for their 

individually enrolled clients.

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS

Although many of the case-study local areas identified linking their economic 

development and workforce development systems as a high priority goal, fewer sites 

had undertaken to transform the design and delivery of services to local employers as 

part of furthering that goal.7

Five of the 14 local workforce investment areas studied in Round 2 identify the 

Job Service as the sole provider of services to employers and have not yet redesigned 

the menu of employers services to meet new WIA objectives. The traditional employer 

services available in these five local areas include soliciting and completing job orders 

from local employers, recruiting and screening jobseekers prior to referral to 

employers, holding on-site job fairs for groups of local employers and job seekers, and 

providing on-site rooms for employers to use in interviewing, testing, or screening job 

applicants. Some of these sites still emphasize the delivery of staff-assisted services to 

employers; others are encouraging employers to take advantage of self-service options 

(such as posting job orders directly on the Internet). 

Another five local workforce investment areas we visited during Round 2 have 

identified employer services as an area of One-Stop services that should be jointly 

undertaken by all One-Stop partners with WIB policy guidance, but have not yet taken 

specific steps to review and modify local employer service offerings. During this 

critical transition period, local One-Stop centers in these local areas are attempting to 

link workforce development and economic development strategies by offering 

customized training and/or on-the-job training services as well as incumbent worker 

training services to local businesses. However, in contrast to the four local areas 

described below that have more well-developed employer services, training services are 

being marketed piecemeal to individual businesses in these local areas, rather than as an 

organized sectoral strategy. Another weakness in marketing employer services in at 

least one of these local areas is that Job Service and WIA Title IB staff are marketing 

 

7

 See the evaluation’s separate report, Business as Partner and Customer under WIA: A Study of 

Innovative Practices, for a fuller discussion of strategies for engaging business customers.
XI-26

their services separately, rather than as part of a unified menu of One-Stop employer 

services. 

The remaining four local workforce investment areas offer emerging models of 

how to transform employer services to address WIA goals and priorities. 

 In Chicago, the WIB has determined that integrated employer service teams 

will work out of each One-Stop center to provide employers with a single 

unified point of contact. The WIB’s Employer Demand Committee has 

identified five industry sectors that the workforce development system should 

get involved in to promote economic growth: healthcare, manufacturing, 

technology, transportation, and retail/hospitality. To help employers form 

partnerships with the local workforce development system, the WIB has 

prepared an employers’ resource guide to the workforce development system.

 The One-Stop system in DuPage County (IL) markets its services to 

employers as an integrated One-Stop system. As a member of the One-Stop 

operator consortium, the community college offers employers access to 

training for incumbent workers through a separate Business Professional 

Institute.

 In the Portland (OR) local workforce investment area, services to employers 

are organized into two tiers: one carried out at the three-county regional level 

and one carried out by individual One-Stop centers. Regional initiatives are 

carried out by the WIB and WIA administrative entity by building 

partnerships with large employers and entire industry sectors. In addition to 

working directly with employers and employer associations, the WIB helps 

facilitate partnerships between employers and local education agencies. For 

example, the WIB is helping local community colleges partner with businesses 

that employ metalworkers to upgrade worker skills in the metals industry. At 

the center level, each One-Stop center has a business services consultant 

charged with responding to the needs of local businesses. Some local OneStop centers are developing menus of new services to offer local employers, 

such as drug testing of job applicants on a fee-for-service basis.

 In the Medford (OR) local workforce investment area, the regional Business 

Response Team initially developed to respond to large-scale layoffs has taken 

on a new role of designing employer services to further regional goals. In 

addition to the traditional offerings of recruiting and screening job applicants, 

the Business Response Team has developed services to respond to employers 

needs for workplace readiness training, basic skills training for incumbent 

workers, child care referral assistance, and job retention skills training 

(including job coaching, training, and support services provided at the 

employer’s worksite).
XI-27

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In describing their goals for the development of comprehensive workforce 

development systems under WIA, state and local workforce investment boards 

acknowledged that there was much room for improvement over the previous patchwork 

system of separate programs. In fact, one of the underlying assumptions of the goals 

they described is that the separate identities and agendas of different funding streams 

and programs can be subordinated to a larger shared community agenda of meeting 

customer needs. As we have described, however, convincing individual program 

managers to subordinate their individual program identities to the development of a 

shared menu of services for customers needing core, intensive, and training services 

has been a challenging task in most local areas.

In building a One-Stop infrastructure for the coordinated delivery of core and 

intensive workforce development services consistent with this vision, local workforce 

investment areas have tended to exhibit the following patterns:

1. Local areas enunciated a wide variety of goals for the workforce systems they were 

creating, including better linking workforce development and economic 

development strategies, coordinating services for job seekers and employers, and 

improving system visibility.

2. Several states took the opportunity to “grandfather” One-Stop centers that had 

existed prior to WIA, and several additional states continue to play an active role in 

the approval of comprehensive centers. However, in general local workforce 

investment boards are now the key players in certifying new One-Stop centers and 

chartering One-Stop operators. 

3. Six of the 14 local areas we studied had certified only a single comprehensive 

center; the remaining areas had from two to nine centers. Because the local areas 

vary so widely in geographic size and population density, it is difficult to draw 

conclusions about the adequacy of the existing infrastructure. However, some areas 

were very aggressive in establishing multiple access points, through satellites and 

affiliate sites, including ones for specially targeted populations (e.g., persons in 

public housing, those of certain ethnic groups, etc.).

4. Local workforce investment boards have designated a wide variety of local 

organizations to act as operators for comprehensive One-Stop centers. The most 

common organizational arrangement is for a consortium of One-Stop partners to act 

as the One-Stop operator; the selection of the operator through a competitive 

process was uncommon. Key roles for the One-Stop operator include managing the 

physical facility and providing core services. Where additional on-site partners 

participate in the delivery of core services, the One-Stop operator often coordinates 

the delivery of core services or facilitates an inter-agency management group.
XI-28

5. The facilities initially selected to house comprehensive One-Stop centers were often 

previously used as a freestanding service site by one of the participating partners. 

Because of this history, a single agency often continues to hold the lease and “host” 

the One-Stop facility, with or without financial contributions from other 

participating partners. Facilities for the earliest One-Stop centers under WIA have 

not always been conducive to shared delivery of services by One-Stop partners. In 

several instances, new One-Stop facilities developed cooperatively after the first or 

second year of WIA implementation are more supportive of coordinated services, 

with larger reception and resource areas, and more open space for staff from 

multiple partners to share service delivery operations.

6. Automated self-service tools have been instrumental in making core services 

available to businesses and individuals throughout a broad geographic area. Most 

local workforce investment areas have developed relationships with a wide variety 

of institutional affiliates—including public housing agencies, libraries, welfare 

offices, Job Service offices, and non-profit community organizations—to offer a 

wide range of self-service and staff-assisted services to One-Stop customers. Less 

commonly, some sites have made other special efforts to promote access to core 

services, such as by offering extended hours of operation for their One-Stop centers 

(e.g., weekend or evening hours) and providing interpreters for non-English 

speakers.

7. In the majority of the comprehensive One-Stop centers we visited, integrated frontend services end shortly after the customer receives the initial greeting from the 

shared receptionist, leaving staff from individual partner programs to address 

customers’ core and intensive service needs. Thus, the delivery of core services to 

One-Stop customers is most often the result of coordinated efforts among different 

partners operating as independent programs, rather than the result of an integrated 

service design and delivery system. In the majority of local sites we visited, the 

WIA Title IB administrative agency or its contractor has primary responsibility for 

the delivery of core services to the general public. 

It has been difficult to realize WIA goals for the creation of comprehensive and 

coordinated One-Stop delivery systems in the absence of unified federal and state 

systems for planning and overseeing different workforce development resource streams. 

Local respondents often noted that as long as individual programs continue to have their 

own reporting requirements and individual program performance goals, they will 

continue to view their individual program objectives as more important than any shared 

One-Stop goals. Unified State Plans, while promoting the appearance of coordinated 

funding streams, have not provided an effective framework for weaving together 

individual resource streams at the local level. Local workforce investment boards can 

encourage the development of coordinated systems, but usually lack the authority to 

control the expenditure of funds other than WIA Title IB funds. 
XI-29

Despite the challenges noted above, local workforce investment areas are 

developing a shared One-Stop infrastructure through steady changes to their previous 

ways of doing business, rather than by starting over with a clean slate to integrate 

program operations. As a result of these changes, a broad range of One-Stop partners 

now have staff working on-site at comprehensive and satellite One-Stop centers at least 

part-time. This has led to increased face-to-face communication among program 

partners, increased familiarity with partners’ programs, and a greater sense of goodwill 

among partners whose previous relationships were sometimes tenuous or even 

unfriendly.

As a result of the co-location and coordination of a variety of workforce 

development agencies within One-Stop centers, the menu of core services available to 

the general customer has increased substantially in many sites, and the number of 

individuals using walk-in or remote-access services to obtain user-friendly information 

about labor markets, careers, education/training opportunities, and local employers has 

increased dramatically in some sites. Although not all local areas have transformed 

their menu of services to address the needs of the universal customer, a number of OneStop partners have coordinated their individual program resources to offer a wider 

range of assisted core services to all One-Stop visitors, including brief individual job 

search counseling sessions and short-term workshops on a variety of job search and 

career information topics. 

Most disappointing, to date, is the limited progress that has been made to develop 

a seamless system of services for employers that will help further some of the One-Stop 

systems’ most challenging goals: (1) attracting a broad range of employers into the 

public labor exchange, including employers listing high skill, high wage, and 

professional jobs; (2) making One-Stop centers attractive to the job seekers and 

incumbent workers looking for the skills that will enable them to enter high-wage jobs 

and move up career ladders; and (3) weaving employers and educational institutions 

into effective partnerships that can support and stimulate regional economic.
XI-30

Exhibit 1: One-Stop Operators and Partners’ Roles

Case Study Site/

# of One-Stop Centers One-Stop Operator(s) 

Role of WIA Staff/Funds in Delivering 

Core Services

Role of Wagner-Peyser Staff & Funds 

in Delivering Core Services

Role of Other On-Site 

Partners

Balance of Mariposa 

County, AZ 

(1 county, excluding city 

of Phoenix)

2 comprehensive centers 

at time of site visit, and 

several satellites

County Human Services 

Department (WIA 

administrative entity)

At most sites, core and intensive services 

are staffed almost exclusively by County 

Human Services (WIA) staff. This 

includes some labor exchange staff 

functions (WIA staff have been trained to 

use ES MIS).

One Job Service staff on-site full-time at 

One-Stop center. Most ES services are 

provided at separate ES offices. Within 

One-Stop, the emphasis is on self-service 

for labor exchange. ES office is one 

block away: referral to ES office for 

staffed labor exchange services.

Participation in delivery 

of core services by Older 

Workers participant, and 

one Job Services staff onsite full-time.

Yuma, AZ 

(1 county)

1 full-service career 

center

Yuma PIC (WIB) 

received waiver from 

state to operate the OneStop center and offer 

core, intensive and 

training services.

Other than ES staff, WIB/WIA staff 

provide all core services on site.

ES has one staff representative on- site at 

One-Stop who assists with core and some 

intensive services. ES also maintains 

separate offices.

Nearly all staff at center 

are YPIC staff.

Northeast Georgia 

(12 counties)

1 center in Athens, 

Georgia; use RVs as 

mobile access points

Georgia Department of 

Labor (ES/UI/TAA)

WIA funds focused on training. Core services provided entirely by 

Wagner-Peyser staff 

Limited collocation by 

partners.

Southwest Georgia 

(14 counties)

1 center chartered in 

2000; 5 additional ES 

offices chartered as OneStop centers in October 

2001. WIB hopes to 

eventually have one 

center in each county. 

Georgia Department of 

Labor (ES/UI/TAA)

For now, WIA funds are focused on 

training. If additional centers are 

established, core services will be provided 

using WIA funds.

Core and intensive services provided 

entirely by Wagner Peyser staff. ES 

maintains several separate offices.

All centers have some 

collocation from 

partners.
XI-31

Case Study Site/

# of One-Stop Centers One-Stop Operator(s) 

Role of WIA Staff/Funds in Delivering 

Core Services

Role of Wagner-Peyser Staff & Funds 

in Delivering Core Services

Role of Other On-Site 

Partners

Chicago, IL

(1 city)

5 comprehensive centers,

with 33 satellites

Consortia of partners, led 

by “Operations Team” 

including representatives 

of all partners. However, 

centers are run by 

separate contractors

Core services are provided by center 

contractors, including resource room, 

greeter position.

ES is collocated but largely operates

independently. ES isn’t supportive of 

cross-training ES and WIA staff.

Some collocation at all 

sites.

DuPage County, IL 

(1 county)

1 comprehensive OneStop center; no satellites, 

but has affiliate sites

Consortium includes 4 

agencies: ES, WIA, 

community college, and 

non-profit agency 

WIA Employment Services Unit provides 

core services, but partners participate as 

well.

ES, as a member of the operating 

consortium, helps staff core services, 

including reception, resource room, 

workshops, job club, marketing and 

outreach. ES has now expanded its 

services and works together with other 

partners to improve job clubs, 

workshops, and improve service 

referrals

Fairly strong partnerships 

in evidence

Rural Minnesota CEP 

(19 counties)

9 comprehensive OneStop centers, and no 

satellites

Statewide operator 

consortium includes 

WIA, ES, VR, State 

Services for the Blind. 

All WIA core and intensive services are 

provided by WIA administrative entity, 

with part-time assistance of an ES staff 

member

ES provides 1 staff to help staff resource 

room. ES has pushed self-service model 

since development of automated job bank 

system. ES orientation presents all 

partners’ services and includes exposure 

to resource room. ES also provides a 4-

hour job search seminar for UI profilees, 

which is also offered to universal 

customer

Partners are on-site

Balance of State, MT

(46 counties)

1 One-Stop center

designated, but not yet 

certified by local WIB; 

serves 6 county sub-area

3 program consortium 

includes Job Service, 

WIA Title I, Vocational 

Rehabilitation/WtW 

Each co-located partner has its own 

resource room, but most customers are 

served by Job Service; WIA is identified as 

an agency serving low-income people. 

WIA offers a job club once a week (no 

coordination with Job Service).

Job Service has the most well-developed 

resource room, gets about 25 customers 

a day. 

3 co-located partners—

Wagner Peyser, WIA, 

and Vocational 

Rehabilitation—provide 

separate services in 

separate offices within a 

shared building.
XI-32

Case Study Site/

# of One-Stop Centers One-Stop Operator(s) 

Role of WIA Staff/Funds in Delivering 

Core Services

Role of Wagner-Peyser Staff & Funds 

in Delivering Core Services

Role of Other On-Site 

Partners

Suffolk County, NY

(1 county)

1 comprehensive OneStop center and several 

satellites

Consortium includes 

Suffolk County 

Department of Labor 

(WIA and WtW) and 

County Department of 

Social Services (TANF) 

WIA staff are the primary providers of 

core services in the comprehensive OneStop, but other co-located partners help 

out: all on-site staff are willing to assist 

each other. Intensive services provided 

primarily by WIA staff and contractors.

Although ES is not a member of the 

operator consortium, it is perceived as 

strong and cooperative on-site partner; 

staff help out in resource room and 

delivery of staff-assisted job placement 

services (4-5 ES staff are on-site at 

comprehensive One-Stop center.) 

Extensive collocation; 

very strong partnerships

Erie County, NY 

(1 county, including city 

of Buffalo)

2 comprehensive OneStop centers (one in 

county, one in city); 2 

satellites and some 

affiliate sites

WIA administrative 

entity—Buffalo/Erie 

County Workforce 

Development Consortium 

(WDC). One center is 

directed by city staff; one 

is directed by community 

college staff. 

One-Stop operator (WIA administrative 

entity) is responsible for coordination of 

partners and services.

In first comprehensive center, WIA staff 

provide most core and intensive services.

In second comprehensive center, staff from 

community college (reimbursed with WIA 

funds) provide most core and intensive 

services.

ES has a staff member collocated at the 

Buffalo One-Stop center. ES runs four 

other ES centers within the county that 

are affiliated sites (primarily interact 

through referrals). 

ES is not a member of operator 

consortium.

Strong partnerships that 

have greatly strengthened 

under WIA. 

Portland Area, OR

(3 counties)

7 full-service One-Stop

centers, and 2 affiliate 

sites

Competitive RFP used to 

select One-Stop 

operators; these include 

community colleges (4 

centers) and nonprofit 

organization (3 centers).

Generally, One-Stop operator provides all 

core services, though partners provide 

some services as well.

Collocation of ES staff varies widely 

across centers, from several on-site staff 

to off-site referrals only. ES staff assist 

with providing self-assisted core 

services.

Varies by center, but 

partners usu. share 

reception, orientation, 

and basic intake. In 

some centers, partners 

help provide resource 

room services

Medford Area, OR

(2 counties)

1 comprehensive center 

and 1 more in 

development; numerous 

affiliate sites

One-Stop operating 

consortium includes ES, 

community college, 

TANF, Goodwill 

Industries, Southern

Oregon University, WIA, 

and Vocational 

Rehabilitation. 

At comprehensive One-Stop, WIA staff 

cover the resource room and provide staffassisted core and intensive services.

WIA pays for full-time greeter, and other 

staff cover at lunch.

ES has 11 staff collocated at One-Stop 

centers and affiliates around region. 

Where ES staff are on-site, labor 

exchange functions include directing 

customers to ES job database and 

employment services, providing 

information and enrolling customer into 

UI and ES. Where ES is not on-site, 

other partners direct customers to 

automated web sites.

Very strong partnerships. 

On-site partners (welfare, 

community college, or 

ES) may make some 

staff-assisted services 

available to WIA core 

and intensive customers. 

All staff wear One-Stop 

name badges.
XI-33

Case Study Site/

# of One-Stop Centers One-Stop Operator(s) 

Role of WIA Staff/Funds in Delivering 

Core Services

Role of Wagner-Peyser Staff & Funds 

in Delivering Core Services

Role of Other On-Site 

Partners

Southwestern Virginia

(8 jurisdictions)

2 comprehensive centers 

and 3 satellites

Consortium consisting of 

state ES agency; 

community action 

agencies, housing and 

redevelopment authority, 

Title I adult agency, 

WtW agency

WIA focused on training. ES staffs reception desk, assists 

customers with labor exchange and 

resource room.

Core services are relatively undeveloped. 

History of strong 

informal relations among 

partners

Hampton Roads, VA 

(8 jurisdictions)

2 comprehensive One 

Stops, and 3 satellites

Consortium with WIA, 

Head Start/Community 

service, older Americans, 

community college 

Core services include monthly workshops 

on Internet usage, interview strategies, 

entrepreneurship, email and stress 

management.

WIA provides all workshops and 

assessments (intensive services)

ES is not a member of operator 

consortium. ES services are almost 

completely self-service.

1 ES staff is on-site at main One-Stop 

center full time; takes a turn staffing 

resource room along with other on-site 

partners.

WIA staff predominates, 

but on-site partners take 

turns supplying a staff 

member to look after the 

resource room. 

Otherwise, on-site 

partners provide own 

programs’ services.


 
XII-1

XII. SERVING THE HOMELESS THROUGH THE 

ONE-STOP SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY

In the summer of 1999, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) awarded Social 

Policy Research Associates (SPR) a contract for the national Evaluation of the 

Implementation of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). As described in the appendix 

to this paper, the evaluation consists of multiple data collection components, using both 

qualitative and quantitative research methods, which can be divided into three distinct 

phases. As part of the first two phases, field staff conducted site visits to 14 states and 

23 local areas to understand broad issues of WIA implementation and operations, such 

as the transition from JTPA to WIA, partnership building, governance, and service 

design and delivery. Also as part of these earlier phases, SPR tracked indicators of 

states’ and local areas’ progress towards implementing required WIA elements 

nationwide, as well as analyzed client-level data on program participants to understand 

the extent to which client characteristics and services changed as local areas transitioned 

from JTPA to WIA. As shown in the appendix, a total of 19 reports and papers were 

produced from these first two phases of the study. 

The year 2003 marked the beginning of the third and final phase of the 

evaluation, yielding four additional papers. Rather than revisiting broad-level 

implementation issues, this phase focused on two narrowly defined topics: (1) the 

engagement of businesses as part of One-Stop strategic planning and as customers, and 

(2) One-Stop services to special populations. Each of these topics branched into a 

distinct but related sub-study under Phase III. 

The special populations sub-study, of which this paper is a part, is specifically 

concerned with how three particular groups—limited-English-proficient individuals 

(LEPs), the homeless, and migrant and seasonal farmworkers (MSFWs)—can be 

effectively served within the One-Stop context. With this question in mind, field staff 

conducted site visits in December 2003 and January 2004 to 18 additional local 

workforce investment areas. Three of these areas were included in our sample 

specifically because of their homeless-serving strategies. These are: Pima County, 

Arizona; Portland Worksystems, Oregon; and Coastal Counties, Maine. In addition to 

these three sites, this paper is informed to a much smaller degree by a site visit to the 
XII-2

Capital Area Michigan Works local area—a site we studied as part of the business 

engagement sub-study.1

The three primary sites listed above were selected as part of a difficult process to 

identify local areas that had extensive experience and innovative strategies in working 

with the homeless in the One-Stop context. As part of this process, we requested 

nominations from DOL and special interest organizations and used web research to 

identify a small pool of potential sites. Next, we conducted preliminary telephone 

interviews with each site to narrow this pool to the three local areas whose practices in 

serving the homeless we profile in this paper. Given the difficulty we experienced in 

finding potential local areas that met our selection criteria, and the small number we 

eventually visited, the sites we studied should be viewed as case studies of different 

models of serving the homeless in the One-Stop context.

INTRODUCTION

Measuring the prevalence of homelessness presents a serious challenge, 

particularly because homelessness is often a temporary condition rather than a 

permanent status. In addition, attempts to measure homelessness are made more 

difficult by varying definitions of homelessness and imperfect methodologies that often 

result in undercounts, particularly of those who are intermittently rather than 

chronically homeless, and of those who are homeless but in less visible locations. That 

said, a study by the Urban Institute in 2000 estimated that approximately 3.5 million 

individuals are likely to experience homelessness in a given year. 

The causes of homelessness are often just as difficult to pinpoint as its frequency,

with both macro- and micro-level factors being cited by various organizations and 

individuals. For instance, trends in wages, public assistance and rental housing have all 

been pointed to as contributors to the nation’s increase in homelessness over the past 

quarter-century. With respect to wages, some point to factors such as a decrease in the 

number of manufacturing jobs, an increase in non-standard work such as temporary and 

part-time employment, and an erosion in the value of the minimum wage.2 Low-wage 

 

1

 Though the special populations and business engagement sub-studies each had their own 

respective set of site visits, site visitors on each team asked limited questions about the other sub-study 

while on site.

2

 Mishel, L., Bernstein, J., and Schmitt, J. The State of Working America: 1998-1999. 1999, 

Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC.
XII-3

workers have been particularly affected by these wage trends; the real value of the 

minimum wage in 1997 was 18.1% less than its value in 1979.3 Stagnant or declining 

wage trends and less secure jobs have put housing out of reach for many workers, 

particularly low-wage workers, which has, in turn, led to an increase in the number of 

impoverished workers at homeless shelters.4 

Some also cite the decreasing value and availability of public assistance as a 

contributor to the rise in homelessness. Between 1970 and 1994, the typical state’s 

AFDC benefits for a family of three fell 47 percent, even with an adjustment for 

inflation.5 In 2000, only about half of eligible families participated in Temporary 

Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), compared with nearly eight in 10 families in 

1996.6

There have been trends in the private housing market that some feel are 

significant to explaining the rise in homelessness. The gap between the number of lowincome renters and the number of affordable housing units has exploded from near nonexistent, to a shortfall of 4.4 million affordable units—the largest shortage ever 

recorded.7 In addition, only about one-fourth of eligible families receive federal 

housing subsidies, highlighting the tremendous gap between demand and supply.8

Finally, the destruction of Single Room Occupancy (SRO) housing, the effective 

end of involuntary commitment for the mentally ill, the deinstitutionalization of the 

mentally ill without sufficient housing, the crack epidemic, and the declining frequency 

 

3

 Ibid.

4

 In every state, more than the minimum wage is required to afford a one- or two-bedroom 

apartment at Fair Market Rent. National Coalition for the Homeless. “Why are People Homeless?” 

September 2003. Available online at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/causes.html

5

 Greenberg, Mark and Jim Baumohl “Income Maintenance: Little Help Now, Less on the Way,” 

in Homelessness in America, 1996, Oryx Press. Available from the National Coalition for the Homeless, 

Washington, DC.

6

 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. “Falling TANF Caseload Amidst Rising Poverty Should 

Be a Cause for Concern.” 2003. Available online at http://www.cbpp.org/9-4-03tanf.pdf.

7

 Institute for Children and Poverty. A Shelter is Not a Home: Or is it? April 2001. Available 

online at www.homesforthehomeless.com/ or from the Institute for Children and Poverty, New York, 

NY 10003.

8

 National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2004. www.nlihc.org
XII-4

of marriage among women with children have also all been assigned a role in the 

growth of homelessness.9

Just as there are myriad potential macro-level factors contributing to 

homelessness, there are also myriad potential individual-level factors preventing an end 

to homelessness, not the least of which is insufficient education, skills or work 

experience to secure a living-wage job. 

A number of key lessons have emerged from programs specifically designed to 

assist homeless individuals find and maintain employment, including those from the Job 

Training for the Homeless Demonstration Program (JTHDP). Authorized by the 

Stewart B. McKinney Act and administered by DOL, JTHDP tested a range of 

employment, training and supportive service strategies specifically designed and 

implemented to assist the homeless in finding and retaining employment. For just over 

seven years, JTHDP grantees—which included CBOs as well as JTPA Service Delivery 

Areas (SDAs) across the nation—provided services to over 45,000 homeless 

individuals. 

The experiences of the JTHDP grantees confirmed the key challenges faced by 

the homeless in finding employment—such as lack of education and competitive work 

skills, disabling conditions, and lack of supportive services—and highlighted key 

elements of successful employment programs—including access to case management; 

assessment and employability planning; job training services that include remedial 

education, vocational training and job search assistance; job development and 

placement; housing services; and supportive and follow-up services. Also underscored 

by grantees’ experience was the critical need to establish strong partnerships between 

employment and training agencies and local homeless-serving organizations, stabilize 

homeless individuals in terms of housing and other emergency services prior to 

engaging them in employment and training services, and provide continuous assessment 

and case management services in order to then provide a set of services targeted to each 

homeless individual’s unique combination of needs. Overall, given the range and 

intensity of services that the homeless need to move into gainful employment, JTHDP 

grantees found it necessary to engage in careful planning of the local service delivery 

system, and to establish strong client-coordination procedures among agencies. 

 

9

 Jencks, Christopher. The Homeless. 1994, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
XII-5

Although JTHDP funding was cut in FY1995, DOL has worked to help ensure 

that the critical lessons and practices gleaned from the JTHDP are used to build the 

capacity of national employment programs to serve the homeless. In addition, given the 

Bush Administration’s New Freedom Initiative and its pledge to end chronic 

homelessness within ten years, and renewed focus on the Interagency Council on the 

Homeless (Council), increasing attention and resources have been given to help 

integrate homeless individuals into the workforce. A series of interagency funding 

collaborations—such as last summer’s DOL-HUD Notice of Funding Opportunity on 

Ending Chronic Homelessness—signals an alignment with the type of partnerships and 

coordinated employment and housing services found critical under the JTHDP. DOL’s 

role in particular with regard to national partnerships on homeless issues is to be 

augmented in the coming year with a more pronounced role on the Council. 

Given the backdrop painted above, this paper on serving the homeless in the OneStop context comes at an opportune time. Its overarching research question is, to what 

extent can the One-Stop system effectively serve the homeless population and through 

what specific and unique means and strategies. In addressing this question, we revisit 

many of the key issues and findings of the JTHDP evaluation, but in a post-JTPA 

environment. The remainder of this paper is divided into five key areas: (1) profiles of 

the three sites we visited; (2) key challenges and strategies with regard to outreach and 

enrollment of the homeless population in WIA; (3) key characteristics and modifications 

of the service delivery system needed for the homeless population to secure and retain 

employment; (4) analysis of the nature of local partnerships to serve the homeless; and 

(5) a distillation of key themes and practices to emerge from the study, as well as their 

implications for other local areas and for the future.

LOCAL PROFILES

Here we provide an overview of the three homeless sites we visited in order to 

place this paper’s findings in local context—e.g., in terms of varying demographics and 

homeless characteristics, key homeless-serving partners, and the extent of local 

planning with regard to the homeless population.10

 

10 As stated earlier, this paper is informed to a much smaller degree by a site visit to the Capital 

Area Michigan Works LWIA—a site we visited for the business engagement sub-study. This LWIA is 

comprised of urban, suburban and semi-rural counties, a largely White population, and an economy 

dominated by public sector employment. Because of its extremely minor role as a data source, we chose 

not to profile the site in addition to the three homeless sites. 
XII-6

Pima County LWIA 

Located in the southern half of Arizona, Pima County has a population of 

approximately 890,000—over half of which resides in the city of Tucson, where we 

focused our site visit. The second largest city in the state, Tucson has a population that 

is predominantly White (75%), though there is also a significant Latino population. The 

city has experienced an approximately 25% increase in its population over the last 14 

years. 

Tucson has witnessed a weakening of its manufacturing base, particularly with the 

departure of a number of key companies such as National Semiconductor and Bob 

Deere, which provided a ready supply of entry-level jobs. While agriculture was a 

traditional linchpin of the Tucson economy in the past, major industry clusters today 

include tourism, telecommunications, and bio-industry. The unemployment rate in 

Tucson hovers around five percent.

The Pima County LWIA has two full-service One-Stop centers located in the 

northern and southern halves of Tucson. We based our site visit at the Kino Service 

Center, in southern Tucson. The LWIA also has four satellite or specialized centers, 

including the Jackson Employment Center, which specializes in providing employmentrelated services to homeless individuals. In addition to receiving WIA funds, the Center 

has just won Homeless Veterans’ Reintegration Project (HVRP) funds and is also a 

Continuum of Care (CoC) grantee. The Jackson Center has five Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) Supportive Housing Programs (SHPs), which are 

considered traditional housing programs and thus require employment as a condition of 

residence. The Jackson Center has 14 permanent, full-time employees, most of whom 

are concerned with employment skills training or training coordination. There is one 

intake/eligibility staff person, three full-time case managers and one full-time MIS staff 

person. The Center serves approximately 450-500 individuals per year—40% of whom 

are youth,11 30% of whom are veterans, 20-30% of whom have been previously 

incarcerated and 60% of whom are females. An estimated 10% of the Center’s clientele 

suffers from mental illness.

As with homeless counts in general, Tucson’s estimates of its own homeless 

population vary significantly. A recent HUD grant application from Tucson/Pima 

 

11 Youth at the Jackson Center are co-enrolled in YO. 
XII-7

County used a point-in-time count in February 2003 to provide a figure of 4,336 

homeless—63% of whom were unsheltered and 13% of whom were chronically 

homeless—while a local respondent estimated that 2,500 individuals are homeless in 

Tucson at any given time. The former estimate may be significantly higher given that 

the point-in-time count took place in the winter, when local respondents indicated there 

is an increase of homeless in shelters due to a temporary increase in shelter space, and 

because more homeless are likely to migrate to Tucson in the winter months. 

The largest transition in the local homeless population has been the shift from 

single men over 30 years of age, to women, families and youth. Families now account 

for approximately half of the local homeless population, which has had implications for 

how shelters provide services—e.g., stocking diapers as well as razors for men. 

Currently there is insufficient shelter space designed to accommodate family units. 

Veterans still comprise a significant proportion of the local homeless population. This 

may be due in part to the proximity of Davis Air Force Base in Tucson, as well as Fort 

Huachuca to the east. Veterans also tend to be drawn to the Tucson area by the climate, 

a large and growing Veterans Administration (VA) hospital, as well as by an extensive 

veterans community and service base. A good proportion of the homeless—veterans in 

particular—tend to congregate not on city streets, but rather in rural desert patches and 

washes where they can establish camps.

The Tucson Planning Council on the Homeless (TPCH, or the Council) is a 

voluntary collaboration of individuals and organizations committed to reducing 

homelessness, and is the lead local entity for developing and implementing the CoC 

plan. There are over 30 members of TPCH, including the local One-Stop system, city 

and county officials, the VA hospital, housing providers, police officers and members 

of the faith community. TPCH meets at least monthly and uses strategic planning as the 

basis for all its activities. Sub-committees on topics ranging from winter shelter to 

homeless youth are charged with implementing and reporting on goals and strategies 

throughout the year.

The local One-Stop system—the Jackson Center in particular—is a strong member 

of TPCH. A lead staff member from the Jackson Center currently serves as Chair of 

TPCH. The Jackson Center is the acknowledged local expert on the employment and 

training component of the homeless service delivery system; thus all other One-Stop 

centers and a wide range of homeless-serving organizations, such as shelters and mental 

health facilities, consistently refer their clients to the Jackson Center for employment 
XII-8

and training services. Overall, Tucson has a significant number of agencies and CBOs 

that provide various services to the homeless, and a strong philosophy of coordination 

rather than duplication. Consequently, individual agencies and organizations appear to 

have a clear sense of their specific role and/or specialization within the homeless 

service delivery system. 

Portland Worksystems, Oregon 

Worksystems Inc. serves Multnomah, Washington, and Tillamook counties,

which account for one-third of Oregon’s total population. In addition, the region has 

experienced an increase in population of approximately 250,000 over the last decade. 

The city of Portland, located in Multnomah County, is where we concentrated our site 

visit. Portland has a population of approximately 540,000, which accounts for 

approximately 80% of the county’s population. Over 75% of Portland’s population is 

White. 

The primary industries of Multnomah County are manufacturing, transportation, 

wholesale and retail trade, and tourism. However, over the past three years, the 

Portland area has lost over 55,000 jobs. One of the hardest hit industries has been 

manufacturing. Relatively strong industry clusters currently in the Portland area 

include information technology and bioscience. The unemployment rate in Portland is 

around seven percent; like Oregon, Portland has a higher unemployment rate than the 

nation as a whole.

As in Tucson, local respondents described the difficulty of coming up with a local 

homeless count. According to a point-in-time count in 2002, Portland had a homeless 

population of 2,526. However, local respondents’ estimates ranged from 2,000-10,000. 

Key homeless subgroups in Portland include those who have a criminal background, are 

mentally ill, and are addicted to drugs. Local respondents indicated that they had 

witnessed an increase over the past ten years in homeless women and homeless 

individuals who are addicted specifically to heroin. 

At the state level, the workforce development system is merged with the 

community college system—aptly named the Department of Community Colleges and 

Workforce Development. The Multnomah/Washington/Tillamook LWIA reflects this 

merger in that three of the area’s six One-Stop centers are operated by community 

colleges. We based our site visit at the West Portland One-Stop center (WPOS)—a OneStop specializing in serving the homeless and operated by Central City Concern (CCC), 
XII-9

a homeless services organization operating in Portland since 1980. The WIA 

administrative entity, fiscal agent and staff to the local workforce investment board 

(WIB) is Worksystems, Inc. (WSI).

The City of Portland’s Bureau of Housing and Community Development (BHCD) 

is the administrator of federal and local homeless funds, including McKinney funds. 

BHCD is also the lead agency on local planning efforts to end homelessness in ten years 

and houses a number of specific homeless working groups, such as those on discharge 

planning and chronic homelessness. While BHCD plays a primary role with regard to 

local planning efforts on homelessness, there is also a local homeless providers’

association comprised of eight members that meet monthly.

The role of WPOS in the local homeless service delivery system is a relatively 

large one, partly due to the identity of the One-Stop operator, CCC. That is, because 

CCC is an organization dedicated specifically to providing programs and services to the 

homeless, WPOS is a well-connected hub in the local service delivery system. CCC 

operated a number of housing programs with employment components before applying 

to serve as the operator of WPOS. A range of partners maintain a presence at WPOS—

not only required, “traditional” One-Stop partners, but also partners such as shelters 

and other homeless-related CBOs—a blend of partners viewed as critical for bridging 

the gap between the homeless population and “mainstream” resources.

Coastal Counties LWIA12

The Coastal Counties LWIA is comprised of six counties in Maine, including 

Cumberland County, where the city of Portland is located and where we based our site 

visit. The greater Portland area has a metro population of approximately 230,000, 

which comprises nearly 25% of the state’s total population. Portland is the largest city 

in the state with a population of approximately 65,000. Over 90% of the city’s 

population is White and predominantly middle class; however, Portland is also known 

as a significant refugee resettlement area, primarily for Somali and Sudanese 

populations. In addition, the local retiree population is growing, as well as the local 

Latino population—the latter in part due to migrant farmworkers who come to the area 

to harvest blueberries.

 

12 Though the Coastal Counties LWIA was one of our three homeless sites, in reality, it informed 

the LEP sub-study to a much greater degree.
XII-10

Portland is a port city and the local economy relies heavily on tourism. As with 

many other states and local areas, manufacturing is on the decline, leading the local 

economy to become more service- and retail-oriented. Small businesses dominate the 

local economy, though two supermarkets represent the largest employers in the state. 

While the unemployment rate in Maine is between five and six percent, the 

unemployment rate for Cumberland County is lower at around three and a half percent.

The size of the local homeless population in Portland fluctuates according to 

season; the population decreases in winter when some homeless migrate to warmer 

climates and peaks in the summer. According to the City of Portland’s Health and 

Human Services Department, there were approximately 318 homeless individuals in 

Portland in 2003—the majority of whom are comprised of adult White males, and 

approximately 12 percent of whom identify themselves as veterans. A 2001 CoC 

planning document estimated that there was a need for 839 emergency shelter, 

transitional housing, and permanent supportive housing slots (with an existing inventory 

of 706). Local respondents indicated that the local Oxford Street Shelter serves between 

180-250 individuals every night. Local One-Stop respondents provided only an estimate 

of the number of homeless they serve—about 75 per year, approximately 80 percent of 

whom are veterans. Veterans—typically from Vietnam—are a key subgroup of the 

overall homeless population in Portland. Local respondents have also observed a 

significant increase in the number of female homeless, which in 2003 were estimated to 

comprise approximately one-quarter of the homeless population. 

 Statewide, there are 23 One-Stop centers across four LWIAs. We based our site 

visit at the Portland Career Center, one of seven One-Stops in the Coastal Counties 

LWIA and the only One-Stop in the city of Portland. Key stakeholders involved in the 

local homeless service delivery system include the Dislocated Veteran Outreach 

Program at the Career Center, the Maine Veterans’ Workforce Investment Program and 

the City of Portland Health and Human Services, which runs the largest emergency 

shelter in the state, Oxford Street Shelter.13

In general, the Portland Career Center works closely with other agencies in order 

to secure referrals and to refer homeless clients to emergency services prior to 

receiving employment and training services. This is facilitated by the fact that the 

 

13 The Oxford Street Shelter served 1,646 unduplicated individuals in FY 2003—41% of whom 

had never used the shelter’s services before.
XII-11

Career Center is located on the same street as the Oxford Street Shelter and other key 

agencies. A number of these key homeless-serving partners participate on several 

planning committees, including the Emergency Shelter Assessment Committee, the 

CoC Committee, and the Homeless Veterans Workgroup.

OUTREACH & ENROLLMENT

The One-Stop centers we visited relied heavily on their specialized nature, 

physical location, outreach workers and partner referrals to build and maintain 

awareness of their services among the homeless and to enroll homeless clients.

The Jackson Center and WPOS both identify themselves as specialized One-Stop 

centers. That is, the Jackson Center is a One-Stop specifically for those who are 

homeless, unemployed and job-willing, while WPOS—operated by a large umbrella 

homeless services organization—is technically open to any customer, but is widely 

known to specialize in homeless and/or previous offender clientele. As a result of their 

specialized natures, these two One-Stops enjoy a level of contact with and awareness 

among the homeless population that would not ordinarily be the case with more 

traditional One-Stop centers. The specialized nature of the One-Stops also facilitates 

homeless individuals in feeling comfortable visiting the Jackson Center or WPOS, as 

opposed to more traditional One-Stop centers where their status as a special population 

would be more pronounced.

All three centers are strategically located with regard to other homeless resources 

in their respective cities. For instance, the Jackson Center in Tucson is located near the 

Casa Maria Soup Kitchen. WPOS stands on a busy street corner, across the way from a 

major shelter and very close to a number of other critical homeless resources, such as a 

detoxification center and CCC transitional housing buildings. The Portland Career 

Center is located on the same block as both the city’s major emergency shelter and the 

General Assistance (GA) office.

Though all centers are located in high visibility sites, walk-ins or self-referrals 

were not cited as a significant source of homeless customers. For instance, lead staff at 

the Jackson Center stated that walk-ins account for only 10-15% of their clientele. 

Rather the centers depend greatly on outreach workers and partner referrals to recruit 

homeless customers. Outreach workers may be based at any number of agencies or 

organizations. For instance, WPOS relies on a single, full-time outreach worker funded 

by the city. This designated “bunk kicker” regularly visits all city shelters in order to 
XII-12

develop relationships with homeless individuals and encourage them to learn about and 

visit the One-Stop. This requires the outreach worker to act as friend, advocate and 

even potential enemy in order to successfully educate the homeless about One-Stop 

services and get them to even start thinking about employment as a possibility. This 

form of outreach was deemed highly successful for WPOS for the past five years; the 

level of trust and familiarity was apparent during the site visit, as we observed the 

outreach worker being personally greeted and engaged in conversation by homeless 

individuals on the street and at the shelters.

Similarly, the Portland Career Center relies on the Outreach Coordinator—a 

formerly homeless veteran—to regularly visit local shelters and encourage the use of 

One-Stop services. The Jackson Center in Tucson also relies on the direct outreach 

efforts of staff members at various other partner agencies and organizations, such as the 

VA hospital. Many of these agencies and organizations have found it useful to utilize 

outreach workers who are viewed as peers by the homeless—e.g., veterans, youth, etc. 

The Jackson Center relies on the expertise of these staff to conduct outreach at shelters 

and other locations, and then, in turn, to refer the homeless individuals they reach to 

the Jackson Center. 

All the centers we visited rely significantly on the referrals of other agencies and 

organizations—including “traditional” One-Stop centers—for homeless clients. Shelters 

are often the primary referral agency. WPOS also counts the local prison as a primary 

referral agency. According to one local respondent, the prison communicates two 

directives to just-released prisoners: “go see your parole officer, and go to the West 

Portland One-Stop.” While it seems natural that One-Stop centers would rely on other 

homeless-serving agencies to provide clients, the Jackson Center strongly endorses the 

referral system for other reasons as well. Though the Jackson Center will not turn away 

any potential client (e.g., a walk-in), its official policy is that all clients must be 

referred from another community-based agency. Such a policy means that by the time 

homeless individuals walk into the Jackson Center, they have already presumably 

received (emergency) services from another agency and are better equipped to engage 

in employment and training services.

A strong referral system highlights the need for awareness among homeless 

service providers as well as the homeless themselves. The Jackson Center and the 

WPOS both enjoy a strong connection to and reputation among local homeless-serving 

agencies and CBOs, which in turn facilitates positive word-of-mouth among the local 
XII-13

homeless population who come to identify the centers as places that work extensively 

with the homeless. 

Finally, because of the unique nature of the WPOS operator (as a homeless 

services agency), WPOS can also rely to some extent on free advertising at its various 

other program and service sites. For instance, CCC advertises WPOS services at the 

transitional housing units it also operates. In general, however, the centers we visited 

did not cite advertising in its traditional form as an outreach or recruitment strategy—

presumably because such a strategy was not needed and/or because such a strategy 

would be ineffective given the transitional nature of the target population and their 

frequent disconnect from traditional media outlets.

The Jackson Center and WPOS serve as key but differing examples of whether 

and how homeless individuals that come into the One-Stop are actually enrolled in WIA 

services. At the Jackson Center, all participants are WIA registrants. The Jackson 

Center’s only criteria for enrollment are that the individual: be homeless, want to work, 

and not be engaged in criminal behavior. There are no other screening-out criteria that 

come into play during the intake/eligibility determination process. In the case that the 

individual in question is actively abusing drugs, the Jackson Center will first refer him 

or her to local detoxification services. After reviewing an individual’s basic 

demographic information and confirming eligibility, the next step is to form an 

Individual Service Strategy (ISS), which involves the assessment of individual interests 

and capabilities, engaging in Employability Skills Training (EST), and forming an 

Employment Development Plan. (The latter two elements are discussed further in the 

following service delivery section.) One major challenge with regard to the 

intake/eligibility determination process is that of varying homeless definitions. Jackson 

Center staff stated that because DOL and HUD have different definitions of homeless, 

some of the center’s clients may meet the DOL definition, but not the HUD definition, 

and therefore may not qualify for housing. 

Given that the identity of WPOS is not technically exclusively for homeless 

individuals, it is not surprising that the WIA enrollment decision is a more complicated 

one at WPOS. After completing initial paperwork, attending a group orientation to the 

One-Stop and meeting with an assessment specialist, homeless individuals will be 

enrolled in WIA only if they are considered suitable according to a number of 

guidelines such as whether the individual: has been clean and sober for at least 60 days; 

has no current criminal charges, outstanding warrants or pending court dates that might 
XII-14

result in long-term incarceration; is considered mentally stable; and is off the street. In 

general, staff uses the above guidelines, as well as dialogue amongst themselves, to 

gauge whether a homeless individual is currently employable and thus suitable for 

referral to WIA services. 

Potential WIA customers at WPOS are sent to a WIA counselor. Counselors 

undertake a three-step process with their customers: assessment, eligibility and 

registration. One WPOS counselor noted that she schedules the assessment and 

eligibility steps in two separate appointments as a way to gauge the customer’s 

commitment to participating in WIA services. Given that the process of obtaining 

customer identification (to prove eligibility) can be a lengthy one, this is an especially 

telling test of customer commitment. In addition, counselors may use their observation 

of customers’ filling out paperwork as a covert assessment of literacy skills. Suitable 

and interested individuals may be enrolled in the Shoreline housing and employment 

program14 and co-enrolled in WIA. 

Portland Career Center spoke only to the question of whether to enroll homeless 

veterans, since the vast majority of homeless individuals who seek their services are 

veterans. The veterans WIA services, provided under the Maine Veterans’ Workforce 

Investment Program, include career counseling, assessment, training and placement. 

All eligible individuals are registered. Eligible individuals must have been honorably 

discharged and meet at least one of the following criteria: have a service-connected 

disability, have earned a medal, served during the Vietnam War, been discharged 

within the last 48 months, and/or be homeless. 

Performance measures do play a role in determining whether to register homeless 

individuals in WIA services.15 One WPOS WIA staff member described the difficulty 

of this decision given these customers’ vulnerable state, and their frequently more 

pressing need for housing and substance abuse services. As this staff member further 

described, “it’s a balancing act to work with people who need services, and [knowing] 

what will help us meet our performance standards . . . we struggle with people who 

 

14 The program makes use of 62 SRO housing units located above the One-Stop and is operated 

by CCC.

15 In the Capital Area Michigan Works LWIA, no homeless customers are registered in WIA 

because of performance measure concerns, particularly the retention measure.
XII-15

aren’t ready for intensive services, but who also aren’t really ready to navigate the core 

services system, or their life, on their own.” 

At WPOS, in cases where referrals to services other than WIA are made, they are 

often made to co-located partners—such as housing or the Homeless Veterans 

Reintegration Program (HVRP) if they are veterans—or outside to CBOs for such 

services as mental health treatment. (An individual who cannot be transitioned off the 

street is often seen as a “red flag” of undiagnosed mental illness, and may be referred 

to CBOs for treatment.) Even when WIA registration is not an immediately feasible 

option, WIA staff at WPOS still plays a relatively significant role in terms of helping to 

connect homeless individuals to pre-employment services. One WPOS WIA counselor 

noted that this level of involvement from WIA staff prior to WIA registration is unusual 

compared to other One-Stops.

SERVICE DELIVERY

The sites we visited rely on different models of service delivery. For instance, 

while the Jackson Center is viewed as the sole employment and training specialist 

within the homeless service delivery system, it relies heavily on a sophisticated local 

network of other homeless agencies and organizations to provide a full set of services to 

its clients, including housing and mental health counseling. Each member of the local 

network has a clearly identified and specialized portion of the spectrum of care for the 

homeless population. At WPOS, on the other hand, many of the various needed 

services are available through “in-house” CCC programs, which can be grouped into 

four broad categories: housing, chemical dependency and health services, workforce 

services and business enterprise.

While the model of service delivery may look quite different from one local area 

to the next, one cross-site commonality is that homeless individuals’ various and serious 

needs mean that they often require a wide range of services in order to successfully 

secure and retain employment. These include stabilization services, job placement and 

training services, and a significant dose of case management and supportive services.

Stabilization and Pre-Employment Services

Pre-employment and/or emergency service provision is the first critical step in 

serving the homeless population and is part of a larger formulated client action plan or 

individual service strategy. 
XII-16

At the Jackson Center, each client is sheltered as the first step of program 

participation. Housing provides more than just shelter; it also provides an address, 

which can be critical for getting homeless clients the full range of services they need. 

Because the Jackson Center relies on their clients’ being initially referred by other 

agencies, many clients’ immediate housing needs have already been addressed prior to 

arriving at the Jackson Center. Nevertheless, the Jackson Center’s intake staff person 

sends no fewer than three individual “walk-ins” per day to local shelters. The Jackson 

Center identifies additional emergency needs using case management practices. These 

additional needs may include substance abuse detoxification, mental health counseling, 

public transportation passes and grooming items. 

At WPOS, stabilization needs are often addressed during the time between 

determining WIA eligibility and WIA registration. While housing is the most obvious 

need, WPOS also cited criminal charges, and various physical, mental, and learning 

disabilities that may require attention before employment is a feasible option for 

homeless clients.

Other non-emergency, pre-employment services can include basic educational 

remediation. For instance, staff at the Jackson Center estimate that approximately 60% 

of their clientele require remediation through Pima Community College. Individual 

clients typically test at an 8th or 9th grade education level. 

Another critical pre-employment phase/service at the Jackson Center is the 

mandatory two-week Employability Skills Training (EST) program—an intensive 

component that teaches a form of self-directed job search. The curriculum—developed 

during the local area’s participation in the JTHDP—teaches participants about the 

“hidden” job search process, based on the assumption that publicly announced job 

openings account for only about five percent of all job openings. The key question 

addressed during EST is how one should go about accessing these unannounced job 

openings. In addition to teaching participants how to research Tucson-area jobs and 

engage in peer networking, the EST curriculum also covers issues of self-esteem and 

personal upkeep. EST participants are expected to emulate the world of work by 

wearing professional attire to class. The two-week EST course also serves as an 

assessment tool, in that Jackson Center staff can determine which EST participants are 

ready to enter the Job Development phase, and which participants would benefit by first 

receiving additional services, such as remedial education services to improve their 

reading skills by at least one grade level.
XII-17

Job Placement & Training Services

Both the Jackson Center and WPOS prioritize job placement as opposed to 

training services for their homeless clients. This prioritization can be attributed to a 

number of reasons, including homeless clients’ obvious need for immediate income, as 

well as the limited amount of training dollars available. WPOS cited additional reasons 

for why their homeless clients rarely utilize training dollars, including homeless clients’ 

lack of interest, homeless clients’ inability to believe in training as a viable option, and 

the need for WPOS staff to use immediate job placement as a way for homeless 

customers to even view the world of work as a feasible one. At WPOS, training is rare 

not just for homeless customers, but for all customers. The PY 02 summary report for 

WPOS shows that only 31 of 414 enrolled WIA adult customers completed training.

While the Jackson Center also prioritizes job placement, it does rely on Pima 

Community College as a training provider. The college offers strong short-term and 

certificate training programs, particularly those geared toward the medical field. The 

Jackson Center rarely utilizes private vocational schools, except for two truck driving 

schools and Pima Medical, which offers training in the pharmaceutical and veterinary 

fields. 

Job placement for homeless customers is similar for the Jackson Center and 

WPOS in that it occurs in a wide variety of industries; however, the method of job 

placement differs considerably. WPOS appears to utilize a more hands-on approach in 

assisting homeless customers secure jobs. For instance, WIA staff use their intimate 

knowledge of the registered customer base to screen job listings and refer appropriate 

candidates. If a staff member sees a job listing that seems appropriate for a particular 

customer, they will write the customer’s name on the white board in the lobby along 

with the message, “I have a job posting for you.” This assisted approach reflects the 

local area’s articulated philosophy of helping their homeless customers build an initial 

foundation of self-confidence and see that employment is indeed possible. 

At the Jackson Center, homeless customers must rely more on themselves and 

entrepreneurship skills—i.e., researching potential unannounced jobs and making cold 

calls to potential employers. In the words of one local respondent, the Job Development 

phase consists of “a supervisor watching someone direct their own employment search 

in the phone room.” Jackson Center staff’s approach to job placement reflects their 

articulated insistence that there should be absolutely no difference between a homeless 

and non-homeless customer in terms of expected success in finding a job. Given that 
XII-18

assumption, the Jackson Center is different from other homeless serving agencies that 

often feel or operate as if homeless clients must be “given” a job. 

In terms of the types of jobs actually secured by homeless clients, there appeared 

to be no particular pattern of note in the sites we visited. At WPOS, homeless 

customers find jobs in industrial warehouses, shipping and receiving, truck driving, 

welding, street-cleaning, telemarketing and janitorial services. Likewise, at the Jackson 

Center, homeless clients are placed in a wide variety of “living wage” jobs, nearly all 

of which are in the Tucson area. Those homeless clients with a higher education level 

typically require a longer period of time to find a job, in part because the Jackson 

Center strongly encourages them to wait for a job that matches their abilities. One 

Jackson Center staff shared the story of a college-educated homeless client who took a 

job as a security guard and expected a hearty round of congratulations from his case 

manager. Instead, the case manager expressed great disappointment, which helped to 

prompt this client to continue his job search and eventually find a professional position. 

Despite the fact that homeless customers often have numerous barriers to 

employment, according to WPOS staff, once homeless clients are job ready, placement 

tends to follow relatively quickly. This differs from customers served at other local 

One-Stop centers, who, according to WPOS staff, are more likely to engage in longterm training and be considering a career change, with the result being that job 

placement often takes longer.

Case Management & Supportive Services 

The importance of case management and supportive services cannot be 

overemphasized. While employment may be the primary focus and end goal of WIA 

staff serving the homeless, there are, in the words of one local respondent, “a huge 

amount of underlying issues” that must be addressed not only upfront at the 

emergency/pre-employment stage, but also continuously throughout the job search 

and/or training process. Transportation, child care, housing, clothing, and mental 

health needs are all common components of a supportive service strategy for the 

homeless. The role of the case manager as an assessor and coordinator of these various 

services is “the glue that holds it all together.” 

The case manager goes beyond ensuring that supportive services are provided; the 

case manager addresses countless ancillary and less visible needs. For example, one 

case manager at a Tucson CBO observed that, “housing is no good without case 
XII-19

management [because] there are more reasons for homelessness than not having a 

house.” This case manager described how even when homeless individuals are provided 

shelter, they will often still live as if homeless—for example, by not thinking to buy 

furniture, keeping the curtains closed, setting up a “camp” in the living room, or living 

in unsanitary conditions. The case manager may need to convey very basic information 

to their clients—for instance, how to clean a bathroom and why doing so is important. 

This type of case management can require daily interaction before eventually petering 

off. Case managers must not only provide time-intensive services, but also tailor their 

services very precisely, as there is “no typical client” when serving the homeless 

population.

Case managers at the Jackson Center and WPOS see their clients often—usually 

weekly or even daily. Case managers at the Jackson Center check in with their clients 

almost daily as they come in for EST or to use the phone room during the Job 

Development phase. Check-in time is used to ensure that clients’ various supportive 

service needs are being met by the local service delivery system. Likewise, case 

managers at WPOS meet weekly or bi-monthly with clients and work on a number of 

supportive service issues that may be affecting job seeking efforts and employment.

Homeless clients may receive case management and supportive services from a 

variety of sources in the local service delivery system. WPOS clients, for example, can 

access many services through CCC—the One-Stop operator and homeless organization. 

CCC’s services can be categorized into four areas: housing; chemical dependency and 

health; workforce; and business enterprise. For instance, CCC owns or manages 1,400 

units of housing—some of which is “stand-alone” housing, and some of which is 

connected to particular supportive services, such as substance abuse treatment. CCC 

also operates the Hooper Detoxification Center, which intervenes in the process of 

chemical dependency by providing outreach, sobering and sub-acute medical 

detoxification services. Thus, because WPOS is part of a larger and homeless-specific 

parent organization, WPOS homeless clients are in essence directly connected to a 

larger “One-Stop” of supportive services. 

The Jackson Center relies more on a partnership/network approach in providing 

its homeless clients with both case management and supportive services. Homeless 

clients may receive case management services from multiple local service providers—

including, but not limited to the Jackson Center. Jackson Center clients’ basic 

supportive service needs will be met through the network as long as they are following 
XII-20

their ISS. Some of these services are provided in shelters and transitional housing 

facilities, while others are provided off site. The case managers from different agencies 

meet regularly as “an interdisciplinary team” to discuss their mutual clients and avoid 

duplication of services (e.g., two case managers providing bus tokens to the same 

client).

Supportive service provision does not end at job placement. An explicit 

component of the Jackson Center’s program is to continue to support the client’s 

transition to independent living once employment is obtained. This may entail “ad hoc” 

assistance—such as buying one client a bicycle once bus transportation was no longer a 

feasible means of getting to work—as well as more traditional follow-up support. 

Follow-up services, or after-care, involves Jackson staff not only periodically verifying 

each client’s employment and wages, but also identifying ongoing supportive service 

needs, or needs more directly tied to employment (such as the need to mediate a 

situation with the client’s employer). The Jackson Center views after-care services as a 

critical tool for keeping their clients employed and “on the right track.” Clients who 

lose their job are urged to return to the Jackson Center as quickly as possible, not just 

to regain employment, but perhaps to address more pressing issues (e.g., a client who 

needs a ride to detoxification services). 

Supportive service needs—particularly housing and substance abuse counseling—

are also a component of WPOS’ follow-up with clients once they are placed in a job. 

Newly employed clients are exited at the end of the quarter; staff follows up with the 

entire group 30 days thereafter in order to determine current employment, housing and 

supportive service needs. Clients also receive a letter notifying them of their date of 

exit as well as available follow-up services. Because keeping abreast of homeless 

clients’ changing contact information is a particular challenge, WPOS staff instituted a 

raffle whereby newly employed customers submit their current contact information for 

a chance to win a prize. 

Major Service Delivery Challenges and Modifications

Perhaps one of the most basic challenges at hand in serving the homeless 

population is the stigma often attached to this special population and the chasm that 

exists between the homeless and more “mainstream” resources, such as One-Stop 

centers. As one local One-Stop respondent observed, “people won’t go to get services 

at a place where the people staffing it and the other customers don’t look like them.” 

As a reflection of this, both WPOS and the Jackson Center are specialized One-Stop 
XII-21

centers. While WPOS is open to any customer, it is well known that it specializes in 

homeless and previous offender populations; furthermore, its very location on a corner 

full of “street life” makes it less likely that members of the “mainstream” population 

would choose to access One-Stop services at WPOS. Finally, even WPOS’s signage 

indicates the specialized nature of its services. WPOS is housed in a building boldly 

labeled Central City Concern. The West Portland One-Stop label is much smaller and 

was clearly added at a later date than the CCC seal. 

While local staff at WPOS opined that they did not see how the homeless could be 

effectively served without their specialized set-up, they did discuss associated 

challenges—specifically, questioning their identity as either a One-Stop center or as a 

homeless organization providing employment and training services, and questioning the 

long-term effectiveness of isolating the homeless population within such a specialized 

center. While customers with unique barriers can doubtless benefit from programs 

designed specifically to address those barriers, such a structure might also convey a 

further sense of isolation from “mainstream” resources, including the labor force in 

which they are attempting to enter via the One-Stop system. 

The Capital Area Michigan Works LWIA presents a kind of compromise. Here 

homeless individuals are never enrolled in WIA services. However, Advent House, a 

faith-based non-profit that operates the Good Work! Employment Program for the 

homeless, attempts to provide enough of its programming onsite at the One-Stop center 

so that its homeless customers become adjusted to “mainstream” facilities and can use 

certain resources, such as the resource room, clothes closet and computer labs. The 

hope is that customers will eventually be able to make use of mainstream One-Stop 

services on their own. In this way, the Good Work! Program is viewed as a “pre-preemployment” program. 

While the Jackson Center also grapples with the challenge of a homeless 

“stigma,” it does not face the same question of identity as WPOS, in that it is officially 

and specifically a One-Stop center for the homeless. However, its formal name also 

reflects a strategic decision with regard to its more mainstream goals. As one local 

respondent stated, it is not called the Jackson Center for the Homeless. It is the Jackson 

Employment Center. The word homeless was deliberately left out to avoid the 

associated stigma. Furthermore, including the word employment in the center’s name 

reflects its previously discussed conviction that homeless customers can be held to the 

same high expectations as more “traditional” One-Stop customers. At the same time, 
XII-22

in bridging the gap between the homeless and the mainstream, perhaps the most 

significant advantage possessed by both WPOS and the Jackson Center is the ability to 

function like a CBO with their specialized knowledge of and interactions with the 

homeless population, but the capacity to provide services with more “mainstream” 

WIA and HUD resources.

But while using specialized centers runs the risk of isolating the homeless from 

the mainstream, WIA staff question the feasibility of using mainstream structures to 

serve the homeless. For example, given the complex and interrelated elements of 

homelessness, ranging from mental illness to child care needs, it is not surprising that 

the first major quandary staff may face is whether homeless individuals should even be 

enrolled in WIA services. Homeless clients may require more intensive and ongoing 

services than WIA staff are prepared to offer; furthermore, given their multiple barriers 

to employment and peripatetic nature, they may pose a “risk” to WIA performance 

measures. 

The One-Stop centers we visited are able to use different strategies for addressing 

the enrollment question. Its “officially” specialized One-Stop identity allows the 

Jackson Center to essentially bypass this decision altogether; there are no screening out

criteria. However, even with its ability to accept effectively all homeless clients, the 

Jackson Center is still mindful of the need to stabilize homeless individuals prior to any 

employment and training services. Thus, unlike other One-Stop centers, the Jackson 

Center has made it policy to require that their clients be referred from another agency—

i.e., an agency that would have “prepped” these individuals for employment and 

training services by first providing more immediate services such as housing and 

detoxification. 

As an “unofficially” specialized One-Stop center, WPOS struggles a bit more 

with the WIA enrollment decision for homeless individuals, and relies on a set of 

guidelines and staff dialogue to gauge homeless clients’ suitability for WIA services. 

While their enrollment decision is not as automatic as that of the Jackson Center, 

WPOS differs from more traditional One-Stop centers in the level of WIA staff’s 

involvement in helping homeless individuals connect to pre-employment services, 

whether they be in-house or at local CBOs.

With regard to job training and placement, a couple of challenges that emerged 

from our sites were low expectations of homeless individuals and the difficulty in 
XII-23

finding jobs for some homeless individuals, particularly those with barriers such as 

criminal backgrounds. The sites we visited respond to these challenges in various ways. 

The Jackson Center’s philosophy is that homeless individuals should be held to high 

expectations. As such, the Jackson Center relies on a relatively intensive EST program 

to address self-esteem issues and to provide homeless clients with the tools to find a job 

independently. The emphasis on unannounced job openings in particular underscores 

the need for homeless clients to create their own opportunities. The Jackson Center is 

concerned not just with their clients’ finding jobs, but finding jobs that match their 

education and skill level; as such, the Center encourages clients to take not just any job, 

even if it means a drawn-out job search process. 

WPOS capitalizes upon the business enterprise arm of CCC to address some of its 

homeless clients’ employability challenges. CCC runs several small businesses, 

including a janitorial service, a building maintenance and repair service, used furniture

rehabilitation and resale, two thrift stores, and a painting crew. CCC also has plans to 

expand into other areas, such as historical building preservation. CCC originally 

conceived of its small business enterprise as a way to safeguard itself against 

fluctuations in public and private funding. However, these small business enterprises 

are also designed to employ a workforce that has typically faced barriers to labor force 

entry based on homelessness, addiction, mental health issues, criminal background or 

other factors. Thus, not only is WPOS a One-Stop well-suited to the needs of customers 

facing special barriers to employment, but the center’s operating organization is also an 

employer of these very same customers, and serves as a way for employees to develop 

credibility and references for future employment in the mainstream labor market. 

Furthermore, as employers, business enterprise staff can provide special understanding 

of and guidance on employees’ soft skills issues, such as how to interact with 

supervisors and clients in a respectful way. Finally, WPOS has developed unique and 

popular courses, such as “Looking for work with a criminal background,” that also 

reflect the center’s attention to its customers’ unique employability challenges.

The Portland Career Center also works to provide homeless clients with a 

measure of “beginner” work experience, given their employability challenges. Career 

Center staff coordinate with the Employment Trust, Inc. /Manage Work Services 

Initiative, which uses funds to create a work experience program. Employment Trust, 

Inc. provides a reference for the customer and a job coach that helps place and retain 

individuals in a work situation. The Career Center pays 50% of the individual’s wages. 
XII-24

The primary employer for this initiative has been a large grocery store chain in New 

England. 

Given homeless customers’ often intensified need for soft skills training and other 

supportive services, these job placement strategies can succeed only if—in the words of 

one local respondent—“case management becomes a primary service rather than strictly 

job coaching.” In both Tucson and Portland (Oregon), this translates to the heightened 

importance of interpersonal contact and relationships. Successful recruitment in 

Portland (Oregon) depends heavily on the full-time “bunk kicker’s” visits to the local 

homeless shelters, where he has developed many personal relationships. Retention of 

homeless clients in EST in Tucson depends greatly on the relationship the instructor 

builds with his/her class members, and the personal motivation he or she provides. 

Success in new housing arrangements depends on sometimes daily visits with case 

managers. Retention in employment is aided by personal contact and follow-up by case 

managers, who can probe clients on the need for ongoing services and support. 

As for a specific type of case management approach that appears to work best 

with homeless clientele, local respondents only commented on the need to wear many 

different hats—i.e., advocate, enemy, friend—and the need to define success differently 

with homeless individuals. As one case manager observed, “what really works is 

repetition”—making repeated interpersonal contacts to build trust and make small 

degrees of progress. As another respondent described, “a seed is planted but you might 

have to try, try again.” To avoid burnout from repeatedly providing such intensive 

service, case managers must learn to define success in smaller steps. For instance, one 

respondent said that a measure of success might be a homeless client’s remaining sober 

for four weeks instead of two. One interesting strategy specifically mentioned by a 

Tucson respondent was to include the children of homeless clients in case management 

sessions in order to expose them to productive living practices at a young age, and to 

hopefully break the cycle of homelessness. 

Finally, another important service adaptation we noted was that many key 

homeless-serving staff at the One-Stop (and outside the One-Stop) had experience being 

homeless, or were particularly interested or trained in homelessness and serving 

vulnerable populations. For instance, the average staff person at the Jackson Center has 

12 years of experience working with the homeless. The WPOS Center Director 

estimated that 70% of WPOS staff had experienced homelessness, incarceration, 

addiction disorder, or, at the very least, poverty, and/or were previous CCC clients. 
XII-25

These forms of staff experience were clearly valued at WPOS, in some cases more than 

employment and training service expertise.

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS FOR SERVING THE HOMELESS

Given the variation and intensiveness of required services for the homeless to 

secure gainful employment, partnerships are essential to an effective service delivery 

system. No one homeless service provider can “go it alone,” particularly with 

extremely limited funding at their disposal. In some sense, agencies have no choice but 

to collaborate, given the scarcity of public dollars and the incapacity of any one agency 

to meet all the different needs of a single homeless client. 

The One-Stop centers we visited utilized different forms of partnership in order to 

effectively serve their homeless clientele. WPOS could be characterized as having a 

strong tradition of intra-organizational partnership, in that the One-Stop operator is 

such a multi-faceted homeless services provider, that, to some extent, CCC does not 

need to build external partnerships. (Indeed, one local respondent differentiated 

between the community-wide Continuum of Care, and the CCC’s in-house Continuum 

of Care.) In addition, WPOS uses co-location effectively as a tool for partnering with 

such partners as the Homeless Veterans’ Reintegration Project.

The Jackson Center, on the other hand, looks outward in its partnership efforts—

including to the many homeless-serving CBOs in the Tucson area. Each local partner, 

including the Jackson Center, has a clearly identified, specialized piece of the homeless 

services pie—whether that be employment and training, housing, clothing or 

detoxification services. The strength of the local CoC is highly dependent on the 

effective partnerships and communication between different agencies. As one local 

respondent noted, one of the reasons why partnerships work so well in Tucson is 

because agencies do maintain their turf (i.e., specialized expertise) without acting turflike. As another respondent summed up, local partnership is all about “specialization, 

referrals, and communication.”

Besides having specialized service niches, the sites we visited have a number of 

other strategies or factors that contribute to effective partnership, including: regular 

meetings between the staff of different partners to “coordinate not duplicate” homeless 

services; development of a Homeless Management Information System (HMIS); a 

client- rather than agency-focus; a cadre of homeless leaders and stakeholders who have 

been working together for a long period of time; co-location; use of grant opportunities 
XII-26

or special initiatives to establish or strengthen partnerships; and the establishment of a 

formalized council as a collaborative vehicle.

While WPOS facilitates effective homeless-serving partnerships by having 

numerous partners (including less traditional ones, such as a credit union that works 

with homeless clients) co-locate at the center, Tucson provided a richer discussion of 

partnership strategies and elements of success.16 Foremost among these was the 

development of a highly democratic council, the TPCH. TPCH provides a clear and 

equitable structure for collaborative efforts in serving the homeless. While the 

Executive Committee is responsible for setting TPCH’s agenda, actual decision-making 

power is dispersed throughout the membership—a change that greatly increased TPCH 

participation. Each member agency, no matter what its size or relative influence, gets 

only one vote; this includes the city and county members. 

The primary incentive for TPCH membership is the chance to be a part of joint 

grant application processes and secure resources for individual agencies. Unlike other 

local areas where powerful agencies (e.g., city and county agencies) might take control 

of all local funds to dole out to other organizations, in Tucson, TPCH—not a particular 

agency or organization—is the lead on all grants. However, TPCH makes it clear that, 

in order to share in grant resources, members must serve on one of TPCH’s committees 

and be an active part of TPCH throughout the year, not just at grant application time.

Besides resource incentives, members are motivated to participate in TPCH 

because of networking opportunities with agencies throughout the local area, as well as 

learning opportunities—e.g., to hear about trends that other agencies may be observing. 

For instance, a new police captain recently approached TPCH about membership 

because she wanted to learn about homeless agencies and issues. She in turn offered 

TPCH insight into what the police are seeing in terms of homeless trends on the street. 

In this way, TPCH is relatively unique in that it is a homeless-focused entity, but is not 

comprised only of homeless specialists. Its members include the police, AIDS 

organizations, behavioral health organizations as well as the faith community.

 

16 The Pima County local area has been formally recognized for its strong partnership model. In 

August 2000, the area received national recognition from HUD with a best practice award for creativity 

in the development and use of community linkages. The award was particularly focused on the local La 

Casita Transitional Housing Program for youth. Key program partners, including the Jackson Center, 

provide housing and educational opportunities for youth between 16 to 21 years old.
XII-27

In short, TPCH effectively draws together various homeless-serving and other 

concerned organizations to develop and implement the local CoC. While this is the 

council’s primary function, TPCH also serves as a critical repository of “partnership 

culture”—a culture characterized by a basic but strong commitment to the homeless, a 

“non-profit mindset,” joint planning and shared resources, democratic decision making 

processes, and clearly defined objectives and plans for serving the homeless. With this 

partnership culture embodied in a structure larger than any one particular organization 

or individual, homeless-related collaboration is somewhat protected against the 

inevitable comings and goings of particular TPCH members. 

Local respondents in Tucson indicated that one of the primary challenges in 

establishing a collaborative body such as TPCH is simply for members to engage in 

community planning without thinking about their own individual agency’s interests 

first. To address this challenge, Tucson found it helpful to conduct focus group sessions 

of ground-level intake and case management staff that knew very little about their 

agencies’ budgets, but knew a lot about direct interaction with the homeless population. 

These focus groups in turn informed the larger strategic planning process with direct, 

“real world” homeless experience, rather than with the political and financial interests 

of particular agencies at the forefront. 

While one local respondent indicated that it “would take years” for another group 

to become as cohesive and cooperative as TPCH—in part, because key stakeholders 

have been working together for many years—the most immediate recommendation to 

other local areas was to simply have agencies talk with one another. Another key lesson 

is to ensure that people have the space to disagree with one another in the context of 

such a body as TPCH; toward this end, TPCH found it helpful to hire an outside 

consultant to run the meetings and establish this “safe space.”

In Tucson, coordination and inter-agency partnership is facilitated by a relatively 

strong sense of alignment between partner philosophies on serving the homeless. While 

the Jackson Center is sometimes criticized as being too “tough” on the homeless with 

its immediate world of work expectations, given the Center’s demonstrated success, 

more local partners are adopting the Center’s philosophy of “high expectations with 

high support” for their homeless customers. For instance, Travelers Aid does not just 

provide “three hots and a cot,” but also an incentive—clients must go to the Jackson 

Center in order to maintain their housing. Case managers from other local 
XII-28

organizations indicated that they like being able to send their clients to the Jackson 

Center for day-long, purposeful activities. 

On the other end of the spectrum from the Jackson Center, shelters and youthfocused homeless agencies are sometimes criticized for being too “soft” on their 

clients, too directive or coddling. However, local respondents in Tucson agreed that, 

overall, differences of philosophy do not at all interfere with their partnership efforts 

and, furthermore, were probably necessary in that one philosophy or approach would 

not work for all sub-groups of the homeless (e.g., youth versus veteran homeless).

When on site, we asked local respondents to describe partnership efforts not just 

at the broader level of aligned philosophies and governing structures, but also at the 

more detailed level of communication and coordination methods and links. Overall, 

both Tucson and Portland (Oregon) make use of consistent email and phone contact, as 

well as interpersonal meetings between different partner staff in order to coordinate and 

not duplicate services to homeless clients. However, while Portland’s approach is to 

“talk to each other when we need to talk to each other,” Tucson’s approach is relatively 

more formal, in that the various case managers meet regularly to discuss their mutual 

clients “as an interdisciplinary team.” In Portland, Maine, representatives from varying 

agencies meet regularly via participation on several committees, including the CoC 

Committee and the Homeless Veterans Workgroup. During these meetings, current 

issues or challenges in serving the homeless are discussed, as well as possible solutions. 

These formal meetings, as well as informal communication between partners, help to 

effectively link and coordinate their services. 

Local respondents in Portland (Oregon) indicated that the best inter-partner 

communication occurs when there is a project that various partners are interested in 

working together on. One example was a project designed to assist people with 

psychiatric disabilities enter the workforce. Several partners, including CCC, convened 

to write a proposal for implementing a particular service design. In this way, grant 

opportunities serve as catalysts for effective partnership. Similarly, in the Capital Area

Michigan Works LWIA, the WIA administrative entity partnered with Advent House—

a faith-based non-profit that runs the Good Work! Employment Program for the 

homeless—specifically to secure Food Stamp employment and training funding to 

support the Good Work! Program. (As a result of this partnership, the Good Work! 

program began utilizing space at the One-Stop; its customers can use the resource 

room, clothes closet and computer labs.)
XII-29

In Tucson, inter-partner communication and coordination will be further 

strengthened and formalized via a forthcoming Homeless Management Information 

System (HMIS), which was due to go online in February 2004. Twenty-three agencies 

are scheduled for HMIS implementation throughout a two-year process. The HMIS will 

allow all agencies to share information on their homeless clients and to more easily 

refer them to other partners’ services—for example, to reserve a bed in a shelter across 

town, or to plug into state services. The system will have a universal intake form with 

common areas highlighted, but with the flexibility to add agency-specific, customized 

data fields. Local respondents also expressed hope that the HMIS will help partners 

work together to identify the chronic “game players”—those who “work the system” 

and are interested only in handouts and subsidies, not in improving their socioeconomic 

situation.

Finally, though a relatively minor factor, in both Portland (Oregon) and Tucson, 

it was pointed out that the cities are small enough so that partners have often known 

each other in various capacities and/or on a personal level for many years. These longstanding and multi-faceted relationships have in turn facilitated specific partnership 

efforts on the homeless population. 

SUMMARY & IMPLICATIONS OF KEY LESSONS

In previous sections of this paper, we discussed key characteristics of models for 

serving the homeless in the One-Stop context. In many respects, these characteristics 

confirmed the JTHDP findings—for example, the need to provide continuous 

assessment and case management services, and the need to stabilize homeless clients 

prior to providing employment and training services. The broader concern of to what 

extent the One-Stop system can effectively serve the homeless population is more 

difficult for us to answer, given the very small sample of sites we visited. Nonetheless, 

our site visit data do allow us to crystallize what appear to be some key implications for 

transferability to other local areas.

The One-Stop system’s ability to serve the homeless is perhaps most determined 

by the interrelated issues of identity and resources. Our site visits made clear the value 

of One-Stop centers that are identified, either officially or unofficially, as homelessserving organizations. Such an identity allows homeless customers to feel comfortable 

seeking services in the first place, and allows for staff who not only have the expertise 

in interacting with homeless individuals, but also the intimate connections to other 

homeless-serving agencies and resources in the community. For example, when asked 
XII-30

specifically about the unique role of the Jackson Center as compared to more traditional 

One-Stop centers, respondents in Tucson emphasized that the Jackson Center was 

indispensable because staff at traditional One-Stops would not be equipped to work with 

the homeless, and would not be located at what was considered a “hub” of the homeless 

service delivery system. 

With an identity as a homeless-serving organization, One-Stop centers may 

perceive their mission and weigh their performance concerns somewhat differently than 

a traditional One-Stop. The Jackson Center does not struggle with the decision of 

whether to enroll homeless customers in WIA because of performance measure 

concerns; its mission means that essentially all homeless customers are enrolled and 

served. While WPOS does struggle with the enrollment question a bit more, 

respondents also indicated that, because they are a homeless-serving organization, they 

feel an obligation not just to WIA performance measures, but also to more local factors 

and concerns—e.g., specifically serving the homeless with federal employment and 

training dollars, and reaching those performance goals negotiated specifically with WSI 

(WIA administrative entity).

Thus, without a mission that is at least in part specifically concerned with the 

homeless, and without the benefit of specialized “homeless staff,” the lessons of the 

One-Stops we visited would be difficult to transfer to many other local areas. Even in 

the case of a traditional One-Stop center with a WIA staff member who possessed 

expertise in homeless issues, that staff member would presumably need to be concerned 

with how homeless clients might affect local performance outcomes, and might have 

substantial limitations on capacity to serve homeless customers (e.g., in terms of 

dollars, connections to other local resources and amount of time available for 

continuous interpersonal contact).

In terms of actual service delivery, the key features that emerged from our site 

visits were a relative emphasis on job placement over job training, and intensive case 

management service provision. Job placement was prioritized for various reasons, 

including scarce training dollars and perceived lack of interest in training among 

homeless clientele. However, all sites sometimes use a “stepping stone” approach to 

job placement, in that they make available to their homeless clients a type of pre-work 

experience that acknowledges their unique employability challenges and builds a 

foundation of confidence. The pre-work experience takes the form of World of Work 

expectations during EST, employment in a homeless services organization’s business 
XII-31

enterprise arm, and a subsidized work experience program. The centers provide other 

resources specially targeted to homeless clients’ employability challenges, such as a 

class on how to look for work with a criminal background, and a very intensive EST 

curriculum that addresses a range of issues that homeless clients in particular might be 

facing. Thus, while other local areas might very well be able to also emphasize job 

placement over job training for their homeless clientele, they would also need to 

provide the necessary and specifically targeted supports, whether they be a specially 

designed curriculum or a supply of job opportunities for those hardest to employ. Even 

the Jackson Center, with its philosophy of high expectations for homeless clients and 

emphasis on independent job search skills, realizes that it must provide targeted and 

intensive support in order for its homeless clients to be successful. “High expectations 

with high support,” is how one staff member described the Jackson Center’s approach.

Perhaps the most intensive type of service required for homeless clients is case 

management. The sites we visited emphasized the inability of more traditional OneStops and WIA staff to provide the type of case management that many homeless clients 

require. Furthermore, in Tucson, Jackson Center staff discussed the need for case 

management services to be provided by a range of partners in the CoC, so long as they 

are coordinated. Replication of this model depends on strong inter-partner 

communication and client coordination procedures, which in turn depend on the 

specifics of the local landscape at hand.

Political factors are one critical component of the local landscape and its ability to 

replicate some of the key strategies discussed here. Concentrated efforts to serve the 

homeless were, to some degree in both Tucson and Portland (Oregon), motivated by 

key political figures. City Council members in Tucson served as a catalyst for the 

TPCH’s formation. One particular leader in Portland, who was strongly dedicated to 

the homeless, fought to establish WPOS in its current homeless-friendly location. 

Establishing a homeless services agency (CCC) as the operator of WPOS was a 

similarly improbable accomplishment, in no small part due to the efforts and dedication 

of key political leaders. 

The nature of the local political landscape also has implications for the ability to 

replicate effective partnership strategies for serving the homeless. In Tucson in 

particular, local respondents expressed uncertainty about the extent to which its

collaboration-not-competition spirit could be reproduced, let alone the cohesiveness of 

the group represented by the TPCH. Implementing the extremely democratic operating 
XII-32

procedures of TPCH (one member, one vote) presented some challenges even in 

Tucson. A much larger city with additional heavyweight agencies and layers of turf or 

bureaucracy could involve even more complex challenges—not just specifically for

establishing a TPCH-like body, but even for meeting consistently as “an 

interdisciplinary team.” 

Finally, we would like to revisit the long-term desirability of the models 

presented here, in that they provide the immediate advantages of specially designed 

services, but may also convey a sense of isolation from more mainstream centers. This 

is not a question we are prepared to answer within the scope of this paper; however, it 

does bring us back to the Capital Area Michigan Works LWIA—a site that informed 

this paper to some small degree, but did hint at a compromise between a specialized 

One-Stop center and those that simply do not enroll homeless clients in WIA services.

In this LWIA, homeless clients receive employment and training services from a 

specialized CBO, but are also brought to the One-Stop center to use some 

“mainstream” resources such as the resource room and clothes closet. Though these 

clients are not enrolled in WIA, the hope is that their exposure to the One-Stop center 

might serve as an initial step towards a later time, when the One-Stop might be more 

equipped to address their needs. Further study could help illuminate the extent to which 

such a strategy is an effective one.
XIII-1

XIII. SERVING MIGRANT AND SEASONAL 

FARMWORKERS THROUGH THE ONE-STOP SYSTEM: 

A CASE STUDY

In the summer of 1999, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) awarded Social 

Policy Research Associates (SPR) a contract for the national Evaluation of the 

Implementation of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). As described in the appendix 

to this paper, the evaluation consists of multiple data collection components, using both 

qualitative and quantitative research methods, which can be divided into three distinct 

phases. As part of the first two phases, field staff conducted site visits to 14 states and 

23 local areas to understand broad issues of WIA implementation and operations, such 

as the transition from JTPA to WIA, partnership building, governance, and service 

design and delivery. Also as part of these earlier phases, SPR tracked indicators of 

states’ and local areas’ progress towards implementing required WIA elements 

nationwide, as well as analyzed client-level data on program participants to understand 

the extent to which client characteristics and services changed as local areas transitioned 

from JTPA to WIA. As shown in the appendix, a total of 19 reports and papers were 

produced from these first two phases of the study. 

The year 2003 marked the beginning of the third and final phase of the 

evaluation, yielding four additional papers. Rather than revisiting broad-level 

implementation issues, this phase focused on two narrowly defined topics: (1) the 

engagement of businesses as part of One-Stop strategic planning and as customers, and 

(2) One-Stop services to special populations. Each of these topics branched into a 

distinct but related sub-study under Phase III. 

The special populations sub-study, of which this paper is a part, is specifically 

concerned with how three particular groups—limited-English-proficient individuals 

(LEPs), the homeless, and migrant and seasonal farmworkers (MSFWs)—can be 

effectively served within the One-Stop context. With this question in mind, field staff 

conducted site visits in December 2003 and January 2004 to 18 additional local 

workforce investment areas. Three of these areas were included in our sample 

specifically because of their MSFW-serving strategies. These are: Adams County, 
XIII-2

Colorado; the Eastern Shore, Virginia; and the Lower Rio Grande Valley, Texas.1 

This paper is also informed by our attendance in Sacramento, California at one of 

several recent DOL-funded national dialogues on developing collaboration between the 

National Farmworker Jobs Program (NFJP) grantees and state and local workforce 

investment boards (WIBs).

The three primary sites listed above were selected as part of a difficult process to 

identify local areas that had extensive experience and innovative strategies in working 

with MSFWs in the One-Stop context. As part of this process, we requested 

nominations from DOL and special interest organizations and used web research to 

identify a small pool of potential sites. Next, we conducted preliminary telephone 

interviews with each site to narrow this pool to the three local areas whose practices in 

serving MSFWs we profile in this paper. Given the difficulty we experienced in 

finding potential local areas that met our selection criteria, and the small number we 

eventually visited, the sites we studied should be viewed as case studies of different 

models of serving MSFWs in the One-Stop context.

INTRODUCTION

Migrant and seasonal farmworkers (MSFWs) are considered a special population 

because of their crop-based employment cycle—planting, harvesting, and processing 

products for international consumption—and because of the multitude of social issues 

that beset the group, the majority of which can be linked to their employment in farm 

labor. Agricultural labor tends to be low-paid, lower skilled, physically demanding, 

and often migratory. The breadth of issues farmworkers face include declining wages; 

inadequate housing, transportation, and childcare; and adult and child exposure to 

pesticides and dangerous working conditions exacerbated by a lack of medical benefits 

or access to health care. In response to these circumstances, federal employment and 

training resources directed toward this group emphasize enhancing quality of life,

ensuring self-sufficiency, and gaining employment outside of agricultural labor. 

Counting MSFWs in the United States is a well-acknowledged challenge. The 

GAO has published at least one report focused on improving the counting of MSFWs 

 

1

 Our findings are specific to the One-Stop we visited within the local area, rather than to the 

whole LWIA.
XIII-3

for the U.S. Census. However, in 1992, the Report of the Commission of Agricultural 

Workers estimated there were 2-3 million farmworkers in the U.S. 

The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) does not attempt to count 

farmworkers; instead it explores MSFW demographics and conditions based on a 

selected sample. The NAWS of 1997-1998 (published in 2000) reported that 81% of 

all farmworkers are foreign-born, and that 77% are Mexican-born—statistics that were 

reflected in the three sites we visited. An even higher percentage of farmworkers speak 

Spanish. Farmworkers are undereducated, and 85% are estimated to have difficulty 

reading printed material in any language. The majority are younger than 35, and an 

even larger majority are men. The survey reported that 52% of farmworkers lack legal 

work authorization.

Farmworkers are categorized in two primary groups, seasonal and migrant. 

While definitions of these two groups vary across programs, we provide here the 

definitions according to the two primary federal programs providing employment and 

training resources, the NFJP and the Employment Service MSFW outreach. The 

definitions differ principally in the amount of time a worker must be employed 

primarily in farm labor in order to be considered a seasonal or migrant worker, and in 

the required percentage of the worker’s wages that have come from farm labor during 

that time. 

Under WIA Section 167, which governs the National Farmworker Jobs Program, 

a seasonal farmworker is an individual who for 12 consecutive months out of the 24 

months prior to seeking assistance has been primarily employed in farm labor that is 

characterized by chronic unemployment or underemployment (or is a dependent of an 

individual fitting this definition). A migrant farmworker is a seasonal worker, with the 

additional condition that the individual is required to travel to a job site such that he or 

she is unable to return to a permanent residence within the same day (or is a dependent 

of said individual). 

Under Wagner-Peyser, which governs the Employment Service and MSFW 

outreach workers, a seasonal farmworker is one who, during the preceding 12 months,

worked at least 25 days in farmwork, earned at least half of his or her income from 

farmwork, and has been primarily employed in farmwork on a seasonal basis, without a 
XIII-4

consistent year round salary. A migrant farmworker is a seasonal worker who is 

unable to return to his or her permanent residence from work that same day.2

Federal employment and training services for MSFWs have technically been 

available since at least the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which established the 

Employment Service (ES). However, it was not until 1980 that the program’s 

regulations were revised to include specific language about the delivery of services to 

the MSFW population. The intention of the revisions was to ensure that MSFWs 

receive employment services that are “qualitatively equivalent and quantitatively 

proportionate” to services provided to other job seekers.3 These amendments delimit 

the structure and influence the content of MSFW services in the One-Stops we visited. 

Several other pieces of federal legislation have impacted the type and availability 

of federal employment and training resources and protections for MSFWs. The 

Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 initiated the program now known as the National 

Farmworker Jobs Program (NFJP), re-authorized with regularity by JTPA and, most 

recently, under WIA Section 167. The NFJP provides job training and employment

services specifically to MSFWs, both to help them obtain employment outside of 

agriculture as well as to upgrade their employment within agriculture. The program 

also provides emergency services to farmworkers in the migrant stream. NFJP is a 

required One-Stop partner in areas where an NFJP program is operated. 

The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA) of 1983 

mandates MSFW protections related to transportation, housing, pay, and working 

conditions. Under this act, agricultural employers must provide to their workers written 

information about the conditions of their employment, including information about 

wages, hours, length of employment (e.g. number of weeks), workers compensation, 

and the availability of housing or transportation, as well as its cost to the employee. 

 

2

 20 CFR 651.10.

3 These revisions came about due to a 1974 court order issued by U.S. District Court Judge 

Charles Richey in response to NAACP v. Brennan, attesting that the farmworkers’ constitutional rights 

were violated because of discriminatory practices of the federal Employment Service. The court ordered 

that MSFWs should receive the full range of federal employment services, benefits, and protections 

available to all workers, and it established federal regulations for the system of State Monitor Advocates 

and outreach workers now operated under the Wagner-Peyser Act’s Employment Service.
XIII-5

This information must be provided to the farmworker in a language in which he or she 

is fluent or literate. 

A current emphasis in federal employment and training services for migrant and 

seasonal farmworkers is (1) enhancing collaboration within DOL programs and among 

other federal entities and organizations that serve MSFWs, such as Migrant Education; 

and (2) increasing the number of MSFWs and agricultural employers served. The 

recent NFJP-workforce board dialogues, which explored strategies for increasing 

collaboration between the two entities in the service of MSFWs, are an example of this 

emphasis. 

One salient issue with implications for current federal employment and training 

resources for MSFWs is that the NFJP is slated for termination, as the President’s 

budget for FY 2005 requests no funding for this program. The NFJP has faced 

elimination before. The President’s budget in previous years has zeroed out the 

program, yet Congress has thus far restored the program’s funds. Regardless of the 

final outcome, the potential disappearance of the NFJP provides context for this paper, 

as other One-Stop partners must become equipped to assume primary responsibility for 

employment and training services to this population. 

In this report we examine how WIA and the One-Stop system in three sites serve 

MSFWs and their families, and we explore how the trends and strategies that emerge 

might inform other states and local areas for the future of services to this population. 

The remainder of this paper is divided into five key areas: (1) profiles of the three sites

we visited; (2) key challenges and strategies with regard to outreach and enrollment of 

the MSFW population into One-Stop services; (3) key characteristics and modifications 

of the service delivery system needed for the MSFW population to secure and retain 

employment; (4) analysis of the nature of local partnerships to serve MSFWs; (5) a 

distillation of key themes and practices to emerge from the study, as well as their 

implications for other local areas and for the future.

LOCAL PROFILES

Here we provide an overview of the three primary MSFW sites in order to place 

this paper’s findings in local context—e.g., in terms of varying demographics and 

MSFW characteristics, key MSFW-serving partners, and the extent of local planning 

with regard to the MSFW population.
XIII-6

The Lower Rio Grande Valley, Texas

This LWIA sits on the southern tip of Texas and borders Mexico. According to 

the 2000 U.S. Census, the Valley is the third poorest congressional district in the 

nation; 37% of the population lives below the poverty line. Nearly 90% of the 

population is Latino. 

The Valley is a metropolitan area, and is one of the fastest growing regions in the 

state. While services and retail constitute the bulk of the region’s urban area economy, 

in the surrounding rural communities, agriculture—including vegetables, sugarcane, 

citrus, nursery and livestock production—contributes significantly to the local area 

economy. Despite these key industries, unemployment in the region remains high. In 

January 2004, the unemployment rate for the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission metropolitan 

area (located inside the LWIA) was 14.6%. 

The local area encompasses three counties and has eight full service One-Stops. 

We concentrated our visit at the Edinburg One-Stop, in Hidalgo County. The 

population of the county is approximately 600,000. According to staff we interviewed, 

the Valley has the largest concentration of migrant farmworkers in Texas. While an 

exact count is unavailable, the U.S. Census notes 4,289 workers in the Agriculture, 

Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, and Mining Industries in Hidalgo County; moreover, 

more than 40,000 migrant and seasonal farmworkers are estimated to reside in the 

county.4 In addition to the farmworkers themselves, 800 migrant youth are enrolled in 

the Edinburg/McAllen school districts within the county. Most of the farming jobs pay 

the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour, rather than a piece rate, which is 

common in other areas. 

The majority of MSFWs in the Valley are from Mexico and speak limited 

English, although most MSFW youth have adapted to speaking English at school. 

MSFWs tend to live below the poverty line, and many of them live in Colonias, shanty 

towns, many of which lack indoor plumbing and electricity. The Colonias have been 

problematic for the state, in that they are impoverished areas, often poorly constructed 

 

4

 The recognized challenges in obtaining accurate counts given the prevalence of illegal workers 

in the MSFW population, as well as the wariness even on the part of legal workers to report information 

to government entities, make it difficult to verify whether this number accurately reflects MSFWs in the 

region.
XIII-7

on vacant land, and abandoned at least annually as the migrants who inhabit them move 

on to other crop areas. 

The WIA strategic plan created by the Lower Rio Grande Valley LWIA for 2000-

2004, and updated yearly, has sections dedicated to services to MSFWs and agricultural 

employers. Performance has been an important issue in the area, both to the WIB and 

to the One-Stop administrators. Because of a recognition that MSFWs have not been 

attaining positive outcomes on WIA performance measures, such as the wage gain and 

retention measures, the Brighton One-Stop created specific policy in 2003 regarding the 

services that must be provided to MSFW customers within 30 days of their visit to the 

One-Stop or of their encounter with an outreach worker in the field.5 They hope that 

this more explicit service provision policy will help improve MSFWs’ poor

performance outcomes. (We will further explore this policy in the Service Delivery 

section, later in this paper.)

The Eastern Shore, Virginia

This LWIA, in which the Onley One-Stop center (the location of our visit) is 

located, is a rural area located on a 70-mile long peninsula between the Atlantic Ocean

and Chesapeake Bay. The local area population of 50,000 fluctuates seasonally by 

approximately 5,000 residents due primarily to migrant workers. While non-Latino 

Whites and African-Americans predominate, the area hosts a small but growing yearround Latino population, about 20% of whom are seasonal farmworkers.

The largest industry is agriculture, particularly poultry and tomato production. 

However, as in many parts of the country, agriculture is a declining industry. Nonagricultural industries such as timber and pine products are on the rise. Currently, 

three employers dominate the agriculture industry and employ between 30-40% of 

MSFWs in the area. The remaining farmworkers are employed by nearly 30 smaller 

employers.

The Eastern Shore local area, though part of a three-area consortium, is itself 

comprised of two counties. The Onley One-Stop center is the only One-Stop in the 

local area. Onley is the one primary MSFW site of the three we visited where the 

NFJP grantee is not co-located at the One-Stop, but the grantee is nonetheless regarded 

 

5

 This “first day services” policy, as it is known, matches the equity measures established for the 

ES in response to the Judge Richey court order. 
XIII-8

as a primary provider of intensive and training services for migrant and seasonal 

farmworkers looking to leave farm work for other occupations and industries or to 

upgrade their agricultural employment. 

It is estimated that there were about 17,000 MSFWs in Virginia in PY 2001. 

However, estimates vary widely, and another organization put the number at 42,000. 

There are reportedly nearly 5,000 migrant and seasonal farmworkers at peak season in 

the Onley area, and the Onley One-Stop serves approximately 65% of them, or about 

3,000, annually. The area’s strategic plan for PY 2003 predicts serving 4,800 to 5,000 

MSFWs, a larger number than in previous program years. 

The local area has conducted several important activities that inform the 

development and provision of services for MSFWs. In the late 1990s, three partnering 

agencies—Virginia Employment Commission (VEC), the Eastern Shore Community 

College (ESCC), and the Eastern Shore Area Agency on Aging/Community Action 

Agency (ESAAA/CAA)—met to discuss ways to better serve the migrant population. 

One important outcome of this meeting was a dedication to hiring bilingual staff, three 

of which currently work at the Onley One-Stop center. The annual One-Stop strategic 

plan also incorporates a specific MSFW component. As part of the development of this 

plan, in January of every year, the Onley One-Stop prepares to serve the influx of 

migrant workers by contacting the farmers and soliciting information about the number 

of workers the farmer expects to employ that year, and the crops they intend to grow. 

Several other entities have bearing on One-Stop planning for services to the 

MSFW population. Meetings of the Eastern Shore Migrant Council are attended by 

One-Stop partners, along with numerous other community-based organizations that 

serve farmworkers. The Council meets quarterly and reports to the Governor’s MSFW 

Board. The ES State Monitor Advocate attends these meetings as well as other 

meetings hosted by MSFW service providers or by government entities exploring 

MSFW issues (including the Department of Motor Vehicles, housing providers, and the 

Virginia Council of Churches). The Advocate in turn updates the outreach workers, or 

farmworker placement specialists as they are known in Virginia, two of whom work out 

of the Onley One-Stop.

Adams County, Colorado

This LWIA runs northeast to southwest of the metro Denver area. 

Approximately 400,000 people live in the county, nearly 30% of whom are Latino. 
XIII-9

The county harbors a mix of industries, including agriculture, light manufacturing, and 

educational institutions. 

The One-Stop center in Brighton, where we focused our visit, houses the NFJP 

grantee as well as a Wagner-Peyser designated outreach worker. In fact, the Brighton 

office has only those two representatives, while the WIA adult and dislocated worker 

programs and other partner programs are represented at the four other One-Stops in the 

local area. 

MSFW-serving staff in Adams County quote a conservatively estimated 20,000 to 

25,000 MSFWs in the state. The Brighton One-Stop served 152 MSFWs in PY ‘02, 

and 268 thus far in PY ‘03. While the large majority of MSFWs are Latino and from 

Mexico, the Brighton staff did report a newer—though still small in comparison to the 

Latino population—influx of MSFWs representing disparate races, ethnicities, and 

countries of origin. These include Guatemalan Indians, Haitians, Asians (particularly 

Hmong), Russians, Kickapoo Indians, and South Africans. 

A significant number of the migrant workers who come to Adams County live in 

housing provided by the farmers. These are most often dormitory style residences, in 

which multiple people share kitchen facilities and bathrooms. The MSFW outreach 

worker in Brighton has established relationships with many of the farmers and inspects 

housing facilities for migrants. 

The One-Stop local area strategic planning process does not focus specifically on 

the MSFW population. The Adams County One-Stop system experiences high traffic

and the percentage of MSFWs seeking services is small. However, the outreach 

worker, outreach worker supervisor, and NFJP grantee all routinely attend regional, 

state, and even national events, including the Migrant Coalition and MAFO (a 

Midwestern association of farmworker organizations) conferences, that inform their 

design and delivery of services to the MSFW population in the local area. The State 

Monitor Advocate holds annual training sessions that act as ad hoc planning sessions as 

well. The Northern Area and State Migrant Coalitions are operative entities for 

planning specific to farmworkers, although, in these settings, One-Stop administrators 

and staff are participants, not hosts. 

OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT

In this section, we consider the two related activities of (1) outreach to MSFW 

community members to inform them of the existence of the One-Stop and the services 
XIII-10

available to them through this venue, and (2) of intake or enrollment into WIA and 

other One-Stop partner programs. We consider MSFW community awareness of the 

One-Stop in the three sites we visited, and explore how such awareness is developed 

through a variety of outreach strategies. Finally, we examine the initial intake process, 

and what factors play a role in rendering the One-Stop a desirable setting for MSFWs 

to access employment, training, and supportive services. 

Outreach and recruitment are critical activities in promoting community 

awareness of the One-Stop because MSFWs face challenges such as a lack of 

transportation, a distrust of government entities, and the reality of long work days that 

leave little time for travel to an office for services. For all these reasons, One-Stop 

staff find it important to conduct outreach to inform MSFWs of the existence of the 

One-Stop, and to draw them into those centers for services. 

In the sites we visited, MSFWs are viewed as a unique population in that an 

outreach component is built into the services available to this group through a WIA 

mandated partner, the Employment Service. In fact, MSFW outreach workers are 

mandated to spend a majority of their time in the field during peak season for 

farmworkers, which is often an eight- to ten-month period. However, NFJP grantees 

also conduct substantial outreach efforts. 

Due in large part to this outreach activity, in the three One-Stops we visited, the 

majority of migrant and seasonal farmworkers in the communities know about the OneStop, according to staff. Yet this awareness does vary depending on the proportion of 

new migrant workers each year, the outreach workers’ level of penetration into the 

farmworker community, and the effectiveness of the MSFW “grapevine.” 

Another significant factor affecting the population’s awareness of the One-Stop is 

which partners are represented there, and the extent to which that representation and the 

needs of the farmworkers are coterminous. Each of the three sites we visited is a 

federally designated “significant field office”6 for MSFWs, and is staffed by at least 

one outreach worker. In two of the three sites, the NFJP grantee is co-located at the 

One-Stop. Colorado’s Brighton OS also houses a Head Start office utilized by migrant 

 

6

 Significant local offices are designated annually by ETA and include those local offices where 

MSFWs account for 10% or more of annual applicants. Local offices that are located in an area with a 

large number of MSFWs can be designated as significant even if MSFWs do not account for 10% of 

applications.
XIII-11

families, and a charter school at which numerous migrant children are enrolled. In 

Texas, co-located partners at the Edinburg OS include TANF, Food Stamps, and 

Unemployment Insurance (UI)—particularly important partners, as they are a primary 

draw for MSFW customers to access the One-Stop.7 Staff report that MSFWs may not 

be aware of the many services available to them through the One-Stop until they have 

been introduced to the system by the specific partner they already knew about. If, for 

example, the NFJP grantee in Brighton, Colorado was not located in the One-Stop (and 

if the partners did not have a close working relationship), MSFWs being served by the 

NFJP grantee might never seek out the One-Stop for other services. 

Successful outreach is often contingent on local outreach staff developing 

relationships with agricultural employers so that the worker is welcomed onto the farms 

for the purpose of conducting outreach and providing services. In Brighton, the 

outreach worker provides a host of valuable services for the farmers, such as housing 

inspections for on-site migrant housing and translation of posted materials regarding 

pesticides, which often result in the farmers’ willingness to allow the outreach worker 

to work on site. (These services to agricultural employers are an important component 

of the overall package of services available to MSFWs and will be discussed in more 

detail in the Service Delivery section.)

Outreach workers may also identify places in the community where farmworkers 

congregate or spend time. In Edinburg, Texas, outreach workers conduct much of their 

work in the Colonias, the shanty-towns in which many farmworkers live. In the 

Colonias outreach workers are able to get to know farmworkers who may be looking 

for work, or family members who have needs that could be addressed via referrals. 

One strategy that facilitates this is the establishment of relationships with promotoras, 

women who are recognized as leaders by the residents of the Mexican community, who 

in turn provide the outreach workers an introduction to the community. 

Other local recruitment or awareness-building strategies conducted by the OneStops we visited include posting information on bulletin boards at the farm sites, 

visiting local churches to make announcements about One-Stop services, advertising on 

Spanish television and radio, and relying on mandated or community partner referrals. 

 

7

 In many states, however, agricultural jobs are not covered in the UI system, which poses 

additional burdens for MSFWs in that they are not eligible for UI benefits.
XIII-12

In Brighton, Colorado, two primary referring partners are the two community health 

clinics that provide mobile unit services at the farm sites. 

Once farmworkers are contacted through outreach, the ability of the One-Stops to 

recruit them for services is related to how central the One-Stop is for the MSFW 

community in accessing the many services they typically need. For example, Onley, 

Virginia’s One-Stop has developed a reputation as a popular venue for employment and 

supportive services for MSFWs—due to their historically consistent provision of

employment services and referrals to the farmworker community. 

A further example is evidenced by Brighton, Colorado, where the NFJP grantee 

is co-located. The One-Stop center in Brighton is a hub or gateway for MSFW 

employment services as well as for referrals to other organizations for pre-employment 

or emergency services. The Brighton office has been operating for more than 20 years, 

and the ES outreach worker and NFJP grantee have been co-located for nearly that 

long. Thus, the long-standing presence of the office, in addition to the MSFW 

community’s sense of safety in accessing all manner of services and referrals there, 

contribute to the Brighton One-Stop’s accessibility to the farmworker population. 

While MSFWs in Colorado and Virginia come to the One-Stop primarily to 

access ES job matching services and referrals, MSFWs come into the One-Stop in 

Edinburg, Texas for a fundamentally different reason. According to staff there, the 

principle reason MSFWs seek out the One-Stop is that it also houses the TANF and UI 

programs. Unlike many states, Texas has not transitioned to a call center-based UI 

system. For both TANF and UI, customers must go to the One-Stop to access program 

benefits. A natural and frequent practice is for TANF and UI staff to introduce MSFW 

customers to the staff in the resource room, in order for MSFWs to access core 

services, and to be assessed for their need for intensive and training services as well. 

Staff at the Edinburg One-Stop noted with some distress that migrants who are 

collecting unemployment from other states no longer need to access an actual office to 

continue receiving benefits, resulting in diminishing MSFW traffic at the Edinburg 

center, and thus reduced opportunities for the One-Stop to offer services to these 

customers.

8

 

 

8

 Texas is somewhat unusual here, in that in many states agricultural employment is not well 

covered in the UI system.
XIII-13

While we did not have the opportunity to speak directly with farmworkers, staff 

at the sites we studied emphasized the development of relationships in the farmworker 

community as a critical aspect of outreach, recruitment, and ultimately of service 

delivery. Brighton, Colorado’s outreach worker was raised in a migrant family, and 

participated in farm labor for many years. She maintains relationships with migrant 

families and with farmers she has known from her own labor history. In Texas, a 

number of the Edinburg One-Stop staff, including several administrators and case 

managers, have ties to the migrant or Latino communities, including one who lives in 

the Colonias. These staff testified to the importance of their cultural links in facilitating 

services to farmworkers. 

One One-Stop reported that they build trust (and, by extension, relationships)

with MSFWs by clarifying that documentation of legal authorization to work in the 

U.S. is not gathered and verified with the intent to police farmworker legality or to 

cause adverse consequences for those who may not have it. (Because legal 

documentation is required in order to receive many One-Stop services, a factor 

affecting MSFWs’ willingness to access these services is the perception in the 

farmworker community of how strict the One-Stop is when it comes to verifying 

documentation authenticity.) Once that trust is established, farmworkers are more 

inclined to seek out the One-Stop not only for employment services, but for referrals to 

a wide variety of other services.

The heavy emphasis on referrals to providers of pre-employment or supportive 

services is another unique aspect of the intake process for MSFWs, and will be 

discussed in more detail in the Service Delivery section. Even if MSFWs plan to leave 

farm labor, which tends to be a rare occurrence at the sites we visited, the individual or 

family has often just arrived in the community and has immediate needs, such as for 

food and shelter, which must be met in addition to employment, or in the interim before 

employment is secured. 

There are several other key components of the intake process that One-Stop staff 

have modified to meet the specific needs of farmworker customers. For example, 

while self-services are often considered a first step for universal customers in the OneStop, for MSFWs they are usually skipped entirely in favor of immediate staff-assisted 

core services provided in Spanish by bilingual staff. Monolingual farmworker 

customers would be unable to navigate self-services, such as a job search on the 

Internet, without the assistance of Spanish-speaking staff. 
XIII-14

Regarding intake, another unique aspect of One-Stop services is the rarity with 

which MSFWs actually become registered in the WIA adult or dislocated worker 

programs. Core services are often seen as sufficient to move the MSFW customer into 

employment in farm work, and the NFJP grantee is available to provide the intensive 

and training services for MSFWs who are attempting to develop skills and find 

employment outside of farm labor. Further, the “related assistance” that can be 

provided by the NFJP grantee includes supportive services that, if they were to be 

provided by a WIA formula-funded program, would require registration. Additionally, 

crop-based employment cycles preclude many farmworkers from attaining positive 

outcomes on WIA employment, retention, and earnings change measures, deterring 

WIA program staff from enrolling farmworker customers who might hurt the area’s 

performance outcomes. 

In summary, outreach and enrollment strategies that take into consideration 

language, culture, location, the MSFW community’s general distrust of government 

entities, and the fact that basic needs such as food, shelter, and transportation take 

precedence over, or at least are intricately related to, employment, are critical to a 

successful effort to bring farmworkers into the One-Stop system for employment and 

training services. 

SERVICE DELIVERY

In this section, we consider the delivery of the wide range of services provided to 

the MSFW population, including emergency assistance; pre-employment, training, and 

placement services; case management; and supportive services. We explore the extent 

to which services to employers play an important role in facilitating services to 

MSFWs. We examine the challenges associated with delivery of services to 

farmworkers, particularly the difficulty with which this population is able to transition 

from sporadic, poorly-paid farm labor into secure, long-term employment that promotes 

self-sufficiency, in agriculture or other industries. Lastly, we look at the key 

modifications that providers have made to services in order to effectively meet the 

unique needs of MSFW customers, and the extent to which those modifications may be 

transferable to other areas serving this population.

Pre-employment and Emergency Services

MSFWs face challenges associated with the demands of their employment cycle, 

including frequent uprooting and low wages that result in individuals and families often

living below the poverty line. As a result, emergency services, such as food and 
XIII-15

shelter, are often a prerequisite to job placement. More standard pre-employment 

assistance such as the development of interviewing skills and resumes is important as 

well, yet its provision to MSFWs is often tailored to the needs of this population—

through the use of bilingual staff, for example. 

Initial intake into the One-Stop occurs when One-Stop staff identify the MSFW 

customer’s need for pre-employment and emergency services. One-Stop staff 

conducting intake typically have an initial conversation with an MSFW customer about 

their employment needs and their need for pre-employment, supportive or emergency 

services. This initial intake process is provided either by an ES-funded outreach 

worker or by bilingual staff operating under the auspices of an integrated One-Stop 

system. 

In Virginia, for example, Onley One-Stop staff provide farmworkers a list, in 

Spanish, of other partners and CBOs in the area that can provide services and resources 

such as food, emergency shelter, health services, transportation assistance, family 

counseling, Adult Basic Education, GED courses, and occupational training. Most 

MSFWs are then registered with ES and receive an immediate referral to a job. This

intake process, during which these initial services are provided, is also known as “first 

day services” in two of the sites we visited. 

For Spanish speakers, who represent the overwhelming majority of MSFW 

customers in these three sites, intake is always conducted by a bilingual staff person. 

The organizations to which these customers are referred represent varying degrees of 

bilingual capacity. Some programs that serve migrant farmworkers specifically, such 

as the NFJP grantee, consistently have a majority of bilingual staff. Other 

organizations that serve a broader cross-section of the population may have fewer 

bilingual staff. 

A companion service to the initial job match provided to farmworker customers is 

the I-9 certificate of work authorization.9 Two of our sites report the importance of this 

service both to the farmworker customer and to the employers who later receive it. In 

fact, one site identifies the I-9 certificate as a primary service MSFWs come to the 

 

9

 Employers must have on file an I-9 certificate of work authorization for every person they hire. 

This form is used in conjunction with proper documentation to verify the employee’s identity and legal 

right to work in the United States. 
XIII-16

One-Stop to receive. Employers are mandated to have on file I-9 certificates for all of 

their employees; thus they too benefit from the service. 

The intake process may also involve an assessment of the farmworker customer’s

capacity to attain non-agricultural employment. If the farmworker expresses a desire to 

leave agricultural labor, One-Stop staff will conduct career counseling to explore other 

occupational possibilities. When a laborer wants to leave farmwork, the career 

counseling and assessment process inform the development of a plan intended to 

culminate in non-farm labor job placement. In the sites we studied, this assessment is 

always provided by either the NFJP grantee or the ES outreach worker. 

Other primary pre-employment services are resume development and soft skills 

counseling for MSFWs seeking to find immediate employment in either agriculture, if it 

is the migrant season, or outside of agriculture, if it is not the migrant season and the 

worker is seeking to supplement his or her income until the season begins.

10 In the 

sites we visited, it is typically the outreach worker who provides this service.

Emergency services are most often provided by the NFJP grantee, other federal 

programs (not WIA Adult/Dislocated Worker program or ES), or by community- or 

faith-based organizations. The catalyst for MSFWs to receive these services is the 

intake process, during which staff make referrals for extra-employment needs. 

Emergency services are sometimes sought by farmworkers and their families when they 

are on their way from one state to another for migrant work. For example, a migrant 

family may be on their way from Texas to Virginia, and their car may need new tires 

or a new transmission if they are to arrive safely. It is usually the NFJP grantee that 

provides this type of service, and it is generally a one-time event. 

Emergency services may also be required to assist a migrant worker or family to 

get established in a community when they have just arrived, but do not yet have income 

from farmwork. This type of emergency service includes food, Food Stamps, rent and 

utility assistance, repair or replacement of important household items, shoes and 

 

10 Services are most often activated when migrants arrive in the local area looking for farmwork. 

Seasonal workers may be looking for work either during the growing and harvesting seasons, or they 

may be looking for non-agricultural employment during the off-season. Migrants who call the local area 

“home” may similarly be looking for temporary employment when farmwork is not available; of our 

three sites, Edinburg, Texas has the only significant representation of migrants who consider the area 

their permanent residence. 
XIII-17

clothing, shelter, violence prevention and aid for migrants fleeing violent partners, and 

health care. Emergency services are critical to MSFWs’ survival because they provide 

for basic needs that allow farmworkers to continue working and generating income. 

Training and Placement Services

Many MSFWs are (or are nearly) job-ready for a farm labor job when they come 

to the One-Stop. The assistance they need is often in identifying agricultural employers 

who are hiring. Thus, job matching is a key service, usually provided by ES or NFJP 

staff in the sites we studied. Outreach workers are uniquely equipped to provide job 

matching services in the field; they often travel with a laptop computer, and can 

connect electronically to the state’s labor exchange system from a farm site or a 

farmworker Colonia. Job development is an additional activity that outreach workers 

can conduct either in the One-Stop or remotely.

More intensive services can be provided if a farmworker is not job-ready for 

either farm labor or for non-agricultural employment. Intensive services such as 

English language instruction are provided by the NFJP grantee or, in some cases, by a 

One-Stop partner, such as the community college. Which entity is chosen to provide 

the service is often dependent on the customer’s language capacity. If customers are

completely monolingual Spanish, they will more likely access intensive services 

through the NFJP grantee, which can always provide bilingual services, and provides 

an environment where the farmworker may be more comfortable. 

At the three sites we visited, training is generally confined only to those migrant 

workers who seek to leave the agricultural industry—a small percentage of the total 

number of MSFWs who seek services through the One-Stops we visited. MSFW 

customers who want to enter training at these sites are referred to the NFJP grantee. 

Grantees reported that the primary sub-group of MSFWs who are the most likely to 

leave agriculture, or at least migrant labor, are migrant youth. Youth may be less 

attached to the migrant life, be encouraged by their families to achieve better 

opportunities, and are more likely to be fluent in English due to their time spent in the 

school system. 

In Brighton, Colorado, the NFJP grantee arranges several work experience 

opportunities for migrant youth each summer. For example, in the summer of 2003,

two youth worked in the One-Stop office, three worked on the janitorial crew in the 

One-Stop, and one worked in the Head Start program—also co-located at the One-Stop. 
XIII-18

Youth are more likely to participate in work experience than in summer vocational 

training because work experience pays a wage, and migrant youth are often expected to 

contribute to the family finances in the same way that adults are. 

Another group more likely to take advantage of training is seasonal workers, 

particularly older workers. In Virginia, the Onley One-Stop partner, Eastern Shore 

Area Agency on Aging, provides on-the-job training for older seasonal workers who 

are unable to continue physically demanding farm labor, yet still need employment. 

Seasonal workers in general may be more likely to opt for training because they do not 

typically move to another state when the current season is over, whereas even an aging 

migrant will continue to travel with the family, perhaps taking on child care 

responsibilities when fieldwork becomes too difficult. Seasonal workers may also have 

ties to the community that encourage integration into year-round employment, whereas

migrants do not. Though most migrants have a state or country they consider their 

permanent home, even there residency is sporadic, thus impeding plans to enter into 

training. 

Even when MSFWs participate in intensive and training services, it is almost 

always paid for by the NFJP grantee. Put differently, very few MSFWs are ever 

registered in the WIA adult program. Our interviews with program staff from all three 

sites suggest that WIA performance measures are a major concern that informs the 

practice of referring MSFWs needing intensive or training services away from the WIA 

adult program and towards the NFJP grantee programs. This happens regardless of 

whether or not the NFJP grantee is co-located at the One-Stop. 

The entered employment, retention, and earnings change measures—measures 

MSFWs are more likely to be included in than the credential measure, given that so few 

attend training—are calculated at different points after the customer exits the WIA 

program, such as the first or third quarter after exit. Due to the nature of the farm 

labor employment cycle, and the fact that many farmworkers’ employment is not 

reported to the UI system, MSFWs may not appear in the UI wage record as having 

wages in their first or third quarters after exit. If they are present in the wage record, 

they may not earn more after exit compared to before registration. In fact, they may 

earn less if there is no work during the period for which the measure is calculated. 

Thus, MSFWs are seen as a WIA performance liability and are steered away from WIA 

registration and toward other partners or providers who can provide equivalent services 

without negative performance consequences. Another factor that causes NFJP to be the 
XIII-19

provider of choice is that the capacity of the WIA adult or dislocated worker program 

to serve eligible MSFWs may be inhibited by a lack of bilingual staff, or staff that have 

the appropriate training and experience to serve this population.

Case Management & Supportive Services

One of the many reasons that farmworkers are considered a special population is 

the previously identified struggle between the clear benefits of leaving farm labor for 

better employment in other industries, and the recognition that farm labor is difficult to 

leave, for cultural and economic reasons. The sites we studied repeatedly emphasized

this struggle, and admitted that only a small minority of MSFWs served through the 

One-Stop system are able to successfully transition to non-farm labor employment. As 

a result, case management, supportive services, and follow-up services are somewhat 

different for this population than they may be for the universal customer. 

Case management is generally designed to assist customers to prepare, and to 

coordinate comprehensive employment plans. For any customer, an employment plan 

can incorporate not only workforce investment activities such as a job search or 

vocational training, but also supportive services needed to attain and retain 

employment. MSFW customers are, like other special populations, uniquely in need of 

a comprehensive array of employment and supportive services in order to enter and 

maintain employment. While case managers often provide coordination over time for 

universal customers who participate in core, intensive, and training services in pursuit 

of employment, case managers for MSFWs more often operate as an episodic point of 

access to services (provided on site or through referrals) that are intended to result in 

stable, self-sufficient employment, but that may not involve standard intensive and 

training services. In other words, while universal customers may receive case 

management regularly and consistently over a period of time during which they are 

participating in a service plan, MSFWs often access the services of a case manager only 

at distinct points in time in which they may find themselves in need of a referral to a 

specific service or resource. 

Outreach workers and other One-Stop staff provide limited case management 

services at the three sites we visited. The NFJP grantee staff are more likely to provide 

long-term case management with customers who are attending training. When the 

grantee is co-located in the One-Stop, and an outreach worker or other ES staff are also 

present, the physical proximity of the co-located programs facilitates communication 
XIII-20

about customers being served by both the grantee and ES, perhaps diminishing the need 

for formal case management on ES’s part.

After referral to a specific job, the most common service provided to One-Stop 

customers is a referral for assistance that supports the obtaining and retention of 

employment, what is generally called supportive services.11 For MSFWs, the line 

between the previously described emergency services and supportive services is not 

distinct. Many of the services that MSFWs may need prior to participating in any 

workforce investment activities (e.g., emergency services such as housing) they may 

continue to need in the form of supportive services (e.g., rental assistance) in order to 

obtain and retain employment. Regardless of whether these types of services are 

provided before or after employment begins, they often look the same, ranging from

providing for basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter, to transportation, health 

care, family counseling, child care, and access to education for children and youth. 

NFJP is currently uniquely suited to provide many of these supportive services, in 

accordance with the program’s category of “related-assistance,” which allows the 

provision of these services without requiring customers to be enrolled in intensive or 

training services. This is a very different model from the formula-funded WIA 

programs, in recognition of the unique characteristics of MSFWs. 

As with emergency services, supportive services are provided by an array of 

community- and faith-based organizations, and by One-Stop partners, such as the NFJP 

grantee. For example, community clinics providing medical care on farm sites can 

treat respiratory conditions or foot problems that enable farmworkers to continue 

working. MSFWs who have received assistance to obtain housing upon their arrival in 

a community might also access rental or utility assistance from One-Stop partners (such 

as Community Action Agency) in order to maintain their housing. If transportation 

assistance was provided by the NFJP grantee in order to assist a migrant family in 

getting to another state, the family might also, upon arrival in the new state, seek 

assistance for car repair in order to have a reliable way to get to work.

 

11 According to WIA Title I, supportive services means services such as transportation, child 

care, dependent care, housing, and needs-related payments, that are necessary to enable an individual to 

participate in workforce investment activities. According to Wagner-Peyser, supportive services are 

considered services other than employment or training that are needed to enable individuals to obtain or 

retain employment, or to participate in employment and training programs.
XIII-21

Services to Employers

The extent to which One-Stop staff work closely with agricultural employers has 

implications for the extent to which they are also able to provide critical services to 

farmworkers. Agricultural employers have an unequivocal impact on their employees 

due to the physically demanding nature of farmwork and the fact that many migrants 

obtain housing and transportation through their employer. By establishing a positive 

relationship with employers, One-Stop staff have a better chance to facilitate 

employment opportunities, improve working conditions, and successfully mediate 

employer-employee conflict. In addition, agricultural employers are a legitimate 

customer of the One-Stop, and as such, qualify for and can receive One-Stop services. 

In our sites, the ES-funded outreach worker is the primary provider of services to 

agricultural employers. Outreach workers assist farmers in articulating the desired skill 

sets for their job openings and to write descriptions for job postings with the labor 

exchange. This service tends to keep outreach workers informed about when (and how 

many) jobs will be available—information they can then convey to farmworker job 

seekers. This capacity also enables outreach workers to perform a screening function 

and to refer capable laborers to the employer. If laborers referred by the One-Stop are 

successful employees, the farmer is further encouraged to maintain a close relationship 

with One-Stop staff for screening and referral of future job candidates. 

As a further service to employers, outreach workers conduct a variety of 

inspection and certification services that employers are federally mandated to have 

performed, and which the One-Stop provides at no cost to the farmer. These include 

housing inspections of any migrant housing provided by the employer, and inspections 

of work sites for OSHA-mandated safety and sanitation requirements. In Brighton, 

Colorado, in addition to conducting inspections at the beginning of the season, the 

outreach worker also conducts an informal inspection at the end of the season to let the 

farmer know what repairs or adjustments will need to be made before the beginning of 

the following season in order to pass inspection. This gives farmers time post-season to 

bring their housing up to code. 

Farmers are also required to post information at the work site about the use of 

pesticides and the health risks of working without proper protection. This information 

is required by the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act (MSPA) to be posted in 

a language the farmworkers can understand. Outreach workers often provide this 

Spanish translation service for the farmer. 
XIII-22

Finally, outreach workers mediate conflict by processing complaints from 

farmworkers and, if appropriate, translating employees’ concerns to their employer. 

Complaints can be related to a variety of issues, including wages, child labor, housing, 

pesticides, working conditions, or discrimination. 

As an example of the relationships that develop between employers and outreach 

workers, one outreach worker described an incident in which a farmer requested 

assistance to contact a long-time migrant employee who had not yet arrived on site, and 

about whom the farmer was concerned. The worker went to the farmer’s home to 

phone the employee in Mexico, as the farmer did not speak Spanish. As noted, this 

type of service is important both for the concrete assistance it provides to the employer, 

and for the way in which it builds the relationship with the employer. Through this 

relationship, agricultural employers may be more disposed to allow the outreach worker 

to conduct outreach on the farmer’s land, and to post information about One-Stop 

services at the work site. 

At the same time, we learned at the NFJP-workforce board dialogues that 

agricultural employers are often unaware of the One-Stop system. Dialogue 

participants noted that one strategy for increasing the level of awareness in the 

agricultural employer community is to invite employers to participate on local and state 

workforce investment boards. In the sites we studied, agricultural employers appear to 

be well-informed about the One-Stop. Thus, there appears to be a strong relationship 

between the presence in a One-Stop of an outreach worker, and a higher level of 

agricultural employer awareness of the One-Stop system. In any event, the sites we 

visited show that farmers and other agricultural employers can be reached by the OneStop, and that MSFWs and employers can be better served as a result. 

Lastly, One-Stop staff in Edinburg, Texas discussed the value they place on 

working with non-agricultural employers to allay fears about hiring former 

farmworkers, including the fear that the worker will quit his or her job once work 

becomes available on farms. 

Primary Challenges and Adaptations to Service Delivery

The WIA Section 167 regulations state that “the purpose of the NFJP, and the 

other services and activities established under WIA 167, is to strengthen the ability of 

eligible migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families to achieve economic selfsufficiency.” This goal can be achieved by providing farmworkers with training that 
XIII-23

enables them to obtain upgraded employment within agriculture or to leave farmwork in 

favor of another industry.

12 On that basis, one of the reasons given for the 

disappearance of funding for the NFJP from the President’s 2003 budget was the 

concern that supportive and emergency services were taking precedence over training.13 

(Funding was reinstated, yet diminished for FY 2004, and the program is slated for 

elimination in FY 2005.) However, the goal of helping MSFWs transition into other 

occupations or industries poses a challenge.

The sites we visited consistently reported that for MSFWs, particularly migrant 

workers, leaving farmwork is challenging and rare. Workers often come from 

generations of farm laboring families, and staff spoke frequently of their customers’ 

adherence to “the migrant way of life.” For those customers who travel as a family, 

the family labors together, each contributing to an economic equilibrium, though often 

a poverty-stricken one. If one member leaves the system to enter training, the rest of 

the family may be put at risk given the loss of income that often accompanies entry into 

training. 

Thus, the philosophy of federal employment and training services for 

farmworkers, which conceives of assistance as support for leaving farm labor, poses a 

dilemma: to provide services to MSFWs so that they are empowered to leave 

farmwork, or to recognize the infrequency with which farmworkers do leave farmwork 

and instead provide services that facilitate the farmworkers’ continued participation in 

migrant or seasonal farmwork, albeit with increased quality of work and life. 

The programs we studied address this dilemma by attempting to meet

farmworkers’ immediate needs for emergency, pre-employment, and placement 

 

12 “The NFJP provides funding to organizations that assist migrant and seasonal farmworkers and 

their families attain greater economic stability by assisting them to acquire new job skills in occupations 

offering better pay and a more stable employment outlook, and by providing supportive services to them 

while they work in agricultural labor,” (emphasis added) as noted on DOLETA website, 

http://www.doleta.gov/MSFW/html/facts.cfm.

13 “The [NFJP] program is enabling migratory farmwork through supportive services, but not 

helping enough farmworkers exit the tasking lifestyle, according to Mason Bishop, ETA special assistant 

to the assistant secretary,” Employment and Training Reporter, 4-15-02. Elsewhere, the Program 

Assessment Rating Tool notes, “Annually, most of the approximately 36,000 participants receive only 

low-cost supportive services. Despite the importance of these supportive services—which help many 

participants stabilize their budget while they are unemployed—providing them through the DOL program 

detracts from its primary purpose to help farmworkers find more stable, year-round employment,” OMB, 

2004. 
XIII-24

services while simultaneously exposing MSFW customers to the possibility of finding 

full-time work outside of farm labor. We gathered anecdotal evidence suggesting that 

regardless of how arduously One-Stop partner staff promote farmworker retraining for 

non-labor employment, the successes are few, and tailored to specific circumstances of 

farmworker customers. For example, one site described a migrant young adult who 

entered office skills training while the rest of her family worked in the fields. She 

stayed in the area to complete her training when her family moved on to work in 

another state. When she finished training, she went to be with her family, and was able 

to obtain clerical employment with the agricultural employer for whom her family 

labored. Training in this case was successful, yet the success is tempered by the 

customer’s specific circumstances. When the young migrant’s family moves on, there 

is no guarantee she will again find clerical employment in the same location in which

the rest of her family labors. 

As we learned in the NFJP-workforce board dialogues, innovative approaches to 

training within agriculture have also been developed. These intra-industry training 

programs are a natural bridge between farm labor to either more consistent employment 

throughout the year or to higher skilled work that pays better, is less physically 

demanding, and is not migratory. Some examples of these innovative training 

programs include cross-training programs to train laborers to work crops with opposing 

growing seasons (such as wine grapes and roses) in the Central Valley of California; 

agriculture workforce certificate programs focused on dairy farming in New York; and

customized farmworker training in production and manufacturing in the wine industry 

in Sonoma County, California. 

Regardless of the specific focus of the programs’ efforts, though, a variety of 

special circumstances must be acknowledged in serving farmworkers. For example, 

MSFWs are often in need of English language instruction, income support, and 

occupational skills training that includes basic skills instruction. All sites referred to 

the challenge of illiteracy, rendering even translated material difficult for customers 

who cannot read in their own language. False documentation, used by some MSFWs to 

both maintain employment on a farm and collect Unemployment Insurance, was noted 

by some sites as an obstruction to a seamless provision of services, and to customer

tracking.

Language and culture are two components of MSFW customer uniqueness, and 

they render modified services critical. The MSFW population in our three sites, and 
XIII-25

generally nation-wide, is overwhelmingly limited-English proficient, and a majority are 

Mexican or Mexican-American. Thus, One-Stop staff who work with MSFWs must

often be bilingual, especially in Spanish. For smaller linguistic minorities, One-Stops

may find it more challenging to maintain bilingual staff. Many One-Stops and 

Employment Service departments have addressed this challenge by maintaining agencywide directories cataloguing all bilingual staff that can be utilized as translators for 

customers who do not speak English. 

Outreach workers, NFJP grantee staff, and any other One-Stop staff working 

specifically with MSFWs (such as intake staff) at the sites we visited are all bilingual 

and many are Latino. In at least two sites, multiple staff have strong connections to the 

migrant farmworker community, as they were raised in a migrant family or have 

extended families and friends who are or were migrant workers. These staff attribute 

the success they have had at developing trusting relationships with MSFWs to cultural 

competency and/or the personal experience of farm labor.

Rarely can all staff at a One-Stop be bicultural or have personal experience with 

farm labor. Thus, it becomes critical that staff at the One-Stops have adequate training 

in the special needs of the MSFW population, and in culturally competent practice. In 

Colorado, the Brighton One-Stop outreach worker, who was raised in a migrant family, 

and who has been providing services to farm workers for nearly 20 years, trains not 

only the Adams County One-Stop staff on an annual basis, but also acts as a personal 

trainer for new outreach workers across the state who travel to Brighton to learn from 

her and shadow her in the field. 

In Onley, Virginia, the One-Stop staff who work with farmworkers attend 

Migrant Council meetings where they interact with other MSFW service providers, and 

maintain an awareness of MSFW community issues that assists them in their practice. 

One site facilitates the need for its staff to be exposed to a larger community of 

providers serving MSFWs by routinely sending them to regional or national meetings 

and conferences. The most popular event is the MAFO annual conference that focuses 

on the State Monitor Advocate and outreach worker roles, and provides an opportunity 
XIII-26

for front-line service providers and state and federal policy makers to meet and share 

information.14

The NFJP-workforce dialogues explored the strategy of cross-training grantee and 

other One-Stop partner staff in the provision of services to all potential customers. In 

Edinburg, Texas, One-Stop staff have begun cross-training, initially in response to 

diminishing funds across programs. As a result, the center has found that crosstraining specifically broadens the One-Stop’s ability to respond to the needs of MSFW 

customers, and case managers and intake staff become cognizant of the conditions of 

the farmwork that may cause their new customers to have different needs than many of 

their other customers. For example, staff from the Edinburg One-Stop in Texas note 

that because migrants are often poor and are usually coming from or going to the farms 

when they come into the One-Stop, their clothes may be dirty and they may be wearing 

muddy boots. Migrants who live in the Colonias often burn coal for fuel and thus may 

be accompanied by the pungent smells of coal and farms. These characteristics set 

MSFWs apart from many of the other customers, and require staff attention to ensure 

that services are equitable. This might mean conversations or staff meetings in which 

administrators or supervisors highlight the importance of providing equitable services to 

MSFW customers. In Edinburg, One-Stop staff are sensitive to these factors, and work 

to provide a welcoming environment for MSFWs. 

One other area in which farmworkers may differ significantly from other OneStop customers is in their reticence to access services from entities affiliated with the 

government. For those MSFWs who are new to the One-Stop, staff in the three sites 

described the intentionality with which they explain to MSFWs the One-Stop system. 

Staff explain what the One-Stop is, why paperwork is required, and are also explicit 

about the fact that they are not affiliated with the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service. 

Another key service delivery adaptation is to bring service to the farmworker 

customer, rather than assuming the customer will visit the One-Stop. For example, 

outreach workers from the three sites travel with laptops to the farms, and use either 

 

14 We have evidence from at least one site that outreach workers and other One-Stop staff would 

benefit from additional training. These staff noted that they had been developing their service strategy 

primarily through trial and error, and were interested in learning from experts in the field. 
XIII-27

dial-up or wireless technology to access labor exchange job postings. NFJP 

representatives at the NFJP-workforce board dialogues also identified this strategy as 

one they are regularly employing. As wireless technology becomes more prevalent, 

this out-of-office connection to the services of the One-Stop will be expedited. 

Similarly, one participant of the NFJP-workforce board dialogues in Sacramento, 

Proteus Inc., shared its development of Mobile Employment Centers that have begun 

delivery of services to rural communities in the southern San Joaquin Valley that may 

lack accessible employment and training services. The Mobile Employment Centers 

are 36-foot vehicles equipped as mobile One-Stops, with computers, Internet access, 

and tables and chairs for individual self-service, staff assistance, or classroom 

instruction.15 The mobile units are collaboratively staffed by NFJP, WIA, and ES. 

Another related strategy for bringing One-Stop services to the customer that was 

shared at the NFJP-workforce board dialogues was the designation of NFJP grantee 

sites as satellite One-Stops. According to dialogue participants, grantee sites are often 

located in areas more rural than the One-Stops, thus the satellite office designation 

increases the opportunity for rurally situated MSFWs to receive One-Stop services. 

One-Stop staff in Edinburg, Texas noted that the Lower Rio Grande Valley LWIA had 

in fact opened several satellite offices in rural communities with a high percentage of 

MSFWs, so as to better serve this population. 

A last example of services structured uniquely for MSFW One-Stop customers is 

the practice of serving the family as the customer. In many cases, migrants travel and 

labor in family units. As such, each member of the family is implicitly a customer of 

the One-Stop, not just the member who is job-seeking. Family members may require 

some of the same services and resources that an individual MSFW job-seeker 

requires—such as placement into employment, and basic needs such as food, clothing, 

shelter, and health care. They may also have additional needs that a single job-seeker 

is unlikely to have, such as for child care services, and enrollment in Head Start or K12 education. In Edinburg, Texas, the majority of the migrant youth enrolled in the 

local school system are failing, suggesting that migrant youth are also in need of 

tutoring services, and that migrant parents may lack the language skills and time to 

assist their children with homework. Thus, programs such as the MSFW Youth 

 

15 Proteus Inc. is both an NFJP grantee and a contractor providing WIA dislocated worker 

services. 
XIII-28

program, and the High School Equivalency Program-College Assistance Migrant 

Program (HEP-CAMP) are important partners in the service of MSFW families. 

In addition to emphasizing the importance of providing services to migrant 

families, One-Stop staff also highlighted the concept of the interdependence of the 

family, and how critical it is for staff to consider this when providing services. A 

decision for one member to enter training, for example, has profound implications for 

the rest of the family. In the example given previously, migrant youth often are willing 

to participate in work experience because they are still able to contribute to the family 

income while pursuing alternative career opportunities. By being aware of the 

dynamics of interdependence, One-Stop staff can anticipate families’ concerns, and 

work with the family to choose appropriate services.

Overall, the local service delivery system in each of our sites is challenged by the 

breadth and depth of farmworker needs, and funds that are routinely too exiguous to 

serve every farmworker and family member. The sites uniformly suggested that there 

are never enough targeted resources necessary to assist all MSFWs in need, and to the 

degree that they are subsequently able to work year-round and live self-sufficiently.

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS

The design of the One-Stop system not only values but mandates partnership in 

the service of job-seekers. Many of the products of partnership have been noted in our 

discussion of services to MSFWs and employers. Here, we review and further explore 

the factors that impact the formation, development, and maintenance of partnerships 

designed to serve MSFWs. 

The sites we studied made clear that strong local partnerships are the foundation 

of a thorough service delivery system for MSFWs. Different partnership networks

have developed across the sites, sometimes several within one local area. Some of 

these networks pre-date WIA, and have been incorporated into the One-Stop system

with its advent. Others have historically operated independently of the One-Stop 

structure of mandated partners, yet One-Stop operators and partners have become 

participants. These other networks can inform One-Stop operations and services to 

MSFWs, as well as be informed by One-Stop partner participants.

One annual activity that encourages the maintenance of partnerships is the 

development of the local area strategic plan. Strategic plans usually contain projections 

of MSFW customers to be served by the One-Stop in the coming year. The salient 
XIII-29

aspect of this planning activity for partnership is that local areas develop their plans by 

gathering data and projections from farmers in the area, and from One-Stop partners 

and community providers, thereby taking stock of the resources available to serve the 

MSFW community, as well as of the local job market for farm labor. 

The three sites’ referral processes for farmworkers who come into the One-Stop 

with needs other than or in addition to employment illustrate another aspect of 

community partnership. Each of the sites maintains and distributes to all new MSFW 

customers a list of community resources from which MSFWs might seek services. This 

list accompanies the orientation or intake process, and is usually provided in Spanish.

Another aspect of referral is of partners to the One-Stop system. Some

community agencies that are more explicitly incorporated into the One-Stop’s outreach 

plan, such as the mobile clinics in Brighton, Colorado, are actively involved in 

completing the “referral circle,” referring customers they provide services to in the 

field back to the One-Stop. 

In other places, such as in Onley, Virginia, the referral process is less formal, yet

a number of community-based organizations regularly refer MSFWs to the One-Stop 

for employment and training resources that the CBO does not have the capacity to 

provide. For example, the Eastern Shore Coalition Against Domestic Violence 

regularly refers MSFWs to the One-Stop because many of them are in need of new job 

skills in order to leave farmwork (and an abusive partner) for employment in another 

industry. However, at least one site suggested that while the One-Stop regularly refers 

MSFW customers to community partners, these partners do not routinely refer their 

customers to the One-Stop for employment services.

Staff knowledge of the organizations to which they make referrals is one measure 

of the quality of community partnerships (and a factor that may impact the effectiveness 

of the referral process, and ultimately the services provided to MSFWs). One site 

discussed the haphazard quality of their referral process, noting that little is known 

about the eligibility requirements and quality of the organizations to which staff make 

referrals. In general, at the sites we visited, One-Stop staff members’ knowledge of 

organizations serving MSFWs ranges from nominal to thorough. Similarly, MSFWserving community-based organizations and public programs not represented on site at

the One-Stops demonstrated varying levels of understanding of One-Stop services for 

MSFWs. At one site, community providers brought together for a SPR-conducted
XIII-30

interview noted that this opportunity helped them become more familiar with the 

services available through their colleagues’ programs. This unanticipated benefit to the 

One-Stop and MSFW-serving community suggests the potential for a more formal 

structure of inter- and intra-agency information sharing, one with positive consequences 

for partnership.

As the example above suggests, communication is yet another element that 

informs the quality of partnership. Informal partner communication specific to MSFWs 

is the norm at all three sites we visited. While One-Stop partners tend to meet formally 

on a quarterly or monthly basis, meetings and communication specific to farmworkers 

occur on an ad hoc basis. Both in the One-Stop centers, and in the local community, 

staff of all partner organizations talk by phone or in person regularly, as specific issues 

with farmworker customers arise. For example, when families come to the One-Stop 

with a primary job-seeker, One-Stop staff often make phone calls to a variety of other 

MSFW-serving organizations to help orchestrate family services. Similarly, as OneStop intake staff explore a farmworker’s interest in leaving agricultural labor, staff will 

call or talk to NFJP grantee staff to plan for training and supportive services. 

One-Stop partners reported that as peak migrant season approaches, 

communication to prepare for the surge in customers becomes more intentional—

meetings are scheduled and informal conversations multiply. Partners, both at the OneStop and throughout the community, share information about services, including how 

much of a resource is available (e.g. the approximate food pantry volume), how many 

“slots” are open for farmworkers to fill (e.g. in a Head Start program), the number of 

job openings in agricultural labor in the local area, and the available housing for 

migrant workers. 

During the migrant season, extemporaneous meetings may also be held in the 

event of an unplanned issue or event that has direct implications for farmworkers, and 

which requires some action on the part of partners. For example, the Eastern Shore of 

Virginia learned one season of an approaching hurricane, and the One-Stop held an 

emergency meeting of partners to decide how to warn and assist MSFWs to prepare for 

it. Regardless of the level of formality or regularity, consistent and effective 

communication appears critical to the preservation of partnerships in the service of 

MSFWs. 
XIII-31

In the One-Stop, the partner relationship among the MSFW outreach workers, 

intake staff, and the NFJP grantee appears particularly significant in the provision and 

coordination of services to farmworkers. MSFW customers often interact with these 

three partners in succession, thus the transfer of customers from one to the other is a 

critical step in providing effective, “seamless” services. Outreach workers are often 

the reason an MSFW customer comes into the One-Stop. Intake staff are generally the 

first to greet MSFW customers and provide them initial services. If customers are 

found to be in need of training to leave agricultural employment, or if they are in need 

of related assistance, they are passed on to the NFJP grantee, which provides training 

assistance and supportive services. Due to this shared responsibility and standard 

procedure for serving MSFWs, these staff develop methods of communication befitting 

their respective roles in serving the farmworkers. These methods include regular phone 

calls, emails, and in-person check-ins. In addition, in at least one site (Brighton, 

Colorado), these partners share an MIS, enabling them to view the services and 

activities that other staff have provided or to whom customers have been referred. 

In two sites, the State Monitor Advocate plays an important partner role in the 

development, oversight, and coordination of services to MSFWs. The Monitor 

Advocate is a statewide position, yet because the outreach workers they supervise are 

often few in number, and because the MSFW population is often concentrated in 

several specific areas in the state, Monitor Advocates can cultivate a local expertise. In 

Virginia, the Monitor Advocate participates on the Governor’s Migrant and Seasonal 

Farmworker Board, as well as attends local meetings hosted by MSFW service 

providers and other entities grappling with MSFW issues. (The Department of Motor 

Vehicles recently invited the Monitor Advocate to a meeting about coping with 

undocumented individuals trying to obtain drivers’ licenses.) In Colorado, the Monitor 

Advocates’ annual training and routine visits to the local areas in which there are 

outreach workers assist the One-Stop to consider whether they are providing equitable 

services to MSFWs. In this sense, Monitor Advocates are a central component of the 

network of partners serving MSFWs. 

The other significant formal partnership in the three sites is coalition 

organizations, both local and statewide, comprised of MSFW-serving organizations. In 

each of the three sites, representatives from the One-Stop are members of their local or 

statewide coalition or council. In Colorado, there is one state migrant coalition and

several regional coalitions across the state. Virginia, too, maintains a migrant council. 
XIII-32

The councils and coalitions tend to address “issues that no single organization could 

tackle on their own,” according to one outreach worker. For example, the Northern 

Area Migrant Coalition in Colorado (the region encompassing Adams County) targeted 

increasing the number of units of housing affordable for migrants, and with coalition 

support, member Catholic Charities built new affordable housing in Greeley, a town in

neighboring Weld County. In the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas, a coalition exists

that targets the health and well-being of the families in the Valley. While this coalition 

is not specific to farmworkers, because there are significant numbers of migrant 

families in the Valley, the coalition’s work targets them as a priority population. In 

addition, the coalition meetings are a venue for One-Stop staff to meet with 

promotoras, who help inform staff about the status and current issues of concern in the 

migrant community. 

The many partners we spoke with suggested that their primary challenge to 

partnership is the frenetic pace of business engendered by the overwhelming needs of 

the MSFW community. The crop-driven employment cycle is such that approximately

half the year represents build-up and break-down of farmworker activity, and the other 

half constitutes the height of the growing and harvesting season. Agencies supplying 

services to this population are affected by the annual arrival and disappearance of their 

customers. The times of the year during which partnerships are most auspicious are, 

logically, the busiest times. Referrals flourish, but the aspects of partnership that are 

germane to knowledge-sharing, policy-making, and advocacy are hampered by the 

customer rush. 

In summary, our visits and observations of partnerships at the three sites yielded a 

number of key factors regarding their development and usefulness in facilitating 

services to MSFWs. In general, an array of One-Stop and community partners are 

essential to meet the employment and supportive service needs of MSFW customers and 

their families. Factors that can impact the quality of these partnerships include the 

development of One-Stop strategic plans that involve partners in estimating the volume

of MSFWs to be served in the coming year, and committing to serving these customers, 

according to partner capacity and expertise. The quality of the referral process—both 

the referral of MSFWs from the One-Stop to community-based partners and vice 

versa—is impacted by the depth of knowledge all partners have about each other, and is 

yet another factor affecting the strength of local partnerships. Lastly, One-Stop 

participation in community, regional, or statewide coalitions dedicated to advocating for 
XIII-33

or serving MSFWs can be a means for building relationships with community partners 

and educating the MSFW-serving community about One-Stop services. 

SUMMARY OF KEY LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Before providing a final summary of the key lessons gleaned from sites, we 

restate two important factors that have implications for the future of One-Stop services 

to MSFWs. First, although the primary goal of federal employment and training 

programs is to help farmworkers achieve self-sufficient employment through a 

transition into other industries, many farmworkers will not leave agricultural labor, due 

to an array of economic, cultural, and personal reasons. Second, the NFJP, which has 

provided training, and supportive and emergency services specifically to MSFWs, is

slated for termination. In this event, One-Stops may be compelled to ask to what extent 

other resources, such as WIA core, intensive, training, and supportive services, can be 

used to assist those farmworkers who wish to leave farmwork, as well as those who 

seek an upgraded position within agriculture or need stabilization services just to 

maintain their current levels of farm labor employment. 

In light of these factors and our site visits, a number of key lessons emerged with 

regard to One-Stop services for MSFWs. 

 An expertise in serving and understanding the farmworker community and 

culture is an important factor in how well-used the One-Stop is by MSFWs. 

One factor that may aid the development of such expertise is to have staff with 

cultural connections to the MSFW community, as well as bilingual capacity. 

 In the future, outreach workers may be left as the only dedicated staff for 

MSFWs. Yet the demand may be such that outreach workers cannot serve all 

farmworkers needing One-Stop services. Cross-training additional staff to 

serve MSFWs, and ensuring the hiring of bilingual staff may be a way for 

One-Stops to address this challenge. 

 The need for bilingual services also has implications for the way in which 

core services are provided. Self-services are often inaccessible to 

monolingual MSFWs; thus bilingual staff are required to provide immediate 

staff-assisted core services. Even when One-Stop printed materials and 

computer services are available in Spanish, monolingual MSFWs may not 

have the basic literacy and/or computer literacy to take advantage of these 

services without staff assistance. 

 The passage of specific policy regarding MSFWs can be an important strategy 

in helping states, local areas, or individual One-Stops prioritize services to 

MSFWs. For example, the One-Stop in Edinburg, Texas passed a policy 
XIII-34

requiring the provision of “first day services” that must be provided to 

MSFW customers within 30 days of their initial contact with the One-Stop. 

 In order to make One-Stop services accessible to MSFWs, rural satellite 

offices may be opened that are closer to MSFW communities than other OneStops. The NFJP-workforce board dialogues identified the use of NFJP 

grantees as satellite or mobile One-Stops in rural areas. 

 MSFW-specific coalitions and councils are an important venue in which the 

One-Stop can participate to stay informed about issues facing the MSFW 

community, learn about potential service strategies, and inform other partners 

and potential partners about One-Stop services. 

 Families are as important a “customer” in the One-Stop system as are 

individual job-seekers. Individual members within the family may have 

different needs, yet the family unit is a critical unit for service providers to 

consider. 

 The subset of the MSFW population about whom the three sites have the most 

hope of leaving farm labor is migrant youth. Thus, the MSFW youth 

program, the WIA youth program and programs such as HEP-CAMP may 

become particularly important service providers in the future.

 Supportive and emergency services, including housing, utility assistance, 

food, clothing, transportation, health care and health education, child care, 

and educational services including English language instruction, are critical to 

stabilizing MSFWs and their families, and allowing them to find employment, 

whether in agriculture or in another industry. 

 In general, the availability of English language instruction is often inadequate. 

Classes are neither large enough in number nor offered in a wide enough

variety of time slots to meet the demand. Supportive services such as child 

care and transportation are critical services to enable MSFWs to participate in 

English language instruction, yet they are rarely available in the sites we 

studied.

 Services to employers are critical for serving MSFWs. 

 Services to agricultural employers can ultimately benefit MSFW 

customers, if those services result in improved working 

conditions and render the employer willing to receive the 

outreach worker on site. One-Stops can also obtain information 

from agricultural employers, such as crops to be grown or job 

openings in the coming year, which assists in the on-going 

planning process. 

 Services to non-agricultural employers may include education 

about employing former farmworkers, allaying fears that the 

employee will quit when the crop season returns.
XIII-35

As we noted in our introduction, the sites we studied are case studies identified 

through a difficult search for One-Stops providing any targeted or unique services for 

MSFWs. Other One-Stops may lack the specific focus on serving MSFW customers, 

and the accompanying expertise developed by these three sites. Thus, for other OneStops to take advantage of the lessons described above will require concerted effort, 

and a significant investment in time, technology, infrastructure, partnership, and staff,

in order to effectively serve this special population. 


 
XIV-1

XIV. SERVING LIMITED-ENGLISH SPEAKERS

THROUGH THE ONE-STOP SYSTEM:

A CASE STUDY

In the summer of 1999, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) awarded Social 

Policy Research Associates (SPR) a contract for the national Evaluation of the 

Implementation of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). As described in the appendix 

to this paper, the evaluation consists of multiple data collection components, using both 

qualitative and quantitative research methods, which can be divided into three distinct 

phases. As part of the first two phases, field staff conducted site visits to 14 states and 

23 local areas to understand broad issues of WIA implementation and operations, such 

as the transition from JTPA to WIA, partnership building, governance, and service 

design and delivery. Also as part of these earlier phases, SPR tracked indicators of 

states’ and local areas’ progress towards implementing required WIA elements 

nationwide, as well as analyzed client-level data on program participants to understand 

the extent to which client characteristics and services changed as local areas transitioned 

from JTPA to WIA. As shown in the appendix, a total of 19 reports and papers were 

produced from these first two phases of the study. 

The year 2003 marked the beginning of the third and final phase of the 

evaluation, yielding four additional papers. Rather than revisiting broad-level 

implementation issues, this phase focused on two narrowly defined topics: (1) the 

engagement of businesses as part of One-Stop strategic planning and as customers, and 

(2) One-Stop services to special populations. Each of these topics branched into a 

distinct but related sub-study under Phase III. 

The special populations sub-study, of which this paper is a part, is specifically 

concerned with how three particular groups—limited-English-proficient individuals 

(LEPs), the homeless, and migrant and seasonal farmworkers (MSFWs)—can be 

effectively served within the One-Stop context. With this question in mind, field staff 

conducted site visits in December 2003 and January 2004 to 18 additional local 

workforce investment areas. The four workforce investment areas we visited 

specifically for their LEP-serving strategies were: Santa Cruz County, Arizona; 

Chicago, Illinois; Coastal Counties, Maine; and North Central Wisconsin. 
XIV-2

The four primary sites listed above were selected as part of a difficult process to 

identify local areas that had extensive experience and innovative strategies in working 

with LEPs in the One-Stop career center context. As part of this process, we requested 

nominations from DOL and special interest organizations and used web research to 

identify a small pool of potential sites. Next, we conducted preliminary telephone 

interviews with each site to narrow this pool to the four local areas whose practices in 

serving LEPs we profile in this paper. Given the small number of local areas we 

studied as part of the research for this paper and the lack of any objective criteria for 

measuring their success in serving LEPs, the sites we studied should be viewed as case

studies of different models of serving limited-English speakers in the One-Stop context.

INTRODUCTION

As defined in WIA’s client-level reporting system, “limited English language 

proficiency” describes persons who (1) have a limited ability to speak, read, write or 

understand English, and (2) whose primary language is a language other than English

or who live in a household or community where English is not the dominant language. 

The size of the LEP population in the United States is quite large and has grown 

dramatically over the last 10 years. In 1990, about 6.5 million adults spoke English 

“not well or at all.” In 2000, the number of adults who fell into this category jumped to 

more than 10.5 million. Of these 10.5 million, the most commonly spoken language 

was Spanish (6.6 million adults), followed by Asian or Pacific Islander languages (1.4 

million adults) and “Indo-European” languages (1.2 million adults).

1

While, by definition, the LEP population faces the challenge of having limited 

English skills, this population also often faces additional barriers, such as wages that 

are lower than those of individuals proficient in English. For example, immigrants who 

are orally fluent in English have earnings that are 14% greater than the earnings of 

immigrants who are not orally fluent in English. Likewise, those immigrants who are 

fluent in oral and written English have earnings that are 24% greater than the earnings 

of immigrants who are not.2

 

1 Revised Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding the Title VI Prohibition 

Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons (Revised DOL 

Recipient LEP Guidance) in the Federal Register on May 29, 2003 (68 F.R. 32290).

2

 Maloney, C. (August 18, 2003). Clinton bill promotes English language services in One-Stops. 

Employment & Training Reporter, p. 738.
XIV-3

Many federal policies and guidelines have been established in the last several 

years to help ensure that the LEP population is adequately and fairly served by 

federally-funded programs, such as programs in the One-Stop system. Many of these 

efforts were spurred by the release in 2000 of Executive Order 13166: Improving 

Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency. This federal order 

stated that, as part of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, persons who are limited in 

English proficiency as a result of national origin may not be “excluded from 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”3In addition, this Order 

mandated that all federally-funded agencies examine the delivery of their services to the 

LEP population, and develop agency-specific Title VI guidance for ensuring that the 

LEP population has reasonable access to program services and activities. 

In response to Executive Order 13166, DOL developed Revised DOL Recipient 

LEP Guidance, including recommended strategies for One-Stop centers, such as: (1) 

how to determine whether their LEP services are adequately provided, given the 

surrounding LEP population, (2) when to provide oral language interpreters and how to 

ensure that interpreters are competent and appropriate, and (3) how to determine which 

documents should be translated and how to ensure that the translations are accurate. In 

addition, this guidance contained five elements that One-Stops may address when 

developing their own LEP service-plan, such as policies for: (1) identifying customers 

that need language assistance, (2) interacting with LEP customers and ensuring that 

they are provided with appropriate interpretation and translation, (3) training staff about 

LEP policies and procedures, (4) effectively alerting LEP community members of the 

One-Stop services available in their primary language, and (5) evaluating and updating 

the LEP plan.

4

 

3

 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: No person in the United States shall, on the 

ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 

be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 

(Section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d.)

4

 The Department of Labor published Revised Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance 

Recipients Regarding the Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited 

English Proficient Persons (Revised DOL Recipient LEP Guidance) in the Federal Register on May 29, 

2003 (68 F.R. 32290). On this same date, Employment and Training Administration Advisory System 

issued Training and Employment Guidance Letter No. 26-02, which notified State Workforce Liaisons 

and State Workforce Agencies of this guidance.
XIV-4

To aid local One-Stop systems in developing and implementing LEP plans, DOL 

alerted state workforce liaisons and agencies of tools and information available on the 

website of the Interagency Working Group on LEP (http://www.lep.gov). This website 

provides links to tools and resources such as: (1) federal LEP guidance, including 

Executive Order 13166, (2) “I Speak” Language Identification Flashcard that LEP 

customers can use to indicate their spoken language, (3) organizations that can aid OneStop centers in identifying appropriate translators and interpreters, (4) government 

websites and other resources in languages other than English, and (5) the Language 

Assistance Self-Assessment and Planning Tool for Recipients of Federal Financial 

Assistance5 that One-Stop centers can use to develop and assess a plan for LEP 

services. 

As part of a longer-term strategy for supporting local One-Stop systems, the 

Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA) has also 

created the LEP Workgroup, made up of ETA regional and national office staff who 

are charged with identifying, collecting, and making available LEP tools and best 

practice information. In addition, DOL is developing other products that will support 

LEP services in the workforce investment system, including a Technical Assistance 

Guide on Services to Limited English Proficient Persons, an on-line Peer Expert 

Directory, and a special Tabulation of Census Data for local workforce areas. All of 

these products are going through ETA clearance and will soon be available on the 

Internet.

While not enough research has been conducted to identify “best practices,” there 

are a few trends for serving the LEP population in the workforce context that seem to 

hold particular promise. Current workforce-program design recommendations include: 

(1) teaching language and literacy skills as part of job skills training to help expedite the 

rate of job placement, (2) helping LEP persons design long-term career goals that 

include career ladders, (3) reducing redundancy across English courses and focusing the 

content on what is needed to perform in a job, (4) preparing persons with basic cultural 

skills expected by the American workplace, (5) providing occupational training in other 

languages when English is not required to perform a job, and (6) adapting training 

 

5 http://www.lep.gov/selfassesstool.htm
XIV-5

programs to better meet the needs of LEP persons, such as hiring bilingual staff and 

teaching using a “hands on” or “contextualized” approach.6

Given the increasing attention being paid to serving the LEP population, this 

paper on serving LEP customers in the One-Stop context comes at an opportune time. 

Its overarching research question is, to what extent can the One-Stop system effectively 

serve the LEP population and through what specific strategies. The remainder of this 

paper is divided into six key areas: (1) profiles of the four sites; (2) planning processes 

used to develop LEP service procedures; (3) challenges and strategies with regard to 

outreach and enrollment of the LEP population in One-Stop services; (4) key 

characteristics and modifications of the service delivery system recommended for the 

LEP population to secure and retain employment; (5) analysis of the nature of local 

partnerships to serve LEP customers; and (6) a distillation of key themes and practices 

to emerge from the study, as well as their implications for other local areas and for the 

future.

LOCAL PROFILES

The One-Stop career centers that we visited as part of this study have rather 

distinct local contexts. That is, the geographic setting, demographics of the LEP 

population, service plans, and key industries are quite different from one community to 

the next. In addition, the local areas in the study also have distinct approaches to 

structuring the One-Stop system so that it meets the needs of customers with limited 

English proficiency. This section provides a summary of the four sites we visited in 

terms of the One-Stops’ local context and staffing structure.

Santa Cruz County, Arizona

The Santa Cruz County local area has two One-Stop centers, both of which are 

located in Nogales, Arizona. The city, population 21,000, is located on the Mexican 

border, adjacent to its twin city of Nogales, Mexico. Nogales serves as a critical port 

of entry for Mexican produce, which fills 75% of America’s need during the winter. 

Agriculture, government, and the local Wal-Mart store are the city’s largest employers. 

The population is predominantly Latino, with non-Latino whites being the second 

largest sub-population. Spanish-speaking or bilingual persons are considered the 

 

6

 Wrigley, H.S., Richer, E., Martinson, K, Kubo, H., and Strawn, J. (2003). The Language of 

Opportunity: Expanding Employment Prospects for Adults with Limited English Skills. National Adult 

Education Professional Development Consortium and Center for Law and Social Policy.
XIV-6

“norm” in the community, with 70% to 80% of the population being LEP, according to 

local respondents. Given this unique situation, the LEP population in this area is not 

considered a “special population,” although the local area uses several strategies that 

might be used by other local areas serving the LEP population.

In the Santa Cruz County LWIA, we concentrated our site visit on one of the 

Nogales One-Stop career centers. Most of the One-Stop customers are referred by the 

state Employment Services office and the state Vocational Rehabilitation office, both of 

which are located off-site. Adult Basic Education (ABE), a key One-Stop partner for 

serving the LEP population, funds two organizations as service providers for the LEP 

population: Literacy Volunteers of America, which is co-located at one of the two OneStop centers, and Nogales Unified School District. Both ABE programs are the main 

providers of English as a Second Language (ESL) and General Education Development 

(GED) credential for One-Stop customers. Respondents we spoke with estimated that 

about 80% of WIA registrants were LEP. 

North Central Wisconsin

In the North Central Wisconsin LWIA, we focused our site visit on Marathon 

County Job Works. This comprehensive One-Stop center is located in Wausau, 

Wisconsin (population 40,000), a city that relies heavily on the manufacturing industry 

for jobs. Until 30 years ago, when the community became a refugee resettlement 

community, the population was almost entirely white. The refugee LEP population that 

has moved to the Wausau area is primarily Hmong, with a much smaller but significant 

representation of Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese refugees. Many refugees have 

lived in the area for a number of years and have children in the public school system. 

Unlike their parents, these youth often have full mastery of the English language and 

have adopted the local Wisconsin culture as part of their own. There are also a 

significant number of Latino LEP permanent residents, who are drawn to the area by 

manufacturing and farming job opportunities. 

Marathon County Job Works is a part of the local system that uses a strong 

network of required and non-required partners to serve the local LEP population. The 

primary partner is the Workforce Attachment and Advancement Program,

7

 a state-

 

7

 Funding through the state grant for the Workforce Attachment and Advancement Program ended 

just after our site visit. It was expected that the activities associated with this program would continue, 

and be funded by TANF dollars.
XIV-7

funded program that is co-located at the One-Stop center and focuses on providing 

supportive and training services to LEP customers. Other services and support for LEP 

customers come from various partners, such as TANF and USDA Food Stamp 

Employment and Training, which fund the Resource Room staff and case managers. 

Another key partner is the Wausau Area Hmong Mutual Association—the local Refugee 

Resettlement program—which provides primarily Asian LEP persons with employment 

and training services, ESL courses, GED courses, and other supportive services. Other 

non-required partners include Children’s Service Society of Wisconsin (mental health 

provider), Neighbor’s Place (food pantry and adult education provider), Wausau School 

District (GED and ESL provider), North Central Technical College (GED and eligible 

training provider), Latinos Unitos (Latino resource group), and J and P Consultants 

(private translation and interpretation service provider). The LEP specialist we spoke 

with estimates that he works with about 50 Hmong customers per month, or about 500 

per year; none of these become WIA registrants.

Chicago Mayor’s Office, Illinois

Chicago, Illinois (population 2.9 million) is divided into neighborhoods, which 

often reflect different cultures, such as Latino, Chinese, Russian, and Polish 

communities. After seeing a significant decline in manufacturing, the largest types of 

employers in the area are restaurants, elementary and secondary schools, and general 

medicine and surgical hospitals.

In structuring its One-Stop system, Chicago took advantage of the city’s strong 

system of community-based organizations (CBOs) throughout the different 

neighborhoods, and created a formal network called “WorkNet Chicago.” This network 

is comprised of over 100 CBOs in Chicago, many of which have direct and wellestablished connections with LEP sub-populations. The Chicago local workforce 

investment board (LWIB) provides WIA funding to 50-60 of these CBOs. These 

affiliate sites provide WIA core, intensive, and training services. Additionally, the 

Chicago local area has five comprehensive One-Stop centers geographically distributed 

throughout the city, including Pilsen One-Stop Career Center (Pilsen One-Stop), which 

was our center of focus. In program year 2001, Chicago exited about 800 WIA 

registrants, of whom about 7% were identified as LEP.

Partners that are particularly key to the delivery of LEP services at the Pilsen 

One-Stop are the Illinois Department of Employment Security and National Able 

Network, a non-profit agency that was contracted to provide WIA services, in part, 
XIV-8

because of the staff’s ability to speak multiple languages and understand different 

cultures in the local community. One other partner that is particularly key to service 

delivery for both comprehensive and affiliate sites is City Colleges of Chicago, which 

offers ESL in 57 locations throughout Chicago. 

Coastal Counties, Maine

Portland CareerCenter—one of seven centers in the Coastal Counties LWIA—is 

located in Portland, Maine (population 65,000). Portland is a port city and the local 

economy relies heavily on tourism. The residents are primarily white, although there is 

a large and diverse LEP refugee population that comes from numerous countries, 

including Somalia, Sudan, Congo, Zaire, Ethiopia, and Iraq. Many of these refugees 

were originally settled in this area, although there are significant numbers of “New 

Mainers” who originally settled in another part of the United States, but moved to 

Portland because of its reputation for being a pleasant city with plenty of available jobs 

during the tourist season. As a result of the growing retiree population, the cost of 

living is increasing, which makes it difficult for the refugee population to find 

affordable housing.

Portland CareerCenter serves the LEP population through many required and 

non-required partners, including WIA and Portland Adult Education (the local ABE 

provider). Since Portland has few community-based organizations, other LEP service

providers usually include programs that are funded through the City of Portland’s 

Health and Human Services/Social Services Division, such as the Refugee 

Collaborative and Family Shelter Program. Respondents we spoke with estimated that 

the workforce system serves about 500 LEP customers per year, but the number who 

become WIA registrants is much smaller.

PLANNING PROCESS

DOL recommends that One-Stop career centers develop a set of LEP-service 

procedures to ensure that the population is adequately served. To aid One-Stops in 

developing a plan, DOL recommends that centers use The Language Assistance SelfAssessment and Planning Tool for Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance.

8 This 

 

8

 Guidance to develop a plan, and specific mention of the Language Assistance Self-Assessment 

and Planning Tool for Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance, were issued by Employment and 

Training Administration Advisory System on May 29, 2003 in Training and Employment Guidance 

Letter No. 26-02.
XIV-9

tool involves two major activities: 1) conducting a self-assessment, such as determining 

the size of the LEP population in the community and assessing the resources available, 

and 2) developing a set of planned procedures, whether in written form or simply in the 

form of knowledge across all staff, including procedures for serving LEP customers

and constructing a system for regularly monitoring and updating the service plan. 

The One-Stop centers in this study carried out such planning but without a written 

plan. Their LEP-service procedures evolved over time through implementing different 

practices, reflecting on those practices, and making continuous, incremental changes. 

The frontline staff often had input into these evolving policies and had a common 

understanding of how to serve the LEP customers, including how to greet an LEP 

customer and find an interpreter in the event of a language barrier.

Centers were more likely to produce written plans when funding was provided

specifically for this task or when funding requirements dictated a written plan. For 

example, even though Portland CareerCenter and Marathon County Job Works have 

been serving the LEP populations for many years without written plans, both had 

recently developed or were currently developing written plans as a result of funding 

opportunities. Portland CareerCenter received a $200,000 grant from WIA incentive 

funding, which it was using to conduct a formal needs assessment of the LEP 

population and, based on the findings, develop a written plan. As another example, 

Marathon County Job Works received a grant for serving the Latino LEP subpopulation. When applying for the grant, they were required to document the goals of 

Latino LEP activities, outline how the services would be coordinated and delivered, and 

develop a monitoring system for ensuring that the activities were completed.

As part of local planning processes, the One-Stop centers we visited also helped 

to develop cross-agency, community-wide plans for serving the LEP population. For 

example, the Chicago One-Stop system helped ensure that LEP services were well 

distributed over their large geographic region by developing a Community Workforce 

Employment Council comprised of five CBOs, five employers, and one community 

resident. This council went to numerous CBOs in the community to describe the local 

One-Stop services, learn about the LEP population, determine what services and 

resources were needed, and coordinate services among agencies. Marathon County Job 

Works used a different approach. Rather than touring the community to assess needs, 

the director became a member of the city’s community-based strategic planning 

committee, called the Minority Affairs Office of Wausau 2000. Since 1992, this group 
XIV-10

of service-providers and leaders has met bi-monthly to assess the changing needs of the 

LEP community and coordinate services.

OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT

In order to adequately serve the LEP population, it is essential that the local LEP 

population first be aware of the One-Stop center, as well as the specific services that it 

provides. To recruit and retain LEP customers, all One-Stop centers in this study 

implemented multiple measures to help ensure that LEP customers have a positive and 

productive experience from the moment they walk into the center. This section 

describes some of the challenges that the One-Stop centers faced in recruiting LEP 

customers and how the centers tailored their recruitment and enrollment strategies to 

overcome some of these challenges.

Outreach and Recruitment

While challenges to recruiting LEP customers varied across the One-Stop centers

in this study, the three most often cited were: 1) limited English-speaking skills make it 

difficult for LEP populations to learn about available services, 2) limited literacy skills, 

which are present in many of the LEP customers in this study, make it difficult for 

customers to read promotional materials that have been translated into their own

language, and 3) some LEP populations may not trust government agencies and 

therefore may be initially wary of One-Stop centers. 

Several approaches were used to help overcome these challenges to recruitment. 

For example, centers produced advertisements in languages other than English using 

multiple forms of media, such as flyers, brochures, radio advertisements, television 

advertisements, and written articles in the LEP communities’ newspapers. One-Stops 

have also sponsored or participated in LEP-targeted events, such as job fairs and 

workshops, with information being presented in the primary language or with 

interpreters. In addition, many One-Stop centers have taken advantage of networks 

established by agencies that serve the LEP population, and rely on these agencies as a 

referral source.

Targeted efforts to build the LEP populations’ trust of One-Stop centers were

another important component of effective recruitment. Among the ways centers did 

this was to build relationships with community leaders, service providers, and 

community members. For example, lead administrators of Marathon County Job 

Works worked for several years to build trust with key Hmong leaders, including 
XIV-11

administrators of other programs that served the Hmong community, such as the 

Refugee Resettlement program. As part of the trust-building effort, One-Stop

administrators worked with Hmong leaders on different committees, established 

personal relationships with the Hmong leaders, showed a genuine interest in and respect 

for the Hmong culture, advertised in Hmong using various media, and adapted their 

services to meet the needs of the Hmong population—such as by providing bilingual 

and bicultural Hmong staff. Once trust was established with the Hmong community 

leaders, these leaders became the main source of LEP customer referrals. In addition, 

this One-Stop center also worked especially hard to satisfy the Hmong customers when 

they did come to the center, recognizing that word-of-mouth within the LEP community 

would be a powerful source of recruitment. For example, case managers worked to 

place Hmong customers in jobs very quickly, since immediate employment was often 

their goal. 

Another strategy for building the LEP communities’ trust in One-Stop centers was 

to help new grass-roots community groups become legally recognized. For example, 

Marathon County Job Works acquired funds from a state grant and worked with the 

Latino community members, faith-based organizations, and other service providers to 

develop Latinos Unitos, a 501c3 organization. Because Marathon County Job Works is 

directly involved in supporting this newly emerging program, key Latino leaders are 

familiar with and more frequently promote the One-Stop center to Latino community 

members. 

Despite the multiple advertising and recruitment strategies used by the One-Stop 

centers in this study, two strategies, which reflect the tight-knit nature of many LEP 

populations, appear to be the most effective for recruiting LEP customers. The first is 

word of mouth, in which customers who accomplish their goals through the aid of OneStop centers tell neighbors and friends about their success, as described above. The 

second strategy is referral by agencies that are strongly connected to the LEP 

population. For example, both Portland CareerCenter and Marathon County Job 

Works have established close working relationships with their local Refugee 

Resettlement programs, which now refer a large number of LEP customers. As 

another example, Chicago’s LWIB intentionally placed One-Stop services in CBOs that 

already had a strong presence in different LEP communities, making these CBOs 

affiliate One-Stop sites. Once the CBOs became affiliate One-Stop sites, the LEP 
XIV-12

community members that were already coming to these sites could also access the 

newly added One-Stop services.

Intake and Enrollment 

The One-Stop centers altered several components of their intake and enrollment 

processes in order to ensure that LEP customers’ experiences were equal in quality to 

that of English speakers. These efforts included providing bilingual staff or interpreters 

for LEP customers and altering the method and content of intake and enrollment 

processes, as described in this section.

To ensure effective communication as soon as the customer walks into the OneStop center, three of the four One-Stop centers intentionally place bilingual and 

bicultural “greeters” at the front desk of the Resource Room. This allows the One-Stop 

staff to immediately discuss the LEP customers’ needs and refer them to appropriate 

One-Stop services. In addition, these staff know how to put the LEP customers at ease 

by interacting with them in a culturally appropriate manner. For example, if a man and 

woman enter the One-Stop center, the Resource Room greeters’ may direct their 

conversation to the woman, man, or both, depending on cultural norms. 

Other features of the Resource Room are also modified in order to make LEP

customers feel welcome upon entrance into the One-Stop center. For example, all of 

the centers provide translated materials about the services available through the OneStop and other service providers in the community. Marathon County Job Works also 

provides signs and artwork targeted toward the more common LEP groups. 

All of the centers modify both the content and method of orientation to 

accommodate the LEP customers. For example, at Pilsen One-Stop in Chicago and 

Portland CareerCenter, a group orientation is held either in the customers’ primary 

language or with an interpreter, depending on the number and composition of 

orientation participants. As part of orientation, the staff work closely with the LEP 

customers to identify their goals and gain a basic understanding of their English skills. 

This information is used to determine the best route of services for each LEP customer, 

especially since the Resource Room tools are predominantly in English.

Since basic English skills are required to use the Resource Room tools, in most 

cases, LEP customers skip the Resource Room services altogether and instead are 

provided with staff-assisted services by a bilingual case manager or a case manager 

paired with an interpreter. 
XIV-13

SERVICE DELIVERY

Once intake occurs, customers are offered an array of employment and related 

services, which the centers in this study often adapted to meet the needs of their local 

LEP populations. We examine the One-Stop career centers’ delivery of emergency and 

basic need services to LEP customers, and pre-employment and job training services 

that are adapted to better meet the needs of LEP customers. We examine the centers’ 

delivery of job matching and placement services. We discuss the importance of case 

management and employer services provided in support of the LEP customers. Lastly, 

we discuss the challenges that the centers commonly face in adapting their services.

Emergency and Basic-Need Services

One-Stop centers routinely offer emergency and basic-need services to customers 

in need, regardless of whether they are LEP or English proficient customers. These 

basic-need services often include medical, housing, and transportation services. Such

stabilizing services are provided so that customers can effectively use the employment 

and training services at the One-Stop. 

There were no definitive patterns regarding the need for emergency and basicneed services based solely on the customers’ LEP status; however, LEP customers in 

this study that were newer to the area were often in greater need of housing and related 

services. For example, the Portland CareerCenter refers many of its “New Mainers,”

who by definition are newly resettled, to two housing and basic-need programs within 

the City of Portland’s Health and Human Services/Social Services Division. The first 

program, The Family Shelter program, provides housing and assistance with 

developing a work plan that will lead to permanent housing. The second program is the 

Refugee Collaborative, which links refugees with basic-need services, such as housing, 

medical services, food pantries, and small stipends for utility bills. In contrast, the 

Hmong population in Marathon County is a more established population, and thus 

results in fewer referrals to housing and emergency services.

The One-Stop centers commonly refer customers to off-site providers for basicneed services, although the Chicago One-Stop system used an interesting strategy that 

allowed some affiliate sites to provide certain basic-need services directly. That is, 

when the Chicago LWIB selected One-Stop affiliate sites, the board selected some 

CBOs that were already delivering basic-need services. The One-Stop employment 

services were added to the service package already offered at the CBOs. 
XIV-14

Pre-employment Training

All of the centers in this study tailored their pre-employment training programs to 

the local LEP populations, specifically to help LEP customers understand the 

expectations of American employers. For example, Portland CareerCenter designed a 

long-term program that teaches pre-employment skills, including how to obtain a job 

(such as finding, applying for, and interviewing for a job opening), as well as how to 

retain a job (such as by arriving to work at the same time every day). Marathon 

County Job Works uses a different delivery approach and provides stand-alone 

workshops, which do not require long-term commitments from participants. To reach a 

large LEP audience, the workshops are conducted in the Hmong language and are often 

held off-site at the local Refugee Resettlement program. The workshops are often 

theme-focused and have included topics such as, “how to keep a job,” “legal rights,” 

and “sexual harassment.” 

Centers also found that many of their LEP customers were in need of the basic 

computer skills required in order to apply for a job. To meet this need, Pilsen OneStop in Chicago developed a program specifically for LEP customers that focuses on 

computer skills, such as how to find a job opening on the computer, produce a résumé, 

and communicate via email. 

The One-Stop centers commonly integrated English skills training into preemployment training for LEP customers. For example, the Nogales One-Stop career 

center provides pre-employment training that focuses on computer skills. Even though 

the course was not designed exclusively for LEP customers, the instructor incorporates

several strategies to accommodate the large number of LEP students. She encourages 

her LEP students to speak in English, which they are generally hesitant to do. The 

instructor also spends much of her classroom time focusing on self-esteem issues before 

beginning with the computer instruction. To boost their confidence, she works to 

connect with each customer on a personal level, cites examples of her own struggles

with learning, and encourages customers to progress through the course at their own 

pace—which commonly takes four to six months. 

Job Training Services 

Each of the centers have multiple formats of job training for LEP customers. 

These approaches include: 1) providing job training after establishing some measure of

English proficiency, 2) providing job training using an integrated approach, whereby 
XIV-15

customers learn English as part of the job training, and 3) providing job training in 

languages other than English.

The first approach that the centers use is to conduct job training after LEP 

customers establish some degree of proficiency in English. Both Portland CareerCenter 

and Nogales One-Stop centers often use this more traditional approach, which does not 

require modifying the job training program itself. That is, customers first attend 

English courses. Then, after some minimum level of English proficiency has been 

reached, the customer attends the unaltered job training. 

There is some debate over the merit of this approach. Critics point out that the 

English requirement can unnecessarily prolong the job placement process and often 

results in an English curriculum that is repetitive and broader than necessary for LEP 

persons to function in the workplace.9 At the same time, some of this concern can be 

assuaged by using an English curriculum that is more closely tailored to the workplace, 

such as with Portland CareerCenter, in which WIA and Portland Adult Education 

collaborated to design a program for the LEP refugee population that integrates English 

and pre-employment skills instruction.

The second job training approach that the One-Stop centers use for LEP 

customers is integrated job training, in which English skills required for the job are 

taught as part of the training. This approach has been used in Nogales One-Stop and 

Marathon County Job Works to deliver Certified Nursing Assistant training. Rather 

than using the traditional approach to job training, which requires that customers master 

the English language before enrolling in training, basic English skills required for the 

job are offered as part of the training itself. At both centers, the curriculum consists of 

two phases. The first phase focuses on developing study habits and English skills that 

would be used by a Certified Nursing Assistant in the workplace. The second phase is 

the nursing instruction itself. The nursing instruction is provided by eligible training 

providers, although the training providers in Marathon County Job Works and Nogales 

One-Stop use different training styles. At Nogales One-Stop, even though students 

learn the English skill set required for nursing, much of the instruction is still provided 

in Spanish. Upon reflection, staff commented that the instruction would be better if it 

 

9

 Wrigley, H.S., Richer, E., Martinson, K, Kubo, H., and Strawn, J. (2003). The Language of 

Opportunity: Expanding Employment Prospects for Adults with Limited English Skills. National Adult 

Education Professional Development Consortium and Center for Law and Social Policy.
XIV-16

were entirely in English. This approach is implemented in Marathon County Job 

Works, where the second phase is taught exclusively in English and the bilingual 

instructor from the first phase accompanies the students through the nursing instruction 

phase and assists with interpretation when needed. 

The third job training approach that the centers use is to provide job training in 

languages other than English, specifically for jobs that require no or very limited 

English skills. Marathon County Job Works uses this strategy to train LEP customers 

for many jobs, such as manufacturing and other labor-intensive positions. The success 

of this approach requires a system of strong supports for both the LEP customer and the 

employer, either upfront, or on an on-going basis, or both. 

For example, one local manufacturing employer wanted to hire a large number of 

employees and continue hiring over a considerable period of time. To accomplish this 

goal, the employer and One-Stop staff worked together to identify front-line employees 

that were bilingual in Hmong and English, and then supported their development of the 

complex skill set that was required for them to become line supervisors, such as 

leadership skills and GED credentials. Once these bilingual staff became supervisors, 

they were able to train and supervise subsequently hired LEP employees. 

In another example used by this One-Stop center, bilingual staff provided support 

to both the LEP customers and employers before, during, and after the job training. 

Thus, before the training began the center staff worked with the employer to identify 

skills that were required to perform the jobs, and then found LEP customers with those

requisite foundation skills. The center staff learned how to operate the equipment and 

either conducted the training in the LEP customers’ language or arranged for a 

bilingual eligible training provider to do so. After the training, the center staff 

followed-up to ensure successful job placement, retention, and satisfaction on the part 

of both the LEP customer and employer. These subsequent activities often required 

that the center staff provide interpretation, mediation, and problem-solving services.

Job Matching and Placement Services 

The sites demonstrated two very different attitudes toward job matching and 

placement. Portland CareerCenter and Pilsen One-Stop in Chicago believe it is best to 

empower their LEP customers with the skills necessary to find and obtain a job 

independently of the staff, rather than provide extensive job matching and placement 

services. 
XIV-17

In contrast, Nogales One-Stop and Marathon County Job Works rely on heavy 

staff intervention and frequently conduct job matching and placement services

specifically for their LEP customers. For example, bilingual case managers at 

Marathon County Job Works familiarize themselves with various employers, skill 

requirements of open positions, and the skill sets of LEP customers in need of a job. 

Based on this information, the case manager works with the employers and customers 

to make the most appropriate job matches. Nogales One-Stop uses a similar approach, 

but makes use of a non-profit organization outside of the One-Stop center called More 

for Kids. The director of More for Kids spends much of his time building relationships 

with employers, alerting employers of job-seekers (many of whom come from the OneStop center), and setting up interviews. According to Nogales One-Stop center staff, 

this strategy works well because the director of More for Kids is first and foremost a 

successful business owner who understands the business world and knows how to 

effectively interact with other business owners.

Case Management

The One Stop centers in this study provide a greater amount of case management 

services to LEP customers than to English-proficient customers. Much of this is 

because the LEP customers do not have the English skills required to use the Resource 

Room tools without large amounts of direct assistance, which is commonly provided by 

the case manager. 

LEP customers also commonly receive additional case management at these 

centers because they are more likely than English proficient customers to experience 

communication problems with employers after job placement, which can result in lower 

job retention rates without effective intervention. To assist LEP customers with such 

problems, Marathon County Job Works provides extensive follow-up services with LEP 

customers and keeps an “open door” policy even after the customer is exited from the 

One-Stop system. 

The One-Stop centers also shifted their case management approach in response to 

their local LEP populations, and place greater emphasis on helping LEP customers 

establish long-term career goals. Staff explained that establishing career goals is 

commonly needed for LEP customers because they often come to the centers with the 

goal of starting work as soon as possible, and rarely have plans for acquiring higher 

wages in the future. The staff at Pilsen One-Stop in Chicago are particularly concerned 

about this issue, often encountering LEP customers who come to the One-Stop centers 
XIV-18

and expect to be immediately matched with a job that they can start the next day. As a 

general rule, Pilsen One-Stop staff encourage these customers to develop long-term 

career goals and enroll in related training and develop a plan for economic stability. 

Centers also shifted their case management approach for LEP customers so that 

additional efforts are made to enroll LEP customers in English and GED instruction and 

ensure that courses are completed. For example, in Marathon County Job Works, the 

case manager frequently “makes a deal,” in which the customer agrees to enroll in 

English and GED instruction in exchange for quick job placement. In another strategy, 

the Portland CareerCenter provides its English instruction onsite, so that case managers 

can easily observe and react to missed attendance.

Finally, case management for LEP customers can continue even well beyond the 

initial job placement and in some instances has been identified as critical to job 

retention. For example, Marathon County’s case managers periodically check with 

employers with whom LEP customers have been placed as well as the customers 

themselves to identify problems that the LEP customer might be having on the job site, 

such as a failure to understand or follow directions or difficulty in adjusting to the work 

site or the employer’s expectations. Once problems are identified, center staff provide 

interpretation or mediation services to resolve them.

Employer Services

One-Stop centers in this study found that employers who do not have bilingual 

staff are sometimes initially hesitant to hire LEP customers because of the expected 

communication barrier. However, with encouragement and the promise of on-going 

support from the One-Stop centers this reluctance can be overcome. Marathon County 

Job Works is particularly attentive to serving employers, and believes that employer 

services are key to opening up job opportunities for LEP customers, as well as placing 

and retaining LEP customers in those jobs. This section takes a close look at this 

center’s multifaceted approach toward providing employer services on the behalf of 

LEP customers.

To increase the number of job openings and to open employers’ doors to hiring 

LEP customers, bilingual One-Stop case managers usually schedule meetings with 

employers, who are primarily manufacturers. During these meetings, the case 

managers learn about the various positions at the company and identifies positions that 

would be appropriate for persons who have no or very limited English skills. As part 
XIV-19

of this, the case managers help the employers identify skills that are needed to perform 

the job, including the degree to which English skills are required. Often times, after 

going through this process, the employers realize that as long as the LEP workers 

understand the safety procedures, very little English is actually needed to carry out the 

requirements of these often labor-intensive positions.

The One-Stop staff also commonly serve employers by reviewing and updating

the companies’ policies so that they are conducive to hiring LEP customers of different 

cultures. For example, in the Marathon County area, policy accommodations are often 

made to allow for three-day funerals, which are a custom of the local Hmong 

population. In addition, the One-Stop center makes arrangements for the policies to be 

translated into other languages either by the bilingual One-Stop staff or by private 

consultants.

Arrangements are also commonly made for contextualized job training once the 

employer agrees to hire LEP customers. If the work procedures are simple enough, 

bilingual center staff learn how to operate the equipment and then conduct the training 

themselves in the LEP customers’ language. When more complicated customized 

training is required, center staff identify eligible training providers and help obtain

funding so that the training procedures can be delivered in languages other than 

English. 

After LEP customers are hired, additional employer services are provided to help 

ensure that the employer is satisfied with the placement and performance of the LEP 

customers. As part of this, bilingual center staff help resolve communication problems 

between LEP customers and employers by providing interpretation, mediation, and 

problem-solving services when needed. Often times these services are provided after 

the One-Stop center is closed to ensure that second and third-shift supervisors and 

customers are supported.

Primary Challenges and Modifications to Service Delivery

As the preceding discussion suggests, the sites we visited faced a number of 

challenges in designing services to their local LEP populations and introduced some 

noteworthy modifications in addressing them. First, these centers did not have OneStop “best practice” models to follow when they developed their LEP services; indeed, 

such models are still quite rare. As a consequence, the centers designed their services 

by noting the needs of the local LEP population and developing their own philosophy 
XIV-20

about how to best meet them. For example, the Pilsen One-Stop of Chicago operates 

under the general philosophy that LEP customers need more than a job—they need the 

basic skills required to independently navigate the American employment system. 

Based on this philosophy, the center has designed their services to promote self 

sufficiency through emphasizing the development of pre-employment skills and longerterm career goals. As another example, Marathon County Job Works’ services are 

based on the philosophy that personal relationships are critical to the success of their 

LEP customers. In that vein, the center provides many supports to LEP customers and 

their employers before, during and after job placement. 

Second, the centers also commonly found that in order to increase the chance of 

LEP-customers’ success, the pre-employment and job training services required more 

than just simply being translated and delivered in different languages. Instead, the local 

LEP populations in this study benefited from the customization and extra emphasis that 

the centers provided in developing these customers’ work-specific English skills, longterm career goals, and knowledge about common expectations of American employers. 

Each of these skills required the introduction of new culturally-specific curricula. 

Third, centers understood the importance of hiring and training front-line staff 

who could understand LEP-specific service procedures. For example, Resource Room 

staff were either bilingual and multi-cultural themselves or learned how to find an 

interpreter and quickly route LEP customers to appropriate services, even if this meant 

bypassing the English-based Resource Room. Such staff capacity was the result of 

explicit hiring decisions, reinforced in some cases through diversity training so that 

staff would be culturally competent to serve customers from diverse backgrounds.

As a consequence of these adaptations, all of the centers provided services to LEP 

customers that were functionally equivalent to those provided to English-speaking 

customers. However, the funding sources sometimes differed. For example, some 

sites had special grants, which they used to hire staff who could function as “LEP 

specialists.” Additionally, because ESL and GED instruction were commonly provided 

to LEP customers, funding through Adult Education services was often key. We 

found, in fact, that local areas had a preference for using funding sources other than 

WIA Title I dollars to serve LEP customers, because of their concern about the 

consequences to their WIA performance if they did otherwise. 
XIV-21

LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS

In order to provide a wide range of services to LEP customers, it is essential that 

One-Stop centers develop partnerships with and refer customers to LEP service 

providers. This section describes which service providers are especially important to 

serving the LEP population, how the partners benefit by coordinating efforts with each 

other, barriers that can hinder the development of strong partnerships around LEP 

services, and strategies used to strengthen LEP-service partnerships.

The One-Stop centers commonly developed partnerships with three types of 

service providers in order to adequately serve LEP customers: 1) Adult Basic 

Education, 2) interpreter and translation service providers, and 3) local Refugee 

Resettlement agencies. All of the centers in this study developed partnerships with 

Adult Basic Education, and commonly rely on this partner to provide adult literacy

instruction, such as English instruction (which, by definition, is needed by all LEP 

customers) and GED instruction (which is commonly needed by the LEP customers at 

the visited centers). As was demonstrated during our visits, ABE is commonly 

provided through several types of organizations, including public school districts, 

community colleges, and non-profit organizations. In addition, more than one 

organization may provide ABE services in an area, as was the case in Nogales. The 

Nogales One-Stop referred their customers to two different ABE providers— Nogales 

Unified School District and Literacy Volunteers of America. 

Even though the One-Stop centers had bilingual staff on site, several of the 

centers still found it important to develop partnerships with interpretation service 

providers. Interpreters are called upon when, for example, bilingual staff are not 

available or when customers speak languages unfamiliar to center staff. There are 

several sources of interpreters, including individual consultants, private interpretation 

and translation agencies, and language professors at local colleges and universities. 

Respondents explained that it is important to know off hand which interpreters speak 

which language, so that appropriate interpreters can be quickly provided. This 

hastened response helps prevent LEP customers from relying on bilingual relatives and 

friends for interpretation, which can breach confidentiality and result in poor 

interpretation. 

Both Portland CareerCenter and Marathon County Job Works developed strong 

partnerships with the local Refugee Resettlement programs, which is funded through 

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. These One-Stop centers found the 
XIV-22

programs to be vital resources for recruiting LEP customers, as well as providing ESL, 

pre-employment and job training, and other supportive services. 

The LEP-service providers benefited by the partner development in that they 

could cumulatively provide a much broader range of services than any one provider 

could offer, including English instruction, GED instruction, job skills training, and 

basic-need services. These benefits were seen at Portland CareerCenter, which began 

forming local partnerships before WIA because resources for LEP customers were so 

limited in the community. In addition, by working together, local programs were 

strengthened by each other’s expertise. Such was the case at Portland CareerCenter, in 

which Portland Adult Basic Education (ABE) and WIA used their specialized 

knowledge and collaboratively developed and now co-teach a program for LEP 

customers that develops their English and pre-employment skills. 

One-Stop centers and providers also reduced the amount of effort and money 

spent on marketing to the LEP population by increasing the number of referrals within 

the network of partnering agencies. For example, Marathon County Job Works 

invested great effort in developing relationships on a personal and professional level 

with the staff of the local Refugee Resettlement program. Once trust was established 

and the Refugee Resettlement program regularly referred LEP customers to the OneStop center, the One-Stop center found that they could rely on this free “advertising,” 

and reduce the number of television, radio, and newspaper advertisements. 

Despite the advantages, differing views about the importance and priority of LEP 

services can be a significant barrier to developing local partnerships. For example, one 

One-Stop center in this study found that some service providers in their area were not 

supportive of LEP-tailored services. This left the center in an awkward position of 

trying to push service providers toward more effectively serving the LEP population 

without damaging organizational partnerships. 

Even if all partners are in agreement that LEP-tailored services should be 

provided, there may not be agreement about how best to tailor the services. Even 

among the centers in this study, we found that there were many methods used to deliver 

training, including requiring English mastery before providing job training, teaching 

job-specific English as part of job skill training, and providing job matching services in 

exchange for a verbal agreement that the LEP customers would enroll in English 
XIV-23

instruction. Without sound research that identifies the most effective approaches for 

delivering workforce training for LEP customers, the debate remains open.

Nonetheless, the One-Stop centers found state and federal guidance helpful for 

strengthening partnerships and agreement around LEP issues. For example, staff at one 

One-Stop center found Executive Order 13166 and the state’s interpretation of federal 

legislation effective for convincing some service providers that they should provide 

interpretation services for LEP customers, and that interpretation providers should be

neutral parties who are fluent enough to describe the topic at hand. Another local area, 

which has been struggling with forming relationships with some providers, explained 

that the WIA legislation has helped sustain relationship-building efforts.

One underlying element that is also key to developing and maintaining strong 

local partnerships is frequent informal communication. The centers use multiple 

strategies to increase the frequency of informal communication about LEP services, 

including co-teaching, co-locating, and following up on referrals. For example, at 

Portland Career Center, WIA and Adult Basic Education have increased their frequency 

of communication through co-teaching a program for LEP customers. As another 

example, both Marathon County Job Works and Portland CareerCenter co-locate 

Refugee Resettlement staff members by hiring them part-time at the One-Stop center. 

More formal approaches to communication are also used by the One-Stop centers 

to help ensure that partners are in full agreement of decisions, including decisions about 

how to best serve LEP customers. Many of the centers hold several meetings of 

different staff composition, including meetings with on-site agency partners, off-site 

agency partners, and different levels of staff within a One-Stop center (such as frontline staff, managers, and directors). 

Chicago used a unique strategy for strengthening local partnerships around LEP 

services through their selection of One-Stop affiliate sites. The local WIB selected 

CBOs that were already well-integrated in different LEP communities, and “locked” 

these service providers into the One-Stop partnership by selecting them as One-Stop 

affiliate sites. For example, Spanish Coalition for Jobs, Inc. and Chinese American 

Service League were selected to serve as affiliate One-Stop sites because these CBOs 

were already well-connected with Latino and Chinese neighborhoods. 

To strengthen local partnerships around LEP services, some bilingual One-Stop 

staff serve on several advisory boards, including advisory boards of their partner 
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agencies. Through this process, the One-Stop staff keep other service providers 

informed of their LEP services and learn of the LEP services provided by others. In 

addition, by advising and learning from partners’ experiences, the One-Stop staff are 

able to help strengthen the LEP services that many of their customers receive.

SUMMARY & IMPLICATIONS OF KEY LESSONS

In previous sections of this paper, we discussed alternative strategies used by the 

case study sites that are key to serving LEP customers within the One-Stop context. 

Although we are limited by the small sample of sites we visited, we can identify 

strategies that were critical to the centers’ success of serving LEP customers, as well as 

identify some key implications for transferability to other local areas.

The One-Stop centers were successful in their service delivery to LEP customers, 

in part, because they took into account the barriers, beyond limited English, that were 

commonly found in their local LEP populations. For example, Marathon County Job 

Works recognized that their Hmong and Latino populations were generally mistrustful

of government agencies, and concluded that these populations may be hesitant to use 

their center. To overcome this barrier, the One-Stop centers used numerous strategies 

to build trust with the local LEP communities, including building personal relationships 

with key LEP community leaders and developing strong partnerships with service 

providers that were already well-established in the LEP communities. As another 

example, the centers often developed training programs to help LEP customers acquire 

the knowledge and skills expected by the American workplace, such as how to apply 

and interview for a job opening

Another factor that contributed to the One-Stop centers’ success was that each 

center tailored multiple components of their service delivery package to their local LEP 

populations. During our site visits, we found numerous examples of modified 

recruitment strategies, intake and enrollment processes, basic skill and job trainings, 

and staff training procedures. These LEP-service delivery strategies have evolved and 

strengthened through the process of implementing different practices, reflecting on 

those practices over time, and making continuous, incremental changes.

All of the centers in this study used multiple strategies for hastening the 

placement of LEP customers in jobs, such as adapting trainings to LEP customers and 

working closely with employers. The One-Stop centers also modified job training 

programs to accommodate LEP customers, such as by providing the job training in 
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languages other than English, and using integrated training, in which the English skill

set required by a particular job is taught as part of the job training. Two centers also 

found it helpful to establish connections with employers. For example, in Marathon 

County Job Works, a bilingual case manager works closely with employers to help 

identify positions that LEP customers can qualify for, develops a training system that 

communicates job and safety requirements, and ensures effective communication 

between employers and LEP employees after job placement.

In addition, all four centers emphasized helping LEP customers develop basic 

skills, including English skills, that would help increase their chance of independence. 

All centers heavily encouraged LEP customers to take ESL, and when needed, GED 

courses. All centers placed emphasis on helping LEP customers develop long-term

career goals that would lead to economic stability. Pilsen One-Stop in Chicago and 

Portland CareerCenter developed programs specifically for the LEP populations that 

emphasized the development of long-term career goals and basic skills required to help 

achieve those goals. Marathon County Job Works used a different strategy: LEP 

customers were quickly placed in jobs, with the agreement that customers would attend 

English courses and develop and work toward longer-term career goals.

When examining the issue of transferability, it is important to acknowledge that

many of the centers in this study were successful in tailoring some of their services 

because they obtained additional funds. For example, services for LEP customers at 

Marathon County Job Works greatly benefited from a state grant that was used to hire a 

full-time, bilingual case manager that specifically focuses on serving LEP customers. 

Likewise, it is important to recognize that one-time funding for designing LEP 

services may not be enough to ensure continued implementation. For example, 

Nogales One-Stop received funds to design and implement an integrated training course 

for Certified Nursing Assistants, in which LEP students learned the English skill set 

required for the position. However, when start-up funds were depleted and no 

additional funds materialized, the integrated training ceased.

Nonetheless, the sites in this study do suggest that initiatives to serve the LEP 

population can be built and sustained by building on existing local community 

resources. Recent federal requirements and guidelines should give momentum to these 

efforts, including Executive Order 13166 and Revised DOL Recipient LEP Guidance. 

Already, one of the One-Stop career centers in this study has found Executive Order 
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13166 helpful for convincing other federally-funded service providers in their area that 

interpretation and translation services should be made available to LEP customers. 

Continued federal emphasis regarding LEP customer service will increase the likelihood 

of adequate LEP service delivery elsewhere. At the same time, requirements without 

additional tools or guidance may result in inadequate or poorly thought-out program 

modifications. With this in mind, DOL may want to conduct further research with the 

intent of identifying more “best practice” tools and models for serving the LEP 

customers in the One-Stop career center context.