Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John M. Haecker

Squiller & Hamilton, LLP

Auburn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

E.C.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

June 26, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JV-76

Appeal from the DeKalb Circuit

Court

The Honorable Kurt B. Grimm,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

17C01-1706-JD-20

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] On August 9, 2017, E.C. was adjudicated to be a delinquent child for 

committing what would have been Class A misdemeanor resisting law 

enforcement if committed by an adult and was placed in a juvenile detention 

facility. The State subsequently filed a petition to modify the prior dispositional 

order after E.C. was involved in a number of incidents at the facility. During a 

hearing on its petition, the State recommended placement in a juvenile 

detention facility operated by the Department of Correction (“DOC”). Both 

E.C.’s attorney and her Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) spoke on E.C.’s behalf 

during the hearing and indicated that they agreed with the State’s petition and 

placement recommendation. On appeal, E.C. argues that the juvenile court 

violated her due process right to be heard during the hearing. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 13, 2017, the State alleged that E.C. was a delinquent child for 

committing what would be Level 6 felony battery to a public safety officer and 

two counts of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by 

an adult. On August 9, 2017, E.C. admitted that she had committed what 

would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an 

adult. The juvenile court adjudicated E.C. to be a juvenile delinquent, entered 

a dispositional order, and placed E.C. at the Youth Opportunity Center 

(“YOC”). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 3 of 7

[3] E.C. was involved in a number of incidents at YOC during November of 2017. 

On November 3, 2017, a YOC staff member was injured while intervening in 

an altercation between E.C. and another resident. E.C. was placed in restraints 

on November 10, 2017, after verbally and physically abusing a member of the 

YOC staff. On November 16, 2017, E.C. started a fight with a peer in another 

resident’s unit, and when staff attempted to intervene, E.C. punched the staff 

member in the face with a closed fist. E.C. and several other residents created a 

disturbance at the facility on November 27, 2017, during which E.C. broke a 

fire alarm and attempted to use the broken pieces of the alarm as a weapon. 

E.C. pushed and lunged at staff members and grabbed workers in an attempt to 

impede their attempts to separate residents. E.C. also attempted to punch a 

police officer who responded to the situation. In light of these incidents, on 

December 6, 2017, the YOC informed the DeKalb County Probation 

Department that it was no longer able to provide care and treatment for E.C. 

due to her “noncompliance and aggressive behaviors.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II, p. 100.

[4] On December 11, 2017, the State filed a verified petition to modify the 

dispositional decree, requesting that the juvenile court remove E.C. from the 

YOC and to conduct a hearing to determine a proper placement. The next day, 

the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition. During the 

hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony that E.C. had previously been 

removed from five prior placements. E.C.’s probation officer, Kelly Mattes, 

testified that she had spoken with a counselor at the juvenile facility operated by 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 4 of 7

the DOC and believed that E.C. would benefit from the more structured and 

secure environment offered by that facility. The facility also offers therapeutic 

programs from which E.C. could potentially benefit. Mattes opined that there 

were no other less-restrictive placements appropriate for E.C. 

[5] Megan Refner, the family case manager assigned to E.C.’s ongoing CHINS1

case, agreed with Mattes’s recommendation and opined that there were no 

other less-restrictive placements available for E.C. that would ensure both 

E.C.’s safety and that of the community. E.C.’s attorney, Darrick Brinkerhoff, 

presented argument on E.C.’s behalf, indicating that she did not want to be 

placed at DOC’s juvenile facility. Brinkerhoff acknowledged, however, that 

“unfortunately there’s ... too many incidents [and] ... there is no other option.” 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 13. E.C.’s GAL, Cory Swagger, testified that while he had some 

concerns about placement in the DOC, he “agree[d] with the recommendations 

of the ... Probation [Department] that the DOC is gonna be the safest, at the 

moment, for” E.C. Tr. Vol. II, p. 15. Following the hearing, the juvenile court 

awarded wardship to the DOC with a recommendation for treatment of E.C.’s 

mental health issues. 

Discussion and Decision

 

1

 The term CHINS is commonly used to describe cases in which a juvenile has been alleged to be a Child In 

Need of Services.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 5 of 7

[6] On appeal, E.C. challenges the juvenile court’s order modifying the 

dispositional decree.

The specific disposition of a delinquent is within the juvenile 

court’s discretion, to be guided by the following considerations: 

the safety of the community, the best interests of the child, the 

least restrictive alternative, family autonomy and life, freedom of 

the child, and the freedom and participation of the parent, 

guardian, or custodian. We reverse only for an abuse of 

discretion, namely a decision that is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the 

reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.

K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (internal citation and quotation 

omitted). The juvenile court is accorded “wide latitude and great flexibility in 

dealing with juveniles[.]” C.T.S. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1193, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003).

[7] “The standard for determining what due process requires in a particular juvenile 

proceeding is fundamental fairness.” D.A. v. State, 967 N.E.2d 59, 64 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). With respect to notice and the 

opportunity to be heard in juvenile delinquency cases, Indiana Code section 31-

37-18-1.3 provides as follows:

(a) The prosecuting attorney or probation department of the 

juvenile court shall provide notice of the date, time, place, and 

purpose of the dispositional hearing under this chapter to each:

(1) party or person for whom a summons is required 

to be issued under [Indiana Code section] 31-37-12-2; 

and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 6 of 7

(2) foster parent or other caretaker with whom the 

child is placed for temporary care;

at the time the dispositional hearing is scheduled.

(b) The court shall:

(1) provide a person who is required to be notified 

under subsection (a) an opportunity to be heard; and

(2) allow a person described in subdivision (1) to 

make recommendations to the court;

at the dispositional hearing.

[8] The juvenile court afforded both E.C.’s attorney and GAL the opportunity to 

speak on her behalf during the hearing on whether to modify the dispositional 

order. Both E.C.’s attorney and GAL indicated that they agreed with the 

State’s recommended placement. Given that the juvenile court allowed E.C.’s 

representatives to speak on her behalf, we conclude that the juvenile court 

complied with the statutory requirement affording the opportunity to be heard.2

[9] Moreover, we are unpersuaded by E.C.’s claim that she was entitled to make a 

statement of allocution. Article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution 

provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to ... 

to be heard by himself and counsel[.]” (Emphasis added). In addition, 

Indiana’s current allocation statute explains that

When the defendant appears for sentencing, the court shall ... 

afford counsel for the defendant an opportunity to speak on 

behalf of the defendant. The defendant may also make a 

 

2

 Neither E.C. nor her attorney made any indication that E.C. wished to make a statement before the 

juvenile court and nothing in the record suggests that the juvenile court would not have allowed E.C. to 

speak on her own behalf if she had requested the opportunity to do so. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-76 | June 26, 2018 Page 7 of 7

statement personally in the defendant’s own behalf and, before 

pronouncing sentence, the court shall ask the defendant whether 

the defendant wishes to make such a statement. Sentence shall 

then be pronounced, unless a sufficient cause is alleged or 

appears to the court for delay in sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-1-5. The above-quoted authorities reinforce the common law 

principal that the right to allocution is limited to criminal defendants. 

[10] It is well-settled that “proceedings in juvenile court are civil proceedings, not 

criminal in nature and that an act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime.” T.K. 

v. State, 899 N.E.2d 686, 687–88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation and 

brackets omitted). Dispositional decrees are intended to promote rehabilitation 

so that the juvenile does not become an adult criminal. A.A.Q. v. State, 958 

N.E.2d 808, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “This is in keeping with the legislative 

policy that juveniles are to be treated as persons in need of care, protection, 

treatment, and rehabilitation.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). In light of the 

civil nature of juvenile proceedings, E.C. has failed to convince us that either 

the Indiana Constitution or relevant statutory authority provide a juvenile with 

the right to make the equivalent of an allocution statement prior to the 

pronouncement of a dispositional judgment. 

[11] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.