WARFIGHTER 

SUPPORT

DOD Should Improve 

Development of 

Camouflage Uniforms 

and Enhance 

Collaboration Among 

the Services

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2012

GAO-12-707

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

 

Highlights of GAO-12-707, a report to 

congressional requesters 

September 2012

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

DOD Should Improve Development of Camouflage 

Uniforms and Enhance Collaboration Among the

Services

Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2002, the military services have 

introduced seven new camouflage 

uniforms with varying patterns and 

colors—two desert, two woodland, and 

three universal. In addition, the Army is 

developing new uniform options and 

estimates it may cost up to $4 billion 

over 5 years to replace its current 

uniform and associated protective 

gear. GAO was asked to review the 

services’ development of new 

camouflage uniforms. This report 

addresses: 1) the extent to which DOD 

guidance provides a consistent 

decision process to ensure new 

camouflage uniforms meet operational 

requirements and 2) the extent to 

which the services have used a joint 

approach to develop criteria, ensure 

equivalent protection and manage 

costs. To do this, GAO reviewed DOD, 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) and GAO acquisition guidance 

and key practices, statutory 

requirements and policies, interviewed 

defense officials, and collected and 

analyzed records about uniform 

development. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD take four 

actions to improve the development of 

camouflage uniforms and enhance 

collaboration among the services: 

ensure that the services have and use 

clear policies and procedures and a 

knowledge-based approach, establish

joint criteria, develop policy to ensure 

equivalent protection levels, and 

pursue partnerships where applicable 

to help reduce costs. DOD concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations and 

identified planned actions. 

What GAO Found

The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and how to 

apply Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition guidance for their uniform 

development and they varied in their usage of that guidance. As a result, the 

services had fragmented procedures for managing their uniform development 

programs, and did not consistently develop effective camouflage uniforms. GAO 

identified two key elements that are essential for producing successful outcomes 

in acquisitions: 1) using clear policies and procedures that are implemented 

consistently, and 2) obtaining effective information to make decisions, such as 

credible, reliable, and timely data. The Marine Corps followed these two key 

elements to produce a successful outcome, and developed a uniform that met its 

requirements. By contrast, two other services, the Army and Air Force, did not 

follow the two key elements; both services developed uniforms that did not meet 

mission requirements and had to replace them. Without additional guidance from 

DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based 

approach, the services may lack assurance that they have a disciplined approach 

to set requirements and develop new uniforms that meet operational needs.

The military services’ fragmented approach for acquiring uniforms has not 

ensured the development of joint criteria for new uniforms or achieved cost 

efficiency. DOD has not met a statutory requirement to establish joint criteria for 

future uniforms or taken steps to ensure that uniforms provide equivalent levels 

of performance and protection for service members, and the services have not 

pursued opportunities to seek to reduce clothing costs, such as by collaborating 

on uniform inventory costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010 required the military departments to establish joint criteria for future 

ground combat uniforms. The departments asked the Joint Clothing and Textiles 

Governance Board to develop the joint criteria, but the task is incomplete. If the 

services do not use joint criteria to guide their activities, one or more service may 

develop uniforms without certainty that the uniforms include the newest 

technology, advanced materials or designs, and meet an acceptable level of 

performance. Further, DOD does not have a means to ensure that the services 

meet statutory policy permitting the development of service-unique uniforms as 

long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable, provide service

members the equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the 

risk to individuals operating in the joint battle space. Without a policy to ensure 

that services develop and field uniforms with equivalent performance and 

protection, the services could fall short of protecting all service members equally, 

potentially exposing a number to unnecessary risks. Finally, the services may 

have opportunities for partnerships to reduce inventory costs for new uniforms. 

The Army may be able to save about $82 million if it can partner with another 

service. Under DOD guidance, the services are encouraged to actively seek to 

reduce costs. The Air Force has shown interest in the Army’s current uniform 

development, but none of the services has agreed to partner with the Army on a 

new uniform. In the absence of a DOD requirement that the services collaborate 

to standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, the 

services may forego millions of dollars in potential cost savings. View GAO-12-707.

For more information, contact Cary Russell at 

(202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Letter 1 

Background 4

Military Services Have Not Used a Consistent Decision-Making 

Process to Produce Effective Camouflage Uniforms 11

Military Services’ Fragmented Approach to Developing Uniforms 

Has Resulted in Inconsistent Protection for Service Members 

and No Collaboration to Reduce Costs 23

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II Flame Resistant Ground Combat Uniforms 39

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 44

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47

Figures

Figure 1: Services’ Camouflage Uniforms, Dates of Initiation and 

Fielding, and Development Costs 5

Figure 2: Services’ Flame Resistant Uniforms, Dates of Initiation, 

and Development Costs 40

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support 

Abbreviations 

ABU Airman Battle Uniform 

ABE Airman Battle Ensemble 

ABS-G Airman Battle System-Ground 

ACU Army Combat Uniform 

AT&L Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

BDU Battle Dress Uniform 

DCU Desert Combat Uniform 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

FR ACU Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform 

FROG Flame Resistant Organizational Gear 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

MARPAT Marine Corps Pattern 

MCCUU Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform 

MDA Milestone Decision Authority 

MP-ICE Program Manager-Infantry Combat Equipment 

OCP Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PEO Program Executive Office 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 28, 2012

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Chairman

The Honorable Kelly Ayotte

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Readiness 

and Management Support

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Burr

United States Senate

The military services spent about $300 million in Fiscal Year 2011 to 

procure new camouflage uniforms. The primary goal of camouflage is to 

reduce vulnerability of forces to detection in combat; however, over time 

the services also have chosen camouflage patterns that are service 

specific and distinguish one service from another. Since 2002, the 

services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with varying 

patterns and colors—two desert, two woodland, and three universal.1 In 

addition, each service has introduced a service-specific flame-resistant 

uniform in response to urgent warfighter needs. Most of the services’ new 

camouflage patterns and colors replaced two Army-developed 

camouflage patterns that all military services were using.2

 

1

A universal camouflage pattern is designed to blend across terrains such as woodland, 

urban, and desert.

Specifically, the 

services replaced the Army’s four-color woodland camouflage pattern 

developed in 1981, known as the Battle Dress Uniform or Combat Utility 

Uniform, and its three-color desert camouflage pattern developed in early 

1990 and known as the Desert Camouflage Uniform. Further, as part of 

the Army’s ongoing camouflage study, the office responsible for uniforms, 

Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, plans to present the results of 

its camouflage testing to senior leadership by the end of December 2012 

on future uniform options. If the Army selects a new uniform, officials

2

One camouflage pattern, the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern, replaced 

the Army Combat Uniform in Afghanistan.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

estimated that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace a new 

camouflage uniform and associated protective gear for the entire service.

In May 2010, we reported on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of 

ground combat uniforms in response to a mandate in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.3 We reported that 

combat uniform performance standards developed by some of the 

services were not related to specific combat environments; the 

introduction of flame-resistant fabric, insect repellent treatment, and the 

increased pace of operations in Afghanistan accounted for increases in 

uniform production and procurement costs; and government-owned 

patents on elements of the Marine Corps’ uniforms presented no legal 

barrier to allowing other services to use these elements. In June 2011, we 

reported on matters related to the supply of flame resistant fibers for the 

production of military uniforms.4

To determine the extent to which DOD guidance ensures the services 

follow a consistent decision process to guide the development and 

acquisition of their camouflage uniforms, we reviewed key guidance and 

service decision-making processes. We reviewed key practices for 

federal acquisitions that are included in the Office of Management and 

Budget’s (OMB) guidelines and GAO’s framework for assessing 

acquisition functions.

In response to your request, this report

addresses 1) the extent to which DOD guidance provides a consistent 

decision process to ensure new camouflage uniforms meet operational 

requirements and 2) the extent to which the services have used a joint 

approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection, and manage 

costs.

5

 

3

GAO, Warfighter Support: Observations on DOD’s Ground Combat Uniforms,

We compared OMB’s and GAO’s key elements for 

acquisitions with the decision processes used by the services, and we 

identified two elements that are essential for agencies to follow to 

GAO-10-669R (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2010). The report followed a briefing provided 

to the committees in April 2010 to fulfill the mandate found in section 352 of the Act. See

Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(b), (c) (2009) (10 U.S.C. § 771 note prec.).

4

GAO, Military Uniforms: Issues Related to the Supply of Flame Resistant Fibers for the 

Production of Military Uniforms, GAO-11-682R (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011).

5

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy, Guidelines for Assessing the Acquisition Function (May 2008); GAO, 

Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies, GAO-05-218G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2005).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

produce successful outcomes and were applicable to uniformdevelopment programs. The two elements are clear policies and 

procedures that are implemented consistently and a knowledge-based 

approach that includes meaningful data to determine whether a product 

will meet customer requirements. Additionally, we interviewed relevant 

DOD and military service officials, including military service officials 

responsible for the management of uniform development and acquisition 

policy. Further, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics about the 

relevance and flexibility of DOD’s acquisition guidance and how the 

services used this or other guidance in their development decisions. We 

visited the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy offices responsible 

for managing the development or acquisition of its camouflage uniforms 

and gathered and analyzed data on the use of policies to support their 

decision processes and the testing or cost data that guided decisions 

during the development of their camouflage uniforms.

To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint approach 

to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs, we 

reviewed requirements and policies found in DOD guidance and in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.6

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to 

September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

We also 

reviewed data and interviewed officials from the military services and 

members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to 

determine if the services had established criteria for camouflage uniforms 

using a joint approach. In addition, we assessed information from DOD 

about how DOD officials plan to meet the statutory policy permitting future 

uniforms to uniquely reflect the identity of the individual services, as long 

as they provide equivalent levels of performance and protection to the 

maximum extent practicable. Finally, we reviewed guidance and 

interviewed officials with the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support 

office to assess how they encourage the services to jointly reduce 

development and acquisition costs. Our detailed scope and methodology 

appears in Appendix I.

 

6

See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(a), (d).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Each service has introduced at least one new uniform into inventory in the 

last 10 years. Prior to 2002, all four military services were using the 

Army’s Battle Dress and Desert Camouflage uniforms. However, since 

that time each of the services (including the Army) has developed new 

uniforms to address deficiencies that they identified with the existing Army 

uniforms. Improvements incorporated into the design of the services’ new 

uniforms include improved visual or near-infrared capabilities for 

concealment and improved fabric technology. Additionally, each service 

introduced a service-specific flame resistant uniform in response to urgent 

need requests. For additional information on the development of flame 

resistant uniforms by the services, see appendix II. The services also 

expected the new uniforms to provide other benefits, such as a unique 

appearance to increase the morale of personnel and aid in recruitment. 

Figure 1 provides additional information on the development of the 

services’ uniforms and is followed by a description of each service’s 

development activities.

Background

Military Services’ 

Camouflage Uniforms
 

Page 5 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Figure 1: Services’ Camouflage Uniforms, Dates of Initiation and Fielding, and Development Costs
 

Page 6 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

In April 2000, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the 

development and fielding of a new Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform 

(MCCUU). The requirements of the new uniform, developed under the 

decision-making authority of the Commander of the Marine Corps System 

Command, were to provide Marines with a uniform that increased 

durability and combat utility compared to the current uniform, provide 

commanders versatility for a variety of missions, and be uniquely Marine. 

The Marine Corps spent $319,000 to develop the MCCUU, and began 

fielding its new uniforms in June 2002.

Development of the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) began in January 2003 

in response to a need for a combat uniform with greater operational utility. 

Under the decision authority of the Chief of Staff, the new uniform 

included requirements to improve visual or near-infrared capabilities, to 

improve morale, and to provide a universal camouflage pattern with 

acceptable levels of performance in woodland, desert, and urban terrains. 

The Army spent about $3.2 million to develop the ACU in the universal 

camouflage pattern and began fielding its new uniform in February 2005.

In 2009, based on concerns from soldiers in Afghanistan, a congressional 

conference committee directed DOD to take immediate action to provide 

personnel deployed to Afghanistan with a camouflage pattern that was 

suited to that environment.7 The conference committee further directed 

the Secretary of the Army to provide a report on the program plans and 

budgetary adjustments necessary to provide appropriate uniforms to 

deployed and deploying troops to Afghanistan. In response, the Army 

developed the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP) 

to address current camouflage requirements and initiated a study of 

camouflage for future uniforms. The Army spent about $3.4 million to

develop the OCP and began fielding the uniform in July 2010. As part of 

its study of camouflage, the Army is reviewing camouflage to identify 

three color variations—desert, woodland, and transitional8

 

7

See H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 86 (2009) (Conf. Rep., accompanying the Supplemental 

Appropriations Act, 2009).

—as future 

uniform options. Additionally, the study will identify one camouflage 

pattern for protective gear that blends well with all three uniforms. By the 

end of December 2012, the Army plans to brief senior Army leadership on 

8

A transitional camouflage pattern, similar to the universal camouflage pattern, is 

designed for multiple geographic environments.

Marine Corps

Army
 

Page 7 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

the results of its study. The Army spent about $2 million through Fiscal 

Year 2011 on the development of these uniforms, and reported in 

February 2012 that it expects to spend an additional $5 million on 

development costs through Fiscal Year 2017. If the Army chooses a new 

camouflage uniform, officials estimate that it may cost up to $4 billion over 

5 years to replace its uniform and related protective gear.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force in October 2002 initiated a research 

and development project to field a new uniform. The objective was to 

design a distinctive uniform that—compared to the current Army Battle 

Dress Uniform (BDU)—provided a better fit, and was also easier and less 

costly to maintain.9

In 2006, as part of a broader review of Navy uniforms, the Chief of Naval 

Operations announced approval of a concept for new desert and

woodland

According to officials, the program was conducted 

under the authority of the Chief of Staff. The Air Force spent about $3.2 

million on the development of the Airman Battle Uniform (ABU) and 

began fielding its new uniform in January 2007.

10 uniforms for Navy ground forces.11 In 2009, the Chief of Naval 

Operations received approval from Special Operations Command to use 

camouflage patterns, developed by Naval Special Warfare Command,12

for the Navy’s new Type II desert and Type III woodland uniforms. The 

Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, oversaw the 

$435,000 spent by the Navy on the final design of its two new camouflage 

uniforms. The Navy began fielding its Type II desert uniform in February 

2011 and its Type III woodland uniform in September 2011.

 

9

The BDU was not permanent pressed and needed either to be ironed after laundering or 

to be professionally dry cleaned to maintain an acceptable appearance during duty at 

bases, according to Air Force officials.

10The desert uniform is designed for desert, tundra, and arid regions; the woodland 

uniform is designed for jungle, woodland, and temperate regions.

11The Navy also developed its Navy Working Uniform Type I in a blue, digital pattern, but 

designated it for sailors at sea and ashore. It is not considered a ground combat or utility 

uniform, and consequently we did not include it as part of this review.

12Independent of the Navy costs, Naval Special Warfare spent around $8 million overall 

on the development of its Personal Signature Management program, of which its 

camouflage uniforms were one component.

Air Force

Navy 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

DOD’s acquisition guidance, collectively referred to as the 5000 series,13

provides management principles, policies, and procedures to establish 

and manage acquisition programs and to help to manage the nation’s 

investments in technologies, programs, and products. The primary 

objective of defense acquisition is to acquire quality products that satisfy 

user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability and 

operational support, and to do so in a timely manner and at a fair and 

reasonable price. The military departments have issued guidance to 

implement the DOD guidance.14

In addition, the instruction identifies specific statutory and regulatory 

reports and information—such as an acquisition strategy, cost estimates, 

test and evaluation activities, and risk assessments throughout the 

process to support decisions from design to production.

According to DOD Directive 5000.01, 

The Defense Acquisition System, an acquisition program is a directed, 

funded effort that provides a new, improved or continuing materiel, 

weapon or information system, or service capability in response to an 

approved need. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System, establishes a flexible management framework for 

translating capability needs and technology opportunities into acquisition 

programs.

15

 

13The 5000 series includes Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, The Defense 

Acquisition System (May 12, 2003) (certified current as of Nov. 20, 2007); Department of 

Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008);

and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which supports the guidance by providing 

background information, tutorial discussions, key practices, and information about 

requirements for each phase and milestone decision.

A key tenet of 

the guidance is that it provides the approving official, the Milestone 

Decision Authority (MDA), with the discretion to structure the activities 

and reporting requirements of the acquisition process as appropriate and 

14The military departments’ implementing guidance includes Army Regulation 70-1, Army 

Acquisition Policy (July 22, 2011); Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2E, 

Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (Sept. 1, 2011); and Air Force 

Instruction 63-101, Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management (Apr. 8, 2009) 

(incorporating through change 4, Aug. 3, 2011).

15DOD has issued guidance that amplifies and amends the requirements found in DOD 

Instruction 5000.02. See, e.g., Directive Type Memorandum 11-003, Reliability Analysis, 

Planning, Tracking, and Reporting (Mar. 21, 2011); Directive Type Memorandum 09-027, 

Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Dec. 4, 2009). 

DOD Policies
 

Page 9 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements to achieve 

performance, schedule, and cost goals.

Under another DOD Regulation, DOD 4140.1-R, DOD provides guidance 

on the development to the delivery of items, and on the key practices in 

materiel management within DOD’s supply chain framework.16 For 

uniforms and other clothing and textiles, the regulation includes 

procedures on coordination of research and testing activities. It also 

encourages DOD components to actively seek to reduce costs by 

standardizing basic materials and accessories, such as new clothing 

items,17 and provides information on costs to introduce a new uniform into 

inventory. According to Defense Logistics Agency policy, an initial 

inventory fee could apply to new items when the cost of introducing a 

replacement item into inventory is greater than 10 percent of the cost of 

the item being replaced or when a new item is introduced by an individual 

organization.18

Also, DOD issued Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and 

Textiles (Class II), in August 2008, in part to prescribe authority, policy, 

and responsibilities for the management of clothing and textiles in 

peacetime and across the spectrum of military operations.

The initial inventory fee, charged by the Defense Logistics 

Agency, covers the cost of acquiring initial inventory of seven months of 

the new clothing and the cost of the remaining inventory being replaced.

19

 

16See generally Department of Defense Regulation 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel 

Management Regulation (May 23, 2003).

The 

instruction directed the establishment of the Joint Clothing and Textiles 

Governance Board and also made the Director of the Defense Logistics 

17With respect to clothing items, including combat and individual equipment, the regulation 

encourages standardization insofar as functionality, maintenance of combat readiness, 

and mission accomplishment permit. The regulation states that any desired distinctiveness 

should be obtained by using separate items of insignia, patches, etc. See id., para. 

C8.2.2.4.1.

18For new clothing with a forecasted total annual demand value exceeding $100,000, 

DOD policy provides that the initial investment and acquisition of inventory levels to satisfy 

demands up to the effective date of supply is the financial responsibility of the requesting 

component. Officials of the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office stated that 

their interpretation of the policy is that items with a value of 10 percent greater than the 

item being replaced will include the initial inventory fee. 

19See Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and 

Textiles (Class II) (Aug. 5, 2008).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Agency responsible for ensuring collaboration and DOD-wide integration 

of clothing and textiles activities by establishing and chairing the board. 

The governance board includes representation from the Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration and 

logistics officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, and the 

Defense Logistics Agency.

DOD Instruction 4140.63 also describes responsibilities of various DOD 

entities in the development, management, and use of clothing and 

textiles. Clothing and textiles covered by the instruction include uniforms, 

other personal items, and organizational clothing and individual 

equipment that belong to the organization and not to the person using it. 

In addition, the instruction prescribes policy that the military departments 

maintain responsibility for the acquisition, funding, and fielding of new 

clothing and textiles in accordance with the management principles, 

policies, and procedures in DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense 

Acquisition System. Finally, Instruction 4140.63 directs the military 

departments to coordinate operational requirements and sourcing with the 

Director of the Defense Logistics Agency to minimize duplication and 

redundancy.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the 

Secretaries of the military departments to establish joint criteria for future 

ground combat uniforms.20

 

20See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(d).

According to the act, the joint criteria shall 

ensure that new technologies, advanced materials, and other advances in 

ground combat uniform design may be shared between the military 

services and are not precluded from being adapted for use by any military 

service due to service-specific proprietary arrangements. The act also 

established United States policy that the design and fielding of future 

ground combat uniforms may uniquely reflect the identities of the 

individual military services as long as the uniforms, to the maximum 

extent practicable, provide equivalent levels of performance and 

protection for members commensurate with their respective assigned 

National Defense 

Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010
 

Page 11 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

combat missions and minimize the risk to the individual soldier, sailor, 

airman, or marine operating in the joint battle space.21

The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and 

how to apply acquisition guidance for their uniform development, and 

varied in their use of the guidance. DOD provided no alternative or 

additional direction clarifying use of acquisition guidance or other 

guidance when developing ground combat uniforms. Consequently, the 

services used varying, fragmented processes for managing their uniform 

acquisition activities, which have not consistently ensured the 

development of effective camouflage uniforms.

DOD has provided policy, known as the 5000 series, which is designed to 

offer the services a flexible management framework for translating 

capability needs and technology opportunities into stable, affordable, and 

well-managed acquisition programs. In the context of their uniform 

development activities, the services varied in their views as to the 

applicability of the 5000 series. For example, the Air Force did not view its 

uniform development and fielding activities as an acquisition program, 

although it may do so in the future as a consequence of the policy 

contained in DOD Instruction 4140.63.22

 

21See § 352(a). Under the policy, service-unique uniforms would, to the maximum extent 

practicable: (1) provide members of every military service an equivalent level of 

performance, functionality, and protection commensurate with their respective assigned 

combat missions; (2) minimize risk to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine 

operating in the joint battle space; and (3) provide interoperability with other components 

of individual war fighter systems, including body armor and other individual protective 

systems. See id. 

The services also varied in their 

usage of the acquisition guidance where they determined that it applied. 

Under the guidance, the milestone decision authority may tailor the 

regulatory information requirements and acquisition process to achieve 

cost, schedule, and performance goals, where consistent with statutory 

and regulatory requirements. Generally, due to statutory and regulatory 

22The instruction prescribes policy that the military departments maintain responsibility for 

the acquisition, funding, and fielding of new clothing and textiles in accordance with the 

management principles, policies, and procedures in DOD Directive 5000.01. See

Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and Textiles 

(Class II), para. 4(b) (Aug. 5, 2008).

Military Services Have 

Not Used a Consistent 

Decision-Making 

Process to Produce 

Effective Camouflage 

Uniforms

DOD, OMB and GAO Have 

Provided Guidance and 

Key Practices for Effective 

Acquisition Processes
 

Page 12 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

requirements, higher-cost acquisition programs have greater information, 

reporting, and procedural requirements than lower-cost programs. 

Accordingly, since milestone decision authorities that manage lower-cost 

programs generally have fewer statutory or regulatory requirements to 

implement, they often have greater flexibility to tailor the guidance. Due to 

the flexibility allowed in DOD’s acquisition guidance and varied views as 

to its applicability to uniform development programs, we also evaluated 

key practices in the Office of Management and Budget’s guidance to 

federal acquisition officers on steps to take to assess and achieve 

efficient and effective acquisition functions. OMB’s guidance noted that it 

was adopting key practices that we reported in 2005, which listed a 

framework of cornerstones and elements for an effective acquisition 

function.23

Specifically, for this review we identified two elements from the OMB and 

GAO guidance that we considered essential for agencies to follow to 

produce successful outcomes because the two elements most closely 

relate to product development activities. The two elements are: clear 

policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and a 

knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful data to determine 

whether a product will meet customer requirements. We assessed 

whether three services—the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force—followed 

two key elements that OMB and GAO have determined are key practices 

for a decision-making process that produces successful outcomes, and to 

what extent each service developed uniforms that met requirements. We 

did not assess the Navy’s decision process because it adopted uniforms 

developed by Naval Special Warfare Command rather than developing a 

new uniform. The development activities of special operation forces, such 

as the Naval Special Warfare Command, are outside the scope of this 

review. We were not requested to review the uniform program for special 

forces.

 

23Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy, Guidelines for Assessing the Acquisition Function (May 2008); 

GAO-05-218G. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

The services’ decision-making processes for developing new uniforms 

are fragmented and vary in their effectiveness. The Marine Corps used a 

decision process that followed the two key elements that we identified as 

essential to produce a successful acquisition outcome, and produced a 

combat uniform that the Marine Corps officials have found effective. 

However, the Army and Air Force did not follow the two key elements, 

and they found that their new uniforms did not meet specific mission 

requirements. To meet combat requirements, both the Army and Air 

Force replaced their uniforms for personnel deployed to Afghanistan with 

the OCP uniform.

Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and 

procedures for a knowledge-based approach to developing effective 

uniforms, some services may continue to lack assurance that they have a 

disciplined process that is capable of delivering uniforms that meet 

warfighter requirements.

Marine Corps officials used a decision process that followed two key 

elements we found essential to produce a successful acquisition 

outcome, and produced a combat uniform that the Marine Corps officials 

have found effective and continues to meet Marines’ needs. The Marine 

Corps officials used clear policies and procedures that were implemented 

consistently, and used a knowledge-based approach that included 

collection and use of meaningful data to determine whether a product will 

meet warfighter requirements.

Regarding clear policies and procedures, according to officials, the 

Marine Corps used the flexible decision framework provided by thencurrent versions of DOD’s and the Secretary of the Navy’s acquisition 

guidance to establish a process designed to ensure that its decisions 

would result in a camouflage uniform that met its requirements.24

 

24According to officials, the Marine Corps used Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, 

Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Jan. 4, 2001) and Secretary of the Navy 

Instruction 5000.2B, Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for Major and Non-Major 

Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information Technology 

Acquisition Programs (Dec. 6, 1996). These publications have since been superseded.

In doing 

so, the Marine Corps developed a number of key documents as tools to 

support acquisition planning and decision making. For example, the 

Marine Corps developed documents to support decision making in the 

five areas described below.

Services Varied in their 

Decision-Making 

Processes for Acquisitions, 

and Two New Uniforms 

Did Not Meet Specific 

Mission Requirements

Marine Corps’ Decision Process 

Used Elements Essential For a 

Successful Outcome
 

Page 14 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

• Acquisition Strategy—First, officials used an acquisition strategy to 

highlight deficiencies in the service’s current uniform and assessed 

methods for addressing the deficiencies. The service considered 

modifying the current uniform or buying a commercially available 

uniform, but concluded that the best approach was to begin a new 

development program that could rapidly test and evaluate prototypes 

of alternative designs that would meet Marine preferences obtained 

from field surveys and allow it to develop a unique uniform for the 

Marine Corps. Officials provided an action plan and key dates for 

developmental testing, testing of prototypes, field evaluations, 

production approval, contract award, first article testing, product 

verification, full production, initial issuance, and initial operational 

capability. Also, the strategy included contracting requirements and a 

phased fielding plan to test small lots of uniforms for a limited number 

of Marines before building up inventory to meet the needs of all 

Marines.

• Acquisition Program Baseline—The Marine Corps developed an 

acquisition program baseline to seek and receive full funding for new 

uniforms, and to list performance, schedule, and cost parameters over 

the program’s life cycle.

• Risk Assessment—In preparing a risk assessment, the Marine Corps 

concluded that risk to cost, schedule, and performance would be low. 

The assessment included a 20-year life cycle cost estimate for the 

uniform. Further, the scheduled fielding of the uniform would be 

deliberately slow to build up inventory before changing over to the 

new uniform. The new uniforms were developed with Marine input 

both at the conceptual and developmental phases, and the uniforms 

were updated based on field input during the first phase of fielding.

• Cost Estimate for Program’s Life Cycle—The Marine Corps chose to 

prepare a life-cycle cost estimate for the program. Life-cycle costs 

include research and development, investment, operation and 

support, and disposal. The life-cycle cost analysis was used to assess 

program affordability and to support the review and oversight of cost 

estimates. Among various assumptions of costs, Marine Corps 

officials determined that the 2001 projections of the number of officer 

candidates and active and reserve recruits would remain constant 

throughout the 20-year life cycle. All told, the Marine Corps estimated 

that the 20-year life-cycle costs would be about $502 million in 

constant fiscal year 2001 dollars.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

• Test and Evaluation Master Plan—The Marine Corps Systems 

Command created a plan to evaluate different camouflage patterns 

and colors. Marine Corps Systems Command and U.S. Army Soldier, 

Biological and Chemical Command, conducted testing and evaluation 

on camouflage technology and alternative uniform designs to 

determine which camouflage and elements of uniform design would 

meet user requirements. The plan also included field tests by 

approximately 450 Marines to evaluate two designs of the new 

uniform for suitability for a number of mission-oriented tasks, such as 

helicopter and amphibious operations. The planned tests and 

evaluations were to determine durability, function, and preferred 

features.

In addition, Marine Corps officials established a process that followed the 

federal key practice to use a knowledge-based approach that includes

meaningful data to determine whether a product will meet customer 

requirements. A knowledge-based approach includes obtaining sufficient 

information about technology, design options, and production capabilities 

so that the product will be able to meet various requirements. In April 

2000, according to documents, Marine Corps officials decided to replace 

the existing combat uniforms with new camouflage combat uniforms to 

increase durability and utility for combat over the current BDU and Desert 

Camouflage Uniform and to provide Marines with a unique and distinct 

combat uniform.

As part of their knowledge-based approach during decision making, 

Marine Corps officials considered about 70 camouflage patterns, and 

Marine Corps test observers, who were assessing the effectiveness of the 

camouflage, narrowed the candidates to eight. The eight were narrowed 

to the top three performers, due to what Marine Corps officials described 

as patent issues. The Marine Corps chose four colors each for the 

patterns for woodland and desert environments based on discussions 

with camouflage experts. The Marine Corps Commandant reviewed the 

camouflage patterns and officials chose two camouflage patterns for 

further testing—Tiger Stripe and Canadian Disruptive Pattern (later 

named the Marine Corps Pattern or MARPAT). However, initial field 

testing showed that the Tiger Stripe was not an effective camouflage 

pattern. After other field tests with woodland and desert colored variations 

of the Marine Corps Pattern, Marine Corps officials determined that the 

Marine Corps Pattern had performance advantages over the Tiger-Stripe 

pattern when used in camouflage uniforms. On the 7-point scale, with 7 

being the most effective camouflage, test observers gave average scores 

of 5.0 to the Marine Corps Pattern and 4.16 to the Tiger Stripe. In June 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

2001, the Commander of the Marine Corps Systems Command approved 

the MARPAT camouflage pattern for production and deployment of the 

new MCCUU uniform.

During the field tests of the MCCUU, evaluators involved 284 Marines 

from Marine Expeditionary Forces for an average of 22 days in 2001. 

Wearers spent about 8 days in the field, and 14 days on base. The 

evaluation led by U.S. Army Soldier, Biological & Chemical Command, 

included the following results:

• Fit and Comfort: 76 percent were satisfied with the fit of the blouse 

and 64 percent were satisfied with the fit of the trousers. Overall, 

wearers gave both clothing items 6.3 comfort ratings toward the 

maximum positive rating of 7.

• Durability: 13 percent reported durability problems with the blouse, 

such as Velcro and snaps that did not hold or rips and tears. 25 

percent reported durability problems with the trousers, such as 

excessive wear and rips at the knees (mostly caused by field training).

• Appearance: 98 percent stated the uniform generally was easy to care 

for and maintain, and about two-thirds of respondents stated that the 

uniform, after laundering, had creases that were sharp enough for 

garrison wear.

• Mission Suitability: 97 percent stated the uniform was suitable for use 

in a tactical environment.

As a result of the field testing, the service adopted the Marine Corps 

Pattern and uniform design in the production of its new camouflage 

uniforms.

The Army used a decision process for the development of a new uniform 

that did not produce a successful outcome, and it had to replace that 

uniform in 2010. The Army did not consistently use clear policies and 

procedures or use a knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful 

data to determine whether the product would meet customer 

requirements. Our prior work has shown that the use of policies, 

procedures, and a knowledge-based approach is essential to produce 

Army’s Decision Process Did 

Not Use Elements Essential 

For a Successful Outcome
 

Page 17 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

successful outcomes.25

According to officials and documentation, during the decision process to 

develop the Army Combat Uniform (ACU)—which ran from 2003 to 

2005—the Army used some elements of DOD’s 5000-series policy and 

Army Regulation 70-1, which is the military department’s implementing 

guidance. The Army identified the approval structure and decision maker 

for its development activities. However, the Army did not follow the 5000-

series policy or establish alternate policies and procedures on reporting of 

testing, performance, and risk to the program to support its decision 

making, which could have provided reasonable assurance that its 

requirements were met. The Army tailored its development program in a 

manner that excluded steps in the process that might have ensured the 

use of test and evaluation results to support decision making throughout 

the development of the ACU. For example, the Army did not take steps to 

establish an acquisition strategy, which can guide the development 

activities, or use another mechanism to inform senior leadership about 

testing, performance, and risks associated with the development of the 

uniform. An acquisition strategy can provide a master schedule for 

research, development, testing, production, fielding and other activities; 

one of the keys to a successful program is an acquisition strategy that is 

carefully developed and consistently followed.

While the Army conducted some testing on 

camouflage patterns, it did not complete the testing before selecting a 

pattern. As a result, the Army developed a uniform that proved to provide 

ineffective concealment for operations in Afghanistan.

As part of our review, officials from the program office that managed the 

program—Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier—told us that officials 

briefed the Chief of Staff in March 2004 through the Army Uniform Board 

on issues related to the management of fielding the new uniform to 

soldiers. Specifically, the briefing included the number of uniforms per 

soldier, the cost of the new uniforms, and the timeline for fielding. The 

Army did not provide information on testing results or an evaluation of the 

performance and risks associated with the development of the uniform. 

Developing an acquisition strategy could have provided the Army with a 

structured approach to requirements, testing plans, cost estimate data, a 

risk assessment of the program, and recommendations to support 

decision making.

 

25GAO-05-218G. 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Similarly, we found that the Army did not employ the key practice of using 

a knowledge-based approach to support development decisions that 

included obtaining sufficient information about camouflage performance 

from testing data. As part of the development of the ACU, the Army 

Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center began a 

field evaluation in 2002 of the performance of 13 camouflage patterns and 

color combinations. However, PEO Soldier officials told us that prior to 

the completion of this study the leadership chose a camouflage pattern 

and colors for the new uniform without data from the camouflage study. 

PEO Soldier leadership could not provide a performance report to support 

the selection of the Universal Camouflage Pattern nor explain how the 

camouflage pattern was developed. The Universal Camouflage Pattern 

was not part of the Natick study and was not tested prior to the decision 

by PEO Soldier to use this pattern or prior to the June 2004 approval of 

the pattern by the Chief of Staff. The Army began fielding the uniform in 

February 2005. Later in 2005, the Army Natick Soldier Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center completed its camouflage 

evaluation and recommended a different pattern—Desert Brush—as the 

most effective universal camouflage pattern. In 2009, a follow-on Army 

study found that the Universal Camouflage Pattern of the ACU offered 

less effective concealment than the patterns chosen by the Marine Corps 

and some foreign military services, such as Syria and China. The test 

showed that soldiers wearing the Universal ACU were at greater 

operational risk of visibility to enemy forces than soldiers wearing the 

Marines’ pattern.

Moreover, soldiers deployed to Afghanistan conveyed concerns about 

their uniform, which they indicated provided ineffective concealment in the 

Afghan environment. In response to those concerns, in 2009 a 

congressional conference committee directed immediate action to provide 

combat uniforms suited to that environment.26

 

26See H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 86 (2009) (Conf. Rep., accompanying the Supplemental 

Appropriations Act, 2009).

The Army established a 

decision process that included a strategy of development and fielding 

activities and leadership review of the testing to support a decision on a 

new uniform. The Army expedited testing of camouflage patterns suited 

for Afghanistan by sending a photo simulation team to Afghanistan to 

collect environmental data. Further, the Army surveyed soldiers on 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

deployment to support its decision making. The Army also considered the 

conclusions of the 2005 and 2009 Natick studies.

In 2010, the Army began replacing the ACU for personnel deployed to 

Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern 

(OCP), and estimated that the replacement would add more than $38.8 

million in development and initial fielding costs for fiscal year 2010 and 

2011.

For future uniform needs, the Army is conducting a study to choose 

environment-specific camouflage patterns for use Army-wide by the end 

of December 2012. If the Army chooses a new camouflage uniform, 

officials estimate that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace 

its uniform and related protective gear. The leadership of PEO Soldier 

told us that, unlike the decision process used to support development of 

the camouflage pattern for the ACU, the decision process for future 

camouflage uniforms will include a knowledge-based approach and 

greater use of DOD policies and procedures to ensure that decisions are 

informed, science-based, and data driven. For example, the Army 

established an acquisition strategy for conducting the development of 

new uniforms, hosted regular meetings to obtain input from other services 

and Army organizations, and PEO Soldier regularly provided Army 

leadership with information about its development activities.

In 2002, Air Force officials began developing the Airman Battle Uniform 

(ABU) for noncombat use to replace two combat uniforms. At the time, 

the U.S. military, including the Air Force, was conducting expeditionary 

operations worldwide, including Afghanistan. Officials later recognized 

that the ABU under development might not meet their needs, and in 2005 

they began testing to determine the suitability of the ABU in a combat 

environment. We found that the decision process used by the Air Force in 

the development of the ABU did not follow the key element of using clear 

policies and procedures. Also, the Air Force did not employ a knowledgebased approach including an analysis of the potential requirements for 

both combat and base uniforms. As a result, the Air Force developed a 

non-combat uniform for wear at the home base. Personnel found that the 

uniform’s fabric weight was uncomfortable due to heat buildup, and the 

Air Force had to replace the uniform with one constructed from a lighter 

fabric.

During our review, Air Force officials told us that they did not follow 

DOD’s 5000-series policies. According to Air Force officials, in 2002 Air 

Force leadership determined that its development activities for its new 

Air Force’s Decision Process 

Did Not Use Elements 

Essential for a Successful 

Outcome
 

Page 20 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

uniform—intended for use only on bases—did not constitute an 

acquisition program under the 5000 series and Air Force Instruction 63-

101, entitled Operations of Capabilities Based Acquisition System. 

Instead of following a specific policy, the Chief of Staff provided direction 

on the development of the uniform during three senior leadership 

briefings between 2002 and 2004, according to Air Force officials. In 

considering support for his decision making, the Chief of Staff did not 

require the Clothing Office to establish a strategy to guide the 

development activities, such as documenting deficiencies of the current 

combat uniforms and establishing capability requirements for the 

replacement uniforms. Also, the Chief of Staff did not use a mechanism to 

report how the new uniform would meet capability requirements, as well 

as the results of uniform testing, performance evaluation, and risk 

assessment. All these procedures could have provided more reasonable 

assurance that personnel requirements were met. If the Air Force had 

used DOD policies or established an alternative policy that included 

procedures to review requirements of the new uniform prior to the start of 

development activities, Air Force officials may have determined that 

replacing combat uniforms with a non-combat uniform would leave a gap 

in uniform capabilities.

In addition, in developing their uniform the Air Force officials did not fully 

employ the key practice of using a knowledge-based approach that 

included the collection and use of meaningful data to determine whether a 

product will meet customer requirements. The Air Force tested the ABU 

against other service uniforms in different environments for camouflage 

effectiveness and conducted field tests for comfort and durability. We 

found that the Air Force’s testing process had weaknesses, such as not 

testing different camouflage patterns and fabrics prior to choosing the 

tiger-stripe pattern, and using test results of a desert pattern in a 

woodland area. Also, officials chose not to implement all of the testing 

recommendations from the Air Force’s Air Warfare Center, including one 

recommendation to reduce the heat build-up from the uniform.

During the development of the uniform, the Air Force conducted surveys 

of personnel to determine their uniform design preferences. Then, 

according to Air Force officials and documents, the Chief of Staff directed 

the Clothing Office to use a tiger-striped camouflage pattern in a uniform 

for all environments with colors complementing the Army’s universal 

camouflage uniform, and to use one fabric weight for the trousers and the 

blouses worn in hot and cold climates. In contrast, the Marine Corp’s 

knowledge-based approach included testing and evaluation of multiple 

camouflage patterns and colors from which they selected two top 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

performing patterns. As a result, the Marine Corps produced two 

prototypes for extensive field testing and evaluation. Using this 

information, the Marine Corps was able to make knowledgeable decisions 

to select the best prototype and to make improvements in the design prior 

to production. The Marine Corps selected the same twill fabric weave that 

the Air Force selected for the ABU, but the Marine Corps decided to use a 

lighter weight fabric than the Air Force did for the uniform jacket as a way 

to prevent heat buildup.

In 2005, the Air Force Uniform Board sought testing of the ABU to assess 

the uniform’s suitability for use in a combat environment and whether a 

second version of the uniform was needed. The Air Warfare Center 

produced a test plan, which included the overall test methodology and 

measures of uniform effectiveness and performance for concealment and 

comfort.

In October 2006, the Air Warfare Center issued a report on its testing of 

the combat effectiveness of the ABU. The report concluded that the ABU 

camouflage performed well in most environments—never ranking lower 

than third among the six uniforms in different environments. However, the 

report also concluded that the ABU was not an effective combat uniform 

due to trouser fit, heat buildup, and other concerns.

Regarding camouflage effectiveness, the Air Force compared the ABU 

performance to five fielded uniforms: Army Combat Uniform, Marine 

Corps desert and woodland uniforms, and Army Battle Dress (woodland) 

and Desert Camouflage uniforms. However, four of the five uniforms were 

environment-specific uniforms not intended for a number of settings for 

which they were tested. Specifically, in a tropical forest environment, the 

Air Force tests showed that the DCU and Marine Corp desert uniforms 

performed worst, and were ranked 5th and 6th respectively out of six 

uniforms tested. Similarly, in a desert scrub environment, the Air Force 

tests showed that the BDU woodland and Marine Corps woodland 

performed worst, ranking 5th and 6th respectively among six uniforms 

tested. Our analysis shows that the Air Force used camouflage test 

results from settings other than the ones for which they were developed, 

which raises questions about the meaningfulness of the report’s 

conclusion that the ABU camouflage performed well in most 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

environments. In 11 of 19 tests, Air Force observers rated the ABU as 

marginal or unsatisfactory for concealment 58 percent of the time.27

Additionally, the report recommended some design changes to improve fit 

and comfort and to improve the ABU’s overall effectiveness for combat 

use. As a result, the Air Force incorporated some changes into the final 

production design, such as relocating pocket drain holes and redesigning 

the trouser crotch, but did not address other recommendations like the 

heat buildup.28

At the conclusion of our field work, we learned that the Air Force had 

begun replacing the ABU with a lighter weight version to address the long 

standing complaints by personnel about the heat buildup issue. According 

to Air Force officials, the replacement ABU in a lighter weight fabric will be 

used by home base and deployed personnel with the exception of those 

serving in Afghanistan, where the Army OCP uniform will continue to be 

used. If Air Force officials had expanded the knowledge-based approach 

for selecting a uniform—such as by ordering extensive testing and 

evaluation of varying fabric weights for comfortable wear to support the 

decision process—the service may have avoided the need to replace 

uniforms with a lighter weight fabric.

In response, the Clothing Office noted that the original 

direction for the development of the ABU was for non-combat use rather 

than as a combat uniform or as a camouflage-effective garment.

In 2010, Air Force Central Command decided that it would be safer for 

personnel serving in Afghanistan to wear the Army’s flame resistant OCP 

uniform rather than the ABU or its flame resistant uniform. Air Force 

Central Command determined that the ABU’s camouflage contrasted with 

the Army’s camouflage, increasing the risk of personnel standing out to 

enemy forces when Army and Air Force personnel were in a joint 

operating environment.

 

27We excluded 2 of 22 tests because no data was collected, and excluded another test 

that used subjective data.

28The Air Force allowed personnel to remove interior pockets in the ABU shirt to address 

the heat buildup issue. The Air Force web site states that to address the heat issue some 

personnel may choose to cut the interior pockets out of the garment, as long as it does not 

change the outer appearance of the uniform.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

The military services’ fragmented approach to developing uniforms, 

without any joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, has not 

ensured that the resulting uniforms provide equivalent levels of 

performance and protection for service members, and the services have 

not collaborated to reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. DOD has 

reported to the congressional defense committees on planned steps to 

develop joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms, but it has not met 

the statutory requirement to establish joint criteria. Additionally, there is 

no DOD policy to ensure that future service-specific uniforms comply with 

statutory policy to provide equivalent levels of performance and protection 

and minimize the risk to individual service members operating in the joint 

battle space, to the maximum extent practicable. We found that the 

services have experienced opportunities to potentially save millions of 

dollars in development costs and in initial inventory fees by partnering 

with another service in the introduction of new uniforms. At the time of our 

review, the services had no partnership agreement to reduce potential 

costs on the Army’s new uniforms, and the Navy had decided to field its 

uniform before securing a partnership with the Coast Guard that may 

have achieved $6 million in cost savings for inventory fees.

DOD and its service components have not collaborated to establish joint 

criteria for ground combat uniforms. A provision in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the Secretaries of the 

military departments to establish joint criteria for future ground combat 

uniforms that ensures new technologies, advanced materials, and other 

advances in ground combat uniform design may be shared between the 

military services and are not precluded from being adapted for use by any 

military service due to service-unique proprietary arrangements.29 The 

Secretaries of the military departments were to establish the joint criteria 

by February 22, 2011.30

 

29See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(d).

In June 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed 

Services directed the Secretary of Defense to report by August 2010 on 

the steps that DOD took and planned to take to implement the 

requirement for joint criteria, including the steps the Secretaries of the 

30See id. The provision required the establishment of joint criteria no later than 270 days 

from the date of our report on ground combat uniforms required by section 352(c). We 

fulfilled the requirement with a report submitted to the congressional defense committees 

on April 26, 2010, but the report was published on May 28, 2010 as GAO-10-669R. 

Military Services’ 

Fragmented Approach 

to Developing 

Uniforms Has 

Resulted in 

Inconsistent 

Protection for Service 

Members and No 

Collaboration to 

Reduce Costs

DOD and Its Components 

Have Not Met the 

Statutory Requirement to 

Establish Joint Criteria for 

Ground Combat Uniforms
 

Page 24 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

military departments took or would take—in conjunction with the Joint 

Staff and combatant commands—to update their ground combat uniform 

standards and develop operational performance criteria for camouflage.31

The Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board, established in 2008, 

is the forum the military departments are using to establish joint criteria 

for the performance of camouflage uniforms. The governance board was 

established by DOD to ensure collaboration and DOD-wide integration of 

clothing and textile activities, such as uniforms.

DOD issued a report to congressional committees in February 2012 on 

the steps it planned to take to establish joint criteria for ground combat 

uniforms, but it has not yet met the statutory requirement to develop joint 

criteria.

32 The DOD instruction on 

clothing and textiles made the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency 

responsible for establishing and chairing the board. According to 

governance board officials, a working group of the governance board met 

in 2010 to begin discussions on the joint criteria. The working group 

includes representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, and all the military services. However, the group’s leadership 

did not meet the February 2011 deadline for issuing joint criteria because, 

according to members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 

Board, members of the working group were unable to obtain consensus. 

Our prior work has concluded that successful interagency collaboration, 

such as among the military services and defense agencies, requires 

commitment by senior officials to articulate their agreements in formal 

documents, such as a memorandum of understanding or interagency 

guidance.33

 

31See S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 117 (2010) (accompanying S. 3454, a proposed bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011).

Without high-level commitment from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Director of DLA may be unable to promote 

effective interagency cooperation and collaboration among the members 

of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board and ensure DODwide integration of clothing and textiles activities.

32See DOD Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and Textiles (Class II), 

encl. 2, para. 3(a) (Aug. 5, 2008).

33GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities 

Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, GAO-08-665 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 17, 2008).
 

Page 25 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Moreover, in February 2012, Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 

Board officials told us that competing demands to address logistics 

efficiency initiatives also delayed the development of the criteria. In its 

February 2012 response to the congressional committees, DOD 

acknowledged that it could do more to promote and enhance inter-service 

collaboration and life-cycle coordination with the Defense Logistics 

Agency and provided a plan to develop joint criteria.34

Furthermore, the DOD instruction on clothing and textiles also made the 

Director of the Defense Logistics Agency—as chairman of the 

governance board—responsible for overseeing the development of a 

charter to outline the board’s roles and responsibilities.

Governance board 

officials told us that they plan to convene a new working group and 

complete the joint criteria by December 2012. Further, DOD reported that 

the governance board will identify a common set of performance 

characteristics to be used across the military departments. Without joint 

criteria on the performance of uniforms to guide activities, one or more 

service may develop uniforms without knowing whether its uniforms 

include the newest technology, the newest materials or designs, and 

meet an acceptable level of performance.

35 However, the 

charter has not been completed. An official told us that the charter has 

been drafted and continues to be under review by members. According to 

board officials, the governance board has met twice and the officials 

believe that the board’s progress is not impeded by the lack of a signed 

charter. However, almost four years after the board was created, DOD 

has not defined the board’s role. Until the board has a charter outlining its 

authorities, the department may continue to experience difficulty in 

establishing joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms.

 

34DOD, Report on Requirements for Standard Ground Combat Uniforms (Washington, 

D.C.:, February 2012).

35See DOD Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and Textiles (Class II), 

encl. 2, para. 3(a) (Aug. 5, 2008).
 

Page 26 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Each military department has developed its own standards for combat 

uniforms, and DOD does not have a policy to ensure that the services’ 

fragmented uniform programs comply with statutory policy to provide 

equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to 

individual service members operating in the joint battle space, to the 

maximum extent practicable. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010 established policy that the design and fielding of future 

ground combat uniforms may uniquely reflect the identity of the individual 

services as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable, 

provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for members 

commensurate with their respective assigned combat missions and 

minimize the risk to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine 

operating in the joint battle space, among other things.36 Separately, 

under DOD’s instruction on clothing and textile management, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is 

responsible for the development of DOD policy and implementing 

guidance on all matters relating to the clothing and textiles supply chain.37

We found that the services have not collaborated on uniform 

development, and have not ensured that their current service-unique 

uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and 

minimize risk to individual service members operating in the joint battle 

space. DOD and the Joint Staff have described the modern-day battlefield 

as a place with no clearly defined front lines or safer rear area where 

combat support operations are performed.38

 

36See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(a).

In such an environment, 

service members wearing uniforms consisting of different camouflage 

may be exposed to different levels of risk. For example, the Air Force 

requires personnel in Afghanistan to wear a camouflage uniform that best 

protects them and enables them to blend with other service members with 

whom they operate to minimize risk. However, the Navy requires some 

personnel in the desert environment to wear different camouflage 

uniforms, potentially exposing them to increased risk.

37Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and Textiles

(Class II), encl. 3, para. 1 (Aug. 5, 2008).

38DOD, Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting 

the Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.:, February 

2012).

DOD and Its Components 

Have Not Developed a 

Policy to Ensure That 

Service-Specific Uniforms 

Provide Equivalent Levels 

of Protection and Have 

Not Collaborated to 

Minimize Risk
 

Page 27 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

In September 2010, Air Force Central Command decided to enhance the 

level of protection of personnel serving in Afghanistan by directing 

personnel to wear the Army’s OCP uniform (where available) rather than 

the Air Force’s existing ABU and flame-resistant uniform. According to Air 

Force officials, this action was taken to reduce the risk of any personnel 

standing out in the joint operating environment. Conversely, the Navy 

limited the use of its Type II desert uniform in desert environments. In a 

2009 administrative message, the Navy stated that the Type II desert and 

Type III woodland uniforms would increase the probability of mission 

success and survivability in combat and irregular warfare operations.39

However, the Navy also indicated that only Naval Special Warfare 

personnel and sailors assigned to or directly supporting Naval Special 

Warfare units would be authorized to wear the Type II desert uniform. 

Although the Navy later revised its guidance on wear of the Type II desert 

and Type III woodland uniforms,40

In June 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed Services expressed 

concern about the Navy’s restricted use of the uniform among its 

personnel.

this restriction and its focus on 

personnel from or supporting Naval Special Warfare units largely 

remained. As a result of the policy, some Navy units, such as construction 

and intelligence units, were issued the woodland Type III uniforms to 

wear in desert environments.

41

 

39Chief of Naval Operations, NAVADMIN 374-09, Navy Working Uniform Type II and III

(Dec. 29, 2009).

In hearings before the Subcommittee on Readiness and 

Management Support in April 2010, the Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps testified that Marine Corps and Navy discussions prompted 

the Navy’s policy to restrict the use of its Type II desert combat uniform. 

When the Marine Corps first learned that the new Navy uniform looked 

very similar to the Marine Corps’ combat uniform, the Assistant 

Commandant testified, the Marine Corps suggested the selection of a 

Navy pattern that was different enough to distinguish it from the uniform 

worn by the Marines. However, the Assistant Commandant testified, the 

Marine Corps Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations later 

reached an agreement that forward-deployed Navy SEALS and similar 

40Chief of Naval Operations, NAVADMIN 259-11, Navy Working Uniform Type I, II, and III, 

Camouflage Utility Uniforms (Aug. 30, 2011). The Navy guidance was revised, in part, to 

allow U.S. Coast Guard personnel to wear Navy uniforms under certain conditions.

41See S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 117 (2010).
 

Page 28 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

personnel could use the Type II desert uniform. The effect of the 

agreement, however, is that it does not allow other Navy ground support 

units to wear the Type II uniform. According to Navy officials, the Navy did 

not approve a waiver requested by the Commander of the Navy 

Expeditionary Combat Command to allow expeditionary sailors, not 

directly supporting Naval Special Warfare, to wear the desert uniform in a 

desert environment. The Navy’s restriction on the use of its Type II desert 

uniform appears inconsistent with the department’s prevailing view of the 

modern-day battlefield.

DOD has not developed a policy to ensure that future service-specific 

uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and 

minimize risk to the individual operating in the joint battle space. In its 

February 2012 response to congressional committees about ground 

combat uniforms, DOD reported on the Joint Clothing and Textiles 

Governance Board’s activities to improve performance of uniforms. As 

part of its effort to establish joint criteria and standardize uniforms, the 

Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board plans to identify a common 

set of performance characteristics. The governance board intends for the 

performance characteristics to be used across the military departments to 

develop and field the most effective camouflage uniforms and personal 

protective gear to ensure maximum protection for the troops. However, 

common performance characteristics alone may not fully minimize risk 

without also considering the effects of combining different uniforms in the 

same battle space. Without a policy to ensure that services develop and 

field uniforms with equivalent performance and protection, the services 

could fall short of offering equivalent protection for all service members, 

and DOD could expose even those service members wearing the most 

effective camouflage available to unnecessary risks.

Although the statutory policy permits the services to pursue unique 

uniform designs, the services’ fragmented approach to developing 

camouflage uniforms has resulted in numerous inventories of similar 

uniforms at increased cost to the supply chain. As presented earlier in this 

report, each service now has its own set of camouflaged uniforms—the 

Army and Air Force with their universal camouflage ACU, OCP and ABU 

uniforms, and the Marine Corps and Navy with their environment-specific 

MARPAT and Type I and II woodland and desert camouflage uniforms. In 

addition, each service has developed a separate flame resistant version 

of its uniforms. Maintaining inventory levels of reserve and contingency 

stock for multiple versions of camouflage uniforms, in aggregate, requires 

a larger total inventory of uniforms than would be necessary to support a 

Military Services Have Not 

Fully Explored Partnership 

Opportunities to Reduce 

Inventory Costs
 

Page 29 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

product line with fewer uniform versions, and the services have not taken 

advantage of opportunities to reduce costs through partnering on 

inventory management or by collaborating to achieve greater 

standardization among their various camouflage uniform versions.

Under DOD’s supply chain regulation on materiel management, DOD 

components are encouraged, but not required, to standardize basic 

materials and accessories and to standardize uniforms and other clothing 

items when possible to reduce costs.42

In addition, DOD’s supply chain regulation states that any desired 

distinctiveness for clothing items should be accomplished by methods 

such as using separate items of insignia and patches. However, two 

services—the Marine Corps and the Navy—have printed their service 

logos on the camouflage-patterned fabric during the manufacturing 

process. We have previously reported that the Marine Corps patents on 

elements of the uniform do not preclude another service from adopting 

the Marine Corps’ uniform. However, given the prevailing military service 

culture that places a high value on having distinctive and unique combat 

uniforms, the printing of a service’s logo on a uniform’s fabric might make 

However, according to DLA 

officials, none of the services has partnered on combat uniforms since 

they began separately replacing the BDU and DCU beginning in 2002. 

Instead, each of the services generally went its own way in developing or 

adopting service-specific camouflage uniforms. For example, the goals for 

the Marine Corps’ uniform development program included providing 

Marines with a unique combat uniform, the Air Force wanted a utility 

uniform with a distinctively Air Force look, the Navy’s goals were to adopt 

a set of uniforms that reflected the requirements of a 21st century Navy 

and its naval heritage, and the Army wanted a new uniform that would be 

more widely accepted by its soldiers than the BDU. The services’ 

fragmented approaches to uniform development began with the Marine 

Corps in 2002 and continued for other services until the Navy was the last 

service to replace the BDU in 2011 with camouflage uniforms developed 

for naval special forces. During our review, we found that the services 

collectively have spent approximately $12.5 million for uniform 

development since 2000 or an average of $2.1 million for each of the six 

development programs that we reviewed.

 

42See Department of Defense Regulation 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel 

Management Regulation, chapter 8 (May 23, 2003).
 

Page 30 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

it difficult for another service to adopt the uniform for temporary mission 

needs or as a permanent replacement unless the printed logo was 

removed. Conversely, the Army and the Air Force have not found it 

necessary to print their service logos on their combat uniforms. The Army, 

for example, has been open in allowing members of another service to 

wear its uniform to meet mission needs.

We also found that the services have not reduced costs by collaborating 

to eliminate inventory fees for new uniforms. When the military services 

introduce a new item, the Defense Logistics Agency imposes an initial 

inventory fee if the cost of the new item is greater than 10 percent of the 

cost of the item being replaced and if the item is introduced into inventory 

by only one DOD component.43 The inventory fee covers the cost of 

acquiring initial inventory, according to Defense Logistics Agency officials, 

and includes the first four months of inventory, a three-month safety level, 

and the cost of the remaining uniforms in inventory being replaced.44

Two military services, the Army and the Navy, have recently experienced 

opportunities to potentially save tens of millions of dollars in initial 

inventory fees by partnering with another service in the introduction of 

new uniforms. The Army is currently testing camouflage patterns to 

support the development of new camouflage uniforms for service-wide 

use and has estimated that the service could avoid initial inventory fees of 

as much as $82 million by partnering with another service or services. 

However, during our review none of the services had reached an 

agreement to partner with the Army. According to PEO Soldier officials, 

they have coordinated with the other services by hosting an Integrated 

Product Team to obtain input on their development activities and included 

To 

encourage the services to reduce costs by standardizing materials and 

eliminating duplication, according to the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop 

Support office, officials will waive the initial inventory fee if two or more 

services agree to jointly introduce the item into their inventories.

 

43For new clothing with a forecasted total annual demand value exceeding $100,000, 

DOD policy provides that the initial investment and acquisition of inventory levels to satisfy 

demands up to the effective date of supply is the financial responsibility of the requesting 

component. Officials of the Defense Logistics Agency’s Troop Support office stated that 

their interpretation of the policy is that items with a value of 10 percent greater than the 

item being replaced will include the initial inventory fee. 

44According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, the initial inventory fee is based on a 

calculation of the monthly demand, the speed of fielding, and the cost of the new uniforms.
 

Page 31 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Marine Corps and Navy camouflage uniforms in the baseline testing to 

evaluate new camouflage patterns. The Air Force is monitoring the 

Army’s activities and Air Force officials stated that they are considering 

using the new uniforms if the uniforms meet their requirements. 

Nevertheless, we found that Army officials have not reached an 

agreement with the Air Force or other services to partner on the joint 

introduction of its uniforms to achieve cost savings if the initial inventory 

fee applies. If the Army does not partner with at least one service on the 

introduction of its new uniforms, it will miss an opportunity to eliminate the 

initial inventory fee cost, decrease the life-cycle costs of its uniforms, and 

may duplicate effort if the Air Force or another service later decides to 

independently develop a new uniform.

The Navy, as part of its acquisition planning in the spring of 2011, 

estimated potential cost savings of about $6 million in its initial inventory 

fees if it partnered with another service in the introduction of its Type II 

desert and Type III woodland uniforms. In March 2011, the Coast Guard 

requested approval from the Navy, Naval Special Warfare Command, and 

U.S. Special Operations Command to use the camouflage uniforms for 

maritime, counter-terrorism, and security missions. The Coast Guard 

request stated that the uniform partnership would promote the active 

relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy and provide 

interoperability and cooperation in the joint maritime environment. In 

August 2011, the Navy revised guidance on the wear of its uniforms, 

permitting the Coast Guard to use its Type II desert uniform for Coast 

Guard personnel assigned to or directly supporting Naval Special 

Warfare, and it approved use of the Type III woodland uniforms for all 

other Coast Guard personnel.45

In the absence of DOD requirements that the services collaborate to 

standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, 

the services may continue to miss opportunities to increase efficiencies 

and forego tens of millions of dollars in cost savings.

Nevertheless, Navy officials decided to 

field the uniform before establishing a formal partnership with the Coast 

Guard. As a result, the Navy incurred $6 million in inventory fees, thereby 

increasing the overall life-cycle cost of the uniforms.

 

45See Chief of Naval Operations, NAVADMIN 259-11, Navy Working Uniform Type I, II, 

and III, Camouflage Utility Uniforms (Aug. 30, 2011). 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

In the past 10 years, each of the military services independently 

introduced at least one service-specific camouflage uniform, and two 

services’ uniforms did not meet requirements and needed to be replaced. 

DOD has provided the services with guidance for acquisitions through its 

5000-series instruction, but all services did not follow that guidance 

because they determined it was not applicable to their development and 

acquisition of uniforms or they did not apply the guidance in a manner 

that would ensure effective outcomes. In addition, DOD did not clarify the 

appropriate use of this or other guidance when developing combat 

uniforms, resulting in varying, fragmented procedures that did not 

consistently produce effective camouflage uniforms. By not following two 

key practices for a decision-making process that can produce successful 

outcomes, military services developed uniforms that did not meet specific 

mission requirements. DOD has provided some additional clarity in the 

2008 instruction on the management of clothing and textiles, but the 

military services may continue to vary in their application and use of 

acquisition guidance. With additional clarity from DOD on the consistent 

use of policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the 

services could increase their assurance of having a disciplined process 

that is capable of developing uniforms that meet warfighter requirements.

Additionally, the military services have fragmented approaches to 

developing uniforms that do not rely on joint criteria for meeting combat 

requirements, do not ensure that the resulting uniforms provide equivalent 

levels of performance and protection, and do not lead to collaboration to 

reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. Without a high-level 

commitment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of 

the Defense Logistics Agency may be unable to promote effective 

interagency cooperation and collaboration among the members of the 

Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board. If the services developed 

and used joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, service officials 

could increase assurance that their new uniforms include the newest 

technology and the newest materials or designs, and meet an acceptable 

level of performance. Also, by completing the board’s charter to outline 

the board’s roles and responsibilities, the board could increase the 

likelihood that its members would establish the joint criteria for uniforms 

required by statute in 2009. The services have not established a means 

to assess and ensure that future uniforms will fulfill statutory policy 

regarding service-unique uniforms and, as a result, may not be able to 

ensure that future ground combat uniforms provide all service members 

with equivalent levels of protection and performance or minimize risks 

while operating in the joint battle space. Finally, the services’ fragmented 

approach to uniform development has resulted in the services not 

Conclusions
 

Page 33 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

standardizing camouflage uniforms, not collaborating or partnering on 

inventory fees to reduce development and inventory costs, and potentially 

not saving on overall procurement costs. Standardizing the development 

of camouflage uniforms and partnering to share inventory fees could 

increase efficiency in uniform development programs and potentially save 

DOD tens of millions of dollars over the life cycles of the services’ combat 

utility uniforms.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 

actions:

• To better ensure camouflage uniforms being developed by the military 

services meet mission requirements, direct the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure that the 

services have and consistently use clear policies and procedures and 

a knowledge-based approach to produce successful outcomes.

• To facilitate the department’s ability to meet the statutory requirement 

to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms, direct the Secretaries 

of the military departments to identify and implement actions 

necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 

Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to the 

development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform. These 

actions should include efforts to ensure the completion of the Joint 

Clothing and Textiles Governance Board’s charter outlining the roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities of the board, and establishing a 

timeline for developing joint standards.

• To address the statutory policy related to camouflage uniforms, direct 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to develop a policy and establish a timeframe to ensure that 

future service-specific uniforms provide equivalent levels of 

performance and protection, and minimize risk to service members 

operating in the joint battle space.

• To take advantage of potential efficiencies and cost savings when 

introducing new uniforms, direct the Secretaries of the military 

departments to actively pursue partnerships for the joint development 

and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the development of 

uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall procurement 

costs.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 34 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written 

comments, reprinted in their entirety in appendix III, DOD concurred with 

our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments, which we 

have incorporated, as appropriate. In response to our recommendations, 

DOD stated that steps will be taken to improve the use of policy and 

procedures during development of uniforms, to address statutory 

requirements and policy, and take advantage of potential efficiencies and 

cost savings. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to ensure that the services have, and consistently use, clear 

policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach to produce 

successful outcomes. DOD said that (USD) AT&L will place additional 

emphasis on the importance of following guidance related to the Defense 

Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 

System through oversight by the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 

Board. If DOD completes the Joint Clothing and Textiles Government 

Board charter clearly outlining the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of 

the Board to include oversight of the services’ uniform development 

process, then the action proposed by the department may satisfy the intent 

of the recommendation. However, DOD did not specifically identify how the

Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board plans to provide consistent, 

long-term oversight to ensure the military services use policies and 

procedures to guide their development activities in the future. As we 

discuss in our report, without additional guidance from DOD on the use of 

clear policies and procedures for a knowledge-based approach to 

developing effective uniforms, some services may continue to lack 

assurance that they have a disciplined process that is capable of delivering 

uniforms that meet warfighter requirements. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretaries of the military departments to identify and 

implement actions necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles 

Governance Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to 

the development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform and 

establishing a timeline for developing joint standards. One important 

action includes the completion of the Board's charter outlining the roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities of the board. DOD stated that the military 

departments participate in the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 

Board's efforts to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms by 

providing appropriate research and development and functional expertise. 

DOD stated that draft joint criteria for camouflage uniforms have been 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 35 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

developed and are going through the DOD approval process, which DOD 

estimated will be completed in the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year 2013. 

Finally, DOD stated that once approved, the joint criteria will be used prior 

to the development or acquisition of new camouflage uniforms. While we 

are encouraged to learn that DOD has draft joint criteria moving through 

the approval process, the development of the joint criteria has been an 

ongoing effort for several years—initially to be completed by February 

2011, then in December 2012, according to DOD's status report to 

congressional committees, and now no later than March 2013, in 

response to our recommendation. Because of the difficulties the 

department has experienced in developing and approving joint criteria, 

our recommendation called for the completion of the Joint Clothing and 

Textiles Governance Board's charter as a specific action that DOD should 

take to facilitate the department's ability to meet the statutory requirement 

to develop joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms. DOD, 

however, did not address completion of the Board's charter in its 

comments. We continue to believe that completion of the charter to 

clearly outline the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Board 

would facilitate military department approval of meaningful joint criteria. 

Further, we believe that completion of the Board's charter will be critical in 

ensuring that the Board can assist DOD in 1) carrying out the oversight of 

service uniform development actions and 2) providing additional oversight 

and encouraging active partnerships for joint development and use of 

uniforms, particularly since DOD has identified the Board as an essential 

actor in carrying out three of our four recommendations. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics develop a policy and 

establish a timeframe to ensure that future service-specific uniforms 

provide equivalent levels of performance and protection, and minimize 

risk to service members operating in the joint battlespace. DOD said that 

the USD (AT&L) will disseminate policy guidance to the military 

departments that will include direction for using joint criteria and ensuring 

equivalent levels of performance and protection by the 3rd quarter of 

Fiscal Year 2013. If fully implemented, we believe this action would 

satisfy our recommendation. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of the 

military departments actively pursue partnerships for the joint 

development and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the 

development of uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall 

procurement costs. DOD stated that it will use the Joint Clothing and 

Textiles Governance Board and the Cross-Service Warfighter Equipment 
 

Page 36 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Board to provide additional oversight and further pursue active 

partnerships for joint development and use of uniforms. We believe these 

actions, if fully implemented, would satisfy our recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Air 

Force, Army, and Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV.

Cary B. Russell,

Acting Director,

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

To determine the extent to which Department of Defense (DOD) guidance 

provides a consistent decision process to ensure that new camouflage 

uniforms meet operational requirements, we reviewed key guidance and 

interviewed relevant DOD and military service officials. We collected and 

reviewed the DOD’s and services’ regulations, instructions, policies, 

procedures, and other guidance that the services used to structure their 

decision processes on the development and acquisition of their 

camouflage uniforms. We assessed the decision processes based on 

their use of DOD’s 5000-series acquisition guidance, military department 

implementing guidance, or other guidance, and OMB’s acquisition 

guidance and GAO’s framework for assessing acquisition functions. We 

assessed whether three services—the Marine Corps, Army and Air 

Force—followed the two key elements that GAO has determined are key 

practices for a decision process that produces successful outcomes, and 

to what extent each service developed uniforms that met requirements. 

We visited the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy offices 

responsible for managing the development or acquisition of their 

camouflage uniforms and gathered data and reports that the services 

used to support their decisions. We interviewed military service officials 

responsible for the management of uniform development and acquisition 

policy and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics about the flexibility of DOD’s 5000-series 

guidance and how the services used this guidance in their development 

activities. To determine whether the services’ uniforms met requirements, 

we collected data and interviewed service officials to determine if the new 

uniforms have been replaced to meet operational needs.

To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint approach 

to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs, we 

reviewed the DOD guidance, the requirement of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that the military departments 

establish joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms, and policy 

established by the act permitting the design and fielding of serviceunique, future ground combat uniforms so long as they, to the maximum 

extent practicable, provide equivalent levels of performance and 

protection to all service members commensurate with their assigned 

combat missions and minimize the risk to the individual service members 

operating in the joint battle space, among other things.1

 

1

See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(a), (d).

We collected data 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

and interviewed relevant officials from the four military services and 

officials with the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board from the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics and the Defense Logistics Agency to determine if the services 

are using a joint approach to address the requirement and policy and if 

they are being met. Specifically, we interviewed governance board 

officials and reviewed documents related to the board’s efforts and plans 

to develop joint criteria and collect a set of common uniform 

characteristics to support development of uniforms and protective gear. 

Finally, to determine how the services jointly seek to reduce costs in the 

acquisition of uniforms, we gathered data from the Navy and Army on the 

estimated cost to introduce their new camouflage uniforms into inventory. 

We reviewed DOD’s supply chain materiel management regulation and 

other guidance from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office 

on initial inventory fees and how the agency provides the services a 

reduced initial inventory fee if a service partners with one or more service. 

To assess the reliability of the cost data, we interviewed Navy and Army 

officials to understand how the initial inventory fee was determined. The 

Defense Logistics Agency confirmed the cost of the Navy’s initial 

inventory fee. To verify the Army’s estimate, we obtained data from the 

Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office on monthly demand for 

uniforms and created our own cost estimate. To ensure that the 

computer-generated data from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop 

Support office is reliable, we collected information about the Enterprise 

Business System and the Standard Materiel Management System and 

interviewed officials who manage the system. We determined that the 

data from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office, the Navy, 

and the Army were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our 

engagement.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to 

September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat 

Uniforms

Page 39 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Since 2006, each service has developed or adopted flame-resistant 

uniforms in response to urgent warfighter needs. See figure 2 for 

additional information about the uniforms. Prior to Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD personnel with flame 

resistant uniforms were mainly aviators, fuel handlers, and combatvehicle crewmen. These personnel required flame resistant uniforms 

because of their potential exposure to fire or other thermal energy. With 

the growing prevalence of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat, 

all ground forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have been exposed to 

the possibility of fire-related injuries. As the threat from IEDs emerged 

and continues today, the services have developed flame resistant uniform 

capabilities to protect the warfighter.

Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat 

Uniforms 
Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat 

Uniforms

Page 40 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Figure 2: Services’ Flame Resistant Uniforms, Dates of Initiation, and Development Costs

The Marine Corps developed its Flame Resistant Organizational Gear 

(FROG) in response to a July 2006 Urgent Statement of Need to increase 

protection against flash flame IED events in Central Command’s area of 

responsibility. The Urgent Statement of Need requested burn protection 

for the hands, face, and neck. After extensive testing, the Marine Corps 

determined that in addition to providing a base layer of protection, the 
Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat 

Uniforms

Page 41 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

service also needed to provide an outer layer of protection. The Marine 

Corps conducted testing of flame-resistant fabrics in January and 

February of 2007 and selected the TenCate DefenderTM M fabric for its 

flame-resistant uniforms. The Marine Corps spent about $1.5 million in 

the development of the FROG through Fiscal Year 2008. The service 

began fielding FROG items in February 2007 to all deployed and 

deploying Marines.

The Army’s Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FR ACU) was 

developed in response to two Operational Need Statements requiring 

flame protection clothing capabilities to support operations in Central 

Command’s area of responsibility due to greater threats of IEDs with 

enhanced accelerants throughout the theater. In August 2006, the Army 

received an Operational Need Statement from Multi-National Corps Iraq 

which called for an increase in the number of flame-resistant uniforms 

already available to be used by soldiers to protect against increased burn 

injuries occurring from IED attacks. The Operational Need Statement was 

met by issuing Nomex® Combat Vehicle Crewman’s uniforms and 

Nomex® Combat Vehicle Crewman’s balaclavas for those soldiers 

deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 

Freedom. In addition, as part of its response, the Army tested flameresistant fabrics in 2006 for future uniforms. In March 2007, an 

Operational Needs Statement was submitted by United States Army 

Central requesting flame-resistant uniforms to enhance survivability while 

conducting missions. The Army developed its FR ACU using the same 

flame-resistant fabric, TenCate DefenderTM M, identified in its 2006 

testing and as the Marine Corps’ FROG. The Army did not provide the 

total cost of the development of the FR ACU, but did provide PEO 

Soldier’s research and development costs of about $530,000. The Army 

began fielding the FR ACU to soldiers in late 2007.

In response to direction from a June 2009 conference committee that 

DOD take immediate action to provide personnel deployed to Afghanistan 

with a camouflage pattern that is suited to the environment of 

Afghanistan,1

 

1

See H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 86 (2009) (Conf. Rep., accompanying the Supplemental 

Appropriations Act, 2009).

the Army developed the Operation Enduring Freedom 

Camouflage Pattern (OCP). The OCP uniform provides increased 

camouflage protection to soldiers operating in Afghanistan’s diverse 
Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat 

Uniforms

Page 42 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

environments and is printed on the TenCate DefenderTM M flame 

resistant fabric. The Army spent about $3.4 million through 2009 on 

development, began fielding the uniform in July 2010, and it is expected 

to be fully fielded by September 2012.

The Air Force’s Airman Battle System-Ground (ABS-G) was developed in 

response to a May 2008 Urgent Operational Need for flame-resistant 

equipment to be used in ground combat and combat support 

environments by personnel performing non-traditional, ground-focused, or 

newly emerging missions for the Air Force and in support of other joint 

and services’ staffs in Central Command’s area of responsibility. The 

ABS-G consists of four layers of flame-resistant clothing: a base layer, 

core layer, an outer layer, and an extreme cold-weather layer. In 2007, 

the Air Force and Army conducted joint testing of flame-resistant fabrics 

to identify alternatives to TenCate DefenderTM M based on concerns 

about the availability of flame resistant rayon given a projected increase 

in demand from both services. The Air Force spent about $1.7 million 

between 2007 and 2010 in the development of the ABS-G and began 

fielding it in March 2009. However, in September 2010, the Air Force 

changed its combat uniform wear policy to enhance the level of protection 

for personnel who perform ground combat missions. The updated policy 

authorizes personnel conducting ground combat missions beyond the 

perimeter of a base to wear the uniform of their assigned or aligned unit—

generally the Army’s OCP—and directs all other Air Force personnel 

deployed to Afghanistan to wear the Army’s OCP uniform or the FR ACU 

if the OCP uniform is not available. If neither uniform is available, the 

policy authorizes personnel to wear the ABS-G. Air Force officials stated 

that the ABS-G will be transitioned out of the Air Force’s inventory as 

soon as the production levels of the Army’s flame-resistant uniforms can 

meet Air Force demand.

In response to an Urgent Statement of Need dated February 2011, the 

Navy adopted the Marine Corps’ flame resistant uniform for Navy use, 

thereby avoiding a duplication of effort and eliminating development 

costs. Through the Naval Logistics Integration initiative with the Marine 

Corps, the Navy is leveraging the Marine Corps’ flame resistant uniform 

and gear and adding its own Type II desert and Type III woodland 

camouflage patterns and the legacy Desert Camouflage Uniform patterns 

to the FROG uniform for use by the Navy’s expeditionary ground 

personnel. The Marine Corps Systems Command’s Program Manager for 

Infantry Combat Equipment (PM-ICE) is the program manager for the 

Navy expeditionary ground personnel’s flame-resistant uniforms. The 

Navy spent about $29,000 for final preproduction review of the uniforms 
Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat 

Uniforms

Page 43 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

and had no additional research or development costs because it adopted 

the Marine Corps’ flame-resistant uniform. The Navy began fielding 

elements of the Navy FROG in September 2011. According to an official, 

the Navy plans to begin fielding its FROG in the Type II desert pattern in 

2012.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 44 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 45 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 46 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 47 GAO-12-707 Warfighter Support

Cary Russell, Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, 

(202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact name above, key contributors to this report were 

Larry Junek, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Morris, Grace Coleman, Susan 

Ditto, James Lackey, Tobin McMurdie, Carol Petersen, Richard 

Powelson, Michael Shaughnessy, and Amie Steele.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351527)
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