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76–016 2012

NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, 

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 11, 2010 

Serial No. 111–104 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Vice Chairman 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANE HARMAN, California 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 


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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

Chairman 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

Vice Chair 

JOHN SARBANES, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

FRANK PALLONE, New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1 

Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Kentucky, opening statement ......................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, opening statement .............................................................................. 7 

Hon. Bruce L. Braley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 8 

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement ....................................................................................... 9 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, prepared statement ........................................................................... 81 

Hon. Kathy Castor, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 85 

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 88 

WITNESSES

David L. Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ................................................................................................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 91 

Joan Claybrook, Former Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .......................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Ami V. Gadhia, Safety Policy Counsel, Consumers Union ................................... 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 119 

Dave McCurdy, President and CEO, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers .......................................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 127 


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NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD 

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:48 p.m., in Room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bobby L. Rush 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Rush, Schakowsky, Sutton, 

Barrow, Braley, Dingell, Markey, Stearns and Whitfield. 

Staff present: Michelle Ash, Chief Counsel; Anna Laitin, Professional Staff; Will Cusey, Special Assistant; Bruce Wolpe, Senior Advisor; Danny Hekier, Intern; Jeff Wease, Deputy Information Officer; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant; Lindsay Vidal, Deputy 

Press Secretary; Shannon Weinberg, Minority Counsel; Brian 

McCullough, Minority Senior Professional Staff; Sam Costello, Minority Legislative Analyst; Robert Frisby, Minority FTC Detailee; 

Sarah Kelly, Press Intern; and Kevin Kohl, Minority Professional 

Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. RUSH. The subcommittee will now come to order. 

Let me just say something in regards to those people who have 

been waiting since 10 a.m. this morning. I sincerely apologize, but 

as you know, the duties of the House are varied and we did have 

to postpone this meeting for a series of votes and other matters, so 

again, please accept my sincere apologies for the delay. We are very 

cognizant of your time and we value your time, so please accept our 

humble apology. We will now proceed with this hearing. 

This hearing today is a hearing of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, and the subject matter is 

NHTSA: The Road Ahead. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for the purposes of an opening statement. 

The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection again welcomes our participants here at this meeting. Our 

main purpose for coming together today is to assess NHTSA’s 

functionality and its effectiveness. Last month, I promised America’s motorists, passengers, and pedestrians that as this subcommittee takes up its jurisdictional responsibility to reauthorize 

NHTSA, we would help NHTSA regain the public’s confidence. 


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This is our first occasion to welcome NHTSA’s newest administrator, Mr. David Strickland, to this hearing and to this subcommittee and to this committee. Although Administrator 

Strickland’s first several months at NHTSA’s helm have been rocky 

and filled with difficult challenges, I know him to be a highly intelligent, thoughtful and capable professional. I expect that he will 

‘‘shoot straight’’ with us as we begin crafting reauthorization legislation that the members of this subcommittee can quickly support 

and move through this subcommittee and through the full committee and take it to the floor of the House. 

I look forward to listening to both witness panels and hearing 

their views on what NHTSA is currently doing through its crash 

data analysis, its research and its rulemakings to promote vehicular safety. 

Although I am typically not very stringent about enforcing time 

restrictions on member statements and questioning, this is a different day. We are starting late, and because of the timeliness, I 

will not hesitate to drop the gavel today to keep us on point, and 

I might say, on the right path, as much as possible. The right road 

may be more appropriate. We have a lot of ground to cover and we 

expect a number of members to participate. I would ask my colleagues for their understanding and to be as cooperative as possible 

as it relates to the time considerations. 

Before I yield my time, I would like to say a few words about the 

scope of today’s hearing. Let me be clear, this is not a hearing 

about Toyota’s recalls or its practices. Please try to restrain yourselves from veering too far away from our purpose of examining 

NHTSA and NHTSA’s configuration, NHTSA’s organization, and 

NHTSA’s performance in the areas of defects investigation, safety 

standards and enforcement. 

Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for taking the time 

out of your very important schedules in order to advise this subcommittee. Again, I want to say we are more than thankful to you 

for your patience. Let us work collaboratively and constructively to 

ensure that NHTSA has on hand the necessary resources and capacity to fulfill its stated mission of saving lives, preventing injuries and reducing economic costs due to road traffic crashes 

through education, research, safety standards and enforcement activity. You are all great Americans and you are becoming greater 

Americans if you help us improve NHTSA. Thanking you again. I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

And now I recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes, my 

friend from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to 

thank you all for your patience, and we welcome the witnesses on 

both panels. 

I would like to start out first of all this afternoon by simply congratulating the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. I 

notice that today’s vehicles are safer than ever. In 2009, there were 

33,963 highway fatalities, which is too many, but the fewest since 


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1954. The rate of fatalities in 2009 was 1.6 deaths per 100 million 

vehicle miles, and when this record was first recorded back in 

1979, there were 3.34 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles. I 

think that should make the public feel more comfortable, even 

though one death is one death too many. 

As a result of all the focus on Toyota, some commentators have 

opined that the system is broken and needs to be fixed. Those opinions are wide ranging and point to many different issues ranging 

from NHTSA’s authority to the way in which it has utilized its authority. Mr. Sean Kane, who is president of the Safety Research 

and Strategies Company, which does a lot of consulting work for 

plaintiff trial lawyers, testified during the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee hearing last month when he was asked the 

question, does NHTSA need more tools, more authority. He simply 

said that ‘‘I think the number of errors were made in the process 

of these investigations, not so much that the tools were not available as much as the tools were not employed.’’ So I think it is important that we consider all of those things as we move forward. 

As far as unintended acceleration, this is a problem that has cut 

across 3 decades and multiple Administrations without successful 

resolution. Similar to NHTSA’s finding in the late 1980s and early 

1990s when it commissioned an independent examination of unintended acceleration or the more recent review conducted between 

1999 and 2000, the current investigation has not answered all 

questions and may never do so to everyone’s satisfaction. 

Regarding NHTSA’s action, it is also not clear what more they 

could have done than what they have already done and whether 

the outcome would be any different. Administrator Strickland testified last week that there simply wasn’t a strong enough case to 

force the issue of a mandatory recall, even if that had been decision 

NHTSA’s decision, and if a problem cannot be clearly identified, a 

proposed fix most likely will not have a meaningful benefit. 

I might also say that to date the Office of Inspector General 

within the Department of Transportation announced the initiation 

of an audit of NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation to conclude 

an examination of its handling of Toyota as well as the broader 

issue of the process that ODI employs to examine and investigate 

safety defects. The Office of Inspector General’s objectives are similar to those of this hearing and that is simply to determine whether NHTSA has the tools and information available to investigate 

safety defects and identify possible improvements to its current 

procedures, and I think that is what this hearing is all about as 

we move forward with NHTSA, and I would yield back the balance 

of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitfield follows:] 


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Statement of the Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 

Protection 

Hearing on National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

March 11,2010 

• Thank you Chairman Rush for calling this important hearing to 

conduct oversight and examine the role of the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration in conducting recalls in the wake 

of the Toyota recalls. 

• Some commentators have opined the system is broken and needs 

to be fixed. Those opinions are wide ranging and point to many 

different issues ranging from NHTSA's authority to the way in 

which it has applied its authority. 

• As one witness testified during the Oversight and Investigations 

Subcommittee hearing last month, he believed it wasn't a lack of 

tools at fault, but rather the use of the incorrect tools as it applies 

to the Toyota problems. 

• A careful review of the facts thus far does not offer any easy 

answers or solutions. What we know is that Toyota has recalled 

over 5 million vehicles and gone to lengths to repair "sticky" 

pedals and address floor mat entrapment. But it is not clear yet 

that anyone can definitively say that either of those issues - or 

their solutions - was the problem related to every report of 

sudden unintended acceleration. 

• Unintended acceleration is not a phenomenon unique to any 

particular manufacturer. In the past decade alone, NHTSA has 

received thousands of consumer complaints of unintended 

acceleration each year. In recent years Toyota's share of those 

complaints has risen and triggered subsequent NHTSA 

investigations which have led to the current recalls. 
5 


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• NHTSA has taken steps to investigate the recent problems, 

including the purchase of the actual vehicle owned and driven by 

one of the witnesses at the Oversight Subcommittee's hearing last 

month, Mrs. Smith. I commend NHTSA on their proactive 

response. 

• Unfortunately, we do not know whether NHTSA - or any 

manufacturer - will be able to accurately identify the cause of 

every report of unintended acceleration it receives. 

• The problem has cut across three decades and multiple 

Administrations without resolution. Similar to NHTSA's finding 

in the late 1980's and early 1990's when it commissioned an 

independent examination of unintended acceleration, or the more 

recent review conducted between 1999 and 2000, the current 

investigation has not answered all questions and may never do so 

to everyone's satisfaction. 

• Left unanswered are the thousands of consumer complaints each 

year for all models and types in which the consumer experiences 

some form of unintended acceleration. Some may be explained 

by user error while others cannot. And like a problem we may 

hear in our own car infrequently, often it disappears when we 

take it to the mechanic and cannot be reproduced. 

• Regarding NHTSA's actions, it is also not clear what more they 

could have done than what it has already done, and whether the 

outcome would be any different. Administrator Strickland 

testified last week that there simply wasn't a strong enough case 

to force the issue of a mandatory recall even if that had been 

NHTSA's decision. And if a problem cannot be clearly 

identified, a proposed "fix" most likely will not have a 

meaningful benefit. 

• To date, the Office ofInspector General within the Department of 

Transportation announced the initiation of an audit ofNHTSA's 
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Office of Defects Investigation ("ODI"), to include an 

examination of its handling of Toyota as well as the broader issue 

of the process ODI employs to examine and investigate safety 

defects. 

o The Office oflnspector General's objectives are similar to 

those of this hearing: determine whether NHTSA has the 

tools and information available to investigate safety defects 

and identify possible improvements to its current 

procedures. 

o At a minimum, we should not jump to conclusions 

about the efficacy of NHTSA's efforts or whether they 

had sufficient tools and used them appropriately until 

we can review the Inspector General's report and 

recommendations . 

• As we examine NHTSA's actions, authorities, and resources, if 

legislation is determined to be warranted, it will move through 

this Subcommittee. So I commend your decision to hold this 

hearing as we seek the facts. I look forward to the testimony and 

working with you Mr. Chairman to ensure our roads and cars 

remain safe. 
7 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair recognizes the vice chair of the subcommittee, Ms. Schakowsky of Illinois, for 5 minutes for the purpose of opening statements. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am so happy that 

we are having this hearing today. 

Without a doubt, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s profile has risen dramatically as a result of its role in responding to the dangerous problems with Toyota vehicles, probably 

a little higher profile than perhaps you had wanted or anticipated. 

This hearing will give us the opportunity to explore whether 

NHTSA has the resources, expertise and authority necessary to 

sufficiently investigate reports of safety problems and enforce existing safety rules. 

I want to welcome Mr. Strickland and congratulate him on his 

new position and welcome him to this committee. I know that you 

really are an advocate for consumers and it was really a pleasure 

to be able to work with you earlier on the Consumer Product Safety 

Improvement Act when we worked together when you were in the 

Senate. So I know of your commitment to consumers and consumer 

safety. 

My guess is, though, that right now we will find some gaps that 

need to be filled, and I look forward to working with Chairman 

Rush and the subcommittee and with NHTSA in crafting legislation to address those gaps. 

Mr. Strickland, in addition to discussing issues surrounding 

NHTSA’s oversight and enforcement activities, I am looking forward to begin a dialog with you about children’s safety in and 

around cars and other proactive safety measures. I appreciate that 

we had a moment before this 10:00 hearing to discuss this a bit. 

In past year, Congress has enacted legislation requiring NHTSA to 

issue specific safety regulations. Dear to my heart has been the 

Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act signed into 

law in 2008, requiring rulemaking on a rear visibility standard and 

a power window standard, and I know that you are working on 

both of these issues as we speak and it is my hope that both standards will be very strong in order to protect children. 

I have to tell you that I think the hardest thing that I have done 

in this Congress, I am in my 12th year now, is having parents 

come with pictures of their children who are no longer with us, 

sometimes because they themselves inadvertently, and we know in 

large part due to design problems actually were responsible for 

those children’s deaths. It is just the most unbearable thing to 

think about, that these were preventable, and yet these parents 

have turned this tragedy into a crusade to make automobiles safer, 

not just in traffic but not in traffic. And so I am looking forward 

to working with you to create standards that actually do prevent 

those accidents from happening. 

My concern is that in the past that Congress was forced to take 

action because NHTSA was not initiating badly needed rulemaking 

on its own and so I look forward to working with you to make sure 


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that NHTSA has all the tools it needs and that it uses its tools to 

protect consumers. I look forward to that very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, 

Mr. Braley, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. BRALEY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to applaud you 

and the ranking member for holding this important hearing. 

It is really an honor to have you here today, Mr. Strickland. We 

haven’t met before. You have an important responsibility that is 

too often kept on the back pages of most newspapers and magazines, and it is only when something dramatic like these Toyota recall hearings comes up that the public starts to understand the 

critical role that your agency plays. You look to me like you are a 

young man, so I don’t know if you know where you were on December 2, 1994, but I know where I was. I was not sitting in that chair, 

even though I was supposed to be sitting in that chair, because I 

was supposed to be testifying that day at a recall hearing on sidesaddle fuel tank explosions involving CK General Motors pickup 

trucks, and I did not get the opportunity to testify because a settlement was reached that day between your agency and the Secretary 

of Transportation and General Motors whereby $51 million was 

paid for supposed consumer safety programs so that the recall 

hearing would not go forward where people like me would have an 

opportunity to talk about the impact on human lives of defects that 

do not get solved, and I was going to testify that day about a client 

of mine, a young woman in Iowa, who had the right side of her face 

burned off when the pickup truck she was riding in was involved 

in a collision and the pickup rolled over on its side, and because 

of the placement of those fuel tanks outside the frame rails, the 

flames went up the side of that pickup truck and engulfed her face 

in flames, and her husband, who was driving the pickup truck, 

pulled her young son, who was seated between them, through the 

broken windshield and got him to safety, and when he went back 

to try to rescue his wife, he reached into grab her and pulled out 

big chunks of her hair that had burned off in the fire. And he went 

back to his son and told him Mommy is in heaven now, but miraculously, this brave woman survived and went through months and 

years of grueling, painful skin grafts, hair transplants and incredible disfigurement because of that defect. 

When we gather for these hearings, we spend a lot of time talking in very arcane, technical language about sudden, unanticipated 

acceleration and electronic control safety devices, but we rarely 

talk about the human impact of the failure to act, and so when you 

think about the important responsibilities your agency has, it is 

important not just to think about where we are today and where 

you are going to take that agency going forward, it is important to 

look backwards at the legacy of this agency and why there are 

some people who feel it is not fulfilled its responsibility to keep the 

American public safe. 

So I look forward to the opportunity to have a meaningful, longterm conversation with you about the important responsibilities 


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you have, and I look forward to hearing your testimony today as 

we work together to get to the bottom of this unexplained problem, 

and I yield back. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus of 

the full committee, my friend from the State of Michigan, Mr. Dingell, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness and 

courtesy. I commend you for this hearing, which is very important, 

and I also commend you for your fine leadership of this subcommittee which you have done a splendid job. 

I want to observe that NHTSA’s response to the safety defects 

implicated in these recalls has been sluggish. Likewise, NHTSA’s 

decisions to terminate several internal analyses related to the defective Toyota vehicles since 2003 due to a purported lack of resources leave one with the impression that the agency lacks the appropriate level of personnel and appropriations with which to fill 

its mandate. We want to find out if that is the case today because 

if that be so, then the safety of the American public is of course 

in question. 

As was the case with its sister agency, the Consumer Products 

Safety commission, NHTSA has suffered years of stagnation in 

funding and in many cases has endured a reduction in personnel 

levels, most notably in its important Office of Defects Investigation, 

ODI. Nevertheless, the agency possesses a number of powerful enforcement tools, many of which were augmented under the Transportation Recall Enhancement Accountability and Documentation, 

or the TREAD Act, of 2000. In addition to being able to compel 

manufacturers to recall defective vehicles, NHTSA may impose 

civil penalties for noncompliance and criminal penalties for falsification or withholding of information. This in mind, we must ask 

ourselves today why these authorities were not used in the case of 

recent Toyota recalls. Put another way, are the problems with 

NHTSA’s response to the recalls better traced to a lack of authority 

or rather to ineptitude and lack of resources. At present, it appears 

that the latter is more persuasive. Although I will not discount the 

possibility that improvement can be made in the statutes of conferring NHTSA its authority. 

Our discussion of NHTSA’s authorities and resources must not 

lose sight of what I believe to be malfeasance on the part of Toyota 

improperly addressing the problems that led to the recall of over 

8 million vehicles. To reauthorize NHTSA without a view towards 

compelling better behavior by automobile manufacturers would be 

a self-defeating exercise. 

Two weeks ago, my questioning of Mr. James Lentz, Toyota head 

of sales for North America, indicated that all of Toyota’s decisions 

relating to recalls are made in Tokyo. More disquieting is the fact 

that U.S. officials, the Secretary of Transportation, and the thenhead of NHTSA had to fly to Japan to persuade Toyota to initiate 

recalls in the United States. In brief, we must examine how best 


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to oblige automobile manufacturers selling vehicles in the United 

States to comply quickly and fully with our regulations and law. 

In closing, I suggest my colleagues bear these comments in mind 

as we begin what must be the first of many conversations about 

improving federal oversight of transportation safety. I further ask 

that these discussions and their resultant legislation will be bipartisan, collegial and subject to the regular order for these are the 

hallmarks of this committee’s best work over the years. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness. I thank our witnesses for appearing before us and I yield back the 58 seconds remaining to me. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his extraordinary 

kindness. 

It is the normal practice of this committee to swear in the witnesses, so would you stand and raise your right hand? 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. RUSH. Let the record reflect that the witness has responded 

in the affirmative. 

The Chair recognizes himself now for 5 minutes for questioning 

the witness. Oh, I am sorry. The Chair is getting ahead of himself. 

The Chair wants to recognize now the administrator, because he 

has certainly some opening statements, so the Chair recognizes the 

administrator for 5 minutes for the purposes of opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID L. STRICKLAND, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To be perfectly honest with you, my statement is not as important as the committee’s 

questions, so I can understand you wanting to hurry up and get to 

business. 

Mr. RUSH. A great beginning. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you so much for your kind words, all of 

you, and before I begin my formal remarks, I want to just take a 

second to acknowledge Mr. Braley and Ms. Schakowsky’s note 

about the human toll. We have a tremendous amount of death on 

today’s highways, and I am very happy to report some very good 

news, but 33,000 people is a tremendous amount of people to die, 

and one person is too many, and the personal toll that it takes on 

a family is absolutely catastrophic, and in my time that I served 

as a staffer on the Senate Commerce Committee, I have had the 

opportunity to spend time with countless victims including mothers 

and fathers who have killed their children in unfortunate back-over 

accidents and folks that have been disfigured and burned because 

of traffic accidents, because of defects, and you can never properly 

capture what this means to people, so I am fully aware of the responsibility that I have and that every day this agency has one 

goal. That is to keep people alive and safe on the road, and we can 

never do that job well enough. We just simply can’t. But that 

doesn’t mean that we can’t try, and we will continue to put forward 

maximum effort as we have to make sure that we accomplish the 

goals. But thank you so much for your observations and they are 

taken well to heart. 

Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Whitfield and members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 


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today to discuss the Department of Transportation’s vision for the 

future of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and 

its important safety programs. Transportation safety is the Department’s highest priority. NHTSA’s safety programs are an integral 

part of addressing that priority. Even before I was sworn in as administrator on January 4th, I knew NHTSA’s programs worked 

and they work well. We just released numbers that show a continuing dramatic reduction in the overall number of highway 

deaths. The Secretary this morning released a report that projects 

that traffic fatalities have declined for the 15th consecutive quarter 

and will be 33,963 in 2009, the lowest annual level since 1954, but 

we must do more. The loss of more than 33,000 people represents 

a serious public health problem to our Nation. We will not rest 

until that number is zero. 

So how do we get there? Highway safety is a complex problem, 

and NHTSA has built a broad spectrum of programs that address 

both behavioral and vehicle-related causes of highway deaths. The 

linchpin of all of our programs is good data, good science and careful engineering. 

When I was sworn in 2 months ago, I felt it was important to 

look at whether there was a need to improve NHTSA’s effectiveness in this era of the global marketplace and rapidly changing 

technologies. One of my first decisions was to question whether 

NHTSA is being well served by the four vehicle statutory authorities on which it relies to regulate. The reality is, is that while current authority does work and various constituencies have learned 

to work with them, they were written in the 1960s and the 1970s 

when the world and the automobile market were profoundly different. The question I pose and the questions I want to have is 

whether NHTSA’s statutory authorities accommodate the modern 

automobile, the modern competitive marketplace even. More importantly, do they allow us to regulate in a way that allows the industry to build and sell safe products that the consumer wants to 

drive? Do they allow us to promote safety, innovation and fuel efficiency while providing effective regulatory and enforcement oversight? I have asked our legal and program staff to take a look at 

our existing authorities to answer these questions and to make 

their best recommendations. 

I believe this self-assessment is critical and supports the President’s goals for transparency and accountability in government, 

and while we are taking a hard look at our authorities, I also commit to look at the current ethics rules. I believe the ethics standards set by this Administration are the highest ever established by 

any Administration, and I fully support Secretary LaHood’s desire 

to tighten and enforce these rules across the Department of Transportation. If there is any evidence of any violations of these rules, 

swift and appropriate action will be taken. 

The next question I ask of NHTSA is, do we have the programmatic expertise that we need to support our programs? 

NHTSA has a diverse and experienced workforce and we will take 

full advantage of their skills, talent and expertise. If as we go forward we find that we need to shore up our workforce in certain 

areas, we will recruit aggressively. We are currently requesting the 


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authority to hire 66 more people next year and will target these positions to meet our program needs. 

Well, at this point it appears that I am out of time and I will 

cut my remarks here, and I thank the committee for their time and 

their patience and I stand ready for questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Strickland follows:] 


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STATEMENT OF 

THE HONORABLE DAVID L. STRICKLAND 

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY 

TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

SUBCOMMITEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND 

CONSUMER PROTECTION 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

HEARING ON 

NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD 

March 11, 2010 

Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Whitfield, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

Transportation's vision for the future of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA) and its important safety programs. 

Safety is the Department's highest priority. NHTSA's safety programs are an integral part of 

addressing that priority. Over the last two years we have seen a dramatic reduction in the overall 

number of highway deaths. In 2008, we had the lowest highway fatality rate ever recorded and 

the lowest number of fatalities since 1961. Based on early projections, we expect to see similar 

reductions in 2009. Still, the loss of over 37,000 people in traffic-related crashes in a single year, 

as occurred in 2008, represents a serious public health problem to our nation. 

One of the first questions I asked when r became the Administrator ofNHTSA is whether our 

current statutory authority-drafted largely in the 1960s and 1970s-is sufficient to address the 

modern automobile and the global automotive marketplace. I have asked our legal and program 

staffs to take a very close look at the scope and effectiveness of those authorities and make 

recommendations about how they may be improved. r look forward to working with this 

committee on how NHTSA' s ability to perform its mission might be strengthened through 

legislation. 
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An Overview of NHTSA and its Mission 

NHTSA is not a large agency. We currently have 632 positions. The President's budget for 

fiscal year 2011 requests funds for an additional 66 positions to help strengthen our ability to 

address the enormous safety mission that this agency faces. 

2 

NHTSA's safety programs address both the behavioral and vehicle aspects of highway safety. 

Human behavior is by far the leading cause of highway crashes and deaths. This is why our 

programs place such a heavy emphasis on reducing drunk and drugged driving, encouraging seat 

belt use at all times, and underscoring the dangers of distracted driving. Secretary LaHood has 

sparked an important international dialogue on the subject of distracted driving, which we 

estimate contributes to about 6,000 deaths a year in the United States alone. Funding for the 

grant programs to states to conduct educational and enforcement efforts to address these 

behavioral problems is absolutely essential for the safety of drivers and their passengers. These 

progranls have demonstrated enormous successes over the years in driving down the number of 

deaths involving alcohol and driving up the percentages of vehicle occupants who wear seat 

belts. For example, in the years 2000 through 2009 the percentage of people who used seatbelts 

rose from 71 percent to 84 percent. We are just beginning our efforts on the distraction issue, but 

we believe an effective program to reduce distracted driving can also yield enormous safety 

benefits. 

Our vehicle safety program is also extremely important. Our research and rulemaking priorities 

are focused on finding the areas of highest risk where new or amended vehicle standards can 

make a significant impact on reducing the death toll on our nation's highways. NHTSA 

regulation of occupant crash protection has resulted in significant improvements in the 

crashworthiness of today' s vehicles. These standards have saved many thousands of lives and 

prevented countless injuries. NHTSA has also used its vehicle crash ratings to motivate vehicle 

manufacturers to voluntarily improve the safety of their vehicles above the federal standards. 

This New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), known generally as the government's 5-star safety 

rating program, has been an overwhelming success in driving improvements in vehicle safety. 

NHTSA was the first vehicle safety agency in the world to implement such a program. Today, 

these programs have been implemented around the world. 

Even though fatal crashes resulting from a vehicle problem are relatively rare by comparison to 

such crashes caused by human factors, we must do everything we can to find and eliminate those 

causes. Moreover, the emergence of crash avoidance technologies in vehicles offers significant 

promise for reducing crashes related to driver error. For example, electronic stability control, 

which is being rapidly phased into the new vehicle fleet, will be required by NHTSA in all new 

passenger vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2011. This technology will 
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significantly reduce fatalities that result from loss of control, including deadly rollover crashes. 

The agency estimates that when this technology is fully implemented into the fleet it could save 

up to 10,000 lives a year. Other technologies are now being developed and deployed into the 

fleet that also have the potential to reduce crashes, reduce injuries, and save lives. Technologies 

such as lane departure warning, forward collision warning, and crash imminent braking are now 

beginning to be offered in some new vehicles. One area we are looking at very closely is brake 

override, a system that ensures that a brake application will supersede a conflicting throttle 

application in certain circumstances. Manufacturers are equipping many of their vehicles with 

this feature, but there is not currently any standardization with regard to the conditions under 

which this feature will work or precisely how it will work. If our review indicates that requiring 

this feature could substantially reduce the most dangerous kinds of sudden acceleration, we will 

strongly consider a rulemaking to require it. 

3 

NHTSA's vehicle safety enforcement program has two major components: ensuring compliance 

with NHTSA standards and conducting defects investigations. The Office of Vehicle Safety 

Compliance tests new vehicles and equipment to determine whether they meet the applicable 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Manufacturers must certify that their 

products meet those standards. If the vehicles or equipment do not comply, manufacturers must 

recall them and provide a remedy to the consumer. 

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has a different mission. ODI searches through 

consumer complaints, manufacturer data, and other sources for information that might indicate a 

defect trend. Where it can find a possible defect trend, it investigates. If NHTSA can 

demonstrate that a defect exists and that it poses an unreasonable safety risk, the agency can 

order a recall. I will explain this process more fully below. 

NHTSA's Programs for Informing the Public of Safety Issues 

A central element ofNHTSA's mission is getting timely information to the public on highway 

safety issues. This requires collecting solid data in the first place. NHTSA's National Center 

for Statistics and Analysis is the assembler and primary analyst of our safety data. That office 

maintains several national data bases and produces detailed and prompt analyses of the data to 

support public educational efforts, rulemaking, research, and enforcement. 

In close collaboration with our program offices and data analysts, our communications office 

organizes and implements public awareness campaigns and paid advertising to support program 

efforts targeting the leading causes of crashes and encouraging use of the most important safety 

measures. These include the public campaigns to discourage drunk driving ("Over the Limit, 

Under Arrest") and to encourage seat belt use ("Click It or Ticket"). More recently, the agency 
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has mounted efforts related to distracted driving. We launched a government website--

www.distraction.lwv--with comprehensive information on distracted driving. 

4 

In the vehicle safety area, the agency issues safety advisories on some of the most important 

issues, including notable recalls. NHTSA's most well known program for providing vehicle 

safety information to the public is the NCAP program, which tests new vehicles and provides the 

results on a public website (v.ww.safercar.gov). These "star ratings" are known to many 

consumers and used by many manufacturers to emphasize their products' safety. The program 

has helped inform consumers and motivate manufacturers to continually improve various safety 

features. NHTSA will soon launch a revised NCAP program to help push manufacturers to a 

new level of safety. 

Important information on NHTSA's vehicle safety enforcement aetivities is also readily 

available to the public, also on www.safercar.gov. Consumers can find on the website 

information on recalls that might apply to their vehicles or vehicle equipment. In fact, over the 

last two years NHTSA has initiated a subscription service that allows consumers to sign up for 

immediate email alerts on recalls that affect their vehicles, child seats, or tires. Consumers who 

sign up do not have to rely on media reports or await official notification from the manufacturer 

to learn about recalls that may affect their safety. We are hoping that this new tool will help 

increase the percentage of consumers who have recall repairs done. We are concerned that many 

conswners ignore recall notices, leaving themselves and others unnecessarily exposed to safety 

risks. 

The website also contains information concerning all open and closed safety defect 

investigations. Consumers who experience what they believe are safety problems with their 

vehicles or vehicle equipment may write to us or file complaints on the website or through 

NHTSA's telephone hotline. We review every complaint and analyze available data constantly 

to identifY potential safety problems early. These complaints provide the most important data 

NHTSA's defect investigations staffhave for deciding what emerging problems may warrant 

investigation. NHTSA is considering ways of making the online complaint form more user 

friendly as a way of encouraging more people to provide us information. We are also looking for 

ways to enhance the program's outreach to the public to increase awareness of the defects 

investigation progranl and the complaint process. 

NHTSA's Defects Investigation and Recall Process 

As previously mentioned, NHTSA's vehicle safety enforcement program has two major 

elements: (1) ensuring compliance with the safety standards, and (2) investigating possible 

safety defects in vehicles and vehicle equipment. While the compliance program rests on a large 
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body of detailed standards (the FMVSS) developed over the last four decades, the defects 

investigation program rests on a single statutory standard, i.e., the presence of a defect that 

creates an "unreasonable risk" to safety. 

5 

Manufacturers have a duty to inform NHTSA of defects that create an unreasonable risk to safety 

and to then initiate a recall to remedy the defect. In many situations, however, the presence of a 

defect andlor its relationship to safety risk is not readily apparent. Where data suggest that a 

defect exists and it presents an unreasonable risk but manufacturers have not made such a 

determination and initiated a recall, it is up to NHTSA to determine whether a defect exists and 

demonstrate that the defect creates an unreasonable risk. 

NHTSA's defects investigation office, aD!, has a staff of 57 people. Of those, 14 people screen 

complaints and data for possible defect trends and 22 people actually conduct defect 

investigations. Their goal is to find possible defect trends that may indicate significant safety 

risks in particular makes, models, and model years; determine whether those trends create an 

unreasonable safety risk and are being caused by a defect that ODl can demonstrate; and, if so, 

persuade-or require--the manufacturer to conduct a recall. The remainder of the staff performs 

other important functions, such as tracking the hundreds of recalls that occur each year. That 

entails monitoring quarterly reports on completion rates, ensuring the scope of the recalls is 

correct, and compiling information on recalls for the public. 

The defects investigation process begins with the screening of incoming information for 

evidence of possible defect trends. Complaints from consnmers are the primary source of 

information. NHTSA receives over 30,000 complaints a year and reviews each one promptly. 

Although NHTSA staff make direct contact with some complainants to obtain additional 

information when it appears quite useful, they cannot contact every complainant. Screeners also 

look at technical service bulletins issued by manufacturers, reports of foreign recalls, and 

supplemental information such as occasional reports from insurance companies and information 

available on the Internet. Also, members of the public may file petitions asking NHTSA to 

investigate and order a recall on a particular matter. The agency carefully reviews each petition 

before making a decision on whether to grant or deny it. If granted, a fOlmal investigation is 

opened. 

Another important source of information is Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data submitted 

quarterly by manufacturers of vehicles, tires, and child seats. For light vehicle manufacturers, 

the data include counts of property damage claims, warranty reports, consumer complaints, and 

field reports. These aggregate data are broken down by make, model, and model year and by 

component category (e.g., steering, braking, engine, speed control). Manufacturers must also 

submit brief reports on each claim against the company for death or injury allegedly related to a 
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possible vehicle defect. The volume of the data received is enormous. NHTSA uses 

sophisticated data mining techniques to identify in the data any trends that may be evidence of 

safety defects. 

6 

Those who screen the EWR information and those who screen the other sources are in constant 

communication. When patterns emerge from any source, the screeners look very carefully at 

what may be behind the patterns. Where there is possible evidence of a defect trend, the 

screening staff recommends that the appropriate investigating division consider opening an 

investigation. ODI staff meets regularly to determine which recommendations warrant opening 

an investigation and which may warrant continued monitoring. Considerations in choosing what 

to investigate include the preliminary evidence on the frequency and severity of the problem and 

the available investigative resources. 

An investigation begins with a preliminary evaluation. This often entails detailed interviews 

with complainants, requesting relevant information from the manufacturer, and analysis to 

determine whether there is sufficient evidence either to seek a recall or continue to a more indepth investigation. The next stage is the engineering analysis, which involves gathering 

additional information from consumers and the manufacturer, perhaps some testing of vehicles 

or equipment or surveys of peer vehicle experience, and in-depth analysis of the underlying 

problem. 

If, at any stage, om staff believes they have enough information to demonstrate both a specific 

defect and that it creates an unreasonable risk to safety, they can then push the manufacturer to 

conduct a recall. Where the manufacturer resists, ODI management and NHTSA counsel confer 

to deternline the best course of action. If the agency decides it can meet its burden, it tells the 

manufacturer it expects a recall to occur. Where the manufacturer is not persuaded by NHTSA 

to undertake a recall voluntarily, NHTSA may issue an order requiring that the manufacturer 

conduct the recall. First, however, NHTSA must provide the manufacturer an opportunity for a 

hearing. Then, if the agency concludes that a recall should occur and issues an order, the 

manufacturer can resist the order. In that case, in order to prevail, NHTSA must go to court and 

prove that a defect exists and that it creates an unreasonable safety risk. All of this means that 

NHTSA must remain mindful of its burden of proving its case as it selects matters for 

investigation, completes the investigation, and moves to the formal process of requiring a recall. 

If om cannot establish that a safety-related defect exists, it must move on to other potential 

subjects for investigation. 

We believe the defects program has flllctioned extremely well over the years in identifying 

defects that create unreasonable risks and ensuring that recalls occur in those situations. The 

result has been thousands of recalls involving hundreds of millions of vehicles and items of 
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motor vehicle equipment (such as child seats), which have helped to protect millions of 

consumers from the safety hazards they might otherwise have faced. We take our responsibility 

to protect consumers very seriously and will continue to ensure that manufacturers fulfill their 

obligations to identify and remedy safety defects in vehicles and equipment. 

I hope my testimony has given the committee a useful overview of the breadth ofNHTSA's 

mission, its dedication to achievement of that mission, and the challenges that the agency faces. 

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions. 

7 
20 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair thanks the administrator, and the Chair 

recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

As has been stated, Mr. Administrator, our goal, the goal of this 

subcommittee as it relates to NHTSA is to look forward and to determine for ourselves what is the best way that we can assist 

NHTSA in its primary goal of protecting American citizens and 

American drivers. As I looked at this scenario of this Toyota incident as a framework, I wonder about the safety, the quality or the 

safety of the automobiles on America’s highways in general. The 

question I have is, what reason can you give the subcommittee that 

we should not think that the recent Toyota recall that it would not 

replay itself for any other automobile dealer that manufactures 

automobiles for America’s highways? Can you assure us that this 

Toyota recall is really just something that is an aberration as it relates to automobile safety? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that the Toyota 

recall, while wide ranging, is I think indicative of how NHTSA uses 

its authority in a way to get to the bottom of something. When the 

Secretary of Transportation took office, and at the time it was Acting Administrator Medford, they were observing certain issues with 

Toyota and they felt so strong about it that Mr. Medford went to 

Japan to inform Toyota that they did not feel that Toyota was holding up its obligations to inform and interact with NHTSA in a way 

to address safety concerns and recall concerns. That was the beginning. That effort began actually on December 15th. It was the day 

of my confirmation hearing, which is a good reason why the entire 

senior staff regarding defects was actually in Japan and not at my 

hearing. But better that they be there in Japan explaining to Toyota what they were doing wrong than sitting in a hearing room 

here in Washington, D.C. When I took office on January 4th, I was 

updated about these issues, and Toyota was at that point beginning 

to get the message. I again met with them personally for the first 

time on January 19th, and I learned about the sticky pedal situation, and they actually executed their stop sale on January 21st. 

That effort was because of the analysis of the NHTSA, the fast action of the career staff and the leadership of the Secretary of 

Transportation. So I don’t see Toyota as an indicative example of 

failure, I see it as NHTSA doing its job, and when our professionals 

use the data, make the case and go forward, we get the results that 

we need. So I think that Toyota in the wide-ranging recall that it 

executed, that is the type of response that frankly I would want as 

administrator and I think that this agency is expecting, and I 

would hope that in the future that other automakers would do the 

same in the same set of facts. 

Mr. RUSH. Can you give the subcommittee any assurances that 

the automobiles right now as far as NHTSA is concerned have a 

level of safety that is greater than what we have experienced with 

Toyota? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There are two parts of that answer. First, I will 

go back to the success that we just had regarding the current data. 

We have the lowest number of deaths we have had since we have 

been recording this data since 1954. NHTSA is succeeding in its 

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The second part of your question, do I feel that vehicles are generally safe or will be safe and we won’t have any other issue like 

Toyota, it is the automakers’ responsibility to warrant that their 

vehicles comply with the federal motor vehicle safety standards. 

That is their responsibility. We are not branding these cars safe. 

It is our job to enforce and to police the marketplace, which we will 

do. So as far as I am concerned, the automakers have to uphold 

their obligation to not only comply with our standards but basically 

the state of the art. It is my job to make sure that they hold to 

those standards and this agency will hold that line. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair’s time is up. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Whitfield for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, Mr. Strickland, thank you again for joining 

us this afternoon. As I said in my opening statement, I do think 

that the agency should be commended because the highways really 

are safer today than they have ever been from a statistical standpoint. You would agree with that, I am assuming? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, we have heard a lot—there have been a lot 

of articles written, a lot of testimony recently that NHTSA has not 

fulfilled its responsibility, NHTSA is a lapdog for the industry, not 

a watchdog for the industry, and so there has been a lot of criticism 

out there about the agency. And as the administrator, how would 

you respond to that in just a general way? Do you think that criticism is valid or not valid? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No, sir, it is not valid at all. We have been a 

very active agency since I have taken office. The agency has been 

very active since Secretary LaHood has taken office. And from my 

review of the work done, if we are talking about Toyota specifically, 

this agency opened eight separate investigations over the time period when there were complaints about sudden acceleration. A 

lapdog doesn’t open eight investigations. Now, the goal is for us 

and our statutory, you know, order is to find any vehicle safety defect that presents an unreasonable risk. Any time a complaint or 

any data or any anomaly in the number of complaints or what we 

see from the early warning system, our folks take a look at it, they 

go forward and they investigate. If we cannot find the defect, we 

cannot under the statute and force a mandatory recall, but that 

doesn’t mean that we think that vehicle is safe per se. At that 

point we cannot make the statutory case but we will keep looking, 

and as we have, we keep looking, and when we find a defect such 

as in the instance of the floor mat entrapment or the instance of 

sticky pedal or in the instance of the 2010 Prius brakes, we act and 

we act quickly. I don’t think that the history of our action in this 

area before I took office or in the 10-year period that a lot of people 

are looking at, I think that this agency has been quite active. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, if you find a defect, then you can require 

a mandatory recall. Is that correct? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir, we can. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And I have heard a lot of discussion about subpoena power, and it is my understanding that you can issue information requests. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. WHITFIELD. And do the manufacturers have to respond to 

that request? Is it—— 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There is a difference between a subpoena and 

an information request. I know a lot of people talk about we have 

subpoena power and yes, we can compel a subpoena for documents. 

We say we want every document you have on a question, and yes, 

they have to give that to us. Information requests, they also have 

to respond, but it has actually a better purpose. We not only get 

documents, we actually ask direct questions that they give us answers to. It is a much sharper tool and the agency uses that quite 

frequently. In fact, we sent three queries to Toyota, three large 

queries, regarding the timeliness of their submission of information 

to us regarding the floor mats and the sticky pedal, and we sent 

a large recall query asking Toyota for all their information and answer questions about all of sudden-acceleration incidents, which 

will be a large amount of documents and data for us to review. If 

we find in the review of those documents that there is a violation, 

we will move forward accordingly. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, have you found the lack of subpoena power 

a hindrance to the agency doing its job effectively? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. In my review of the work on Toyota, they have 

been able to—while Toyota has been slow in years past, I will say 

that they have not been as responsive as my career staff feel they 

should have been in responses. Since I have been in office, they 

have been very responsive, and I would hope that that would continue in the future. But in terms of our subpoena, our ability to get 

information requests issued and responded to, I have gotten no evidence that that has been a problem in terms of getting a response. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, I know most of your budget money goes to 

the States for grants and then the rest is spent basically between 

behavioral safety and vehicle safety. Is that correct? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And I know in 2005, Congress directed NHTSA 

to conduct a national motor vehicle crash causation survey, and at 

that time they came back and they said that 95 percent of crashes 

were due primarily to driver fault or negligence. Are you familiar 

with that study or do you have any thoughts on that? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I am tangentially familiar with it. I can’t give 

you song, chapter and verse about the study but I can talk sort of 

in more specifics about behavior. That is the largest component of 

risk on the highway, which is the reason why the NHTSA budget 

is designed to attack the highest risk. Impaired driving, not wearing belts, driving distracted, those are all the hugest risks for everyone on the road today. Vehicle defects are important. We have 

to address them. They are significant. But in terms of the overall 

risk profile for highway safety, the behavioral side of the house, so 

to speak, comprises the largest risk and that is the reason why our 

program for safety is designed the way it is. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. 

Mr. RUSH. The chairman emeritus is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank for your courtesy. 

My questions in view of the time shortage have to require yes or 

no answers. 


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Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, Mr. Dingell 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Administrator, do you believe that the NHTSA 

made mistakes in its response to the recent Toyota recalls? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. DINGELL. Should NHTSA have pushed Toyota to initiate recalls earlier than it did? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Sir, we pushed the recalls when we had the evidence of an unreasonable risk defect. 

Mr. DINGELL. But yes or no? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The answer is yes, we responded appropriately. 

Mr. DINGELL. OK. Thank you. What authorities does NHTSA 

lack whether under TREAD Act or otherwise with which to address 

defects in automobiles deemed hazardous to public safety? Please 

submit that answer for the record. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, yes or no, does NHTSA have in place a ranking system for determining the priority of defects investigations, 

yes or no? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The answer is no, but we rank risk by profile 

internally. There isn’t a one through ten. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. Now, there seems to be broad agreement about the need to increase resources available to NHTSA to 

carry out its mission. Do you need additional resources, yes or no? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The President’s budget gives us more resources, 

so—— 

Mr. DINGELL. Do you need more? 

Mr. STRICKLAND [continuing]. When the President’s budget is 

passed, we will have the resources we need. 

Mr. DINGELL. Please submit to us for the record how much more 

resources you need in what area. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. I want that submitted directly to the committee 

and not through OMB. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, in my questioning of James Lentz, Toyota’s 

chief of sales for North America, he revealed decisions to recall 

Toyota vehicles sold in North America are made in Japan. Do any 

other manufacturers require that your information for details or 

decisions made relative to recalls are made in any country outside 

this United States? Is Toyota unique in that, yes or no? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. It appears Toyota is unique, yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. It strikes me that this is a bad situation 

insofar as safety of the American people. Am I correct or wrong? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The system that Toyota uses could be much 

more efficient. 

Mr. DINGELL. By requiring them to have a response to be made 

in the United States by somebody empowered to comply with our 

laws. Is that right? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I would feel that if they had somebody in America to respond directly, we could act more quickly. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, I would appreciate it if you would submit to 

us for the record how this would be corrected. 


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Now, is there a quantitative difference in response times between 

domestic and foreign automobile manufacturers to NHTSA’s data 

inquiries, yes or no? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The domestic manufacturers tend to respond 

faster than the foreign, yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. What is the cause for this? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. There are several reasons in terms of design of 

leadership, as you mentioned, and other factors. 

Mr. DINGELL. In the case of Toyota, it is because the information 

has to be procured from Toyota instead of receiving it directly from 

here. Is that right? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That has been identified by Toyota itself as a 

problem. 

Mr. DINGELL. This is also true with regard to the question of recall? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DINGELL. The decision is made in Tokyo? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the data provided to NHTSA by domestic and foreign 

automobile manufacturers? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The quality is—because they are statutorily required, the quality of data is very similar between foreign and domestic. 

Mr. DINGELL. Similar? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Similar. 

Mr. DINGELL. That doesn’t it is the same. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. They have different data sets because of their 

manufacturing and information processes. They comply to our system so they are similar. 

Mr. DINGELL. All right. Now, why was it that the Secretary of 

Transportation and the acting head of NHTSA had to go to Tokyo 

to get cooperation of Toyota on recalls and production of information? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. They were responding to NHTSA and the acting administrator and the Secretary too slowly. 

Mr. DINGELL. But they had to go over there. Why did they have 

to go over there? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Because at the time, the Secretary and the acting administrator felt they needed to go directly to convey that 

message. 

Mr. DINGELL. So they had to convey that message because the 

message was to urge Toyota to comply more expeditiously with the 

safety concerns of the Department of Transportation? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. So they had to do it to get more expeditious cooperation from Toyota? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for 5 minutes for questioning. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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On September 1, 2009, proposed rules were put out dealing with 

the automatic reverse system in windows. Let me quote: ‘‘NHTSA 

proposes requiring automatic reversal systems, ARS, in those windows equipped with one-touch closing or express up operation.’’ In 

a letter March 10, 2010, sent to you, Mr. Strickland, Henry Waxman, Chairman Rush and myself point out that such windows generally already have auto reverse technology and are usually found 

in the driver’s window where children don’t sit, and the intention 

of the legislation of course was to protect children. But here is really the point I want to make that I find stunning is that you have 

a chart. This was alternative one of five alternatives that were proposed at that time. This is before your tenure. Alternative one is 

the one I described, and when it says on this chart cost per window 

for this remedy supposedly, it says zero dollars, total incremental 

cost near zero dollars, annual fatality benefits zero, annual injury 

benefits near zero. So the preferred alternative to protect children 

was a no-cost, no-benefit solution. I would have thought it embarrassing actually not only to put that in writing but to choose that 

as the preferred option. I would hope that nothing like that happens again. 

Let me describe alternative two, requiring auto reverse windows 

at all power side windows to meet ECE 21, which is European 

standards. The cost per window, $6, which I think most people 

would find reasonable, the total incremental cost, $149.4 million. 

Annual fatality benefits, two, annual injury benefits, 850. So two 

deaths and 850 injuries, which I think is a pretty modest projection, pretty conservative, could be saved. That was at 6 bucks a 

window. Again, I want to go back to those families that came talking about children who were choked by these windows. It has got 

to be maddening to them that this is something that could have 

been corrected for $6 and that that is the European Union standard, why isn’t it the standard here. So really my request is that we 

reject this alternative one, but how does that happen? Can we expect that it will not happen any more, that a no-cost, no-benefit solution will not be proposed? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. As you know, Representative Schakowsky, I 

can’t engage in a discussion about a rule that is currently being 

worked on by NHTSA, but I understand that we have received new 

data from a lot of constituencies including the folks that have 

worked very closely with you and other members on the Cameron 

Gulbransen Act and the agency is taking a very hard look at that 

data, and when the rule is finally promulgated, we hope that we 

will be— I know for a fact it will be based on sound data and sound 

science that will be the most efficacious of safety. So that is the one 

thing I can tell you. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, let me make a very strong recommendation that you don’t propose rules that have absolutely no effect 

when the Congress stated very clearly that we want to protect children, and I am sure you will agree with that, so I thank you very 

much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Representative. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. 

Braley, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. Strickland, in your opening statement that we received, the 

written statement, on page 1, third paragraph, you wrote, ‘‘One of 

the first questions I asked when I became the administrator of 

NHTSA is whether or our current statutory authority drafted 

largely in the 1960s and 1970s is sufficient to address the modern 

automobile and global automotive marketplace.’’ Have you answered that question? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That question is still being worked on by the 

staff. I have a great deal of experience in looking at consumer product safety statutes from my prior employ, and you have to be very 

careful in examining these things. We have to make sure that 

there is a lot in those statutes that are very functional and works 

well, and we want to look to improve upon a strong authority, and 

both my legal staff and my programmatic staff are undertaking 

that work right now. When we have completed that work, we will 

be happy and excited to share our thoughts with the committee 

and looking forward to working with you on a going forward basis. 

Mr. BRALEY. And I look forward to having that conversation, and 

let me get back to one of my earlier points about the legacy of the 

agency that you now head, because in your statement, you noted 

correctly that safety is the Department of Transportation’s highest 

priority, and you stand by that statement today? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Mr. BRALEY. And we know that the Office of Defect Investigation, 

often referred to by its acronym, ODI, is on the front line of defect 

investigation and prevention as part of the Department of Transportation. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. And Mr. Whitfield asked you a very appropriate 

question when he said you have mandatory recall power and you 

answered yes. Do you remember that? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. Can you explain to all of us then why your agency, 

NHTSA, has not initiated a recall since 1979? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Because you can often influence a recall by 

going through the initial stages of the process. Most times an automaker will not want to go through the full formal process. It takes 

approximately a year. It is a public process, and a lot of automakers, realizing they are facing public scrutiny of fighting a vehicle safety defect, and when they know that the agency can prove 

it, they will go forward and effectuate a voluntary recall. The universe is that most recalls are voluntary—all recalls since that period of time are voluntary but there is a huge number that are influenced by this agency and that is the actual we want you to look 

at, and we influence well over half of the recalls that happen ever 

year. So that is the real number, Mr. Braley. I think that is indicative of the power of ODI. We don’t have to get to a point where 

the administrator after a year of public hearings and show-cause 

hearings has to sign an order. Automakers will go forward and 

take care of that recall voluntarily from ODI’s work. 

Mr. BRALEY. Well, count me as skeptical that in a 31-year period 

there has not been an instance where automakers acted responsibly in every particular case responding to demand for recall of a 

product defect in a 31-year period. 


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One of the things that I also want to talk to you about is how 

you described the agency’s mission has changed in response to 

changes in the automotive industry. Do you remember that in your 

opening remarks? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I don’t think I will change it a change in mission but it is a change in how we have to approach the job because 

of the change in the marketplace. There was a time when America 

was the world’s leader in automotive manufacturing. We are no 

longer that leader. 

Mr. BRALEY. Well, I am talking about something different so I 

want to make sure you understand. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I apologize, Mr. Braley. 

Mr. BRALEY. When I was growing up, it was during the muscle 

car era where you could tear apart a Chevy large block engine in 

your basement and put it back together having a basic knowledge 

of the internal combustion engine. You cannot do that anymore. 

Would you concede that? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I agree, yes, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. And one of the things that came out during our earlier hearing was this concept of black-box technology that has crash 

data in it that is driven by complex computer codes, sometimes 

which the manufacturer is willing to share with your agency and 

sometimes manufacturers have been very reluctant to share that 

data or to provide an ability for your own employees to have the 

keys to the kingdom so that they can download and interpret that 

information independently. You would agree with that? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, sir, I agree. 

Mr. BRALEY. So one of the things that I am concerned about is 

our own internal committee report for this hearing suggests that 

your agency’s budget dedicated to vehicle safety has remained stagnant relatively over the past 10 years and that your resources are 

far below the resources that were available for this type of investigation than when the agency was at its height, and my concern 

is, based upon some of the testimony at the previous hearing, when 

you have a demand for computer engineers and electrical engineers 

and people who are not based on mechanical backgrounds, I am 

concerned that the level of funding and the staffing of personnel 

within your agency may not be adequate to meet the incredible demands of the changing technology of this automobile industry. 

Have you done an independent review since assuming responsibility to make your own independent judgment on whether or not 

that is a critical case we need to address? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I have a couple of responses to that, Mr. 

Braley. The work of ODI and the automotive engineers that do the 

work, they are some of the finest in the business in this country, 

and as the technology evolves, the experience of our investigators 

and our engineers also evolves. I can give you the quantum number 

of folks that we have on deck to do the job. We have 125 engineers 

in NHTSA. We have five electrical engineers. We have a software 

engineer. We have engineers that are based in our East Liberty, 

Ohio, facility. We have resources for consultants when we need additional expertise. My understanding from what I know from when 

I have taken office, there is not a notion that we don’t have the 


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proper expertise to handle today’s automobiles. I don’t think that 

is the case at all. 

However, recognizing that you can always buttress what you 

have, the President has provided us resources to hire 66 new people, which we will use to leverage our resources and to buttress 

and strengthen those folks, in addition to we will be looking at 

ways how we can do longitudinal studies and long-range studies on 

these complex systems, as the Secretary spoke about in the prior 

hearings. Is my confidence that we can handle the current marketplace with our expertise? Yes, we can. Can we be stronger in that 

area? Of course we can. 

Mr. BRALEY. Of the 62 employees you have identified that are in 

the President’s budget request, how many of those do you propose 

to allocate to ODI? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That is part of the process I am working with 

the career staff and with the Office of the Secretary to figure out 

what our resource needs will be in that area. I will be happy to 

come forward with that information when a decision is made. 

Mr. BRALEY. Can you also provide the committee with a breakdown of the people working at ODI with engineering degrees by 

their names, their job titles and what their particular expertise in 

terms of being a professional engineer is? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Braley. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I yield back. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair recognizes now the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Sutton, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RUSH. Ohio. I am sorry. 

Ms. SUTTON. I am close to Michigan but I am from Ohio. 

Mr. RUSH. I apologize. 

Ms. SUTTON. That is OK. 

Administrator Strickland, thank you for being here. I have a 

number of questions and they touch on different areas, so bear 

with me as we shift around. 

Beginning with the question of the black-box technology, we have 

heard a lot about when Secretary LaHood was here he indicated 

difficulty getting the information that is in those black boxes, that 

we don’t have the capacity, whether it is, as my colleague, Mr. 

Braley, described, that we don’t have keys to the kingdom, which 

is that information. But when I heard you answer Representative 

Dingell about having access to data, you said we have access to 

data in a similar way whether it is Toyota, who keeps information 

in Japan, and our domestic auto industry. But I was under the impression based on the last hearing that we actually could access information from our domestic auto manufacturers in a way that we 

can’t get from Toyota. So could you clarify for me? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I would be happy to clarify. I took from Mr. 

Dingell’s question about early warning reporting data, which is the 

quarterly data we receive from all automakers, which is a set template of data that we receive. There are some differences in how 

they collate and present it but we can understand all of that. That 

is what I thought he meant. 

In terms of event data recorders, you are absolutely right, Representative Sutton. Toyota has a proprietary system that up until 


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I guess a week or so ago there was only one tool in the country that 

could be used to read it and we did not have that tool. So if we 

ever wanted to get information from an event data recorder on a 

Toyota vehicle, it was very difficult. It is my understanding that 

Toyota has provided my ODI staff three of these tools to read their 

event data recorders. I am not sure of the status of whether we 

have received them all yet but that is my understanding, that Toyota has promised to us that they will provide those tools. So in 

terms of Mr. Dingell’s question, in terms of the set data that comes 

in to us quarterly from all automakers, yes, it is similar. On your 

question on event data recorders, yes, there is a difference between 

the Detroit automakers, which all use a commercially available tool 

and we have the ability to read it, versus Toyota, where we could 

not up until a week ago. 

Ms. SUTTON. And now that you have this equipment, that was 

the only hindrance to having access to the black boxes? You can get 

them? You can always get access? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. We can access it, Representative, but we still 

need a Toyota representative to help decode the data. It isn’t fully 

transparent, even when we download the box. So I still believe that 

we need Toyota representation to assist us in decoding what happened 5 seconds pre crash and 1 second post crash I believe is the 

data that is being included in those boxes. 

Ms. SUTTON. And is that something that they are required in any 

way to do or is that just a voluntary offer on their part? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. At this point we are undergoing rule. By 2012, 

if an automaker chooses to have an EDR on board, it has to comport with certain readability and data standards but they don’t 

have to have an electronic data recorder on board. It is not mandated. 

Ms. SUTTON. Well, that is interesting. We will have to follow that 

and see what the consequences intended and others are of that 

rulemaking. 

OK. With respect to what we have been reading, we have been 

reading in the Washington Post about the relationship between 

some of those who used to work at NHTSA and going over to work 

for some of the car companies, and in this moment, Toyota is in 

the headlines, and so the Post article mentioned that two former 

NHTSA defects investigators left the agency and immediately took 

jobs at Toyota managing federal defect investigations. Do you think 

that there is an apparent conflict of interest here? You know, we 

are charged, as Members of Congress, with ensuring that the public interest is always the key, and you can understand that people 

are more than a little concerned when they see sort of that cozy, 

quick turnover revolving door. Could you comment on that? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Certainly. I have two responses to that, Representative. No ethics laws were broken. You know, Mr. Santucci 

and Mr. Tinto, who are former employees of NHTSA, when they 

left their post employment, they were of the level of employee—everything that they did was fully compliant with the current federal 

laws regarding post-employment limitations. So no laws were broken. 

But I am not going to quibble with you on appearance. Perception is reality. And the Secretary was very clear in his statement 


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to this committee and to Oversight and Government Reform and to 

the Senate Commerce Committee on this issue. He is committed to 

strengthening the ethics requirements in the Department of Transportation. I fully support his efforts, and as far as I am concerned, 

I am going to hold every employee in NHTSA to the highest ethical 

standard as the Secretary holds everybody in DOT to the highest 

standard and frankly the Obama Administration has made it a 

focal point that this will be the most ethical Administration in history. So we are looking forward to working with you on a going forward basis in dealing and handling this issue of appearance and 

arms-length distance for employees of NHTSA and when they move 

into a post-employment situation. 

Ms. SUTTON. I appreciate that answer because the public trust 

is critically important in making sure that things are working as 

they should, and, Mr. Chairman, if I could just indulge in one last 

question. 

During the hearings that we have had in the past with representatives of Toyota and Secretary LaHood, we heard information about how recalls of vehicles had happened in other countries, 

and these recalls, you know, stemming from what appear to be 

problems that arose here in this country and led to eventual recalls 

after much tragedy had occurred. Is there anything that requires 

auto manufacturers to report to NHTSA problems beyond our borders with vehicles that are sold in this country? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Yes, there are a couple of requirements actually. They have to report to us foreign recalls that involve components used in United States vehicles and they have to also report 

foreign service campaigns in the vehicles. Now, the question is 

whether they did this timely. We definitely will investigate those 

issues. But we receive a lot of data from the early warning system 

and other obligations from the TREAD Act and we are definitely 

looking at other ways and other types of information that could be 

helpful to us in that mission and we are looking forward to working 

with the Congress and finding ways that we can buttress those 

abilities. 

Mr. RUSH. We see that Mr. Markey has joined the subcommittee. 

He is not a member of the committee, so the Chair seeks unanimous consent that Mr. Markey be allowed to ask questions of the 

witness, and hearing no objection, so ordered. Mr. Markey, you are 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your hospitality. 

As you know, the early warning system that I helped to create 

during the 2000 TREAD Act was intended to provide the Department of Transportation and the public with early information that 

auto manufacturers receive about safety-related complaints. But 

the Bush Administration issued a regulation that deemed almost 

all of the information automakers to be confidential business information. As a result, as far as the public is concerned about my provision back in 2000, the early warning system has become an early 

warning secret. I have a summary here of the public information 

contained in all of the early warnings submitted by Toyota in the 

last quarter of 2008. It tells you that there were seven reports of 

deaths or serious injuries due to speed control but that is all the 


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information you get. The public can’t learn whether those reports 

relate to sudden unintended acceleration. They can’t learn what 

happened and they can’t learn whether any consumers made complaints about similar problems that didn’t result in a serious injury 

or death. 

Do you agree that the public versions of early warning system 

data don’t really tell the public anything specific or useful about 

potential automobile safety problems? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Markey, the one thing I would like to start 

off with saying is that the NHTSA databases and the information 

we provide are some of the most transparent in government, and 

we have been noted by the federal government about our data 

sources that we provide. 

In terms of the early warning system, as far as the Obama Administration is concerned, as far as I am concerned as administrator, the more transparency we have, the better. I definitely 

would like to have a dialog with you about the early warning reporting system and your thoughts on how we can improve transparency going forward. 

Mr. MARKEY. Now, consumers can report safety complaints to 

NHTSA as well and these reports are made public. Does it make 

sense to you that when a consumer reports a safety problem directly to NHTSA, it goes into a publicly searchable database, but 

when a consumer not knowing that they could complain to NHTSA 

instead reports the safety problem to a car company, that it becomes confidential business information without a requirement 

that the public learn about it? Do you think that is right or do you 

think that that information should as well have to be made public 

because it is given to NHTSA as part of a public report? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. I clearly see that inconsistency. This Administration believes in transparency. I would happily talk to you on a 

going forward basis how we can make our databases more transparent. 

Mr. MARKEY. Do you think that information should be information that the public, me as an owner of a Toyota Camry, should I 

have had that information? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. That information should not be hidden, in my 

personal opinion. However, there are other things that should come 

into play and I would be happy to talk to you on a going forward 

basis. 

Mr. MARKEY. When President Clinton signed the Act into law, he 

directed the Department of Transportation to implement the early 

warning system in a manner that ensures maximum public availability of information. That clearly hasn’t happened. So my goal is 

to work with you, sir, in order to accomplish that goal. We thank 

you for taking this job, by the way. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. And we have enjoyed working with you over all the 

years, especially on the fuel economy standards and your work in 

the Senate. 

Let me ask if I may one final question. Although NHTSA can undertake a mandatory recall, doing so takes a great deal of time and 

can require you to go to court to prove the existence of a safety defect. There are times, however, when taking that long costs lives. 


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As you know, since you were the lead staffer in the Senate 2 years 

ago, Congress gave the Consumer Product Safety Commission the 

authority to quickly inform the public of an imminent product safety hazard, even though the formal recall process was complete. Do 

you think that sort of authority could help NHTSA more effectively 

protect and inform the public of serious safety problems, and will 

you work with us to develop such a provision? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. The imminent-hazard authority, Mr. Markey, is 

in several of our sister consumer safety agencies. The Federal Rail 

Administration, for example, has this authority and it has proven 

to be very helpful to them. I look forward to working with you and 

having a further discussion on this authority. It has proven very 

successful in other areas in consumer protection and it may bear 

fruit for NHTSA as well. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, and our country is very fortunate that 

you were willing to accept this position. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Markey. That is very kind. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair will ask the indulgence of the witness just 

for a few more minutes. The Chair will authorize a second series 

of questioning, and the Chair recognizes himself for 2 minutes. 

NHTSA’s budget for vehicle safety programs has been stagnant, 

as was mentioned earlier, for the past 10 years. From my perspective, this year’s budget request is down a few million dollars from 

the year before. ODI, which focuses its enforcement activities on 

new cars sold within the last 5 years, has a budget of less than $10 

million to police a fleet of 80 million vehicles, and according to the 

Chicago Public News, adds up to about 10 cents a car. The budget 

for rulemaking has suffered as well. It has delayed major rulemaking efforts to the point that Congress has been compelled to 

legislate mandates for rollover standards and for child safety. I 

know that there is an increase of about 66 new personnel but if you 

get more resources for your safety programs, where would you 

focus those increased resources? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, the safety mission is not simply in the ODI or the vehicle safety office. It is actually our entire mission. It is the behavioral side as well. And the 

President’s budget provides resources for us to accomplish our mission with the new resources for those personnel. We will take a 

hard look at those 66 personnel and deploy them at the places 

where we need not only to improve and strengthen the Office of Defects Investigation but in other places where we can also help further our safety mission in the most efficient way. 

In terms of resources overall, we have accomplished our mission 

with the resources we have had. The President has given us a 

budget that gives us more resources to do more and we will use 

that for the safety mission. 

Mr. RUSH. This Congress has to prepare a budget. The Congress 

has to approve a budget. Would you have any objections if we gave 

you more than a budget for 66 employees? 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Rush, the President’s budget helps us accomplish our mission. If the decision of the Congress is to provide 

us more resources, we will use them judiciously for the purposes 

of improving safety. 


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Mr. RUSH. Sounds like a good answer to me. 

Mr. Whitfield for 2 minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. I would just say, I don’t know how much more 

we have to give you, but thank you. 

Mr. RUSH. With that said, and seeing no more members seeking 

recognition, Mr. Administrator, you have done an excellent job. We 

thank you very much. And again, please forgive us but our duties 

have taken us away and so we weren’t able to be as prompt as we 

wanted to be beginning this hearing, so thank you for your patience. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. No, thank you, Mr. Rush. It has been an honor. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. RUSH. Thank you. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Whitfield, thank you. 

Mr. RUSH. The second panel will please be seated at the desk. 

The Chair thanks the second panel for your patience, and again, 

we want to reemphasize our apologies to you for our scheduling. It 

has been fairly horrendous and it has taken us away from our 

scheduled duties. And so please accept our sincere apologies. 

The Chair wants to introduce the witnesses now that comprise 

the second panel. On my left is Ms. Joan Claybrook. She is the 

former administrator for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and Ms. Claybrook, we want to welcome you here 

once again. Seated next to Ms. Claybrook is Ms. Ami Gadhia, and 

Ms. Gadhia is the safety policy counsel for the Consumers Union, 

and Ms. Gadhia, we want to welcome you also to this hearing. And 

lastly we want to not just recognize but we want to also say hello 

to our former colleague, who was a member of this House, a very 

able Member representing the State of Oklahoma for many years, 

a very bright and intelligent human being, the Hon. David McCurdy, who is the president and the CEO of the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers. Dave, it is good seeing you again and we 

welcome you again to this subcommittee hearing. 

Now we want to recognize for 5 minutes for the purposes of an 

opening statement the illustrious Ms. Joan Claybrook. 

STATEMENTS OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; AMI V. GADHIA, SAFETY POLICY COUNSEL, CONSUMERS UNION; AND DAVE MCCURDY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS 

STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am the last person to have required an auto company to do a 

recall, and that was 31 years ago, and I would like to say that 

when you do find a defect, the auto companies will often do a recall 

and you do not have to go to court. But sometimes you do have to 

go to court, and I think that there has been, and the Toyota case, 

I think, elaborates on this. I think there has been a misconception 

on what a defect is, and in the last case that was litigated by the 

Department of Transportation on this issue, the federal Court of 

Appeals made several important comments which I would just like 

to mention to you. This is not in my testimony. I hope my whole 


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testimony will be in the record. But I think that this is a very important issue. It has come up now several times in recent days. 

What the court said was, to find a defect within the meaning of 

the Act, the NHTSA must show that the vehicle itself is defective 

whether the defect manifests itself in performance, construction, 

components or materials of the automobile. In other words, it can 

be a performance defect and they do not have to show that there 

are five or 500 or 10,000 consumer complaints that have arisen, 

and often in fact those complaints are not allowed in court as evidence. So if the agency relies on it, then it is not going to have 

them find a successful result. 

Judge Leventhal, who was a Court of Appeals judge in a different case, said that a determination of a defect does not require 

any predicate of identifying engineering, metallurgical or manufacturing failures. A determination of a defect may be based exclusively on the performance record of a vehicle or component. 

Now, I think that this changes if you look at the Toyota case, 

and I know this is not just about Toyota but it is about the agency. 

It changes the way the agency should approach these defect investigations, and I do think that the agency has fallen into a trap, if 

you would, with the Toyota case and others, where it seems to be 

accepting the burden of having to define what the defect is in 

terms of the failure of performance. That is the responsibility of the 

manufacturer. The manufacturer put that vehicle together. They 

did the design drawings. They make the profit from it. And how 

this happens is their responsibility. If it has a failure in performance, the agency can find a defect and the company has to fix it 

and the company has to figure out what that fix is. That is what 

the courts have said, and I think it is very important to make that 

clear. 

My testimony that I submitted has seven points that I would like 

to just mention very briefly. One is that there has been a low priority on enforcement in the agency, a lack of resources, which you 

all have discussed, but there is another key issue which is that a 

court of appeals in the mid-1980s found that consumers did not 

have authority under the existing statute to sue if a defect was not 

found by the agency. In other words, if a case is closed, there is 

no authority of consumers to go to court. There is authority for consumers to go to court if a rulemaking decision is made that we 

don’t think is proper, and we in fact have gone to court at Public 

Citizen on many, many occasions and helped to make the statute 

work better because of the cases that we have brought. We have 

brought them on uniform tire quality grading, the tire monitoring 

system for the amount of inflation in the tire, on the early warning 

system, which was kept secret, totally secret. We at least got part 

of it revealed in two different lawsuits. So we can sue when there 

is a rulemaking issue. We cannot sue when there is a defect disclosed, and I think that changes the balance of thinking by the administrator. There is no fear that if they close a case that it is finished, and what the court there said in the court of appeals in the 

mid-1980s was that the agency had the discretion to figure it out 

according to their resources and so in every case that NHTSA 

closes, it says it closes it on the basis of resources. They just are 

mimicking the words of the court decision. But the fact is that we 


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should have that authority because we are not going to bring cases 

we don’t think we can win because that is a waste of our time and 

energy, and I think there ought to be a better balance of power because if the agency finds a defect, then the company gets a change 

to get its words and say what it thinks, and if we bring a case, they 

can intervene. 

Secondly, the agency has been engaged in excessive secrecy. The 

early warning system, which Mr. Markey talked about, is a good 

example, and as I said, we had to sue to make it available. We 

don’t even know how many times Toyota in the recent cases filed 

an early warning report to the agency and what it said and how 

many consumer complaints it had and how many warranty claims 

it had and how many field reports it had. All of that is secret. And 

if that were more open, then the public would have access to it and 

they could help the agency by letting them know when they had 

a problem, but their web page in addition is a mess, so if you went 

to the web page to try and figure out whether there have been 

early warning reports on the particular vehicle that you are driving 

that is not working right, you wouldn’t be able to figure it out. I 

wouldn’t be able to figure it out. 

The third point is that I think the penalties that the agency has 

authority to impose are insufficient. First, they should have the 

criminal authority for knowing and willful violation of the Act, 

which you put in the CPSC law most recently a year ago. It is in 

the FDA law. It is many of the sister agency laws. I think the same 

should be available for NHTSA. And in addition, the penalty for 

the civil penalty is $16.2 million, which is a flyspeck for companies 

like Toyota. They spend that much in half a day on their communications activities and staff. So we think that it ought to be $100 

million because that is something that they would pay attention to. 

Fourth, the agency is drastically underfunded. The total budget for the motor vehicle program for the whole United States is $132 

million in this agency. That is it. And it is not much above what 

it was when I was there just individual dollars, and in terms of inflation, it is way below. It has been drastically cut. By the way, 

those 66 new FTEs that were being discussed, it is actually only 

33 full-time ones. So that is not really 66. And in addition, they 

have allocated them. Twenty-three are for operations and research, 

eight for rulemaking, four of them for enforcement. So that is the 

tentative allocation. Now, they may be changing that and reconsidering it but that is what was in the budget. So the agency cannot 

handle the programs, the rulemaking programs which are critically 

important, as important certainly as the defect enforcement because of lack of capacity. 

Information gathering and the data systems are totally insufficient. They should have been funded at four or five times what 

they are now, given the design of these systems back when they 

were first created in the 1970s. I think that a key issue that has 

come up at this hearing to some extent is the black box. It is a voluntary standard. Voluntary standards don’t work as evidenced by 

the fact that Toyota, you know, its system is not even being made 

available and the deadline for compliance was supposed to be 2010. 

It was extended to 2012, so it is delayed. It is a 5-year lead-in for 

a voluntary standard, which is ridiculous. We think that the black 


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box ought to be mandatory and that the data, have a standardized 

downloading for the data so that the police don’t have to have 

seven different computers depending on if it is a General Motors 

car or Toyota or Nissan or Mercedes. They ought to have one 

standardized downloading system. And I think that a way that the 

agency could be drastically enhanced, it is very exciting, would be 

to have that black-box data when it is downloaded when a crash 

occurs, a serious crash, a tow-away crash or an airbag crash, to 

have that data go to NHTSA, have NHTSA set up a data system 

to receive it so that that can be the basis for their evaluation of 

defects and evaluation of safety standards, and the data would be 

voluminous and it would be fabulous and far more than what they 

have today, and it would be much less expensive. So I hope that 

the committee will consider that issue as well. 

The new safety standards should come out of some of the work 

that goes in the defects area. For example, for years NHTSA has 

tested cars and seat backs have failed when they hit them in the 

rear at 30 miles an hour and yet they have never issued a standard 

to upgrade that seat back. The very dangerous circumstance of seat 

back fails, you can’t control the car, and also many people become 

quadriplegic and paraplegic as a result. But in the Toyota case, I 

think a brake override standard and a new accelerator standard 

which was issued in 1973, it is not even electronic that is completely irrelevant to the current model should be done. 

And then finally, I believe that conflict-of-interest rules need to 

be strengthened as we have mentioned and I would mention that 

NHTSA has a test facility in Ohio but it is owned by Honda Motor 

Company. I created this back in the 1970s when it was owned by 

the State of Ohio. Now it is owned by Honda because they bought 

it. And I think that that should be changed. They should change 

their facility and there are some opportunities for doing that. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have several submissions 

for the record. I am sorry that I am slightly over on my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:] 


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Statement of Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public 

Citizen, and Former Administrator, National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration 

Concerning the Performance of the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration and Recommendations for Legislative 

Improvements 

Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 

Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U. S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 

March 11, 2010 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Joan Claybrook. I am a former 

Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and 

President Emeritus of Public Citizen, a national public interest organization. I appreciate 

the invitation to testify today on the performance and decisions ofNHTSA on motor 

vehicle safety issues and the opportunity to make recommendations for improvements. 

To start, let me say that one of the pleasures of working for or in association with 

NHTSA is the opportunity to support its clear mission of saving lives and reducing fuel 

use on the highway. The rewards of this work have kept many agency staff working 

there for years. Also, the statute creating the agency in 1966 with amendments over the 

years is strong and supports effective leadership. 

Yet NHTSA is the poor stepchild of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 

responsible for addressing 95 percent of the transportation-related deaths with only one 

percent of the DOT budget. This has severely hampered the agency's effectiveness. 

NHTSA has been viewed by the motor vehicle industry for years as a lapdog, not a watch 

dog. The agency is heavily dependent on the manufacturers it regulates to cooperate 

with the agency and supply information. While NHTSA sends defects investigation 

letters requiring response, for decades it has not sent a subpoena or letter requiring a 

sworn response under threat of criminal penalty. It has not asserted its hefty authority 

through demanding information from manufacturers, suppliers and dealers, through 

extensive defects testing at its Ohio facility, through hiring the best experts worldwide or 
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contacting consumer lawyers and their experts, or through alerting consumers to supply 

infonnation about their experiences on the road. Auto companies, including Toyota, treat 

the agency with contempt, failing to supply requested infonnation, delaying actions 

requested, arguing against reasonable agency proposals, attempting to mislead the 

agency, gloating when the agency backs off of proposed actions, and boasting about their 

influence over the agency. This is a sad state of affairs for a crucial, vitally important and 

potentially potent safety regulatory agency. NHTSA's new leadership must change the 

agency's perfonnance and results. 

This new leadership gives us great hope that a number of agency shortcomings to be 

tackled. And this hearing today is just what is needed to make sure that the agency is 

doing its job and has the capacity to do so. 

Today I will recommend seven types oflegislative and administrative remedies for the 

agency to be much more effective, to be a watchdog instead of a lapdog, and to save the 

lives it should be saving, as has been tragically highlighted by the Toyota cases. 

1. Low Priority for Enforcement. The agency leaders for too long have given low 

priority to its enforcement programs, and as a result, cases are opened and closed 

routinely \vith minimal investigation, there are no clear criteria by which the agency 

detennines is priorities in investigating cases, and the public must be able to seek judicial 

review of agency enforcement decisions as it can already for rulemaking final decisions. 

2. Agency Secrecy Makes Public Ovcrsight Difficult. There is little opportunity for 

public oversight because of excessive secrecy, including with the Early Warning Reports 

program created by the TREAD Act in 2000 under this Committee's auspices. The Early 

Warning program has not served the public need. 

3. Penalties are Insufficient to Deter Violations. TIle penalties in the law are 

insufficient to deter manufacturers from refusing or failing to admit their vehicles contain 

a defect and then recalling them 

4. Agency Resources Need to be Drastically Increased. The agency resources to 

handle the volume of vehicle defect problems each year are pitiful and they need to be 

drastically increased. 

5. Information Gathering and Data Systems are Insufficient. NHTSA's information 

gathering and data systems are woefully under-funded and inadequate for issuance of 

safety standards and enforcement. 

6. New Safety Standards Should Result from Investigations and Testing. The 

enforcement office should regularly recommend to the leadership new or upgraded safety 

standards based on findings from its investigations. 

7. Conflict of Interest Rules Need to be Strengthened. The agency needs to review 

its conflict of interest rules to detennine whether they need to be tightened based on the 
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issues raised with former NHTSA personnel leaving the agency to work for Toyota and 

other auto companies. 

Low Priority for Enforcement 

The standards and defect enforcement program at NHTSA is often a stepchild until a big 

case like Firestone or Toyota blows up and then a laser beam of attention is focused on it. 

But most of the time NHTSA administrators worry about setting standards for safety and 

fuel economy, and state grant in aid programs which dominate the agency's budget. 

An important tool for assuring keen oversight ofNHTSA enforcement decisions is the 

ability of outside parties to challenge them in court just as they can challenge final safety 

standards in court. The law needs to be amended to grant this authority. The statutes of 

many other agencies include such authority (Atomic Energy Act, The Clean Air Act, the 

Safety Drinking Water Act, the Endangered Species Act and more). It is clear that it is 

needed for the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act as well. I can testify from 

my own personal experience that the agency takes great care with issuance of safety rules 

because it knows it can be challenged in court. It should give the same premium 

consideration to enforcement actions. 

Reviewing tens of thousands of consumer defect complaints, gathering detailed 

information about a problem with particular make/model vehicles, asking the 

manufacturer for more specific information and analyzing all the data is a daily task for 

enforcement engineers and investigators to whom little attention is paid. The small size 

of the staff, the huge size of the manufacturers regulated, the imbalance not only of 

resources but of knowledge about particular problems between manufacturer and 

regulator, the pressure on NHTSA engineers to "get it right" or face the ire of supervisors 

and manufacturers, all combine to make agency staff very cautious and often secretive. 

But as the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General emphasized in a report 

on his audit ofNHTSA's defect investigation programs in 2004, the agency needs to 

"ensure consistency in recommending and opening defect investigations in order to 

ensure the highest priority cases are investigated." This means not only effective 

procedures but also regular reporting to and review by the Administrator to assure the 

agency is the government cop on the corporate beat. 

Over the years the defect program has become increasingly complex and hard for 

outsiders to fathom. To begin a defect review the agency used to conduct an engineering 

analysis, produce a public list each month of ongoing cases, and if warranted open an 

investigation with a press release. Then it added additional preliminary steps, didn't tell 

anyone, and stopped producing monthly lists of vehicles with potential defects being 

considered. Keeping this information secret means the public is not alerted so citizens 

can take measures to protect themselves, and it means they will not know to supply 

crucial information to the agency about their own vehicles. 
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NHTSA has tried in the past to limit recalls regionally (until challenged by consumer 

groups). In the case of the Lexus in 2007, NHTSA allowed an equipment recall for floor 

mat replacement without requiring vehicles to be brought in and inspected by dealers, 

saving Toyota $100 million according to a Toyota July 2009 power point presentation. 

Some companies (Toyota in October 2009) conduct a recall but in documents filed at 

NHTSA claim the problem is not a safety related defect. And the agency does not 

respond. The agency has the authority to review recall letters a company sends to 

consumers to be sure it truly alerts the recipient to the dangers and encourages them to 

get repairs made. Many letters, however, appear not to have been reviewed because they 

are designed to be so bland that the consumer is not likely to respond. This protects the 

manufacturer's liability and restrains costs. 

Also, the agency used to routinely ask companies to conduct voluntary recalls when the 

top engineering staff believed a safety defect was involved. Some companies agreed and 

others didn't. After OM raised a stink about such a request involving the CK pickup 

truck with dangerous side-saddle gas tanks in the 1990's, the agency created so-called 

peer review panels that include even legislative staff who have to sign off on such a 

request before it is made. These panels meet infrequently, delaying action. They should 

be abolished. The head ofthe Enforcement should have authority to approve of such 

requests. 

Another tactic the agency should not tolerate is a company substituting so-called "service 

campaigns" for full safety recall campaigns. This may be appropriate in very limited 

circumstances where there is no safety issue involved, but once one company does it the 

others all try to do so was well. 

Agency Secrecy Makes Public Oversight Difficult 

Over the years NHTSA has gotten more and more secretive. Often simple requests 

require the filing of a Freedom ofInformation Act (FOIA) letter which is more time 

consuming for the agency to process but which at least must be answered and can be 

challenged in court. Thus consumer organizations now routinely file FOIA requests 

instead of infonnal ones. All of that of course takes time and resource by the requesters 

and the governments. The Internet has helped the public get information about docket 

comments on rulemaking and about safety defect and enforcement final decisions. But 

more and more manufacturers are requesting confidentiality for information submitted, 

and too often the agency grants the requests. It also takes a long time to process some of 

the confidentiality requests. 

A major program the Congress intended to be public but NHTSA fought to keep secret is 

the Early Warning Report program information submitted quarterly by manufacturers by 

make and model and alleged defect when they learn of a death or injury. It took effect in 

2004. 

During debate on the TREAD Act, reported out of this committee in 2000, Chairman 

BillyTauzin and Representative Ed Markey had a colloquy on the House floor assuring 
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the early warning information would be public. In the signing statement for TREAD, 

President Bill Clinton said the information should be public. The NHTSA legislative 

counsel John Womak wrote a memo after the law was enacted stating the infonnation 

would be kept public. The first rulemaking notices indicated thc information would be 

public. But guess what? In a jujitsu move, the agency amended its confidentiality rule 

and decided the carly warning notices from manufacturers would be secret: 

Public Citizen had to sue twice to get only some of the information. The public now has 

access to the make, model, alleged defect and the number of death and injuries. But still 

kept secret by NHTSA arc the number of warranty ctaims, the number of consumer 

complaints, and the number of field reports about that make/model vehicle and alleged 

defect. Not even required to be reported are the number of law suits filed on that vehicle. 

NHTSA says such information is confidential business information. Yet for years it has 

released such information on particular make/model vehictes in final reports on safety 

defect investigations. Recommendation: All of the early warning information should be 

made public. 

As the Toyota cases make ctear, even excellent letters or defect investigation pctitions 

from consumers that cause the agency to take a look at an issue can be dismissed by 

NHTSA, but without the early warning information the public carmot weigh in and be 

effective advocates in response. We still don't know whether Toyota filed early warning 

reports on the vehictes NHTSA initially reviewed for sudden acceleration following 

receipt of letters and petitions, or whether they were filed (as they should have been) 

before the Toyota recall announcements on a variety ofvchicles for sudden acceleration. 

In addition, NHTSA has kept secret infornlation about what early warning reports prompt 

the agency to initiate informal investigations or inquiries. They simply are not made 

public like other agency defect investigations. There is no reason for this secrecy and all 

of them should be made public. 

The DOT Inspector General in its 2004 report criticized the agency for its many mistakes 

in creation of a computer program to manage the early warning reporting that cost the 

agency $9.4 million through 2004 and another $11.5 million to operate and maintain 

from 2005 through 2009. The computer program is called ARTEMIS. As the Inspector 

General reported, "ARTEMIS (Advanced Retrieval(Tire Equipment, Motor Vehicles) 

Information System) cannot perform more advanced trend and predictive analyses that 

were originally envisioned as being needed to identify defects warranting 

investigation .... " If this program is not helping identify potential defects, what criteria 

does the agency use to do so? This question needs to be answered. 

Further, the NHTSA web page on early warning is almost impossible to use, particularly 

for a consumer. Whatever the reason, it needs to be made user friendly with easy 

summaries by type ofvehic1e and type of alleged defect. Let's finally administer this 

program as Congress originally intended to not only help the agency do its job but to save 

lives as well. 
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Penalties Are Insufficient to Deter Violations 

The current penalties under the NHTSA statute are primarily civil. However, there is a 

useless criminal provision that should be rewritten. Under the TREAD Act, which added 

section 30170 to Title 49, violations that include falsifying or withholding information 

with the specific intent of misleading the Secretary of Transportation with respect to 

motor vehicle or equipment safety related defects that have caused death or serious injury 

are subject to a fine under IS U.S.C 1001, the government wide criminal law, and/or up 

to 15 years in jail, except it contains a safe harbor provision under which criminal 

penalties do not apply if the person did not know the violation would result in an accident 

causing death or serious injury and the person corrects any improper reports. 

This section too narrow and fails to cover elements of the NHTSA law other than defects. 

But the safe harbor provision also essentially negates the criminal penalty and raises the 

question about whether ISU.S.C. 1001, which does not have the safe harbor, could 

separately be applied. This section should be rewritten to apply criminal penalties for 

any knowing and willful violation of the NHTSA statute, similar to the provision this 

Committee wrote in 200S for the Consumer Product Safety Commission Act (CPSA). 

The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act has contained criminal penalties for years. Its office 

of Criminal Investigations has a $41 million budget. It's amazing that NHTSA does not 

have authority to impose criminal penalties given that an individual negligent driver can 

be prosecuted for vehicular homicide for killing one person. 

Civil penalties with a maximum of $16.4 million dollars apply to all other NHTSA 

statutory violations. This is hardly enough to influence the decisions of multinational 

motor vehicle manufacturers. The TREAD Act increased NHTSA's maximum civil 

penalty from $1 million to $15 million (increased to $16.4 for inflation). Unfortunately 

NHTSA lax leadership is revealed by its failure to impose even the penalties is currently 

is authorized. The agency did not impose any penalties from 2004 to 200S and the 

maximum penalty it has imposed is $1 million dollars! 

The law should be amended to remove any maximum civil penalty and increase the 

current $5000 per violation penalty to $25,000 as in the EPA law. By comparison, one 

defense contractor, BAE Systems, was recently fined $400 million in a decades old case, 

for misleading the Defense and State Departments about compliance with the Foreign 

Corrupt Practices Act. 

Increasing these penalties for violations of the Act will deter manufacturers from failing 

to obey the law and reduce the load on NHTSA that too often finds itself"urging" 

manufacturers to comply. 

NHTSA's Resources Need to be Drastically Increased 
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NHTSA is the poor stepdaughter in DOT. It is responsible for addressing 95 percent of 

transportation-related deaths but has only 1 percent of the DOT budget. 

Its motor vehicle safety budget is $132 million for FY 2011. This is totally insufficient 

to conduct research and prepare regulatory analyses for issuance of complex motor 

vehicle safety standards, test sufficient numbers of vehicles to assure their compliance 

with agency vehicle safety standards, carry out the New Car Assessment Program under 

which new cars are crash tested and the information listed on the price stickers of new 

cars in the show room and also published on NHTSA's web page, review and evaluate 

tens of thousands of consumer complaints, manage the Early Warning Reporting 

program, investigate vehicle safety defects require recalls. 

For FY 2011, NHTSA's motor vehicle program request is $5 million less than Congress 

enacted for FY 2010. By comparison, grants to the states total $620 million, an increase 

of $14 million over FY 2010. An additional $117 million is allocated for highway safety 

research. These two programs total 84 percent ofNHTSA's budget. The motor vehicle 

program accounts for only 15 percent. 

The motor vehicle safety budget should be increased by $100 million dollars. It has been 

declining for years and has crippled this important agency as the Toyota case reveals. 

The Office of Defects Investigation has only 57 employees and 18 investigators. It lacks 

crucial electronics and software expertise needed to oversee today's vehicles. Not only is 

there a gross imbalance in resources between NHTSA and any company whose vehicle is 

being investigated, there is an imbalance in knowledge and expertise which is 

exacerbated by lack of funding. As a result, in addition to being ill-equipped to conduct 

thorough investigations of Toyota's sudden acceleration defects, it regularly closed 

promising inquiries after Toyota refused to acknowledge any defect. This type of agency 

failure must be changed. And adequate resources for NHTSA is one of the key to that 

change. 

Information Gathering and Data Systems are Insufficient 

NHTSA's databases are woefully under funded and inadequate for standards setting and 

enforcement. The original intent of the National Accident Sampling System (NASS) was 

to conduct about 20,000 accident investigations a year. It now conducts only about 4,000 

at a cost of about $12 million annually, with thc result it is unable to identify key 

problems from its data. 

In addition to the fatality data system (a census of all motor vehicle fatalities occurring 

each year) and NASS that need vastly increased funding, there is a potential vast new 

source of data the agency has not attempted to tap that could be readily available. That is 

the data from Event Data Recorders, or black boxes, now in most motor vehicles that 

record data when a crash occurs. But there are great variations in the existing systems 

which would make creation of a data base impossible. 
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NHTSA issued a voluntary standard in 2007 that takes effect in 2012. It requires a 

minimal about of data to be captured in a crash. But it is totally insufficient and should 

be rewritten. The data collected under a mandatory standard should include all 

important crash data and could form the basis for a new NHTSA data base from real 

world crashes-a very exciting prospect. It would also have to require a single, uniform 

interface system for downloading the data (now each company's system has a different 

downloading method causing great confusion) so that the police would need only one 

computer to do so. Also the standard should include protections against exposure to fire, 

water submersion, and tampering, and prohibit on/off switches. It must also include 

enhanced recording of rollover crashes (currently only one event is recorded when 

multiple air bags deploy) and rollovers usually involve 2 or more rolls. 

I cannot emphasize enough the potential treasure trove of safety information 

inexpensively collected to significantly enhance NHTSA's analytical capacity. NHTSA 

should be required to issue a mandatory safety standard and to establish a public 

repository/database for EDR case data with personal identification information removed, 

and state and local authorities should be required to routinely collect EDR data in all 

fatal, injury and tow-away crashes and forward it electronically to the NHTSA database. 

The event data recorders are also an issue in the Toyota cases. Toyota, unlike U.S. 

manufacturers, has made it almost impossible to secure black box intormation. It has not 

made available any downloading systems, saying the one it had in the U.S. was a 

prototype. To the best of my knowledge, Toyota has not made available to NHTSA any 

black box information about its vehicles involved in sudden acceleration crashes, making 

it more difficult for the agency to do its job. In the midst of the storm over Toyota's 

posture on the sudden acceleration recalls, the company announced it was delivering 

three computers to download the black box information to NHTSA and that 100 systems 

would be available for commercial application in April. However, it is very likely that 

the data collected by the Toyota systems is minimal given the company's penchant for 

secrecy. 

New Safety Standards Should Result from Investigations and Testing 

In the course of conducting safety enforcement and consumer information New Car 

Assessment crash tests and defect investigations, agency staff often learns about vehicle 

failures that can be corrected with new safety standards. It appears that such information 

is not effectively transmitted to the safety standards section of the Agency or that it is not 

treated seriously ifit is transmitted. For example, front seat backs have failed in a 

number of agency rear impact crash tests, yet a safety standard to prevent such failures 

has never been issued. 

Likewise, the Toyota cases bring to light a number of safety standards that should be 

upgraded or issued. The accelerator standard was issued in 1973, years before 

electronic throttles were installed but which are now common in all motor vehicles. This 

standard needs to be seriously upgraded to address electronic accelerators. 
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The brake override system that has been prominently mentioned in the Toyota floor mat 

recall is another needed standard given the prevalence today of electronic throttles. 

Toyota said it is installing the brake override in many of these vehicles when they are 

brought in for the floor mat fix. NHTSA should issue a safety standard as rapidly as 

possible to assure the service brake overrides inputs to the accelerator control systems. 

Another issue raised by the Toyota cases is the need for standardization of ignition 

shut-off systems. Reports of tragic Toyota sudden unintended acceleration cases have 

revealed the difficulty for drivers in shutting offthe engine. NHTSA should require 

standardization depending on whether the shut-off mode uses a traditional key, 

instrument panel button or switch, or an electronic key fob. 

In addition, the Toyota case reveals the need for a safety standard for motor vehicle 

electronics, given that many safety-critical systems for vehicle operation and control are 

now electronic. NHTSA should set minimum safety standards for electronic systems 

and for protection of those systems from electromagnetic interference (EMI). 

There are of course other safety standards NHTSA should address but these are key ones 

that have been given prominence by the Toyota recalls. 

Conflict ofInterest and Ethics Rules Need to be Tightened 

While neither NHTSA nor DOT usually set ethics rules that are different from the 

government-wide rules, we urge the Secretary of Transportation to consider the need to 

impose tougher standards and stricter scrutiny for the agencies that protect the public 

safety, particularly in light of the two Toyota employees who carne to the company from 

NHTSA as well as the large number of high level NHTSAfDOT staff who now work 

directly for the auto industry. In particular, the focus should be on engineering staff that 

can move immediately from the agency to a regulated company as long as they don't 

work on any matter they handled at the agency It should also consider a cooling-off 

period longer than two years for senior agency or department personnel leaving to 

represent the auto industry. 

I would also note that NHTSA rents space at a crash testing now owned by Honda Motor 

Company. It originally was owned by the State of Ohio when I established our testing 

work at the facility. It is now time to avoid the conflicts inherent in this arrangement and 

find new facilities that are not involved with regulated companies. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for the opportunity to testify on 

these important matters today. 
46 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair by unanimous consent will accept the extraneous material and your full statement into the record. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. RUSH. Ms. Gadhia, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF AMI V. GADHIA 

Ms. GADHIA. Thank you. Chairman Rush, Ranking Member 

Whitfield and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the road ahead for NHTSA. I am Ami 

Gadhia, policy counsel with Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports. 

The recent Toyota recalls involving sudden, unintended acceleration have focused national attention on safety problems. Consumers Union believes that addressing this formidable challenge 

demands a coordinated effort by the government, automakers, the 

public and independent consumer groups such as our own. We recommend the following government actions to improve our auto 

safety net. 

Consumers Union believes government regulators could have 

moved more aggressively to pursue sudden, unintended acceleration and to protect consumer safety. Various news reports and our 

own analysis of documents from the investment point to a pattern 

of missed opportunities. NHTSA and Toyota were aware of unintended-acceleration complaints involving Toyota models as early as 

2003 when the agency received a petition to investigate the problem. We are pleased that NHTSA is now looking into potential electronics issues behind the events involving Toyotas and we eagerly 

await the agency’s findings. However, we believe that NHTSA can 

take actions now to improve safety. 

First, we would like to see improved public access to safety information. NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigations collects complaints and data about autos from the public and manufacturers in 

two separate databases: the consumer complaints database and the 

agency’s early warning reporting system. They both have limitations, and the data they provide are not integrated, making it more 

difficult for investigators to spot issues and for consumers to find 

information. Consumers shouldn’t have to visit different sites to see 

all of this information or be forced to search it using tools that are 

less than user-friendly. All complaint information should be visible 

by a single easy-to-use consumer-facing site. NHTSA should also 

initiate a program to raise public awareness and invite more drivers to participate in data gathering. The more public complaints 

there are to analyze, the greater the change that problems such as 

unintended acceleration will be identified at an early stage. 

Second, NHTSA should promulgate certain safety regulations to 

prevent unintended acceleration in all automobiles. They should require that cars be able to stop within a reasonable distance with 

a sustained press on the brake pedal even when the throttle is fully 

open. One method to reduce stopping distances is smart throttle 

technology that allows the brakes to override the throttle. Other 

methods may also become available. To us, the most important 

safety feature is to ensure that a vehicle can stop within a reasonable and safe distance. NHTSA should require simple standard 

controls that can easily turn off the engine in an emergency. In 


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many current Toyota vehicles, when the car is moving, it requires 

a sustained 3-second push of the button to turn off the engine. 

Though that is a safety precaution to prevent accidental engine 

shutoff, it is an action many owners may not be able to do in a 

panic situation. Ignition controls should be easy to operate, especially in an emergency. 

NHTSA should require intuitive, clearly labeled transmission 

shifters in all cars. If your car is accelerating out of control, hitting 

the brakes and shifting into neutral is your best strategy but you 

want to know where neutral is when you are panicking. There 

should be consistency for shifters across all vehicles. NHTSA 

should also require a minimum distance between the gas pedal and 

the floorboard. Floor mats that entrap pedals have been a major 

focus in recent recalls but people frequently use thick mats or illfitting mats or stack the mats on top of each other. NHTSA should 

ensure that there is sufficient clearance between the pedal and the 

floor mat. 

We also think that NHTSA’s cap on civil penalties should be lifted to act as a deterrent against future violations and that NHTSA 

could improve the recall compliance process. The average consumer 

response rate to vehicles is 74.1 percent. Currently, manufacturers 

notify dealers about recalls and the dealers in turn notify car manufacturers once the cars are repaired in response to a safety recall. 

Consumers Union suggests that going forward car manufacturers 

submit such data to NHTSA. This information, which manufacturers already have, should include individual vehicle identification 

numbers, or VINs, of cars that are subject to a particular recall as 

well as when the recall repairs were performed on the vehicles. 

NHTSA would then be able to match up safety recalls with the 

manufacturer-provided VIN in a consumer-friend searchable database. We would further encourage States to consider linking safety 

recall compliance with the ability to obtain a vehicle registration 

similar to the way consumers must show proof of insurance to register their cars now. This would help people who purchase used 

cars to know whether recall repairs have been made. 

We also recommend that Congress take a look at the reports of 

a revolving door at NHTSA and whether this may have impacted 

safety decisions. We are pleased to hear today the administrator’s 

comment that NHTSA will be looking into this particular issue. 

Finally, we urge Congress to adequately fund NHTSA. In 2007, 

motor vehicle crashes accounted for 99 percent of all transportation-related injuries and fatalities yet NHTSA’s budget currently 

amounts to just over 1 percent of the overall DOT budget. The 

agency’s budgeting and staffing for auto safety and consumer protection functions should be commensurate with the realities of traffic safety. 

Consumers Union thanks the committee for the opportunity to 

present its recommendations as you move forward. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gadhia follows:] 


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Consumers Union 

Statement of 

Ami V. Gadhia 

Policy Counsel 

Consumers Union 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection 

of the House Energy and Commerce Committee 

"NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead" 

March 11,2010 
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Chainnan Rush, Ranking Member Whitfield, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify on the road ahead for the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA), I am Ami Gadhia, Policy Counsel with Consumers Union (CU), the 

non-profit publisher of Consumer Reports®. 1 

The recent Toyota recalls involving sudden unintended acceleration have focused national 

attention on safety problems that are infrequent, but potentially fatal. Much of the ongoing debate 

and public outcry has centered on why these issues weren't caught or properly acted upon earlier. 

But while the U.S. has arguably the best automotive safety net in the world, these types of problems 

can be hard to catch and difficult to diagnose - in this case, with deadly consequences. 

Consumers Union believes that addressing this formidable challenge demands a coordinated 

effort hy the government, automakers, the public and independent consumer groups such as our 

own. 

Below are recommendations that we would like to see implemented to improve our autosafety system. 

I. What the Government Can Do 

The government is at the center of the nation's auto-safety net and is one of the keys to 

catching new problems as early as possible. 

Even given difficulties in identifying and diagnosing an issue like unintended acceleration, 

Consumers Union believes government regulators should have moved aggressively to pursue the 

I Consumers Union of United States, Inc .• publisher of Consumer Reports®, is a nonprofit membership organization 

chartered in 1936 to provide consumers with infonnation, education, and counsel about goods, services. health and 

personal finance. Consumers Union's publications and services have a combined paid circulation of approximately 8.3 

million. These publications regularly carry articles on Consumers Union's own product testing; on health, product 

safety, and marketplace economics; and on legislative, judicial, and regulatory actions that affect consumer welfare. 

Consumers Union's income is solely derived from the sale of Consumer Reports®, its other publications and services, 

fees, noncommercial contributions and grants. Consumers Union's publications and services carry no outside 

advertising and receive no commercial support. 
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issue and protect consumers' safety. Yet various news reports" and our own analysis of documents 

from the investigation point to a pattern of missed opportunities. NHTSA and Toyota were aware of 

unintended acceleration complaints involving Toyota models as early as 2003, when the agency 

received a petition to investigate the problem. It took almost seven years for this safety issue to be 

more fully addressed with the current recalls of more than 7 million Toyotas. Consumers Union 

believes government regulators must be better prepared to spot and fully address similar safety 

issues going forward. We are pleased that NHTSA is now looking into potential electronics issues 

behind the sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) events involving Toyotas, and we look forward to 

the agency's findings. 

Our recommendations iuclude: 

• Improve public access to safety information: NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation 

(ODI) collects complaints and data about autos from the public and manufacturers in two separate 

databases: the consumer complaints database and the agency's Early Warning Reporting (EWR) 

system. But both have limitations and the data they provide are not integrated, making it more 

difficult for investigators tq spot issues and consumers to find information. 

Public access to this information should be dramatically improved. Consumers shouldn't 

have to visit different site sections to see all of this information, or be forced to search it using tools 

that are less than user-friendly. All complaint information should be visible via a single consumerfacing site. And this service must include intuitive tools that allow users to easily find information 

for particular models and compare vehicle safety records. 

2 See "Secretive Culture Led Toyota Astray," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 2010, 

hnp:'onlinc.\\sj.coll1 article·SB I (100 1-!2-!05274870-l8::'090-l575055733096312::'38.html; and see "Safety Agency 

Scrutinized As Toyota Recall Grows," Nell' York Times, Feb. 9, 2010, 

Imp:', \\"\\'w.nytimes.com '~O! 0,'02 'I 0 business' I Osafcty .htm!. 

2 
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We also recommend that NHTSA initiate a program to raise public awareness and invite more 

drivers to participate in data gathering. We believe many safety problems are not reported to 

NHTSA and that public participation in the complaints program clearly needs to be encouraged. 

Dealers should also be asked to contribute by educating new owners about the complaints program, 

and encouraging them to report problems. The more public complaints there are to analyze, the 

greater the chance that problems such as unintended aeceleration will be identified at an early stage. 

• Mandate specific safety changes in new cars: NHTSA should promulgate the following 

safety regulations to prevent sudden unintended acceleration in all automobiles: 

> Require cars to be able to stop within a reasonable distance, even with the 

throttle fully open. A sustained press on the brake pedal should allow the car to stop 

in a reasonable distance, even if the throttle is wide open. One method to reduce 

stopping distances is "smart throttle" technology that allows the brakes to override 

the throttle. But other methods may be appropriate. To us, the most important safety 

feature is to ensure that a vehicle can stop within a reasonable and safe distance to be 

determined by NHTSA. 

> Require simple, standard controls that can easily turn off the engine in an 

emergency. In many current Toyota vehicles. for instance, the engine is shut off 

with a single press of the button when parked, but when the car is moving it requires 

a sustained three-second push. Though that is a safety precaution to prevent 

accidental engine shut-off, it is an action many owners may not know and --

particularly in a panicked situation -- may be unable to do. Recently, Toyota 

announced that it will change how its start-stop ignition button operates to improve 

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ease of use. 3 Ignition controls including push buttons should provide immediately 

intuitive operation in the event of an emergency. 

;.. Mandate intuitive, clearly labeled transmission sbifters in all new cars. If your 

car is accelerating out of control, hitting the brakes and shifting into Neutral is your 

best strategy. The advent of gated and electronic shifters can make finding Neutral 

difficult if the driver is in a panic. Shifters should be designed so that a driver can 

quickly identify the Neutral position and easily shift gears to regain control. 

;.. Require a minimnm distance between the gas pedal and the floorboard. Floor 

mats that entrapped throttle pedals have been a major focus in recent recalls. People 

frequently use thick all-weather floor-mats, ill-fitting mats, or stack one mat atop the 

other. Simply allowing for sufficient clearance benveen the pedal and the floor mat, 

no matter what position the pedal is in, will reduce the risk of pedal entrapment. 

• Remove NHTSA's cap on civil penalties: NHTSA has the authority to seek civil penalties 

from automakers and suppliers for a variety of violations. If agency officials determine that a 

company violated such statutory obligations, the company can be fined up to a maximum of$16.4 

million in civil penalties. This amount might be considered by a large, multi-billion dollar 

manufacturer as just the "cost of doing business." We recommend removing this cap on civil 

penalties to act as a deterrent for future violations of the law. 

• Improve the recall compliance process: According to NHTSA, the average consumer 

response rate to vehicle recalls is 74.1 percent. We are also concerned that when consumers 

purchase used cars, they may have no way of knowing whether the vehicle has had all recall-related 

repairs performed. Further complicating the process, not every model year of a particular vehicle is 

subject to recall; sometimes, only a range of vehicle identification numbers (VINs) is recalled. For 

3 See "Toyota to Redesign Start-Stop Buttons to Improve Safety," http://bIogs.consumerreports.orgicars/201O/02/toyotato-redesign-start-stop-buttons-to-improve-safety.htmI. 

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example, only cars with a component manufactured at a certain facility, or during certain months, 

are at issue. But for the safety of all drivers on the road, it is important that recall repairs are made. 

Car manufacturers monitor the recall and repair process. Manufacturers notij'y dealers about 

recalls, and the dealers, in tum, notij'y car manufacturers when the cars are repaired in response to a 

safety recall. 

CU suggests that going forward, car manufacturers submit to NHTSA in a timely manner 

the individual VINs of cars subject to a recall as well as information when the recall repairs have 

been performed on the vehicles. 

NHTSA would then be able to match up safety recalls with the manufacturer-provided VIN 

numbers in a consumer-friendly, searchable database. The consumer would be able to enter a VIN 

number to check for any applicable recalls without waiting days or weeks for the recall letter to 

arrive from the manufacturer. (We envision this system as supplementing, not supplanting, direct 

consumer notification by, e.g., letter from the manufacturer.) Purchasers of used cars could also 

check to see whether the car they are buying has any outstanding recalls. We would further 

encourage states to consider linking safety recall compliance with the ability to obtain a vehicle 

registration - similar to the way consumer must show proof of insurance to register their cars now. 

And as a final note on privacy, we do not believe any personal information should be stored 

with VIN numbers in NHTSA's database; we simply urge that a method be established by which 

consumers can check to see if a specific vehicle is subject to a safety recall and, of special value to 

used car purchasers, learn whether the recall repair has been performed. 

• Give NHTSA more resources: Consumers Union believes NHTSA is in need of additional 

funding and staff. In 2007, motor-vehicle crashes accounted for 99 percent of all transportationrelated fatalities and injuries. Y ct NHTSA's budget currently amounts to just over I percent of the 

overall Department of Transportation (DOT) budget. 

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The need for additional funding support will be even more imperative ifNHTSA proceeds 

with the recommendations outlined above, which could put more pressure on agency resources. It is 

important to make sure that the agency's budget and staffing for auto-safety and consumerprotection functions is commensurate with the realities of traffic safety and can keep up with the 

agency's other priorities. 

We are also concerned about reports that former NHTSA employees have gone to work for 

the companies that they once regulated and that this may have impacted safety decisions. 4 We urge 

Congress to examine this issue and the loopholes in current government ethics rules, and to consider 

additional ways to stop the "revolving door" at NHTSA and other federal agencies. 

II. The Roles of Manufacturers, Consumers, and Consumer Reports® 

We believe that car manufacturers, consumers, and Consumer Reports® can all do more 

going forward. 

A. Auto Manufacturers 

First and foremost, vehicles should be well designed from a safety perspective, with modern 

safety features and good crash-test results. In addition, automakers receive a steady stream of 

feedback on service and safety problems, directly from dealers, through warranty claims, from 

complaints made directly to the automaker, and other sources. This information is critical to 

identifying and resolving issues - and to alerting dealers, the government and consumers to issues 

and fixes. 

But Consumers Union believes manufacturers should go above and beyond when designing 

for safety, even when not mandated by specific government regulations. Many advanced safety 

features - including electronic stability control - are not currently offered on some budget cars. 

Young families and teenagers are often driving vehicles that are the last to get what we consider to 

4 See "Analysis Finds Uneasy Mix in Auto Industry and Regulation," Washington Post. Mar. 9, 2010, 

http:' 'ww\V.\\ashingtonp()5t.c0!l1\\p~d)!l 'content articie,'20 1 0 03,'OS/,-\R20 I003080-l900.hlml?hpid:::::topne\\s 

6 
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be basic and essential safety features. We call on manufacturers to make all safety features standard 

on all cars. We also call on manufacturers to end the practice of packaging critical safety options 

with luxurious amenities that people prefer not to purchase. For instance, if buyers are interested in 

electronic stability control for their Honda Civic, they are required to equip the car with leather and 

heated seats at thousands of dollars in extra cost. 

Regarding information sharing, manufacturers are required by the Transportation Recall 

Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act to report select information to 

NHTSA. That information is given to NHTSA via the EWR system. But only the tallies for 

fatalities, injuries and property damage and production numbers are currently made public under the 

EWR system; consumer complaints to the manufacturer are currently kept confidential 5

• We believe 

consumer complaint numbers submitted by manufacturers to NHTSA under the EWR system 

should also be made public by NHTSA and should be easily searchable, as described in Section I. 

We also call on manufacturers to make infonnation from black box recording devices more 

immediately accessible to govcmment investigators. Most new passenger vehicles are equipped 

with Event Data Recorders (EDRs), often referred to as black boxes, which record such data as 

vehicle speed, throttle position, air-bag deployment, brake application, and safety belt usage. These 

data can help police and accident investigators reconstruct what happened in a crash. But it can be 

difficult for carmakers and investigators to easily access this information. Toyota, for instance, has 

only limited proprietary data retrieval tools for their black boxes. Other companies use formats that 

can be easily read by commercial tools. We encourage all automakers to quickly adopt formats to 

enable swift information retrieval and dissemination to crash investigators. 

EDR information must also be standardized and expanded - and much of it will be, based on 

a 2006 mandate from NHTSA that defines detailed monitoring requirements for EDRs, including 

5 See: http://w,,w-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/qb/documentsiNI-lTSA-ODI-EWR-Facts.pdf 

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which systems should be recorded and for how long. These standards must be implemented in 

EDRs that are installed in the 2013 model-year cars. We encourage carmakers to apply these 

monitoring standards to their vehicles as soon as possible, with the appropriate privacy controls. 

B. What Consumers Can Do 

Data from the field-actual owner experiences-is a key component to unearthing defects 

and safety-related faults. Consumers drive cars on a daily basis, under all sorts of conditions, and 

are arguably our best real-world automotive testers. As drivers put cars through these daily stresses, 

and issues arise, they can act as an important early alert system simply by registering complaints 

and issues with government databases and manufacturers. Indeed signs of possible sudden 

unintended acceleration issues were reported to NHTSA as early as 2003. 

These safety databases are only as good as the data they contain. And active contributions 

from consumers seem to be lagging. NHTSA gathers a modest 30, ODD-plus complaints each year; 

compared to the number of people who drive (the Department of Transportation says 203 million 

people were licensed in 2006) many incidents are likely going unreported. 

We therefore encourage consumers to report major safety problems both to NHTSA and to 

the car's manufacturer. Consumers need not report squeaks and rattles, or parts that normally wear 

like brakes and mufflers. But if the brakes totally fail suddenly, if the car races out of control, 

catches fire, or the steering fails, they should take action and let NHTSA know about it. By 

reporting their information to the agency, they can ensure it becomes part of the public record. 

Whether reporting a complaint to a dealer, an automaker, or NHTSA, we urge consumers to 

accurately state their car's VIN. The information in this number can help experts isolate a problem 

that is common to, say, a specific assembly plant or to vehicles built in a certain period of time. 

Consumers also have a critical safety role to play in ensuring that potentially unsafe recalled 

vehicles are fixed in a timely way. As noted above, according to NHTSA, the average consumer 

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response rate to vehicle recalls is 74.1 percent. The response rate is low in part because 

manufacturer recall letters may not reach all affected owners, including those who have changed 

their mailing address or those who have bought used cars. But owners who have been notified could 

do more to make sure recall fixes are implemented in more vehicles. We also have 

recommendations for improvements to the recalls process, described above in Section I. 

C. What Consumer Reports Will Do 

Consumer Reports' role in the marketplace is to evaluate product performance and provide 

detailed Ratings and reliability information to help car buyers choose the best vehicle. Our Ratings, 

evaluations and recommendations arc based on extensive vehicle testing and on reliability data on 

more than 1.4 million vehicles. Our fonnal testing is done at our Auto Test Center track in 

Connecticut and on surrounding public roads, and our testers put thousands of miles on each vehicle 

over a typical six-month period. 

Safety is a major focus of our testing. We evaluate vehicles' braking capabilities on both dry 

and wet surfaces and perf ann a number of tests to see how vehicles handle at their limits. We 

combine our test results with crash-test scores from NHTSA and the Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety (TIHS) to produce our overall safety Ratings. In our reliability survey, we ask for 

detailed information on problems that subscribers have experienced in 17 different areas, making it 

the most comprehensive survey of its kind. 

Given our rigorous testing and survey process, why didn't we spot the sudden aeceleration 

issues with Toyota or in any other vehicles? First, we didn't encounter any issues with either floormat entrapment or a sticking accelerator pedal in any of the Toyotas we've tested. These episodes 

are too rare to show up in our standard testing. And they did not surface as an issue in our annual 

reliability survey. Had we noticed a problem in our testing, we would have contacted the company 

immediately, as we did when we experienced a perceived brake failure in our Ford Fusion Hybrid. 

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Going forward we will broaden the scope of safety information on our site in as many of 

these areas as is practical, beginning with recall information, Consumers should not learn of safety 

related problems via news reports, only to wait weeks for notification by mail of a recall, 

Communicating recall information to consumers is currently the manufacturer's responsibility. But 

we will support these efforts by publicizing recall information on our Web site and possibly other 

venues. 

NHTSA is our main safety watchdog, and we will continue to rely on the agency as our first 

line of defense. A more accessible NHTSA database (based on some changes we are recommending 

for the government) will also allow Consumer Reports to more thoroughly analyze and publish 

analysis of consumer complaints. If we were able to more fully mine the database, Consumer 

Reports and other independent groups like ours could do more to support NHTSA by flagging any 

spikes we see in problems with specific vehicles. Such information would be useful for car owners 

and buyers, as well as the agency and automakers. 

We will make additional efforts to gather information about our subscribers' experiences 

with recalls. We will be gathering this information for all vehicles, not just Toyotas. We'll ask our 

more than five million subscribers to tell us if their car had a recall in the last year. We'll also ask 

them about the specifics of handling the recall, including how they first heard about it (from news 

reports, a letter ITom the manufacturer, or a letter from the dealer); whether they took their car in to 

be fixed; and how long it took to complete the fix. We will share our findings with consumers, 

government regulators and other groups that might find it useful. 

III. Conclnsion 

The current situation with SUA in Toyotas presents the Committee with opportunities for 

improvements to our auto safety net. Consumers Union thanks the Committee for the opportunity 

to present its recommendations as you move forward. 

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Mr. RUSH. The Chair thanks the witness. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. McCurdy for 5 minutes for the 

purposes of an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DAVE MCCURDY 

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Whitfield for the opportunity to appear and speak on behalf of the 

industry as a whole. I must admit as you made your introduction, 

there was some chagrin on my personal part when I looked at the 

membership of this subcommittee in that I actually served with the 

fathers of three of the members, so it is a homecoming of sorts but 

I hadn’t thought I had been gone that long. It is good to be back 

with you. 

As you and your colleagues consider the road ahead of National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, it is important to remember three key points. The administrator, who we are all delighted 

that David Strickland is now the administrator of NHTSA, as he 

pointed out in the Department of Transportation highlighted today 

and actually I have a chart that is displayed here that motor vehicle crash fatalities and injuries are at historic lows. It is a very, 

very important point because that is the mission of the organization. Secondly, autos have never been safer and they are still getting safer every day because of innovative safety technologies including advanced electronics. And third, we need to be careful not 

to inhibit the innovation or the speedy identification and remedy 

of defects. 

On the first point, as the chart indicates, sometimes when you 

see a chart like that it is confusing for folks but to put it in perspective, this figure reports fatality per 100 million vehicle miles 

traveled, so there are 1.16 fatalities per 100 million miles traveled. 

That is down from in excess of two. Put that in terms of human 

lives, and again, we all know that this is far too many, that is a 

significant reduction from what Joan Claybrook would indicate 

back in the 1970s when it was at a high of 51,000. Now that is a 

decrease of 17,000. So I think that is a very important point that 

there is a significant and steady reduction despite increased ownership and increased vehicle miles traveled. So I think this is a goal 

that we share and we want to continue to work to support. 

As far as the safety of vehicles, by every single measure, these 

vehicles are dramatically safer than years ago, and in the last 15 

years we have seen a revolutionary expansion of advanced vehicle 

safety technologies including increased number of electronic components and features. Mr. Braley mentioned being able to take apart 

a carburetor and engine in the basement. It is indeed impossible 

to do that today. But a lot of the technologies that we see to meet 

fuel economy requirements, to meet emission controls, to provide 

safety are because of these advanced electronics. Also, Ms. 

Claybrook said that voluntary standards don’t work but in fact 

many of the incredible safety innovations were voluntary and were 

brought out before the agency ever considered regulating it. Electronic stability control—electronic stability control saves anywhere 

from 5,000 to 9,000 lives annually. Lane departure warning, over 

2,700 lives. Safety belt reminders and safety belt interlock, again 

significant. Side airbags, forward collision warning, emergency 


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brake assist, adaptive headlights, blind spot information systems, 

all of these are innovations that the industry introduced ahead of 

regulation. 

Secondly, it is really important to recognize that electronic systems are often far more reliable over time than mechanical systems. I used to represent the electronics industry and I will tell you 

that the advancements in solid-state technology provide increased 

performance. It enables vehicles to not only sense, diagnose and 

also to have failsafe modes that are not possible with traditional 

historic mechanical systems. So this is a very significant technology 

which is helping us to meet our goals of sustainable mobility. 

And third, as I indicated, I think we are going to have to be careful not to inhibit this cycle of innovation because this industry innovates more rapidly and gets into the marketplace technologies 

for consumers and so we need to maintain a policy framework that 

embraces technology-based solutions ahead of regulation, and I 

don’t think the public would be well served if automakers were 

forced to wait for the government to catch up with industry’s innovation. 

And it also important, we have talked a lot about recalls, but the 

vast majority of recalls are voluntary, and I have a chart here talking about detecting and correcting the defects sooner. In fact, the 

number of recalls is up. Some may say well, isn’t that a sign of 

problems. In fact, that is a good point because the number of vehicles affecting is coming down so automakers are using the recall 

system based on data it receives not only from the consumer directly but also from the agencies to initiate these actions, to identify the defects and get them remedied and get the vehicles back 

into the marketplace. 

And then just in closing, I want to make a couple points about 

some suggestions for this committee, and I appreciate—I know how 

this chairman works and I know how this committee works, and 

you want to build a consensus on a bipartisan basis to address significant concerns. We would respectfully submit that Congress really does need to ensure that NHTSA has the resources to do its job 

and we would support this committee in its efforts. We have long 

advocated additional resources to fund the National Automobile 

Sampling System, the NASS system, which we believe is underfunded. We also support a number of other legislative elements 

that we hope would be included in this reauthorization such as 

State inducements, in other words, working to encourage States to 

adopt primary enforcement safety belt laws. I know that Chairman 

Oberstar is looking at this in his reauthorization. Our industry 

spent hundreds of millions of dollars in campaigns to try to pass 

primary seat belt enforcement laws across the country, and we 

have made real progress. We had three States this year alone. 

We also believe there should be a first offense with an ignition 

interlock requirement for impaired driving, drunk driving. The statistic that is not reported up there, the 33,000 deaths, unfortunately, 30 percent of those or more are the result of less than 1 

percent, one-half of 1 percent of the drivers and those that are impaired drunk driving. We have to get those people off the road. 

And then lastly, the graduated license laws for teens based on 

best practices, the STANDUP Act, we support that, and then there 


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are other things that can really work to fund support high-visibility 

enforcement efforts such as Click It or Ticket and other limit under 

arrest or over the limit under arrest provisions. And again, there 

is an opportunity to support a driver alcohol interlock device research program called the ROADS SAFE Act, which puts money to 

try to develop research to prevent drunk drivers getting access to 

vehicles or starting vehicles. 

We appreciate very much your work. I understand how challenging it is. And we look forward to working with you to help develop commonsense solutions to some of these challenges. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy follows:] 


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STATEMENT 

OF 

THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS 

BEFORE THE: 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COMMERCE, TRADE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 

MARCH 11,2010 

PRESENTED BY: 

The Honorable Dave McCurdy 

President & CEO 
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Thank you Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Whitfield, and members of the 

subcommittee for the opportunity to provide the automakers' perspective on manufacturing, 

selling and servicing the world's safest motor vehicle fleet As you and your colleagues consider 

the road ahead for the National Highway Tramc Safety Administration (NHTSA) it is important 

to bear in mind the broader context of motor vehicle safety in the U.S. today. 

Fatalities and serious injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes in the U.S. are at 

their lowest level in 49 years. This fact is remarkable given that during the same timeframe the 

number oflicensed drivers has more than doubled and annual vehicle miles travelled have more 

than quadrupled. Fewer fatalities per mile driven are occurring on U.S. roads than at any other 

time in the modem era of driving; in fact, in 2008 more than 99 percent of pol ice-reported 

crashes resulted in no fatalities. This is because the government and the industry are doing many 

things very well to innovate, develop, and implement effective safety systems and programs. 

Significant technological advances in the design and construction of automobiles, tough but fair 

regulatory initiatives at the federal level, increased safety belt usage, and road infrastructure 

improvements are all having an historic impact on vehicle safety. 

NHTSA's mission is to "save lives, prevent injuries and reduce economic costs due to 

road traffic crashes, through education, research. safety standards and enforcement activity. " 

By the most important objective measure the number of fatalities and serious injuries resulting 

from motor vehicle crashes - the agency has been very successful. From 2007 to 2008, overall 

traffic fatalities fell nearly 10 percent to their lowest level since 1961. 

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Preliminary data shows the trend continuing in 2009. NHTSA's analysis of the first 3 

quarters in 2009 show a 7.9 percent drop in highway fatalities. In addition the fatality rate for 

the first nine months declined to 1.16 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT), 

down from 1.26 fatalities per 100 million VMT in the first nine months of 2008. 

This continuing trend of improved traffic safety has occurred as vehicle manufacturers 

have incorporated an increasing number of electronic components and features. Electronics 

benefit automotive safety in two ways. First, electronic systems are often more reliable over 

time than mechanical systems. Second, electronic systems can provide performance, sensing, 

diagnostics, and failsafe modes that are not possible with mechanical systems. A recent example 

is electronic stability control (ESC). ESC provides improvements in vehicle handling and 

stability that no mechanical system could match. ESC is widely viewed as one orihe most 

significant safety enhancements in automobiles in many years. Another example is the brake 

override [smart pedal) feature that has been talked about in recent hearings to help address the 

risk of unintended acceleration. Studies have repeatedly shown that the most common cause of 

unintended acceleration in motor vehicles is pedal misapplication by drivers. Only with the 

capabilities of electronic throttle control systems can manufacturers offer the smart pedal feature 

that can help address potential unintended acceleration events when both the brake and 

accelerator pedals are pressed. No mechanical system can provide that same benefit. 

Technology provides a pathway to improve vehicle safety and efficiency - we need to maintain a 

policy framework that embraces technology based solutions ahead of regulation. 

In 2005, Congress authorized NHTSA to conduct a National Motor Vehicle Crash 

Causation Survey (NMVCCS). This effort involved a nationwide survey of crashes involving 

light passenger vehicles with a focus on the factors related to pre-crash events. NMVCCS 

investigated a total of 6,950 crashes during a three-year period from January 2005 to December 

2007. This survey's results are consistent with the groundbreaking Indiana University Tri-Level 

study conducted nearly three decades earlier: of all crash factors, the vehicle was attributable as 

a factor 2.09 percent of the time while the driving environment was a factor 2.48 percent of the 

time and the driver was a factor 95.43 percent of the time. Vehicle factors include both 

equipment-related and maintenance related failures. 

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Automakers pursue diligent efforts to protect our customers ... wbo include our 

families. Safety is among the industry's top priorities, and it is a top priority tor our customers. 

According to Consumer Reports Auto Brands Perceptions survey for 20 I 0, the number one 

factor consumers consider when they purchase a new vehicle is safety. Safety leads even quality 

and durability. Consequently, automakers have developed and introduced many oftoday's most 

significant safety features without a government mandate. Volnntary safety features developed 

and implemented by automakers include anti-lock brakes, ESC, electronic roll mitigation, 

adaptive headlights, side airbags and curtains, front passenger safety belt reminder systems and 

advanced collision avoidance features. 

Automakers are focusing on enhancing safety in multiple \vays: crashwOlthiness, crash 

avoidance, crash mitigation, and post-crash emergency response facilitation. For example, 

adaptive cruise control, forward collision warning, lane departure protection systems and more 

help drivers avoid crashes and lessen their severity when a crash is unavoidable. Advanced 

technologies are also implemented to proteet occupants involved in crashes, with technologies 

like advanced airbags, advanced head restraints and satety belt pre-tensioners. Virtually all of 

loday's advanced vehicle saiety technologies are being developed and implemented ahead of 

regulatory mandates. 

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The United States leads the world in automobile safety, and other countries emulate 

our policies. Vehicles manufactured for sale in the U.S. are built to comply with the world's 

most extensive safety regulations. For example. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 

(FMVSS) 208 (Occupant Crash Protection) represents the most comprehensive crash standard in 

the world, requiring use of a range of test dummies, angled crash tests at various speeds and 

ability to suppress airbags when child seats are used. In addition, FMVSS 126 (Electronic 

Stability Control Systems) and FMVSS 214 (Side Impact Protection), along with the proposed 

FMVSS 226 (Ejection Mitigation), sct new global standards for safety. 

Beyond the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI), which has recently been the focus of 

attention, NHTSA has other resources devoted explicitly to motor vehicle safety. The agency's 

Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) develops objective and repeatable compliance test 

procedures for new and amended Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards that the agency uses to 

evaluate regulation conformance. It also conducts the agency's vehicle compliance test program 

that annually includes an average of230 vehicle tests and over 800 tests on motor vehicle 

equipment. 

In addition to the compliance test program, testing performed by the agency's New Car 

Assessment Program (NCAP) also provides an indication of compliance with related FMVSS 

requirements and can help identify the existence of potential safety-related concerns. 

Historically, NHTSA conducts more than 150 NCAP vehicle crash tests per year covering over 

85 percent of the new car fleet. 

The Alliance agrees that Congress should ensure that NHTSA has the resources to do its 

job. Secretary LaHood has touted the President's request for 66 additional FTEs at NHTSA. 

The Alliance believes that another critical need is to fund the National Automobile Sampling 

System (NASS) at a level sufficient to attain its intended design size to ensure critical 

"real-world" data is collected at a sufficient number of sites nationwide to provide the 

statistically valid, nationally representative sample originally intended. 

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The budget for NASS has not kept pace with either the Department's informational needs 

or inflation. Moreover, these needs are growing as automakers reinvent the automobile in 

response to societal demands for ever safer and cleaner vehicles. Starved for funds, the 

capability ofNASS has been dramatically reduced. Currently, NASS collects in-depth data on 

approximately 4,500 crashes less than a third of the intended design size of 15,000 to 20,000 

crash cases annually. A $40 million dollar annual investment in NASS equates to 1.73 cents for 

every $100 of economic loss. 

Automobiles are complex, integrated systems that undergo years of rigorous testing 

and certification before they ever go on sale. Automakers are world leaders inresearch and 

development spending. In fact, in 2009 ... even in the worst market since the Great 

Depression ... automobile manufacturers still invested $86 billion on .research and development, 

much of it devoted to advanced vehicle safety technologies. Today's high-tech automobile is 

assembled from thousands of parts all performing specialized functions in carefully specified 

ways. 

As one of the marketplace's most regulated products, the automobile undergoes rigorous 

testing to validate performance to engineering and regulatory standards. Through the Society of 

Automotive Engineers (SAE), 14,000 mobility experts in 100+ countries have worked together 

to develop more than 2,600 globally recognized standards for motor vehicle transport. 

The durability oftoday's automobiles is at all time highs. The median age of cars in 

1970 was 4.9 years, according to R.L. Polk & Co. In 2007, the median age nearly doubled to 9.2 

years. J.D. Power and Associates, recognized for their quality studies, reports that vehicle 

quality and dependability have improved significantly in the past ten years. Their Vehicle 

Dependability Survey demonstrates a 62 percent reduction in problems over the past decade. 

Beyond all ofthe safety development work that goes into designing and producing new 

vehicles, thousands of engineers and specialists actively and continuously monitor the field 

performance (e.g., review of warranty claims, customer correspondence and information from 

suppliers) of their products, in addition to reviews of consumer complaints and Early Warning 
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data supplied to NHTSA. Each manufacturer has a review process to monitor this field data to 

determine whether a defect trend related to motor vehicle safety can be identified and whether a 

recall is appropriate. 

The trend in recalls is for mannfactnrers to evalnate concerns sooner and respond 

qnickly with volnntary initiatives when needed. Most recalls occur before there have been 

any fatalities, injuries or crashes which may be attributable to the defect being remedied. From 

1966, when the Safety Act was enacted, through 2009, there have been 12,727 vehicle recalls 

involving 467,180,795 vehicles to remedy safety-related defects and non-compliances. Tn 2009, 

there were 492 recalls affecting 16.4 million vehicles. Of that total, 340 of those recalls, or about 

70 percent, were undertaken by manufacturers without any NHTSA involvement; the remaining 

152 recalls were "influenced" by NHTSA. With respect to recalls that are NHTSA "influenced," 

usually, there are legitimate questions regarding whether the issue observed in the field actually 

presents an "unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety," (the statutory threshold for triggering 

notice and remedy) or whether a defect trend exists. 

During the five-years from 2005 to 2009. the median number of vehicle recalls 

undertaken annually was 562 affecting 14.8 million vehicles. Comparing this five-year period to 

the five-year period from 1995 to 1999, the median number of recalls conducted annually has 

increased by 85 percent while the number of affected vehicles has declined by approximately 17 

percent. This suggests that both NHTSA and the industry are doing a better job of identifying 

and pinpointing safety-related defects and taking faster action to remedy those defects. The 

current trend further indicates that manufacturers are identiJYing defects sooner, as evidenced by 

the decline in the population of vehicles affected. 

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NHTSA-and federallaw-demand specific, transparent actions to protect 

consumers. Federal law requires all automobile manufacturers to notifY NHTSA witbin five 

days of determining that a safety defect exists, and to promptly conduct a recall. Providing 

consumer notice is a priority, to both automakers and to NHTSA. Under statute, automakers 

must notify customers by mail, explaining the potential safety hazards and the correction process. 

NHTSA supports this process through its Vehicle Safety Hotline and its website, 

www.satercar.gov. Automakers comply with extensive reporting requirements to assist NHTSA 

in identifYing potential safety defects in a timely manner, including reports of injuries and deaths 

related to an alleged or proven defect, consumer complaints, warranty claims, field reports, 

property damage, customer satisfaction campaigns, consumer advisories, recalls (including 

foreign recalls) or other activities involving the repair or replacemcnt of vehicles or equipment, as 

required by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, as amended by the TREAD Act in 

2000. 

In addition, there are stringent non-federal regulatory or legal requirements covering 

consumer complaints and defects. The automobile is one of the most heavily regulated 

consumer products in American commerce. A panoply of laws, regulations and potential legal 

liability attach to everything from production, advertising, sale and repair, to ultimate disposal or 

recycling. For example, every state has a vehicle-specific Lemon Law that requires 

manufacturers to repurchase new vehicles that contain defects that impair the use, value or safety 

of those vehicles. 

In summary, a range of data demonstrates that our roads are safer today, even with 

consumers driving more. These results can be attributed to rigorous R&D and high quality 

standards by automakers, and regulatory requirements that lead the world. In the event of a 

recall, the statutes are explicit on the procedures. Our system of"checks and balances;' 

including Congressional oversight, the courts and consumer buying patterns, helps maintain the 

satest motor vehicle fleet in the world. 

### 

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Mr. RUSH. The Chair thanks all the witnesses and the Chair 

thanks Mr. McCurdy for your statement. The Chair recognizes 

himself for 5 minutes for questioning. 

Mr. McCurdy, there has been a lot of testimony at this hearing 

and in past hearings, and some of it has centered on the black box 

as a technological solution or a recording device that would help in 

gathering data and also determining the causes for accidents. What 

is the industry’s response to this phenomenon of the black box? 

Mr. MCCURDY. We believe the information from event data recorders is important for NHTSA to do its job. They do have a rule 

that has standardized or recommended standards for the type of 

data that would be acquired. I think the industry is moving rapidly 

towards deployment of that system. Over 60 percent of all vehicles 

today, modern vehicles, have that capability. The only caution I 

would give, and again, having come from the intelligence and defense world, when we talk about black boxes or we come from the 

world of aerospace where some people think that in an aircraft 

there is this black box that they recover after an accident. Actually 

these data systems are embedded throughout vehicles and so it is 

not just one solitary device. But is important that there are commercially available tools to access that. So I think the agency is 

going to be addressing this and we look forward to working with 

them. I think this is something that can be addressed. 

Mr. RUSH. Ms. Claybrook, you indicated that you think that 

NHTSA’s current budget is inadequate and that the President’s 

budget for this year, or next year, rather, is inadequate. What do 

you think as a former administrator in today’s dollars, how much 

do you think NHTSA’s budget should be and what do you think 

should be the categories that we should look at increasing personnel and other resources for NHTSA? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the budget should be doubled. It is $132 million, which is a pittance 

by any measure in the federal government, and it should probably 

double the year after that. This agency is starving to death. It can’t 

do the research it should. It can’t collect the data that it should. 

It doesn’t have the expertise that it should. It doesn’t have the enforcement personnel that it should. And all of us suffer from that 

because of deaths in the highway, and I think that Mr. Strickland 

is going to be a good leader for this agency. I am looking forward 

to see his work, I think he needs the resources to do it, and I have 

already been talking to him and the Secretary a little bit about 

this, and I think his answer was very appropriate that they would 

use very wisely the resources that the Congress decided that they 

would give the agency. He didn’t say we didn’t want them or that 

they couldn’t use them. He said that they would use them wisely, 

and I think that is as far as he is allowed to go under the President’s rules and I am very pleased to see that he said that. 

Mr. RUSH. You have given us seven—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I would add one other thing, Mr. Chairman, 

which is that issues have been raised today about the reduction in 

death and injury on the highway, which is magnificent, but I would 

also point out that after the oil crisis of 1973, there was a reduction 

of 9,000 deaths a year because the economy was in the sink, and 

I think that if you look at the documents that were prepared by 


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the agency itself, for example, here is there list that they put out 

today of their crash stats, you will see that every time there is a 

downturn in the economy, there is less discretionary driving and 

there is a downturn in death and injury, but it comes right back 

up again, and so should anyone suggest that this is a permanent 

fix for the agency, it is not. I think that you are still going to need 

those resources, new safety standards, and there are many others 

that I didn’t mention today which I will submit a list of for the 

record of other safety standards that the agency is woefully behind 

in issuing. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Chairman, may I inject one point on that, 

just clarification? I think the administrator said that it actually 

had decreased and decline for 15 and a half straight quarters. That 

is more than the current recession, so I think this is a long-term 

trend. It is because of the regulatory efforts and it is because of the 

work of the industry cooperatively with that agency and also the 

work of Congress. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, I wouldn’t say that. The acting administrator, the one who went to Japan, Mr. Medford, he gave a presentation which I will also submit for the record in which he said that 

safety technologies had between 1960 and 2000 saved 328,551 

lives, and so I do agree, I agree with Mr. McCurdy that cars are 

safer today. I am disappointed that the industry often opposes 

some of those improvements but they also do take initiatives on 

their own, which he has mentioned, and these safety features can 

make a huge difference. They have made a difference in the number of lives saved and the number of deaths on the highway today 

would be far, far greater were not this agency doing its work, but 

there is much more that can be done and we will see more deaths 

and injuries when the economy improves. 

Mr. RUSH. My time is expired. The Chair recognizes Mr. Whitfield for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. This has been quite an interesting 

hearing, and of course, any time we talk about death on the highway, and all of us have known people who have been killed in car 

accidents or have had loved ones that have been disfigured, and 

there is no way not to be emotional about individual deaths on the 

highway. But I am walking away from this hearing feeling a little 

bit better really about things, understanding that the Toyota issue 

is out there but when you have this kind of a reduction in the 

deaths per 100 million miles from in the middle 1970s 3.34 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles down to last year 1.16 per 100 

million miles, and it doesn’t really make any difference what the 

economy is or is not, we are talking about 100 million vehicle 

miles. So I think that is something we really should celebrate to 

see that the fact that this fatality rate is coming down. 

Now, when we talk about the budget of NHTSA, I think the total budget is somewhere in the neighborhood of $900 million but a lot 

of that goes to State grants, and you all may be more familiar with 

those State grants than I am and I know that Ms. Claybrook is 

right as far as vehicle safety. There is about $132 million a year 

for vehicle safety. But I referred earlier, for example, to this Congressionally mandated study in 2005 about the causes of vehicle accidents, and it said that 95 percent were due to the driver, priVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:53 Nov 27, 2012 Jkt 076016 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A016.XXX A016

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marily driver mistakes, and 2 percent, by the way, were related to 

vehicle or equipment defect but about 40 percent or 50 percent of 

that related to tires. So I am just wondering if maybe we should 

look at this in a different way and try to start focusing more money 

on educating drivers, better educational programs for drivers. And 

every State sets their own laws for how old you have to be and 

what kind of program you have to go through to drive. Because of 

the fact that 95 percent of all accidents are caused primarily because of driver neglect or whatever, should we be focusing on more 

programs to provide better educational opportunities for drivers to 

make them better prepared? And I would just ask each one of you 

that question and see how you would respond to that. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, first of all, Mr. Whitfield, thank you so 

much for putting this out, and I appreciate your question. First of 

all, I would like to submit for the record the problems that we see 

with this causation study. It is quite complicated and I don’t want 

to take the time today, but there are a lot of deficiencies in it. But 

even assuming, which I don’t, that 95 percent of the crashes occur 

because of driver error, what you have to look at is what causes 

the death and injury, and Dr. William Haddon, who was the first 

NHTSA administrator, put together what he called the Haddon 

Matrix and it had pre crash, crash and post crash, and what you 

are talking about is the pre-crash issue, which is drunk driving, 

falling asleep, brakes don’t work, whatever it may be in the precrash field. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Ms. Claybrook, there is only about a minute left, 

so I am just going to say that you disagree with what I was saying, 

I am assuming, that—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, no, not necessarily. I will submit for the 

record the information on that. But what you want to do is to protect the driver and the occupants, and the way you do that is making sure the car is safe regardless of what causes the crash, and 

on driver education, NHTSA itself has done lots of work on this 

and shown that driver education really doesn’t do much in terms 

of the long-term driving capability of most people. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. What about you, Miss Gadhia? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I like driver education. I mean, it—— 

Mr. WHITFIELD. What about you, Ms. Gadhia? Do you have any 

comments on that? 

Ms. GADHIA. In our testimony that we submitted for the record, 

we took a look at the question that the committee is asking in light 

of all the recalls that we have seen in recent weeks, are there areas 

that we see for improvement, and so we have made our recommendations accordingly. We are pleased, though, that the agency and Secretary LaHood have put a great focus on distracted driving. That is something that has been obviously a big problem. So 

we do see a value in that particular kind of focus. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. McCurdy? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. In fact, in addition to 

driver behavior and performance, there is the driving environment, 

so the condition of roads, the lack of safety features there, weather, 

et cetera is a fact in 2 percent and then in the other instances, 

about 2 percent can be attributed to the vehicle. But I will tell you, 

since we had a reference to older vehicles, I will provide for the 


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record a copy of our playbook. It has an interesting photograph of 

a 50th anniversary event at the National Institute of Highway 

Safety, the Insurance Institute, and they did a 40-mile-an-hour 

head-on crash of two vehicles. One was a 1959 Chevrolet Belair. 

We are not picking on Chevy. It is actually a good story here. As 

you know, in 1959—well, some of you probably weren’t around then 

but most of us who were know there is a lot of metal there—a 40- 

mile-an-hour head-on crash with a 2009 Chevy Malibu, which is a 

smaller car, and the results are dramatic. The cage, the front seat, 

the passenger area of the 1959, those passenger would have been 

killed. There is no doubt. I mean, severely injured, tremendous impact, crushing that compartment. In the new model, the cage is intact. It also has front airbags, side airbags, side curtains and also 

has other features that improve the likelihood of survival in a 

head-in crash regardless of the cause, whether it is someone swerving. 

The last point I would make in this, a comment made about the 

3-second stop. I drive a vehicle that has push-button on stop. That 

is one of the features that many, many consumers are moving towards. Are we saying that consumers today, it is in the manual, 

it is in the instructions and all the rest, can’t take 3 seconds to 

push a button? I know that we panic, I know there are instances, 

but there is a need for education. There is a need. And maybe one 

of the positive aspects of all this investigation, all the reporting is 

maybe consumers are having to pay attention to actually the vehicles that they are driving, what are those shifters, where is neutral. My son-in-law drives a Camry. When this came up, the ones 

in the recall, he asked what do you do. I said you put it in neutral, 

OK. You don’t want to turn it off at first, and those buttons are 

there and that 3-second delay is there for a reason because you 

don’t want inadvertent shutting off the engine because then you 

could lose power. That affects steering and other conditions. 

So I think there is a commonsense approach we need to take. Let 

us find out what it is. Let us work together. And I think that is 

what NHTSA and the industry should be discussing. So there is 

not one solution, but I think there is a genuine concern about it 

to try to develop some solutions. 

Ms. GADHIA. Mr. Chairman, may I briefly respond to the comment about the push button? 

Mr. RUSH. Certainly. 

Ms. GADHIA. I would like to note that our recommendations have 

to do with when the consumer is in an emergency situation since 

we have been talking about sudden unintended acceleration, and I 

will note also that given what has happened, it is my understanding that Toyota is working on reconfiguring their push-button 

ignition so it can be turned off in an emergency situation with multiple quick presses in a short period of time. So that is what we 

are talking about. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois for 

5 minutes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize 

to the witnesses for not being here for your testimony, though I 

have looked at it. I want to also just take this moment to say what 

a tremendous resource we have in Joan Claybrook, who did serve 


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as head of NHTSA, and I hope that not only our subcommittee but 

that NHTSA right now will take advantage of all of the years of 

experience she has had not only as an administrator but as an advocate. I thank Ms. Gadhia and also Mr. McCurdy for the work 

that you are doing, but I wanted to particularly just thank Joan 

for decades, I won’t say how many, of being an advocate for consumers. 

In looking at the priorities that you laid out for legislative and 

administrative—I mean, there are a couple things that are clearly 

legislative. If you think that penalties need to be enhanced, I think 

that is legislative on our part. But what are those things that you 

think the committee in particular has to deal with that really can’t 

be done administratively to meet the goals that you have set out 

or the problems that you have identified? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, I would say certainly in the penalty area 

that that is a legislative issue, and in the funding, that is a legislative issue. The President’s budget is what it is and it is totally insufficient, and so it is not this committee’s responsibility, although 

you do authorize, of course. I think that in the area of transparency, there have been some decisions made by the agency that 

this committee could change. In the early warning act, while there 

was a lot of discussion about the information being open, in fact, 

the way that it was written was interpreted as not being open. So 

I think that it would helpful clarification on transparency with the 

early warning system because right now it is not available to any 

of us. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And that would require a change or a clarification or—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I think it would be—yes, I think it would be 

very helpful to have a clarification of that. 

In terms of consumers being able to bring a lawsuit when a case 

is closed in the enforcement area, we definitely need to have legislation there because of the court of appeals decision, and then I 

think it would be very helpful to have some legislative support for 

improving the black block. This is something that could be done administratively by the agency. I think it would be really helpful because if the black box is mandatory, if it gathers a lot of really good 

data, if it can be downloaded easily, all of that data can come into 

NHTSA’s data system and it would vastly enhance, excitingly enhance the capacity of the agency to analyze problems, to find out 

what is going on in the highway because this would be rich information from our crashes that occur right then on the highway, and 

this information is totally lacking in the agency now, and gathering 

it through the NASS system, which is this National Accident Sampling System, which is after the fact investigations, there was intended to be 20,000 of them a year, it is now 4,000 because of the 

cost, and this I think will never get to the 20,000. So why not take 

advantage of this data that is going to be collected anyway in black 

boxes under what I think has to be a mandate for the black box 

itself and use that data for the operation for the agency as well as 

particular crashes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. McCurdy, you seem to be nodding at that. 

Did you want to comment on this? 


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Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, ma’am. Actually I did want to comment. We asked for additional resources for NASS. We think that 

data needs to be collected, and this committee has oversight of 

NHTSA and the data is there but we need to make sure that the 

agency has the tools and resources to gather it. My only caveat on 

that, and I think this is something that we need to work on, is I 

don’t believe that the wholesale release of raw and unverified data 

would further objective of quickly identifying and correcting defects. If anything, it may lead to more litigation, and I don’t believe 

that is the answer. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, I should say, Mr. McCurdy—— 

Mr. MCCURDY. I actually have the mic, Mr. Chairman. You 

know, I don’t believe it would in fact do that. I would hope before 

the gentlelady leaves or we at least have another round actually 

talk about one of the principle issues that you are the key sponsor 

of which we supported, the Cameron Gulbransen Act, and the role 

that we actually played because this is one of our priorities and it 

shows where we can actually work together to address significant 

problems, and those are some of the most tragic instances that we 

know. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. They are. 

Mr. MCCURDY. I worked with Senator Sununu and Senator Clinton at the time as well as your staff and the staff of the committee 

to make that happen, and the industry fully supported that. So I 

want to make sure that is on the record. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And I appreciate that. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Could I—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Is there any way, Mr. Chairman, that Ms. 

Claybrook can respond back to that, or do you want—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. It is privacy information. I just want to make 

clear that I don’t think that this data should be public as to individual crashes. It would be for statistical purposes. That is all I 

wanted to say. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

Mr. RUSH. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Stearns. 

Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Claybrook, let me just follow up what Ms. Schakowsky 

talked about. In these boxes, isn’t the box on a person’s car, that 

box would belong to that person, wouldn’t it? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Yes. 

Mr. STEARNS. So wouldn’t they have the right to opt out if they 

wanted to? Could they flick a switch so that if they didn’t want this 

to occur, they could do it, or do you think that should not be—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I don’t think there ought to be an on/off switch. 

Mr. STEARNS. So you think there should be no opt-out? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I do not think there should be an opt-out. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. Secondly, the information they collect is obviously speed, perhaps location. Is it going to go beyond that in terms 

of weight in the car or driving habits? What, in your opinion—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. On the black box? 

Mr. STEARNS. In the black box. It sounds like you want to expand 

it, and I think many people are concerned about how the federal 

government will handle this data. Say I can’t opt out of the box 


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under your persuasion, then if it goes to the federal government, 

is this going to be public on the Internet? Should private citizens 

be able to go and see that about their neighbors who are driving? 

I mean, there are some privacy implications I think that I am concerned about. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I really appreciate you asking the question because I certainly didn’t mean to suggest that every crash that occurs should be publicly exposed on the Internet with the name of 

the person and their car and all the rest of it. The black box generally collects data 20 to 5 seconds before a crash and 5 to 10 seconds—— 

Mr. STEARNS. So it doesn’t come on all during the whole time? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. No. 

Mr. STEARNS. And so it is very, very limited time frame, and 

what it records is whether your foot was on the accelerator, whether it was on the brake, a lot of aspects of the engine itself, the 

speed of the vehicle and so on, and that data, what I am talking 

about having to go to the federal government, it would be only statistical data. All privacy information would be erased, so the federal government wouldn’t even have it. It would just be statistical 

data. It would just be that a crash occurred and what the circumstances were so that you can then accumulate that data and 

say these are the kind of crashes that are occurring and these are 

the kind of remedies that we need to think about applying because 

of that. I do think it needs to be mandatory. I think it should be 

on every vehicle. Actually, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler 

readily reveal the contents of their black boxes in litigation because 

they think it is advantageous for them. 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, I guess this committee would be concerned 

about the privacy. Let me move on. I have another question. 

Mr. McCurdy, welcome to the committee. It is nice to see you. 

Eddie Towns and I dropped a bill on January 28, 2009, which 

would direct the Department of Transportation to issue regulations 

which would mitigate the safety hazard caused by near-silent hybrid and electric cars. I was in a parking lot going into the grocery 

store and I was just walking along with my BlackBerry and this 

car came up that was a hybrid and I didn’t hear it, and it practically hit me, and so my question is, I think both General Motors 

and NHTSA have come up and proposed methods to address this, 

and I guess the concern of the ever-increasing desire now to have 

these cars that are hybrid and silent and you can’t hear them. Winston Churchill almost got killed when he came to the United States 

and got off the wrong side of the road, and certainly if these cars 

are silent, he might not have been alive and so concerned with 

ever-increasing danger and sort of the inconsistency of the industry 

response so far. Do you think NHTSA needs to take further action 

to ensure an industry-wide solution, perhaps something like Congressman Towns and I, the bill we introduced which is called the 

Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of 2009. It has 210 cosponsors. 

It is H.R. 734. 

Mr. MCCURDY. I know the bill well, and it is good to see you, Mr. 

Stearns. Actually we refer to this as the quiet car legislation, and 

concern. Actually I think we ought to recognize—I don’t know if 

John is still here—John Pare from the National Federation of the 


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Blind. We at the Alliance have been working closely with NFB. Our 

member companies have been conducting acoustic testing. There 

are some challenges. You know, it is ironic, unintended consequences, but we have been pushed for years by some that say we 

have to reduce noise. We have been pushed by others to say we 

have to eliminate the internal combustion—— 

Mr. STEARNS. No one is ever happy. 

Mr. MCCURDY. So we are moving, you know, rapidly to hybrid 

and electric technology and they are quiet, if not silent. I can’t resist the point, though, when you say that you are walking along 

with your BlackBerry and don’t hear it. It is a little bit of distracted walking, and we are mixing issues here, but we talk about 

distracted driving too. The point that—— 

Mr. STEARNS. But I am a pedestrian and I had the right-of-way 

with the hybrid. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Actually I spoke to the NFB convention earlier in 

the year when they were in Detroit. I think they will tell you that 

we have reached out to them. We have worked closely with them. 

What we are trying to do is understand the challenges here, to 

really understand what the acoustic—— 

Mr. STEARNS. Is there a timeline? Can you give me a timeline? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Well, we have been doing the research now. I 

think there are questions of length of implementation but I think 

we are not far from finding a solution. 

Mr. STEARNS. A year, 2 years? 

Mr. MCCURDY. It depends on front end and back. I think we are 

actually making real progress, and again, we want NHTSA to engage with us as well. So I think there is an opportunity for real 

stakeholder conversation here, and it is not confrontational at all. 

I think this is a question of really understanding the problem and 

bringing to bear the right science and engineering. But I think 

there will be a solution and I think it can be—— 

Mr. STEARNS. And you think NHTSA should have an industrywide solution? 

Mr. MCCURDY. It should be industry-wide. I think it is actually 

going to be global. I am involved internationally and I think Japan 

is—— 

Mr. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCURDY [continuing]. Actively engaged and others will as 

well. 

Mr. RUSH. I recognize Mr. Braley for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Stearns, there is a great episode on the TV show The Office 

where one of the characters engages in a low-speed chase with a 

Prius and sneaks up on one of the other characters, which demonstrates the importance of this legislation. 

Mr. McCurdy, voluntary can be a relative thing, and you talked 

earlier about some of the voluntary changes the industry has made 

to respond to safety concerns but a lot of those changes that were 

made were also things that the industry initially resisted, and one 

of the great things about the country we live in, we have a system 

that allows people from all different walks of life to work together 

both in a public setting like through NHTSA and through our private enforcement methods to try to hold people accountable and 


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work together to improve the technology in automobiles. You mentioned that you had concerns about the use of electronic data recorder information and suggested it could lead to more litigation. 

I would challenge that statement because I believe if you had a 

system with standards for accessing and downloading that information and a clear understanding of what it represented, you could 

actually reduce litigation because right now much of the expense 

in a lot of these crash cases is people trying to understand how an 

accident occurred, how the occupant compartment was compromised and potentially contributed to the fatality or the severity 

of the crash. So one of the things that I am interested in hearing 

from you is, we have been talking about the standards for electronic data recorders and there has already been some proposals 

both by the Institute for Electric Engineers and also proposed regulations that NHTSA is considering, and it has been my impression 

that some members of your alliance have been objecting to the enactment of those regulations. Are you able to make a statement 

here at the hearing today on behalf of the Alliance that it supports 

the enactment of standardized regulations by NHTSA that govern 

the use of electronic data recorder information? 

Mr. MCCURDY. I believe we are moving in that direction. I will 

put it that way. I think the industry, there is well over 64 percent 

I think is the most recent number of 2005 models that have EDRs. 

I may have been confused on all the information. I think some of 

the early warning information is where we have some concerns. 

The type of information in the EDR is probably less of concern. But 

again, I think there can be movement on this, and again, I think 

the stakeholders and working with NHTSA have an opportunity. 

My hesitation was because of my experience in the electronic field 

is that again some people have a very simplistic idea of what that 

is. It is not quite as simple as just saying everyone is going to have 

a black box, but I think we are moving in that direction. 

Mr. BRALEY. And Ms. Gadhia, I want to talk to you about that 

because in your written statement you said the EDR information 

must also be standardized and expanded, and Mr. Stearns began 

his question by asking Ms. Claybrook about the ownership of that 

data and assumed that it belonged to the owner of the vehicle, and 

yet during the early years of EDR data availability, the manufacturers frequently took the position that was proprietary information that belonged to them, not the person who paid for the automobile. So how do we move forward from this point to try to come 

up with a system that makes easily available and downloadable information that achieves the privacy concerns we are worried about 

but provides us with better data that helps us solve the underlying 

problems that lead to occupant injury? 

Ms. GADHIA. As we noted in our written testimony that the 

NHTSA regulation is going to require EDRs to collect—the cars 

that do have EDRs to collect certain standardized amounts of data 

from 2013 model year cars. We would like to see that happen sooner. We think there is a utility to the information that they collect. 

But there are some privacy concerns about ownership of the data, 

as you mentioned, Representative Braley, and in the past Consumers Union has submitted comments to NHTSA as they were 


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considering the regulation that the final rule that they put forward 

in 2006 and I would be happy to share that with your office. 

Mr. BRALEY. Please do. That would be much appreciated. 

Ms. Claybrook, I want to finish with you. One of the things that 

we know from the medical field, there is a process called differential diagnosis, and that is when a physician is presented with a 

sick patient, they come with the hierarchy of the possible causes 

of their illness beginning with the most likely and descending to 

the least likely, and then the physician goes through a process of 

testing and evaluation to try to rule out what could be causing the 

illness to be able to reach a final diagnosis and a plan of treatment. 

And one of the concerns I have with the response we have seen to 

some of the problems with the Toyota recall is that the differential 

diagnosis that Toyota engaged in was limited, it appeared to many 

of us, to a mechanical failure, and they have now participated in 

massive recalls to address sticky accelerator pedals and problems 

with floor mats. And yet we still see reports of sudden unintended 

acceleration in vehicles where those retrofits have been made. So 

can you comment based on your experience as a former NHTSA administrator and as somebody involved in a long period of public 

safety advocacy on what you think needs to be done to get to the 

underlying cause? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Well, Toyota is the only company, the only entity that can do that. They designed the vehicle, they created the 

software, they have software engineers who did it. The National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration should not design the remedy. It never has in any case ever. And it doesn’t have the capacity 

to do the kind of evaluation that is necessary to figure out what 

the underlying cause is. A lot of people have said that figuring out 

a software glitch is almost impossible in some cases, particularly 

if no marker is left that this glitch even occurred, a marker left in 

the computer. And so that is why a lot of people have talked about 

the brake override as the only possible solution because we just 

don’t—at least we don’t know, maybe Toyota does but we don’t 

know what the problem is. I think it is very interesting that Toyota 

has said it is a floor mat recall of 5 million cars and yet the remedy 

that they are putting in most of those cars is not only to remove 

or fix the pedal and the floor mat but to put in a brake override 

system, which is an electronic fix. Why did they put an electronic 

fix in if it is the floor mat or the pedal? They say it is for customer, 

you know, so they will feel safe. I think it is because it is a software problem, and if the vehicles have been fixed with the floor 

mat and the pedal and the pedal and they still run away, then 

there is obviously another problem, and I think there are also vehicles that are not covered by the recall that may have these problems. They may not be identical. They may use different software 

so they are not identical problems. But there is no question in my 

mind that this is an electronic issue, and I think the company took 

the position early on that it wasn’t because that hurts their sales 

with consumers. Consumers don’t like software glitches they can’t 

understand, and they couldn’t change. Now if they change their 

mind, they are going to be subject to 18 U.S.C. 1001 lying to the 

government and going to jail. So they are in a very difficult posiVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:53 Nov 27, 2012 Jkt 076016 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A016.XXX A016

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tion. Why would they do that now that they have taken this position in the hardcore way that they have. 

I was at a Senate hearing the other day and there were 21 people representing Toyota sitting in front of me, and I said to them, 

gee, you have a lot of lobbyists, and they said oh, no, no, these are 

all communications people. I think that they are looking at this as 

a communications fix as opposed to a real fix. 

Mr. BRALEY. I want to thank all the witnesses for your impressive testimony and look forward to working with all of you as we 

move forward on these important issues, and I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. RUSH. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and the Chair himself also thanks all the witnesses again for your patience and for 

your time that you have contributed to us. Your testimony has 

been invaluable as we proceed down this path for reauthorizing 

NHTSA, and the Chair thanks you and wants you to know that 

you have done a great service to the American people, the driving 

public, today. 

Thank you very much. The subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 


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Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce 

NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection 

March 11,2010 

Thank you, Chairman Rush, for holding this hearing. Last 

month, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 

examined the recent Toyota recalls and the government response 

to sudden unintended acceleration. Today, we take the next 

step: we will examine the reforms needed at NHTSA. 

NHTSA failed in its response to Toyota vehicles surging 

out of control. The indicators were there: NHTSA received 

thousands of consumer complaints as well as reports from a 

major insurance company indicating a trend. Several 

preliminary investigations were opened by NHTSA's Office of 

Defects Investigation, but the agency did not follow through. 

The scope of the investigations was too narrow. Engineers with 

the proper expertise were not engaged. The investigators relied 

too heavily on the company's claims about how its vehicles 

operate. And time and again the case was closed, while more 

complaints rolled in. 
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The lesson from the Toyota experience is that 

improvements are needed at the agency. NHTSA needs more 

resources, more expertise in emerging technologies, and 

stronger enforcement authorities. It also must provide better 

public transparency, strengthen its data collection, and exercise 

leadership. Let me just highlight a few of these needed reforms. 

There is a definite resource problem at NHTSA. The 

budget for the programs that oversee safety, testing, 

investigations, enforcement, and recalls has been virtually 

frozen for ten years. During this time, millions of new cars have 

been put on the road. 

There is also an expertise shortage. Cars are changing 

rapidly, but NHTSA has not changed along with them. Cars are 

now moving computers that are controlled by millions of lines 

of code. But NHTSA lacks electronics experts on staff. It looks 

for mechanical explanations when the evidence points to 

electronic defects. 

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NHTSA should have the capacity and the flexibility to stay 

ahead of technological change. 

In addition, the agency has lacked strong leadership - at 

least until recently. I want to welcome Administrator Strickland 

to the agency and to this Committee. He has had a busy first 

two months on the job. 

Administrator Strickland and Secretary LaHood have taken 

some important steps in recent months that demonstrate a 

commitment to protecting consumers and to ensuring the safety 

of vehicles on the road. 

I respect that Administrator Strickland and Secretary 

LaHood have stood behind the agency and its staff. But the 

investigation into Toyota has shown that the status quo is not 

working. This Committee wants to work with them to 

strengthen the agency and ensure that it has the resources and 

the capabilities to investigate possible defects and enforce the 

law. 

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I look forward to the testimony today and expect that it will 

be useful to this subcommittee as it begins to develop legislation 

aimed at strengthening the agency. Chairman Rush, I look 

forward to continuing to work with you on this important issue. 

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Opening Statement for CTCP Hearing "NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead" for 

Rep. Kathy Castor, FL-ll 

• Thank you, Chairman Rush, and good morning to my 

colleagues. We are here today because recent events have 

forced all of us to question whether the National Highway 

Safety and Transportation Administration is capable of 

proactively addressing basic safety concerns. 

• Not since the late 1990s when Ford Explorers were rolling 

over because of defective Firestone tires has a recall been the 

cause of so much alarm and anger. 

• And justifiably so-39 deaths have been linked to runaway 

Toyotas, not to mention the injuries, both physical and 

emotional, that have lingered. 

• When people are literally scared to death to get in their cars, 

you know you have a bigjob on your hands convincing them 

that you're doing everything you can to protect their safety. 

• In a recent CNN poll, 42 percent of respondents said the 

federal government's response was slow. We can do better. 

• Today's hearing gives us a chance to prevent the Toyota 

fiasco from happening again, to the best of our abilities. 

• What we need to know now is what NHTSA's capabilities 

are and what can be done to strengthen the oversight system 

as a whole. 

• To put it simply: does NHTSA have the regulatory strength 

required to effectively protect American consumers? 
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• And does NHTSA have the budget and manpower to carry 

out its mandate to save lives, prevent injuries, and reduce the 

economic cost of crashes? 

• Or, as many have claimed, has it delegated that authority to 

carmakers and relied too heavily on their data and resources? 

• On the point of strength, NHTSA usually relies on voluntary 

recalls to address defects. 

• It has the authority to issue mandatory recalls but hasn't done 

so since 1979. 

• And in many cases, voluntary recalls have gotten the job 

done, saved lives, and kept costs to the public and the 

Administration down. 

• In other cases, though, such as the Firestone and Toyota 

recalls, we have to wonder ifNHTSA used its authority to 

the fullest extent of the law in defense of consumer safety. 

• So, what is the process that NHTSA follows to determine if it 

should take action? 

• Well, the Office of Defects Investigation inside NHTSA has 

to wade through thousands of consumer complaints each year 

to determine if a recall is the most effective way to protect 

drivers. 

• Following up on these complaints takes considerable time, 

money, and staff, which ODI seems to have very little of 

these days. 

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• In fact, former Administrator Joan Claybrook, who is 

testifying today, recently explained to Congress that in the 

1970s, 119 people worked in the enforcement division of 

NHTSA. 

• Today, there are just 57 staffers assigned to enforcing the 

rules of the road. 

• And sometimes it has just been easier and cheaper to listen to 

what the manufacturers say about their own cars. 

• The Washington Post recently reported that officials have at 

times minimized or simply rejected consumer accounts of 

what happened in favor of the manufacturers' assessments. 

• Which leads us to ask what can be done to improve 

NHTSA's oversight authority and the resources it has to step 

up its efforts. 

• My hope is that we will leave here today with solutions and 

not just more questions. 

• Thank you all. I look forward to the testimony of our 

witnesses, and I yield the balance of my time. 

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Statement of the Honorable Joe Barton 

Ranking Member, Committee on Energy & Commerce 

March 11,2010 

"NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead" 

Thank you, Chairman Rush for calling this timely hearing on the oversight of 

NHTSA. I strongly believe that it is our primary job to investigate when 

problems appear, determine what went wrong, and make adjustments as 

necessary. 

I'd like to start my comments by praising NHTSA for its role in shepherding 

us into the safest period in automobile history. Despite record numbers of 

drivers on the MV A rolls and record number of cars on the road, we have the 

lowest number of both fatal crashes and automobile-related fatalities in 

history. 

That said, in recent weeks, it has become clear that something went terribly 

wrong with certain Toyota vehicles. What is not so clear is whether this was 

a regulatory failure. We have heard a wide range of criticisms identifYing 

problems -- from the relationship between industry and its regulator, to a 

revolving door at the agency, to a lack of sufficient authority, to a reluctance 

to use its existing authority, to a lack of strong enough penalties that would 

"scare" industry into doing the right thing "or else." 

At the other end of the spectrum, we've heard that NHTSA has adequate 

resources and powers, but that the facts haven't changed and therefore neither 

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would the agency's actions there still isn't enough information to identifY 

the cause of the safety issue to support a mandatory recall. 

Whatever the cause may be, I want to caution against knee-jerk reaction. 

Some folks never met a regulation they didn't love, or a problem that 

couldn't be fixed by a lot more government. But as recent history has shown 

with the CPSIA bill, there's quite a difference between careful legislating and 

meddling. There's certainly a problem to be solved here, and the Department 

of Transportation's Inspector General has launched an investigation into 

NHTSA's handling of the Toyota recalls. I hope that if we move down the 

road toward altering NHTSA' s authorities, we would await the results of that 

investigation instead of throwing quickie so-called "solutions" at the wall and 

hoping one of them sticks. We'll be prouder of the outcome if we identifY the 

actual problem before we try to fix it. 

As I said moments ago, there is no question there was a failure here. Our job 

is to determine where that failure occurred. Is it a safety standard failure? Is 

it operator failure? Is it a regulatory failure? IfNHTSA simply didn't 

properly use the tools it already has - or a "system failure" as one witness 

described it at the 0&1 hearing - there is no need, particularly in this fiscal 

climate, to throw good money after bad. Our job is to find the problem (if 

there is a problem) and fix the problem, not just throw money at the problem. 

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Again, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you for holding this timely hearing in 

the interest of protecting all of us on the road, and a thank you to our 

witnesses today for giving their time and expertise to help us with that goal. 

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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

for Administrator David L. Strickland 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

March 11,2010 Hearing 

"NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead" 

Questions from Congressman Dingell 

l. Sufficiency of Existing NHTSA Authorities and Resources 

QUESTION I: Are the reporting provisions of the TREAD Act being effectively implemented 

by NHTSA and automobile manufacturers? Please explain your response and submit supporting 

materials for the record. 

RESPONSE I: The reporting provisions of the TREAD Act have been effectively implemented. 

In 2002, NHTSA first published its Early Warning Reporting (EWR) regulations requiring that 

motor vehicle and equipment manufacturers report certain early warning data quarterlyproduction information; information on incidents involving death or injury; aggregate data on 

property damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty claims, and field reports; and copies of 

field reports (other than dealer reports and product evaluation reports) involving specified 

vehicle components, a fire, or a rollover. Since 2002, NHTSA has amended the EWR 

regulations. Also. as required by the TREAD Act, NHTSA has issued a regulation requiring 

manufacturers to report to NHTSA foreign recalls or other foreign safety campaigns covering an 

identical or substantially similar motor vehicle, motor vehicle equipment or tire; to require 

manufacturers to submit annual lists of substantially similar vehicles; and to make EWR 

reporting more efficient and focused. On an ongoing basis, NHTSA reviews the reporting 

requirements and our analytical methods to determine whether additional requirements or 

improvements are necessary to identify potential safety concerns more effectively and 

efficiently, and intends to implement those changes as necessary. 

The Early Warning Division ofNHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) reviews and 

analyzes a huge volume of early warning data and documents submitted by manufacturers. ODI 

uses other sources of information (such as consumer complaints from vehicle owner 

questionnaires (VOQs) and manufacturers' own communications) as well as EWR data to 

identifY and investigate potential safety defects. NHTSA has utilized EWR data to assist in 

opening 110 defect investigations, which resulted in over 11 million recalled vehicles and 

equipment. Specifically, EWR data has prompted the opening of28 defect investigations, 

accelerated the opening of 30 defect investigations, and supported the opening of 52 other defect 

investigations. We believe that these facts demonstrate the effective implementation of the 

reporting provisions of the TREAD. 

QUESTION 2: Did the TREAD reporting system accomplish what was necessary to protect the 

public safety in the recent Toyota recall cases? If not, please provide for the record where and 

how the system failed, both at NHTSA and Toyota. 
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RESPONSE 2: NHTSA receives significant information from manufacturers that submit EWR 

data. Light vehicle manufacturers producing 5,000 or more vehicles annually are required to 

report U.S. and foreign death incidents and U.S. injury incidents based on claims and notices to 

the manufacturer and total counts of property damage claims, warranty claims, consumer 

complaints, requests or demands for relief related to a crash received by the manufacturer, and 

field reports. In addition to providing counts of field reports, manufacturers must also provide 

actual copies of the field reports. 

2 

Manufacturers report information under 20 general components or system categories. 

Unintended acceleration issues normally would be included under the speed control component. 

We note that not all speed control issues are unintended acceleration. Speed control may include 

other acceleration issues such as problems with the cruise control. In addition, incidents of 

unintended acceleration may also have been reported under another component, such as brakes. 

Since mid-2003, Toyota has reported claims and notices of 17 deaths and 352 injuries, under the 

speed control component in EWR through the fourth quarter of2009. Toyota has also reported 

141, 141 warranty claims, 11,321 consumer complaints, 1,328 field reports (including dealer field 

reports), and 622 property damage claims in the EWR aggregate data for speed control. In 

addition, Toyota has submitted 381 speed control field reports through the fourth quarter of 

2009. 

Compared to other manufacturers, Toyota has not reported the highest number of speed control 

deaths and injuries, and Toyota does not have the highest rate of "speed control" deaths and 

injuries. Toyota has the fourth highest rate of speed control deaths and injuries based on the 

manufacturer's average quarterly production volume. Overall, Toyota speed control aggregate 

data does not stand out from its peers. 

Although EWR data collected in accordance with the TREAD Act is very important, it is not the 

leading source of information that NHTSA uses to spot defect trends. Complaints from 

consumers are still a more important source and can even provide earlier warning of a problem 

than EWR data because consumers often report their problems to NHTSA immediately allowing 

the agency to review those reports soon after an incident. EWR data are submitted by 

manufacturers quarterly and reflect information received by the manufacturer some months 

previously. In the Toyota situation, just five consumer complaints were enough to trigger an 

investigation into the use of all-weather floor mats in 2007, which were causing high-speed, open 

throttle incidents. On the other hand, a small number ofEWR reports pointed NHTSA to a 

concern with a trim panel that, when loose, was causing unintended acceleration in Sienna vans. 

In both cases, NHTSA's investigations led to recalls. Therefore, we believe that EWR data 

along with other information available to NHTSA, such as consumer complaints, is adequate to 

enable NHTSA to protect the public from potential safety defects. 

QUESTION 3: Is there any critical data or source of data needed by NHTSA that is not 

currently provided to it under the TREAD Act or other reporting requirements for automobile 

manufacturers? If so, please describe this data and what is required for NHTSA to obtain it. 
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RESPONSE 3: NHTSA does not believe there is any critical data or source of data that is not 

currently provided to NHTSA under the TREAD Act or that NHTSA could not require 

submission of under current authority. However, on an ongoing basis, NHTSA reviews the 

reporting requirements and our analytical methods to determine whether additional requirements 

or improvements are necessary to identify potential safety concerns more effectively and 

efficiently. Based on recent reviews, we believe that some component categories could be 

refined to provide more useful information on technologies recently introduced into the market, 

particularly crash avoidance technologies that are heavily dependent on electronics, and we plan 

to amend the rule to require manufacturers to report on these additional categories. We are also 

considering expanding the reporting requirements to cover actions taken by manufacturers 

concerning vehicle components that are used in vehicles sold here even if not used in a 

substantially similar vehicle. This would ensure NHTSA's awareness ofa problem involving a 

common part, even if used in dissimilar vehicles. 

QUESTION 4: Do you believe NHTSA made mistakes in its response to the recent Toyota 

recalls? Likewise, should NHTSA have pushed Toyota to initiate recalls earlier than it did? 

RESPONSE 4: NHTSA's objective in conducting investigations is to determine ifthere is a 

defect that poses an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety in a particular vehicle or series of 

vehicles. During the relevant time period, NHTSA's screening process separately identified 

instances of pedal entrapment in other Toyota vehicles such as the Lexus ES350 (via all weather 

floor mat interaction with the pedal) and the Sienna (via trim panel movement). This work led to 

investigations which ultimately influenced Toyota to conduct safety recalls in the affected 

vehicles. 

In March 2007, NHTSA opened an investigation into pedal entrapment by floor mats in MY 

2007 Lexus ES350 vehicles based on five complaints. Toyota maintained that the vehicles and 

the all-weather floor mats did not contain a defect because in all the identified incidents, the floor 

mats were not properly installed in the vehicle. After upgrading the investigation and many 

discussions and meetings with Toyota, NHTSA influenced Toyota's decision to issue a recall of 

the floor mats in September 2007. NHTSA made sure that the replacement floor mats were 

shaped in such a way that, even if not properly installed, they could not entrap the accelerator. 

After the fatal San Diego crash in August 2009, there was evidence of further pedal entrapment. 

In light of the severity of the potential consequences of pedal entrapment, NHTSA pursued the 

matter with Toyota, insisting on a vehicle-based remedy, and Toyota issued a pedal recall. 

NHTSA pursued recalls with Toyota when the agency had information pointing to a safety 

defect. However, at least in the recall of the sticky pedal in Toyota vehicles, Toyota failed to 

notifY NHTSA of safety defects in a timely manner as required by law. As a result, Toyota has 

agreed to pay nearly $16.4 million in civil penalties. NHTSA still has two additional 

investigations pending (a Timeliness Query investigation of the pedal entrapment recall and a 

Recall Query investigation into the scope of both recalls) to determine what Toyota knew about 

each of these problems and when Toyota knew it, as well as whether the scope of each recall was 

appropriate and the remedies effective. 
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OUESTION 5: What authorities does NHTSA lack, whether under the TREAD Act or 

otherwise, with which to address defects in automobiles deemed hazardous to the public safety? 

RESPONSE 5: We have been reviewing our statutory authorities, looking at such issues as: 

4 

Are the current civil penalties adequate to serve as a deterrent? Would the public be better 

served if, in the rare case of a truly imminent hazard, NHTSA could issue a recall order more 

promptly and with quicker judicial review than under current law? Are there ways to improve 

the ability of consumers to file complaints with NHTSA or enhance the information we receive 

from manufacturers and, do any of those possible improvements require legislative change? We 

look forward to working with the committee in evaluating how NHTSA's ability to perform its 

safety mission might be strengthened through legislation. 

OUESTION 6: Does NHTSA have in place a ranking system for determining the priority of 

detects investigations? If so, please describe this system. If not, please explain why no such 

system is in place. Further, ifno such system is in place, should one be, and how should it be 

structured? Should it be mandated under statute? 

RESPONSE 6: We believe that our safety defect screening and investigation process works well 

in identifYing, investigating, and remedying safety defects in the field. NHTSA's process is 

data-driven, and decisions are based on input from around the agency. NHTSA uses the basic 

principles of risk analysis when deciding what issues to investigate and which investigations 

involve issues that should be the subject of a safety recall. Under those principles, the risk 

involved in a situation can be determined by considering both the frequency of the potential 

harm and the severity of the potential consequences of the harm. During both the preinvestigation and investigation processes, NHTSA applies these risk analysis principles, 

including an analysis of the frequency and severity of the possible defect. 

At the pre-investigative stage the analysis is focused on spotting possible defect trends that might 

warrant an investigation. A frequency assessment provides information regarding current failure 

rates and, often, data from peer vehicles or from prior similar investigations and recalls. A 

failure trend may be included as part of the frequency assessment to show if complaints are 

increasing, decreasing or constant as a function oftime in service. The severity assessment 

provides an analysis of the harm that has resulted from the failures that have already occurred 

and the potential for harm to occur in the future. The harm is measured not only by the number 

of crashes, fires and injuries that have occurred, but also by their severity and the likelihood that 

sim ilar events will occur. In general terms, then, this process is designed to surface for 

investigation the issues presenting a significant degree of safety risk, with priority given to those 

that may pose the highest risk. 

Once an investigation has been opened, managers and investigators on an ongoing basis review 

the entire list of pending investigations to identifY those that seem to entail the highest or most 

immediate safety risks. Managers then focus staff investigators on moving those investigations 

more quickly and communicating to the manufacturers the agency's perception of urgency, 

without lessening pressure on other investigations. Any ranking system would seem to be based 

on similar ideas of comparative risk. However, the agency does not use systems that would 

publicly identify some investigations as lower priority (as any ranking system would have to do) 
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to reduce the likelihood that manufacturers would delay safety recalls based on a low ranking. 

Also. because the agency's perception of the risk entailed in a particular investigation often 

changes as it receives more information, the necessity to change rankings periodically would be 

inefficient and increase the risk of confusion to the public. We believe that our flexible 

application of risk analysis principles serves to prioritize the most important matters and that a 

mandated ranking system would not benefit safety. 

5 

QUESTION 7: There seems to be broad agreement about the need to increase the resources 

available to NHTSA to carry out its mission. Could you suggest by how much NHTSA's budget 

should be increased, as well as the rationale for this amount? 

RESPONSE 7: The President's FY 2011 budget requests 66 additional personnel to help 

strengthen our ability to address safety issues on the nation's roadways. If approved and funded 

by the Congress, the agency plans to use those positions where they are needed to ensure that the 

agency is meeting its various safety responsibilities. including additional resources to the Office 

of Defects Investigations. 

II. Penalties 

QUESTION I: Are the civil penalties NHTSA is allowed under statute to assess sufficient for 

the agency to deter non-compliance by automobile manufacturers? Please explain your answer. 

RESPONSE 1: No. We believe that the maximum civil penalties should be increased. They are 

but a very small percentage of the manufacturers' finances. 

QUESTION 2: Are there additional criminal penalties that the Congress should consider 

allowing NHTSA to impose on automobile manufacturers? If there are, please name and discuss 

them. 

RESPONSE 2: No. 

QUESTION 3: Are you concerned that the threat of criminal penalties will chill 

communications between manufacturers and NHTSA? Please explain your response. 

RESPONSE 3: No. 

III Domestic vs. Foreign Automobile Manufacturers 

QUESTION 1: My questioning of James Lentz, Toyota's chief of sales for North America, 

revealed that decisions to recall Toyota vehicles sold in North America are made in Japan. I am 

concerned this is a threat to public safety in this country. Do you agree? 

RESPONSE 1: We do not necessarily believe that because Toyota's recall decisions are made in 

Japan, that this alone constitutes a threat to public safety. We note that other foreign 
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manufacturers who make recall decisions outside the United States are better at facing up to 

recall decisions. 

6 

Rather, we are concerned with Toyota's pattern of behavior of sitting on matters and pushing 

back in investigations, including situations where the consequences of inaction could result in 

harm to the public. It was difficult to engage in productive discussions with Toyota not only 

because the Washington Office of Toyota, with whom the agency communicated, had no 

authority to make decisions, but also because we believe that the decision-makers in Japan gavc 

insufficient weight to information that was passed on to Toyota in Japan. NHTSA expressed our 

concerns during the December 15, 2009 meeting between NHTSA and Toyota officials in Japan. 

OUESTION 2: How should this be corrected? For example, should foreign automobile 

manufacturers that sell vehicles in the United States be required to empower their personnel here 

to initiate recalls? 

RESPONSE 2: As stated above, some foreign manufacturers that make recall decisions outside 

the United States have better decision-making processes than Toyota. Because these other 

foreign manufacturers seem to make more timely safety decisions, we believe that the culture of 

the company and its understanding and respect for the laws of the United States are more 

important that the geographic location. 

Recently, Toyota announced a fundamental change in the way Toyota responds to safety 

concerns. Toyota established a Special Committee for Global Quality and added a system to 

bettcr share safety information and to work more closely with government agencies. Toyota also 

announced that its North American operations will have more autonomy and decision-making 

power with regard to recalls and other safety issues. These structural changes may improve 

Toyota's performance on safcty recall issues, but the attitude of the company and its employees 

with regard to adhering to the company's obligations under our law is likely to be far more 

important than structure. 

OUESTION 3: Is there a quantitative difference in response times between domestic and foreign 

automobile manufacturers to NHTSA data inquiries? If so, what do you believe is the cause for 

this? 

RESPONSE 3: Domestic manufacturers are usually allowed six weeks (0 respond to an 

information request and foreign manufacturers are usually allowed seven weeks. Foreign 

manufacturers may have additional issues that may delay response, such as document translation. 

Nevertheless, generally there has not been a significant difference between domestic and foreign 

response times for information request letters. 

OUESTION 4: Is there a quantitative or qualitative difference in the data provided to NHTSA 

by domestic and foreign automobile manufacturers? If so, what do you believe is the cause for 

this? 
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RESPONSE 4: There are some differences in the way the manufacturers present data, but 

generally the data have been similar. This is a company specific issue, and does not appear to be 

related to a company's foreign or domestic status. 

IV Conflict of Interest Rules 

QUESTION I: Are NHTSA's current conflict-of-interest rules sufficient to protect the agency 

from undue influence from former staff? Please briefly explain your answer. 

RESPONSE I: Current and former NHTSA employees are subject to the government-wide postemployment restrictions found in criminal law and the rules of the Office of Government Ethics. 

Under these existing restrictions, all former federal employees are pennanently restricted from 

appearing before the government about a specific project on which they worked while a federal 

employee. These rules are designed to avoid conflicts of interest without unduly limiting 

employment of federal employees in their areas of expertise when they leave the government. 

We do not believe that these government-wide conflict of interest rules have had any negative 

impact on the Toyota matters or on any other defect investigation. 

QUESTION 2: ffyou believe this is not the case, should new conflict-of-interest rules be 

codified in statute, or should that be left to the NHTSA to set for itself? 

RESPONSE 2: As noted above, we do not believe that government-wide conflict of interest 

rules applicable to all Executive branch employees have had any negative impact on the Toyota 

matters or on any other defect investigation. To the extent that ethics requirements are changed, 

we believe that any additional post-employment restrictions should have government-wide 

application. 

Questions from Congresswoman Sutton 

QUESTION I: Do you think the current cap of $16.5 million on the civil penalties that NHTSA 

can levy on a manufacturer for failure to comply with NHTSA regulations is adequate for the 

types of situations such as the Toyota recalls of over 8 million vehicles? What might be a more 

appropriate cap on such fines? 

RESPONSE 1: We think the current cap limits the deterrent effect of civil penalty actions with 

regard to large corporations. If Congress decides to raise the cap, it should be at a level that 

would provide a deterrent to such companies in situations that warrant a significant penalty. 

QUESTION 2: Do you believe that the reporting of data under the TREAD Early Warning 

System has provided data and information that has helped improve vehicle safety? 

RESPONSE 2: The agency believes the information reported by manufacturers to NHTSA is 

useful for identifYing potential safety defects in the affected vehicles in the U.S. Since 2004, the 

first full year in which NHTSA received Early Warning Reporting (EWR) data, the Office of 

Defects Investigation (ODI) has used the EWR data to assist in our safety-defect identification 
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investigation process. NHTSA has utilized EWR data to assist in opening 110 defect 

investigations, which resulted in over II million recalled vehicles and equipment. Specifically, 

EWR data has prompted the opening of28 defect investigations, accelerated the opening of 30 

defect investigations, and supported the opening of 52 other defect investigations 

QUESTION 3: Are you able to cffectively process all of the Early Warning Data that the 

manufacturers provide today? Does the current analytical capability allow you to effectively 

process the volume of Early Warning and other data that NHTSA receives from automakers and 

other sources? 

RESPONSE 3: We belicve that OD! is able to effectively process the EWR data that 

manufacturers report to NHTSA. ODI has developed and implemented a number of analytical 

methods to process the EWR data and identify potential safety-related defects. OD! reviews 

these analytical methods and improves them to help identifY trends and data that are outside the 

norm that are potentially related to safety defects. For example, one of the methods 'improves 

itself each quarter; the Bayesian Filter evaluates field reports using a computer program with 

probability formulas that considers how similar each field report is to ones that were previously 

identified as likely or not likely to indicate a safety-related defect. Each quarter, new field 

reports are added to help continuously improve this filter. 

QUESTION 4: Do you believe that there is substantially more Early Warning type data 

available to be collected that is not collected today? 

8 

RESPONSE 4: At this time, NHTSA does not believe there is substantially more Early Warning 

type data that the agency is not collecting. However, NHTSA reviews the reporting 

requirements and our analytical methods to determine whether revisions to what is reported are 

necessary to identify potential safety concerns more effectively and efficiently. Based on recent 

reviews, we believe that some component categories that are reported could be refined to provide 

more useful information on technologies recently introduced into the market, and we plan to 

amend the rule to require manufacturers to report on these additional categories. 

QUESTION 5: Can you tell me some of the areas in which NHTSA expertise might be missing 

or less effective than it could be? Is there readily available talent to fill these shortcomings in the 

current staffing? 

RESPONSE 5: NHTSA has a diverse and experienced workforce with extensive experience in 

automobile safety, including experts conducting defects investigations and experts researching 

and testing vehicle safety at NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center. NHTSA does not 

hesitate to reallocate resources within the agency's current staffing ceiling as necessary. In 

addition to our staff, NHTSA hires contractors to support OUf work when there are areas where 

we need special ized expertise. 

The President's FY 2011 budget requests 66 additional personnel to help strengthen our ability to 

address safety issues on the nations' roadways. If approved and funded by the Congress, the 

agency will use those positions where they are needed to ensure that the agency is meeting its 

various safety responsibilities. 
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QUESTION 6: Among the stated objectives of the Department of Transportation (DQT) is to 

prevent crashes before they actually occur and, therefore, reduce fatalities and injuries. As part 

of these efforts, DOT has examined the potential for advanced safety systems to assist in 

preventing heavy vehicle crashes. I understand that the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) intends to proceed with a rulemaking on stability control for 

commercial vehicles in 2010. Please provide an update on the status of the agency's internal 

deliberations. When does NHTSA plan to release the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)? 

RESPONSE 6: In December 2009, consistent with our 2009-2011 Rulemaking and Research 

Priority Plan and the 2009 DOT Motorcoach Action Plan, NHTSA tentatively decided to pursue 

a regulatory requirement for stability control systems on truck tractors and motorcoaches. We do 

not expect to publish the NPRM in 2010. Currently, we are working on developing a NPRM, 

including an estimated timetable for publishing the NPRM. 

QUESTIQN 7: Please summarize the highlights of the agency's research on stability control 

systems for commercial vehicles. I believe that NHTSA's studies, released in October 2009, 

indicated that Electronic Stability Control (versus Roll Stability Control) would save more lives, 

avert more injuries and overall- prevent approximately 4,659 truck crashes from occurring. 

Clearly, it is important that - if the agency decides to mandate it should mandate the more 

robust technology and seek to extract the maximum societal benefit from this rulemaking. 

RESPONSE 7: NHTSA's research program on stability control systems for commercial vehicles 

focuses on two main areas: (I) estimating the safety benefits of stability control systems and (2) 

developing performance requirements and objective tests. 

Safety benefits research: 

Combination vehicles (tractor semitrailers): NHTSA completed a combination vehicle 

stability control report ("Safety Benefits of Stability Control Systems for TractorSemitrailers" (DOT HS 811 205) in October 2009. This report estimated that Roll 

Stability Control (RSC) systems could reduce 3,489 crashes and 106 fatalities annually. 

The report also estimated that Electronic Stability Control (ESC) could reduce 4,659 

crashes and 126 fatalities annually. 

Single Unit Trucks and Buses: NHTSA is performing similar research to estimate the 

benefits of stabi lity control systems for straight trucks and buses and a final report will be 

published in early 20 II. 

Performance requirements and objective test development: 

Combination vehicles (tractor semitrailers) and motorcoaches: NHTSA has completed 

research to develop performance requirements and objective tests for tractor semitrailers 

and motorcoach vehicles and expects to publish final reports documenting this research 

later this year (2010). 

Single Unit Trucks and Buses: Research is underway and scheduled to be completed in 

2011. 
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10 

QUESTIQN 8: Has the agency made a decision regarding which type of technology it will 

mandate? ESC - Electronic Stability Control (commercial vehicle stability technology that helps 

mitigate rollovers and loss-of-control crashes) or RSC - Roll Stability Control (commercial 

vehicle stability technology that only helps mitigate rollovers)? 

RESPONSE 8: NHTSA has not made a final decision yet. NHTSA has been conducting 

research on both types of stability systems and is reviewing this research. 

QUESTIQN 9: NHTSA is required to complete a rigorous cost-benefit analysis for each of its 

regulations. Has the agency commenced this process relative to the expected stability control 

rulemaking? Is NHTSA taking into account the financial benefit that would be accrued from 

preventing the associated commercial vehicle crashes? 

RESPONSE 9: NHTSA has started the process of analyzing the costs and benefits of regulating 

stability control in commercial vehicles. In October 2009, NHTSA released a report ("Safety 

Benefits of Stability Control Systems for Tractor-Semitrailers" (DOT HS 811 205) that 

contained preliminary costs and benefits information. We are performing further analyses to 

measure the costs and benefits associated with any proposal, including the reduction of fatalities, 

injuries, property damage and travel delay as a result of preventing crashes. 

QUESTION 10: The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, 

released in 2009, indicated that NHTSA would "develop performance requirements and assess 

the safety benefits for stability control systems on motorcoaches to reduce rollover events" in the 

fourth quarter of2009. DOT highlighted this activity as a priority given that "rollover crashes 

involving motorcoaches account for the largest portion offatalities at 37 percent." What is the 

status of these efforts? Has NHTSA made a decision to proceed with a rulemaking on ESC 

stability control systems for motorcoaches as it indicated in this action plan? If so, would the 

agency seek to conduct this rulemaking in tandem with the regulation concerning commercial 

vehicles? 

RESPONSE 10: NHTSA has developed performance requirements and assessed safety benefits 

of ESC systems on motorcoaehes as well as on tractor-semitrailers. In December 2009, 

consistent with our 2009-201 I Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan and the 2009 DOT 

Motorcoach Action Plan, NHTSA tentatively decided to pursuc a regulatory requirement for 

stability control system on truck tractors and motorcoaches. We are working on developing a 

plan for an NPRM and have not yet decided on a publication date for the NPRM. 

QUESTION 11: Is NHTSA considering a rulemaking on Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems for 

heavy vehicles? I am aware that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), as part of its 

report on an August 2008 motorcoach crash, has recommended that tire pressure monitoring 

systems be required for all motor vehicles weighing more than 10,000 pounds. 

RESPONSE II: NHTSA and DOT's Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 

are conducting research on heavy truck tire pressure monitoring systems (TPMS) technology, 

functionality, test procedures, and performance criteria. Currently, FMCSA is conducting a field 

operation test that is expected to be completed in 20 I O. This assessment will be used to develop 
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a cost/benefit assessment ofTPMS for heavy vehicles, and is expected to help NHTSA 

detennine the possible next steps, including whether rulemaking should be considered. Any 

regulation promulgated by NHTSA would apply to new vehicles. 

QUESTION 12: The NTSB has also issued recommendations in favor of collision warning 

systems with active braking for commercial vehicles. Is NHTSA conducting research on these 

systems and developing perfonnance standards for them? If so, what is the status of this 

research? Has the agency considered a potential rulemaking on these systems? 

11 

RESPONSE 12: NHTSA is researching collision warning systems that incorporate active 

braking, also referred to as collision mitigation braking (CMB) systems. Currently, we are 

performing a test track evaluation of commercially available CMB systems, and we expect to 

complete the initial evaluation of their performance capabilities in 2010. NHTSA plans to 

conduct follow-up research to develop performance requirements and objective tests in 2010-

2011. In addition, NHTSA is conducting research to evaluate the potential costs and benefits of 

CMB systems, and this research is expected to be completed in 2011. Based on this research, 

NHTSA will detennine the appropriate next steps for collision warning and active braking 

systems. 

Questions from Congressman Barton 

QUESTION 1: Please describe the criteria NHTSA uses to decide which investigations to 

in itiate based on risk of hann and in what priority those criteria are considered. 

RESPONSE I: NHTSA uses basic principles of risk analysis when deciding what issues to 

investigate and which investigations involve issues that should be the subject of a safety recall. 

Under those principles, the risk involved in a situation can be assessed by considering both the 

frequency of the potential hann and the severity of the potential consequences of the harm. At 

the pre-investigative stage, the analysis is focused on spotting possible defect trends that might 

warrant an investigation. A frequency assessment provides information regarding current failure 

rates and often data from peer vehicles and from prior similar investigations and recalls. A 

failure trend may be included as part of the frequency assessment to show if complaints are 

increasing, decreasing or constant as a function of time in service. The severity assessment 

provides an analysis ofthe hann that has resulted from the failures and the potential for harm to 

occur in the future. In general terms, then, this process is designed to surface for investigation 

the issues presenting a significant degree of safety risk, with priority given to those that may 

pose the highest risk. 

QUESTIQN la: NHTSA received approximately 2,000 consumer complaints of unintended 

acceleration in 2009. Please state where the reports regarding Toyota vehicles fall in relation to 

all complaints of unintended acceleration from all other manufacturers. 

RESPONSE I a: Consumer complaints to NHTSA are not labeled with a condition code that 

identifies the various conditions referred to as unintended acceleration. To identify possible 

complaints of unintended acceleration, NHTSA used a broad keyword search of eomplaint 

narratives. The results, therefore, included reports alleging a variety of conditions reported by 
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drivers. The search criteria were deliberately over inclusive and, as a result, some ofthe 

complaints captured by the search do not include sudden acceleration. Of the 2009 complaints, 

this search identified a total of 1,985 complaints from all vehicle manufacturers. This t1gure 

constitutes approximately 5 percent of all safety defect complaints in 2009. 

12 

Ofthe 1,985 complaints, Toyota had the highest number (649) of such complaints, accounting 

for approximately 33 percent of the total. Ford had the next highest number of such complaints 

with 355, accounting for 18 percent of the total. The remaining manufacturers accounted for 

much smaller portions of the total. 

We note that ofthe 1,985 Toyota-related complaints in 2009, the majority of the complaints (73 

percent) werc received during a four-month period after the tragic crash in San Diego in August 

2009, which received considerable publicity. Before August, Toyota's share of the complaint 

volume relative to other manufacturers, while higher, did not stand out. 

OUESTION 1 b: Please state whether NHTSA plans to investigate any of the complaints of 

unintended acceleration for a make and model other than Toyota. 

RESPONSE Ib: NHTSA has reviewed and continues to review the complaints of unintended 

acceleration in other vehicles. We are monitoring the complaints to determine whether to open 

investigations into unintended acceleration in other vehicles. As a result of our ongoing 

monitoring, on April 29, 2010, we opened an investigation into the 2007 Dodge Calibers for a 

sticky accelerator pedal condition. The condition in the Caliber pedal, which involves parts that 

loosen and can lead to a stuck accelerator, is not the same as the defect in the recalled Toyota 

vehicles. 

OUESTION I c: Please explain how NHTSA factors new problems presenting in vehicles that 

have been on the road for more than a decade in the context of detennining whether there is a 

problem with newer models. For instance, at least two of the Toyotas identified in the timeline 

NHTSA provided to this Committee were more than 10 years old at the time of the incidents. 

RESPONSE I c: In most cases, problems in vehicles that are over a decade old bear little 

relevance to issues of unintended acceleration in newer models. On average, light vehicles at 

this age have expended most of their useful service lives, and the accumulation ofa decade or 

more of service by a particular vehicle is likely to have a greater effect on the vehicle's safety 

than any potential latent safety defects. The two vehicles identitled in the time line provided to 

the Committee were a 1989 Camry involved in a fatal crash at the end of2003 and a 1996 

Avalon involved in a fatal crash in mid 2009. NHTSA generated that timeline using broad 

parameters - fatal incidents in which a vehicle-based cause of unintended acceleration was 

alleged. In those two incidents, vehicle age and older technology (mechanical throttles) placed 

those vehicles outside the scope of the recent attention applied to electronic throttle control 

systems. However, NHTSA is conducting further follow-up and review ofthe incidents listed in 

the timeline as part of its broader effort to uncover the causes of unintended acceleration. 
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QUESTION Id: Please describe how imposing strict mandatory recall triggers would impact 

NHTSA's effectiveness at identifying risk and prioritizing investigations, particularly if the 

Office of Defects Investigation cannot determine whether a defect exists. Please state whether 

you believe mandatory recall triggers would save lives, particularly if a problem has not been or 

cannot be identified. 

RESPQNSE Id: The Office of Defects Investigation (OD!) considers a significant amount of 

information -- the frequency of the failures (raw numbers, failure as a percentage of the 

population, failure rate after a specific amount of time in service) and a review of the severity of 

the consequences of failures (crashes, if1juries, fatalities). Different types of failures in different 

systems pose different levels of safety risk for reasons not necessarily related to the frequency of 

the failure. For example, a loss of steering is extremely severe and just a few reports would 

trigger an investigation, whereas reports concerning extended stops would require more analysis 

to understand the reports and ensure that they are truly a safety defect. If strict mandatory recall 

triggers based on frequency of complaints were imposed, a number of problems would ensue. 

Complaints by consumers, of course, are of varying quality. Consumers' descriptions and their 

attribution of the experience to a particular cause is not necessarily based on any expertise. 

Triggering investigations based solely on the number of such complaints would ignore the 

severity portion of the risk and commit agency resources to matters that may be frequent but not 

of significant risk. Those resources might well be diverted from investigations involving lower 

frequency but higher potential severity. 

We believe that mandatory recall triggers would not necessarily save lives. If a satety-related 

defective component or system could not be identified, the manufacturer may not be able to take 

the appropriate action to remedy the defect. Even in instances where a defect is identified, the 

manufacturer may still dispute the severity ofthe problem and whether it meets the legal 

requirements to classify the problem as an "unreasonable risk" to highway safety. 

QUESTION 2: In her testimony before the Government Reform Committee, Ms. Claybrook 

characterized NHTSA as a "lapdog" as opposed to a "watchdog," alleged that industry views 

NHTSA with contempt, and criticized the agency for not using its subpoena power in decades. 

According to industry observers, this is because cooperation and communication between 

industry and the agency are at an all-timc high with the advent of the safety database and other 

TREAD Act improvements. Please state whether you agree with Ms. Claybrook's assessments. 

If not, please explain your response. 

RESPONSE 2: We disagree with Ms. Claybrook's characterization ofNHTSA as a "lapdog." 

We note that since Ms. Claybrook's departure in 1981, the agency has influenced 2,777 recalls 

affecting over 281 million vehicles and items of equipment. The pace of vehicle recalls 

influenced by NHTSA investigations in recent years compares quite favorably to what it was 

during Ms. Claybrook's tenure. NHTSA takes its enforcement responsibilities seriously. During 

an investigation, NHTSA compels manufacturers to submit information through NHTSA's 

process of issuing requests for document production and responses to questions. We have found 

that these formal requests are a better way to obtain the information we ask for than issuing 

subpoenas. 
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OUESTION 3: Numerous critics have chastised NHTSA for not using its subpoena power or 

mandatory recall authority more frequently. However, the agency frequently issues Information 

Requests and has facilitated thousands of voluntary recalls. Please describe the compulsory 

nature of these requests, whether NHTSA issues these requests as an alternative to subpoenas, 

and why NHTSA so frequently issues these requests versus a sUbpoena. 

RESPONSE 3: NHTSA compels manufacturers to answer questions and produce documents 

under its authority to require manufacturers to make reports in 49 USC § 301 66(e). This 

authority is broader than subpoena authority because it is used to require answers to questions, in 

addition to the production of documents. It is equal in scope and an effective alternative to a 

subpoena with regard to production of documents. 

OUESTION 4: The Department of Transportation' s IG Office recently launched an 

investigation into NHTSA's actions related to the Toyota recalls. Please state the scope of this 

investigation and the timeframe in which the investigation is to take place. Please also state 

whether you believe this investigation could inform any legislative reform efforts. 

RESPONSE 4: The DOT OIG announced its audit ofNHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation 

on February 19, 20 I O. OIG identified three objectives: 

examine NHTSA's efforts to ensure that aDI has the appropriate information systems 

and processes in place to promptly identify and take action to address potential safety 

defects as intended by the TREAD Act; 

assess NHTSA's procedures and processes for ensuring that companies provide timely 

notification of potential safety defects; and 

examine the lessons learned from the Toyota recalls to identify any improvement 

needed in current policies and procedures. 

In a February 24,2010 letter from Senator John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the U.S. 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and Senator Mark Pryor, 

Chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and 

Insurance, the OIG was requested to expand its audit to include: 

industry-wide complaints or reports collected by NHTSA regarding sudden unintended 

acceleration and brake failure in automobiles with electronic throttle and braking 

control systems; 

compliance with the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 

Documentation (TREAD) Act reporting requirements; and 

government ethics at NHTSA. 

OIG's audit is progressing and NHTSA is cooperating fully. We have not been informed of the 

timeframe for the investigation. Because we do not have the results of the investigation, we are 

not able to answer whether it would inform any legislative reform efforts. 
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15 

OUESTION 5: Consumers Union submitted testimony recommending Congress mandate 

particular regulatory measures. Specifically, Consumers Union would like to see regulations on 

brake override, emergency engine shut-off, intuitive placement and better labeling of the neutral 

position, and gas pedal-to-floorboard distance standards. Ms. Claybrook has made similar calls 

for new safety standards updating the accelerator fail-safe standard, requiring electronic brake 

override, and requiring electronic magnetic interference protection. 

a. Please state whether NHTSA has looked into these issues or ifthere [are J any plans to look 

into these recommendations. 

b. Please state whether NHTSA believes there is safety merit to these suggestions, and, if so, 

whether you believe a Congressional mandate that NHTSA review these measures is necessary. 

c. Please provide any statistics NHTSA has on how many lives will be saved or injuries 

prevented by these safety measures. 

d. Please provide any per-vehicle cost estimates NHTSA has for these measures. 

e. Please describe where you believe these safety measures fall into a risk-based priority list. 

RESPONSE 5: We are currently evaluating whether new regulatory actions are needed in these 

areas, including whether there is safety merit to these suggestions, and the priority that should be 

given to a rulemaking for each safety measure. 

Brake Override and Accelerator Fail-Safe Standard 

NHTSA has a standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 124, that requires 

an engine's throttle to return to idle when the driver stops pressing on the accelerator pedal or 

when anyone component of the accelerator control system is disconnected or severed at a single 

point. In recent years, NHTSA has been working to update the standard and address more 

directly newer electronic systems and different types of failures such as those that could be 

addressed by brake override technology. We are evaluating brake override technology to 

determine its safety benefits and to understand its performance characteristics, including how 

brake override systems differ among manufacturers using this technology. Currently, we do not 

have estimates for the number of fatalities or injuries that could be prevented by this technology. 

It is our understanding that manufacturers currently selling vehicles in the United States have the 

technological capacity to install electronic throttle control and therefore have the technological 

capacity to install brake override on their vehicles. Some manufacturers may lack sufficient lead 

time to change their manufacturing plans to install brake override for model year 20 II. 

Emergency Engine Shutoff 

NHTSA has a standard, FMVSS No. 101 "Controls and Displays," which regulates the location, 

identification, color, and illumination of certain vehicle controls for both normal operation of a 

vehicle and in a panic situation. Currently, we do not have performance requirements specific to 

keyless ignition but they are subject to the requirements ofFMVSS No. 114 Theft Protection and 

Rollaway Prevention. There is a lack of standardization of this feature among manufacturers, 

and we are evaluating whether the agency should consider taking steps to require standardization 

of this feature. We note that SAE International has been working to develop test procedures and 

guidelines for these controls, and they anticipate completion in June 20 II. NHTSA is also 

monitoring this important work. Currently, we do not have estimates for the number of fatalities 

or injuries that could be prevented by the standardization of keyless ignitions. With regard to 
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costs, it is our understanding that manufacturers currently selling vehicles in the United States 

would have the technological capacity to standardize their controls but would need sufficient 

lead time to change their current strategies. 

Pedal Distance Standards 

16 

We believe additional research in this area is needed. We are currently developing an evaluation 

plan to conduct new research in this area, including a review of SAE HI 00 which contains 

recommendations for the placement of pedals. Currently, we do not have estimates for the 

number offatalities or injuries that could be prevented by the standardization of pedal distances. 

With regard to costs, depending on the level of standardization, there could be significant 

redesign of the vehicle, including adjustments made for crash protection and the movement of 

mechanical components, and therefore significant costs. 

Labeling and Placement of Neutral Positions 

NHTSA has a standard, FMVSS No. 102 "Transmission shift position sequences, starter 

interlock, and transmission braking effect," which among other things regulates the position and 

identification of the neutral position. The standard allows manufacturers design flexibility with 

regard to the operation of automatic transmissions. We are developing a research plan to 

evaluate whether standardization of the operation for these controls is needed. Currently, we do 

not have estimates for the number of fatalities or injuries that could be prevented by better 

labeling and more stringent requirements for automatic transmissions. There could be significant 

redesign and thus associated costs given that affected vehicles would have to go through some 

amount of interior redesign. 

Electronic Magnetic Interference (EM!) Protection 

NHTSA is not aware of any proposed or demonstrated failure modes whereby EMI has caused 

vehicle malfunctions resulting in unintended acceleration. NHTSA has commissioned the 

National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to examine this and other issues. The NAS panel will 

make recommendations to NHTSA on how its rulemaking, research, and defeets investigation 

activities may help ensure the safety of electronic control systems in motor vehicles. We will 

await the outcome of their study before making an evaluation on whether new standards are 

needed. Their work is scheduled to be completed in 2011. 

QUESTION 6: Critics suggest NHTSA relies too much on manufacturers for information in 

order to do its job. Please state whether you agree with this assessment. 

RESPONSE 6: We disagree with the assessment. Although NHTSA obtains a lot of information 

from manufacturers because they have warranty claim and complaint information as well as 

engineering data on the vehicles, NHTSA relies on a variety of sources for information. For 

example, NHTSA communicates with vehicle owners and operators, obtains information on peer 

vehicles made by other manufacturers, and conducts its own tests of vehicles, including the 

complaint and comparable vehicles, performs surveys, and uses available and relevant 

information from other sources. 
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OUESTION 7: Ms. Claybrook suggests in her written testimony that there is a breakdown in 

communication between your New Car Assessment section and the Safety Standards section in 

that information is not always transmitted or not taken seriously if transmitted. Please state 

whether you agree with this assessment. 

RESPONSE 7: We disagree with Ms. Claybrook's assessment. New Car Assessment Program 

testing and safety standards sections are both in NHTSA's Office of Rulemaking and both 

sections work collaboratively on vehicle safety issues. 

OUESTION 8: Critics argue that NHTSA isn't as effective as it could be because there are no 

clear criteria by which the agency determ ines investigation priorities. Please state whether you 

believe safety investigations can be advanced by a one-size-fits-all approach. If yes, please 

explain any efforts taken by NHTSA to identify these criteria. 

17 

RESPONSE 8: As noted above, NHTSA uses a set of risk-based procedures when deciding what 

issues to investigate and which investigations involve issues that should be the subject of a safety 

recall. (Please see response to question I for a more detailed discussion.) If a "one-size-fits-all" 

approach to determining investigations priorities means relying solely on the number of 

complaints, NHTSA does not believe that such an approach to safety investigations would serve 

the interests of safety. We believe that any approach needs to allow for assessments of risk. The 

informal risk analysis that NHTSA uses permits consideration of all relevant factors and, 

properly applied, is more likely to identify situations involving significant risk than a one-sizefits-all approach. 

OUESTION 9: The agency's budget request is divided, providing $117 million for Behavioral 

Safety and $132.8 million for Vehicle Safety. Considering industry spends over $80 billion a 

year on research and development but highway deaths are more likely to be related to driver 

behavior (for instance, there are approximately 16,000 alcohol-related deaths and an estimated 

6,000 related to distracted driving), please state your opinion on whether the allocation is 

properly balanced to save the most lives. 

RESPONSE 9: We believe that the tremendous strides that have been made over the years to 

reduce traffic injuries and deaths attributable to driver behavior. However, this does not 

diminish the need to continue to improve vehicle safety, including the agency's research efforts. 

NHTSA has the statutory responsibility to conduct research and work with the industry on 

vehicle safety issues, especially in the promulgation of rulemaking, testing of safety 

technologies, and ensuring compliance with these rules. All of these activities are supported by 

the $132.8 million requested for vehicle safety efforts. Therefore, we believe that the allocation 

of funds strikes an appropriate balance to save the most lives. 

We also note that the agency's budget request for $117 million is not the only source offunds for 

driver behavioral issues. NHTSA also requested an additional $620.7 million for grants to States 

to support driver behavioral programs at the State and local level. 
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18 

QUESTION 10: Please describe the impact additional criminal penalties would have on the flow 

of information between manufacturers and NHTSA. 

RESPONSE 10: We do not believe that additional criminal penalties would impact the flow of 

information. 

QUESTION lOa: Please state your opinion on whether it [would] be reasonable to assume that 

every safety- or warranty-related communication would be filtered by criminal defense attorneys 

if criminal penalties are attached to reporting requirements and whether this could slow the flow 

of information to and communication with NHTSA. 

RESPONSE lOa: We do not believe that it would be reasonable to assume that every warranty 

related opinion would be filtered. We have no opinion on safety related communications. 

QUESTION lOb: Please state your opinion on the likelihood that NTHSA may require more 

attorneys than engineers if certain behavior becomes subject to criminal penalties. 

RESPONSE lOb: We believe that this is unlikely. 

QUESTION II: Critics urge Congress to make public the information which NHTSA receives 

through the Early Warning Reporting. NHTSA has identified [] this information as confidential 

business information and been upheld upon challenge. Please state whether you support 

NHTSA's position. 

RESPONSE 11: NHTSA's position was supported by a rulemaking record. This could be 

changed by a conclusive statutory determination. 

QUESTION 12: The industry spends billions developing new safety technologies every year. 

Please state your opinion on the likelihood that increased penalties and additional criminal 

liability as proposed will have a chilling effect on R&D into new technologies or on the 

deployment of new technologies, thereby having a negative impact on safety. Please also state 

your opinion on whether it is likely some manufacturers may choose to stick with proven safety 

technologies rather than risk a glitch in the development or deployment of new technology. 

RESPONSE 12: The development and implementation of new safety technologies continues to 

be an essential, active, and effective process for improving safety for drivers and passengers. 

There is a strong market and regulatory pull for these new developments as companies strive to 

market improved safety for their customers. These forces will likely continue. 

In general, we believe that there are many factors that manufacturers weigh regarding the choice 

to "stick with proven safety technologies rather than risk a glitch in the development or 

deployment of new technology", and we are uncertain how manufacturers will make their 

decisions in response to increased penalties and criminal liability. 
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19 

QUESTION 13: NHTSA has a long history under both Republican and Democratic 

administrations of extensively investigating the causes of sudden or unintended acceleration 

incidents. NHTSA released a report in March 1989 titled "An Examination of Sudden 

Acceleration" based on an independent review it commissioned to look into the 2,800 reports of 

sudden acceleration in Ford vehicles between 1989-1992. NHTSA revisited this issue in 1999-

2000 in response to a petition alleging that NHTSA had failed to consider or address certain 

issues and requesting that it "institute a new investigation into the cause or causes of sudden 

acceleration." After review of current data and a review of the 1989-1992 Ford data, NHTSA 

denied the petition in ApriJ2000. Please state whether there is there any evidence thus far to 

suggest the procedure or findings of the agency at those times was insufficient or different from 

what the agency is now doing. 

RESPONSE 13: NHTSA's report, "An Examination of Sudden Acceleration," was published in 

January 1989. This report was intended to take an independent review of the current state of 

understanding of the sudden acceleration phenomenon and was not related to the 2,800 reports of 

sudden acceleration in Ford vehicles. A panel of outside experts from the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Southwest Research Institute 

and Tufts University conducted the study. The 1989-1992 Ford study, commonly called the 

Updegrove study, was a different study. 

When NHTSA revisited the issue of sudden acceleration in 2000 in response to a petition, 

NHTSA fully considered both the NHTSA report and the Ford study. We do not believe that the 

agency's procedure or findings at those times were insufficient or substantially different from 

what the agency is now doing. However, the increased use of electronic control systems in 

vehicles since the time of the 1989 NHTSA study certainly warrants a fresh look at unintended 

acceleration in the present context and issues that might need to be addressed involving vehicle 

electronics through research or rulemaking. The agency has initiated two major studies designed 

to answer the questions surrounding the issue of unintended vehicle acceleration, both with a 

focus on the possible role of electronic systems. 

QUESTION 14: Please state whether NHTSA needs greater flexibility to contract on an "asneeded" basis for services it cannot perform internally. Please state the number of contractors 

NHTSA currently has under contract and how many contracts for service it used in 2009. 

RESPONSE 14: We believe that we have adequate flexibility to contract for services that we 

cannot perform internally. As of April 30, 2010, NHTSA has 232 active contracts. In FY 2009, 

NHTSA had 275 active contracts. 

QUESTIQN 15: Please provide historical data per year since NHTSA was established detailing:· 

QUESTIQN 15a: The number ofNHTSA FTEs directly related to defect investigation (i.e., not 

administrative staft). 

RESPONSE 15a: Attached is a table listing the number of on board employees directly involved 

in investigations by year since 1990. Please note that NHTSA has historical data on staff from 

1990 to 2010. 
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20 

QUESTION 15b: The number of defect investigations initiated. 

RESPONSE 15b: Attached is a table listing investigation by type and by year since 1967 

through present. In the early years, only "Cases" were conducted. They later gave way to 

Engineering Analyses (EA) and Information Requests (IR) which were the predecessor to the 

Preliminary Evaluation. The IR's were conducted for four years in the early 1980s. Currently 

our first level investigation is the Preliminary Evaluation (PE). Recall Queries (RQ) are 

conducted when a follow-up examination of an existing recall is warranted. Blank cells indicate 

that no investigations of that particular type were performed that year. 

QUESTION 15c: The number of voluntary recalls issued. 

RESPONSE 15c: Please see attachment. 

Question from Congressman Terry 

QUESTION: Will your agency officially support Congressional efforts to remove the driving 

restrictions from 23 United States Code § 164, and permit each State to use ignition interlocks to 

stop drunk drivers in ways that make sense to State legislators? 

RESPONSE: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration would not be opposed to 

Congressional action to remove the statutorily-imposed location restrictions for repeat DUI offenders 

driving with an ignition interlock device during the limited reinstatement period. 
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Response 15b: Number of Defects Investigations Initiated 

Case* Engineering Information 

Analysis Request 

Calendar 

Year 

1967 9 

1968 53 

1969 90 

1970 55 

1979 80 

1972 14 62 

1973 8 72 

1974 8 110 

1975 2 43 

1976 4 31 

1977 3 84 

1978 1 182 

1979 I 173 

1980 156 

1981 34 16 

1982 55 37 

1983 30 97 

1984 42 74 

1985 2 47 

1.986 I 33 

1987 61 24 

1988 I 24 

1989 I 44 

1990 1 45 

1991 61 

1992 1 46 

1993 33 

1994 I 43 

1995 33 

1996 31 

1997 28 

1998 25 

1999 34 

2000 28 

2001 19 

2002 37 

2003 25 - 2004 37 

2005 22 

2006 21 

2007 19 

2008 26 

2009 18 

201M 4 

Totals 397 1,881 224 

* Case designatIOn/classificatIOn was ehmmated m the mld-J990s. 

t The EA, PE and RQ numbers are as of April 16, 2010. 

Preliminary Recall Query 

Evaluation 

66 

78 

62 

109 

171 1 

123 16 

157 3 

90 0 

102 4 

95 3 

62 7 

75 2 

51 13 

65 25 

79 22 

49 19 

44 2 

97 2 

66 10 

84 12 

67 4 

58 9 

63 4 

75 7 

59 4 

10 3 

2,057 172 

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All Recalls by Year 

All Defect Compliance 

All Volunta Influenced All Vorunla Influenced All Volunta lnnu

Year Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Re<:alls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls 

1966 58 982.823 58 982,823 0 0 " 982,823 58 982,823 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1961 143 3,745,009 138 (664,539 5 2,080,470 143 3,745,009 '" 1,664,539 5 2,080,470 0 0 0 0 0 

1968 137 1,507,881 134 1,058,497 3 449,384 137 1,507,881 134 1,058,497 3 449,384 0 0 0 0 0 

1969 187 7,974,566 170 7,677)97 17 296,769 179 7,889,544 166 7,664,283 13 225,261 8 85,022 4 13,514 4 

1970 162 1,340,258 147 1,041,234 15 299,024 154 1,212,223 144 1,029,660 10 182,563 8 128,035 3 11,574 5 

1971 253 9,650,686 199 1,557,487 54 8,093,199 213 9,115,630 188 1,413,299 25 7,702,331 40 535,056 11 144,188 29 

1972 331 12,275,042 230 3,904,487 101 8,370,555 310 l'.993,H73 226 3,814,391 84 8,179,282 21 281,369 4 90,096 17 

1973 278 8,365,736 245 3,306,671 33 5,059,065 254 8,297,784 238 3,286,232 16 5,011.552 24 67,952 7 20,439 17 

1974 292 4,601,843 2" 2,976,119 53 1,625,724 260 4,488,148 224 2,912,454 36 1,575,694 32 113,695 15 63,665 17 

1975 263 2,297,175 242 1,933,713 21 363,462 224 1,953,790 218 1,823,895 6 129,895 39 343,385 24 109,818 15 

1976 262 4,275,566 215 2,713,807 47 1,561,759 169 3,568,023 164 2,141,685 5 1,426,338 93 707,543 51 572,122 42 

19IT 309 11,544,627 239 4,501,716 70 7,042,911 198 10,573,093 171 3,941,909 27 6,631,184 111 971,534 68 559,807 43 

1978 331 24,396,804 235 4,142,402 96 20,254,402 259 23,083,393 186 3,907,129 7J 19,176,264 72 1,313,411 49 235,273 23 

1979 341 10,378,200 28' 4,SOM08 56 5,569,592 243 9,965,363 214 4,575,411 29 5,389,952 98 412,837 71 233,197 27 

1980 22012,675,797 174 2,031,402 46 10,644,395 147 11,949,056 123 1,782,387 2410,166,669 73 726,741 51 249,015 " 

1981 197 31,000,131 165 7,769,730 3223,230,401 146 30,868,304 128 7,662,364 18 23,205,940 51 131,827 37 107,366 14 

1982 174 2,924,012 144 1,729,696 30 1,194,316 141 2,647,158 124 1,709,323 17 937,835 33 276,854 20 20,373 13 

1983 182 7,173,745 144 1,987,876 38 5,185,869 132 5,381,598 109 1.619,074 23 3,762,524 50 1,792,147 35 368,802 15 1964 209 7,552,553 174 2,905,219 35 4,647,334 156 6,686,182 135 2,316,939 21 4,369,243 53 866,371 39 588,280 14 

1985 22710,688,249 173 2,387,208 54 8,301,041 166 6,389,052 132 2,299,171 34 4,089,881 61 4,299,197 41 88,037 20 

1986 219 4,383,134 184 2,831,337 35 1,551,797 158 3,480,631 139 2,367,860 19 1,112,771 61 902,503 45 463,477 16 

1987 25210,221,660 195 3,163,844 57 7,057,816 199 9,208,108 160 2,878,419 39 6,329,689 53 1,013,552 35 285,425 18 

1988 242 12,022,644 19810,083,599 44 1,939,045 201 11,240,073 172 9,875,986 29 1,364,087 41 782,571 26 207,613 15 

1989 281 11,427,325 2" 4,204,634 70 7,222,691 211 8,119,998 16£ 2,435,339 45 5,664,659 70 3,307,327 45 1,769,295 25 

1990 269 18,535,563 183 6,289,115 86 12,246,448 184 12,015,711 154 5,872,286 30 6,143,425 85 6,519,852 29 416,829 56 

1991 282 14,401,194 178 3,209,183 104 11,192,011 199 12,004,345 14<) 2,848,747 59 9,155,598 83 2,396,849 38 360,436 45 

1992 217 13,554,727 147 4,541,527 70 9,013,200 17811,453,278 123 4,034,716 55 7,418,562 39 2,101,449 24 506,811 15 

1993 264 11,017,438 177 1,710,662 87 9,306,776 219 9,816,809 150 1,307,330 69 8,509,479 45 1,200,629 27 403,332 18 

1994 290 9,911,975 225 3,396,811 65 6,515,104 229 9,075,789 189 2,946,007 4<) 6,129,782 81 836,186 35 450,804 25 

1995 348 19,027,724 250 7,008,108 98 12,019,616 279 15,899,098 189 3,930,353 9011,968,745 69 3,128,626 61 3,077,755 8 

1996 34119,505,204 237 5,863,090 104 13,642,114 290 1],100,960 197 4,155,333 93 12,945,627 51 2,404,244 40 1,707,757 11 

1997 312 16,744,265 247 4,328,828 6512,415,437 273 14,943,643 215 3,952,654 58 10,990,989 39 1,800,622 32 376,174 7 

1998 408 19,185,682 315 7,142,374 93 12,043,308 343 17,448,789 261 5,571,752 8211,877,037 65 1,736,893 54 1,570,622 11 

1999 440 55,560,458 333 40,570,828 10714,989,630 349 52,635,122 270 39,168,437 79 13,466,685 91 2,925,336 63 1,402,391 28 

2000 626 44,615,540 505 13,357,877 12131,257,663 501 39,708,133 41810,227,094 83 29,481,039 125 4,907,407 87 3,130,783 38 2001 527 22,391,967 43712,139,797 90 10,252,170 436 20,112,189 374 10,520,343 62 9,591,846 91 2,279,778 63 1,619,454 28 

2002 504 21,252,005 413 10,268,376 9110,983,629 450 20,320,873 372 9,498,831 78 10,822,042 54 931,132 41 769,545 13 

2003 600 22,780,659 445 11,917,174 155 10,863,485 47818,172,637 349 7,947,214 129 10,213,568 122 4,608,022 W 3,969,960 " 

2004 698 33,009,036 533 13,827,864 165 19,181,172 564 30,383,887 43811,513,748 126 18,720,078 134 2,625,149 95 2,314,116 39 

2005 645 20,396,519 465 8,283,599 180 12,112,920 528 19,077,638 393 7,341,090 135 11,736,548 117 1,318,881 72 942,509 45 2006 613 14,056,632 477 7,157,377 136 6,899,255 495 10,801,420 416 5,179,479 79 5,621,941 118 3,255,212 61 1,977,898 57 2007 712 20,622,012 575 9,895,423 137 10,726,589 584 19,457,386 484 9,359,012 100 10,098,374 128 1,164,626 91 536,411 37 

2008 78122,531.937 494 12.848,015 287 9,683,922 588 19,019,193 39711,838,640 191 7,180,553 193 3,512,744 97 1,009,375 "" 

2009 570 17,843,586 397 9,164,747 '" 8,678,839 427 17,036,453 339 8,534,129 88 8,502,324 143 807,133 58 630,618 as Total 14,997 650,349,589 11,571274.285,220 3,426376,064,369 12,052 saO,829,890 9,725240,910,264 2,327339']57,710 2,945 69,519,699 1,846 33,374,956 1,099

RMD 

Upda

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Vehicle Recall Summary by Year 

All Defect 

All Volunta Influenced Influe

Recalls Affacte d Recalls Affecte Recall!;> Affecte Recalls 

58 98282, 58 982823 0 0 0 

143 138 5 2080470 137 134 

179 166 13 

149 139 10 

206 181 25 

306 222 84 

239 225 14 

231 198 33 

193 18"1 5 

144 141 3 

171 147 24 

216 154 62 

205 '" 26 121 101 20 

123 106 17 

113 100 13 109 90 19 

137 119 18 

147 115 31 

135 120 16 

1987 197 159 38 

='1 

175 139 37 

1988 197 164 33 1,071,802 155 142 23 

234 175 59 5,423,32 181 140 41 

208 144 6' 4,3"16,373 142 120 22 

'" 150 71 5.426,607 162 120 42 1992 185 123 62 7,229,071 155 104 51 

1993 222 144 78 8,421,03 185 121 64 

199' 247 198 3.21113. 204 171 33 

208 152 58 

260 m 83 

237 188 49 

304 228 75 312 240 72 

432 357 75 

379 322 57 

385 310 75 

429 311 118 

493 375 118 

472 346 126 1 415 ,., 74 

502 408 94 

527 338 188 

370 290 

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Equipment Recall Summary by Year 

All Defect Com liance 

All Volunta Influenced All Volunta Influenced All Volunta Influ

Y •• Recalls Affecte Recalls Affected Recalls Affect Recalls Affected Recalls Affocte Recalls Aff"" .. Recalls Affectec Recalls Affected Recalls 

1970 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1971 3 3,673 3 3,673 0 0 2 2,126 2 2,126 0 0 1 1,547 1 1,547 0 

1972 2 16,480 2 16,480 0 0 2 16,480 2 16,480 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

1973 6 36,897 5 36,697 1 200 6 36,897 5 36,697 1 200 0 0 0 0 0 1974 14 604,016 12 185,396 2 418,620 ,. 604,016 12 185,396 2 418,620 0 0 0 0 0 

1975 25 146,124 24 145,742 1 382 19 76,174 19 76,174 0 0 6 69,950 5 69,568 1 

1976 25 320,585 21 280,447 4 40,138 21 307,459 20 280,447 1 27,012 4 13,126 1 0 3 

1977 29 350,898 17 195,972 12 154,926 18 259,355 15 170,672 3 88,683 11 91,543 2 25,300 9 

1978 29 854,053 14 291,023 15 563,030 24 427,417 14 291,023 10 136,394 5 426,536 0 0 5 

1979 24 1,223,033 20 192,741 4 1,030,292 21 1,222,121 18 191,872 3 1,030,249 3 912 2 869 1 

1980 28 730,670 20 248,038 8 482,632 19 375,877 17 243,241 2 132,636 9 354,793 3 4,797 6 

1981 15 262,863 13 262,658 2 205 13 256,483 12 256,458 1 25 2 6,380 1 6,200 1 

1982 21 813,504 14 399,401 7 414,103 15 750,281 14 399,401 1 350,880 6 63,223 0 0 6 

1983 20 958,970 15 74,842 5 884,128 18 80,508 15 14,842 3 5,666 2 878,462 0 0 2 

1984 27 240,052 .15 105,110 12 134,942 18 110,301 15 105,1'10 3 5,191 9 129,751 0 0 9 

1985 33 4,726,086 15 536,199 18 4,189,887 17 538,761 15 536,199 2 2,562 16 4,187,325 0 0 16 

1986 28 900,025 22 843,873 6 56,152 16 667,470 14 616,396 2 51,074 12 232,555 8 227,477 4 

1987 36 793,138 19 263,577 17 529,561 16 211,993 15 211,789 1 204 20 561,145 4 51,788 16 

1988 30 6,561,347 23 6,215,075 7 446,272 26 6,216,086 23 6,215,075 3 1,011 • 445,261 0 0 4 

1989 29 396,288 24 363,474 5 12,814 23 360,267 21 351,089 2 9,178 6 36,021 3 32,385 3 

1990 34 2,047,713 21 519,826 13 1,527,887 24 563,363 20 519,675 • 43,687 10 1,484,350 1 150 9 

1991 35 4,078,569 14 127,509 21 3,951,060 27 3,138,381 12 121,322 15 3,017,059 8 940,188 2 6,187 6 

1992 17 562,311 14 506,060 3 56,251 15 540,121 13 494,121 2 46,000 2 22,190 1 11,919 1 

1993 32 143,704 28 106,609 4 36,895 29 118,505 25 81,610 • 36,895 3 25,199 3 25,199 0 

1994 31 3,125,411 20 309,560 11 2,815,851 20 2,981,252 15 177,332 5 2,803,920 11 144,159 5 132,228 6 

1995 75 524,849 38 418,409 37 106,440 69 517,520 35 415,842 34 101,676 6 7,329 3 2,567 3 

1996 30 852]47 17 63,583 13 789,164 27 191,197 17 63,583 10 127,614 3 661,550 0 0 3 

1997 34 388,134 25 177,987 9 210,147 33 387,978 25 177,987 • 209,991 1 156 0 0 1 

1998 35 513,239 29 424,072 6 89,167 33 461,759 28 392,446 5 69,313 2 51,480 1 31,626 1 

1999 33 33,851,801 26 32,830,936 7 1,020,865 29 33,796,543 25 32,807,304 4 989,239 4 55,258 1 23,632 3 

2000 73 1,182,95 55 1,071,308 1. 111,64 61 1,118,570 55 1,07i,30E 5 47,26 12 64,382 0 0 12 

2001 56 1,028,192 47 894,272 9 133,920 45 586,621 42 563,039 3 23,582 11 441,571 5 331,233 6 

2002 51 1,104,284 49 1,049,893 2 54,391 51 1,104,284 49 1,049,893 2 54,391 0 0 0 0 0 

2003 60 1,373,197 40 1,097,098 20 276,09 43 630,758 34 532,159 9 98,599 17 742,439 6 564,939 11 

2004 78 1,273,691 55 1,124,108 23 149,583 58 1,102,432 50 1,074,134 8 28,298 20 171,259 5 49,974 15 

2005 71 1,088,242 48 804,914 23 283,328 49 646,026 41 456,067 8 191,95 22 440,216 7 348,847 15 

2006 96 2,133,644 66 1,456,313 40 677,331 59 1,468,717 55 1,455,242 4 13,475 37 664,927 1 1,071 36 

2007 107 1,760,366 78 1,530,170 29 230,196 72 1,552,969 71 1,497,969 1 55,00( 35 207,397 7 32,201 2' 

2008 66 2,630,738 50 1,321,754 16 1,306,984 48 1,311,542 47 1,311,250 1 292 18 1,319,196 3 10,504 15 

2009 64 737,965 47 646,864 17 91,101 48 624,030 43 614,991 5 9,039 16 113,935 4 31,873 12 

Total 1,503 80,440,451 1,056 57,161,863 447 23,278,588 1,149 65,364,640 971 55,137,762 178 10,226,878 354 15,075,811 85 2,024,101 269 

Update

Insert offset folio 121 here 76016A.073jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with 

1981 1982 1983 

1984 

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 

1994 

1995 1996 1997 

1998 1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 2004 

Child Safety Seat Recall Summary by Year 

Update

Insert offset folio 122 here 76016A.074jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with 

Ye; 

19£ 

197 

197 197 

197 197 197 197 197 197 197 

198 

198 

198 

198 198 198 198 

198 198 

198 199 199 

199 199 

199 

199 199 199 199 

199' 

200 200 200 200 200, 200 2001 

200-

200; 200' 

Tota 

I Recalls 

1 4 

1 7 1 15 

2 4 

l 19 

1 30 

l 23 l 28 

, 35 

l 31 

1 42 

) 24 

I 24 

2 16 

l 21 

1 16 

; 19 ; 14 

, 16 

, 12 , 11 

) 13 

12 

2 7 

, 5 

I 5 ; 3 ; 2 

5 

, 4 , 7 , 6 

I 10 

, 13 

I 3 I 17 

; • 

; 22 

7 

, 21 

, 6 

I 587 

All 

Affected 

54,367 

106,532 

226,951 

114,134 116,349 

1,074,544 

44,380 

457,884 469,374 

14,686,375 

235,231 

7,069,995 

123,076 

93,600 

94,454 

81,030 

28,215 

164,133 

43,116 

214,975 

115,573 171,784 152,190 

7,967 

5,941 

93,090 

9,527 

1,242 

7,146 

597,159 

6,459 

14,412,550 

3,804,056 

679,626 

745 

571,290 

134,839 

589,629 

374,826 

8,065,975 

168,572 

55,468,901 

AI. 

Voiunta Influenced 

Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls 

2 11,870 2 42,497 0 

5 63,385 2 43,147 4 

14 159,007 1 67,944 5 

4 114,134 0 0 2 

15 76,707 4 39,642 8 

28 73,910 2 1,000,634 15 

22 44,372 1 • 12 23 427,643 5 30241 4 

30 458,381 5 10,993 9 

29 183,357 2 14,503,018 19 

41 221,272 1 13,959 17 

22 49,995 2 7,020,000 7 22 118,161 2 4,915 9 

15 72,800 1 20,800 11 

20 94,429 1 25 5 

16 81,030 0 0 1 

19 28,215 0 0 1 

14 164,133 0 0 5 16 43,116 0 0 6 10 200,862 2 14,113 • 9 38,191 2 77,382 5 13 171,764 0 0 10 

12 152,190 0 0 7 

7 7,967 0 0 3 

5 5,941 0 0 4 

5 93,090 0 0 2 

3 9,527 0 0 1 

2 1,242 0 0 1 

5 7,146 0 0 2 

4 597,159 0 0 4 

7 6,459 0 0 4 

5 12,550 1 14,400,000 6 

9 1,004,056 1 2,800,000 9 

13 679,626 0 0 11 

3 745 0 0 2 

17 571,290 0 0 11 

8 134,839 0 0 5 

22 589,629 0 0 20 

5 281,420 2 93,406 3 

20 6,265,975 1 1,800,000 6 

6 168,572 0 0 4 

547 13,486,177 40 41,982,724 268 

Tire Recall Summary by Year 

Defect Com liance 

All Volunta Influenced All Volunta 

Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Recalls Affected Re

0 0 0 0 0 4 54,367 2 11,870 

53,799 4 53,799 0 0 3 52,733 1 9,586 

18,038 5 18,038 0 0 10 208,913 9 140,969 

25,703 2 25,703 0 0 2 88,431 2 88,431 

56,268 • 56,268 0 0 11 $0,081 7 20,439 

1,051,445 14 51,445 1 1,000,000 15 23,099 14 22,465 

21,127 12 21,127 0 0 11 23,253 10 23,245 

309,270 3 303,270 1 6,000 24 148,614 20 124,373 

20,024 9 20,024 0 0 26 449,350 21 438,357 

14,618,090 1. 118,090 1 14,500,000 12 68,285 11 65,267 

197,689 17 197,689 0 0 25 37,542 24 23,583 

7,026,399 5 6,399 2 7,020,000 17 43,596 17 43,596 

94,280 9 94,280 0 0 15 28,796 13 23,881 

85,358 10 64,558 1 20,800 5 8,242 5 8,242 

27,439 4 27,414 1 25 16 67,015 16 67,015 

14,831 1 14,831 0 0 15 66,199 15 66,199 

1,450 1 1,450 0 0 18 26,765 18 26,765 

13,643 5 13,643 0 0 9 150,490 9 150,490 

29,828 6 29,828 0 0 10 13.288 10 13,288 

212,493 6 198,380 2 14,113 4 2,482 4 2,482 

111,395 4 34,281 1 77,114 6 4,178 5 3,910 

143,938 10 143,938 0 0 3 27,846 3 27,846 

137,517 7 137,517 0 0 5 14,673 5 14,673 

3,247 3 3,247 0 0 4 4,720 4 4,720 

4,711 4 4,711 0 0 1 1,230 1 1,230 

77,273 2 77,273 0 0 3 15,817 3 15,817 

2.016 1 2,016 0 0 2 7,511 2 7,511 

544 1 544 0 0 1 698 1 698 

1,496 2 1,496 0 0 3 5,650 3 5,650 

597,159 4 597,159 0 0 0 0 0 0 

6,336 4 6,336 0 0 3 123 3 123 

14,412,550 5 12,550 1 14,400,000 0 0 0 0 

3,788,631 8 988,631 1 2,800,000 1 15,425 1 15,425 

678,611 11 678,611 0 0 2 1,015 2 1,015 

95 2 95 0 0 1 650 1 650 

567,007 11 567,007 0 0 6 4,283 6 4,283 

58,157 5 58,157 0 0 3 76,682 3 76,682 

524,252 20 524,252 0 0 2 65,377 2 65,377 

366,671 2 274,924 1 91,747 4 8,155 3 6,496 

7,976,954 5 6,176,954 1 1,800,000 15 89,021 15 89,021 

166,173 4 166,173 0 0 2 2,399 2 2,399 

53,501,907 254 11,772,108 14 41,729,799 319 1,966,994 293 1,714,069 

Update

Insert offset folio 123 here 76016A.075jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with 

Recalls 

Vehicle Recalls 

19901991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 199920002001 20022003200420052006200720082009 

Year 

Insert offset folio 124 here 76016A.076jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with 

Millions 

Vehicles 

1990 1992 1994 1996 

Vehicles Recalled 

1998 2000 

Year 

2002 2004 2006 2008 
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Consumers Union (CU) responses to written questions for the record, "NHTSA Oversight: 

The Road Ahead" hearing, March 11,2010. 

The Honorable John D. DingelJ 

1. Sufficiency a/Existing NHTSA Authorities and Resources 

1) Are the reporting provisions of the TREAD Act being effectively implemented by 

NHTSA and automobile manufacturers? Please explain your response and submit 

supporting materials for the record. 

The changes implemented by the TREAD Act - among others, a requirement that auto 

manufacturers report to NHTSA information about safety recalls or defects; the creation of an Early 

Warning Reporting system (EWR); and the attachment of increased civil and criminal penalties to 

violations ofthe law - were all improvements to NHTSA's authorities. We are not able to 

comment specifically on how well the TREAD Act provisions are being followed by all auto 

manufacturers. However, we are concerned about the adequacy of compliance because of the 

Toyota case involving sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). Specifically, NHTSA stated that 

Toyota failed to report known safety problems to the agency as required by the TREAD Act. We 

believe that NHTSA needs additional resources to be able to hire enough staff to fully monitor 

compliance, and to enforce violations of TREAD Act requirements. 

2) Did the TREAD reporting system accomplish what was necessary to protect the public 

safety in the recent Toyota recall cases? If not, please provide for the record where 

and how the system failed, both at NHTSA and Toyota. 

The TREAD Act states that auto manufacturers are legally obligated to notifY NHTSA within five 

business days if they detennine that a safety defect exists. In this case, based on NHTSA's 

investigation and the recent fine levied by the agency against Toyota, it is clear that Toyota failed to 

adhere to the legal requirements of the TREAD Act. We believe that lax enforcement by NHTSA 

in the past may have contributed to an atmosphere of non-compliance. 

3) Is there any critical data or source of data needed by NHTSA that is not currently 

provided to it under the TREAD Act or other reporting requirements for automobile 

manufacturers? If so, please describe this data and what is required for NHTSA to 

obtain it. 

Under the TREAD Act, manufacturers are required to report select infonnation to NHTSA. That 

information is given to NHTSA via the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) system. But only the 

tallies for fatalities. injuries and property damage and production numbers are currently made public 

under the EWR system; consumer complaints to the manufacturer are currently kept confidential! 

We believe consumer complaint numbers submitted by manufacturers to NHTSA under the EWR 

system should also be made public by NHTSA and should be easily searchable by consumers. 

With regards to other information that would be a critical source of data for NHTSA, we also 

believe that manufacturers should make information from black box recording devices more 

1 See: http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/qb/documentsINHTSA.ODI-EWR-Facts. pdf 
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immediately accessible to government investigators. Most new passenger vehicles are equipped 

with Event Data Recorders (EDRs) that record such data as vehicle speed, throttle position, air-bag 

deployment, brake application, and safety belt usage. These data can help police and accident 

investigators reconstruct what happened in a crash. But it can be difficult for carmakers and 

investigators to easily access this information. Toyota, for instance, has only limited proprietary 

data retrieval tools for their black boxes. Other companies use formats that can be easily read by 

commercial tools. 

In 2006, NHTSA promulgated a final rule on EDRs; the standards put forth in this final rule must be 

implemented in EDRs that are installed in the 2013 model-year cars. As part ofthis rule, NHTSA 

requires auto manufacturers and their licensees to ensure that EDR data retrieval tools are 

commercially available. Congress may want to consider ways to ensure that retrieval tools for 

existing EDRs not just the 20 I3 model-year cars captured by the NHTSA rule - are also 

commercially available. We have encouraged all automakers to quickly adopt formats to enable 

swift information retrieval and dissemination to crash investigators. We would also like to see the 

incorporation ofEDRs in all vehicles. 

4) Do you believe NHTSA made mistakes iu its response to the recent Toyota recalls? 

Likewise, should NHTSA have pushed Toyota to initiate recalls earlier than it did? 

We believe that NHTSA should have opened the same type of investigations that it has now opened 

into the Toyota SUA problem, and more aggressively pursued information and responses from 

Toyota (e.g., by going to Japan to speak to Toyota officials there) earlier. We are pleased that the 

agency is now in the midst of a thorough investigation of this issue, and we look forward to their 

findings. 

We also believe that Toyota and NHTSA (by det1lUlt for agreeing to the recall) erred in the 2007 

recalJ regarding floor mats. In that recall, Toyota only re-profiled the regular and all weather mats 

so that they gave more space around the throttle pedal. The manufacturer missed a simple fact: that 

consumers will double stack the mats (by putting the all weather mat on top of the regular floor 

mat) and thus create the potential for throttle pedal entrapment. This 2007 recall should have also 

required Toyota to re-profile the throttle pedal to allow clearance for this reasonable use by the 

eonsumer. NHTSA, by agreeing to the less expensive recall, was complicit in this issue. A recall 

should not be left up to the consumer to perform. 

5) What authorities does NHTSA lack, whether under the TREAD Act or otherwise, with 

which to address defects in automobiles deemed hazardous to the public safety? 

NHTSA has the authority to seek civil penalties from automakers and suppliers for a variety of 

violations. If agency officials determine that a company violated sueh statutory obligations, the 

company can be fined up but only up to a maximum of$16.4 million in eivil penalties. This 

amount might be considered by a large, multi-billion dollar manufacturer as just the "cost of doing 

business." We believe that NHTSA should have greater authority to levy civil penalties that ean 

serve as a real deterrent against further wrongdoing. Therefore, we recommend removal of the cap 

on civil penalties. 

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6) There seems to be broad agreement about the need to increase the resources available 

to NHTSA to carry out its mission. Could you suggest by how much NHTSA's budget 

should be increased, as well as the rationale for this amount? 

It is critical that the safety functions that support NHTSA's mission to save lives and prevent 

injuries are adequately funded. In 2007, motor-vehicle crashes accounted for 99 percent of all 

transportation-related fatalities and injuries. Yet NHTSA's budget currently amounts to just over I 

percent of the overall Department of Transportation (DOT) budget. Congress should ensure that the 

agency's budget and staffing for auto-safety and consumer-protection functions is commensurate 

with the realities of traffic safety and can keep up with the agency's other priorities. We think the 

President's budget request for NHTSA for FY20ll of$878 million is a good start. 

II. Penalties 

1) Are the civil penalties NHTSA is allowed under statute to assess sufficient for the 

agency to deter non-compliance by automobile manufacturers? Please explain your 

answer. 

We do not believe that there should be a cap of the civil penalties that NHTSA can Icvy on 

manufacturers for violating the law. NHTSA recently levied a fine of $16.4 million against Toyota 

for failing to notifY NHTSA of a dangerous pedal defect for almost four months. The agency could 

not levy higher civil penalties against Toyota, even if it felt that to be appropriate, because of the 

cap. As stated above, we are concerned that this amount might be considered by a large, multibillion dollar manufacturer as just the "cost of doing business." We therefore recommend that the 

cap on civil penalties be lifted. 

2) Are there additional criminal penalties that the Congress should consider allowing 

NHTSA to impose on automobile manufacturers? If there are, please name and 

discuss them. 

Congress should consider revising NHTSA's statutory authorities to include the ability to levy 

criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations ofNHTSA rules and regulations. 

3) Are you concerned that the threat of criminal penalties will chill communications 

between manufacturers and NHTSA? Please explain your response. 

We do not believe that criminal penalties will chill communications between manufacturers and 

NHTSA. NHTSA is required to meet certain legal requirements in making the case for application 

of criminal penalties; these legal proof requirements are adequate to ensure that auto manufacturers 

will not be criminally fined if they are following with the law. 

ITI. Domestic vs. Foreign Automobile Manufacturers 

1) My questioning of James Lentz, Toyota's chief of sales for North America, revealed 

that decisions to recall Toyota's vehicles sold in North America are made in Japan. I 

am concerned that this is a threat to public safety in this country. Do you agree? 

We agree with you. 

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2) How should this be corrected? For example, should foreign automobile manufacturers 

that sell vehicles in the United States be required to empower their personnel here to 

iuitiate recalls? 

Yes. We think that all auto manufacturers should have a system in place that ensures their full and 

timely compliance with all safety-related issues and NHTSA requests. 

IV Conflict of Interest Rules 

1) Are NHTSA's current conflict-of-interest rules sufficient to protect the agency from 

undue influence from former staff? Please explain your answer. 

We are concerned about reports that former NHTSA employees have gone to work for the 

companies that they once regulated and that this may have impacted safety decisions. 2 We urge 

Congress to examine this issue and the loopholes in current government ethics rules, and to consider 

additional ways to stop the "revolving door" at NHTSA and other federal agencies. 

2) If you believe this is not the case, should new conflict of interest rules be codified in 

statute, or should that be left to the NHTSA to set for itself? 

We urge Congress to examine this issue and the loopholes in current government ethics rules, and to 

consider additional ways to stop the "revolving door" at NHTSA and other federal agencies. 

We also bring to your attention an LA Times news article, which details Transportation Secretary 

LaHood's response to questioning on this topic by the Senate Commerce Committee. According to 

this news article, "[Secretary] LaHood said [NHTSA] complied with legal prohibitions on 

contacting the agency on issues they [former NHTSA employees now working in industry] had 

worked on at the agency, but said he would welcome a rule preventing NHTSA employees from 

going to work for automakers until at least two years after leaving the agency.,,3 We think that the 

Secretary's proposal makes sense. 

'See "Analysis Finds Uneasy Mix in Auto Industry and Regulation," Washington Post, Mar. 9, 2010, 

hltp:/ iwww.washinglonpost.comiwp·dynlcontcntlarticle/20 I 0103/08/ AR20 I 0030804900.html?hpid=topnews 

1 Sec "Calls Grow for Throttle Safeguard," Los Angeles Times. Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.latimes.comibusinessila-fi· 

toyota-hearing3-20 I OmarO} 0,4259968.story. 

4 
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The Honorable Joe Barton 

1) You testified that NHTSA became aware ofuninteuded acceleration complaints as 

early as 2003 but that it took 7 years for the issue to be more fully addressed. As 

discussed at the hearing, there has been extensive awareness, attention, and action on 

the part of NHTSA dating back to the late 1980's. Given that your testimony 

acknowledges some ofthese types of problems can be hard to reproduce and diagnose, 

aud that the results ofNHTSA's multiple investigations did uot produce evidence 

sufficient to support a recall, please explain what different course of actiou you believe 

NHTSA should have taken. 

We believe that NHTSA should have noticed that there were enough complaints in the past to 

warrant a more thorough investigation of the SUA problem. We also believe that NHTSA should 

have opened the same type of investigations that it has now opened into the Toyota SUA problem, 

and more aggressively pursued information and responses from Toyota (e.g., by going to Japan to 

speak to Toyota officials there) earlier. For example, according to an investigation by House 

Energy & Commerce Committee Majority, "[ s Jince 2000, NHTSA has received 2,600 complaints of 

sudden unintended acceleration, as well as six defect petitions requesting investigations. Despite 

these warnings, NHTSA conducted only one cursory investigation in 2004 into the possibility that 

defects in electronic controls could be responsible for these incidents.,,4 

2) You acknowledge that we have the best automotive safety net in the world, that the 

recent unintended acceleration problems can be hard to catch or diagnose, and that 

your organization's safety tests failed to reveal any acceleration issues in Toyotas in 

part because the episodes are so rare. Please provide any recommendations you 

believe Congress should consider that will help accurately diagnosc the problem 

earlier. 

We have a few recommendations for items that we believe Congress should consider to help 

NHTSA accurately diagnose and address safety problems such as SUA earlier. First, CU believes 

NHTSA is in need of additional funding and staff. We believe that additional resources will help the 

agency to hire appropriate staff and to pursue investigations more thoroughly, as they are required 

to do pursuant to their auto safety mission. 

Second, Congress should consider improvements to make the NHTSA database easier to use for 

NHTSA, as well as for consumers and independent third parties such as CU. NHTSA's Office of 

Defects Investigation (ODI) collects complaints and data about autos from the public and 

manufacturers in two separate databases: the consumer complaints database and the agency's Early 

Warning Reporting (EWR) system. But both have limitations and the data they provide are not 

integrated, making it more difficult tor investigators to spot issues and consumers and third parties 

to find information. 

Public access to this information should be dramatically improved. Consumers shouldn't have to 

visit different site sections to see all of this information, or be forced to search it using tools that are 

less than user-friendly. All complaint information should be visible via a single consumer-facing 

4 See letter from Chairmen Waxman and Stupak to Secretary Ray LaHood, Feb. 22, 2010, at 

http://cnergvcommerce.house.gov/Press Illf20100222flahood letter 2010 2 22.pdf. 

5 
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site. And this service must include intuitive tools that allow users to easily find infonnation for 

particular models and compare vehicle safety records. 

Improvements to these databases would also help Consumers Union to help NHTSA. Ifwe were 

able to more fully mine the database, CU and other independent groups like ours could do more to 

support NHTSA by flagging any spikes we see in problems with specific vehicles. Such information 

would be useful for car owners and buyers, as well as the agency and automakers. 

3) Safety features are become [sic] more complex and more technological every year. The 

more technology is involved, the more expensive something is. If safety features are 

mandated, don't we risk a continuatiou of making cars too expensive to afford, thus 

prolonging purchase decisions and keeping older cars on the road that don't have 

safety features? 

When safety features are incorporated in all vehicles, the costs of such features are reduced. For 

example, when electronic stability control (ESC) first started as an optional extra in early vehicles, 

it cost approximately $1,000. However, when it was incorporated into more vehicles, the cost of 

this option steadily fell to $600, and then to less than $200. 

Consumers place a tremendous amount oftrust in their vehicles, and expect that the underlying 

product is safe enough to transport themselves and their families every day. CU believes that 

vehicle safety protections should be available to all consumers - whether they purchase high-end or 

low-end vehicles. or foreign or domestic vehicles - and that mandates are often necessary to ensure 

that all car manufacturers are providing the same protection. Finally, by mandating safety features, 

we prevent manufacturers who do not offer the protections from having a price advantage over 

another company that does include the safety feature. 

4) Thc NHTSA budget sends 70% - over $600 million each year - to States. Please 

explain whether you believe the allocation between the states and NHTSA should be 

reexamined. 

CU believes that both the state-based and the federal safety activities ofNHTSA are vital. However, 

it is critical that the safety functions that support NHTSA's mission to save lives and prevent 

injuries are adequately funded. In 2007, motor-vehicle crashes accounted for 99 percent of all 

transportation-related fatalities and injuries. Yet NHTSA' s budget currently amounts to just over I 

percent of the overall Department of Transportation (DOT) budget. Congress should ensure that the 

agency's budget and staffing for auto-safety and consumer-protection functions is commensurate 

with the realities of traffic safety and can keep up with the agency's other priorities. 

6 
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5) Please specify the additional information you believe event data recorders should 

captnre. Please also describe how consnmers' privacy can be protected once that 

information is turned over to NHTSA and then made pnblic as suggested by some 

safety advocates. 

In our comments to NHTSA regarding its proposed rule on event data recorders (EDRs), we 

submitted the following list of minimal data that we felt should be gathered by EDRs: 

? Longitudinal and lateral acceleration and principal direction offorces 

? Seat belt status by seating location 

? Number of occupants and location within/without the vehicle 

? Pre-crash data. such as steering wheel angle. brake use, vehicle speed 

? Time of crash 

? Rollover sensor data 

? Yaw data 

? ABS. traction control, and stability control data 

? Air bag operation data 

? Tire pressure data 

? VIN (alpha-numeric portion, not 6-digit serial number) 

In addition to the points above submitted in our comments, we think that EDRs should also gather 

engine revolutions per minute (rpm), gear selector position and gear at the time of the crash. 

In its final rule on EDRs, NHTSA stated that it is requiring seat belt status for front passengers only, 

whereas CU recommended both front and rear passengers be included. 

Regarding privacy concerns, in its final rule, NHTSA stated that it will obtain the consent of the 

vehicle owner to gain access to EDR data, that it will hold all personally identifiable infonnation as 

confidential, and that it will not make public any infonnation which has the potential to either 

directly or indirectly identify individuals (except as specifically required by law). The rule also 

stated that for any inforn1ation that is released publicly, NHTSA will remove the last 6 digits of the 

VIN, which are the personal identifiers of a vehicle and its owner. We believe that these privacy 

protections, as included in the final rule, are adequate. 

Further detail about our privacy concerns regarding EDR infonnation are detailed in our 2004 

comments to NHTSA in response to its EDRs rulemaking; these comments are available at: 

http://www .consumersunion.org/pub/1130%20EDR %20NHTSA %20comments.pdf. 

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Dave McCurdy 

President and CEO 

April 23, 2010 

The Honorable Henry Waxman 

Chainnan 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chainnan Waxman: 

In response to your letter of April 9, 2010, the Alliance appreciates the opportunity to provide 

you and others in the Congress with the industry'S perspective on manufacturing, selling and servicing 

the safest motor vehicle fleet in the world. 

In your letter, you provided questions for responses, and specific answers are attached. Thank 

you for the opportunity to summarize how auto safety is a top priority to automakers. 

Sincerely, 

The Honorable Dave McCurdy 

cc: The Honorable Joe Barton, Ranking Member 

The Honorable John Dingcll, Chainnall Emeritus 

BMW Group. Chrysler Group LLC • Ford Motor Company. General Motors Company. Jaguar Land Rover 

Mazda • Mercedes~Benz, USA. Mitsubishi Motors. Porscbe. Toyota. Volkswagen 

1401 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005~6562· Phone 202.326.5500· Fax 202.326.5567· v.'Ww.autoaliiance.org 
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The Honorable John D. Dingell Qnestions: 

I. Sufficiency of Existing NHTSA Authorities and Resources 

1. Are the reporting provisions ofthe TREAD Act being effectively implemented by NHTSA 

and the automobile manufacturers? Please explain your response and submit supporting 

materials for the record. 

The TREAD Act (the act) requires reporting of extensive data to NHTSA. NHTSA promulgated 49 

CFR Part 579. which implemented the provisions of Section 3 of the act requiring the submission of 

infonnation about "Defects in Foreign Countries" and "Early Warning Reporting" infornmtion. Part 

579 has effectively created a framework for the submission of the required infonnation and has 

resulted in the creation of a large data warehouse by NHTSA, with assistance from the Volpe 

Transportation Center, to receive and store the resulting infornlation. This data warehouse is known as 

"ARTEMIS". Early Warning Reports are required to be submitted quarterly, with production 

infornlation and aggregate data due sixty days after the end of the calendar quarter and portable 

document fonnat (pdf) copies of non-dealer field reports due seventy-five days after the end of the 

calendar quarter. All but the smallest manufacturers are required to submit the information 

electronically using a file transfer protocol. Both NHTSA and manufacturers have invested significant 

resources in the development of the organizational and IT infrastructure needed to meet the aggressive 

timing in Part 579. The current system allows NHTSA to effectively collect the required data, and 

does achieve the stated goal of making the information available to NHTSA sooner. 

Recently NHTSA conducted a two-year review of TREAD reporting and made adjustments to Part 579 

to increase the effectiveness of the reporting and to reduce certain infonnation being collected from 

certain smaller manufacturers. During this review NHTSA also considered making revisions to the 

reporting templates, but ultimately decided that such changes were not justified at this time. The 

Alliance concurs with NHTSA's decision not to revise the templates because the resources required to 

make such changes cannot be shown to provide an added safety benefit. 

Further, the Alliance recommends that consideration be given to providing resources for improving 

NHTSA's website, to make the current search engines and consumer interfaces more effective and user 

friendly. For example, the current website requires a consumer to do separate searches on NHTSA's 

VOQ data and to manually analyze the publicly available TREAD death and injury data from each 

manufacturer on a quarter by quarter basis to review what data may be applicable to their vehicle. A 

more advanced website design might allow a single search by make, model and model year for both 

kinds of data. Further, NHTSA's VOQ system for collecting consumer complaints directly from 

consumers does not make use of manufacturer's production data submitted under Part 579 to create 

menu-driven valid make-mode 1- model year combinations to identify the consumer's vehicle, rather 

than an open text field. The Alliance recommends that these and other improvements to NHTSA's 

consumer interfaces on their website be considered. 

2. Did the TREAD reporting system accomplish what was necessary to protect the public 

safety in the recent Toyota recall cases? If not, lease provide for the record where and 

how the system failed, both NHTSA and Toyota. 

NHTSA has collected consumer complaints directly from consumers for several decades through its 

Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VQQ). VOQs have historically been a rich source of infonnation for 

NHTSA and have been the basis for the opening of a significant portion of their investigations. The 

TREAD reporting system implemented under Section 3(b) of the TREAD Act and Part 579 of the 

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implementing regulations has provided additional infomlation to supplement the VOQ data. In 

particular, the pdf copies of non-dealer field reports submitted under Part 579, provide a technically 

rich set of early warning information that, together with VOQs, allows NHTSA to identify and initially 

evaluate potential issues, and determine whether to open an investigation. The Alliance believes that 

these two sources provide NHTSA with adequate infonnation to identify potential issues. The fact that 

NHTSA opened multiple investigations into acceleration-related reports demonstrates that the agency 

had sufficient data available to it on this topic. 

3. Is there any critical data or source of data needed by NHTSA that is not curreutly 

provided to it under the TREAD Act or other reporting requirements for automohile 

manufacturers? If so, please descrihe this data and what is required for NHTSA to 

obtain it. 

The Alliance believes that NHTSA, manufacturers and safety researchers would benefit from having 

improved real-world crash data. NHTSA is in a unique position to collect such data through its NASS 

and F ARS systems, and the recent introduction of several advanced safety technologies such as side 

airbags, advanced frontal restraints, electronic stability control, and improved roof strength help drive a 

need for increased data on the performance of these new systems in real world crashes. Please see the 

answer to Congressman Barton's first question for additional details. 

4. Do you believe NHTSA made mistakes in its response to the recent Toyota recalls? 

Likewise, should NHTSA have pushed Toyota to initiate recalls earlier than it did? 

The Alliance is not privy to all of the data available to Toyota or NHTSA, nor to any of the discussions 

that may have occurred between them, and therefore, is unable to comment as to whether any mistakes 

were made. Federal law requires all auto manufacturers to notify NHTSA within five working days of 

determining that a safety defect exists and promptly conduct a recall. See 49 CFR Part 573, "Defect 

and Non-Compliance Responsibility and Reports." Federal law further requires manufacturers to 

submit to NHTSA a description of the manufacturer's program for remedying the defect or noncompliance. The agency has the authority to order a vehicle manufacturer to expand the sources of 

replacement parts or the number of authorized repair facilities beyond those usually and customarily 

used to accelerate the completion of the remedy program. 

Manufacturers must also submit to the agency quarterly progress reports to allow the agency to track a 

manufacturer's progress in completing its recall program. If NHTSA believes that progress is 

insufficient, it may order a manufacturer to issue additional notifications to affected vehicle owners in 

an attempt to increase the completion rate. 

Finally, as established by the TREAD Act, federal law specifies requirements for manufacturers to 

reimburse owners and purchasers for costs incurred for remedies completed in advance of the 

manufacturer's remedy program. Details of a manufacturer's reimbursement plan must be provided (0 

NHTSA. 

5. What authorities does NHTSA lack, whether under the TREAD Act or otherwise, with 

which to address defects in automobiles deemed hazardous to the public safety? 

Alliance members sell vehicles in markets throughout the world, and we recognize the NHTSA has 

having a very aggressive and thorough investigative authority. The Alliance believes that NHTSA's 

current authorizing legislation gives it broad and adequate powers to collect information, conduct 

investigations and address defects in automobiles that may present an unreasonable risk to motor 

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vehicle safety. NHTSA's principal legal authority comes from the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 

Safety Act of 1966, as amended. The Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and 

Documentation Act (the TREAD Act), among other things, amended the Safety Act. The Safety Act is 

codified in Chapter 301 of Title 49 of the United States Code. Additional authority for NHTSA resides 

in Chapters 321, 323 (Consumer information), 325 (bumper standards), 327 (odometers), and 329 

(automobile fuel economy) and Title 23 U.S.c. sections 401-411 (grants and highway safety 

programs). Implementing regulations are codified at Chapter V of Title 49 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations. 

Sections §30118 - 30121, §30163, and §30165 30166 of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle 

Safety, provide specific authority (granted to the Secretary of Transportation, carried out by NHTSA) 

relating to enforcement activities associated with safety defects in motor vehicles (and motor vehicle 

equipment) and failures to comply with applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). 

Please see Appendix A to these comments. The corresponding implementing regulations are codified 

at Parts 573 through 579 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 

NHTSA also has various resources available to it to aid in the detection of potential defects. NHTSA's 

Enforcement Division investigates defects and non-compliances. A brief overview of this activity is 

given below. 

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) investigates possible defect trends, and where appropriate, 

seeks recalls of vehicles and vehicle equipment that pose an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. 

ODI analyzes the various data received or developed to determine whether anomalies or trends exist 

that potentially indicate the presence of a defect trend and an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety: 

As required by the TREAD Act, NHTSA developed and maintains a comprehensive and sophisticated 

data warehouse/system (ARTEMIS) to access the voluminous amount of early warning reporting 

(EWR) data submitted quarterly by manufacturers. Please see Appendix B for more infornlation about 

the EWR requirements. 

The agency annually receives approximately 30,000 complaints from vehicle owners, and pursues 

multitudes of evaluations and investigations based on this information. 

The agency's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) is responsible for the development of 

objective and repeatable compliance test procedures for new and amended Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standards (FMVSS) that the agency uses to evaluate conformance to the regulations. It also 

conducts the agency's vehicle compliance test program that annually conducts an average of 230 

vehicle tests and over 800 tests on motor vehicle equipment. 

In addition to the compliance test program, testing perfonned by the agency's New Car Assessment 

Program (NCAP) also provides an indication of compliance with related FMVSS requirements and can 

help identifY the existence of potential safety-related concerns. Historically, NHTSA conducts more 

than 150 NCAP vehicle crash tests per year that covers over 85 percent of the new car fleet. 

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6. There seems to be broad agreement about the need to increase the resources available to 

NHTSA to carry out its mission. Could you suggest by how much NHTSA's budget 

should be increased, as well as the rationale for this amount? 

NHTSA needs to have the necessary resonrces (authority, funding, staffing) to fulfill its mission. The 

annual budgeting process provides Congress the opportunity to regularly review whether sufficient 

resources exist and whether those resources are being used to maximum advantage. 

Congress has consistently funded NHTSA above authorization levels. NHTSA has about 635 

employees and an annual budget of $870 million, 70 percent of which goes to states and local 

governments in the form of highway traffic safety grants. The near-term priority plan recently 

published by the agency 1 and the longer-term plan now under development by the agencl are useful 

tools to NHTSA, the industry it regulates, and other safety partners. These documents are also 

useful tools by which the Committee may exercise oversight of the agency, as they can also be used to 

gauge the extent ofresources needed to accomplish these plans. 

In FY2010, NHTSA has an enforcement budget of $18,077,000. Specifically, Vehicle Safety 

Compliance is funded at $8,096,000; Safety Defect Investigations is funded at $9,829,000. These 

amounts go to SUppOlt DOT Safety goals by ensuring compliance with motor vehicle safety standards, 

evaluating safety-related concems in motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, enforcing the 

Federal odometer law, encouraging enforcement of State odometer laws, and by ensuring that 

manufacturers conduct recalls in a timely manner. 

The Alliance believes that another critical need is to fund the National Automobile Sampling System 

(NASS) at a level sufficient to attain its intended design size to ensure critical "real-world" data is 

collected at a sufficient number of sites nationwide to provide the statistically valid, nationally 

representative sample originally intended. The budget for NASS has not kept pace with either the 

Department's informational needs or inflation. Moreover, these needs are growing as automakers 

reinvent the automobile in response to societal demands for ever safer and cleaner vehicles. Starved for 

funds, the capability ofNASS has been dramatically reduced. Currently, NASS collects in-depth data 

on approximately 4,500 crashes less than a third of the intended design size of 15,000 to 20,000 

crash cases annually. A $40 million dollar annual investment in NASS equates to 1.73 cents for every 

$100 of economic loss. 

II. Penalties 

1. Are the civil penalties NHTSA is allowed under statute to assess sufficient for the agency 

to deter non-compliance by automobile manufacturers? 

Yes. When Congress passed the TREAD Act in 2000, it increased civil penalties available to the 

agency to $5,000 per vehicle per offense with a cap indexed to inflation. The cap currently stands at 

$16.4 million per offense. By comparison, in 2008, Congress capped civil penalties for other 

manufacturers of consumer products at $15 million per offense. 

To be clear, penalties are not the primary motivation for Alliance members to meet and exceed 

government safety requirements, and to fully comply with all aspects of the Safety Act. Alliance 

1 See 74 Fed.,Bgg. 57623, November 9,2009. 

2 See 74 Fed, Egg. 57385/ November 5,2009. 

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members are first and foremost motivated by the safety of our customers and our reputations for 

building safe and reliable transportation. 

2. Are there additional criminal penalties that the Congress should consider allowing 

NHTSA to impose on automobile manufacturers? 

No. Auto manufacturers already face criminal sanctions under 18 USC 1001 for making false 

statements to NHTSA concerning defects or non-compliances. The statute, which applies to early 

warning reporting requirements. provides that anyone who knowingly and willfully conceals a material 

fact or makes any false statement or representation to a Federal agency. on a matter within its 

jurisdiction, is guilty of a felony. Additionally. 18 USC 371 provides felony sanctions for conspiring 

to defraud a Federal agency. Additional criminal sanctions, aimed exclusively at auto manufacturers, 

could have the perverse effect of delaying the speedy identification and remedy of defects related to 

safety as explained below. 

3. Are you concerned that the threat of criminal penalties will chill communications between 

manufacturers and NHTSA? 

Yes. When Congress passed the TREAD Act, it recognized that the best way to protect the public is to 

identify and remedy vehicle defects as soon as possible. In the ten years since TREAD passed, the 

number of recalls has increased, but the overall number of vehicles recalled has actually decreased. 

That is because auto manufacturers and NHTSA are identifying potential problems sooner and 

engaging in a process that is driven primarily by engineers on both sides. not attorneys. 

Criminal penalties could chill communications with NHTSA and complicate and delay resolution of 

disputes to the detriment of the driving public. The dialog that exists today between engineers at 

NHTSA and manufacturers might be replaced by guarded, fonnal communications vetted by lawyers 

on both sides. To the extent that there are disputes between NHTSA and manufacturers regarding the 

existence of a defect or non-compliance, the vast majority of these are resolved relatively quickly 

without a fonnal determination by NHTSA. Polarizing this process by adding criminal penalties could 

result in more disputes being ultimately resolved through litigation rather than the administrative 

process established by Congress. Such litigation would be exhaustive, expensive, and lengthy, with 

the govermnent having the highly difficult task of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, individual guilt 

for a knowing and willful violation. 

III. Domestic vs. Foreign Automobile Manufacturers 

1. My questioning of James Lentz, Toyota's chief of sales for North America, revealed that 

decisions to recall Toyota vehicles sold in North America are made in Japan. I am 

concerned this is a threat to public safety in this country. Do you agree? 

No, we believe this was a specific communication problem at one parent company that has since been 

addressed. Secretary LaHood and Administrator Strickland testified at the hearings that the 

communications problem with the parent company in the recent instance was unique and steps have 

been taken to ensnre that similar problems do not arise in the future. 

2. How should this be corrected'? For example. should foreign automobile manufacturers 

that sell vehicles in the United States be required to empower their personnel here to 

initiate recalls? 

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Auto manufacturing is a global business, and it is important for US lawmakers to keep in mind that any 

provision adopted in the US could be subject to mirror legislation in more than 150 countries around 

the world, creating burdens for all automakers. There are logical reasons why recall decisions arc 

ultimately made in the "home" country for automakers headquartered outside the US, as well as those 

headquartered domestically. 

• Most design engineers and test engineers are in the home country, 

• The home country is often in charge of selecting and communicating with component suppliers, 

The home country is in a better position to analyze the problem from a global perspective 

because it receives inputs from all markets. 

At the same time, automakers recognize the importance of involvement in recall decisions from within 

the country where problems occur. Again, Secretary LaHood and Administrator Strickland testified at 

the hearings that the cOIlUnunications problem with the parent company in the recent instance was 

unique and steps have been taken to ensure that similar problems do not arise in the future. 

IV. Conflict of Interest Rules 

1. Are NHTSA's current conflict-of-interest rules sufficient to protect the agency from 

undue influence from former staff? Please explain your answer. 

Yes, there are extensive ethics and conflicts-of- interest regulations for all employees of the executive 

branch. These regulations are described in detail in 5 CFR Part 2635. The regulations cover 

everything including: gifts from outside sources, conflicting financial interests, impartiality in 

performing official duties, seeking other employment, misuse of position and what sorts of outside 

activities are permissible. The penalties associated with violating any of the ethics regulations include 

fines and potential imprisonment and are contained with 18 USC Sections 207 and 216. 

2. If you believe this is not the case, should new conflict-of-interest rules be codified in 

statute, or should that be left to the NHTSA to set for itself? 

Please see answer to the previous question. 

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The Honorable Joe Barton Questions: 

1. You testified the NASS program - which plans to collect data on 4,500 crashes this year 

could be funded with $40 million more to increase the number of test crashes closer to 

20,000. 

a. Please state how you arrived at the sample number of 20,000. 

The original design for NASS completed in 1975 detennined that 15,000 to 20,000 real-world crashes 

would need to be investigated annually to develop a valid national representation of most traffic safety 

phenomena. See J. O'Day, A. Wolfe, and R. Kaplan, Design for NASS: A National Accident 

Sampling System, (Ann Arbor, MI, Highway Safety Research Institute, The University of Michigan, 

1975). 

b. Please state by what degree a sample size of 20,000 is statistically more accurate or 

relevant than 4,500. 

Statistical analyses of 95% confidence and 5% accuracy are common. To achieve these confidence 

and accuracy levels, 740 reports of a given event would be needed. The need for a large number of 

annual reports arises when a particular set of events to be examined has low probability of occurrence 

in the sample. A report prepared in 1975 for the Transportation Subcommittee of the House 

Committee on Appropriations provides several illustrations for the need for a large number of crashes 

to be examined ammally, including the following: 

"Suppose, for example, one wishes to detennine the distribution of car weight in rollover injury 

accidents for two categories of occupants: belted and unbelted, 740 reports in each of the two 

categories would be required. Injury accidents constitute 33% of reportable accidents, and the 

probability that an injury accident was a rollover 3-/ is about 8%. Perhaps 25% of those injured wore 

belts. Thus 0.67% of reportable accidents were rollover-injury-belted, and to find a sample of 740, an 

aggregate of 111,000 reports in the 'reportable accident category would be required. (This same set of 

reports would provide more than enough unbelted-rollover-injury events.) If only injury accidents 

were reported, a sample of37,000 reports would suffice. If the same analysis were to be done for fatal 

rollover accidents drawn from a mass accident file, the file would have to number 3,500,000 to find 

740 fatal-rollover-belted events. The reason for the much larger data file in this case is that there are 

far fewer fatalities than injuries." See Office of Technology Assessment. "Automobile Collision Data: 

An Assessment of Needs and Methods." House Committee on Appropriations, Transportation 

Subcommittee. February 17, 1975. 

2. Critics suggest NHTSA relies too much on manufacturers for information in order to do 

its job. 

a. Please describe the nature of the relationship and flow of information between 

your members and NHTSA. 

The automobile is one of the most heavily regulated consumer products in American commerce. As 

the regulatory authority, NHTSA must communicate with automobile manufacturers in order to better 

understand the latest trends in safety and technology. Since consumers place such a premium on 

safety, automakers monitor and respond to customer concerns quickly. Manufacturers continually 

monitor a range of data to respond to consumers, including consumer complaints, warranty claims, 

property damage and field data about their products and conduct consumer satisfaction campaigns, 

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consumer advisories and many recalls before any crashes or injmies occur. The other somce of that 

data is NHTSA. 

b. Please state your response to the criticism that NHTSA as a regulator is too close 

to and relies too much upon those it regulates. 

The Alliance disagrees with the assumption that communicating with the regulatory body is an 

inherently bad concept. It is critical and beneficial for everyone that there is an open dialogue with the 

agency. An open constructive dialogue with the agency and manufacturers has resulted in the vast 

majority of recalls since TREAD being conducted voluntarily. Public safety is not well served by a 

cumbersome process that is more polarizing, more guarded, with only fonnal written communications 

between automakers and the agency. 

3. You testified that "virtually all oftoday's advanced safety technologies are being 

developed and implemented ahead of regulatory mandates." 

a. In terms of the universe of safety features, please state how many of those safety 

features were developed by industry without government prompting versus how 

many were mandated by Congress or NHTSA. 

Safety is one of the industry's top priorities. Many of today's most significant safety featmes have 

been developed and introduced by automakers .... without a government mandate. It's in om interests 

to do so, because safety sells like never before. Voluntary safety features include anti-lock brakes, 

brake assist, electronic stability control, electronic roll mitigation, adaptive headlights, side airbags and 

curtains, front passenger safety belt reminder systems and advanced collision avoidance features, 

including lane departure warning, active cruise control with automatic braking and blind spot monitors. 

For example, Electronic Stability Control (ESC) was developed by tbe auto industry's researchers and 

engineers and was soon after considered so effective, the federal government then mandated the 

technology. Even after the mandate, industry continues to implement ESC well in advance of the 

phase-in schedule outlined in the DOT rule. As of Model Year 2008, 81 percent of the new light 

vehicle models on sale were available with ESC (61 percent standard; 20 percent optional). The 

percentage of MY 2008 SUVs with ESC available was even higher. Ninety-five percent of MY 2008 

SUVs were available with ESC (93 percent standard; 2 percent optional). This was well in advance of 

September 1, 2012 when such systems will be required. 

Similarly, as of Model Year 2008,76 percent of the new light vehicle models on sale are available with 

side curtain air bags (63 percent standard; 13 percent optional). The percentage of MY 2008 SUVs 

with side curtain air bags available is even higher. Ninety-seven percent of MY 2008 SUVs are 

available with side curtain air bags (91 percent standard; 6 percent optional). 

Automakers also have collectively pursued several voluntary initiatives to enhance motor vehicle 

safety. Beginning in 2003, the Alliance worked with the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IlIlS) 

on the development and implementation of test procedures and perfonnance criteria to enhance 

occupant crash protection in crashes between cars and light trucks. To meet the perfonnance criteria, 

automakers are designing the primary energy absorbing structures of new SUVs and pickup trucks to 

overlap at least 50 percent of the federally mandated bumper height zone for cars. Alternatively, 

automakers may elect to connect a second energy-absorbing structure to the primary one. Then the 

lower edge of the secondary structure cannot be any higher than the bottom of the car bumper zone. 

By September 1, 2009, just six years after beginning development, 100 percent of each manufacturer's 

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applicable vehicles were being produced in a way that improves crash compatibility. IIHS' field 

studies support the expectation of substantial real-world benefits of designing vehicles to this 

agreement. JIHS reports an overall 19 percent reduction in passenger car driver deaths in both 

front-to-front and front-to-side crashes involving both SUVs and pickup trucks already designed to the 

agreement's front-to front compatibility requirements. 

Automakers' most recent voluntary initiative was codified as part of the Cameron Gulbransen Kids 

Transportation Safety Act of 2007, which the Alliance supported. Automakers' voluntary agreement 

on Brake Transmission Shift Interlocks was adopted as part of this Act and now includes compliance 

enforcement and recall oversight by NHTSA. This agreement further reduces the risk of inadvertent 

shift selector movement in automatic transmission equipped vehicles in circumstances where an 

unsupervised child has access to both a vehicle and its ignition keys. 

b. In comparison to those innovations by industry versus those features mandated by 

government, please state which safety features have bad the most success in 

preventing injuries or fatalities. 

Please reference the chart below: 

Automaker-Developed Estimated/Potential 

Safety Innovations Lives Saved Annually 

(not additive) 

Electronic Stability Control 5,300 to 9,600 

(ESC) 

lane Departure Warning 2,736 

(LOW) 

Safety Belt Reminder/Safety Belt 1,652 

Interlock (90% usage nationwide) 

Side Airbags 1,029 

Forward Collision Warning (FeW) 632 

w/automatic braking 

Emergency Brake Assist 271 

Adaptive Headlamps 225 

Blind Spot Information System 38 

Source: NHTSA & mIS 

4. Ms. Claybrook testified that NHTSA should mandate the use of event data recorders 

(EDRs) and that the types of information these "black boxes" collect should be expanded. 

She also testified these devices should not have an on/off switch (which would allow 

privacy-minded consumers to "opt-out" of data collection) and that EDR data should not 

be granted confidential treatment by NHTSA. 

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a. Please state who owns the event data recorded by these devices. 

The Alliance supports the development of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that would require, 

after an adequate lead-time, the installation of EDRs on all light vehicles (10,000 lb GVWR and 

under). Collecting the resulting data, when anonymous and aggregated, would further the long-term 

objectives of automotive safety by providing addition real-world safety performance infonnation, As 

noted in response to earlier questions, this should be included as a part of increased NASS data 

collection, which the Alliance supports. However, the Alliance believes that data gathered by an EDR 

remains the property of the vehicle's owner or lessee, and the pennission of the owner or lessee, or a 

search warrant or subpoena is required to access the data. Thirteen states (AR, CA, CO, CT, ME, NV, 

NH, NY, ND, OR, TX, VA, and WA) have enacted laws that explicitly state that a vehicle's owner 

owns the event data recorded and that the owner's consent is needed to access this data. The Alliance 

further believes that common law principles assigns ownership of event data recorded to the vehicle 

owner in instances where there is no explicit statement to this effect in individual state statutes. 

b. Please state your recommendations on how such data should be handled at the 

Federal government level. 

Any data recovered from an EDR by federal investigators under authority given by the vehicle owner 

should be included in NASS only after any personal identifying infonnation has been redacted. In 

particular, the Alliance recommends that the last six digits of the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 

be redacted. 

Although VINs are supposed to be immune from "reverse engineering" of the owner of the affected 

vehicle under state and federal privacy laws, the truth is that it is relatively easy to detennine the name, 

address, social security number, home telephone number and other personal identification information 

from a VIN. To prove this point, an Alliance member found two Vehicle Owner Questionnaires 

(VOQs) with full VINs on NHTSA's website, and was able to determine the name, home address and 

home telephone number of the vehicle owners, the names of the lien holders, and, in one of the two 

examples, was able to detennine the owner/lessor's social security number and obtain information 

about an accident involving that vehicle. It should be noted that the Alliance member's experiment 

here did not involve vehicles manufactured or financed by that company; rather, this information was 

found on commercially available databases. 

Personal identifying infonnation is protectable under Exemption Six of the Freedom of Information 

Act (FOIA), which guards the release of information that could invade the personal privacy of 

individuals. 

c. Please state whether you believe private citizens should be able to opt <out> of this 

data collection (sic). 

EDRs should not be required to have an on/off switch which would allow privacy- minded vehicle 

owners to "opt-out" ofthis data collection for the following reasons: 

EDRs are a functionality engineered into airbag control modules, electronic stability control modules, 

etc. Requiring on/off switches for these devices could compromise the functional integrity of the 

safety system fitted with the EDR functionality. 

The privacy of vehicle owners is protected by (I) assigning ownership of any data recorded to the 

vehicle's owner, (2) requiring the vehicle owner's permission to access any data recorded, and (3) 

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requiring that any personal identifYing infonnation contained in the data record, such as the VIN, be 

redacted or otherwise protected under Exemption Six of the Freedom of Infomlation Act. 

d. Please state your opinion on how Congress should balance Ms. Claybrook's 

suggestions with the serious and legitimate privacy concerns of citizens. 

Vehicle owner's privacy concerns should be protected as follows: 

Consumer lufonnation: The Alliance supports providing consumers with important infonnation on 

their autos, including EDRs. Notification of the presence of EDRs is provided in the owner's manual, 

along with infonnation on what data are collected, how the data is used and consumer ownership of 

data. 

Consumer Ownership of Data: The Alliance advocates that data gathered by an EDR remains the 

property of the vehicle's owner or lessee, and the pcnnission of the owner or lessee is required to 

access the data. 

Service Agreement Notification: The Alliance supports requirements that subscription service 

providers notifY their customers if crash-related infonnation will be recorded and transmitted. 

SUbscription services include Automatic Collision Notification. 

National Leadership: The Alliance supports federal policy that would pre-empt inconsistent state or 

local laws. A federal policy would ensure that the benefits of EDRs are not jeopardized by an 

unnecessary patchwork of potentially conflicting state requirements. 

5. The industry spends billions developing new safety technologies every year. Please state 

whether increased penalties and additional criminal liability pose a realistic threat of a 

chilling effect on research and development into new technologies or on the deployment of 

new technologies and, if so, how. 

Some have suggested that manufacturers should face criminal penalties for introducing defective 

products into commerce. Such penalties would very clearly have a chilling effect on research, 

development and deployment of innovative technologies. According to the statute, "'defect' includes 

any defect in perfonnance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

equipment." 49 USC 30 !O2( a )(2). Because there is no agreed-upon definition of "defect" that would 

put a manufacturer on notice of the conduct that is subject to criminal sanctions, criminal penalties 

would criminalize uncertain, subjective judgments after the fact as to whether a vehicle contains a 

defect related to safety. The safest course of action for manufacturers under such a regime would be to 

avoid innovation that could end up exposing the corporation or its officers to criminal prosecution. 

12 

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