U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

21–699PDF 2005

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE:

AN EARLY ASSESSMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 

NONPROLIFERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 9, 2005

Serial No. 109–55

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms 

Control, U.S. Department of State ..................................................................... 4

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement .............................. 7

(1)

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: 

AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND NONPROLIFERATION, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing, on Proliferation Security Initiative: An 

Early Assessment, will come to order. 

President Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative, or 

PSI as we refer to it, 2 years ago in Krakow, Poland. The PSI is 

a post-9/11 U.S.-originated multilateral initiative aimed at stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of 

WMD-related materials. It aims to interdict WMD cargo on the 

land, in the air and at sea. 

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, who spearheaded its creation, has called this 

Proliferation Security Initiative foremost among President Bush’s 

efforts to stop WMD proliferation. Today, there are 60 countries 

supporting this initiative. 

PSI is an aggressive response to increasingly sophisticated 

proliferators who do pose a grave threat to our national security. 

PSI’s most high-profile operation has been the interception of the 

BBC China. Now, the BBC China was a ship delivering WMD components, significant centrifuge parts, to Libya in 2003. It was a 

joint U.S.–U.K. operation. This contributed to Libya’s decision to 

renounce its WMD program, and it contributed to the unraveling 

of Dr. A.Q. Kahn’s nuclear proliferation network. 

In general, PSI has received good grades from analysts from 

other countries and from the U.N. Secretary General, who has endorsed the PSI concept. There can be only partial grades, however, 

because the Administration recently reported that 11 successful 

PSI interdictions took place in the last 9 months. And while details 

are sketchy due to intelligence security concerns, this number included a shipment of material and equipment bound from ballistic 

missile programs in countries of concern, including Iran. 

This number of reported interdictions does suggest a worrisome 

level of proliferation activity. The PSI grade is not complete because we obviously have no idea what proliferation PSI is missing. 

Intelligence collection is the foundation of PSI. Director of National 

2

Intelligence, John Negroponte, recently said, ‘‘PSI makes intelligence actionable.’’ Yet the Robb-Silverman Commission Report, 

released in March, noted that the U.S. intelligence community is 

ill-equipped to support PSI. 

As the intelligence community retools, supporting programs like 

PSI should be central to their mission. Last year, a Pentagon group 

reported that nuclear knowledge, materials and weapons are oozing 

out of control. Some have suggested that PSI risk deflecting attention from other nonproliferation efforts, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recently concluded an unfruitful review 

conference. Nonproliferation treaties, threat reduction programs, 

export control regimes and other efforts should not be shortchanged. We need to be using all tools in the toolbox. PSI might 

be the hammer, but we need the screwdriver and saw, too. 

PSI has been described as an activity, not an organization. It has 

little institutional structure and no official membership or headquarters. No permanent staff. This brings advantages. It avoids red 

tape. It avoids a lowest common denominator approach when taking action. It avoids the possible political acrimony over selecting 

interdiction targets. PSI is nimble. 

There are possible drawbacks, though. There are some concerns 

about PSI’s staying power as governments change abroad. PSI does 

not have its own funding base in the State Department budget, 

even though it aims to expand. John Bolton drove the PSI’s creation, showing great commitment, skill and perseverance. He is 

now ready to go to New York as our Ambassador to the United Nations. New leadership will have to press ahead. We should continually reassess this critical activity, this activity of WMD interdiction, and we should ask if it is best situated outside the type of organizational framework that is brought to most other diplomatic 

challenges. And that is what we are doing today. 

I will now turn to the Ranking Member for his statement, Mr. 

Brad Sherman from Sherman Oaks. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I thank my colleague from Fullerton 

for holding these hearings, and I thank the staff for working hard 

to make them happen, given how busy the Full Committee has 

been this week. 

I thank Assistant Secretary Rademaker for joining us again. Let 

me take this opportunity, just as we were talking informally, to remind you, Assistant Secretary, that you promised that at the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in New 

York, which has been over for a couple of weeks now, that you 

would provide us with a letter on which countries were helpful and 

which countries were not helpful in achieving our objectives there. 

And every morning, I check my mailbox with great anticipation in 

awaiting that letter. 

In addition, we can have some informal conversations, but what 

would be useful to the Congress is something formal. Because me 

knowing something is not as important as the entire Congress 

knowing it. Although we can talk informally as well, that may be 

useful. 

I can think of no better way for a country to demonstrate friendship to the United States than to work with us on nonproliferation 

issues. Those countries that do should receive our gratitude, and 

3

those who hinder our efforts should become known to this Congress 

formally or informally. 

Our topic today is the PSI, which has been touted by the Bush 

Administration as one of the most successful multilateral efforts at 

nonproliferation during the tenure of this President. And as pointed out by the Chairman, it was John Bolton who has been spearheading this effort. 

PSI is a pretty loose coalition of the willing. The Administration 

says we have 60 supporting countries, although what it means to 

be a supporting country is somewhat of a mystery. Absent a handful of universally recognized scourges, such as slave trading and piracy, there is virtually no legal authority for the United States or 

any other power to hail over and board an international ship outside its own territorial waters. So even if we know a ship cruising 

in international waters is carrying centrifuges destined for Iran, 

unless we have an agreement with the flag country or unless that 

ship enters a friendly state’s territorial waters and that country 

grants us the right to board, we do not have the legal authority to 

board that ship. 

I might point out that given a choice between letting the centrifuge get to Iran or get to North Korea, on the one hand, and 

boarding the ship without legal authority, on the other, I would 

certainly advise the second course. But it is always nice to have 

legal authority, and it is nice to have diplomats around the world 

getting us that authority. 

This problem of legal authority can be solved significantly by getting that authority from the major flag carriers, especially the flag 

of convenience jurisdictions. We should commend Cyprus for joining PSI, and the Government of Nicosia for giving us that authority. Panama is a participant, so is Liberia, but I will be asking the 

Assistant Secretary to describe our efforts to get other friendly 

countries who flag a significant number of ships, including the 

Marshall Islands, especially given the very large amount of foreign 

aid we provide per capita there, but also Honduras, Belize, Sri 

Lanka and Jamaica. 

I would point out that this Congress is being asked to approve 

CAFTA, and these countries are not cooperating with us on stopping nuclear proliferation? Those who choose to vote for CAFTA 

will have to explain why they are willing to take that action. 

I note South Korea is not a member of PSI. While Japan has aggressively used its authority to inspect North Korean ships in its 

territorial waters, South Korea’s lack of PSI membership is certainly disappointing to me, and I look forward to having the Assistant Secretary explain our efforts vis-a-vis South Korea. 

The Chinese, likewise, play a critical role in nonproliferation. Of 

course, it should not surprise us that they have not joined PSI. 

China has not been very cooperative in limiting proliferation. It 

continues to subsidize North Korea, and we, of course, are absolutely unwilling to even hint to the Chinese that their failure to 

help us on nonproliferation issues could have the slightest impact 

on trade. The reason is that that huge trade deficit that sucks jobs 

out of America makes some Americans that are very powerful very 

rich. And for this reason, we have a President who has said that 

if we cannot invade it, we are not going to do anything about it exVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:50 Sep 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\ITN\060905\21699.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

cept send the diplomats without the power to do anything, such as 

hint about trade. 

I know I have gone on for a while here, and I would look forward 

to hearing the Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. ROYCE. Stephen G. Rademaker is the Assistant Secretary for 

Arms Control at the State Department. In addition to his duties at 

the Bureau for Arms Control, Secretary Rice has given Mr. 

Rademaker the duties of Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation. 

Before joining the State Department, Mr. Rademaker worked as 

the Chief Counsel for the Committee on Homeland Security and as 

the Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel for our Committee on 

International Relations. 

Secretary Rademaker, we saw you 6 weeks ago, and we thank 

you for joining us today. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sherman, other Members of 

the Committee, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you again 

today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can interrupt you for just a second, I had it 

wrong on the Marshall Islands. They are a participant, and I am 

sorry about that mistake. 

Mr. ROYCE. And the good news is that most of these developing 

countries that are these convenient states have been signed on by 

the Administration, and so that is certainly a lawful activity in 

terms of the legality of the process, with this being underwritten. 

But as Congressman Sherman suggests, we will certainly be attentive to making certain that all other developing countries that 

are still in the category of countries of convenience see the light on 

this. 

But please proceed, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, the RMI is not only a participant in the PSI, they 

have signed a shipboarding agreement with the United States as 

well. 

As I was saying, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee again. I have submitted a prepared 

statement for the record. I will not insist on reading it, if that is 

okay with you. Instead, I would like to make a few introductory 

comments and then respond to whatever questions the Members 

may have. 

The PSI has been a big success, and I would say, at least for myself, an unexpected success, or the degree of success has been unexpected. It was announced just 2 years ago, and as of today, we have 

over 60 countries that participate in one form or another in the 

PSI. What we have done is tap into a very strong desire on the part 

of many countries to do something, to participate in some way in 

efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction. 

I think what we have to say about this is that, at a deep intuitive level, many governments understand, especially post-9/11, the 

grave risks to all civilized countries posed by the nexus of terrorists 

who are intent on killing as many people as possible in order to 

5

make political statements, state sponsors of terrorism who lend assistance to these kinds of organizations, and the fact that many of 

these state sponsors of terrorism are also in the business of seeking 

to develop weapons of mass destruction. And if such governments 

ever obtained weapons of mass destruction, they will be sorely 

tempted to pass those weapons into the hands of terrorists who 

would not hesitate to use them. 

And for that reason, there has been a very high degree of interest in many countries all over the world in acting collectively to 

confront this threat that faces us. The PSI has served as a vehicle 

to attract and channel this enthusiasm to do something, and I 

think that accounts for the large number of countries that are participating, the very high level of activity that takes place under the 

PSI in terms of planning and exercises and developing patterns of 

cooperation that can be used in discreet interdictions that the PSI 

may seek to effectuate as cases emerge, and the success we have 

actually achieved in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction. 

We have said repeatedly that the PSI is an activity, not an organization, and I do think that is an important concept for all of us 

to bear in mind. There is no secretariat, no headquarters, no staff 

of the PSI. Instead, it is an informal coalition of countries that, as 

I said, get together, work together, and develop patterns of cooperation that they can use when the need to work together on a discreet interdiction arises. And we have had successes. 

Secretary Rice, in her address on the second anniversary of the 

PSI, just 10 days ago, alluded to a number of them, and you, Mr. 

Chairman, relayed correctly what she said about the successes that 

we had over the last 9 months. I would comment, however, that 

successful interdictions are not ultimately the best measure of the 

success of the PSI. The best measure of success of the PSI will be 

the interdictions that never happen because the weapons of mass 

destruction or the components of weapons of mass destruction were 

never shipped in the first place because the PSI successfully deterred or dissuaded would-be proliferators from engaging in this 

kind of activity in the first place. And we will never have a number. We will never be able to quantify how many shipments of 

weapons of mass destruction never took place because of the PSI, 

but we believe the PSI is already having a deterrent effect, and we 

think it will increasingly have that effect in the future. 

The PSI, of course, is just one element of the Administration’s 

overall strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. It is complemented by and it complements other elements of that strategy. 

Resolution 1540, adopted by the U.N. Security Council a little over 

a year ago, required all governments to adopt export controls and 

to assert or exercise their sovereign responsibility to try to prevent 

transfers of weapons of mass destruction and their components. 

This regime, under resolution 1540, works hand in glove with what 

we have established under the PSI. 

PSI and resolution 1540 are highly complementary. One provides 

a legal basis within countries for stopping these kinds of shipments, and the PSI serves as an international safety net that can 

act in cases where shipments take place, notwithstanding the prohibitions found in resolution 1540. 

6

We are working diplomatically to increase international participation in the PSI. As I said, we have over 60 participants today. 

That number continues to grow. Just yesterday—I will not name 

the country—but I was contacted by an Ambassador here in Washington from a country not currently participating in the PSI but 

who wanted additional information because his government is 

thinking about adhering to the PSI. 

We are in the process of signing shipboarding agreements, which 

are not as central to the ability of the PSI to interdict shipments 

of weapons of mass destruction, but they can facilitate interdiction 

operations that will save us time, and that is why we are seeking 

to negotiate them. We have signed four to date, including with the 

Marshall Islands, also with Panama, Liberia and, most recently, 

Croatia. And we are seeking many additional ones. Negotiations 

are in various stages, but there are many countries that are interested in working with us on these agreements. 

There are additional countries where we are not seeking agreements because we do not think such agreements are necessary. A 

lot of the original participants in the PSI have an informal understanding among themselves that they will very quickly provide approval to any interdiction of their flagships. And so among original 

participants in the PSI, there is no effort to negotiate these agreements. We are working with other countries that came subsequently to the PSI with these agreements. 

I could respond to some of the comments that were made by the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member in your opening statements, or 

I could stop at this point and respond to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

7

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE


21699a.eps
8


21699b.eps
9


21699c.eps
10


21699d.eps
11


21699e.eps
12


21699f.eps
13


21699g.eps
14

Mr. ROYCE. Feel free. We have plenty of questions, Assistant Secretary Rademaker, that we will follow up on. So if you would like 

to make some observations based upon our opening statements, do 

that, and we will then follow up with a discussion. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Certainly. 

Mr. Chairman, you commented that the recent report of the Silverman Commission had indicated that the intelligence community 

was not sufficiently organized to support the PSI. Changes are 

being adopted within the intelligence community to increase its 

ability to support the PSI. 

They have recently established something called the Suppliers 

and Interdiction Group, which is an entity within the intelligence 

community that will seek to provide intelligence support to the 

PSI. 

Mr. ROYCE. Why don’t you tell us what needs to change there, 

in your opinion? We know the overall conclusion of the Robb-Silverman Commission, and we understand they are responding. But in 

your opinion, what needs to change in that environment? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, the Suppliers and Interdiction Group is a 

change, so I think it would be premature for me to call for further 

change until we see how this change plays out. But I have already 

seen evidence that this group is having an effect and is increasing 

the level and usefulness of intelligence support to the PSI. 

You had expressed a concern, with the departure of Under Secretary Bolton, there might be less high-level attention to the PSI 

within the Bush Administration. I am quite confident that will not 

be the case. As you know, Under Secretary Bolton just last week 

was replaced by Under Secretary Robert Joseph. I can assure you 

that Robert Joseph’s commitment to the PSI is no less firm than 

Under Secretary Bolton’s. 

Under Secretary Joseph came from the NSC staff, where he had 

an instrumental role in helping to establish the PSI. And he is 

fully familiar with it and fully committed to it. So I would expect 

to see no interruption or change whatsoever in the high-level support for and commitment to the PSI. 

Mr. Sherman, you expressed concerns about the legal authority 

under which the PSI operates. We have made clear to participants 

in the PSI that it is not the intention of the PSI to act contrary 

to international law or to ask countries to act contrary to the best 

legal authorities of their governments and the various entities 

within their governments that are involved in PSI activities. That 

does not mean, however, that the PSI is severely limited in its ability to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction. 

One of the early collective activities within the PSI was to assemble legal experts from participating countries to carefully analyze 

the international and domestic legal authorities available to the 

participating governments with an eye to first identifying what authorities exist and, second, to identifying areas in which participating governments could enhance their domestic legal authority 

through the enactment of additional legislation to more fully equip 

or enable them to exercise jurisdiction available to them under 

international law. 

And what has emerged is that, if we take all of the legal authorities that are available, there will certainly be cases where it is difVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:50 Sep 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\060905\21699.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

ficult or impossible to find legal authority to stop a particular shipment, but in the vast majority of cases, it appears that some legal 

authority can be found. 

You commented about one important source of authority under 

international law to interdict shipping, and that is with the consent 

of the flag state. And, of course, that is an ample authority under 

international law, provided the consent of the flag state can be obtained. It can be obtained on an ad hoc basis, which we have done 

on many occasions, or it can be obtained on an expedited basis 

through a shipboarding agreement. And because having consent on 

an expedited basis can save time, we are seeking to negotiate these 

agreements. 

But that is a very important source of legal authority, though we 

do have to understand there may be some flag governments that 

will refuse to give such consent. But even in such cases, there are 

other authorities available. Custom authorities have authority over 

ships in port. Coastal states have legal authority to stop shipping 

in their territorial waters. 

Another factor which played importantly in the BBC China case 

is that ships have owners, and those owners often do not come from 

the same state as the flag state. But if the owners of the ship direct 

the crew of the ship to pull into a particular port, that can then 

provide authority for the customs authorities in that port to conduct a search. 

That is in fact exactly what happened in the case of the BBC 

China. That ship was an Antiguan-flagged vessel, but it was owned 

by a German company. And the German Government approached 

their citizens who owned the ship and asked them to direct the vessel into an Italian port, and Italian customs authorities then carried out the search, which discovered the centrifuge, which led to 

unraveling both of the covert Libyan nuclear program and the covert A.Q. Kahn nuclear proliferation network, a big success carried 

out by states participating in the PSI. 

I know there has been a quarrel about whether it was officially 

a PSI operation or not. I think that is actually a silly discussion 

to engage in because since the PSI is not an organization to begin 

with, it becomes difficult to say whether a particular operation involving PSI participants was in fact carried out under the PSI. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, you have got an informal arrangement here 

and you have got four participants in PSI all involved in that informal arrangement: Italy, Germany, the United States and the U.K., 

so it is obviously a PSI operation, by definition. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Fundamentally, the PSI creates patterns of cooperation. And when those who have established those patterns of 

cooperation in fact cooperate to carry out an interdiction, we would 

count that as an operation under the PSI. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, states have the power to stop and seize cargo, 

as you say, in their territory or in their territorial seas, and certainly these flag of convenience states, usually developing countries, have the ready ability to sign on to an initiative. 

Earlier, my colleague, Congressman Sherman, asked you about 

getting back to us on the question of which countries were helpful 

and which were not with regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference. Maybe we could amend that to discuss these flag 

16

of convenience states, and if you could give us those that are not 

being helpful, I am sure Members of this Subcommittee and on the 

Committee on International Relations would be very interested in 

following up and focusing on that issue. 

I wanted to ask you a couple of questions having to do with 

which State Department official is charged with PSI. So let’s start 

there. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The lead responsibility within the State Department for the PSI resides with the Under Secretary for International Security and Arms Control who is Robert Joseph. Below 

him, the Bureau on Nonproliferation has the lead. And within the 

Bureau of Nonproliferation, we have an office that devotes a considerable portion of its time to working on the PSI. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you how we can measure how often requests we make of other countries to act on intelligence that we 

provide are denied? I think we, as Members of this oversight panel, 

would be very interested. 

And I think I have a question here as a follow-up to that. Have 

we actually acted on information provided by other countries that 

are allied with us on PSI? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Have we acted on? 

Mr. ROYCE. On intelligence information. Or is this all our own 

intelligence information that we have been able to act on to date? 

Or if you would like to discuss that in a classified setting, that is 

all right with me. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I am afraid you may be getting into matters 

that may be discussed better in the Intelligence Committee. 

In the intelligence world, among the PSI participants, as I said, 

the objective is to establish patterns of cooperation, and that would 

include patterns of information sharing. And a significant portion 

of the information that needs to be shared would fall into the category of intelligence information. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, one of our focuses here on the International Relations Committee, is to try to get a measure on the requests that 

we are making of other countries to act on intelligence that we provide and then where, on the high seas or on land or at the airport, 

these requests that we have raised about our concern over WMD 

are denied. 

And I do not know whether you can share that or any information with me at this point or whether you would like to answer in 

writing on that. But, it is a question I have of you. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. It is a very difficult question for me to address, 

particularly in a public setting such as this. Not all of our requests 

are honored, but, surprisingly, a large number are. And if you want 

more detail than that, I think we would have to go into a classified 

setting. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will do that. 

In February of last year, President Bush made an announcement 

that we were looking at expanding PSI. And he said we were going 

to deal with more than just shipments and transfers. And this expansion would, his words were, would involve shutting down facilities, seizing materials and freezing assets. 

I was going to ask you how the President’s proposal on this front 

has been followed up on? 

17

Mr. RADEMAKER. Within the Executive Branch, we are mindful 

of directives we receive from the President, such as the one you 

just referred to, so we have certainly been pursuing those objectives. I have nothing to announce for you today, but I can assure 

you that we are mindful of the President’s commitment here, and 

we are working diligently on it. I should add, it will be something 

that will work or can best be achieved in cooperation with other 

governments. 

Mr. ROYCE. I mentioned Mr. Bolton, and in the context of the 

fact that PSI does not have a formal framework, you basically had 

his initiative, his driving force behind organizing this informal arrangement, and I was going to ask you about the benefits of keeping PSI informal. 

I know the greater flexibility that you argue we get from that, 

and I spoke to that in my opening statement. But there are two 

sides to the issue. And the other side is, what does PSI lose by 

being informal? What could be better institutionalized? I thought 

I would ask you that question. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, that is a very good question, 

and it is something that we have considered as the PSI has 

evolved. On balance, we are satisfied that PSI will be most successful if it remains relatively informal. 

Mr. ROYCE. What you lose in that are regularized budgets and 

formalized intelligence sharing. Formal membership might entice 

more countries to participate. Maybe not, I do not know. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. That may be true to a certain degree, although 

we do not think, in reality, those concerns you just pointed to pose 

practical obstacles to the PSI’s success. 

Mr. ROYCE. I see. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. On the other hand, we are concerned that to 

formalize the PSI to a greater degree, to institutionalize it, could 

introduce bureaucracy, procedural obstacles to the success of the 

PSI. 

For interdictions to be carried out successfully, speed is often of 

the essence. And we are reluctant to go down a path that would 

result in the drafting of regulations, requirements, a formalized 

procedure before an interdiction can be carried out. We would not 

want to have a review process that had to be complied with before 

the PSI could be activated. 

And as you know, we are seeking broad participation in the PSI. 

If we formalized the PSI and brought into it countries whose commitment to nonproliferation principles was debatable, we would 

have to be concerned whether they were using those kinds of procedures to frustrate the objectives of the PSI. And we do not want 

to be limited in our ability to bring additional governments into the 

PSI. We do not want to have to worry that, by bringing them into 

the PSI, we are positioning them to interfere with the success of 

the PSI. 

Today, when a particular PSI operation is undertaken, the only 

involvement is with respect to those countries who are necessarily 

involved. The country that provides the information; the country 

that, for territorial reasons or because it is the flag state, has jurisdiction over the particular vessel or the aircraft; or the country 

18

whose military or customs authorities or law enforcement authorities are in a position to act. 

So it can be a streamlined operation in the current form, and we 

need not worry that there may be other countries in the PSI who 

are participating in the PSI and prepared to cooperate with the 

PSI. 

Mr. ROYCE. There is no veto power in this arrangement. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Correct. The current arrangement enables us to 

expand the PSI very broadly without concern that countries we 

bring in might cooperate on particular operations but be less cooperative in others. And, today, that is an immaterial consideration. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, Assistant Secretary Rademaker, this is a good 

program. It is a critical issue. Our goal here is to look at creating 

the best program possible and assisting you in whatever way we 

can in our efforts to do that. 

So we wish you well with this big challenge, and we congratulate 

PSI on its successes to date. And I will now turn to the Ranking 

Member, Mr. Sherman, for his questions. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first request is that you get to us, hopefully within 1 week, 

just a list of all the CAFTA countries, whether they are PSI participants and, much more importantly, whether they have signed a 

fully adequate shipboarding agreement. 

We are going to be asked, perhaps the week after next, to make 

an important decision about the CAFTA countries, and just about 

any country can claim to be in PSI. It does not mean anything. 

What means something is if they have signed a shipboarding 

agreement. 

Now, I realize at times ad hoc permission may be almost as good 

as a shipboarding agreement. But it is so ephemeral that, you 

know, you either signed a shipboarding agreement or you did not. 

So that is obviously very important for Honduras, which is the one 

CAFTA country I have been able to identify that is on the list of 

32 flag of convenience countries listed by the International Transport Workers Federation. But I am told Honduras is not even in 

PSI, let alone a shipboarding agreement. 

So if you can get us a list, just list each country: PSI yes or no; 

shipboarding agreement yes or no. And then if you want to tell us 

whether the shipboarding agreement is fully adequate or not, that 

would be helpful. 

Next, also on the CAFTA countries, and I know you just got back 

from New York a couple of weeks ago, you had the discussions of 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which CAFTA countries—

and this would be a separate letter, and I realize a little more difficult to draft because it is not so easily objective. I mean, that first 

letter you can give to a GS–10 and they can whip it up, but this 

one would be: Which of the CAFTA countries was outstandingly 

helpful in using its voice and vote toward a consensus or toward 

the position that article IV does not allow full fuel cycle? 

Because, as I understand it, that is the heart of the U.S. concern 

with that treaty and its interpretation. And one would hope that 

each and every one of the CAFTA countries were fighting with each 

other as to who could be the loudest Spanish language voice in supVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:50 Sep 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\060905\21699.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
19

port of our position of article IV. I look forward to finding out 

which countries were the most helpful on that. 

Continuing with my concern about the treaty discussions up in 

New York, perhaps you could comment for us here diplomatically, 

and maybe we will talk privately as well: Did Egypt support our 

position with regard to full fuel cycle and the interpretation of article IV? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. As I am sure you have read from the accounts 

of the NPT review conference in New York, we encountered a series of procedural obstacles along the way that prevented us from 

having the substantive discussion of a number of these issues that 

we would like to have had. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So I would ask you, in your analysis, both of the 

CAFTA countries and of Egypt, to look at their position on procedural issues leading up to that, were important to the United 

States, any procedural issue. We in the House certainly know the 

procedural votes are arguably the most important votes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can recall no instance where the CAFTA countries were unhelpful on procedural matters. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can you recall any instance where they were particularly helpful; loud, demonstrative, lobbying other countries and 

bringing them on board? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The fundamental procedural problem we had at 

the review conference was occasioned largely by Egypt, and most 

other countries were simply spectators to Egypt’s conduct at the review conference. 

On your question about——

Mr. SHERMAN. So Egypt was not just one of those that was not 

terribly helpful; Egypt was the loudest voice, in general, on efforts 

to frustrate us procedurally in New York? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Certainly on procedural issues, Egypt was second to none in creating obstacles. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me bring a smile to your face here, at least 

a little bit of a silver lining. The Prime Minister of Egypt met with 

us on the Committee; it must have been only a week, week and a 

half ago. He promised me orally, informally, that I would be happy 

with what they did in New York. He also urged us to not make a 

change in our aid program but continue to provide the majority of 

aid, or almost exclusively, the aid to the military and not civilian. 

And in this room just yesterday, we decided to at least shift the 

aid, if not reduce it. And I think we were aware—I mean, you are 

putting it even more crisply than I had realized of Egypt’s leading 

role in frustrating our efforts to control nuclear weapons, at least 

a leading role up at this New York conference. 

How helpful was Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I do not recall them figuring importantly in 

these procedural debates that took place in New York. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And what about Brazil? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The president of the review conference was a 

Brazilian diplomat, and I think, for better or worse, the Brazilian 

delegation took a lower-profile role, played a lower-profile role in 

this review conference than in past review conferences. I think primarily because they did not wish to diminish the success of the 

president of the review conference. 

20

Mr. SHERMAN. I know that, later this year, we will have a chance 

to even see whether we should reduce aid to Egypt, and that is not 

something I have ever been willing to do before, but this is—it is 

very hard to frustrate our efforts here and then try to be the number two recipient of United States aid. 

Let’s shift a little to the legal rights on boarding ships. First, how 

big are these centrifuges? Could they easily be shipped by air or 

is ocean transport an important part of the process of moving them 

around? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Certainly some could be shipped by air, but——

Mr. SHERMAN. You need hundreds to make a nuclear bomb, don’t 

you? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thousands. But I should stress that the PSI is 

not limited to the stopping of ships. 

Mr. SHERMAN. A little tougher to do planes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. It is tougher but not impossible. I have not 

talked about the exercises we have had under the PSI, but we have 

had 16 exercises since the founding of the PSI. We have about another dozen planned in the next year or so, and a number of them 

focus on interdiction of air shipments. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, but if you do not have an agreement in advance, an ad hoc agreement to do something vis-a-vis a plane while 

it is in the air is diplomacy at light speed. It could happen, but it 

would have to be a very friendly government and a very efficient 

government as well. 

But I think you have answered my question. Some could be 

shipped by air, but given that you need thousands, ocean transport 

is an important part of the process. 

And you have talked about the owners of the ship being important. In one case, you mentioned that owners voluntarily agreed. 

Can PSI countries impose duties on those who own ships even if 

the flag is of a different color? That is to say, could German law 

or American law say, ‘‘You own a ship, you cooperate with PSI, you 

allow boarding, and we do not care that you have a Mongolian flag 

on your ship?’’

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think yours is a question that would have to 

be put to the lawyers. I suspect the answer is that there are things 

that the government with sovereignty over the owners of a vessel 

could ask of those owners. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We compel people in this country that own things, 

even if they own them in other countries, all the time. And I would 

hope that we would not be looking just for ad hoc agreements to 

beg owners to cooperate, but we would look for laws in countries 

that allow their governments to require such cooperation. 

We were lucky on what was the most important step we took 

that we had owners that were amenable to suggestion. And I would 

hope you would work toward achieving something more than that. 

Also, though, do we have the right to stop a ship that is on the 

high seas because it is imperiling the safety of navigation and surrounding ships; a ticking time bomb on the ship? Does maritime 

law allow us to stop a ship for that reason? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I believe there is some basis under international law for some action. I should also mention in this connection that there is an international treaty. We call it the SUA. It 

21

stands for suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, and there is currently an effort under way to 

amend the SUA to increase the international jurisdiction available 

to address shipments related to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I would hope that you would enlighten us 

as to which countries are being helpful to us in those SUA negotiations as well. There should not be a disconnect between our diplomats who have to deal with these matters on the one hand, and 

a Congress that has to decide what is our overall level of positive 

feeling and action toward individual countries on the other. And, 

I would hope that the United States would recognize that nuclear 

items on a ship imperil that ship. They imperil the safety of the 

high seas and, by themselves, may justify what has to be done 

under extreme circumstances. 

I know you will try to find a sounder legal basis than that, but 

any port in a storm is a maritime rule. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We are going to go to Mr. 

Weller of Illinois. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Rademaker, good to see you again. Thank you for your 

time before our Subcommittee. 

And just to begin with some comments, I noted my good friend’s 

comments regarding our friends in Central America. Of course, 

many of us consider the countries of Central America and the Dominican Republic good allies and good friends of the United States. 

Not only are they democratically-elected governments—particularly 

since they succeeded in kicking Fidel Castro and the Commies out 

back in the 1980s—but they have been partners in a lot of ways. 

El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic all 

provided military personnel as part of the coalition of the willing 

in Iraq. Salvadorans have served particularly with distinction in 

combat, and are still there. So I think it is important to acknowledge the contribution they have made to the United States’ policy 

initiatives. 

But when it comes to security, recently having been to Honduras, 

I remember the conversations we had with President Maduro and 

other government officials about the desire of the Honduran Government to participate in the container security initiative in their 

ports. So I think it is important to note, they are not only our 

friends, but they are our partners, and we particularly appreciate 

the cooperation of the Salvadorans in providing a location for aircraft to monitor the narco traffickers who are using the air around 

Central America to transport their goods as well as the waterways 

as they try to enter the United States. 

That really ties in with my questioning. Myself and others, as we 

look at our best friends and neighbors to the south, South America, 

Central America, the Caribbean, unfortunately, our southern border, our third border, as many label it, is somewhat porous. There 

are those that are finding their way to bring narcotics into our 

country, they are bringing human cargo into our country, the 

smuggling of humans, but also the smuggling of illegal aliens into 

the United States from south of our borders. And I think common 

22

sense would say, if you can bring in narcotics, if you can bring in 

a person, the odds are you can bring in other dangerous things, as 

well as the people committed to activating those devices. 

I wanted to get a sense from you, Mr. Rademaker, as we move 

forward on the Proliferation Security Initiative, which there is so 

much focus on shipboarding, but it is also air, land and sea. So 

there are other initiatives. Tell us about the cooperation you are receiving south of the border, particularly in the Caribbean and in 

Latin America. 

I should say at the outset that in construction of PSI we had focused correctly on countries, you might call it rogue state countries, 

that are as far as we are aware interested in acquiring weapons 

of mass destruction and therefore are in the business of importing 

the components and the materials they need to build such weapons. 

We know who these countries by and large tend to be in the Middle East. There is one in Northeast Asia. And so in seeking to enlist countries in the PSI, we have focused on countries that are best 

situated geographically to act against shipping or air or land transit to those countries. There are no countries in Latin America 

today that we put in this category of seeking to develop weapons 

of mass destruction, and so diplomatically our focus has not been 

on signing up countries in Latin America for participation in the 

PSI. 

That is not to say we are uninterested in their cooperation. In 

the case of Panama, for instance, Panama is one of the top flag 

state countries, and that is why we sought shipboarding agreement 

with Panama. 

Mr. WELLER. But when it comes to this priority, we also talk 

about WMD-related materials, and some of these countries that 

may be interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction may 

not necessarily be interested in assembling them in their own territory. Instead, they may desire to assemble them where their target 

may be, which in this case would be the North American continent, 

particularly the United States. And, you know, I note in the map 

that our staff provided here, they showed the various jurisdiction 

exercises here, and of course the red-colored countries are those 

who are active participants, members of the core membership, and 

then green denotes publicized participation exercises. And there 

are three green countries: Brazil, Argentina and Panama. And all 

the rest, including our closest neighbor, Mexico, are white, which 

means they don’t participate. Again, the question being if our focus 

is solely on looking for materials being transported to the so-called 

rogue states, why would we not monitor the trafficking and transportation of materials that could actually be then assembled as 

well as the people that would activate them, you know, assembled 

onsite at their intended target? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I did not mean to suggest that we are uninterested in working with Latin America and the Caribbean countries 

on the PSI. To the contrary, we are interested in working with 

them. One of the most recent adherents to the PSI was Argentina 

and we very much welcome their decision to endorse the statement 

of interdiction principles. We did have a PSI exercise. One of the 

16 PSI exercises that have taken place to date took place in NoVerDate Mar 21 2002 09:50 Sep 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\ITN\060905\21699.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
23

vember 2004, and it was called Exercise Chokepoint, and it involved Argentina, Chile, Panama and Mexico in its operation in the 

Caribbean. 

That said, in the establishment of the PSI, we necessarily had 

to focus our resources, our limited resources on the biggest problem 

areas, so we have made a bigger effort with regard to countries 

that we know from past experience are more directly involved as 

either countries of origination of these kinds of components and 

technologies, or transit countries, or countries that are in a position 

to interdict shipments to the countries that we are most concerned 

about. And as a geographical matter, most of those countries where 

in the past this activity has taken place are not countries located 

in Latin America. 

So the larger focus diplomatically to date has been on regions 

other than Latin America, and I think that might account for the 

fact that you would find a disproportionately large rate of participation outside of Latin America. 

Mr. WELLER. You know there has been—recently there was the 

apprehension of individuals allegedly connected to the Sandinista 

element, which of course ruled Nicaragua back in the late 1970s 

and early 1980s, that was trafficking surface-to-air missiles capable 

of shooting down jetliners. Much of the trafficking that occurs in 

Latin America, of course, is tied in with the FARC in Colombia, 

and of course those networks are established. 

Would you agree that, as we monitor and look to prevent the 

transportation of WMD-related material and personnel, we should 

be equally concerned about those who may be attempting to transport the components of WMD to within our borders, within the 

United States as well as to so-called rogue nations? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Absolutely, and you mentioned the case of Nicaragua and the MANPADS, Man Portable Air Defense Missiles, and 

we have a program under way with the Nicaraguan Government 

where we are seeking to work with the Government of Nicaragua 

to destroy the large inventory of these weapons that they inherited 

from the Sandinista regime. 

Mr. WELLER. Of course the surface-air missiles I referred to were 

not in inventory that the Nicaraguan Government is aware of. 

They didn’t have any of the matching serial numbers that identified them as being part of the known collection of SAMs left over 

from Sandinista times. But again, the point is the question I am 

trying to ask of you, you know, in level of priority is the monitoring 

as well as the interdiction of WMD-related materials and personnel, do we give equal priority to an effort to prevent that from 

coming into our borders? Not just, you know, in comparison to the 

transportation to nations and countries in which we suspect an attempt to assemble a WMD? Is it equal priority, less priority, higher 

priority? Where did you rank in it in your priority? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think it is important to distinguish between 

the various elements of our policy to protect America from the 

threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. To the extent 

we are talking about shipments into the United States of these 

kinds of weapons or components of weapons, the Container Security Initiative is a very important policy where we seek to make it 

much more difficult for that kind of activity to take place. 

24

The Container Security Initiative is separate from the Proliferation Security Initiative. The focus of the Proliferation Security Initiative is not primarily on shipments into the United States. Rather, it is on shipments, the primary focus is on shipments destined 

for the countries that we know are seeking to develop weapons of 

mass destruction. 

Mr. WELLER. And from the standpoint of our policy, on balance, 

do we give equal priority to interdiction, as well as monitoring of 

any attempts to transport material, as well as personnel into the 

United States into our borders? Do we give the same level of priority as we do to monitoring the shipments of materials as well as 

personnel to those countries? That is the question I am trying to 

get answered here. From a level of priority, is it equal or do we 

give higher priority to watching what is going on in someone else’s 

neighborhood? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Your question goes beyond the Proliferation Security Initiative and addresses other aspects of our policy, and I 

think if you look at it at the level of overall United States policy, 

certainly we attach at least as much and probably more attention 

and more priority to preventing these dangerous things from coming, certainly weapons of mass destruction coming into the United 

States and terrorists coming into the United States, as compared 

to shipments to states that are seeking to develop weapons of mass 

destruction. 

The PSI, as a tool, is primarily devoted to the shipments headed 

to states seeking to develop these weapons. We have other tools 

that we use to try to prevent the shipments of weapons and terrorists into the United States. The PSI is not primarily adapted to 

serve as such a tool. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 

opportunity. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Rademaker, I wanted to ask you, I know the PSI 

plans—one last question—to conduct exercises in the Los Angeles 

area, I think in September. And I was going to ask you what you 

could tell us about those exercises, who would be involved in them, 

where the focus would be. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Give me 1 second, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am told for the record by my staff that the activity you are referring to in Los Angeles is not an activity being 

conducted under the auspices of PSI. It is an activity organized by 

the Department of Homeland Security and it has a slightly different focus. 

Mr. ROYCE. Okay, well, I appreciate that information. I want to 

thank you again for coming before us today, and you have a critical 

portfolio, and I was going to raise the issue of perhaps myself and 

the Ranking Member and perhaps Mr. Weller as well—who has a 

keen interest in Latin America, South America, Central America—

if he could join us as well to discuss some of the additional details 

that we have gone over today, get into some issues that we didn’t 

bring up with you but concerns that we would like to talk to you 

about in private and some information we would like to receive as 

well. 

This PSI program is of vital importance to this country. So far 

it has had some astounding successes, but we are interested in a 

25

few more details, and we appreciate very much you appearing here 

again. We saw you just 6 weeks ago. Thank you for sharing this 

information with us. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. It was a pleasure for me to appear, Mr. Chairman, and we would be delighted to arrange a briefing along the 

lines that you just described. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Rademaker, and this 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ