U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

56–845 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–479 

AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE ROAD AHEAD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 3, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State, Department of State, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

Richard G. Lugar ....................................................................................... 60 

Barbara Boxer ........................................................................................... 69 

Robert P. Casey, Jr ................................................................................... 71 

Bob Corker ................................................................................................. 73 

Gates, Hon. Robert, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC .................................................................................................................. 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

Richard G. Lugar ....................................................................................... 65 

Barbara Boxer ........................................................................................... 69 

Robert P. Casey, Jr ................................................................................... 72 

Bob Corker ................................................................................................. 74 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 4 

Mullen, ADM Michael, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC ........ 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

Barbara Boxer ........................................................................................... 70 

Bob Corker ................................................................................................. 74 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Dodd, Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement ...... 59 

(III)

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE ROAD AHEAD 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, 

Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, 

Corker, Isakson, Risch, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen, we welcome you here today. Thank you very much for joining us. And we 

appreciate your coming to share more details about the President’s 

plan, and for consulting and partnering with Congress on the decision, obviously, of enormous consequences for our soldiers, our 

security, and our country. 

This is a decision that the President of the United States has 

made, but ultimately all of us share responsibility for its consequences. Given the complexities of our challenge and the seriousness of the sacrifices ahead and the absence of strategy over much 

of the last 8 years, I believe the President exercised important 

leadership by taking the time he needed to make the right decision, 

even as political pressure mounted in different directions. His 

words and your testimony show that the administration has confronted tough realities, carefully weighed all of the options, and 

arrived at a comprehensive, considered path forward. 

I believe that the President appropriately narrowed the mission 

in Afghanistan. What he presented to the American people is not 

an open-ended, nation-building exercise or a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, and nor should it be. The President was 

right to frame our commitment to Afghanistan in the context of all 

of our national priorities, from the drawdown in Iraq to our urgent 

challenges at home. And he was correct to consider our mission 

there, in terms of our enduring interests in Pakistan. 

Over the last days, I’ve heard a number of people saying that we 

are in Afghanistan today because that is the place from which we 

were attacked. Frankly, 8 years later, that’s simply not good 

enough. We have largely expelled al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. 

Today, it is the presence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan, it’s direct ties to, 

2 

and support from, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the perils of an 

unstable nuclear-armed Pakistan that drive our mission. 

What happens in Pakistan, particularly near the Afghan border, 

will, in my judgment, do more to determine the outcome in Afghanistan than any increase in troops or shift in strategy. Congress has 

provided 7.5 billion in nonmilitary aid over the next 5 years to help 

address the crucial Pakistani dimension of the President’s plan. 

That is a beginning. But, I believe, and I think other members of 

the committee share the belief, that there is more that we can and 

must do with the Pakistanis, all of which can alleviate the pressure 

in Afghanistan; indeed, even determine the outcome in Afghanistan. 

And I believe it is important for the Pakistanis to understand 

that our commitment to them and to the region is long term even 

as troops are reduced in Afghanistan. In fact, the conditions that 

permit a reduction in American troops in Afghanistan are a benefit 

to Pakistan. 

The President was correct to define success in terms of our ability to empower and transfer responsibility to Afghans as rapidly as 

possible while simultaneously achieving a sufficient level of stability to ensure that we leave behind an Afghanistan that is not 

controlled by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. 

As I’ve said before to each extra family that is asked to send a 

husband, wife, son, or daughter into harm’s way, the deployment 

of a single additional soldier makes all the difference, but a public 

debate that reduces a difficult mission in a complex region to a 

simple headline-ready number of troops does us all a disservice. 

What will matter most on the ground in Afghanistan is not the 

number of troops, but what they will do and how they are integrated into a broader civilian and military strategy. 

I returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan in October with serious concerns that even if additional troops are able to clear the 

enemy and hold an area, even in the limited areas where we will 

operate, unless we are able to build and transfer leadership to local 

Afghans, unless the governance and development pieces are in 

place, we risk squandering the gains, time and time again. And 

right now, our military will tell us that, in many places, that tripartite capacity is not there. 

There are three principal conditions that I still believe must 

guide the tasking of additional troops. 

First, are there enough reliable Afghan National Army and 

Police forces to partner with American troops and eventually take 

over responsibility for security? The President has recognized the 

critical importance of speeding up training and mentoring. And to 

date, we’ve struggled to do so on the scale required, and I look forward to hearing your plans today to increase that training capacity 

and to quickly move Afghan security forces into the center of the 

fight. 

Second, are there local Afghan leaders with whom we can partner? We have to be able to identify and cooperate with tribal, district, and provincial leaders who command the authority to help deliver services and restore Afghans’ faith in their own government. 

Third, is the civilian side ready to follow swiftly with development aid that brings tangible benefits to the local population? The 

3 

President has outlined a surge in civilian personnel which will be 

crucial to locking in any of our military gains and bringing stability 

to Afghanistan. And I know, Secretary Clinton, that you’ve been 

working on that task, and we look forward to exploring it with you 

today. 

I would hope that, just as the exit strategy is based on the conditions on the ground, so too should our strategy for any escalation 

be based on conditions on the ground. I continue to believe that, 

absent an urgent security need, we should not send American 

troops in to clear places unless we are confident that we have the 

Afghan partners and resources in place to build on those victories 

and transfer both security and government function to legitimate 

Afghan leaders. 

I still remain concerned that additional troops will tempt us 

beyond a narrow and focused mission. And with 30,000 troops 

rushing into Afghanistan, I believe we’ll be challenged to have the 

civilian and governance capacity in place quickly enough to translate their sacrifice into lasting gains. 

Through conversations with the President and Vice President in 

recent days, and the President’s speech, I’ve been assured that the 

administration recognizes the need to meet these conditions. How 

we answer these challenges will go a long way toward determining 

our overall prospects for success, and we’re all eager to hear in 

detail how we better—how we can do better than we’ve done on 

each of these components. 

Everyone understands that President Karzai’s efforts and followthrough will be critical to the outcome, and we all understand that 

our ultimate goal, the cornerstone of our strategy, is to empower 

and transfer responsibility to the Afghans. 

Some are trying to make much of the President’s target deadline. 

I think we learned in Iraq that, when our policy is to be in another 

country, with troops, for ‘‘as long as it takes,’’ our hosts are very 

good at taking as long as they want. The President is correct to set 

a target. It will help create a sense of urgency and for the Afghans 

who chafe at foreign boots on their soil, it sends a message that, 

while America will remain committed to the Afghan people, we 

aren’t interested in a permanent occupation. 

We can all agree that the next 18 months are crucial to reversing 

the momentum and laying the groundwork for a stable Afghanistan, one where the police and army can play a greater role in 

serving their citizens, and whose government focuses squarely on 

reclaiming legitimacy with the Afghan people, and where we have 

intelligence in place to engage in the counterterrorism missions 

that, for years ahead, we will need to be able to engage in. 

We should all recognize that Americans, all of us, fundamentally 

share this challenge. The Senate voted unanimously to go to war 

in Afghanistan. It should humble all of us that today there are simply no easy options. We have no choice but to grapple with the 

complexities, reach the conclusion that best serves the American 

people, and work in partnership with other branches of government. And that is how a democracy fights a war. 

The President’s speech offered a vision of the path forward, but 

a great many questions remain, including how, simply, beyond adding more resources, the United States and Afghan civilian strategy 

4 

will improve, what balance we will strike between securing population centers and venturing into the Afghan countryside, how we 

intend to finance this increased commitment, and, crucially, how 

we intend to improve our partnership with Pakistan. 

We look forward to the conversation this morning. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary 

Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. 

We appreciate very much that you have come to the Foreign 

Relations Committee today. The presence of all three of you underscores that success in Afghanistan depends on both military and 

civilian programs. We must sustain this civil-military approach, 

given the interlocking elements of the newly announced strategy. 

As we consider our course in Afghanistan, we should evaluate 

options according to how well they contribute to United States 

national security. The ultimate purpose of committing tens of thousands of new troops and tens of billions of additional dollars to the 

war effort in Afghanistan must be to enhance United States security and our vital national interests in the region. 

This may seem to be an obvious point. But during long wars, specific tactical objectives can become ends, in themselves, disconnected from the broader strategic context or an accounting of finite 

resources. Pursuing al-Qaeda or the Taliban and improving governance and economic opportunity in Afghanistan are important. But 

when our country commits the level of forces contemplated by the 

President to a sustained war, the objective must be absolutely fundamental to United States security. 

This is especially true at a time when our Armed Forces have 

been strained by many years of high deployment rates, our capacity 

for new government debt is limited, and our Nation has not fully 

emerged from a severe recession. 

The President made the case on Tuesday that what happens in 

Afghanistan can directly impact the safety of Americans. I believe 

that most Americans accept this point based on the reality that the 

9/11 attacks were conceived in Afghanistan and that the Taliban 

forces who protected al-Qaeda are likely to become more resurgent 

if we leave. 

But much more discussion is warranted on whether the Afghanistan mission is so central to our core national security that it 

necessitates huge spending increases and the deployment of a large 

portion of our finite combat capability. 

In essence, we have to ask whether the costs of this deployment 

are justified in our overall national security context and whether 

we are mistakenly concentrating our forces to fight a terrorist 

enemy in a specific location, even as the global terrorist threat is 

becoming increasingly diffuse. 

Terrorist cells that are associated with or sympathetic to 

al-Qaeda exist in numerous countries in Africa and the Middle 

East. Terrorist attacks were perpetrated in Europe by homegrown 

cells. Killing Taliban fighters and training Afghan soldiers and 

5 

policemen are unlikely to substantially diminish these broader terrorist threats. 

Moreover, the results of even the most skillful civil-military campaign in Afghanistan are likely to be imperfect in the long run. I 

do not doubt that the application of additional United States and 

allied forces will result in a military setback for the Taliban. During this time, it is hoped that progress can be made in building Afghan security forces. But over the long run, we should recognize 

that problems stemming from tribalism, corrupt governance, and 

lack of economic opportunity in the country are almost certain to 

persist, complicating efforts to ensure that the central government 

can effectively govern the country and resist the Taliban when 

allied troops are withdrawn. 

Even if the President’s plan achieves the very best stabilization 

scenario, allowing for United States withdrawals on the schedule 

he contemplates, we may be responsible for most of the Afghanistan defense and police budgets indefinitely. 

Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear how an expanded military effort in Afghanistan addresses the problem of Taliban and 

al-Qaeda safe havens across the border in Pakistan. If these safe 

havens persist, any strategy in Afghanistan will be substantially 

incomplete. 

Specifically, will Pakistan work with us to eliminate the leadership of Osama bin Laden and other major al-Qaeda officials? 

As hearings in our committee have underscored, the potential 

global impact of instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan dwarfs 

anything that is likely to happen in Afghanistan. 

The future direction of governance in Pakistan will have consequences for nonproliferation efforts, global economic stability, our 

relationships with India and China, and security in both the Middle East and South Asia regions, among other major issues. 

The President did not dwell on Pakistan in his speech on Tuesday evening, perhaps because sensitivities in that country to American influences and intentions are extremely delicate. But, the 

President and his team must justify their plan not only on the 

basis of how it will affect Afghanistan, but also on how it will 

impact our efforts to promote a much stronger alliance with Pakistan that embraces vital common objectives. 

Having made these observations, I want to recognize that the 

President has been confronted with extremely difficult choices in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. He and his team have worked through 

the problem carefully and deliberately to reach their conclusions. 

There are no options available that are guaranteed to succeed. 

Every conceivable course from complete withdrawal, to maintaining 

the status quo, to the plan outlined by the President, to an unrestrained and unlimited counterinsurgency campaign, has its own 

set of risks and costs for the United States. The President deserves 

credit for accepting ownership of this difficult problem as we go forward and for his clear advocacy expressed in the speech on Tuesday night. 

Congress and the American people now must evaluate whether 

this course has a reasonable chance to succeed, if ‘‘success’’ can be 

defined, and whether the objectives outlined are worth the expenditure of American and Afghan lives and treasure. 

6 

In this situation, the advocacy of the President and his national 

security team must be as broadminded and thorough as his policy 

review appeared to be. Within months, the President is likely to 

ask Congress for additional funds related to Afghanistan. In the 

meantime, the administration must be prepared to answer many 

difficult questions about its strategy as the American people study 

the potential consequences of the President’s decision. 

I thank our distinguished witnesses for their very substantial 

leadership. I look forward to hearing their testimony today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Let me just say that Senator Dodd may have to leave at some 

point during your testimony, because he has to chair the Bernanke 

hearings—confirmation hearing today, so we respect the fact that 

that will be the reason he might have to go. 

Senator DODD. I could have brought him here, Mr. Chairman, 

and have a joint hearing between the Federal Reserve Chairman 

and the—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And maybe he could have told us how we pay for 

this. [Laughter.] 

Madam Secretary, thank you for being here. Mr. Secretary, if you 

would follow the Secretary of State, and then Admiral Mullen, we 

look forward to your testimonies. If you want to summarize, we can 

put your full testimonies in the record. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry and 

Ranking Member Lugar, and to all the members of this committee. 

It is an honor for me to be here to testify before you, and also 

to continue the dialogue. Both the chairman and the ranking member’s statements, as would be expected, were extraordinarily 

thoughtful, raised a lot of the hard questions that we’re grappling 

with, and posed the challenges that we have to meet, both the 

administration and the Congress together. And I want to thank the 

committee for the constructive role that it has played in helping us 

to address the difficult issues raised in the region of the world that 

we are focused on today. 

When President Obama addressed the cadets at West Point, he 

set forth both the rationale and the difficult choices that his policy 

represents. At the end of a very long and thoughtful process that 

consisted of 10 meetings with the President and his national security team, and probably three times that many among the rest of 

us, without the President, the President concluded that, among a 

range of very difficult decisions, this is the best way to protect our 

Nation now and in the future. 

Extremists who have taken root in the border area of Pakistan 

and Afghanistan have attacked us before. They’ve attacked our allies. They are now attempting to destabilize, if not overthrow, the 

Pakistani Government and take back enough control, if not the entire country, of Afghanistan. 

7 

We believe that if we allow Afghanistan to become a failed state, 

if we allow the extremists to have the same safe havens that they 

used before 2001, they will have a greater capacity to regroup and 

attack again, and also to continue to provide the leadership the 

operational and logistical support that they currently provide to 

global extremism. 

We believe they could drag an entire region into chaos. And we 

know that, based on the reports from our military and civilian 

leadership, the situation in Afghanistan is serious, and worsening. 

Now, I know we don’t want to go back in history and anchor our 

decision totally on what happened on September 11, 2001, but I 

think it does have to be part of the national debate. 

The damage done with those attacks against our economic and 

military power centers was also an attack on my constituents, 

because, at that time, I had the honor of serving as Senator from 

New York. I witnessed the tragic consequences to the lives of thousands of innocent families, the damage done to the economy, and 

the damage to our sense of security, so I feel a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from such violence, and I entered 

into the very intense consultations we’ve been engaged in with that 

as my overriding goal, but without any preconceived notion of 

exactly the best way to meet that goal. 

The case for action against al-Qaeda and its allies has always 

been clear, but the United States course of action over the last 8 

years has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. And 

while our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban regained 

momentum in Afghanistan, and the extremist threat grew in Pakistan, a country, as you know well, with 175 million people, a 

nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges. So, it was 

against this backdrop that the President called for this careful, 

thorough review of our strategy. 

Our objectives are clear. We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate safe havens for those plotting 

against us, our allies, and our interests. We will work to find reliable partners in the region to help us stabilize it, which we think 

is fundamental to our national security. We will develop a longterm sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so 

that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past—primarily, our 

abandonment of that region. The duration of our military presence 

will be limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as 

our troops begin coming home. 

Now, accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the 

American people is not easy. It does mean sending more civilians, 

troops, and assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding 

our civilian efforts in Pakistan, which we have begun to do, under 

the leadership of the chairman, the ranking member, and this committee. We will be asking the young men and women, who not only 

serve in the military, but are part of our civilian service team, to 

be taking great risks and facing extraordinary sacrifices. I want to 

assure the committee that we will do everything we can to ensure 

that their sacrifices make our Nation safer. 

Now, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but 

it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. 

The beginning of President Karzai’s second term has opened a new 

8 

window of opportunity. We obviously have real concerns about the 

influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan Government, and we 

will redouble our efforts to pursue them. But, in his inauguration 

speech last month, I witnessed President Karzai call for a new 

compact with the Afghan people and the international community. 

He pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver. 

His words were long in coming, but they were certainly welcome. 

They now must be matched with action. The Afghan people, the 

United States, and the international community must hold the 

Afghan Government accountable. 

We will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen 

institutions at every level. The President has outlined a timeframe 

for transition to Afghan responsibility. As he said in his speech, 

‘‘The additional American and international troops will allow us to 

accelerate our handing over of responsibility to Afghan forces as we 

begin to transfer our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.’’ 

Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition 

responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. This is 

not a cliff, this is a transition. 

The timeframe for the transition provides a sense of urgency in 

working with the Afghan Government, but it should be clear to 

everyone that, unlike the past, the United States and our allies will 

have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan. Our resolve in this 

fight is reflected in the commitment of troops since the President 

took office, and in the significant civilian commitment that will 

continue long after our combat forces begin to leave. 

Our civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and 

advisers are helping to craft policy inside government ministries. 

We are engaged in a process of certifying those ministries that we 

feel confident in providing funding for, and we will not provide it 

if we cannot certify them. 

When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had civilians 

on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the very next 

day. As our operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is growing 

even stronger. We are on the track to triple the number of civilian 

positions in Afghanistan, to 974 by early next year. When we 

started, there were about 320; they had 6-month rotations. Our 

checking of their duty rosters showed that a lot of them didn’t 

spend more than 30 to 60 days inside of Afghanistan, even though 

they’d been assigned there. We have totally revamped how we are 

providing civilian assistance, and we believe that we are beginning 

to make a difference. 

Each of these civilians leverage not only, on average, 10 partners 

from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs, but 

what we’re finding, most interestingly, is, they leverage expertise 

within the United States military. When you put an agricultural 

expert embedded in a battalion, and, along with the commanding 

officer of that battalion, they go looking for soldiers with ranching 

and farming experience, we have a real force multiplier. And when 

I was in Kabul, 2 weeks ago, meeting with our civ-mil teams, 

that’s—those are exactly the kind of stories that I was told. And 

the military, who are responsible for the clearing and a phase of 

our military operations, told me repeatedly how important the civilian presence was. As one said to me, ‘‘I’m happy to supply whatVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
9 

ever support these valuable civilians need, and we need more of 

them.’’ This strategy will make that possible. 

Not only do we believe we have the right people to achieve our 

objectives, we believe we have a sound strategy. We’ll be delivering 

high-impact economic assistance and bolstering Afghanistan’s agricultural sector, the traditional core of the Afghan economy. 

A number of my former colleagues have talked with me, in the 

last months, about the importance of agriculture and how they 

tried for 8 years to help create jobs, reduce the funding that the 

Taliban receives from poppy cultivation—in effect, draw insurgents 

off the battlefield by moving them from poppies to pomegranates. 

Well, we have taken that advice seriously. 

We also will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to 

those Taliban who are willing to renounce al-Qaeda, abandon violence, and wish to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand 

that some of those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out 

of ideology, theology, or conviction, but, frankly, due to coercion 

and money. The average Taliban fighter is—our information— 

receives two to three times the monthly salary than the average 

Afghan soldier or police officer. 

Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach by 

seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries. 

And that, of course, leads me to Pakistan. A strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner for the United States and 

an ally in the fight against violent extremism. We’ve seen progress 

over this past year, as people in Pakistan increasingly come to the 

view that we do share a common enemy. I heard that repeatedly 

during my recent visit. But, we have a long way to go. 

We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the 

potential of Pakistan and its people, demonstrating a long-term 

commitment. I spent 3 days in Pakistan last month, and most commonly I heard, over and over again, ‘‘You left us before. Will you 

do it again? You walked away, you left us holding the problem that 

you helped to create.’’ We want to send a clear message, as the 

Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation does, that we intend to be committed over the long term. 

We will not be facing these challenges alone. We have 42 other 

troop-contributing countries. Our NATO ISAF allies have already 

made significant contributions. After this hearing, I will leave for 

Brussels to begin the process of securing additional Afghan commitments. Ambassador Holbrooke is already there consulting with 

our allies. We’ve had a very encouraging response in the conversations we’ve had thus far. And we’re looking beyond NATO to build 

the strongest, broadest possible global coalition. Japan just 

announced a $5 billion commitment to Afghanistan. We think other 

governments are beginning to recognize that this is a common fight 

against a common enemy. 

So, let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult 

choices, but the President’s plan represents the best way we know 

to protect our Nation today and in the future. The task we face is 

as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetimes. We 

will not succeed if people view this effort as the responsibility of 

a single party, a single agency within our government, or a single 

10 

country. We owe it to our troops and our civilians, who will face 

these dangers, to come together as Americans, and come together 

with our allies and the international partners, to help accomplish 

this mission. 

I look forward, as always, to continuing to work with you to 

achieve that goal. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, I’m grateful for 

this opportunity to testify before so many good friends. Many of you have been personally involved in our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I want to thank 

the committee for the constructive role it has played in addressing the challenges 

we face in this region of the world. 

On Tuesday, President Obama presented the administration’s strategy for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and I will all 

be providing you with additional details. But let me speak briefly at a more personal 

level about why we are making this commitment. 

Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the best way to protect our 

Nation now and in the future. 

The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have attacked us and 

our allies before. If we allow them access to the very same safe havens they used 

before 2001, they will have a greater capacity to regroup and attack again. They 

could drag an entire region into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have reported that the situation is serious and worsening. We agree. 

In the aftermath of September 11, I grieved with sons, daughters, husbands, and 

wives whose loved ones were murdered. It was an attack on our country, but it was 

also an attack on my constituents. I witnessed the tragic consequences in the lives 

of thousands of innocent families, and the damage done to our economy and our 

sense of security. So I feel a personal responsibility to help protect our Nation from 

such violence. 

THE MISSION

The case for action against al-Qaeda and its allies has always been clear, but the 

United States course of action over the last 8 years has not. The fog of another war 

obscured our focus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban 

gained momentum in Afghanistan. And the extremist threat grew in Pakistan— 

a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of 

challenges. 

It was against this backdrop that the President called for a careful, thorough review of our strategy. I was proud to be a part of that process. And our objectives 

are clear: 

• We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate safe 

havens for those plotting attacks against us, our allies, and our interests; 

• We will help to stabilize a region that is fundamental to our national security; 

and 

• We will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and 

Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. The duration of our 

military presence will be limited, but our civilian commitment must continue 

even as our troops begin to come home. 

Accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American people will 

not be easy. It will mean sending more civilians, troops, and assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan. 

The men and women carrying out this mission are not statistics on a PowerPoint 

slide. They are our friends and neighbors, our sons and daughters, our brothers and 

sisters. We will be asking them—and the American people who support them—to 

make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security. I want to assure the committee that we will do everything we can to ensure their sacrifices make our Nation 

safer. 

11 

THE METHODS

The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is not, in my view, 

as negative as frequently portrayed in public. And the beginning of President 

Karzai’s second term has opened a new window of opportunity. We have real concerns about the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan Government, and we will 

continue to pursue them. But in his inauguration speech last month, I witnessed 

President Karzai call for a new compact with the Afghan people and the international community. He pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and 

deliver for the people of his country. His words were long in coming, but welcome. 

They must now be matched with action. The Afghan people, the United States, and 

the international community will hold the Afghan Government accountable for making good on these commitments. 

We will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen institutions at 

every level of Afghan society so that we don’t leave chaos behind when our combat 

troops begin to depart. 

The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan responsibility. As 

he said in his speech Tuesday, the additional American and international troops will 

allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to 

begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011. Just as we have 

done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. 

A timeframe for transition will provide a sense of urgency in working with the 

Afghan Government. But it should be clear to everyone that—unlike the past—the 

United States and our allies and partners will have an enduring commitment to 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. Our resolve in this fight is reflected in the 

substantial commitment of troops since the President took office and in the significant civilian commitment that will continue long after our combat forces begin to 

leave. 

That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries, providing development assistance 

in the field, and working in scores of other roles. When our Marines went into Nawa 

this July, we had civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the 

next day. And as operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is growing even 

stronger. 

We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions in Afghanistan to 974 

by early next year. On average, each of these civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs. It’s cliche to say 

that we have our best people in these jobs, but it also happens to be true. When 

I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American colonel who told me that 

while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his command, none of them 

had the 40 years of agricultural experience of the USDA civilian serving alongside 

his battalion, or the rule of law and governance expertise of their civilian specialists 

from the State Department. He told me: ‘‘I am happy to supply whatever support 

these valuable civilians need. And we need more of them.’’ The President’s strategy 

will make that possible. 

Not only do we have the right people to achieve our objectives, we also have a 

sound strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic assistance and bolstering Afghanistan’s agricultural sector—the traditional core of the Afghan economy. 

This will create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield. 

We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those Taliban who 

abandon violence and want to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand that 

some of those who fight with the insurgency do so not out of conviction, but due 

to coercion or money. All Afghans should have the choice to pursue a better future 

if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and 

renounce al-Qaeda. 

Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach, by seeking to 

mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to shift the calculus of 

neighboring countries from competition for influence to cooperation and economic 

integration. 

We also believe that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner 

for the United States, and an ally in the fight against violent extremism. People in 

Pakistan are increasingly coming to the view that we share a common enemy. I 

heard this repeatedly during my recent visit. Our relationship is anchored in our 

common goals of civilian rule; robust economic development; and the defeat of those 

who threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the peace of the world. 

12 

We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the potential of 

Pakistan and its people. Our assistance will demonstrate the United States commitment to addressing problems that affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis and bring 

our people closer together. But it will also bolster Pakistan against the threat of 

extremism. A village where girls have had the opportunity to get an education will 

be more resistant to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And a young man with a bright 

future in a growing economy is less likely to waste his potential in a suicide bombing. It was extremely important to have the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan 

Act—sponsored by Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and Chairman Berman—pass 

with bipartisan and bicameral support. We will seek full funding from Congress, 

and I believe this legislation will play a critical role in helping us transform our 

partnership with Pakistan. 

We will not be facing these challenges alone. We share this responsibility with 

governments around the world. Our NATO allies have already made significant contributions of their own in Afghanistan, and this afternoon I will leave for Brussels 

to begin the process of securing additional alliance commitments of troops, trainers, 

and resources. Ambassador Holbrooke, our Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, is already there consulting with our allies. 

The international community is also expanding its support to Pakistan, and we 

are in close touch with partners to coordinate assistance. We are also looking 

beyond NATO to build the broadest possible global coalition to meet this challenge. 

Our objectives are shared by people and governments from Europe to Australia, 

from Russia to China to India, and across the Middle East. And we are reaching 

out to Muslims everywhere to make it clear that the United States seeks to build 

a better future with them in a spirit of mutual respect and partnership. 

THE MESSAGE

Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. But the President’s plan represents the best way we know to protect 

our Nation today and in the future. The task we face is as complex as any national 

security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this effort as 

the responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our government, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and civilians who will face these dangers to 

come together as Americans—and come together with our allies and international 

partners—to help them accomplish this mission. I look forward to working with you 

to meet this challenge. And I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Secretary Gates. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the 

committee, I would like to provide an overview of the strategic 

thinking and context behind the President’s decisions; in particular, the nexus among al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and 

Afghanistan, and our objectives, and how the President’s strategy 

aims to accomplish them. 

As the President first stated in March, and reemphasized Tuesday night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist 

allies, and to prevent its return to both countries. The international 

military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this 

overarching goal. 

Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually 

reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, 

as much as we might wish that to be the case. 

While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now, and dependent on 

the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al-Qaeda’s message to 

the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the winning side 

of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
13 

biotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. 

Al-Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly. 

The lesson of the Afghan Taliban’s revival for al-Qaeda is that 

time and will are on their side, that with a Western defeat, they 

could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory, 

as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire 

and attract followers and funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now 

necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda. 

At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in 

Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation 

of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic 

extremists. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to 

the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated, sophisticated 

attacks in Afghanistan. 

By the same token, providing a sanctuary for extremists in 

southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on 

a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the 

last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan’s domestic 

peace and stability, carrying out, with al-Qaeda’s help, escalating 

bombing attacks throughout the country. 

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, 

if not most, of Afghanistan, and likely a renewed civil war. Talibanruled areas could, in short order, become, once again, a sanctuary 

for al-Qaeda, as well as a staging area for resurgent militant 

groups on the offensive in Pakistan. 

Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists, as was 

the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts. It would 

strengthen the al-Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fundraising, and more sophisticated operations. 

It is true that al-Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute 

attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to London to Denver. What makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location, including Somalia, 

Yemen, and elsewhere, is that this part of the world represents the 

epicenter of extremist jihadism, the historic place where native and 

foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, 

caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole 

remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for this country and the world. 

Some say this is similar to the domino theory that underpinned, 

and ultimately muddied, the thinking behind the United States 

military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we 

have very real and very recent history that shows just what can 

happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing 

space, safe havens, and governments complicit with, and supportive 

of, their mission. 

Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez 

Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993, Islamic militants launched 

their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again. 

The President’s new strategic concept aims to reverse the 

Taliban’s momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the 

14 

time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country. The 

essence of our civil-military plan is to ‘‘clear, hold, build, and transfer.’’ Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in 

summer of 2011 is critical and, in my view, achievable. 

July 2011, the time at which the President said the United 

States will begin to drawdown our forces, will be the beginning of 

a process, an inflection point, if you will, of transition where 

Afghan forces begin to assume greater responsibility for security. 

The pace and character of that drawdown, which districts and 

provinces are turned over, and when, will be determined by conditions on the ground. It will be a gradual but inexorable process. It 

will be similar to the gradual but steady conditions-based drawdown that began to take place in Iraq about 14 months after the 

surge began there. 

As with so many issues in the national security and defense 

arena, the real challenge in Afghanistan is finding the right balance. The prompt dispatch of some 30,000 United States combat 

troops, on top of the 21,000 already ordered by the President earlier this year, sends a certain message of the President’s resolve to 

both our partners and our adversaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. When this buildup is complete, total United States force levels in Afghanistan will have more than doubled under President 

Obama’s orders, to about 100,000 troops. Whether you agree with 

what we are doing or not, there should be no doubting, at home or 

abroad, this President’s commitment to the success of this mission. 

On the other hand, we have to send an equally strong message 

to the Afghan Government that, when all is said and done, the 

United States military is not going to be there to protect them forever, that the Afghans must step up to the plate and do the things 

necessary that will allow them to take primary responsibility for 

defending their own country, and do so with a sense of purpose and 

urgency. 

This is the balance we’re trying to achieve, and I believe the 

President’s plan provides both the resources and the flexibility to 

do so. Making this transition possible requires accelerating the 

development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan 

army and police through intensive partnering with ISAF forces, 

especially in combat. Even after we transfer security responsibility 

to the Afghans and drawdown our combat forces, the United States 

will continue to support their development as an important partner 

for the long haul. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when 

we abandoned the country, only to see it descend into chaos and 

then into Taliban hands. 

Let me offer a couple of closing thoughts. The President believes, 

as I do, that, in the end, we cannot defeat al-Qaeda and its toxic 

ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in 

Afghanistan. The President’s decision offers the best possibility to 

decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia, all 

necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital 

interests. 

As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women 

who have volunteered and revolunteered to serve their country in 

15 

uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and in our 

prayers as we take on this arduous, but vitally important, mission. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to testify 

today. On Tuesday night, President Obama announced a renewed commitment and 

more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind his decisions, in particular: 

• The nexus among al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; 

• Our objectives and how the President’s strategy aims to accomplish them; and 

• The military forces required. 

WHERE WE STAND

As the President first stated in March, and reemphasized on Tuesday, the goal 

of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and 

defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent its return to both countries. The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. 

Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that 

to be the case. 

While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and 

other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly 

strengthen al-Qaeda’s message to the Muslim world: that violent extremists are on 

the winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al-Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly. 

Taliban success in retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces of multiple, modern armies—the current direction of events—has dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular perceptions of who is 

winning and who is losing. The lesson of the Taliban’s revival for al-Qaeda is that 

time and will are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their 

strength and achieve a major strategic victory—as long as their senior leadership 

lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling back the 

Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al-Qaeda. 

At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in Afghanistan from 

the stability of Pakistan—a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also 

explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists. The two countries, bound by ties of tribe 

and faith, share a porous border of more than 1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated, 

sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani Government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. Indeed, the 

Pakistan Taliban, just in the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan’s 

own domestic peace and stability, carrying out—with al-Qaeda’s help—escalating 

bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks, and the Taliban’s 

movement toward Islamabad 7 months ago, that largely motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. And we know the Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. 

A related point with regard to Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from 

the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing of military-to-military relations, 

many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner. 

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of 

the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas could in short order 

become, once again, a sanctuary for al-Qaeda as well as a staging area for resurgent 

militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan. 

Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists—as was the case 20 

years ago—would beget success on other fronts. It would strengthen the al-Qaeda 

narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fund-raising, and more 

16 

sophisticated operations. Aided by the Internet, many more followers could join their 

ranks, both in the region and in susceptible populations across the globe. 

It is true that al-Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations—from Munich to London to Denver. But what makes the border 

area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location—including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible redoubts—is that this part of 

the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where 

native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its 

collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in 

the same place would have severe consequences for the United States and the world. 

Some may say this is similar to the ‘‘domino theory’’ that underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The 

difference, however, is that we have very real—and very recent—history that shows 

just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing 

space, safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their mission. 

Less than 5 years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of 

Afghanistan, Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again. 

THE WAY AHEAD

A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan—one that is sustainable 

over the long term by their governments—is vital to our national security. By the 

same token, the current status quo in Afghanistan—the slow but steady deterioration of the security situation and growing influence of the Taliban—is unacceptable. 

So too is the status quo ante—a largely ungoverned region controlled by extremists 

in which the United States had little influence or ability to gain actionable intelligence on the ground. 

The President’s new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban’s momentum 

and reduce its strength while providing the time and space necessary for the 

Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own 

country. 

We will focus our resources where the population is most threatened, and align 

military and civilian efforts accordingly—with six primary objectives: 

• Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the United 

States, our allies, and the Afghans; 

• Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communications; 

• Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing al-Qaeda from 

regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan; 

• Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan National Security 

Forces; 

• Increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and employing other local forces 

selectively to begin transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan Government within 18 months; and 

• Selectively building the capacity of the Afghan Government, particularly in key 

ministries. 

This approach is not open-ended ‘‘nation building.’’ It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style Afghan nation-state—the likes 

of which has never been seen in that country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the 

other. 

It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, 

dismantling, and eventually defeating al-Qaeda by building the capacity of the 

Afghans—capacity that will be measured by observable progress on clear objectives, 

and not simply by the passage of time. 

The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build, and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical— 

and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district by district, province 

by province, depending on conditions on the ground. The process will be similar to 

what we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided ‘‘overwatch’’—first 

at the tactical level, then at the strategic level. Even after we transfer security 

responsibility to the Afghans and drawdown our combat forces, the United States 

will continue to support their development as an important partner for the long 

haul. We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only 

to see it descend into civil war, and then into Taliban hands. 

Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and police through intensive partVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
17 

nering with ISAF forces, especially in combat. It also means achieving a better balance between national and local forces; increasing Afghan unconventional warfare 

capabilities; engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect 

their own territory; and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation 

efforts. 

At the strategic level, the President’s plan will achieve a better balance between 

investments in the central government and subnational entities. At the national 

level, the focus will be primarily on reforming essential ministries and pressing for 

the appointment of competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and 

regional level, there will be a shift to work through existing, traditional structures 

rather than building new ones. In all of these efforts, we must have a committed 

partner in the Afghan people and government. That is one reason why there will 

be very clear and definitive timeframes for reviewing our—and their—progress. 

ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES

As the President announced, the United States will commit an additional 30,000 

troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to 24 months. These forces—the 

U.S. contribution to this fight—will be deployed and concentrated in the southern 

and eastern parts of the country. The first of these forces will begin to arrive in 

Afghanistan within 2–3 weeks. 

In all, since taking office President Obama has committed nearly 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of approximately 100,000. We are 

looking to NATO and our other partners to send a parallel international message 

of strong resolve. Our allies must take the lead and focus their resources in the 

north and west to prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds. We will 

seek some 5–7,000 troops from NATO and expect the allies to share more of the burden in training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Army and police. 

CONCLUSION

Let me offer a few closing thoughts. 

It is worth remembering that the security situation in Afghanistan—though serious—does not begin to approach the scale of violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was confirmed as Secretary of Defense 3 years ago 

this week. With all the resources already committed to this campaign—plus those 

the President has just announced—I believe the pieces are being put in place to 

make real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24 months. 

The President believes, as do I, that, in the end, we cannot defeat al-Qaeda and 

its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. The President’s decision offers the best possibility to decisively change the 

momentum in Afghanistan, and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia—all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and 

our vital interests. So, I ask for your full support of this decision to provide both 

Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources they need to be 

successful. 

This is will take more patience, perseverance, and sacrifice by the United States 

and our allies. As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women who 

have volunteered and in many cases revolunteered—to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this 

arduous but vitally necessary mission. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Gates. 

Admiral Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL MULLEN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT 

CHIEFS OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, DC 

Admiral MULLEN. Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your time today. 

I’d also like to express my appreciation for all the work this committee has done to get the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill passed. And 

there, in these discussions, it can be easily lost that that $71⁄2 billion is actually nonmilitary aid, which I think, having spent a lot 

of time in that part of the world, is absolutely critical. And the 

other part of it is that it’s over an extended period of time. For too 

18 

long in Pakistan, as many of you know, it’s been year-to-year, and 

so that 5-year commitment is really significant. 

And I want to ensure you, in the debates and the deliberations 

that we’ve had in the administration with respect to this strategy 

in this region, that there was an enormous amount of time spent 

on Pakistan, and, Chairman, specifically to your focus on this, that 

that was a very critical part of the discussion, as well. And, by and 

large, the principles agreed on the need to have a sustained, longterm partnership approach with Pakistan, even given the complexities there. 

And then, the linkage—I have come to believe that the linkage 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan is almost absolute and that the 

outcome in Afghanistan bears directly on Pakistan’s future and 

how they’ll act and how they see their future. So, a stable, supportive Afghanistan will make a big difference in how Pakistan 

sees its future. 

I support, fully and without hesitation, the President’s decision, 

and appreciate the opportunity to contribute to what I believe was 

a healthy and productive discussion. I’ve seen lots of internal 

debates on national security issues in the time that I’ve been chairman, but I can honestly say that there’s not one issue that was so 

thoroughly and thoughtfully considered as this one, as, in fact, it 

should be, as Secretary Clinton said, because this is the most complex national security issue that faces us. It’s also, in my belief, 

directly tied to our vital national interests. 

Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as those 

of the Joint Chiefs, was given a voice, and every single individual 

used it. We now have before us a strategy that more appropriately 

matches us to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, and 

resources matched more appropriately to that strategy, particularly 

with regard to reversing the insurgency’s momentum as quickly as 

possible, focusing immediately on 2010. And given the stakes in 

Afghanistan for our own national security, as well as that of our 

partners around the world, I believe that the time we took was well 

worth it. 

Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already walked you through 

the policy issues, the large policy issues in question, and I won’t 

repeat them here. 

But, from a purely military perspective, I believe our new 

approach does three critical things. 

First, by providing more discrete objectives, it offers better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ their 

forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al-Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven. 

They will still strive to protect the Afghan people, who remain the 

center of gravity in Afghanistan. They will still pursue major elements of the counterinsurgency campaign desired and designed by 

General McChrystal, which, as we all know, involves at least some 

measure of active counterterrorism operations. But, now, they will 

tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on al-Qaeda’s leadership, and 

by more effectively working to degrade the Taliban’s influence, and 

by streamlining and accelerating the growth of competent Afghan 

National Security Forces. 

19 

At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing space for 

the Afghans to secure their own people and to stabilize their own 

country. It’s about partnering and mentoring just as much, if not 

more so, than it is about fighting and combat. Where once we 

believed that finishing the job meant, to a large degree, ‘‘do it ourselves,’’ we now know it cannot truly or permanently be done by 

anyone other than the Afghans themselves. Fully a third of the 

United States troops in theater are partnered with Afghan forces 

as we speak, and I expect that number to rapidly grow over the 

next year. 

Second, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives commanders on the ground the resources and the support they need to 

reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to accomplish these more limited objectives. I’ve said it before, and I believe 

it still today, that this region is the epicenter of global Islamic 

extremism. And I acknowledge that there are federated terrorists 

globally. But, this is the epicenter. It’s the place from which we 

were attacked on 9/11, as has been discussed, and, should we be 

hit again, it’s the place from which, I am convinced, the planning, 

training, financing, and leadership will emanate. 

Al-Qaeda may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack, but the 

Taliban will be the bricklayers. Though hardly a uniform body, 

Taliban groups have grown bolder and more sophisticated. I saw 

that just a few months ago in the Korengal Valley, where Taliban 

forces attacked coalition outposts using what I would call ‘‘almost 

conventional small-unit tactics.’’ Their fighters were better organized and better equipped than they were just 1 year ago. That’s 

been the case for the last 3 years. In fact, coalition forces experienced a record number of—a record level of violence over the last 

year, up 60 percent in 2009, when compared to 2008. And through 

brutal intimidation, the Taliban has established shadow governments across the country, coercing the reluctant support of many 

locals, and challenging the authority of elected leaders and state 

institutions. Indeed, we believe the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11 of the—of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. To say 

there is no serious threat of Afghanistan falling once again into 

Taliban hands ignores the audacity of even the insurgency’s most 

public statements. And to argue that, should they have that power, 

the Taliban would not at least tolerate the presence of al-Qaeda on 

Afghan soil, is to ignore both the recent past and the evidence we 

see every day of collusion between these factions on both sides of 

the Af-Pak border. The cost of failure, then, is grave. That is why 

the President’s decision for the extended surge of—to Afghanistan 

of 30,000 additional troops is so important. It gets the most U.S. 

force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General 

McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative. It 

validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach, and it 

offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible chance to set the 

security conditions for the Afghan people to see our commitment to 

their future, for the Karzai government to know our strong desire 

to see his promised reforms, and for the Afghan Taliban to understand they will not and cannot take back Afghanistan, and finally, 

for those beyond Afghanistan who support the Taliban or who 

20 

would see the return of al-Qaeda, to realize the futility of their 

pursuit. 

I should add that these reinforcements come on top of the 21,000 

troops the President ordered shortly after taking office, troops 

which have already made a huge difference in the southern 

Helmand Valley. But, as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no 

amount of troops in no amount of time will ever be enough to completely achieve success in such a fight; they simply must be accompanied by good governance and healthy public administration. 

This, not troop numbers, is the area of my greatest concern. Like 

everyone else, I look forward to working with the Karzai government, but we must have the support of the interagency and international communities, as well. 

And that brings me to my final point. The President’s new strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based approach to 

regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in isolation any 

more than he views the ties between al-Qaeda and the Taliban as 

superficial. He’s called for a stronger and more productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is, likewise, under the 

threat from radical elements and whose support remains vital to 

our ability to eliminate those safe havens. He has pledged, and we 

in the military welcome, renewed emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort, more contributions by other NATO 

nations, and a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to the 

Afghans. 

His is a more balanced, more flexible, and more achievable strategy than we’ve had in the past, one based on pragmatism and real 

possibilities. And speaking for the 2.2 million men and women who 

must go execute this and who, with their families, have borne the 

brunt of the stress and the strain of 8 years of constant combat, 

I support the President’s decision and appreciate his leadership. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on the subject of the President’s newly 

announced strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The President’s Tuesday evening announcement at West Point of our strategy and 

increased military resources for Afghanistan culminates a process of deliberate strategic review that began with the arrival of General McChrystal’s interim assessment 

in early September. I believe this national-level review has been sober and essential. 

The challenges we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan are great, and our interests 

there are significant. This administration needed to take the time to look at all the 

options and craft a balanced and sustainable approach. I believe that the review has 

met this aim. 

I support fully, and without hesitation, the President’s decision. 

REFINING THE STRATEGY

The facts compel us to act. Our strategic review confirmed that the overarching 

policy goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies 

from either country in the future. 

South Asia is the epicenter of global Islamic extremism; the location of al-Qaeda’s 

core leadership and the terrain that dozens of Islamic terrorist groups call home. 

It is the location from which the 9/11 attacks on America were planned and driven. 

If the United States should be hit again, I remain convinced that the planning, 

21 

training, and funding for such an attack will emanate there. It is a region where 

a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan, is under direct threat from al-Qaeda and affiliated Pakistani-Taliban groups that aspire to acquire and use nuclear weapons 

against the United States and our allies. Thus, it is a region with a unique—and 

deadly—combination of the most dangerous terrorists and the most dangerous technology in the world. Our actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan seek to prevent catastrophic outcomes from these toxic forces, and constitute a most critical national 

interest. 

Our strategic review paid particular attention to Pakistan. The people of Pakistan 

are under as much, if not greater, threat from al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism than 

are we. We must encourage and aid the Pakistani military fight against these 

extremists in South Waziristan, in SWAT, and across Pakistan. We must also help 

Pakistan widen its aperture in seeking out and eliminating all forms of extremism 

and terrorism—those who threaten not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan, the 

wider South Asia region, and the globe. We are deepening ties with the people of 

Pakistan as well as with their security forces. We see progress with our Pakistani 

allies as paramount to the way ahead. 

In Afghanistan, we narrowed in on a challenging, but attainable goal: to deny 

al-Qaeda safe haven and the Afghan-Taliban the ability to overthrow the duly elected Afghan Government. To achieve this refined strategic aim, we must continue to 

deny al-Qaeda any Afghanistan toe-hold, reverse the momentum of the Taliban 

insurgency, and build sufficient Afghan Government and security capacity to eventually defeat the insurgent threat. Our review also narrowed and refined the military objectives for General McChrystal’s NATO–ISAF force—focusing it on security 

of key population areas while Afghan forces grow in size and capability, prioritizing 

a robust NATO–ISAF program of training and mentoring Afghan military and 

police, and establishing the conditions necessary for Afghans to assume their own 

security. Each of these objectives will hasten the day when we can begin thinning 

the U.S./NATO–ISAF security forces presence, turning the internal security of 

Afghanistan over to the Afghans. This strategy provides the time and space for the 

Afghans themselves to build sufficient security and governance capacity to stabilize 

their country. 

Our refined military objectives for Afghanistan complement those in the political 

and economic spheres. They also support diplomatic, political, and military programs that the President’s strategy calls for us to undertake with neighboring countries—especially Pakistan—that increase pressure against al-Qaeda’s leadership; 

that expand counterinsurgency operations against Taliban insurgents who threaten 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider region; and that help set the conditions for 

improved regional security and stability. 

MATCHING STRATEGY AND RESOURCES

Throughout this strategic review, I advised the Secretary of Defense and the 

President that our commitment of military resources must match our strategy. 

I am pleased to inform this committee that the President’s decision accommodates 

this advice. The strategy he approved commits 30,000 more U.S. forces, with some 

number of additional enablers, while calling for our NATO and non-NATO allies to 

generate additional forces. This rapid, coalition-wide buildup of force aligns with 

General McChrystal’s recommendations, even more so in light of the narrowing of 

objectives for Afghanistan that the President announced Tuesday night. 

The President’s commitment is to rapidly send these additional forces forward to 

get as much force into the fight as fast as General McChrystal can absorb it. This 

allows Generals McChrystal and Petraeus to plan for cohesive logistics and transportation support over the course of the coming year. While there are no guarantees 

in war, I expect that we will make significant headway in the next 18–24 months. 

I also believe we could begin to thin our combat forces in about the same timeframe. 

From a military standpoint, the President’s commitment to an increase in military 

force, especially backed by an increase in civilian resources, is much better than one 

featuring periodic assessments that trigger incremental force escalation. 

The President’s decision also supports accelerated expansion of Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF)—a critical initiative. We simply must invest in the growth 

of an Afghan security force—through more radical and in-depth partnering. The 

additional U.S. and coalition forces heading to Afghanistan will focus a great 

amount of time and energy toward empowering a strong and capable ANSF. 

General McChrystal intends to use these additional U.S. troops to conduct more 

focused counterinsurgency operations that enhance population security against the 

Taliban in south and east Afghanistan. As in Iraq, our troops will live among the 

population. Thus—and as General McChrystal has successfully emphasized since his 

22 

arrival as COMISAF last June—we will continue to make every effort to eliminate 

civilian casualties, not just because this is the right thing to do, but because these 

casualties work against our goal of Afghan population security. Although we must 

expect higher alliance casualties in coming months as we dedicate more U.S. forces 

to protect the population and mentor the ANSF, our extended security presence 

must—and will—improve security for the Afghan people and limit both future civilian and military casualties 

MOVING FORWARD—CONCLUSION

No commitment of additional force in the number we plan for Afghanistan is without risk. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I assess the risks to our military forces and 

our military missions—at home and abroad—from this force deployment decision to 

be acceptable. We can continue to balance the additional force flow requirements for 

Afghanistan against those coming available from drawdown trajectory programmed 

for, and on track in, Iraq. 

I believe that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be gradual, and sometimes halting. Yet I believe we can succeed. The President’s announced strategy and 

this force-flow decision give us the best possible chance for success. We must exhibit 

vision, apply sufficient resources, and display endurance to realize our objectives for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most challenges we now confront in the South Asia 

region are not military in nature. They require solutions from and led by national 

and local governments. Yet none of these solutions are possible in an environment 

of insecurity. Our role must be to fill the security gap for a short time, concurrently 

growing our partner government’s capacity to self-secure. Pursued with resolve, our 

actions will send an unmistakable message that the United States remains committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets of partnerships available to address future challenges without a long-term need for large numbers of 

U.S. combat forces. 

In providing advice to this President over the past 10 months, one important point 

I have made, consonant with other key Presidential advisers, is that our military 

activities must support rather than lead our Nation’s foreign policy. Our warfighting 

ability will never be in doubt. But we have learned from the past 8 years of war 

that we serve this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated 

approach that employs all elements of national power to achieve the policy goals set 

by our civilian leaders. This approach remains crucial in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

across South Central Asia. 

On behalf of our servicemembers, I would like to thank the members of this committee—and the Congress as a whole—for the sustained investment in our brave 

young men and women in uniform, and for your unwavering support of them and 

their families as they continue to serve so magnificently and selflessly in this time 

of protracted war. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Thank you, each of you, for comprehensive statements that are 

very, very helpful. 

Let me focus in, if I can, on—Secretary Gates, you particularly 

talked about the nexus with respect to the al-Qaeda/Taliban relationship and why Afghanistan is important in that. Last night, I 

had dinner with a group of Congressmen, a number of whom either 

don’t see the nexus or don’t accept it or, you know, somehow feel 

that we can get by notwithstanding whatever nexus there is, that 

it doesn’t rise to the level—in a sense, building on Senator Lugar’s 

opening statement, where he, sort of, talked about the question of, 

you know, being fixated on al-Qaeda and committing a certain 

number of troops that may be out of proportion to the level of 

threat. 

You’ve both—both Secretary Clinton and you, Secretary Gates, 

addressed this in your statements, but there’s a way in which, I 

think, somehow, in the statements, people don’t always hear the 

exclamation point of it. 

I’d like to ask you—I mean, if we have Congress—if we have 

members of this committee who disagree with the decision and who 

feel that somehow that nexus is not sufficient, that it brings this 

23 

national security threat to a level that says, ‘‘You’ve got to have 

100,000 troops,’’ et cetera—you know the arguments—what I want 

you to do now, if you can, is put the exclamation point on it. I 

mean, how do you convey, through your experience and the stakes 

that you’re trying to protect, what is really at stake here so people 

understand why the President, who clearly, at West Point, said, 

you know, he doesn’t take this decision lightly—and we all understand that; nobody would—to make this kind of commitment. What 

is it, in the simplest of terms, that compels you to say, ‘‘Al-Qaeda 

in Pakistan remains a sufficient factor to require 100,000 troops in 

Afghanistan’’? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, I would say that I consider the situation today, in this respect, more dangerous than it was a year or 

18 months ago, because it is clear that—just on the Pakistani side 

of the border, that al-Qaeda is deeply involved with the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban, in planning attacks 

against the Pakistani Government and people, and attempting to 

destabilize that government. And the al-Qaeda provides them with 

technical information, provides them with operational information 

and support. 

Al-Qaeda also is supportive of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the terrorist group that is responsible for the bombings in Mumbai. And 

al-Qaeda is providing them with targeting information and helping 

them in their plotting in India, clearly with the idea of provoking 

a conflict between India and Pakistan that would destabilize Pakistan. They also are very much involved with the Afghan Taliban. 

And so, they are supporting all of these different groups in ways 

that are destabilizing, not just for Afghanistan, but for the entire 

region. And al-Qaeda is at the heart of it. And whether or not the 

terrorists are homegrown, when we trace their roots, they almost 

all end up back in this border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

whether they’re from the United States or Somalia or the United 

Kingdom or elsewhere. 

And so, what we see is al-Qaeda, despite their being under pressure and despite their limited numbers and despite the fact that 

there are few of them in Afghanistan right now, that they are taking advantage of the situation in the region to play a very destabilizing and dangerous role. 

What they have learned, as I suggested in my remarks, is that, 

in an ungoverned space, you have the opportunity to recover, reconstitute, and reassert yourself, which is exactly what the Taliban did 

in Pakistan over a period of about 3 years, and now are in a position where, with their momentum, are challenging, successfully to 

this point, significant numbers of modern armies. 

So, the point is that if given—if parts of southern and eastern 

Afghanistan once again come under the control of the Taliban, that 

would be space in which the al-Qaeda could reconstitute itself, very 

much as the Taliban did in Pakistan just in recent years, and then 

expand their operations and their capabilities to launch attacks 

against Europe and the United States and, really, all over the 

world. 

The CHAIRMAN. If—— 

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. So—go ahead. 

24 

Secretary CLINTON. I would just add, to what Secretary Gates 

said, the following three points. 

First, we have increasingly come to see these organizations not 

as separate independent operators that occasionally cooperate with 

one another, but as part of a syndicate of terrorism. They—the 

level of operational cooperation, training, equipping, financing, has 

grown exponentially. And at the head of the table, like an old 

Mafia kind of diagram, sits al-Qaeda. And al-Qaeda still has much 

greater access to the financing that comes from the gulf, and is 

able, then, to support a lot of their Taliban partners in their various undertakings. Al-Qaeda’s experience in recruiting foreign 

fighters has aided and abetted certain of the Taliban operations inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani military has told us 

that they’ve picked up foreign fighters in South Waziristan. And 

the continuing training of new recruits, people that then go off to 

Yemen or Somalia, or, indeed, Denver, has a global reach that is 

unmatched. 

Second, as Admiral Mullen said, the planning and the, sort of, 

brains of the operation with respect to plots against us remains alQaeda, but, increasingly, the Taliban are the bricklayers. You 

know, the recent arrests here in our own country trace back to 

Pakistan and trace back, certainly in the case of Zazi, directly to 

an al-Qaeda-originated training camp and training program. 

But, finally, and perhaps most chillingly, the fact that Pakistan 

is a nuclear power raises the stakes enormously. There is no doubt 

in any of our minds that al-Qaeda seeks nuclear materiel, seeks 

access to nuclear weapons. The challenges within the Pakistani 

military, that Admiral Mullen can address, because he’s done yeoman’s work in working on a—building a better relationship. We 

walked away from the Pakistani military, you know; we were sanctioned, we couldn’t cooperate with them. And there’s a real gap between the leadership of the Pakistani military that ever trained in 

or connected with the American or the British or the Australian 

military and, sort of, the younger officers. And there’s a real struggle going on, for influence, for the kind of advantage that would 

give this syndicate of terror just a horrific challenge to all of us. 

But, I think—if Admiral Mullen could have the time to add to 

that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, I’ve certainly—agree with the 

nexus. And I’ve watched it, over the last year to two, that these 

groups are coming together. 

I’m—and this—Secretary Gates talked about the linkage between 

the LET and al-Qaeda. And it’s actually not—so, it’s not local anymore. And that is an example of the collaboration that’s going on 

with all these units. I was struck, as I’m sure you were, in 

Mumbai, that a terrorist outfit could literally generate that kind of 

attack and then bring two nation-states closer to conflict. That is 

not an achievement lost on anyone that observed that. And those 

kinds of plots continue. The ability to destabilize Pakistan, seeking 

that nuclear materiel—those nuclear materiels and weapons—it’s 

extraordinarily dangerous. And I recognize both the price we pay, 

in blood and treasure, and the cost—that it costs our government, 

specifically. These—and my own view of this is that, without 

addressing this, the potential risks of something recurring, on the 

25 

order of what happened before, is out there, and the enormous 

costs that would be associated with that. 

So, this decision and investment now is absolutely critical. And 

the terrorist central cells that are there in this border, that’s 

really—this is really the headquarters. There are other franchise 

cells throughout—in places like Yemen and Somalia, but this is the 

most dangerous one. They all need to be addressed. This has a significantly more capable center of gravity, if you will, because of all 

the organizations that are associated with al-Qaeda in this border 

area. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that. 

Secretary GATES. Can I just add one sentence? The—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Please. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. Just in terms of underscoring the 

central role of al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistan border area—the 

reality is that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the 

Arab Peninsula, place high value on their affiliation with al-Qaeda 

in that border area. And there is ample intelligence showing other 

terrorist groups that basically are in the application process to 

become affiliates of al-Qaeda. So, the central mythology and the 

central role of these people is still there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say that I think that it’s going 

to be very important in the next days to really build this linkage 

and case so that people have a real understanding of the importance. And it obviously begs the question—and I don’t want to 

abuse the time periods here, so I won’t ask it now; I’m sure colleagues will follow up on it—but, it clearly begs the question of 

Pakistan’s cooperation and what we can expect in these next 

months. And I’m sure colleagues will follow up on that. 

I did want to mention congratulations on Chelsea’s engagement. 

I just finished playing ‘‘wedding planner’’ for my younger daughter, 

and my advice to you is: hire a professional. 

Secretary CLINTON. Are you available? [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I am not—distinctly not a professional. 

VOICE. Can’t afford him. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, let me follow up on your questions, as well as the responses 

of the witnesses. 

Secretary Clinton, in your testimony you said, ‘‘We will work 

with the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to eliminate safe 

havens for those plotting attacks against us, our allies, and our interests.’’ As an additional point you say, ‘‘We will develop a longterm sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so we 

do not repeat the mistakes of the past.’’ 

Now, each of you responded in your testimonies to the thought 

that al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups may be becoming increasingly diffuse, by saying, ‘‘Of course. But, this border area is significantly different.’’ Admiral Mullen, you pointed out again that this 

area is unique as it would likely serve as the base for the planning 

of future terrorist attacks against the United States. Secretary 

Gates, you just mentioned how even in the Maghreb and elsewhere, 

they feed into the so-called spiritual or intellectual, leadership that 

is coming out of the border area. 

26 

I would like each of you to further expound on a view we have 

heard you all espouse, that ‘‘We believe that a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner for the United States, an 

ally against violent extremism.’’ Of course that is correct. But, a 

number of historians have come before this committee in previous 

discussions of these matters and they’ve made comments such as 

this, that, ‘‘The al-Qaeda in Afghanistan has sometimes been useful 

for Pakistan to at least influence, if not control, things over in 

Afghanistan so that India would not have a strong influence there.’’ 

When the Indians were here visiting with you recently, they certainly expressed some feeling of exclusion that came not only from 

Pakistan, but of Pakistan’s use of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 

Recently, the three of you have been engaging in active diplomacy in Pakistan, and, collectively, with the President, the Vice 

President, General Jones, and others, have convinced the Pakistani 

military that they ought to do something about Pakistani Taliban 

in Swat Valley and elsewhere. It is possible that this success also 

has to do with a change in viewpoint of the Pakistani military 

establishment. 

But, we still get back to the point that we’re talking about, this 

border area which is comprised of two countries. On one side, we 

are going to emplace additional troops dealing with these 11 provinces in Afghanistan. What is not clear is precisely what is going 

to happen in Pakistan in this alliance of the two of us, the United 

States and Pakistan. And you would say, ‘‘Well, for good reason. 

Don’t be naive. This is a very difficult situation.’’ As you said, Secretary Clinton, we have a long way to go. This is a growing relationship. You’ve been out in the countryside, visiting places the 

President of the country has not chosen to visit as he is huddled 

there in the capital. Indeed, this is very tough business. 

I’d like to ask all of you about what I see as some of our crucial 

objectives in our relationship with Pakistan and continued engagement in the region. I agree with the chairman on the importance 

of this concentration on the number of troops, the number of 

months, and of whatever is going to happen in the urban areas of 

the 11 provinces. But, what is crucial is whether any of the three 

of you, or all of you, or the President, the Vice President, General 

Jones, or anyone else in your team, is going to be able to deal with 

the leadership in Pakistan, whether it be the civil, military, or 

intelligence leadership, so that they are prepared to face what we 

are all seeing as the problem: the continued presence of Osama bin 

Laden and al-Qaeda in the border area. No one wants to talk about 

Osama bin Laden. Isn’t this a major target? Isn’t this a reason why 

continued warfare is necessary? 

Now, if it is so, we’d better talk about it directly to the Pakistanis. This being a public hearing, the Pakistanis are hearing that 

loud and clear, and they’re going to have to respond. 

Now, it is all well and good for us to say the Pakistanis have got 

to be stable over the long run with regard to their nuclear weapons. Well, of course they need to be stable. They understand that. 

They often have resented us talking about their nuclear weapons, 

quite apart from the thought we might protect them and their nuclear weapons, as this is in our own interests. 

27 

Progressing from the President’s plan is certainly not the end of 

the story. Whether this plan works or not may depend upon personal diplomacy and the ability of leadership in Pakistan to come 

to very different, significant conclusions from the past in terms of 

their view on the best way forward to improve their welfare. I’d 

like to ask any of you how rapidly you think this can occur. In 12 

months? Eighteen months? Two years? In other words, it better 

occur soon or we’re going to have the shifting of people back and 

forth across the border, even as we have military success, as we 

will, in the provinces of Afghanistan. 

Would anyone want to respond? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Lugar, I’ll start, and then I’m 

sure my colleagues would want to add to what I say. 

I share your sense of urgency, your analysis of the challenges 

that we confront, but I think we have to look very clear-eyed at 

where we are starting from. When I went through my round of confirmation hearings and then, sort of, introductory hearings in the 

House—and that was back in January—I said, at the time, that it 

was hard to believe that the Pakistani Government was not going 

after the direct threats that it faced from within its own borders. 

And that caused a big outcry in Pakistan. But, I think it’s significant that we’re sitting here today, having seen two major military 

operations after the failure of some kind of accommodation and 

unsuccessful peace agreements were finally recognized. 

We are now making the case to our counterparts in Pakistan, 

both in the civilian and the military leadership, that the efforts 

they have made against the TTP, primarily in Swat and now in 

Waziristan and the Mehsud tribal core, are necessary, but far from 

sufficient, efforts to protect themselves, that this syndicate, this 

network of terrorism has to be addressed, that whatever the utility 

of any of these groups might have been in the past, they have 

morphed into a form that poses a threat to the Pakistani Government. 

And this is an argument that, I think, takes time to make. It is 

certainly an argument each of us, plus others, have carried repeatedly, and will continue to do so. But, there is a great gulf of mistrust. Secretary Gates can speak very eloquently, since he was 

involved, in the 1980s, in working with the Pakistani Government 

to put together the mujahideen that led to the overthrow of the 

Soviet Union, but which the Pakistanis feel like we then walked 

away from helping them cope with. And they accommodated themselves, they went into survival mode, and maybe even saw some 

certain advantages flowing from those relationships, advantages 

that they were kind of making lemonade out of lemons in order to 

obtain. 

So, I think your analysis is right, but we’re dealing with a sovereign country that has a very clear idea of who they think their 

overall enemy is—namely, India—but who has slowly been convinced, because of what’s happened inside their own territory, that 

they have to take action. And I think that that will continue to lead 

to positive steps. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

28 

It is an honor to have this distinguished panel of witnesses here 

today. I am pleased that the President has set a goal for when we 

will begin reducing troop levels; however, I am disappointed that 

he’s decided to escalate our military presence and did not give any 

goal or timeframe for when our massive military operations in 

Afghanistan will actually end. I do not support the decision to prolong and expand a risky and unsustainable strategy in the region. 

And, while I support ongoing civilian engagement in Afghanistan 

and counterterrorism efforts in the region, I do not believe more 

American lives should be risked for a war that no longer serves our 

most pressing national security interests. We must promptly transition to a sustainable, targeted counterterrorism strategy for the 

region and the world, one that is as agile and global as the enemy 

we confront: al-Qaeda. 

So, rather than focusing so much of our attention and resources 

on Afghanistan, I think we need a comprehensive, global strategy 

that divides al-Qaeda from populations that have principally local 

grievances. We need to improve our intelligence capabilities, build 

partnerships with legitimate local partners, and, if appropriate, utilize targeted tactical operations. 

Secretary Gates, you have argued that we must continue to pour 

our resources into Afghanistan or it would be perceived as a victory 

by al-Qaeda. And I have to say, I am somewhat less concerned 

about the ‘‘perception’’ of victory and more focused on actually 

defeating al-Qaeda for real. 

I think the best way to do that is to recognize that we’re dealing, 

as you have recognized, with a global enemy with a very limited 

presence in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda’s stated objective is to bankrupt 

the United States. So, I guess my first question is, Do you at least 

acknowledge that investing over $100 billion in just one country, 

in 1 year alone, risks degrading our long-term ability to relentlessly 

pursue al-Qaeda around the globe? 

Secretary Gates. 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think, first of all, just for clarity, the 

costs that we are looking at for fiscal year 2010 for both the wars, 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, will be about $20 billion less than we 

spent in 2008. And I realize that’s small comfort, given how much 

we spent in 2008. But, I think the—I go back to the chairman’s 

comment, What are the consequences, what are the costs, of 

Taliban being able to control space in Afghanistan, and on the Pakistani side of the border, that gives al-Qaeda the ability to reconstitute itself and perhaps provoke a war between India and Pakistan 

or get access to nuclear weapons from Pakistan? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Secretary, I understand that that’s your 

view of not doing something. But, my question is, Once we spend 

this $100 billion, what are the consequences for our resources in 

all the other places that we’re talking about here? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. That there’s another side to this. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. I think that we have, frankly, adequately resourced the effort to go after terrorism on a global basis. 

We certainly have had successful operations, some of which have 

been in the newspapers, and we are devoting a lot of effort, and 

have received resources from the Congress, to the kind of partVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
29 

nering that you have described, in terms of trying to root out these 

terrorist organizations. 

I will tell you, having come back to government after being gone 

for 13 or 14 years, the improvement in the quality of our intelligence, in terms of being able to go after terrorists, and in the 

depth of our intelligence liaison relationships with other countries, 

is a world apart from what I saw in 1993, when I retired. So, we 

have made, I think, good investments, and these investments continue, in terms of going after the global threat. But, it’s important 

to recognize where the home nest is, and to deal with that, as well. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate that. I question whether 

we’re adequately resourcing some other critical places around the 

world that I’ve spent a fair amount of time studying. I won’t get 

into the specifics of it, but it’s something we can discuss in the 

future. 

Admiral Mullen, in his assessment, General McChrystal stated 

that even a ‘‘properly resourced’’ military strategy would still leave 

large swaths of Afghanistan outside government control. Indeed, as 

we’ve increased levels of troops in the south, attacks have grown 

more deadly in the north. 

What are the chances that an increase in troop levels will only 

push militants into different regions? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Feingold, the principal threat, I think, 

will continue to remain in the south and in the east. We recognize, 

in the north, over the last year or so, that it has gotten more difficult. But, General McChrystal is confident that the spread, if you 

will, there—and also, to some degree, to the west, although not 

really significant at this point—can be handled by our NATO 

forces. And, in fact, the NATO forces that—we have expectations 

for receiving additional NATO forces here, commitments in the 

near future, to address that. His main effort is in the south. That 

really is where he will focus most of his troops, supported by his 

efforts in the east. And then, that really gets to the most critical 

areas, from a Pashtun standpoint, from a border standpoint. And 

the intent of this strategy—and his, certainly, to support it—is not 

to do counterinsurgency all over the country. We don’t see it growing to a point, at this point, where it would turn into something 

equal to the kind of threat that we have and see in the south and 

in the east, up north. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Admiral, several witnesses testified before 

this committee that the majority of people we’re currently fighting 

in Afghanistan do not have an international terrorist agenda, but, 

rather, ‘‘tend to coalesce against what is perceived as an outsider.’’ 

And one former CIA station chief in Islamabad has testified that 

if we send 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, it would only 

produce 40,000 additional militants. Actually, I’d like both you and 

Secretary Clinton to answer this. Is there a danger that our current strategy has provoked greater militancy and has thereby made 

it harder for us to isolate members of al-Qaeda? 

Admiral MULLEN. We haven’t seen this. I think General 

McChrystal said, not too long after he got there—and this gets to 

the whole occupation issue—we know we’re not an occupying force. 

Obviously, our actions need to support our intent with respect to 

that, which is very clear. But, the Afghans that we engage with are 

30 

much more concerned with what we do with our forces, as opposed 

to how many they are. McChrystal has shifted the focus to secure 

them—population security for them. That’s what they seek more 

than anything else right now. So, we certainly—while I recognize 

that, particularly because of history, we haven’t seen that extensively, nor have we seen an extensive generation of additional militants, per se, although that is a concern. And we’re looking to get 

as many of them off the battlefield, in this new strategy, as possible, as well, with respect—by reconciliation, reintegration, et 

cetera. But, that’s got to happen through security—better security. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Admiral. 

Madam Secretary. 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, I would just add three points. 

One, General McChrystal significantly changed the way that our 

military forces and NATO ISAF conduct themselves with respect to 

the civilian population. He significantly tightened the rules for air 

support for any kind of combat in order to limit the number of civilian casualties. And he also issued orders concerning nighttime 

raids, particularly with the use of dogs. When I was in Afghanistan, I had a number of people tell us that made a huge difference. 

Second, in every reliable research that I have access to, there is 

no appetite for the return of the Taliban, whatsoever. What we 

have seen an increase in, over the last several years, has been 

more hedging that people are understandably nervous about, 

‘‘What’s the outcome, and whose side should I and my family end 

up on?’’ 

But, there is no appetite for the return of the Taliban, and we 

do not see what is a legitimate concern to keep in mind, the potential reaction that would lead to increased insurgents. 

We also know that a lot of the people who are in the Taliban do 

not share the overall goal, which has morphed. You know, the 

Omar—the Mullah Omar core group that heads the Afghan 

Taliban and is closely allied with al-Qaeda has morphed into, not 

just a nationalistic Islamist group, but now kind of buying into this 

caliphate idea. 

And therefore, a lot of the people who have been conscripted, in 

effect, into service on behalf of the Taliban have no real allegiance. 

So, part of the challenge here—and it’s something that we are 

working on with President Karzai; obviously, we have a whole 

team embedded in NATO ISAF under retired British general, General Lamb, who had played a major role in Iraq, with the Sons of 

Iraq in The Awakening, is to begin to do a much more thoughtful 

job to separate out—I mean, the Taliban are a homegrown entity. 

The Talib, the students, you know, they rose up, in part, against 

the oppression of the Soviet regime, the chaos of the warlord era, 

and a desire to have an Islamist state that imposed shariah order, 

et cetera. So, we know that there is an opportunity for those who 

renounce al-Qaeda violence, et cetera, to be reintegrated and to 

play a part in the political system. Now, we might not like their 

political agenda. I’ll just put that on the table. You know, Senator 

Boxer and Senator Shaheen and I would not particularly be enthusiastic about a nonviolent, peaceful Taliban political movement 

that legitimately played within the democracy. But, you know, 

31 

there is that possibility that I think we have to recognize, if they 

do move into reintegration. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, my time’s up, but I just want to say, 

Madam Secretary, thank you for a thoughtful answer. I’m sure 

you’d agree that it’s at our peril that we minimize the potential 

feelings of the Afghan people for an extended presence there. I 

know you’re aware of that, but we have to be so careful not to minimize the importance of that. 

I thank the Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And thank each of you for your service. I very much respect the 

positions that each of you hold, and realize that there are no easy 

answers. I know this has been very complex, and I know it’s very 

agonizing to come before panels like this when you’re part of the 

administration. 

I do hope—and I see the chairman has left—but, since this is so 

Pakistan-centric, I hope that Ann Patterson—I know she’s here— 

will be made available and we will have hearings with her and others involved in Pakistan, maybe Petraeus. My understanding is, 

we’re trying to set up McChrystal and Eikenberry this next week. 

Is that correct? 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator Corker, that is correct. And we 

would certainly make any witness available. We might want to 

suggest that you plan a short public hearing and a longer classified 

hearing. I think that would be very useful to get at a lot of the 

issues that both Senator Lugar and Chairman Kerry have raised. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I think if we’re going to have the classified briefing, which would be great, the station chief in Pakistan 

would be very beneficial. But, you all can make those decisions. I 

hope at least we’ll have a public hearing with Ann Patterson, who 

is an outstanding ambassador and certainly knows what’s happening in that area. 

You can’t help but be in Afghanistan and know that part of what 

is driving what we’re doing there is just the inertia, the fact that 

we’re there and we’re loathe to leave before success, whatever that 

means, and the fact that we’re trying to prove to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan citizens that we’re real friends. So, my point is, is that 

much of what you all have said, no doubt, is true, but there’s an 

underlying current that creates an inertia, I think, for us to be 

there. And I know a lot of comments have been made about the 

fact that it’s very clear what we’re doing now, and maybe we 

weren’t clear in the past. And there’s no doubt we were not clear 

in the past. 

I would say that I still—I have average intelligence, and I think 

it’s still pretty unclear to me what we’re doing. I know, last March 

the President announced a more narrowed mission, supposedly. It 

was evident to me it was anything but a more narrowed mission. 

I know, on September 22, General Jones came in and created— 

showed us the metrics that are being used to measure what’s happening. I know the chairman was present. It was very evident— 

and I don’t mean to be pejorative—but we were nation-building in 

Afghanistan. The metrics very much lay out a nation-building in 

32 

Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke has got a whole team of people 

that—he would call it ‘‘rebuilding a nation,’’ because he certainly 

goes back in history to the times when Afghanistan was more of 

a functioning country. But, my point is, it—you know, look, there’s 

no question that the metrics laid out in September were nationbuilding. 

I met with Secretary Gates, who I greatly respect, at the Pentagon, and we talked about a partial nation-building, and now we 

talk about, you know, coming home in 18 months, with our 

troops—I realize civilians will stay after that point in time, and I 

realize that the coming-home part, based on testimony yesterday, 

was really just a throwaway comment to sort of appease people 

who are concerned about the buildup. 

So, to me, it’s really not clear. And I think that the American 

people, who are going to be—the civilian side, in particular, is 

going to be, for decades—the whole budget of Afghanistan today is 

about $890 million. The 400,000 security troops we’re talking about 

are about $10 billion a year. And I’m wondering, Madam Secretary, 

whether it would make sense to really lay out clearly what all of 

this means, from the standpoint of support for the next several decades, the amount of civilian activity, and just from the standpoint 

of security, what we really anticipate doing, over time? I know, in 

18 months, the buildup, securitywise, is going to be lesser than 

400,000, but I know, over time, at least—unless it’s changed 

again—that has been our goal, between Afghan police and army. 

So, I would say to you that it’s been very unclear, and it’s been 

like a sine wave, over the last 9 months, as to what we’re actually 

doing there. So, I’d love some edification. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Corker, I’ll do my best, and 

then perhaps I could bring in some reinforcements, here, on either 

side of me. 

First, let me just provide the context, the best I can. In our view, 

looking back, we never adequately resourced the mission in 

Afghanistan. That’s just a fact. And I think this committee’s work 

and reports certainly give a lot of credence and support to that 

view. 

There were, basically, 30,000 troops for a number of years, with 

an additional, you know, 30–40,000 NATO troops, and we didn’t 

really have the kind of commitment that we were needing. 

We also transferred a lot of the assets that should have been 

used to support the troops we had in Afghanistan to Iraq. That’s 

just a fact, as well. 

So, when the President took office, there were backed-up requests for additional troops, that had been in the pipeline. And I 

personally know several of the people who were commanders on the 

ground in Afghanistan, going back to 2001; there were always additional troop requests, which, because of the move toward Iraq, were 

never given what was requested. So, that’s part of the history. 

There was a pending troop request that the Bush administration—and Secretary Gates can speak to this—looked on favorably 

as they were going out the door, of 17,000 troops, and then a 

request they left for President Obama of 21,000. 

And so, right out of the bat, the President’s, you know, given a— 

what is a 38,000-troop request, and he orders a very quick study, 

33 

that Bruce Riedel, a very experienced intelligence professional, 

headed up, along with Richard Holbrooke and Michelle Flournoy, 

from the Defense Department. And, as the President said when he 

made the announcement back in March, ‘‘We’re going to go forward 

with these troops. They’ve been pending. There seems to be an 

argument for them. Our goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al-Qaeda. We are changing commanders, something that is rare to 

do. But, we’re going to look at this again as soon as the election’s 

over,’’ because the election season in Afghanistan was taking hold. 

Well, that’s exactly what we’ve done. Unfortunately, the election 

lasted a very long time, until, thanks to Chairman Kerry, we 

finally began to bring it to a conclusion. 

So, I don’t blame you, and I don’t blame anybody, for wondering, 

you know, where we are, because of the history we inherited and 

our effort to, frankly, make sense and rationalize what was happening, and to put it into an integrated civilian-military strategy. 

One of the first things President Karzai said to me, when I saw 

him Kabul, was, ‘‘I’m confused.’’ You know, and he’s talked about 

how he said, ‘‘I understood what we were supposed to be doing 

from 2001 to 2005. It was the war on terror. And then all of a sudden I started hearing people in your government saying we didn’t 

need to kill bin Laden and Mullah Omar, and I didn’t know what 

that meant.’’ Well—so, there’s been some confusion, which, frankly, 

this administration has been trying to sort through. And we think 

we’ve got it about as right as you get it, given where we started 

from. 

There is no doubt that putting these additional troops in, in our 

mind, is necessary to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, to 

demonstrate clearly to both the Afghans and the Pakistanis that 

we are serious about our resolve to work with them to try to stabilize their two countries, improve their security situation, and that 

we know it cannot be just a military undertaking; that’s why we’re 

emphasizing the civilian side of it. 

So, ultimately, Senator, we are going to have to maintain civilian 

support for Afghanistan and Pakistan, going forward. We think 

that’s in our national interest, to do so. 

But, I just want to make one final point. The July 2011 date is 

the date on which we begin to transfer authority and responsibility 

to Afghan security forces. Now, what we have tried to demonstrate 

is that the pace, the size of the drawdown is going to be determined 

in a responsible manner, based on the conditions that exist at the 

time. And if things are going well, a larger number of forces will 

be transitioned out, and the Afghans will be expected to take on 

greater responsibility. So, it is not contradictory to set a date certain, yet to condition it on the reality that we confront at that time. 

Secretary GATES. Let me just say a word. I know that—time to 

move on. But, first of all, one of my concerns, coming out of the 

decisions in March was that it was clear they were interpreted as 

providing for full-scale nation-building and creating a strong central government in Afghanistan—— 

Senator CORKER. As were the metrics. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. Neither of which is achievable in 

any realistic timeframe, or sustainable, given the costs and everything else. 

34 

So, I would describe, in just a few sentences, what I believe our 

strategy is today, what these decisions represent. It is to reverse 

the momentum of the Taliban. It is to deny them control of territory in Afghanistan. It is to degrade their military capabilities and, 

at the same time, grow and strengthen the capabilities of the 

Afghan National Security Forces so that they can manage the internal security of their own country because they’re dealing with 

better capabilities on their side and degraded capabilities on the 

Taliban side. This allows us to pull the bulk of our combat troops 

out and return, in terms that—as Senator Feingold put it, to more 

of a counterterrorism mission, because we don’t have to worry 

about the security situation inside Afghanistan. You cannot do 

pure counterterrorism unless you have a government, or provincial 

and local governments, that create a hostile environment for the 

Taliban and that allow us to gather the information and intelligence that we need to do the counterterrorism. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I—you stepped out for a second. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I heard that, and I’m happy to—happy to do 

that. 

Senator CORKER. Are we going to have a second round, just—are 

we planning to do that or—— 

The CHAIRMAN. If we have time, we will try. Let’s see where we 

are. 

Senator CORKER. OK. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’d like to do a second round, if they are able to, 

but we have a time constraint. We’ll see what we can do. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

And thank you, all of you, for your dedicated service to our 

Nation. We all appreciate it. 

In 2001, every Senator voted to go against those who attacked 

us using Afghanistan as the base. And President Bush, in a lot of 

our views, turned away from Afghanistan, clearly, toward a disastrous Iraq war. And many of us repeatedly urged an end to that 

war and a refocus on Afghanistan. Well, here we are, many years 

later, and Secretary Clinton is explaining the results of that 

neglect. 

So, 5 months ago, after our President asked for 21,000 additional 

troops for Afghanistan, I supported that request. It wasn’t easy for 

me, but I felt it was important to give him that chance to refocus. 

We also included funding for the women in Afghanistan, who have 

borne the brunt of the Taliban. 

The President said when he announced his Afghanistan strategy, 

that he needed those 21,000 troops—now, this is just months ago— 

to, ‘‘take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and 

give greater capacity to partner and train with Afghan security 

forces.’’ That’s what he’s saying again now. I agree with that 

mission. 

So, I voted. We sent 21,000 more troops. And here’s the thing. 

We’re told, since we sent those troops, that the situation has deteriorated. And I would like to put into the record an interview with 

General McChrystal in which, basically, he said, ‘‘The Taliban—the 

35 

fight against the Taliban has gone downhill.’’ And that was since 

the 21,000 troops were sent. 

[The article referred to follows:] 

[From the New York Daily News, Sept. 25, 2009] 

GEN. MCCHRYSTAL: VIOLENCE IN AFGHANISTAN GETTING WORSE

(By Richard Sisk) 

WASHINGTON.—The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan has admitted he was 

blindsided by the Taliban’s comeback this summer in the bloodiest fighting of the 

eight-year war. 

‘‘I think that in some areas that the breadth of the violence, the geographic spread 

of violence, is a little more than I would have gathered,’’ Army Gen. Stanley 

McChrystal said in a CBS ‘‘60 Minutes’’ interview to be broadcast Sunday. 

Despite the influx of 22,000 troops, bringing U.S. troop levels to 68,000, 

McChrystal said the battle against the Taliban has gone downhill since he took command in June. 

‘‘They’re probably a little worse,’’ he said of conditions on the ground. 

McChrystal said his focus was on limiting ‘‘collateral damage’’ to civilians. 

‘‘This civilian casualty issue is much more important that I even realized,’’ 

McChrystal said. ‘‘It is literally how we lose the war, or in many ways how we win 

it.’’ 

McChrystal’s recent gloomy report on the status of the war and his pending 

request for more troops has touched off a fierce debate within the Obama administration, pitting supporters of the military against those favoring a more limited 

response targeting Al Qaeda in Pakistan. 

The debate prompted McChrystal to tell the New York Times this week, ’’I have 

no intention of resigning.’’ 

Senator BOXER. So, I would ask you, Why did the situation get 

worse in Afghanistan after we sent 21,000 more troops? And I 

guess I’d start with Secretary Gates. 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, the full number of troops that 

the President authorized did not actually ultimately arrive in 

Afghanistan until late in the summer, early fall. The Marines arrived in southern Helmand in July. And, in fact, the reporting that 

we’re getting is that things have begun to get better in southern 

Helmand, where the Marines are. So, part of it has been a—first 

of all, it’s been—I think, when General McChrystal did his assessment, it was really, at least as far as I’m concerned, the first thoroughgoing assessment in the field on how things were going since 

I became Secretary, in December 2006. And I think what General 

McChrystal found, through doing that assessment and traveling all 

over the country and looking at the situation, was, as you just 

cited, that the situation was serious and deteriorating. 

We got his report in late August, and, as you know, we’ve had 

this dialogue and effort inside the administration to determine 

what to do on the basis of that assessment. But, fundamentally, 

where the troops have arrived, the situation has stabilized, and in 

some cases gotten better. And what General McChrystal basically 

has said, that to stabilize the other areas, these additional forces 

are necessary. 

And maybe, Admiral Mullen would like to add. 

Senator BOXER. Well, before he does—and I will, of course, turn 

to Admiral Mullen—I just want to put in the record a GAO study 

that shows that, as we added more troops, the violence actually 

escalated. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

36 

Senator BOXER. And this interview by General McChrystal was 

at the very end of September. 

So, Admiral, here’s what I’m getting at. You know, I voted, with 

reluctance, because I believed more troops would help our situation. We added the troops. The violence got worse. 

Now we’re being told we should add more troops. And I guess 

what I’m asking you is, How can we now leap to the conclusion 

that more troops will mean less violence, when the opposite seems 

to have occurred? 

Admiral MULLEN. Ma’am, General McChrystal’s assessment— 

and I agree with the Secretary of Defense, that it really was the 

first thorough, comprehensive assessment that I’ve seen from a 

commander, one. Two is, we’ve talked about underresourcing this 

campaign, for a long time, for a good 4 or 5 years, seen the insurgency just get worse. Particularly starting in 2006, it’s been very 

evident we couldn’t resource it and get the troops there, because 

of—— 

Senator BOXER. OK. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Our commitments to Iraq. 

Senator BOXER. OK. 

Admiral MULLEN. So, it’s where we found ourselves. And I think 

the strategy that the President laid out in March, significant in 

many ways, focused on the region, not just on Afghanistan— 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, specifically. 

I’ve argued, and certainly it has occurred, many months ago, that 

we need to have a national debate and discussion about this, 

because I think that’s been lacking, because of our focus on what 

was the top priority for all of us, as directed by President Bush. 

So, we’re all learning as we go. I wanted—— 

Senator BOXER. I wanted to follow it up and ask you, as you’re 

explaining this, to consider this information. As I see it—and I 

37 

know this is correct, unless you disagree—that we have, now, 

68,000 American troops on the ground. There’s 36,231 NATO 

troops. That’s 104,231. There’s roughly 94,000 Afghan troops. And 

we won’t count the 93,000 Afghan police, so we’ll leave that aside. 

That’s roughly 200,000 versus 22,000 Taliban and 100 Qaeda. So, 

my concern is—and this is why I interrupted you, just to focus on 

this—it doesn’t seem to me to be a question of the numbers of 

troops. It’s hard to say that 200,000 versus 22,000 is that different 

than 230,000 versus 22,000. It’s the mission. And I guess what I’m 

sort of trying to probe here is, How are we going to change the mission from what President Obama outlined when I gave him my 

vote for the 21,000 troops?—which seems to me the same mission 

he’s talking about now. 

Admiral MULLEN. Three quick thoughts. One is, as we add more 

troops and face this growing insurgency, the level of violence is 

going to go up. It did in Iraq, in the surge; it will do that here, as 

well, and, I want to be very clear, that a very, certainly, tragic part 

of this, so will our casualties. That should not be out of the sight 

of anybody with respect to this over a period of time. But, it is the 

path to, actually, reduced number of casualties and a lower level 

of violence, first of all. 

Second, McChrystal has changed the focus specifically to focus on 

the key population centers. Secretary Clinton talked about reducing the number of civilian casualties. Complete change in focus, 

from a leadership perspective. 

Third, he’s changed, dramatically, how we partner with the 

Afghan security forces, which we weren’t doing before. We were 

mentoring them, training them. Now we’re in the field with them, 

planning, living, fighting, et cetera. 

So, those are fundamental shifts to get at achieving the success 

that I think is possible with these additional forces. 

Senator BOXER. OK. I really appreciate—that’s the best argument I’ve heard, but I still have tremendous doubts about the numbers. I just think the objectives you’ve outlined we ought to try to 

accomplish—with the numbers that are there. 

Last question has to do with our forces, who are incredibly 

stressed. I know, Secretary Gates—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, Senator—— 

Senator BOXER. This is the last question. Divorce is up, suicide’s 

up, and psychological wounds are on the rise. So, my quick question is—we know some of our men and women have been deployed 

six or seven times. Are you confident, Secretary Gates, that we’re 

no longer deploying servicemembers who are currently struggling 

with significant mental health problems from their prior tours? 

Secretary GATES. I think the only thing I can say in response to 

that is, we are making every effort not do that. We have put in 

place some very intensive screening processes. We have hired an 

enormous number of mental health care providers. We are trying 

to do everything we can to identify those who have problems, to 

encourage those who have problems to come forward and get treatment. The Army leadership, in particular, has been very aggressive 

in this area. Can I say with certainty that we’re not deploying 

somebody who has severe problems? No. But, I can tell you we’re 

making every effort to avoid doing so. 

38 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for coming here today and helping and being 

engaged in this national dialogue on this important issue that we 

really need to do. I view this, really, not as a Republican problem 

or a Democrat problem; this is an American problem. After all, we 

were all Americans before we were Republicans or Democrats. And 

as polarized as this country is politically, this is an issue that we 

really, really all need to pull together on. And I appreciate you 

coming here and engaging in this conversation. 

Regarding the President’s recent announcement on strategy, I 

think that obviously he had choices, as the Commander in Chief. 

And I think anyone who knows anything about this issue has to 

be—has to have empathy for what he went through in making this 

decision. 

This is a problem that one could characterize only as a Rubik’s 

Cube on steroids. I mean, it is—it has so many facets, it’s—it is difficult to wrestle with. And the conclusion one reaches quickly is 

that there are no good choices, there are only choices to be made 

that would be in the best interests of the American people. 

Secretary Clinton observed that we don’t hear much about 

positives from there. And that is true. And obviously, the media is 

much more interested in the negative than the positive. But, you 

know, our objective, when we went into Afghanistan—and I think 

everyone would agree with this—was to get al-Qaeda, to stop 

al-Qaeda, to squelch al-Qaeda. And that objective really has been 

met. We have run al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the 

Taliban remain. And that—the relationship that Secretary Clinton 

described between al-Qaeda and the Taliban complicates the issue 

tremendously. 

And the difficulty that we hear, of course, is that al-Qaeda has 

now migrated into western Pakistan, and there is a slow drip, if 

you would, of those people migrating into Yemen and Somalia, 

which is going to cause us a problem in the future, I would think. 

But, in any event, I think that’s a positive that we should look 

at, and the fact that we have driven al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan, 

but we have to remain—we have to deal with what’s left over. 

This is a question that I have, hopefully a brief question. As we 

build up now in Afghanistan, as the President has said we’re going 

to do, and you look at what has happened in Iraq, whether you 

agree or disagree with whether we went there—whether we should 

have gone there in the first place or whether the surge was good 

or bad, things seem to be generally better in Iraq today than what 

they’ve been. 

When you went through this exercise, was any consideration 

given to stepping up the drawdown in Iraq as we build up more 

quickly in Afghanistan? That is, did you consider stepping up the 

schedule for withdrawal from Iraq? Could I get a brief answer on 

that? 

Secretary GATES. The answer is ‘‘No.’’ General Odierno has a 

plan, in terms of the drawdown, to get our combat forces out of 

Iraq by the end of August 2010, and all of our forces out by the 

end of 2011. He has found that the conditions, the improved condiVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
39 

tions that you referred to, in Iraq have allowed for the early withdrawal of at least one brigade; but, that was based on the decisions—on the situation in Iraq itself. So, there really—in none of 

our discussions, either in the Pentagon or in the interagency, was 

there a discussion of accelerating the drawdowns in Iraq. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Admiral MULLEN. If I could just add to that. In addition to the 

brigade, General Odierno has been very aware of the requirements 

for some of the key things—smaller forces, enabling forces—that he 

has agreed to transfer into Afghanistan. So, he’s been very supportive of this overall approach, albeit very consistent with what 

the Secretary said, in terms of interagency consideration. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. And I’d encourage that we keep an 

eye on that, and anything that can be done to accelerate that, I 

think would be beneficial to everyone. 

Secretary Clinton, you articulated, about as well as I’ve heard, 

trying to thread the needle on the business of our commitment. I 

heard you use the word ‘‘commitment.’’ I heard you use the term 

‘‘long haul.’’ And those are at odds with a date. And that’s a difficult needle to thread, because those people have got to be convinced that we do have a commitment, that we’re there for the long 

haul, and yet, we say ‘‘July 2011.’’ Well, you know, we really need 

to be clear on this, because the enemy is going to take their calendar out, they’re going to circle ‘‘July of 2011,’’ and say, ‘‘Well, you 

know, just like America, we are going to reevaluate, at that point, 

whether we’re going to step down until then and gear up at that 

point.’’ 

So, I—and again, I know it’s a difficult needle to thread, because 

the American people, including myself, want to see success, they 

want to see us out of Afghanistan. And yet, at the same time, the 

people there have got to be convinced that somehow we are going 

to protect them if they cooperate with us. 

So, I—and I—with all due respect—and I don’t mean this, 

maybe, the way it’s going to sound, but I heard—Secretary Gates, 

I heard you talk about ‘‘a target’’ yesterday, when you were talking 

about July 2011. And yet, the impression I got from the President 

was, it isn’t a target as much as a hard date for starting to drawdown. And those two things are very difficult to reconcile. So, 

again, I’m being critical, here, without an answer, but that is a difficult needle to thread, but you’re going to have to do it. 

Secretary GATES. Let me just start, briefly, by saying that I 

think, through the course of the questioning yesterday, what I was 

trying to make clear is that the date of July 2011 to begin thinning 

our forces and transitioning the security responsibilities to the 

Afghans is a firm date that the President has established, but the 

pace of that drawdown, the location of the drawdown, and so on, 

will be conditions-based and, to use his words, a responsible drawdown, as we have done in Iraq. But, there should be—as I said in 

my opening statement, and as Secretary Clinton just said a few 

minutes ago, July 2011 is the time that the President has picked 

when we have to begin drawing down. 

Now, let me just reiterate the balancing act that we’ve—the balance that we’ve tried to establish here. We are sending a signal of 

significant, I think, commitment to be successful in Afghanistan, 

40 

with the deployment of these additional forces. But, at the same 

time—and I—and as I said yesterday, one of the things that 

became clear at the end of the surge in Iraq was that the Iraqis 

wanted us out of the country as quickly as possible. That is not 

necessarily the case in Afghanistan. They live in a rough neighborhood, and our sense is, there are a number of Afghans that would 

like to have us hang around, and the United States Army and 

Marine Corps protect them for the indefinite future. 

So, one of the purposes of this date, an important element of this 

date, is to put the Afghans on notice that—and give them a sense 

of urgency that they must begin to accept their responsibility for 

their own security, and it’s going to start then, because—so, they 

have to get their men recruited, get them trained, and get them 

into the field and into combat with us. 

So, it’s a combination of sending a message of commitment, but, 

at the same time, putting the Afghans on notice that the time is 

coming when they are going to have to establish their own security—or, maintain their own security. 

Senator RISCH. I couldn’t agree with you more that the sense of 

urgency really seems to be lacking there, and they need to be—as 

the chairman had said earlier, that they really need to have a 

sense of urgency instilled in them. And they think in terms of centuries, we think in terms of months, so it’s a difficult proposition. 

Thank you very much. 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, could I just add one comment to that? 

I mean, this date has also been described as arbitrary. It’s not arbitrary at all. On the military side, we feel that that timeframe, 

between roughly July 2009, when the Marines arrive in Helmand, 

and into July 2011, we will know whether we’re going to be successful or not. And so—and thinking that this is the—believing this 

is the right strategy and that we will be successful, we think that 

time of beginning the transfer of security responsibility and the 

transition is the right time. And then, again, that—responsibly and 

based on conditions. But, it was not an arbitrary date. It is the 

third year—third summer, if you will, that the Marines will be in 

Helmand, and we will have a clear indication from three seasons, 

if you will, at the heart of the fighting season there, that—which 

way this is going. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Admiral. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Thank you all for your service to our country. I think we’re all— 

a debt of gratitude, especially at a most difficult time. 

You know, Admiral Mullen, I heard you say that the underresourcing of our engagement in Afghanistan over the last 4 or 5 

years has brought us to where we are today. So, that, to me, means 

that our adventure in Iraq has created a set of circumstances 

where we have underresourced our efforts in Afghanistan. Is that 

a fair comment? 

Admiral MULLEN. The—as I indicated, I think, in my previous 

comments, clearly the priority and the direction I had, both as 

chairman and as the chief of a service, was to resource Iraq. And 

we were balancing deployments, balancing time at home, and 

we—— 

41 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you did not—— 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Could not resource Afghanistan. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you couldn’t resource Iraq and resource 

Afghanistan as you needed to. 

Admiral MULLEN. That’s correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, I look at this July 2011 date, and I see 

it as clearly aspirational. And I think we need to be honest with 

the American people. Can any of you tell me that, after July 2011, 

that we won’t have tens of thousands of troops years after that 

date? 

Secretary GATES. I think that the President, and we, have been 

clear that July 2011 is the beginning of a process of drawing down 

in Afghanistan. That process will be based on the conditions on the 

ground. But, it—you know, the President is very—I think I can 

speak for him, and Secretary Clinton can correct me if I get it 

wrong—the President, throughout this process, was very concerned 

about an open-ended conflict, of just unending commitment of significant numbers of troops and dollars in this. And so, I think that, 

you know, he has not put deadlines, in terms of when our troops 

will all be out, but clearly he sees the—July 2011, as I said in my 

opening statement, an inflection point where we begin to draw 

down those forces in Afghanistan, and with a view to transferring 

this responsibility to the Afghans over a period of probably 2 or 3 

years. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that, and you’ve 

reiterated it several times. Let me go back to my question. 

Can any of you tell this committee that, in fact, after July 2011, 

we won’t have tens of thousands of troops for years after that date? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I can tell you what the intention is. And the intention is—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. But, you—I don’t—Madam Secretary, I don’t 

want to hear what the intention is. I want to know, Can you tell 

the committee that there won’t be tens of thousands of troops after 

July 2011, for years after that? It’s unlikely, right? It’s—— 

Secretary CLINTON. No, I—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Unlikely. 

Secretary CLINTON. I can only answer the way that I am comfortable in giving you the best information available at the moment, 

and that is that there is a convergence of opinion between us and 

President Karzai in his second term. In his inaugural address, he 

said he wanted the responsibility, and would be prepared for the 

responsibility within 3 years, for Afghan control over many important parts of the country—right now, about 60 percent of the country is not contested—and within 5 years, the Afghans would be 

responsible for their entire security. 

So, that is his aspiration. It happens to be very much in line with 

what we want to see happen. There will be, starting in July 2011, 

troops withdrawn, based on conditions. Sitting here today, I would 

believe that we will be able to start the transition, as planned, in 

2011. We also know that there will be, probably for the foreseeable 

future, a drawdown and transfer out of combat troops, but a 

request for continuing logistical support for the Afghan security 

force. 

42 

So, you know, that is the kind of, you know, target that we’re 

aiming at. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Admiral Mullen, is it true that right now the 

Afghan Army only has about 10,000 soldiers that can operate without us being alongside them? 

Admiral MULLEN. That’s a—it is a small percentage, yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, what we are talking about is a massive 

increase that we seek in the Afghan army, which presents a 

daunting obstacle, considering the fact that finding sufficient literate recruits, and reversing what is an abysmal retention rate, is 

a huge challenge. Something we haven’t done in 8 years, we’re 

going to do in 18 months. And a large national army also requires 

a strong and capable central government to command it, and 

clearly a permanent foreign subsidy. 

So, when I hear these dates, I believe that they are as solid as 

quicksand and, at best aspirational. And I appreciate the aspiration, but the reality is, as someone who has to cast a vote for that 

money that will be coming forth, I can’t tell the people of New Jersey, or this country, that we are doing that clearly on aspirations. 

I think we need to be a lot more honest about our assessments. 

You know, I see—this is putting a lot of eggs in President 

Karzai, who has been there since 2001, first as a transitional President, and then as an elected President. And what has he presided 

over? He’s presided over massive corruption, where, you know, anywhere between 20 or 40 percent seems to be the going rate of skimming off of the taxpayers’ money; where members of his family and 

members of certain ministers’ families ultimately seem to do very 

well in business transactions, they travel to some of the best places 

in the world, they have bank accounts overseas, outside Afghanistan—and we want to say that we’re really going to condition 

them? I’d like to see us condition their travel and their bank 

accounts to make sure that we’re not going to see the continued 

corruption. That’s a serious effort to have some type of control and 

say that we’re not having a blank check. 

You know, I look at President Karzai, when he makes his speech 

about ‘‘my brother Taliban’’—well, maybe there will be a day of reconciliation, but first you’ve got to fight the Taliban before you get 

to the point of reconciliation, so that they understand there is a 

need for reconciliation. 

And so, it worries me that a lot of what we’re putting our eggs 

in, here, is someone who doesn’t even speak in the terms of fighting 

the enemy, and an Afghan police that is so rife with corruption and 

is cooperating with the Taliban. 

And then, I look at the disadvantage of having Karzai there if 

our national security is as you’ve defined it, as creating stability 

and creating an opportunity for the Afghan Government to ultimately have the space and the time to fulfill what is ultimately 

nation-building, we still will have the security issue as a concern 

if Karzai doesn’t perform, 18 months from now. We still will have 

that security issue. 

So, as you’ve defined our national security interests, whether 

Karzai performs or not, we will be stuck in that set of circumstances. And that’s a real problem. 

43 

I don’t get a sense we have a clear civilian counterpart. Even 

General McChrystal says, ‘‘Who is my civilian counterpart?’’ And do 

we really believe that 974 civilian personnel versus 100,000 troops 

is going to meet the civilian aspect of this? 

And finally, I get no sense that we have a Pakistan strategy. We 

have been talking about offering them a strategic relationship. 

They don’t seem to want a strategic relationship. They want the 

money, they want the equipment, but, at the end of the day, they 

don’t want a relationship that costs them too much. And it seems 

to me, the more we build up our troops in Afghanistan, the more 

reliant we become on the Pakistanis in a variety of ways. 

So, I just don’t get the sense, at this point in time, of a comprehensive policy that says that I should vote for billions of dollars 

more to send our sons and daughters in harm’s way in a way that 

we will ultimately succeed in our national security goals. I hope I 

can be convinced before that vote comes, but, as of right now, I’m 

not. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Do you want to convince him right 

now? [Laughter.] 

Secretary CLINTON. I’ll wait and do that, Mr. Chairman. We’ll 

bring in more reinforcements. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I—first of all, thank you to all of the witnesses for your service 

and commitment to the country. I know the last thing you want to 

talk about is July 2011, but I do want to try and focus on something. 

I’ve been very impressed, quite frankly, with what all of you said 

yesterday, in Armed Services and what you’ve said today. Admiral 

Mullen, I saw you this morning on FOX—with regard to this July 

2011 date. Secretary Clinton, and I quote, said in her speech, ‘‘Just 

as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account the conditions on the ground.’’ You have 

said today, Secretary Gates, that the goal is to ‘‘clear, hold, build, 

and transfer,’’ which is what we did in Iraq. We transferred authority; now the Iraqis are in control, and I think that’s the goal all 

of us want in Afghanistan. 

The problem on the July 2011 date is the concern a lot of people 

have that there’s one constituency we’re not talking to yet. We’re 

talking to the American people, who want to win and come home. 

That’s what they want to do. We’re talking to the Afghans and 

President Karzai about taking responsibility for their own country. 

‘‘The United States is not going to be your surrogate army, and 

we’re not going to stay forever.’’ And that’s important. But, alQaeda and the Taliban are the other constituency, and this July 

2011 date, if they interpret it as an end game for us, gives them 

some opportunity. So, I think statements like what you said, Secretary Clinton, about being determined by the outcome on the 

ground and the circumstances on the ground, and Admiral Mullen, 

you’ve been quite clear, and Secretary Gates, you said yesterday 

that the President has the—can change his mind anytime he wants 

to, based on the circumstances that take place. 

44 

I’m not asking a question, but I’m going to tell you why the confusion still exists with some of us who are scared about sending the 

wrong signal. White House Press Secretary Gibbs, this morning, 

according to an article by Chip Reid of CBS News, in responding 

to a question about the July 2011 date, said the following, and I 

quote, ‘‘The President told me it is locked in, there’s no flexibility, 

troops will start coming home July 2011, period. It’s etched in 

stone. Gibbs said he even had the chisel.’’ That type of statement 

is not helpful to that constituency, being al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 

who don’t need to be encouraged that there’s a tolerance level 

beyond which we won’t go in this battle, because each of you said 

that this is the epicenter of Islamic terrorism. I believe that too. 

The intelligence that all of us have seen is that way. And as we 

speak to our constituencies, the Americans and the Afghans, we’ve 

got to also understand that we’re talking to the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda, and our resolve has to be there or the commitment we’re 

making to these troops is not going to have the force behind it that 

it needs to have. 

So, I’m not asking you a question. I don’t want to put you 

between Mr. Gibbs and yourselves and your excellent testimony 

today, but that is the open question that, to me, has to be dealt 

with in delivering the message. And I won’t ask any of you to have 

to respond to that, but I think it’s important. 

Two questions from me. On the Taliban and al-Qaeda, have we— 

are we tracking their source of arms? Do we know where they’re 

getting their arms? You had referred, Admiral Mullen, to the skill 

level of the encounters we had had most recently with them, which 

tells me they have both the equipment and the leadership that 

they can fight a pretty doggone good battle. Where are they getting 

this from? Is it coming from Iran? Is it coming out of Pakistan? Is 

it a combination? Do we know? 

Admiral MULLEN. The, probably, most significant threat that we 

see for our people is the IED network, that is growing in Afghanistan. And actually, an awful lot of that’s homegrown. It’s—there’s 

not a lot coming in from the outside. Rather than specific arms, 

certainly financing, we’re trying to pay attention to that, where 

they’re getting their finances from. Some of it’s coming from the 

opium piece, some of it’s coming from the gulf, some of it’s coming 

from the fact that they tax like crazy; you know, they tax all the 

locals. So, trying to impact that—and actually, we’ve put people in 

place to focus on this specifically in Afghanistan. 

So, from that standpoint, those are the focus areas, rather than 

the individual weapons. At least it’s my experience in that part of 

the world, you don’t run into anybody that doesn’t have a weapon. 

It’s a question of who they’re going to use it against. It—so, from 

that standpoint, we’re hard after that. 

Secretary GATES. Let me give you an example on the IEDs. The 

most devastating IEDs that are being used against our troops and 

against our MRAPs and so on, is based on ammonium nitrate, a 

fertilizer. It’s illegal to have that fertilizer in Afghanistan, so 

there’s clearly a smuggling network that is bringing in huge quantities of these. One of the IEDs that went off under one of our 

MRAPs and blew it in half was 1,500 pounds of this ammonium 

nitrate. And what they do is, basically, use as a triggering device 

45 

mines that are left over from the Soviet era. So, there’s a lot of 

stuff left over from a period when, frankly, some of us were involved in shipping a lot of arms into Afghanistan. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for that answer. 

Secretary Gates, you and Secretary Clinton both. Secretary Clinton, I have your statement here about Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

you said, ‘‘We’ll develop a long-term sustainable relationship with 

Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes 

of the past.’’ And I think, in your testimony, you refer to the mistakes of the past. Is that in the context of inconsistent engagement 

with Pakistan? Is that the mistake you were referring to? 

Secretary GATES. I think that the—it was really turning our 

backs on both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistanis—and it 

goes to a question that was asked earlier. I mean, the truth is, 

there is a great deal of mistrust on the part of the Pakistanis 

toward us. They believe we have abandoned them, or betrayed 

them, on several different occasions, only the most recent of which 

was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. And so, we have a lot of 

work to do in trying to convince them that we’re not trying to take 

over their country, that we’re not trying to take control of their nuclear weapons, and that we are actually interested in a long-term 

partnership with them. But, it is because—and I was Deputy 

National Security Advisor and then DCI at the time—you know, we 

were dealing with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of eastern Europe. I mean, it wasn’t where we were twiddling 

our fingers—twiddling our thumbs at the time, but the fact 

remains, the United States turned its back on Afghanistan. 

And the irony is—and I was talking to the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee about this yesterday—the irony is that Charlie Wilson, 

over there, who was so successful in getting money for CIA and— 

to give to the mujahideen, the weapons to beat the Soviets, after 

the Soviets left, tried to get money for the civil side on Afghanistan, and, where he was able to get hundreds of millions for the 

weapons, couldn’t get very small amounts to try and build schools 

and so on. So, that was the mistake, in both countries. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. Thank you again for 

your service to the country and your patience with the committee 

today. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to echo my sincere appreciation to all three of you for 

your service to our country. I have the greatest confidence in your 

abilities and your commitment, and I thank you for that. I know 

you’re doing your best and that you’re working together as a team. 

Secretary Gates, you pointed out that this is part of a coordinated strategy to deal with the epicenter of terrorism, which is in 

the Afghan-Pakistan border areas. I want to raise one other issue. 

You talked about external forces that are supporting the terrorist 

organizations and the recruitment strategies. Well, one of the strategies I thought the administration was pursuing was the closing of 

Guantanamo Bay, not only because it wasn’t effective in what we 

are trying to accomplish, but also that it was a recruitment symbol 

46 

for terrorist organizations. We’ve fallen behind on that. Can 

you just comment briefly on whether we are still committed and 

how important that is as part of our strategies on dealing with 

terrorists? 

Secretary GATES. We very much are committed to closing Guantanamo. We have very detailed plans on how to do that. We are, 

I think, in the final stages of selecting a facility, and we are, at the 

same time, in the process of identifying detainees that we believe 

can be transferred to other countries. I think there are about 215 

detainees left; we’ve identified, I think, 116, at this point, that we 

think can be transferred. 

The President has every intention of doing this, and we will do 

it. The logistics—the—principally, the logistics of it have proved 

more complicated than—— 

Senator CARDIN. How important is this—— 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. We anticipated, but I think we’re 

about there. 

Senator CARDIN. How important is this in regards to our strategies against terrorism? 

Secretary GATES. Well, one of the reasons why I articulated the 

opinion that we should close Guantanamo not long after I got this 

job, in—at the end of 2006, is because I—you know, the irony is, 

Guantanamo is probably the best prison in the world today—elliptical trainers, reading rooms, flat-screen TVs—and probably the 

most highly disciplined guard force in the world. But, it has a legacy. And what I said 3 years ago is, it bears a taint, and it is a 

recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and for other terrorists and Islamic 

extremists. So, I think that there is unanimity in the administration that we need to get this done, and, as soon as we can finalize 

the logistics, I think you’ll see pretty quick progress after that. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me say from the outset that I am unconvinced on the need for the additional troops. I have concerns 

about committing more Americans to this effort. 

First, let me get the number. The President has authorized 

30,000, but, as I understand it, that number could be more than 

30,000 when you talk about the backup support troops. 

Secretary GATES. During our discussions, one of the things that 

has—that I’ve tried to make clear consistently is that when you’re 

looking ahead, it is impossible to foresee every need. And where I 

do not—where I have asked the President for some flexibility is in 

medics, in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, in counter-IED capabilities—in short—road clearance, engineers—those 

things associated with safeguarding the lives of our troops. And I 

have asked him for a modest amount of flexibility on that. And it’s 

in the range of about 10 percent of the 30,000. My hope is that I 

won’t need to use much, if any, of it, but trying to look ahead a 

year or more, I felt that having some flexibility was important, particularly in terms of safeguarding our troops. 

Senator CARDIN. I understand that. So, we are really looking at, 

potentially, 33,000 additional troops. 

Secretary GATES. Potentially. 

Senator CARDIN. OK. Just so we get the number right. 

Now, with adding more troops, we raise the stakes. I want to 

talk about the benchmarks. You say the circumstances on the 

47 

ground will dictate the withdrawal, the standdown of troops in July 

2011. We have benchmarks that are currently being developed for 

Afghanistan. I would like to hear more specifics as to what would 

be the circumstances on the ground that would affect your recommendation on troop levels starting in July. Are we talking about 

the performance of the Afghan Government? Is that part of what 

we’re looking at, with how they control the security of their country? Are we looking at the number of military that they have ready 

to stand up? Are we looking at the cooperation we’ve received from 

the international community as part of this? Are we looking at the 

activities of the Taliban, and specifically how much of the nation 

they control, or how many al-Qaeda are actually in Afghanistan? 

What—and I hope you can be specific—what are we looking for as 

far as the circumstances on the ground, so that Congress can at 

least carry out our responsibility in evaluating this request? Do we 

know what we’re looking at 18 months from now, what expectations we can expect? And can you be specific on this? Any one of 

you. 

Admiral MULLEN. Two of the highest-risk areas from my perspective with respect to this strategy. One is Karzai and his government. And I mean that down to the subdistrict level, not just in 

Kabul. And the other is the development of the Afghan security 

forces. And we’ve set annual targets, year-to-year targets for that 

development, some of the reasons that have already been discussed 

here. 

But, with respect to the Karzai government, specifics: good ministers; good governors; anticorruption; local governance; is the 

money actually going to the people; are goods and services getting 

to the people in the villages; reintegration; reconciliation. ANSF, 

the annual targets that I talked about specifically, we’ve got to reduce the attrition rate, increase the retention rate, specifically; and 

then, they will transition to more security forces in the lead. Corruption, in particular, in the police—on the police side, which has 

been mentioned. International support. We expect offers. We need 

to see those and actually what they’re doing on the ground, not just 

military, but civilian, as well. There are noncontributing nations— 

Japan being one, recently contributing—agreed to contribute up 

to—or, $5 billion to Afghanistan. 

Pakistan, shifting their strategic calculus. Do we see that happening? Because we’ve got to work with them to get at these safe 

havens for al-Qaeda. 

So, those are some of the—at the major level—— 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I would hope we could be more specific. 

Let me just challenge you on one criteria—the corruption of the 

Karzai government, which has been well documented. Does our 

strategy mean that if progress is not made, we reduce our troop 

levels quicker; or if progress is made, we keep more troops there? 

How does that translate to U.S. troops being in theater? Is it a 

positive sign for removing troops or a negative sign? Corruption. 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, what we’re looking for is capacity 

and effectiveness. We believe that corruption is one of the reasons 

why the Karzai government has not developed the capacity it 

needs, nor has it been effective enough. 

48 

I mean, I don’t want anybody to think that we’re trying to aim 

toward some zero-corruption standard in Afghanistan. I mean, that 

doesn’t exist anywhere in the world, and particularly in that part 

of the world. But, what we do expect to see is a government that 

delivers more for the people, thereby obtaining the allegiance of 

more people in more parts of the country, that can support the 

effective ministers and the effective governors, especially where we 

need them. We each have experiences with different ministries that 

we think are quite competent and very professional—you know, the 

Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry—increasingly, the Finance 

and the Education and the Agriculture Ministry. 

You know, I didn’t have time to respond to Senator Menendez at 

the length and with the thoroughness that his long litany deserves, 

but this is not all a negative picture. And I think it’s unfair—it’s 

unfair to our efforts, it’s unfair to the efforts of many people inside 

the Afghanistan Government who are truly making a positive difference in the performance that we would expect from a functioning 

government. We have to do a better job, in the international side, 

to coordinate our aid, to get more accountability for what we spend 

in Afghanistan. But, much of the corruption is fueled by the money 

that has poured into that country over the last 8 years, and it is 

corruption at every step along the way, not just in the palace, in 

Kabul. You know, when we are so dependent upon long supply 

lines, as we are in Afghanistan, where everything has to be 

imported, it’s much more difficult than it was in Iraq, where we 

had Kuwait as a staging ground to go into Iraq. You offload a ship 

in Karachi, and by the time whatever it is—you know, muffins for 

our soldiers’ breakfasts or anti-IED equipment—gets to where 

we’re headed, it goes through a lot of hands. And one of the major 

sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money. That 

has nothing to do with President Karzai. 

So, I think we need a—we owe you a more careful unpacking of 

a lot of the concerns, and we will endeavor to provide that. 

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I’d like to welcome all three of you again after our brief 

exchange yesterday. It’s been interesting to hear how different 

committees approach the same situation. Welcome to the Foreign 

Relations Committee. 

I would like to say, first of all, that I think we have pretty broad 

agreement about the concerns that we are facing in Afghanistan. 

I mean, even among members who have been pretty vocal here 

today, the question really is to continue to examine the process 

that we are proposing in order to address those questions. And I 

think there have been some really excellent points made today by 

Senator Feingold, who talked about a concern that I’ve had for a 

number of years here, that we are losing our maneuverability. We 

did it in Iraq. We are in danger of, to a certain extent, losing it 

in Afghanistan as we face a threat to this country that has a high 

degree of mobility. And Senator Corker, I think, has made some 

really valid points. And you’ve heard, again and again, this quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
49 

tion about timeline versus concept. And I’m going to mention something on that again. 

But, before I do, I want to just—Secretary Gates, I want to give 

you my view on something that you said, just to clarify my view 

for the record, when you said that, in your view, a lot of Afghanistans don’t want us to leave, and that being one of the motivations 

behind putting some sort of a date on the beginning of the leaving 

process, I would say perhaps that’s more true among people who 

are in the government than it is Afghanis, writ large. I would comment, there’s an Asia Foundation survey, this year, which shows 

that 56 percent of those surveyed were sympathetic to antigovernment groups that used violence against us. And this is a country, 

as I mentioned yesterday, that has a long history of opposing any 

sort of foreign occupation. So, that’s the other side of this. 

And I think there’s some legitimacy in the concern that Senator 

Boxer mentioned, with level of violence that might be engendered 

by military presence in areas where there’s a perception of occupation. And we discussed that yesterday. I won’t go in it again today. 

But, I’d just like to lay out three basic thoughts here. One is, if 

we’re talking about a stable, supportive Afghanistan, which is 

something that came up in testimony, it’s very difficult—particularly if we’re talking about being there long term, as, Secretary 

Clinton, you’ve mentioned—it’s very difficult to do that without a 

stable, viable government of some sort. And I’m curious—and I’ve 

mentioned this a number of times before—about the process 

through which this government was formed. The constitution that 

formed this government, as a result of the Bonn Agreements, 

which, on paper, created a centralized system and there might be 

an adjustment needed, constitutionally or otherwise, that devolves 

some sort of power if, realistically, we’re going to look at a stability 

in the provinces and above. 

And the second is, you can’t grow a national army of 400,000, 

including national police, without people who are willing to support 

that concept. And we’re having a very difficult time in growing 

that. And I’ve not heard anything from the President, through yesterday to today—and, Admiral Mullen, I’d like your thoughts on 

this—with respect to where we are, in terms of meeting the goals 

that we announced, in terms of growing that national army. 

And then, third, you can’t really talk about this timeline. This is 

probably one of the greatest difficulties of the way that this has 

been presented. It’s very difficult to talk about a timeline for withdrawal without clearly laying out, in an affirmative way, what the 

conditions on the ground will be that will enable this process to 

begin. And we haven’t really heard in these exchanges, from yesterday and today. What is this going to look like—not necessarily specifically, province by province, but what is this environment going 

to look like when this turnover can occur? 

So, those are the three questions that I would have. And, Secretary Clinton, I’d very much like to hear your views on the nature 

of this government and how we can operate there long term without addressing some way to perhaps change the constitution. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I’ll take No. 1; I think that 

maybe Admiral Mullen can take No. 2, and Secretary Gates can, 

you know, be our cleanup hitter. 

50 

I think you raise a very profoundly important question, and it’s 

something that I began discussing with President Karzai during 

my last visit. There has to be the decentralization of the—of government functions and authority that reflects the way the country 

actually operates. I think this has to be undertaken in a very clear 

process headed by—motivated by the interests of the Afghans 

themselves. 

I think the Bonn constitution, which was a credible effort, you 

know, made a number of assumptions that were at variance with 

both the past and the current reality within Afghanistan. 

So, this is a—this does seem to be a conversation that President 

Karzai is willing to engage in. There are certain redlines for him, 

as there would be for any President of a sovereign country. But, he 

was very open to it. Looking for ways to bring in some of the traditional decisionmaking processes, like the loya jirga, and make it a 

part of an ongoing governmental authority—there’s a lot there that 

we should be looking at. And so, I think your suggestion is one that 

we will be talking to him further about. 

And just, finally, I think, too, that the way that the government 

currently functions is something that could not necessarily have 

been predicted 8 years ago at Bonn, but—— 

Senator WEBB. I would strongly agree with you on that, by the 

way. I think, in the context of 2001, it was an accomplishment to 

have achieved this constitution. 

Secretary CLINTON. That’s right. And so, now I think it is time 

to take stock, and there are many different ideas being discussed, 

and what we need is to make this an Afghan process—I just want 

to reiterate and close with this—the last thing in the world we 

want is a bunch of international experts flying in to Kabul to tell 

the government and the people of Afghanistan, ‘‘Here’s how you 

must, you know, construct your government.’’ But, let’s work together to get the lessons that have been learned, and then try to 

translate that. 

Senator WEBB. The challenge would be for Karzai to understand 

that, in the long run, that would be in his self-interest, I would say. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, not only that, it would be in the interest of his legacy. 

Senator WEBB. And it’s in the interest of the Afghan people. Yes. 

Secretary CLINTON. You know, one of the—one of—I mean, one 

of the things that President Karzai has said to me is that, you 

know, his family—his family has fought for Afghanistan for 300 

years. I mean, he carries that sense of patriotism very close to his 

heart. Now, we may have different views about how he sees his 

role and how he’s conducted it, but I think it is a serious mistake 

not to put yourself into the shoes of the other person and to actually listen and understand how they see the reality they inhabit. 

And so, that’s, you know, part of what we’re trying to get better 

than it’s been over the last several years. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Admiral MULLEN. ANSF, just quickly, Senator Webb, we’re at 

about—on the army side, about 96,000 right now. That said, we’re 

sort of in the 55,000 to 60,000 that actually are out there in the 

field. So, we’ve got to work on the overhead aspect of this. 

51 

One of the real fundamental changes that McChrystal’s put in 

place is the partnership piece. So, I mean, we have company, platoon, squad-sized units out, you know—— 

Senator WEBB. In terms of growing the size of the Afghan—— 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that’s a—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. National—— 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. That’s a—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Military, where are we from where 

the goals would have been at this point? Are you on target, in 

terms of growing the actual size of the—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I think that—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. National army? 

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, the targets just recently, you know, 

got reset by McChrystal, so we’re 96,000 in the army right now, we 

need to be at 134 about 12 months from now, by next—— 

Senator WEBB. Right. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. September, roughly. And that 

kind of increase each year, to build to whatever the eventual outcome is, aspirationally, notionally, 400,000 between both the army 

and the police, specifically. But, our—we’ve got to reduce the retention—or, we’ve got to increase retention significantly, reduce the 

attrition, and increase recruiting. 

One of the things is just incentives. I mean, the Taliban make 

a lot more money than the national security forces right now. So, 

General McChrystal is, as we speak, increasing the pay fairly significantly for the security forces, which we think will have an 

impact. 

So, we think we understand what the specifics are, what we need 

to do, and—but, it’s really about, now, executing that, and we don’t 

underestimate, particularly on the police side, the significance of 

the challenge and the risks that are associated with that. 

In the end, they’re the ones that are going to provide the local 

security, they’re the ones that are going to be able to ‘‘hold’’ and 

on which to ‘‘build’’ in the long run, and we know that. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that—we’re going to run up 

against a timeframe here—there’s going to be a vote, I think, somewhere in the next 10 or 15 minutes—— 

Senator WEBB. All right, well, let me just—in terms of the third 

question, it’s been discussed a good bit, so I will just leave it as an 

observation so we can move the hearing on and—thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

And, in addition to that, Secretary Gates, I know, has to leave 

at noon, sharp. And Secretary Clinton needs to leave for Brussels. 

So, we do want to try to wrap it up, if we can. 

Admiral MULLEN. I’d be—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I know that we need—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Chairman, I’d be glad—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’d prefer to have a second round—— 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. I’d be glad to stay. I’m kidding. 

[Laughter.] 

I’m going with my boss. [Laughter.] 

52 

The CHAIRMAN. We would love to have had a second round, but 

this will be an ongoing conversation. I think we’ll have some 

chances—maybe even get the committee together for a good conversation rather than just a hearing. And, I think if you’re willing 

to do that, I think it would be very helpful, at some point in time. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by thanking each of you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And I can’t tell you—I don’t know why we have 

a hurricane above us here today. I apologize for—— 

Secretary GATES. We thought it was a Senate bowling alley. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be news to me, I don’t know. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I want to applaud each of you and the President and everybody who’s been involved in the very thorough 

review of what our strategy should be in Afghanistan. 

New Hampshire is, this week, sending another 140 National 

Guard members over to Afghanistan. And, as you pointed out, Secretary Clinton, these are mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, 

and we owe them, and all of the men and women serving there, a 

mission that they can understand and support. And I think it’s 

appropriate, also, that we continue to have a rigorous debate in 

Congress and in the Senate about what we’re going to do. So, 

thank you all for that. 

There have been a number of mentions about the importance and 

the potential for reconciling certain Taliban elements, and the 

importance of that to the success of what happens in Afghanistan. 

Have any of those overtures begun? And who do we see is going 

to do those kinds of negotiations? How do we envision that 

happening? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, we have tried to, in our discussions, 

differentiate between reconciliation and reintegration. It may seem 

like a semantic point, but we consider reconciliation to be, What 

opportunities are there with Taliban leaders to bring them over 

and along with the people who are fighting for them? 

I think the general view is that, until the momentum shifts 

against the Taliban, the likelihood of significant reconciliation, in 

those terms, is not very bright. So, that’s part of changing the 

momentum, is beginning to get these guys to think differently 

about the future. 

With respect to reintegration, this is really about getting the foot 

soldiers to decide that they don’t want to be a part of the Taliban 

anymore. And we have some very limited anecdotal information 

about people deciding they didn’t want to fight for the Taliban anymore, and going back to their villages. The key here—and we think 

that there is some significant percentage of these foot soldiers who 

actually are doing this for pay or who have been intimidated into 

doing it. So, if we can provide economic opportunities, or the international organizations, or whoever, or our efforts on agriculture 

can create more opportunities for them to earn a salary—but, the 

security piece is absolutely central, because there are also too many 

stories of people who have wanted to quit the Taliban who not only, 

themselves, have been killed, but all of their family have been 

killed. And so, the security environment in a village or in a district 

53 

has to be such that these people who want to put down their guns 

and pick up a plow can do so without the fear that they and their 

entire families will be massacred. 

And again, this is a matter of establishing the security, but it’s 

also a sense of—Secretary Clinton referred, earlier, to more of a 

hedging on the part of the Afghans because of their uncertainty of 

who’s going to win, because the winners—if the winners are the 

other side, and they’ve picked our side, they will be killed. And so, 

they are waiting to see where the momentum is shifting. And, 

frankly, it’s this shift of momentum that we think is important and 

that is a fundamental purpose behind this surge of troops to push 

that Taliban back and to create an environment in which these 

people, as they look at this situation to decide which way they 

want to go, go our way, go the way of the Afghan Government. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Secretary Clinton, I know you’re on your way to a NATO meeting, and I had the opportunity, a couple of weeks ago with Secretary Gates, to be part of the first of a forum on global security 

with a number of our NATO allies, and was on a panel with the 

German Defense Minister, and was impressed with his willingness 

to look at Germany’s role in their NATO mission, and just wondered what message you’re going to take to our NATO allies to 

encourage them to talk to their publics about the importance of the 

mission in Afghanistan. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, we have been reaching out 

vigorously to our counterparts. Certainly, the President has spoken 

with a number of heads of state, the Vice President, Secretary 

Gates, myself, National Security Advisor Jones. And we’ve gotten 

a very encouraging response. 

Secretary General Rasmussen, at NATO, has been very positive 

about the President’s decision, and has carried that message to 

capitals across Europe. And I think that, as the weeks ahead 

unfold, there will be significant announcements of additional 

troops. Our hope is that the aggregate of the troop announcements 

will be between 5,000 and 7,000. That would give us a lot more leeway in many of the parts of the country that we want to continue 

to make sure are secure. It would help with the performance of certain functions, as well as the important role of training the police 

and the army. 

So, we are encouraged. There will also be an international meeting, at the request of Prime Minister Brown and Chancellor Merkel 

at the end of January, which is a very important event for a lot 

of our NATO ISAF allies. So, I think that, you know, we will see, 

in real terms, the delivery on the rhetorical support that the President’s decision has engendered. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And will your discussions also include better 

coordination of the different NATO forces who are in Afghanistan? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, that certainly is a conversation that we 

are in the midst of. I held a meeting, when I was in Kabul, with 

about a dozen of the NATO ISAF Foreign Ministers who were there 

for the inauguration, and one of the points that I stressed is how 

we have to do a better coordinating our civilian aid, how we would 

like to see a civilian counterpart to General McChrystal, who is the 

commander of the NATO ISAF forces. Not all the ISAF members, 

54 

as you know, are in NATO, so trying to structure this the right 

way is challenging, but there’s a great and growing understanding 

of why we need to do a better job with all of the partners, NATO 

ISAF, the United Nations. Obviously, the United States believes 

that we have to play a major role in this because of the burdens 

that we have assumed, but we want the international support, as 

well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. And I’m out of time, but I just 

wanted to urge followup on what we heard from Senators Webb 

and Cardin, that the measures of how we’re going to determine our 

success over the next 18 to 24 months, I think, will be very important to make sure that we understand, and that the public understands, what we’re looking at that shows us that we’re being 

successful. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I want to thank Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and 

Admiral Mullen for at least two things—your public service at this 

time in our Nation’s history, as well as the review, that you just 

conducted along with the President, which was both thorough and 

essential, contrary to some of the commentary around Washington. 

I wanted to return to a topic that I know some have explored to 

some degree already, and that’s President Karzai and his government. We know that on a number of occasions—in order to get this 

right—and we have to get it right; I can’t imagine a more serious, 

grave situation we’ve faced in recent American history—you have 

to get the security right, the governance part of this right, as well 

as other issues, like development. And to get governance right, 

President Karzai has to be a full partner in this. 

I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan in August, and I know that 

being on the ground for a few days doesn’t confer omniscience on 

any Senator, but I have to say that, meeting with President Karzai 

in August 2009 and May 2008, I came away very troubled by his 

answers to questions I and others have posed to him, and stunned 

by some of the things he said or did not say in those meetings. So, 

I keep returning to this question, among others, when we analyze 

our strategy. 

So, I wanted to get a sense of, in a very specific way—I know, 

Secretary Clinton, in your testimony, you rightly and appropriately 

said the Afghan people, the United States, and the international 

community will hold the Afghan Government accountable for 

making good on its commitments and President Karzai’s recent 

pledges—of what, specifically, will we do to hold him accountable, 

both him personally, but also his government? I know you understand the importance of this. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, there are a number of steps. You know, 

we have been working closely with the Afghan Government in support of a major crimes tribunal. We have enhanced our cooperation 

between law enforcement and intelligence—FBI, DEA, Department 

of Justice—in order to clearly and unequivocally present evidence 

of corruption that we expect action to be taken on with respect to 

charging and prosecuting and removing from office and seeking 

restitution from those against whom a case can be made. We are 

55 

also working to certify ministries as to which will or will not 

receive the money from the United States. And we want that to be 

part of our overall coordination, to go back to Senator Shaheen’s 

question, so that we can have an international—an internationally 

accepted standard for transparency and accountability in these governments. We are working closely and encouraging the right decisions, in our view, to be made about members of the new Cabinet, 

governors to be appointed, and the like. 

So, there’s an intense ongoing consultation. I would think that 

probably Ambassador Eikenberry and other members of his leadership team spend many hours every day in direct consultation and 

conversation with, not only President Karzai, but others in positions of responsibility. 

So, I mean, we’re moving on all of these fronts, Senator Casey, 

and it’s—it’s not easy, and we think that our intentions are clear, 

and we expect to see progress made. But, again, I don’t want to 

paint some Utopia that we are attempting to achieve; that’s just 

not in the cards. It’s not in the cards anywhere. 

And the United States has been deeply involved in other countries, going back 60 years, often with combat troops on the ground, 

where there was massive corruption, where there was instability, 

where there were fraudulent elections. And, you know, you just— 

you know, you have to have a certain level of strategic patience 

here in order to see things through. And I think that, you know, 

President Karzai and his government have been under more scrutiny than probably most ever have been. I mean, we do a lot of 

business with a lot of countries that have elections where the 

leader is reelected at 98 or 99 percent, and we don’t say a word, 

we just keep going. Now, the difference is, we have our young men 

and women, military and civilian, in a combat situation, and we 

have to expect more. 

But, we need to put it in the broader context of, you know, what 

we have done around the world for decades, and, you know, the 

kind of efforts that prove successful and in keeping with the 

national security needs of the United States. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I want to commend the work that you, 

Ambassador Eikenberry, and others have done. I know it’s not easy 

and that there are limitations of what we can do when dealing with 

a sovereign government. But, I know how important it is. 

I wanted to raise another issue, and ask whether Secretary 

Gates and Admiral Mullen want to add to anything that we’ve 

explored already. But, the second element of this decision, in terms 

of getting it right is governance. What do we do with, or can we 

have a positive impact on, local and provincial leaders? One thing 

that was heartening to me, as disappointed as I was at some of 

President Karzai’s answers, was that the two ministers that we 

met with, Minister Wardak as well as Atmar, with army and police 

responsibilities, obviously, were said to be, and, I think, in the limited time we had with them, gave evidence that they’re very competent and they’ve got a lot of skills. 

We also met some capable local and provincial leaders. So, what’s 

the strategy with regard to engaging local or provincial leaders? 

And how does that factor into getting this governance piece right? 

56 

Secretary GATES. From the time I—actually, from my confirmation hearings, I’ve been concerned that, among other things, we 

were too focused on the central government in Afghanistan, and 

particularly the notion of trying to build a strong central government in a country that had never had one, and that we weren’t 

paying enough attention to the local and tribal leaders and the traditional institutions in Afghanistan. The—one of the tragedies of 30 

years of war is that many of those local institutions—the tribal 

shuras and so on—had been significantly weakened as elders have 

been shot or executed or—and their authority undermined, and the 

Taliban goes after them specifically. And so, I think a really important part of the President’s decisions and our discussions was, How 

are we going to engage, at the subnational level, at the provincial 

level, at the district level, and at the local and village level? And 

it’s everything from the President’s talk to Secretary Clinton and 

myself about communications—how do we communicate with those 

people, convey to them what we and the Afghan Government are 

trying to do? And so, and how do we work with them? And the 

truth of the matter is—and we’ll get into it further with you all 

down the road—but, in terms of the transfer of security responsibility, in a lot of these districts and areas, it may not be the Afghan 

National Army or the Afghan National Police that we—that—to 

whom we turn for providing local security; it may well be a local 

security force that operates within the context of the provincial 

government or the district government. We’ve seen some experiments with this in Wardak province and elsewhere, and they’ve 

worked pretty well. And so, I think it’s going to be a mix. 

And, to answer the question that Senator Webb asked, my view 

is, we will do the transfer of security in the same way we did it 

in Iraq, and that will be a judgment by the ISAF commanders of 

when an area is ready, when the local forces are ready, to assume 

that responsibility with us in a tactical, and then a strategic 

overwatch, sort of a cavalry over the hill, if you will. And I think 

that—but, local security forces and local governance are going to be 

a big part of that—a big part of that equation. 

The caution that we have is not to cross the line into reestablishing warlords and local militias that, in fact, are operating independent of the government, whether at the district or provincial or 

national level. 

Senator CASEY. I know I’m out of time, but—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator—yes. 

Senator Kaufman, we’re in the back 7 minutes of the vote, and 

there’s a grace period, as you know. Senator Cardin’s going to come 

back, so we can, hopefully, you know, get the two last Senators in, 

here. But, if you want to truncate a little bit, it’s your choice. We 

won’t—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. I will try. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Require it. 

Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I will do that. 

And it—look, I want to thank you very much for wrestling, which 

I find to be—agree with several statements that were made—one 

of the most complex problems I’ve ever seen, and the most difficult 

problem, because it involves lives of the folks that are just the best 

57 

among us. And I also want to thank you for the infinite patience 

to wrestle with us on this issue, and the ability to do that. And I 

can’t think of three people who would be better, that I’d be happier, 

to see wrestling with this problem than the three of you. 

Now, I want to agree with what Senator Casey and a lot of other 

people have said. I think the No. 1 problem here—there’s a lot of 

problems, so—you know, I don’t minimize any—but, the No. 1 problem is, Do we have a partner, in the Afghan Government, for success? That, to me, is the really key question. I spend time—two 

trips to Afghanistan, met with folks and talked to them. There’s a 

lot of other problems. But, that’s the No. 1 problem, in my mind. 

And one of the great things, I think, about the President’s proposal 

is, he came up with a way, which I thought no one could, to kind 

of give me some hope that we can do something with the present 

government, and that is setting the deadline of July 2011. Because 

people came in and talked to me, and I’ve talked to so many people 

on this, and they all say, ‘‘Well, we should use our leverage on 

Karzai.’’ I don’t think we had any leverage in Karzai until you set 

a date certain that we’re going to leave. 

So, I think it’s very—and kind of in a cleanup position at the end 

of this thing—I think it’s really important—there’s been a lot of 

confusion back and forth on the deadline, so I just want to make 

it clear, to send a message to the Afghan Government. You have 

no doubt that the President has a deadline of transferring troops 

out of Afghanistan in July 2011. Is that fair to say? Is it fair to 

say, therefore, to deal with so many other problems we have—and 

comparisons have been here—there is no—you have no doubt that 

we will not be adding more troops to Afghanistan after this deployment, outside of the 3,000, potentially, that you may have to add? 

Secretary GATES. That is the commitment that we have made to 

the President. 

Senator KAUFMAN. That’s right. So, when—this is not like what 

we—comparisons to Vietnam, where we had promises and then 

didn’t—this is not even like Iraq. This is a firm commitment by the 

President of the United States, agreed by the major foreign policy 

strategic planners in our government, that in July 2011 we’re going 

to start drawing down troops, and we’re not going to be adding 

more troops. I think that’s a significant message, and I think it’s 

the only message. If we stick to that message—it’s the only message that can have—help—that the Karzai government can, in fact, 

be successful. 

And because of the lack of time, I will yield to the Senator from 

New York for questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Before you begin, Senator, if I could just—I want to thank you, 

because I’ve got to take off and vote. And I’ll hold the vote open, 

get them to protect you, here. But, I really appreciate your coming 

in. I know it takes a lot of time, but it does, as you know full well— 

and, Secretary, you know perhaps even more—sort of, helps the 

process to work, and, in the end, is critical to our own deliberative 

process. So, we thank you very, very much for doing that. And I 

wish you well on your journey. 

Senator Gillibrand. 

58 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to each of you, for being here. You’ve provided such 

extraordinary leadership for our country, and we’re extremely 

grateful. 

I agree with my colleague, this is the most difficult issue any of 

us can face. 

I’d like you just to touch, briefly, if you can, on the issue of 

al-Qaeda. Secretary Gates and I, last time we spoke, talked about, 

Why do you care if al-Qaeda has a foothold in Afghanistan? He provided very detailed analysis about why that type of foothold would 

be able to be a launching ground for similar terrorist attacks to 

9/11, and also the overwhelmingly destabilizing effect with regard 

to Pakistan, which obviously has nuclear weapons; it could pose 

grave security risks to the United States. 

My concern is, What’s to stop al-Qaeda from moving to Somalia 

or Yemen or any other place? And, you know, to the extent you can 

talk about this on a nonsecured basis, what are some of the things 

that you intend to do, militarily and in other operations, with 

regard to other places al-Qaeda will create potential strongholds? 

Secretary GATES. Well, very briefly, as I said in my opening 

statement, al—the Afghan-Pakistan border area is the epicenter; it 

is the historic—it is the site of the historic victory over the Soviet 

Union by many of these same actors. And it is where the planning 

and the inspiration—certainly the inspiration, much of the training, much of the planning for al-Qaeda operations emanates from. 

And wherever people have been, whether it’s Somalia or Yemen or 

the United States or the United Kingdom, almost always, the roots 

trace back to this border area. It is the home base, if you will, of 

this operation. 

And it’s interesting, as I said earlier, how other terrorist groups, 

including al-Qaeda of the Maghreb, al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, gravitate and look to that area for leadership and inspiration 

and legitimacy of their efforts in the context of terrorist aspirations. 

And all I can tell you is that we are very aggressive in going 

after al-Qaeda, and we have the authority of the President to hunt 

them down wherever in the world we find them. 

Secretary CLINTON. I would just add, Senator, that al-Qaeda has 

very deep roots now in this border area. You know, they have operated, in the case of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others, in and around 

this area, going back 20 years—well, 30 years. They have a degree 

of protection from both the Afghan side and the Pakistan side. 

If you read the long articles that David Rohde wrote when he 

escaped, there is a governmental presence, in effect, in the ungoverned areas of Pakistan that gives them every reason to believe 

they’re secure. And they’re—and they—and it’s not just one or 

more people picking up. They have extended families, they have 

networks of connections that would have to be disrupted. 

So, I don’t see that it would be very attractive or easy for them 

to leave where they are, and I’m not sure there is any terrain anywhere in the world that is more hospitable to them. So, for all 

those reasons, I think that’s where you will find them. 

Secretary GATES. Maybe most significantly, we would love to see 

them leave there. 

59 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I’d add to that is—and it goes 

to Secretary Gates’ comment about having been seen to defeat the 

Soviet Union, and this would be seen to defeat the only remaining 

superpower. And that is an inspiration for recruiting, it is an acceleration for their global extremist capabilities, and it is what, in the 

long run, I worry the most about, if they are seen to be able to do 

that. Even as they are more diminished, which they have been over 

the last few years, but they are very, very deadly, and they seek 

the same kind of aim. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Well, thank you again for your testimony 

and your time. We’re extremely grateful for your extraordinary 

leadership. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. As I’m sure Secretary Clinton is 

aware, we’ve had a vote going on, on the floor of the Senate, so 

there’s been a little bit of shuffling back and forth. But, I do want 

to thank Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates and Admiral 

Mullen, on behalf of our chairman, for your patience here today, 

and particularly for your service to our country. 

And, with that, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 

stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. Secretaries Clinton and Gates, 

and Admiral Mullen, thank you all for your tremendous service to this country. The 

President and the American people are lucky to have such able, dedicated public 

servants at this important moment in our history. 

The decision regarding how to move forward in Afghanistan represents an incredibly difficult moment—for the President, for this panel, and for our Nation. 

Every American wants our troops to succeed in Afghanistan. Every Senator is 

committed to the security of our Nation and the stability of the world. And this 

week, the President laid out a serious proposal that merits careful consideration. 

Sending young Americans into battle is something none of us take lightly. All of 

us have been to the funerals, spoken to the families, written too many letters of condolence. The cost to our country—in blood and treasure—has been high in Afghanistan, and the gain insufficient. As the President said this week, the status quo is 

not sustainable. 

A better way forward relies upon the development of the comprehensive, detailed, 

and realistic plan for Afghanistan that we have been lacking for far too long. Without it, we cannot justify the continuing loss of American lives and resources, and 

no amount of sacrifice will accomplish our national security goals. 

For my part, I remain skeptical about sending more troops to Afghanistan. This 

will only be acceptable to the American people—and it will only work—if it is part 

of a broader strategic effort, encompassing both diplomatic and economic initiatives. 

I hope that, in today’s hearing, you’ll help us consider some of the fundamental 

questions that are on the minds of many Americans. 

First of all, how does this policy fit in with our broader effort to keep America 

safe? How does it help us achieve our national security goals in Pakistan, and in 

the region? 

Does the plan encompass the diplomatic and economic imperatives that must 

accompany a shift in military strategy? In my view, a strategy for success must 

include narrowly defined, achievable goals like protecting key population centers, 

providing for targeted and limited economic development (including schools, roads, 

water, and agriculture), cracking down on rampant corruption, and boosting the 

capacity of the Afghan Government (not just at the national level, but at the local 

level) to meet the basic needs of the Afghan people. 

60 

Do we have allies who are ready to stand with us? We all agree that our NATO 

allies need to do more, and that we need to work in closer concert with them. But 

how do we go about working with our NATO allies so that we can agree on a plan 

in which each of us can share our strength, and the burden of this effort? 

Do we have a reliable partner in the Karzai government? We must be able to have 

confidence that the regime is ready, willing, and able to work with us. The Afghan 

people must be able to have confidence that their government can provide basic 

physical and economic security. 

Finally, and perhaps the question weighing heaviest on the minds of the American people, do we have a credible plan for completing this mission and bringing 

our troops home as soon as possible? Our effort must come to an end someday, and 

someday soon, because, as President Obama says, our goal was never to occupy 

Afghanistan. Our roadmap must have a destination, a path toward a day when the 

Afghan Government will be able to take basic responsibility for its own people and 

its own future. 

We wrestle with these issues because that future is inextricably linked with our 

own. Although there are questions to be answered, I appreciate the President’s sincere, thoughtful proposal—and I appreciate the presence of our witnesses today. The 

challenges we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan are many and complex. I look forward to discussing them with you all. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. The President’s strategy in Afghanistan calls for both military and civilian activities to stabilize and rebuild the country’s economy. 

• With regard to the coordination of civilian and military development activities, 

what is the chain of command among the numerous agencies engaged in some 

aspect of development, and how does this structure aid or hinder coordination? 

Answer. Starting from the bottom—at Provincial Reconstruction Teams and District Support Teams, civilian employees from USAID, USDA, and the State Department on their agencies work in teams with one designated as the senior civilian at 

each platform, responsible for coordination. They coordinate closely with the military commanders of the PRTs to ensure that the projects they are overseeing complement those that the PRT commanders are executing through programs like the 

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. Our civilian and military leaders at 

each platform seek concurrence from their counterparts before spending funds. 

Senior civilians report to the senior civilian representative at the Regional Command their PRT or DST falls under. The military PRT commander at a given PRT 

reports to a superior at his or her respective Regional Command. This ensures that 

civilian-military coordination on all matters—including development—occurs at the 

Regional Command level. 

If matters need to go higher for review or resolution, the civilians send them to 

the U.S. Embassy, who is responsible for all civilian assistance, and the military 

chain is through USFOR–A in Kabul. Ambassador Eikenberry and General 

McChrystal have a close working relationship and meet regularly to share views 

and coordinate their respective activities. 

The net effect of this is that we have developed synchronized civilian-military 

chains of command, to ensure coordination at each level: district, provincial, 

regional, and national. So far, our experience has been that this has promoted coordination on development and other issues. 

Question. Who is ultimately in charge of the strategy? 

Answer. In theater, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are responsible for implementing the strategy. They report to the President. 

Question. How are DOD reconstruction activities integrated with those of civilian 

agencies? 

Answer. The activities are coordinated at the district, provincial, regional and national level through the mechanism described. At the district and provincial level, 

the PRT Commander and civilians are part of the Integrated Command Team. They 

are in constant contact with one another to ensure that their activities are complementary, and do not conflict or duplicate one another. Similar structures exist 

at the Regional Commands. Task Force and maneuver battalion commanders, who 

also have the ability to carry out development activities, frequently consult with 

PRT commanders and their civilian counterparts in their Areas of Responsibility, 

which can cut across provinces and districts. In a given month, the number of 

61 

Regional Command development conferences, secure conference calls, and meetings 

on development can be daunting, but ensure that our civilian and military reconstruction activities are well-coordinated and supporting our objectives in Afghanistan. 

Question. Does DOD fully participate in country team deliberations? 

Answer. Yes. DOD is well represented at our Embassy in Kabul. 

Question. What is the role of Ambassador Tony Wayne with regard to DOD activities? 

Answer. Ambassador Wayne, as Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs in Kabul, oversees all U.S. Government nonmilitary assistance to the 

Afghan nation. In this position, he supervises a wide range of Embassy sections, 

programs, agencies and offices in the field. He is kept abreast of DOD activities, 

including development activities funded through programs like CERP. 

Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles in Afghanistan. 

• If U.S. military forces will begin departing the country in as soon as 18 months, 

who will manage the programs and sectors that DOD has been managing? • How will a transition be accomplished? 

Answer. As part of the transition and drawdown process, we will examine each 

program to determine which programs managed by DOD should be continued. There 

will be close coordination with U.S. Forces–Afghanistan to ensure continuity. We 

will notify the Congress as required by law or request authorities as needed based 

on a careful evaluation of each program. 

Question. In the context of a counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan, what are 

the respective roles of State/INL, USAID, and DOD? 

Answer. INL, USAID, and DOD coordinate closely with the Office of the Special 

Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP), the State Department’s 

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), Embassy Kabul, and the larger 

Washington interagency to oversee and execute programs in support of the U.S. 

Government’s Counternarcotics Strategy. These efforts support progress toward an 

end state in which the Afghan Government, in partnership with its neighbors and 

the international community, can effectively fight the drug trade within its own borders and break the narcotics-insurgency link by denying drug funding to insurgents. 

The new U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, now in its final stages 

of approval, includes objectives aiming to disrupt the nexus between narcotics and 

the insurgency, as well as address linkages between narcotics and official corruption. While each agency and bureau hold particular expertise and capability to execute specific counternarcotics (CN) programs, interagency working groups—with 

participation by DEA, DOD, ONDCP, INL, SCA/A, S/SRAP, DOJ, USAID, and other 

interested parties—in both Kabul and Washington meet regularly to ensure that 

programs and policy align with overall U.S. Government’s goals in Afghanistan. 

Working groups meet bimonthly in Washington, DC, and monthly in Kabul. 

Specifically, INL carries out programs to build the capacity of the Ministry of 

Counternarcotics in CN public information and messaging; enhance provincial-level 

capacity and commitment to CN; expand drug addiction prevention and treatment 

capacity; and support provincial-level supply reduction through Governor-Led Eradication and the Good Performer’s Initiative. INL also engages with multilateral 

partners such as the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime to consolidate regional commitment to combating the flow of Afghan opiates and to diversify the base of international support for enhanced CN, law enforcement, and rule of law cooperation 

between Afghanistan and its neighbors. 

USAID, alongside the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is working to dramatically 

expand support for agricultural development, which forms an important cornerstone 

of the new U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan. USAID programs work 

to increase agricultural sector jobs and income through increasing farmers’ access 

to inputs and effective extension services; regenerate agribusiness by increasing 

linkages between farmers, markets, credit, and trade corridors; rehabilitate watersheds and improve irrigation infrastructure. Further, in order to increase Afghans’ 

confidence in their government, USAID works to increase capacity within the 

Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock to deliver services and promote 

the private sector and farmer associations through direct budget and technical 

assistance. 

DOD’s counternarcotics mission is to support the Combatant Commander and law 

enforcement through information-sharing, intelligence, training and equipping, 

infrastructure, and emergency assistance. In December 2008, DOD approved revised 

62 

rules of engagement for USCENTCOM to give military commanders on the ground 

the flexibility to target narcotics production facilities and facilitators for military 

action if they are determined to provide support to insurgents. In addition, intelligence efforts are being closely synchronized in theater through the Interagency 

Operations Coordination Center and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell for counternarcotics and threat finance operations in order to target joint drug networks and 

insurgency effectively. 

INL, DOD, and DEA also work closely together to improve the capacity of the 

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior 

(MOI) to conduct interdiction activities, investigations, and operations in order to 

disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations and prosecute those involved 

in the illicit drug trade. DEA holds the operational and mentoring lead for training 

the specialized vetted units of the CNPA, including the Sensitive Investigative Unit 

(SIU), National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and Technical Intercept Unit (TIU), and 

conducts joint operations with these units on counternarcotics and counterinsurgency nexus targets. In support of this effort, INL provides operational, maintenance, and life support for CNPA facilities in Kabul and Forward Operating Bases 

throughout the country. In addition, INL supports ongoing training, equipping, and 

vetting assistance for the DEA-mentored specialized units. INL contributes aviation 

assets to joint CNPA/DEA operational missions, which include mission planning, 

reconnaissance, transport, aerial escort and overwatch, in-extremis support, insertion/extraction, search and rescue, and medevac assistance using INL’s 10 armed 

and armored (Huey–II) rotary wing assets, to interdict traffickers and target, seize 

and destroy processing labs, chemical and drug caches/storage. Aviation support to 

DEA/CNPA is also provided with INL’s fixed wing and leased aircraft. 

DOD assistance includes support for the MI–17 program in the CNPA Aviation 

Interdiction Unit (AIU), which currently has a total of 12 helicopters, with 7 in 

country and 5 in the United States for training. In addition, DOD provides advanced 

training to the NIU and support to the DEA country office and FAST (Foreigndeployed Advisory Support Teams) officers. 

Finally, DOD also supports the Border Management Task Force, including tactical 

training, equipment, and infrastructure for the Border Police, and construction of 

border crossing points, to help control borders and decrease drugs leaving Afghanistan and the importation of precursor chemicals and IEDs. 

Question. How are each agency’s activities integrated into a coherent strategy? 

Answer. The U.S. interagency is working diligently to finalize a formal U.S. Strategy on Counternarcotics in Afghanistan, which is in the final stages of approval 

with the Office of the Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan 

(S/SRAP). This strategy supports the President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy, the 

implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy, and is integrated with the 

U.S. Agriculture Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan. As part of the administration’s ‘‘whole of government’’ approach to assisting the Afghan Government in waging its counterinsurgency, the Counternarcotics Strategy also supports the U.S. 

Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. Following 

final approval of the strategy, the interagency Counternarcotics Working Group will 

draft implementation plans for specific programmatic aspects of the strategy. 

Each agency’s programs support the draft provisions contained within this strategy, which has been drafted in accordance with guidance provided to the Counternarcotics Working Group by S/SRAP and the Bureau for South and Central Asian 

Affairs (SCA). In addition to informal verbal and written guidance provided during 

extensive working group and policymaking discussions, such guidance from S/SRAP 

and SCA also includes an internal CN action plan developed by SCA and approved 

by S/SRAP in May 2009. This currently serves as a template for interagency activities while transitioning to the revised counternarcotics strategy. 

Question. Who is responsible for National Police training? 

Answer. Afghan National Police (ANP) training is coordinated in Afghanistan by 

the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). Within the United States Government, the Department of Defense is responsible for U.S. efforts on police training. 

Although State initiated its own police training program in Afghanistan in 2003, 

in 2005 a multiagency agreement gave the Department of Defense (DOD) authority 

over all U.S. Government efforts to organize, train, and equip the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 

the Afghan National Army (ANA). Congressional funding for this effort is provided 

exclusively through Afghan Security Forces Funding (ASFF) given to DOD. DOD 

transfers funds to State which INL uses to deploy U.S. civilian police trainers and 

63 

advisors to conduct training and mentoring of the ANP. DOD’s representative in the 

field, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), determines 

program requirements; the U.S. Chief of Mission provides policy guidance. 

Contractual responsibility for ANP training is scheduled to transfer from INL to 

CSTC–A on March 31, 2010. This will serve to streamline management of ANP 

training so that resourcing, funding, and other management issues are more efficient. State will continue to play a role in Afghan law enforcement training through 

program policy, oversight, and direction of the police program through Ambassador 

Eikenberry, the U.S. Chief of Mission. INL and DOD are also currently assessing 

future requirements in advanced training and training/mentoring for gender-specific 

programs. 

Question. How will the U.S. monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral police and 

army training? 

Answer. Training and preparing Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take 

the lead in protecting the Afghan people and their territory is a key element of the 

President’s strategy in Afghanistan. Building the ANSF has been and will continue 

to be a significant and critical task, and we have reached out to our NATO allies 

and other international partners to help us work with the Afghan Government to 

achieve this goal. The international community has responded positively to the 

requests made by the Afghan Government by providing trainers, equipment, and 

funding. In close coordination with the Afghan Government, NATO allies, and international partners we have established programs of instruction for training the army 

and police that ensure a uniform approach to building the ANSF. Finally, in 2009, 

allies agreed to establish a NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan under U.S. LTG 

William B. Caldwell IV, who also commands the U.S. Combined Security Transition 

Command–Afghanistan. This ‘‘dual-hat’’ command arrangement will help ensure 

that the diverse international efforts to help the ANSF are coordinated and that 

training provided to the army and police is effectively monitored and evaluated. 

Question. Please provide the following information: 

• The Afghanistan Government ministries that will receive direct U.S. financial 

support. • The U.S. Government agency that will oversee that support, including which 

agency will be responsible for determining the readiness of each ministry to 

handle the proposed level of support. • The level of funding proposed for each ministry. • The objective that the financial support is designed to achieve. • The entity, United States or Afghan, that will be responsible for monitoring and 

evaluation. 

Answer. As part of our effort to support the Afghan Government’s ability to 

deliver services for the Afghan people, USAID is reviewing the financial, management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries regarding their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. Assessments (financial and procurement) are 

conducted for ministries that USAID intends to fund with direct assistance. If the 

assessments determine the management, procurement, financial, and expenditure 

systems can be certified as accountable, the USAID Mission in Afghanistan certifies 

the ministry as having the capacity to accept direct funding. If the assessments 

determine additional specific technical assistance is required, USAID will provide it. 

As of December 2009, the Ministries of Public Health, Communications and 

Information Technology and Finance have been assessed and certified to directly 

accept U.S. Government funds. USAID is planning to conduct assessments on the 

Ministries of Education; Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; and Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 

For those ministries that have been certified to receive direct USAID, assistance, 

the breakdown of funding and objectives are below. It should be noted, however, 

that for those ministries with pending certification, no determination has been made 

regarding the exact dollar figure for direct assistance, and objectives of such assistance are still in development. 

• Ministry of Public Health: $236 million/5 years 

Æ Objective: Allowing the continuation of basic health services in 13 USAID-supported Afghan provinces. 

• Ministry of Communication & Information Technology: $1 million/2 years 

Æ Objective: Allow for the improvement of information and communication technology coverage and infrastructure throughout government institutions, as 

well as to increase access to information for the people of Afghanistan. 

• Ministry of Finance: $30 million/2 years 

64 

Æ Objective: The Civilian Technical Assistance Plan allows the GIROA to recruit, 

hire, and place expatriate advisors, deployed at the central and subnational 

levels in specific technical areas in accordance with the needs of the Afghan 

ministries/agencies. It is a multidonor initiative to rationalize the placement 

of technical assistance, ensuring that the assistance provided is demanddriven and that there is an overall picture of the number and placement of 

advisors. 

Æ Furthermore, we are also contemplating direct budget funding of $200 million 

per year for 5 years to be used to fund priority programs in the Afghan Government’s development budget, with at least 50 percent of the funds going to 

specific high-priority areas in the South and East, and tied to clear benchmarks. 

• Ministry of Education: certification pending 

• Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: certification pending 

• Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock: certification pending 

Oversight, monitoring and evaluation of this direct assistance will be handled by 

USAID. In the case of the Ministry of Public Health, it should be noted that a specialized grants and contracts unit within the ministry will be responsible for the coordination and administration of grant and contract awards. 

USAID also contributes to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust (ARTF) Fund, a 

multidonor trust fund administered by the World Bank that pays a portion of the 

Afghan Government’s operational costs, as well as funds certain national-level 

development projects. The operational costs covered by the ARTF include delivery 

of services such as health care and education, and paying the salaries of about 

250,000 nonuniformed civil servants throughout the country. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is GIROA’s flagship development program which provides a 

mechanism for the government to deliver urgently needed services to its rural population. Through the NSP, the government develops connections to the local population and provides them with resources to build infrastructure projects, identified 

and implemented by the communities themselves. 

The World Bank administers the ARTF program, although it is considered direct 

assistance to the Afghan Government. Donors contribute to a single account, held 

by the World Bank in the United States. The ARTF Management Committee makes 

decisions on proposed allocations at its monthly meeting, and those decisions are 

translated into funds through grant agreements signed between the World Bank 

and the Government of Afghanistan. The World Bank also monitors the projects. 

In 2009, USAID provided $230 million to the ARTF, and in FY 2010 we will provide $650 million to the same account, with not less than $175 million of that 

amount going toward the NSP. From FY 2003 through FY 2008, USAID provided 

approximately $400 million to the ARTF. 

Question. In October of this year, the Broadcasting Board of Governors briefed the 

committee on its operations worldwide, including our programming for the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. The BBG noted in a followup written response that, 

in spite of working with the Afghan Government since the fall of 2005, ‘‘The Ministry of Information continues to block the contract for the operation of the Khost 

facilities . . . Minister of Information Khurram continues to block efforts to resolve 

this issue . . . ’’ How has the situation changed since October? 

Answer. The Department of State has worked closely with the Broadcasting Board 

of Governors to resolve the impasse with the Government of Afghanistan over the 

commissioning of the Khost transmitter site. 

After many months of active engagement on this issue with Afghan officials, on 

December 3, 2009, the U.S. Embassy informed BBG of a possible interim solution 

to the impasse. Under this plan, Minister Khurram agreed in principle to a rapid 

startup of the Khost facility and operations for 6 months. If, during this period, 

BBG and the Ministry cannot come to a permanent agreement, then the Afghan 

Government has the right to shut down the transmitter. 

BBG has advised the Embassy that it accepts the proposal, and has asked that 

our concurrence be transmitted to the relevant ministries so that startup of the 

transmitter can be expedited. 

The central issue in any permanent agreement remains control over the content 

of Voice of America—and, presumably—RFE/RL Pashto broadcasts when they begin 

in mid-January 2010. The ministry apparently still wants to insert language into 

the bilateral agreement governing the broadcasts that would give them the right to 

terminate the transmission of programs deemed detrimental to the national interests of Afghanistan. 

65 

BBG has rejected that language, and proposed alternative language. BBG has 

pledged to begin discussions immediately, and work closely with the U.S. Embassy 

in Kabul to reach a final agreement in timely fashion. 

RESPONSES OF DR. ROBERT GATES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION

The President’s strategy in Afghanistan calls for both military and civilian activities to stabilize and rebuild the country’s economy. 

Question. With regard to the coordination of civilian and military development 

activities, what is the chain of command among the numerous agencies engaged in 

some aspect of development, and how does this structure aid or hinder coordination? 

Answer. The Department of Defense does not engage in ‘‘development activities’’ 

per se, but rather urgent humanitarian, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency 

activities that can also aid the development of Afghanistan. The newly established 

USG integrated civil-military decision-making chain allows for planning and coordination of activities at all levels from the district/company-level to the national/ 

embassy-level. While new, this structure has already exhibited vast improvements 

in the coordination of civilian and military activities. 

Within this chain, there are two primary nodes of coordination of ‘‘development 

activities’’: the Provincial Reconstruction Team where military and civilian actors 

develop integrated plans for executing critical projects, and at the U.S. Embassy 

where national-level working groups provide a forum for coordinating large projects. 

In addition, USAID has a seat on the national-level Commanders’ Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) coordination board that reviews projects above a certain 

funding level. 

This question would best be served by additionally asking our State Department 

counterparts. 

Question. Who is ultimately in charge of the strategy? 

Answer. With regards to the overall U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

the President of the United States and his Cabinet are ultimately in charge of the 

U.S. strategy. In Afghanistan, Ambassador Eikenberry is the lead U.S. Government 

official responsible for U.S. Government (USG) policy. General McChrystal is 

responsible for U.S. military efforts while also serving a unique role of being the 

international military commander. General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry 

are responsible for coordinating USG efforts. 

With regards to civilian-military coordination, in August 2009, both General 

McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry published an ‘‘Integrated Civilian-Military 

Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan’’ that provides guidance from the U.S. 

Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan to U.S. personnel 

in Afghanistan. The plan represents the collaborative effort of all the USG Departments and Agencies operating in Afghanistan and the range of different equities, 

resources, and approaches. The plan is based on close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as well as the United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective civilian and 

military mechanisms for integrated assistance. But its most important component 

is a strong partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIROA) that will build the capacity needed to provide Afghanistan with a stable 

future. The ultimate goal is for the GIROA to have full responsibility for its own 

security and administration as the international community continues to offer economic assistance, training, and other noncombat support for the continued development of the country. 

Question. How are DOD reconstruction activities integrated with those of civilian 

agencies? 

Answer. In August 2009, both General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry 

published an ‘‘Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan’’ that provides guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Commander 

of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. 

The newly established U.S. Government integrated civil-military decisionmaking 

chain allows for planning and coordination of activities at all levels from the district/ 

company-level to the national/embassy-level. While new, this structure has already 

exhibited vast improvements in the coordination of civilian and military activities. 

66 

Within this chain, there are two primary nodes of coordination of ‘‘development 

activities’’: the Provincial Reconstruction Team where military and civilian actors 

develop integrated plans for executing critical projects, and at the U.S. Embassy 

where national-level working groups provide a forum for coordinating large projects. 

In addition, USAID has a seat on the national-level Commanders’ Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) coordination board that reviews projects above a certain 

funding level. 

Question. Does DOD fully participate in country team deliberations? 

Answer. DOD participates in and contributes to virtually every aspect of Country 

Team deliberations. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal meet frequently to discuss issues and approve coordinated civil-military planning that 

addresses Afghanistan’s challenges. The Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan, 

endorsed by both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal, forms an Executive Working Group and 15 national-level working groups—each cochaired by a 

civilian and military representative. Several of the Embassy’s sections have detailed 

or embedded military members who bring valuable experience and perspective while 

also serving as conduits to the military organizations for informal communication. 

Internal Embassy products, such as cables and briefing and information memos, are 

provided to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Combined Joint Task Force–435 

(CJTF–435), and NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A)/Combined Security 

Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) in draft form for input and comments. 

Finally, a military liaison office headed by a U.S. Air Force brigadier general 

ensures that the Embassy is well informed and connected to military planning and 

activities. The Ambassador relies on this general as a trusted confidant and sounding board. DOD participates in every aspect of Embassy deliberation including policy formulation, drafting of policy documents, and final decisionmaking at the 

Ambassador’s level. 

Question. What is the role of Ambassador Tony Wayne with regard to DOD activities? 

Answer. Ambassador Tony Wayne, the Coordinating Director for Development 

and Economic Affairs at U.S. Embassy Kabul, is responsible for overseeing economic 

and development activities in Afghanistan. He plays a vital role in ensuring U.S. 

civilian and military assistance activities are harmonized and mutually reinforcing. 

For example, he and his group worked to ensure governance and other civilian 

assistance efforts can be available to go into contested Afghan localities at an appropriate time after or with the U.S. military as part of our clear, hold, build, and 

transfer approach. He cochairs the Executive Working Group (EWG) with Brigadier 

General Frank McKenzie of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The 

EWG meets weekly to coordinate and direct the activities of all 15 of the nationallevel working groups established under the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign 

Plan. Ambassador Wayne plays an important role for the Embassy in overseeing the 

activities of the Senior Civilian Representatives in each of the Regional Commands. 

In addition, he ensures the efforts of the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other relevant civilian agencies undertaking 

assistance activities in Afghan development are done as a ‘‘whole of government’’ 

approach so they have the greatest possible efficiency and effect. 

Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles in Afghanistan. If U.S. military forces will begin departing the country in as soon as 18 

months, who will manage the programs and sectors that DOD has been managing? 

Answer. Regarding the transition start date, it is imperative to understand that 

July 2011 is the beginning of a process. We are increasingly looking to the Afghan 

Government to take on more responsibility, and we will assess conditions as we 

move forward. Based on the assessment of conditions on the ground, the President 

will determine the scope and pace of a gradual and responsible drawdown of U.S. 

combat forces. DOD trainers and advisors will remain in Afghanistan conducting 

security sector capacity-building and reform to ensure a sustainable transition. 

The President’s strategy is an integrated civil-military strategy. Increased civilian 

resources are being established now to ensure the capability exists to sustain efforts. 

As Secretary Clinton described during her testimony, the Department of State will 

seek additional resources, including additional civilian personnel in Afghanistan, to 

implement the President’s strategy. The State Department, in coordination with our 

military commanders, is currently examining the requirements for additional personnel to complement our military force increase. 

In order to coordinate these civilian activities with our military efforts, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal published the ‘‘Integrated Civilian-MiliVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
67 

tary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan’’ in August 2009, which provides 

guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission and the Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. 

U.S. Government senior civilian positions have been established and integrated at 

each level of the military chain of command to serve as counterparts to military 

commanders and coordinate civilian efforts. This newly established U.S. Government integrated civil-military decisionmaking capability in theater allows for planning and coordination of activities at all levels from the district/company level to 

the national/embassy level. Although new, this structure has already contributed to 

vast improvements in the coordination of civilian and military activities. 

Within this chain of command, there are two primary nodes of coordination for 

stabilization and reconstruction activities: the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

where military and civilian actors develop integrated plans for executing critical 

projects, and at the U.S. Embassy where national level working groups provide a 

forum for coordinating large projects. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) has a seat on the national level Commanders Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) coordination board that reviews projects above a certain 

funding level. 

Question. How will a transition be accomplished? 

Answer. The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build, and transfer. 

How the latter phase of this process is accomplished will largely be dictated by conditions on the ground and it will be done responsibly. The duration of our military 

presence will be limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our 

troops begin to come home. 

Regarding the transition start date, it is imperative to understand that July 2011 

is the beginning of a process. It is not when we rush for the exits; rather, it is when 

we begin the responsible drawdown of our forces and the responsible handoff of missions to our Afghan partners. There is no determination of how long this will take 

and there is no withdrawal date on the right-hand side of July 2011. There is also 

no specific guidance with respect to how many troops will be pulled out. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Question. In the context of a counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan, what are 

the respective roles of the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and DOD? 

Answer. The U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan supports the 

President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy. It is integrated with the U.S. Government Agriculture Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan, which focuses on the redevelopment of the agricultural sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes 

for rural families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy. The CN 

Strategy also supports the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military 

Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. 

Although State/INL, USAID, and DOD work together as a part of the ‘‘whole of 

government approach’’ to assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (GIROA) in waging its counterinsurgency, general responsibilities fall 

within these respective areas: 

1. Public Information (State/INL and DOD); 

2. Alternative Development (USAID and USDA); 

3. Interdiction (DEA, DOD, and State/INL); and 

4. Law Enforcement/Justice Reform (DOJ and State/INL). 

DOD’s main focus is on interdiction efforts to decrease narcotics trafficking and 

processing in Afghanistan while building Afghan capacity to disrupt and dismantle 

significant drug trafficking organizations. DOD supports CN operations in Afghanistan by detecting, monitoring, and supporting the interdiction, disruption or curtailment of emerging narcotics-related threats to our national security. 

Question. How are each agency’s activities integrated into a coherent strategy? 

Answer. The U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan supports the 

President’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy. It is integrated with the U.S. Government Agriculture Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan, which focuses on the redevelopment of the agricultural sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes 

for rural families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy. The CN 

Strategy also supports the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military 

Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. 

68 

The CN Strategy focuses on resources for those programs that will contribute 

directly to: (1) breaking the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus and, (2) helping 

to connect the people of Afghanistan to their government. 

Question. Who is responsible for National Police training? 

Answer. NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A)/Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) is the overall lead and has the responsibility for U.S and NATO efforts to man, train, and equip the ANP. NTM–A/CSTC– 

A coordinates closely with the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, U.S. Embassy, the 

European Police Mission, and other international bodies in this effort. 

Question. How will the U.S. monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral police and 

army training? 

Answer. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) 

commander, who is dual-hatted as the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan commander, Lieutenant General Caldwell, is responsible for monitoring the overall 

quality of instruction for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National 

Police (ANP). Lieutenant General Caldwell took command on November 21, 2009, 

when CSTC–A/NTM–A was recently upgraded from a 2- to 3-star headquarters, and 

he will continue to monitor the training, by both U.S. and international partners, 

of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

BUDGET SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN MINISTRIES

Please provide the following information: 

Question. The Afghanistan Government ministries that will receive direct U.S. 

financial support. 

Answer. DOD does not provide direct U.S. financial support to any Afghan ministry. DOD provides indirect support to the Ministries of Defense and Interior 

through the Afghan Security Forces Fund. These appropriated funds support developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and 

construction. 

Additionally, DOD was authorized in the FY10 NDAA (sec. 1222(d)) to transfer 

$50M in the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund to the 

Department of State for the National Solidarity Program, administered by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. We are currently discussing the 

appropriate path to implement this. 

This question would best be served by additionally asking our State Department 

counterparts. 

Question. The U.S. Government agency that will oversee that support, including 

which agency will be responsible for determining the readiness of each ministry to 

handle the proposed level of support. 

Answer. As the Secretary of State noted in her testimony, the Department of 

State will be responsible for certifying ministries to receive direct budget support. 

This question would best be served by additionally asking our State Department 

counterparts. 

Question. The level of funding proposed for each ministry. 

Answer. Because the State Department is responsible for this type of funding, and 

DOD will not be directly providing funding to any Afghanistan Government ministry, this question should be redirected to the Secretary of State. 

Question. The objective that the financial support is designed to achieve. 

Answer. Because the State Department is responsible for this type of funding, and 

DOD will not be directly providing funding to any Afghanistan Government ministry, this question should be redirected to the Secretary of State. 

Question. The entity, United States or Afghan, that will be responsible for monitoring and evaluation. 

Answer. Because the State Department is responsible for this type of funding, and 

DOD will not be directly providing funding to any Afghanistan Government ministry, this question should be redirected to the Secretary of State. 

BBG OPERATIONS

Question. In October of this year, the Broadcasting Board of Governors briefed the 

committee on its operations worldwide, including our programming for the AfghaniVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:39 Dec 20, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\2009 HEARINGS WAITING FOR OK\AFGH1203.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
69 

stan/Pakistan border region. The BBG noted in a followup written response that, 

in spite of working with the Afghan Government since the fall of 2005, ‘‘The Ministry of Information continues to block the contract for the operation of the Khost 

facilities . . . Minister of Information Khurram continues to block efforts to resolve 

this issue . . . ’’ 

• How has the situation changed since October? 

Answer. This question would best be served by asking our State Department 

counterparts. 

RESPONSE OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. Over the past 8 years, I have consistently voiced my concern about the 

dire situation of women in Afghanistan, and worked to secure resources to help 

them build better lives. I was surprised that President Obama did not mention 

Afghan women in his speech on Tuesday, particularly since they are so important 

to the future of Afghanistan. 

• How does the President’s strategy take into account the needs of women? 

• If President Karzai negotiates with Taliban leaders, as he has indicated he 

may, how will the United States help ensure that women are protected? 

Answer. We remain deeply committed to promoting women and girls’ equal and 

active role in Afghan society. Women’s empowerment and full and equal civic participation are critical to economic stability, security, good governance and development—key pillars of our strategy in Afghanistan, which is aimed at preventing the 

reestablishment of an environment conducive to the return of al-Qaeda. In particular, we will work to ensure that the judiciary upholds the equal rights guaranteed to Afghan women in their own Constitution, and to extend the rule of law and 

strengthen Afghan civil society’s own efforts to advance women’s empowerment. 

We understand and share your concern about how reintegration of former insurgents into their communities might adversely affect the rights of women. During 

that process, we must distinguish between irredeemable ideologues and those who 

were coerced to fight by economic or other exigent circumstances. We have made 

clear that we are willing to work with anyone who renounces al-Qaeda, lays down 

their arms, and respects the human rights of their fellow citizens as is enshrined 

in the Afghan Constitution. 

RESPONSES OF DR. ROBERT GATES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. I am gravely concerned about the threat posed by improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan, as statistics indicate that they are responsible for 70 

to 80 percent of all American casualties there. 

You have been instrumental in providing Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

(MRAP) vehicles—which are designed to survive IED attacks—to protect our service 

men and women. Since 2007, thousands of these armored vehicles have been delivered to or ordered to be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan because of your direct involvement. 

However, in General McChrystal’s report to President Obama on the situation in 

Afghanistan, he indicates that abandoning important protective measures—such as 

the use of armored vehicles—in the near term will save lives in the longer term. 

Specifically, he states that the use of armored vehicles in secure areas of the country conveys ‘‘a sense of high risk and fear to the [Afghan] population.’’ 

General McChrystal goes on to recommend giving leaders the ability to accept 

‘‘some risk’’ and use less protective equipment, such as armored vehicles and body 

armor, in order to better relate to the population. 

But, he concludes that doing so ‘‘could expose military personnel and civilians to 

greater risk in the near term.’’ 

• Are you comfortable with accepting this ‘‘risk’’ since the weapon of choice in 

Afghanistan is the IED, where the enemy can target U.S. forces from a distance? 

Answer. I am never comfortable accepting risk when it involves the safety and 

lives of our troops. However, our Nation and coalition allies are committed to reducing the influence of the Taliban and developing a capable Afghan National Security 

Force (ANSF), which means that, unfortunately, ‘‘risk’’ will be involved in accomplishing our goals. There are numerous measures within the Department of Defense 

70 

(DOD) that we are taking to mitigate and reduce the ‘‘risk’’ of improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs) to our troops in Afghanistan. Finding solutions to countering IEDs 

and reducing the ‘‘risk’’ to our troops is one of my top priorities as Secretary of 

Defense. 

The Presidents’ recent decision to deploy 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will be a big boost to our C–IED battle by allowing us to flow in extra specialized personnel and equipment in the near term that will provide for greater counterIED (C–IED) capacity. 

There is no single solution to countering the threat of IEDs. However, we can 

reduce and mitigate the IED threat with technical solutions and by attacking vulnerabilities along the entire spectrum of the IED network, and the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has focused many efforts along these lines. I believe that General 

McChrystal’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is ultimately our greatest hope for 

reducing the risk to our troops. One of the indicators that his COIN strategy is 

working will be in the increasing volume of human intelligence (HUMINT) collected 

from the local citizens. As we continue to successfully implement General McChrystal’s COIN strategy, I anticipate that instances of citizens providing us with 

HUMINT will be on the rise, and have an exponential impact in combating the IED 

menace. 

Finally, I am certain that the recent establishment of the Counter-IED Senior 

Integration Group (C–IED SIG), led by Dr. Carter and Lieutenant General Paxton 

(the Joint Staff Operations Officer), will have a positive impact in providing coherence to DOD’s C–IED efforts. They will be evaluating all current initiatives within 

DOD and ensuring that we galvanize the full resources of the Department and U.S. 

Government in combating IEDs and reducing the ‘‘risk’’ to our troops in harm’s way. 

Question. In light of General McChrystal’s proposed strategy, how is the Department of Defense going to balance the threat of IEDs with protecting our troops? 

Answer. Finding solutions to countering IEDs and more effectively protecting our 

troops is one of my top priorities as Secretary of Defense. As the statistics indicate, 

IEDs account for the greatest number of casualties and deaths among U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. 

Unfortunately, there is no single solution to countering the threat of IEDs. Reduction and mitigation of the IED threat is possible through technical solutions and 

attacking vulnerabilities along the entire spectrum of the IED network, and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has focused many efforts along these lines. The President’s recent decision to deploy 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will be 

another boost to our C–IED battle by allowing us to flow in extra specialized personnel and equipment that will provide for greater C–IED capacity. 

General McChrystal’s strategy contains the seeds for reaping the greatest potential gains in our C–IED fight. The central pillar of his strategy is protecting the population. When we reach the tipping point where the people of Afghanistan believe 

that we are credibly providing for their security and are there to stay, they will 

reject the Taliban, and provide us and our Afghan partners in the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) with the human intelligence (HUMINT) to effectively reduce 

the IED threat. We have already seen several instances in Helmand province where 

our counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign has produced positive results with local 

citizens identifying the location of IEDs for our Marines. As we continue to implement General McChrystal’s COIN strategy, I anticipate that instances of citizens 

providing us HUMINT will become the norm, and have an exponential impact in 

combating the IED menace. 

Finally, we recently established a Counter-IED Senior Integration Group (C–IED 

SIG), led by Dr. Carter and Lieutenant General Paxton (the Joint Staff Operations 

Officer), to evaluate current initiatives within DOD in order to ensure unity of effort 

within the Department. Dr. Carter and Lieutenant General Paxton just returned 

from a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation and look at ways to catalyze our 

C–IED initiatives and synchronize actions across the Department. I can assure you 

that we will continue to explore every available method to reduce the threat of IEDs 

to our troops. 

RESPONSES OF ADM MICHAEL MULLEN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. Over the past 8 years, I have consistently voiced my concern about the 

dire situation of women in Afghanistan, and worked to secure resources to help 

them build better lives. I was surprised that President Obama did not mention 

71 

Afghan women in his speech on Tuesday, particularly since they are so important 

to the future of Afghanistan. 

• How does the President’s strategy take into account the needs of women? 

Answer. The President’s strategy highlights the protection of the Afghan population—all elements, including women and children. The USG recognizes the powerful role women can play in changing the environment in Afghanistan while balancing that within the cultural context. In providing security for critical population 

centers in Afghanistan, the U.S. military will reduce the risks faced by women and 

create an environment whereby development and humanitarian agencies can help 

Afghan women better realize their social and economic potential. 

In the training of the Afghan National Security Forces, the U.S. military has 

ensured a focus on protecting human rights—including gender rights. In fact, 

women serve in the Afghan National Police force. In the development of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program projects, commanders take into account the 

needs of Afghan women as influencers in their environment. 

Question. If President Karzai negotiates with Taliban leaders, as he has indicated 

he may, how will the United States help ensure that women are protected? 

Answer. The USG does not have a direct role in reconciliation or negotiation with 

Taliban leaders. However, the USG has stated to President Karzai, with the support 

of the wider international community, that any political settlement must respect the 

fundamentals of the Afghan Constitution which respects and protects the human 

rights of all individual, including women. 

RESPONSE OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Our strategy in Afghanistan requires us to have legitimate, capable, and 

reliable Afghan partners. However, the Karzai government is riddled with corruption. Transparency International recently described Afghanistan as the second-most 

corrupt nation in the world, with the public sector worsening for the second year 

in a row. Last month, for example, the Afghan Minister of Mines, Mohammad Adel, 

reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award the country’s largest development 

project to a Chinese mining firm. Given that Karzai has been reluctant to fire 

corrupt ministers in the past, it is unclear whether he will follow up his words with 

actions. 

• What specific benchmarks will you use to ensure that the Karzai government 

is taking steps to combat corruption and promote transparency within the ministries? Is there a timeline associated with the benchmarks? What are the 

repercussions for not meeting the benchmarks? What steps are taken to certify 

that the ministries have met our benchmarks? Who is conducting the certification process? 

Answer. President Obama and I, as well as many leaders from the international 

community, have consistently voiced our concerns to President Karzai and the 

Afghan Government over corruption and the absence of rule of law. President 

Karzai’s inaugural address was particularly strong on the steps he intends to take 

on corruption. He reinforced this stance on December 15 on the occasion of an 

anticorruption conference in Kabul. But the Afghan Government must now take 

measurable actions to combat corruption; they have the responsibility to demonstrate to the Afghan people—and the wider international community—that they 

are making progress. Among other key reform/anticorruption measures, we hope to 

see the following specific actions taken: 

• Appointment of competent, reform-minded individuals to lead critical ministries 

(e.g., Finance, MAIL, Health, Education, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, 

Defense, and Interior), and also to key provincial and district positions in the 

south and east. 

• Concrete action by the Afghan Government against corrupt officials and known 

criminals (e.g., increased investigations by the Major Crimes Task Force resulting in criminal charges; public prosecutions of corrupt officials). 

• Enhanced oversight of ministries, especially police (e.g., creation and strengthening of inspector general functions in core ministries; increased audits of major 

programs). 

• Decreased evidence of political interference with Afghanistan’s Chief Prosecutor 

and other Afghan law enforcement bodies, and more generally in anticorruption 

enforcement. 

72 

We will monitor these steps and we have a responsibility to ensure that the considerable foreign assistance we provide does not add to the problem and is utilized 

appropriately and effectively. 

Fighting corruption is not easy and we should not expect results overnight. However, it is clear that some ministries fare better than others. A key element of our 

governance strategy is to address corruption through strengthening the capacity and 

capability of Afghan institutions, thus developing greater accountability and transparency. President Karzai has announced measures to reduce corruption: the simplification of administrative systems through the anticorruption commission, reducing the opportunity for corruption and improving basic services for the population; 

and streamlining international donor coordination through the Afghan Government. 

Afghanistan has recently set up a Major Crimes Task Force and plans to create a 

commission against corruption. Several U.S. agencies work with a range of Afghan 

counterparts on training and building such capacity. There is also a crucial role to 

be played by the Afghan people themselves—through civil society organizations, 

Parliament, other institutions and through media debate—to set out what they need 

from their government and what they will be able to give in return. 

We have a system for certifying ministries to receive U.S. funds directly and will 

expand that. USAID is reviewing the financial, management, procurement and 

expenditure systems of key ministries regarding their capacity to accept U.S. direct 

assistance. As of December 2009, USAID has assessed and certified that the Ministries of Public Health, Communications and Information Technology, and Finance 

can directly accept U.S. Government funds. Assessments of other key ministries are 

planned. We are using fewer big contractors, reducing the layers through which our 

assistance flows. Finally, we are dramatically increasing the numbers of USAID officers and inspectors to monitor our aid. 

RESPONSES OF DR. ROBERT GATES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. I understand why the Afghan Public Protection Force can play a critical 

role in helping to secure rural areas. Having local residents take ownership in providing security will be essential to success. I am concerned however that the AP3 

and other such efforts are susceptible to command by local warlords. 

• Can you describe the command structure of these local forces? After we have 

trained them, to whom do they report? 

Answer. It is important to note that the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), 

the security arm of the Afghanistan Public Protection Program (AP3), currently consists of a single pilot program in Wardak province. The APPF is NOT a tribal militia but a community-based force that is part of the Ministry of Interior. They are 

a uniformed service with a term of enlistment and receive salary and benefits. The 

personnel in the APPF are drawn from the community and are generally representative of the different ethnic and tribal groups. Since they are a security force that 

is part of the Afghanistan National Police, they are not under control of warlords 

but under the command of the district police chiefs. They sign an enlistment contract and swear an oath to the Government of Afghanistan. They are also held 

accountable by local community councils of elders that help select individuals for 

this program. 

Question. Once we have achieved our desired end state with respect to security, 

what’s the end game for these militias? 

Answer. Again it is important to note that the Afghan Public Protection Force 

(APPF) is not a militia but a security force that is part of the Afghanistan Ministry 

of Interior. They are already part of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and in the 

long term, when security improves, they will transition into the ranks of the regular 

Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) or be released when their term of service when it 

expires. 

Question. Do we have any safeguards or controls on these militias? 

Answer. Again, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is NOT a militia. The 

APPF is under control of the Ministry of Interior and reports to the district chief 

of police. They also have U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) mentors with them 

as well as a Police Mentoring Team (PMT). The SOF and PMTs, as well as the battle space owners and local police chief all provide oversight and additional training. 

Question. Who is providing arms and training to these local groups? 

73 

Answer. The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) recruits receive formal training from qualified Afghan National Police (ANP) Instructors at the ANP Mehter 

Lam Regional Training Center in Laghman province. The training and ANP 

Instructors are monitored by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) until their formal 

graduation. While at Mehter Lam, the recruits are issued uniforms, individual 

weapons (AK–47s) and other individual equipment which they keep for the duration 

of their service. The weapons are procured by the United States and provided to the 

recruits through the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI). Accountability of the weapons is maintained jointly by Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan 

(CSTC–A) and the MOI. Once they graduate from initial training, the APPF receive 

additional sustainment training back in their district conducted by U.S. SOF, Police 

Mentoring Teams (PMTs), and the battle space owner. 

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. In detail, what is the military and the civilian end objective, or definition of ‘‘success’’ for Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Answer. As President Obama stated in his December 1 speech at West Point, our 

overarching goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

Between now and the attainment of that goal, we must deny al-Qaeda a safe 

haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan. We must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for 

Afghanistan’s future. And we must do this with the full recognition that our success 

in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. 

Success in these efforts will bring us to the point at which we can begin to transition our relationship with the Afghans to one of partnership that reflects growth in 

their capacity to run their own country. Ultimately, success in Afghanistan is when 

that country can stand on its own two feet, defend its borders, provide for internal 

security, and keep terrorists like al-Qaeda out. 

Question. In detail, what are the ground conditions necessary to begin to drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan—both positive and negative? Under what conditions would the beginning to drawdown be postponed? 

Answer. In order to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, we must create conditions on the ground aimed at achieving the operational objectives which will permit the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. We 

must reverse Taliban momentum, deny the Taliban access to and control over population and production centers and lines of communication, disrupt Taliban outside 

of secured areas and prevent al-Qaeda from gaining sanctuary, degrade Taliban 

capabilities to a level at which the ANSF on its own can effectively combat the 

Taliban, increase the size and capability of ANSF while leveraging local security 

forces, and selectively build the capacity of the Afghan Government. 

Over the next 18 months, there will be a series of reviews which will gauge our 

progress in Afghanistan. The rate of drawdown and transition to our Afghan partners beginning in July 2011 will depend on conditions at that time. 

Question. What level of involvement did President Karzai, or members of his government, have in the development of the new U.S. plan? Was he, or senior members 

of his government, completely engaged in developing the plan? What level of consultation occurred? Did Karzai know the details of the plan prior to President 

Obama’s call on December 1 to discuss the plan? Is Karzai a full partner in the execution of the plan? Please explain your responses and any hesitations that you may 

have. 

Answer. We are in full partnership with President Karzai and all levels of the 

Afghan Government. Our strategy reflects our daily consultations with President 

Karzai and other Afghan officials. A critical outcome of the plan the President 

described on December 1 will be to transition the full range of security, governance. 

and development activities to the Afghans as quickly as conditions and their capacity allow. This is a clear request from the Afghan Government. We expect that over 

the long term, we will enhance and normalize our relationship with Afghanistan 

and its people to reflect our own interests and their exercise of complete sovereignty. 

As we continue this transition, our programs and plans will make increasing use 

of Afghan leadership and processes, while ensuring accountability. 

74 

RESPONSES OF DR. ROBERT GATES AND ADM MICHAEL MULLEN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. In detail, what is the military and the civilian end objective, or definition of ‘‘success’’ for Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Answer. As the President first stated in March, and reemphasized on 1 December 

2009, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent its return to both countries. The 

international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this 

goal. Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing 

missions. 

In Afghanistan, success is an Afghanistan capable of maintaining and securing its 

own sovereignty and able to prevent al-Qaeda from using its territory as a safe 

haven. As the President said, we will begin transitioning to Afghan lead in ensuring 

security in Afghanistan by July 2011. This process will be conditions-based, district 

by district, province by province, and the pace determined by the ability of the 

Afghan security forces. 

To this end, our military objectives are clear: reverse Taliban momentum; deny 

the Taliban access to and control over population and production centers and lines 

of communication; disrupt Taliban outside of secured areas and prevent al-Qaeda 

from gaining sanctuary; degrade Taliban capabilities to a level at which the ANSF 

on its own can effectively combat the Taliban; increase the size and capability of 

ANSF while leveraging local security forces; and selectively build the capacity of the 

Afghan Government. 

Question. In detail, what are the ground conditions necessary to begin to drawdown U.S. forces in Afghanistan—both positive and negative? Under what conditions would the beginning to the drawdown be postponed? 

Answer. Regarding the transition start date, it is imperative to understand that 

July 2011 is the beginning of a process. It is not when we rush for the exits; rather, 

it is when we begin the responsible drawdown of our forces and the responsible 

handoff of missions to our Afghan partners. There is no determination of how long 

this will take and there is no withdrawal date on the right-hand side of July 2011. 

There is also no specific guidance with respect to how many troops will be pulled 

out. 

What we aim to do is degrade the Taliban-led insurgency while building sufficient 

Afghan capacity to secure and govern the country. This has a number of implications for the military mission, which now focuses on six operational objectives: 

reverse Taliban momentum; deny the Taliban access to and control over population 

and production centers and lines of communication; disrupt Taliban outside of 

secured areas and prevent al-Qaeda from gaining sanctuary; degrade Taliban capabilities to a level at which the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) on its own 

can effectively combat the Taliban; increase the size and capability of ANSF while 

leveraging local security forces; and selectively build the capacity of the Afghan 

Government. Ground conditions specifically refer to our ability to work toward these 

focused objectives as we continue to clear, hold, build, and ultimately transfer 

responsibility for security to the Afghan Government. 

Question. What level of involvement did President Karzai, or members of his government, have in the development of the new U.S. plan? Was he, or senior members 

of his government, completely engaged in developing the plan? What level of consultation occurred? Did Karzai know the details of the plan prior to President Obama’s 

call on 1 December 2009 to discuss the plan? Is Karzai a full partner in the execution of the plan? Please explain your responses and any hesitations that you may 

have. 

Answer. President Karzai and key Cabinet members were consistently consulted 

when appropriate in the development of our more focused strategy. The President’s 

strategy makes clear that our commitment to the future of Afghanistan requires 

action on the part of the Government of Afghanistan to fight corruption, deliver 

services, institute policies for reintegration of local Taliban fighters, and address 

other urgent problems. This is the stated goal of President Karzai and his government and we expect the Afghan leaders to achieve these goals with our support. 

Æ