Page 1 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

November 20, 2012

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate

The Honorable Fred Upton 

Chairman

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Member

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Spectrum Management: FCC’s Licensing Approach in the 11, 18, and 23 Gigahertz 

Bands Currently Supports Spectrum Availability and Efficiency

Radio-frequency spectrum is a natural resource that is used to provide an array of wireless 

communications services critical to the U.S. economy and a variety of government functions, 

such as scientific research, national defense, homeland security, and other vital public safety 

activities. As new spectrum-dependent technologies and services are brought to market and 

government users develop new mission needs, the demand for spectrum continues to 

increase and additional capacity will be needed to accommodate future growth that cannot be 

addressed through more efficient use of wireless technologies. A primary driver of the 

increased demand for spectrum has been the significant growth in commercial wireless 

broadband services, including third and fourth generation technologies that are increasingly 

used with smart phones and tablet computers.1

 To accommodate this growth, common 

carriers, such as cellular phone companies and other telecommunications firms providing 

communication services to the public, often rely on wireless methods, such as fixed point-topoint microwave service, to transmit data.2

 Fixed point-to-point microwave service refers to a 

radio communication between two fixed points, such as between two stationary cell phone 

towers. These connections, known as links, are used for a variety of purposes, including 

connecting cellular sites to the telephone network and relaying television signals. 

 

1

Wireless broadband comprises both fixed and mobile wireless communication services. Fixed-wireless broadband

refers to stationary wireless devices or systems that provide high-speed Internet access from a fixed location. 

Mobile broadband refers to wireless high-speed Internet access through a portable device, such as a cell phone.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—an independent agency that regulates 

spectrum use for commercial and other nonfederal users—manages spectrum through 

2

According to FCC, a microwave frequency is any frequency at or above 890 megahertz (MHz). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

allocation and assignment.

3

 Allocation involves designating bands of spectrum for specific 

types of services or classes of users, such as for commercial or government use.4

 

Assignment provides a license to a specific entity, such as a wireless company, to use a 

specific portion of spectrum. To facilitate the use of point-to-point communications, FCC has 

allocated spectrum for microwave connections in the 11, 18, and 23 gigahertz (GHz) (common

carrier) bands, as well as in a number of other microwave spectrum bands.5

 In recent years,

use of microwave links has increased significantly, particularly as a cost-effective alternative to 

traditional wireline technologies, such as fiber optics. Given the increasing demand for and 

importance of these types of links, a few industry stakeholders have expressed concern about 

the availability of additional spectrum and whether FCC’s policies reflect the value of this 

spectrum. 

In the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Congress directed us to examine 

FCC’s licensing approach in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands.6

 Consequently, we examined (1)

the steps FCC has taken to ensure availability of common carrier licenses in the 11, 18, and

23 GHz bands and the extent to which these steps provide incentives for efficient use of this 

spectrum, and (2) how alternative approaches to assigning licenses in these bands might 

affect both revenue generated by the government and spectrum efficiency.7 In addition, we 

examined the views of industry stakeholders on the implications of FCC’s licensing approach 

in these bands on other spectrum licenses and we present this information in enclosure 1.

To address these objectives, we reviewed statutes, regulations, plans, and orders related to 

FCC’s current common carrier licensing approach. We analyzed FCC notices on proposed 

changes to its common carrier licensing rules, and industry comments on FCC’s approach. We 

reviewed academic publications, and prior GAO and Congressional Research Service reports 

on spectrum assignment approaches. We also analyzed the results of prior auctions of fixed 

point-to-point microwave licenses. We obtained data from FCC’s Universal Licensing System 

on applications for common carrier microwave licenses submitted to, granted by, and 

dismissed by FCC in 2011. In addition, we analyzed data on the number of active licenses in 

the common carrier bands and the number of licenses canceled, terminated, or expired in 

2011. Based on interviews with FCC officials for this and prior GAO reviews, as well as data 

testing for potential missing values, outliers, and errors, we determined that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We interviewed FCC officials as well as a judgmental 

sample of industry stakeholders, including common carrier license holders, industry 

associations, firms with related spectrum licenses, and other third-party firms.8

 

3

The Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is 

responsible for managing the federal government’s use of the radio frequency spectrum, while FCC is responsible 

for regulating nonfederal spectrum use.

 We also 

4

A band is a range of frequencies in the spectrum that are used or set aside for a specific purpose (such as the 

1,710–1,755 MHz band that FCC allocated for Advanced Wireless Services to support Third Generation (3G) 

mobile broadband and advanced-wireless services).

5

In this report, we refer to the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands as the common carrier bands, which include frequencies 

from 10,700 MHz to 11,700 MHz, from 17,700 MHz to 19,700 MHz, and from 21,200 MHz to 23,600 MHz, 

respectively. 

6

Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 6412(b), 126 Stat 156, 234 (Feb. 22, 2012). 7

Our review focuses primarily on the concept of “technical efficiency”—that is, getting the most use, or “output,” 

from a portion of spectrum, given the mission or market context of its use. Other important aspects of efficiency are 

also relevant in spectrum management. In particular, economic efficiency relates to whether spectrum is allocated 

across various uses in a way that maximizes society’s welfare.

8

In a judgmental, or nonprobability sample, a sample is selected from knowledge of the population’s characteristics 

or from a subset of a population. For example, we identified a sample of firms to interview based on the number of 

common carrier licenses assigned to these firms in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. 
Page 3 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

interviewed spectrum policy experts that we selected based on their expertise in spectrum 

policy as represented by publications, recommendations from other stakeholders, and 

participation in prior GAO reviews. For a full list of the industry stakeholders and experts that 

we interviewed, see enclosure 2. Because we selected a judgmental sample of industry 

stakeholders and experts, the information we obtained from these interviews cannot be 

generalized to all of the industry stakeholders or experts with interests and views on these 

topics. Information obtained from these interviews is intended to provide a sampling of views 

found throughout the telecommunications industry and held by spectrum policy experts. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2012 to November 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

Results in Brief

FCC has generally ensured the availability of licenses and encouraged the efficient use of 

spectrum through its various regulations. Specifically, stakeholders noted that the 

Commission’s rules on frequency coordination, buildout requirements, and operating 

requirements each ensure availability of licenses and encourage efficient use of spectrum. 

First, FCC’s requirement to coordinate new links with existing links protects incumbent 

licensees from interference. Under this requirement, applicants must resolve potential conflicts 

raised by incumbent licensees by, for example, designing links that avoid interfering with the 

signals of incumbent licensees. These procedures ensure availability of licenses by allowing 

the applicant to acquire new links and promote efficiency by increasing overall use of the 

spectrum. Second, FCC’s buildout rule requires licensees to construct and activate links within 

18 months; a licensee that fails to meet this requirement can lose its license. This promotes 

spectrum availability by helping to ensure that unused spectrum is again made available to 

other applicants. This also promotes spectrum efficiency by pushing licensees to build out their 

systems and begin using the spectrum in a timely manner. Third, FCC’s operating rules 

require a licensee to cancel a license if it is not used for any 12-month period after 

construction, a rule that promotes availability by again helping to ensure that unused spectrum 

is available to other applicants and promotes efficiency by requiring use of the spectrum. Most 

industry stakeholders we interviewed told us that as a result of these steps, spectrum is 

generally available in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. Similarly, FCC officials stated that based 

on feedback from industry stakeholders, they believe spectrum is generally available in these 

bands, noting that the Commission almost never rejects applications for licenses in these 

bands. Further, most industry stakeholders stated that FCC’s approach generally encourages

efficient spectrum use, although some stakeholders asserted that this licensing approach 

leads to the inefficient use of spectrum. However, FCC officials stated that the FCC’s process 

encourages firms to cancel unused or underutilized licenses. 

How alternative approaches to FCC’s current licensing regime in these bands would affect 

government revenue and spectrum efficiency depends on FCC’s implementation approach 

and the extent of spectrum availability. Some industry stakeholders stated that using 

competitive bidding, or auctions, could generate additional revenue for the government and 

encourage the efficient use of spectrum. However, the overall effect of such an approach 

would depend on whether spectrum is available and the number of firms assigned licenses 

through an auction—FCC could assign multiple licenses or a single license in a geographic 
Page 4 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

area. For example, where spectrum is generally available, experts believe that competitive 

bidding would not likely increase revenue or spectrum efficiency. In contrast, where spectrum 

is generally unavailable, experts believe that competitive bidding could encourage greater 

spectrum efficiency if FCC assigned licenses to multiple firms in geographic areas; firms that 

place the highest value on obtaining those licenses would receive the licenses in an auction. 

Such an approach might increase government revenue while ensuring a sufficient number of 

licensees exists to promote competition and establish efficient prices for links. Alternatively, 

FCC could use competitive bidding to assign a single license via auction; such an approach 

could increase government revenue, but would also diminish industry competition and thereby 

reduce spectrum efficiency. Spectrum policy experts stated that they believe the primary 

objective of auctions should be efficiency—putting the spectrum in the hands of those best 

able to use it—rather than focusing on revenue. Some industry stakeholders also suggested 

that the application of an additional spectrum fee could help FCC generate additional revenue 

and encourage greater spectrum efficiency. FCC is not currently authorized to assess 

spectrum fees for spectrum licenses,9 but since 2001 has annually requested general authority 

from Congress to do so. Experts noted that the effects of a spectrum fee would depend on the 

amount of the fee and the availability of spectrum in the common carrier bands. In general, the 

application of a spectrum fee would raise the cost of a license, which would potentially 

increase government revenue and, where spectrum is unavailable, encourage spectrum 

efficiency. For example, a spectrum fee above the current regulatory and application fees 

could encourage those who value the spectrum less to pursue other alternatives, thus freeing 

the spectrum for those with who place a higher value on the use of this spectrum. Conversely, 

where spectrum is generally available, spectrum fees could raise some additional revenue; 

however, this could raise the cost of a license and encourage firms to pursue other means to 

transfer communications data, a pursuit that could result in less intensive use of the spectrum 

and, according to some stakeholders, slow broadband deployment. 

Background

The radio-frequency spectrum is the part of the natural spectrum of electromagnetic radiation 

lying between the frequencies of 3 kilohertz (kHz) and 300 GHz. It is the medium for wireless 

communications and supports a vast array of commercial and governmental services. 

Commercial entities use spectrum to provide a variety of wireless services, including mobile 

voice and data, paging, broadcast television and radio, and satellite services. Federal, state, 

and local agencies use spectrum to fulfill a variety of government missions, such as air-traffic 

control, navigation, weather forecasting, and public safety. See figure 1 for examples of how 

spectrum is used. 

 

9

We use the term spectrum fee to refer to a premium charge for licensing spectrum in addition to existing 

application and regulatory fees authorized under the Communications Act, Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, Title I, 

§§ 8, 9, as amended, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 158, 159.
Page 5 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

Figure 1: Examples of Allocated Spectrum Uses

Historically, concern about interference or crowding among users has been a driving force in 

spectrum management. FCC, along with NTIA, works to minimize interference through two 

primary spectrum management functions—the allocation and assignment of radio spectrum. 

Specifically: 

• Allocation involves segmenting the radio spectrum into bands of frequencies that are 

designated for use by particular types of radio services or classes of users. For 

example, the frequency bands from 88 to 108 MHz are allocated to FM radio 

broadcasting in the United States. In addition to allocation, spectrum managers, such 

as FCC and NTIA, specify service rules, which outline the technical and operating 

requirements for stations using specific frequency bands. 

• Assignment, which occurs after spectrum has been allocated, involves providing a 

user, such as commercial entity or government agency, with a license or authorization 

to use a specific portion of spectrum. For example, FCC assigned a license for the 88.5 

MHz band in Washington, D.C., to American University, for its radio station, WAMU. 

Generally, FCC assigns licenses for frequency bands to non-federal users such as 

commercial enterprises, state and local governments, and other entities; NTIA provides 

assignments for federal users. 
Page 6 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

FCC has used a variety of mechanisms to assign spectrum licenses, depending upon whether 

applications for spectrum licenses were mutually exclusive—that is, the grant of a license to 

one entity for a specific portion of the spectrum would preclude the grant of a license, covering 

the same portion of the spectrum, to any additional entities in the same location. Where 

licenses are not mutually exclusive, FCC has used administrative processes to assign 

licenses.10 For example, FCC assigns some licenses on a first-come, first-served basis, where 

licenses are assigned in order of preference based upon when the license applications are 

submitted to FCC. For mutually exclusive applications, FCC has primarily used the following 

three assignment mechanisms:

•

•

Comparative hearings were quasi-judicial proceedings in which competing applicants 

argued why they should be awarded a license, and FCC awarded licenses based on 

pre-established comparative criteria. FCC principally used comparative hearings from 

1934 to 1984. 

•

Lotteries entailed FCC randomly selecting licensees from a pool of qualified applicants. 

Congress authorized FCC to use lotteries to assign mutually exclusive licenses in 

1981, partially in response to the administrative burden associated with comparative 

hearings. FCC used lotteries from 1984 to 1993. 

Competitive bidding, through auctions, is a market-based mechanism in which FCC 

assigns a license to an entity based on the results of competitive bidding for specific 

bands of spectrum. Congress provided FCC with authority to use auctions to assign 

mutually exclusive licenses for certain subscriber-based wireless communications 

services in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.

11 FCC has used 

competitive bidding through auctions to assign spectrum licenses in other bands as 

part of its efforts to promote spectrum efficiency while enabling the government to 

recover a portion of the spectrum’s value.12 Where it accepts mutually exclusive 

applications for initial licenses, FCC is now required to assign those licenses through 

competitive bidding, with certain limited exceptions, such as for public safety and non 

commercial stations.13 

In some frequency bands, FCC authorizes unlicensed use of spectrum—that is, users do not 

need to obtain a license to use the spectrum. Rather, an unlimited number of unlicensed users 

can share frequencies on a non-interference basis, such as with home wireless networks, 

cordless phones, and garage door openers. The assignment process does not apply to the 

use of unlicensed devices. 

 

10In choosing how to assign spectrum licenses, FCC has discretion to adopt a licensing approach that avoids 

mutually exclusive applications, if such an approach serves the public interest. 11Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312, 387-392, amending the 

Communications Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309.

12Specifically, as part of designing an auction, FCC is required to promote economic opportunity, competition, and 

the efficient and intensive use of spectrum. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B),(D). When designing 

competitive bidding systems, FCC is charged with ensuring that new and innovative technologies are readily 

accessible by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of 

applicants, including small businesses. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B). The Commission may not base a finding of public 

interest, convenience, and necessity on the expectation of federal revenues from the use of a system of competitive 

bidding nor may it prescribe regulations solely or predominantly based on such an expectation. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 309(j)(7)(A), (B). FCC is required to seek value for the commercial use of spectrum and avoid unjustly enriching 

auction participants. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C).

1347 USC § 309(j)(1), (2).
Page 7 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

FCC has specifically allocated 18 frequency bands throughout the spectrum for fixed point-topoint uses.14 Fixed point-to-point service refers to a radio communication between two fixed 

points, such as between two stationary cell phone towers. To establish a link between two 

points, users identify a path with an unobstructed line of sight that is free of interference from 

other spectrum uses. At each station (each end of a link), a user must install equipment, such 

as radios and antennas, to transmit and receive communications. In contrast, point-tomultipoint systems transmit communications data originating from one point to multiple users. 

Point-to-multipoint licenses can also be used for point-to-point links. (See fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Configuration of Point-to-Point and Point-to-Multipoint Communications

 

Within the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands, fixed point-to-point microwave licenses are assigned to 

commercial entities and state and local governments for varying purposes. Common carriers, 

such as wireless telephone companies, use these bands to provide communications service to

the public. For example, common carriers use point-to-point links for backhaul connections or 

to connect points on the telephone network that cannot be connected using standard wireline 

technologies because of cost or terrain.15

 

14FCC has allocated frequency bands between 930 MHz and 90 GHz for fixed point-to-point microwave uses. Both 

private and common carrier operations share these microwave bands.

Private operators, primarily firms outside the 

telecommunications industry, use these bands for internal communications. For example, links 

in these bands may be used to operate unattended equipment; record data such as pressure, 

temperature, or speed of machines; or control and monitor various operations along 

installations like pipelines, railroads, and highways. In addition, state and local governments 

can use these bands for public safety purposes, such as relaying emergency calls to police 

and fire stations. According to FCC data, as of August 2012, over 63,000 active common 

carrier and other licenses exist in these bands. (See table 1.)

15Backhaul is the telecommunications industry term that refers to connections between a central 

telecommunications network and other nodes outside the central network, such a cell phone tower.
Page 8 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

Table 1: Active Fixed Point-To-Point Microwave Licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz Bands, August 2012

License Category 11 GHz 18 GHz 23 GHz Total

Common carrier 12,105 8,514 4,191 24,810

Private operational 8,285 9,177 11,715 29,177

Private operational - public safety service 4,529 2,650 2,009 9,188

Other 9 333 4 346

Total 24,928 20,674 17,919 63,521

Source: GAO analysis of FCC data.

Note: Each license may contain one or more point-to-point paths that transmit to different end points from the same origin station. 

Each path may also contain multiple frequencies. 

FCC assigns common carrier fixed point-to-point licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands on 

a first-come, first-served basis. Prior to submitting an application, applicants are required to 

coordinate with existing spectrum users.16 As part of this process, applicants typically work 

with a private third party firm, known as a frequency coordinator, to communicate with existing 

license holders to minimize and control potential interference between existing and proposed 

links. Once a frequency coordinator has identified a path and frequency that does not interfere 

with existing users, the applicant submits an application to FCC. As part of the application for 

a license, which would be granted for 10 years, applicants pay a $270 processing fee as well 

as 10 year’s worth of regulatory fees totaling $250.17 Once assigned, a single license 

authorizes transmission from a single point, and because these licenses are assigned based 

on transmit locations, a user would need two licenses (one for each transmitter) in order to 

transmit from both end points in a point-to-point link.

FCC Has Taken Regulatory Steps to Help Ensure License Availability and Encourage 

Spectrum Efficiency

License Availability

Industry stakeholders identified a number of key regulatory actions taken by FCC and stated 

that these actions help ensure licenses are available in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz common

carrier bands. 

• Frequency Coordination. Several industry stakeholders we spoke with noted that the 

required frequency coordination provides a strong incentive for technical cooperation 

among licensees and protects incumbent licensees from interference.18 Specifically, 

according to stakeholders, the frequency coordination process has fostered 

communication across all spectrum users, and resulted in a number of working groups 

 

1647 C.F.R. § 101.21(f). 17FCC generated approximately $2.1 million per year on average in regulatory and application fees for new and 

modified common carrier licenses in these bands from 2007 through 2011. FCC’s regulatory fees are based on its 

regulatory costs, calculated and adjusted on an annual basis. For more on FCC’s regulatory cost structure, see 

GAO, Federal Communications Commission: Regulatory Fee Process Needs to Be Updated, GAO-12-686

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2012).

18FCC’s frequency coordination rule, at 47 C.F.R. § 101.103(d), requires that an applicant, before filing its 

application with FCC, notify potentially affected licensees about the technical parameters of the proposed new radio 

system. Incumbent licensees should respond as quickly as possible and any response indicating potential 

interference must be provided to the applicant within 30 days. 
Page 9 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

to establish coordination practices.19

• Buildout Requirements. Stakeholders stated that FCC’s requirements to construct and 

activate links within a given time period after receiving a license help promote license 

availability. FCC requires that the licensee build out its system to operate the link within 

18 months of a license assignment.

Furthermore, communication between license 

holders during the coordination process helps minimize conflicts. This communication 

helps ensure license availability by allowing the applicant to identify potential instances 

of interference and proactively design a link that most efficiently avoids interfering with 

incumbent licensees’ signals. In addition, some stakeholders noted that because many 

existing license holders frequently add new licenses and paths, stakeholders who 

operate in these bands have a strong incentive to ensure that new licenses do not 

preclude future uses of the spectrum. 

20 FCC’s process requires licensees to demonstrate 

that this requirement has been met; failure to do so results in automatic termination of 

the license, absent a showing that it is due to causes beyond the licensee’s control.

21

• Operating Requirements. FCC has also established procedures for termination of an 

unused license after a link has been constructed. For example, FCC requires that a 

licensee must cancel a license if it is unused for a 12-month period any time after 

construction is completed, or if operations are discontinued for 30 days or more 

because of voluntary changes made to the station by the licensee.

At that time, the spectrum previously reserved by the terminated license again 

becomes available to other interested parties that may apply for it. FCC publishes, on a 

weekly basis, details of licenses that are nearing the end of the 18-month period, thus 

providing information to the public about spectrum that may become available. 

22

• Additional Spectrum Allocation. FCC has allocated additional spectrum in other bands 

for fixed point-to-point operations, thus reducing some demand for these licenses in the 

11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. In an August 2011 order,

Similar to the 

buildout requirements, this helps to ensure availability by taking unused spectrum and 

making it once again available to applicants. Stakeholders also noted that the 

operating requirements, in conjunction with the buildout requirements, work to 

discourage speculative acquisition of licenses. 

23 FCC concluded that it could 

expand the spectrum allocated for fixed-microwave service by permitting fixed point-topoint operations in the 7 and 13 GHz bands, in rural areas where certain television 

broadcast auxiliary microwave operations are not licensed.24

 

19Many procedures in frequency coordination were developed informally by private sector frequency coordinators. 

For example, FCC’s rules require that coordination notices be sent to licensees operating in the same area whose 

existing or planned usage could be affected by a proposed license. In practice, frequency coordinators send notices 

to licensees that share the same band and are located within 125 miles of the licenses being proposed. Beyond this 

distance, interference between licensees is generally considered unlikely.

Prior to this order, this 

spectrum was allocated for use only by television broadcast auxiliary microwave 

operations, though these bands are also well suited for microwave backhaul 

operations.

2047 C.F.R. § 101.63(a).

2147 C.F.R. §§ 101.63(c), (e); id. § 1.946(e). 2247 C.F.R. §§ 101.65(b), (a), 101.305(d). 23In the Matter of Amendment of Part 101 of the Commission’s Rules, 26 FCC Rcd. 11614, 11623 (2011).

24Broadcast auxiliary microwave operations allow television and radio stations to transmit program material from 

the sites of breaking news stories to studios, to transmit program material from studios to broadcast transmitters, 

and to transmit programs between broadcast stations.
Page 10 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

As a result of these actions, most industry stakeholders we spoke with—frequency 

coordinators, licensees, and industry associations—told us that licenses are generally 

available in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. Frequency coordinators told us that they can 

nearly always find a path to support a microwave link, even in heavily congested areas. They 

noted that coordination failures in these bands are uncommon, and one coordinator estimated 

that he is unable to meet a client’s need in less than one percent of requests. However, 

frequency coordinators and licensees do report difficulty in getting desired licenses in certain 

locations. For example, each frequency coordinator cited a few urban areas, such as New

York City, where coordination was more challenging. Two coordinators also noted challenges 

in certain mountainous areas where numerous licensees depend on a single tower as a path 

over the mountain. Licensees also told us that frequency coordination is nearly always 

successful for point-to-point links within these bands. For example, seven licensees, including 

four nationwide broadband service providers, said they had no difficulty obtaining needed 

licenses. However, some licensees identified limited instances when licenses were difficult to 

obtain for specific locations. For example, three licensees said they have modest difficulty 

obtaining licenses, particularly in Washington, D.C., and Denver, Colorado, where microwave 

operations share spectrum with satellite operations. Most licensees said they can get the 

licenses they need, though they may need to use a less desirable path or frequency. All four 

industry associations we contacted said that FCC’s approach has been successful at helping 

to assure spectrum availability for new license applicants.

While stakeholders report few problems acquiring licenses, the lack of available data make it 

difficult to quantify the availability of spectrum in these bands. First, there is no finite limit on 

the number of links in a given area because the potential number of links in an area depends 

on how links are arranged. Accordingly, engineers we spoke with told us that there is no way 

to know how many links can be created in a given area. Second, frequency coordinators told 

us they do not keep data on coordination failures because such failures are so rare. Third, 

FCC does not maintain data on spectrum availability in these bands. FCC does not track data 

on applications rejected because of a lack of available spectrum because the frequency 

coordination process is designed to ensure that a workable path is identified before an 

application is submitted to FCC. As a result, FCC officials stated that they almost never reject 

applications for common carrier microwave licenses because of a lack of available spectrum; 

rather application dismissals are generally the result of incomplete applications or unpaid 

application fees.25 FCC officials stated that based on feedback from industry stakeholders, 

they believe that spectrum is generally available. For example, in 2012, when FCC asked for 

public comments on the rejection of applications for licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz 

bands,26 all six public respondents—three licensees, two trade associations, and a frequency 

coordinator—said that rejections rarely occur because of a lack of available spectrum in these 

bands. Four respondents did mention that adjustments might be needed in the path originally 

proposed.27 In addition, FCC stated that secondary market transactions, such as the transfer 

of licenses between firms, are rare, a statement that suggests that most firms find that licenses 

are generally available through FCC.

 

25For example, in 2011, FCC rejected approximately 100 applications in nearly 2,659 applications for new common 

carrier licenses in these bands because of such administrative reasons. As noted previously, an application may 

propose more than one path for a given license. 26Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Information from the Public for Report to Congress on Microwave 

Bands, 27 FCC Rcd. 7062 (2012).

27FCC asked for information on the rejection rate of requests for common-carrier use of spectrum in the 11, 18, and 

23 GHz bands. FCC specified that the rejection rate should include both applications made to the Commission and 

requests made to third-party coordinators.
Page 11 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

Spectrum Efficiency

According to many licensees and other industry stakeholders, FCC’s process for assigning 

licenses in these bands also promotes spectrum efficiency. Specifically, the stakeholders

noted that many of the same regulations established by FCC to ensure availability also help 

promote efficient spectrum use. 

• Frequency Coordination. According to an economics study, well-defined liability rules 

combined with procedures for identifying and resolving conflicts provides incentives to 

use spectrum efficiently.28

• Buildout Requirements. As previously discussed, FCC’s regulations prescribe a 

maximum construction period that if unmet, results in the termination of unused 

licenses. In addition to promoting availability, FCC’s buildout requirements promote 

efficiency by ensuring that licensees build their links on a timely basis or allow other 

potential licensees the opportunity to use the spectrum.

FCC’s coordination rules are based on the principle that 

existing users should be protected from harmful interference caused by later users. 

During the coordination process, applicants must demonstrate to existing users that 

they will not cause interference above a specified level. In addition, frequency 

coordinators may recommend that new entrants pay for interference-eliminating 

upgrades for incumbents’ equipment. Because the process accommodates new 

licenses without interference to existing licenses, the addition of each new user 

increases the overall use of the spectrum. 

• Operating Requirements. Through regulations, FCC has established operating 

standards for licensees in common carrier bands to encourage efficient spectrum use. 

As noted previously, a licensee must cancel a license if it is unused for a 12-month 

period any time after construction is completed, or if operations are discontinued for 30 

days or more because of voluntary changes to the station. In addition to these 

requirements, FCC has also established equipment capacity requirements for common 

carrier bands. For example, in each of the common carrier bands, new licensees are 

required to comply with minimum equipment capacities to ensure that licensees use 

their acquired spectrum.29

Nevertheless, some industry stakeholders stated that FCC rules may not fully encourage 

efficient use of common carrier spectrum. Although FCC allows for the cancellation of a whole 

license at no charge and returns the unused portion of the original regulatory fee, licensees 

are required to pay an application fee to cancel an unused path on an active license. 

Furthermore, stakeholders said that FCC does not actively monitor compliance with its rules 

even though the operating standards regulate minimum capacity and non-use to promote 

efficiency. For example, FCC requires licensees to turn in unused licenses, but relies on 

licensees to self-report compliance with this requirement. FCC typically only investigates 

compliance with its rules when other industry stakeholders notify the Commission about 

possible non-compliance. As a result, some industry stakeholders speculated that there may 

be some portion of these bands in which spectrum is licensed but unused.

These requirements help encourage the intensive use of 

spectrum in these bands. 

 

28Carson E. Agnew and Richard G. Gould, “Frequency Coordination and Spectrum Economics,” Research in Law 

and Economics, vol. 9 (1986): 167-184. 29FCC created minimum capacity requirements for new digital equipment placed in service after 2005. 47 C.F.R. 

§ 101.41(a)(1)(ii).
Page 12 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

FCC officials acknowledged that FCC relies mainly on licensee self-reporting to ensure 

compliance with many of these regulatory requirements. However, they stated that because of 

the resources required to monitor compliance with even a sample of the 64,000 licenses in 

operation, the Commission does not independently verify whether licensees are in compliance 

with construction and operating requirements. Furthermore, FCC officials noted that from a

technical perspective, it is difficult to monitor the energy emitted from a microwave station. 

Nevertheless, FCC officials stated that FCC’s process generally encourages firms to cancel 

unused or underutilized licenses. According to FCC, licensees voluntarily canceled and 

returned 474 common carrier licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands in 2011. In addition, 

FCC terminated 27 common carrier licenses in these bands for failure to meet regulatory 

requirements in 2011, including the buildout and operating requirements. By comparison, FCC 

received over 2,600 applications for new, similar licenses in these bands during the same 

period. 

The Effect of Alternative Assignment Approaches on Revenue and Spectrum Efficiency 

Would Depend upon FCC’s Implementation Approach and Spectrum Availability 

Competitive Bidding

Some telecommunications companies have suggested that using competitive bidding 

(auctions) could help encourage spectrum efficiency in the common carrier microwave bands 

and increase the revenue generated from the assignment of licenses. Experts and industry 

participants stated that assigning individual point-to-point licenses through an auction would be 

impractical because of the nearly infinite number of links that could be created in this spectrum 

and would generate limited interest from firms. Experts stated that competitive bidding, if 

adopted by FCC, should instead assign area-wide licenses exclusive to a geographic or 

metropolitan area. FCC has previously used auctions to assign some point-to-point and pointto-multipoint licenses on an exclusive geographic, area-wide basis. Applied to the common

carrier bands, the licensee could use the spectrum authorized by the area-wide license to 

lease links to other common carriers. In this scenario, the licensee would thus perform the 

frequency coordination and assignment functions currently performed by frequency 

coordinators and FCC, respectively. However, the results of these types of auctions have 

varied. For example, in 2000, FCC made 2,450 point-to-point licenses in the 39 GHz band 

available for purchase at auction. The auction sold nearly 90 percent of the licenses, raising 

$410 million for the U.S. Treasury. However, in 2004, FCC only sold 7 of the 880 point-to-point 

and point-to-multipoint licenses available in the 24 GHz band, raising about $216,000. Industry 

stakeholders attributed the outcome of the 2004 auction to economic conditions within the 

telecommunications industry, among other things.

FCC could use competitive bidding to assign multiple area-wide licenses for a metropolitan 

area in each of the common carrier bands, but experts stated that the effects of such an 

approach would depend on the availability of spectrum in the bands. In structuring the auction, 

FCC would need to determine how many firms to license in a given band and geographic area; 

FCC would want to ensure a sufficient number of licensees to promote competition and 

efficient prices for the resulting links. The auction winners could then use the licenses to lease 

links under these licenses to other firms similar to how FCC currently assigns point-to-point 

licenses to firms, or use the licenses for their own business purposes. However, the ultimate 

outcome of the auction would depend on whether spectrum for these licenses was available. 

As previously discussed, few instances of scarcity exist in the common carrier bands. 

Accordingly, in an environment where spectrum was available, experts stated that such an 

approach would be unlikely to increase spectrum efficiency or government revenue. However, 
Page 13 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

if there was a spectrum shortage in these bands, competitive bidding could provide a means to 

assign spectrum to users who place the highest value on that spectrum and may generate 

additional revenue.

Alternatively, FCC could use competitive bidding to assign a single exclusive, area-wide 

license via auction; such an approach could increase government revenue, but would also 

reduce spectrum efficiency as a result of diminished industry competition. For example, FCC 

could design an auction that results in a single, exclusive license for each metropolitan area 

for the three common carrier bands. Potential licensees would submit bids based on their 

expected ability to charge higher prices as a result of being the sole supplier of common 

carrier links in their awarded geographic area. However, such an approach would result in a 

loss of spectrum efficiency, since the higher prices created by the establishment of a sole 

provider in each band would result in less intensive use of the spectrum. Spectrum policy 

experts we spoke with opposed the use of this approach because such a policy might 

artificially create spectrum shortages and reduce spectrum efficiency.

Regardless of any FCC competitive bidding approach, the Commission would need to 

determine how current license holders would be affected. FCC could encourage existing pointto-point operators to migrate to other frequencies allocated for point-to-point users. For 

example, when FCC relocated spectrum from fixed point-to-point uses in the 2.1 GHz bands in 

2006, FCC required the new license holders to negotiate with existing license holders to help 

them relocate to other sections of the radio-frequency spectrum. These negotiations were 

designed to determine relocation costs. As part of these negotiations, new license holders 

were generally expected to pay the cost of relocating existing users, which would include 

replacing systems as needed, completing frequency coordination for the new links, and 

covering any increased operating costs resulting from the use of a different frequency. We 

have previously reported that FCC’s re-assignment process can be lengthy.30 In the case of 

the 2.1 GHz bands, these efforts began in 2006 and are still under way. Furthermore, FCC 

officials stated that other bands may not be able to accommodate the existing licensees in the 

11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. Alternatively, some industry stakeholders suggested that existing 

license holders could work with auction winners to retain their licenses in these bands once an 

existing licensee’s 10-year license term has concluded. Under such a scenario, existing 

licensees would decide at the end of their license term either to lease spectrum from auction 

winners, or terminate their licenses and relocate to another frequency. Some industry 

stakeholders also stated that FCC might consider protecting the rights of existing license 

holders and only auction unused spectrum in these bands. 

Experts and industry stakeholders provided a range of views on the use of competitive bidding 

to assign licenses in these bands. Experts stated that the primary objective of these auctions 

should be increasing efficiency—putting the spectrum in the hands of those best able to use 

it—rather than maximizing revenue. Some experts pointed out that auctions have the potential 

to raise a lot of money for the government and assign spectrum quickly, but auctions do not 

always promote efficient spectrum use. Furthermore, as previously discussed, experts stated 

that unless spectrum is unavailable, competitive bidding is unlikely to produce any additional 

revenue or spectrum efficiency. Many common carrier licensees as well as industry 

stakeholders we spoke with noted that the reduced competition that might come from the use 

of an auction could result in a variety of negative outcomes, though many of these effects 

would be limited to areas where shortages exist. They stated that an auction could allow a few 

 

30GAO, Commercial Spectrum: Plans and Actions to Meet Future Needs, Including Continued Use of Auctions, 

GAO-12-118 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 2011).
Page 14 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

firms to control significant amounts of both wireless licenses and wireline alternatives. In 

addition, where shortages exist, an auction could increase the cost of obtaining a microwave 

link. Specifically, common carrier licensees and stakeholders said that winning firms may try to 

raise prices for firms without spectrum licenses by reducing the number of available links. 

Firms speculated that as the cost of obtaining a link increased, spectrum efficiency would be 

reduced thus slowing broadband deployment in these bands. Moreover, according to the firms, 

competitive bidding could encourage speculative acquisition of microwave licenses, prompting 

some firms to buy up spectrum where shortages exist and resell it at a profit, rather than use it 

for their own needs. However, as previously discussed, spectrum is generally available in 

these bands, and thus the potential for such speculative actions appears limited.

Spectrum Fees

FCC has argued that licenses that limit spectrum to specific uses, such as the licenses in the 

common carrier bands, do not provide market signals about new uses with potentially higher 

value. According to the National Broadband Plan, additional spectrum fees, beyond FCC’s 

regulatory fee, might help certain licensees consider the value of their spectrum by comparing 

their valuation of the spectrum to the amount of the spectrum fee.31 Thus, the amount of the 

fee should reflect the best feasible alternative use of that spectrum, also known as the 

opportunity cost of the spectrum. According to the plan, spectrum fees may help to free 

spectrum for new uses such as broadband services, since licensees that use spectrum 

inefficiently may reduce their holdings as the cost of the fee increases. However, FCC is not 

currently authorized to assess spectrum fees on licenses; it has annually requested general 

authority to do so from Congress since 2001. 

Some industry stakeholders have identified spectrum fees as an approach that might help 

FCC generate additional revenue and encourage greater spectrum efficiency in the common 

carrier bands. For example, some stakeholders have stated that FCC’s current licensing 

approach does not capture the value of the spectrum assigned to users; instead, FCC’s 

current fee structure is designed to recover the cost of processing applications and 

administering the licensing regime. A spectrum fee approach might involve, for example, an 

additional fee assessed per license based on the amount of spectrum used by a licensee, or a 

fee assessed on all common carrier licenses in a given geographic area. 

The effects of a spectrum fee applied to licenses in the common carrier bands would depend 

on the availability of spectrum and the extent to which increases in the cost of a license affect 

potential licensees. Spectrum policy experts stated that the amount of the spectrum fee should 

be set to encourage efficiency, rather than maximize revenue, since the latter approach could 

result in unused spectrum and would therefore be inefficient. Where spectrum is unavailable or 

scarce, a spectrum fee could potentially increase government revenue and encourage 

spectrum efficiency. Specifically, a spectrum fee above the current regulatory and application 

fees could encourage those that value the spectrum less to pursue other alternatives, thus 

freeing the spectrum for those with who place a higher value on the use of this spectrum. For 

example, some experts suggested that if FCC applied a spectrum fee in select urban areas 

when demand exceeds supply, it could generate additional revenue and encourage links to be 

acquired by those who value them the most. However, if spectrum is available, a spectrum fee 

has the potential to raise additional revenue, but might be offset by a decrease in the use of 

spectrum of these bands. For example, users that place a high value on use of this spectrum 

will continue to use the spectrum and would be willing to pay more than the current fees, thus 

 

31FCC, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2010), 82-83.
Page 15 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

potentially increasing government revenue. However, once the fee exceeds a user’s value for 

the license, the users may decide to pursue other spectrum or wireline alternatives, thus 

reducing the use of this spectrum. Furthermore, both changes to government revenue and 

spectrum efficiency would depend on whether the increase in price motivates common carriers 

to use alternatives to these bands. For example, raising the cost of a license in the common 

carrier bands could encourage firms to pursue other means to transfer communications data. 

According to some industry stakeholders, a spectrum fee could increase the demand on other

already congested data transmission methods, including other spectrum licenses, fiber optic 

lines, or other services. In addition, stakeholders suggested that spectrum fees could raise the 

cost of broadband, thus reducing its adoption. 

Concluding Observations

FCC’s current approach to assigning common carrier licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz 

bands has generally ensured licenses in these bands are available and encouraged spectrum 

efficiency. While most stakeholders noted that spectrum is currently generally available in 

these bands, no data exists to definitively determine how much spectrum is available in these 

bands, and some stakeholders have experienced difficulty obtaining licenses in some urban 

areas. Without definitive information on spectrum availability in these bands, it is unclear 

whether there is a need for other approaches, such as the use of competitive bidding or the 

application of spectrum fees, to generate more revenue for the government and increase 

spectrum efficiency. Moreover, it may be challenging to design and implement approaches 

that would successfully increase both revenue and spectrum efficiency. However, as the 

demand for spectrum is not static, and if spectrum becomes less available in the future, these 

alternative assignment approaches might become preferable to the current approach when 

assigning licenses in these bands. 

Agency Comments 

We provided a draft of this report to FCC for comment. FCC provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated where appropriate. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman of the Federal Communications 

Commission, and the appropriate congressional committees. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in enclosure 3. 

Mark L. Goldstein

Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues
Enclosure I

Page 16 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

Views on the Implications of FCC’s Common Carrier Licensing Process on Related 

Spectrum

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has assigned some exclusive use, 

geographically-based licenses in bands outside the 11, 18, and 23 gigahertz (GHz) common 

carrier bands and some stakeholders have suggested that these licenses could serve as 

alternatives to the use of spectrum in the common carrier bands. FCC assigned exclusive, 

geographic licenses in these bands (referred to as related spectrum) through auctions that 

occurred from 1998 to 2000, with winning bidders receiving the exclusive right to operate in an 

assigned geographic area and frequency range. Stakeholders identified point-to-multipoint 

licenses in the Local Multipoint Distribution Service (LMDS) bands, which include frequencies 

from 27.5 GHz through 31.3 GHz, as well as licenses in the 39 GHz band as potential 

alternatives to common carrier licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands.

Some firms holding geographic point-to-multipoint licenses in the related spectrum have 

argued that FCC’s process for assigning licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands

discourages the efficient use of the LMDS and 39 GHz bands. Owners of these area-wide 

licenses in related bands said that FCC’s licensing process undercuts their ability to compete 

in the backhaul market and to lease point-to-point links in their spectrum to other firms. These 

firms stated that the private sector considers licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz as similar to 

licenses in the LMDS and 39 GHz bands, and that this creates downward pressure on their 

prices to align with the price for obtaining a point-to-point license in the common carrier bands 

from FCC. The firms suggested that by setting a low price for common carrier spectrum, FCC 

encourages the overuse of common carrier spectrum, and the underutilization of spectrum 

licensed for exclusive use in other bands, such as in the LMDS and 39 GHz bands. 

Specifically, they further suggested that the current FCC application and regulatory fees for 

common carrier licenses force the licensees in related bands to price their spectrum at a 

discount (from its value and utility as reflected by the price originally paid at auction) in order to 

compete for licensees. For example, one owner of related spectrum licenses said it has leased 

services in these related bands at rates below what it considers the value of the spectrum in 

order to compete with common carrier licenses. Accordingly, some of the firms holding related 

spectrum licenses suggested that FCC should consider alternative assignment approaches for 

licensing common carrier spectrum, in order to promote parity between the price of their 

licenses and that of common carrier licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. 

Experts disagreed with the suggestion that FCC should promote parity between the licenses in 

the LMDS and 39 GHz bands and the common carrier licenses in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz

bands. Some experts noted that raising the price of a common carrier license could 

discourage use of these bands, thus reducing efficient use of the common carrier spectrum. 

Furthermore, some experts questioned the idea that FCC should seek to promote parity 

between the common carrier licenses and the point-to-multipoint licenses as a policy goal. For 

example, FCC’s point-to-point licensing process was in place at the time of the point-tomultipoint auctions so bidders had the opportunity to factor any potential effects of FCC’s 

common carrier licensing process on the value of the exclusive licenses into their bid prices. In 

addition, this spectrum was not, at that time, considered to be an alternative to common carrier 

licenses, and it has only been in the last few years that the use of this spectrum as a potential 

alternative has become practical. 

Furthermore, key differences between these exclusive spectrum licenses and the common 

carrier licenses exist, raising doubts about the whether the value of a license in the LMDS and 

39 GHz bands is comparable to the value of a common carrier license. First, FCC operational 
Enclosure I

Page 17 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

rules generally provide significant flexibility to licensees operating in both the LMDS and 39 

GHz bands. For example, licensees are permitted to offer point-to-multipoint and point-to-point 

services. Licensees in the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands can only use their licenses for specific 

point-to-point applications. Second, licensees in the LMDS and 39 GHz bands also have 

exclusive use of the spectrum in the specific area covered by their licenses. Spectrum in the 

11, 18, and 23 GHz bands is licensed based on transmit locations and paths, so FCC can 

assign new licenses to multiple firms in a given geographic area. Third, the physical properties 

of the exclusive-use bands may differ from the 11, 18, and 23 GHz bands. The path length 

supported by related spectrum is short, compared to a common carrier license path. For 

example, an LMDS path can be no greater than 5 miles while an 11 GHz band path can be 

over 20 miles long. In fact, licensees in the LMDS and 39 GHz bands stated that licenses in 

these bands may offer advantages over conventional common carrier licenses. For example, 

licensees noted that they can provide faster availability to users because the frequencies in 

these bands can be coordinated more quickly than in the common carrier frequencies, which 

are coordinated through FCC’s licensing approach. 

Some common carrier licensees said they do not consider these particular exclusive licenses 

as a viable alternative for their point-to-point backhaul needs, but others see these licenses as 

having potential to help meet the growing demand for backhaul.

32

 

32Backhaul is the telecommunications industry term that refers to connections between a central 

telecommunications network and other nodes outside the central network, such a cell phone tower.

Some common carrier 

licensees cited disadvantages of related spectrum that included its short range; the high cost 

of equipment, as compared to the readily available equipment for 11, 18, and 23 GHz licenses; 

and the higher cost of leasing spectrum for point-to-point service from the licenses compared 

to the cost of applying for an FCC license. However, some other common carrier licensees 

stated that spectrum in the LMDS and 39 GHz bands has a number of advantages that make it 

a potential alternative to common carrier spectrum, including its greater availability (compared 

to common carrier spectrum) and recent improvements in available equipment. For example, 

one licensee told us that it prefers to utilize its existing LMDS licenses for backhaul because 

this band is particularly useful for establishing short links in dense urban areas.
Enclosure II

Page 18 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

List of Stakeholders and Experts GAO Contacted For Views on FCC Licensing 

Approaches

Table 2: Non-Government Industry Stakeholders and Experts Interviewed

Industry Stakeholders

AT&T

Bel Air Internet 

Clearwire Corp.

Comsearch

CTIA – The Wireless Association

Exalt Communications 

Fiber Tower 

Fixed Wireless Communications Coalition

IDT Spectrum

MetroPCS 

Micronet Communications

National Spectrum Management Association

Radyn, Inc. 

Sprint/Nextel

Telecom Transport Management, Inc.

T-Mobile

Verizon Wireless

Widelity, Inc.

XC Networks

XO Communications

Experts 

Coleman Bazelon, The Brattle Group

Michael Calabrese, New America Foundation

Thomas Hazlett, George Mason University School of Law

Benjamin Lennett, New America Foundation

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

Gregory Rosston, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Source: GAO.
Enclosure III

Page 19 GAO-13-78R Spectrum Management

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact listed above, Michael Clements (Assistant Director), Stephen Brown, 

Russ Burnett, Richard Calhoon, Colin Fallon, Bert Japikse, Hai Tran, and Matt Voit made 

major contributions to this product.

(543302)
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