FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL,

INC., a Delaware corporation;

FIDELITY EXPRESS NETWORK, INC., a

California corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COLIN H. FRIEDMAN, individually

and as trustee of Friedman Family

trust UDT Dated 7/23/87; HEDY

KRAMER FRIEDMAN, individually

and as trustee of Friedman Family

trust UDT Dated 7/23/87; FARID

MESHKATAI, an individual; ANITA

KRAMER MESHKATAI, individually

and as trustee of Anita Kramer

Living Trust Dated 7/23/87,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15913

D.C. No.

CV 15-2288 DJH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 12, 2018

San Francisco, California

Filed August 22, 2019
2 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Mary H. Murguia,

Circuit Judges, and Robert N. Chatigny,

*

 District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

SUMMARY**

Registration of Judgments

The panel reversed the district court’s order vacating a

registered judgment and remanded.

Plaintiffs obtained a civil fraud judgment in California

federal court and registered this California judgment in the

District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Plaintiffs

later attempted to renew the Arizona judgment, but the

district court ruled that the renewal or re-registration was void

as untimely. Plaintiffs next registered the California

judgment in Washington federal court and then registered the

newly-obtained Washington judgment in the District of

Arizona. The district court granted defendants’ motion under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the newly-registered second

Arizona judgment as void. In a prior appeal, the court of

appeals reversed, holding that registering the California

judgment in Washington created a “new” Washington

judgment that could be re-registered in another state under

* The Honorable Robert N. Chatigny, United States District Judge for

the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN 3

§ 1963. On remand, the district court again granted relief

under Rule 60(b) on the ground that the Washington

judgment was void because the Western District of

Washington lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants

at the time of registration.

The panel reversed, holding that a court need not have

personal jurisdiction over a judgment debtor in order to

“merely register” a previously obtained judgment pursuant to

§ 1963. The panel held that § 1963 itself does not require that

the court have personal jurisdiction. Further, the Due Process

Clause does not require that a court in which a judgment

creditor registers a pre-existing federal judgment have

personal jurisdiction over judgment debtors at the time of

registration. The panel held that once a federal court of

competent jurisdiction has determined the parties’ substantive

rights and entered a judgment following a proceeding that

comports with due process, that federal judgment should be

enforceable in any other federal district by way of the federal

judgment registration statute.

COUNSEL

Thomas H. Case (argued) and Michael G. King, Hennelly &

Grossfeld LLP, Marina del Rey, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

David M. Bass (argued), David M. Bass & Associates Inc.,

Los Angeles, California; Dominica J. Minore, The Law

Offices of Dominica J. Minore P.C., Scottsdale Arizona; for

Defendants-Appellees.
4 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

In order to facilitate the enforcement of federal

judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 provides that a judgment

entered in a federal court may be registered in any other

federal district by “filing a certified copy of the judgment” in

that district. In this case we address, as a matter of first

impression in our Circuit, whether personal jurisdiction over

the judgment debtors in the district of registration is required

for such registration of a judgment. We hold that it is not,

because neither § 1963 nor due process imposes such a

personal jurisdiction requirement. We therefore reverse the

order and judgment of the district court, and remand.

BACKGROUND

In 2002, Plaintiffs-Appellants FidelityNational Financial,

Inc., and Fidelity Express Network, Inc. (collectively,

“Fidelity”), obtained a multimillion dollar civil fraud

judgment (the “California Judgment”) against DefendantsAppellees the Friedmans and Meshkatais (collectively,

“Defendants”) in the U.S. District Court for the Central

District of California. This judgment became final on May

15, 2003, after this Court dismissed Defendants’ appeal from

the judgment.

While Defendants’ appeal in the original case was

pending, Fidelity registered the California Judgment in the

District of Arizona pursuant to the federal registration statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1963. In 2007, Fidelity attempted to renew the

Arizona judgment. However, on March 2, 2012, the District

Court of Arizona ruled that Fidelity’s 2007 renewal or re-
FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN 5

registration of the Arizona registered judgment were void as

untimely, because the judgment had already expired under

Arizona’s five-year statute of limitations for the enforcement

of judgments.

Unable to enforce the Arizona registered judgment or reregister the original California Judgment in Arizona, Fidelity

came up with a creative alternative. Fidelity registered the

California Judgment in the Western District of Washington

(the “Washington Judgment”) Fidelity then registered the

newly-obtained Washington Judgment in the District of

Arizona (the “Second Arizona Judgment”).

Several months later, Defendants moved the Arizona

District Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to

vacate the newly-registered Second Arizona Judgment as

void, arguing that § 1963 did not allow successive registration

of federal judgments. That is, Defendants argued that

registering the California Judgment in Washington did not

create a new Washington judgment that could then be

registered in Arizona under § 1963. Defendants also argued

that, in any case, the Washington Judgment was invalid for

lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. The Arizona

district court granted Defendants’ motion and vacated the

Second Arizona Judgment, holding that § 1963 did not allow

successive registration of judgments—in other words, that

only an original judgment, such as the California Judgment in

this case, may be registered in another district under § 1963. 

See Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, 939 F. Supp. 2d 974,

979–87 (D. Ariz. 2013). The district court did not reach

Defendants’ second argument regarding lack of due process

and personal jurisdiction. Id. at 986–87.
6 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

Fidelity appealed, and this Court reversed. Fid. Nat’l

Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, 803 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2015)

(“Fidelity I”). We held that registering the California

Judgment in Washington created a “new” Washington

judgment that, like any other Washington judgment, could be

re-registered in another state under the plain terms of § 1963. 

Id. at 1003. We remanded the case to the Arizona district

court on that basis, without reaching Defendants’ alternative

argument that the Washington Judgment was void for lack of

jurisdiction over Defendants. See id. at 1003 n.3.

On remand, the district court again granted Defendants’

Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, after allowing

supplemental briefing on Defendants’ contention that the

Washington Judgment was void because the Western District

of Washington lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants

at the time of registration. See Fid. Nat’l Fin. Inc. v.

Friedman, No. CV-15-2288-PHX-DJH, 2017 WL 6049376

(D. Ariz. May 1, 2017). The district court held that

registration of a judgment pursuant to § 1963 requires that the

court of registration have personal jurisdiction over the

judgment debtors. See id. at *6–7. In reaching this

conclusion, the district court first noted that a judgment is

void if the court that “rendered” the judgment lacked

jurisdiction over the parties. Id. at *5. It then reasoned that

because we suggested in Fidelity I that registering a judgment

under § 1963 creates a “new” judgment, the court of

registration can be said to have “rendered” a judgment such

that the normal jurisdictional requirements apply. See id. at

*5–7. Because Defendants had no assets or other contacts in

Washington, the district court concluded that the Washington

court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants;

consequently, that the Washington Judgment was void and

could not have been validly registered in Arizona. Id. at *4,
FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN 7

*7. As a result, the district court vacated the Second Arizona

Judgment. Fidelity again appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “review[s] de novo . . . a district court’s ruling

upon a Rule 60(b)(4) motion . . . because the question of the

validity of a judgment is a legal one.” Export Grp. v. Reef

Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1995); see also

Fidelity I, 803 F.3d at 1001.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Fidelity asserts that the district court

improperlygranted relief from judgment because a court need

not have personal jurisdiction over a judgment debtor in order

to “merely register” a previously obtained judgment pursuant

to § 1963. For the reasons explained below, we agree.

First, neither the relevant statute’s plain language nor its

purpose supports a personal jurisdiction requirement for

registration of a judgment. Section 1963 provides:

A judgment in an action for the recovery of

money or property entered in any court of

appeals, district court, bankruptcy court, or in

the Court of International Trade may be

registered by filing a certified copy of the

judgment in any other district . . . when the

judgment has become final by appeal or

expiration of the time for appeal or when

ordered by the court that entered the judgment

for good cause shown. . . . A judgment so

registered shall have the same effect as a
8 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

judgment of the district court of the district

where registered and may be enforced in like

manner.

28 U.S.C. § 1963. Nothing in this provision limits the district

courts in which a judgment may be registered to only those

that can assert personal jurisdiction over the judgment

debtors. Instead, the provision’s text is extremely broad,

allowing a judgment entered in “any . . . district court” to be

registered “in any other district.” Id. Furthermore, the fact

that registering a judgment in another district simply requires

“filing a certified copy of the judgment” suggests that the

registration process is intended to be simple, essentially an

administrative task that does not require any additional

judicial action. See id.

Giving effect to this broad statutory language also accords

with the provision’s purpose, which is “to simplify and

facilitate collection on valid judgments.” Fidelity I, 803 F.3d

at 1003 (citation omitted). Section 1963 aims to spare

creditors and debtors “the additional cost and harassment of

further litigation which would otherwise be required by way

of an action on the judgment in a district court other than that

where the judgment was originally obtained.” S. Rep. No.

83-1917 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142; see

also Stanford v. Utley, 341 F. 2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965)

(“[T]he purposes of § 1963 were to simplify and facilitate the

enforcement of federal judgments, . . . to eliminate the

necessity and expense of a second lawsuit, and to avoid the

impediments, such as diversity of citizenship, which new and

distinct federal litigation might otherwise encounter.”). 

Adhering to the statutory text’s expansive license to register
FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN 9

judgments in other districts effectuates those purposes;1

reading a non-existent jurisdictional requirement into the

statute would contravene Congress’ intent by placing limits

on registration that would make the process more onerous and

potentially require additional litigation regarding

jurisdiction.2 Thus, we hold that § 1963 itself does not

1 Defendants point out that Fidelity’s registration of the California

Judgment in Washington was not for the purpose of enforcing the

judgment in Washington, but rather for the purpose of creating a new

judgment that could subsequently be registered in Arizona and thus

provide an end-run around Arizona’s statute of limitations on the

enforcement of judgments. Defendants’ argument that imposing a

jurisdictional requirement for registration under § 1963 is appropriate

simply because, as applied to the facts of this case, such a requirement

would not contravene the statute’s underlying purpose of facilitating

enforcement in the state of registration and would close a seeming

loophole, is unpersuasive. In Fidelity I, this Court rejected Defendants’

invitation to “refuse to give effect to Congress’ chosen words” simply

because doing so “potentially allows plaintiffs to register a judgment that

has previously expired under a state’s statute of limitations,” noting that

such an effect is “irrelevant in view of the plain language of § 1963.” 803

F.3d at 1003.

2 For example, a personal jurisdiction requirement could hamper a

judgment creditor’s ability to register and enforce a judgment when a

judgment debtor has no contacts with a state beyond assets that are

controlled by a third party in the state. Cf. U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D.

Const. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 497 (1st Cir. 2000). In fact, the Supreme Court

has explicitly recognized that in some cases, the “presence of the

defendant’s property in a state . . . alone would not support . . .

jurisdiction” under the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction. 

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977). Thus, imposing a minimum

contacts jurisdictional limit on the registration of judgments, as

Defendants suggest is required, risks allowing a judgment debtor to “avoid

payment of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a

place where he is not subject to an in personam suit.” Id. This would be

directly at odds with § 1963’s purpose of facilitating collection on valid

judgments. See Fidelity I, 803 F.3d at 1003.
10 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

require that a court have personal jurisdiction over a

judgment debtor in order to register an existing judgment.

We next turn to the due process basis of the district

court’s ruling. The district court noted that under this Court’s

ruling in Fidelity I, registering a judgment in another district

pursuant to § 1963 creates a “new judgment” that is treated as

if it had been rendered in the new district and that “[a]

judgment is void ‘if the court that rendered the judgment

lacked jurisdiction over the parties . . . .’” Fid. Nat’l Fin.

Inc., 2017 WL 6049376, at *5 (quoting In re Ctr. Wholesale,

759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985)). This reasoning,

however, is flawed because it incorrectly presumes that

constitutional due process protections in the form of a

personal jurisdiction requirement attach based on the

appearance of a judgment, rather than based on the

characteristics of the process that results in that judgment. 

We must therefore ask this crucial constitutional question: 

does the Due Process Clause require that a court in which a

judgment creditor registers a pre-existing federal judgment

have personal jurisdiction over judgment debtors at the time

of registration? We hold in the negative.

A long line of Supreme Court cases reflects that the

personal jurisdiction requirement of due process is grounded

in protecting litigants from being unfairly dragged into a

faraway court to defend a suit.3

See, e.g., World-Wide

3 Another function of the personal jurisdiction requirement is

preserving the balance of powers between coequal states. See World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (“[The

minimum contacts test] acts to ensure that the States through their courts,

do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as

coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”). But that issue is not of concern
FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN 11

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980)

(“The concept of minimum contacts . . . protects the

defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or

inconvenient forum.”). The constitutional standard focuses

on “whether the ‘quality and nature’ of the defendant’s

activity is such that it is ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ to require him

to conduct his defense in that State,” i.e., whether the

defendant has sufficient “contacts with the forum state such

that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Kulko v.

Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting Int’l Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)).

A key distinction here, however, is that the process of

registering a federal judgment in another federal district

pursuant to § 1963 does not involve “maintenance of a suit”

or “[conducting a] defense.” See id. Instead, registration

simply requires “filing a certified copy of the judgment.”4

here, because we are dealing with judgments issued by federal, not state,

courts.

4

In fact, as discussed above, legislative history documents show that

§ 1963 was specifically intended to avoid additional litigation. The report

issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee explains:

[R]egistration of judgments in other districts is a

modern legal device. It assists judgment creditors by

making it possible for them to pursue the property of a

debtor in satisfaction of a judgment by the ordinary

process of levying execution on a judgment in any

district where the judgment is registered. The result is

that both creditors and debtors are relieved of the
12 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

See 28 U.S.C. § 1963. Defendants make no substantive

argument about why, even in the absence of the central

concern animating the due-process-based personal

jurisdiction requirement, courts must nonetheless have

personal jurisdiction to register judgments under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1963. Constitutional due process requirements depend on

the procedures at issue, not semantics—just because a court

might be said to “render” a “new” judgment pursuant to

registration does not mean that no meaningful distinction

exists between, on the one hand, subjecting a person to a

lawsuit in which claims are litigated in an ongoing

proceeding before a court that may determine or alter

substantive rights when it renders a final judgment, and, on

the other hand, registering a pre-existing judgment, a process

additional cost and harassment of further litigation

which would otherwise be required by way of an action

on the judgment in a district other than that where the

judgment was originally obtained.

S. Rep. No. 1917 (1954) (emphasis added), as reprinted in 1954

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142, 3142; see also Air Transport Ass’n of Am. v. Prof’l

Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO) (In re Prof’l Air Traffic

Controllers Org. (PATCO)), 699 F.2d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(“Registration is a rapid procedure that does not require the intervention

of a judge. It is merely a matter of having the clerk of the court in which

the judgment is registered enter the pertinent provisions of the . . . sister

court’s judgment on the judgment docket.” (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted)); Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co. v. LiRocchi, 490 F.2d 105, 107

(6th Cir. 1974) (“This statute has been held to have been adopted to

protect both judgment creditors and judgment debtors from the additional

cost and harassment of further litigation which otherwise would be

incident to an action on the judgment in a foreign district.”); Stanford,

341 F. 2d at 270 (“[T]he purposes of § 1963 were . . . to eliminate the

necessity and expense of a second lawsuit, and to avoid the impediments,

such as diversity of citizenship, which new and distinct federal litigation

might otherwise encounter.”).
FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN 13

which does not require any party to appear in court and in

which no judicial action is taken. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at

210 n.36 (holding that, once a judgment is validly rendered

against a debtor, the judgment creditor may sue to satisfy the

debt with property in a state that lacks personal jurisdiction

over the judgment debtor).

Registration of a judgment pursuant to § 1963 can only

occur after a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered the

original judgment (otherwise there would be no judgment to

register). Of course, the court that adjudicated the parties’

claims and issued the original judgment must of course

satisfy due process requirements such as ensuring personal

jurisdiction. Thus, registration will only happen afterfull due

process has been provided during the original adjudication on

the merits that determined the parties’ substantive rights and

obligations. We see no reason why—based on case law,

policy, or otherwise—why the simple act of subsequently

registering a judgment alters a debtor’s substantive rights

such that a due process right is triggered.5 To the contrary,

registration itself does not change the amount of money or

property owed; it only facilitates collection of a pre-existing

judgment.

5 Moreover, the practical reality is that judgment debtors must have

some sort of presence or property in the state before judgment creditors

can attempt to enforce a judgment, because without a judgment debtor’s

presence or property in the state, there is nothing against which the

judgment can be “enforced.” The district court elided this fact, concluding

that any potential distinction between registration and enforcement was

eliminated by this Court’s determination in Fidelity I that registration of

a judgment has the same effect as creating a new judgment. We see no

basis for such a conclusion. Enforcement involves additional steps

beyond registration, such as moving to execute on a judgment debtor’s

assets, and nothing we said in Fidelity I changed this.
14 FIDELITY NAT’L FIN. V. FRIEDMAN

We therefore hold that once a federal court of competent

jurisdiction has determined the parties’ substantive rights and

entered a judgment following a proceeding that accords with

due process, that federal judgment should be enforceable in

any other federal district by way of the federal judgment

registration statute.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that valid registration

of a federal judgment under § 1963 does not require that the

court of registration have personal jurisdiction over the

judgment debtors. The statute permits a judgment creditor to

register a federal judgment “in any other district.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1963 (emphasis added). Because the Due Process Clause

does not require that this broad statutory language be cabined

by a jurisdictional limitation, “any . . . district” includes

districts in which personal jurisdiction over judgment debtors

may be lacking. As a result, the Washington Judgment was

not void for lack of jurisdiction, and the district court erred by

vacating the Second Arizona Judgment on that basis.

REVERSED and REMANDED.