REVISED

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-50141

Emilio Lira, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Edward Jones Investments, also known as Edward D. Jones &

Company, L.P., 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:20-CV-7

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit 

Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Emilio Lira brings a Title VII retaliation claim 

against his former employer, Defendant-Appellee Edward Jones. The district 

court granted summary judgment for Edward Jones, holding that Lira failed 

to establish the causal link between his termination and his protected 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 7, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

2

activities and thus had not established a prima facie case of retaliation. Lira 

appeals. We AFFIRM.

I.

In 2016, Emilio Lira, who is Hispanic/Latino, was employed as a 

financial advisor by Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. (“Edward Jones”). That 

year, he brought a lawsuit against Edward Jones alleging discrimination and 

retaliation based on race and national origin. On March 12, 2019, the district 

court in that case granted summary judgment to Edward Jones and taxed 

Edward Jones’s costs against Lira.

Lira was required to timely report this 2019 judgment to Edward Jones 

pursuant to Edward Jones’s internal policies, which implemented Financial

Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) reporting obligations. He did 

not. An Edward Jones employee from the reportable events team then gave 

Lira two deadlines to disclose the 2019 judgment. Lira did not comply with 

either deadline. 

Lira reported the judgment on May 8, 2019 and also sent an email to 

the reportable events team employee accusing Edward Jones and its 

employees of “behav[ing] like a white supremacist or a colluder of white 

supremacist [sic].” Edward Jones terminated Lira’s employment on May 13, 

2019 for unprofessional conduct and failure to provide timely responses to 

compliance inquiries. Lira subsequently filed a retaliation charge with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On October 18, 

2019, the EEOC issued a notice of dismissal and a right-to-sue letter.

On January 6, 2020, Lira again sued Edward Jones for retaliation.

Edward Jones moved to dismiss. On May 26, 2020, Lira filed the operative 

amended complaint alleging that his termination was retaliation in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In this 

complaint, he proffered five protected activities: (1) complaining internally 

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

3

of discrimination at Edward Jones in 2014; (2) filing a charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC in 2016; (3) filing his 2016 employment 

discrimination lawsuit against Edward Jones; (4) giving a deposition in that 

lawsuit; and (5) opposing Edward Jones’s summary judgment motion in that 

lawsuit. Edward Jones moved for summary judgment.

In February 2022, the district court granted Edward Jones’s motion 

for summary judgment. It held that Lira failed to make a prima facie case of 

retaliation because he could not establish the causation requirement of a 

retaliation claim. Alternatively, the district court noted that even if Lira had 

established a prima facie case, “Edward Jones satisfied its burden by 

presenting evidence of legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons supporting Lira’s 

termination.” Lira timely appeals.

II.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment and apply the same 

standards as the district court. Yogi Metals Grp., Inc. v. Garland, 38 F.4th 455, 

458 (5th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence and draw all 

inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant; however, 

“[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported 

speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” 

Brown v. City of Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003).

Because Lira seeks to prove retaliation through circumstantial 

evidence, he must satisfy the burden-shifting framework established in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). See Owens v. 

Circassia Pharms., Inc., 33 F.4th 814, 825, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2022). Under this 

framework, Lira has the burden of making a prima facie case by showing that 

(1) he participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took 

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

4

an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists 

between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Id. at 835. 

The primary issue in this appeal is the third element, often called the “causal 

link.” See, e.g., Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 284 (5th Cir. 2021).

III.

Lira cannot show the requisite casual connection between any of his 

proffered protected activities and his termination, i.e., the materially adverse 

action. As an initial matter, Lira’s protected activities are too temporally 

removed from his May 2019 termination to show causation based on timing 

alone. We have previously noted that, at the prima facie stage, “a plaintiff 

can meet his burden of causation simply by showing close enough timing 

between his protected activity and his adverse employment action.” Brown 

v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Garcia 

v. Pro. Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 2019)). Previously, we 

have held that periods of two-and-a-half months, Garcia, 938 F.3d at 243, and 

six-and-a-half weeks, Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of Comm’rs, 

810 F.3d 940, 949 (5th Cir. 2015), were sufficiently close enough to show a 

causal connection at this stage. A period of three or four months, on the other 

hand, may not be sufficiently close. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 

268, 273–74 (2001) (citing cases).

Here, the first four protected activities occurred from November 2014 

to November 2017 and are thus at least one year removed from Lira’s May 

2019 termination.

1 These activities are clearly outside the range in which 

temporal proximity alone can establish the causal link. And the fifth activity, 

1 Lira’s (1) internal complaint of discrimination at Edward Jones was filed in

November 2014; (2) his first EEOC charge was filed in February 2016; (3) his employment 

discrimination lawsuit was filed in October 2016; and (4) he was deposed in that lawsuit in 

November 2017.

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

5

which Lira characterized as “filing a response in opposition to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment,” occurred in early January 2019, more than 

four months before his May 2019 termination. This, too, falls outside the 

established range. As such, the timing of these protected activities alone does

not sufficiently show the requisite causal link.

Lira’s arguments do not compel a contrary conclusion. Lira’s primary 

argument concerning causation is a novel “big picture” theory purportedly 

drawn from Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1992). Lira 

seems to suggest that we should group the first four activities as part of the 

first lawsuit that ended in March 2019 (i.e., plausibly close enough to his 

termination) for purposes of identifying causation. This argument is 

unsupported by the cited authority. In Shirley, we held that a plaintiff’s firing 

14 months after filing an EEOC complaint (and two months after the EEOC 

complaint’s dismissal) was retaliation for her bringing said complaint. Id. at 

42–43. But our conclusion in that case was supported by additional evidence 

beyond just temporal proximity, including her boss’s frequent mentions of 

the EEOC complaint and her receiving complaints of “flagrant indiscretions 

or violations.” Id. at 43. Lira cites Shirley in arguing that here, what the 

district court failed to consider is that the lapse of time did not automatically 

absolve Appellee of its responsibility for retaliating against Appellant when 

we look at the big picture. Id. at 39. But more accurately read, Shirley stands 

for the principle that a 14-month delay between a protected activity and a 

termination will not necessarily preclude a finding of causation when the 

plaintiff can adduce other evidence suggesting a causal relationship. See id. at 

44 (“The district court properly weighed the lapse of time as one of the 

elements in the entire calculation of whether Shirley had shown a causal 

connection between the protected activity and the subsequent firing.”). 

In attempting to show this causal relationship, Lira makes various 

arguments and adduces various documents to provide the additional

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

6

evidence required by Shirley. We consider these below but ultimately 

conclude that Lira has not met his burden of proof with respect to causation

concerning any of his protected activities. See Owens, 33 F.4th at 835.

First, Lira has presented no evidence that the Edward Jones employee 

responsible for his termination decision was aware of Lira’s filing this 

opposing motion at the time of Lira’s termination.

2 Lira’s only citations to 

the record indicate that the employee in question was aware only of Lira’s 

first EEOC complaint, the first lawsuit, and the first lawsuit’s dismissal. The 

cited testimony does not show that the employee knew of the specific 

protected activity Lira proffers: the filing of the opposition to summary 

judgment. Without awareness of the specific protected activity at the time of 

termination, Lira cannot draw the causal link between this protected activity 

and his termination. See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 883 

(5th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n order to establish the causation prong of a retaliation 

claim, the employee should demonstrate that the employer knew about the 

employee’s protected activity.”); id. at 883 n.6 (“If the decisionmakers were 

completely unaware of the plaintiff’s protected activity, then it could not be 

said . . . that the decisionmakers might have been retaliating against the 

plaintiff for having engaged in that activity.”); Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. 

Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1999) (“If an employer is 

unaware of an employee’s protected conduct at the time of the adverse 

employment action, the employer plainly could not have retaliated against 

the employee based on that conduct.”).

2 Lira has also not cited any legal authority or argued that knowledge by the 

terminating employee was not required through, e.g., a cat’s paw theory of liability. See 

Zamora v. City of Hous., 798 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining the cat’s paw theory).

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

7

Next, we discuss the various critical emails Lira sent to Edward Jones 

after the conclusion of the first lawsuit in March 2019.

3 We note that these 

emails were not included in the amended complaint.4 The district court 

interpreted Lira’s filing these emails as Lira trying to belatedly proffer 

examples of additional protected activities for his retaliation claim and ruled 

that these emails were “not properly before the court as bases for Lira’s 

retaliation claim.” On appeal, Lira argues that these emails were not 

introduced “for the purposes of adding more protected activities but to shine 

a light on the big picture” that Lira was “a thorn on the side of [Edward 

Jones] because of his continued complaints.”

We are unconvinced by Lira’s argument that these emails were not 

introduced as additional protected activities. These emails contain criticisms 

by Lira of various practices of his employer. These emails are thus squarely 

within what we have ruled to be “protected activities.” EEOC v. Rite Way 

Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that “protected 

activity can consist of . . . ‘oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by this subchapter’” (alteration in original) (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a))). And Lira, under his legally unsupported “big 

picture” theory, seems to be introducing these emails as bases for his 

retaliation. Thus, despite his language arguing otherwise, Lira elsewhere

attempts to characterize these emails as additional protected activities. To 

the extent he is doing so, these emails should have been in the amended 

complaint and cannot now serve as bases for a retaliation claim. See Phillips v. 

Caris Life Scis., Inc., 715 F. App’x 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming a grant 

3 These emails generally criticize Edward Jones’s culture and practices.

4 These emails were included in Lira’s response (filed after the amended 

complaint) opposing Edward Jones’s motion for summary judgment.

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

8

of summary judgment for the employer because the plaintiff “completely 

failed to plead retaliation claims based on these events in her complaint”).

Even taking Lira at face value and treating these emails as evidence of 

causation, he does not make any cognizable argument as to how they show a 

causal link between his termination and his filing an opposition to Edward 

Jones’s summary judgment motion in the first lawsuit. Instead, he makes 

conclusory arguments that the district court “failed to consider other 

evidence of retaliation in deciding whether there was a causal connection 

between Appellant’s lawsuit and his termination.” He does not explain how 

these emails constitute such evidence, and we do not credit this argument. 

See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 499 n.1 (5th Cir.

2004) (“Failure adequately to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of 

that argument.”). As such, these emails cannot suffice for Lira to meet his 

burden of proof on the causation element.

Lira’s attempts to point to other record evidence of retaliation are

similarly unavailing. He presents three sources of “testimony via affidavit 

and emails authored by Appellee personnel” purportedly showing

“animosity held by” Edward Jones. The first is Lira’s declaration, the second 

is an email discussing Lira’s interest in the Uvalde office, and the third is an 

article from a human resources publication announcing Edward Jones’s plans 

to combat racism. Because Lira does not further elaborate which portions of 

these documents constitute evidence of animosity (or why they do), he has 

waived his argument that these documents evince animosity. See Procter & 

Gamble Co., 376 F.3d at 499 n.1; Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (stating that 

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

9

appellants must provide reasons for their assertions, including “citations to 

the authorities and parts of the record” on which they rely).5

Finally, Lira’s other miscellaneous arguments are without merit.

First, he argues that “[Edward Jones’s] reaction to the email wherein the 

phrase ‘white supremacists’ was used” constitutes evidence of retaliation. In 

doing so, Lira suggests, without a single citation to legal authority, that 

Edward Jones had already admitted that racism existed within its 

organization, that his description of Edward Jones as being composed of 

white supremacists was accurate, and that he was fired “to deflect this fact.” 

We do not credit this argument because nothing in this line of argumentation 

provides any additional evidence to suggest a causal link between any of 

Lira’s protected activities and his termination. Second, Lira argues that 

“there was no evidence presented by [Edward Jones] that [Lira] was 

performing poorly in his job.” But Lira bears the burden of proving a causal 

link between his protected activities and his termination; accordingly, 

identifying a way in which the other party has not proven an alternative 

reason for his termination is insufficient for him to meet his burden of proving 

the causal connection in the first instance.6

IV.

5 Regarding the article, Lira only rhetorically asks why Edward Jones would 

“announce such a plan if racism did not exist within the company.” But nothing in this 

article suggests anything about Edward Jones’s retaliation as to Lira’s specific protected 

activity. Accordingly, nothing in this article is sufficient for Lira to meet his burden of 

proving causation.

6 Because we hold that Lira has not met his burden of showing a prima facie case, 

we need not and do not reach the issue of whether Edward Jones has met its burden of 

proving legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for Lira’s termination. See McCoy v. City of 

Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007) (“If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, 

the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or 

nonretaliatory reason for its employment action.”).

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 22-50141

10

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

Case: 22-50141 Document: 00516647485 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/15/2023