Corrected 12/14/12

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAUL ZAMORANO-PONCE,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-10462

D.C. No.

4:11-CR-01244-

CKJ-JCG-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Mark W. Bennett, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 14, 2012–San Francisco, California

Filed November 6, 2012

Before: Arthur L. Alarcón, Susan P. Graber,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber
2 UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

*

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

SUMMARY

*

Criminal Law

Affirming a sentence for illegal reentry after removal, the

panel held that a prior conviction for “rape of a child in the

third degree,” in violation of Revised Code of Washington

section 9A.44.079, categorically qualifies as “statutory rape,”

which is a “crime of violence” for the purpose of a sentencing

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

COUNSEL

Andrea L. Matheson, Matheson Law Firm, P.C., Tucson,

Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

Robert L. Miskell, Assistant United States Attorney, Tucson,

Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Raul Zamorano-Ponce appeals the sentence

imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after

removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The question before

us is whether a prior conviction for “rape of a child in the
UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE 3

third degree,” in violation of Revised Code of Washington

section 9A.44.079, qualifies as a “crime of violence” for the

purpose of the sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Reviewing de novo, United States v.

Espinoza-Morales, 621 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), we

answer “yes” and, therefore, affirm the sentence.

In 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty in state court to “rape

of a child in the third degree,” in violation of Revised Code

of Washington section 9A.44.079. The state court sentenced

him to a 12-month term of imprisonment. After serving just

over half of the sentence, Defendant was released from prison

and removed from the United States.

In 2011, the United States Border Patrol apprehended

Defendant and several others a few miles from the United

States-Mexico border, near Lukeville, Arizona. The group

admitted to being Mexican citizens without documentation to

establish the legality of their presence in the United States.

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for reentry after

removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He pleaded guilty

pursuant to a written plea agreement.

The main issue at sentencing was whether the court

should apply a 16-level enhancement for a prior “crime of

violence,” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The

Presentence Investigation Report and the government

recommended that the court apply the enhancement because

Defendant’s prior conviction under Revised Code of

Washington section 9A.44.079 qualifies categorically as a

“crime of violence.” Specifically, the government argued that

section 9A.44.079 falls squarely within the generic federal

definition of “statutory rape.” Defendant objected to the
4 UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE

 The relevant application note states: 1

“Crime of violence” means any of the following offenses

under federal, state, or local law: Murder, manslaughter,

kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including

where consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid,

such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary,

incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a

minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,

burglary of a dwelling, or any other offense under federal, state,

or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (emphasis added).

enhancement, arguing, among other things, that section

9A.44.079 is broader than the federal definition because it

does not require a mens rea of “knowingly.”

The district court concluded that violation of section

9A.44.079 qualifies categorically as a crime of violence.

Accordingly, the court applied the 16-level enhancement and

sentenced Defendant to 33 months’ imprisonment. He timely

appealed.

“Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines provides for a sixteen-level sentencing

enhancement upon conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, where

an alien illegally reentered the United States after having

been previously deported subsequent to a conviction for a

felony ‘crime of violence.’” United States v. Gomez-Mendez,

486 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2007). Relying on the application

notes to the Guidelines, we have previously concluded that

statutory rape is a “crime of violence.” Id. at 601–02; United 1

States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d 738, 741 (9th Cir.

2007). The question here, then, is whether Defendant’s
UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE 5

conviction under Revised Code of Washington section

9A.44.079 constitutes “statutory rape” and is, therefore, a

“crime of violence” that subjects him to the sentencing

enhancement. Section 9A.44.079 states:

A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third

degree when the person has sexual intercourse with

another who is at least fourteen years old but less than

sixteen years old and not married to the perpetrator

and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older

than the victim.

“To determine whether a conviction constitutes ‘statutory

rape’ and therefore a ‘crime of violence,’ we employ the

familiar categorical approach the Supreme Court crafted in

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).” GomezMendez, 486 F.3d at 602. 

Under the categorical approach, we do not look to the

specific conduct that was the basis of a defendant’s

state convictions. Instead, we consider the statutory

definition of the crime. A state’s definition of [the

crime] must be compared with the generic definition

of that crime to determine if the defendant’s

conviction is a crime of violence pursuant to the

Sentencing Guidelines.

Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 743–44 (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In cases

involving nontraditional offenses, as here, we must determine

whether the full scope of conduct proscribed by [Revised

Code of Washington section 9A.44.079] falls within the

‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning’ of the term
6 UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE

 We recognize that the panel in Rodriguez-Guzman questioned the 2

Gomez-Mendez panel’s categorization of statutory rape as a “nontraditional offense.” See Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 745 n.5. The

categorization of statutory rape as a traditional common law offense or a

nontraditional offense makes no difference here because it does not affect

the federal generic definition of statutory rape under Gomez-Mendez and

Rodriguez-Guzman. See id.

‘statutory rape.’” Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d at 602 (footnote 2

omitted).

We have previously provided a generic federal definition

for “statutory rape” in the context of “crime[s] of violence”

under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. In Gomez-Mendez, we held that

“[t]he term ‘statutory rape’ is ordinarily, contemporarily, and

 commonly understood to mean the unlawful sexual

intercourse with a minor under the age of consent specified

by state statute.” 486 F.3d at 603. Shortly thereafter, we held

that “the term ‘minor’ in the context of a statutory rape law

means a person under sixteen years of age.” RodriguezGuzman, 506 F.3d at 745. Accordingly, under RodriguezGuzman, the generic federal definition of “statutory rape” is

unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of

16. The generic federal definition may also include a fouryear-age-difference element. United States v. GonzalezAparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 431 (9th Cir. 2011). We need not

resolve the latter issue here, however, because Revised Code

of Washington section 9A.44.079 contains a four-year-agedifference element and, thus, would not cover more conduct

than the federal definition even if the federal definition also

required a four-year age difference.

Section 9A.44.079 qualifies categorically as “statutory

rape” under Rodriguez-Gomez’ generic federal definition of
UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE 7

that crime because the federal definition covers the “full

scope of the conduct” that the Washington statute prohibits.

Gomez-Mendez, 486 F.3d at 602. Both prohibit engaging in

unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of

16, where there is at least a four-year age difference between

the perpetrator and the victim, and the federal definition

contains no additional requirement that is absent from section

9A.44.079.

Defendant relies on Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,

546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), to argue that the

federal generic definition of “statutory rape” includes a mens

rea element of “knowingly.” Defendant’s reliance on

Estrada-Espinoza is misplaced. That case defined the term

“sexual abuse of a minor” for the purpose of considering

whether a prior conviction constituted an “aggravated felony”

under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 1150.

Nothing in Estrada-Espinoza purports to require that

“statutory rape,” within the meaning of the commentary to the

Guidelines, contain a mens rea element. Nor does the case

overrule or undermine Gomez-Mendez or Rodriguez-Guzman

in any other way. In fact, we have recognized previously that

Estrada-Espinoza “never discussed or even cited to our prior

‘statutory rape’ decisions in Gomez-Mendez and RodriguezGuzman.” Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d at 432. Nor did

United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2009),

change the definition of “statutory rape” within the meaning

of the Guidelines. Rather, as relevant here, it held only that

a state-court conviction for lewd and lascivious acts on a

child under 14 years old is still “sexual abuse of a minor” for

sentencing purposes after Estrada-Espinoza. Medina-Villa,

567 F.3d at 509.
8 UNITED STATES V. ZAMORANO-PONCE

In summary, Defendant’s conviction under Revised Code

of Washington section 9A.44.079 qualifies categorically as

“statutory rape,” which is a “crime of violence” that subjects

him to a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.

AFFIRMED.