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INQUIRY INTO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON GULF COAST OIL SPILL 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Chairman Emeritus 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Vice Chairman 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANE HARMAN, California 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO MACK, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 


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(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

Vice Chairman 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin Islands 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

Ranking Member 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 


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(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California, opening statement ............................................................................. 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, opening statement .................................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, opening statement .................................................... 34 

Hon. John Sullivan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oklahoma, opening statement .................................................................................... 34 

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement ....................................................................................... 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

Hon. Phil Gingrey, a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 40 

Hon. Bruce L. Braley, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 41 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Hon. Parker Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Alabama, opening statement .................................................................................... 45 

Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado, opening statement ...................................................................................... 45 

Hon. Robert E. Latta, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Hon. Michael F. Doyle, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, opening statement ................................................................... 50 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Tennessee, opening statement ............................................................................ 54 

Hon. Donna M. Christensen, a Representative in Congress from the Virgin 

Islands, opening statement ................................................................................. 54 

Hon. Peter Welch, a Representative in Congress from the State of Vermont, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 55 

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 56 

Hon. Mike Ross, a Representative in Congress from the State of Arkansas, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 57 

Hon. Betty Sutton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 58 

Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, prepared statement ............................................................................ 165 

WITNESSES

Steve Newman, President and CEO, Transocean Limited ................................... 60 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 335 


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Page

VI 

Lamar McKay, Chairman and President, BP America, Inc ................................. 76 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79 

Tim Probert, President, Global Business Lines, Chief Health, Safety, and 

Environmental Officer, Halliburton ................................................................... 91 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 340 

Jack B. Moore, Director, President and CEO, Cameron International ............... 97 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 98 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 344 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Document binder ...................................................................................................... 167 


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(1) 

INQUIRY INTO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON 

GULF COAST OIL SPILL 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in Room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stupak, Braley, Markey, DeGette, 

Doyle, Schakowsky, Ross, Christensen, Welch, Green, Sutton, Dingell, Waxman (Ex Officio), Burgess, Sullivan, Blackburn, Gingrey, 

Griffith, Latta, and Barton (Ex Officio). 

Also Present: Representatives Engel, Capps, Inslee, Melancon, 

Castor, Stearns, Myrick, Scalise, and Jackson Lee. 

Staff Present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director; Kristin Amerling, 

Chief Counsel; Bruce Wolpe, Senior Advisor; Brian Cohen, Senior 

Investigator and Policy Advisor; Greg Dotson, Chief Counsel, Energy and Environment; Robb Cobbs, Policy Analyst; Caitlin 

Haberman, Special Assistant; Dave Leviss, Chief Oversight Counsel; Meredith Fuchs, Chief Investigative Counsel; Stacia Cardille, 

Counsel; Alison Cassady, Professional Staff Member; Al Golden, 

Professional Staff Member; Jennifer Owens, Investigator; Ali 

Neubauer; Karen Lightfoot; Communications Director, Senior Policy Advisor; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant; Lindsay Vidal, 

Special Assistant; Earley Green, Chief Clerk; Mitchell Smiley, Special Assistant; Alan Slobodin, Minority Chief Counsel; Mary 

Neumayr, Minority Counsel; Peter Spencer, Minority Professional 

Staff Member; Andrea Spring, Minority Professional Staff Member; 

and Garrett Golding, Minority Legislative Analyst. 

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order. 

Today, we have a hearing titled, ‘‘Inquiry Into Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill.’’ 

We have a number of Members present for this hearing who are 

not members of the subcommittee but are members of the full committee. We welcome them, and I note that they will be allowed to 

submit written statements for the record, but they will not be allowed to deliver verbal opening statements. In addition, after all 

subcommittee members complete their questioning, full committee 

members will be allowed to ask questions. Members who are not 

on the subcommittee or full committee are welcome to observe, but 

they will not be permitted to give a verbal opening statement or 

ask questions due to time constraints. 


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2 

The chairman, ranking members and chairman emeritus will 

now be recognized for a 10-minute opening statement. Other members of the subcommittee will be recognized for 3-minute opening 

statements. 

I yield to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for 

an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WAXMAN. Last month, the blowout occurred on an oil rig 

drilling in deep water off the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven people lost 

their lives and an environmental calamity is now unfolding in the 

Gulf as oil gushes from the well and threatens the coast. 

We are here today to begin the process of understanding what 

went wrong and what we need to do to prevent future catastrophes. 

The investigation is at its early stage, but already we have learned 

some key facts. BP, one of the world’s largest oil companies, assured Congress and the public that it could operate safely in deep 

water, and that a major oil spill was next to impossible. We now 

know those assurances were wrong. Halliburton, one of the world’s 

largest oil service companies, says that it had secured the well 

through a procedure called cementing, and that the well had 

passed a key pressure test, but we now know this is an incomplete 

account. The well did pass positive pressure tests, but there is evidence that it may not have passed crucial negative pressure tests. 

According to a senior BP official, significant discrepancies were observed in at least two of these tests which were conducted just 

hours before the explosion. 

Transocean, one of the world’s largest operators of drilling rigs, 

says it has no reason to believe that the rig’s failsafe device, called 

a blowout preventer, was not fully operational, but we have learned 

from Cameron, the manufacturer of the blowout preventer, that the 

device had a leak in a crucial hydraulic system and a defectively 

configured ram. And we know there our major questions about the 

effectiveness of BP’s response to the spill. The company said it 

could manage a spill of 250,000 barrels a day, yet it is struggling 

to cope with this blowout, which is releasing only 5,000 to 25,000 

barrels a day. 

The more I learn about this accident, the more concerned I become. This catastrophe appears to have been caused by a calamitous series of equipment and operational failures. If the largest oil 

and oil service companies in the world had been more careful, 11 

lives might have been saved and our coastlines protected. 

It is dangerous to drill for oil a mile below the ocean surface. An 

accident can wreak environmental havoc that destroys livelihoods 

and imperils fish and wildlife. The oil companies make billions of 

dollars from taking these risks, but they don’t bear the full costs 

when something goes drastically wrong. 

In the course of our investigation, we have received over 100,000 

pages of documents. The story that these documents and our interviews tell us is a complicated one. At this early stage in the investigation, we have far more questions than answers, but we have 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARING
3 

learned some important facts which Chairman Stupak, Chairman 

Markey, and I will describe in our statements. 

There are four principal areas of inquiry that our committee is 

pursuing. The first involves questions related to well integrity. We 

know there was a failure of the well because gas surged up the 

riser and exploded on the rig. We will be investigating what caused 

the breach in well integrity and who was responsible. 

The second area of inquiry involves what happened on the 

Transocean drill rig. There are pressure monitors on the rig that 

feed information constantly to the drill operators, and there are 

panels on the rig that control the operations of the blowout preventer and the drill string. We will be examining what the drill operators knew and what decisions they made. In the rest of my 

statement I will discuss what we have learned about these two 

areas of the inquiry. 

Our third area of inquiry involves the blowout preventer, which 

is also called the BOP. This is supposed to be the last line of defense against the blowout of the well, but it failed. We have learned 

a lot about the blowout preventer, and Chairman Stupak will summarize this part of our investigation. 

The final area of inquiry involves the response of BP and other 

companies to the spill. They promised to contain any spill, but they 

are not succeeding. Chairman Markey, who chairs our Energy subcommittee and the Select Committee on Energy Independence, will 

cover this area of our inquiry in his opening statement. 

We recently received a document from BP called, ‘‘What We 

Know.’’ It was prepared on May 6, and it summarizes what BP 

knew about the spill at that time. I want to focus on the first four 

bullets. I also ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that this document and other documents cited during this hearing be made part 

of the official hearing record. 

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection, so be it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. The first bullet says, ‘‘Before, during or after the 

cement job, an undetected influx of hydrocarbons entered the well 

bore.’’ What this means is that there was a breach somewhere in 

the well integrity that allowed methane gas and possibly other hydrocarbons to enter the well. 

The second bullet says, ‘‘The 97H inch casing was tested. The 

97H casing hanger packoff was sent and tested, and the entire system was tested.’’ BP explained to us that this refers to a positive 

pressure test in the well. What this means is that fluids were injected in the well to increase the pressure and to monitor whether 

the well would retain its integrity. The well passed this test. 

Rigs like Deepwater Horizon keep a daily drilling report, and 

Transocean has given us the report for April 20, the day of the explosion. It is an incomplete log because it ends at 3 o’clock in the 

afternoon, about 7 hours before the explosion, but it confirms that 

the three positive pressure tests were conducted in the morning to 

the early afternoon. 

The next bullet says, ‘‘After 161⁄2 hours waiting on cement, a test 

was performed on the well bore below the blowout preventer.’’ BP 

explained to us what this means. Halliburton completed cementing 

the well at 12:35 a.m. On April 20, and after giving the cement 

time to set, a negative pressure test was conducted around 5 p.m. 


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4 

This is an important test. During a negative pressure test, the fluid 

pressure inside the well is reduced, and the well is observed to see 

whether any gas leaks into the well through the cement or casings. 

According to James Dupree, the BP Senior Vice President for the 

Gulf of Mexico, the well did not pass this test. Mr. Dupree told 

committee staff on Monday that since test results were not satisfactory and inconclusive, significant pressure discrepancies were recorded. As a result, another negative pressure test was conducted. 

This is described in the fourth bullet. 

During this test, 1,400 PSI was observed on the drill pipe while 

zero PSI was observed on the kill and the choke lines. According 

to Mr. Dupree, this is also an unsatisfactory test result. The kill 

and choke lines run from the drill rig 5,000 feet to the blowout preventer at the sea floor. The drill pipe runs from the drill rig 

through the blowout preventer deep into the well. In the test, the 

pressures measured at any point from the drill rig to the blowout 

preventer should be the same in all three lines, but what the test 

showed was that the pressures in the drill pipe were significantly 

higher. Mr. Dupree explained that the results could signal that an 

influx of gas was causing pressure to mount inside the well bore. 

Another document provided by BP to the committee is labeled, 

‘‘What could have happened?’’ It was prepared by BP on April 26, 

10 days before the first document. And according to BP, their understanding of the cause of the spill has evolved considerably since 

April 26, so this document should not be considered definitive. But 

it also describes the two negative pressure tests and the pressure 

discrepancies that were recorded. 

What happened next is murky. Mr. Dupree told the committee 

staff that he believed the well blew moments after the second pressure test, but lawyers for BP contacted the committee yesterday 

and provided a different account. According to BP’s counsel, further 

investigation has revealed that additional pressure tests were 

taken, and at 8 p.m. Company officials determined that the additional results justified ending the test and proceeding with well operations. 

This confusion among BP officials appears to echo confusion on 

the rig. Information reviewed by the committee describes an internal debate between Transocean and BP personnel about how to 

proceed. What we do know is that shortly before 10 p.m., just 2 

hours after well operations apparently resumed, gas surged from 

the well, up the riser, and the rig exploded in a fireball. This hearing and future hearings the committee will conduct in the coming 

weeks will explore these questions. Our goal is to learn what 

caused the fatal explosion so that Congress and the executive 

branch can act to prevent future disasters. 

But as we focus on these narrow questions of what happened and 

why, we also need to keep the broader perspective in mind. Our national energy policy is broken, and nothing illustrates this better 

than this massive spill. Our dependence on oil and other fossil 

fuels is fouling our beaches, polluting our atmosphere, and undermining our national security. 

One lesson is already apparent from the catastrophe in the Gulf; 

we need an energy policy that emphasizes clean, renewable sources 

of energy. Now we can’t snap our fingers and transform our energy 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARING
5 

economy overnight. If we do not have the courage to take on the 

oil companies and take decisive steps to reduce our overreliance on 

oil, when the consequences of doing nothing are so clear, we may 

never start down the path toward a clean energy economy. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today’s hearing, and I thank the 

witnesses for appearing and for their cooperation in the investigation. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Waxman follows:] 


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6 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 11 here 76577A.001

Hf/'mY A. WAXMAN, CAUmRMA t,:WAIRMAN 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

(lCongress of tue Wntteb $tatcs 

}!)ou~c of ~eprc~entatibe~ 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OffiCE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6115 

energycommerce.house,gov 

JUI. !~I\t\lUN> II-fiAt> 

f{A,NKrN(; McMf.,'ER 

Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce 

In<luiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

May 12,2010 

Last month, a blowout occurred on an oil rig drilling in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Eleven people lost their lives and an environmental calamity is now unfolding in the Gulf as oil 

gushes from the weJl and threatens the coast. 

We are here today to begin the process of understanding what went wrong and what wc 

need to do to prevent future catastrophes. 

The investigation is at its early stages, but already we have learned some key facts. 

BP, one of the world's largest oil cornpanics, a<;sured Congress and the public that it 

could operate safely in deep water and that a major oil spill was next to impossible. We now 

know those assurances were wrong. 

Halliburton, one of the world's largest oil services companies, says that it had secured the 

well through a procedure called "cementing" and that the well had passed a key pressure test. 

But we now know this is an incomplete account. The well did pass positive pressure tests, but 

there is evidence that it may not have passed crucial negative pressure tests. According to a 

senior BP official, significant pressure discrepancies were observed in at least two of these tests, 

which were conducted just hours before the explosion. 

Transocean, one of the world's largest operators of drilling rigs, says it has no reason to 

believe that the rig' 5 failsafe device, called a blowout preventer, was not fully operational. But 

we have learned from Cameron, the manufacturer of the blowout prcventer, that the device had a 

leak in a crucial hydraulic system and a defectively configured ram. 

And we know there are major questions about the effectiveness ofBP's response to the 

spill. The company said it could manage a spill of 250,000 barrels per day. Yet, it is struggling 

to cope with this blowout, which is releasing only 5,000 to 25,000 barrels per day. 
7 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 12 here 76577A.002

The more I learn about this accident, the more concerned I become. This catastrophe 

appears to have been caused by a calamitous series of equipment and operational failures. If the 

largest oil and oil services companies in the world had been more careful, II lives might have 

been saved and our coastlines protected. 

It is dangerous to drill for oil a mile below the ocean's surface. An accident can wreak 

environmental havoc that destroys livelihoods and imperils fish and wildlife. The oil companies 

make billions of dollars from taking these risks, but they don't bear the full costs when 

something goes drastically wrong. . 

In the course of our investigation, we have received over 100,000 pages of documents. 

The story that these documents and our interviews tell is a complicated one. At this early stage 

in the investigation, we have far more questions than answers. But we have learned some 

important facts, which Chairman Stupak, Chairman Markey, and I will describe in our 

statements. 

There are four principal areas of inquiry that our Committee is pursuing. The first 

involves questions related to well integrity. We know there was a failure of the well because gas 

surged up the riser and exploded on the rig. We will be investigating what caused the breach in 

well integrity and who is responsible. 

The second area of inquiry involves what happened on the Transocean drill rig. There 

are pressure monitors on the rig that feed information constantly to the drill operators, and there 

are panels on the rig that control the operations of the blowout preventer and the drill string. We 

will be examining what the drill operators knew and what decisions they made. 

In the rest of my statement, I will discuss what we have learned about these two areas of 

inquiry. 

Our third area of inquiry involves the blowout preventer, which is also called the B.O.P. 

This is supposed to be the last line of defense against a blowout of the well, but it failed. We 

have learned a lot about the blowout preventer, and Chairman Stupak will summarize this part of 

our investigation. 

The final area of inquiry involves the response of BP and the other companies to the spill. 

They promised to contain any spill, but they aren't succeeding. Chairman Markey, who chairs 

our Energy Subcommittee and the Select Committee on Energy Independence, will cover this 

area of our inquiry in his opening statement. 

We recently received a document from BP called "What We Know." It was prepared on 

May 6 and it summarizes what BP knew about the spill at that time. I want to focus on the first 

four bullets. I also ask for unanimous consent that this document and other documents cited 

during this hearing be made part of the official hearing record. 

The first bullet says: "Before, during or after the cement job, an undetected influx of 

2 
8 


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hydrocarbons entered the wellbore." What this means is that there was a breach somewhere in 

well integrity that allowed methane gas and possibly other hydrocarbons to enter the well. 

The second bullet says: "The 9 7/8" casing was tested; the 9 7/8 "casing hanger packoff 

was set and tested; and the entire system was tested." BP explained to us that this refers to a 

positive pressure test in the well. What this means is that fluids were injected in the well to 

increase pressure and to monitor whether the well would retain its integrity. The well passed this 

test. 

Rigs like the Deepwater Horizon keep a daily drilling report. Transocean has given us 

the report for April 20, the day of the explosion. It is an incomplete log because it ends at 3:00 

p.m., about seven hours before the explosion. But it confirms that three positive pressure tests 

were conducted in the morning to early afternoon. 

The next bullet says: "After 16.5 hours waiting on cement, a test was performed on the 

wellbore below the Blowout Preventer." BP explained to us what this means. Halliburton 

completed cementing the well at 12:35 a.m. on April 20 and after giving the cement time to set, a 

negative pressure test was conducted around 5:00 p.m. This is an important test. During a 

negative pressure test, the fluid pressure inside the well is reduced and the wcll is observed to see 

whether any gas leaks into the well through the cement or casing. 

According to James Dupree, the BP Senior Vice President for the Gulf of Mexico, the 

well did not pass this test. Mr. Dupree told Committee staff on Monday that the test result was 

"not satisfactory" and "inconclusive." Significant pressure discrepancies were recorded. 

As a result, another negative pressure test was conducted. This is described in the fourth 

bullet: "During this test, 1,400 psi was observed on the drill pipe while 0 psi was observed on 

the kill and the choke lines." 

According to Mr. Dupree, this is also an unsatisfactory test result. The kill and choke 

lines run from the drill rig 5,000 feet to the blowout preventer at the sea floor. The drill pipe 

runs from the drill rig through the blowout preventer deep into the well. In the test, the pressures 

measured at any point from the drill rig to the blowout preventer should be the same in all three 

lines. But what the test showed was that pressures in the drill pipe were significantly higher. 

Mr. Dupree explained that the results could signal that an influx of gas was causing pressure to 

mount inside the wellbore. 

Another document provided by BP to the Committee is labeled "What Could Have 

Happened." It was prepared by BP on April 26, ten days before the first document. According 

to BP, their understanding of the cause of the spill has evolved considerably since April 26, so 

this document should not be considered definitive. But it also describes the two negative 

pressure tests and the pressure discrepancies that were recorded. 

What happened next is murky. Mr. Dupree told the Committee staff that he believed the 

well blew moments after the second pressure test. But lawyers for BP contacted the Committee 

yesterday and provided a different account. According to BP's counsel, fU11her investigation has 

3 
9 


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revealed that additional pressure tests were taken, and at 8:00 p.m., company officials 

determined that the additional results justified ending the test and proceeding with well 

operations. 

This confusion among BP officials appears to echo confusion on the rig. Information 

reviewed by the Committee describes an internal debate between Transocean and BP personnel 

about how to proceed. 

What we do know is that shortly before 10:00 p.m. - just two hours after well operations 

apparently resumed - gas surged from the well up the riser and the rig exploded in a fireball. 

This hearing - and future hearings the Committee will conduct in the coming weeks -

will explore these questions. Our goal is to learn what caused the fatal explosion so that 

Congress and the Executive Branch can act to prevent future disasters. 

But as we focus on these narrow questions of what happened and why, we also need to 

keep the broader perspective in mind. Our national energy policy is broken and nothing 

illustrates this better than this massive spill. Our dependence on oil and other fossil fuels is 

fouling our beaches, polluting our atmosphere, and undermining our national security. 

One lesson is already apparent from the catastrophe in the Gulf: we need an energy 

policy that emphasizes clean, renewable sources of energy. We can't snap our fingers and 

transform our energy economy overnight. If we do not have the courage to take on the oil 

companies and take decisive steps to reduce our over-reliance on oil when the consequences of 

doing nothing are so clear - we may never start down the path toward a clean energy economy. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's hearing, and I thank the witnesses for appearing 

and for their cooperation in our investigation. 

4 
10 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Next I will go to Mr. Barton, ranking member of the full committee, for an opening statement. Your opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Stupak. I am going to submit 

my written statement for the record and speak extemporaneously 

because I think, based on what Chairman Waxman just said, we 

need to kind of set the parameters. 

There is nobody on either side of the aisle in this subcommittee 

or the full committee that doesn’t want to get the facts on the table 

about what happened down in the Gulf of Mexico approximately 1 

month ago, why it happened, what can be done to prevent it happening in the future, and remediate any damages, both human and 

environmental. The 11 people that lost their lives is a primary 

tragedy. The fact that 5,000 barrels a day of oil is spilling out of 

the well and coming to the surface and beginning to wash up on 

some of the beaches in Louisiana and Alabama is a problem, but 

it is a problem that can be remediated. 

I want to focus on some of the things that Chairman Waxman 

said right at the end of his statement when he made the comment 

that if we can’t take on the oil industry, as if this was some sort 

of an adversarial situation between the people in the industry. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. The United States of 

America is the greatest nation in the world because we are based 

on the premise of freedom for every individual in this country. That 

freedom is enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. 

Our Founding Fathers had the foresight and the wisdom—and so 

far political leadership for the last 200 years—and said the best 

way to protect our freedoms is to provide maximum economic opportunity through a free market, capitalistic system. We are one of 

the few nations in the world that have let the private sector develop our natural resource base. That has given us the most productive economy, the largest economy. Literally, the United States 

economy by itself is approximately one-third of the total world’s 

gross product. That is not a consequence of government, it is a consequence of free men and women exercising free choices to maximize their opportunity, and in so doing, create economic opportunity for everybody in the world. 

We are in a situation now where if we are going to have additional domestic energy production in a way that maintains our existing lifestyle, it is going to be because we develop our natural resource base both onshore and offshore. I have absolutely no problem with the alternative energy sources, whether it be solar, wind, 

ethanol, hydro, you name it, but there is a reason that we are an 

oil-based economy, it is because that barrel of oil, refined into all 

the products that flow from it, have tremendous, tremendous productivity potential. You can take a gallon of gasoline and you can 

power a 4,000-pound car with four adults in it at 60 miles an hour 

in air-conditioned comfort down the highway all the way from New 

York City to Los Angeles, California. 

Now, we do not want, on either side of the aisle, to have people 

have to import more and more foreign oil. Whether we like it or 


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not, the only real place to find significant additional oil deposits in 

meaningful quantities is in the Outer Continental Shelf. Now, we 

have had an accident. It is not an act of God. The amount of pressure, the amount of gas and oil that came up that bore hole is 

something that was foreseeable, it is something that could have 

been and should have been contained. The blowout prevention 

equipment that was on that rig had a design capacity that should 

have controlled that explosion, it didn’t. 

The facts that we have uncovered in this investigation through 

the documents that have been provided show that there was, in all 

probability, shoddy maintenance; there were mislabeled components; the diagrams didn’t depict the actual equipment, but that 

was not an act of God like a hurricane or an earthquake or a volcano that man can’t control. Now, through the efforts of this subcommittee and the full committee and some of the other committees, we will get to the bottom of it; we will find out the facts and 

we will take corrective measures to prevent that from happening 

in the future, whether it is legislatively or regulatorily or through 

best practices changes by the industry. But what we should not do, 

Mr. Chairman, is make a decision to fence off the Outer Continental Shelf, to use this as the equivalent of the Three Mile Island 

accident for nuclear power and set back domestic oil and gas production in the Outer Continental Shelf for the next 20 or 30 years. 

That would not only be a mistake in my opinion, it would be a disservice to the American people. 

So I don’t want to take on the industry. I want to work with the 

industry, I want to work with the Congress, I want to find out 

what the problem was, I want to solve that problem, and I want 

to move forward. I don’t want the United States of America to continue to import 12 to 14 million barrels of oil a day. That one well 

in the Gulf, although British Petroleum has not been explicit, that 

one well probably has the potential to produce 50,000 barrels of oil 

a day. To put that in perspective, there are 200,000 oil wells onshore Texas producing 1 million barrels of oil, that is five barrels 

a day per well in Texas. This one well is the equivalent to 10,000 

oil wells in Texas. That one well in full production is 1 to 2 percent 

of the production capacity existing in the Gulf of Mexico today. Mr. 

Chairman, we can’t fence that off. We can correct the problem, we 

can prevent the problem, we can try to change the technology, but 

do not use this accident as an excuse to take away from the American people probably the biggest domestic energy resource we yet 

have to develop on the North American continent. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time 

and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:] 


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Opening Statement of the Honorable Joe Barton 

Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing on the 

Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill 

May 12, 2010 

Thank you Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess. 

The events on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of 

Mexico were tragic. Eleven men died. Even if nothing more had 

happened, the loss of life would alone is worthy of our 

investigation. Yet today, not only are we looking into the reasons 

behind their deaths, we are also looking at a vast oil spill that is 

now threatening the people who live and work along the Gulf 

Coast. 

Mr. Chairman I support the Subcommittee's investigation. 

But it is important to recognize that the problem in the Gulf of 

Mexico is an anomaly in an industry that has been exploring 

offshore for longer than most of us have been alive. What 

happened was a tragedy, but not an apocalypse, much less 
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doomsday. Offshore oil drilling is important. Given all the 

sources that can have a measurable impact in enhancing our energy 

supply, offshore oil drilling is the biggest. This is not the time to 

panic. We need to figure it out and fix it. Don't let this spill be the 

Three Mile Island of offshore oil drilling. 

The facts are not yet clear, and it is very early to reach any 

conclusions at all. Indeed, the principal focus of the nation and the 

companies involved right now should be to stop the spread of oil. 

In the foreseeable future, America will continue to have a 

requirement for domestic energy, and as long as there is a concern 

about reliance on foreign sources of energy, we're going to need 

offshore production. 

Today is our first hearing on how to get that right, but it 

won't be the last. 

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Our job is to ask fair, but tough questions to identify what 

happened and why it happened, not so we can find excuses to stop 

offshore production, but so we can ensure that it is safe. 

We have to understand who was responsible for the activities 

and decision-making on the rig. We have to understand whether 

there was proper oversight of the drilling operations, of the testing, 

ofthe well construction by the operator. 

In the past, including when I was Committee chairman, we 

have investigated oil spills on the North Slope of Alaska and traced 

the problems to human and management failures by the company 

responsible for the operation, in that case BP. As some of you will 

recall, I was very disappointed with BP's actions in Alaska. Now 

we have BP before us again because it is responsible for activity on 

the Deepwater Horizon. 

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That said, we do not yet know whether failures can be traced 

to BP or Transocean, the owner of the rig, or even Halliburton or 

Cameron - all represented by witnesses appearing before us today. 

Unfortunately, we have no witnesses from the Obama 

Administration, especially Secretary Salazar, to discuss the federal 

government's oversight and how the Deepwater Horizon was 

inspected three times since January 2010 by the regional Mineral 

Management Service office and found to be in compliance. 

Ultimately, we have to know what caused this blowout. We 

have to understand whether there was a material failure or a 

technological failure that could have been prevented with better 

maintenance, better planning. 

Until this incident, offshore drilling had a strong safety 

record that was getting stronger. According to data from the 

Mineral Management Service, between 1996 and 2008, for 

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combined operations on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, lost 

workday incident rates fell from a 3.39 rate in 1996 to a 0.64 rate 

in 2008. That is a reduction of more than 80%. Hopefully, we can 

determine the cause and help make offshore drilling even safer. 

Our hearing today is about some current and past events, but 

ultimately, we have to focus on the future in this investigation: 

How do we ensure the Outer Continental Shelf drilling program 

will operate in a safe and effective fashion? The United States 

needs this energy production - which represents 30% of U.S. daily 

supply. This is a valuable resource, which, until this incident, was 

produced safely and effectively for decades. 

We have to ensure it will be produced safely and effectively 

for decades to corne. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time and look 

forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

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17 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton. I will do my opening statement now. 

Three years ago almost to the day, this subcommittee held a 

hearing into British Petroleum disasters at Texas City and on the 

North Slope of Alaska. The 205 Texas City Refinery explosion resulted in the death of 15 workers and injured more than 170 people. 

As a result of that accident and BP’s failure to correct potential 

hazards faced by employees at Texas City, OSHA has twice slapped 

BP with record-setting fines totaling more than $100 million. Several reports criticized management at the Texas City facility, including BP’s own 207 report of the Management Accountability 

Project, which stated, ‘‘A culture that evolved over the years 

seemed to ignore risk, tolerated noncompliance, and accepted incompetence.’’ 

In March of 2006, BP discovered their pipeline on Alaska’s North 

Slope had spilled more than 200,000 gallons of oil on the tundra, 

making it the largest spill in North Slope history. Our hearings 

discovered that significant cost-cutting measures resulted in decreased maintenance and inspections of the pipeline, and BP’s 

management culture deterred individuals from raising safety concerns. 

Since our last hearing, BP has experienced continual problems 

on the North Slope. September 29, 2008, an eight-inch high pressure gas line at the Y–Pad location separated, sending three pieces 

of pipe to the tundra. One segment of the pipe landed 900 feet from 

the pipeline. Roughly 30 minutes later, a second and unrelated incident occurred on the S–Pad where there was a gas release. 

January 15, 2009, a disk cleaning pig became lodged and lost in 

the 34-inch oil transit line during de-oiling, allowing gas to pass 

around the pig and travel through Skid 50 to Pump Station number one, causing a significant venting of gas into the atmosphere 

and a complete shutdown of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 

October 10, 2009, at the Centro Compressor Plant, low-pressure 

flare staging valves were stuck closed, causing gas to travel to the 

back-up, low-pressure serve valves, which activated, caused the gas 

to vent to the atmosphere, which could have caused an explosion. 

November 28, 2009, an 18-inch, three-phase common line near 

Lisburne Production Center carrying a mixture of crude oil, produced water and natural gas ruptured, spraying its contents over 

an estimated 84,000 square feet. 

In addition to these pipeline incidents, there have been personal 

injury acts since where employees have been seriously injured or 

killed, as was the tragic case of Mike Fallinon November 18 when 

he was crushed between a pipeline and a truck. 

Today we are here to investigate the latest BP tragedy, one 

which has resulted in the loss of 11 lives and is well on its way 

to becoming one of the largest oil spills in our Nation’s history. Let 

me take a moment on behalf of the entire committee to convey our 

deepest sympathies to the family, friends, and coworkers of those 

11 individuals lost on that fateful day. 


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On April 20, an explosion and fire occurred in the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig which BP was leasing to drill an exploratory well 

in the Gulf of Mexico. The rig was owned and operated by 

Transocean, the world’s largest offshore drilling company, and was 

under contract from BP. On April 22, the rig capsized and sank to 

the floor of the ocean, resulting in oil leaks from three separate locations among the twisted wreckage. 

The world is wondering, what went wrong to allow explosive gas 

to shoot out of the drill pipe on the Deepwater Horizon causing the 

explosion? We heard Chairman Waxman discuss theories of what 

may have gone wrong in the well and what went wrong on the rig. 

I would like to take a few minutes to discuss issues related to the 

blowout preventer, the BOP, which was the fail-safe system that 

cut off the flow of oil and gas to the rig. 

In his testimony today, Mr. Lamar McKay, the President of BP 

America, says that blowout preventers are ‘‘intended to be failsafe.’’ But that didn’t happen. The blowout preventer used by Deepwater Horizon rig failed to stop the flow of gas and oil. The rig exploded, and an enormous oil spill is now threatening the Gulf 

Coast. We know that the blowout preventer, the BOP, did not properly engage. The BOP has multiple rams that are supposed to slam 

shut to pinch off any flow around the drill pipe and stop the flow 

of oil from the well. There are also shear rams in the BOP that are 

supposed to cut and seal the pipe to prevent oil and gas from flowing. The question we will ask is, why did these rams fail? 

Our investigation is at its early stages, but already we have uncovered at least four significant problems with the blowout preventer used on the Deepwater Horizon drill rig. First, the blowout 

preventer had a significant leak in the key hydraulic system. This 

leak was found in the hydraulic system that provides emergency 

power to the shear rams, which are the devices that are supposed 

to cut the drill pipe and seal the well. 

I would like to put on the screen a document that the committee 

received from BP. This document states, Leaks have been discovered in the BOP hydraulic system. The blowout preventer was 

manufactured by Cameron. We asked a senior official at Cameron 

what he knew about these leaks. He told us when the remote operating vehicles tried to operate the shear rams, they noticed a loss 

of pressure. They investigated this by injecting dye into the hydraulic fuel which showed a large leak coming from a loose fitting 

which was backed off several turns. The Cameron official told us 

he did not believe the leak was caused by a blowup because every 

other fitting on the system was tight. We also asked about the significance of the leak. The Cameron official said it was one of several possible failure modes. If the leak deprived the shear rams of 

sufficient power, they might not succeed in cutting through the 

drill pipe and sealing the well. 

Second, we learned that the blowout preventer had been modified 

in unexpected ways. One of these modifications was potentially significant. The blowout preventer has an underwater control panel. 

BP spent the day trying to use this control panel to activate a variable oil ram on the blowout preventer that is designed to seal tight 

around any pipe of the well; in other words, pinch off the flow of 

oil. When they investigated why their attempts failed to activate 


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the bore ram, they learned that the device had been modified. A 

useless test ram, not the variable bore ram, had been connected to 

the socket that was supposed to activate the variable bore ram. 

An entire day’s work of precious time had been spent engaging 

rams that closed the wrong way because it was wired wrong. 

BP told us the modifications on the BOP were extensive. After 

the accident, they asked Transocean for drawings of the blowout 

preventer because the modifications that drawings they received 

did not match the structure on the sea floor. BP said they wasted 

many hours trying to figure this out. 

Third, we learned that the blowout preventer is not powerful 

enough to cut through the joints in a drill pipe. We found a 

Transocean document that I would like to put on the screen, and 

it says, Most blind shear rams are designed to shear effectively 

only on the body of the drill pipe. Procedures for use of BSRs must 

therefore ensure that there is no tool joint opposite the ram prior 

to shearing. This seemed astounding to us because the threaded 

joints between the sections of drill pipe make up about 10 percent 

of the length of pipe. If the shear rams cannot cut through the 

joints, that would mean the so-called ‘‘fail safe’’ device would succeed in cutting the drill pipe only 90 percent of the time. 

We asked the Cameron official about the cutting capacity of the 

blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. He confirmed that it 

is not powerful enough to cut through the joints and the drill pipe. 

He told us that this was another possible explanation for the failure of the blowout preventer to seal the well. 

And fourth, we learned that the emergency controls on the blowout preventer may have failed. The blowout preventer has two 

emergency controls, one is called the emergency disconnect system, 

or EDS. BP told us that the EDS was activated on the drill rig before the rig was evacuated, but the Cameron officials said they 

doubt that the signals ever reached the blowout preventer on the 

seabed. Cameron officials believe the explosion on the rig destroyed 

the communications link to the blowout preventer before the emergency sequence could be completed. 

In other words, the emergency controls may have failed because 

the explosion had caused the emergency off the disabled communications to the blowout preventer. Still, the blowout preventer has 

a dead man switch which is supposed to activate the blowout preventer when all else fails. But according to Cameron, there were 

multiple scenarios that could have caused the dead man switch not 

to activate. One is human oversight. The dead man switch may not 

have been enabled prior to installing the BOP on the ocean floor. 

One is a lack of maintenance. The dead man switch won’t work if 

the batteries are dead. The dead man switch is connected to two 

separate control pods on the blowout preventer. Both rely on battery power to operate. When one of the control pods was removed 

and inspected after the spill began, the battery was found to be 

dead. The battery in the other pod has still not yet been inspected. 

There also appears to be a design problem. The dead man switch 

activates only when three separate lines that connect the rig to the 

blowout preventer are all severed, the communication, power and 

hydraulic lines. Cameron believes the power and communication 

lines were severed in the explosion, but it is possible that hydraulic 


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lines remained intact, which would have stopped the dead man 

switch from activating. 

These are not the only failure scenarios that could impair the 

function of the blowout preventer. The Cameron official we met 

with described many other potential problems that could have prevented the blowout preventer from functioning properly. Steel casings or casing hanger could have been ejected from the well and 

blocked the operations of the rams, the drill pipe could have been 

severed successfully, but then dropped from the rig, breaking the 

seal. All operators on the rig could have tried to activate the shear 

rams by pushing the shear ram control button. This would initiated 

an attempt to close the rams, but it would not have been successful. 

The shear rams do not have enough power to cut drill pipes unless they are activated through the emergency switch or the dead 

man switch. In fact, we uncovered an astonishing document that 

Transocean prepared in 2001 when it bought the blowout preventer 

from Cameron. I would like to display the executive summary of 

this document. It says there are 260 separate failure modes that 

could require polling of the BOP. According to this report, the predominant failures included ram blocking mechanisms. How can a 

device that has 260 failure modes be considered fail-safe? 

The problems with the blowout preventer extend to the procedures for testing the device. CEO of Transocean, Steven Newman, 

says in his testimony, ‘‘We have no reason to believe that they were 

not operational. They were jointly tested by BP and Transocean 

personnel as specified on April 10 and 17 and found to be functional.’’ This assertion seems to be contradicted by a document prepared by BP on April 27, one week after the explosion. According 

to this document, ‘‘The blowout preventer stack emergency systems 

are not typically tested once the BOP stack is on the seabed. What 

this means is that, while some functions of the BOP may have been 

tested in the weeks before the explosion, the emergency systems, 

including the dead man switch and the leaking emergency hydraulic system, were unlikely to have been tested. 

After the Alaska Pipeline and Texas refineries disasters, BP 

promised to make safety its number one priority. This hearing will 

raise questions about whether BP and its partners fulfilled this 

commitment. The safety of its entire operations rested on the performance of a leaking, modified, defective blowout preventer. 

This is the first of what will certainly be multiple hearings into 

this disaster. I look forward to a frank and spirited discussion with 

our witnesses today. 

I ask unanimous consent that the documents I referred to be entered into the record. 

[The information appears at the conslusion of the hearing.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stupak follows:] 


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Opening Statement 

Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

"Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill" 

May 12,2010 

Three years ago - almost to the day - this subcommittee held a hearing into British Petroleum's 

disasters at Texas City and on the North Slope of Alaska. The 2005 Texas City refinery 

explosion resulted in the deaths of 15 workers and injured more than 170 people. As a result of 

that accident and BP's failure to correct potential hazards faced by employees at Texas City, 

OSHA has twice slapped BP with record setting fines totaling more than $100 million. Several 

reports criticized management at the Texas City facility including BP's own 2007 Report o/the 

Management Accountability Project which stated "a culture that evolved over the years seemed 

to ignore risk, tolerated non-compliance and accepted incompetence." 

In March of 2006 BP discovered their pipeline on Alaska's North Slope had spilled more than 

200,000 gallons of oil on the tundra, making it the largest spill in North Slope history. Our 

hearings discovered that significant cost cutting measures resulted in decreased maintenance and 

inspections of the pipeline and BP's management culture deterred individuals from raising safety 

concerns. 

Since our last hearing BP has experienced continued problems on the North Slope 

• September 29, 2008 an 8 inch high pressure gas line at the Y-Pad location "separated" 

sending 3 pieces of pipe to the tundra. One segment of the pipe landed 900 feet from the 

pipeline. Roughly 30 minutes later a second and unrelated incident occurred on the S Pad 

where there was a gas release. 

• January 15,2009 a disc cleaning pig became lodged and lost in a 34 inch Oil Transit Line 

during de-oiling allowing gas to pass around the pig and travel through Skid 50, to Pump 

Station 1 causing a significant venting of gas to the atmosphere and the complete 

shutdown of the Trans Alaska Pipeline for a period of time. 

• October 10, 2009 at the Central Compressor Plant low pressure flare staging valves were 

stuck closed causing gas to travel to the backup low pressure flare valves, which 

activated causing the gas to vent to the atmosphere which could have caused an 

explosion. 

• November 29,2009 an 18 inch three-phase common line near the Lisbume Production 

Center carrying a mixture of crude oil, produced water and natural gas ruptured spraying 

its contents over an estimated 8,400 square feet area. 

In addition to these pipeline incidents there have been several personal injury accidents where 

employees have been seriously injured or killed as was the tragic case of Mike Phalen on 

November 18th last year when he was crushed between the pipeline and a truck. 
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Today we are here to investigate the latest BP tragedy, one which has resulted in the apparent 

loss of 11 lives and is well on its way to becoming the largest oil spill in our nation's history. 

Let me take a moment on behalf of the entire committee to convey our deepest sympathies to the 

family, friends and coworkers of those 11 individuals lost on that fateful day. 

On April 20th an explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig which BP 

was leasing to drill an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico. The rig was owned and operated 

by Transocean, the world's largest offshore drilling company and was under contract from BP. 

On April 22nd the rig capsized and sank to the floor of the ocean resulting in oil leaks from three 

separate locations among the twisted wreckage. 

The world is wondering what went wrong to allow explosive gas to shoot out of the drill pipe on 

the Deepwater Horizon causing the explosion. We heard Chairman Waxman discuss theories of 

what may have gone '~Tong in the well (down hole as they call it) and what went wrong on the 

rig. I would like to take a few minutes to discuss issues related to the blowout preventer (BOP) 

which was the "fail safe system" to cut off the flow of oil and gas to the rig. 

In his testimony today, Lamar McKay, the President of BP America, says that blowout 

preventers are "intended to ... be fail-safe." But that didn't happen. The blowout preventer used 

by the Deepwater Horizon rig failed to stop the flow of gas and oil, the rig exploded, and an 

enormous oil spill is now threatening the Gulf Coast. 

We know that the blowout preventer, the BOP, did not properly engage. The BOP has multiple 

rams that are supposed to slam shut to pinch off any flow around the drill pipe and stop the flow 

of oil from the well. There are also shear rams in the BOP that are supposed to cut and seal the 

pipe to prevent oil and gas from flowing. The question we will ask is why did these rams fail? 

Our investigation is at its early stages, but already we have uncovered at least four significant 

problems with the blowout preventer used on the Deepwater Horizon drill rig. 

First, the blowout preventer apparently had a significant leak in a key hydraulic system. This 

leak was found in the hydraulic system that provides emergency power to the shear rams, which 

are the devices that are supposed to cut the drill pipe and seal the well. 

I would like to put on the screen a document that the Committee received from BP. This 

document states: "leaks have been discovered in the BOP hydraulics system." 

The blowout preventer was manufactured by Cameron. We asked a senior official at Cameron 

what he knew about these leaks. He told us when the remote operating vehicles (ROV s) tried to 

operate the shear rams, they noticed a loss of pressure. They investigated this by injecting dye 

into the hydraulic fluid, which showed a large leak coming from a loose fitting, which was 

backed off several turns. 

The Cameron official told us that he did not believe the leak was caused by the blowout because 

every other fitting in the system was tight. 

We also asked about the significance of the leak. The Cameron official said it was one of several 

possible failure modes. If the leak deprived the shear rams of sufficient power, they might not 

succeed in cutting through the drill pipe and sealing the well. 

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Second, we learned that the blowout preventer had been modified in unexpected ways. One of 

these modifications was potentially significant. The blowout preventer has an underwater 

control panel. BP spent a day trying to use this control panel to activate a variable bore ram on 

the blowout preventer that is designed to seal tight around any pipe in the well. When they 

investigated why their attempts failed to activate the bore ram, they learned that the device had 

been modified. A useless test ram - not the variable bore ram - had been connected to the socket 

that was supposed to activate the variable bore ram. An entire day's worth of precious time had 

been spent engaging rams that closed the wrong way. 

BP told us the modifications on the BOP were extensive. After the accident, they asked 

Transocean for drawings of the blowoutpreventer. Because of the modifications, the drawings 

they received didn't match the structure on the ocean floor. BP said they wasted many hours 

figuring this out. 

Third, we learned that the blowout preventer is not powerful enough to cut through joints in the 

drill pipe. We found a Transocean document that I would like to put on the screen. It says: 

most blind shear rams are "designed to shear effectively only on the body of the drillpipe. 

Procedures for the use ofBSR's must therefore ensure that there is no tool joint opposite the ram 

prior to shearing." 

This seemed astounding to us because the threaded joints between the sections of drillpipe make 

up about 10% of the length of the pipe. If the shear rams cannot cut through the joints, that 

would mean that this so-called failsafe device would succeed in cutting the drillpipe only 90% of 

the time. 

We asked the Cameron official about the cutting capacity of the blowout preventer on the 

Deepwater Horizon. He confirmed that it is not powerful enough to cut through the joints in the 

drillpipe. And he told us this was another possible explanation for the failure of the blowout 

preventer to seal the well. 

And fourth, we learned that the emergency controls on the blowout preventer may have failed. 

The blowout preventer has two emergency controls. One is called the emergency disconnect 

system or EDS. BP officials told us that that the EDS was activated on the drill rig before the rig 

was evacuated. But the Cameron official said they doubted the signals ever reached the blowout 

preventer on the seabed. Cameron officials believed the explosion on the rig destroyed the 

communications link to the blowout preventer before the emergency sequence could be 

completed. 

In other words, the emergency controls may have failed because the explosion that caused the 

emergency also disabled communications to the blowout preventer. 

Still, the blowout preventer also has a "deadman switch" which is supposed to activate the 

blowout preventer when all else fails. But according to Cameron, there were multiple scenarios 

that could have caused the deadman switch not to activate. One is human oversight: the 

deadman switch may not have been enabled on the control panel prior to the BOP being installed 

on the ocean floor. One is lack of maintenance: the deadman switch won't work if the batteries 

are dead. The deadman switch is connected to two separate control pods on the blowout 

preventer. Both rely on battery power to operate. When one of the control pods was removed 

and inspected after the spill began, the battery was found to be dead. The battery in the other 

pod has not been inspected yet. 

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And one appears to be a design problem. The deadman switch activates only when three 

separate lines that connect the rig to the blowout preventer are all severed: the communication, 

power, and hydraulic lines. Cameron believes the power and communication lines were severed 

in the explosion, but it is possible the hydraulic lines remained intact, which would have stopped 

the deadman switch from activating. 

These are not the only failure scenarios that could impair the function of the blowout preventer. 

The Cameron official we met with described many other potential problems that could have 

prevented the blowout preventer from functioning properly. Steel casing or casing hanger could 

have been ejected from the well and blocked the operation of the rams. The drill pipe could have 

been severed successfully, but then dropped from the rig, breaking the seal. Or operators on the 

rig could have tried to activate the shear rams by pushing the shear ram control button. This 

would have initiated an attempt to close the rams, but it would not have been successful. The 

shear rams do not have enough power to cut drill pipe unless they are activated through the 

emergency switch or the deadman switch. 

In fact, we uncovered an astonishing document that Transocean prepared in 2001, when it bought 

the blowout preventer from Cameron. I would like to display the executive sununary from this 

document. It says there are 260 separate "failure modes" that "could require pulling of the 

BOP." According to this report, "the predominant failures" included "ram locking mechanisms." 

How can a device that has 260 failure modes be considered failsafe? 

The problems with the blowout preventer extend to the procedures for testing the device. The 

CEO of Transocean, Steven Newman, says in his testimony: "we have no reason to believe that 

they were not operational- they were jointly tested by BP and Transocean personnel as specified 

on April 10 and 17 and found to be functional." 

But this assertion appears to be contradicted by a document prepared by BP on April 27, one 

week after the explosion. According to this document, "BOP stack emergency systems are not 

typically tested once the BOP stack is on the seabed." What this means that while some 

functions on the BOP may have been tested in the weeks before the explosion, the emergency 

systems, including the deadman system and the leaking emergency hydraulic system, were 

unlikely to have been tested. 

After the Alaska pipeline and Texas refinery disasters, BP promised to make safety its number 

one priority. This hearing will raise serious questions about whether BP and its partners fulfilled 

this commitment. The safety of its entire operations rested on the performance of a leaking and 

apparently defective blowout preventer. 

This is the first of what will certainly be multiple hearings into this disaster and I look forward to 

a frank and spirited discussion with our witnesses today. I ask unanimous consent that the 

documents I referred to be entered into the record. 

4 
25 

Mr. STUPAK. I next turn to Mr. Burgess, ranking member of the 

subcommittee, for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank the chairman. And thank you for convening this important hearing. 

The Deepwater Horizon events obviously represent a shocking 

tragedy. Eleven lives were lost, and we all regret that, environmental and economic harm continues to the area, and we don’t 

know what caused the disaster. But it is apparent that there was 

a failure, and now this committee and, indeed the American people, 

want answers and they want accountability. 

This hearing is preliminary. It is a necessary step in getting the 

answers and getting to that accountability, and that is why I support the efforts of the committee to move rapidly on this investigation. What caused the blowout and the explosion, the failure of the 

various emergency safeguards on the sea floor and the immediate 

response to stem the oil spill deserve our close and thorough scrutiny. 

Unfortunately, today’s hearing and the committee’s investigation 

is what one might call asymmetric oversight. The committee has 

demanded and obtained thousands and thousands and thousands 

of pages of documents and testimony from the four companies represented today, but we have obtained virtually nothing from those 

Federal agencies that were responsible for the licensing and oversight of these operations. 

Nothing from the Obama administration, who presumably has already had discussions with likely many of you as to what went 

wrong and what might be done to mitigate the problem, but no documents, no testimony from the administration or from any of the 

relevant Federal agencies. 

With the benefit of additional interviews and document review, 

we should have included an examination of other factors in the incident, including the role of inspections, including the role of Federal inspections and oversight of drilling operations, practices, and 

technology, and indeed the licensing of same. The Federal role 

would appear to be an integral part of our story. We should have 

heard from the Secretary of the Interior today. And as Ranking 

Member Barton and I have respectfully requested, Mr. Stupak, of 

you and Chairman Waxman, we would like for that hearing, since 

it is not occurring today, to occur in the near future. 

We will hear from others in the administration and other officials 

under oath in the near future, and I think it is mandatory that this 

committee do that. We should have representatives from the Department of Interior and from Minerals Management Services here 

to explain why in March of 2009, in the initial exploration plan for 

the Deepwater Horizon, a blowout scenario was not contemplated 

by BP and why, therefore, the site-specific oil spill response plan 

was in fact not even required by these regulators. 

I would also emphasize the subcommittee should resist the temptation to push ahead on the facts and to lose their perspective. The 

drilling and production operations are not experimental forays into 


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the deep ocean with untested technology. For over 50 years, these 

have been well engineered and well planned operations. 

Until this tragedy, there was a remarkably good record for overall Gulf oil production. The Gulf produces about 1.7 million barrels 

of oil per day, 6.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas, about one-third 

of the total United States daily supply on 3,500 platforms, employing 35,000 workers. 

In recent years, the bulk of new production has come from deep 

sea operations, with scores of exploratory and production wells developed at depths equal to or substantially greater than the 5,000- 

foot depths of the Deepwater Horizon, all without serious incidence. 

In point of fact, this is the first spill of magnitude in the Gulf 

waters. 

This is not to minimize the disaster we confront today; 11 lives 

were lost. Four million gallons of oil has been released into a very 

fragile ecosystem, an ecosystem that has likely over 7,000 miles of 

actual ocean frontage on the coast of Louisiana. This past Friday, 

I went to the Gulf with members of the subcommittee, Chairman 

Markey and Ranking Member Barton, to learn firsthand about the 

recovery operations that were going on. And the magnitude of the 

problems that the people in the Gulf face from what we saw flying 

over the spill really cannot be captured in news photos. The oil 

slick looks to be the size of Montana. It reinforces why it is absolutely critical that we ensure that the responders have what they 

need to control and mitigate the spill, and for the future’s sake, we 

must identify what caused the spill. 

Our visit also reinforced how critical timing was in the incident 

in the immediate response to the blowout. We understand that the 

initial failure of the blowout preventer was critical to the lack of 

containment of the spill. Had it worked as designed or worked in 

a timely fashion in those initial hours or days after the blowout, 

we might be a having a hearing that was focused on entirely different problems today. But the blowout and subsequent failure of 

the blowout preventer tells us about the process and operations we 

actually don’t yet know, but it may reveal issues in mechanical failure, systems failure, human error, or a combination of the three. 

What we hope we do not find is that corners were needlessly cut 

in order to save time and money because ultimately now time and 

money are what are at risk. 

Potential issues with material integrity or procedures in the construction of the well may provide a clue to how an apparently unexpected gas release occurred in the first place. All such issues may 

illuminate areas that better lead to operational oversight by the 

well’s producers, the industry, and again, those charged with the 

regulation of same, which is why a hearing like this, which is 

asymmetric in its construct, it is why it is inadequate to really address the problems. 

I do look forward to hearing the testimony from our key witnesses in the incident, British Petroleum, the operator of the well, 

Transocean, the driller and rig owner, Halliburton, a provider of 

various services, including the critical cementing, and Cameron, 

which manufactured the blowout preventer at the center of the current efforts to stop the flow of oil. But the regulators have failed. 

A litany of questions need to be asked and must be asked of those 


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inspectors at Department of Interior and Minerals Management 

Services. 

For what it is worth, I want to welcome the witnesses to our 

committee. I understand you’ve been going through a very difficult 

schedule amidst what is an enormous tragedy within your businesses. I appreciate your willingness to come forward and discuss 

what you know with the subcommittee. 

Time is going to be critical today. You have all been through a 

day of Senate hearings. And some of the testimony that has come 

forward has been predictable, but some of it has been contradictory 

and troubling in the testimony that we heard yesterday in the Senate. I am hopeful that maybe we can clear up some of these discrepancies and that you will, in fact, address them in your opening 

statements to us today. 

At the hearings yesterday, Mr. McKay, you testified that the 

modifications that were made to the blowout preventer and that 

the claims that your company, BP, was not aware of those. And 

Mr. Newman, you testified that Transocean made the modifications 

in 2005 at BP’s request and at BP’s expense. 

So Mr. McKay, in your opening, please tell us, is this true? Did 

BP, in fact, request and pay for these modifications? And if so, 

would BP not have some documentation of this? And if that is the 

case, why are we hearing from our staff that BP was shocked to 

hear about the modifications? 

And to Mr. Newman, tell us in your opening what modifications 

did you do? Did Transocean fully inform BP of everything it did to 

the blowout preventer? Do you have documents to back yourself 

up? Did you inform BP about any labeling discrepancy in the device itself? So we need to cut through some of those contradictions 

and become aware of the facts. 

And then finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just go back to the issue 

of who’s not here today. In the public information, the public release document, which is the application for the drilling of the 

Deepwater Horizon, there are some serious questions, there are 

some serious red flags. And I would very much like to have Secretary Salazar here; I would very much like to have Minerals Management Services here. 

Section 2.0, General Information, Section 2.7, Blowout Scenario, 

a scenario for a potential blowout of the well from which BP would 

expect to have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons is not required for the operations proposed in this exploration potential. 

Well, wait a minute. That is one thing for BP to say that, but why 

did the Federal regulators just simply rubber-stamp this when it 

was pushed across their desk? You have a well that had the potential to produce 100,000 barrels of oil a day and we are now shocked 

that 5,000 barrels a day are escaping and we have got no plan for 

mitigation? The State of Louisiana is scrambling for boom material 

to protect its fragile coastline. We didn’t have anything stockpiled 

ahead of time? We had to move equipment in and drill a 90-day 

relief well because that is the only way to stop this thing? It just 

seems like more care should have been delivered up front. 

And yes, while I may criticize the companies that are here in 

front of us today, I have also got serious questions that this committee needs to ask of the Federal agency that was charged with 


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the oversight. When I get to the questions, there are many other 

statements in this application that are just as troubling. An offshore coastal dispersion modeling report for the proposed operations is not required for the operations. You could lose control of 

a 100,000-barrel-a-day production well and you don’t have to have 

a model report for offshore coastal dispersion? It goes on and on. 

And again, I don’t necessarily fault the company for perhaps trying to save a buck on the application, but the Federal agency responsible for this that simply stamped it received and approved, 

that is where the problem exists in my mind. 

Last Friday, when we were down on the Gulf coast, the Times 

Picayune had an extensive article on what happened on the rig 

that day. They talk about the removal of the drilling mud prematurely. I hope somebody at some point will address that, that 

the drilling mud was removed and replaced with seawater before 

the second cement plug was placed, and subsequent to that was 

when the blowout occurred. Was, in fact, there some haste at getting this done? Did we depart from best practices? Or is that standard practice now and something that maybe needs to be revisited 

on other wells that are being drilled at the time? 

And then finally, this morning’s Washington Post, just a stunning paragraph from a columnist where Mr. McKay points out, Our 

operating management system in the Gulf of Mexico is as good as 

anyone. I can’t point to any deficiencies. Well, maybe that was true 

in March, but it is certainly not true in May. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:] 


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Opening Statement of the Honorable Michael Burgess 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Hearing on the 

Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill 

May 12,2010 

Thank you for convening this important hearing Chainnan Stupak. 

The Deepwater Horizon oil Gulf Coast oil spill is a shocking tragedy. Eleven 

lives were lost. Environmental and economic harm continues. 

We do not know yet what caused this disaster, but it is apparent there 

was a failure. The American people want answers and they want 

accountability. 

Although this hearing is really a preliminary examination, it is a good 

first step in getting those answers and that accountability. This is why I 

support your efforts to move rapidly on this investigation. What caused the 

blowout and explosion, the failure of various emergency safeguards on the 

seafloor, and the immediate response to stem the oil spill deserves our close 

and thorough scrutiny. 
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Unfortunately, today's hearing and the Committee's investigation is 

what one might call asymmetric oversight. The Committee has demanded 

and obtained thousands of pages of documents and testimony from the four 

companies represented today but virtually nothing from the Obama 

Administration - no document requests, no testimony. 

With the benefit of additional interviews and document review, we 

should have included an examination of other factors in the incident, 

including the role of federal inspections and oversight of drilling operations, 

practices, and technology. The federal role would appear to be an integral 

part of the story. We should have heard from the Secretary of the Interior 

today, as Ranking Member Barton and I had respectfully requested of you 

and Chairman Waxman. Will we hear from Secretary Salazar and perhaps 

other Administration officials under oath in the near future? We should have 

representatives from the Department of the Interior and MMS here to 

explain why in March of 2009, in the "Initial Exploration Plan" for the 

Deepwater Horizon, a blowout scenario was not contemplated by BP why, 

therefore, a "site-specific Oil Spill Response Plan" was not required by the 

regulators. 

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I would also emphasize the Subcommittee should resist the temptation 

to rush ahead of the facts, to lose perspective. These drilling and production 

operations are not experimental forays into the deep ocean with untested 

technology. For over fifty years, these have been well engineered, well 

planned operations. 

Until this oil spill, there was a remarkably good record for overall 

Gulf oil production. The Gulf produces about 1.7 million barrels of oil per 

day, 6.4 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day - about one-third of total 

U.S. daily supply - on some 3,500 platforms, employing about 35,000 

workers. In recent years, the bulk of new production has come from deep 

sea operations, with scores of exploratory and production wells developed at 

depths equal to or substantially greater than the 5,000 foot depths of the 

Deepwater Horizon - all without serious incidents. In point of fact, this is 

the first spill of this magnitude in Gulfwaters. 

This is not to minimize the disaster we confront today. Eleven lives 

were lost and over 4 million gallons of oil has been released into the fragile 

ecosystem. This past Friday, I went to the Gulf with Energy Subcommittee 

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Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Barton, and several other Committee 

colleagues to learn first hand about the recovery operations. 

The magnitude ofthe problems people face on the Gulf, from what we 

saw flying over the spill, cannot be captured in news photos. This reinforces 

why it is absolutely critical that we ensure the responders have what they 

need to control and mitigate the spill and that, for future's sake, we must 

identify what caused this spill. 

Our visit also reinforces how critical timing was in the incident and 

immediate response to the blowout. We understand the initial failure of the 

blowout preventer, the so-called "BOP," was critical to the lack of 

containment of the spill. Had it worked as designed, or worked in a timely 

fashion in those initial hours and days after the blowout, we would be 

having a very different hearing today. 

What the blowout and subsequent failure of the BOP tells us about 

processes and operations we don't yet know, but it may reveal issues of 

mechanical failure, systems failure, human error or a combination of the 

three. Potential issues with material integrity or procedures in the 

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construction of the well may provide a clue to how an apparently unexpected 

gas release occurred in the first place. All such issues may also illuminate 

areas that need better operational oversight by the well producers, the 

industry, and regulators. 

Which is why this asymmetrical hearing is inadequate. While I look 

forward to hearing from four key players in the incident, BP the operator of 

the well, Transocean the driller and rig owner, Halliburton the provider of 

various services including the critical cementing, and Cameron, which 

manufactured the blowout preventer at the center of current efforts to stop 

the flow of oil, the regulators failed and a litany of questions need to be 

asked of the inspectors at Interior and MMS. 

Let me welcome the witnesses. I understand you have been 

undergoing a grueling schedule amidst a great tragedy, and I appreciate your 

willingness to come and discuss what you know with the Subcommittee. 

Our oversight work, ultimately, aims to spotlight problems and compel 

positive solutions. 

Thank you Mr. Chainnan. 

### 

5 
34 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Burgess. 

Next I will turn to Mr. Markey, chairman of the Energy Subcommittee on Select Committee on Energy Independence, for an 

opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH 

OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To be honest, it is hard to have confidence in BP. When BP applied for the rights to drill in this lease, they called the chance of 

a major spill ‘‘unlikely.’’ When the accident initially happened, they 

said it was manageable. And last week, when BP and the other 

companies appeared before this committee, they said they never 

thought the rig could sink. Right now, by their own admission, BP 

is largely making it up as they go. They are engaging in a series 

of elaborate and risky science experiments at the bottom of the 

ocean. And after the failure of the containment dome, we are now 

hearing of plans to stuff the blowout preventer full of a mixture of 

golf balls, old tires, and other junk. 

When we heard the best minds were on the case, we expected 

MIT, and not the PGA. We already have one hole in the ground, 

and now their solution is to shoot a hole in one. We expected a lot 

more sophistication when it came to dealing with something of this 

magnitude. 

I think a root cause for this accident is the ‘‘drill baby drill’’ 

boosterism. There was oil industry boosterism that minimized potential hazards. There was a boosterism on the part of the previous 

administration that got rid of protections that they viewed as obstacles to increased drilling. Now we see the results. Boosterism led 

to complacency and complacency led to disaster, and this is a disaster. But it was not inevitable, it was preventable. And now we 

must enact protections that prevent similar catastrophes in the future. 

As a result of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, lives have 

been lost, livelihoods have been threatened, and a huge ocean and 

coastal ecosystem has been endangered. We have a duty and obligation to find out what happened here, why it happened, who is 

responsible, and how we can ensure that it never happens again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sullivan for an opening statement, 3 minutes, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SULLIVAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses here today. I know you are going through some challenging times right now and I appreciate you being here. 

Chairman Stupak, thank you for holding this hearing today, ‘‘Examining the Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil 

Spill.’’ While the exact cause of this terrible tragedy is still being 

investigated, I am interested in learning from our witnesses their 


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35 

thoughts on what went wrong and their ideas moving forward to 

prevent this from ever happening again. 

On April 20, 2010, a fire and explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, unfortunately 

killing 11 of the 126-person crew and injuring many others. Our 

thoughts and prayers are with all the affected families. 

This spill has the potential to be a massive ecological catastrophe, as nearly 4 million gallons of oil have already spilled into 

the Gulf since the accident. I commend the brave men and women 

who are working day and night to stop the leak and protect the 

shoreline in the Gulf region. This is a challenge of epic proportions, 

and it is the job of this committee to conduct a fact-based investigation into the disaster to find out what went wrong and how we can 

prevent it from ever happening again. 

However, I am disappointed that no one from the Obama administration is here to testify on the Department of Interior’s role in 

response to the accident. Given the integral role of Federal oversight and offshore drilling operations, it is critically important to 

hear the administration’s point of view and to get their take on 

what safety lapses occurred, and if any regulatory breakdowns happened at the Minerals Management Services that may have contributed to this terrible accident. 

During this hearing and the continuing investigation, it is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that 30 percent of the 

total U.S. production of crude oil comes from offshore. While some 

may want to stop drilling offshore altogether, this would be a terrible mistake. If we were to ban or restrict offshore drilling, we 

would simply increase our national dependence on foreign oil which 

makes our Nation less secure in the short and long-term and increases the cost of energy. We should not use this tragedy as an 

excuse to roll back the gains we have made in finding new ways 

to develop our own energy resources as we will need more oil and 

natural gas to help meet the growing demand for energy in the 

coming decades. 

We still have work to do to uncover exactly what went wrong. 

There are many questions that will be asked today on ongoing efforts to contain the leak, whether there are potential equipment or 

operational irregularities that played a part of the accident, and 

what we can learn from this tragedy going forward. I look forward 

to getting to the bottom of this tragedy, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. Dingell for an opening statement, please, sir. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding this important hearing today. 

The Obama administration has proposed expanding offshore oil 

and natural gas drilling in a way that complies with all of our environmental and safety laws. I support expanded offshore drilling if 

it is done right and if the permitting is done according to law and 

if the law, in fact, does work. However, these rigs go further and 


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36 

further from shore, and it becomes then critically important that 

we understand what happened to the Deepwater Horizon rig and 

well, as well as what additional precautions we need to take to prevent something like this from happening again. 

Now, this is not BP’s first time appearing before the Energy and 

Commerce Oversight Subcommittee. Members of this committee 

will recall in 2007 a hearing regarding corrosion in the pipeline 

leading up to the Alaska Pipeline which led to 1 million liters of 

oil leaked in Alaska’s North Slope. At that time, I observed that 

BP workers were often forced to forego safety measures to save 

money and to ultimately increase BP profits, and yet these safety 

programs in many cases appear to have been halted or cut due to 

budgetary reasons. This is the cost of what we have learned about 

the way that BP managed Prudhoe Bay. Until BP finally acknowledges the role of cost cutting and budget pressures played in creating this mess, I fear that other problems like this may be incurring at other BP facilities through the United States. 

The North Slope disaster is unfortunately one example of BP’s 

being before this subcommittee. We also investigated BP’s Texas 

City operations. Back in 2007, BP and its subsidiaries agreed to 

pay $50 million in criminal fines because of the 2005 explosions at 

its Texas City refinery. I note with irony and some dismay this fine 

is equal to less than a day’s corporate profits. And here we are 

again, this time like the explosions at BP’s Texas City refinery, we 

not only have an environmental disaster, but again, we have confronted tragic loss of lives. 

A little more than a year ago, in April of 2009, the Minerals 

Management Service exempted BP’s lease at Deepwater Horizon 

from an Environmental Impact Statement as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. BP called the prospect of an oil 

spill unlikely, and stated that no mitigation measures other than 

those required by regulation and BP policy will be employed to 

avoid, diminish, or eliminate potential impacts on environmental 

resurface . 

This, Mr. Chairman, is, quite frankly, outrageous. NEPA has 

been the law of the land for a long time, and for a good reason— 

I happen to know that because I wrote the legislation. 

Now, I sincerely hope that when this investigation is completed, 

that we don’t find that BP again once tried to cut costs at the expense of safety. Given their history, I am somewhat skeptical that 

that will be the conclusion, but I am hopeful, even though I have 

a pocketful of promises given me by BP during the time we had 

them before this committee that they would do better and that 

there was a new regime going on there that was aware of the environmental concerns as a Nation and the duties of that organization. 

I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we need to hear from the administration because we have not heard from them about why this was 

handled the way it was, failures of the leasing services and failures 

to properly implement NEPA. Now, we all know Gulf Coast is one 

of the most environmentally sensitive areas of the country. Four 

hundred species of rare birds, waterfowls and sea turtles are at serious risk. Coastal wetlands are a fragile ecosystem that deserves 

protection and doesn’t appear to be having it. 


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Since BP’s effort to get the containment dome into place didn’t 

work, the company is now going to use golf balls, knots of rope, and 

materials of miscellaneous character to try and plug the hole. If it 

works, great. It strikes me though as odd that with all the technology we have, golf balls are our best hope. 

I look forward to hearing more about this and efforts to stop the 

leaking in the Gulf. I look forward to the answers of our witnesses. 

I hope that we will hear from the government about why they were 

so generous in allowing this to go forward without full appliance 

of application of all the laws of the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dingell follows:] 


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News From Congressman John D. Dingell 

Serving Michigan's J 5'h Congressional District 

http://www.house.gov/dingell/ 

Wednesday, May 12, 2010 

Contact: Adam Benson, 202.225.4071 (office) 1202.271.8587 (cell) 

Dingell Statement from BP Oil Spill 

Hearing 

Washington, DC - Congressman John D. Dingell (D-MIl5) made the following comments at 

today's Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations healing "Inquiry 

into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Spill": 

"Mr. Chaim1an thank you for holding this important healing today. The Obama 

Administration has proposed expanding offshore oil and natural gas drilling in a way that 

complies with all our environmental and safety laws - and I support expanded offshore oil 

drilling, if it is done right. However, as these rigs go further from shore and into deeper waters, 

it is critically important tl1at we understand what happened to the Deepwater Horizon rig and 

well. as well as what additional precautions we need to take to prevent anything like this from 

happening again. 

"Now, this is not BP's first time appearing before the Energy and Commerce Oversight 

Subcommittee. Indeed, in a 2007 hearing regarding corrosion in pipeline leading up to the 

Alaska Pipeline which led to 1 million liters of oil leaked in Alaska's North Slope. I said 

'Workers were often forced to forgo safety measure to save money and to ultimately increase 

BP's profits' and 'yet these [safety] programs in many cases appeal' to have been halted or cut 

due to budgetary reasons. This is the cost of what we've learned about the way BP managed 

Prudhoe Bay. Until BP fully acknowledges the role cost cutting and budget pressures played in 

creating this mess, I fear other problems, like this, may be incurring at other BP facilities through 

the United States.' 

"The North Slope disaster is unfortunately only one example ofBP being before this 

subconunittee - we also investigated BP's Texas City operations. Back in 2007, BP and its 

subsidiaries agreed to pay $50 million in criminal fines because of the 2005 explosions at its 

Texas City refinery. J note with irony and dismay this fine is equal to less tl1an a day's corporate 

profits. 

"Sadly, here we are again. This time, like the explosions at BP's Texas City refinery, we not 

only have an environmental disaster, but we have the tragic loss of lives. 

"A little more than a year ago, in April 2009, the Minerals Management Service exempted BP's 

lease at Deepwater Horizon from an environmental impact statement as required by the National 
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Environmental Policy Act. BP called the prospect of an oil spill "unlikely" and stated that "no 

mitigation measures other than those required by regulation and BP policy will be employed to 

avoid, diminish or eliminate potential impacts on environmental resources." This, Mr. Chaim1an 

is outrageous. NEPA is the law of the land for a reason. J know because I wrote it. 

"I sincerely hope that when the investigation is completed we don't find that BP once again tJied 

to cut costs at the expense of safety. Given their history. 1 am somewhat skeptical that will be 

the conclusion. but 1 am hopeful. 

"The Gulf Coast is one of the most environmentally sensitive areas in the country. There are 

more than 400 species. including rare birds, waterfowl and sea turtles that are at very serious risk 

from this disaster. The coastal wetlands are a very fragile ecosystem that deserves protection. 

"Since BP's effort to get the contaim11ent dome in place didn't work. the company is resorting to 

golf balls. knots of rope and other miscellaneous materials to try and plug the hole. If it works. 

great - it just strikes me as odd that with all the technology we have. golf balls are our best 

hope. I look forward to hearing more about this and other efforts to stop the leaking of oil into 

the Gulf. 

"Mr. Chainnan, 1 look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their efforts thus far." 

Follow Congressman Dingell online 

Adam Benson 

Press Secretary for Congressman Dinge\l 

202.225.0881 (desk) 

202.271.8587 (cell) 
40 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. 

Mr. Gingrey for an opening statement, please, three minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PHIL GINGREY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA 

Mr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I’ve got a written 

statement. I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit it for 

the record and—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection. 

Mr. GINGREY [continuing]. Offer it extemporaneously. Going back 

to what the chairman emeritus just said, I think his wisdom always comes through, and his remarks really strike a balance in regard to the concern over what the industry’s culpability is and also 

to bring forth, as our ranking member of the subcommittee, Dr. 

Burgess, pointed out, that we need to hear from the administration, we need to hear from the Department of Interior, we need to 

hear from the Minerals Management Services. 

I can’t help but wonder as I listen to this hearing and the opening statements of the members, what is our intent here really? We 

are using up a tremendous amount of time already on the majority 

side, something like 30 minutes of opening statements, and we will 

go on and on and on and probably give each of the witnesses 5 minutes. And the information we have about the blowout preventer 

and all these different things at the bottom of the sea, those of us 

who may have a technical background but not in petroleum engineering, we have been fed information from our staff, but we really 

need to hear from these experts. 

I listened to some of the Senate hearing yesterday, Mr. Chairman. And when Mr. Waxman, the chairman of the full committee, 

says about BP oil, they don’t bear the full cost when something 

goes wrong. I think we are going to hear from Mr. McKay that indeed they will and do and plan to bear the full cost when something goes wrong. I am not defending anybody here, I just want to 

learn the facts, the actual facts, fair and balanced. 

In regard to the criticism of some of the attempts to plug the 

leak that was commented by a Senate majority member yesterday 

in that hearing that it seems like these guys, BP oil in particular, 

are just making it up as they go along. It sounds analogous to what 

our majority party and administration are doing in regard to the 

economic meltdown of this country, kind of making it up as they 

go along. And so far, our unemployment rate has gone from 7.6 to 

almost 10 percent, and we still have 16 million people out of work 

despite a $1 trillion economic stimulus package. So I think we need 

to be fair and balanced here. 

I certainly look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. And 

yes, we are going to ask some question, tough questions. Eleven 

lives were lost, and the ecosystem and the economy of the Gulf 

Coast is at risk, and this is a very important hearing. But let’s just 

don’t put on our makeup and have our hair done and pander before 

the C–SPAN cameras. Let’s get the facts right. That is, after all, 

why we are here. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley for an opening statement, please. 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. BRALEY, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is indeed a very important hearing, and I will submit my formal remarks for the 

record and speak extemporaneously. 

This hearing shows what happens when political chants of ‘‘drill, 

baby, drill’’ evolve into the tragic reality of spill, baby, spill.’’ And 

for all of my colleagues on the other side who wish that there were 

representatives of the administration here today, I would remind 

them that there was a joint congressional briefing held on May 4 

where representatives from Interior, Homeland Security, Coast 

Guard, Commerce, EPA, Minerals Management Services, NOAA 

and the National Ocean Service did appear, gave us extensive 

briefings and were there to answer questions to every Member of 

Congress who chose to end up at that hearing. 

Well, probably one of the most profound statements made at that 

briefing was by Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen, from the Coast 

Guard, who gave a tremendous overview of what was going on as 

part of the Federal Government’s response. And he made this 

statement in describing what is happening: This is closer to Apollo 

13 than to the Exxon Valdez. 

And Mr. Chairman, I think that the fundamental issue of this 

hearing should be to try to figure out why that is the case because 

Apollo 13 happened 40 years ago, 240,000 miles away from the 

Earth, with limited resources to try to solve the disaster that was 

occurring on that mission. That was 10 years into the manned 

space program. 

And Mr. Chairman Waxman, the first submerged and oil wells 

in salt water were drilled under the Santa Barbara Channel in 

California in 1896. So why is this more like Apollo 13 than the 

Exxon Valdez? Why were we not better prepared to deal with the 

enormous environmental and safety risks caused by this massive 

explosion? 

Secretary Salazar said at that briefing, this was supposed to be 

a failsafe system. Obviously, it was not. And the question for all 

of us is why not? 

So as we listen to the witnesses and hear the latest information 

they have to share with us, these are the questions I want answers 

to. How did this happen? Why did this happen? Who is responsible? Most importantly, what have we learned? What are we, Congress, going to do, and what are we prepared to do to ensure this 

never happens again? 

And finally, who will bear the cost? Because despite the assurances we received at that briefing from Secretary Salazar and others that BP has made repeated assurances to stand the full cost 

of this recovery, some of the actions that are taking place in response to this catastrophe would give us the indication otherwise. 

And that is why as we look at these serious issues, I look forward 

to the testimony of our witnesses in answering those questions. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braley follows:] 


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SRUCE L. BRALEY 

WASHINGTQN, DC OFHCE 

ENERGYANO 

COMMER.CE COMMiTIEE 

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Statement of Congressman Bruce Braley 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

"Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill" 

May 12,2010 

Thank you, Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess, for 

holding this important hearing today on the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast 

oil spill. It is critical that we determine what caused the explosion at the 

Deepwater Horizon drilling rig to ensure that this type of tragedy does not 

happen again in the future and to ensure accountability for this historic 

disaster. 

This accident - which led to the tragic deaths of eleven people, an 

historic environmental disaster, and billions of dollars in economic losses 

for the fishing, seafood, and tourism industries - is a dangerous reminder 

of the risks that offshore drilling poses. The oil spill not only jeopardizes 

the livelihoods of the millions of hard-working Americans in the area, but in 

the long-term, could also impact Iowa's middle class families by raising gas 
43 


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prices that are already too high. We must work to ensure a comprehensive 

and thorough investigation into the cause of and response to this disaster, 

both to ensure that this type of accident is prevented in the future and to 

ensure the most thorough and effective cleanup and recovery possible. 

We must also work to ensure that American taxpayers do not end up 

footing the bill for big oil's mistakes. 

This hearing is an important step in getting to the root of the cause of 

the disaster and to providing necessary oversight of the companies' and 

U.S. government's response. I'm also glad that the Administration has 

ordered inspections of all rigs in deep water to prevent this type of 

unacceptable tragedy from happening elsewhere. 

I've also taken action to ensure that British Petroleum - and not the 

American taxpayers - pay for the effects of this spill. While I'm glad that 

BP has indicated they will be responsible for all clean-up costs, last week I 

introduced the Big Oil Company Bailout Prevention Act with Congressman 

Holt to ensure that taxpayers are protected from paying for the disastrous 

effects of this spill. Currently, the responsible party in an oil spill must pay 

for all the economic damages up to $75 million, including lost revenues 

from fishing and tourism, natural resources damages, or lost local tax 

revenues. This legislation would raise the cap to $10 billion and would also 
44 


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eliminate the current $500 million cap on natural resources damages. This 

legislation is critical to ensuring that if big oil companies are responsible for 

a disaster, big oil companies pay for the clean-up and damage. I hope this 

hearing will examine this critical issue of responsibility and accountability, 

and will also be instrumental in ensuring that the companies responsible 

bear the burden of fixing the problem. 

I also hope this hearing will result in an honest and informed 

discussion of the risks and benefits of expanded offshore drilling, including 

an extensive risk-benefit analysis, and an open discussion of the best and 

safest ways to produce energy for our country. This disaster clearly 

highlights the risks that offshore drilling poses to our environment, 

American businesses, families, and communities. It also highlights the 

need for us to continue to move forward aggressively to harvest more safe, 

alternative energy, like biofuel and renewable wind power. My state of 

Iowa is leading the way in these safe, clean energy industries, and I look 

forward to working with my colleagues here to expand production of these 

alternative energy sources in my state and across the country. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses today and to 

working to hold those responsible accountable and to prevent this type of 

disaster from happening again. 
45 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Braley. Mr. Griffith for an opening 

statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PARKER GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 

the chairman and ranking member for calling this important hearing today and the witnesses for taking time to come before our subcommittee to discuss the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

Before I begin I would like to take a moment and offer my sincere condolences to family and friends of those who lost their lives 

on the Deepwater Horizon. Please know my thoughts and prayers 

are with you. 

We cannot achieve energy independence without assuming some 

risk. Whether it is nuclear, coal, oil or natural gas, the process of 

harnessing energy is inherently risky. Having said this, it is the 

role of the Federal Government and good corporate citizens to minimize this risk while working towards United States energy independence. Blocking future production will not protect America. It 

will simply cause us to be much more dependent on unfriendly 

sources of oil. 

The oil and gas industry employs hundreds of thousands of 

Americans, many in my home State of Alabama. We must continue 

to drill and avoid knee-jerk reactions to this accident. The oil and 

gas industry has a safety record that has been steadily improving 

over the years, and I have no doubt that what is learned from this 

incident will be incorporated into the future increase in safety. 

That being said, we must allow this investigation to go forward 

and ensure that Congress provide appropriate oversight. It is important to focus on not assigning blame based on theories, but to 

allow the time to pass that is necessary for a thorough investigation. Once investigations are complete, it is vital that we learn lessons from this incident so that we can keep our workers and environment safe while continuing to produce our valuable oil and gas 

resources. 

Again thank you for coming today, and I look forward to your 

testimony. And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Griffith. 

Ms. DeGette for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As Congress debates the role of a forward-looking energy plan, 

we are going to need to see what part drilling expansion plays in 

development of that plan. And we are going to need to see what 

the causes of this tragic accident were because given the scope of 

this disaster, we cannot afford to vastly expand offshore drilling in 

the future if this type of disaster can be expected to occur, even as 

some on the other side say, on a rare basis. The damage in terms 

of environment and loss of human life is simply too great. 

Accidents on this scale raise innumerable questions about what 

went wrong. And usually, and probably in this case, there is no sinVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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gle answer or single point of blame. But as we attempt to determine the cause in order to prevent such tragedies in the future, 

two issues stand out in my mind and the chairman raised both of 

them. 

The first one is, what role did the cementing job play in the accident? The timing of the accident indicates that the cementing was 

likely a culprit as the accident occurred soon after the cement was 

injected into the well. 

This would not be the first time that cementing has caused problems in the Gulf of Mexico. According to a 2007 study by the Minerals Management Service, nearly half of all blowouts in the Gulf 

over the last 14 years are due to faulty cementing. In addition, 

poor cementing has been identified as the cause of the recent 2009 

blowout at an offshore oil platform in Australia. Cementing has 

been a cause for concern in onshore drilling as well with groundwater contamination incidents tied to improper cementing in my 

home State of Colorado and elsewhere. 

The second issue that this committee needs to probe further is 

the failure of the blowout preventer. This device is designed to be 

the failsafe mechanism that will prevent tragedies such as this 

spill. Its failure is extremely troubling as it calls into question 

whether these devices can be trusted to function properly at offshore drilling locations. 

I know that we won’t be able to identify the root cause of the accident today and that the investigation is still in its early stages, 

but finger pointing will not cause this problem. It is in the interest 

of all of the witnesses to get to the bottom of this issue if they want 

to assure the American people that offshore drilling is a safe practice that we should actually expand farther. 

Frankly, I watched part of the hearing yesterday as well and I 

was dismayed at the parsing of words by all parties yesterday in 

terms of liability and in terms of willingness to pay for these tremendous costs. And so I think that those responsible need to step 

up. They need to bear the cost, and they need to fix this technology. 

Because if they don’t, we will not have expansion of offshore drilling until this committee and the U.S. Congress can be assured that 

it can be done in a safe and in an environmentally and human— 

and in a way to save human life way. Otherwise it simply won’t 

be part of our plan. And many of us don’t object to offshore drilling. 

We support it where appropriate, but not if it cannot be done safely. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. DeGette. 

Mr. Latta for an opening statement please; 3 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. LATTA, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Mr. LATTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Burgess. First and foremost, I also want to extend my heartfelt condolences to families of those who have lost loved ones and those who 

have been injured. I am also deeply saddened by the destruction 

caused by the recent oil spill in the Gulf. I want to commend the 

thousands of dedicated workers, the volunteers and military personnel who are currently in the Gulf responding to this spill to proVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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tect the shoreline and wildlife. The cleanup process from this spill 

will take months if not years. 

As the Marine Board of Investigation, made up of the Minerals 

Management Service, MMS, and the Coast Guard, convened yesterday to identify the factors leading to the explosion, loss of life, sinking and subsequent oil spill of the Deepwater Horizon, I look forward to what the investigation will render and what facts and recommendations will come forth. 

It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that over 42,000 oil wells 

have been drilled in the Gulf of Mexico since 1979 when, the first 

deepwater well was first drilled in the Gulf. Sixty percent of all the 

wells drilled in the Gulf are now deepwater wells and over 2,200 

deepwater wells have been drilled. 

As Members of Congress, we must ensure that the United States 

continues its domestic energy production while also maintaining 

stringent environmental safety regulations. We cannot become complacent when it comes to American lives and our natural resources. 

We need to ensure that the investigation into the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is thorough and those individuals responsible for this 

disaster are held accountable. We cannot afford to have a repeat 

of this kind of a disaster. 

As has already been noted, it is important to note that the oil 

and natural gas industry in America plays a vital role to our economy and supplies this country with millions of jobs. Most recent 

data, according to a American Petroleum Institute study, shows 

that this industry contributes more than $1 trillion to the U.S. 

economy over a year. The State of Ohio contributes over 229,000 

jobs through the oil and natural gas industry, and it is also important to note that we maintain these jobs, but also we need to maintain the safety of our hardworking Americans who are employed in 

this industry. 

As the ranking member has stated, I, too, would like to have witnesses from the Department of the Interior, particularly MMS and 

the United States Coast Guard. I hope that any future hearings in 

this committee on this subject will include government agencies 

that are at the forefront working on this issue. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from today’s 

four witnesses, each of whom represents a company who will play 

a pivotal role in this investigation. And with that, Mr. Chairman, 

I yield back. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Latta follows:] 


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Robert E. Latta 

Opening Statement 

House Energy and Commerce Committee 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Hearing on "Inquiry into Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast 

Oil Spill" 

Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess: 

I want to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families 

of those who have lost loved ones, and to those who have been 

injured. I am deeply saddened by the destruction caused by the 

recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 

I commend the thousands of dedicated workers and 

military personnel currently in the Gulf responding to this spill 

to protect the shoreline and wildlife. The cleanup process from 

the spill will take months, if not years. As the Marine Board of 

Investigation, made up of the Mineral Management Service 

(MMS) and the Coast Guard, convened yesterday to identify 

the factors leading to the explosion, loss of life, sinking, and 

subsequent oil spill of the Deepwater Horizon, I look forward 

to what the investigation will render and what facts and 

recommendations will come forth. 

It is important to note that the oil and natural gas industry 

in America plays a vital role to our economy, and supplies this 

country with millions of jobs. Most recent data according to a 

American Petroleum Institute study shows that this industry 

contributes more than $1 trillion to the U.S. economy every 

year. The state of Ohio contributes over 229,000 jobs to the oil 

and natural gas industry. It is not only important that we 

maintain these jobs, but we also need to maintain the safety of 

our hard working Americans who are employed in this 

industry. 
49 


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It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that over 42,000 

wells have been drilled in the Gulf of Mexico since 1979, 

when the first deepwater well was drilled in the Gulf. 60 

percent of all wells drilled in the Gulf are deepwater wells, and 

over 2,200 deepwater wells have been drilled. 

As Members of Congress, we must ensure that the United 

States continues its domestic energy production, while also 

maintaining stringent environmental and safety regulations. 

We cannot become complacent when it comes to the American 

lives and our natural resources, we need to insure that the 

investigation into the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is thorough 

and those individuals responsible for this disaster are held 

accountable. We cannot afford to have a repeat of this kind of 

disaster. 

I would have liked to have heard testimony from expert 

witnesses from the Department of the Interior, particularly the 

MMS, and the United States Coast Guard. I hope that any 

future hearings in this Committee on this subject will include 

government agencies that are at the forefront working on this 

issue. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from 

today's 4 witnesses, each of whom represents a company who 

will playa pivotal role in this investigation. 

With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 
50 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Latta. 

Mr. Doyle for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL F. DOYLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH 

OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing 

today. 

First let me offer my condolences and prayers to the families and 

friends of the 11 people on the Deepwater Horizon rig that tragically lost their lives in a catastrophe 3 weeks ago. It is a sad, 

grave reminder of the level of risk and danger involved in deepwater drilling. Economic and environmental concerns aside, we owe 

it to these families to fully and responsibly investigate what went 

wrong. 

After reading the testimony that you have all supplied, one thing 

seems quite clear. None of you before us today is prepared to accept 

full responsibility for what happened on April 20. And though I’m 

very interested in learning who is responsible, I don’t believe it is 

the most pressing issue at hand today. Today what is most critical 

are the health, environmental and economic effects of this oil leak 

that continues to grow as this well gushes nearly 5,000 barrels of 

oil into the Gulf each day, and that is a conservative estimate. 

The Unified Command has quickly been activated to arrest and 

mitigate the effects of this oil spill on surrounding communities. 

Workers and volunteers are setting hundreds of thousands of feet 

of boom to protect coastlines, releasing massive volume of 

dispersants to break up the oil, and even skimming the water surface to collect the oil. This vast response has been swift by most 

standards, and I commend each of your companies for its willingness to devote all the necessary resources to this effort. 

It is troubling, though, in your eagerness to drill you told the 

Minerals Management Service in February 2009 that you could 

handle a worst case scenario of 162,000 barrels of oil from an uncontrolled blowout. Now you’re dealing with 5,000 barrels a day, 

and the containment dome hasn’t worked, a relief well is far from 

complete, the blowout preventers can’t be activated, and you may 

need to resort to a jump shot. 

What I have a hard time understanding is how 3 weeks after the 

initial explosion there are not better solutions. By any standard I 

think it is safe to say that each of your companies have done quite 

well over the last year. In fact a quick review of your profits show 

that Transocean netted $677 million in profits, Halliburton $206 

million, and BP rounded out with 6.1 billion in profits, and that is 

just for the first quarter of this year. With the success of this industry, both financially and in technological developments that 

allow us to drill 30,000 feet underground, how is it not possible 

that we haven’t developed better technologies to plug a well? 

Recent news reports explain a maneuver call a jump shot that 

involves shooting golf balls and rubber tires into a well to stop the 

leak. I had to ask my staff if that was really true or a misprint. 

Surely with profits of $6.1 billion, we can devote greater resources 

to more advanced technologies than golf balls and tires. 


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51 

I hope our examination here today and in the future months will 

help us understand how we can allow such high risk drilling to go 

on without any surefire means for addressing a blowout. 

I hope that in response to this horrendous accident that you will 

all devote sizable resources to developing safer technologies and 

better regulations to protect your workers, our environment, our 

wildlife and our domestic energy portfolio. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Doyle follows:] 


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Statement of the Honorable Mike Doyle 

Energy and Commerce Committee 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill 

Wednesday, May 12, 2010 

10:00am 

Mr. Chainnan, thank you for convening this hearing today to investigate the Deepwater 

Horizon Gulf Coast oil spill. First, let me offer my condolences and prayers to the family 

and friends of the 11 people on the Deepwater Horizon rig that tragically lost their lives 

in the catastrophe three weeks ago. It has been a sad, grave reminder of the level of risk 

and danger involved in deepwater drilling. Economic and environmental concerns aside, 

we owe it to these families to fully and responsibly investigate what went wrong on the 

Deepwater Horizon. 

After reading the testimony that you all have supplied, one thing seems quite clear. None 

of you before us today is prepared to accept full responsibility for what happened on 

April20th. Though I am very interested in learning whom is responsible, I don't believe 

it is the most pressing issue at hand today. 

Today what is most critical are the health, environmental and economic effects of this oil 

leak that continues to grow as this well gushes nearly 5,000 barrels of oil into the gulf 

each day - and that is a conservative estimate. The Unified Command has quickly been 

activated to arrest and mitigate the effects of this oil spill on surrounding communities. 

Workers and volunteers are setting hundreds of thousands offeet of boom to protect 

coastline; releasing massive volumes of dispersants to break up the oil and even 

skimming the water's surface to collect the oil. This vast response has been swift by 

most standards. I commend each of your companies for its willingness to devote all the 

necessary resources to this effort. 

It is appalling that in your eagerness to drill, you told the Mineral Management Service in 

February of2009 that you could handle a ''worst-case scenario" of 162,000 barrels of oil 

from an uncontrolled blow-out. Now you're dealing with 5,000 barrels a day and the 

containment dome hasn't worked, a relief well is far from complete, the blowout 

preventers can't be activated and you may need to resort to a '~unk shot." 

What I have a hard time understanding is how three weeks after the initial explosion -

there are not better solutions. By any standard, I think its safe to say each of your 

companies have prefonned quite well over the last year. In fact a quick review of your 

first quarter profits show that TransOcean netted $677 million in profits, Halliburton 

netted $206 million and BP rounded out with $6.1 billion in profits - and that's just for 

the first quarter of this year. With the success of this industry both financially and in 

technological developments that allows us to drill 30,000 feet underground ... how is it 

possible that we have not developed technologies to plug a well? Recent news reports 

explain a maneuver called a "junk shot" that involves shooting golf balls and rubber tires 
53 


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into the well to try and stop the leak. Surely, with profits of6.1 billion dollars you can 

devote greater resources to more advanced technologies than golf balls and tires. 

I hope that our examination here today and in future months will help us understand how 

we could allow such high-risk drilling to go on without any sure-fire means for 

addressing a blow-out. I hope that in response to this horrendous accident you all will 

devote sizable resources to developing safer technologies and better regulations that 

protect your workers, our environment, our wildlife and our domestic energy portfolio. 
54 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Doyle. 

Mrs. Blackburn for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to 

welcome our witnesses. And thank you for the preparation you 

have put into planning to be with us here today. 

There is no doubt this is a terrible event, and it is one that concerns us. And I represent middle and west Tennessee but I grew 

up in the Mississippi coastal plains and I know very, very well the 

impact of the oil production industry on those communities and on 

the livelihood of those citizens. And also I know how dependent 

they are on the Gulf, also, for wetlands and for seafood. And so this 

is a tragedy and it does have so many tentacles, and of course the 

loss of life is very sad. And I know that it reaches deep within 

those families across the Gulf. 

I think that what we, my focus today, what I would seek to do 

is to understand what happened and the cause and to understand 

that without any bias. I think that while going on a search for villains can make for compelling TV, it is not going to put us on the 

path forward that we need. And that needs to be a pathway to sustainable and responsible drilling in the Gulf. 

And we need to look at this, have an honest investigation so that 

we find opportunities for avoidance that may have been missed 

both by Washington and by the industry. 

I think that we also need to focus our attention on cleaning up 

the current spill, securing other wells until a long-term solution 

can be found. In this type business, risk cannot be 100 percent 

managed and I understand that. And realizing that, I think it is 

maybe necessary to review contingency plans and to require operators to have prepositioned containment equipment to limit the impacts. Maybe that is something we need to talk about and look at 

today. 

This hearing is a first step to address these issues. Members of 

this panel are going to have questions of the witnesses on the protocols that are followed, the equipment that was used, and on what 

a proper course of action should be. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to our witnesses, thank you 

for being here today. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mrs. Blackburn. 

Mrs. Christensen for opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Chairman Stupak and Ranking Member Burgess, for holding this 

important hearing to examine the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster situation of grave and far reaching magnitude which is likely to eclipse 

the Exxon Valdez spill of 20 years ago. 

It has been approximately 3 weeks since the explosion that 

caused the Gulf Coast oil spill and many questions remain unanswered. What caused the explosion? Why did several safety mechaVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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nisms fail to prove successful and, the billion dollar question, how 

can we stop the oil from spewing into the ocean and towards the 

shore and how can we do it as soon as possible? 

I look forward to the testimony this morning, and I thank everyone for coming to yet another hearing. What I am not anxious to 

hear is a blame game. There are investigations underway that will 

answer the questions of what went wrong and who and what was 

at fault. Someone speaks of collaborative efforts in their testimony, 

and to my mind this is a tragic accident which all companies, operator and contractors, probably share some responsibility, just as 

they all have a role in the response, cleanup and recovery as well 

and, importantly, making sure this does not happen again. 

We need to clarify what we do know, but the important issue 

now is how to stop the thousands of gallons of oil from continuing 

to pour out and how best we can work with all Federal and private 

partners in the Unified Comman to do just that. 

Despite the fact that we can never know everything because of 

the settlement, there are reports of severe health consequences in 

those who worked on the Exxon Valdez spill and others, and so I 

have grave concerns about the health and safety issues for the responders in this one and want to have the assurance that every 

precaution is being taken to prevent illness and disability in these 

workers. 

I am also concerned about the hundreds of other oil rigs that are 

functioning now, some in deep waters. Are we better prepared 

today to respond to an accident on these than we were on April 20? 

What is being done to ensure that we are? And does BP need what 

I understand are the higher permitting standards of the U.K. In 

their operations here in the United States? 

Of course, like my colleagues, I am also concerned about the protection and preservation of the fisheries and other shoreline wildlife and other economic impacts of those who depend on these resources for livelihood and, of course, the loss of life. 

It is my hope that we will leave this hearing better informed 

than when we came in. I would also like to take this opportunity 

to express my sincere condolences to the families who lost loved 

ones in the April 20th tragedy and wish Godspeed to them, the survivors and their families as they go through their recovery process. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Mr. Welch for an opening statement, please, 3 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the 

witnesses for coming and I, along with my colleagues, want to acknowledge the extraordinary loss of love and lives of brave and 

hardworking people who died and perished in this accident. 

A couple of things. I took the trip to the Gulf Coast with the 

chairman and ranking member, Mr. Barton, some of my colleagues, 

Mr. Scalise and Mr. Melancon most significant among them because they live with the folks whose livelihoods and whose sense 

of self depends on oil and on fishing, and the heartache that we 

saw was very powerful. 


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When we flew out over the oil spill, the journey was in a Coast 

Guard plane that flew low and slow. And traveling out over that 

magnificent Mississippi Delta and looking down at all the wildlife 

that we could see, seeing the boats that wanted to be out fishing 

but couldn’t be, going over the Chandeleur Islands with that pristine white sand, knowing how much that landscape and how that 

economic livelihood is so cherished by Mr. Scalise’s people and Mr. 

Melancon’s people and then seeing that first ribbon of an oil slick, 

that metallic blue ominous sight that we saw a few miles off the 

Chandeleur Island, and then to see this magnificent blue sea become ink black and then to get out over the oil site or the rig site 

where those 11 men perished and to see this cancerous, flame orange glow on the sea that is the combination of the emulsifiers and 

the oil is just heart breaking. 

And gentlemen, you obviously share the concern about this, but 

you do have the responsibility. You have been well paid. The head 

of BP I think made about $6 million last year, Mr. Newman about 

5.4 million, Mr. Probert about 3 million, Mr. Cameron about 8 million. The folks who are now cleaning up the oil spill, we have got 

a picture and Mr. Burgess and I spoke to them, a couple of women 

from New Orleans who come out and work for 12 bucks an hour. 

It is not just golf balls and the other things people mentioned. It 

is hardworking people who are coming out standing in the hot sun, 

and they would like a bit of a raise, to tell you the truth. 

But the other thing we saw that was so heart breaking to me 

was fishermen and their boats are not filled with fish; they are 

filled with these booms, and that is what those two women in the 

earlier picture, they load these boats with booms. These fishermen 

are proud. They work incredibly hard. However hard you work, 

they work harder. And right now they are imperiled. The only 

thing that is keeping them going is that you are paying them to 

put booms out to try to keep the oil from the shore and the seabed. 

But at the end of the day we know harm is going to be done, and 

the one question I want conclusively answered is whether BP, who 

has the ultimate responsibility here, is going to acknowledge specifically and categorically that it will not limit its liability to those 

fishermen and women and those tourist industries in that Gulf 

Coast, those people who have protected the environment, that you 

will not stop your obligation at the $75 million limit that was established after Exxon Valdez. If they have been harmed by conduct 

that you are responsible for, then I want and I think all of us want 

an assurance that those fishermen and women, those folks in the 

tourist industry in Steve Scalise and Charlie Melancon’s district 

will be made whole. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Welch. 

Mr. Green, do you have an opening statement? You are recognized for 3 minutes then. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

today. I would like to welcome our panel. It is certainly under tragic circumstances that we convene here today and my condolences 


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go out to the families who lost their lives in this accident and also 

those who are injured. As Member of Congress from East Harris 

County and Houston, Texas, I have just literally hundreds of people who work offshore, offshore Texas, offshore literally all over the 

world, and along with our infrastructure we still produce oil and 

natural gas in a very urban-suburban area but we also have refineries and chemical plants who need that product that is being produced. 

This hearing today will be the first of many on this subject and 

ultimately will determine what went wrong on the Deepwater Horizon rig and apply those lessons to reduce the chance of this ever 

happening again. However, we should continue to focus on stopping 

the spill and cleaning it up as soon as possible, and I look forward 

to hearing from the panel about the latest efforts on this front. 

In the wake of the tragic accident, many people are understandably concerned about the safety and environmental risks associated 

with offshore drilling, and drilling is certainly not risk free. Neither 

is anything else. However, we should be careful not to rush to judgment on the issue on offshore drilling until we learn what went 

wrong in this particular case. 

In fact, this is the first major accident in the Gulf of Mexico since 

1979, and that is almost 31 years. And we have used a lot of that 

product that has come out of the Gulf of Mexico to move our country for many years. 

Like after the Exxon Valdez incident, I anticipate Congress will 

respond in ways aimed at mitigating a similar accident from ever 

reoccurring, and I agree we must take every possible precaution to 

guard against that happening again. The Energy Information Administration maintains that oil, natural gas and coal will continue 

to make up the large majority of U.S. energy use in 2030 and beyond. If we are to reduce our dependence on foreign policy, we 

must safely and responsibly explore and produce more domestically, which is a very important issue. Because unless we want to 

continue to import, I heard the other day we import 55 percent of 

our oil right now from overseas, Canada, Mexico, but they are producing as much as they can. If we don’t produce it in the Gulf of 

Mexico or offshore, then we are going to get it from Venezuela, we 

are going to get it from parts of the world that we may not have 

the best relationships with. So that is why we need to get it right 

and produce it domestically. 

I look forward to the testimony today and again, Mr. Chairman, 

I thank you for holding the hearing. I yield back my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Mr. Ross for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Chairman Stupak, for holding today’s 

hearing to examine the causes of the recent explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig and the effects of this oil spill on both the Gulf 

Coast region and our Nation’s domestic energy policy. We all recognize this tragic event was an accident, and my thoughts and prayers go out to those who lost loved ones in the explosion and to the 


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people along the Gulf Coast who have been adversely affected by 

this incident in an already tough economy. 

This accident is a wake-up call for our domestic oil and gas production, and we must take this opportunity to carefully examine 

our safety standards and protocols in deepwater drilling. 

America has led the world in technological innovation by putting 

a man on the Moon, sending a robot to Mars, and decoding the 

human genome. Given all the knowledge and technology at our disposal, it amazes me that we could have an accident of this magnitude in 2010. What is even more concerning is that the companies responsible did not have the foresight to anticipate this accident or have an action plan ready or procedures in place that 

would have immediately remedied this situation and reduced the 

harmful consequences before it got out of control. 

After 3 weeks of oil still leaking into the Gulf, it is clear these 

procedures were either not in place or did not work effectively, and 

I am pleased we are now addressing this issue today in this hearing. 

However, I want to make it clear that this event does not diminish our need to continue domestic drilling as part of our overall diverse energy policy, but it does remind us of the risk associated 

and the safety standards that must be adhered to and improved to 

ensure this never happens again. 

I believe that now, more than ever, we shall be investing in the 

most advanced 21st century technologies that will allow us to recover domestic oil and natural gas safely instead of sending half a 

trillion dollars a year overseas, much of which is ending up in the 

hands of those who want to harm us. 

I am hopeful that this tragic event and this hearing can be a 

learning experience to help us to examine our current policies for 

drilling offshore and in the end help secure America’s domestic energy supply for future generations. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Ross. 

We next hear from Ms. Sutton from Ohio for an opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BETTY SUTTON, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Chairman Stupak, and thank you for 

holding this very important hearing on the Gulf Coast oil spill. 

It has been 3 weeks since the first explosion on the Deepwater 

Horizon drilling rig, 3 weeks and we are still looking for answers, 

what caused the explosion, when will the oil leaks be closed, and 

what long-term impacts will this tragedy have on our families, 

small businesses, the environment, and local and State governments. 

The one thing we do know is that the companies involved in this 

oil well operation have failed. And these companies are pointing 

the finger at each other. These companies failed to have a plan to 

deal with this type of incident. The companies failed to implement 

adequate safety measures, and the companies have failed to find 

sufficient solutions to contain and mitigate this disaster. 


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And while America waits for a resolution to this disastrous spill, 

5,000 barrels of oil, over 200,000 gallons a day, continue to pour 

out of the seabed into the Gulf. 

The wake of this oil spill is broad and sweeping. Eleven workers 

died, 17 were injured, the Gulf Coast States’ economies are crippled. The livelihoods of workers, their families and the small businesses that rely on the Gulf remain in question, and there is a 

grave possibility that the Gulf Stream could carry this spill around 

the tip of Florida and to the Atlantic Coast. 

The ramifications of this disaster pose great questions about 

safety measures in deepwater drilling and the priorities of BP, Halliburton, and others. 

BP has stated that they will do whatever it takes to stop these 

leaks. But did BP and Transocean do whatever it took to prevent 

these leaks, this disaster from occurring? BP and Transocean have 

been careful to say that the measures they are taking to end the 

leaks have never really been used before, and one example being 

the failure of the cofferdam placement over one of the leaks this 

past weekend, something that had happened never been attempted 

at such depth. 

BP and Transocean have proven that they did not have a response plan sufficient to meet the need in place for a deepwater 

well spill. The technology for deepwater drilling has continued to 

advance through significant investment by oil companies, enabling 

them to access oil in places once thought impossible, but it is now 

apparent that the necessary investment to develop safety measures 

and contingencies for deepwater drilling were not adequately advanced. Safety must be put first and investment in it must match 

if the search for oil and drilling in our waters off of the shore are 

to continue. 

I remain troubled by the continuation of hazardous safety practices at BP’s facilities, including fines imposed on their refinery in 

Toledo, Ohio, and while we wait for BP to stop these leaks, which 

could possibly take months, the future of our families, workers, 

small businesses, and the environment remain at the mercy of the 

winds of the Gulf, and that is not how it should be. 

So I look forward to hearing the testimony today. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. Sutton. 

That concludes the opening statements of members of this subcommittee. I would note that members of the full committee that 

have been here, Mr. Scalise, Mr. Melancon, Ms. Castor, Mr. Inslee 

was here, Mrs. Capps, I expect they will probably stay or come 

back during questions. I know members will be in and out today. 

It should also be noted that Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee is 

here from Houston, who is sitting in on today’s proceedings. She is 

welcome to do so and welcome to the committee. 

That concludes the opening statements by members of the subcommittee. We have our first panel of witnesses before us. On our 

panel we have Mr. Steven Newman, who is President and CEO of 

Transocean Limited, which owned and operated Deepwater Horizon 

oil rig and blowout preventer; Lamar McKay, Chairman and President of BP America, who is a responsible party in the Gulf leak; 

Mr. Tim Probert, who is the President, Global Business Lines and 

Chief Health, Safety, and Environmental Officer at Halliburton, 


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which did the cementing of the well; and Mr. Jack Moore, who is 

Director, President and CEO of Cameron International, which 

manufactured the blowout preventer used by Transocean with the 

Deepwater Horizon rig. 

It is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under 

oath. Please be advised that you have the right under the rules of 

the House to be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do any 

of you wish to be represented by counsel? Mr. Newman, Mr. 

McKay, Mr. Probert, Mr. Moore? 

Witnesses indicate they do not. So therefore I’m going to ask you 

to please rise and raise your right hand to take the oath. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that witnesses replied in the 

affirmative. You are each now under oath. We will hear your 5- 

minute opening statement. You may submit a longer statement for 

the record and it will be included in the hearing record. 

Mr. Newman, if you don’t mind, we will start with you, please, 

if you would start your opening statement, and thank you for being 

here. 

STATEMENTS OF STEVE NEWMAN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

TRANSOCEAN LIMITED; LAMAR MCKAY, CHAIRMAN AND 

PRESIDENT, BP AMERICA, INC.; TIM PROBERT, PRESIDENT, 

GLOBAL BUSINESS LINES, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER, HALLIBURTON; AND JACK B. 

MOORE, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CAMERON INTERNATIONAL 

STATEMENT OF STEVE NEWMAN 

Mr. NEWMAN. Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, Chairman Emeritus, Ranking Members Barton and Burgess, 

other members of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this morning. My name is Steven Newman, and I’m the Chief Executive Officer of Transocean Limited. 

Transocean is a leading offshore drilling contractor with more 

than 18,000 employees worldwide. 

I am a petroleum engineer by training, and I have spent years 

working with and on drilling rigs. I have been with Transocean for 

more than 15 years, and I am incredibly proud of the contributions 

our company has made to the energy industry during that time. 

Today, however, I sit before you with a heavy heart. The last few 

weeks have been a time of great sadness and reflection for our company and for me personally. Nothing is more important to 

Transocean and to me than the safety of our crew members. And 

our hearts ache for the widows, parents and children of the 11 crew 

members, including 9 Transocean employees who died in the Deepwater Horizon explosion. These were exceptional men, and we are 

committed to doing everything we can to help their families as they 

cope with this tragedy. 

Over the last few weeks, we have also seen great acts of courage 

and kindness in our colleagues and in our communities. That courage and kindness was embodied by the 115 crew members who 

were rescued from the Deepwater Horizon and were as concerned 

about the safety of their colleagues as they were about themselves. 


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It was embodied by the brave men and women of the U.S. Coast 

Guard, who conducted onsite operations and search and rescue operations, and by the medical professionals who received the injured 

crew members when they arrived onshore, and it is embodied by 

our friends and colleagues at Transocean and across the industry 

who have rallied to help the families of the men who were lost. 

This has been a very emotional period for all of us at 

Transocean, and it has also been a period of intense activity and 

effort. 

Immediately after the explosion, Transocean began working with 

BP and the Unified Comman in the effort to stop the flow of hydrocarbons from the well. Our finest engineers and operational personnel have been working with BP to identify and pursue options 

for stopping the flow as soon as possible. Our drilling rig, Development Driller III, is involved in drilling the relief well at the site, 

and our drill ship, the Discoverer Enterprise, is on location participating in the crude oil recovery operations. A third Transocean 

drilling rig, the Development Driller II, will be on location in the 

next day or two to also participate in those onsite operations. We 

will continue to support BP and the Unified Comman in all of these 

efforts. 

At the same time, we have also been working to get to the bottom of the question to which this committee, Congress, and the 

American public desperately want an answer. What happened on 

the night of April 20? And how do we assure the American public 

that it will not happen again? 

Transocean has assembled an independent investigative team to 

determine the cause of these tragic events, a team that includes 

dedicated Transocean and industry experts. They will be interviewing people who have potentially helpful information and studying the operations and the equipment involved. 

Because the drilling process is a collaborative effort among many 

different companies, contractors, and subcontractors, the process of 

understanding what led to the April 20 explosion and how to prevent such an accident in the future must also be collaborative. Our 

team is working side by side with others, including BP and governmental agencies, and these investigative efforts will continue until 

we have satisfactory answers. 

While it is still too early to know exactly what happened on April 

20, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster. The 

most significant clue is that the events occurred after the well construction process was essentially finished. Drilling had been completed on April 17, and the well had been sealed with casing and 

cement. For that reason, the one thing we do know is that on the 

evening of April 20, there was a sudden catastrophic failure of the 

cement, the casing, or both. Without a failure of one of those elements, the explosion could not have occurred. 

It is also clear that the drill crew had very little, if any, time to 

react. The initial indications of trouble and the subsequent explosions were almost simultaneous. 

What caused that sudden violent failure? Was the well properly 

designed? Were there problems with the casing or the seal assembly? Was the casing properly cemented and the well effectively 

sealed? Were all appropriate tests run on the cement and the casVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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ing? Were the blowout preventers damaged by the surge that emanated from the well beneath? Did the surge blow debris into the 

BOP that prevented them from squeezing, crushing or shearing the 

pipe? 

These are some of the questions that need to be answered in the 

coming weeks and months. Until we know exactly what happened 

on April 20, we cannot determine how best to prevent such tragedies in the future. But regardless of what the investigations uncover, ours is an industry that must put safety first. We must do 

so for the sake of our employees, for the sake of their families, and 

for the sake of people all over the world who use, enjoy, and rely 

on our oceans and waterways for their sustenance. 

And before I close let me respond to Representative Burgess’ specific question that arose during yesterday’s Senate testimony. 

The modification referred to was the result of an agreement between representatives of BP and Transocean approximately 5 years 

ago. It was done at BP’s request and at BP’s expense. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today, and I am 

happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newman follows:] 


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Testimony 

Before The Committee On Energy & Commerce 

Subcommittee On Oversight & Investigations 

United States House of Representatives 

May 12,2010 

Inquiry into tlte Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill 

Steven Newman, Chief Executive Officer, Transocean, Ltd. 

Chairman Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Stupak, Ranking Members 

Barton and Burgess, and other members of the Committee, I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to speak with you today. 

My name is Steven Newman, and I am the Chief Executive Officer of 

Transocean, Ltd. Transocean is a leading offshore drilling contractor, with more 

than 18,000 employees worldwide, I am a petroleum engineer by training, I have 

spent considerable time working on drilling rigs and I have worked at Transocean 

for more than 15 years. I am proud of the Company's historical contributions to 

the energy industry during that time, Today, however, I sit before you with a 

heavy heart. 

The last few weeks have been a time of great sadness and reflection for our 

Company and for me personally. Nothing is more important to me and to 

Transocean than the safety of our employees and crew members, and our hearts 

ache for the widows, parents and children of the 11 crew members - including nine 

Transocean employees who died in the Deepwater Horizon explosion, These 

were exceptional men, and we are committed to doing everything we can to 

support their families as they struggle to cope with this tragedy, 

We have also seen great courage and kindness since April 20 that has 

reaffinned our faith in the human spirit. That spirit is embodied by the 115 crew 

members who were rescued from the Deepwater Horizon and were as worried 

about the fate of their colleagues as they were about themselves. It is embodied by 

the emergency workers and friends and family who were waiting for the injured 

crew members when they arrived ashore, And it is embodied by the friends and 

colleagues who have rallied to help the families of those who were lost at sea. 

While this has been a very emotional period for all of us at Transocean, it 

has also been a period of intense activity and effort, 
64 


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Immediately after the explosion, Transocean began working with BP (in 

BP's role as operator/leaseholder of this well) and the "Unified Command" (which 

includes officials from the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of the Interior's 

Minerals Management Service (MMS), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA)) in the effort to stop the flow of hydrocarbons. Our finest 

operational personnel and engineers have been working with BP to identify and 

pursue options for stopping the flow as soon as possible. Our drilling rig, the 

Development Driller lll, is involved in drilling the relief well at the site, and our 

drills hip, the Discoverer Enterprise, is involved in the unique oil recovery 

operations in the Gulf. We will continue to support BP and the Unified Command 

in all of these efforts. 

We have also been working hard to get to the bottom of the question to 

which the Members of this Committee and the American people want and 

deserve an answer: What happened the night of April 20th, and how do we assure 

the American public that it will not happen again? 

Transocean has assembled an investigative team to determine what led to 

these tragic events - a team that includes dedicated Transocean and industry 

experts. They will be interviewing people who have potentially helpful 

information and studying the operations and the equipment involved. Our team is 

working side by side with others, including BP and governmental agencies, and 

these investigative efforts will continue until we have satisfactory answers. 

As is often the case after a tragedy of this kind, there has been a lot of 

speculation about the root cause. I believe it is premature to reach definitive 

conclusions about what caused the April 20th explosion, but on behalf of our 

Transocean employees, I feel compelled to respond to some of this speculation. In 

particular, as we seek to uncover what happened, it is important to understand the 

well constmction process and the roles of the various parties involved in an 

operation like the one that was taking place in the Gulf of Mexico. 

All offshore oil and gas production projects begin and end with the 

Operator. When the Operator (in this case, BP) leases a parcel ofland on the outer 

continental shelf (OCS) from the U.S. government, it must prepare and submit 

detailed plans specifying where and how a well is to be drilled, cased, cemented 

and completed based on its interpretation of propriety data, including geologic data 

from seismic surveys. Once those plans are approved and permits are issued and 

work begins, the Operator - or leaseholder - serves as the general contractor that 

2 
65 


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manages all ofthe work that is performed on its lease. In this capacity, the 

Operator hires various contractors to perform specific functions in the construction 

of the well. 

In addition, the Operator brings in various sub-contractors to perfonn 

specific roles. For example: 

• The Operator selects a driller (in this case, Transocean), which provides a 

vessel (called a "rig") from which drilling operations are perfonned. As the 

name suggests, the driller is also responsible for rotating the long string of 

drill pipe with a drill bit on the end that drills a hole deeper and deeper into 

the ocean floor. The Operator's well plan dictates the manner in which the 

drilling is to occur, including the location, the path, the depth, the process 

and the testing. The drill bits, which are selected by the Operator, are 

supplied by another sub-contractor. 

• A key element of the drilling process is drilling mud, a heavy fluid 

manufactured to the Operator's specifications. That mud is pumped into the 

well hole and circulated in order to hold back the pressure of the reservoir 

and prevent oil, gas or water in that reservoir from moving to the surface 

through the well. The mud is monitored by another sub-contractor (the mud 

engineer) (in this instance, M-I Swaco) to detect any problems. 

• As the drilling progresses, huge pipes are inserted into the well to maintain 

the integrity of the hole that has been drilled and to serve as the primary 

barrier against fluids entering the well. This job is coordinated by the 

casing sub-contractor selected by the Operator (in this case, Weatherford). 

In its well plan, the Operator specifies the diameter and strength of each 

casing segment, purchases the casing, and dictates how it will be cemented 

in place. Well casing is inserted in a telescope-like manner, with each 

successive section inside the previous one. Each casing segment also 

includes a seal assembly to ensure pressure containment. 

• After drilling is concluded, yet another area of expertise comes into play. 

The cementing sub-contractor is responsible for encasing the well in cement, 

for putting a temporary cement plug in the top of the well, and for ensuring 

the integrity of the cement. The purpose of this work is to seal the well to 

make sure that the contents of the reservoir (i.e., oil and natural gas) are not 

driven by the reservoir pressure into the well. (Once drilling is complete 

and the well is cased and cemented, it is no longer necessary to circulate 

3 
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drilling mud through the well; at that point, the casing and cement serve to 

control the formation pressure.) The cementing process is dictated by the 

Operator's well plan, and the testing of the cement on the Deepwater 

Horizon was performed by the cement contractor (Haliburton in this 

instance) as specified and directed by BP. 

Against that background, let me tum to the April 20 Deepwater Horizon 

explosion and its possible causes. What is most unusual about the explosion in this 

case is that it occurred after the well construction process was essentially finished. 

Drilling had been completed on April 17, and the well had been sealed with cement 

(to be reopened by the Operator at a later date if the Operator chose to put the well 

into production). At this point, drilling mud was no longer being used as a means 

of reservoir pressure containment; the cement and the casing were the barriers 

controlling pressure from the reservoir. Indeed, at the time of the explosion, the rig 

crew, at the direction ofthe Operator, was in the process of displacing drilling mud 

and replacing it with sea water. 

For that reason, the one thing we know with certainty is that on the evening 

of April 20, there was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing, or 

both. Therein lies the root cause of this occurrence; without a disastrous failure of 

one of those elements, the explosion could not have occurred. It is also clear that 

the drill crew had very little (if any) time to react. The explosions were almost 

instantaneous. 

What caused that catastrophic, sudden and violent failure? Was the well 

properly designed') Was the well properly cemented? Were there problems with 

the well casing') Were all appropriate tests run on the cement and casings? These 

are some of the critical questions that need to be answered in the coming weeks 

and months. 

Over the past several days, some have suggested that the blowout preventers 

(or BOPs) used on this project were the cause of the accident. That simply makes 

no sense. A BOP is a large piece of equipment positioned on top of a wellhead to 

provide pressure control. As explained in more detail in the attachment to my 

testimony, BOPs are designed to quickly shut off the flow of oil or natural gas by 

squeezing, crushing or shearing the pipe in the event of a "kick" or "blowout" - a 

sudden, unexpected release of pressure from within the well that can occur during 

drilling. 

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The attention now being given to the BOPs in this case is somewhat ironic 

because at the time ofthe explosion, the drilling process was complete. The well 

had been sealed with casing and cement, and within a few days, the BOPs would 

have been removed. At this point, the well barriers - the cementing and the casing 

- were responsible for controlling any pressure from the reservoir. 

To be sure, BOPs are an important aspect of well control. During drilling, 

BOPs provide a secondary means of controlling pressure if the primary 

mechanisms (e.g., drilling mud) prove inadequate. BOPs are robust, sophisticated 

pieces of equipment that can be activated by various direct and remote methods. 

Since the BOPs were still in place in this circumstance, they may have been 

activated during this event and may have restricted the flow to some extent. At 

this point, we cannot be certain. But we have no reason to believe that they were 

not operational - they were jointly tested by BP and Transocean personnel as 

specified on April 10 and 17 and found to be functional. We also do not know 

whether the BOPs were damaged by the surge that emanated from the well beneath 

or whether the surge may have blown debris (e.g., cement, casing) into the BOPs, 

thereby preventing them from squeezing, crushing or shearing the pipe. 

For these reasons, I believe it is inappropriate to focus any causation 

discussions exclusively on the BOPs. Certainly, we need to understand what 

happened to the BOPs and whether changes should be made to improve the 

effectiveness of these devices in the unusual circumstances of an accident like the 

one on April 20. But the BOPs were clearly not the root cause of the explosion. 

Our most important task is to understand why a cased and cemented wellbore 

suddenly and catastrophically failed. As a starting point, our investigative team 

has looked at numerous possible causes, contributing factors, or trigger events, in 

an effort to ensure that nothing is overlooked in this investigation. 

As I explained earlier, the well construction process is a collaborative effort. 

F or the same reason, the process of understanding what led to the April 20 

explosion and how to prevent such an accident in the future must also be 

collaborative. Ours is an industry tllat must put safety first. And I can assure you 

that Transocean has never - and will never - compromise on safety. In 2009, 

Transocean recorded its best ever Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR). And the 

federal agency charged with enforcing safety on deepwater oil rigs, MMS, which 

as you know is a unit of the U.S. Department of the Interior, awarded one of its 

top prizes for safety to Transocean in 2009. The MMS SAFE Award recognizes 

"exemplary performance by Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operators 

and contractors." In the words ofMMS, this award "highlights to the public that 

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companies can conduct offshore oil and gas activities safely and in a pollution-free 

manner, even though such activities are complex and carry a significant element of 

risk." Tn awarding this prize to Transocean, MMS credited the Company's 

"outstanding drilling operations" and a "perfect performance period." 

Despite a strong safety record, Transocean has never been complacent about 

safety. We believe that any incident is one too many. Last year, our Company 

experienced an employee accident record that I found unacceptable. As a result, I 

recommended to our Board of Directors that they withhold bonuses for all 

executives in order to make clear that achieving stronger safety performance was a 

basic expectation and fundamental to our success. That recommendation was 

accepted, and our Company paid no executive bonuses last year, in order to send a 

loud message that we evaluate our Sllccess in large part based on the safety of our 

operations. 

Until we fully understand what happened on April 20, we cannot determine 

with certainty how best to prevent such tragedies in the future. But I am 

committed for the sake of the men who lost their lives on April 20, for the sake 

of their loved ones, for the sake of all the hard-working people who work on 

Transocean rigs around the world, and for the sake of people in each of the 

affected states and worldwide who rely on our oceans and waterways for their 

livelihood to work with others in the industry, with Congress and with all 

involved federal agencies to make sure that such an incident never happens again. 

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Newman. 

Mr. McKay, your opening statement, please. 

STATEMENT OF LAMAR MCKAY 

Mr. MCKAY. Chairman Waxman, Chairman Emeritus Dingell, 

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, members of the committee, my name is Lamar McKay and I am President of BP America. 

We have experienced a tragic series of events. Three weeks ago 

tonight, 11 people were lost in an explosion and fire aboard the 

Transocean Deepwater Horizon rig, and 17 others were injured. My 

deepest sympathies go out to the families and friends who have 

suffered. This is a terrible loss and there is a huge enormous issue 

in the Gulf Coast. Those communities, lives and livelihoods are 

being affected. 

Over the last few days, I have seen the response firsthand. I 

have seen the men and women on the front line. There is absolutely a deep and steadfast resolve to do all we humanly can to 

stop the leak, contain the spill, clean up the damage, and deal with 

the impacts, economic and environmental. As a responsible party 

under the Oil Pollution Act, we will carry out our responsibilities 

to mitigate the environmental and economic impact, and just to be 

very clear, the 75 million is irrelevant and we can talk about that 

later. 

Our efforts are part of a Unified Comman that was established 

within hours of the accident, and it provides a structure, a structure for our work with the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Department of the Interior as well as Defense, Energy, OSHA and 

other Federal agencies, as well as affected State and local governments, and Transocean. 

We are grateful for the involvement of President Obama and 

members of his Cabinet and for the leadership, direction, and resources they have provided. We are also grateful to the Governors, 

congressional members, State agencies, local agencies, and local 

communities of Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, and 

Texas. 

I want to underscore that the global resources of BP are committed to this effort and have been from the outset. Nothing is 

being spared. Everyone understands the enormity of what lies 

ahead and is working to deliver an effective response at the wellhead, on the water, and on the shoreline. 

Before I describe our round-the-clock efforts to respond to this series of events, I want to reiterate our commitment to find out what 

happened. Understanding what happened and why it happened is 

a complex process. We are cooperating with the joint investigation 

by the Departments of Homeland Security and Interior and investigations by Congress. In addition, BP has commissioned an internal investigation whose results we plan to share so we can all learn 

from these terrible events. 

I want to be clear. It’s inappropriate to draw any conclusions before all the facts are known. As we speak, our investigation team 

is locating and analyzing data, interviewing available witnesses 

and reviewing and assessing evidence. And today I think it’s important to give you and the American public an idea of the questions 


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we are asking. There are really two key sets of questions here and 

we are actively exploring both of those. 

First, what caused the explosion and fire on board Transocean’s 

Deepwater Horizon; second, why did Transocean’s blowout preventer, the key failsafe mechanism, fail to shut in the well and release the rig? 

With respect to the first question, the key issue we are examining is how hydrocarbons could have entered the wellbore. BP, as 

a leaseholder and operator of the well, hired Transocean to drill the 

well and fulfill their safety responsibilities. We do not know yet 

precisely what happened on the night of April 20, but what we do 

know is that there were anomalous pressure test readings prior to 

the explosion. These could have raised concerns about well control 

prior to the operation to replace mud with seawater in the well in 

preparation for setting the cement plug. 

Through our investigation we hope to learn more about what 

happened and what was done in the hours before the explosion. 

Apart from looking at the causes of the explosion, we are also examining why the blowout preventer, the BOP as it is called, did not 

work as the ultimate failsafe to seal the well and prevent an oil 

spill. Clearly the BOP remains a critical piece of equipment 

throughout all operations to ensure well control up until the time 

the well is sealed and a cement plug is placed and the well is temporarily abandoned. 

We will continue full speed ahead with our investigation, keeping 

all lines of inquiry open until we find out what happened and why. 

At the same time, we are absolutely fully engaged 24 hours a day 

every second of the day in efforts to respond to these events. 

Our subsea efforts to stop the flow of oil and secure the well involve four concurrent strategies. Activating the blowout preventer 

would be the preferred course since it stops or diminishes the flow 

at the source. Unfortunately, this has proved unsuccessful so far. 

We are working on a containment system which will place enclosures or containment chambers atop the leaks and conduct flow to 

a ship at the surface. There have been technical challenges obviously. Engineers are now working to overcome these challenges. 

We have begun to drill a first of two relief wells designed to 

intercept and permanently secure the original well. We began drilling the first relief well on May 2 and expect to begin the second 

relief well at the end of this week. This operation could take approximately 3 months. 

A fourth effort, known as a top kill, uses a tube to inject a mixture of multi-sized particles directly into the blowout preventer to 

cap the well. It is a technique that has been used industrywide 

across the world but never in 5,000 feet of water. 

On the open water we have 300 response vessels mobilized, 1 

million feet of boom placed, 2.5 million feet sourced, and the supply 

chain geared up to sustainably boom what areas are necessary. We 

are also attacking the spill with biodegradable dispersants that 

were preapproved by the Coast Guard and the EPA. Those are 

being applied by planes and boats. We have also developed and 

tested a technique to apply dispersant at the leak point on the seabed. We have done three tests of that and we are waiting on the 


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EPA to decide if we can continuously use that dispersant, which we 

hope we can. 

To protect the shoreline, we are implementing what the U.S. 

Coast Guard has called the most massive shoreline protection effort 

ever mounted in history. 13 staging areas are in place and over 

4,000 volunteers have already been trained. 

We recognize there are both environmental and economic impacts. BP will pay all necessary cleanup costs and is committed to 

paying legitimate claims for other loss and damages caused by the 

spill. 

Tragic and unforeseen as the accident was, we must not lose 

sight of why BP and other energy companies are operating in the 

offshore, including the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf provides one in 

three barrels of oil produced in the United States, a resource our 

economy requires. 

BP and the entire energy industry are under no illusions about 

the challenge we face. We know that we will be judged. We will be 

judged by our response to this crisis. 

We intend to do everything in our power to bring this well under 

control, to mitigate the environmental impact of the spill, and to 

address economic claims in a responsible manner. 

No resource available to this company will be spared. I can assure you that we and the entire oil and gas industry will learn 

from this terrible event. We will emerge from it stronger, smarter, 

and safer. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will 

be happy to answer your questions. 

In addition, as you requested, I brought a technical expert with 

me, Mike Zangy, Vice President of Drilling and on the modifications, Congressman Burgess, I was referring to yesterday, I need 

to know if the modifications that we encountered on interventions 

while this response was going on, were those the only modifications 

that were made in 2005. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKay follows:] 


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House Energy & Commerce Committee 

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 

Wednesday, May 12, 20101 

Written Testimony 

Lamar McKay 

Chairman & President, BP America 

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, members of the committee, I am 

Lamar McKay, Chairman and President of BP America. 

We have all experienced a tragic series of events. 

I want to be clear from the outset that we will not rest until the well is under 

control. As a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act, we will carry out our 

responsibilities to mitigate the environmental and economic impacts of this 

incident 

We - and, indeed, the entire energy sector as a whole - are determined to 

understand what happened, why it happened, take the learnings from this 

incident, and make the changes necessary to make our company and our 

industry stronger and safer. We understand that the world is watching and that 

we and our industry colleagues will be judged by how we respond to these 

events. 

Three weeks ago yesterday, eleven people were lost in an explosion and fire 

aboard the Transocean Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, and seventeen others 

were injured. My deepest sympathies go out to the families and friends who have 

suffered such a terrible loss and to those in Gulf Coast communities whose lives 

and livelihoods are being impacted. 

This was a horrendous accident. We are all devastated by this. It has profoundly 

touched our employees, their families, our partners, customers, those in the 

surrounding areas and those in government with whom we are working. There 

has been tremendous shock that such an accident could have happened, and 

great sorrow for the lives lost and the injuries sustained. The safety of our 

1 The data described throughout this testimony is accurate to the best of my knowledge as of 8am 

Monday, May 10, 2010, when this testimony was prepared. The information that we have 

continues to develop as our response to the incident continues. 

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employees and our contractors and the safety of the environment are always our 

first priorities. 

Even as we absorb the human dimensions of this tragedy, I want to underscore 

our intense determination to do everything humanly possible to minimize the 

environmental and economic impacts of the resulting oil spill on the Gulf Coast. 

From the outset, the global resources of BP have been engaged. Nothing is 

being spared. We are fully committed to the response. 

And from the beginning, we have never been alone. On the night of the accident, 

the Coast Guard helped rescue the 115 survivors from the rig. The list of 

casualties could easily have been longer without the professionalism and 

dedication of the Coast Guard. 

Even before the Transocean Deepwater Horizon sank on the morning of April 

22nd, a Unified Command structure was established, as provided by federal 

regulations. Currently led by the National Incident Commander, Admiral Thad 

Allen, the Unified Command provides a structure for BP's work with the Coast 

Guard, the Minerals Management Service and Transocean, among others. 

Immediately following the explosion, in coordination with the Unified Command, 

BP began mobilizing oil spill response resources including skimmers, storage 

barges, tugs, aircraft, dispersant, and open-water and near shore boom. 

Working together with federal and state governments under the umbrella of the 

Unified Command, BP's team of operational and technical experts is 

coordinating with many agencies, organizations and companies. These include 

the Departments of Energy, Interior, Homeland Security and Defense, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), US Fish & Wildlife Service 

(USFW), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), EPA, OSHA, Gulf Coast 

state environmental and wildlife agencies, the Marine Spill Response Corporation 

(an oil spill response consortium), as well as numerous state, city, parish and 

county agencies. 

As Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry noted on April 28: "BP is being 

appropriately forward leaning in bringing all the resources to bear to control this 

spilL" 

The industry as a whole has responded in full support. Among the resources that 

have been made available: 

• Drilling and technical experts who are helping determine solutions to stopping 

the spill and mitigating its impact, including specialists in the areas of subsea 

wells, environmental science and emergency response; 

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• Technical advice on blowout preventers, dispersant application, well 

construction and containment options; 

• Additional drilling rigs to serve as staging areas for equipment and 

responders, more remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) for deep underwater 

work, barges, support vessels and additional aircraft, as well as training and 

working space for the Unified Command. 

The actions we're taking 

As Chairman and President of BP America, I am part of an executive team that 

reports directly to our Global CEO, Tony Hayward. I am BP's lead representative 

in the US and am responsible for broad oversight and connectivity across all of 

our US-based businesses. 

BP itself has committed tremendous global resources to the effort. Among many 

other tasks, they are helping to train and organize the more than 10,000 citizen 

volunteers who have come forward to offer their services. 

Indeed, we have received a great many offers of help and assistance. The 

outpouring of support from government, industry, businesses and private citizens 

has truly been humbling and inspiring. It is remarkable to watch people come 

together in crisis. 

Our efforts are focused on two overarching goals: 

• Stopping the flow of oil; and 

• Minimizing the impact on the environment. 

Subsea efforts to secure the well 

Our subsea efforts to stop the flow of oil and secure the well have involved four 

concurrent strategies: 

• Working to activate the blow-out preventer (BOP) on the well using 

submersible ROVs. This would be the preferred course of action, since it 

would stop or diminish the flow at the source on the ocean floor. 

Unfortunately, this effort has so far not proved successfuL 

• Work continues on a subsea oil recovery plan using a containment system, 

placing large enclosures or containment chambers atop the leaks and 

conducting flow from the ocean floor to a ship at the surface through a pipe. 

As we anticipated, however, there have been technical challenges. This 

system has never been used before at 5,000 feet. Engineers are now working 

to see if these challenges can be overcome. 

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• We have begun to drill the first of two relief wells to permanently secure 

the well. These wells are designed to intercept the original MC252 #1 

well. Once this is accomplished, a specialized heavy fluid will be injected 

into the well bore to stop the flow of oil and allow work to be carried out 

to permanently cap the existing well. On Sunday, May 2nd, we began 

drilling the first of these wells. A second drillship will mobilize to the area 

to begin the second relief well later this week. This relief well operation 

could take approximately three months. 

• A fourth effort is known as a "top kill." It is a proven industry technique for 

capping wells and has been used worldwide, but never in 5000 feet of water. 

It uses a tube to inject a mixture of multi-sized particles directly into the 

blowout preventer. The attempt to do this could take two or three weeks to 

accomplish. 

We have succeeded in stopping the flow from one of the three existing leak 

points on the damaged well. While this may not affect the overall flow rate, it 

should reduce the complexity of the situation to be dealt with on the seabed. 

Attacking the spill 

We are attacking the spill on two fronts: in the open water and on the shoreline, 

through the activation of our pre-approved spill response plans. 

• On the water 

On the open water, we have mobilized a fleet of 294 response vessels, 

including skimmers, storage barges, tugs, and other vessels. The Hoss 

barge, the world's largest skimming vessel, has been onsite since April 25. 

In addition, there are 15, 210-foot Marine Spill Response Corporation Oil 

Spill Response Vessels, which each have the capacity to collect, separate, 

and store 4000 barrels of oil. To date, over 97,000 barrels of oil and water 

mix have been recovered. 

Also on the open water, we are attacking the spill area with Coast Guardapproved biodegradable dispersants, which are being applied from both 

planes and boats. Dispersants are soap-like products which help the oil to 

break up and disperse in the water, which, in turn, helps speed natural 

degradation. 

Thirty-seven aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, are now supporting the 

response effort. Over 444,000 gallons of dispersant have been applied on the 

surface and more than 180,000 gallons are available. Typically, about 2,100 

gallons of dispersant is needed to treat 1,000 barrels of oil. 

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To ensure that adequate supplies of dispersant will be available for surface and 

subsea application, the manufacturer has stepped up the manufacturing process, 

and existing supplies are being sourced from all over the world. The cooperation 

of industry partners has been superb and that is deeply, deeply appreciated. 

We have also developed and tested a technique to apply dispersant at the leak 

pOint on the seabed. As far as we are aware, this is the first documented attempt 

to apply dispersant at the source. Early evidence suggests that the test has been 

impactful, and we are working with NOAA, EPA, and other agencies to refine and 

improve the technique. EPA is carefully monitoring the impact of dispersant and 

is analyzing its potential impact on the environment and options for possible 

future use. 

• Actions to protect the shoreline 

Near the shoreline, we are implementing with great urgency oil spill 

response contingency plans to protect sensitive areas. According to the 

Coast Guard, the result is the most massive shoreline protection effort ever 

mounted. 

To ensure rapid implementation of state contingency plans, we announced 

last week that we would make available grants of $25 million to Louisiana, 

Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 

To date, we have about one million feet of boom deployed in an effort to 

contain the spill and protect the coastal shoreline, and another 1.3 million 

feet are available. The Department of Defense is helping to airlift boom to 

wherever it is needed across the Gulf coast. 

Incident Command Posts have been or are being established at 

• Alabama: Mobile; 

• Florida: St. Petersburg; 

• Louisiana: Robert and Houma. 

Thirteen staging areas are also in place to help protect the shoreline: 

• Alabama: Theodore, Orange Beach and Dauphin Island; 

• Florida: Panama City and Pensacola. 

• LouiSiana: Grand Isle, Venice, Shell Beach, Slidell, Cocodrie; 

• Mississippi: Pascagoula, Biloxi and Pass Christian; 

Highly mobile, shallow draft skimmers are also staged along the coast 

ready to attack the oil where it approaches the shoreline. 

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Wildlife clean-up stations are being mobilized, and pre-impact baseline 

assessment and beach clean-up will be carried out where possible. Rapid 

response teams are ready to deploy to any affected areas to assess the 

type and quantity of oiling, so the most effective cleaning strategies can be 

applied 

A toll-free number has been established to report oiled or injured wildlife, 

and the public is being urged not to attempt to help injured or oiled animals, 

but to report any sightings via the toll-free number. 

Contingency plans for waste management to prevent secondary 

contamination are also being implemented. 

Over 10,000 personnel are now engaged in the response, including 

shoreline defense and community outreach. 

Additional resources, both people and equipment, continue to arrive for 

staging throughout the Gulf states in preparation for deployment should 

they be needed. 

Communication, community outreach, & engaging volunteers 

We are also making every effort to keep the public and government officials 

informed of what is happening. 

BP executives have regularly briefed the President's Cabinet and National 

Security Council team, members of Congress, the governors and attorneys 

general of the Gulf Coast states, and many local officials. 

On the ground, in the states and local communities, we are working with 

numerous organizations such as fishing associations, local businesses, parks, 

wildlife and environmental organizations, educational institutions, medical and 

emergency establishments, local media, and the general public. 

BP is leading volunteer efforts in preparation for shoreline clean-up. We have 

and will continue to help recruit and deploy volunteers, many of whom are being 

compensated for their efforts, to affected areas. More than 14,000 calls from 

volunteers offering their help have been received and over 4,000 volunteers have 

been trained thus far. 

Volunteer activities at this time are focused on clearing the beaches of existing 

debris and placing protective boom along the shoreline. Our "adopt a boom" 

program is proving very successful in engaging local fishermen in the response. 

More than 600 fishing vessels are Signed up to deploy boom and assist with the 

response. 

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There are five BP community-outreach sites engaging, training, and preparing 

volunteers: 

• Alabama: Mobile; 

• Florida: Pensacola; 

• Louisiana: Venice 

• Mississippi: Pascagoula and Biloxi. 

A phone line has been established for potential volunteers to register their 

interest in assisting the response effort. 

Coping with economic impacts 

We recognize that beyond the environmental impacts there are also economic 

impacts on the people of the Gulf Coast states. BP will pay all necessary clean 

up costs and is committed to paying legitimate claims for other loss and damages 

caused by the spilL 

We have put in place a BP Claims Process. All claimants are being directed to a 

toll-free number and a website and will be assigned to experienced adjusters 

who will assist them in making their claim. 

As an alternative, claimants can visit one of BP's Community Outreach Centers 

or claims centers. 

The process is being expedited to make immediate payments to those who have 

experienced a loss of income, while the overall claim is more fully evaluated. As 

of today, we have paid out approximately $3.5 million. 

Commitment to investigate what happened 

BP is one of the lease holders and the operator of this exploration well. As 

operator, BP hired Transocean to conduct the well drilling operations. 

Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and its equipment, 

including the blowout preventer. 

The questions we all want answered are: What happened on the seabed and 

aboard the Deepwater Horizon and why did these things happen? 

A full answer to those questions will have to await the outcome of a joint 

investigation by the Departments of Homeland Security and Interior, investigation 

by Congress, and an independent internal investigation that BP is conducting. 

BP's investigation into the cause of this accident is being led by a senior BP 

executive from outside the affected business. The team has more than 40 

people. The investigation is ongoing and has not yet reached conclusions about 

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incident cause. We intend to share the results of our findings so that our industry 

and our regulators can benefit from the lessons learned. 

Investigations take time, of course, in order to ensure that the root cause of the 

failure is fully understood. But let me give you an idea of the questions that BP 

and the entire energy industry, are asking: 

• What caused the explosion and fire? 

• And why did the blowout preventer fail? 

Only seven of the 126 onboard the Deepwater Horizon were BP employees, so 

we have only some of the story, but we are working to piece together what 

happened from meticulous review of the records of rig operations that we have 

as well as information from those witnesses to whom we have access. We are 

looking at our own actions and those of our contractors, as is the Marine Board. 

We are looking at why the blowout preventer did not work because that was to be 

the fail-safe in case of an accident. The blowout preventer is a 450-ton piece of 

equipment that sits on top of the wellhead during drilling operations. It contains 

valves that can be closed remotely if pressure causes fluids such as oil or natural 

gas to enter the well and threaten the drilling rig. By closing this valve, the drilling 

crew can regain control of the well. 

Blowout preventers are used on every oil and gas well drilled in the world today. 

They are carefully and deliberately designed with multiple levels of redundancy 

and are regularly tested. If they don't pass the test, they are not used. 

The systems are intended to fail-closed and be fail-safe; sadly and for reasons 

we do not yet understand, in this case, they were not Transocean's blowout 

preventer failed to operate. 

All of us urgently want to understand how this vital piece of equipment and its 

built-in redundancy systems failed and what measures are required to prevent 

this from ever happening again. In this endeavor, you will have the full support of 

BP as well as, I am sure, the rest of the industry. 

Energy policy remains critical 

Tragic and unforeseen as this accident was, we must not lose sight of why BP 

and other energy companies are operating in the offshore, including the Gulf of 

Mexico. The Gulf is one of the world's great energy producing basins, providing 

one in four barrels of oil produced in the United States. That is a resource that 

powers America and the world every day, one our economy requires. 

Conclusion 

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But before we can think about the future, we have to deal with the immediate 

challenge of today. 

BP is under no illusions about the seriousness of the situation we face. In the last 

three weeks, the eyes of the world have been upon us. President Obama and 

members of his Cabinet have visited the Gulf region and made clear their 

expectations of BP and OUf industry. So have members of Congress, as well as 

the general public. 

We intend to do everything within our power to bring this well under control, to 

mitigate the environmental impact of the spill and to address economic claims in 

a responsible manner. 

Any organization can show the world its best side when things are going well. it 

is in adversity that we truly see what they are made ot 

We know that we will be judged by our response to this crisis. No resource 

available to this company will be spared. I can assure you that we and the entire 

industry will learn from this terrible event, and emerge from it stronger, smarter 

and safeL 

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91 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. McKay. We should note that Mrs. 

Myrick, a member of the full committee, is with us. I’m sure she 

will have some questions when we get to the question period. 

Thanks for joining us, Sue. 

And Mr. Probert, your opening statement, please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF TIM PROBERT 

Mr. PROBERT. Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting Halliburton 

to testify. We will continue to work with you and your staff to collect factual data that will enable an understanding of what took 

place and what we collectively can do to ensure that domestic oil 

and gas production is undertaken in the safest, most environmentally responsible manner possible. 

The catastrophic blowout and the spread of oil in the Gulf of 

Mexico are tragic events for everyone. On behalf of the entire Halliburton family, we extend our heartfelt sympathy to the families, 

friends, and colleagues of the 11 people who lost their lives and 

those workers who were injured in the tragedy. 

As we hope you can appreciate, neither Halliburton nor any 

other party can make a judgment or offer any credible theories 

about what happened until, at a minimum, the well owner has 

interviewed everyone on the Deepwater Horizon to recreate the 

daily log of activities for April 20. In the absence of that information, no one should rush to judgment. However, there are three 

things that could be said with certainty: One, that the casing shoe 

was cemented 20 hours prior to the tragic accident; two, it is premature to say that the root cause of the event was the catastrophic 

failure of the casing or cement; and, three, had the BOP functioned 

as expected this catastrophe would not have happened. 

With respect to the Mississippi Canyon 252 well, Halliburton and 

many other companies were contracted by the well owner to provide products and services. Halliburton provided cementing, mud 

logging, directional drilling, and real-time data acquisition and 

data delivery services for key personnel on board the rig and on 

shore. However, contrary to press reports, Halliburton did not provide casing, wellheads, or seal assemblies. 

Since the blowout, Halliburton has been working at the direction 

of the well owner to assist in the efforts to bring the well under 

control. This includes intervention support to help secure the damaged well and assistance in drilling two relief wells. 

At the outset, I need to emphasize that Halliburton is a service 

provider to the well owner. It’s contractually bound to comply with 

the well owner’s instructions on all matters relating to the performance of all work-related activities. 

The construction of a deepwater well is a complex operation involving performance of many tasks by many parties. While the well 

owner’s representative has ultimate authority for planning and approving activities on the rig, the drilling contractor performs and 

directs much of the daily activity. 

Cement can be used to isolate formation fluids, to prevent movement of these fluids between formations, and to bond and support 

the steel casing. There are many external factors which affect the 

design and execution of the cement job, and these include the variVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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ability of the whole geometry, the relative location of hydrocarbon 

zones, and the hydrocarbon content of associated drilling fluids. 

The centralizer placement on the production casing, the drilling 

fluid conditioning program prior to cementing, and the cement slurry and placement design use of this well were implemented as directed by the well owner. By design, no continuous cement column 

was installed throughout the entire wellbore. 

Approximately 20 hours prior to the catastrophic loss of well control, Halliburton had completed the cementing of the ninth and 

final production casing string in accordance with the well program, 

which would have been approved by the MMS. 

Following the placement of the cement slurry, the casing seal assembly was set in the casing hanger. As required by the MMS and 

as directed by the well owner, a positive pressure test was then 

conducted to demonstrate the integrity of the production casing 

string. The results of the positive test were reviewed by the well 

owner, and the decision was made to proceed with well program. 

The next step was the performance of a negative pressure test 

conducted by the drilling contractor at the direction of the well 

owner and in accordance with MMS requirements. This tests the 

integrity of the casing seal assembly. We understand that Halliburton was instructed to record drill pipe pressure during this test. 

After being advised by the drilling contractor that the negative test 

had been completed, Halliburton’s cementing personnel were placed 

on standby. 

We understand that the drilling contractor then replaced the 

dense drilling fluid in the riser with lighter seawater prior to the 

planned placement of the final cement plug. The drilling fluid was 

transferred directly to a work boat. 

The final cement plug would have been installed inside the production string and enabled the planned temporary abandonment of 

the well, but prior to reaching that point in the well construction 

plan that Halliburton personnel would have been directed to set 

the plug, the catastrophic incident occurred. 

Halliburton is confident that the cementing work on the Mississippi Canyon 252 well was completed in accordance with the requirements of the Well Owners Well Construction Plan. 

To amplify before closing, and to amplify, respectfully, to a comment made earlier by Representative DeGette, the MMS did indeed 

conduct a survey which indicated that cementing was a factor in 

18 of 39 well control incidents over an approximate 10-year period 

in the Gulf of Mexico. I should point out that only one of these incidents occurred in water depths over 400 feet. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share Halliburton’s views. I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Probert follows:] 


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Prepared Statement 

Tim Probert 

President, Global Business Lines and 

Chief Health, Safety and Environmental Officer 

Halliburton 

Before the 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.s. House 

May 12, 2010 

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to share my company's perspective as you review issues related to the 

explosion that occurred on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and the resulting oil spill in the u.s. Gulf of 

Mexico. Halliburton looks forward to continuing to work with you, your colleagues, and your staff to 

understand what happened and what we collectively can do in the future to ensure that oil and gas 

production in the United States is undertaken in the safest, most environmentally responsible manner 

possible. 

At the outset, I want to assure you and your colleagues that Halliburton has and will continue to fully 

support, and cooperate with, the ongoing investigations into how and why this tragic event happened. We 

have already made our senior personnel available to brief Members and staff and we have produced 

thousands of pages of documents in support of current investigations. Halliburton had four employees 

stationed on the rig at the time of the accident. They returned to shore safely and each has and will 

continue to be made available to assist the investigative efforts. We are mindful, however, that Halliburton 

cannot make any judgment or offer any theories about what happened until at a minimum the well owner 

has completed interviewing everyone on board to re-create the daily log of activities, including those that 

occurred after we successfully completed the cementing operations of the production casing string. 

The April 20th catastrophic blowout, explosions and fire of the Deepwater Horizon rig and the spread of oil 

in the Gulf of Mexico are tragic events for everyone connected to the situation. The deaths and injuries to 

personnel working in our industry cannot be forgotten. Halliburton extends its heartfelt sympathy to the 

families, friends and colleagues of the 11 people who lost their lives and those workers injured in the 

tragedy. 

Background on Halliburton 

As a global leader in oilfield services, Halliburton has been providing a variety of services to the oil and 

natural gas exploration and production industry for more than 90 years. Halliburton's areas of activity are 

primarily in the upstream oil and gas industry. They include providing products and services for clients 

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throughout the life cycle of the hydrocarbon reservoir--from locating hydrocarbons and managing 

geological data, to directional drilling and formation evaluation, well construction and completion, to 

optimizing production through the life of the field. The company is also engaged in developing and 

providing technologies for carbon sequestration and we are a service provider to the geothermal energy 

industry. 

Halliburton is the largest cementing service and material provider in the oil and gas industry. Halliburton 

provides zonal isolation and engineering solutions for the life of a well. The company safely conducts 

thousands of successful well service operations each year and is committed to continuously improve its 

performance. The company views safety and environmental performance as critical to its success and 

these are core elements of our corporate culture. Halliburton has much to offer to help our nation meet its 

energy security needs. 

With respect to the Mississippi Canyon 252 well, Halliburton was contracted by the well owner to perform a 

variety of services on the rig. These included cementing, mud logging, directional drilling, and 

measurement-while-drilling services. In addition, Halliburton provided selected real-time drilling and rig 

data acquisition and transmission services to key personnel both on board the Deepwater Horizon and at 

various onshore locations. 

Halliburton's Participation in the Remediation Efforts on Mississippi Conyon 252 Well 

Since the blowout, Halliburton has been working at the direction of the well owner to provide assistance in 

the effort to bring the well under control. This includes intervention support to help secure the damaged 

well and planning and services associated with drilling relief well operations. 

Halliburton has deployed survey management experts to assist in planning the path of the relief wells and 

has mobilized its technology group to work in collaboration with another industry partner to combine our 

technologies, in an effort to develop an integrated ranging system to expedite the intersection of the 

original well. 

Operations Preceding the Catastrophic Loss of Well Control on Mississippi Conyon 252 Well 

I need to start this section with an important statement of disclosure. Halliburton, as a service provider to 

the well owner, is contractually bound to comply with the well owner's instructions on all matters relating 

to the performance of all work-related activities. It is also important to understand the roles and 

responsibilities of the various parties involved in the construction of a well. The construction of a deep 

water well is a complex operation involving the performance of numerous tasks by multiple parties led by 

the well owner's representative, who has the ultimate authority for decisions on how and when various 

activities are conducted. 

Attached to this testimony is an illustration showing the approximate depths and positions of the casing 

and liner strings set in this well. In addition, the approximate position of the various cement placements is 

illustrated, which is consistent with the well design. It should be noted that cement is used at specific 

designated spots and is not designed to be a complete barrier through the entire wellbore. 

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Cement can be used to isolate formation fluids, to prevent movement of these fluids between formations 

and to bond and support the casing. A mixture of cement, water and chemicals is combined in a slurry that 

can be pumped into position around the outside of steel liners and casing. There are many external factors 

that impact the design and execution of a cement job. These include the variability in the hole geometry, 

relative location of hydrocarbon zones, hydrocarbon content and the prior condition of the wellbore and 

associated fluids as determined by the drilling fluid provider. Casing strings are typically run with devices to 

centralize the casing concentrically in the wellbore and prevent incomplete displacement of drilling fluid, or 

"channeling". 

While every effort is made to complete a cement job with the highest levels of mechanical and hydraulic 

integrity, the above mentioned well conditions may prevent this. Confirming cement integrity after 

placement would require the well owner to direct the wireline provider to obtain cement evaluation logs. 

Based on the findings of these logs, the well owner can elect to perform remedial action by perforating the 

casing and "squeezing" cement into remaining voids to improve the integrity of the original cement. 

The centralizer placement on the production casing, the drilling fluid conditioning program prior to 

cementing and the cement slurry and placement design used for this well were implemented as directed by 

the well owner. However, as shown in the attached diagram, by design there is no continuous cement 

column throughout the entire well bore. 

Approximately 20 hours prior to the catastrophic loss of well control, Halliburton had completed the 

cementing of the ninth and final production casing string in accordance with the well program. 

Following the placement of 51 barrels of cement slurry, the casing seal assembly was set in the casing 

hanger. In accordance with accepted industry practice, as required by MMS and as directed by the well 

owner, a positive pressure test was then conducted to demonstrate the integrity of the production casing 

string. The results of the positive test were reviewed by the well owner and the decision was made to 

proceed with the well program. 

The next step included the performance of a "negative" pressure test, which tests the integrity of the casing 

seal assembly and is conducted by the drilling contractor at the direction of the well owner and in 

accordance with MMS requirements. We understand that Halliburton was instructed to record drill pipe 

pressure during this test until Halliburton's cementing personnel were advised by the drilling contractor 

that the negative pressure test had been completed, and were placed on standby. 

We understand that the drilling contractor then proceeded to displace the riser with seawater prior to the 

planned placement of the final cement plug, which would have been installed inside the production string 

and enabled the planned temporary abandonment of the well. Prior to the point in the well construction 

plan that the Halliburton personnel would have set the final cement plug, the catastrophic incident 

occurred. As a result, the final cement plug was never set. 

Halliburton is confident that the cementing work on the Mississippi Canyon 252 well was completed in 

accordance with the requirements of the well owner's well construction plan. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share our views. 

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4 

22"@7,'37' 

1B"@B,"" 

16"@11,&85' 

13618"@13,146' 

11718"@15,103' 

9 7'B"@'7,'.B' 

7" x 9 718" @ 18,360' 
97 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Moore, your opening statement, please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF JACK MOORE 

Mr. MOORE. Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Burgess, Chairman Waxman, Chairman Emeritus Dingell, Ranking Member Barton, members of the committee, good morning. I am Jack Moore, 

President and CEO or Cameron International Corporation, and I 

appreciate the opportunity to be here for this hearing on what is 

truly a tragic event. 

What word about our company; Cameron is based in Houston, 

Texas, and is a leading provider of equipment and services to the 

energy industry worldwide. We have 11 different operating divisions, and approximately 18,000 employees in more than 300 locations worldwide. We have worked with our customers for over 120 

years to design, manufacture, and service products that help them 

safely find, develop, produce and transport oil and gas. 

The Cameron product used by the Deepwater Horizon is called 

a blowout preventer, or a BOP, a product that Cameron actually 

invented in the 1920s. A BOP allows our customers to control the 

pressure in a well while being drilled. We have over 400 BOP 

stacks operating offshore, and 130 are operating in deep water. 

Each individual BOP stack is made of components specified by our 

customers, is configured to their specific operating specifications, 

and is manufactured and tested in accordance with industry standards. Our BOPs have a very long history of reliable performance, 

including performance in some of the harshest operating conditions 

in the word. The BOP stack on the Deepwater Horizon was operating in 5,000 feet of water. 

As soon as Cameron was notified of the Deepwater Horizon incident, we mobilized a team of our best drilling system specialists to 

work with BP in transition to assist in shutting this well in. Since 

that time, we have been working around the o’clock to assist in this 

effort, and we will continue to provide all the necessary resources 

at our disposal until this well is shut in. 

It is far too early to draw conclusions about how the incident occurred, but every one of us at Cameron, myself, and I think this 

industry is mindful of the tragic loss of life that occurred, and likewise, the impact to the environment and to the commercial impact 

that it will have. 

Cameron and I understand the need to discover the facts relating 

to what went wrong and to do all that is possible to prevent the 

occurrence of such an incident in the future. I am accompanied 

today by my colleague, David McWhorter, who is our vice president 

of engineering and quality for your drilling systems group to be at 

your disposal for answers. Thank you for letting us be here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:] 


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United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Written statement of Jack B. Moore, 

President and CEO of Cameron International Corporation 

May 12, 2010 

I am Jack Moore, President and CEO of Cameron International 

Corporation. I have been with Cameron for 11 years and have over 30 years of 

experience in the oilfield service industry. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today for this very important 

hearing on what is truly a tragic event. Since the day of the incident, we have been 

lending our assistance. We will continue to work with everyone involved to 

understand what and how this happened. 

Cameron is based in Houston Texas and is a leading provider of 

equipment and services to the energy industry worldwide, with 11 different 

operating divisions and approximately 18,000 employees in more than 300 

locations. We have worked with our customers for over 120 years to design, 

manufacture and service products that help them safely find, develop, produce and 

transport oil and gas. 

The Cameron product used by the Deepwater Horizon is called a "blow 

out preventer" or "BOP," a product that Cameron actually invented in the 1920's, 

that allows our customers to control the pressure in a well while being drilled. 

There are over 2,500 Cameron BOP's operating around the world today, both 

onshore and offshore. We have over 400 BOP stacks operating offshore, of which 

130 are operating in deep water. Each individual BOP stack is made up of 

components specified by our customers, is configured to their specific operating 

specifications, and is tested and manufactured in accordance with industry 

standards and applicable regulations. 

Our BOP's have a very long history of reliable performance, including 

performance in some ofthe harshest operating conditions in the world. In support 

of our commitment to our products' on-going performance, we maintain a system of 

safety alerts and product advisories that keep our customers abreast ofthe latest 

information about our products. 
99 


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As soon as Cameron was notified of this incident, we mobilized a team 

of our best drilling systems specialists to work with BP and Transocean to assist in 

shutting this well in. We also mobilized teams from our sub-sea, surface and valves 

divisions to assist BP and its partners in the alternative methods they are deploying 

to contain the flow from the well. We have been working around the clock to assist 

in this effort, and we will continue to provide all of the resources at our disposal 

until the well is shut in. 

It is far too early to draw conclusions about how the incident occurred. 

The present challenges involved in determining causes are many, in particular, 

from our standpoint, the inability to examine the Deepwater Horizon's BOP. 

Everyone of us is mindful of the personal, environmental and commercial concerns 

associated with this incident. We understand the need to discover the facts relating 

to what went wrong and to do all that is possible to prevent the occurrence of such 

an incident in the future. 
100 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

It should be noted for members that we asked each of our witnesses to have a technical expert with them to help in answering 

any technical questions. To our witnesses, you may consult with 

your technical experts before responding to questions, and if we get 

to a point where your expert needs to answer directly, then we will 

have them sworn in and hear from them directly, but otherwise, we 

will look to you for the answers. 

So with that, let’s begin our questions. We will go 5 minutes this 

first round. 

Mr. Waxman, would you like to begin, please? 

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to return to a point that I raised in my opening statement, and that was the question about a series of pressure tests 

performed on the well before the blowout took place. 

My understanding is that there are two types of pressure tests. 

A positive test involves adding fluids into the well to exert additional pressure. This tells the well operator whether fluids can flow 

from the well into the surrounding formations. A negative pressure 

test is a reverse; it removes some of that pressure in the well, creating an inward or upward force from the pressure differential. 

That would be used to defect flow into the well through a breach 

in the cement or the casing. Both tests are important, and failure 

of either test can suggest a failure of the seals or the well’s integrity. 

Mr. Newman, am I right in my understanding of the significance 

of these two tests? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Chairman Waxman, I would agree with your assessment, that the successful performance of those tests is critical 

to understanding the condition and the integrity of the casing and 

cement, and a negative response, a negative outcome for either one 

of those tests would indicate that there are potential problems. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. McKay and Mr. Probert, do you agree with 

that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes, I do. 

Mr. PROBERT.Yes. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I understand that the well passed positive pressure tests on the morning of April 20, 2010, but I also understand 

that when negative performance tests were performed later that 

day, starting around 5 p.m., there were anomalous results. Let’s go 

back to the document entitled ‘‘What We Know,’’ which was put out 

by BP. It says, ‘‘After 161⁄2 hours waiting on the cement, a test was 

performed on the well bore below the blowout preventer.’’ And then 

it says, ‘‘During this test, 1,400 PSI was observed on the drill pipe 

while zero PSI was observed on the kill and the choke lines.’’ 

Mr. Newman, can you explain what a 1,400-pound discrepancy in 

the negative pressure test might signify and what its importance 

might be? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The indication of 1,400 PSI on the drill pipe would 

indicate that there was pressure in the well bore being registered 

on the pressure gauge attached to the drill pipe. The absence of 

pressure on the choke and kill line would indicate a discrepancy between the well bore pressure being measured by the drill pipe and 

the annulus pressure being measured by the choke and kill line. 


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Mr. WAXMAN. And what significance does that have? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The significance of the discrepancy between the 

two pressures would lead to a conclusion that there was something 

happening in the well bore that shouldn’t be happening. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And Mr. McKay and Mr. Probert, do you agree? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think it is obviously difficult to speculate, but I do 

think that discrepancy is critical in the investigation. We will have 

to tear that apart piece by piece, absolutely. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And Mr. Probert? 

Mr. PROBERT. We don’t have knowledge of the sort of mechanical—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. I’m just asking if that explanation of a differential 

is accurate? 

Mr. PROBERT. Yes, I would say so. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, Mr. McKay, Mr. Dupree from BP told us on 

Monday, he said the results were not satisfactory, and he said they 

were a possible warning that gas was seeping into the well and 

building up pressure inside the bore hole. Mr. Dupree, is your senior official responsible for operations in the Gulf of Mexico? Do you 

agree with his assessment? 

Mr. MCKAY. Mr. Dupree has been working on the crisis 20 hours 

a day. I wasn’t sitting in on the meeting that you’re referring to, 

so I wasn’t privy to that review. What I would say is 1,400 PSI on 

the drill pipe and no PSI on the choke and kill lines indicates 

something should be investigated, absolutely. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the anomalies in the pressure testing present 

a significant question that should be thoroughly investigated. Just 

hours before the explosion, tests on the well returned results that 

signaled a possible well failure and the influx of gas up the wall. 

Yet it appears that the companies did not suspend well operations, 

and now 11 workers are dead and the Gulf Coast region faces catastrophic environmental damages. We need to know if that is the 

case and why it was the case. And it appears from Mr. Dupree’s 

statements to our staff that that was the result of the test, the negative test that was taken. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Barton for questions? 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have watched the testimony in my office as I did other work, 

so I have listened to the opening statements and to the members’ 

questions and the members’ opening statements. So I have been 

participating by video. 

My first question is generally to the panel. Do any of you allege 

that the incident that occurred should not have been foreseen, that 

it was of such a catastrophic nature that the equipment and the 

technology should not have contained it? Do you understand what 

I’m asking? OK. I see absolutely no response. 

Mr. MCKAY. Could I respond? 

Mr. BARTON. Let me rephrase it. Does anybody here believe that 

the blowout preventer and the technology employed and the procedures, if they had worked properly, could not have prevented the 

spill? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Representative Barton, it’s important to understand the design constraints of a blowout preventer. A blowout preVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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venter is not designed to close around significant debris. A blowout 

preventer is designed to close around drill pipe and most sizes of 

casing. But without knowing exactly what’s inside the blowout preventer today, it is difficult to conclude that the blowout preventer 

wasn’t subjected to conditions that exceed its design constraints. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I am a supporter of OCS drilling. I am a registered professional engineer, I’m not a petroleum engineer, I’m not 

a geologist. But my assumption is, in order to get a permit to drill 

you have to show the MMS that you will put equipment on site and 

drill the well in such a fashion that you can handle expected problems. And there have been millions of oil wells drilled and gas 

wells, there have been tens of thousands of gas wells drilled in the 

Gulf. It has to be a design parameter that you could have a catastrophic pressure release—or a blowout, to use the common term. 

I would think that your blowout preventer and your technology, 

your casing should be designed to handle that. Am I wrong? 

The gentleman who is the President of Cameron, it’s your blowout preventer. This isn’t a volcano that exploded around this well. 

I mean, we don’t know what happened, but my assumption is—and 

if my assumption is wrong, then we have to reassess the entire 

OCS drilling program—that if the technology had worked and the 

people had responded or had time enough to respond, even though 

you had the accident, it would have been contained, it would have 

been shut off. Am I wrong about that? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, we don’t know what happened. I think that’s 

what everyone here is trying to learn. And until we know what 

happens with this investigation, we will not be able to answer 

whether the blowout preventer that was there was functioning for 

that particular purpose. Our blowout preventers are built and designed to do specific things. We do know that they will not shear 

and seal casing, that we know. But they will shear and seal drill 

pipes. 

Mr. BARTON. But when you get a permit from the MMS—I guess 

this would go to the President of BP—you do have to show that if 

you have some sort of a pressure release, you can prevent it escaping into the environment, don’t you? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. I believe the permit requires a well construction plan that also requires the blowout preventer that’s provided 

by the contractor with a permit. And to answer your question, I 

think that, in effect, the well design, the procedures that were 

used, and the functioning of the equipment are going to be the 

mainstays of this investigation. And we do expect those to work, 

absolutely. 

Mr. BARTON. It’s my understanding that the blowout preventer 

equipment is still intact, that it is not—while it may be clogged up 

or it may not be properly installed or connected in terms of the activation mechanism, that it’s not been damaged. So it just hasn’t 

worked properly, but it isn’t like it’s been bent or deformed or impaired; is that correct? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There are no outward, external indications of significant damage, but I would caution the committee that the blowout preventer, as a result of what’s happened, particularly the sinking of the vessel, the blowout preventer was subjected to significant 

stress. 


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Mr. BARTON. I see that my time has expired. 

We’re going to do another round; is that right, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, Mr. Barton. I think we will probably go at least 

another round. 

Well, let me ask this, the term blowout protector—and I’ve spent 

a little bit of time on it—I mean, a blowout protector, like here’s 

your pipe, what it’s supposed to do is really squeeze it off; if something goes wrong, it just squeezes off like a straw, you just squeeze 

it, you pinch it so nothing can go up. Is that correct, Mr. Moore? 

Is that basically correct? 

Mr. MOORE. Correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. I point out four ways in my testimony where 

this blowout protector could not be working. Number one, there 

were modifications that BP indicates they didn’t know about— 

Transocean said no, they know about it 5 years ago. There was a 

hydraulic leak. That would not have enough pressure in there so 

that you could pinch this off if that hydraulic leak is serious 

enough; is that correct, Mr. Moore? 

Mr. MOORE. That would be a cause, we’re not sure. 

Mr. STUPAK. And you also indicated that, when you get these 

joints here, if these joints are in the BOP, the blowout protector, 

it won’t cut a joint; is that correct? 

Mr. MOORE. If those joints are in a shear ram, they will not cut. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. And then also the dead man switch, besides the design, all three of them having to give off, even the battery in this case, the one control panel we did find, the battery 

wasn’t working, correct? 

Mr. MOORE. That’s what we were led to believe, yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So let me ask this; this was a 2001 blowout 

protector for this well? 

Mr. MOORE. Correct, it was built in 2001. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. And in 2003, 2004, there were new regulations that came in for blowout protectors, were there not, Mr. 

Moore? 

Mr. MOORE. In terms of shearing capacity? 

Mr. STUPAK. Shearing capacity in particular, yes. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. In fact, doesn’t section 250.416(e) indicate that now 

it requires the lessee—in this case, BP—to provide information 

that shows that the blind shear or shear rams installed in the BOP 

stack are capable of shearing the drill pipe in the hole under maximum anticipated surface pressures; is that correct? 

Mr. MOORE. I am not aware of that particular article. 

Mr. STUPAK. How about you, Mr. McKay, since you’re the lessee 

in this case. Is it supposed to make sure that the rams can shear 

this pipe? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not personally familiar with the article you’re 

quoting. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. I’m talking about the rules in the Minerals 

Management Service rules and regulations that came out in 2003. 

Mr. Newman, are you familiar with those? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I believe, Chairman, you’re referring to the Code 

of Federal Regulations 30, subsection 250, yes, sir, I’m familiar 

with those. 


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Mr. STUPAK. And you’re supposed to be able to cut this thing in 

half in case there’s an accident, right? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Blind shear rams are supposed to be able to shear 

the tubular, yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And what kind of testing did you, Transocean, 

or BP do to make a determination that the shear rams were satisfactory and could cut this pipe if something happened? Did you do 

any testing? 

Mr. NEWMAN. In terms of confirming the capability of the shear 

rams—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct, which you’re required under 250416(e). 

Mr. NEWMAN. We rely on the test data, which is provided by 

Cameron. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. But test data is just really pressure, nothing 

to do with the make sure you have your hydraulics. There was 

nothing in there to make sure all the valves were tight, to make 

sure the hydraulic fluid wasn’t leaking out, was there? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There are regular tests performed on the BOP, 

while the BOP is on the rig prior to its deployment. 

Mr. STUPAK. While it’s on the rig, OK. 

Mr. NEWMAN. And then regularly, while the BOP is deployed on 

the seabed. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. In fact, section 446(b) says every 3 days, 

weather permitting, you must go down and look at the BOP on the 

sea floor, does it not? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I believe that’s correct, Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Did you do that in this case? 

Mr. NEWMAN. This is an ROV—remote operated vehicle—contracted by BP and located on the rig, and it’s out there for that 

purpose. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And did it perform any tests on the BOP that 

was sitting on the sea floor? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The only test the ROV would perform in that situation, Chairman, is a visual inspection, an observation of the BOP. 

Mr. STUPAK. How about something as simple as—or then there’s 

no shear test that’s performed on the sea floor, right? There’s no 

shear testing performed on the sea floor to cut this baby. 

Mr. NEWMAN. During the progress of well construction operations 

and the routine testing that is performed, there is no test where 

the shear rams are actually subjected to a shearing test. 

Mr. STUPAK. So the ROV really just goes down and takes a look 

at it. 

Mr. NEWMAN. It observes the external observation of the BOP. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Is there any test that tests to make sure the 

batteries are working so you can view your kill switch that actually 

shut this thing down? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Because the electronic signals which transmit back 

and forth between the rig and the BOP control system happen continuously, there would be an indication if the batteries were dead, 

on the BOP there would be an indication of that on the rig. 

Mr. STUPAK. So you’re saying you don’t have to test it because 

as long as the electrical lines are working, that would indicate 

whether or not the batteries are fully charged? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That’s correct. 


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Mr. STUPAK. Well, in this case, in the one control panel that we 

were able to take a look at, the battery was supposed to be at 27 

amps, it was at 18 amps. Did any of your testing show that it was 

under the 27 amps required? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I don’t have any indication, Chairman, that the 

tests would have indicated that the charge in the batteries had 

dropped from 27 to 18. 

Mr. STUPAK. Would you have documents that would show what 

the amps of these batteries were? Do you have any kind of records 

that would show that? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Unfortunately, Chairman, those records would 

have gone down with the rig. 

Mr. STUPAK. So then we have to take the word of those who 

looked at this control panel that the battery was basically dead and 

the dead man switch would not work, correct? You have no records 

to dispute that, right? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I have no records. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. My time is up. 

Mr. Burgess, 5 minutes for questioning. We will do a second 

round. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKay, just to kind of get back to some of the specifics of 

the modifications of the protector are what we know from tab four 

in the evidence binder, modifications that have been discovered in 

the blowout protector system. Can you give us the specific modifications that were discovered in the BOP system? 

Mr. MCKAY. What I was referring to yesterday is, while we were 

doing ROV—remote operated vehicle—interventions as the crisis 

has unfolded, we discovered that there were modifications made. I 

don’t know personally whether those were the exact modifications 

that Mr. Newman referenced that were done in 2005 or they were 

additional ones. I think that’s a very, very important piece of the 

investigation. We found leaking hoses and. You know, the diagrams 

that we were using real-time did not match the blowout preventer, 

so that’s—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Mr. Newman, if I understood him correctly, 

suggested that those modifications were requested and were paid 

for by BP. So it should be possible—those records wouldn’t have 

gone down with the ship, would they? We should be able to get that 

paper trail at some point established, should we not, if there were 

modifications that were requested? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I have looked at the agreement that was signed 

between Transocean and BP, so yes, we have a copy of that. 

Mr. BURGESS. And you will make that available to the committee? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. And Mr. McKay, will you look at your records and 

help us with trying to define that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Absolutely. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let me just ask a question. Mr. Waxman was asking about the negative pressure test. One side read 1,400 PSI, the 

other side read zero. What should the other side have read if the 

pressure test had been absolutely perfect? 


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Mr. MCKAY. The way I understand the configuration that was 

hydraulically connected such that the pressures on the choking kill 

line and the drill pipe should have been the same. 

Mr. BURGESS. Identical pressures. So that, and I’m just a layman, but that would indicate some obstruction that would not 

allow pressure to be transmitted from the drill line to the kill line, 

or vice versa. 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. I can’t speculate as to why, but they should 

have been reading the same from the way they are hydraulically 

connected, from what I understand. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. And going back to the previous issue, committee staffers have been told by your staff, Mr. McKay, that when 

BP attempted to operate one of the blowout protector variable rams 

underwater, the device was either mislabeled or not labeled in the 

way that they anticipated; is that correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. That is correct. I don’t know if that has anything 

to do with the modifications we requested or not or whether they 

are different modifications, but it is correct. 

Mr. BURGESS. Do you think that BP approved the modification? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. That’s going to be a central part of the 

investigation to understand what modifications were made. 

Mr. BURGESS. If it was just mislabeled, you wouldn’t have approved a mislabeling, would you, at BP? 

Mr. MCKAY. We wouldn’t have been involved in the labeling of 

them, no. 

Mr. BURGESS. So is there any reason why management wouldn’t 

be aware of this? Why the labeling, why the discrepancy would 

exist? 

Mr. MCKAY. Are you asking me? 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, sir. Don’t you have oversight over what happens at—— 

Mr. MCKAY. Transocean owns those blowout preventers—— 

Mr. BURGESS. But you have oversight over Transocean in that regard. 

Mr. MCKAY. They are our contractor, yes. 

Mr. BURGESS. I talked to the Governor’s office yesterday—I didn’t 

talk to the Governor, but I talked to some of his folks. And Mr. 

McKay, let me just ask you, they are really concerned that they’ve 

got a coastline, because of indentations and excrescences that is 

much longer than you would think just looking at, as the crow flies 

on the Louisiana coast, they’ve got 7,700 miles of estuaries and 

coastline. There is no way in the world that they have enough 

boom to manage the problems that they are facing. They tell us 

that they are having difficulty getting BP to authorize purchase of 

additional boom and manufacturer of additional boom. It seems to 

me this should be all hands on deck, get the boom locally, get it 

from global sources, but wherever we can, let’s get the boom put 

into position and not go scrambling for it once the oil comes ashore. 

Can you help me with that? Why is the Governor’s office feeling 

like they don’t have an adequate supply of boom? 

Mr. MCKAY. We are accessing, as I said earlier, we’ve got 1.1 

million feet deployed, we’ve got 2.4 million more feet coming, and 

this is under Unified Area Command as far as deployment under 


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the Coast Guard’s direction. So we have a supply chain cranked up 

to supply boom as well. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, just if I can suggest, I think there needs to 

be—I was impressed when we went down there last week, the cooperation between the BP and the Coast Guard and Unified Command. I’ve got no complaints about what I was seeing. But the 

Governor feels that—or at least the person I was talking to at the 

Governor’s office feels that they don’t have the ability to start the 

production line on that boom and they’re going to need a lot more 

than what they have. 

Mr. MCKAY. I will do two things; one, I will check on that and 

make absolutely sure. Number two, I know of no limits from BP 

about getting stuff done in terms of boom or anything else. 

Mr. BURGESS. I appreciate your assurance that you will check on 

that personally. 

The other thing is they don’t have the ratio of liaisons to the 

number of parishes. There might be one liaison for eight parishes. 

That’s not satisfactory. There needs to be a one-to-one relationship 

of the liaison to the parishes that are affected. 

Mr. MCKAY. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. The time has expired. 

Mr. Markey, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKay, on Friday, I flew over the spill and I saw a vast area 

of ocean covered in oil. This is oil from the Gulf. And we now see 

thousands of square miles with this awful sludge. And although the 

spill started about 50 miles offshore, it has now reached the Louisiana coastline. 

You are saying to us that BP is doing everything in its power to 

ensure that this spill is being stopped and that you currently estimate that the leaking is 5,000 barrels of oil per day into the Gulf. 

But this isn’t the only rig that BP operates in the Gulf. In its Oil 

Response Plan for the Gulf of Mexico, BP identified a worst case 

scenario for exploratory well explosion from offshore drilling in the 

Gulf of Mexico as a leak that would release 250,000 barrels of oil 

per day into the ocean about 30 miles off the coast of Louisiana. 

The specific exploration plan that you provided to regulators for the 

Horizon well states, ‘‘Since BP Exploration and Production Incorporated has the capability to responded to the appropriate worst 

case spill scenario, I hereby certify that BP Exploration and Production Incorporated has the capability to respond to the maximum 

extent practicable to a worst case discharge.’’ 

So right now, Deepwater Horizon well is leaking an estimated 

5,000 barrels per day, about 2 percent of the worst case scenario 

of 250,000 barrels, which your company assured the government, 

the American people, that it was capable of addressing in the Gulf. 

So if BP is already using every available resource to combat this 

spill of 5,000 barrels per day and it can’t stop this spill from worsening, then I can’t understand how in the world you can certify 

that you have the capability to respond to a spill of 250,000 barrels 

per day. 

Mr. McKay, you had better rethink your certification for a worst 

case spill of 250,000 barrels per day. Can you really say now, as 


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you sit here, that that certification is accurate, that you can respond to a daily spill of 250,000 barrels per day? 

Mr. MCKAY. What I would say is that we are responding with 

three drilling rigs. A surface response plan that was in place, detailed and is the largest that has ever been put in place—— 

Mr. MARKEY. Are you saying to us that you would use exactly the 

same resources for a spill of 5,000 barrels per day, which is what 

we have now, as you would for a spill of 250,000 barrels a day? 

Mr. MCKAY. Each spill would be specific. This particular one is 

complicated that the emergency dissect did not work on top of the 

blowout preventer, so we are still connected with a riser that’s 

4,300 feet long. We cannot get another blowout preventer on top of 

it right now, which would be the normal course in something like 

‘‘normal,’’ but something you could do if the riser was—— 

Mr. MARKEY. I understand that. But right now, BP is scrambling 

to find enough booms. You’re going to use nylons and hair to soak 

up the oil. I can only conclude that you really don’t have the resources to respond to a spill of 250,000 barrels. And there are wells 

all over the Gulf that are ticking time bombs that could result in 

spills of 250,000 barrels per day; do you really think that you can 

certify, again, today that you could respond to a spill of 250,000 

barrels per day? 

Mr. MCKAY. As I said, we’re doing everything we can. I believe 

that we will learn things through this, there’s no doubt. And I believe that those certifications will be with the knowledge that we 

have—— 

Mr. MARKEY. I just wish that you had a little more humility here 

today, an admission that you don’t have. Last week, you tried to 

plug the leaks with a huge dome, which failed when it froze up. 

Now we’re reading about a small top hat dome. If that fails, the 

solution looking increasingly desperate to plug the leak with a junk 

shot of golf balls and old tires and knotted ropes, soaking up some 

of the oil with hair and nylons. Each of your companies has represented itself as technology leaders in deepwater oil and gas exploration, and each of you now is flailing about, with no clue about 

how you’re going to get out of the mess that you’ve gotten yourselves into. Top hats, golf balls, tires, hair, nylons, these are not 

the response actions of companies who are prepared for the worst 

case scenario accident and capable of carrying out that response 

plan. 

The American people expect your companies to have a technological response to this disaster on par with the Apollo Project, not 

Project Runway, and that’s what they’re seeing night after night. 

You need to do better, and you need to prepare for a worst case 

scenario for the ticking time bomb that could be out there somewhere off the coast of the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Markey. 

Mr. Sullivan for questions, please. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a big mess. I realize that for you guys it’s tough to answer 

these questions. You’re probably, if not already going to sue each 

other, they will be suing you. There is going to be litigation for 


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years on this. A lot of money is involved. And so I understand that 

it’s tough to answer these questions. 

It’s easy to beat up on people when they’re down in this situation, and so I’m not going to do that, I’m going to focus on something different, even though I think it’s bad. We’re going to find out 

who did this, who’s responsible. The investigation will be ongoing 

and we’ll deal with that then. 

But I would like to really focus on the solution right now. We can 

focus on the problem all day long, it’s not going to get us anywhere. 

Someone is responsible, find it out, but let’s focus on the solution. 

I would just like to ask you, Mr. Newman, Mr. McKay, have you 

ever dealt with a blowout of this magnitude in the Gulf ever before, 

or even close? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We have never dealt with a blowout of this magnitude in the Gulf of Mexico before. 

Mr. MCKAY. No. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Both of you are involved in that it’s your rig, 

you’re drilling, you’re working together, he’s a contractor. On the 

rig, who’s quarterbacking the situation right now, who’s in charge? 

It’s his rig, so you have—what do they call them, installation managers on the rigs, or offshore installation managers? If he says 

something, can you override him? How is that working? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The offshore installation manager on a Transocean 

vessel is the senior most transition individual out there. That individual is responsible for the overall safety of the personnel and the 

vessel. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And what if Mr. McKay says something—do you 

accept that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. OK. And also, I know you’ve got a lot going on on 

the rig, there’s people out there in harm’s way working feverishly 

to get this to stop. Also, we talked about the golf balls and hair and 

all that. I know there are sophisticated efforts going on. Could either of you—Mr. McKay, I guess you—elaborate on what is going 

on onshore? Do you have a command center? What is that command center doing? Are they working 24/7? Have you tapped into 

the industry, other companies, experts, the brightest in the world? 

What kind of technologies are they using? Are there video feeds 

from the floor there? What kind of stuff is going on? 

Mr. MCKAY. We have several command centers. The source control is in Houston, and we have over 160 companies working wish 

us across the industry, including our colleagues and partners, as 

well as our competitors. We have the Department of Defense, we 

have the Navy, we have Sandia Labs. We have the brightest scientific minds in the world in these type of situations working on 

it 24/7. We have the highest technology in the world working this. 

As I said, we have three different drilling vessels, Transocean drilling vessels. We have 16 submarines operating continuously in some 

way or another, eight around the blowout preventer. 

This junk shot is actually a very sophisticated operation, a manifold has been constructed to be utilized in 5,000 feet of water, it’s 

never been done. The Koffer Dam was on the hand, we had that 

Koffer Dam for shallow water. It’s been utilized in Deepwater. It 

has hydrate problems as people know. 


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On the surface, we’re using technology with the latest 

dispersants. We are using subsea dispersal, which we think is extremely effective from initial tests, and we would like to get continuous injection going on that. It is extremely high-tech, and the best 

minds in the world are working it 24/7. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And all these companies here and others are involved as we speak? 

Mr. MCKAY. That’s right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Are you drilling wells right now to go into two of 

them, I guess? 

Mr. MCKAY. We’re drilling two relief wells right now. Well, one 

has started, the other will start this weekend. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And I guess the Koffer or the cap was plan A; 

would you say that? 

Mr. MCKAY. The Koffer Dam had hydrate problems, so we are 

working on a secondary plan for subsea containment right now. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So do you have a variety of plans going on multiple approaches right now in case one fails? 

Mr. MCKAY. Really quickly, we have different levels. We are attacking at the subsurface with the permanent securing with the relief wells. We have the blowout preventer, which is top kill is what 

we call it. Then we have the containment and collection systems 

subsea. We have several things working on that. And then we have 

the aggressive on-the-surface attack, which is trying to fight it as 

far offshore and then protect the shoreline, then clean up whatever 

gets to shore. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. When do you think this is going to stop? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, we’re working every second to get it stopped 

as fast as possible. There are viable options being worked that 

could work in the next few days to a couple of weeks, and then ultimately the permanent securing would be up to 3 months or so. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And those wells you’re drilling right now, how are 

those going to plug this well? How would that do it? 

Mr. MCKAY. We will drill and intersect the well just above or 

right into the reservoir Horizon and pump heavy weight to kill 

fluid, to kill that well. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And that could take, you said, two months? 

Mr. MCKAY. It probably will take about three months to get 

there in terms of the relief well. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And that would work, that would work if you 

were there right now—— 

Mr. MCKAY. It’s the normal way to kill a blowout around the 

world, it will permanently secure it, yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. I don’t have any more questions. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley for questions, please. 

Mr. BRALEY. Gentlemen, I want to focus on the last two minutes 

at the Deepwater Horizon well right before the explosion that triggered this catastrophic event because when I go over this accident 

in my head, I try to understand what was in place to protect the 

workers from a sudden event like this blowout. I would like to talk 

about what happened just before the explosion. Can we bring up 

the Halliburton data screen on screen at this point? 

Mr. Probert, you testified that part of your function on this particular well was to provide real-time data collection; is that correct? 


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Mr. PROBERT. That’s correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. And your company produced this particular chart to 

us as part of the contract you had with BP to perform monitoring 

of the mud and other data on this rig; is that your understanding? 

Mr. PROBERT. That’s correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. Are you generally familiar with how this type of a 

chart is used in well monitoring? 

Mr. PROBERT. Generally, yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. Generally. What this chart shows is what was happening inside the well and on the rig in the final two hours before 

the explosion. And if you look, this chart is broken down into time 

intervals that are recorded, beginning at 2010, which would have 

been 8:10 p.m. That evening, correct? 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Braley, if I may, it’s Exhibit Number 5. There 

should be an exhibit book there if you want to look at it, Mr. 

Probert. Hopefully that helps you out a little bit. It’s Exhibit Number 5. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. BRALEY. So this covers a data interval from 2010, or 8:10 

p.m., on April 20 to 2150, which would have been 9:50 that 

evening. Is that the time frame we’re talking about? 

Mr. PROBERT. It would appear to be so, yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. And if you look at this chart, there are several abnormal-appearing entries where a line dramatically goes vertical 

during a time interval between 2146 and 2148. Do you see that? 

Mr. PROBERT. I see that. 

Mr. BRALEY. And what this suggests is that the pressure in the 

standpipe at that moment shot up from 500 PSI—pounds per 

square inch—to almost 3,500 PSI in the space of about 2 minutes, 

and that was immediately before the explosion, correct? 

Mr. PROBERT. That is immediately before the contact was lost 

with the rig, yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. Right. So Mr. Probert, this is your company’s data. 

What does this tell us? 

Mr. PROBERT.What it says is that at some point within 2 minutes 

or so of the loss of the transmission that there was a significant 

increase in standpipe pressure. 

Mr. BRALEY. All right. And what’s the significance of that to people monitoring this well for safety and security reasons? 

Mr. PROBERT. The significance of this to all parties who would 

have had access to this data, and also standard gauges which are 

present on the rig would show that this would be a significant red 

flag. 

Mr. BRALEY. And in addition to gauges and this printout, are 

there any other type of built-in safety devices that would trigger 

a shutdown of the rig? 

Mr. PROBERT. I would have to defer that question to Mr. Newman as to whether or not there are any shutdown processes on the 

rig. 

Mr. BRALEY. All right. Mr. Newman, are you prepared to answer 

that question? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If you could rephrase the question for me, Representative, I would be happy to take a shot at it. 

Mr. BRALEY. Have you ever had surgery, Mr. Newman? 


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Mr. NEWMAN. I have had surgery. 

Mr. BRALEY. And right when you’re undergoing anesthesia, one 

of the last things that happens before you’re put under is they put 

a pulse oximeter on your finger to monitor your oxygen saturation 

level. Do you remember that, a little device that goes over your finger? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The surgery I underwent, sir, was a bit traumatic 

and I was effectively incapacitated in advance of the surgery, so I 

don’t remember. 

Mr. BRALEY. All right. Just accept for the purpose of my question 

that’s what happens to most people, that they actually do monitor 

your oxygen saturation because they don’t want you to die on the 

operating table. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’ll take your word for it, sir. 

Mr. BRALEY. And there are built into that machine that the anesthesiologist uses alarm defaults. When your saturation level gets to 

a certain level that it’s considered hypoxic, everybody in that operating room needs to know that, OK. 

My question for you is, in this particular setting, what type of 

alarm bells, whistles, alerts, other than a pressure gauge, do people 

working on that rig have available to them to tell them they’ve got 

a catastrophic problem that’s unfolding? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Well, there are a number of early warning indicators that are present on a drilling rig that would alarm for the individuals who are monitoring those to give them an indication. 

Which particular alarms would have been triggered in this instance 

depends on exactly what was happening, and I don’t know the answer to the question about exactly what was happening. 

Mr. BRALEY. How do we find out that information? How are 

those alarms recorded? What logs are kept? And what additional 

information do we know to get to the bottom of what was transpiring on that rig? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The alarms are monitored on the rig through what 

we refer to as VMS, a vessel management system. Those alarms 

are logged and a record is kept of that, but that VMS exists only 

on the rig, it’s not transmitted off the rig. And so the VMS system, 

along with the logs of the VMS system, would have gone down with 

the vessel. 

Mr. BRALEY. So you have no mirrored back-up data device so 

that that information is recorded at some other location than on 

the rig itself? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We do not have real-time, off-rig monitoring of 

what’s going on on the vessel. 

Mr. BRALEY. Do you think that’s a failure in the fail-safe system 

that is currently used within the industry to help understand the 

events of a catastrophe like this and learn from it? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Because the decisions regarding continuation of 

the drilling operations or suspension of the drilling operations are 

typically taken at the rig site, the first place we want those alarms 

present is at the rig site. 

Mr. BRALEY. But you’re aware that technology exists—it’s used 

every day in businesses all over the country—where as soon as a 

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mediately recorded at a distant site just to avoid this type of catastrophe from preventing that information from being lost forever. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I am aware of that technology existing, and in fact, 

the reason we have the records you’re showing us now is because 

that technology was employed on this particular operation. 

Mr. BRALEY. For this function that we’re seeing on this chart, but 

not the other recorded data that you’ve described in your testimony. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Not a real-time replication of the alarm logs. 

Mr. BRALEY. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Griffith, do you have questions? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What would have led to the discrepancy between the blowout 

protector and the plans or the diagrams of the blowout protector, 

or the differences? And if, in fact, there was a difference, was it a 

factor in whether or not this well could have been capped immediately? 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman, do you want me to respond to that? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Please, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MOORE. We were first aware of those changes when we were 

in the crisis room with BP when we were trying to function the 

blowout preventer. But honestly, we do not know whether those 

would have any impact on whether the BOP would function under 

the circumstances it was put in. We just don’t have enough information yet to know the answer to that. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. 

How long had the Horizon been operating? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The Deepwater Horizon went into service in 2002. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. So it’s been operating safely for a good while? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The Horizon has drilled approximately 72 wells 

over that eight-year history. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And at the ocean floor, at about 5,000 feet, which 

is approximately 1 mile, you continued down another 13,000 feet, 

another 2.5 miles to the reservoir; is that accurate? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That is an accurate description of the well geometry, yes. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. So this rig has had an exemplary safety record in 

a sense as far as its ability to drill and recover natural resources; 

is that fair? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I think that is a very fair assessment, Congressman. The Deepwater Horizon had a seven-year history with no loss 

time accidents. The Deepwater Horizon, in its past, set the record 

for deepwater operations for a semi-submersible. And the Deepwater Horizon currently holds the record for the deepest well ever 

drilled in the industry. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. So we’ve got a piece of engineering that has been 

fairly successful. And so as we hear testimony and questions about 

what red flags went up as the gentleman referred to an oxygen 

saturation. Over a period of years, the safety mechanisms and the 

correction mechanisms on this piece of equipment, or this well, 

have been significantly tried and found to be successful in most 

cases. And I guess my question, or my statement, would be that 

there is probably going to be a series of facts that all came together 

at a certain time that led to this tragedy. 


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And we, of course, are well aware of how things can happen after 

the fact and we can point fingers and, goodness gracious, America 

has lived through 9/11 to go back over all the things we could have 

done to keep that from happening. Things seem to have happened 

all at an opportune time and the stars lined up. So we’re really interested in your future as far as drilling is concerned, and what is 

being done on other wells around the Nation and internationally to 

double-check and see if all our proper safeguards are in place? 

Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. I can say that in our international rig fleet, we have 

notified and increased the scrutiny under the—on the blowout preventers, we’ve incrementally added some testing to it to make sure 

the ROV on board the ships will be able to actuate the blowout preventer, should it need to. And we’ve recommended, and given some 

ideas to the MMS on what maybe could be considered to enhance 

at least preparation and testing around these things. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. In the reservoir that you were tapping into, the 

dynamics, the hydraulic and the fluid dynamics of that reservoir, 

do those change significantly over time as pressures change, or is 

that pretty well a known and constant fact, or is it a variable on 

a day-to-day basis? 

Mr. MCKAY. On this particular reservoir? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes. 

Mr. MCKAY. This particular reservoir, we don’t have much data 

on it. Generally, reservoirs are different at different depths and different pressures so you can encounter them in different ways. The 

characteristics of this reservoir is difficult because we don’t have 

any measurements on it in terms of pressure. But just so everyone 

understands, it was not a particularly difficult well in the sense of 

its pressure. It was not a very much overpressured well. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Ms. DeGette for questions, please. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Probert, I was a little curious, listening to your opening 

statement, that you felt compelled to respond to my opening statement when I talked about the MMS study that said nearly half of 

all blowouts in the Gulf since 1992 were due to faulty cementing. 

The good news, you said, is only one of those incidents occurred in 

water depths over 400 feet. So I’ve got a couple questions. 

First of all, how many of the wells drilled in the Gulf over this 

period were at depths over 400 feet? 

Mr. PROBERT. I think if I can provide some clarity to that—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. No, I’d like a short answer, please. How many 

wells were over 400 feet? 

Mr. PROBERT. I don’t have that data. That data is available from 

the MMS, though. If you would like me to get it, I will get it. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Was it many of them or few of them? 

Mr. PROBERT. I do not know without reference to—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. You don’t know. So are you saying that since 

there was only one blowout incident at depths of over 400 feet, you 

think there is no risk for cementing for deepwater drilling? 

Mr. PROBERT. No. I think what I was trying to point out, because 

the subject of our study here clearly is deepwater Gulf of Mexico, 


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I was trying to provide a reference point for the committee with respect to the data which the MMS has provided to us—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. So what you’re saying is that there still could be 

a risk, that it’s not just because it’s over 400 feet, right? 

Mr. PROBERT. I’m sorry? 

Ms. DEGETTE. You’re saying that there still could be faulty cementing over 400 feet, yes or no? 

Mr. PROBERT. I am simply replying to—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes or no? 

Mr. PROBERT. No, I am simply replying to—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Now, are you arguing that cementing 

is actually safer at offshore wells with depths over 400 feet? 

Mr. PROBERT. I’m sorry, I didn’t understand your question. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Are you arguing that cementing is actually safer 

at offshore wells with depths over 400 feet? 

Mr. PROBERT. I would say the information would suggest that, 

yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. It is safer? 

Mr. PROBERT. According to the statistics, yes, from the MMS. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Because there have been few leaks? 

Mr. PROBERT. No. It’s a function of the depth of the water and 

what causes and how the well construction processes are undertaken between deep water and shallow water. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. So you don’t think we should then worry 

about the cement at the deeper water? 

Mr. PROBERT. That is not what I said. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. And I do agree with you on one point. The 

point I agree with you on is there are very few accidents, and that’s 

the good news. But the bad news is that if there is an accident in 

this case, if there is faulty cement, if there are other problems, 

then the results of that are catastrophic. Would you not agree with 

that? Yes or no? 

Mr. PROBERT. To the extent that cementing was an issue, if 

you’re referring to this particular incident—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Would you agree that if there is a leak, that the 

catastrophic results are such that even though there are very few 

accidents, we should try to avoid those, yes or no? 

Mr. PROBERT. I do not agree with your assertion, no. 

Ms. DEGETTE. You don’t agree with that. OK. 

So it’s a risk that we should be willing to take? 

Mr. PROBERT. I’m sorry that I’m not getting—you’ll have to restate your question. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Well, let me move on then. 

You said that both positive and negative pressure tests were conducted on the cementing job in your testimony. Several experts 

have stated that a cement bond log test might have additional indicated additional weaknesses such as that the cement had not hardened properly. So I want to ask you, was a cement bond log test 

conducted at this well, yes or no? 

Mr. PROBERT. To the best of my knowledge, the—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes or no? 

Mr. PROBERT. Well, to the best of my knowledge, the well owner 

did not request a cement bond log. 


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Ms. DEGETTE. No. Is it true that a cement bond log would provide assurance of the integrity of the cement bond? 

Mr. PROBERT. The cement bond log is certainly the only realistic 

way of assessing the bond of—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. So that answer would be yes, correct? 

Mr. PROBERT. Correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. McKay, is it BP’s standard practice to only 

use basic pressure tests to evaluate a cement job? 

Mr. MCKAY. I can’t speak directly to this particular well, but 

what I can say is cement bond—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. I didn’t ask you, I asked you your standard practice. Is it BP’s standard practice to only use basic pressure tests to 

evaluate a cement job? 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe every well is engineered individually, so I 

can’t answer a standard practice for this type of well. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So your answer is you don’t know? 

Mr. MCKAY. Can I check with my technical expert? 

Ms. DEGETTE. Absolutely. And Mr. Chairman, if he could supplement his answer, I would appreciate that. 

Mr. MCKAY. Cement bond logs are not required on every well. 

They are utilized when there is an indication of a problem. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Why did BP not pay for a bond log test on this 

well? 

Mr. MCKAY. Because the better way to test are positive and negative tests. A bond log is an inference of bond, not an actual test 

of bond. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Ms. DeGette. 

Ms. Sutton for questions, please. 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a lot of questions, 

so please stick to the question, and if you don’t know the answer, 

just say I don’t know and we’ll move on. 

What was BP’s operating budget in 2009? 

Mr. MCKAY. Operating budget where, worldwide? 

Ms. SUTTON. Sure, worldwide. 

Mr. MCKAY. We spent about $20 billion in investment capital. 

Ms. SUTTON. And what percentage of that 2009 budget was devoted to safety and preventative measures related to deepwater 

spills, do you know? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. How much does BP invest in research and development in the management of deepwater spills; do you know 

that? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t have a number. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. How many deepwater wells does BP operate in 

the Gulf? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know the number of wells, but quite a few. 

Ms. SUTTON. Well, quite a few is a very vague term. Can you 

give us any indication? 

Mr. MCKAY. Can I give you an indication? There’s been several 

thousand deepwater wells drilled in the world, and we’ve been in 

about 30 percent of them. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. And how many on the Outer Continental Shelf, 

do you have a better idea there? 


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Mr. MCKAY. We are only in the deep water on the Outer Continental Shelf. 

Ms. SUTTON. How many of those deepwater wells are operated by 

platforms leased from Transocean? 

Mr. MCKAY. Currently, we have three Transocean rigs working. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. What actions have been taken currently to ensure that this is not a systematic failure in regard to the operations 

of the platforms in a similar situation? 

Mr. MCKAY. What we’ve done, as I said earlier, we’ve instituted 

some tests, incremental tests on blowout preventers, and we’ve 

asked for any modifications that may have been made in the history or the problem of the blowout preventer? 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. So testing and asking about modifications, 

that’s the sum total. 

OK. What is your spill response capability right now on the 

Outer Continental Shelf? I know we heard a little bit of discussion 

about this, but—— 

Mr. MCKAY. We have 300 skimmers and other professional vessels first response to operating. We have 1 million feet of boom deployed. We have 2.4 million being staged or accessed around the 

coast. And we have a supply chain being ramped up to be able to 

sustainably supply 200,000 to 300,000 feet a week. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. What blowout safety devices do you have on 

the oil rigs in the North Sea? 

Mr. MCKAY. I have not worked in North Sea in a long time, but 

similar blowout preventers for the water depth condition and the 

reservoir conditions that are utilized in the North Sea. 

Ms. SUTTON. Well, when you say similar, that’s different than 

the way I understand it, so I’d like a little clarification because my 

question would be, why don’t we use the same thing in the Gulf? 

So clarify that for me. 

And what is your contingency plan for these wells in the depth 

of the water if the depth of the water causes a question of how to 

stop the leak? What is the contingency plan? We have heard a lot 

about things we are trying now, but what is the contingency plan? 

Mr. MCKAY. We have a spill response plan that’s filed with the 

government and it sits underneath the national contingency plan 

and the one gulf plan. That indicates the equipment that’s around 

the Gulf Coast to be utilized and new priorities, and the organizational structure to utilize. That has formed the foundation of this, 

and it was approved last June, 2009. 

Ms. SUTTON. Will BP now keep Koffer Dams on the coasts of all 

their platforms to increase the response time in the face of such a 

disaster? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think as we learn the lessons from this, I do think 

there will be subsea intervention capability that will need to be 

looked at for the industry as well as ourselves, yes. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. Mr. McKay, BP has stated—and I think you 

did hear today—that you will pay for all legitimate claims resulting 

from the spill. What does BP define as a legitimate claim? 

Mr. MCKAY. We have been very clear that we will pay for all legitimate claims. And legitimate claims are folks who are impacted 

or business that are impacted and there is a substantiation of impact. And that is a legitimate claim. 


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Ms. SUTTON. So does that include the loss of profits for fishing 

and tourism? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Ms. SUTTON. And will BP commit to exempting itself from any 

cap and their financial responsibility for damages resulting from 

this spill? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes, we’ve talked. No cap. 

Ms. SUTTON. BP has stated that they are very positive that the 

relief wells will work. Do you concur, that’s what they said? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes, we’re confident that they will work. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. How many attempts did it take for the relief 

wells drilled in the Montara spill to work? 

Mr. MCKAY. I am not familiar with the details of that. I’ve heard 

multiple relief wells. 

Ms. SUTTON. Four, I believe. Does BP expect to have the same 

difficulty and delays in drilling the relief well for a far deeper well? 

You can understand why I ask the question. 

Mr. MCKAY. We do not expect that, but we have the capacity to 

sidetrack these wells. They are set up to be able to have multiple 

attempts. 

Ms. SUTTON. And as I said, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot more 

questions for the rest of our presenters and I will hold them for the 

second round. 

Mr. STUPAK. Very good. We will be going a second round. 

Ms. Schakowsky for questions, please. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Time was a critical element in this disaster. 

It’s possible that a rapid response on the deck of the rig could have 

prevented the catastrophe that continues today and a faster response by BP and Transocean might have reduced the size of the 

leak or cut it off faster. 

We learned during the course of our investigation that, again, 

the critical modifications—we’ve talked about modifications—to the 

blowout preventer may have delayed significantly the response and 

might have been responsible for the failure of the device. 

Mr. McKay, your company documents describe modifications that 

were made to the blowout preventer device. We were told by James 

Dupree, who runs your Gulf of Mexico operations, that you found 

major modifications to the system, in one case, a module that was 

supposed to be connected to a critical piece of equipment called a 

bore ram—that is designed to seal tight any piece of pipe in the 

well—was instead connected to a test ram that does not function 

in an emergency situation. 

Do you agree with that finding? 

Mr. MCKAY. I was not in that review, but I know that’s what Mr. 

Dupree said, and he should know, yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So, yes? 

In another case, two independent controls for rams were wired 

into a single control, possibly increasing the risk of failure. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. If that’s what Mr. Dupree said, that’s what he discovered with Transocean and Cameron and other folks in the intervention. 


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Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. My understanding is that because of these 

modifications, you lost nearly 24 hours attempting to activate the 

controls on the bore ram; is that correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. We discovered leaks and other things, the modifications that didn’t match the drawings, as we were doing these interventions and it did delay things, yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So a useless test ram—I am quoting now from 

the chairman—not the variable bore ram had been connected to the 

socket that was supposed to activate the variable bore ram. So this 

was a useful test ram that you spent 24 hours trying to get at, 

right? 

Mr. MCKAY. If that’s what Mr. Dupree said. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So my understanding that this time is essential in an emergency response like this, when oil and gas are surging through the blowout preventer, it acts like a sandblaster I’m 

told, and can degrade the rubber seals on the bore ram. If you can’t 

activate it quickly, the seals may not function properly; is that correct? And could this delay have an impact on the response? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think that is a question for Mr. Moore or Mr. Newman. I don’t know. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Moore, you made the blowout preventer. 

Is it true? 

Mr. MOORE. Correct. Depending on what’s flowing through that 

well, it could have abrasive materials that could take the elastomer 

elements and destroy them. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So a 24-hour delay allowing the sand and stuff 

to come out could do that? 

Mr. MOORE. Depending on what’s in it. I’m not aware of what 

materials are in the flow area, so it would depend on what’s in it. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But it could. 

Mr. MOORE. It could. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So Mr. Newman, no one on this panel has actually owned up to making mistakes during this hearing, but the 

failure to connect the bore ram to the control module, that seems 

like a mistake to me. Do you agree that this was a mistake, and 

that you are concerned about possible implications of the mistake 

on the response? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If I could clarify your question, Congresswoman. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I think it was a pretty clear question. Is this 

a mistake that was made that the bore ram was not connected to 

the control module; is that a mistake? 

Mr. NEWMAN. In the original configuration, when the BOP system was delivered from Cameron, the ROV port was connected to 

the lower-most ram cavity. It is, today, connected to the lower-most 

ram cavity. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Was it a mistake that it was connected to a 

useless—in this case, useless test ram in terms of preventing the 

disaster? This is a very simple question. Someone clearly made a 

mistake. Was this a mistake? 

Mr. NEWMAN. In the event that the ROV port is connected to the 

lower-most ram cavity and the lower-most ram cavity is outfitted 

with a BOP test ram, that will not serve to restrict or seal off the 

flow of hydrocarbons from the well. 


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Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So in that case, having it connected to that, 

would that be a mistake? 

Mr. NEWMAN. It would be a mistake to rely on that in a well controlled situation, yes. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

So I have very serious concerns about the modifications that 

were made. Transocean has made modifications to the blowout preventer and could not provide BP with accurate specifications when 

it matters most. We don’t know yet if these modifications actually 

caused the failure, but what we do know is that they caused delays 

in trying stop the oil spill and identify its cause, which is very, very 

serious. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes questions of all the members of the 

subcommittee. There are members of the full committee who have 

been here and we appreciate them being here throughout this hearing. We will turn to them for questions before we start round two. 

We do plan on doing round two of questions. 

Mr. Scalise for questions, please, 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Ranking 

Member Burgess, for allowing me to ask questions to the panel. 

We, of course, all in south Louisiana are fighting every day to not 

only do what we can to urge and push BP and all the parties involved to stop this oil from leaking into the Gulf of Mexico, but also 

to prevent it from coming into our marshlands and our seafood 

beds that are such a vital part of Louisiana’s culture. And clearly, 

as we look at all of the things that are involved in the working 

coast that the Gulf of Mexico and south Louisiana is, it’s not just 

an area where 80 percent of all the continental drilling and exploration is done for the United States, but it’s also an area where 

many people make their livelihoods in the seafood industry, and 

that’s all at risk right now. 

And it’s another reason that it really underscores why those of 

us in south Louisiana have been pushing to get our fair share of 

royalties. We don’t get that same share of royalties for the drilling 

that’s done off of our coast as every other state gets, and this is 

a glaring example of why it’s so critical that we do get to finally 

participate in the revenue sharing and not wait until 2017, but do 

that immediately because this has an impact on our livelihood. 

I have a number of questions for the panel that I am going to 

get into. I also have a number of questions for MMS, which I wish 

we had the opportunity to ask as well. We had a closed hearing 

where they were asked some questions, but unfortunately they’ve 

never participated in any public hearing. I’ve asked them for a 

number of documents that they’ve yet to get me on exemptions that 

have been granted on various processes related to the Horizon, as 

well as other exemptions that they’ve given in the past. 

But let me ask you, Mr. McKay, can you tell me how many exemptions were requested for all the activities related to this well 

and how many were granted by MMS? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not sure I know what you mean by exemptions. 

Mr. SCALISE. Exemptions to various processes. It’s my understanding that you were given exemptions on environmental impact 

studies. 


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Mr. MCKAY. Can I explain that real quick? The categorical exclusion that’s talked about is because environmental impact statements have already been done. They’re done with the lease sale by 

the government. 

Mr. SCALISE. So did you not get an exemption on that? 

Mr. MCKAY. You file for a categorical exclusion because those environmental assessments have been done, yes, and we did—— 

Mr. SCALISE. So you did file for that and you were granted that 

by MMS? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. Were there any other exclusions or exemptions 

that you filed through MMS for this particular well? 

Mr. MCKAY. Not that I know of, but I may not know of everything. 

Mr. SCALISE. And as you find out any of them, please get those 

to me. I have asked that same information from MMS, I have yet 

to receive it. So hopefully they will be forthcoming in that as well. 

Mr. Moore, the BOP, that is so in question here, there have been 

a number of studies done. I’ve got a study that goes back to 1999 

that was performed for MMS. There is another study in 2004 that 

was done for MMS that describe various problems with blowout 

preventers, not just in the Outer Continental Shelf, but also looking at other places around the world where they are used in deep 

water. Are you familiar, first of all, with these studies? 

Mr. MOORE. Our teams are familiar with those studies, yes. 

Mr. SCALISE. Have you all made any changes in the design of the 

blowout preventer over the years as these deficiencies have been 

identified? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, most of those reports cover the results of testing in the field, which is very regimented, and its component failures that would result from—it could be maintenance, it could be 

just the life of—you’ve got a blowout preventer that has over 

100,000 moving parts. They do, from time to time, have to be serviced and replaced. So that’s what those testing of components—— 

Mr. SCALISE. Serviced and replaced, but in terms of design—and 

let me read you one section. This is the 1999 study on page 13. It 

said, ‘‘It was decided not to pull the BOP to repair the failure after 

MMS had granted a waiver. The failures in question were typically 

failures in components that were backed up by another component 

in the BOP stack.’’ 

So what it seems to indicate is, because there are multiple redundant systems, if they found a problem in the BOP they would 

just say, well, there’s other redundancies, so don’t worry about that 

problem because something else will catch it. That doesn’t seem to 

me to be a good process to handle a problem with a BOP, if you’ve 

got five redundant systems and one of them fails to say, well, we’ve 

got four others. It seems to me you would go and fix that problem. 

Mr. MOORE. Well, I think those problems are repaired when the 

stacks are put back to surface if it’s a deepwater stack. 

Mr. SCALISE. It didn’t seem to be the case in this one, but I’ll 

move on to my next question. 

I will move on to—whether it’s Mr. Newman or McKay. How 

many times were operations shut down on the BP Horizon, the 

drilling that was done on the Horizon in relation to this well? Do 


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you know how many times operations were shut down because of 

various problems? I will start with Mr. Newman and then ask Mr. 

McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. Ever? 

Mr. NEWMAN. During the life of the Mississippi Canyon 252 well, 

I don’t have a record of how many times operations were suspended. 

Mr. SCALISE. Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m sorry, I don’t know. 

Mr. SCALISE. Well, let me ask you about a few specific problems. 

There was a story in The Times Picayune, New Orleans newspaper, yesterday that goes into detail, they actually started interviewing some of the people that were working on the well, talked 

about problems that go back to weeks prior to the explosion. They 

said, A constant theme is that gas kicks were more frequent in this 

oil field than others that the crews had worked on and members 

were concerned. ‘‘One gas kick that occurred as they got down towards the bottom of the hole approximately 10,000 feet below the 

floor had such a large kick that they had to shut down operations. 

They were concerned about spark sources on the rig at the surface, 

so they had to shut it down because there was so much gas coming 

out of the rig and they were afraid of the explosion. 

Now, are you familiar—that was, according to this report, a few 

weeks prior to—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Scalise, this will have to be your last question. 

Mr. SCALISE. Do you know about that shutdown, and can you 

give me a list of all of times that this rig was shut down due to 

various problems prior to the explosion? 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. We will look forward to information at a later time. 

And you may want to put that in writing because we will have 10 

days after this hearing to submit further questions in writing. 

Now a member of subcommittee, Mr. Green, for questions, 5 minutes, please. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Newman, it has recently been reported that some of the 

Transocean workers that were rescued from the drilling platform 

were told to sign statements denying they were hurt or witnessed 

the blast before they were allowed to contact their families and 

leave and literally were just rescued. Additionally, in Mr. McKay’s 

testimony, he mentions how BP is speaking to those witnesses saying they have ‘‘access to.’’ Can you comment on the statements that 

these employees were forced to take and is there a copy we could 

see? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We absolutely will provide the copy of the statements. And I can categorically deny that they were forced to sign. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, we’re just going by press reports, that’s why 

you all are here today. And believe me, we know sometimes it’s not 

always accurate. 

Will Transocean make all these workers that were on the rig at 

the time of the explosion fully available to investigators? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Congressman, we want to understand what happened just as badly as Congress does, and we will make anything 

available that will help in understanding what happened. 


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Mr. GREEN. OK, I appreciate that. 

Mr. Newman, Halliburton maintains that their sea personnel 

were instructed to record the drill pipe pressure test, but that the 

drilling operator told them that the negative pressure test had already been completed and they were put on standby. The drilling 

contractor then proceeded to displace the riser with seawater. Is it 

common for the drilling contractor to perform the duties of the subcontractor, and why did it happen in this case? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I don’t believe that the drilling contractor in this 

case, Transocean, performed the duties of any other subcontractor. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Mr. McKay, in your testimony, you acknowledge 

that BP, as one of the leaseholders and the operator of the exploration well, has acknowledged its responsible and will clean up and 

will pay all legitimate claims. And I know just from experience, nobody can afford to drill those wells without partners. There has 

been a report in the press that other minority leaseholders 

Anadarko and Mitsui oil exploration; is that correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Mr. Probert, you said that contrary to early reports, the final cement plug in the well was not set and the plug 

would have been the final barrier before the well would have been 

temporarily suspended; is that correct? 

Mr. PROBERT. That’s correct. It would have been necessary to set 

that plug before the blowout preventer could have been removed 

and the well secured. 

Mr. GREEN. And you said that the Deepwater Horizon rig met or 

exceeded the number of safety devices required by the Federal Government, including an independent method of making the blowout 

preventer function correct. Is that correct? The method of making 

the blowout preventer function. 

Mr. PROBERT. I think that may be best directed at Mr. Newman. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Mr. Newman. 

Mr. NEWMAN. The blowout preventer and the BOP control system on the Deepwater Horizon were fitted with a number of methods of activating the BOP. Manual activation from the rig, and 

where the regulations required two independent stations, Horizon 

was actually fitted with three independent stations. In addition, to 

manual activation, the blowout preventer control system on the Horizon was fitted with two automatic response systems, one of which 

the industry refers to as a dead man, and the other one is referred 

to as an auto share. Those are two systems under certain conditions the BOP will automatically respond. And the BOP was also 

fitted with ROV intervention, remote operated vehicle intervention. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. And I understand there are lots of 

redundancies. Also, the benefit of representing east Harris County, 

I have lots of unofficial consultants who are chemical engineers, 

and there are lots of redundancies built in. And you confirmed that 

the blowout preventer device, that it was supposed to shut off the 

oil flow on the ocean floor, but it did fail. 

Mr. NEWMAN. It has not been effective in shutting off the flow. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Thank you. 

And then you go on in your testimony to say that there’s no reason to believe that the blowout preventer wouldn’t work, and there 


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might have been clog by debris shooting up from the well; is that 

correct? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I believe that’s a possibility that needs to be investigated. 

Mr. GREEN. Now I understand your argument that the well has 

been sealed with casing and cement, and within a few days the 

blowout protection would have been removed. And according to you 

at that point, the well barriers, the cement and casing were responsible for controlling any pressure from the reservoir, so the BOP’s 

failure could not be held responsible; is that a statement you made? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The ineffectiveness of the BOP to control the flow 

was not the root cause of the event. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. So the cement plug would have to be set before 

the blowout prevention could be removed. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Setting a cement plug is a normal process of abandoning the well. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. And I know it’s too soon to know exactly what 

happened with the blowout prevention, but there are lots of 

redundancies. And again, this is not the first well we’ve drilled in 

deep water in the Gulf of Mexico. And some folks I know in the 

industry maintain that even with the debris, the blowout protection 

should have still worked, after all, it’s a secondary means of controlling pressure if it the drilling mud is inadequate. Is that generally correct, it should have worked, the blowout preventer? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Provided that the BOP was asked to function within its designed specifications, there is no reason to believe that it 

would not have worked within its design specifications. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. Mr. Cameron, would you like to comment? 

Mr. MOORE. I would agree with his comments. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Mr. Newman and Mr. McKay, Mr. Scalise had asked a question, 

the minority would like to see if you guys can answer it. 

His last question was, 6 weeks ago, according to The Times Picayune newspaper, that 6 weeks ago there was a gas kick and the 

operations were shut down. Do you have any information on that 

shutdown when you had the gas kick about six weeks ago? 

Is that a fair assessment of your question? 

Mr. McKay, do you have any information on that? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not aware of that, but we will get the data to 

the committee. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Newman? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’m not familiar with the specific circumstances of 

that particular incident. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Then I would next turn to Mr. Stearns for 

questions as a member of the full committee, 5 minutes, please. 

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing 

me to participate even though I’m not on the subcommittee. 

Mr. McKay, I’m just going to ask you a basic question. I was 

down there and we saw that the Sombrero did not work and we 

saw that you started the slant drilling. Here is a basic question; 

when will you cap that well? What is your best guess? 


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Mr. MCKAY. We have multiple efforts underway. I can’t give you 

a deterministic—we have multiple efforts that we are working simultaneously. 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, are you going to cap in it in 90 days? Yes 

or no? 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe the relief well will be down in roughly 90 

days. 

Mr. STEARNS. So you think you’ll cap it in 90 days with the slant 

drilling? 

Mr. MCKAY. With the relief wells, or sooner with other methods. 

Mr. STEARNS. What other methods? 

Mr. MCKAY. We’re still working on the blowout preventer itself 

and trying to do a top skill, which could be successful. But we are 

also trying to get a containment system subsea—— 

Mr. STEARNS. So your best guess is within 90 days that you will 

close this rig of the evacuation of all the gasoline; that’s your best 

guess. 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe that or better. 

Mr. STEARNS. Now you’re in a room all alone, just you and the 

Governor of Florida, and he asks you this question, he says, when 

is your best estimate of when it will hit the Florida coast, what 

would you say? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t have any estimates of it hitting the Florida 

coast. I don’t know. 

Mr. STEARNS. Do you think it will ever hit the Florida coast in 

these 90 days that you predict that they will be closing the oil? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t have a way of predicting that. All I can say 

is that we’re trying get a containment system in so that that oil 

is collected before—— 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, let’s take a worst case scenario. As I understand, the wind doesn’t have an impact, it’s basically the current. 

Is there a worst case scenario where it could hit the Florida coast? 

Mr. MCKAY. That is a possibility. That’s why we are organizing 

to be able to do it—— 

Mr. STEARNS. Let’s say it’s a possibility. If you had to be a betting man, would you say it would hit the Florida coast in 90 days? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not speculating on that. We’re doing everything 

we can to make sure it doesn’t. 

Mr. STEARNS. A constituent sent me a little video, it showed a 

large basin of water, and they poured oil into it. They took blue 

hay and other types of hay and they dropped it into it, and in about 

11⁄2 minutes it absorbed all of the oil in the basin of water. 

What is the possibility—can you drop hay in the area, they take 

the hay out, and then it becomes fuel. Why couldn’t you have just 

dropped something to absorb all that oil instantly to give you more 

time to make decisions? Have you ever thought of that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. Some of that absorbent-type material will be 

used in the near shore and the beach area. 

Mr. STEARNS. Yes, but you could have dropped it right on the 

site, then take barges out, pick it all up, it absorbs all the oil off 

the top, and then you could have made the oil into things that you 

could actually burn. Had that ever occurred to you folks? 


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Mr. MCKAY. We are in the Unified Area Command with the 

Coast Guard, and I don’t believe that is as scalable as it needs to 

be for the farthest offshore. 

Mr. STEARNS. If it was a good idea, do you need the Federal Government to approve it or can you do it on your own? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, we work together with the Federal Government under the Unified Area Command and every decision is authorized by the Unified Area Command. 

Mr. STEARNS. In tab 11 of page 7–1, in its application to explore 

to site, BP—do you want to get that tab, or do you just want me 

to read it to you? It reports it has the capability to respond to spills 

of 300,000 barrels per day. This is you folks telling us that you 

have the capability to respond adequately to spills of 300,000 barrels a day. It’s on page 7–1, section 7.0. This is our oil spill information graph worse case scenario—this is you talking, worse case 

scenario—and you say volumes uncontrolled blowout per day, 

300,000 barrels per day. Is that correct, the information in here? 

Do you still stand by? 

Mr. MCKAY. I see that. 

Mr. STEARNS. OK. What is the current spill per day today? 

Mr. MCKAY. The current estimate is 5,000 barrels a day. 

Mr. STEARNS. So basically that’s 60 times less than you say the 

worse case scenario that you can adequately respond to; is that correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. That is the math, yes. 

Mr. STEARNS. So, why are you having so much trouble responding to this when even by your own literature, you’re saying you 

could handle up to 300,000 barrels a day, you have something that 

is 60 times less, and yet this thing is starting to hit the Chandelier 

coast in Louisiana, with a possibility it might even be hitting Alabama and possibly going to Florida. So why can’t you have an adequate response even when your worse case scenario says you can 

handle up to 300,000 barrels per day? 

Mr. MCKAY. This particular incident is very difficult because 

we’ve got a—— 

Mr. STEARNS. This says worst case scenario, these are your 

words. 

Mr. MCKAY. The mechanical configuration of this is very difficult. And the relief efforts that we’re doing include three drilling 

rigs that are working simultaneously to try to contain and stop 

this. 

Mr. STEARNS. So you’re saying today’s situation is more than a 

worst case scenario that you outlined in your report to us? 

Mr. MCKAY. No, I’m not saying that. 

Mr. STEARNS. Well, you see why I am puzzled why you folks are 

sitting here saying you don’t have control when your worst case 

scenario said you can handle 300,000 barrels a day. 

Mr. BARTON. Would the gentleman yield for a clarification? 

Mr. STEARNS. Yes. 

Mr. BARTON. Is the reason you think you can handle a 300,000 

barrel a day worst case because the assumption is the blowout prevention actually works? 

Mr. MCKAY. It’s part of the assumption in dealing with this. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Stearns. 


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Mr. STEARNS. I appreciate the Chairman. The only thing I would 

conclude is that I assume in the worst case scenario that that 

would be part of the worst case scenario. So that’s the only concern 

I have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BRALEY [presiding]. The chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Vermont for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we all know, we were told that what could never happen did 

happen. We were told that if the unimaginable happened, we had 

a fail-safe mechanism that would make certain there would be no 

harm. And of course, the tragedy is that these assurances proved 

wrong. And we are learning one of the reasons that they are wrong, 

drillers have been relying on the device known as the blowout preventer. And in theory, it’s designed to shear off the pipe and completely close the well, as you all well know, in the event of a catastrophe like Deepwater Horizon. 

Mr. McKay, I want to quote from your testimony. You say, and 

I quote, ‘‘The blowout preventer was to be fail-safe in case of an 

accident.’’ Is that correct, you were counting on that blowout preventer as the last line of defense? 

Mr. MCKAY. That is considered the last line of defense, yes. 

Mr. WELCH. OK. I want to ask you about that and the basis for 

that reliance. 

As you know, we received a document that was part of our investigation called the Blowout Preventer Assurance Analysis. This is 

something that you had, BP had. It was commissioned in March of 

2001. The risk assessment of the blowout preventer of the Horizon 

rig identifies 260 different failure modes. In this it says, Specifically includes over 20 that pose high or very high risk on the BOP. 

It describes the potential failure of the blowout preventer to 

unlatch from the rise, the failure of rams to close, the failure to 

shear pipe as examples of the many possible, quote, high consequence failures of the blowout preventer. And these are exactly 

the type of problems that led to the uncontrolled leak in the Deepwater Horizon. 

So the question I have is, if BP had a report that it commissioned for review of the safety mechanism of the blowout preventer 

and it contains 260 failure modes, under what construction of the 

English language is a device with 260 failure modes fail-safe? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m sorry, I’m not familiar with that report. Is that 

a BP requested report? 

Mr. WELCH. It’s an RB Falcon Deepwater Horizon BOP Assurance Report that’s dated March, 2001. It literally lays out failure 

modes. 

Mr. MCKAY. That may be a Transocean report. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, we’ll get that to you because what it does specifically outline are anticipated problems with the blowout preventer. 

Mr. WELCH. We also learned about our critical problems with the 

blowout preventers. One problem is we understand they can’t cut 

joints in the drill pipe and, as I understand it, those are referred 

to as tool joints. 


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Mr. Moore, you made this blowout preventer. And let me ask is 

it correct that it was not designed to cut joints in the drill pipe? 

Mr. MOORE. No, it is not. 

Mr. WELCH. So this is not a minor risk, because we’ve been told 

that the pipe joints can take up to about 10 percent of the pipe’s 

length. Does that sound about right to you? 

Mr. MOORE. That’s correct. 

Mr. WELCH. So basically we have got a blowout preventer that 

won’t work on 10 percent of the mechanism it’s supposed to operate 

on. 

There were multiple failures that led to the disaster in the Gulf, 

and one of the most critical, obviously, was that the blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon just didn’t work, and BP and 

Transocean were relying on the device as if it was the ultimate 

failsafe even though there was a report in March of 2001 outlining 

260 separate failure modes. And obviously we are all now left, most 

importantly the folks who live in the Gulf region, to deal forever 

with the consequences of this catastrophe. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BRALEY. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Melancon, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MELANCON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to ask some questions. 

First, let me start by saying my condolences to the families of the 

11 victims. We are all regretful of such an incident. On the lighter 

side, Mr. Moore, I understand your son Daniel is engaged and I understand his friends are even accepting and saying he got a good 

catch. So being a father-in-law a good catch is a great phenomenon 

even during these troubled times. 

I have been a pro oil and gas person here, and I want to thank 

my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that have refrained from 

saying ‘‘I told you so’’ because I have been a defender of offshore 

drilling. I think the record for shallow water offshore drilling 

speaks for itself. I think it’s very good, it’s very reliable. I think 

this accident demonstrates that maybe our government and former 

minerals management, in working with the industry, that we have 

to figure out what do we need to do to do this better because I can’t 

in all good, with a good heart, encourage the continuation of deepwater until I know that all safety precautions are there, that all 

backup systems are there, that all systems will work under the 

conditions, whether it’s depth, temperature, or whatever. 

So moving forward, I guess one of the questions I have got is, 

when you went to apply for the Deepwater Horizon and you received a categorical exclusion from the NEEP in 2009, what is the 

process by which you secured this exclusion? In retrospect, should 

we have looked at it even more? Was this an exclusion that as companies you knew you always had that option, even though the law 

said, didn’t say exclusions were viable or acceptable? Was it a commonplace thing? 

I think that would be more for Mr. McKay and Mr. Newman. 

Mr. MCKAY. To the categorical exclusion that relies on the environmental impact statements that the MMS and the government 

has done for the lease sale itself and smaller areas within that 

lease sale, an environmental assessment is done specifically for 


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those areas by the government, and the industry generally uses 

those environmental assessments in their permit and files an environmental statement with those. So it’s used, it’s common, yes. 

Mr. MELANCON. Is that where as I understand it the comment 

came that we are 50 miles off, we will have no impact, because as 

you know my concern is the estuaries and the marshlands of south 

Louisiana that I grew up hunting and fishing in, and while my 

heart is heavy, I know those folks that make their living and actually live in those marshes, the frustration, the helplessness that 

they are feeling. So should that have been, in good conscious, something that, is that a negotiated thing between the companies and 

MMS? 

Mr. MCKAY. No. It’s not negotiated. I think through all of this 

we are going to learn a lot and need to look at the qualifications 

and the regulations and the permits that are required to do work. 

I will acknowledge that. This is not something that is unusual. It’s 

utilizing environmental assessments that have been done, and it’s 

in a conventional sense. Conventional sense may not be right, unfortunately. 

Mr. MELANCON. As I said, I guess at the depth, and we have got 

a whole new animal we are dealing with and we need to do to 

know what it is and better. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess my question to the chair would be is there 

some method—my concern right now, especially after what happened in Colorado I think a year or so ago, brought to light with 

MMS some ability for the committee to get an independent auditor, 

investigator, inspector general or something to look into how we do 

this and to make some recommendations so that this never happens again to anyone in this country, much less this world. We are 

the United States, and I would have thought if this was going to 

happen it would have been in maybe a South African continent or 

some third world country that just looked the other way or said, 

if there is still such a thing, and I’m sure there is, as kickbacks 

but that would have happened there and not here in the United 

States. And of course having come through Katrina, Rita, Gustav, 

Ike and now Horizon, it’s just I guess the anxiety is building on 

south Louisiana as though there is a bull’s eye on us. 

And I’m running out of time. I have one other quick question but 

thank you very much I turn back my time. 

Mr. STUPAK [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Melancon. This is the 

first of many hearings we will have on this issue and all avenues 

will be explored. 

Mrs. Blackburn, 5 minutes for questions, please, member of the 

subcommittee. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

that. 

And Mr. McKay, I wanted to talk with you on a couple of things. 

One, people that have come down from the Federal Government, do 

they have an understanding of offshore drilling? Do they have any 

real world experience in that that has proven helpful or have you 

had to kind of give them a tutorial or an understanding of that 

process? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, I think it’s in different categories for different 

folks. A lot of people are learning a lot about the oil business and 


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the technology and issues that are being dealt with. Coast Guard, 

obviously we drill with the Coast Guard. They have been involved 

in lots of things in the Gulf Coast around the oil business for many, 

many years, so they are very familiar with what they are doing. 

Other government agencies, the MMS, are very familiar with what 

we’re doing obviously. Other government agencies are learning to 

be honest, learning and understanding and trying to help. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I also want to ask you very quickly because we 

have limited time, and if you want to do some of this and submit 

it in writing, that’s fine, your protocol for capping a well, if you can 

just step through that and was that protocol explicitly followed in 

this case? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think we will need to get back to you as part of 

the investigation, what was the procedure, how valid was it, would 

it have worked, the design, et cetera, then was it followed correctly 

and then what decisions were made critically between when some 

of the signals were that we may be in a well control event. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. And then on the controlled burns. I know you 

started some of the controlled burns and there were some days the 

weather wasn’t good. How much did you—how many days did you 

use the controlled burns? If you eliminated those, why did you 

make that decision? 

Mr. MCKAY. It’s weather dependent, and it’s been used when the 

weather permits, and we think it’s a very valid tool, and we are 

trying to use it when we can but we have not had the weather 

available to use it as much as we would like. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. OK. And let’s see, Mr. Moore, the BOP system 

that you discussed, what is the best secondary BOP system? You 

talked a little bit about what you had developed, then what is the 

best secondary system? How often is it used? Is there anything else 

for a well that has a history of producing a lot of gas, like it’s my 

understanding that this one did. And what is the best secondary 

or alternative plan for that? 

Mr. MOORE. Other than using a BOP? 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Yes. 

Mr. MOORE. I know of no other one. There are several ways to 

control a well obviously when it’s being drilled through various 

processes. Mud is obviously the biggest one. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So what you’re saying is what was being used 

is considered the best and the only way to address this? 

Mr. MOORE. I think there are numbers of ways to control the 

flow of a well when you’re drilling it. As I said mud systems are 

the most, I think most common. BOPs are put in a situation where 

they must close on a flowing well when certain controls are lost. 

And provided they are maintained, provided that they are activated, and provided there is nothing put into the flow path that it 

can’t close on, they are pretty reliable, very reliable. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. And Mr. Newman, I had one question for you. 

When the explosion first occurred, were your SWAT teams notified 

and how quickly were they on the scene? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If I could just clarify for the Congresswoman what 

a SWAT team is. This is a team that we use when the BOP is on 

surface, on the rig, in between wells, and they are there to provide 

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ducting the thorough program of between wells maintenance that 

is performed on the BOP. So in this particular situation where the 

BOP remains on bottom, the SWAT team, in terms of providing actual onsite expertise, what they have done is mobilized to the offshore operations. So they are providing support and guidance to 

the remote operated vehicle operators as they continue to attempt 

to manipulate and intervene on the BOP. 

We have members of that same expertise or function providing 

support to BP in their WestLake facility in Houston and similarly 

in our own continuing crisis response team in our offices in Houston. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So as soon as word came to you that there was 

a need, you all were in action? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Absolutely. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, sir. I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Dingell for questions, please, member of the 

subcommittee. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Mr. McKay, how much 

has BP spent on the response so far? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t have an accurate number. 

Mr. DINGELL. Would you submit that for the record? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. How much do you anticipate that BP will spend before this matter is over? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. DINGELL. This is a question for all witnesses. 

Was the blowout preventer modified in any way, yes or no? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The blowout preventer has been modified since it 

was delivered from Cameron in 2001. 

Mr. DINGELL. You say it was to be specific for the particular installation? Is that what you’re telling me? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The blowout preventer was modified. It was modified in 2005 as a result of an agreement between Transocean and 

BP. It was modified at BP’s request and at BP’s expense. 

Mr. DINGELL. Why was it modified? And how was it modified? 

You and Mr. McKay will be wanting to answer that question. 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not sure of the details of that modification. I 

think the investigation should look into that as well as whether 

there were any other modifications made other than that. 

Mr. DINGELL. Were the modifications entirely in accord with the 

manufacturer’s instructions or were they at variance with the manufacturer’s instructions? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. DINGELL. Sir, do you know? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The modifications to the Cameron BOP that were 

performed in 2005 utilized Cameron equipment. They were done 

under the direction of BP and in coordination with oversight from 

the MMS. 

Mr. DINGELL. This is for all witnesses, yes or no, were there 

shear rams installed, and were they tested to ensure functionalities 

at the depths of this particular well? Yes or no. 

Mr. NEWMAN. The BOP is outfitted with two sets of shear rams, 

one of which is referred to as a super shear ram, and the other is 

referred to as a blind shear ram. 


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Mr. DINGELL. Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. DINGELL. Next witness, sir, please? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. Mr. Newman is correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. Did the Deepwater have a backup remote trigger 

to activate the blowout preventer? Yes or no. 

Mr. NEWMAN. The answer to that question, Congressman, is yes. 

The BOP system on the Deepwater Horizon was fitted with two 

automatic backup response systems, one of which the industry refers to as a deadman and the other one the industry refers to as 

an auto shear. Both of those systems were fitted on the Deepwater 

Horizon’s BOP control system. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. Do the other witnesses agree with that 

statement? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, Mr. McKay and Mr. Probert, was the cement 

used in this case the same chemical makeup as the cement used 

by Halliburton for other wells? Yes or no. 

Mr. PROBERT. Yes, this type of cement had been used in approximately 100 applications in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. McKay? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. DINGELL. For all witnesses, were the survivors of the explosions asked to sign medical or legal liability waivers after the explosion? Yes or no. 

Mr. NEWMAN. The documents that the Transocean survivors of 

the incident were asked to sign were categorically not waivers. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. For the BP employees, no. 

Mr. DINGELL. Next witness. 

Mr. PROBERT. No. 

Mr. DINGELL. Next witness. 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman, we had no one on the rig. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now, it is my understanding, gentlemen, and this 

is for all of the witnesses, if you please, it is my understanding that 

local fishermen have been contacted by your companies to help 

with the cleanup in different ways. 

Have these contractors been asked to sign any kind of liability 

waiver? 

Mr. MCKAY. We are the—a responsible party that’s operating the 

clean up efforts with the Coast Guard. There was originally a 

standard form that was put out, I have lost track of time, a couple 

weeks ago, that was a problem. That was torn up, started over, and 

no. So your practical answer is no. And that was fixed right after. 

Mr. DINGELL. So the answer to that question is no? 

Mr. MCKAY. They are not signing liability waivers. 

Mr. DINGELL. Is that a categorical or a qualified no? 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe it is a categorical. 

Mr. DINGELL. Very good. Now I have a curiosity. I had intended 

to ask, did the Minerals Management Service exempt BP’s lease on 

the well from an Environmental Impact Statement as required by 

NEPA? BP apparently requested that exemption? 


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Mr. MCKAY. There’s a categorical exclusion that was utilized that 

makes use of the government’s Environmental Impact Statement 

that’s done with the lease sale, and then the government’s environmental assessments that are done by grid and smaller area within 

that lease sale, and those are utilized with the permit. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Ms. Castor for questions, please. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKay, in your testimony, you state that BP recognizes that 

beyond the environmental impact there are also economic impacts 

to the people of the Gulf Coast States, BP will pay all necessary 

cleanup costs and is committed to paying legitimate claims for 

other loss and damages caused by the spill, and that you are determined to do everything humanly possible to minimize the environmental and economic impacts of the resulting oil disaster. 

Now in Florida, the Deepwater Horizon disaster is causing losses 

and damages to our most important industries, to our tourism industry, to the fishing industry, vacations are being canceled, hotels 

don’t know what to do, they are very scared. This is having a devastating impact on the hardworking people of Florida like the other 

Gulf Coast States. 

So when you state that BP is committed to taking responsibility 

for paying claims, are you willing to begin a high level dialogue 

with the political leadership of the State of Florida to talk about 

ameliorating and addressing the impacts on our industries? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Mr. McKay, is there anyone who now works for BP 

America or BP parent or any BP subsidiary who previously worked 

for the U.S. Department of Interior and/or MMS? 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe so, yes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Who is that? 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe Jim Grant worked for the MMS. 

Ms. CASTOR. In what role? 

Mr. MCKAY. In what role for the MMS? I’m not sure. 

Ms. CASTOR. Could you answer that question in detail for the 

committee moving forward, go through your records and see? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Ms. CASTOR. And what about vice versa, is there anyone currently employed by the Department of the Interior or MMS or who 

previously worked for BP America or BP parent or subsidiary? 

Mr. MCKAY. I know of one person. I’m not sure if they are still 

employed but they were, yes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Who is that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Sylvia Baca. 

Ms. CASTOR. In what role? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. I don’t know what her role is exactly. 

Ms. CASTOR. So you will get that information to this committee. 

Mr. MCKAY. I’ll get that to you. 

Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Newman and Mr. Probert, same question except 

substitute Transocean and/or Halliburton. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’m not aware of anybody, but we can certainly 

check our records and confirm. 

Mr. PROBERT. Neither am I aware of anyone, but we will certainly check our records for you. 


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Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much. 

I want to ask question about how the blowout preventer was 

tested. Mr. Newman, in your testimony, you say that the blowout 

preventer was tested regularly and found to be functional, is this 

correct? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Yes. 

Ms. CASTOR. Mr. Newman, I want to read to you a document 

that we obtained late last night. This document is from February 

10 and is labeled as the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer 

subsea test. We have been told that there were additional tests 

conducted after this February test in March and April but they 

went down with the rig. So this February test is the last detailed 

information we currently have on subsea testing of the blowout 

preventer. 

In particular, I want you to focus on the test for their casing 

shear rams. There are no test results here. And it actually says, 

do not function as per exemption. 

Mr. Newman, what does this mean? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’m not familiar with the particular exemption that 

would be in place, so I can’t comment right now. 

Ms. CASTOR. What does it mean when the document states casing shear rams open? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Casing shear rams open would be the test that 

would be performed to confirm that the casing shear rams do in 

fact open, so the shear rams retract. 

Ms. CASTOR. And same thing for closed, same explanation. So 

what does it mean when it says, do not function, do not function 

as per exemption. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I believe that it means as part of this test, those 

casing shear rams are not functioned. 

Ms. CASTOR. So I want to be fair. My understanding is that there 

is evidence that the casing shear rams worked, so this failure to 

test may not have had an effect on the response, but it is indicative 

of the problems with the testing regime. 

Do you want to comment on that? 

We have other documents that discuss the testing of the blowout 

preventer, and one is a document prepared by BP on April 27 after 

the blowout, 1 week after the explosion. I would like to bring that 

up on the screen. This document makes a number of key points 

about problems with the BOP test. It states BOP stack emergency 

systems are not typically tested once the BOP stack is on the seabed. 

It also says that the subsea testing of the emergency systems 

would show whether the system will work when installed and 

showed that there were no leaks that would diminish system integrity. 

Mr. Newman, what is your reaction to this document? 

Mr. NEWMAN. While the BOP is on the surface, prior to being deployed for well operations, all of the systems on the BOP are tested, including simulation of the conditions that would trigger the 

automatic functions on the BOP control system. 

Ms. CASTOR. So were the emergency systems of the blowout preventer tested after the device was installed on the seabed? 


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Mr. NEWMAN. Those systems are not tested once the BOP system 

is on the seabed. 

Ms. CASTOR. Why not? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If we could talk about the auto shear function. The 

auto shear function—— 

Ms. CASTOR. I’m a little over my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NEWMAN. If we could talk about the auto shear function. The 

auto shear function is installed on the BOP control system to simulate the disconnection between the lower portion of the BOP stack 

and the Lower Marine Riser Package. So these are two sets of components that come together, and taken together they constitute the 

entirety of the BOP stack. The auto shear function is designed to 

activate when the Lower Marine Riser Package inadvertently disconnects from the BOP, the lower BOP. There is a way to do that 

subsea, but it introduces significant risk in the well construction 

operations. Disconnecting the LMRP inadvertently from the BOP is 

not an expected, not a normal part of the well construction process. 

It’s an emergency response. And so testing that emergency response while the BOP is on the seabed would introduce significant 

risk. 

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you. Mr. Inslee for questions, please. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. Mr. McKay, would you agree that the industry ought to be using the best available technology to avoid 

these cataclysmic blowouts? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. INSLEE. Now I’m told that other places in the world—let me 

back up for a moment. We’ve learned through some of the investigation that a possible source of failure was the failure for an activation signal in some sense to be given to the blowout preventer. 

I don’t think that’s been categorically proven, but there is some 

suggestion that that’s what happened, from some interruption of 

the connection to the activation switch. We are advised that in 

other places in the world, in Norway and Brazil, an acoustically 

triggered switch is available that is remote to the rig so that it’s 

not dependent on a physical linkage between the blowout preventer 

and the rig, that it receives an acoustic signal of a blowout occurring and immediately sends, through I believe a sonar system, to 

activate the blowout preventer. And the safety that seems to me 

commonsense, in the sense it’s not dependent on a physical connection as this one was, and that physical connection may have been 

interrupted in the explosion in, in a blowout, to me that seems to 

be another inherent safety feature that is used in other countries. 

Was that system used in this particular rig? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not a blowout preventer expert and maybe these 

guys can answer as well, but I think it’s something that needs to 

be looked at. As I understand it, the acoustic signaling is not always applicable in some of the places like the deepwater Gulf of 

Mexico. We did have redundant systems here to try to trigger the 

blowout preventer, including physical manual intervention—— 

Mr. INSLEE. I understand that. I guess those all depend on a 

physical connection to the rig platform. 

Mr. MCKAY. Or the lack of. 


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Mr. INSLEE. Or the lack of. This one has a remote system, and 

it seems to be used by giving you an additional redundancy if you 

will. Let’s just be clear. Was that system in place in this rig? Does 

anybody have a suggestion that it was? No one is shaking their 

head yes. So we are assuming there was no acoustical activated 

trigger. 

Now assuming that, and I will just ask Mr. McKay, assuming 

that this acoustically triggered system would have provided an 

added layer of redundancy that could operate even in the absence 

of any physical connection between the blowout preventer and the 

rig, would BP be willing to accept that technology as the best available technology? 

Mr. MCKAY. We would absolutely accept anything that would improve upon what we have in terms of redundancy. So I would ask 

some of the experts that. But we would be willing to do that if that 

looks like it would help anything, yes. 

Mr. INSLEE. And was that ever considered by British Petroleum 

to require that in its operations at any time? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. INSLEE. Could you find that out and let us know? 

Do any of the other witnesses have information about that as to 

whether or not the acoustically triggered device was ever considered by British Petroleum? Do you have any information, any of 

the other witnesses? 

Mr. MOORE. I would not. 

Mr. PROBERT. No information, no. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to 

comment on what BP may or may not have considered. 

Mr. INSLEE. Well, we will look forward to your letting us know 

Mr. McKay. There have been some press reports that the cost dissuaded British Petroleum from installing this additional safety 

mechanism. So we will be interested to see what you find out in 

your review. 

I want to ask about the capability of the shearing system. And 

I have to just tell you as a layperson, I have been disturbed by the 

lack of reliability of this system from what I’ve been able to look 

at. I’m looking at a document, it’s a study done for the U.S. Minerals Management Service by West Engineering Services of December 2002, and the report suggests that they tested several of these 

blowout preventers and said if you would take in—if operational 

considerations of the initial drilling program were accounted for, 

shearing success dropped to 3 of 6, 50 percent. Fifty percent is not 

something that gives you huge confidence. 

The report goes on to say West, that is the contractor here who 

did the investigation, West is unaware of any regulatory requirements that state the obvious, that the BOP must be capable of 

shearing pipe planned for use in the current drilling program. Apparently there’s no regulatory requirement that there’s been a demonstration of a particular BOP to shear a particular pipe of a particular metallurgical situation. Is that accurate? 

Mr. Moore, you might be the one most knowledgeable to that. 

Mr. MOORE. Let me respond to that because Cameron took the 

position on this in 2007 with a study that we did with our own information on shearing capabilities where we plotted across a maVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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trix of low, medium and high shear rates to shear certain size drill 

pipe. 

We took the top end of that. We took the maximum range in 

which shear pipe should be sheared because sheared pipe is different strengths at different hardnesses so it’s not altogether exactly consistent. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Moore. 

I have one quick question I want to ask Mr. McKay. 

Mr. McKay, on September 14, 2009, BP sent a letter to the U.S. 

Department of the Interior Minerals Management and you said, 

quote, while BP is supportive of companies having a system in 

place to reduce risks, accidents, injuries and spills, we are not supportive of the extensive proscriptive regulations as proposed in this 

rule. That’s signed by Richard Morrison, Vice President, GOM Production. 

Do you plan on revisiting that position by BP in light of this incident? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think everything we learn in this incident will be 

relevant in terms of what regulations should be going forward. 

Mr. INSLEE. I appreciate that. I will be introducing a bill here 

shortly that will require the use of best available technologies. It’s 

motivated in part because of the absence of this particular safety 

device, this acoustic device we’re talking about. So I would appreciate your consideration. 

Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Inslee. 

Mrs. Capps for questions, please. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you for testifying today, each of you. 

To date, more than 1 million feet of barrier absorbent boom has 

been deployed along shorelines in the Gulf and in the open water. 

I guess I should acknowledge first that I’m from Santa Barbara. 

My district represents the central coast of California, and I was a 

resident in Santa Barbara with my young family in 1969. I know 

a bit about absorbent boom. 

Over 3,000 gallons of oil dispersant has been applied from the 

air. This is a newer technology than I’m familiar with, and nearly 

a mile underwater. 

And controlled burns have been used to ignite oil on the ocean’s 

surface, which we have seen in the past. 

These measures sound impressive, but I would like to hear from 

our witnesses about their efficacy. 

Mr. Newman, your company produced a document to the committee that outlines the advantages and disadvantages of different 

cleanup strategies. It’s at tab 9 of your document binder. 

On the first page of the document, in a section that examines the 

strategy of using floating boom to contain oil, the last point warns 

that, quote, and this is a quote from that document, the recovery 

rate of oil under the best circumstances rarely exceeds 15 percent, 

and I can actually give testimony to that fact, it’s the same technology that was used in 1969 in Santa Barbara off the coast. 

Mr. Newman, am I reading this document correctly? Is the best 

case scenario for boom collection really only 15 percent of spilled 

oil? 


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Mr. NEWMAN. Based on the information that I have reviewed 

since the incident occurred, I believe that that percentage is directionally accurate, yes. 

Mrs. CAPPS. And that’s one of our best technologies that we have 

available at this time. It’s not a very impressive rate of recovery. 

But more disturbing is the fact that the rest of the proposed techniques are not particularly effective either. 

The plan cautions that chemical dispersant, and I quote, must be 

used within the first 24 hours to be effective and that in situ burning, quote, and I quote, causes air pollution, and again another 

quote, may leave tarry residue that will wash up on the shorelines 

or sink to the bottom. 

The plan also warns, in all capital letters, and this is another 

quote from the plan, experience has shown that shoreline cleanup 

operations often cause more environmental damage than if the oil 

were left alone. 

I think it’s really so shocking to me, having lived through this 

in my community in 1969, that’s 40-plus years ago, and as was 

given in an opening statement, it’s more than 100 years since the 

first offshore drilling was done along my coastline, that this multibillion dollar oil exploration industry has not come up with more 

effective strategies to contain the damage from a leaking deepsea 

well. The technologies, I know others have said this, the technologies have been perfected to get down there and to go after it. 

Why, and I’m going to ask the rest of you with whatever time 

remains, why was there not equivalent technology developed to 

clean up after a spill, whether a small spill or a huge spill, at the 

very same time using some of the profits that have been generated 

in each of the companies that you represent? 

The cost of doing it now, after the fact, is a cost that you will 

bear. But there is no way you will come close to bearing the cost 

that our Nation will bear, the shrimpers, the oyster folks, all of the 

people, and not to mention untold disasters that lie ahead day after 

day after day. 

I represent a coast with oil drilling. We are still drilling. The 

same Platform A that drilled and spilled in 1969 is pumping oil 

today, 20 platforms off the coast in my district. Each spill, and 

there are many of them, and they are unique, the environment in 

the Gulf is extremely complex, and we don’t understand yet how 

these systems interact with and respond to oil, these complex 

coastal areas that we treasure. 

And I hope that this topic is something we will continue to explore in future hearings. 

And with 10 seconds, I would like to see if one of you has any 

further comment to make. 

Mr. MCKAY. I would just comment we are working very closely 

with all the government agencies, EPA, Coast Guard. The Coast 

Guard deals with spills all over our coastal areas all over the country. We are using the best available technology at scale. This is the 

largest effort that has ever been put together. So we believe we are 

using the best technology and if we have any other ideas—— 

Mrs. CAPPS. But you never had any until it happened. 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, we have been drilling with the Coast Guard 

for years. 


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Mrs. CAPPS. Did you develop technologies for dealing with this? 

Mr. MCKAY. Not individual technologies for this, no. 

Mrs. CAPPS. I rest my case. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Mr. Engel for questions, please. We have three votes, but let’s get 

these questions in. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, yesterday there was testimony, as you know, before 

the Senate and what came out of there was a bunch of finger pointing. Everybody pointed a finger at somebody else. Everybody was 

making excuses and alibis. And the American public is obviously 

outraged. I’m outraged. It’s very difficult to believe a lot of the 

things that we are hearing. 

I want to ask some very basic questions because we have gone 

through a lot of the technical things, and we have gone on and on. 

Generally, we have been told for the past several years in Congress 

that offshore drilling is safe, that we needn’t worry about what 

happens; if there is any kind of an accident, don’t worry because 

there are backup systems and there is a backup system for the 

backup system. And then we find out that none of this is true. 

If there have been improvements in drilling techniques through 

the years, why apparently have there been no corresponding improvements in preventing oil spills? Or is it, is it there simply is 

no ironclad way to prevent spills like these in the future? Is that 

what you’re telling us? 

Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. This has been an unprecedented event. In the Gulf 

of Mexico alone there have been over 42,000 wells drilled in the 

past 50 years, and this is an unprecedented event. We have got to 

learn what caused this and what to do to make sure this doesn’t 

happen again. We are dedicated to do that, and I know the committee is as well. 

All I can say is the industry has been safe and clean for quite 

a while, and this is an unprecedented event we’ve got to figure out. 

Mr. ENGEL. But Mr. McKay, I will bet that I could dig up congressional testimony after the Exxon Valdez mess where people literally said the same thing that you’re just saying now, that this is 

a once-in-a-lifetime thing, it cannot happen again. We were told it 

cannot happen again, what happened up in Alaska in 1989. 

So why should we believe you any more than we could have believed those people that told us the same thing after the Exxon 

Valdez spill in Alaska? 

Mr. MCKAY. My confidence is because I think we are going to figure out what caused this, both the events that caused the explosion 

as well as why the blowout preventer didn’t work. I think we will 

solve this and that will allow us to be safer going forward. 

Mr. ENGEL. Would any other gentlemen care to comment? 

Mr. PROBERT. I think all of us are committed to trying to find 

out what did take place and put the steps in place that are necessary to make this a safer—safer and sounder future for us in 

terms of oil and gas exploration. 

Mr. ENGEL. There is currently a $75 million liability cap and I 

understand, Mr. McKay, you said BP has not adhered to that, 

you’re going higher, is that true? 


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Mr. MCKAY. That’s true. We’ll go over that if needed, absolutely. 

Mr. ENGEL. Should the cap be raised? I know Senator Menendez has introduced legislation to raise it to $10 billion. Should we just 

lift the cap? Is that something Congress should consider? 

Mr. MCKAY. I was asked that question yesterday. I don’t know 

the specifics of that legislation, and I would just say it’s not relevant in this case. 

Mr. ENGEL. We have an 8-cent a barrel tax assessed to oil companies, and proceeds go into a cleanup service. Should that tax be 

modified and should that money be spent differently? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think that will just have to be reviewed in the context of what we learn through this. 

Mr. ENGEL. How about an administration proposal to split the 

Minerals Management Service into two parts, one with oversight 

responsibilities for the oil industry, and another of it would provide 

drilling leases and collect Federal royalties on the operations? Do 

you have any comments on that, or support it, oppose it, and why? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t have any specific comments on that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Anybody else? 

Mr. PROBERT. No specific comments other than to say that that 

is not an unusual process in a number of foreign jurisdictions. 

Mr. ENGEL. I just want to say in conclusion that I’m just really 

agitated and aggravated. Nobody in this room, and certainly the 

four of you didn’t want this to happen. Nobody wanted this to happen. This is a terrible tragedy. But when we get assurances from 

the oil industry year in and year out that this cannot happen and 

that we should drill, baby, drill and we should keep expanding the 

drilling, and then the worst actually happens, I just don’t know 

how we could ever believe anything that we hear from the oil industry. It just boggles my mind as to how this could happen. And 

20 years from now there will be another Congress sitting here, and 

there will be another oil spill and they will be saying the same 

things that you gentlemen are saying now. I am not convinced and 

frankly I am very, very angry. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We will start a second round 

of questions. I know we have votes but I am going to try to at least 

get a first set of questions and then we will break for votes and 

we’ll come back. 

Mr. Newman, Ms. Castor was asking a number of questions 

about the blowout preventer and testing on the surface, the sea 

surface. And it says that the testing of the emergency systems 

would show whether the system will work when installed in hull 

and show that there were no leaks that would diminish the system’s integrity. 

BP, in a memo of April 27, has recommendations. It says that 

the risk in testing emergency systems and subsea testing are manageable and BP recommends these systems be tested in the future. 

I’m glad that BP is recommending improved testing going forward. 

But my question is, this testing, what is done on the BOP for testing when it’s on the sea floor? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If I could clarify the response to the question. A 

BOP is an immense piece of equipment. It’s about 55 feet tall, it’s 

about 20 feet square, it weighs over 300 tons. It’s a combination of 


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a number of valves that are intended to close off the wellbore, and 

it’s got over 100 other smaller valves that function—— 

Mr. STUPAK. I realize all that. It’s 45 tons. I realize all that. 

What testing is done when it’s on the sea floor? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Component by component, we work our way up to 

ensure that the function closes and that it will hold pressure. 

Those are the required tests that are conducted every 2 weeks to 

confirm that the system functions and that it will hold pressure. 

In the intervening 7 days, there is another set of tests which serve 

to confirm that the system still functions. 

Mr. STUPAK. And that’s just pressure tested, you don’t check for 

the valves to see if they are leaking, right? Like we have here, we 

have a leaking valve here right? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Those tests would confirm whether or not the system has any leaks in it as well. 

Mr. STUPAK. So this leaky valve, this hydraulic leaking valve 

that I brought up earlier in my opening statement and asked questions about, you’re saying your tests would have shown that? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. STUPAK. Then, Mr. Newman, in this thing, Cameron officials 

told us the problem was someone overlooked the tightening of a fitting, all these other fittings on the hydraulic system were snug, but 

this one had not been tightened and it was like several turns 

backed off. So how can you explain how is this possible that one 

valve, if your testing was there it would have shown that one valve 

was leaking, would it not? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If that one valve was leaking during the testing, 

the testing would have demonstrated that. The document that I 

was handed a few minute ago, which is a record of a BOP function 

test, you will see that the gallon counts are recorded to the first 

decimal point, which is a very accurate record. 

Mr. STUPAK. That’s the pressure. I’m talking about the emergency testing, like the deadman switch and these rams. What 

would you do to test those when it’s on the floor? What is the emergence for the emergency testing? If something goes wrong, what 

tests should you be doing? 

Mr. NEWMAN. What the auto sheer function and the deadman 

function do is serve to activate the BOP. They operate the control 

system, and they close the valves. So the independent testing that 

we conduct on a regular basis confirms the same thing. 

Mr. STUPAK. How about the emergency power source? That’s 

where we found the leaky valve, the loose fitting, the emergency 

power source. Was that checked? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The emergency power source? 

Mr. STUPAK. For the hydraulic line. 

Mr. NEWMAN. That’s a terminology that I’m unfamiliar with, 

Congressman, so I can’t tell you specifically that would be in reference to. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Moore, am I correct there is an emergency 

power system that could be checked while it’s on the sub floor? 

Mr. MOORE. Would this be the system that sits in the SIM, it’s 

kind of like the brain that—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Control, yes. 


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Mr. MOORE. I’m not sure of how that would be tested by 

Transocean, Congressman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Would your technical guy, Mr. McWhorter, know 

the answer to that? 

Mr. MOORE. We can surely ask him. 

Mr. STUPAK. Go ahead. I have got to ask you to raise your right 

hand and take the oath. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. STUPAK. Please state your name for the record and who you 

work for? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. David McWhorter. I work for Cameron. 

Mr. STUPAK. I’m sorry. 

Mr. MCWHORTER. Could you repeat the question? 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. State your name for the record and who you 

work for. 

Mr. MCWHORTER. David McWhorter. I work for Cameron International. 

Mr. STUPAK. Now there’s a hydraulic power source. You want to 

explain that to us, how you do the energy testing and shut things 

down? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. I believe you were referring to the subsea accumulator banks, which is where the hydraulic energy in effect is 

stored for emergency operations. 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes. What testing can be done to check that when 

it’s on the sea floor? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. On the sea floor? You can fire that function. 

Mr. STUPAK. How do you fire that function? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. Push a button on the surface. 

Mr. STUPAK. Is that a test that would impair the jeopardy of the 

blowout protector while it’s on the sea floor? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. It would depend what would be in the wellbore 

at the time the test was conducted. 

Mr. STUPAK. And this is one of the tests that was not done here 

in this; you have no record of this test ever being done, do you? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. We have no records of any tests, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have any tests of that record being done 

where they do go down and push the right button to see if the hydraulic line worked in the emergency? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If Mr. McWhorter is talking about the subsea accumulators, these are large bottles that are attached to the BOP. 

They contain hydraulic fluid at pressure. Those systems are recharged using the surface system. If there were a leak in the 

subsea accumulators, that would require that the surface system be 

regularly operating to recharge the leak. That would be recorded 

as a volumetric leak, and there is no record of that. 

Mr. STUPAK. Is there any record that you even tested it, that you 

pressed that button? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There is no way to test the subsea accumulator 

system. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, after the explosion, you did go and push into 

this little valve or dye test, you pushed the button it didn’t work. 

That’s when you did the dye test, correct? And that’s when the dye 

test showed there was a hydraulic leak and that the fitting was 

very loose, correct? 


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Mr. NEWMAN. During the post-explosion intervention efforts, a 

number of operations were conducted on the BOP where the remote 

operated vehicles, through a variety of configurations, supplied hydraulic power to the system. During one of those operations, we did 

not see the anticipated pressure response. In response to that indication we conducted troubleshooting operations, and those troubleshooting operations identified a leak on the system. 

Mr. STUPAK. And the leak was because the valve wasn’t screwed 

on tightly, put it laymen’s term, right? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I believe that’s correct, yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Is that correct, Mr. McWhorter? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. There was a leak that was discovered subsea, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Any reason why it couldn’t be discovered before—— 

Mr. MCWHORTER. I really—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Other than the test not being done? 

Mr. MCWHORTER. There’s probably a number of reasons, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Our time is up. We have votes. 

One more question. Mr. McKay, in answer to Mr. Sullivan’s question, you said the best way to stop this is a BOP, right? That’s your 

top kill, I think your exact words were. 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. That is one of the big options, yes, absolutely. 

Mr. STUPAK. Is there any way to put auto BOP on this? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes, we’ve been trying to get diagnostic determination inside that BOP to understand what’s happening, understand 

why that pressure has dropped. 

Mr. STUPAK. You’d have to take that riser off and put another 

one on top? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes, that is a potential and we’re working hard on 

that. 

Mr. STUPAK. And once you take that riser off, it’s possible you 

could have greater oil and gas gushing up through the hole, right? 

Mr. MCKAY. That’s exactly right, but that’s why we’re getting a 

diagnostic where we are using gamma rays and pressure measurements, and we are making progress in understanding. 

Mr. STUPAK. If that riser came off and starts gushing up even 

greater than what it’s doing right now, can you get a BOP back on 

there? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, that’s one of the issues that we’re working. 

Mr. STUPAK. My time is up and when we come back Mr. Burgess 

will have questions. We will stay in recess for a half hour. We have 

three votes. Gentlemen, we will see you in a half hour. We are in 

recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. STUPAK. We will reconvene the committee hearing in the 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and our hearing. I 

remind the witnesses they are under oath. 

When we left, I believe, Mr. Burgess, it was your turn for questions on round two. If you would, please. And Mr. Moore will be 

here in a minute. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKay, you made reference in answer to an earlier question 

that the Obama administration, the White House and the Cabinet 


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had been helpful during this event. Is that a fair statement? Do I 

remember you saying that correctly? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. I think I said the administration and his Cabinet, yes. 

Mr. BURGESS. Have you been to the White House since the accident occurred? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. I have not seen the President, but I’ve met with 

Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Salazar and other administration officials, yes. 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that the White House 

make available to us any minutes or notes or e-mails that would 

be relevant to that meeting? 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, as the gentleman knows, he can ask. I am not 

guaranteeing what kind of response you’re going to get, but yes, 

you can ask. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, I just think it would be helpful. Were you the 

only executive of an oil company who was there, or was this a collaborative response from many people who work in the industry to 

try to help solve the problem? 

Mr. MCKAY. The meetings that I’m talking about were myself 

and Tony Hayward, both of us, BP. 

Mr. BURGESS. Are you aware of any other meetings that have occurred with executives of other companies? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not aware on this particular issue. 

Mr. BURGESS. Can I ask you when that meeting occurred? 

Mr. MCKAY. There have been several over the three-week period 

that we’ve been in—— 

Mr. BURGESS. When would the first meeting have been? 

Mr. MCKAY. Within the first week of the accident, I believe. 

Mr. BURGESS. And that information, Mr. Chairman, should be 

available to us with White House logs, if they will furnish us that 

information. Do I understand that correctly? 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, again, Mr. Burgess, as you know, because 

you’ve used the procedure before, I put the request in writing, we 

will submit it to the White House and we will see what happens. 

I’m not sure of the extent of the discussions and what is appropriate and what is not. I know when we speak about energy or energy policy, there has been some reluctance of the courts because 

under the Cheney Energy—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. BURGESS. No, because my time is limited. 

Mr. STUPAK. I will give you back an extra 30 seconds. 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, I know you will. Thank you. It would just be 

helpful to us, and we will put that in writing. 

Aside from Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Salazar, I assume the Department of Interior was present. Were there White 

House personnel present as well, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of 

Staff? 

Mr. MCKAY. No. 

Mr. BURGESS. Just people from the agency? 

Mr. MCKAY. There were other—Carol Browner—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, certainly, to the extent that these involved 

agency personnel, Department of Interior, Department of Homeland Security, we, as the oversight body of this Congress, should 


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have the ability to get that information. In my understanding, that 

should not be covered under executive privilege, so I will make that 

request. 

Mr. STUPAK. Will the gentleman yield if you’re going to make a 

request, because it’s going to come through me, and I’d like to have 

a clarification from you. 

Mr. BURGESS. If the chairman will yield me an additional 

minute. 

Mr. STUPAK. I will yield you an additional minute, you betcha. 

Mr. WAXMAN. What does the gentleman wish to request? The log 

of these visitors and the fact that they were at the White House 

meeting with people within the administration? 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes. And I would like to know what was discussed. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I don’t know that you’re entitled to that, but 

the White House already posts its logs as to who comes in and 

meets with the—this is something we didn’t have in the previous 

administrations. They do have a posting of the log, and you can 

easily find out who came in from the outside and who met with 

people in the White House. I don’t know why you would be entitled 

to have the discussions or notes or anything like that. I don’t know 

what the precedent is for asking that. 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, it may have occurred to you we’re 

having a great deal of difficulty getting to the actual causation. 

This is the second hearing. We had one closed hearing last week, 

this is an open hearing, but we are really having a lot of difficulty 

getting to causation, there’s a lot of people talking past each other. 

And I just think if there was a frank discussion at the White 

House, that we might benefit from the information that was exchanged that day. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Will the gentleman yield? I will certainly take it 

under advisement. 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank the Chairman for the consideration. 

I’m not sure if I’m going to pronounce your name correctly, Mr. 

Probert or Probert? 

Mr. PROBERT. Probert. 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Moore obviously deals with the blowout protector, but I think if I understand the situation correctly, the blowout protector is not the primary control of the well, that would actually be the material in the drill shaft itself, mud, that would be 

the primary control; is that correct? 

Mr. PROBERT. Yes, that would be correct. 

Mr. BURGESS. And you, in your testimony, talked about—and it 

intrigued me because it was the same thing I read in the New Orleans paper last Friday, that there was a removal of the drilling 

mud from the stack, the initial plug, one cement plug had been 

placed, the drilling mud was removed and replaced with seawater, 

and before the second plug was placed the accident occurred. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. PROBERT. The process was, first of all, to do a positive test, 

which was conducted by Transocean. The second procedure was 

then to do a negative test, which was also conducted by Transocean 

but requires removing some of the drilling fluid, at least from the 

drill pipe. And subsequently, after a successful negative test, to the 

extent the test was successful, then they would go ahead and evacVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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uate or replace the drilling fluid in the riser with seawater in advance of setting the plug, and then ultimately pulling off the well. 

And I would defer to Mr. Newman if I have any part of that process incorrect. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, reported in the Times-Picayune last Friday, 

there was concern that the drilling mud was removed at a point 

prior to when it normally would have been removed and replaced 

with seawater. Is that an error on the part of the paper reporting 

that? 

Mr. PROBERT. No, I think the question in point that was raised— 

and it was raised in testimony yesterday—was that when you replace the drilling fluid in the riser with seawater, you reduce the 

density, effect the density significantly. And had there not been a 

successful negative test, then that would clearly be a situation 

which would be problematic for the well since you’re reducing the 

hydrostatic pressure on the well. 

Mr. BURGESS. But the test wasn’t successful. 

Mr. PROBERT. I have no knowledge of that. 

Mr. BURGESS. Does anybody have any knowledge of that? That’s 

the negative test, 1,400 PSI applied to the drill stack and no pressure recorded in the dead man’s cutoff, or whatever it is. Is that 

a positive test or a negative? I got the impression that was not a 

good result; is that correct? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The actual results of the test, Congressman, were 

first reported to me by Chairman Waxman today in Chairman 

Waxman’s statement. And to my knowledge, prior to this hearing 

I was not aware of the results. I think Chairman Waxman alluded 

to some confusion with respect to those test results, and that is 

what I know about the test results. 

Mr. BURGESS. But if I am understanding Mr. Probert correctly, 

if the test was not the expected result, that it maybe not be a good 

idea to pull off the drilling mud and reduce the hydrostatic pressure on the column over the drill shaft. Did I understand your 

statement correctly about that? 

Well, you said if the test was correct, then it wouldn’t be a problem to reduce the hydrostatic pressure by removing the mud, but 

the test wasn’t correct, mud was still removed, is that a problem 

with what subsequently happened? And Mr. McKay, feel free to 

enter into the discussion. 

Mr. MCKAY. What I believe is there were discrepancies, it appears, in that negative test where you had 1,400 PSI on the drill 

pipe and zero on the choke and kill lines. I think the investigation 

needs to look hard at how that information was either disseminated, used, and decisions made off of it, And who and what decisions were made after that point? 

Mr. BURGESS. What would be drilling best practice if you encountered an anomaly like that test? To go ahead and remove the mud, 

or to wait until we found out what the problem was and corrected 

the problem? 

Mr. MCKAY. I can’t speculate on that individual situation. I really do think this is one of the key things the investigation is going 

to have to look at. 


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Mr. BURGESS. Do you think it would ever be OK to remove the 

hydrostatic pressure on the column of mud if the test was not satisfactory? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m sorry? 

Mr. BURGESS. Would it ever be OK to remove that hydrostatic 

pressure of the mud column if that test wasn’t satisfactory? Would 

there ever be a reason to say, oh, it’s OK, go ahead and do that 

because we do it all the time? 

Mr. MCKAY. I haven’t seen all the data, I just can’t speculate on 

that, I just really can’t. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Chairman Waxman for questions, please. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back to this issue as well, the question of the negative pressure test that we discussed earlier and the discrepancies 

of the negative pressure test that was performed on the well on the 

day of the blowout. And all of you seem to agree that this would 

be a significant issue and it would be a central question in the investigation. But I have a document—I think it’s been given to you, 

Mr. McKay, it’s an e-mail—I thought it had been given to you in 

advance—and the e-mail talks about the testing procedures. Can 

you tell me whether these procedures were followed on the 20th? 

Mr. MCKAY. I cannot tell you whether they were followed. 

Mr. WAXMAN. And the last line of the document—and by the 

way, this is an e-mail, an internal e-mail from BP and it indicates 

the things that would be done if there was a negative test that 

showed a discrepancy. And the last line says, We would send to 

Houston for confirmation plod on charts sent to Houston for confirmation. I assume this refers to BP’s office in Houston? 

Mr. MCKAY. I would imagine so. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Were the test results sent to Houston for confirmation before you resumed well operations on the 20th of April? 

Mr. MCKAY. It looks like, to me—and I have to examine this— 

this looks like to me this is after the last plug would have been set. 

We would have to review this. But I don’t know if it was sent to 

Houston or not, that last plug didn’t get sent. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, this e-mail sets out the procedure, as I understand it, for BP when you have a problem with that negative 

test. They indicate the things that should be done, and the last one 

is you would send it to Houston. Do you know whether the results 

were sent to Houston before the well was back in operation? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t believe so. I believe the explosion occurred 

before number six happened. 

Mr. WAXMAN. So is it fair to say you don’t believe that the officials in Houston approved the resumption of the operations of the 

well. 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Was MMS involved in these decisions, to your 

knowledge? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. WAXMAN. There have been reports that shortly before the 

blowout, BP began displacing drilling mud with seawater. Do you 

know if that’s accurate? 


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Mr. MCKAY. That’s what I’ve been told, but I haven’t reviewed 

it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Did BP’s office in Houston approve this procedure? 

Did they sign off on the decision to displace mud with seawater 

after the negative pressure test discrepancy? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you know whether MMS signed off on this procedure? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not familiar with the procedure, nor am I familiar with who may have or may not have signed off on it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. You’re not familiar with the procedure itself within 

BP on how to deal with a negative test? 

Mr. MCKAY. Not on this particular well, no. 

Mr. WAXMAN. You have a technical expert with you, could you 

ask your technical expert for information in this regard? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. Could you repeat the question, please? 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I wanted to know if this document sets out 

the procedure within BP when there is a negative test that indicates there is a problem. And I also want to know if the BP office 

in Houston approved this procedure and whether they signed off on 

the decision to displace mud with seawater after negative pressure 

test discrepancy? 

Mr. MCKAY. What my expert has told me is that this procedure 

looks like it would have been used with the MMS procedure, the 

sundry procedure. He doesn’t know, nor do I know, whether this 

was confirmed to Houston. What I would say reading this, it looks 

like it’s a procedure to get through the setting of the last plug after 

a successful negative test. 

Mr. WAXMAN. After a successful negative test. 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, that’s the way it looks to me. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I see. So after a successful negative test, you would 

contact Houston to have them sign off on the well getting started 

up? 

Mr. MCKAY. ‘‘Send to Houston for confirmation’’ looks like the 

last step after the final cement plug is set, which never happened. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Why did it not happen. 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. That’s what we all need to know. 

Mr. WAXMAN. I would like you to get for the record the information as to whether Houston was notified, whether Houston approved the procedure, whether they signed off on the decision to 

displace mud with seawater after the negative pressure test discrepancy, and whether MMS signed off on this procedure. Am I correct in assuming your technical expert believed that MMS had to 

sign off on this as well; do you know? 

Mr. MCKAY. The temporary abandonment sundry notice would 

have a broad procedure that the MMS would have signed off on. 

Mr. WAXMAN. A broad procedure. 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, I can’t say if this matches that or it’s—— 

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, if you can get us more information for the 

record, I would appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Barton for questions, please. 


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Mr. BARTON. I thank you, Chairman. And I thank our witnesses 

for continuing to be here. 

I want to take a little bit different tact this round of questions. 

I think what Chairman Waxman just asked was very appropriate. 

I think those were good questions, and I think they deserve 

thoughtful responses. 

But I want to take a little bit broader view. My first question, 

does each of you at the panel support drilling in our coastal 

waters? Is there anybody who thinks we ought to suspend drilling 

in the Outer Continental Shelf because of this accident? Say yes or 

no or nod your head, give something. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Congressman, I think a pause, similar to what 

Secretary Salazar has asked for, I think a pause is prudent to reassess ongoing operations in the Gulf of Mexico. But I believe that 

energy is so important to our economy, and the Gulf of Mexico is 

a domestic source of that energy, that I believe that continued drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf is fundamental to the U.S. economy. 

Mr. BARTON. Do you all support drilling in the ultra deep gulf? 

Mr. MCKAY. I have confidence we’re going to figure out what 

happened here, and that if there are improvements—and there 

probably will be some—that need to be made will be made. And I 

have confidence that the deep water and the ultra deep water can 

be developed, and it’s important to be developed. 

Mr. BARTON. If this accident had occurred onshore under exactly 

the same scenario, you had a well that was a 20,000-foot well that 

had the capability to produce somewhere between 50,000 and 

100,000 barrels per day, and in the switching it over, getting it 

ready for production you had an unexplained event that caused a 

blowout, would that event onshore be fixed by now? If everything 

was the same except it wasn’t in 5,000 feet of water, it was onshore 

Texas or Louisiana, would you have the well under control by now? 

Mr. MCKAY. Let me try that. I think intervention is easier onshore obviously because you can get people and equipment around 

it easier than 5,000 feet of water. But there have been blowouts onshore that require relief wells to be drilled. So I don’t think you can 

automatically say onshore would be easy and offshore it’s not. I 

mean, relief wells are things that have to be used sometimes onshore. 

Mr. BARTON. But the likelihood is that the complicating factor in 

trying to cap it, stop it, staunch it is that you’re 5,000 feet down 

and you’re operating everything with remote-controlled submarines; is that not correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. As Commandant Allen has said, you have no ability 

to have human intervention at 5,000 feet. 

Mr. BARTON. Has any Federal official in a position of authority 

offered any suggestion that has not been accepted? In other words, 

we’ve had lots of members say that you guys are just dopes that 

you haven’t figured out what to do about it yet, that any good college petroleum engineering class ought to be able to figure out 

what to do and get it done. Has anybody in the Coast Guard, the 

Department of Interior, the Minerals Management Service, the Office of the President, the Office of the Vice President, has anybody 


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offered a suggestion that you all have rejected on what to do to 

solve this problem? 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not aware of any suggestions that we haven’t 

been able to take in or to materially change what we’re doing. This 

response is of massive dimension with technical experts from all 

over the world working, including the government. And there have 

been no incremental solutions or other parallel paths that I know 

of to pursue. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I’ve only visited the site one time and we 

went to the Command Center for about a 1 hour briefing. But my 

analysis is that there is excellent cooperation between the Federal 

Government and the private sector, and that the Coast Guard, the 

Admiral who’s the onsite commander is making sure that everybody does the best possible work together. And that this is not a 

case where the Federal Government and the private sector are in 

an adversarial situation. It seems to me that there is excellent cooperation. Do you all agree with that? Everybody? 

Mr. MCKAY. I do. 

Mr. BARTON. I want to put this in perspective, Mr. Chairman, before I have to yield back my time. 

This accident, as far as we know, is releasing 5,000 barrels a day 

into the Gulf of Mexico, it’s been doing so for approximately 3 

weeks, that’s a little over 100,000 barrels. The largest spill in the 

Gulf of Mexico today was a spill off the coast of Mexico. It produced 

90,000 barrels a day for 9 months—90,000 barrels a day for 9 

months. 

Exxon Valdez was a tanker that ran aground in Alaska. That 

was a supertanker that was 300,000 to 400,000 barrels of oil. So 

far this spill has produced a little over 100,000 barrels. Now, that, 

in and of itself, is a significant spill. It is a nontrivial accident, but 

it is nowhere near yet the order of magnitude of other accidents 

that have happened around the world. 

There is a natural seepage in the oceans around the United 

States on an annual basis of 4 million barrels a year. There is an 

annual seepage worldwide of over 40 million barrels of oil per year. 

So while this is an accident, it is nontrivial, it is not of the catastrophic consequences that some in the mainstream media have 

made it out to be. If we work together—and this subcommittee is 

doing an excellent job of getting the facts on the table for the 

American people—there is no reason that in the next—hopefully in 

the next week or so, but certainly in the next 2 months, we will 

stop the oil from flowing, we will come up with new best practices, 

and if necessary new technology and new legislation to prevent this 

in the future. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton. 

Mr. Braley for questions, please. 

Mr. BRALEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My math certainly is not as good as the ranking member’s because he is, after all, an engineer, but the briefing we received, we 

were informed that these relief wells could take 90 days to complete. And if that is the case and we are not able to cap off the flow 

of oil and it gets worse, then we will easily, in the next 90-day period, exceed the quantity of oil that was spilled by the Exxon 


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Valdez. It is not a trivial problem to the people living and who get 

their livelihood from the Gulf Coast. 

Mr. McKay, we have been reassured by the Federal Government—and you stated today—that BP will pay all necessary cleanup costs and is committed to paying all legitimate economic damages associated with this spill. 

Is BP self-insured for all of these items of loss and damage? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. BRALEY. So your corporation will be on the hook, it has not 

insured any of that risk or reinsured any of that risk; is that correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. That’s correct. 

Mr. BRALEY. One of the things I am concerned about is reports 

that have come out recently, Mr. Newman, specifically a National 

Public Radio broadcast dealing with efforts by your company to 

compel Deepwater Horizon crew members to sign forms the day 

after the accident stating they suffered no injuries from the incident or the evacuation. And yesterday, the committee staff was allowed to review several of those signed forms and I want to read 

for you the key passage for the record. 

The form states, ‘‘I was not a witness to the incident requiring 

the evacuation and have no firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident. I was not injured as a result of the incident 

or the evacuation.’’ Is it your understanding that was the language 

in the forms that were presented to your employees? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That is the language on those forms, Congressman. 

Mr. BRALEY. Are you aware of any information given to those 

employees before they were asked to sign those forms? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Between the time the individuals arrived onshore 

and the time they were presented with those forms, there was a 

tremendous amount of information provided to our employees in 

the form of support, medical care, clothing, food, hotel rooms, discussion with them about how we were going to facilitate their travel—— 

Mr. BRALEY. OK. Let me cut you off because my question goes 

to the language in this document. Was there a briefing given to 

them about what was the intent of the form and why they were 

being asked to sign it? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Because I wasn’t there, Congressman, I can’t tell 

you exactly—— 

Mr. BRALEY. Who gave them these forms to sign? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That would have been presented by the support 

team that Transocean mobilized to Louisiana to facilitate the onshore assistance of those individuals as they came in from the rig. 

Mr. BRALEY. How do we get the names of the individuals that 

were on that support team? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We can provide that to you. 

Mr. BRALEY. OK. It says in the form, ‘‘I was not a witness to the 

incident.’’ What was the incident that was referred to in these 

forms? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The incident would have been the well control 

problem on the rig floor and the subsequent explosions. 


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Mr. BRALEY. All right. Given that description of the incident, 

there were no witnesses to the incident, were there? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There are no remaining Transocean individuals 

alive who were on the rig floor at the time of the event, I don’t believe so. 

Mr. BRALEY. Right. And when it says, ‘‘No firsthand or personal 

knowledge regarding the incident,’’ did anybody explain to these 

employees what that meant? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Again, Congressman, because I wasn’t there, I’m 

not sure exactly what was explained to the individuals. 

Mr. BRALEY. Well, the press reports indicate that the crew members who survived the explosion spent somewhere between 12 to 15 

hours on a nearby vessel as they watched the rig burn. And after 

the survivors made it to shore, your company escorted them to a 

hotel for questioning. These men, many of whom were exhausted, 

potentially traumatized, and desperate to contact their loved ones, 

had to decide whether or not to sign that form before going home. 

Do you know, Mr. Newman, whether these employees were allowed to consult with their personal physicians, counselors, or attorneys before they signed those forms? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Congressman, the Transocean employees were not 

forced to sign the form. 

Mr. BRALEY. That is not my question. My question was, were 

they allowed to consult with a physician, a counselor, or their attorneys before they signed this statement? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Because some individuals didn’t sign the statement until a week or so after the event, they could have had consultation with anybody they chose to have consultation with. 

Mr. BRALEY. How many individuals waited a week or so after the 

event to sign the form? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I don’t know that, but we can provide that to you. 

Mr. BRALEY. Please do. They also interviewed one of the Deepwater crew members, a Christopher Choy, who did sign the 

Transocean form. He says that he was angry because he wasn’t 

able to talk to his physician or attorney. And let me tell you what 

his experience was. He saw multiple explosions and flames coming 

out of the rig. He saw men pile into one lifeboat while two others 

burned. He saw his friends and coworkers with burning flesh and 

broken bones. He lived through this disaster and saw those things 

that I hope you and I never have to experience in our life. 

Can you tell us why he was asked to sign a statement that he 

had no firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident 

after experiencing that? 

Mr. NEWMAN. One of our concerns in the aftermath of this event, 

Congressman, is to conduct as thorough a fact-finding exercise as 

we can, and part of the facilitation of that fact-finding exercise is 

to identify individuals who might have helpful knowledge. 

Mr. BRALEY. And wouldn’t you agree with me that a reasonable 

interpretation of the words ‘‘firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident’’ might mean people who had witnessed the 

aftermath of that explosion and the impact that it had on employees who were working on that rig? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’m not sure I can—do you want to engage in a debate about the terminology of personal knowledge? 


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Mr. BRALEY. I’m not trying to engage in a debate, I’m just asking 

you if that wouldn’t be a reasonable understanding that someone 

who had witnessed the things that Mr. Choy described would have 

firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident. 

Mr. NEWMAN. That might be true. 

Mr. BRALEY. I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Ms. DeGette for questions, please. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Newman, many of the independent experts who looked at the 

initial reports from the oil spill came to the same conclusion, which 

was that the failure of the cementing process was likely a cause of 

the blowout. And you said in your statement that we know, quote, 

with certainty that on April 20 there was a, quote, sudden catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing, or both. How, in your 

opinion, do we know that the cementing or casing or both failed? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Congresswoman, the reservoir that we believe is 

flowing hydrocarbons is located 13,000 feet below the seabed. The 

pathway from the reservoir to the seabed should have been 

barriered off by cement and/or casing. In other words, in order for 

the hydrocarbon to get from 13,000 feet below the seabed to the 

seabed you have to have a failure of one or both of those barrier 

mechanisms. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. OK. Let me ask you this; who is responsible for determining the specifications for the cementing? Do you 

know? 

Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m speculating, but we would write a spec for what 

type of casing and the hole conditions, and we would look to Halliburton, in this case, to help with the cement design. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So you would do the specifications and then they 

would modify them as needed; is that correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. We would tell them what we want cemented, the 

type of casing, the hole conditions. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Probert, I wanted to ask you; Halliburton is 

the largest cementing provider for the oil and gas industry, including both offshore and onshore drilling. Are the techniques that Halliburton uses to cement offshore wells similar to those it uses for 

onshore oil and gas cementing? 

Mr. PROBERT. It is really, in many respects, a function of the individual well. While the basic principles are the same, obviously a 

deep and challenging well like this would be cemented quite differently than a well that would be onshore. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So there is some difference not just onshore and 

offshore, but from well to well, correct? 

Mr. PROBERT. Yes. Each well has a unique program. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Mr. Moore, I wanted to talk to you a few minutes 

about the emergency systems on the blowout preventer stack that 

Cameron International assembled. It seemed to me like several 

things might have gone wrong that could have been prevented. 

Chairman Stupak referred in his statement to the report that 

several crew members witnessed the emergency disconnect system 

being engaged. The EDS was supposed to close the shear ramps 

and disengage the riser from the well, but the EDS did not work 


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because neither of these things happened. So my question is, Cameron doesn’t dispute that someone on the Deepwater Horizon 

pressed a button for the emergency system, does it? 

Mr. MOORE. No, we don’t. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And my understanding is that your technical experts think that something else went wrong. One possibility is that 

communications between the blowout preventer and the Deepwater 

Horizon were destroyed before the system fully engaged. Can you 

explain briefly how this would have prevented the emergency system from functioning? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, the control pods that function the blowout preventers is electrically actuated, and then that sends a signal down 

to the control pods, which then—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. A timed signal, right? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, it’s instantaneous. And so if you lose that electrical connection to the pod, then that signal would not make it. 

Ms. DEGETTE. My understanding is that the EDS button 

wouldn’t be hit unless the situation was dire, and that would require the communication lines to be intact for another full minute 

to function. That doesn’t seem to anticipate the type of emergency 

that happened on the Deepwater Horizon, so I want to ask you 

about another part of the system that might have failed. And that 

is the emergency disconnect system had a dead man switch, that 

it would automatically close the shear rams and seal the well if 

something goes wrong, even if the emergency button is not pressed. 

We were told by Cameron during interviews that in order for the 

dead man switch to activate, three things had to happen: The communications had to fail; the hydraulics had to fail; and the electrical power had to fail; is that correct, Mr. Moore? 

Mr. MOORE. That is correct. The dead man system is really designed to function when the riser parts from the wellhead. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. Now, your engineering expert told us that 

it’s possible the dead man switch did not activate immediately after 

the explosion because the hydraulic line could have remained intact; is that correct? 

Mr. MOORE. That could be a possibility. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, Mr. Moore, here’s the important question 

then; shouldn’t the dead man switch be designated to automatically 

seal a well once a catastrophic event happens like the kind of incident that occurred on Deepwater Horizon? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, I’ll just repeat that it was designed to function 

when the riser parts. If the riser is still attached and there is a 

control line still attached, then it could allow that function to 

not—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right, but in this situation everything failed, and 

yet the dead man switch didn’t activate immediately. 

Mr. MOORE. Well, the riser was still connected to the Horizon rig 

for a couple of days, I believe. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So you don’t think it should be designed to automatically seal the well if there is a catastrophic situation like this? 

Mr. MOORE. I think that’s something we have to look at. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes, I think so too. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say one last thing, which is, I 

didn’t want to get into a big argument with Mr. Probert about the 


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liability. I felt that the witnesses were a little more forthcoming 

today about willingness to clean up the situation, but I was dismayed in his testimony when he talked about deflecting blame 

from Halliburton by saying that they were simply following BP’s 

well construction plan. Because it seems to me that with all of 

these systems, it’s obvious there was a catastrophic failure and it 

might have been systemic on every level. 

And so I’m hoping every player here works collaboratively with 

each other, not just to clean up and pay for these damages, but to 

identify how it happened, whether it was a perfect storm, or whatever it was, because otherwise we can’t have that faith as we move 

forward, as I said in my opening statement, we can’t have that 

faith in supporting offshore drilling until we know how we can prevent those failures because while they are rare, they are devastating. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PROBERT. If I could just respond and say we are committed 

to working closely with all parties to ensure that we understand 

exactly what took place, whatever it may be, and use this as a 

basis for improving the safety of operations going forward. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Ms. Sutton for questions, please. 

Before you begin, Mr. Scalise has asked that the article he referred to from the Times-Picayune, Gas Surge Shut Well a Couple 

of Weeks Before Gulf Oil Spill, that be made part of the record. 

Without objection. And if you want to deliver it to the witnesses. 

He may follow it up with some questions, so I thought I would give 

you guys a chance to at least take a look at it. 

Ms. Sutton for questions, 5 minutes, please. 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have to start with some clarification. 

Mr. Newman, following up on my colleague, Representative 

Braley’s, line of questions and about the statements that people 

were asked to sign shortly after the incident—can we have that 

statement again on the screen? Can somebody pull that up? 

My question to you is this; are you telling us in this committee 

and the American people that this statement and asking people to 

sign this shortly after this unbelievable event had happened in 

their lives, that you were trying to find out the facts rather than 

trying to limit your liability, and this is the statement that was 

used to try and find out the facts? 

Mr. NEWMAN. With all due respect, Congresswoman, there is absolutely no limitation of liability in any of those statements. 

Ms. SUTTON. So my question to you is then that this statement 

was offered to these employees because it was an attempt to find 

out the facts. Is that your testimony? 

Mr. NEWMAN. In the immediate aftermath of the event, Congresswoman, our first concern was on the health and well-being of 

our people. We mobilized a team to south Louisiana to meet our 

people as they came—— 

Ms. SUTTON. It’s just really a yes or no question. 

Mr. NEWMAN. It had nothing to do with limiting our liability. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. So, again, the question was, are you telling us 

that this statement, you asked them to sign it because you were 


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trying to investigate the facts, and this is the statement you used 

to further that? 

Mr. NEWMAN. A statement identifying—— 

Ms. SUTTON. It’s just a yes or no question. 

Mr. NEWMAN. A statement identifying individuals who might 

have helpful information would be part of the initial—— 

Ms. SUTTON. Let’s move on. Since you’re not going to answer the 

question, I will take your failure to answer the question as the answer to the question. 

Can you tell me, do you operate rigs off of Norway or Brazil? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We do operate rigs in Norway and Brazil. 

Ms. SUTTON. What kind of a blowout safety system do your rigs 

in other parts of the world have? Can you share that with us? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Rigs around the world have blowout prevention 

equipment similar to what was employed on the Deepwater Horizon. The control systems in two regulatory regimes, Norway and 

Canada, the control systems require an acoustic backup system as 

well. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. So I understand. So how much would a duplicate blowout preventer cost, can you tell me that? 

Mr. NEWMAN. A duplicate blowout preventer, the entire system? 

Ms. SUTTON. Yes. How much would that cost? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I haven’t quoted one recently, my guess is they would be in the realm of $15 million. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. Let me move on to Halliburton and Mr. 

Probert. 

In an incident last year, there was a well blown out near Australia, I mentioned it earlier in my questions to Mr. McKay, the 

Montara spill. What caused that blowout? 

Mr. PROBERT. There is a commission of an inquiry which is underway for the Montara blowout in Australia in the Timor Sea. The 

commission hasn’t produced its findings, in fact, I think they just 

finished gathering evidence about 3 or 4 days ago. 

Ms. SUTTON. So we don’t know yet? 

Mr. PROBERT. So we don’t know yet. 

Ms. SUTTON. Was Halliburton involved in the well cementing? 

Mr. PROBERT. We were involved in the well cementing. But what 

we do know from the public testimony is that a 5-month period 

elapsed between the time the cementing was completed and that 

the well control issue took place. We also know from the testimony 

that the well owner in this particular case did not put a surface 

plug in place to protect the well when the blowout preventer was 

removed, nor did they put a corrosion cap on top of the well. So 

the well was left open to the elements for about 5 months. So I 

think the inquiry is what we all need to look to to find out exactly—— 

Ms. SUTTON. So is it possible that there is a relationship to the 

causes of each of these blowouts, in your opinion? 

Mr. PROBERT. It’s impossible to say until we get details from the 

inquiry, but it seems unlikely that there’s a link. 

Ms. SUTTON. Does the testing of cement change with the increasing depth of wells? 

Mr. PROBERT. Well, there are more casing strings which are run, 

as you have seen from the schematic on this well, there were actuVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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ally nine that were run, casing and liner strings. And so each one 

of those is tested. The first eight are tested in a slightly different 

fashion because we dry out afterwards because we are going to—— 

Ms. SUTTON. I am just asking about in relation to the depth of 

the wells, was the testing changed? 

Mr. PROBERT. I would say as a result of the number of pieces of 

casing, yes. 

Ms. SUTTON. OK. And just let me clarify one other thing. 

Our distinguished colleague, the ranking member of the full committee, had mentioned that he thought that perhaps you had been 

presented as some dolts because you don’t know what to do in the 

aftermath of this incident. But I would just say, to the contrary, 

you were certainly capable of figuring out how to develop and drill 

and profit from it, but what we’re concerned about, what I’m concerned about is that you didn’t figure out, for whatever reason— 

and I haven’t heard a good reason yet—about how to do it safely 

so as to prevent this kind of disaster. 

And the final question I have is, at the beginning of the Bush 

administration, there were closed meetings—and I’m glad Mr. Burgess reminded me of this—held by Vice President Cheney to discuss issues related to energy policy. I know that BP participated 

in those from previous testimony. Were any of the other companies, 

did they have representatives in those meetings? And can you just 

share with me whether or not you know if there was any discussion 

of trying to find ways to responsibly prevent this kind of disaster? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I don’t know whether or not Transocean was a participant in that. I think it would be very easy for us to confirm that 

for the committee. 

Mr. MOORE. I’m not aware that Cameron was either, but we can 

confirm it? 

Mr. PROBERT. I have no knowledge either, but again, we’ll look 

into it and let you know. 

Ms. SUTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Mr. Scalise, 5 minutes for questions, please. 

Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. 

I gave you all a copy of the article that’s titled ‘‘Gas Surge Shut 

Well A Couple of Weeks Before Gulf Oil Spill.’’ That was from yesterday. If you could take a look at that because I still want to get 

those answers about not only the time that’s mentioned in that article, but how many times total that well was shut down. 

I also want to refer, yesterday there was a hearing in New Orleans, an investigation that’s underway as well as some of the ones 

that are happening here, but there was testimony there, and I 

guess one of the supply ships, the Bankston, I guess supplied the 

Horizon, there was testimony by the First Mate of the Bankston 

who said that weeks before the accident, they had to clear mud off 

the rig because of what they heard was a ‘‘loss of circulation.’’ Are 

you familiar with that incident where there was mud that had to 

be cleared off of the rig? 

Mr. McKay or Mr. Newman. 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m not aware of that. 


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Mr. SCALISE. I mean, this was a public hearing yesterday, an investigation into this. I would imagine somebody at BP was monitoring this. 

Mr. MCKAY. I’m sure they were, I’m just not aware. 

Mr. SCALISE. Does your technical expert have any information on 

that? 

Mr. MCKAY. No. 

Mr. SCALISE. Well, get me whatever you have on it. 

Mr. Newman. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’m not familiar with the details of that event, no. 

Mr. SCALISE. And I would be happy to provide that article as 

well. But this was a hearing and investigation into this incident 

that happened yesterday. I would hope somebody at Transocean 

and BP know about this and can answer questions about this because this goes to the heart of were there a series of problems prior 

to the explosion that weren’t being dealt with? And of course if you 

can’t answer it, somebody at BP, somebody at Transocean is going 

to know about this, get me all of that information. 

But also I want to know, what safety changes were made after 

this one or multiple shutdowns occurred? Because if a shutdown occurs, that’s not something that’s supposed to happen, especially if 

mud is coming out because you’re not controlling the flow of the 

natural gas. It’s a well that’s been described here, this was a very 

difficult well, not a typical well. And these are people who were 

working on this well saying this. 

You all should know about this because there are other wells 

that are out there, but if there is a well that is not a typical well 

that’s causing problems, I would imagine you would take other 

safety precautions to address that. Maybe you didn’t. But you need 

to get me that information as well as the number of times it was 

shut down, what safety changes were made after those problems 

were recognized. 

So moving on. It seems like—and this is something else that’s 

discussed in the first article I gave you—it seems like there was 

a disagreement, it’s described here as a heated disagreement between BP, Transocean, and Halliburton regarding the process of removing the mud and putting in the seawater. And this was described as being prior to the cement being completed. 

Now, first of all, I will let each of the three parties that are mentioned here, Mr. Newman, do you know about a disagreement between the parties on what is the best way to install or to remove 

the mud and when to remove the mud and how much to remove? 

Were you all in agreement? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Congressman, I’m not aware of any disagreement. 

The first reference to any confusion with respect to what was happening on the rig I learned of during Chairman Waxman’s opening 

comments today. 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. Same thing, that’s the first I had heard of that. 

Mr. SCALISE. Mr. Probert. 

Mr. PROBERT. Halliburton would not normally be involved in that 

process, so I can’t imagine there would be any disagreement. 

Mr. SCALISE. Well, again, I mean, there are people who were on 

that rig saying that this heated disagreement occurred. Is it a 


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standard protocol, then, for the process that was used to remove 

the mud and replace it with seawater, is this a permitted process? 

Did you have to follow a plan for just how that process was going 

to go? Because clearly there were some problems, and it could be 

one of the main problems in relation to the explosion. Is this a 

standard process for when to remove the mud or is it something 

that you all kind of decide as you are there on the spot? 

I will go again, Mr. Newman. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Displacing the riser with seawater to recover the 

drilling mud is a normal part of the well abandonment process. 

Mr. SCALISE. So it’s not something that should be disagreed upon 

by the parties involved? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The displacement of the riser to seawater should 

not be a subject of disagreement. That is part of the normal processes of abandoning the well. 

Mr. SCALISE. Mr. McKay. 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe the procedure is part of the Temporary 

Abandonment Sundry Notice that’s filed with the MMS. 

Mr. SCALISE. So there should have been a standard protocol filed 

with MMS on the displacement procedure? 

Mr. MCKAY. I believe that the procedure would be filed with the 

Temporary Abandonment Sundry Notice, yes. 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. And if you could give me a copy of that as well. 

And then, Mr. Probert, if you know of any disagreement there, or 

just is that a standard process? 

Mr. PROBERT. I believe it’s part of a standard process. 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. And Mr. McKay, was that the point where you 

were when the explosion occurred? Do you know exactly where in 

the process, what operation was being performed on the rig at the 

time of the explosion? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know the exact time. I mean, this is what 

the investigation is working on. We have an investigation that 

started gathering the information that you’re—some of it is witness 

accounts that we haven’t been able to talk to yet. 

Mr. SCALISE. And finally, I’m out of time now, but a final question. In terms of the process of paying the fishermen and all others 

whose livelihoods are directly impacted by their inability to go and 

earn a living right now because of this, what is the process for getting them reimbursed? Clearly, there are a lot of people that are 

very nervous, one more week, two more weeks might be the difference between them going bankrupt or having their house foreclosed. What is that process, and what kind of assurance can you 

give that those people directly impacted will be able to be made 

whole in a quick, reasonable amount of time? 

Mr. MCKAY. We have a process underway to meet people’s needs 

on the coast immediately. We’ve got claims, numbers to call. We’ve 

actually got community centers to visit as well. We’ve paid out I 

think over 1,000 claims already, and most of it is to fishermen who 

aren’t working and need it for their cash flow. That’s where our 

emphasis has been so far. 

Mr. SCALISE. OK. If you can provide that process to the committee as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Scalise. 


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Mr. Burgess and I have a few more questions and we will wrap 

up this hearing. So let’s go one more round, five minutes each. 

Mr. Newman, I would like to ask you about the Risk and Hazard 

Analysis that your company performed regarding a blowout preventer. Four days in August of 2003, Transocean personnel examined every possible hazard on the Deepwater Horizon rig to figure 

out what could possibly lead to a major accident. Transocean evaluated the safety of the BOP and found out that even though BOPs 

had failed in the past, the likelihood of a BOP failure was low because it was not a frequent occurrence. Transocean then rated the 

severity of a BOP failure as extremely severe, which means the 

risk could result in multiple fatalities or a massive oil spill. 

So Mr. Newman, your staff knew several years ago that the BOP 

component failure would inflict major damage on your crew, your 

company, and the environment. So my question is why wouldn’t 

you do more to protect against a BOP failure? 

If I put your company’s risk analysis on the screen and tab 7 in 

the book there, if you want to look at it, it’s the last page of tab 

7 of that document, the environmental catastrophe taking place 

now is one of those predicted as possible by your experts. First, it 

says possible blowout with possible multiple fatalities and possible 

loss of rig; second, possible environmental impact. 

The preventative measures listed here included testing, inspections, and maintenance. 

Yet today, as I mentioned in my opening and has been mentioned 

a couple of times today, we learned that the BOP had a hydraulic, 

leaky hydraulic system, dead battery, and a configuration or design 

that actually interfered with the BOP safety features. 

So Mr. Newman, if you knew the risk, did the company take the 

necessary safeguards for the BOP? Isn’t there something more you 

could have done to make sure, knowing the extreme severity of an 

accident, that you could have made sure the BOP was working 

properly? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Mr. Chairman, over the last several years we have 

continued to improve our maintenance practices with respect to 

blowout preventers and we have continued to apply rigorous and 

strict testing protocols on a regular basis that would identify any 

failure. 

Mr. STUPAK. What about because we heard a lot about the 

deadman switch, just the batteries, do you have any test developed 

so you can test the batteries to make sure that they’re going to 

work so if everything else fails the batteries will still work and we 

can close those rams and shear this baby off? 

Mr. NEWMAN. We test the batteries when the BOP is on the surface. 

Mr. STUPAK. On the surface but not when it’s in the water. When 

was this BOP put in the water? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I believe it was put in the water in the first week 

of February. 

Mr. STUPAK. So that would be about 2 or 3 months. I guess my 

question is this: When you get done with this BOP, let’s say we 

didn’t have this be a problem, do you use BOPs over and over? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Yes. 


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Mr. STUPAK. This is 2001 this BOP was manufactured. Have 

they improved since, 2010? In the last 9 years have we had improvements in the BOPs to make more safeguards so we don’t have 

these failures of leaky valves and dead batteries and to make sure 

they work? Do we have new, improved BOPs? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The technology that was developed in the late 

1990s, when the industry first built rigs capable of operating in 

10,000 feet of water, is largely the same as what’s employed today. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have new, improved ones, Mr. Moore? 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman, over a 10-year period, yes, things do 

evolve. But we built our stacks to last 20 to 30 years if properly 

maintained and used in the environment in which they are designed for. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask you this because it came up earlier, 

acoustic BOP would be a redundancy system. Knowing what we 

know about this accident, if we had an acoustic BOP as a redundant system, would that have worked, would that have shut off, 

pinched off this pipe so we wouldn’t have this oil coming out? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The answer to that question, Mr. Chairman, depends on what’s inside the BOP. If the BOP is somehow being prevented from functioning correctly, then another means of activating 

the BOP would not have offered any improvement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Would an acoustic BOP be stacked or would it be 

off, somehow off the side to crimp this pipe? How would that work? 

Mr. NEWMAN. What we’re talking about, Mr. Chairman, is an 

acoustic control system. It is another means of activating the BOP. 

It’s not another BOP. It’s simply another means of activating the 

BOP. But here in order to activate this BOP, testimony has been 

that they probably hit the button on the rig when they realized 

there was a problem going on, right? They hit the button to activate the BOP. And you had to sever the communication, the power, 

and the hydraulic lines. Two out of three we know didn’t work. The 

communications and power were cut. The hydraulic lines are still 

intact, therefore the deadman switch didn’t work, correct? 

Mr. MOORE. We’re not sure the hydraulic line was severed. But 

if it wasn’t, it would not know to—— 

Mr. STUPAK. But even if it wasn’t with the acoustics on there, 

would that have shut down this BOP? 

Mr. MOORE. It would be a method to shut it down, if there wasn’t 

anything inside that BOP it couldn’t, it wasn’t—— 

Mr. STUPAK. We will not know that until we get the BOP off? 

Mr. MOORE. We will not know that until we see it. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. McKay, we asked for your risk registry, and I 

know you said you would get it, we still haven’t received it. Would 

you see that we get your risk registry for Gulf organizations; would 

you please provide that to us? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Burgess, 5 minutes for questions please. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Lois Capps was asking some questions about the work that’s 

gone on in the last 30 years as far as the mitigation of a spill when 

it happens. Now, there’s a dispersant that is being or was being injected, placed on the water and also being injected at the site of 


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the spill. That dispersant, is that new or is that something that’s 

been around for a while? 

And anyone, feel free to answer that. 

Mr. MCKAY. This technology is new. I mean this is the first time 

it has been used at any scale and—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Who has been responsible for the development of 

that product? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, Nalco I believe it’s Nalco is the manufacturer, 

Nalco Chemical. 

Mr. BURGESS. Now, I guess I’m a little confused. Did the EPA, 

you all approached the EPA for permission to use the dispersant 

below the surface. How long did it take to get the approval to use 

that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, we’ve requested several attempts, and there 

have been three tests. The last one ended yesterday, I think at 4:00 

something in the morning. That was a 24-hour test. It looks like 

the impact of it was really good. We have asked for the EPA to 

allow us to continue. I don’t know as of yet if we’ve gotten the approval, but we are ready to go on continuous injection. 

Mr. BURGESS. Typically how long does it take to get EPA approval to use a new material like that? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know. 

Mr. BURGESS. I know of a college in my district back in Denton, 

Texas, University of North Texas, does a lot of research on nano 

materials and they’ve got what they call noble-metal nanoparticles 

as well as porous metal organic frameworks that can absorb petroleum selectively and to a large differential. Are you guys looking 

at using anything along those lines? 

Mr. MCKAY. Absolutely. I think it was a bit misleading earlier 

on technology. This industry has massively, massively scaled up for 

oil spill response in the Gulf Coast using all technologies. 

Mr. BURGESS. Right, and it doesn’t have to be hay bales shot over 

the Gulf, there are large scale, the ability to do large scale dispersion—— 

Mr. MCKAY. Massive amount of equipment in the Gulf Coast. 

Mr. BURGESS. Let me just—going back to the tab pressure differential for a moment, Mr. McKay, Mr. Newman, either one of 

you. Would you get, a lot of what has happened today or a lot of 

the questions that come up today relate to who is in charge. I 

guess, Mr. Newman, really it is Transocean, the offshore operations 

manager, whatever it’s called, that is the person ultimately in 

charge of everything on the rig, that’s the captain of the ship, 

right? 

Mr. NEWMAN. If I can clarify that, Congressman, the offshore 

drilling rig is a complex piece of equipment. There’s a hotel out 

there to provide accommodation for the workers when they’re not 

working, there’s a power plant on the rig—— 

Mr. BURGESS. But somebody is ultimately in charge of the decisions, is there not? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The offshore installation manager is ultimately responsible for the maintenance of the rig, for the material handling 

operations of the rig, for the conditions of the hotel on the rig. The 

offshore installation manager cedes decision-making to the cusVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:06 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 076577 PO 00000 Frm 00170 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A577.XXX A577

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163 

tomer representative when it comes to decisions that respect the 

wellbore. 

Mr. BURGESS. So when you have got an anomalous result on that 

pressure differential, is it ever appropriate, and really Mr. Newman or Mr. McKay, either one of you can answer this, is it ever 

appropriate to seek the advice or permission, what is the role of the 

Minerals Management Service when something like that occurs? 

Mr. MCKAY. I don’t know in a specific situation like that. 

Mr. BURGESS. We’re going to override an anomalous result and 

remove the drilling mud, which is the primary protector. Even before the blowout protector, it is the primary protector of the well 

blowing out. Would you have ever consulted with any regulator at 

the Federal level or is that just not done? 

Mr. MCKAY. I can’t speculate on when a Federal regulator would 

be contacted, whether that situation would apply or not. I don’t 

know. The investigation is going to determine a lot of this. 

Mr. BURGESS. But I guess that is really a question that is going 

to have to be answered. And Mr. Chairman, you know, it just 

brings us back to where I started this morning. We’re going to have 

multiple hearings on this, I suspect, and at some point we have got 

to involve Department of the Interior, Department of Homeland Security, Minerals Management Service. We have got to involve these 

individuals. Now the name Carol Browner came up, the White 

House’s energy czar; it would be very interesting to have her come 

talk to us as well. We need to get the information and it is unfortunately going to involve getting the administration to be cooperative 

with this committee for a change. 

So just with that caveat in mind, I’ll yield back the balance of 

my time and thank you for and our witnesses for a very productive 

hearing today. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Burgess. 

As you know, I don’t believe in doing one hearing. I will get into 

an issue and we will have further hearings here, and the administration, it may be appropriate at another hearing to have them 

here, including the Minerals Management Service, and the administration on this issue and all the issues that have been before this 

subcommittee and this Congress has been cooperative. Even some 

document requests you have sent in the past have been, was 

worked out between us. So we will continue to work on it. 

Mr. Scalise, any questions? 

Mr. SCALISE. Just first, on all of the information that I had asked 

from the panel, if they could get that to the full committee as well 

and—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Correct, and I would just maybe follow them up 

with written questions, too. As I will say in a few minutes, we have 

10 days for further follow-up questions. 

Mr. SCALISE. I’d be happy to. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that materials on both 

sides that were actually made available to the committee be made 

available to the committee staff as well? 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes. No objection. All information that has been 

available, it has all been shared equally thus far. If there is anything further or something you don’t think was there, please let us 

know and we will make sure it’s there. 


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Let me ask one more question, Mr. Moore, if I may. The lessons 

we learned thus far about what worked and what didn’t work with 

the BOP, the blowout preventer, do you, the Cameron company, do 

you think the design changes should be made to BOPs and should 

there be modifications to the existing BOPs in service now? 

Mr. MOORE. I’m not sure, Congressman. I think we need to see 

what happened to that BOP. I think it would be, to change something that’s not broke, we don’t know what happened. We do know 

that we’re going to have to look at a lot of different things differently going forward in terms of how we move forward in this industry. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, look at that design one just so you know, you 

had your communications, your hydraulics and the power, the 

power, seems all three have to be severed before it will work, I 

think one or two before it would work. 

Mr. MOORE. Well, the design, as I said, of that was to function 

when you lose the riser from the BOP. 

Mr. STUPAK. We didn’t lose the riser here. 

Mr. MOORE. We didn’t lose the riser here. So we learned something. And Cameron is committed to make the changes, to working 

with our customers and working with the industry to move forward. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, thank you. Thank you to all the witnesses. I 

know it’s been a long day, and this is not an easy subject and it’s 

just beginning, and we are in the early stages. There will be more 

questions and answers, I’m sure, and unfortunately to the people 

who lost their lives our hearts go out to them, their families and 

co-workers. So I thank you for being here. 

That concludes our questioning. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today and for your testimony. The committee 

rules provide that members have 10 days to submit additional 

questions for the record. 

I ask unanimous consent that contents of our document binder 

be entered in the record provided that the committee staff may redact any information that is business proprietary, relates to privacy concerns or is law enforcement sensitive. Without objection, 

documents will be entered into the record. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.] 

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes our hearing. The meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Schakowsky follows:] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 


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Statement of Representative Schakowsky 

Oversight and Investigations Hearing "Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast 

Oil Spill." 

Thank you Mr. Chairman for yielding and holding today's important 

hearing. 

Last month, we were reminded once again, of the tremendous cost of our 

nation's reliance on foreign oil to meet our energy needs. The oil spill in the 

Gulf Coast is not only a human tragedy, leading to the loss of 11 lives, but 

also an environmental catastrophe, spewing hundreds of thousands of crude 

oil into the Gulf each day. 

I want to express my sympathy and support not only to the families of those 

brave workers who perished, but also to everyone who lives and or works in 

the Gulf region. 

The Deepwater Horizon spill is a devastating reminder that the United States 

must pass a comprehensive energy strategy that weans our nation off of oil 

and spurs development of cleaner renewable sources like wind, solar and 

biofeuls. If we fail to pass such reform, I have no doubt that tragedies like 

this one will continue occur. We must not forget that this spill comes on the 

heels of another tragedy, which took on AprilSth at a mine in West Virginia 

where 29 workers were killed in an explosion. 

But the point oftoday's hearing is to learn more about the events that led to 

the spill at the Deepwater Horizon site. Before us today are representatives 
166 


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of four companies who have worked at the site, including British Petroleum 

the company that currently operates the lease to drill there. 

I look forward to hearing their testimony, and hope that today's hearing will 

be productive. I watched yesterday'S Senate hearing and was troubled by 

the fact that the testimony appeared to be more about placing blame on one 

another, rather than ensuring that a spill like this never happens again. 

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for holding today's hearing. I yield back 

the balance of my time ... 
167 


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Before, durmg or after the cement lob, an lil>cietected IIIflux of hydrocarbons 

entered the wellbore: 

• The 9 7/8" casing was tested; the 9 7/8" casing hanger packoff was set and tested; 

and the entire system was tested 

Aftel16 5 110urs waiting on Cel'lent, a test was performed on the wellbore below 

the Biowout Preventer <130["'; 

During ttllS test, 1,400 pSI was observed on the drdl pipe while 0 psr was observed 

on ttle kdl ard the choke IlIle5: 

FollOWing the test, hydrocarbons were unknowingly circulated to surface whlie 

displaclllg tile flser With seawater, 

As hydrocarbons rose to the surface, they expanded, further reducing the 

nyclrostatlc pressure, The wei flowed and wl[lless account suggest that tile Annular 

Preventer In the BOP and the Dlverter were activated; 

An explOSion occurred, followed by a power fadure: 

Witness accounts suggest that the Emergency Disconnect System was activateo; 

The rig was evacuated: 

The BOP system faded to work as IIltended, F!ow was not contained and the Lower 

Mar!ne Riser Package dlci not dlsconnecc; 

• Modifications 11ave been dlscoveled In the BOFo sy~;tell1: 

Leaks ~lave been discovered In the BOP Iwc1rauilcs system, 

SP lauilched an Investigation WhlC!l is ongoing, 

Cementing - design and e)(Gcutlon: 

Casing - deSign and Insta lallon; 

Casing Hanger - deSign ana Instailatloll 

BOP -- configuratIon, maintenance and operation: 

Weil Control Practices 

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What Could Have Happened 

I. Before or during the cement job, an influx of hydrocarbon enters the well bore. 

2. Influx is circulated during cement job to wellhead and BOP. 

3. 9-7/8" casing hanger packoff set and positively tested to 6500 psi. 

4. After 16.5 hours waiting on cement, a negative test performed on wellbore below BOP. 

(- 1400 psi differential pressure on 9-7/8" casing hanger packoff and - 2350 psi on 

double valve float collar) 

5. Packoffleaks allowing hydrocarbon to enter weJlbore below BOP. 1400 psi shut in 

pressure observed on drill pipe (no flow or pressure observed on kill line) 

6. Hydrocarbon below BOP is unknowingly circulated to surface while finishing displacing 

the riser. 

7. As hydrocarbon rises to surface, gas break out of solution further reduces hydrostatic 

pressure in well. Well begin to flow, BOPs and Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) 

activated but failed. 

8. Packoff continues to leak allowing further influx from bottom. 

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Macondo 

la;t 2 trustacreErddtramisSm 
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Confidential Treatment Re'ClUE!SUld by 

Transocean Holdings TRN-HCEC-OOOOOOSO 
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Confidential Treatment Requested by 

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DAVlD L. WOCHNER 

DIRECT llNE: 202.383.0381 

E-maH: davktwochner@;sutherlanct¢Otn 

June 16, 2010 

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Waxman: 

1275 PenN}+vQtila Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004-2415 

202.383.0100 Fax 202.637.3593 

www.$utherlond,com 

ATlAN,A 

AUSTN 

, HQV$TQN 

NEW YORK 

T,l.tLAHAS"SEf 

WA:'I-\ING,?,01"4 DC 

Enclosed are narrative responses to the written questions for the record directed to Mr. Steven 

Newman from Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Members Parker Griffith, Robert 

E. Latta, and Steve Scalise in Chairman Waxman's June 2.2010 letter. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions. 

Attachment 

cc: The Honorable Joe Barton 

Ranking Member 

SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP 
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Enhanced Subsea Blowout Preventer (BOP) Stack Testing for Dynamically 

Positioned Rigs in the Gulf of Mexico 

Purpose 

Subsea BOP stacks are critical safety equipment designed to secure a well in the 

event of flow. They are tested to ensure that they will function and secure the 

well. The testing process also confirms there are no leaks in the system that 

would diminish system integrity. This file note is to document current subsea 

BOP stack testing practices for dynamically positioned (DP) rigs, and identify 

areas of enhancement for Gulf of Mexico (GoM) operations. 

Standard Practices 

Current GoM Mineral Management Service (MMS) regulations require BOP 

stacks to be stump tested at surface with water, pressure tested once installed 

on the well and then every 14 days thereafter. There is no GoM MMS regulatory 

requirement to test the BOP emergency systems once the BOP stack is installed 

subsea. 

Global industry practice before running a BOP stack to the wellhead at the mud 

line is to function and pressure test it on the rig deck. Where not required by 

regulation, this is done to avoid unnecessary downtime. The surface test is 

performed by installing the BOP stack on a test stump and hooking up the 

hydraulic and electric power and the control systems. Since the BOP stacks 

have two redundant pod systems, the surface tests include both pods. The 

function and pressure testing of the BOP stack is typically done using one pod 

and then it is only function tested using the other pod. This function test includes 

actuating the components, but not pressure testing them. In addition to function 

and pressure testing the normal operating functions on the BOP stack, the 

emergency systems are tested as well. These systems include: 

• Deadman 

• Autoshear 

• Emergency Disconnect System 

• Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) access 

BOP stack emergency systems are not typically tested once the BOP stack is on 

the seabed. 

The following is a summary of the emergency systems and how tests are 

typically performed on the test stump at surface. 

Deadman 

• Designed to close programmed rams when BOP stack loses hydraulics 

and electrical power 

• Tested at surface by cutting the power and hydraulics to the BOP stack 

and verifying the programmed rams have closed 

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Autoshear 

• Designed to close programmed rams if the Lower Marine Riser Package 

(LMRP) has an unplanned separation from the BOP stack 

• Tested by inducing a signal that simulates LMRP disconnect, then 

verifying the shuttle valves for the programmed rams work as designed. 

This can be done by "dry firing" (no hydraulic pressure) the system to 

verify the program is working and the shuttle valves operate. The 

Autoshear can be programmed to close the same rams as the Deadman. 

Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) 

• Designed to close programmed rams and disconnect the LMRP from the 

BOP stack 

• The EDS system can be set for multiple scenarios (i.e. with or without drill 

pipe in the hole, running casing, etc.) 

• Typically tested at surface by initiating the signal with no hydraulic 

pressure on the system to ensure the program is working as designed. 

ROV Intervention 

• A ROV stab panel is installed on the BOP stack to enable ROV 

intervention to operate select BOP functions 

• The ROV system is tested by plugging in a stab to the panel and operating 

the functions. The pump rates at surface do not necessarily simulate what 

a ROV could produce subsea. 

Subsea BOP Stack Emergency System Testing 

As stated earlier, the reason to test the BOP stack once subsea is to ensure that 

the stack will work as designed to secure the well if required and to verify that 

there are no leaks in the system that would diminish system integrity. A 

minimum condition of success would include confirmation that the emergency 

systems will close the blind shear rams. This can be accomplished by activating 

the Deadman system. Also, verifying the ROV intervention system is operable 

will ensure redundancy of closing the blind shear rams and provide opportunity to 

function at least one other ram, typically a pipe ram. 

The risk in testing the Deadman is that in cutting power and hydraulics to the 

BOP stack and relying on subsea battery power to operate, there could be a 

drain on the batteries. There is also a risk that the system will not re-start as 

designed and the LMRP would need to be pulled back to surface to enable 

repairs. Both of these are manageable risks. 

There does not appear to be any significant risk in testing the ROV intervention 

system once the BOP stack is installed on the well. However, standard ROV 

systems can only pump seawater in the volumes required. Seawater is adequate 

as an emergency control fluid, but Stack-magic is preferred for normal 

operations. This will require retrofits to standard ROV systems. 

2 

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Autoshear and EDS testing would include actuation of rams and involve 

disconnecting the LMRP. Testing LMRP release is not a critical operation to 

secure the well, could damage a connector and imports significant risk to the 

operation. Since the Deadman test would test the blind shear ram closing 

functions, it is not necessary to perform these additional tests at the seabed. 

A key question arises if the Deadman and ROV intervention systems are tested 

on the wellhead at the mud line as visual confirmation of ram position is not 

possible. How do you know the systems worked as designed? 

In the case of the Deadman system test, there are two indicators to determine 

the system worked as designed. Firstly, a ROV should see the control fluid vent 

as the rams are closed. The second indicator is the volume of fluid pumped to 

open the rams, which is counted at the BOP stack. If the volume pumped is as 

expected, it would be a reliable positive indication that the Deadman system 

operated as designed. There is not a way to get a false positive test 

When the ROV intervention system is tested, there is one current indicator to 

detect that the system worked as designed. As with the Deadman test, when the 

rams are opened, the volume of fluid pumped to perform the operation is counted 

at the BOP stack. If the volume pumped is as expected, this is positive indication 

the rams were closed by the ROV. A future consideration is to count the gallons 

the ROV pumps to close the rams, however it is unclear which ROVs have this 

capability and modification is likely required. 

Recommendation 

Short and long term actions are required to improve subsea BOP stack testing, 

reliability and intervention. The short term solution includes enhanced testing 

procedures when the BOP stack is installed on the well as described above. 

Long term solutions would include BOP stack system design modifications, 

improved operational practices and alternative solutions for contingency and 

intervention. These solutions will require input from operators, drilling and 

service contractors, and equipment manufacturers. 

In order to ensure the BOP stack on a BP-operated DP rig in the GoM will 

function as designed to secure a well, the Deadman and ROV intervention ram 

closure systems will be tested when the BOP stack is installed subsea. 

For the Development Driller III relief well, we will do a surface ROV intervention 

system test using the ROV pump and Stack-magic control fluid. To test the 

emergency system once the stack is connected to the wellhead subsea, we will 

test the Deadman. 

Scott Sigurdson 

VP Engineering, Drilling and Completions 4/27/10 

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-.--~------ WELL CONTROL SECTION -~ 7 

hransocean HQS-OPS-HB-Ol SUBSECTION ---- 2 

i WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

~ __________ ._. _________ !=_fI1~~GENCY ___ _ 

DROPPING THE DRILLSTRING 

A qUick decision may have to be made by the Driller to drop the drillstnng. -/ he 

outcome of this "last resort" depends on the seventy of the kick and the speed of 

execution of the correct procedure 

Situations that may require the drillstring to be released include: 

If an internal blowout occurs and the shear rams cannot be used. 

If an internal blowout occurs when the drill collars are across the BOP 

As an a Iternative to the use of shear rams in the event of an internal blowout 

when drillpipe is in the stack. 

If the BOP develops a leak and no back-up is available. 

It is important to be sure that the string will clear the BOP once it has been dropped 

(espeCially on a floating rig in deepwater). 

1.1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR DROPPING DRILLSTRING 

If the topdrive is connected, pick up the string as far as possible to position a 

tool joint three feet above the rotary table height. 

Stop circulating. Set the slips and break the connection three times 

3 Pick up on the drrllstring and remove the slips. 

4 RIH until the tool joint is as far below the rotary table as possible 

Select reverse on the topdrive, set the torque limiter to maximum and turn the 

topdrrve at maximum RPM until the string separates 

6 If this operation has to be carried out while tripping, and after following the 

above procedure the string has not parted, consideration should be given to 

using the annular BOP to hold the lower section of the drillstring. 

1.2 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR DROPPING DRILL COLLARS 

1. Position the elevators (manual) near the rotary table and attach an air hoist to 

the latch. If air-operated elevators are in use, position so that at least one joint 

(but less than two) is above the rotary table. 

2. Close the annular preventer with 1500 psi closing pressure to support the 

string weight. Where possible, consider closing both annulars. 

3. Unlatch/open the elevators. 

Harrieo les are printed from an electronic system and are not cQntroncd 

ISSUE NO: 03 REVISION NO: 00 PAGE OF 

REVISION DATE: MARCH 31, 2008 1 11 

COPYRIGHT@2008 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

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~ I WELL CONTROL 

, TranSOC8iin 1 ______ I1C1s.()ps-Hs-01 

WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

EMERGENCY L.....-...._._. _", _______ .• _____ .. __ . _____ _ 

4 Open the annular preventer(s) and release the drill collars 

5 Close the blind/shear rams, after string has had time to clear the BOP's 

6. Read and record shut-in pressure and pit gain 

Great care should be taken to ensure safety of personnel during these 

operations. 

2 SHEARING THE DRILLSTRING 

Blind shear rams (BSR's) can be used to cut drillpipe and then act as blind rams in 

order to isolate the well. 

Shearing the pipe is an operation that should be conducted only in exceptional 

circumstances and can be considered in the following situations: 

In preference to dropping the pipe in the event of an internal blowout 

When it becomes necessary to move a floating rig off location at short notice_ 

When there is no pipe in the hole, the BSR's may be used as blind rams. 

Most BSR's are designed to shear effectively only on the body of the dnllpipe. 

Procedures for the use of BSR's must therefore ensure that there is no tool joint 

opposite the ram prior to shearing. 

NOTE: Some subsea BOP stacks have insufficient clearance between the 

upper pipe rams and the BSR to hang-off on the upper rams and shear the 

tube of the pipe. 

Rig personnel must know the capabilities (i-e what size and grade of pipe can be 

sheared) and operating parameters of the shear rams installed In the rig's BOP 

stack. 

Optimum shearing characteristics are obtained when the pipe is stationary and 

under tension. It rs recommended that the string weight be partially hung off prior to 

shearing. Hanging off the pipe also ensures that there is no tool joint opposite the 

shear rams. Maximum operating pressure should be used to shear the pipe_ 

2.1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 

1 _ Space-out to ensure that there IS no tool joint opposite the shear rams_ 

2_ Close the hang-off rams and hang-off the string. 

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I ~ i WELL CONTROL [_ _ SECTION I 7 I , Transocean-Li ____ ""H"'Q"'S-'-O"-'PS-HB~-O~ ___ ~L SUBSECTIQI< ~ 

L

r-- WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

EMERGENCY 

Ensure that the pipe above the hang--off rams remains in tension. 

rj Close the shea! rcmiS at rnaximut1! accumulator pressure 

Monitor the well 

DISCONNECTING LMRP 

There are several situations that could arise during well control operations that may 

require disconnecting the LMRP and moving off the well 

If high annulus pressures approach the rated working pressure of the BOP's 

or because of equipment failure 

Vessel movement due to adverse wealher conditions (anchor chain or DP 

failure). 

Impending vessel collision or fire. 

3.1 BULLHEAD AND EMERGENCY DISCONNECT 

Attempt to bullhead the kick back into the formation. 

If a drop in dart sub is in use. pump down (with kill mud, if available) the dart 

until it lands in the dar! sub, while controlling annulus pressures. 

After the dart seats, bleed off drillpipe pressure and observe to see if dart is 

holding pressure. 

If the dart is holding pressure. close and lock lowe, pipe rams - assllmHlg 

stnng IS already hung off on designated hang-off pipe rams 

Displace riser with sea water 

Close all fail-safe valves 

Shear pipe and lock the sheal rams 

Disconnect lower marine riser package. 

Slack off guide line tensloners, where applicable. 

Move rig off location. 

3.2 EMERGENCY DISCONNECT (NO BULLHEAD) 

Stop the well control operation. 

Stop pumping. 

Close all fail-safe valves. 

Close and lock lower pipe rams (assuming string is already hung off on the 

designated hang-off rams). 

Shear pipe and lock the shear rams. 

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.1'.I"V1SION DATE: MARCH 31, 2008 3 

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I c::p ~~_H_ I WELL CONTROL ~~~ECTION 

"Transocean HQS-OPS-HS-01_ f_-si_S_UI!S""TION 

WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

EMERGENCY 

Disconnect lower marine riser package, 

Slack off the guidelines, if applicable, and move rig off location, 

4 RECONNECTION FOLLOWING EMERGENCY DISCONNECT 

Move ng back to well site, Run and latch LMRP, Displace riser with kill mud 

and pressure test choke and kill lines, Do not use any preventers for well 

control operations until tested, 

Open kill line fail-safe valves and observe drillpipe pressure (there Will be no 

pressure if dart is holding), If pressure is observed, either the dart is not 

holding (though kill procedures can continue) or consider the possibility that 

the string has been dropped, If this is the case, the choke and kill line 

pressures would be the same and the only well control options would involve 

the use of the Volumetric method or bullheading to kill the well, 

Open choke line fail-safe valves below lower pipe rams and observe casing 

pressure, 

Pump down kill line to ensure that circulation through dart is possible, 

Observe pressure increase on choke line gauge, 

If circulation is possible then continue to kill well using kill line gauge as 

drillplpe pressure and choke line gauge as casing pressure, 

Be sure to re-establish Circulating pressures as prevIous slow circulating rate figures 

will no longer apply, 

If circulation IS Impossible then consider bullheadmg or the VolurnetliG 

method, 

5 BLOWOUT/UNDERGROUND BLOWOUT 

Contingency planning must be prepared on the following basis, 

Stage 1 - Early Response: Pre-determined operations that can be implemented 

regardless of the type of blowout, including preparations for abandoning the 

installation and mobilizing emergency/support services 

Stage 2 - Containment: Operations designed to reduce the maximum possible 

damage, most of which occurs during the first 1-2 hours and depends on the type 

and severity of the blowout. 

Stage 3 • Control: Requires the assistance of specialists and may involve some of 

the following services and disciplines: 

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ISS 

Well capping, 

Relief well planning, 

HP pumping vessels/eqUipment. 

Logistics, 

Operations support/contractor personnel. 

Pollution control. 

News/media interface 

Regulatory authority interface, 

Insurance adjusters, 

An underground blowout occurs when formation fluids flow from one subsurface 

zone to another. 

The majority of underground blowouts have been the result of fracturing a shallower, 

weaker zone when shutting in on a kick originating from a deeper, more highly 

pressured zone. 

If an underground flow is confirmed, the Operator Representative and the Rig 

Manager Performance must be notified immediately. 

The direction of flow is important when choosing a control procedure. 

5.1 FLOW TO A FRACTURE ABOVE A HIGH PRESSURE ZONE 

Figure 7 2 1. shows a decision tree for identifYing and dealing with an underground 

blowout of this type. If an underground blowout is suspected, no attempt should be 

made to control the well using standard techniques. If the annulus is opened, 

reservoir fluids will be allowed to flow up the well to surface, thereby increasing 

surface pressures. 

5,2 FLOW TO A FRACTURE/LOSS ZONE BELOW A HIGH PRESSURE ZONE 

Flow down the wellbore from a high-pressure zone usually occurs when drilling into 

a naturally fractured, cavernous or structurally weak formation, The resultant losses 

reduce the hydrostatic head of the drilling fluid to such an extent that a permeable 

zone higher in the wellbore begins to flow. 

When the well is shut-in, it is unlikely that any pressure will be recorded on either the 

drillpipe or the casing, although the casing pressure may increase if gas migrates up 

the annulus. Pumping mud down the annulus will prevent this rise in pressure. 

PAGE OF 

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TTransocean WELL CONTROL 

WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

EMERGENCY -----------------------"-------

Figure 7 ,22, shows the decision tree for Identifying and dealing with an underground 

blowout of this type 

5.3 RECOGNIZING AN UNDERGROUND FLOW 

Indicators of underground flow 

Loss of returns and erratic increases in annulus pressures while CIrculating 

out a kick as the mud In the annulus IS lost to a fracture zone and replaced by 

more influx 

After shutting In the well, the build up of SIDPP and slep will be interrupted 

by a sudden reduelion In both as the formation fractures. 

Unstable or fluctuating SIDPP and slep may result from the unsteady flow 

from one or more formations or from the fractured formation opening or 

closing in response to the changing pressures, 

In most cases, there will be little or no communication between the drillpipe 

and annulus, SIDPP may change without being reflected by the slep and 

vice versa, 

Both SIDPP and slep may fluctuate simultaneously or independently of each 

other. 

If the formation collapses around the drillstring the SICP may stabilize while 

the SIDPP continues to change, 

SIDPP may be greater than the SICP as a result of formation fluids entenng 

the drillpipe, 

SIDPP may fall or go on vacuum if the mud U-tubes from the string and is not 

replaced by influx 

Perform a test to confirm whether or not the shut in well is a closed system, 

Pump a small amount of fluid down the drillpipe and if the DPP and SICP 

Increase, the open hole IS intact If neither the DPP nor the SICP increase 

then a fracture eXists in the open hole, 

5.4 KILL METHODS 

The monitoring and recording of the initial drillpipe and casing pressures is important 

for selecting a method of killing the well. Although the drillpipe pressures may not 

provide a readrng with which to accurately determine bottom hole pressure, they 

could indicate the minimum pressure required to control the kick (I.e. the maximum 

SIOPP seen prior to the formation breaking down would be used to calculate the 

minimum kill mud weight). 

ISSUE NO: 03 

REVISION DATE: 

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I ~ I,d WELL CONTR~~ L SECTION 

~ Transocean HQS-OPS-HB-01 SUBSECTION 

l,", 

WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

EMERGENCY --------

5.4.1 FLOWTO A FRACTURE ABOVE A HIGH PRESSURE ZONE 

If readily available, consider running a temperature/noise log through the dnlistnng In 

order to locate the loss zone 

A, Heavy Pill 

Calculate the minimum pressure required to control the kick using the highest 

SIDPP recorded. 

Select a range of densities for a heavy pill that, in combination with the 

existing mud weight, will provide the equivalent of the minimum hydrostatic 

pressure to control the kick. 

Calculate the height the pill will occupy in the annulus, convert it to a volume 

and mix three times the required amount to account for out of gauge hole and 

influx cutting. 

Displace (with the choke closed) the heavy pill down the pipe and into the 

annulus at as fast a rate as possible to reduce contamination by the influx. 

The original mud in the annulus must be conditioned to a density that will 

control the formation pressure at bottom and the heavy pill used to kill the well 

must be circulated out in stages in order to avoid re-fracturing the formation. 

Once the well is killed and losses have ceased, POOH and cement the 

fractured zone. 

B. Barite Plugs 

If the losses continue, spot a Barite plug on bottom of at least 500ft (150m) high and 

:l ppg (360kg/ m3

, O.36kg/l) heavier than current mud weight 

The high densitylfine particle size of Barite, when mixed with fresh water 

containing no suspension agent, enables the Bante to settle out rapidly when 

pumping ceases to form an impenetrable barrier that seals off the flowing 

zone. 

The surface mixing facilities and plug placement must be continuous and 

rapid If mixing or pumping is halted for even a short time, settling il1 the pits 

or plugging of the drillstring will occur. 

Barite plugs have the following advantages: 

They can be pumped through the bit and offer a reasonable chance of 

recovering the drillstring. 

The plug can be drilled easily if required. 

REVISION DATE: MARCH 31, 2008 7 11 

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Barite - Fresh Water Slurry Recipe (for 1 bbllO 16 m3

) 

Required Density I Volume of Fresh Weight of Barite 

, Water r 18 ppg(2:15i<gll) "" T(j642b~2'';'')-- -~530Ibs (240 kg)' 

r 20 PP9 (2:46k97i) , "To 560' bbls (0,089 ';'1'" '643IbiT292kgj' 

1

21,PP9 (25~1~-~~Q528 bbl;(~~ : 6951bs (31 ~ kg): 

, 22 ppg (2,63 kgll) ____ hc490 bbls (0 078. m3L_J.25.tJlbs (340 kg) 

A complex phosphate, such as sodium acid pyrophosphate (SAPP) or sodium 

hexametaphosphate, should be added to act as a thinner in case of contamination 

by mud in the annulus or by low quality barite, The concentration required IS 0.7 ppb 

(2 kglm\ 

NOTE: Complex phosphates will thermally degrade if the down hole 

temperature exceeds 140°F (60'C). If this is the case, a mixture of 

lignosulphonate 0,4 ppb (1.14 kglm3

) and caustic soda 0.25 ppb (0.71 kg/m3

) 

can be used instead. 

Optimum bante settling is achieved by adjusting the pH to 8-10 with 0.25 ppb (0.71 

kglm3

) of caustic soda. 

Barite Diesel Oil Siuny ReCipe (for 1 bb1/D.-16 m3

): 

(A barite plug derived from a barite - diesel 011 slurry is preferred 111 oil based or invert 

emulSion muds, A barite· fresh water slurry can be used proVided there is a diesel 

all spacer ahead of and behind the slurry) 

An oil wetting agent is added to increase the settling rate at a concentration of 5.0 

ppb (14.0 kgl m\ 

Hardco les are rInted from an electron;c sysWm and are not controlfed 

, ISSUE 

REVISION 

NO: 

DATE: 

03 REVISION 

MARCH 31 

NO: 

2008 

00 ' PAGE 

8 

~ 

11 

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~ : WELL CONTROL 

. ,Transocean i HQS.OPS.HB·O~_~ WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

L _____ . ___ ~ ___ . ______ .~.5MER~NCY ____ _ 

5.4.2 FLOW TO A FRACTURE/LOSS ZONE BELOW A HIGH PRESSURE ZONE' 

It readily available, consider running a temperature/noise log through the dnllpipe to 

locatA the loss zone. 

Keep pumpmg seawater down the annulus until a suitable LCM pill. polvmer 

plug, cement slurry, or diesel-bentonite plug has been prepared. 

Mix and spot a dlesel·bentonite 'gunk' plug (diesel, 400 ppb bentonite, 15 ppb 

of LCM) equal to or greatel than the hole volume below the loss zone. 

At a depth 100 ft (30 m) above the loss zone, pump 5 bbls (0.8 m3

) of 

diesel ahead of and behind the plug. 

When the plug begins to exit the drillstring, close the annular preventer 

and pump mud into the annulus at 2 bbls/mln (300 Ilmin) while 

displacing the plug at 4 bbls/min (600 I/min), 

Once 50% of the plug has been displaced from the string, reduce the 

pump rates to 1 bbllmin (150 IImin) down the annulus and 2 bbls/min 

(300 IImin) down the drillstring. 

Once 75% of the plug has been displaced from the string attempt a 

'hesitation squeeze' with 100·500 psi (690-3450 kPa, 69-34.5 bar) 

surface pressure, 

Under displace plug byl bbl, POOH, and allow plug 8-10 hours to set 

Other Alternatives 

Cernelii/oss L()ne (Refe! tv Sectiull 8 SlI!Jsec;;oll 8 itelll 6.4, Balallced Plug) 

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"-~W~"~'"'CO"'N"TR"'O''''----''--' 

HQS.OPS-HB-Ol 

WELL CONTROL COMPLICATIONS/EMERGENCY 

EMERGENCY 

Figure 7.2.1, Decision Analysis for Flow to a Fracture or Loss Zone 

R"""'~'_""WlOI"''''\>'l° >6<""",~"'","-"." 

/~, ..... 

--~~/ 

.. , ..... "''''' -

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

"".,~ ..... " •. ,I>to""" _"" ...... ". I 

TRN-HCEC-00005552 
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Figure 7,2.2, Decision AnalySIs for Flow to a Fracture or Loss Zone Below a High Prossure Zone 

C.MolConlr,,1 

iNSHW.QstoItSW 

!1l,,*Shultll.wdtln 

, ""nlbl. ~~~~=d bIowo .. ! 

-~,,"'rlKepmau'" 

. .I.~"ul" •• nddrlll~""e"va<"u'n 

(U""1uo ,,, ... ",,,,,m.ybuI16 II"j • 

l.~~~~£r..;;~: I 1 !d·=:~~tW I ,- . 

i 

J 

r-'~-'oonQ\~~~~'~f,om;::'--1 • 

I

I U"."p"""""mptGIh •• nn"!"~ l Suppl"''''I(I.ndll'~"I'''''_\.f 

._--------

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RBFALCON 

DEEPWATER HORIZON 

BOP ASSURANCE ANAL VIS 

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Prerared by: 

.L Tkhve!l 

Tiawell 

WS AIkins Inc 

11200 Richmond Avenue 

Suite 300 

Houston 

Texas 77082 

Tel.: (281) 4961073 

Fax.: (281)496-1225 

Deepwater Horizon BOP Assurance 

A Report Prepared by 

WS A TKINS INC 

on behalf of 

RBFalcon 

Checked by: .J....t:'k§:,. T. Bob 

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RBFalcon 

~~water ~orizon B9~A~s~-"~e ____ _ 

WS Atkins Inc 

DOCUMENT ISSUE CONTROL SHEET 

RB Falcon 

Deepwater Horizon BOP Assurance 

, Issue i Date Purpose 

i 1 I February internal revision I 2001 for WS Atkins I 

I ReView 

2 Copy for Client 

2001 Review 

i 

, 

I 

, 

I 

-

i February 

. ____ . ___ 

3 , March 

i Final Report 

2001 ! 

, I I 

I ! 1 

Rev. : Prepared I 

Desc, J 

, 

0 JET , 

I 1 , JET 

I --_._--. -j2 JET I 

, , , 

! I 

I I 

Pagei 

Checked ! Approved 

TB JET I 

: 

TB JET 

I 

. -- TB , JET , 

I 

i 

NOTE: This document has been specifically produced for the purposes of the Deepwater 

Horizon BOP Assurance and is only suitable for use in connection therewith. Any liability 

arising out of use of this document by RB Falcon Of a third party lor purposes not wholly 

connected with the above project shall be the responsibility of the client. who shall indemnify 

WS Atkins Inc against all claims. costs, damages and losses arising from such use. 

Report No: CL4148-001/FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

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RB Falcon 

Dee~a~er,H,,-ri~oll ~O!, Assurance 

TABL,E O~ C0I.iIEI:l-IS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY H" •• H ••• H .... H ...... H ... H ........ HH .. H ••• H ......... H .......... HH.H ... H...... III 

1. INTRODUCTION ...... H ................................................................. H ............. 1.1 

1.1 Background.................................... 1.1 

1.2 Scope of Work................. 1.1 

2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ........................................................................... 2.1 

3. METHODOLOGy .............. .. 3.1 

4. RESULTS ........ 4.7 

5. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................. H........................................... 5.1 

5.1 

5.2 

6. 

Recommendations ............. H ... .. 

Parking Lot Issues .. .. 

GAP ANALySiS ........ . 

APPENDIX A - DRAWING 

APPENDIX B - FMECA WORKSHEETS 

APPENDIX C - LESSONS LEARNED INDUSTRY 

APPENDIX D - REVISED RUNNING BOP PROCEDURES 

Report No: CL4148·Q01IFMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

5.1 

5.11 

6.1 

Page;; 

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RB Falcon Page iii 

O.er:wate~Horizon BOP Assurance 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

An Integrated Project Team was convened on January 8", 2001 to provide a high level of 

confidence that the BOP system on the Deepwater Horizon is a reliable and safe system. The 

following summarizes the work completed by the RB Falcon, BP, Cameron, TSF and WEST 

team: 

The rig specific failures were reviewed and discussed in detaii. The result of the review 

was that several recommendations for enhanced maintenance, equipment and 

procedures were developed. 

• The industry failures that relate to the equipment on the Deepwater Honzon BOP 

System were discussed in detarL The results of this review were that a few 

recommendations were suggested for improved maintenance, testing and equipment 

change out or modification. 

A risk assessment focused on reliability was completed. Engineering and operations 

personnel from RB Falcon, BP. Cameron, TSF and WEST identified 260 failure modes 

that could require pulling of the BOP or LMRP. It was found that malfunctions of 

regulators, solenoids, hoses, ST Locks, connectors, shuttle valves and autos hear 

circuitry were the predominant failures. Additionally, several reliability.jmproving 

recommendations were proposed. The recommendations were a combination of design 

modifications, equipment replacement, improved PM and procedures. 

The revised running BOP procedures should be reviewed and accepted for use on the 

Deepwater Horizon. The BOP hang-off and retrieval procedure should be revised in a 

similar manner to the revision that was completed on the BOP running procedure. 

• The hazards identified during the HAZID analysis should be issued to the rig so that the 

individuals responsible for running the BOP can be reminded of the hazards and critical 

steps associated with running the BOP. This infonmation can be used to evaluate the 

criticality of any changes in procedure that occur due to equipment malfunctions or time 

constraints while running the BOP. 

The Gap analysis performed revealed that the major difference between the Deepwater 

Horizon and the Discoverer Enterprise BOP Assurance Analysis was the level of PM 

review completed. The Deepwater Enterprise team reviewed PM's in detail to make 

sure that the BOP maintenance is sufficient to uncover the major failure modes 

identified during the analysis and to ensure that the maintenance IS performed at the 

appropriate frequency (Le. quarterly, between well, etc.) !ndividua! procedures were not 

reviewed during the Discoverer Enterprise BOP Assurance Analysis. The predominant 

failures from both analyses were similar; solenoids, hoses, connectors, shuttle valves 

and ram locking mechanisms. 

It is important that all the recommendations associated with this analysis be reviewed and acted 

upon by the appropnate managers within RB Falcon. 

Report No: CL4148-001IFMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

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RB Falcon Page 1.1 

~e_"!,,,,~er~ori~~B..<JP Ass~!a_n~e 

1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Background 

RB Falcon (RBF) has requested that WS Atkins Inc. perform a BOP Assurance Analysis of the 

Deepwater Horizon BOP System. The objective of the analysis is to evaluate the Horizon BOP 

and identify failure scenarios that lead to situations where the LMRP of BOP must be pulled and 

repaired (significant down time), and to review the BOP running, retrieval and handling 

procedures and identify hazards associated with the procedures. The lessons learned will be 

used to eliminate or minimize the consequence of system failures. 

1.2 Scope of Work 

In order to achieve the objectives of the analysis the following tasks were completed. 

Identify failure scenarios that require the LMRP or BOP to be pulled to the surface and 

repaired. 

• Determine which modes of operation the failure scenarios identified affect. 

Perform a failure mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) on each unique LMRP 

and BOP Function. 

• Perform a HAZID on the Horizon BOP running, retrieval and handling procedures. 

The analysis was perfoomed in a three-step process. The methodology of the analysis is 

detailed in Section 3 of this report. The FMECA was limited to the subsea portions of the 

Deepwater Horizon BOP while the HAZID included the reView of both surface and subsea 

portions of the system. 

The analysis was carried out at the RB Falcon offices in Houston, Texas. The study was 

conducted between January 8 and January 15, 2001. The team members that participated in 

the study are listed in Table 1.1. 

Report No: CL4148-001/FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

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RB Falcon 

D~e!>water Ho~z~"-B()P_ Assurao"! ~ ___ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ 

Table 1.1: Team Members 

Malt Gouletl 

1 AI Cotton 

Ken Reed 

Kevin Wink 

. Drew Weathers 

Gary Leach 

Mike Rodgers 

, Scott Hopkins 

RBF 

RBF 

RBF "'--' - --,-

RBF 

RBF 

: RBF 

• RBF 

RBF 

John Wilson RBF 

Bill Ambrose RBF 

mgoulett@rbfalcon.com 

. acotton@rbfalcon.com 

: kreed@rbfalcon.com 

kwink@rbfalcon.com 

sleppard@rbfalcon.com 

gleach@rbfalcon.com 

mnrodgers@rbfalcon.com _ .. - --- shopkins@rbfalcon.com 

------_. __ ._--_ .. __ .- - ._ ..•.. _-,- , Don Weisinger BP 

-"._. '~C~e Eng.- -~ "---

f.--------- is'; 

i Manatee 

-rCa~eron --.-- -i--~-· 

Cameron 

Greg Chiles West .-~----- -"'-

Ed Stidston TSF 

James Tidwell Facilitator, WS Aikins 

Report No: CL4148-001/FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

~re?~~est-hou~com 

• estidston@deepwater.com 

Page 1.2 

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RB Falcon Page 2.1 

O~!p~ater Horizon BOP Assurance 

2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 

The multiplex control system uses both subsea and surface equipment to control the blowout 

preventer stack installed on the wellhead at the sea floor. The stack is in fWo sections: a lower 

stack connected to the wellhead and a retrievable upper stack (LMRP) connected to the lower 

stack. The major subsea units of the system are the subsea multiplex unils, the 

electro/hydraulic control pods, and the retractable slabs. These units are mounted on the 

upper stack. In addition an accumulator system mounted on both the lower and upper stack. 

The principle function of the BOP control system is to control, operate and monitor the various 

closing devices of the BOP stack. Although these closing devices are operated hydraulically, 

electrical signals control application of the hydraulic operating pressures. The multiplex BOP 

control system supplies both the hydraulic operating pressures and the electrical control Signals 

in the manner described below. The accumulator pump unit develops the hydraulic pressures 

and routes them to the subsea control pod. Control panels at the surface originate the 

electrical control signals. The CCU encodes these signals and transmits them through 

electrical cables to the subsea multiplex unit where they are decoded and routed to the control 

pod. The decoded signals operate control devices that direct the hydraulic operating pressure 

to the selected stack functions. 

General functions controlled by the multiplex BOP control systems are: 

A. LMRP Functions 

1. Annular Preventer (Upper & Lower) 

2. Riser Connector 

3. Hydraulic Stabs 

4. Mud Boost Valve 

5. Bleed Valves 

B. BOP Functions 

1. Blind Shear Ram 

2. Casing Shear Ram 

3. Upper Pipe Ram 

4. Middle Pipe Ram 

5. Lower Pipe Ram 

6. Stack Connector 

7. Choke & Kill Valves 

In addition to the genera! control functions, the multiplex system also provides continuous 

control and momtoring of surface and subsea hydraulic pressures and fluid flow and displays 

status indications for the subsea eleclrical and electronic equipment. 

The multiplex control system provides operational reliability through equipment redundancy. 

The two operational systems are designated yellow and blue. Each system is capable at 

operating all stack functions, but only One system is used at a time. 

Both systems share the control panels at the CCU and Driller's Panel, and some of the 

electronic circuitry in the CCU Both systems also share the hydraulic power developed at the 

accumulator pump unit. There are, however, fWo separate cable reels and fWo complete sets 

of subsea units including the control pods, multiplex cables, subsea multiplex unit and 

retractable stabs. Although only one system is operational at a time, both systems receive 

Report No: CL4148..()01JFMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

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RBFareon Page 2.2 

~eepwater Horizon ~~P~~~uran~e 

hydraulic power and electrical control signals and switchover can be accomplished in minimum 

time. 

Report No: CL4148·001fFMECA IREV 2) 

Issue Oal.: March 2001 

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RB Falcon Page 3.1 

Dee~water Ho~on BOP Assurance 

3. METHODOLOGY 

The objective of the analysis was to evaluate the Deepwater Horizon BOP and identify failure 

scenarios that lead to situations where the LMRP of BOP must be pulled and repaired 

(significant down time) and to review the BOP running. retrieval and handling procedures and 

identify hazards associated with the procedures. The lessons leamed will be used to eliminate 

or minimize the consequence of system failures. This objective was achieved by performing 

the following task: 

Review the layout of the RBF BOP. 

Perform a risk assessment and FMECA 01 the Deepwater Horizon BOP. 

Review Ihe BOP running. relf/eval and handling procedures. 

Perform a HAZID on the deepwaler Horizon BOP running. retrieval and handling 

procedures. 

The analysis was performed in a Ihree-phase process: 

Phase.J: During a brain storming session the team determined which failure scenarios lead to 

situations where the LMRP or BOP must be pulled and repaired. The results of the 

brainstorming session were evaluated to determine the relevance of the failure scenarios to 

each drilling operalion mode. The results from this portion of the analysis were recorded in a 

table (see example Table 3.3) that lists the failure scenarios Ihat lead to a pull of Ihe LMRP or 

BOP. The table also delails the operating modes that each failure scenario can affect. The main 

purpose of Phase I was to get the leam members to agree on which failure scenarios require 

the LMRP Of stack to be pulled. 

Phase II: For each function identified in Phase I a failure mode, effect and criticality analysis 

(FMECA) was performed. The hydraulic and electrical diagrams were reviewed to determine 

which failure modes can lead to a loss of the function. The team was also asked to evaluate 

the cause; local effect. system effect. detection method. mitigation. frequency; consequence, 

risk rank. and recommendations for eliminating the failure or reducing the effects of the failure. 

The work performed in this phase of the analysis was also recorded on worksheets. The 

worksheellemplate is allached as Table 3.4 through Table 3.6. 

PhaseJ!!: A HAZID was performed on the BOP running. retrieval and handling procedures. 

The detailed procedures were reviewed and the hazards associated with each step in the 

procedures were identified. The team was asked to identify the consequences, safeguards, 

recovery plan. and recommendations for each hazard identified. The work periormed in this 

phase of the analysis was recorded on worksheets. The worksheet template is attached as 

Table 3.7. 

Report No: CL4148-{)01/FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date; March 2001 

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RB Falcon Page 3.2 

Deep~~ Horizon BOP Assurance ______ _ 

Each failure identified was ranked according to the ranking system detailed in Table 3.1 and 

Table 3.2 

Table 3.1: Consequence 

.C,;;;;;q~e~e -!C~n;;';'~n;~Oeti;;ti~; '- ,.-~.- .~--.. -....... ~.<-.~--.-. ---. - .-,-,. : Very High Potential flow to environment 

High 

• Moderate 

Low 

: Pull BOP 

J Pull LMRP 

! Nuisance 

Table 3.2: Frequency 

Frequ~n:~ i!~~~,:c_Y_D_ef_I".I~O". __ ._ .. _. __ ~ . Very High i Frequent: Once every 4 months 

High ~_probable: Once every 8 months 

Moderate , Possible: Once per year ---------

, low Unlikely: Once per 5 years 

The criticality analyses for each failure mode is determined by its placement within the matrix 

based on the frequency and consequence ratings. The matrix is presented in Figure 3.1. The 

most critical failure modes are represented by a "VH" (very high) in the upper right comer of the 

matrix. while the least critical failure modes will have an "L" (low) in the lower left corner of the 

matrix. 

Figure 3.1: Criticality Matrix 

VH 

H 

M 

L 

l 

Report No: CL4148·001/FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

M H 

Frequency 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

VH 

TRN-HCEC-00016658 

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(") 

o 

g. 

a 

1i!: 

-l 

@ 

'" a 

l 

c: 

g 

::J 

til 

§ 

'" ::J 

::I: 

til 

r 

h 

-l 

;0 

z 

:l: 

(") 

m 

RB .... on 

!>""p'N.a..,r __ 

Table 3.3: Phase I: Failure Scenario vs Operation Mode 

------_. 

FAILURE SCENARIO ,- Runningi Drilling 

I Landing BOP 

11. . Loss of Riser (leak ot: mud 

2_ 

3_ 

\ LMRP '4 

boost line, choke & kill line, rigid . 

conduit, flex joint, mux cables, etc) 

j Loss of 

i T alai loss of one pod 

Loss of one cntica! function on one 

pod (no\ a major leak) 

5_ _ etc_ 

BOP 

,6_ 

3_ 

4. 

5_ 

6. 

7. 

Loss of Choke & Kill valve connection 

_ 

... _---------

Loss of shear ram 

i Loss of more than one pipe ram r - -

I Loss of one choke or kill valve outlet 

(fail to open) 

etc. 

Report No: CL4148-001IFMECA(REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Operation Mode ._>--

Running 

Page 3

Comptetion t Well 

---1---

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Insert offset folio 211 here 76577A.096smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARING

Rb .on 

Horizon 
203 


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R!I raj""" De~p1lVater Horizon 

Issue Date: March 2001 

r.n:"firl"nil%ll Treatment Requested 
204 


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210 


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Confidential Treatment Requested 
211 


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212 


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Confidential Treatment RelqU€,sle'd 
213 


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r,n"firiAnfi,,1 Treatment Ke'JUEist!iO 

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o 

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<1> 

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-l 

(!) 

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IJ 

C 

(!) 

Pag" 
215 


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216 


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rnnfirf",",ti"'l Treatment ,""",(Jw~s[eu 
217 


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!:nnfirl"",ji,,1 Treatment Requested 
218 


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219 


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r:r'nr"'FtrlHa Treatment Kt:C!LI"~l\;" 
220 


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Confidential Treatment r<eqU<lS[€JCI 
221 


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f:onfirj"ntiai Treatment ,,~'qU'Wl"U 
222 


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223 


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Page 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendations 

Confidential Treatment Requested 
224 


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5,2 

',,"',,",nh,,1 Treatment ReqU,)stE)d 
225 


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REI Falcon 5.3 

Confidential Treatment "''''''lUt''''"''' 
226 


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RB Falcon 

Oe_"~waler Horizon 

March 2001 
227 


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PM (visual 

Cc,pfiiaerlliai Treatment ""'\.lL"'''!~'C 
228 


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RIi! 

D!,,~,,!er_. 

Confi(jen,liai Treatment Ke'queslea 
229 


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RBFalccII 
230 


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RBf.lco" 

Report No: 

Issue Date: 

Confidential Treatment Requested 
231 


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1<6 Falcon 

D"e~ater Horizon 

i Recommendatlon 

(FICIR) 

(UMfl) 

Confidential Treatment KelaUflSlG'U 
232 


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RS Falcon 

De""wa!e, Horizon SOP 

ReoortNo' 
233 


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REI Falco" 

BOP Assurance 

5.2 Parkit1glot Issues 

The issues listed below in Table 5. i were 

The issues listed in this section the concerns 

analysis that were not associated with a speCific failure mode 

Report No: Cl414S'{)()1IfMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

5.1 Parking lo! Issues 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

Page 5.11 

lot list during the 

were captured during 

TRN·HCEC·00016693 
234 


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RS Fal"" ... 

i review. 

Report No: CL4148-0011FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean Holdings 

Page 5.12 

TRN·HCEC-00016694 
235 


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RBFal""" Page 

Report No: 

Msrch2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean Holdings LLC TRN·HCEC·00016695 
236 


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RBfalc"" Page 5.14 

2001 

Report No: 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean Holdings TRN-HCEC-00016696 
237 


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RB Falcon Page 5.15 

2001 ; 

: c.Olmeclorhob,) [-

Report No: 

March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by T,,'n~r""''''n Holdings TRN-HCEC-00016697 
238 


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REI Falcon Pago 5.16 

~~ep~~~~~~~~.~OPAS~LW~~~:. __ :: .. ::::::.~:.=.:: .. ~ .. ::=:::::: __ ::::==~::~:=:=~. 

Review riser deck 

completion 

review. 

Report No: CL4148'()01iFMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date.' 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings 

2001 

TRN·HCEC·Q001669S 
239 


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RB Falcon 

i operational limits) to 

Report No: CL4148·QQ 1!FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

\Vink 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

Page 5.17 

TRN-HCEC-00016699 
240 


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RB Falcon 

~""!'~\\Ia!",::~o!i~OI1 ~~c;lP "Assurance 

6. GAP ANALYSIS 

A 

to see 

Pall" 6"1 

was conducted upon 

The Gap analysis was 

of the two analyses" 

The Gap performed revealed that major difference between the Deepwater 

Horizon and Disooverer Enterprise BOP Assurance the level of PM review 

The Deepwater Enterprise team reviewed PM's detail to make SUre that the 

maintenance is sufficient to uncover the failure modes identified 

analysis and to ensure that the maintenance is at frequency 

between well, Individual reviewed during 

BOP failures from both 

Report No: Cl4148oQ01IFMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings lLC TRN·HCEC-00016700 
241 


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Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN·HCEC·00016701 
242 


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RB Falcon 

~!eE'!~!:':l()~~"~~1'!5)P Ass"~,,.! ___ "_" ______ "_~ ___ ~ ____ _ 

APPENDIX A 

DRAWINGS 

CL4148-001IFMECA (REV 2) 

March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

AppendixA.l 

TRN-HCEC-00016702 
243 


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244 


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250 


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251 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 260 here 76577A.145

Confidential Trealment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00016711 
252 


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RB Falcon 

Deepwater HO~rlzon !3()!~~!"!I<:e 

APPENDIXB 

FMECA WORKSHEETS 

Report No: CL4148-001/FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

Appendix B·1 

TRN·HCEC·00016712 
253 


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RIlFalcoll 

~""water Hamon BOI' Assurance 

APPENDIX EI 

FMECA WORKSHEETS 

Report No: CL4141l-001IFMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

Appendix B·1 

TRN-HCEC·00016713 
254 


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317 


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318 


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319 


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320 


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321 


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322 


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Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00016782 
323 


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RBFal",," 

~"epwllter Horizoll BOP Assurance 

APPENDiXC 

lESSONESLEARNEOINDUSTRY 

Report No: CL4141>-0011FMECA (REV 2) 

Issue Date: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 

(;-1 

TRN-HCEC-00016783 
324 


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Confidel1tial Treatment Requested LLC TRN-HCEC-00016784 
325 


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Confidential Treatment Requested 
326 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 335 here 76577A.220

Confidential Treatment Requested by Tr<m~nl"'"'' 
327 


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Confidential Treatment Requested llC TRN·HCEC·Q0016787 
328 


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Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean 
329 


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; Stack Frames 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean LLC TRN-HCEC-00016789 
330 


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Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00016790 
331 


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REI Falcon 

O .. ep1N"t~Horiz()f1~OP Assurance 

APPENDIXD 

REVISED RUNNING BOP PROCEDURE 

Report No: CL41413-OO11FMECA (REV2) 

Issue Dat.: March 2001 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings llC 

Appendix D-1 

TRN-HCEC-00016791 
332 


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Reviewed by HAZID Team, January 2001,Revised 0 11701 

3.1.1.11-

General Information 

is landed. 

Job Po.itlons Involved; 

Installation 

Crane Operator, 

Procedure: 

Preparation: (starts in skate) 

1. 

Subsea Engineer, Assistant Driller, Derrickman, Fioorman, 

of drilling units operated by R&8 Falcon 

conform to the safe working 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00016792 
333 


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2, 

3, 

4, 

5, 

6, 

7, 

8, 

9, 

10, 

lL 

l" 

15, 

16, 

17, 

18, 

19, 

20, 

21 

numbers are recorded $0 days in service can be 

cart 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC 
334 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 343 here 76577A.228

Seals intact and lubricated. 

pressure test (Check with Company Man & 1M to dete;mlne 

Hardcop!es are printed from all electronic system u"coutrolled. 

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC TRN-HCEC-00016794 
335 


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POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

TRANSOCEAN LTD. 

INQnRY INTO HIE DEEPWATER HORIZON GULF COAST OIL SPILL 

MAY 12,2010 

OUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE GRIFFITH 

I. How do you anticipate implementing findings of the investigation into currently operational 

wells and future exploration? 

Transocean has assembled an investigative team to determine what caused the Deepwater 

Horizon explosion, a team that includes dedicated Transocean and other industry experts. 

That investigation is ongoing. Transocean is committed to working hard to understand what 

caused this incident and what might be improved. We will implement whatever 

recommendations come out of that analysis. Until we know exactly what happened on 

April 20, 2010, the real sequence of events. and what recommendations will be made, it is 

difficult to speculate about how Transocean may implement any findings. 

2. Throughout testimony. several investigations arc mentioned. How long do you anticipate 

these investigations will last? 

The Transocean investigation is gathering inionnation, some of which is not available to 

Transocean. Transocean has provided the Committee with documents and analysis relating 

to the investigation. An interim report was provided to the Committee on June 14,2010. 

and has been published to the Committee's website. 

3. Do you have similar operations in deepwater environments? Can you address any similar or 

different safety concerns that you have encountered? 

Transocean operates in deepwater environments around the world. We maintain a 

consistent standard of policies and procedures, maintenance practices, and operating 

practices across the global Transocean fleet. In the aftermath of this incident, we have 

continued to follow Transocean policies and procedures around the world. Until we find 

out what happened and determine what might be improved following the incident. it is 

difficult to pinpoint any safety concerns that may have arisen elsewhere that may be related 

to any concerns posed by the events of April 20. 

4. You address the functions of the players in drilling contracts in your testimony. In your 

opinion, what can be done in the future to facilitate Operator and sub-contractor joint 

responsibility? 

Under applicable statutes, drilling contracts, and industry practice, the responsibility of each 

party reflects its relative control, investment, and ownership of the well and the 

hydrocarbons. The Operator identifies its target location, secures a lease tl'om the United 

States, develops the well plan, applies for a permit. selects its contractors, and owns and 

takes the production from the well. Contractors selected by tbe Operator contract to 
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perform specific services for a negotiated tee. A system of joint responsibility for the well 

\vould be a fundamental change in the structure of offshore oil and gas operations. 

5. How do you think that responsibility should be allocated? Should it be different depending 

on contract or an industry standard? 

Under applicable statutes, drilling contracts, and industry practice, the responsibility of each 

party reflects its relative control, investment. and ownership of the well and the 

hydrocarbons. The Operator identifies its target location. secures a lease from the United 

States, develops the well plan, applies for a permit. selects its contractors. and owns and 

takes the production trom the well. Contractors selected by the Operator contract to 

perform specific services for a negotiated fee. A system of joint responsibility for the well 

would be a fundamental change in the structure of offshore oil and gas operations. 

6. In your testimony, you identity the cement. the casing, or both to clearly be the "root cause 

of tile occurrence." What, if anything can be done to protect in the future if there is a cement 

or casing issue that causes pressure to be released from the reservoir? 

Until we know exactly what happened on April 20.20 I 0 and the real sequence of events, it 

is ditIicult to speculate about what specifically might be done in the future to prevent 

pressure being released from the reservoir in the event of a cement or casing issue. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE LATTA 

1. How many people does your company currently employ in the United States? 

Transocean currently employs 4.497 persons in the United States. 

2. How many operational rigs does Transocean currently have within the waters of the United 

States? Also. does Transocean have the largest amount of rigs among your competitors here 

in the United States? 

Fourteen drilling rigs owned by various subsidiaries of Transocean Ltd. are operating in 

waters of the United States. Among competitors. Transocean has the largest number of 

deepwater rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. 

3. Since 2005 how many federal investigations have been opened into the safety and 

environmental problems on drilling rigs owned by Transocean? 

With the exception of the current investigations related to the April 20, 2010 explosion, we 

do not believe that any Transocean drilling rig has been the subject of U.S. federal safety or 

environmental investigation. 

4. What is Transocean's current safety record, as measured by injuries per hour worked? 

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Transocean has maintained a strong safety record in the Gulf of Mexico and throughout the 

world. Transocean has never and will never compromise on safety. In 2009. Transocean 

recorded its best ever Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR). In 2009, we achieved a 

worldwide TRIR of 0.77 incidents per 200.000 man hours. Thirty-eight (38) rigs had zero 

TRIR (no recordable incidents) and sixty-seven (67) rigs had zero lost time accidents. Four 

(4) rigs achieved our safety vision of zero incidents. The Deepwater Horizon had a sevenyear history with no lost time accidents. 

5. Is Transocean's safety record better than the overall industry average, and how do you 

compare to other deepwater driHing companies in the United States? 

Transocean does not compare itself to other deepwater drilling companies directly because 

each company records, classitles. and categorizes incidents differently. Accordingly, such 

comparisons could be inaccurate or misleading. 

The IADC publishes incident rates for drilling companies in U.S. waters. These IADC rates 

retlect the number of recordable incidents or lost time incidents per 200,000 man hours. 

Notably, however, these statistics do not distinguish between deepwater and shallow water 

drilling. 

Comparing the IADC rates for U.S. waters to comparable Transocean rates, in 2009. 

Transocean's rates were generally consistent with the fADC industry rates. In the i1rst 

quarter of 20 10. Transocean far outperformed the industry by demonstrating incident rates 

significantly belmv the IADC rates for drilling companies in U.S, waters. 

6. How is Transocean helping the families of those I! loved ones who passed away on the 

Deepwater Horizon, and also those who were injured? 

The families of the nine Transocean employees who passed away in the Deepwater Horizon 

explosion continue to receive full pay and benefits at this time. All injured crew and those 

receiving ongoing counseling (45 in total) continue to receive full pay and benei1ts, in 

addition to any statutory benefits that may be owed under workers compensation, the Jones 

Act, or the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act. All uninjured crew aboard 

the Dccpwater Hori::on not currently receiving counseling (25 in total) also continue to 

receive full pay and benefits. 

The families of ail nine Transocean employees who passed away were advised shortly after 

the event that the Company was interested in and available to sit down with them, as soon 

as they felt ready and able to discuss their i1nancial futures and potential settlement of their 

claims. We are currently having these discussions with some families and hope to do the 

same with all the families and their counseL No approach by any family or their 

representative to have settlement discussions has been rejected by the Company. With 

respect to injured employees and their families, the Company is willing to discllss 

settlement of any injury claim at any time. 

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Most of the Transocean crew lost personal possessions in the incident, and compensation 

for these lost items has been offered by the Company. Almost all of these individuals 

accepted the Company's offer. including those who arc represented by attorneys and have 

lawsuits pending, and the families of the who passed away. Compensation for 

lost possessions was also offered to the Transocean cmployees who were onshore at the 

time of the incident, but may have left some possessions onboard. Almost all of these 

persons also have accepted the Company's offer of compensation for that personal property. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE SCALISE 

1. How many times were operations shut down on the Deepwater Horizon rig prior to the 

explosion on April 20. 20 I O? 

Prior to the April 20, 20 I 0 explosion. drilling operations were suspended and there was a 

partial evacuation of the Horizon on one occasion. On May 26, 2008. the 

Deepwater Horizon was evacuated after taking on water during drilling operations 

for BP at the Freedom No.2 well. At approximately 5:30 p.m .. an alarm in the starboard 

forward pump room notified crew members of water ingress in the pump room and a 

thruster room. causing the vessel to list two degrees starboard forward side. As counterballasting measures began. 77 non-essential personnel were transferred to a standby vessel 

while 61 remained on board. The Coast Guard, among other authorities, was immediately 

notified of the incident. By 10:50 pm, the vessel was stabilized and all personnel were 

brought back on board. 

2. What safety changes werc made following these shut downs. if any? 

An investigation immediately commenced to determine the cause of the vessel taking 011 

water. The cause was an inadvertent opening of the overboard discharge valve and a series 

of ballast valves as a result of routine maintenance. which allowed water to enter the pump 

and thruster rooms. We reintbrced our tocus on task planning to improve control of routine 

maintenance tasks. 

3. [t has been reported that there was a serioLis disagreement over the decision to remove the 

heavy drilling mud and replace it with sea water. Who made this decision? Was there a 

serious disagreement? 

Based on our information. there was not a disagreement about the decision to displace the 

drilling mud with seawater. It is our understanding from testimony to the U.S. Coast Guard 

that there was a discussion between Jimmy Harrell of Transocean. the OIM, and Bob 

Kaluza, the BP Well Site Leader. and Donald Vidrine. the BP Company Man, on April 19th• 

Based on that testimony, we understand that Mr. Harrell was presented with a new or 

revised plan by BP that did not include a negative pressure test. Mr. Harrell insisted that a 

negative pressure test be conducted. After discussion. the negative pressure test was 

conducted. It is norn1al practice to remove the drilling mud from the riser prior to 

disconnecting the riser 1]'om the well. and that would have been part oftbe logical sequence 

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of events during abandonment of the well. The timing is determined by the Operator and 

may be set forth in the wel! plan. 

4. Is there a uniform industry practice for the process and timing regarding (he displacement of 

mud with seawater? 

Displacing drilling mud with sea water is a normal and, in fact, required step in the 

abandonment process (See 30 CFR 250.442(e)). Standard industry practice is to not 

displace drilling mud with sea watcr until the Operator is confident that the cement and 

casing are adequate barriers to contain pressure from the reservoir. 

5. It has been reported by the media and mentioned at Congressional hearings that mud had to 

be cleared off the rig six vvceks prior to the explosion because of a loss of circulation. Are 

these reports accurate? If so, was this a warning sign that something was \\Tong with the rig, 

and of what would eventually occur on April 20. 2010'1 

Transocean has no information to support such a report. However, we know that during the 

course of drilling at this location, there were four events during which well control 

operations were successfully conducted. Those operations would have involved the use of 

drilling mud. Our investigation reflects that the Transocean employees acted appropriately, 

and those events would not suggest or imply that there was any problem with the rig; to the 

contrary, the well control equipment and the drilling crew successfully addressed well 

control issues. 

6. You stated during the hearing that there would have been procedure on me with MMS for 

removing heavy drilling mud and replacing it with sea water. Can you please provide a copy 

of this procedure? 

The tilings of procedures with the MMS are the responsibility of BP in its role as the 

Operator. We have not been able to locate a copy of this procedure. 

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HALLIBURTON 

1150 18th Street, NW· Suite 200' Washington, D.C. 20036 

Main: 202.223.0820' Fax: 202.223.2385' e-mail: bob.moran@halliburton.com 

Robert Moran 

Vice President, Government Affairs 

June 14,2010 

Via Fmail 

The Honorable Hentv A. \'iJaxman 

Chairman 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Room .316 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20S15·6115 

and 

'[1,e Honorable Bart Stnpak 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on U\Cr:"V'll and Inycstigations 

Room 316 Ford House Building 

Washington, DC 20515-6115 

Re: :-fay 12 Hearing on Deepwater I lonzon Catasnophe 

Dear Chairman Waxman and Chairman Stupak: 

Please find attached the responses of Tim Prohert of Halliburton to the Qnestions for the 

Hearing Record. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me or our outside cou1lSel (ldfre), L. Turner of Patton 

Boggs LL1') if you ha\'c any questions. 

cc: The Honorable Joe Barton 

The Honorable Michael Burgess 
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RESPONSES OF TIM PROBERT, HALLIBURTON 

TO 

MAY 12 HEARING QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE 

The Honorable Parker Griffith 

1. How do you anticipate implementing t1ndings of the investigation into currently 

operational wells and future exploration? 

Response: Until the root cause of the Mississippi Canyon Block 252 Well number 1 

incident is identit1ed, Halliburton cannot speculate on actions that may be taken on 

currently operational wells and future exploration. 

2. Throughout testimony, several 

anticipate these investigations will last? 

are mentioned. How long do you 

Response: Halliburton cannot offer an opinion in this area. 

3. Do you have similar in deepwater environments? Can you address any 

similar or different safety concerns that you have encountered? 

Response: Halliburton has extensive experience operating in similar deepwater 

environments. Our work in deepwater has been conducted with very positive safety 

results. 

4. In your testimony, you state that Halliburton is contldent that cementing work was 

done in accordance with the well owner's construction plan. Is there any type of 

documentation done by the owner after cementing is done for veritlcation purposes? 

Or is this the responsibility of Halliburton as a sub-contractor? 

Response: Well integrity tests and all documentation including cement evaluation are 

the responsibility of the well owner. 

5. What, if anything can be done to protect in the future if there is a cement or 

issue that causes pressure to be released from the reservoir? 

Response: Industry well control theory identities that the well owner must maintain 

multiple effective barriers to the reservoir during well construction, well completion, 

and well production operations. 
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6. According to the New York Times on Tuesday II, 20 I 0, "HallibUJion, the 

contractor for the cementing job on the Deepwater Horizon well that blew on April 

20, used a type of nitrogen-charged cement to close olfthe bottom of the well, 13.000 

feet below the sea bed. The nitrogen gas was blended into regular cement to make a 

substance that was puffier and lighter than the cement used in oil drilling. 

Experts said this type of cement can form a stronger bond in celiain types of rock, but 

is also more difficult to use than standard cement. requiring great care in mixing and 

application. 

A supervisor on the rig has said he had not seen 

deepest part of a well, and investigators are 

catastrophic explosion." 

cement used betore in the 

\vhethel' it contributed to the 

a. Can you comment on what types of cement mixtures are used to plug varying 

well types? 

Response: There are a variety of str:,I-fieCC)gnllz,:d cementing solutions 

available for plugging wells. Foam <'M"PT"'" is a commonly used solution in 

the oil and gas 

b. Is there a standard cement mixture that BP or the drilling industry as 

a whole uses? 

Response: There are a of industry-recognized cementing solutions 

available for plugging wells. 

c. Can you comment on what situations bring tbrth the use of different cement 

mixtures? 

Response: A variety of well eonditions temperature, pressure, 

economics and other) are considered when designing a cement mixture. Foam 

cement helps improve mud displacement. prevent migration of well 

fluids, and helps protect the formation. 
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The Honorable Steve Scalise 

I. It has been reported that a new type of cement was being used for the seal of the 

blowout preventer. Was the application process documented and permitted? 

a. The cement used in the Mississippi Block 252 well is common 

and in the industry. All application and permitting 

requirements are the responsibility of the well owner. Halliburton did 110t 

take part in that process. 

2. It has been reported that there was a serious disagreement over the decision to remove 

the heavy drilling mud and it with sea water. Who made this decision? Was 

there a serious disagreement? 

a. Halliburton was contracted to cementing, directional drilling and 

measuremel1t-while-drilling services. The decision to remove drilling 

mud and replace it with sea water was not within Halliburton'S scope of 

work. Halliburton did not participate in that decision. 
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CAME 

The Honorable R. ParKer Griffith 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

House of Representatives 

Congress of the United States 

2125 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515·6115 

Dear Congressman Griffith: 

June 16,2010 

! write in response to your questions communicated to me by Chairman Waxman in his 

June 2, 2010 !ettec Our responses to those questions are as follows: 

1. How do you antiCipate implementing findings of the investigation into currently 

operaUonai wells and future explorations? 

Cameron provides flow equipment products, systems and services to worldwide oill gas 

and process industries, but does not itself design, drill or operate wells, Our customers 

design the wells; they frequently specify the equipment that will be used to drill and 

produce those wells; and they operate the Cameron--provided equipment. 

Because Cameron is an equipment provider, it does not, strictly speaking, have the 

ability to make changes in any currently operational wells and it cannot direct the 

structure of future drilHng operations, 

What Cameron can do is the following: First, it wil! continue its practice of informing lts 

customers of improvements in the safety and performance of our products through 

regular issuance of Safety Alerts, Engineering Bulletins and Product Alerts. If a safety 

improvement is identified, a Safety A!ert wi!! be sent via certified mail and email to all 

known users and posted on our Transact Website for customers 

Second, once results ofthe various investigations are known, Cameron may obtain new 

information that can be assessed for purposes of studying, and potentially 

implementing, improvements in the design of Cameron products. Cameron will review 

the results of such investigations with great care and consider any relevant information 

in the context of future design and manufacture of Carneron products. 

1/UO 
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Chairman Henry A. Waxman 

June 16, 2010 

2. ThrougllOut testimony, several investigations are mentioned. How long do you 

anticipate these investigations will/ast? 

Cameron is presently aware of investigations inquiries into this matter by the 

Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard), the 

Department of the Interior (Minerals Management Service) and numerous 

Congressional Committees. It is impossible even to estimate how long so many 

investigations/inquiries may take. Furthermore, Cameron has no clear sense at this 

time of when the BOP will be recovered to the surface. For that reason, too, it is 

impossible to have even a rough idea of how long the investigations and inquiries will 

last. 

3. Do you have simi/or operations in deepwater environments? Can you address any 

similar or different safety concerns that you have encountered? 

Strictly speaking, Cameron does not itself have "operations in deepwater 

environments." However, Cameron does provide equipment to the companies that do. 

We are currently aware of approximately 130 Cameron supplied BOP's operating in 

deepwater environments. In the category of safety concerns, I note that a Cameronsupplied BOP was in place on the Ixtoc 1 drilling platform from which there was a 

serious spill in 1979. As we understand it, in the Ixtoc case the blowout preventer was 

unable to shear the drilling pipe because the shear rams encountered a drill collar in the 

BOP's shear ram cavity. It was well-known in the drilling industry that the BOP shear 

rams were not designed to cut drill collars, which are too big to be sheared. 

4. Of the 2500 BOPs you mention in your testimony, how many ore involved in deepwater 

projects? 

As note in my response to Question 3 above, we currently know of approximately 130 

Cameron-supplied BOP's operating in water depths of more than 1,000 feet. 

Cameron deeply mourns the loss of life and damage to our Gulf Coast environment. The whole 

oil and gas industry, as well as Cameron, needs to learn as many lessons as possible from this tragedy so 

that we can continue to meet the United States' energy needs in a safe and secure manner. If we can 

assist your inquiry further, please contact me or our counsel, Emmet T. Flood, Williams & Connolly LLP, 

at (202) 434-5300. 

Jack B. Moore 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

o