COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ROBERT A. VILLWOCK, T/A 

 PIONEER CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0434-95-3 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 MARCH 19, 1996 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA/CIGNA, 

 CHRISTOPHER R. ROUTH, ROBERT C. 

 HUFFMAN AND UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 R. Louis Harrison, Jr. (R. Louis Harrison, 

Jr., P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 John M. Poma (Midkiff & Hiner, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee Insurance Company of 

North America/CIGNA. 

 No brief or argument for appellees 

Christopher R. Routh, Robert C. Huffman and 

Uninsured Employers' Fund. 

 Robert A. Villwock appeals the ruling of the Workers' 

Compensation Commission that CIGNA, the putative insurer, 

complied with Code § 65.2-804(B) in cancelling his workers' 

compensation insurance policy. We affirm because credible 

evidence supported the commission's finding that the employer 

received notice of cancellation. 

 Robert A. Villwock owns and operates the Pioneer 

Construction Company. He had workers' compensation insurance 

through CIGNA. The most recent policy was to be effective from 

April 7, 1993 through April 7, 1994. As a condition of that 

policy, Villwock was required to comply with certain audit 

requirements, including provision of payroll records. 
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 On March 30, 1993, CIGNA requested payroll information for 

an audit. The request was accompanied by a notice that the 

information had to be provided within fifteen days in order to 

avoid an interruption in coverage. CIGNA received no response 

from Mr. Villwock, and sent a second request for information on 

May 8th. Villwock's insurance agent, Virginia Fowler, received a 

copy of this notice, and contacted Villwock by telephone. 

Villwock assured Fowler on two occasions that he would provide 

the requested information immediately, but did not do so. 

 CIGNA then requested permission from NCCI, which administers 

workers' compensation insurance for the Commonwealth of Virginia, 

to cancel Villwock's policy. A copy of this request was sent to 

Villwock and his agent. On August 13, 1993, NCCI responded 

directly to Villwock, with a copy to CIGNA, informing Villwock 

that if he did not provide the requested information within 

fifteen days his policy would be cancelled. While both Fowler 

and CIGNA received their copies of the aforementioned notices, 

Villwock denied receiving any of them. 

 CIGNA then proceeded with cancellation of the policy 

pursuant to Code § 65.2-804(B). On August 27, 1993, it sent a 

notice to Villwock, with a copy to the agent, informing him that 

his insurance would be cancelled effective September 30, 1993. 

The statute requires a thirty-day notice to the employer and the 

commission, and CIGNA routinely adds five to seven days to 

account for mailing. Under standard office practice, the notices 

to Villwock and the agent would be mailed the day the notice was 
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typed, and the commission's would be mailed two to five days 

later in a bulk mailing. 

 The commission did not receive its notice until September 

22, 1993. NCCI, to which CIGNA also sent a copy of the notice, 

received its notice on September 16. Because it received its 

notice less than thirty days from the cancellation date, the 

commission changed the effective date of the cancellation to 

October 21, 1993, thirty days from its receipt of the notice from 

CIGNA. The commission's standard practice was to send a notice 

to the employer notifying it of the cancellation and the 

effective date. A commission witness testified that this form 

was sent, although he was unable to produce a copy of it because 

the hard copies of the record had been destroyed. Villwock 

denied receiving notice from either CIGNA or the commission. His 

agent received her copy of the notice from CIGNA. 

 On November 15, 1993, two employees of Pioneer Construction 

fell from a scaffold and were injured, one severely. On the day 

of the accident, Villwock contacted his insurance agent, who 

informed him that his policy had been cancelled. Villwock 

testified that CIGNA did not inform him that the policy was 

cancelled until he contacted the company himself in February 

1994. 

 At his deposition, Villwock testified that in June 1993 he 

moved from Route 1, Box 148B in Huddleston, Virginia to 112 

Autumn Avenue in Huddleston. Villwock did not inform either 

CIGNA or his insurance agent of his change of address. He did, 
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however, provide a forwarding order to the post office, and he 

received forwarded mail. He was still receiving forwarded mail 

as of the deposition date of August 24, 1994. Yet, he testified 

that he never received a single item of correspondence from 

CIGNA, NCCI, or the commission concerning either the audit or the 

cancellation of his insurance. He testified that he was unaware 

of any other mail he failed to receive after changing his 

address.1

 He acknowledged receiving and cashing a refund check 

from CIGNA that was mailed to his former address in March 1994. 

 Villwock's method of dealing with his business mail was 

haphazard. Both he and his wife, who helped with the business, 

collected the mail. Mail was opened each day "at random" by 

either Villwock or his wife. The business and personal mail were 

both delivered to the same mailbox. The Villwocks did not open 

all of the business mail at once, but instead "at various times." 

 They did not datestamp the mail. 

 We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

party prevailing below. States Roofing Corp. v. Bush 

Construction Corp., 15 Va. App. 613, 616, 426 S.E.2d 124, 126 

(1993). The commission's factual findings will not be disturbed 

on appeal if supported by credible evidence. Id. This Court is 

not bound by the commission's determination of legal questions. 

 

 1 At the hearing, Villwock testified that he had changed his 

address in 1987. The commission cited this date in its decision. 

 The testimony at the deposition concerning the change of address 

was more clear and detailed, and is also more consistent with 

other facts in the record. We therefore accept the deposition 

testimony for purposes of this appeal. 
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Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324, 416 

S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337, 428 S.E.2d 905 

(1993). 

 Resolution of this case requires interpretation of Code 

§ 65.2-804(B). The statute provides, in pertinent part: 

 No policy of insurance hereafter issued 

under the provisions of this title . . . 

shall be cancelled or nonrenewed by the 

insurer issuing such policy . . . except on 

thirty days' notice to the employer and the 

Workers' Compensation Commission . . . 

 The threshold question is whether the insurance company must 

show that the notice was received, or merely that it was mailed. 

 The commission's opinion is ambiguous on this issue. For the 

reasons set forth below, we hold that CIGNA must show that the 

employer received the notice.2

 In American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Barlow, 4 Va. App. 

352, 355-56, 358 S.E.2d 184, 186-87 (1987), we held that the 

notice must actually be received by the commission in order for 

cancellation to be effective. In Barlow, the employer received 

the notice but the commission did not. We thus had no need to 

decide whether the employer must actually receive the notice. 

 In deciding whether actual receipt is necessary to effect 

cancellation, the language of the statute controls. Where the 

 

 2 The commission did not rule explicitly on whether Villwock 

had received the notice. However, it noted that Villwock had 

received and cashed the policy refund check--in effect finding 

that Villwock had received the notice as well. As discussed 

further below, this finding is amply supported by credible 

evidence. 
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statute provides that the policy may be cancelled by giving a 

certain number of days' notice to the insured, and does not 

specify mailing as the method of providing notice, actual receipt 

is required for the notice to be effective.3

 This rule is well 

established in both cases and commentary. See Scanlon v. Empire 

Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 117 Idaho 691, 693-94, 791 P.2d 

737, 739 (1990); Larocque v. Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance 

Assoc., 536 A.2d 529, 530-31 (R.I. 1988); Nunley v. Florida Farm 

Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 494 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 1986); Osborne v. Unigard Indemnity Co., 719 S.W.2d 737, 

740-41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Smith v. Municipal Mutual Insurance 

Co., 169 W.Va. 296, 298-99, 289 S.E.2d 669, 670-71 (1982); Rocque 

v. Co-operative Fire Insurance Association of Vermont, 140 Vt. 

321, 325, 438 A.2d 383, 385-86 (1981); Martin J. McMahon, 

Annotation, Actual Receipt of Cancellation Notice Mailed By 

Insurer as Prerequisite to Cancellation of Insurance, 40 A.L.R. 

867, 873, 883-88 (4th ed. 1985); 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 391 

(4th ed. 1982). 

 

 3 The same rule applies to provisions in an insurance policy 

that set forth requirements for notice of cancellation. Where, 

as here, the policy provisions conflict with the applicable 

statute, the statute controls. See Ampy v. The Metropolitan 

Casualty Insurance Company of New York, 200 Va. 396, 400, 105 

S.E.2d 839, 844 (1958) (Code provision regarding cancellation of 

motor vehicle insurance became part of insurance policy and 

insurer had to comply with it); see also Boman v. State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 505 So.2d 445, 450 (Fla. Dist. 

Ct. App. 1987); Smith v. Municipal Mutual Insurance Co., 169 

W.Va. 296, 301, 289 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (1982); Martin J. McMahon, 

Annotation, Actual Receipt of Cancellation Notice Mailed By 

Insurer as Prerequisite to Cancellation of Insurance, 40 A.L.R. 

867, 871 (4th ed. 1985). 
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 This rule is consistent with the policy that underlies Code 

§ 65.2-804(B). As the Court noted in Barlow, one purpose of the 

notice requirement is to allow employers to secure insurance with 

another carrier. See also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. 

Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 223 Va. 641, 

643-44, 292 S.E.2d 327, 328 (1982). If the employer does not 

receive the notice, the employer does not have the opportunity to 

secure other insurance, and thus the statutory purpose is not 

fulfilled. See Larocque, 536 A.2d at 531; Smith, 169 W.Va. at 

299, 289 S.E.2d at 671. 

 CIGNA met its burden of showing, based on credible evidence, 

that the employer received the notice.4 First, CIGNA presented 

evidence concerning its regular procedure for mailing notices of 

cancellation. This evidence supports a finding that the notice 

 

 4 Insurance companies typically meet this burden through 

application of the presumption that correspondence properly 

mailed is received by the addressee. See Larocque, 536 A.2d at 

532; Osborne, 719 S.W.2d at 741. In Virginia, the mailing of 

correspondence, properly addressed and stamped, raises a 

presumption of receipt of the correspondence by the addressee. 

Washington v. Anderson, 236 Va. 316, 322, 373 S.E.2d 712, 715 

(1988). Denial of receipt by the addressee raises an issue for 

the fact finder. Manassas Park Development Co. v. Offutt, 203 

Va. 382, 385, 124 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1962). 

 Here, the notice was not "properly addressed" because, due 

to Villwock's failure to inform CIGNA of his change of address, 

it was mailed to his former address and therefore had to be 

forwarded. We need not decide whether the mailing presumption 

applies in the circumstances of this case. Even without benefit 

of the presumption, which disappears upon denial of receipt by 

the addressee, credible evidence supports the finding that 

Villwock received the notice. 

 
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was mailed from CIGNA in the regular manner. Villwock disputes 

this, arguing that the commission's late receipt of the notice 

negates any inference that the mailing was handled in a regular 

manner. However, a postal delay in processing the commission's 

copy of the notice, or a delay by the commission handling the 

notice once it arrived, is irrelevant to the procedures used by 

CIGNA in handling Villwock's notice. Also, the notices to the 

commission and Villwock were mailed using different procedures, 

with notice to the employer going out the day it was typed, and 

notice to the commission going out two to five days later through 

bulk mail. While CIGNA's procedures for mailing commission 

notices may have contributed to the delay, this does not suggest 

that Villwock's notice was handled other than in the regular 

manner. 

 Second, none of the correspondence from CIGNA to Villwock 

concerning either the audit or the cancellation was returned as 

undeliverable. Indeed, CIGNA showed and Villwock acknowledged 

that he had received the refund check from CIGNA that was mailed 

to his former address. He also testified that he had received 

forwarded mail and was unaware of failing to receive any 

forwarded mail other than the notices concerning his insurance. 

The commission was justified in concluding that Villwock's 

haphazard procedures for handling business mail, as well as his 

history of failing to respond to verbal notice provided by his 

insurance agent, supported the inference that he received the 

cancellation notice but failed to respond, either deliberately or 
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through negligence. We hold that Villwock's insurance was 

effectively cancelled. 

 According to Villwock's testimony, mail to his former 

address in Huddleston was forwarded to his new address. While 

CIGNA added five days to the notice period to account for 

mailing, the necessity of forwarding may have delayed the notice 

so that the notice period was less than thirty days. However, 

even if it was received late, the notice was still effective. 

 Villwock had more than thirty days' notice of the need to 

procure substitute insurance. The commission, because it 

received its notice less than thirty days before the notice 

period set by CIGNA was due to expire, established a new 

cancellation date of October 21, 1993. The commission sent a 

notice to Villwock that informed him of the new cancellation 

date. The commission's action negated any failure to comply with 

the thirty-day notice period set by the statute. Moreover, under 

the rule generally applicable to cancellation of insurance, 

failure to give the notice of the requisite length does not void 

the notice; instead, cancellation becomes effective after the 

required period has lapsed. See Wright v. Grain Dealers National 

Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 186 F.2d 956, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1950) 

(applying Virginia law); 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 389 (1982). 

In addition, both CIGNA and NCCI informed Villwock in August, 

more than two months before the cancellation date, that his 

insurance would be cancelled for failure to provide information 

necessary for the audit. Villwock's insurance was effectively 
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cancelled under Code § 65.2-804(B). 

 Therefore, the judgment of the commission is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.