alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 52003XC0326(01) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 52003XC0326(01)

**Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures **

*
Official Journal C 072 , 26/03/2003 P. 0002 - 0002 *

Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures

(2003/C 72/02)

1. The Commission gives notice that, unless a review is initiated in accordance with the following procedure, the anti-dumping measures mentioned below will expire on the date mentioned in the table below, as provided in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2722/1999 of 17 December 1999(1) imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China.

2. Procedure

Community producers may lodge a written request for a review. This request must contain sufficient evidence that the removal of the measures would be likely to result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.

Should the Commission decide to review the measures concerned, importers, exporters, representatives of the exporting country and Community producers will then be provided with the opportunity to amplify, rebut or comment on the matters set out in the review request.

3. Time limit

Community producers may submit a written request for a review on the above basis, to reach the European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade (Division B-1), J-79 5/16, B-1049 Brussels(2) at any time from the date of the publication of the present notice but no later than three months before the date mentioned in the table below.

4. This notice is published in accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995(3).

>TABLE>

(1) OJ L 328, 22.12.1999, p. 1.

(2) Telex COMEU B 21877; Telefax (32-2) 295 65 05.

(3) OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1972/2002 (OJ L 305, 7.11.2002, p. 1).
-----Original Message----- 

From: maureenmcdermott@att.net [mailto:maureenmcdermott@att.net] 

Sent: Tuesday, May 04, 2010 2:35 PM 

To: EBSA, E-OHPSCA - EBSA 

Subject: Comment in support of RIN 1210-AB30 

May 04, 2010 

I am writing to support the interim final rule under the Paul Wellstone 

and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 

(RIN 1210-AB30). 

I support the strong rule that would forbid insurance companies from 

charging higher copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket 

expenses for mental health treatment than they would for other physical 

health care. Thank you for ensuring that mental health care and 

physical health care coverage are included in a single deductible. 

Sincerely, 

Maureen McDermott 

497 E. California Blvd. #324 

Pasadena, CA 91106
-----Original Message----- 

From: ruthsteinberg@verizon.net [mailto:ruthsteinberg@verizon.net] 

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2010 11:45 AM 

To: EBSA, E-OHPSCA - EBSA 

Subject: Comment in support of RIN 1210-AB30 

April 26, 2010 

I am writing to support the interim final rule under the Paul Wellstone 

and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 

(RIN 1210-AB30). 

I support the strong rule that would forbid insurance companies from 

charging higher copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket 

expenses for mental health treatment than they would for other physical 

health care. Thank you for ensuring that mental health care and 

physical health care coverage are included in a single deductible. 

Sincerely, 

Ruth Steinberg 

103 Knollwood Drive 

Tinton Falls, NJ 07724
|EXHIBIT 21.1

Subsidiaries of the Registrant                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc. (b) (F2)

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (b) (F2)

C.V. Realty, Inc. (a) (F1)

Central Vermont Public Service Corporation -
   East Barnet Hydroelectric, Inc. (a) (F1)

Custom Investment Corporation (a) (F1)

Catamount Resources Corporation (a) (F1)

Eversant Corporation (a) (c) (F1)
|- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -                                                                                                                                                                              
|(FN)
(F1)

(F2)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WALL STREET DELI, INC. FOR THE QUARTER ENDED OCTOBER 2,
1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-04-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-02-1999
<CASH>                                       1,215,272
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,645,702
<ALLOWANCES>                                   591,445
<INVENTORY>                                    559,761
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,680,040
<PP&E>                                      28,134,318
<DEPRECIATION>                              19,496,178
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,575,414
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,875,684
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       170,740
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,528,990
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                16,575,414
<SALES>                                     12,838,407
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,890,779
<CGS>                                       11,706,194
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               13,050,962
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (41,045)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               591,445
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,088
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (201,228)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (201,228)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (201,228)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.07)


</TABLE>
#### Antonio Lordi, Plaintiff-Respondent, *v.*People’s Surety Company of New York, Defendant-Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

December, 1910.)

Fidelity bond — Remedies of the parties — Who may sue.

A single creditor cannot maintain an action upon a surety company bond given by a private banker, conditioned upon his faithful transmission to foreign countries of moneys deposited with him for that purpose.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York, entered in favor of the plaintiff after a trial before the court and a jury.

Edward M. Grout and Paul Grout (E. Sidney Williams, of counsel), for appellant.

Rosario Maggio, for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The defendant appeals from a judgment of the City Court in favor of plaintiff, entered upon the verdict of a jury, in an action brought by plaintiff to recover from defendant the sum of $510 and interest, deposited by plaintiff with one Caponigri, a hanker, to he transmitted by him to a hank-in Italy. The plaintiff proved the deposit of the money with Caponigri, his failure to transmit the sum to Italy as per instructions, and the giving of a bond by defendant surety company conditioned upon the faithful transmission by him of all moneys which might he deposited with him for transmission to foreign countries. The appellant contends that the bond executed by the defendant surety company was intended to create a fund for the benefit of all creditors and that an action cannot, therefore, he maintained for his sole benefit by a single creditor, based upon such bond. There is no evidence-in this case of the existence of any other creditors. Appellant quotes in support of its proposition the opinion of the learned Appellate Division in Guffanti v. National Surety Co., 133 App. Div. *599610, to the effect that: “An action at law by one creditor solely on behalf of himself is entirely inconsistent with the purpose for which the bond was required or given.” The Guffanti case, however, was an action in equity brought on behalf of a number of creditors and the question at issue was whether an action could be maintained. The situation in the case at bar is entirely different, and it seems hardly possible that the learned court of review intended to hold that an action at law upon the bond cannot be maintained by a single creditor where there is an entire absence of proof as to the existence of other creditors. As the Appellate Term of this court, however, has followed this rule in Cappadonna v. Illinois Surety Co., 68 MisC. Rep. 470, and in other recent cases, we deem it our duty to follow the same course, and order a reversal of the judgment herein, with leave to appeal to the Appellate Division.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event, with leave to appeal to the Appellate Division.

Present: Guy, Platzek and Gavegan, JJ.

Judgment reversed.
-----Original Message----- 

From: jkauf2997@gmail.com [mailto:jkauf2997@gmail.com] 

Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2010 1:39 AM 

To: EBSA, E-OHPSCA - EBSA 

Subject: Comment in support of RIN 1210-AB30 

May 02, 2010 

I am writing to support the interim final rule under the Paul Wellstone 

and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 

(RIN 1210-AB30). 

I support the strong rule that would forbid insurance companies from 

charging higher copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket 

expenses for mental health treatment than they would for other physical 

health care. Thank you for ensuring that mental health care and 

physical health care coverage are included in a single deductible. 

Sincerely, 

Judith Kaufman 

146 Eastmoor Dr. 

Asheville, NC 28805
-----Original Message----- 

From: Mollyfee@aol.com [mailto:Mollyfee@aol.com] 

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2010 1:58 PM 

To: EBSA, E-OHPSCA - EBSA 

Subject: Comment in support of RIN 1210-AB30 

April 26, 2010 

I am writing to support the interim final rule under the Paul Wellstone 

and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 

(RIN 1210-AB30). 

I support the strong rule that would forbid insurance companies from 

charging higher copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket 

expenses for mental health treatment than they would for other physical 

health care. Thank you for ensuring that mental health care and 

physical health care coverage are included in a single deductible. 

Sincerely, 

margaret kosakoski 

1201 NE 179 St. 

N. Miami Beach, FL 33162
```

[Journal of the House of Representatives, 1995]
[Wednesday, September 27, 1995 (121), Para 121.9 Truth in Lending]
[Page 1452]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

para.121.9  truth in lending

  On motion of Mr. LEACH, by unanimous consent, the Committee on Banking 
and Financial Services was discharged from further consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 2399) to amend the Truth in Lending Act to clarify the intent 
of such Act and to reduce burdensome regulatory requirements on 
creditors.
  When said bill was considered, read twice, ordered to be engrossed and 
read a third time, was read a third time by title, and passed.
  A motion to reconsider the vote whereby the bill was passed was, by 
unanimous consent, laid on the table.
  Ordered, That the Clerk request the concurrence of the Senate in said 
bill.
```
#### James Murphy, Plaintiff-Appellant, *v.*Charles Mundorff, Defendant-Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

November, 1910.)

Costs — Payment and enforcement thereof — Staying further proceedings on actions till costs paid —Staying second action till costs of former paid — Proceedings in different court.

A court of record may stay proceedings in its own court until the costs of a previous action in another court are paid.

The City Court of the city of New York has jurisdiction to stay all proceedings in an action pending therein until plaintiff has paid the costs awarded against him in a prior action brought in the Municipal Court of the city of New York between the same parties upon the same cause of action.

Appeal by tiro plaintiff from an order of the Oity Court of tbe city of Mew York staying proceedings upon the part of the plaintiff until! he pay costs in a former action dismissed in the Municipal Court of the city of Mew York.

John B. McMullen (Rudolph Dugan, of counsel), for appellant.

James F. Brady (Bertrand L. Pettigrew, of counsel), for respondent.

Seabury, J.

The plaintiff appeals from an order of the City Court staying him from proceeding with an .action pending in the City Court until the plaintiff pays the costs awarded to the defendant against the plaintiff in an action previously brought in the Municipal Court. The former action, which was brought in the Municipal Court, was based upon a cause of action identical with that alleged in the complaint in the City Court action.

In the Municipal Court action the complaint was dismissed with costs. The costs awarded have not been paid. Upon this 'appeal the appellant denies the authority of the *335City Court to stay proceedings until the costs in the prior action are paid.

The general rule has long been settled that 5 a court of record may stay proceedings in its own court until the costs of a previous action are paid. Cuyler v. Vanderwerk, 1 Johns. Cas. 247; Perkins v. Hinman, 19 Johns. 237; Youle v. Brotherton, 10 id. 364.

This rule was recognized as applicable to the Marine Court of the city of New York. McAdam’s Marine Court Practice (2d ed.), 213, 214.

The rule prescribed by section 779 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the costs of a motion are directed to he paid by an order, applies to the payment of the costs of an action, where another action is commenced between the same parties to recover upon the same cause of action. Wilner v. Ind. Order Ahawas Israel, 122 App. Div. 615.

Section 779 of the Code is made applicable to the City Court by subdivisions 4 and 6 of section 3-347 of the Code.

It follows that the order appealed from was within the jurisdiction of the court below and that in making such an order the discretion of the court was properly exercised.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

Page and Bijur, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.
-----Original Message----- 

From: dreagan@npcc.edu [mailto:dreagan@npcc.edu] 

Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2010 11:42 AM 

To: EBSA, E-OHPSCA - EBSA 

Subject: Comment in support of RIN 1210-AB30 

April 28, 2010 

I am writing to support the interim final rule under the Paul Wellstone and 

Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (RIN 

1210-AB30). 

I support the strong rule that would forbid insurance companies from charging 

higher copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket expenses for mental 

health treatment than they would for other physical health care. Thank you 

for ensuring that mental health care and physical health care coverage are 

included in a single deductible. 

Sincerely, 

David T. Reagan 

138 Circle Drive 

Hot Springs, AR 71901
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 6/5/15 11:12 AM

Received: June 03, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8j7w-30d4

Comments Due: July 06, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: EBSA-2010-0050

Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice; 

Notice of proposed rulemaking and withdrawal of previous proposed rule.

Comment On: EBSA-2010-0050-0204

Definition of the Term Fiduciary; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment Advice

Document: EBSA-2010-0050-DRAFT-0305

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-08831

Submitter Information

Name: Ira Sager

Address: 

144 North Road

Suite 1150

Sudbury, MA, 01776

Email: isager@optimal-wm.com

Phone: 508 358 9191

General Comment

To whom it may concern:

Department of Labor and Regulation Identifier Number: RIN 1210-AB32

Please take into consideration that the Fiduciary rule under consideration has the potential to 

greatly reduce the availability of financial advice to persons of moderate means. I believe the 

regulators involved, while well intentioned, have not understood the eventual result of passing 

such as rule. The rule is complex and I need more time to analyze it.

I need sufficient time to analyze how the rule will impact my clients,advisors, and my business 

practices, especially within the IRA sphere;

I want to ensure that I can provide DOL with thoughtful, constructive commentary that will be 

helpful in their review of the proposal.

Page 1 of 2

https://www.fdms.gov/fdms/getcontent?objectId=0900006481b1929a&format=xml&showo... 6/5/2015
Because of the length and complexity of the proposal, neither of the above objectives can be 

adequately accomplished within the 90-day comment period that is currently attached to the 

proposal.

Thank you.

Page 2 of 2

https://www.fdms.gov/fdms/getcontent?objectId=0900006481b1929a&format=xml&showo... 6/5/2015
PUBLIC LAW 109–44—AUG. 2, 2005 119 STAT. 443

Public Law 109–44

109th Congress

An Act

To designate a portion of the White Salmon River as a component of the National

Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Upper White Salmon Wild and

Scenic Rivers Act’’.

SEC. 2. UPPER WHITE SALMON WILD AND SCENIC RIVER.

Section 3(a) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C.

1274(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘( ) WHITE SALMON RIVER, WASHINGTON.—The 20 miles of

river segments of the main stem of the White Salmon River and

Cascade Creek, Washington, to be administered by the Secretary

of Agriculture in the following classifications:

‘‘(A) The approximately 1.6-mile segment of the main stem

of the White Salmon River from the headwaters on Mount

Adams in section 17, township 8 north, range 10 east, downstream to the Mount Adams Wilderness boundary as a wild

river.

‘‘(B) The approximately 5.1-mile segment of Cascade Creek

from its headwaters on Mount Adams in section 10, township

8 north, range 10 east, downstream to the Mount Adams

Wilderness boundary as a wild river.

‘‘(C) The approximately 1.5-mile segment of Cascade Creek

from the Mount Adams Wilderness boundary downstream to

its confluence with the White Salmon River as a scenic river.

‘‘(D) The approximately 11.8-mile segment of the main

stem of the White Salmon River from the Mount Adams Wilderness boundary downstream to the Gifford Pinchot National

Forest boundary as a scenic river.’’.

16 USC 1271

note.

Upper White

Salmon Wild and

Scenic Rivers

Act.

Aug. 2, 2005

[H.R. 38]

119 STAT. 444 PUBLIC LAW 109–44—AUG. 2, 2005

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 38 (S. 74):

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 109–125 (Comm. on Resources).

SENATE REPORTS: No. 109–8 accompanying S. 74 (Comm. on Energy and Natural

Resources).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 151 (2005):

June 27, considered and passed House.

July 26, considered and passed Senate.

Æ

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are

necessary to carry out this Act.

Approved August 2, 2005.
#### § 236.528 Restrictive condition resulting from open hand-operated switch; requirement.

When a facing point hand-operated switch is open one-fourth inch or more, a trailing point hand-operated switch three-eighths inch or more, or hand-operated switch is not locked where facing point lock with circuit controller is used, the resultant restrictive condition of an automatic train stop or train control device of the continuous type or the resultant restrictive cab signal indication of an automatic cab signal device on an approaching locomotive shall be maintained to within 300 feet of the points of the switch.
#### § 196.101 What is the purpose and scope of this subpart?

This subpart prescribes the minimum requirements that excavators must follow to protect pipelines subject to PHMSA or State pipeline safety regulations from excavation-related damage.
NO. 07-05-0219-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B OCTOBER 17, 2005

______________________________ CHRISTOPHER

LEE CROSS, Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 64 TH DISTRIC T COURT O F HALE COUN TY; NO. B15,360-0402; HON. ROBERT W . KINKAID, JR., PRESIDING

_______________________________

Order of D

ismissal

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. Christopher

Lee Cross ( appellant) appeal ed from his conv iction for pos sessi ng a controlled substance. Bec ause appellant had not filed a brief, w e abated and remanded the cause to the 64th Distric t Court of HaleCounty ( trial cou rt). The latter convened a hearing attended by appellant and his counsel. At the proceedi ng, appellant informed the trial court that he nolonger car ed to prosecute t he appeal. The trial court found thisdecision to be kno wing and volun tary. Furth ermore , it along with appellant's

representation s were memor ialized in a supplemental clerk's record filed w ith this cour t. Altho ugh we have no motion to dismi ss before us as r equired by

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2( a), Rule 2 of the same rules per mits us to suspend the operat ion of an existi ng rule. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 2; see Rodriguez v. State , 970 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. ref'd). Theref ore, pursuant to Rule 2, and because appel lant has clearlyrevealed h is desire to forego appeal, w e suspend Rule 4 2.2(a) and dis miss the appeal based upon appel lant's repr esentation to the trial cour t. Having so dismissed the appeal, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthw ith.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice Do not publish

.
#### § 236.795 Route.

The course or way which is, or is to be, traveled.
-----Original Message----- 

From: kayvan@mit.edu [mailto:kayvan@mit.edu] 

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2010 12:51 PM 

To: EBSA, E-OHPSCA - EBSA 

Subject: Comment in support of RIN 1210-AB30 

April 26, 2010 

I am writing to support the interim final rule under the Paul Wellstone 

and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 

(RIN 1210-AB30). 

I support the strong rule that would forbid insurance companies from 

charging higher copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket 

expenses for mental health treatment than they would for other physical 

health care. Thank you for ensuring that mental health care and 

physical health care coverage are included in a single deductible. 

Sincerely, 

Kayvan Zainabadi 

77 Massachusetts Ave 

Cambridge, MA 02139