* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 4, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-60525 Summary Calendar

ELONZO HARRY, Pl aint iff- Appellant MARILYN HARRY, Appellant
versus LAUDERDALE COUNTY, SARAH P. SPRINGER, BILLIE SOLLIE, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of Mississippi (4:04-cv-00207-TSL-JMR)
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Elonzo and Marilyn Harry (the “Harrys”) appeal a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their claims2

against Judge Sarah P. Stringer and a subsequent summary judgment ruling dismissing t heir claims against Sheriff Billie Sollie and Lauderdale County , Mississippi. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 27, 2 002, Mattie Bell Harry, Elonzo Harry’s former wife, filed suit in Lauderdale County, Mississippi, seeking enforcement of Elonzo’s child support obligations arising out of a divorce judgment entered in Lamar County , Mississippi, on February 4, 1993. Since the divorce, Mattie Bell and the child had moved from Lamar County to Lauderdale County. On May 3, 2002, Judge Stringer, a Lauderdale County Chancery Court Judge, conducted a hearing and fo und Elonzo in contempt for failing to pay child support and ordered him jailed. From jail, Elonzo filed
a mo tion to set a side judgment, arguing that the Lauderdale County Chancery Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the 1993 Lamar County Chancery Court divorce judgment. In response, Mattie Bell argued th at because she and the child were residents of Lauderdale County, the Lauderdale County Chancery Court had jurisdiction over the mat ter pursuant to M ISS . C ODE ANN . § 93-11-65, which provides in part, [T]he chancery court of the proper county shall have jurisdiction to entertai n suits for the custody , care, support, and maint enance of mino r children and to hear and determ ine all such mat ters, and shall, if need be, require bond, sureties, or other guarantee to secure any order fo r periodic payments fo r the maint enance or support of a child . . . . All actions herein authorized may be brought in the county where the child is actually residing, or in the county of the residence of the party who has actual custody, or of the residence of the defendant. Judge Springer denied Elonzo’s mo tion, stating th at she had determ ined th at the Lauderdale County Chancery Court had personal and subject mat ter jurisdiction aft er re viewing the relevant statutes and case law. Elonzo appealed to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, which reversed Judge Stringer’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that the Lamar County Chancery Court had exclusive3

and continuing jurisdiction over contem pt mat ters pertaining to the non-payment of child support. Harry v. Harry , 856 So. 2d 748 (Mi ss. Ct. App. 2003). The Harry s subsequently filed suit in federal district court agai nst Judge Stringer, Sheriff Sollie, and Lauderdale County , seeking com pensatory and punitive damages fo r Elonzo’s wrongful incarceration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and Mississippi law. The federal claims were based on the argument that Elonzo’s First, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fo urteenth Amendment rights were vio lat ed. The state-law causes of action were for abuse of process and loss of consorti

um. Judge Springer filed a Rule 12(b)(6) mo tion to dismiss, arguing th at the claims against her were barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. The court granted the mo ti on. Following the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, Sheriff Sollie and Lauderdale, County filed a Rule 56 mo tion fo r summary judgment, arguing that if t he claims against Judge Springer were barred by absolute judic i al immunit y, claims against them fo r wrongful imprisonment, arising out of the execution of Judge Springer’s order, were similarly barred by immunity. The court granted the motion. The Harry s timely appealed to this court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropri ate only when “‘it appears th at no relief could be granted unde r any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations.’” Meadow briar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn , 81 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons , 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5t h Cir. 1995)); s ee also Rochon v. City of Angola , 122 F.3d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1997). We review the district court's action de novo, accepting
as true all well-pleaded facts in the Harrys’ com plaint
. M eadow briar Home for Children , 81 F.3d at 529.4

This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. T

ango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Services LLC , 322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropri ate if no genuine issue of mat erial fact exists and the mo ving party is entitled to judgment as a mat ter of law. FED . R. C IV . P. 56(c). The Court views the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the non-movant. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. , 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). The non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue fo r tri al t o avoid summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict fo r the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establ

ish t he existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322. III. DISCUSSION A. “Judicial of

ficers are entitled to absolute immunit y from claims fo r damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions.” B oyd v. Biggers , 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994). This immunit y can be overcome only by demonstrating that the conduct complained of was non-judicial or by showing th at the conduct was “in the com plete absence of all jurisdiction.” I d
. Here, Judge Springer acted in a judicial role. Judicial acts are those that are “normally performed by a judge” and that affect parties who “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id . at 285. The Harry s argue that Judge Springer is not entitled to judicial immunity because she acted in “complete absence of all subject matter j uri sdiction.” They point to the Mississippi Court of5

Appeals decision, which held th at she acted wit hout subject mat ter jurisdiction. Despite the Harrys’ arguments to the contrary , the Mississippi Court of Appeals’ decision th at Judge Springer acted wit hout subject mat ter jurisdiction is not coterm ino us wit h the conclusion th at she acted in “complete absence of all subject mat ter jurisdiction.” If this were the case, each and every time a judge decided
an issue where an appellate co urt l ater f ound subject matter jurisdiction lacking, that judge would have no judicial immunit y. That proposition seems antithetical to the concerns underlying absolute judicial immunit y, a doctrine meant to ensure th at “‘a judicial o fficer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, w it hout apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (quoting B radley v. Fisher , 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872)). The Harry s argue th at Judge Springer had a dire mo tive and th at she knowingly acted wit hout subject mat ter jurisdiction. This, however, is not reflected in the record. The statute in question was susceptible to mo re th an one int erpretation. Additionally, even if the Harrys could point to some sort of dire mo tive, Judge Stringer would still be entitled to judicial immunit y. “[A] judicial act does not become less j udicial by virt ue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive . . . .” S tump v . Sparkman , 435 U.S., 349, 362 (1978). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the Harrys’ suit against Judge Springer. B. The Harry s also arg ue th at Elonzo Harry was wrongfully imprisoned under the control of Sheriff Sollie and Lauderdale County
. In their brief, the Harrys concede that the immunity of Sheriff Sollie and Lauderdale County is “derivative” of Judge Springer’s absolute immunit y. Because Judge Springer was entitled to absolu te i mmunit y, Sheriff Sollie and Lauderdale County, who acted6

pursuant to a valid order, are also entitled to immunit y. As previously discussed, Judge Springer was not acting in “complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction.” See Mays v. Sudderth , 97 F. 3d 107, 113 (5th Cir. 1996). “[A]n official acting within the scope of his authority is absolutely immune from a suit fo r damages to the extent th at th e cause of action arises from his compliance with a facially valid judicial o rder i ssued by a court acting within its jurisdiction. ” Id
. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.