* Because the Honorable José A. Cabranes recused

himself prior to oral argument, this appeal is being decided

by the remaining two members of the panel pursuant to Second

Circuit Internal Operating Procedure E(b).

1

09-4630-cr

United States v. Lasaga

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AMENDED SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST

SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 20th 4 day of October, two thousand ten.

5

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

7 Chief Judge,

8 WILFRED FEINBERG,

Circuit Judge.* 9

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12 United States of America,

13 Appellee,

14

15 -v.- 09-4630-cr

16

17 Antonio Lasaga,

18 Defendant-Appellant.

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21
2

1 APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: Diane Polan (S. Max Simmons, on

2 the brief), Law Offices of Diane

3 Polan, LLC, New Haven, CT.

4

5 APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Jonathan S. Freimann, Assistant

6 United States Attorney (Deirdre

7 Daly, Acting United States

8 Attorney, and Robert M. Spector,

9 Assistant United States

10 Attorney, District of

11 Connecticut, on the brief).

12

13 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

14 Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, J.).

15 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

16 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

17 AFFIRMED.

18 Defendant-Appellant Antonio Lasaga (“Lasaga”) appeals

19 from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

20 District of Connecticut (Thompson, J.), entered on October

21 23, 2009 (the “Order”), refusing by written decision to

22 resentence Lasaga. The judgment follows this Court’s remand

23 in United States v. Lasaga, 136 F. App’x 428 (2d Cir. 2005),

24 which was issued in light of United States v. Booker, 543

25 U.S. 220 (2005) and United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103

26 (2d Cir. 2005). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

27 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues

28 presented for review.

29 This case returns to us for a third time following the

30 decisions of this Court in United States v. Lasaga, 328 F.3d

31 61 (2d Cir. 2003) (Lasaga I), which remanded for further

32 factual findings with respect to the district court’s upward

33 departure on the basis of psychological harm to a minor

34 victim, and United States v. Lasaga, 136 F. App’x 428 (2d

35 Cir. 2005) (Lasaga II), which remanded for a determination

36 whether resentencing was necessary in light of this Court’s

37 decision in Crosby and instructed the district court to

38 reconsider the criminal history departure “in light of the

39 Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shepard v. United States,

40 544 U.S. 13 (2005) . . . and . . . Williams v. United

41 States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) . . . .” Lasaga II, 136 F.

42 App’x at 433.
3

1 On remand, the district court solicited and received

2 resentencing memoranda from the government and Lasaga, and

3 concluded that it would not have imposed a different

4 sentence had the Sentencing Guidelines been advisory at the

5 time the sentence was imposed. In so doing, the district

6 court rejected Lasaga’s argument that the court could not

7 enhance the sentence on any basis other than facts admitted

8 by Lasaga or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and

9 the court observed that it had already considered all of the

10 mitigating factors set forth in Lasaga’s resentencing

11 memorandum at each of the prior sentencing hearings. With

12 respect to this Court’s instruction concerning the criminal

13 history departure, the district court advised: “Assuming

14 arguendo a Criminal History of Category I, the resulting

15 range under the Sentencing Guidelines is 151 months to 188

16 months, which encompasses the sentence the court continues

17 to view as being the appropriate sentence. Therefore the

18 court need not address the issues of departure to Criminal

19 History II.” United States v. Lasaga, No. 99 cr 122(AWT),

20 Slip Op. at 3-4 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2009). 

21 In the current appeal, Lasaga cites the district

22 court’s discussion as to whether it would impose the same

23 sentence even without a one-level criminal history

24 enhancement. Lasaga argues that, by recalculating the

25 guideline range, the district court sentenced Lasaga de novo

26 without the benefit of a sentencing hearing and in violation

27 of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.

28 We review a sentence for reasonableness even after a

29 district court declines to resentence pursuant to Crosby. 

30 United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir. 2007). 

31 The reasonableness review contemplated by Booker requires

32 “consideration not only of the sentence itself, but also of

33 the procedures employed in arriving at the sentence.” 

34 United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2006). 

35 Reasonableness review is “akin to review for abuse of

36 discretion,” which asks “whether the sentencing judge

37 ‘exceeded the bounds of allowable discretion[,] . . .

38 committed an error of law in the course of exercising

39 discretion, or made a clearly erroneous finding of fact.’”

40 Id. at 27 (quoting Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114).

41 Lasaga’s primary appellate contention, that the court

42 in effect imposed a new sentence, does not take into account

43 the district court’s limited obligations in response to a

44 Crosby remand. First, district courts “should obtain the
1 Following this Court’s remand in Lasaga I, the

district court calculated Lasaga’s offense conduct level to

be 34 and his criminal history category to be level II. The

corresponding sentencing range was 168 months to 210 months. 

Assuming an offense conduct level of 34 and a criminal

history category of level I, the sentencing range would be

151 months to 188 months.

4

1 views of counsel, at least in writing, but ‘need not’

2 require the presence of the Defendant.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at

3 120 (citation omitted). Next, “[u]pon reaching its decision

4 (with or without a hearing) whether to resentence, the

5 district court should either place on the record a decision

6 not to resentence, with an appropriate explanation, or

7 vacate the sentence and, with the Defendant present,

8 resentence in conformity with the [Sentencing Reform Act of

9 1984], [Booker], and [Crosby], including an appropriate

10 explanation.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the district

11 fulfilled both obligations. Specifically, in deciding not

12 to resentence Lasaga, the district court explained that it

13 had, on two prior occasions, considered all of factors set

14 forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), together with the mitigating

15 factors set forth in Lasaga’s sentencing memoranda, and

16 concluded that 180 months’ imprisonment was an appropriate

17 sentence. 

18 The district court’s discussion of Lasaga’s criminal

19 history did not amount to a de novo sentence; rather, it was

20 an acknowledgment that the criminal history departure would

21 have had no impact on the sentencing, given that either

22 guideline range would have encompassed Lasaga’s ultimate

sentence of 180 months.1 23 Accordingly, because “the record

24 indicates clearly that the district court would have imposed

25 the same sentence” regardless of whether or not the upward

26 departure applies, any claimed error (assuming that there

27 was error), “may be deemed harmless.” United States v. Jass,

28 569 F.3d 47, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

29 omitted). “As long as the sentencing judge is satisfied

30 that the same sentence would have been imposed no matter

31 which of the two guideline ranges applies, the sentence

32 should stand.” United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925,

33 934 (2d Cir. 1988). 

34 Having affirmed the district court’s judgment, we DENY

35 as moot Lasaga’s motion to hold the appeal in abeyance

36 pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United
5

1 States, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010). Finding no merit in

2 Lasaga’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the district

3 court’s judgment.

4

5

6 FOR THE COURT:

7 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

8

9