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i 

62–161 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–163] 

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: 

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY AND 

FUNDING 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 29, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 29, 2010, Security and Stability in Pakistan: Developments 

in U.S. Policy and Funding ................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 29, 2010 ........................................................................................ 31 

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 2010 

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. 

POLICY AND FUNDING 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 4 

Paxton, Lt. Gen. John M., Jr., USMC, Director of Operations, J–3, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ....................................................................................................... 6 

Shapiro, Hon. Andrew J., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political–Military 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, jointly with Lt. Gen. John M. Paxton, Jr. ............. 42 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 38 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 35 

Shapiro, Hon. Andrew J. .................................................................................. 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PAKISTAN: 

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. POLICY AND FUNDING 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 29, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. 

This morning we have with us the Honorable Miche`le Flournoy, 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, at the Department of Defense; Lieutenant General John M. Paxton, Jr., Director for Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Honorable Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs for the Department of State. 

We welcome you and thank you for being with us. 

Before we begin, let me remind members that this is open, so today’s discussion should be solely involving unclassified matters and 

not matters of national security classification. 

Pakistan’s continuing security challenges have serious implications for our national and homeland security, for our efforts in Afghanistan, as well as for security in that region. In fact, there is 

no security relationship in the world today more important than 

the relationship between the United States military and the military of Pakistan. This relationship has experienced its ups and 

downs over the years, but today as we speak, it is solid and it must 

remain so if we are to serve the interests of both nations. 

The relationship is founded on the fact that our national interests are aligned in fundamental ways. It is also sustained by the 

personal and professional relationship between the two nations’ officer corps, and not least by the mutual support we provide each 

other in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 

This committee has authorized a large share of the funding for 

the support we provide to Pakistan, and we are deeply interested 

in the logistical and operational support they in turn provide to our 

country. 

I am pleased that the Administration’s strategy for Pakistan is 

already showing signs of success, success due in large part to the 

increase in Pakistani operations, which have been largely successful. 
2 

I applaud the recent detention of senior Taliban leaders inside 

Pakistan, the increased cross-border collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the growing popular support for our 

shared counterterrorism activities. 

However, there is still a long way to go and, frankly, a lot of hard 

work. ‘‘Hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ capabilities are integral to counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan but they are not yet developed. Pakistan must have the civilian capacity needed for long-term security 

and stability in the country. Moreover, there is a need for greater 

international contributions to Pakistan. 

The Administration’s recent report to Congress on metrics for 

Pakistan, frankly, was a disappointment. While the Administration 

has developed good metrics and we are assured that you are tracking them, very little of this information has actually been provided 

to us in Congress. I trust that this deficiency will be corrected very 

quickly. 

The information we are missing is important, because the Administration has requested significant resources from Congress and 

the American people to continue efforts to support the country of 

Pakistan. The administration’s fiscal year 2011 request includes an 

additional $1.6 billion for the CSF [Coalition Support Funds] and 

$1.2 billion for the State Department’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Capabilities Fund. In addition to examining the justifications for 

these amounts, the committee remains interested in determining 

what the future is for the CSF as they wind down Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. 

Again, we thank you so much for being with us today. We look 

forward to your testimony. 

To Under Secretary Miche`le Flournoy, she has become a good 

friend, and you have been here a good number of times sharing 

your wisdom with us. We are especially pleased to have you once 

again. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding today’s hearing on Pakistan. 

This morning’s discussion gives us an opportunity to focus on our 

policy toward Pakistan and the types of tools that have been critical to expanding our partnership with Pakistani Security Forces. 

I would also like to welcome our witnesses. I look forward to your 

testimonies and to candid dialogue. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a brief moment and highlight 

some key issues and submit my formal statement for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. MCKEON. Almost 1 year ago today, this committee held a 

similar hearing focused on Pakistan. While much has evolved over 

the last 365 days, three things have remained the same: 
3 

First, it remains in our national interest to defeat Al Qaeda and 

its extremist allies and ensure that they will have no safe havens 

from which to attack the American people. 

Second, Pakistan continues to be engaged in a tough fight 

against a complex insurgency. 

Third, Pakistan is an essential partner to the United States, both 

in the near and long term, and we must remain committed to 

building trust between our two Nations. 

While all of these factors were important to informing our overall 

approach to Pakistan and how we resource that effort, I would like 

to focus on the security environment in Pakistan. It is my view 

that the traditional peacetime framework for security assistance is 

inappropriate and no longer works. Despite Pakistan’s increased 

military operations, Pakistan is a nation that is more appropriately 

comparable to a combat zone, such as found in Afghanistan, and 

should be treated as such. 

That is why I supported the Administration’s original request for 

a new authority and funding stream which resembled our train and 

equip efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Last year, Under Secretary Flournoy testified to this committee 

that the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, or PCCF, 

will align authorities and funding to develop Pakistan’s capability 

in current counterinsurgency operations with DOD’s [Department 

of Defense] responsibility to implement the security portion of the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, including our own current operations. I agreed then and I agree now. 

Unfortunately, the next day Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton ignored their own strategy and decided that the PCCF authority will reside in the State Department. It remains to be seen how 

the State Department will manage the PCCF authority and if it 

has the right culture and capacity to adequately respond to the 

wartime needs in Pakistan. 

In my mind, I still question the rationale to move PCCF to State 

when DOD has proven its ability to execute similar programs in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. I also think it is fair to question if Congress 

will appropriate this year’s money without strings attached and in 

a manner consistent with wartime contingencies. 

Mr. Chairman, I think our committee should continue to closely 

monitor the execution of PCCF and ensure the CENTCOM [U.S. 

Central Command] Commander, through the Office of Defense Representative for Pakistan, maintains the speed and flexibility needed 

to take advantage of emerging and urgent opportunities with the 

Pakistan military. 

Pakistani Security Forces have increased their operational tempo 

and are improving their capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations against insurgent networks on its side of the border. It is 

in both our nations’ strategic interest to see this momentum continue. 

However, as you all know, clearing is only one phase of an effective counterinsurgency strategy. As we have learned in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the ‘‘hold’’ and ‘‘build’’ phases are equally important. 

I would like our witnesses to comment on the recent notification to 

Congress to use economic support funds to provide quick impact, 

small-scale assistance to benefit the local population. It seems to 
4 

me that such funds are critical to building upon last year’s military 

gains. 

Lastly, I think Congress should also consider Coalition Support 

Funds under this wartime paradigm. Let me be clear. It is our congressional prerogative to conduct oversight and scrutinize funding, 

including CSF or any other funds in that matter. But we must balance accountability with supporting Pakistan’s ability to adapt and 

respond to the fluid and dynamic security situation on the ground. 

I hope to hear from our witnesses today why the CSF is critical 

to Pakistan’s will and ability to conduct military operations and 

how we are working with the Government of Pakistan to ensure 

that such reimbursing efforts directly support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. 

Again, thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony 

and discussion. Thank you. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. 

Ms. Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense, you are on. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Mr. Chairman and Congressman McKeon, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

inviting this panel here today to testify on the growing U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership. The Administration’s core goal in this 

region remains consistent: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al 

Qaeda and ensure elimination of Al Qaeda’s safe havens in the region. Pakistan is a critical ally in these efforts, and the U.S. and 

Pakistan also have shared interests that extend far beyond countering violent extremism. 

President Obama has charged us with building an effective partnership, one that advances U.S. interests while demonstrating to 

Pakistan that we will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity over the long term. To build such an enduring 

partnership, we must strike the right balance between civilian and 

military cooperation. 

On the security side, our programs are designed to strengthen 

Pakistan’s capacity to target violent extremist groups that threaten 

both of our countries, the region, and the world. We have reiterated 

our long-term commitment to Pakistan through senior-level engagement by DOD leadership. We have increased the amount and 

the responsiveness of our security assistance. And in Pakistan 

itself, the Office of Defense Representative Pakistan, ODRP, has 

also deepened our day-to-day relations with our Pakistani defense 

colleagues. The close coordination between ODRP and Pakistani 

Security Forces represents a good working model for monitoring assistance and ensuring accountability. 

While it is certainly too early to fully evaluate the success of our 

approach, we believe that our efforts to demonstrate the strong and 

enduring U.S. commitment to Pakistan are bearing fruit. Over the 

last year, the Government of Pakistan has demonstrated a signifi-
5 

cantly increased commitment to combating violent extremist organizations that use its territory. 

When I testified on the subject last March, violent extremists 

were entrenched along Pakistan’s western border and expanding 

their influence into the settled areas of Pakistan. Devastating attacks on cities from Islamabad to Lahore led to a public outcry and 

a galvanizing of Pakistani political will to combat these violent extremist organizations. 

In the last year, Pakistani Security Forces have taken unprecedented military action, recapturing significant territory from insurgent groups. Their actions have disrupted Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the border regions. And their perseverance in the face of 

significant casualties, nearly 4,000 in 2009 alone, testify to their 

commitment to the fight. 

But even with the momentum of recent operational successes, 

Pakistan still faces a Herculean task. The threat of militant violence against the Pakistani state continues. The human cost of that 

violence and the instability that it has engendered is incalculable; 

and the financial strain is taking an enormous toll on Pakistan’s 

economy. 

The United States faces three significant hurdles in our efforts 

to assist Pakistan: capacity, threat perceptions, and mistrust of the 

United States. 

When it comes to capacity, Pakistan’s Security Forces have improved their ability to clear territory, but this progress remains 

fragile. Pakistan must also have the capabilities to translate tactical successes into permanent elimination of militant and terrorist 

safe havens. In particular, we must help Pakistan build the capacity of its civilian agencies to more rapidly move development and 

government resources into areas that have been cleared by the 

military. 

Another challenge relates to Pakistan’s threat perceptions. Although extremist attacks have led to the repositioning of substantial Pakistani forces, Pakistan’s strategic concerns about India remain preeminent. We must continue to reassure Pakistan that as 

it combats the terrorist threat, it is not exposing itself to increased 

risk along its eastern border. 

A final hurdle frankly relates to the legacy of mistrust between 

the United States and Pakistan. Past U.S. sanctions, Pakistani 

concerns about the growing U.S.-India relationship, its skepticism 

about U.S. staying power in the region, have made it a wary partner. Similarly, reports of Pakistan’s tolerance and support for some 

violent extremist groups have created skepticism on the U.S. side. 

This is a partnership that is absolutely vital to our national interests, but it is also complex; and the need for candid dialogue and 

mutual reassurance remains very strong. And I believe we have 

made substantial progress in this regard over the last year. 

We do believe we are on the right path. U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in the form of material assistance, training assistance, operational coordination, and reimbursement for their operational costs 

have been critical enablers to Pakistani progress against insurgents and has helped to build trust. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, or PCF, has proven to be particularly effective in expanding Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities. 
6 

The flexibility of this funding has allowed DOD to take advantage of emerging opportunities to equip, train, and coordinate with 

Pakistani Security Forces. It allowed, for example, the overhaul of 

a dozen Mi-17 helicopters which were used extensively in the counterinsurgency campaign in the Swat Valley. In addition, courses in 

intelligence analysis, civil military operations, and the law of 

armed conflict have helped prepare Pakistani military and Frontier 

Scouts for counterinsurgency operations. DOD has also supported 

enhanced coordination both with Pakistan and across the border. 

In using PCF, we have helped to establish several intelligence fusion centers. Overall, this close coordination and this training relationship has proven an effective antidote to mistrust. In addition, 

Coalition Support Funds have allowed us to reimburse Pakistan for 

their logistical, military, and other support to our overseas contingency operations, particularly support to Afghanistan operations. 

And prompt payment of CSF claims, while ensuring careful assessment, is absolutely critical to sustaining Pakistan’s willingness to 

continue to conduct combat operations. 

Finally, we strongly agree with our State Department colleagues 

about the importance of a multiyear security assistance package for 

Pakistan, one that includes substantial and predictable levels of 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF is the foundation of our 

long-term bilateral military-to-military relationship and such a 

multiyear package would further strengthen our long-term relationship with Pakistan. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, our partnership with 

Pakistan is fraught with challenges but it remains vital to our 

overall goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda, 

and enhancing stability in a critical region. 

I want to thank you all once again for the committee’s support 

for these endeavors and for the opportunity to testify today. We 

look forward to further discussion and to working closely with you 

in the future. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and General 

Paxton can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you so much. 

General Paxton, welcome, and we appreciate your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, 

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, J–3, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General PAXTON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

the opportunity. Congressman McKeon, and other distinguished 

members of the committee. Let me begin by thanking you for your 

continued support for our men and women in uniform and across 

the globe. I am honored to have the opportunity to appear before 

the committee this morning to report on Pakistan and the vital 

military and security assistance we provide the Armed Forces in 

our common fight against violent extremism. 

I would like to start by reiterating Under Secretary Flournoy’s 

point that a stable and secure Pakistan is of vital strategic importance to the United States. Their fight against violent extremism 

is directly aligned with our goals and interests in the region. We 

must see Pakistan’s efforts to combat violent extremism as our 

own, and we must remain steadfast in our commitment to devel-
7 

oping their abilities to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign. 

Thus far, our military and security assistance has indeed been 

instrumental in enhancing their effectiveness and success and that 

of the ongoing efforts of the Pakistani Security Forces. 

As events of the past several years have made painfully clear, 

the Pakistani state and society are under direct threat from Al 

Qaeda, from Pashtun jihadi groups such as Pakistani Taliban, as 

well as several Sunni Deobandi and Salafi jihadi groups operating 

in the country. These violent networks pose danger not just to 

Pakistan or to South and Central Asia, but to the entire globe, including our U.S. homeland. 

Given this reality, it is imperative that the United States encourage and support the Pakistani Government, military, and people in 

their fight against military extremists operating inside their own 

borders. 

Pakistan’s traditional defense posture is, and always has been, 

geared to conventional military conflict with India and not to counterinsurgency. Consequently, prior to Pakistani Taliban’s audacious 

foray into the Swat Valley approximately 1 year ago, Pakistani 

leadership was reluctant to acknowledge such groups as serious 

threats to their state security. 

In the past, Pakistan approach to dealing with violent extremists, relied primarily on limited and often inconclusive military operations as well as tenuous cease-fire agreements, all of which collapsed immediately. Pakistan’s approach to military networks 

changed when these militants began directing their violence inwards against the Pakistani state, people, and society. 

Over the past year, through concerted military campaigns in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA, and in the NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP), now the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 

previously known as the NWFP, Pakistan has demonstrated increased resolve in its efforts against the Pakistani Taliban and 

other Al Qaeda-allied movements. 

Months of intense operations in the FATA’s Peshawar agency 

have greatly diminished the presence of the Pakistani Taliban and 

subsequently disrupted and displaced the Al Qaeda in the process 

as well. Late last month, military-launched operations in Orakzai 

Agency, which, while ongoing, resulted in modest yet positive territorial gains. 

All of these gains highlight the Pakistani military’s recent success in clearing territory formerly under the de facto militant control, which is a direct consequence of the equipping and training 

provided through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, or PCF, 

and other funding authorities such as the Coalition Support Funds 

all of which has been positively enabled by this committee and 

Congress. 

The security and military assistance we provide has notably improved the efficacy of Pakistan’s ongoing counterinsurgency campaign both in the FATA and in KPK [Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa]. 

However, as Under Secretary Flournoy noted, simply clearing 

these areas of these militants is insufficient, and this progress 

would be undermined if the Pakistani Security Forces are unable 

to hold and gradually build in these areas. 
8 

The Office of the Defense Representative of Pakistan, or ODRP, 

has recently noted the trickling in and return of militants in previously cleared areas. This risk underscores the importance of providing assistance that continues to enable the Pakistanis to move 

permanently to dismantle extremist networks and eliminate their 

safe havens. 

Permanent control of these territories will require the development of an effective civilian governance capability, institutions, and 

personnel. Establishing and developing this capacity will certainly 

be a key challenge Pakistan will face in its efforts to hold and build 

within these areas. 

The local populace must see and believe that the government 

presence will be enduring and positive. However, this longer-term 

objective can only be achieved if the Pakistani Security Forces are 

actually capable of ensuring the civilian security in the area. Accomplishing this goal will necessitate that military and paramilitary forces are trained and equipped not only to maintain security, but, in the interim, to also meet the immediate humanitarian 

and civilian needs of the local populations. Our continued support 

through PCF and CSF is helping to guarantee that all of this happens. 

Continued military and security assistance to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts will be instrumental to their success in dismantling and defeating the extremists within their country’s borders. 

Our technical, financial, and material assistance has already enabled Pakistan to address this challenge far more aggressively than 

ever in the past. 

Deepening our ties and relationships with Pakistan will enable 

their government and security forces to continue pursuing objectives that are in the vital interest of both of our Nations. 

Mr. Chairman, committee members, thank you again for inviting 

us and for the opportunity for being with you this morning. Under 

Secretary Flournoy and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Paxton and Secretary 

Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shapiro. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW J. SHAPIRO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL–MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member 

McKeon, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify on how the State Department’s security assistance programs contribute to our partnership with the Government of Pakistan and the security of the region. 

As Secretary Clinton said last month, it is clear that our partnership with Pakistan and progress on the ground are key to the security of the United States. The Secretary’s visit to Pakistan last fall 

and the successful March 24 and March 25 U.S.-Pakistan strategic 

dialogue meeting have helped to place our partnership on a significantly stronger foundation. 
9 

In this regard, I want to talk about the important role that State 

Department-managed security assistance programs play in Pakistan. 

Our security assistance efforts complement the substantial assistance being provided to Pakistan’s civilian authorities and organizations, consistent with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan 

Act and the President’s pledge of a long-term partnership with 

Pakistan. 

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages assistance for 

Pakistan through three accounts: Foreign Military Financing, FMF; 

International Military Education and Training, IMET; and the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, PCCF. Effective 

management and execution of these programs is a major priority 

for the Bureau. In fact, I just visited Pakistan in March to discuss 

in greater depth the security assistance programs that we manage 

there. 

FMF is the foundation of a long-term U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. It supports the transformation and modernization of Pakistan’s military through equipment upgrades and acquisitions. In 

addition to developing Pakistan’s long-term counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism capabilities, FMF enhances the ability of Pakistan’s military to meet its legitimate defense needs and play a 

greater role in improving regional security. 

The IMET program is crucial to U.S. efforts to deepen the U.S.- 

Pakistani partnership. IMET helps to enhance the professionalism 

and development of Pakistan’s future military leaders. IMET is 

central to our efforts to allow Pakistani military officers to interact 

with members of the U.S. military and build personal relationships. The Administration has requested $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2011 

for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund in order to accelerate the development of Pakistan’s capacity to secure its borders, deny safe haven to extremists, fight insurgents, and provide 

security for its population. 

Fiscal year 2011 will be the first year the State Department assumes full management of PCCF. We take this responsibility very 

seriously and are confident that we have the capability and capacity to successfully execute PCCF. Moreover, State and DOD share 

the goal of a seamless transition for PCCF that has no discernible 

impact on U.S. implementers and Pakistani forces in the field. 

PCCF funds will continue to build the capability of Pakistan’s Security Forces directly engaged in combat operations to clear and to 

hold terrain in contested areas. Supporting a better trained and 

equipped security force is critical to our complementary efforts to 

work with Pakistan’s civilian government to implement our $7.5 

billion five-year civilian assistance strategy, which includes efforts 

to help Pakistan provide basic services in areas vulnerable to extremists. 

My Defense Department colleagues and I are committed to continuing to work with your committee, other DOD oversight committees, and our own State Department oversight committees, and to 

keep you fully informed of developments on this critical program. 

While PCCF will help enable Pakistan’s Security Forces to clear 

and hold terrain, the security situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is likely to complicate build-transfer efforts for 
10 

some time. Therefore, the State Department is planning to transfer 

$10 million in economic support funds to DOD to enable U.S. military personnel to provide rapid humanitarian and community stabilization projects to help hold conflict-affected areas. This will help 

fill a short-term assistance gap in areas where clearing operations 

are ongoing and there are acute civilian assistance needs which civilians cannot currently access. 

In addition, we are working with Pakistan to find ways to afford 

civilians safe access to forward areas. 

As I mentioned, we are also making a long-term commitment of 

nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan which is targeted at helping the 

Pakistani people overcome the political, economic, and security 

challenges that threaten Pakistan’s stability. With the $7.5 billion in civilian assistance authorized in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, we are moving towards the 

effective balance between civilian and military assistance required 

to help Pakistan reach a more secure and prosperous future. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these important 

programs and initiatives with you. I look forward to taking your 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Shapiro can be found in 

the Appendix on page 51.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shapiro, you mentioned the IMET program 

which is, as you know, the program that allows officers as well as 

others to come to our country to learn about things military; in particular, the war colleges which this committee has been very active 

in reviewing from time to time. 

There was a time when our relations with Pakistan for all intents and purposes were cut off, at least the military. And the 

IMET program suffered. And during that period of time—I think 

it was eight years, I think I’m right—during that time, a whole 

generation of Pakistani officers did not have the opportunity to 

come to this country and make associates and friends. 

How has that affected today’s operations with the Pakistan military? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. I will start off by saying clearly we agree that 

the IMET program is critically important and that that gap was 

unfortunate because we did miss out on the opportunity to develop 

those relationships with Pakistani military leaders. However, we 

are engaging once again. We have IMET. Our IMET program is— 

we spend more on IMET with Pakistan than nearly any other 

country, because of the importance that we place on it. And we are 

seeing the results of that with a new generation of military officers 

which are able to benefit from that training. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand all of that, but you are not answering my question. 

My question is: How did that gap of seven or eight years affect 

our military relationships with Pakistan? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Clearly, there was some cost. But that is one 

of the reasons why it is so important for us to develop a relationship that is based on a partnership, going forward, to demonstrate 

that we are there for the long haul because of that history. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have some comments? 
11 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add what we find now is we 

have actually a number of senior Pakistani military officers who 

came through IMET before the ban, who remember their time in 

the United States, know their U.S. colleagues, et cetera. We have 

the youngest generation who has come through in recent years 

since we have been rebuilding the program. 

But in the middle, in the sort of field-grade officer ranks, we 

really did lose a generation or an opportunity to build those kinds 

of relationships and that essential familiarity and trust. And we 

are now scrambling to try to find other ways to engage them and 

to rebuild that. But it did have quite an impact in terms of the 

basic relationships between the two militaries, and we will spend 

a long time recovering from that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I understand there are two reports on Pakistan that were due to 

our committee yesterday. One is an interagency progress report, 

and the second is a Department of Defense report regarding possible alternatives to the Pakistan Coalition Support Funds. My 

question is, when will they be delivered? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I knew you were going to ask about that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have them with you? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I don’t have them with me. But the one on 

CSF and alternatives just got to my office. I will sign it out first 

thing when I get back—— 

The CHAIRMAN. What about the other one? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The second one is, something that as you 

mentioned, it was supposed to be signed out by the President. We 

are seeking to have the President delegate that authority to sign, 

for the Secretary of Defense to sign—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Is it complete? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes. That is the issue; we have to get the 

delegation of authority to sign. We aim to have those to you, certainly the first one by the end of this week; and hopefully the second one, if not early next week. So we are working very hard to 

get those to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. We look forward to receiving 

them. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on the 

Chairman’s question on IMET. 

Apparently that gap when they weren’t sending people to work 

with our people at that school has caused some, as you mentioned, 

some problems going forward, and we will have to work to fill in 

that gap. So it sounds to me that you are saying IMET is very important in our military operations. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Absolutely. It is absolutely critical. 

Mr. MCKEON. I am sure that is something that we will be addressing again as we go through the markup of our bill this year. 

Under Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton, during the last 

year, the people and leaders of Pakistan have been increasingly 

drawn to see militant and extremist groups as a serious threat to 

their internal security. We have also seen Pakistani Security 

Forces step up in their operations against the insurgency with increased urgency and skill. 
12 

What has changed since our last hearing on Pakistan? What role 

has CSF and PCF played? And how do Pakistan’s efforts tie into 

our broader strategic goals in the region, both in the near and long 

term? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think several things have changed in the 

last year. The most important is the threat in Pakistan went from 

being one that was sort of in the border regions to one that came 

home to Pakistanis who live in the major cities of Pakistan, with 

direct attacks on Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, et cetera. And the 

threat came home to the Pakistani people. And I think it galvanized their political will to see this not just as Pakistan assisting 

the U.S. in its fight, but Pakistan having its own security challenge 

that they had a vital interest in dealing with. And so we have seen 

a huge shift in political will that has translated into a much greater level of military commitment to the fight. 

The OPTEMPO [operational tempo] is quite high. They have 

taken casualties and have not been deterred from continuing in the 

face of those casualties. The sacrifice has been quite substantial on 

their part. And we have also seen them—I think another thing that 

is changing, that is less tangible, is their assessment of our commitment to them and to the region, our staying power; because 

that fundamentally affects their calculus in how they are going to 

play the cards in their hand, if you will. 

And I think the fact that we have been extremely responsive 

with PCF, and now PCCF, to meet their immediate operational 

needs, the fact that we have followed through to reimburse them 

since 2001 with over $7 billion of CSF for their operational support 

to us, and the fact that we have engaged them in a strategic dialogue that is going beyond fighting violent extremism to addressing 

their more fundamental energy needs—water, strategic perspective 

on the region—they, I believe, are starting to believe that we are 

actually committed to their security and the security of the region, 

and that is translating into greater willingness to work with us. 

General PAXTON. Sir, I certainly support both points that Under 

Secretary Flournoy made. 

I think there is a third piece at the front end that has changed 

significantly in the last year, and that is the success of the allied 

and coalition operations in Afghanistan. I think we should never 

lose sight of the fact that the border is certainly porous and the increased success of the ISAF [International Security Assistance 

Force] and the coalition forces as well as the stepping up of the Afghan Security Forces has put pressure on those militant groups, 

and many of them have not only fled physically across the border, 

but have taken and tried to increase the OPTEMPO in their base 

camps, and perhaps have either gotten frustrated with the pressure or perhaps a little bit more brazen. And that was part of the 

assessment from the Pakistani side, that they were under threat 

there because it was very visible to them that the safe havens and 

the sanctuaries were actually originating inside their border and 

they had to do something about them. 

And then the second follow-on piece, I think, is because of our 

resolve and commitment, they felt that they could take some calculated strategic risks and move forces that had been aligned and 
13 

allied against India and the conventional threat, and they had to 

move them up in the FATA and the Northwest Frontier provinces. 

So our presence, their presence, the pressure on the militant 

groups, all serve to kind of galvanize them; and then consequently, 

some of their initial operations met with success on the ground. 

And then our continued resolve and staying power, I think all of 

those put together have given them a sense of both capacity and 

will, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. Has India pulled some of their troops from their 

border? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. I think probably on the intelligence 

side, we would want to answer that in closed session. But there is, 

and we have made overtures, obviously, that trying to diminish the 

feeling of threat there will have mutual benefits and a lessening of 

tensions within the region. And I think we have good partners and 

allies on both sides of the India-Pakistan equation, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. Good. How would you assess the current security 

environment in Pakistan? If we had to plot it on a spectrum, would 

it fall under or closer to the heading of a nation at war or a nation 

at peace? How does the country see itself? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think that when you talk to Pakistani 

interlocutors, they feel that they have a serious threat on their 

hands with regard to the violent extremists. That said, I think 

there is a growing sense of confidence that they are dealing more 

and more effectively with them. 

The military successes that General Paxton mentioned in the 

tribal areas, but also our counterterrorism cooperation, particularly 

against Al Qaeda, in the settled areas and throughout Pakistan has 

been quite successful. And we have had a number of high-value arrests through our cooperation and so forth. 

So they definitely feel under threat, but I think they are also 

growing in confidence in their ability to meet that threat and, importantly, as I said, in our commitment to them to address the 

more fundamental and long-term conditions that would underwrite 

greater stability in Pakistan. 

General PAXTON. And I would agree, sir. 

I don’t think the dynamic is as distinct as a nation at war, a nation at peace. It is probably more of a nation under threat or a nation under siege, and they realize that they have to respond now; 

that they have both the opportunity and the obligation; and that 

failure to do so now, things could conceivably get worse and get 

worse quickly. 

Mr. MCKEON. What role does the ODRP play in executing the 

PCF program? If monies were to be delayed in the coming year, 

what would be the impact on the ability of ODRP in assisting the 

development of Pakistani counterinsurgency capabilities? What 

would be the impact of such delays on the ability of Pakistani Security Forces to conduct their own counterinsurgency operations? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. With the transition from the DOD PCF authority to the State Department PCCF authority, DOD, and particularly ODRP and CENTCOM, continue to play a lead role in 

helping to define the requirements of what are the capabilities that 

the Pakistani military need, obviously working with the Pakistanis 

to do that, but also in the execution of the program on the ground. 
14 

So the money comes back to a number of DOD entities, DSCA [Defense Security Cooperation Agency], the services, et cetera, to actually execute the programs on the ground. 

So far, so good in terms of how this is working for the year that 

we are in, the fiscal year that we are in. I think we don’t anticipate 

delays. If they were to occur, we believe they would be very consequential. This is PCF; PCCF actively supports the Pakistani military, the Frontier Scouts, those entities that are directly in the 

fight day to day, and our ability to remain responsive and steady 

is absolutely critical to their success on the ground. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. And I would just add that we are working assiduously with DOD to ensure that there is no impact on the 

ground for the transfer of PCCF to the State Department. And we 

are putting together a team at the State Department which will 

manage PCCF and has already engaged closely with the ODRP on 

the ground as well as CENTCOM and Joint Staff and OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense] policy to ensure that there is no gap. 

And we have already invited and are planning to make a formal 

request to have someone from DOD join us at State Department for 

the implementation program. 

Mr. MCKEON. The concern I have on the delay is I don’t see a 

budget being passed. And my real concern is about appropriation 

bills being passed this year from what we see. Would that cause 

a delay? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Well, you know, we still have the fiscal year 

2010 monies to complete spending. And obviously, you know, we 

need money to be able to implement the PCCF program. But we 

are continuing to work with DOD on the completion of the fiscal 

year 2010 spend plan but clearly there would be an impact if there 

was a lack of funds to continue to provide to the Pakistan. 

Mr. MCKEON. What about a CR? 

General PAXTON. Sir, if I may, the uniqueness of the budget as 

it exists is the fiscal year 2009 monies are one-year monies; the fiscal year 2010 are two-year monies. So that is beneficial to us on 

the obligation and spend rate. It also is very timely in the transfer 

of responsibilities and authorities from DOD to State, and I think 

it also highlights, as much as the committee is able to do, the value 

of multiyear funding, sir. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. And we would seek and ask Congress to fully 

fund PCCF ahead of the budget. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Shapiro, let me pick up on that point. Because 

you sent us a budget for 2011, which has met with a 50 percent 

cut in the rate of increase you are seeking in the Senate in its 

markup of the budget resolution a week ago. And it raises a question whether or not in the quest for complementarity as opposed 

to competition in the transfer of responsibilities, the Department of 

State is getting its fair share of funding to undertake and support 

the new mission that you are undertaking. You sort of pussyfoot 

around that issue here in your written statement as well as in your 

oral statement, and I think the State Department needs to state 

emphatically what its needs are. 

And one of the reasons your budget is difficult to deal with is 

that so much of it is not based on spending. It is supplemental 

spending, the previous year money that came in supplementals 
15 

that you would like to see put in the baseline, but most of it is ad 

hoc and nonrecurring. And we need to have, I think, a new hand 

dealt to deal fairly with what your needs are in light of the responsibility, the additional responsibilities you are taking on. Would 

you comment on that? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Obviously we are supportive of the Administration’s budget request, disappointed by the cut, but we are hopeful that as the full Congress considers the budget, that those funds 

will be restored. 

Mr. SPRATT. Look, half the argument is in the presentation of it. 

And if you look at your budget, base year to base year, there is a 

15.6 percent increase at the same time the President is asking for 

a freeze in non-security funding. Very difficult for most Members 

in both parties to underwrite a 16-percent increase in the State Department budget at a time when non-State, non-military things are 

being frozen. You have got to make the case. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. And I think the Administration has been arguing that the State Department spending is critical to our national security; that our success in Afghanistan and in Pakistan 

and elsewhere, it is critical to have the State Department funds. 

Mr. SPRATT. My question to you is: Are you taking on additional 

funds with the additional responsibilities commensurate with what 

your needs are going to be? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. I mean, we have asked for additional funds 

to meet these needs that we think are critically important in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. And it is a critical part of the 

Administration’s policy to fully fund civilian efforts, which I think 

we would all agree are going to be critical to our success. 

Mr. SPRATT. We need an outline that shows us how your additional funding compares to your additional responsibilities. I think 

that would help your case. 

According to the staff memo that we have, there are substantial 

subsidies that have been paid to Pakistan—and to Afghanistan, of 

course—but Pakistan in particular. I believe the number given us 

by staff was about $16 billion between 2002 and 2009, probably 

$20 billion between 2002 and 2010, this year. 

That is a substantial sum of money in a sense, but substantial 

and particular in regard to what the Pakistanis are putting up in 

the same period of time. They are spending about $4 billion a year, 

which is not at a great sum of money. It is 2.6 percent of their GDP 

[Gross Domestic Product]. 

How long can we sustain these payments? Will we need to sustain these subsidies to the Pakistani Army? Are these long-term 

subvention that we should be looking at and figuring into the future needs; or are they ad hoc, likely to go away once we have 

achieved our mission? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that the PCF and PCCF monies are 

really focused on the near-to-midterm, and the need for those will 

evolve with the fight, the sort of current fight. I think some funding streams like IMET, like FMF, really need a longer-term perspective where we are building a longer-term security relationship 

or rebuilding a relationship with Pakistan. 

I think a lot of the—and I will defer to my State Department colleague on this—but a lot of the investment that we are making on 
16 

the civilian side is in areas like energy, infrastructure, and so forth 

is actually designed to bolster the Pakistani economy so that it can 

generate more of its own support over time. 

But I think honestly this is a critical area of national interest, 

and I think we need to have a fairly long-term perspective that this 

is going to be an assistance priority for the United States for a 

number of years going forward. 

Mr. SPRATT. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

For each of these hearings, our professional staff prepares for us 

background material, and I would like to read a statement from 

that background material and ask you for your comments. 

‘‘Since 2003, the Army has conducted unprecedented counterterrorism operations in the tribal region, although such operations 

have frequently failed to subdue militants, alienated local residents, resulted in civilian casualties, and alleged human rights 

abuses and created hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 

persons.’’ 

And then in a footnote it says, ‘‘This month’s Human Rights 

Watch reported that it had documented as many as 300 

extrajudicial killings by the Pakistani military during and after the 

operation in the Swat Valley. 

Now if what we are trying to do is win the hearts and minds of 

these people in these areas, this is hardly calculated to do that. 

In terms of Pakistan’s internal security interest and our longterm interest, isn’t this treatment about as bad as the disease? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me just say on the allegations of 

human rights abuses, we take those extremely seriously. We are 

engaging our counterparts in Pakistan on these allegations. We are 

ensuring that for DOD’s part anyway—and I am sure the same is 

true is for State—but that we are all ensuring that we are living 

by both the letter and the spirit of U.S. law in terms of making 

sure everybody receives assistance, goes through the Leahy vetting 

process, people receive human rights training and so forth. But we 

are taking these allegations very seriously and we are discussing 

them with our Pakistani counterparts. 

I would say on details of that, I would be more comfortable discussing those in a closed session with you, sir, if you want to follow 

up. 

On the IDP question, the internally displaced people, there were 

a large number of IDPs—or there have been. One of the things that 

has actually gone relatively well in this campaign is a fairly rapid 

resettlement of those people back to their home villages, and I 

think the numbers actually bear that out. That continues to be a 

work in progress, but a lot of assistance has gone in that direction 

to help the Pakistanis minimize the displacement that has resulted 

from the campaign. 

Mr. BARTLETT. It seems to me that in trying to solve one problem, we may be creating a different but maybe bigger problem, and 

I appreciate your concern. 

Let me read another footnote from this same report. This is kind 

of unsettling to me: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is reportedly—we 

don’t even know who controls it apparently—is reportedly under 
17 

the control of Pakistan’s Strategic Plan Division, which is part of 

the country’s nuclear command and control mechanism and is led 

by General Khalid Kidwai. 

How much do we know about these people if in fact they are the 

ones controlling it, and what is their disposition toward the global 

aspirations of Islamists who are probably right of center? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, again, in an open session, what I can 

say is that we believe that Pakistan has a very solid command and 

control system for their nuclear weapons. We have engaged with 

them in discussions on these issues. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But Madam, if we don’t know who is controlling 

them then how do we know they are under good control? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I do not believe that statement is accurate 

sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You don’t believe that statement is accurate? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. No. I believe that we have a good understanding of their command and control system, that there are clear 

lines of command and control, and they have made a great deal of 

investment in the security of their nuclear arsenal. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Do we know what their disposition is toward the 

global aspirations of radical Islam? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. ‘‘They,’’ meaning? 

Mr. BARTLETT. Those who are in control of these nuclear weapons. We know that the person who created them had no problem 

in dispersing this capability pretty widely. What about those who 

are controlling them now? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I think this is—the Pakistani state, 

both in the civilian leadership and the military leadership, is dominated by people with a very secular orientation and with a very 

strong commitment to their responsibilities as a possessor of nuclear weapons. I would say again, this is something that if you 

would like to explore further, I would suggest having a closed discussion. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. Mr. Ortiz, 

the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Flournoy, General Paxton, Secretary Shapiro, thank you so much for joining us 

this morning and providing your insight into securing stability in 

Pakistan. You know, with our military relying on key supply routes 

in and out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, through Pakistan, what 

are we doing to ensure that these routes are secure and to allow 

for critical supplies to make it to our warfighters? And what is the 

status of the cross-border collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan? And what are the challenges that we still face? 

I know we are using these routes, but we want to be sure that 

our soldiers get the supplies that they need and the weapons that 

they need and whatever they need. But what are we doing to be 

sure that as things are changing and the playing field changes, 

what are we doing to protect those routes and protect our soldiers 

and make sure they get the equipment? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. Your question is of vital concern not 

only within the Department of Defense but particularly to the U.S. 

Central Command and U.S. Transportation Command. And the 
18 

contracts that we negotiate, either for access to our uniformed military, or contracting out for civilian providers, are each written and 

enforced to adequately assess and guarantee the security of our 

equipment and goods as it moves on the LOCs, or the lines of communication. 

In specific and to your question, sir, I would state that I believe 

that the loss and pilferage rate moving through those lines of communications is only between 1 and 2 percent, which is actually 

equivalent to or perhaps a little bit less than it is on the average 

elsewhere around the world. So we have a good track record for the 

security of the equipment and gear that is getting there right now. 

Our concern is that they operate, obviously, a different sense of 

time, distance, different sense of importance than we do, so I think 

that the current concern is that we have both multi-modal and 

multiple routes so that we can build up, not huge stockpiles in 

what we used to refer to as the ‘‘iron mountain,’’ but we have an 

adequate flow of our equipment between what is positioned Stateside, or other areas in the region; what is in either Afghanistan or 

Pakistan and what is on the lines of communications, just so there 

is a constant movement; so that if we do have a disruption, either 

for security or passports and visas or whatever it is, that we have 

adequate to maintain the fight without putting troops at risk, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. When you mentioned about contracting out to civilians now, who are they? Are they American civilians? Are they 

Pakistanian, are they Afghanistanian? And do you feel comfortable 

with who you hire? It is a matter of trust, because we have seen 

that there have been several inside jobs where several of our soldiers have been killed. 

General PAXTON. It is a source of concern. There is a vetting 

process. There is both an enforcement process when we write the 

contracts, and then how we guarantee that the terms of the contract are enforced, whether we do it ourselves or whether we work 

through a second or third party, through the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Afghanistan, or an independent contractor 

there. And it is no different than those things that we have done 

in either Afghanistan or Iraq, and it is subject—we put it in terms 

of reference there. It is subject to our supervision and assessment 

on the metrics there, about how much does flow, gets there on 

time, gets there without being vandalized or lost. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, if I could just add, since 2001, the Pakistani military has made keeping these lines open and securing the 

flow of goods through them a major priority. And this is one of the 

core functions of our Coalition Support Fund reimbursement is to 

reimburse them for that critical support that they are providing to 

keep our supply lines to Afghanistan open. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My time is about up. Thank you 

so much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks, please. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

General, I always want to say a special thank you to those that 

carry stars on their uniform. It is an indication of a life lived essen-
19 

tially for the sake of freedom and others, and I appreciate your 

service. 

General PAXTON. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. I guess I want to start by taking up, to some extent, 

where Congressman Bartlett left off. I will try to stay away from 

any areas that would even approach a classified nature. But I 

know, as you are very concerned, as well as all of us, that weapons 

of mass destruction, nuclear weapons falling into terrorists’ hands 

are among our greatest fears, our greatest concerns. And my question revolves around, who is in charge of Pakistan’s military and 

foreign policy? There is some debate whether that is Islamabad or 

the military. 

In a Washington Post op-ed on Tuesday, Ahmed Rashid wrote 

that Pakistan’s military has virtually been taken out of control of 

foreign policy, and strategic decision-making has been taken from 

the civilian government. And I guess that question seems critical 

to me, given the fact that, you know, even General Musharraf, in 

coming into power some years ago, essentially came into power 

with some fairly radical backing. And even though he did a lot to 

work with us, a lot of that mechanism still remains in the military. 

And of course, the concern would be that someone in control of nuclear capability might be compromised. 

And so I guess my overall question is, is it possible to discern a 

trend on the issue as to whether the military or Islamabad is controlling foreign policy in that regard? 

And I will direct the question to you, General, and also to Under 

Secretary Flournoy. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. 

Pakistan, since the elections, is working through the civilian control of the military and, I wouldn’t say—certainly a fledgling democracy, but a democracy that had been out of practice for some 

years when Musharraf cemented the power there. But I think, 

based on both civilian-to-civilian and military-to-military relationships, there is a respect for the obligations and the responsibilities 

on both sides of the aisle, whether it is a uniform or a suit. And 

I think that General Kayani is mindful of the obligation to control 

the nuclear stockpile and where it may be, but also responsive to 

where President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani may go as the 

government continues to manifest itself. 

Mr. FRANKS. And you share Secretary Flournoy’s general conclusion that those nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s arsenal are at least 

secure within civilian hands or civilian government to control? 

General PAXTON. Yeah. And again, without going into closed session here, I mean, we are working under the expectation and from 

our contacts that they have an adequate internal, you know—we 

might not have perfect visibility, they have an adequate internal 

assessment of what they have and where it is, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Secretary Flournoy. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would certainly recognize and acknowledge that Pakistan’s military has been a very strong institution 

historically and remains a strong institution today. 

That said, it is also an institution that desires and accepts civilian control and wants civilian leadership. One of the things that 

was very striking, as we held our strategic dialogue with Pakistan 
20 

just a month or two ago, was the strength of the civilian ministers 

who came to the table and played a leading role in that dialogue, 

from the foreign minister, to the finance minister, to others in the 

cabinet. And they were fully engaged with their civilian counterparts on our side. And so I think, if you asked for a trend, we are 

moving in the right direction. 

Mr. FRANKS. Moving in the right direction. 

Well, thank you. Let me ask one last question, General Paxton. 

As far as your professional duties on the strategic importance of 

the tribal districts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, I know 

that there is a great effort to clear these areas, but is Afghanistan 

even winnable without Pakistan? Can it be made safe from terrorist attacks if we cannot clear these areas? What is your perspective? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. I mean, obviously, we are using the 

same counterinsurgency model that met with a great deal of success in Iraq, but it is the shape, the clear, the hold, the build and 

then ultimately the transfer. And we have to be always mindful 

that you will not go in and clear an area unless you have every intention of holding it. And then when you hold it, you want to build 

it and transfer it. And you have to just make the assessment up 

front, am I going to transfer it to a local tribe? Am I going to transfer it to the provincial government? Or am I going to transfer it to 

a national government? 

And we have to do our mission analysis to make sure we go in 

with reasonable expectations about what the threat is in the area 

and what the ultimate end state of the area either should be or 

what the tribes and the people in the area can support. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Flournoy, I am curious. About three weeks ago 

the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army was in town and met with 

a number of us. I believe his name is General Kayani. And he expressed his frustration with our State Department getting helicopters to him. And I think my question to him was, are you looking for a lift; are you looking for attack? And his answer was, both. 

Now, I realize there is a lot more than just delivering the helicopter; that you have to train the pilot, that you have to put together the logistics training. But I am curious, what is being done 

to address that, and what is your timeline for addressing that? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we have worked very hard on the helicopter issue. I have personally put hours and hours of my time into 

this. The first thing that we focused on was refurbishing their Mi17 fleet, which was quite aged, needed a lot of spare parts, overhaul work. We have done that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, let’s go to that point, Ms. Flournoy. Let’s start 

with that. We have over 10 percent unemployment in this country. 

What is the logic of refurbishing a Russian-made helicopter when 

we make helicopters, the world’s best helicopters, in this country? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The logic there is they have them today. 

They know how to fly them. In a matter of weeks, we can get them 

airborne again to support them in the current fight. 
21 

As a longer-term helicopter solution, we are working with the 

Pakistanis to look at a U.S. buy using FMF and so forth. And so 

that is something they may transition to. 

But in the near term, for the current fight, we had to get what 

they had up and flying, and that is where we focused our initial 

effort. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So what is the long-term plan to get Black Hawks 

or something like that to them? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. This is something we are in discussion with 

them with regard to a 5-year defense plan that we are working 

with them to develop and a multi-year approach to security assistance in FMF. They haven’t made a decision yet on that, but it is 

something we are actively discussing with them, and I think they 

are very open to, frankly. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, my opinion is based on when the Marines, 

shortly after the fall of the Iron Curtain, thought they were getting 

a bargain on some iron ships made in the Soviet Bloc and modifying them and thought they were getting a bargain with the modifications; it ended up taking longer. We spent more money than 

purchasing an American-made product. I would certainly hope we 

would learn from our mistakes with that. 

And secondly is, I am not so sure that a 5-year plan does the 

Paks a whole lot of good. I think they need help right now. And 

I realize it takes a while to train a pilot. It takes a while to put 

together the logistics training. But I would hope that we would 

have something better than a 5-year plan in mind. And I would 

hope that you would get back to me on what that plan is. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we are happy to do that once we have 

the details worked out with the Pakistanis. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Lastly, General, since you touched on it, I do remain 

concerned. I do think that one of the vulnerabilities that we have 

in Afghanistan is that 21-day transit through Pakistan to get almost everything the troops need. 

I am curious, has there been any sort of an uptick on attacks 

on—and I realize it is private contractors transiting through Pakistan, but also realize I think well over 100 drivers have been killed 

so far just transiting Pakistan. What has been the trend as far as 

the security on those convoys? Is it getting better? Is it getting 

worse? I realize that you have opened some routes through the 

former Soviet republics that are coming from the north. But I have 

got to believe that the vast majority of the things that make it to 

Afghanistan still flow through Pakistan. So what are the trends as 

far as in security? 

General PAXTON. Sir, if you don’t mind, I certainly would like to 

take it for the record and get you back some accurate statistics. I 

believe that the trend has been relatively consistent. We haven’t 

seen any major upticks either going through the south, through 

Chaman, or through either the Northern Distribution Network or 

the Khyber area. We have had modest increases sometimes, whether it is a bridge blown out or a convoy attacked, but I don’t think 

substantively in recent times we have had a big increase at all. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But you will get back to me on that? 

General PAXTON. I will get back with you, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Within a week or so? 
22 

General PAXTON. Absolutely, sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman, please. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Shapiro, we are putting—U.S. tax dollars are flowing 

into Pakistan, and I guess this is Secretary Flournoy, too, to support the military buildup there, and particularly counterinsurgency 

capability of the Pakistan military. Yet the Pakistan military still 

seems to be very focused in terms of its capability against India. 

And it is building up its conventional capability and maintaining 

its conventional capability and not necessarily diverting enough resources of its own for a counterinsurgency fight. What are the initiatives of this Administration in terms of diffusing the tensions between India and Pakistan so that they can reorient their military 

to really what is their greatest threat, and that is Islamic fundamentalism within their own country? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Well, obviously, we are very supportive of efforts by India and Pakistan to reduce tensions. There was a recent 

meeting between the two governments, and we want to continue to 

encourage those types of efforts. On our security assistance, as we 

mentioned, we have been focusing a lot of resources through PCF 

and PCCF toward the counterinsurgency fight, so our resources are 

being used to help them in the counterinsurgency fight that they 

have. And then our FMF is designed to build—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me step back. What I want to know is, is 

there a significant initiative by this Administration? Obviously, 

there is one in the Israeli-Palestinian question, unwelcomed by the 

Israelis, but is there one on the India-Pakistan question in terms 

of there ought to be a major initiative to diffuse those tensions so 

that we don’t have to subsidize their military, that their military 

simply reorients itself based on what I would see as the greatest 

threat, which is an internal problem? But they have to have a resolution of the India-Pakistan problem in order to divert those resources. So what initiative, if there is one, by this Administration, 

or is there not one? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Well, I have with me Ambassador 

Holbrooke’s deputy, Paul Jones, who I think would be well positioned to answer sort of on a regional perspective. And so with your 

indulgence, I could ask him to come up and address that question. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Coffman, thank you very much. In answer to your question, 

Mr. Coffman, it is certainly a very high priority for the President, 

for Secretary Clinton, for this Administration, to be as supportive 

as we can in reducing tensions between India and Pakistan. We 

recognize that, in order to be most supportive, we have to do what 

both countries would like in terms of support. So we encourage, engage where we can. What we have seen is an interest on both 

sides. And just recently, in fact just today, there was a meeting between Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Gilani in which 

they announced the beginning of a dialogue process at that level 
23 

of foreign ministers, which had been interrupted after the Mumbai 

attacks. 

So I would say it is something we are very focused on. It is a 

very complex situation, and the United States I think can, it is 

very clear that our support is best done in a quiet fashion and just 

encouraging the process and offering the support to the parties that 

we can. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. Another question. 

Certainly now the Pakistan military seems to be very engaged in 

fighting the Pakistan Taliban. Have we seen any evidence now that 

they are also willing to prosecute any activities against the Afghan 

Taliban on their side of the border? 

General Paxton. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. We believe with a fair degree of certainty that a lot of the extremists are a syndicated network. And 

they have loose ties; they have marriages of convenience, whether 

it is the Haqqani network, Commander Nazir, the Taliban, the TTP 

[Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan]. So that when you see evidence of the 

Pakistan security forces, whether it is the PAKMIL [Pakistan military], the Frontier Corps, when they are stepping up to take action 

against insurgents and militants locally, they are focusing obviously on the near-term target, who is creating the problem or creating the risk for them. But it is an increased evidence that they 

are willing to take on the entire syndicated network because they 

know there is movement between all of them, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. 

Secretary Flournoy, maybe you can help settle this little factual 

point. But in the ranking member’s opening statement, he said that 

Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton had reversed themselves 

with regard to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund. 

My recollection was that in fact there was pushback from the Congress, specifically the House Appropriations Committee wanted to 

make that move, and that the Administration leadership responded, well, here is a way to do it, but it was not their preference. In fact, there was no reversal by Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. In fact, it was a response to the Congress saying, 

we are going to do this, what would be the best way to do it? What 

is your recollection? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, I think Secretary Gates was very supportive of the idea of migrating the authority to State. And the 

question was how to do that without having any negative impact 

on performance and effectiveness. And so we set up a transition 

process that we would have sort of the first year be kind of to 

State, but a passthrough directly to DOD to sort of give us time 

to set up the appropriate mechanisms at State; that this year 

would be fully a State authority, that DOD executes per State direction and so forth. 

So I think that is where we are now. So far, so good. It is working well. We have not seen any delays in terms of execution. And 

as Assistant Secretary Shapiro mentioned, we are working very 
24 

hard to ensure State has the capacity to do proper oversight of our 

execution of the program. 

Dr. SNYDER. Any comments, Secretary Shapiro? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Yes. We have been working very closely together with DOD and indeed are very grateful for Secretary Gates’ 

support for the State Department taking the oversight role of 

PCCF. And we are doing everything that we can to make sure that 

this program is administered properly. It is directly from the Secretary one of my top priorities, and we will not fail in the administration of the program. 

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to go back to the discussion about the helicopters because I didn’t understand your exchange with Mr. Taylor. In your written statement, you say an urgent need for helicopters still remains. And I mean, they are at 

war. It is a huge amount of territory. The Pakistani military needs 

to be able to move troops around quickly, probably at multiple sites 

simultaneously. So I will take you at your word that an urgent 

need for helicopters still remains. 

Would you outline for me the specific roadblocks? I don’t understand where the roadblocks are. At a time of war, you said you 

have been working on this. Well, they are at war; they are losing 

folks. You acknowledge it is urgent. Where are the specific roadblocks to them getting the helicopters I think you all wanted to 

help them with? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. There are two types of—their principal 

kind of workhorses are Mi-17s, which are a Russian-made system, 

and the Bell 412s, which are American made. In both cases, we are 

trying to provide spare parts, support for maintenance, overhaul, et 

cetera, to keep what they have in the air and flying at very high 

rates. In the case of the Mi-17, the parts—the helicopter is made 

by a company that is under sanction. So that has required us to 

seek a congressional—or, I am sorry, yes, a waiver to actually work 

to buy from the company, provide parts, provide support. But we 

have used a national security waiver to do that because we think 

it is so critical. On the Bells, obviously, that is something that we 

have had more ability to control directly, and I think we are moving forward in that area. 

But longer term, they need some replacement helicopters. They 

need a new breed, if you will. And so we are right now in discussion with them to understand exactly what their requirements are, 

what they can afford, how many they need and so forth. And for 

that mid to longer term replacement program, we will be looking 

to use FMF to support that over the coming years. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Paxton, will your counterpart of the Pakistani military, how will they respond to what Secretary Flournoy 

just said? If your commander is on the ground, do they respond to 

the urgent need? I am not putting her on the spot, as I think we 

have got some bureaucratic thing, but how do they see the situation? 

General PAXTON. Sir, everyone in the military wants more and 

wants faster. The constant dynamic we have is to educate them 

about, what is your requirement, to tell us what the capability is 

that we are going to provide, and then how can we best sustain it? 
25 

And it goes to the discussion we had earlier about the value sometimes to getting the maintenance tail on a long-term program. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California. 

Mr. MCKEON. Just a point of clarification if I might. Mr. Snyder 

likes to always correct my statements. And it is just a little thing 

that we have, but I unfortunately was out of the room this time. 

I would like to ask one question of Secretary Flournoy. The original 

proposal that was presented to us on the PCCF was that it would 

come under the Defense Department, is that correct? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, the original proposal was that, and 

that was before we had reached—had further interagency discussions and worked out a transition plan that we were all happy 

with. 

Mr. MCKEON. And that would be that he also requested for fiscal 

year 2010? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That was the transition plan that Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton ultimately recommended. 

Mr. MCKEON. He may have had that plan somewhere to ultimately transfer, but the request was—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. For within the Department of Defense? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The original request was, yes, correct. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman, please. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Paxton, Secretary Flournoy and Secretary Shapiro, 

thank you so much for joining us today. I had an opportunity just 

recently a couple weeks ago to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and had an opportunity to meet with General McChrystal, with 

President Zadari, President Karzai and also Prime Minister Gilani. 

A great trip. I left there reinvigorated concerning our efforts in 

both countries. 

Still challenges left. I think there are still things out there that 

we have to accomplish. But I got a good sense from our men and 

women on the ground there that things are going in the right direction and that we are making positive strides, and also with the 

leaders there and their governments that they are appreciative of 

our efforts there and they see the value of our efforts, so that is 

always an important part of that effort. 

When I was in Pakistan, we met with General Kayani, had a 

long meeting with him, and asked him specifically about where he 

saw the current efforts, where he saw the needs. And we were 

there with Admiral LeFever, who heads our operations there with 

our support. And we asked him also within the same context. And 

both of them say that we are gaining a significant amount of momentum in the fight against the Taliban. And both of them emphasized our long-term success is going to be tied to maintaining that 

momentum. 

And we were there meeting with General Tariq Khan with the 

Frontier Scouts and our folks there that are training them, a new 

training facility, things going in the right direction. Give me your 

thoughts about where we are going from your standpoint in maintaining that momentum. I know we are going to build some new 
26 

training facilities there. But give me your thoughts about how we 

maintain that momentum, and then how do we make sure that we 

watch that momentum extend past the FATA and the Northwest 

Frontier Province? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think a key part of this is continuing to 

broaden and deepen the equipping and training and assisting relationship, as you noted. I think it is also as the Pakistan military 

and the Frontier Scouts have success in clearing areas that we help 

provide the broader Pakistani government with the resources they 

need to actually hold them and build governance capacity and the 

ability to provide basic services to the affected populations. This 

ESF [economic support funds] account that Assistant Secretary 

Shapiro described where $10 million is going to be provided for 

DOD forces to work with PAKMIL to execute hold-build assistance 

that is a start. 

I think one of the conversations the State Department will be 

having with its committees, we would like to have with this committee, is what additional work, what additional assistance can we 

provide in the hold-build area, and what kind of, what should that 

authority look like? And we are still conceptualizing that as an Administration, trying to figure out the best vehicles to use to ensure 

that it is flexible, but also that it can go to the right user. In some 

cases, it may be the military. In other cases, it will be a civilian 

agency on the ground. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Paxton. 

General PAXTON. Sir, if I may. I certainly agree with Secretary 

Flournoy and the whole-of-government approach and the closeness 

between State and Defense. The other thing, as I alluded to earlier, 

is not to ever lose site of the other side of the border. So there is 

a tri-part relationship here. And just as we build enduring relationships and comfort level with Pakistan, we want to do it with Afghanistan, and then we want the two of them to do it. So our efforts on border control points and joint coordination centers and intelligence fusion cells is all good and kind of diminishes the perception of the threat there, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Great. 

Secretary Shapiro. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. I think Paul Jones is in the best position to 

talk about our efforts at economic development in hold-build. 

Mr. JONES. If I may just briefly, sir. We enthusiastically agree 

with the importance of the civilian side, the Pakistani civilian side 

and the international, particularly U.S., effort to support that. We 

have an extensive civilian assistance program that is active 

throughout the tribal regions in the Northwest Frontier Province 

through USAID [United States Agency for International Development], through Office of Transition Initiatives, where we are working very closely to provide assistance. The World Bank has just set 

up a trust fund where a number of other countries can put assistance in. It has got $110 million into it so far, just for those border 

regions, in a way that builds confidence. 

What we have identified, as Under Secretary Flournoy was mentioning, that in some areas where—specific locations where there 

has been recent clearing operations and there isn’t an ability for 

Pakistani or international assistance efforts on the civilian side to 
27 

be present there, what we thought is that the most appropriate use 

of a portion of the ESF funds is to, as we have outlined in testimony, to provide that for those who can have access in that area. 

And so I think that is a creative approach unique to this situation 

that we are very pleased, and I think it speaks to the civ-mil coordination we have in Pakistan. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And one final comment. I want to emphatically 

support the need for helicopters there in Pakistan. Having ridden 

on some 40-year-old Hueys and almost not getting on board, I emphatically support whatever you need to do to get some new air 

platforms there for you. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we hear you. We all shared those experiences. I will just make one other point. And that is, in some 

cases, we may be competing with our own U.S. needs for helicopters in terms of getting in line for production, so that is a challenge. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis, please. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all of you for being here. I appreciate it. 

Could you put in simple terms this balance that you are talking 

about of military and non-military assistance? Are we thinking in 

terms of percentages? What is it now, and where do you want to 

take that in about 3 years from now? I am trying to get a better 

handle on what that is and perhaps with—you have given a number of examples and you have spoken to that, but I am not sure 

whether there is a clear understanding of whether you are all on 

the same page on that. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I actually think within the Administration, 

there is a very strong shared sense of where we are trying to go. 

We have gone from a situation where the bulk of our aid was on 

the military side. Now, for fiscal year 2011, if you look at our proposals, it is close to 50/50. We have made a substantial commitment on the civilian side. And I am happy to let Paul speak to this 

directly. But we are really trying to fully invest in building capacity on the civilian side of government, which we think is critical to 

underwriting long-term security and stability. 

Do you want to add what we are doing on the civilian side. 

Mr. JONES. If I may, we have increased dramatically to $1.5 billion a year in civilian assistance on a 5-year commitment, which 

I think, in our view, very much mirrors the intention of a 5-year 

military commitment as well on the FMF side. We have dramatically changed the way we provide civilian assistance in Pakistan. 

We had been doing a lot, not in coordination with the government 

of Pakistan. And what we are doing now is going through and seeing how closely we can align our assistance and also work through 

accountable ministries of the Pakistan government and provincial 

administrations in order to get the assistance through, build capacity to the Pakistani government. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is that trying to really reach individuals, or if you 

want to call them insurgents, in the FATA region, because there 

is a difference of opinion about why people there are fighting or not 

fighting against their own government? 

Mr. JONES. We work very closely in the FATA through the FATA 

secretariat, enabling them to provide small project assistance in 
28 

communities that are vulnerable and to build communities’ 

strength against extremism. We found that to be well received. It 

needs to be identified with Pakistan for security reasons, but also 

to build the capacity and the image of Pakistan’s own capability. 

So that is a really critical part of our assistance strategy. 

Mrs. DAVIS. We spoke earlier a little bit about what we call the 

shadow war between India and Pakistan, at least it has been 

phrased in that way. I am sure you are aware of that language. 

And in many ways, India is playing a role also, as well as Pakistan 

to a certain extent, in building up capacity in Afghanistan particularly. And I am wondering, is that something that we are working 

on with them and together? Is that helpful, and how are we doing 

that road building, other capacities within Afghanistan and whether or not that is seen as more tension building in the region, or is 

seen as helping the efforts that we have and certainly the dollars 

that are flowing into the region to try and help with that capacity? 

Mr. JONES. If I may, India has been a major donor in Afghanistan, and we very much support that. India has made significant 

civilian investments in the areas of health, road building, and 

transportation. That has been a source of tension with Pakistan, as 

historically Afghanistan has been seen as a source of tension between India and Pakistan. We believe that, to the extent that all 

donors can be as transparent as they can, and we try to encourage 

the UN [United Nations] leads in that effort in Afghanistan, and 

we support it in every way we can, so everyone can see exactly 

what is being done, and that can ensure that it is not misunderstood by some of the neighbors. It is a complex neighborhood, not 

only between obviously Pakistan and India, and it is everyone’s 

benefit to understand exactly what sort of civilian assistance is 

being provided. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And with all that, could you just characterize how 

that is having an impact on the insurgency in Afghanistan, because 

so much of our effort has been directed to the FATA and to changing that. And I know that it is not a simple equation. In fact, I 

think, General Paxton, you suggested that what we have learned 

in Iraq has some applicability to Afghanistan. And certainly there 

is some, but there are a number of experts that would suggest that 

this is a different animal essentially. Can you—my time is up, 

but—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think we are seeing—one of the goals we 

set for ourselves in Afghanistan was to really shift the momentum, 

and we are seeing the earliest signs of that. The addition of forces 

in Afghanistan, the focus on a much more effective approach to 

counterinsurgency is starting to put pressure on the Afghanistan 

side of the border in the south and the east in particular. At the 

same time, you have the PAKMIL operations that are pressing 

from the other side of the border. At the same time, you have enhanced counterterrorism cooperation pressuring the leadership of 

Al Qaeda. At the same time, you have people waking up to the fact 

that the U.S. isn’t leaving this region any time soon. We have made 

a commitment, and we are going to stay involved in a very longterm sense. The nature of that involvement will change over time, 

but politically, economically, strategically we are going to stay invested in this region. And I think all of that is starting to have a 
29 

cumulative effect that is creating a lot of rethinking inside elements of the insurgency on both sides of the border. And that is 

exactly the kind of rethinking we want to stimulate ultimately. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Taylor asked about helicopters, and I am familiar with the 

request about Pakistan about helicopters. We are at war, and I am 

having a little bit of difficulty in understanding the lack of urgency. 

Is there something that I am missing? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, there is absolutely no lack of urgency. 

And again, the thing we could do fastest was to get what they have 

flying. And we have increased manyfold their capacity just by getting what they have back in the air and consistently operating. We 

are now looking at the issue of replacement, but frankly, we have 

been focusing our energies, first things first, on getting them up 

and flying with what they have. And they are now developing a 

multi-year plan that we will be bringing to you for replacement. I 

don’t know if you want to add anything. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. I would just say—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you get something to us on that in the 

very, very near future? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, we will. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not just what you are rebuilding, but the future 

helicopters for which they ask. Will you do that for us please? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. And I would just add that we are using FMF to support procurement of two Bell 412 helicopter squadrons, $204 

million from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2011, a $60 million fiscal year 2010 sup [supplemental] request to the Hill supports this. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Shapiro, this question should be 

asked of you. We had some experts on Pakistan some time ago that 

suggested that the real key to success and the greatest return on 

our investment is on the police in working with them. They are not 

tied to the territory vis-a-vis India. Is there some thought to helping them more than we are? 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Well, that is a very timely question. There 

was—the State Department’s INL [International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs] bureau signed an implementation agreement with Pakistan in February 2010 that allows for training, infrastructure and equipment for police and aviation support. And 

the goal is to expand the number of elite police to recruit, vet, hire, 

train, and equip by July 2011 and to expand the infrastructure 

training for FATA forces as well. So we are devoting resources to 

this, and it is clearly a priority for us as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get us something on that in more detail? We would certainly appreciate it. 

Secretary SHAPIRO. Sure. 

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, we certainly 

thank you very much for being with us. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Flournoy, you have been around long enough to 

know that we went through this with the Colombians on Plan Colombia, their request for Black Hawks. As a part of your presen-
30 

tation when you get back to us, will you give us how this is going 

to compare on the timeline for the delivery of the Black Hawks to 

Colombia, the training, the equipping and how we are doing with 

Pakistan, I think that would be a very useful benchmark. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We will do that, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, ma’am. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. And we would ask you all to support the $60 million in the supplemental for helicopters for Pakistan. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. We are certainly grateful for 

your being with us today and for your excellent testimony, and we 

look forward to seeing you again soon. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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