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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SHARING 

WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT TEN YEARS 

AFTER 9/11 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

Serial No. 112–70 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Vice Chair 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KEVIN GUNDERSEN, Staff Director 

ZACHARY D. HARRIS, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence .................................................................................................... 3 

WITNESSES

Mr. Scott McAllister, Deputy Under Secretary, State and Local Program 

Office, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 7 

Mr. Louis Quijas, Assistant Secretary, Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, Deparment of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 7 

Mr. Eric Velez-Villar, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Department of Justice: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Ms. Maurita J. Bryant, Assistant Chief, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

APPENDIX

Questions Submitted by Chairman Patrick Meehan for Scott McAllister and 

Louis F. Quijas ..................................................................................................... 33 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Patrick Meehan for Eric Velez-Villar ......... 37 

(1) 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE 

SHARING WITH STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL 

LAW ENFORCEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT TEN 

YEARS AFTER 9/11 

Tuesday, February 28, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Meehan, Long, Cravaack, Higgins, 

Hochul, and Hahn. 

Mr. MEEHAN. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony regarding 

an assessment of the Federal Government sharing intelligence with 

State, local, and Tribal law enforcement entities. I now recognize 

myself for an opening statement. 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing, and I look 

forward to hearing from the witnesses on this important issue, but 

before we begin the actual substance of the meeting, I would like 

to take formal notice of the new Member sitting to my left, Congressman Brian Higgins from Buffalo, New York, the new Ranking 

Member of the subcommittee. 

We have been discussing a little bit of ice hockey up here for the 

last minute or so. These are important issues before us. But I know 

from his very genuine and deep involvement in the numerous 

issues we have had here before the subcommittee to this year, he 

has been thoughtful and thorough in his approach, and I look forward greatly to continuing the great collaboration in a bipartisan 

fashion we have had on this committee through the year. 

I also want to take a moment to express formally for the record 

my deep appreciation for the service from Congresswoman Jackie 

Speier from California, who has left us to move to the higher 

waters of the Armed Services Committee. But it was a unique opportunity for some issues that related back to Congresswoman 

Speier and her district. I know she reluctantly handed over the 

sharing of the gavel, so to speak, on this committee, but I am deeply appreciative of the great work that she has done, had done, 

again, in a collaborative fashion, and look forward to working with 
2 

her on some of the issues in her position. I am sure she will still 

remember the important work we do in this subcommittee. 

Over the last year, the subcommittee has held hearings on a 

number of issues related to intelligence sharing and DHS’s role 

when coordinating with its State, local, and Tribal partners to collect, analyze, share, and disseminate critical intelligence to the 

public and to private stakeholders Nation-wide. It is an important 

time right now, because we are 10 years after 9/11. It is important 

we assess the role of fusion centers as members of the National, 

State, and local intelligence and law enforcement communities and 

ask the important questions about their performance to date and 

discuss the outlook for the future. 

I had the opportunity to be the United States attorney in Philadelphia after 9/11, took office just 6 days, and we as an entire Nation were responding to the new challenge of information sharing. 

I remember the initiation of fusion center programs, and supported 

them. 

However, today what was envisioned 10 years ago appears to be 

different in some measures to what is currently in place today. 

That may be the result of a logical evolution, and it may very well 

be a good thing, but both the Government Accountability Office and 

the DHS inspector general have reported that DHS still lacks effective means to assess its strategy to support State fusion centers. 

I think that is something that we should be focused on to see how 

we can make progress in that area. 

There has been strides made, but I think there are a couple of 

important questions that we need to ask. Where does DHS stand 

on developing metrics and defining requirements to gauge the efficacy, relevancy, and impact of fusion centers on local, State, and 

Federal partners? How does DHS plan to hold fusion centers to 

these measurable requirements? How will DHS and Federal Government sustain fusion centers financially, including determining a 

level of Federal funding and support for each center, as we appreciate the great struggles that we are have on the Federal level to 

deal with the budget deficit? Then how does the DHS plan to 

standardize procedure for all fusion centers to guide the type of information that is collected, the methods utilized for collection, and 

the manner in which it is analyzed? 

I am also interested personally in understanding better the 

guidelines in place at the National level and, more importantly, at 

the State and local level to protect individual privacy. As many of 

you on this panel are aware, the Pennsylvania director of homeland 

security resigned following revelations that an organization that 

had contracted with the State Office of Homeland Security was collecting intelligence on lawful citizen groups, including opponents of 

natural gas drilling. 

Now, I recognize this was not a fusion center case, and it was 

a violation at the State level, but privacy is still nonetheless a critical issue. We have spent a lot of time working on the importance 

of protecting that with the Federal agencies, but appreciate that, 

to the average person, government is government, and activities by 

local departments affiliated with homeland security that are conducting surveillance and information and intelligence gathering, 
3 

what are they doing with that material and product? How is it 

being protected against misuse or abuse? 

I think the last issue, of course, is the budgets. As we have said, 

we are living in a time of budget constraints. The reality is, it is 

likely to continue. We are all being asked to do more with less, and 

I hear—look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on the important issues about how that may affect their mission and how 

they think they can move forward, if, in fact, we are going to be 

looking, notwithstanding all the advocacy we will do to fund as 

fully as we can, but the reality that there could be less support. 

So at this point in time, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from 

New York, Mr. Higgins, for any statements he may have. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my friend and the gentleman from Pennsylvania, for his welcome. I look forward to working with him. 

I would also like to thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing today and want to thank the witnesses for their attendance and their testimony. Information sharing is an integral 

part to our Nation’s security. An environment in which information 

is shared is where better decisions can be made and ultimately in 

which people are safer. 

This message is not new. It is something that has been on our 

radar for the past 10 years. It is also something that the Federal 

Government has been working to get right. Since September 11, 

the Federal Government has developed many initiatives expanding 

Federal efforts at information gathering and sharing with State 

and local partners. We now have information-sharing partnerships 

that we did not have on September 12, 2001, such as fusion centers 

and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, which based on my 

experience has been highly, highly effective. 

Further, this administration has indicated that effective information sharing throughout the Government is a key priority. Over the 

past 3 years, three Executive Orders have been issued to improve 

information sharing. 

Although we have made improvements with information sharing, 

we must not become complacent. We need specificity. We need the 

Government to have a clear-cut definition of the programs and activities that are most important to the homeland security mission. 

Further, in this budgetary environment, we do not want to shortchange security. However, as we extend financial and human resources to these programs, their value should be defined. Additionally, information sharing should have a tailored approach. State 

and local officers must get the assistance they need to be most effective in protecting the people in their own communities. That 

means that when intelligence officials are deployed to jurisdictions 

that they have an interest in knowing the jurisdiction and that jurisdiction’s sensitivities. 

That means that we must be cognizant of the entire threat. The 

threat that exists in western New York may not be the same as 

those that exist along the Southern Border. Also, we need for the 

agencies as a whole, especially Department of Homeland Security, 

to be willing participants and provide the necessary support to assist State and local efforts. Unfortunately, in November 2011, the 
4 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 

found that there were improvements needed in this area. I look forward to hearing the Department of Homeland Security, what they 

have done to rectify this situation since the release of that report. 

Further, as we partner with jurisdictions, we must remember 

that State and local officers know their jurisdictions best. They also 

need to have a voice and should be heard. This is not a new message, but for some reason one that we must continually reinforce. 

These are the challenges that we are here to explore today. I 

hope that each of our witnesses will be forthcoming in your assessments of these and other challenges that lie ahead for the information-sharing environment. Only by helping us fully understand the 

challenges ahead can we hope to work together to craft solutions 

to these problems. 

I welcome all of you here, and I look forward to your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

Now, we are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses 

before us today on this important topic. The Honorable Scott 

McAllister is the deputy under secretary for State and Local Programs for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department 

of Homeland Security. In this role, he manages the office responsible for Departmental and interagency support to the National 

network of fusion centers. 

Before coming to the Department, Mr. McAllister was the chief 

of investigation of the Fort Myers Regional Operations Center for 

the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Mr. McAllister also 

served as the State of Florida’s deputy homeland security adviser 

from 2007 to 2010. Prior to serving as deputy homeland security 

adviser, Mr. McAllister previously served as a special agent supervisor in charge of domestic security and protective operations at 

the Miami division of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. 

Mr. McAllister brings more than 36 years of State and local law 

enforcement expertise, including roles as a major crimes detective, 

SWAT operator, and joint terrorism task force agents. More importantly, as I understand, before he found the sunny beaches of Florida, he came from southeastern Pennsylvania, so he has got good 

roots. 

The honorable Louis Quijas was appointed to the Department of 

Homeland Security as assistant secretary for the Office for State 

and Local Law Enforcement in July 2011. In this position, Mr. 

Quijas serves as the principal Department-wide liaison with State, 

local, and Tribal law enforcement, ensuring that both relevant information and policy development are coordinated with our nonFederal law enforcement partners. 

Prior to coming to the Department, Mr. Quijas served as the 

president of Datong Electronics North American operations. Before 

entering the private sector, Mr. Quijas had a 36-year career in Federal and local law enforcement. In 2002, while in the FBI, Mr. 

Quijas was appointed FBI assistant director for the Office of Law 

Enforcement Coordination. Prior to his appointment in the FBI, 

Mr. Quijas was the chief of police for the city of High Point, which 
5 

I recollect from my days as a prosecutor had a very aggressive, was 

it—an anti-gang and anti-gun program that was Nationally recognized. So congratulations. He accepted the position of chief of police 

upon his retirement from Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department after 25 years of service. 

Thank you, Mr. Quijas, for being here. 

Mr. Eric Velez-Villar is the assistant director for the Directorate 

of Intelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Prior to 

being named to this position by Director Mueller in 2012, Mr. Velez 

was the deputy assistant director for the Directorate of 

Intelligence’s intelligence operations branch. That must be tough to 

get on a business card. 

Mr. Velez started his 27-year career with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation in 1985 as a computer specialist. Early on in his career, he worked organized crime, drug, and public corruption matters. In 2012, he served as the organized crime and drug supervisor 

of the Los Angeles division, until he was re-assigned to supervise 

Orange County’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

In 2004, he was promoted to assistant special agent in charge of 

the Los Angeles field office counterterrorism program. In 2006, he 

was appointed as the deputy director of terrorist training center. 

In 2008, Director Mueller appointed Mr. Velez as the first special 

agent in charge of the newly created Intelligence Division of the 

Los Angeles field office, where he remained until being appointed 

to the Directorate of Intelligence. 

Last, from the great State of Pennsylvania, the assistant chief 

Maurita Bryant is assistant chief for the operations branch for the 

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, where she oversees all uniform and civilian personnel in the six police zones in the special deployment 

division. Ms. Bryant is a 34-year veteran of the Pittsburgh Bureau 

of Police, getting her start in 1977. She worked as a plain-clothes 

officer. She was a sergeant in the mobile crime unit, and she rose 

to commander of Zone 5 Station. 

Prior to her promotion to assistant chief in October 2006, Ms. 

Bryant served in various capacities, including the commander for 

narcotic, vice, and firearms trafficking and commander in charge of 

major crimes and commander of the sex assault and family crisis 

division. She is a 2004 graduate of the 218th session of the FBI 

National Academy in Quantico and a 2005 graduate from the Police 

Executive Research Forum’s Senior Management Institute for Police in Boston, Massachusetts. She is a 2010 graduate of the 26th 

Class of Leadership, Pittsburgh, and an instructor for the Penn 

State Justice and Safety Institute. 

Thank you for being here, Ms. Bryant. 

So for all panelists, we will give you the opportunity to make 

your opening statements. We will appreciate the recognition that 

we have been grateful for your submitted written testimony, and 

I know you will do your best to try to summarize your testimony 

and give us the essence as best you can within what we give as 

the 5-minute parameters. 

So let me begin by recognizing Deputy Under Secretary 

McAllister for your testimony. 
6 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT MC ALLISTER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF 

INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, 

and Members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts 

to keep our Nation safe from evolving threats through a robust information sharing with our State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector homeland security partners. 

As you know, I&A is a member of the intelligence community 

and fills a unique role as the critical bridge between the intelligence community and our State and local partners. I can personally attest to the vital importance of that bridge. 

Prior to joining the Department of Homeland Security in December 2011, I enjoyed a 36-year career with State and local law enforcement, which included investigating terrorism cases on Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, overseeing a State fusion center, and serving as the deputy homeland security adviser for the State of Florida. 

The collective progress made by the homeland security community to effectively collaborate became readily apparent to me during 

the decade I spent in State law enforcement post-9/11. Last fall, I 

jumped at the opportunity to come to DHS to build on that shared 

progress that I had previously been a part of at a State and local 

level. 

You have my formal written testimony, so I would like to use my 

remaining time to discuss what DHS is doing to build this momentum. The terrorist threat to the United States has dramatically 

evolved since the 9/11 attacks. Today we face a threat environment 

where violent extremism is not defined or contained by international borders. This means we have to address threats that are 

home-grown, as well as those that originate abroad. 

The threat of home-grown violent extremists fundamentally 

changed who was best positioned to spot, investigate, and respond 

to terrorist activity. State and local law enforcement officers are 

now the ones most likely to be in a position to detect the early 

signs of terrorist activity. This fact has profound implications on 

how we go about securing the homeland. 

The role of State and local partners in counterterrorism efforts 

has never been more valuable. As a former Governor, Secretary 

Napolitano understands the critical role State and local governments play in protecting our communities. As the Secretary has 

stated many times, homeland security begins with hometown security. 

DHS’s efforts to facilitate the flow of information between and 

among homeland security partners at all levels of government is 

made up of several mutually reinforcing elements. First, we have 

fundamentally changed the way the Department provides information to law enforcement agencies by improving the production and 

dissemination of classified and unclassified information regarding 

threats to the homeland. DHS has developed tailored products, including joint intelligence bulletins, to meet the needs of the State 

and local partners. 
7 

Last April, DHS also implemented the new National Terrorism 

Advisory System. This new system is designed to provide timely, 

detailed information to the public and private sectors about credible terrorist threats and recommended security measures. 

Second, our approach includes maturing grassroots intelligence 

and analytical capabilities within the State and local environment 

through National network of fusion centers. We are looking to ensure that every fusion center has core capabilities that include the 

ability to analyze local implications to National intelligence, thus 

enabling local officials to be—better protect their communities. 

We have also supported the development of fusion centers to 

grants, training, technical assistance, and deployment of Federal 

personnel. We currently have DHS intelligence officers deployed to 

64 fusion centers, and 63 centers now can receive classified threat 

information through the Homeland Secure Data Network. 

Fusion centers are a force multiplier to inform and contribute investigation initiating conducted by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces. Fusion centers and JTTFs have distinct, but complementary roles in securing the homeland, and I would like to thank Eric 

Velez for collaborating with us to strengthen this relationship and 

to ensure consistent messaging between fusion centers and the 

JTTF. 

Third, DHS is partnering with the Department of Justice on a 

Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, which establishes standard processes to identify, report, and share suspicious 

activity. Together, we have transformed how we train front-line officers to recognize and report suspicious activities. 

Finally, we recognize that an engaged and vigilant public is vital 

to our efforts to protect our communities from terrorism. Through 

the Nation-wide expansion of ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ campaign, we emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper law enforcement partners. 

In conclusion, I look forward to continuing to further develop the 

distributed homeland security architecture that we have built since 

9/11, in particular over the past 3 years, all while protecting the 

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all Americans. 

Now, I would like to close by thanking the committee for the opportunity to be here today, and more than happy to answer any 

questions. 

[The joint statement of Mr. McAllister and Mr. Quijas follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT MCALLISTER AND LOUIS F. QUIJAS

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

Thank you, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the 

committee. We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to keep our Nation safe from evolving threats 

through information-sharing activities with our State and local partners. 

Over the past 3 years, one of the Department’s top priorities has been to establish 

a domestic information-sharing capability that facilitates our efforts to fully integrate State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) officials into our terrorism prevention capacity. 

DHS is working with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), as well as with 

our SLTT partners on four key priorities: 

• Improve production and dissemination of classified and unclassified information 

regarding threats to the homeland; 
8 

• Establish grass-roots analytic capabilities through the development of a National network of State and major urban area fusion centers so that National 

intelligence can be incorporated into a local context; • Standardize how we train SLTT law enforcement to recognize indicators of terrorism-related criminal activity and report those suspicious activity reports 

(SARs) to Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) for investigation and fusion centers for analysis; and • Increase community awareness and encourage the public to report suspicious 

activity to law enforcement. 

As part of these efforts, DHS, including the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of Privacy, works to ensure appropriate civil liberty and privacy 

protections are integrated into all of our information-sharing and terrorism prevention activities. 

PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION

• The Department has developed tailored product lines to meet the needs of our 

SLTT partners, and expanded our dissemination to include the diverse range 

of homeland security stakeholders (law enforcement, emergency management, 

public health, and private sector). Specifically, I&A produces a variety of timely, 

tailored, and actionable intelligence products for SLTT partners, to include: 

Daily Intelligence Highlights (DIH), Roll Call Releases (RCR), Homeland Security Notes (HSN), Homeland Security Reference Aids (HSRA), Homeland Security Assessments (HSA), Homeland Security Monitors (HSM) Intelligence Notifications and Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS–SLIC) messages, and Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) trend analysis. Additionally, I&A coordinates the development of tearline reporting with 

the larger intelligence community (IC) during times of imminent threat to ensure that SLTT partners remain fully apprised of the evolving threat environment in the Homeland. I&A also works closely with the FBI on the development 

of Joint Information Bulletins (JIB), both classified and unclassified, that are 

disseminated to SLTT and law enforcement officials, which provide situational 

awareness and information on potential threats. 

• I&A uses feedback provided by State and local customers to adjust its analytic 

and current intelligence products to better meet their needs. As a result of feedback received over the last 2 years, I&A initiated new products including the 

Snapshot, which identifies tactics, techniques, and procedures of an emerging 

event which may have Homeland implications, and provides potential indicators 

and recommended preventive and protective actions. Analysis of survey data 

provided by SLTT partners on I&A products reveals that 98 percent of SLTT 

customers rated the relevance of I&A products they reviewed as Important to 

Critical. Likewise, 96 percent rated their satisfaction with the usefulness, timeliness, and responsiveness of I&A products as Somewhat to Very Satisfied. 

The Department has increased its coordination and collaboration with DOJ and 

the FBI through joint production and dissemination of intelligence and information 

to our SLTT and law enforcement partners. For example: 

• DHS and FBI provide joint Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTC) to SLTT and 

law enforcement officials, as well as the private sector to provide intelligence 

information regarding emerging threats. Specifically, we provided joint SVTC to 

stakeholders during the 10th Anniversary of 9/11 and leading up to the 2011 

holiday season; 

• The Department’s National Terrorism Advisory System, or NTAS, replaces the 

color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). This new system more 

effectively communicates information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to SLTT and law enforcement partners. 

FUSION CENTERS

As part of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007, DHS was charged with leading the effort to support and coordinate with a 

network of State or local-led information sharing and analytic centers in States and 

major cities throughout the country. Through I&A’s State and Local Program Office 

(SLPO), DHS has included these fusion centers in the intelligence cycle by building 

their capabilities to receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather information at the 

local level. I&A facilitates unified Federal support to fusion centers that yields the 

highest possible degree of two-way information sharing. This not only helps build 

a robust National intelligence infrastructure, it also simultaneously enhances State 

and local law enforcement capabilities. The result is an increasingly robust, dynamic 

flow of information with the States that results in joint intelligence products, report-
9 

ing of information of intelligence value, and building of an analytic and informationsharing capacity. DHS has made considerable progress in building fusion centers’ 

information-sharing capabilities, including the following: 

• There are now 93 I&A intelligence personnel deployed in support of fusion centers throughout the country. These intelligence personnel coordinate with DHS 

Component intelligence and law enforcement personnel who support fusion centers in various capacities. For example, I&A Intelligence Officers (IOs) coordinate with TSA field IOs to understand threats to the transportation sector and 

collaborate on intelligence products 

• Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) systems are deployed to fusion centers 

to permit access to Secret information and intelligence at the local level. I&A 

has developed and deployed a collaboration tool on HSDN to connect analysts 

from across the Homeland Security Enterprise to focus on counterterrorism-related issues. 

• Through I&A-led training, non-Federal analysts at fusion centers are rapidly increasing their analytic capacity and producing products routinely exchanged 

throughout fusion centers that fuse intelligence and information from the intelligence community with local/regional context. 

• DHS has the first statutorily required privacy office of any Federal agency, and 

the Department builds privacy and civil rights and civil liberties protections 

into its operations, policies, and programs. All fusion centers have appointed a 

privacy officer and have a written privacy policy that conforms to the requirements of the Information Sharing Environment established under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In addition, State and local personnel participate in regional workshops and on-site privacy and civil liberties 

training. 

Almost every process or system in the fusion centers is designed to facilitate twoway information sharing. For example, I&A has deployed reports officers who work 

with State and local law enforcement to gather and report information of intelligence value to the Department and the intelligence community that has not traditionally contributed to intelligence community analysis. In fiscal year 2011, I&A reports officers submitted 332 Intelligence Information Reports based on information 

provided by State and local partners. 

TRAINING

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), which is led 

by the Department of Justice, responds to the mandate to establish a ‘‘unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing [SARs]’’ in a manner that rigorously protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, as called for in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. The NSI establishes standardized processes and policies for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information 

about terrorism-related suspicious activities. The NSI allows State, local, Tribal, territorial, and Federal law enforcement organizations, as well as private sector entities, to share information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related. 

This initiative is training all law enforcement across the Nation to recognize behaviors and indicators related to terrorism, crime, and other threats; standardize 

how those observations are documented and analyzed; and ensure the sharing of 

those reports with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further investigation. 

This training emphasizes privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations in 

assessing and documenting observed suspicious activities. Beginning in December 

2010, the NSI has trained over 196,000 front-line officers, with the goal that virtually all front-line law enforcement personnel in the United States—hundreds of 

thousands of officers—will eventually receive the training. 

DHS has also worked closely with SLTT law enforcement and community organizations to support the administration’s countering violent extremism (CVE) approach as outlined in Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in 

the United States. Likewise, the administration’s Strategic Implementation Plan for 

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (SIP) 

was heavily informed by State and local law enforcement and underscores the 

strength of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and communityoriented policing. 

DHS, in partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department and the National 

Consortium for Advanced Policing, is in the process of developing a CVE training 

curriculum for State, local, and Tribal law enforcement. This CVE curriculum was 

test-piloted in San Diego in January 2012 and the Major Cities Chiefs Association 

has passed a motion to implement this curriculum across the country once it is fi-
10 

nalized. The curriculum includes an analysis of the common behaviors and indicators associated with violent extremism and guidance and best practices for community partnerships, to include an understanding of the privacy, civil rights, and civil 

liberties considerations in this arena. This curriculum is a key example of the Department’s efforts to partner with State and locals on countering violent extremism. 

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is also currently working 

to develop a CVE curriculum that will be integrated into its Federal law enforcement training programs. 

In addition to the Department’s training efforts, DHS and FBI field personnel, on 

a regular basis, provide briefings and workshops to State and local jurisdictions to 

help them to prepare for, protect against, and respond to coordinated terrorist attacks against multiple targets. For example, DHS has worked closely with NCTC 

and FBI to present the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series 

(JCTAWS) to cities Nation-wide. This initiative is designed to improve the ability 

of local jurisdictions to prepare for, protect against, and respond to potential coordinated terrorist attacks against multiple targets. The JCTAWS workshops, held in 

cities across the United States, include Federal, State, and local participants from 

across the law enforcement, emergency response, and private sector communities. 

‘‘IF YOU SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING’’ 

We continue to coordinate with the NSI on the rollout of the ‘‘If You See Something, Say SomethingTM’’ public awareness campaign. Originally used by the New 

York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, DHS received permission to use the 

MTA-trademarked phrase and to expand ‘‘If You See Something, Say SomethingTM’’ 

to a Nation-wide effort to increase public awareness and encourage the reporting of 

suspicious activity to local law enforcement authorities. This campaign is being expanded in locations that are part of the NSI in order to ensure appropriate training, 

safeguards, and reporting mechanisms are in place prior to any launch. Engaging 

the public and capturing SARs is increasingly important given the on-going threat 

of homegrown violent extremists. In addition, DHS and the FBI have co-branded 

briefing and educational materials provided to stakeholders and have announced 

major partnerships with the State, local, and private sector. 

ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENTAL INFORMATION-SHARING EFFORTS

Other Departmental information-sharing initiatives include outreach to elected 

and appointed officials including Governors, homeland security advisors (HSA), 

mayors, and Tribal officials and State and local law enforcement entities. 

DHS’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) leads interaction with elected 

and appointed officials and works closely with I&A and the Office of State and Local 

Law Enforcement (OSLLE) to ensure they are kept abreast of threat information. 

Interactions between HSAs and local officials and I&A Intelligence Officers in the 

field is routine, providing State leadership with up-to-date threat information on a 

regular basis at multiple classification levels. DHS also has expanded its work with 

Tribal governments and law enforcement entities across the Nation. DHS has Tribal 

liaisons in every operational component to work directly with Tribal communities. 

This continuous collaboration is evidence of the interagency determination to ensure 

State leadership is an integral part of the homeland security enterprise. 

In addition, the DHS’ OSLLE, working in a coordinated approach with IGA, helps 

ensure the broadest possible reach to the Nation’s law enforcement community. The 

Office is staffed by a combination of second-career law enforcement professionals 

and current DHS Component personnel that are in law enforcement career series 

(GS–1800) who build and maintain relationships with non-Federal law enforcement 

partners. 

The day-to-day interactions between fusion centers and the non-Federal law enforcement community vary throughout the Nation. In order to address the diverse 

nature of these relationships, the OSLLE utilizes its role as the DHS principal liaison with non-Federal law enforcement partners to ensure that those law enforcement agencies that are not integrated with a fusion center receive the same level 

of information as their fusion center counterparts. The OSLLE works to ensure that 

these law enforcement agencies receive not only threat and response information, 

but also information regarding National and Departmental initiatives and programs. To better serve our partners and ensure that they receive the latest information on Department activities, the OSLLE has formed an intra-agency group, the 

DHS Component Law Enforcement Outreach Committee (CLEOC), comprised of 

DHS personnel whose duties include outreach to our non-Federal law enforcement 

partners. 
11 

Furthermore, the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) utilize 

the expertise and viewpoint of active law enforcement in its mission to maintain situational awareness. DHS OPS has sworn law enforcement personnel from across 

the Nation within the National Operations Center (NOC) who are included at every 

level of the watch functions, including reviewing the information sent from OPS to 

its stakeholders and partners. In particular, the law enforcement personnel in the 

NOC are active participants in the dissemination of products from I&A’s Intelligence Watch, which is co-located with OPS in the NOC. 

CONCLUSION

While America is stronger and more resilient as a result of these efforts to 

strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise, threats from terrorism persist and 

continue to evolve. Today’s threats do not come from any one individual or group. 

They may originate in distant lands or local neighborhoods. They may be as simple 

as a homemade bomb or as sophisticated as a biological threat or coordinated cyber 

attack. 

The Federal Government realizes that State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, as well as citizens, businesses, and communities are on the front lines 

of detection and prevention. Protecting the Nation is a shared responsibility and everyone can contribute by staying informed and aware of the threats the Nation 

faces. 

The Federal Government benefits from a robust information-sharing infrastructure with its SLTT partners. SLTT partners similarly benefit from the collaborative 

environment established within the fusion centers through their analysis of the National threat picture and the provision of products that are developed and tailored 

using local context to support the implementation of information-driven communitybased solutions by local officials. SLTT partners also benefit from the National Network of Fusion Centers’ support of the implementation of the NSI and fusion center 

participation in the ‘‘If You See Something, Say SomethingTM’’ public awareness 

campaign. These important initiatives, combined with other coordinated outreach efforts of the Department, underscore the concept that homeland security begins with 

hometown security, where an alert public plays a critical role in keeping our Nation 

safe. 

DHS thanks this subcommittee for your continued support of our efforts, and your 

invaluable guidance and oversight as we continue to work to create a stronger and 

safer country. We look forward to any questions you may have. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. McAllister. 

Now, Mr. Quijas, for your testimony, please. 

STATEMENT OF LOUIS QUIJAS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 

DEPARMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. QUIJAS. Good morning, Mr. Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s efforts regarding information sharing with our State, 

local, and Tribal law enforcement partners. 

As mentioned at the beginning of this hearing, I have had the 

pleasure and honor of serving 36 years in Federal and local law enforcement. It is this experience that I draw on in my current position as assistant secretary of the Office for State and Local Law 

Enforcement. 

In response to the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, Congress created my office and directed that the assistant secretary 

lead the coordination of the Department-wide policy relating to 

State, local, and Tribal law enforcement’s role in preventing acts of 

terrorism and to serve as a liaison between law enforcement agencies across the country and the Department. 

As the Department’s principal liaison with our law enforcement 

partners, my office is uniquely positioned to assist other DHS components connect with this very important customer base. That 
12 

unique relationship exemplifies the need for a strong, independent 

office with a direct tie to the Office of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security. By moving forward with our plans to move my office as 

a direct report to the Secretary in fiscal year 2012, we will be better-positioned and aligned with the organizational structure of existing outreach and offices within the Department. It will also improve our ability to provide the Secretary with situational awareness and real-time information on issues, concerns, and requirements of our law enforcement partners. 

The realignment will improve the office’s visibility, traction, and 

standing within the Department, allowing us to better serve the 

800,000 State, local, and Tribal law enforcement customers, the 

18,000 agencies they represent, and the hundreds of organizations 

and associations that champion their cause. 

One of the Department’s top priorities has been to establish a domestic information-sharing capability that facilitates our efforts to 

fully integrate our law enforcement partners and to the Department’s terrorism prevention capacity. In coordination with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, my office utilizes its outreach capabilities to help facilitate information sharing with our mutual 

customers. 

To better serve our partners and to ensure that they receive the 

latest information on Departmental activities and initiatives, my 

office formed the DHS Component Law Enforcement Outreach 

Group, an interagency coordination body. This group is comprised 

of members from across the Department that have a nexus of responsibility for outreach to our law enforcement partners. 

My office is committed to proactively identify and then responding to challenges facing the law enforcement community. For example, in the recent economic—current economic downturn, law enforcement agencies are finding it difficult to maintain routine services and incident response. As a former police chief, I know firsthand that training is usually the first casualty of budget cuts. 

In an effort to assist our partners in identifying options to meet 

their current and future training requirements, my office has a 

range for the leadership of the major law enforcement associations 

to visit and tour the DHS Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, or FLETC, in Glynco, Georgia. This visit will allow Connie Patrick, the director of FLETC, and her team to brief the attendees 

on the resources, capabilities, and training programs this state-ofthe-art training facility has to offer. The visit will also provide the 

FLETC team an opportunity to help identify training efficiencies 

and areas for future collaboration. 

The Federal Government benefits from a robust informationsharing infrastructure with State, local, and Tribal law enforcement communities. Conversely, our partners benefit from having 

my office as their advocate and voice within DHS to help ensure 

that their issues, concerns, and challenges are understood and 

given full consideration during the budget, grant, and policy development processes. I believe that was the intent of Congress when 

it created my office and named it the Office for State and Local 

Law Enforcement. 

As an active police chief on the morning of September 11, 2001, 

and having had the unique experience of being a part of the FBI’s 
13 

and DHS’s outreach efforts to the law enforcement community 

post-9/11, I can say without hesitation that the level of cooperation 

and information sharing with these very valuable partners has 

never been better. 

It also reflects, as Scott said earlier, our belief that homeland security truly begins with hometown security. On behalf of the Secretary, I would like to thank this subcommittee for its support as 

we continue to work together to create a safe, secure, and resilient 

Nation. 

I look forward to any questions you may have, and thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Quijas. 

I would like to recognize now Assistant Director Velez-Villar for 

your testimony, sir. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC VELEZ-VILLAR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the committee. 

I am Special Agent Eric Velez, and I am the assistant director 

for the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence. I have submitted a written 

statement for the record to the committee, so I will keep my comments brief, and I look forward to answering any questions you 

may have. 

First, I would like to start off by saying that it is an honor to 

be able to speak before such a distinguished committee. On behalf 

of Director Mueller, I would like to thank you for the opportunity. 

The FBI recognizes that with evolving National security threats, 

it is extremely important that we adapt and position ourselves to 

counter such threats before they do harm. We must do this, always 

keeping in mind the rights and civil liberties of our citizens. The 

most effective tool we have at our disposal is each other. By working collaboratively and sharing what we know, together we become 

a formidable force to our enemies. 

As threats are increasingly conceived and carried out entirely 

within our borders, our reliance upon our State, local, and Tribal 

partners has never been more critical. It is almost certain that before an FBI agent comes face-to-face with a threat actor, a State, 

local or Tribal police officer or deputy will most likely encounter 

them first. They must know what we know in order to do their 

jobs. 

The fusion centers have become a strong and committed partner 

of ours. Our special agents in charge, or SACs, serve on the various 

governance boards or executive committees. We have assigned analysts and agents to the majority of the centers and are committed 

to doing everything we can to help them succeed. 

The way we see it, anyone committed to protecting our communities is a partner of ours. As a lead agency for domestic intelligence, we welcome everyone willing to assist to be part of the 

team. We see these centers as a force multiplier. They assist our 

field intelligence groups, or FIGs, in communicating our intelligence to our State, local, and Tribal partners. They keep their 

eyes open for any indicators of potential threats and relay that information to our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs. They as-
14 

sist in our intelligence analysis by adding a State and local context 

to that analysis. 

Some of the centers are collocated with our FBI field office, and 

we find it to be an optimal operating environment, which allows for 

seamless integration and collaboration. 

In summary, I would just like to say that information sharing 

and our partnership with State, local, Tribal agencies is nothing 

new to the FBI. We have been doing it since the beginning of our 

organization. It is engrained in the way we do business. 

9/11 was a stark reminder of how important it is for us to share 

information. We have worked very hard to find more effective and 

efficient ways to share intelligence with our partners. I look forward to answering any questions you may have, and thank you for 

the opportunity. 

[The statement of Mr. Velez-Villar follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC VELEZ-VILLAR

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and Members of the 

subcommittee. It is my privilege and pleasure to address you today as the Assistant 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Directorate of Intelligence, and to 

demonstrate our organization’s commitment to the timely sharing of intelligence 

and information related to United States National security. 

The constantly-evolving National security threat requires an adaptable information-sharing strategy. In the period immediately following 9/11, the FBI focused on 

threats originating outside the United States, but we now also must direct our resources to address the threat from individuals residing in our country who demonstrate violent extremist actions on behalf of either a foreign-based or domestic 

ideology. The FBI will continue to provide relevance and context on foreign threat 

information; however, we also recognize that the violent extremism threat may be 

first identified within our communities by State, local, or Tribal law enforcement. 

As a result, we have taken numerous proactive steps in the past year to develop 

a more robust information-sharing capacity with all Federal, State, local, and Tribal 

law enforcement partners. 

Given the diverse threats we face, it is essential that law enforcement entities 

work together, making our partnerships with all levels of law enforcement that 

much more invaluable. As the lead agency for domestic intelligence collection, as 

outlined in Executive Order 12333, the FBI must ensure that we maintain responsibility for all investigative activity involving terrorist threats while also sharing as 

much information as possible with our partners. We routinely disseminate raw and 

finished intelligence products to our partners to help us achieve this goal, and we 

focus on three critical tools to facilitate information sharing with our partners: Fusion centers, the FBI’s Field Intelligence Groups (‘‘FIGs’’), and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (‘‘JTTFs’’). 

As the analytical counterpart to the fusion centers—sharing a similar mission of 

gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information—FIGs are the 

focal point for sharing information with fusion centers. FIGs ensure all terrorismrelated information is passed to the FBI’s JTTFs. Unlike fusion centers and FIGs, 

JTTFs conduct operations and are focused exclusively on terrorism, with the responsibility for operations against and investigations of terrorist acts and terrorist 

threats inside the United States as well as related intelligence collection activities 

inside the United States. 

The FBI has implemented an engagement strategy to enhance our relationship 

with fusion centers and has demonstrated its commitment to partnering with other 

agencies, specifically, the Department of Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’), on fusion center initiatives in several key ways. To foster better coordination and integration of 

intelligence dissemination, the FBI has directly supported fusion centers by assigning approximately 96 FBI personnel to at least 55 of the 77 fusion centers on a fulltime or part-time basis. Of the more than 100 JTTFs operating throughout the 

country—comprising more than 4,000 task force members from more than 650 Federal, State, and local agencies—16 are collocated with fusion centers, providing even 

greater coordination and information sharing and enabling FBI and fusion center 
15 

personnel to better understand each other’s roles and responsibilities. All participants in fusion centers and JTTFs act as equal partners: Federal, State, local, and 

Tribal JTTF participants can access all threat information relevant to their area of 

responsibility, and the JTTFs share specific threat information concerning operations and investigations with relevant State and local entities. 

Fusion centers maximize our ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond 

to criminal and terrorist activity. They assist the FBI by providing information 

made available by the combination of knowledge, expertise, and information within 

local law enforcement and homeland security agencies operating throughout the Nation, and our participation allows us to provide a National perspective on regional 

threats and trends so we can better inform decision makers at all levels. The exchange of intelligence that takes place in fusion centers aids other intelligence and 

law enforcement organizations—including the JTTFs—in their investigative operations and serves as a critical tool for collaboration at all levels. 

With the DHS, the FBI co-chairs the Fusion Center Sub-Committee of the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee, a group that coordinates 

Federal support to fusion centers by providing guidance and standards to support 

interconnectivity, thereby ensuring information sharing among fusion centers and 

all levels of government. Moreover, the FBI recently hosted a 2-day northeast regional meeting of the fusion center directors, and we invited all of the directors to 

participate on their respective JTTF Executive Boards to ensure more effective coordination. We have also requested that the Special Agents in Charge of each FBI 

field office participate on their respective Fusion Center Advisory Board. 

In addition to its collaboration with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement through its fusion center initiatives, the FBI works with its law enforcement 

partners in many other areas. We have partnered with the International Association 

of Chiefs of Police, DHS, and other agencies to establish a unified approach to addressing the critical information needs of Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement. Concurrence among senior interagency leaders has resulted in an unprecedented commitment to unified messaging to the public regarding the proper 

protocols for reporting suspicious activity. This message encourages agencies at all 

levels of Government to encourage the use of the ‘‘If You See Something Say SomethingTM’’ campaign to raise public awareness of behavioral indicators of terrorism, 

and to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activities to proper law enforcement authorities, which will forward suspicious activity reports to fusion centers and the FBI’s JTTFs for follow-up and de-confliction. 

Training materials for law enforcement agencies in several States will be rolled 

out in the coming weeks and months to ensure that line officers understand how 

to identify the suspicious behaviors associated with pre-incident terrorism activities, 

how to document and report suspicious activity, and how to ensure the protection 

of privacy and civil liberties when documenting information. This messaging will be 

replicated Nation-wide at all levels of government to educate the public and raise 

awareness. 

Further, the FBI and its partner agencies have renewed their commitment to ensuring all information—whether it is reported to a fusion center or to a JTTF—is 

shared with those who need to know. Over the past few months, the FBI has 

worked closely with the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (‘‘SAR’’) Initiative’s Program Management Office to implement technical and business processes 

that enable two systems—the FBI’s eGuardian system and the Information Sharing 

Environment’s Shared Space systems—to share SARs more quickly and efficiently. 

While they continue to work to improve this synchronization, as of December 1, 

2011, SARs and other information are now pushed from one system to the other 

more effectively. This has ensured that all SARs entered into Shared Space are 

shared with eGuardian. The final goal in linking the two systems is to ensure that 

SARs will automatically pass between them without duplicating users’ efforts and 

without changing the Shared Space system, resulting in more seamless sharing of 

information between fusion centers, FIGs, and JTTFs. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I would be happy to answer 

any of your questions. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Velez. 

Now we turn to the last member of the panel to present testimony, Ms. Bryant. 
16 

STATEMENT OF MAURITA J. BRYANT, ASSISTANT CHIEF, 

PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE 

Chief BRYANT. Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee and distinguished 

panelists. 

As the first national vice president of the National Organization 

of Black Law Enforcement Executives, NOBLE, I am here today on 

behalf of NOBLE, and I thank you for the opportunity to allow me 

to speak on issues related to the effectiveness of fusion center operations. 

Overall, fusion centers are moving in the right direction, but 

there are still some disconnects. In today’s climate of shrinking 

budgets, manpower shortages, global networks supporting foreign 

and domestic terrorism, organization and drug trafficking, all levels of local, State, and Federal law enforcement realize we must 

work together and enter into the information-sharing process. 

Most important to law enforcement at all levels is the critical 

operational capabilities that primary and recognized fusion centers 

provide, such as the ability to receive classified and unclassified information from Federal partners, the ability to assess, analyze, and 

access the implications of local threat information, the ability to 

disseminate threat information to other local, State, Tribal, and 

territorial law enforcement agencies and private-sector entities, the 

ability to gather and share locally-generated information. 

Continued funding to fusion centers will permit these entities to 

advance beyond the policy development associated with the critical 

operating capabilities. This will allow centers to enter into a sound 

implementation phase with business practices consistent throughout the National network of fusion centers. Some fusion centers 

across the Nation in cities such as Tennessee, Los Angeles, Boston, 

Chicago, and Arizona, to name a few, are more operational than 

others and can be modeled for their performance. 

At the current time, the Pittsburgh Region Fusion Center has 

not been stood up for its full operational capacity. It does routinely 

produce and disseminate to all sectors an open-source document 

that is well-received by the appropriate personnel. The current and 

projected projects of the All Hazards Fusion Center, per Federal 

guidance, is specifically designed to expand beyond the terrorism 

nexus. 

Some of the systems in place, such as National Security Institute, NSI, and the FBI’s eGuardian are designed to generate dayto-day information that is—that has a possible nexus to terrorism, 

which is sometimes routed in the appropriate law enforcement 

agency. 

This can be a challenge, depending upon the geographical location, personalities, and existing cultural barriers, such as sharing 

information among public safety disciplines. Pittsburgh is in the 

early stages of their fusion’s effort and project that it can have a 

substantial impact based on experience to date with a limited deployment. 

The biggest issue currently is funding in the out-years. Recently, 

the Pittsburgh Urban Area Securities Initiative has been removed 

from the list of urban areas that will be funded in the 2012 budget. 

Without an active and funded All Hazards Fusion Center, Pitts-
17 

burgh will not be able to fully understand the threat, let alone 

react to prevent, protect, defend, deter, and respond to acts of terrorism. 

One of the key capabilities of a fusion center is to have access 

to intelligence and threat information. In order to effectively support fusion center priorities, the process for direct fusion center 

funding must be explored. 

Pittsburgh has recently had its threat profile downgraded from 

27th in the Nation to 33rd, which has cut the funding. Pittsburgh 

maintains that it cannot develop a full understanding of the threat 

without an All Hazards Fusion Center, which leaves them in a 

catch-22 situation. 

I will close now and then leave it open for questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Bryant follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAURITA J. BRYANT

FEBRUARY 28, 2012 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, Ranking and Members of the committee: I am Maurita J. Bryant, first national vice president of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and submit testimony for the record regarding intelligence sharing and the importance of information gathered in fusion centers to stop and prevent crime. The 

National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, better known as 

NOBLE, was founded in September 1976, during a 3-day symposium to address 

crime in urban low-income areas. The symposium was co-sponsored by the Police 

Foundation and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The mission of NOBLE is to ensure equity in the administration of justice in the provision 

of public service to all communities, and to serve as the conscience of law enforcement by being committed to justice by action. NOBLE strives to be recognized as 

a highly competent, public service organization that is at the forefront of providing 

solutions to law enforcement issues and concerns, as well as to the ever-changing 

needs of our communities. 

As the first national vice president, I am here representing a membership body 

of over 2,500 predominantly African American law enforcement executives from six 

regions across the United States and abroad. NOBLE has been a leading National 

voice on hate crimes, community policing, racial and religious tolerance, and law enforcement accreditation standards as a founding association of the Commission on 

Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), along with International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and 

the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA). 

As you are aware since 2001, all 50 States and some local governments have established fusion centers where homeland security, terrorism, and other intelligence 

information are shared. It should be noted that while the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have been engaged in addressing 

the challenges fusion center officials have identified, we are of the opinion that overall fusion centers are moving in the right direction but there are some disconnects. 

In today’s climate of shrinking budgets, manpower shortages, global networks supporting foreign and domestic terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking; all levels of local, State, and Federal law enforcement realize we must enter into the information-sharing process. Fusion Centers provide the avenue for the exchange of information. While fusion centers initially focused their efforts on terrorism-centric 

matters, we are pleased that they have taken on an ‘‘all hazards’’ approach and continuous development of these capabilities is important. Fusion centers can provide 

an ideal venue and an effective and efficient way to exchange information and intelligence to improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism and to respond to disasters. State and major urban area fusion centers are owned and operated by State 

and local entities. The Federal Government recognizes these designations and has 

a shared responsibility with State and local agencies to support the National network of fusion centers. Law enforcement at all levels of government has grown to 

utilize fusion centers to provide expertise and situational awareness to inform decision-making for the allocation of valuable resources. Approximately 18 months ago 

DHS came out with a self-assessment process and later developed a more structured 

process that involved internal and external fusion center partners. Most important 
18 

to law enforcement at all levels is the critical operational capabilities that primary 

and recognized fusion centers provide, such as: • Ability to receive classified and unclassified information from Federal partners. • Ability to access, analyze, and assess the implications of local threat information. • Ability to disseminate threat information to other local, State, Tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies and private-sector entities. • Ability to gather and share locally generated information. 

Continued funding to fusion centers will permit these entities to advance beyond 

the policy development associated with the critical operating capabilities. This will 

allow them to enter into a sound implementation phase with business practices consistent throughout the National network of fusion centers. Some fusion centers 

across the Nation in cities such as Tennessee, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and 

Arizona, to name a few, are more operational than others and can be modeled for 

their performance. At the current time the Pittsburgh Region Fusion Center has not 

been stood up to its full operational capacity. It does routinely produce and disseminate to all Sectors an open-source document that is well-received by the appropriate 

personnel. The current and projected projects of the All Hazards Fusion Center per 

Federal Guidance, is specifically designed to expand beyond the terrorism nexus. 

Some of the systems in place such as, NSI and the FBI’s eGuardian, are designed 

to generate ‘‘day-to-day’’ information that has a possible nexus to terrorism, which 

is sometimes routed to the appropriate Law Enforcement Agency. This can be a 

challenge depending upon the geographical location, personalities and existing cultural barriers; such as sharing information among public safety disciplines. Pittsburgh is in the early stages of their Fusion effort and project that it can have a 

substantial impact based on experience to date with a limited deployment. The biggest issue currently is funding in the out-years. Recently the Pittsburgh UASI has 

been removed from the list of Urban Areas that will be funded in the 2012 budget. 

Without an active and funded ‘‘All Hazards Fusion Center’’ Pittsburgh will not be 

able to fully understand the threat, let alone react to prevent, protect, defend, deter, 

and respond to acts of terrorism. 

One of the key capabilities of a fusion center is access to intelligence and threat 

information. In order to effectively support fusion center priorities the process for 

direct fusion center funding must be explored. Pittsburgh has recently had its threat 

profile downgraded from 27th in the Nation to 33rd which has cut the funding. 

Pittsburgh maintains that it cannot develop a full understanding of the threat without an All Hazards Fusion Center, which leaves them in a ‘‘catch-22’’ situation. Another issue that has impacted the success of those working hard to develop fusion 

center capabilities is the Federal grant approval process which oftentimes causes 

significant delays in the roll-out. However, DHS has recently removed a number of 

the impediments, which will make it easier to ‘‘fast track’’ fusion centers and other 

projects. Unfortunately for Pittsburgh, it will not have the funding after 2011 dollars are exhausted. In response to the question, does DHS provide sufficient guidance and structure to State and local responders and their missions? Depending 

upon who is asked the question, the response would be at times there is far too 

much guidance and structure. In places where fusion centers are more mature they 

can pretty much go on auto pilot with little or no guidance because they have processes and relationships in place. Fusion centers that are less mature need more 

structure and guidance. For some that has been the on-going issue in moving Fusion 

and other Homeland Security projects forward within acceptable time frames based 

upon the fact that the priorities of the fusion center and the State and local environment are not always consistent with the priorities promulgated by DHS. 

When asked is there anything more that the Federal Government should be doing 

in order to make this intelligence-sharing process more efficient and reliable? A recommendation would be to put in a process to qualify larger numbers of people to 

ensure better dissemination of information. The disconnect is that there are not 

many people in local or State law enforcement who have secret, not alone top secret 

clearances, so the classified information is not disseminated. Although clearances 

play a major role, we recognize this issue is under revision. Information sharing 

must be a two-way street, local level information is not always communicated because personnel may not think it is worth communicating on a National level. This 

is where education and awareness must continue at the State and local level and 

within the fusion center. Any information-sharing process must better determine access and minimize exclusivity—there still remains a tendency to hoard knowledge. 

It will be a waste of time for everyone if the information (beyond data) available 

is not being shared. 

Information sharing is vital in law enforcement and it is important that appropriate intelligence coupled with analysis is continually provided if we are to achieve 
19 

success in this area. DHS has been somewhat effective in getting past the old model 

of information ‘‘silos’’ that has impaired the ability of local officials to react to the 

ever-changing threat landscape. The capabilities of the various fusion centers must 

continually be evaluated on a holistic basis to ensure that across the country information is provided to State and local partners so that all gaps in identifying emerging threats to our communities are closed. As fusion centers receive intelligence that 

is pertinent, it is critical for that information to be shared in an expeditious manner. 

When information is shared it should be one message without circular reporting. Information overload is a casualty that comes from receiving the same information 

coming from multiple sources. It should also be recognized that large States such 

as Texas, California, Virginia, and Florida with multiple fusion centers allow for a 

greater population base to be served. One fusion center per State does not always 

answer the needs for the entire State. In looking towards the future, it is anticipated that collaboration efforts between State and local authorities and Federal 

agencies will progress and jurisdictional boundaries will become less significant over 

time. Information must be as highly mobile as the population in order to solve crime 

and thwart terrorism. While the existence of fusion centers has allowed information 

sharing to increase in a post-9/11 environment there is still a tremendous amount 

of ground to be covered if we are to fully realize a positive information-sharing environment at all levels of government. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Bryant. Thanks to each of the 

members of the panel, again, as I said, for your written testimony, 

but also for summarizing the essenc of your key points in your 

verbal testimony. 

So, again, we will allow each of the committee Members the 5 

minutes allotted to each of us to begin our questioning. I will now 

recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. 

Let me begin by just a couple of observations and ask the panel 

to be responsive, because I think you spelled out well sort of the 

boundaries of where we were. First, we watched in the course of 

10 years—and this is the essence of what I am asking—we have 

been 10 years at it. Where are we? What are we doing right? 

We have seen a transformation, accurately identified by Mr. 

McAllister, in which we now are looking beyond the threat from 

overseas to the simultaneous reality, in light of what we have seen 

with Hezbollah and others and, you know, acting out potentially in 

Washington, DC, and the concomitant reality of homegrown terrorism, that we have got joint issues that we need to be looking at, 

at the same time. It is actually increased the challenge before us. 

We have on the National level very sophisticated operations, Mr. 

Velez, throughout the FBI in every field office, in which we have 

stood up Joint Terrorism Task Forces, looking in a very disciplined 

way towards the issue of terrorism. We have down on the local 

level—as Mr. Bryant pointed out—fusion centers which are largely 

State- and local-oriented. 

We have got a lot of consistency, but a lot of inconsistency, and 

who remembers how they are organized, how they are overseen, 

and the role that they play in interaction. That may be a good 

thing, based on local needs and challenges, but in this context, 

where we have got this changing nature of the threat and we are 

organized in different ways, both Federally and locally, is it working? What is going right? What is going wrong with regard to fusion centers? What should we be doing a better job on? May I just 

ask the panel to respond to those observations and give me your 

gut sense as to what we ought to be doing better? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Chairman Meehan, if I could address that, first 

of all, let me describe the National network of fusion centers. Each 

Governor is requested to identify a primary fusion center for his or 
20 

her State. In addition to that, there are recognized fusion centers. 

So right now, we have a core capability throughout the majority of 

State and territories in the United States as those primary touch 

points between the Federal Government with threat information 

coming down to a State fusion center, and that State fusion center 

applying a localized context to that threat information—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. How does it work with the situation in which—you 

coming from the southeast, you appreciate—Philadelphia has got a 

fusion center. Ms. Bryant is in Pittsburgh. There is a huge difference geographically with Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Is Pittsburgh tied in? Or are there two separate fusion centers? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Well, I can describe my experience in Florida. 

In Florida, as the deputy homeland security adviser, we had our 

primary State fusion center located in Tallahassee, designated by 

the Governor. Also, there were two other recognized fusion centers 

that sat in urban areas, one in Orlando and one in the Miami area. 

What is important to note is that these are owned and operated 

by local entities. They are not owned by the Federal Government. 

In turn, it is incumbent upon that State entity to describe an overarching architecture of how information and intelligence will be 

shared within that State. So for my personal experience, we developed a program in order for information and threat to come down 

from the Federal Government to the State, the State out to our 

other recognized fusion centers and other nodes within that State, 

and then the reverse flow. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Ms. Bryant, you are from Pittsburgh. How does 

that work, from your perspective, right now? 

Chief BRYANT. Well—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Would you push your button so that we can hear 

you? 

Chief BRYANT. As I stated earlier, our fusion center is not fully 

operational. We have the disconnect because—if I was to ask the 

director of our emergency management services, he would say that 

the disconnect is the bureaucracy and the audits, and he would 

give a whole lot of information. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Federal audits? State audits? Local audits? Who is 

doing that? 

Chief BRYANT. State and Federal audits. It has been a 3-year 

process for Pittsburgh, but it still hasn’t gotten off the ground. 

Then it is the dilemma of, who is going to be in charge? Is it going 

to be emergency management? Or is it going to be law enforcement? So we have a lot of issues—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. Is this because you are going into all-hazards? 

Chief BRYANT. Yes, because it is all-hazards. For our area, we do 

need all-hazards. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Well, that is an issue worth—Mr. Velez or 

Mr. Quijas, if you have anything to add, my time has passed, but 

if you have something quickly to add to either the general question 

or the specific, I would be delighted to hear it. 

Mr. QUIJAS. I think the critical piece here that as a State, we focused on is the involvement of State and locals in the fusion centers. Prior to September 11, you would not have seen that. The 

level of engagement, the level of involvement and the management 

at the local level, as Scott said, those are locally managed, which 
21 

I think says a lot about where we have come from September 11 

and the engagement of our State and local partners in basically 

driving these initiatives. So I think there has been a lot of progress 

in that, and I think the fusion centers show that. 

Mr. MEEHAN. My challenge is one State directing the local partnership, a State like Pennsylvania, not unlike many others, with 

two specific urban centers. There may be more. You know, how do 

we make it work in a situation like that? 

Let me just—Mr. Velez, do you have any comment before I turn 

it over to Mr. Higgins for—okay, well, thank you so much. 

At this point in time, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Higgins, for his questions. Thank you. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much 

the characterization of the disjointed way that security issues were 

dealt with prior to 9/11. 

There is a book written by Lawrence Wright called ‘‘The Looming 

Tower.’’ The subtitle is ‘‘From Al Qaida to 9/11.’’ In it, there is a 

passage where he recounts that an FBI agent, when the second 

plane hit the tower, physically got sick, because he realized that 

between the FBI, the CIA, and local law enforcement agencies, 

they had the intelligence to potentially thwart that attack. 

But because these barriers existed between the Federal law enforcement agencies, that intelligence wasn’t shared freely, and thus 

it was of no use relative to that situation. So I appreciate very 

much, you know, reassuring us that things have changed profoundly since, but we can never become complacent. You have to 

be diligent. 

The Chairman had mentioned—and we have had previous testimony in this committee—about the potential threat of Hezbollah in 

the Western Hemisphere, including North America. Hezbollah is a 

terrorist organization committed to violent jihad. They act as a 

proxy for Syria, for Venezuela, and for Iran. They have a presence 

in the 20-country region of Latin America, and they also have a 

presence in 15 American cities and four major cities in Canada. 

This is a threat that we have been told we shouldn’t be too worried about it, because their activities, Hezbollah, in North America 

is limited to fundraising activity. Well, to me, that is cold comfort. 

When you look at the effectiveness of the fusion centers, are they 

well-positioned, some 72 of them throughout the Nation, are they 

well-positioned to deal with not only the existing threats, but prospective threats, as well, from organizations like Hezbollah that act 

as a—as I said, a proxy for people that want to harm us? 

So I ask that generally to the panel. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may, first of all, we are positioned in order 

to address that. It is a complementary, rather than competitive 

type of environment. Working jointly with the FBI, Department of 

Homeland Security I&A has developed a joint information bulletin 

that is classified, but has been provided to our key stakeholders 

throughout the State and local environment, and working together 

with the FBI, it is a prime example of being able to communicate 

that potential threat. 

But the concept is, is in order to provide those key leaders out 

there the ability to make informed decisions based on that threat 

in the localized context to their area of responsibility in order to 
22 

make informed decisions on deployment of their resources in order 

to mitigate that threat. So that process is in place, and it is working well. 

Chief BRYANT. One of the problems that State and local law enforcement has is that there are not many law enforcement officers 

at that level that have secret, not alone top secret clearance to receive the information. We work very well with our Federal partners, but in the fusion center, if there is not an FBI analyst to decipher and disseminate the information, it doesn’t always come all 

the way down. 

Another disconnect with that two-way information-sharing is the 

officers who work on the street who are many times the first who 

would encounter a threat don’t always realize the importance of 

pushing the information up. So there needs to additional education 

and awareness initiatives to ensure that more officers are sent to 

where they can receive the proper clearances and that the patrol 

officer on the street or the beat officer on the street knows what 

information is key to be pushed upward to our National levels. 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Yes, I would just like to point out, as well, the 

FBI uses a variety of mechanisms in order to ensure that not only 

the fusion centers, but all our State and local partners are positioned as well as they can be. Mr. McAllister mentioned the joint 

intelligence bulletins, but one of the most effective ways of doing 

this is through our Joint Terrorism Task Force. Obviously, any investigation regarding Hezbollah would be operated by the JTTF. 

We have Joint Terrorism Task Force executive boards in which we 

bring in the membership of these boards, which make up chiefs of 

police, homeland security advisers, and we brief them on on-going 

efforts on these threats, and we brief them in a classified environment, if need be, but we share that directly face-to-face with them. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Just to add to that, just to give you a context 

of how many State and local law enforcement and other first responders have security clearances, there are approximately 4,000 

State and local first responders that have been provided secretlevel clearances, if not higher. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you. I want to thank you all for being here 

today, No. 1. 

You don’t need to turn around and look, but there are a couple 

of pictures on the wall behind you all that had gone missing from 

this committee room for a few years, and thanks to Chairman 

King, they have been returned as a reminder, one, of the Twin 

Towers engulfed in smoke and flames. The other one is two searchlights going up at nighttime from where the Twin Towers used to 

stand. 

With that, in our memory, I think you all aware that there was 

a CIA watch-listed individual that was pulled over by a Maryland 

State trooper 2 days before that event, and he was also one of the 

hijackers. Due to a lack of information sharing, we were unable to 

stop him or do anything that might have prevented the occurrence 

on 9/11. 
23 

So, Mr. Quijas, I would like to ask you, are we doing all that we 

can in the area of information sharing among all law enforcement 

agencies in this country? If not, what are the top three areas that 

need to be addressed, in your opinion? 

Mr. QUIJAS. Thank you, sir. You know, again, I was a sitting 

chief on the morning of September 11, and tragically, as the events 

were unfolding in New York, I had two FBI agents that were sitting in my office briefing me, as we held the furniture market 

every year in North Carolina in High Point. I went from that period of really having to pull information out of our Federal partners 

to now we basically have went to the other end. In my travels, talking to the major city chiefs, the National Sheriffs’ Association, 

IECP members, in some cases, I hear, ‘‘We are getting too much 

information. Is there a way that we can vet out that information 

so when we get it, it is more accurate and actionable?’’ That is 

what they want. 

So that State trooper that you talked about that pulled that car 

over, I can almost guarantee you today that that officer through either the JTTF or fusion centers or one of the other mechanisms out 

there sharing information would more than likely have that information. 

I have to agree with what the chief said. I think sometimes there 

is a little confusion about, you know, how much information people 

get, how it gets out to them, and I think the challenge for us in 

the future is making sure that we don’t overwhelm our State and 

local partners, because at the end of the day they are still keeping 

our homeland secure. They are answering 9–1–1 calls. They are responding to burglaries. They are doing all the local stuff. Plus, we 

have also asked them to be on the front lines of keeping our country safe. 

So I think in reality we have to be at the Federal level more sensitive to—instead of just pushing more information out, is that information timely? Is it actionable? So our State and local partners 

can take action on that, help keeping our communities safe, and as 

we all know, eventually keeps our homeland safe. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Ms. Bryant, you were nodding your head to 

that ‘‘too much information.’’ Could you elaborate? 

Chief BRYANT. Yes. Information overload is a casualty. It comes 

from receiving information from multiple sources. If you continue 

to receive it, you tend to discard it, that it is not important, because it is just too much. Sometimes we get the same information 

two and three times just from different sources, so if that could be 

vetted some sort of way so that the message gets out, but it is not 

circular reporting. 

Mr. LONG. But are you able to get the critical information that 

you do need in a timely fashion? Do you feel between agencies information sharing? 

Chief BRYANT. I think it is an on-going process—— 

Mr. LONG. There are no more turf battles? 

Chief BRYANT. It is an on-going battle, but it is getting better. 

It really is getting better. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. 

Chief BRYANT. We are talking to one another, not talking at one 

another. 
24 

Mr. LONG. Next question is also for you, Ms. Bryant. I hail from 

the fastest-growing Congressional in Missouri. The Springfield, 

Branson, Joplin area of southwest Missouri grew the fastest over 

the last 10 years of any area in the State. My question was going 

to be: What could I tell my local law enforcement agencies who 

need a fusion center what steps they could take or what they need 

to do in that regard? But after your earlier testimony, where you 

said you all have been 3 years trying to get a fusion center, I guess 

I would ask if you could perhaps point out some pitfalls or things 

to be wary of or how—if they could go forward without falling into 

a 3-year morass like you all have. 

Chief BRYANT. I think, first, your law enforcement leaders should 

visit some of the fusion centers around the country that are operational and that are working together. First, before they even start 

the planning phase, they need to build the relationship with the 

Federal, State, and local representatives. 

If you don’t have a relationship, you are going to have a hard 

way to go. Once that relationship is formed, you have to figure out, 

well, who is going to take the lead on the fusion center and what 

type of fusion center we want to have. Those are two crucial things 

that have to be done, and when those decisions are made, then it 

is just a matter of submitting the paperwork and getting started. 

Mr. LONG. So you all do not have an operational fusion center 

as we speak? 

Chief BRYANT. It is not fully operational, no. As I stated, some 

information is disseminated, but the information is from open 

sources. You could pretty much get it from anywhere. The law enforcement component to the fusion center is not quite together yet. 

Mr. LONG. This is for any of you real briefly. How many operational operating fusion centers are there in the country? 

Chief BRYANT. Seventy-two throughout the Nation. 

Mr. LONG. Okay, without the—not counting Pittsburgh? 

Chief BRYANT. Well, we are counted a little bit. 

Mr. LONG. Mr. Quijas, I don’t know if you ever had cause to run 

into my buddy Forest Mendenhall down there in High Point, but 

good auctioneer buddy friend down there. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Never losing an opportunity to push the business, 

huh, Mr. Long? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Long. 

At this point in time, the Chairman recognizes the gentlelady 

from California, Ms. Hahn. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really appreciating 

this hearing that we are holding this morning. 

I have a great success story from one of the two fusion centers 

in L.A. County. This was from a press account about the JRIC, 

which is the name of our fusion center. It was in 2006. 

As the month-long Israeli-Hezbollah conflict embroiled the Middle East earlier this year, in 2006, a group of analysts working on 

the seventh floor of an inconspicuous office building in Norwalk, 

California, near Los Angeles started to connect some dots. In a 

room with low cubicles to ease the flow of communication, specialists in areas like epidemiology, hazardous material, and terrorism 
25 

intelligence began analyzing information and assessing various situations, possible threats, and potential targets. 

Through the JRIC intelligence, information valued for its currency and relevancy was furnished to agencies throughout Southern California, sending officers to reinforce sensitive locations, like 

the Jewish Federation of Greater Los Angeles. Soon after, on July 

28, 2006, 1,200 miles from Los Angeles, a gunman opened fire at 

the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle, wounding five women 

and killing one. 

While cities scrambled to protect their Jewish centers, the greater Los Angeles area was already prepared, thanks to the JRIC’s 

foresight, said John Miller, FBI assistant director of public affairs. 

With its landmark model of interagency cooperation, the center is 

one step ahead of counterterrorism efforts Nation-wide, predicting 

threatening situations instead of reacting to them. 

The JRIC, a multi-agency fusion center, looks strategically at all 

criminal activities locally and internationally. Since opening, the 

center has grabbed the intelligence community’s attention and received praise from law enforcement agencies. 

I thought it would be great to offer a success story this morning 

as we talk about how critical and important these fusion centers 

are. Sitting here as a relatively new Member of Congress, you 

know, knowing what this center was able to prevent, and then 

hearing from Ms. Bryant of centers that are still not up and running, and talking about how we might continue as Congress to ensure that we connect the dots—because that is really what this is 

about. Since 9/11, that seemed to be the recurring theme for us 

was, how do we connect the dots? 

We also have one at the Port of Los Angeles, which, you know, 

the Port of Los Angeles between Los Angeles and Long Beach is 

the largest port complex in the country. Forty-four percent of all 

the trade that comes into this country comes through that center. 

We know, if something were to happen at one of those ports to 

knock it out of service, it would cost this country, I believe, $2 million a day in our local economy. By the way, every Congressional 

district depends on what comes through those ports. 

I am concerned about the funding. You know, I feel like we need 

a continued revenue stream of funding for our fusion centers. I am 

worried that many of these analysts in these fusion centers were 

grant-funded, and I am concerned of some of the—some of you have 

alluded to it, but I guess my question would be, what do you see, 

realistically, as the impact of some of our cuts back here, particularly in some of these security grant fundings projects? What is 

that going to have—what kind of an impact is that going to have, 

particularly on the analysts that are in these fusion centers that, 

as I just read that story, were critical in preventing a deadly attack 

in Los Angeles? 

So I am concerned about—I am concerned about the ports, and 

I am concerned about the grant-funded analysts in these fusion 

centers across the country. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. First, I could not have more eloquently described a success story that, again, hearkens back to that taking 

threat information, applying a localized context to it, and then developing a mitigation strategy on how to address that threat. 
26 

Pertaining to grants, again, remember that there—the State and 

local fusion centers are locally owned, and they have a variety of 

different sustainment methods in order to use either general revenue or some grant money in order to sustain those efforts. 

Ms. HAHN. But I—let me just say, the centers have received $426 

million in Federal funds since 2004. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Correct. What we do is we work to convey the 

Secretary’s message as far as how important when it comes to the 

grant language that the National network of fusion centers is interwoven into those sustainment efforts, through grant language, as 

well as working on the assessment and metrics in order to provide 

your colleagues here with the return on investment from those already invested dollars that have come from Congress. 

Ms. HAHN. Anybody else want to speak to the port security 

issue? 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. I can’t speak to the funding issue, but I can 

tell you about the port security issue. Having come from L.A.—and 

I served as the Joint Terrorism Task Force supervisor in Long 

Beach and was on the executive committee for the JRIC, so I appreciate the comments on the JRIC and the success. 

With regard to the ports, whether there is funding from DHS to 

the fusion center for that, ultimately from a JTTF perspective, protecting those ports was extremely important to us. We created a 

squad at the FBI office solely dedicated to port security. I served 

on the area maritime security committee with the Coast Guard 

captain of the port, and we are constantly working with the port 

to ensure that that infrastructure is protected. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. I will yield my time. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thanks, Ms. Hahn. 

At this point in time, the Chairman will now recognize the 

gentlelady from New York, Ms. Hochul. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to congratulate my colleague, Congressman Higgins, on his elevation as our 

Ranking Member on this subcommittee, so thank you. It is great 

to be able to tag-team on issues that relate to the Canadian border, 

as well. It is something that we are very concerned about. 

I am sorry I missed the earlier testimony. In fact, I am on deck 

to ask questions of the Secretary of the Air Force about something 

in our area, so I have to—I only am going to have time for one 

question, because I have to run over there. 

But representing the western New York area on the border with 

Canada, tell me how our relationship with the Canadian government has improved with respect to information sharing since 9/11? 

That is critically important, with the four bridges we have, bringing lots of people into our communities from Canada, which has 

certainly standards to get into the country, but we are always concerned about people crossing the border. The airports, the air base 

we have there, and actually the critical infrastructure, which is a 

huge hydroelectric power facility that gives power to the grid to 

take to New York City. 

So in my sense, we have some vulnerabilities up there, but I 

want to know what is being done to engage the Canadian government and how you feel that is going and, No. 2, can it be improved? 
27 

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may—and I know you are short on time— 

but the Secretary is very collaborative in the Beyond the Borders 

Initiative. Our under secretary of intelligence and analysis was just 

up with Canadian officials to address information sharing and collaboration across the border, particularly in the area of suspicious 

activity reporting and the like. 

So if you would like—I know you are short on time—we are more 

than happy to come back and give you a more thorough brief on 

what is underway. 

Ms. HOCHUL. My question is: Are you comfortable with the level 

of cooperation? Or is there room for improvement? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. My personal experience has been that the Canadians are—have a thirst for knowledge and have the proper perspective in order to do the right and collaborate in that information 

sharing and collaboration across the border in order to ensure both 

Canada and the United States is safe. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you. 

I yield back the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you for taking the time, Ms. Hochul, to juggle the balls, but to get here for our committee hearing. 

I now appreciate that we have been joined by another seasoned 

veteran of the committee, and at this point in time, if the gentleman from Minnesota is prepared to ask a question, we would be 

delighted to entertain that opportunity. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. 

Let’s see. I am trying to catch up, so—I just came out of one committee, so I apologize to the Members of the committee. Thank you 

very much. It is very important what you do, and I am going to 

jump on in. 

Fusion centers were originally intended to serve as a conduit for 

information to flow from State and local enforcement to Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, JTTFs, and 

to promote regional information sharing to combat terrorism by 

combining Federal, State, and law enforcement resources. 

Is there any metric that you can tell me in place to measure how 

intelligence gathered at fusion centers has supported the Federal 

counterterrorism investigations? I will just open that up to a broad 

question. 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Sir, I can’t speak of a specific metric that has 

been captured. I know within our organization, within the FBI, we 

actually do capture—whenever we conduct an investigation, whether it is terrorism-related or whether it is criminal investigations, if 

there is support from the fusion center, we capture that on a form 

that we utilize in which we give it a score from one to four pertaining to the amount of assistance that was provided by the fusion 

center. So we do capture that internally within our field offices. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Just to add to that, JTTFs are involved in 

counterterrorism investigations and are operated and owned by the 

FBI. Fusion centers are locally owned and operates and collaborate 

in a more broader focus. They collaborate with each other, which 

is important to note. Through the analysis that fusion centers do, 

they complement what investigations are underway by the JTTFs. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So you find the communication to be pretty good, 

back and forth? 
28 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Excellent. Federal guidance required that by October 29, 2010, DHS was to develop an annual reporting process 

that would document the total operational sustainment costs of 

each of the 72 fusion centers in the National network. Has this 

been completed yet? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. We are completing the 2011 assessment on a 

National network. That document should be finalized and available 

within the next month or two. We will be happy to share that with 

you at that time. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Any red herrings? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Not that I am aware of, but I have only been 

here since December, so—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Welcome aboard. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Thank you. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Let’s talk a little bit about mission creep. The 

number of fusion centers has gradually increased to about 77. Furthermore, the original mission of the fusion centers expanded from 

preventing terrorist attacks in some places to criminal analysis and 

emergency management. Has DHS strictly defined the limit or 

scope of fusion centers’ mission or our jurisdiction? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. The answer is no. Fusion centers are owned 

and operated locally. They are designated by the Governor or the 

particular State that they reside in, both in primary and recognized 

fusion centers. What we bring to bear is we provide the senior intelligence officers and the secure network in order for them to receive secure information, analyze it in a local context, determine 

what is of value as far as a mitigation strategy, as well as providing that localized context back up through the intelligence community to add value there. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. In your opinion—and this is a generalization, 

since you have been on-board since December—how many total fusion centers are needed to ensure the country remains safe? Is 77 

enough? Do you think we need more? In your opinion, in analyzing 

the threats that are out there and the—and the geography of those, 

the demographic of those threats, what do you think? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. I served as the deputy homeland security adviser for the State of Florida, and there we had more than one fusion center in that State. But what was incumbent upon me and 

other senior executives within the State was to determine the architecture in which information and information sharing would be 

shared. 

In response to my opinion, we cannot say a specific number, as 

far as what is the ideal amount. That is determined by State and 

local officials, as well as the Governors of the States and territories. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay, thank you. Let me just—if you don’t mind, 

switch gears a little bit. Let’s talk about immigration, border security. It has come to my attention that ICE personnel serve at some 

of the fusion centers. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. We have some personnel commingled in the fusion centers, but at a minimum—and, again, I can base this on my 

experience—at the State of Florida, the State fusion center there, 

we didn’t have an ICE personnel there, but our analysts had built 
29 

relationships with those individuals in order to have a seamless 

collaboration on any—with that component, as well as other components within DHS. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. How much of ICE’s fusion center would 

you say is related to illegal immigration? Would that be something 

that is specifically on your radar for any length of time? Is it constant? What would you say? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may, I would prefer taking that back in 

order to get you the proper answer. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Okay. Okay. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Thank you. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Do you think that—this is another general question—I would like to ask each one of the members—if I may just 

be indulged, sir—let me ask you this question. Do you think we 

have a secure Southern Border? I will just take it down the row, 

if you don’t mind. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. I think that we have secured the border more 

and that, as with any initiative or issue, there is always room for 

improvement. If we can—you know, as a normal business process, 

try and close those gaps, we strive to do so. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Do you think it is a vitally important mission? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Absolutely. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Sir, can I ask you? 

Mr. QUIJAS. As Scott said, I have to agree that—I mean, it is an 

on-going process. It is not an event. As long as we continue to develop our relationships with our other Federal, State, and local 

partners that have responsibility for the Northern Border, I believe 

we are situated currently to have a very secure Northern Border. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Coming from Minnesota, we appreciate that, so— 

sir? 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Yes, I would just echo what my colleagues 

have said. Obviously, from the FBI’s perspective, when it comes to 

the Southern Border, we need to ensure that we are doing everything possible to ensure that any violence or any crimes along 

those borders are not coming through over the border into our communities, and we are working very closely with our partners along 

the borders to ensure that we effectively mitigate those types of 

threats. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. You would agree this is a vitally important mission? 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. Absolutely. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you. Thank you, sir. 

Ma’am. 

Chief BRYANT. I think for any of us to say that something is completely secure would give a—would not be good to do. We continually work to make sure that we do the best that we can to make 

sure that our borders are safe, and that is with working together. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. You would agree that is a vitally important mission, as well? 

Chief BRYANT. Yes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, ma’am. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the Chair’s indulgence. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you to the gentleman from Minnesota. 
30 

I just have a quick follow-up line of inquiry, and I will certainly 

invite any of my colleagues if they have any follow-up questions to 

do so, as well. But I follow again from the recognition, Mr. 

McAllister—among others, you have testified that we have created 

this separation from the local fusion centers, in the sense that they 

are products of State and local government, so we encourage them, 

but we have created some kind of separation. 

My fear is of—sort of two sorts. One is that we have created an 

expectation and we see the situation in Pittsburgh where they have 

stood one up, but it isn’t getting the full, you know, level of support. Or is it inappropriate to have so many, if, in fact, they are 

not going to be able to be, you know, fully supported by a commitment from every agency to participate? 

Then you see differences among them, where some are all-hazards and others seem to be more focused on counterterrorism. How 

are we communicating with the local level to create some kind of 

a sense of standardization and expectation with regard to what we 

want from them? I would like to ask Mr. Quijas and Mr. McAllister 

to respond to that. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Thank you, sir. 

First of all, there was developed baseline capabilities for all State 

and urban fusion centers. That was done in—I think it was 2009. 

As building upon that, there was grant language that indicated 

that recognized fusion centers need to try and adhere to that baseline capability so we have consistency across the United States. 

Further development was in 2010. Part of that grant language 

indicated that in order to use preparedness grant monies that the 

insurance—or the fusion centers have a privacy policy in place, as 

well as compliance for all the personnel to 28 CFR Part 23, which 

deals with civil rights and civil liberties. 

There is a build-up to that, as well as what is important to note 

is we work on the not only individual fusion centers that are, 

again, owned and operated by local governments and recognized by 

the Governors, but on a National network, as well. So not only do 

we have information coming down from the Federal Government 

and that localized context taking place, but also fusion-center-to-fusion-center collaboration. 

As an example, I can note one from Pennsylvania, actually, 

which was a rape suspect who had committed a crime in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania fusion center had obtained partial information on a main tag that collaborated with the main fusion center, identified the suspect, found out that he had traveled over into 

Canada, and subsequently through the sharing of that information, 

led to an arrest in Canada for that particular individual. 

Mr. MEEHAN. How do we protect against what Ms. Bryant was 

identifying, which is that there seems to be no consistency with respect to how that pattern of communication takes place? If you are 

talking fusion center to fusion center and then JTTF down to fusion center and, you know, you have got a lot of different ways the 

circuitry can work, is there any predictability as to how it will regularly work? Or is it just sort of catch as catch can? 

Mr. MCALLISTER. No, there is a system in place, sir. That is further developed by the information-sharing environment, through 

the PMISC, as it is called, which standardizes the flow of informa-
31 

tion and intelligence down, as well as outward, throughout the fusion center network. 

I would be more than happy to further brief you at a later time 

on that. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. Well, we may follow up on that. I thank you. 

My last question relates to this issue of privacy, because the extent to which the local fusion centers, are they conducting any of 

their own internal investigation and creating some kind of local objective, either in all-hazards or in particularly in monitoring and 

preventing future acts of terrorism by understanding what they believe is going on in their own region? 

Mr. Velez and Ms. Bryant, maybe you could help me with that. 

Mr. VELEZ-VILLAR. I can’t speak—I know the fusion centers have 

privacy officers within each fusion centers. They take civil liberties 

and privacy very seriously. 

I could speak on behalf of the FBI, if that helps any. With regards to privacy, civil liberties are something that we take extremely seriously. Any time that we conduct an investigation or an 

assessment, we are guided by a series of guidelines that are very 

strict. The Constitution allows us to do certain things. The attorney 

general guidelines allow us to do other things. 

Our bureau policies are even more strict, and that is how we ensure that we take into account all the civil liberties and the 

privacies of all our investigations and our assessments. 

Chief BRYANT. We are sworn to protect the civil liberties of all 

individuals, so it is very important to us that we put measurements 

in place to protect those privacies and so that we don’t do something that infringes on someone else’s rights. So I can’t speak for 

all fusion centers, but I am sure that is a top priority in each one 

of them. 

Mr. MEEHAN. But you think there is sufficient training and 

guidelines and otherwise to protect against the abusive information 

that can be held and developed at a local level and disseminated 

to others with the imprimatur of intelligence that comes from a 

governmental agency? 

Chief BRYANT. We could always use additional training. Training 

cannot hurt. We can always use additional training. 

Mr. MEEHAN. All right. Thanks, Ms. Bryant. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. Mr. Chairman, I can give you some statistics 

on that, if you would like. There are 77 privacy policies in place 

right now. Grant guidance calls for, like I said earlier, that all personnel comply with 28 CFR Part 23 training, as well as have an 

approved privacy policy in place. 

There is a joint DHS-DOJ technical assistance program that is 

in place that supports the development of further privacy policies, 

working with civil liberties advocates within the communities, and 

as well as training for analysts in that particular endeavor. 

We also have a privacy, civil rights, civil liberties institute training program that has developed train-the-trainer curriculum, and 

so far, we have had privacy and civil rights, civil liberties train-thetrainer at 69 fusion centers, on-site training for 35 fusion centers, 

as well as there are web resource toolkits that are available and 

a subject matter expert flyaway team, in order to go deal with a 

hot-button issue that might emerge. 
32 

So there has been great emphasis placed on not only by the Secretary, but the Department on the protection of privacy and civil 

rights and civil liberties. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. 

At this point in time, do any of my colleagues—Mr. Higgins? Any 

further—Mr. Long? One follow-up question? 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I take umbrage with the 

fact that you sort of chastised me a while ago for giving what you 

thought was a shameless plug for a friend in North Carolina, but 

I didn’t even mention that Mr. Quijas worked 25 years for the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department in the Show-me State, where 

the Missouri Auction School is located. Now, that would have been 

a shameless plug, if I would have said that. 

I want to direct this to the entire panel, concerning the Secret 

Service, counterfeiting operations, and internet financial fraud, so 

that is going to be the—any of you can answer if you will, but what 

regular intelligence data sets are provided by the Secret Service regarding counterfeiting operations and internet financial fraud? 

How is this data shared with State and local agencies? I ask, because a small land title company in Springfield, Missouri, had 

$400,000 lifted out of their bank account a little over a year ago, 

and over a weekend. It went overseas, never to be returned. 

The United States Secret Service led that investigation, which I 

didn’t understand that exactly, but—and this isn’t the first cyber 

crime in my district. So I want to make sure we are doing what 

we can to help. 

Mr. MCALLISTER. If I may, Secret Service is a component of the 

Department of Homeland Security. If, with your permission, we 

will get a detailed brief on their efforts to combat—— 

Mr. LONG. Great. 

Mr. MCALLISTER [continuing]. Cyber crime. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Okay. Okay, and thank you all again for being 

here today. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank the gentleman from Missouri, and I thank 

the panel for your preparation and for your being here today, but 

most significantly for your work each and every day in helping us 

to continue to be on the forefront of protecting not just the homeland, but America across the world against the threat of terrorism 

and the threat to our homeland. So thank you for your service. 

I ask you, as well, to continue to be diligent in helping us to grow 

this bureaucracy—effective, to be sure, but it is a huge challenge. 

We have got to be the ones ensuring that there are efficiencies and, 

you know, effective communication up and down the line. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony 

and the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and 

we will ask you to respond in writing for those if they are forwarded. So the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. 

So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(33) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN PATRICK MEEHAN FOR SCOTT MCALLISTER AND

LOUIS F. QUIJAS

Question 1. The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 

Centers include ‘‘strategic analysis services.’’ How have these services been used by 

DHS to develop a National threat picture? 

Answer. State and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers) are State and 

local resources. The strategic analysis services that the Baseline Capabilities encourage fusion centers to develop are intended to serve their respective State, local, 

Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions. These strategic analysis services enable 

local officials and front-line personnel to understand the local implications of National intelligence and better protect their communities. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) does, however, leverage fusion center strategic analysis 

to inform analysis of the evolving threat environment and create a more comprehensive and holistic National threat picture. For example, in March 2012, I&A produced 

a collaborative analytic product exploring the possibility of illicit khat sales being 

utilized to raise funds for terrorist activity that incorporated reporting from five fusion centers. 

Question 2. DHS has participated in drafting Federal strategies such as the 

Obama administration’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. This 

strategy covers many types of illegal activity such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, intellectual property theft, and cybercrime. These affect 

Americans at the State and local level every day. Since 9/11, fusion centers have 

evolved to deal with criminal, public safety, and terrorism matters across multiple 

disciplines. 

Has DHS considered leveraging fusion center assets to help with National-level 

strategies that deal with issues other than terrorism? 

Answer. DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) regularly engages Fusion 

Centers in strategy and policy development. Recent examples include the National 

Intelligence Priorities Framework and Presidential Policy Directive—8 National Prevention Framework. 

In addition, I&A is leveraging fusion center assets for intelligence production and 

information gathering to support the execution of National strategies, and to address National homeland security issues related to transnational criminal activities 

and enterprises. For example, as part of the DHS Priority Actions Implementing the 

White House Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Strategy in 2012, I&A personnel are working with the fusion centers to develop regional production and collection plans which address the collective TOC-related intelligence and information 

needs of Federal, State, and local stakeholders. These production plans will include 

the identification of intelligence gaps related to TOC which are of interest to both 

DHS and the fusion centers, and which can be answered through the generation of 

intelligence products—either by I&A, DHS Components, the fusion centers, or 

through interagency joint production efforts. Additionally, related information collection plans are being developed to identify how DHS, intelligence community, and 

Federal, State, and local assets can be effectively and appropriately leveraged to 

gather information to fill critical information gaps about TOC adversaries and operations. I&A is also using this collaborative intelligence support planning approach 

with the fusion centers to support Federal, State, and local law enforcement and 

public safety operations related to TOC prevention and interdiction. 

Question 3. Not so long ago there were 72 fusion centers. Today, that number is 

77. Would you please explain how and why that number continues to grow? Is DHS 

planning to assign Intelligence Officers to each of these new centers? At what point 

do we reach a saturation point where the number of fusion centers yields diminishing return, particularly in the current fiscal environment? 
34 

Answer. Fusion centers are State and local entities designated by State governors, 

and with the bulk of a fusion center’s work supporting State and local needs; therefore, DHS does not control their number. While the number of fusion centers has 

held steady at 72 for several years, over the past several months, the Governor of 

the U.S. Virgin Islands notified DHS of the creation of a territory-wide fusion center 

and the Governor of Texas notified DHS of four additional recognized fusion centers 

for a new total of 77. Like the decision to designate fusion centers, the saturation 

point for the number of fusion centers is a State-by-State decision. 

DHS uses the June 2011 Federal Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC) Policy issued 

by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM–ISE) to 

prioritize allocation of Federal resources such as an intelligence officer, classified 

connectivity, training courses, and technical assistance to fusion centers. 

Question 4. What are DHS’ primary objectives in providing funds and personnel 

to State fusion centers? Do these objectives match the State fusion centers objectives? 

Answer. DHS does not provide funds to fusion centers. Grant funds are available 

to States which may in turn use them to support fusion centers, but fusion centers 

are primarily funded and staffed by State and local governments. 

DHS does support the fusion centers through the deployment of intelligence officers, classified connectivity, training courses, and technical assistance. Through the 

deployment of these resources, DHS objectives are to establish focal points within 

the State and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of 

threat-related information among Federal and State, local, Tribal, and territorial 

(SLTT) partners in support of homeland security and counterterrorism objectives. 

While important, these Federal objectives are seldom enough to justify the substantial State and local investment in each fusion center. Therefore, each fusion center 

has primary duties that vary based on the environment in which the center operates; some have adopted an ‘‘all-crimes’’ approach, whereas others have also included an ‘‘all-hazards’’ approach. DHS will continue to focus its support on achievement of the identified critical operational capabilities (receive, analyze, disseminate, 

and gather), while respecting that a fusion center’s mission will also be defined 

based on jurisdictional needs. 

Question 5. Do you believe there is a long-term need for separate offices with outreach to State and local law enforcement, or in your opinion could it someday make 

sense to roll the mission into a single place within DHS? 

Answer. The breadth of DHS’s support for State, local, and Tribal law enforcement make its effective provision by a single DHS office unlikely. DHS’s support 

goes beyond intelligence and information-sharing matters, to include coordination 

during policy development and operational activities, such as responses to or recovery from an incident. While the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) leads efforts 

to support the timely sharing of intelligence and information through fusion centers, 

DHS Components also engage State and local law enforcement partners beyond fusion centers (e.g., U.S. Customs and Border Protection on border-related issues, U.S. 

Coast Guard on maritime issues). In addition, the Office for State and Local Law 

Enforcement (OSLLE) plays an important role in advocating for and advising the 

Secretary on the issues, concerns, and requirements of our State, local, and Tribal 

law enforcement partners during policy development and strategy formulation. In 

order to assist DHS in synchronizing and aligning the internal DHS messaging 

about Department-level initiatives and programs, the OSLLE chairs an internal 

DHS coordination body—the Component Law Enforcement Outreach Committee 

(CLEOC) whose mission is to align and coordinate with the Component-level offices 

located throughout DHS who perform outreach to non-Federal law enforcement. As 

described in the response to Question No. 6, the National Operations Center (NOC) 

within the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) provides incident 

and event reporting to homeland security enterprise partners, including State and 

local law enforcement stakeholders, through the NOC’s common operating picture. 

Question 6. By maintaining multiple offices within DHS that outreach to State 

and locals in different ways, are we inadvertently reducing the effectiveness of the 

fusion centers? Particularly given this budget climate, if we were to truly focus 

State and local information sharing at the fusion centers, would it raise the stature 

of the fusion centers, and perhaps ultimately make them more valuable to their 

State thereby helping them in the fight for State grant dollars? 

Answer. DHS offices carry out different mandated functions which require engagement with State, local, and Tribal partners based upon their mission set or for 

matters that fall outside of the intelligence and information-sharing realm. Departmental-level intelligence and information sharing is focused through fusion centers 

(for strategic, operational, and tactical products) and the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis (I&A), but this is only one piece of the daily interaction that the Depart-
35 

ment’s Components and offices have with State, local, and Tribal governments. For 

example, the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), through its 

daily interactions with law enforcement associations, is responsible for sharing information about DHS programs and initiatives. The OSLLE is also responsible for 

ensuring that DHS leadership is aware of and considers the issues, concerns, and 

requirements of the State, local, and Tribal law enforcement communities during 

Department-wide policy development. 

Question 7a. Is there an accounting of how many different offices within the Department with ‘‘State and local outreach’’ or ‘‘State and local information sharing’’ 

as part of its mission? 

Answer. The main DHS offices responsible for State, local, and Tribal outreach 

are the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) for law enforcement 

associations and the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) for State, local, Tribal 

and territorial elected and appointed officials. The Office of Intelligence & Analysis 

(I&A) is the lead for intelligence and information sharing. Other DHS Components 

have direct communication with their State, local, and Tribal counterparts on operational issues. 

Question 7b. How many of those offices have regular, direct contact with State 

and local law enforcement, versus passing their information through one of your offices? 

Answer. All DHS Operating Components have regular contact at the operational 

level with their counterparts in State, local, and Tribal law enforcement. This contact cannot and should not be confined to a single office. 

Question 7c. How are these offices coordinating with each other? 

Answer. The OSLLE chairs an internal DHS coordination body—the Component 

Law Enforcement Outreach Committee (CLEOC) whose mission is to align and coordinate with the Component-level offices located throughout DHS who perform outreach to non-Federal law enforcement. In addition, IGA holds weekly calls with all 

of the DHS intergovernmental offices or component points of contact. IGA also holds 

quarterly face-to-face meetings. During these calls and meetings, the participating 

offices provide read-outs on current and future interactions with State, local, Tribal, 

and territorial officials to ensure effective coordination across the Department. Additionally, IGA has specific points of contact within each component/office. As topics/ 

issues arise that should be brought to the attention of other DHS Offices, IGA helps 

to facilitate that conversation and coordination. 

Question 7d. Who is ultimately ‘‘in charge’’ of ensuring they are coordinating? 

Answer. While IGA, OSLLE, and I&A share this responsibility with specific stakeholders, IGA’s weekly coordination call helps to increase and facilitate the level of 

coordination between these offices. 

Question 7e. What ability does that office/person have to hold other ‘‘outreach offices’’ accountable for coordination? 

Answer. Regular communications occur between IGA, OSLLE, and I&A to ensure 

that stakeholder outreach is well-coordinated and effective, and it is in everyone’s 

best interest to ensure that the meetings, briefings, and messages to our stakeholders are delivered in a clear and consistent manner. 

Question 8. The President’s budget for fiscal year 2013 proposes to consolidate eligible activities of the State and local preparedness grants into a single grant program, the National Preparedness Grant, with priority given to projects that are determined to be ‘‘deployable assets.’’ In your estimation, would fusion centers be considered a deployable asset? 

Answer. Fusion centers are not deployable assets. The proposed 2013 National 

Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) vision document clearly states that a portion 

of grant funding may be used by States and high-threat urban areas to sustain core 

capabilities that may or may not be deployable, such as fusion centers. 

Question 9. Given the deep cuts we have seen to the DHS grant dollars for SLT 

Law Enforcement, what impact will these cuts have to the continuing maturation 

of fusion centers across the network? 

Answer. DHS is committed to resourcing the homeland security mission responsibilities of the fusion centers by providing deployed intelligence officers, training, 

technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, connectivity to Federal 

systems, and technology. However the overall resourcing of each fusion center is dependent on the circumstances of their State or local government’s budget and commitment to the effort, or on their successful competition for, and subsequent distribution of, grant dollars. With regards to grants, the amount of grant funds leveraged by individual State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) for fusion centers varies 

greatly. DHS cannot predict the exact impact of the reductions in grant funding. Fusion centers continually compete for funding support with all other State and local 

homeland security and emergency management-related priorities, such as interoper-
36 

able communications, emergency operations planning and emergency operation centers, personal protective equipment, etc. 

Question 10. Currently, States have discretion in allocating homeland security 

grant funds for fusion center activities. Do you believe this structure has provided 

sufficient Federal funding to fusion centers? If not, what guidance would you provide the States to assist them in determining appropriate levels of funding for fusion centers? 

Answer. Ideally, each State and local entity with a fusion center would sustain 

it largely through its own resources, with DHS providing an intelligence officer, 

classified connectivity, training and other assistance directed at the portion of the 

fusion center’s work dedicated to homeland security mission responsibilities. In 

many fusion centers, this is already the case. In others—predominately those that 

are still building their capability—the fusion center is heavily reliant on the Federal 

grants process. The State Administrative Agencies (SAA) must consider a variety of 

factors unique to each individual State when determining the amount of grant funds 

allocated to the fusion center. DHS’s position is that States should direct Federal 

grant funds towards identified gaps in their achievement of Baseline Capabilities. 

These goals are identified and updated via participation in the annual Fusion Center Assessment Program, managed by DHS, which is a requirement for access to 

DHS grants. 

Question 11. Secretary Napolitano has repeatedly stated that State and Local Fusion Centers are the primary contact point between the Department (DHS) and 

State and local law enforcement. Would you please elaborate on why having a State 

and Local Law Enforcement Office within DHS Policy—and separate from the State 

and Local Program Office—is necessary? 

Answer. In 2007, Congress created the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) to be the voice for State, local, and Tribal law enforcement within 

DHS. OSLLE acts as the Departments primary liaison between DHS and our nonFederal law enforcement partners. 

In October 2011, Secretary Napolitano spoke to the International Association of 

Chiefs of Police (IACP). In her address, she stressed the importance of the OSLLE 

and its unique mission: ‘‘... [W]e recently filled a critical position at DHS that 

I know is important to IACP members—our Assistant Secretary for State and Local 

Law Enforcement. We’re proud to have Lou Quijas now leading this office. He is 

well-known to the IACP, having worked closely with you during his time overseeing 

the FBI Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. And as the former Chief of Police 

of High Point, North Carolina, and a 25-year veteran of law enforcement in Kansas 

City, Missouri, he understands the needs and perspective of our Nation’s police officers. I know he is committed—as I am—to strengthening our partnership not just 

with IACP, but all law enforcement, at all levels.’’ 

The OSLLE is not a source of intelligence or operational coordination, but rather 

is the Department’s liaison to strengthen the partnership and sharing of ideas and 

opportunities between DHS and the non-Federal law enforcement community. 

To ensure that this information is coordinated between the DHS Components and 

messaging is consistent, the OSLLE formed the DHS Component Law Enforcement 

Outreach Committee, an intra-agency coordination body composed of members from 

across the Department that have some level of responsibility for outreach to our 

non-Federal law enforcement partners. 

Within DHS, the OSLLE serves as an advocate for non-Federal law enforcement. 

As an outreach office, the OSLLE is responsible for ensuring that DHS leadership 

is aware of and considers the issues, concerns, and requirements of State, local, and 

Tribal law enforcement during policy development and strategy formation. As Assistant Secretary Quijas stated in his oral testimony to the Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on February 28, 2012, 

‘‘I believe this was the intention of Congress when it created and named my office, 

the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement.’’ 

In contrast to the OSLLE, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has 

the mandate within the intelligence community (IC) to share strategic information, 

operational information, and intelligence with State, local, and Tribal governments 

and the private sector. This is a vital and high-priority mission within DHS; however, it is distinct from the mission of the OSLLE. Although, when appropriate and 

authorized, the OSLLE may assist in expanding the dissemination of this type of 

information, I&A remains the primary component within DHS responsible for the 

analysis and dissemination of operational information and intelligence through various means, to include State and major urban area fusion centers. Additionally, 

DHS Components also have direct communication with law enforcement partners, 

including fusion centers, to coordinate and share information related to operational 

issues in accordance with their respective missions. 
37 

The distinction between I&A, operational components, and the OSLLE is a matter 

of type and scope of information. I&A focuses primarily on the analysis and sharing 

of information and intelligence, and DHS components focus on the coordination of 

operational activities and information. The OSLLE focuses on coordinating Departmental positions and communicating to our non-Federal law enforcement partners 

a broad range of information, including DHS initiatives and the opinions, concerns, 

and requests of State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officials that can affect and 

be affected by Departmental policy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN PATRICK MEEHAN FOR ERIC VELEZ-VILLAR

Question 1. What criteria does the FBI use to determine which FBI employees are 

assigned to fusion centers? What additional training, if any, does the FBI provide 

to its personnel assigned to fusion centers? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. From an information management perspective, some fusion centers 

leaders note the requirement for their personnel to routinely check numerous Federal information and intelligence systems to be certain they are aware of all of the 

intelligence that may be relevant to their State. What have you done, perhaps jointly with the DHS and/or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Program 

Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, to streamline how FBI information flows to fusion centers? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. It is the committee’s understanding that to standardize its approach 

to interacting with fusion centers, the FBI Fusion Center Integration Unit (FCIU) 

has evaluated its field offices’ engagement with fusion centers. What are the FBI’s 

plans to work closer and more effectively with fusion centers and promote the continuity of information sharing at the field office level, not merely headquarter-released products? What steps have you taken to require all field offices to take the 

same forward-leaning information-sharing approach? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Æ