United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

Comptroller General

of the United States

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

The decision issued on the date below was subject to 

a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has 

been approved for public release. 

 

Decision 

Matter of: Bilfinger Berger AG Sede Secondaria Italiana 

File: B-402496 

Date: May 13, 2010 

Carl L. Vacketta, Esq., Fernand A. Lavallee, Esq., Seamus Curley, Esq., J. Philip 

Ludvigson, Esq., Nedra S. Adams, Esq., and C. Bradford Jorgensen, Esq., DLA Piper 

US LLP, for the protester. 

Joseph P. Hornyak, Esq., T. Wayne Gray, Esq., and Megan Mocho Jeschke, Esq., 

Holland & Knight, LLP, for Cooperativa Muratori Riuniti, an intervenor. 

Katherine D. Denzel, Esq., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for the agency. 

Frank Maguire, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, 

participated in the preparation of the decision. 

DIGEST 

Protest challenging negative responsibility determination is denied where agency--

relying on information that protester and debarred firm were related companies that 

previously had performed contracts using each other’s resources and that protester 

would make use of debarred firm’s resources in performing contract under Italian 

licensing system--reasonably determined that debarred firm would participate in 

contract performance. 

DECISION 

Bilfinger Berger AG Sede Secondaria Italiana (BBSSI), of Vincenza, Italy, protests the 

award of a contract to Cooperativa Muratori Riuniti (CMR), of Bologna, Italy, under 

request for proposals (RFP) No. W912GB-09-R-0032, issued by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers for construction, repair, and facilities maintenance services in Italy. 

The protester challenges the agency’s determination that it is not a responsible 

prospective contractor. 

We deny the protest. 

BACKGROUND 

The RFP, issued on May 12, 2009, was for award, on a “best value” basis, of the Italy 

Job Order Contract (JOC), for construction, renovations, repair, and replacement of 
building systems, maintenance and repair of facilities, and other maintenance 

services at military installations in Italy. Agency Report (AR) at 1. Under the RFP, 

offerors were required to submit a Societa Organismi D’Attestazione (SOA), a 

certification evidencing compliance with Italian law regarding the qualifications of 

companies competing for public works contracts. RFP at 31-32; AR at 2. An SOA 

certifies a company to be qualified in particular categories and classifications of 

work. Id. at 3. BBSSI’s proposal included an SOA in the name of a related company, 

Bilfinger Berger Hochbau GmbH (BBH), a debarred contractor. Contracting 

Officer’s (CO) Statement at 11-12. Submission of an SOA in the name of another 

contractor is permissible in certain circumstances under a system called 

avvalimento, authorized by Italian law. Protest at 6; AR at 4. 

Following review of initial proposals, a competitive range was established, 

discussions were held, and final proposal revisions were received. CO’s Statement at 

17. After evaluation of final proposals, the contracting officer determined that 

BBSSI’s proposal was the best value. CO’s Statement at 20; AR exh. 19, Source 

Selection Decision Document (SSDD), at 001132. 

In considering BBSSI’s responsibility, however, the contracting officer found that 

BBSSI and BBH had an extremely close business relationship, based on their 

corporate relationship, government dealings with both firms on prior contracts in 

which their resources and assets had been used interchangeably, and BBSSI’s listing 

of contracts performed by BBH as experience and past performance in its proposal. 

SSDD at 001113-14; CO’s Statement at 22; AR at 7-11. The contracting officer 

concluded that BBSSI had provided “several indications that it is affiliated with 

[BBH],” and may have been “a mechanism for [BBH] to submit proposals and to 

continue to contract with the U.S. Government,” and that it therefore was necessary 

to review the “whole record ... based on various evidence and documents that have 

been received from the contractor which indicate this relationship.” SSDD at 

001133. The contracting officer found substantial information in this regard. He 

notes, for example, that “8 out of the 10 projects submitted as Experience and Past 

Performance in [BBSSI’s] original proposal were performed by [BBH],” and that 

“discussions with field personnel administering current BBH and BBSSI contracts in 

Italy [indicated] that the same people and resources were performing work under 

both company names.” CO’s Statement at 22. 

The agency also obtained an opinion from an Italian legal expert to determine the 

effect of BBSSI’s use of BBH’s SOA. AR exh. 19, Opinion of Giorgio Cosmelli, Jan. 8, 

2010. The contracting officer’s interpretation of this opinion was that the SOA 

system is intended to provide assurance to contracting parties that they are dealing 

with qualified companies and that, although a contractor’s submission of an SOA in 

the name of another contractor is permissible, the system contemplates that the 

awardee will have full disposal of the resources of the firm holding the SOA. SSDD 

at 001134. The contracting officer concluded that, because of BBSSI’s use of BBH’s 

SOA, BBSSI would have “full disposal of [BBH’s] assets and resource[s]--technical, 

Page 2 B-402496 
financial, employees, machinery, know-how, organization, economic and financial 

standing,” and would likely avail itself of those assets. SSDD at 001134. 

Based on these circumstances showing both a close relationship between BBSSI and 

BBH, and the appearance that BBH would participate in performance of the 

contract, the contracting officer determined that BBH was indirectly offering on the 

solicitation through BBSSI. The contracting officer also concluded that BBSSI was 

not a responsible offeror and was not eligible to receive the award. See Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 9.104-1; SSDD at 001134; CO’s Statement at 22. 

Award was made to CMR on January 28, 2010. This protest followed. 

DISCUSSION 

BBSSI generally challenges the contracting officer’s negative responsibility 

determination. It specifically asserts that the determination was unreasonable, since 

it advised the agency that it would perform the contract without any involvement of 

BBH. Protest at 11-12. Further, the protester asserts that the Cosmelli opinion, as 

interpreted by the contracting officer, could not form the basis for a reasonable 

nonresponsibility determination. Supp. Protest, Mar. 12, 2010. BBSSI also asserts 

that the SOA requirement was a definitive responsibility criterion, which it satisfied. 

Protest at 9-13. Finally, the protester asserts that the contracting officer’s 

determination constituted a wrongful de facto debarment. Protest at 19-20. 

In making a negative responsibility determination, a contracting officer is vested 

with a wide degree of discretion and, of necessity, must rely upon his or her business 

judgment in exercising that discretion. Although the determination must be factually 

supported and made in good faith, the ultimate decision appropriately is left to the 

agency, since it must bear the effects of any difficulties experienced in obtaining the 

required performance. For these reasons, we generally will not question a negative 

determination of responsibility unless the protester can demonstrate bad faith on the 

part of the agency or a lack of any reasonable basis for the determination. Miklin 

Corp., B-236746.2, Jan. 19, 1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 72 at 1-2, recon. den., B-236746.3, June 8, 

1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 540; see, e.g., Blocacor, LDA, B-282122.3, Aug. 2, 1999, 99-2 CPD 

¶ 25. Our review is based on the information available to the contracting officer at 

the time the determination was made. Acquest Dev. LLC, B-287439, June 6, 2001, 

2001 CPD ¶ 101 at 3. 

Here, as indicated above, based on the information available to him, the contracting 

officer concluded that BBSSI had provided indications that it may have been “a 

mechanism for [BBH] to submit proposals and to continue to contract with the U.S. 

Government.” SSDD at 001133. In support of this conclusion, the agency supplies a 

statement by the head of its contract administration office, who states that “the same 

personnel have simultaneously represented [BBSSI and BBH] on the contracts we 

have administered there both prior to and during the period in which BBH has been 

debarred,” and that there has been “no differentiation between the operations, 

insofar as the same key personnel have been identified and have signed documents 

Page 3 B-402496 
for contracts with both companies.” AR exh. 15a, Declaration of William Thievon, 

Mar. 4, 2010; see AR exh. 15d (organizational chart showing identical Bilfinger 

representatives on BBSSI and BBH contracts). The agency asserts that the two firms 

utilized common facilities and equipment, common and shared employees, including 

key personnel and management, and common bank accounts and that this resulted 

in the lack of a practical differentiation between either company in their daily work. 

AR at 7, 18. 

The protester generally does not dispute the information on which the agency based 

its determination. Rather, it asserts that the information is irrelevant, since it does 

not “invalidate the very clear and explicit representation in BBSSI’s discussion 

response, whereby it was unequivocally represented that BBSSI would perform on 

this [contract] without any involvement of BBH.” Comments at 25 (emphasis in 

original). 

We find that the extensive information on which the contracting officer relied fully 

supported the view that BBSSI and BBH were closely related, and the resultant 

appearance that BBH, a debarred contractor, would be involved in performing the 

contract, as it had been under prior contracts. Debarred contractors generally may 

not receive contracts from the government or subcontracts from government 

contractors, and “are also excluded from conducting business with the Government 

as agents or representatives of other contractors.” FAR § 9.405. Further, the FAR 

prohibits debarred firms from submitting offers for government contracts either 

directly or “indirectly (e.g., through an affiliate).” FAR § 9.403 (definition of 

“contractor”) and § 9.405(a) (“contractors” debarred, suspended, or proposed for 

debarment are excluded from receiving contracts); Detek, Inc., B-261678, Oct. 16, 

1995, 95-2 CPD ¶ 177 (firm not eligible for award where circumstances indicated that 

debarred affiliate was attempting to submit offer through affiliated offeror). While 

BBSSI represented that BBH would not participate in performance, the contracting 

officer was not required to take BBSSI’s representations at face value; he reasonably 

could rely on the historical and other information evidencing a close working 

relationship between BBSSI and BBH in concluding that BBH essentially was 

proposing through BBSSI, and that BBSSI therefore was nonresponsible. 

We also find that the contracting officer’s concerns about BBSSI’s reliance on BBH’s 

SOA was reasonable. SSDD at 001133-34. Based on the Cosmelli opinion, the 

contracting officer found that BBSSI’s use of BBH’s SOA further supported the 

conclusion that BBH would be involved in contract performance and was essentially 

offering on the solicitation through BBSSI. Id. The protester asserts that its use of 

BBH’s SOA was “simply for the sake of satisfying the ministerial requirement of 

having a SOA certificate,” Protest at 11-12; AR at 3, and reiterates that it intended to 

perform the contract wholly by itself, without participation by BBH. Again, however, 

the agency was not bound to accept BBSSI’s representations and disregard its SOA 

arrangement with BBH, together with the other substantial information bearing on 

the firms’ relationship. 

Page 4 B-402496 
The protester asserts that the legal opinion reviewed by the agency could not form 

the basis for a reasonable nonresponsibility determination due to deficiencies in the 

agency’s acquisition of the opinion, the opinion itself, and the contracting officer’s 

interpretation of the opinion. Comments at 4-21; Supp. Protest, Mar. 12, 2010. In this 

regard, the protester asserts that the Request for Quotations seeking the legal 

opinion did not provide sufficient background material, including information setting 

forth BBSSI’s views regarding the legal effect of the SOA. Comments at 4-9, 18-21. 

We do not agree with BBSSI, however, that the absence of its views from the RFQ 

diminished the reliability of the opinion.1 The RFQ adequately described the subject 

matter the opinion was to address, and there was no requirement that the agency 

turn the opinion into a vehicle for debate by setting forth BBSSI’s views on the 

matter. Contracting officers generally are entitled to rely on information available to 

them at the time of a responsibility determination, absent any indication that the 

information is defective, unsupported, or suspect. M. Matt Durand, LLC, B-401793, 

Nov. 23, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 241 at 7. 

BBSSI also asserts that the agency misinterpreted the legal opinion and that the 

opinion does not support the contracting officer’s conclusions. Comments at 9-11, 

15-19. However, BBSSI has not established that the agency’s interpretation of the 

opinion was incorrect or unreasonable. The opinion comments on the law 

surrounding an SOA, rather than the precise question of one firm’s use of another 

firm’s SOA. However, the opinion does indicate that, under the SOA system, a 

contractor may “prove to have the technical capabilities and the economic and 

financial standing necessary” to compete for the award of a public contract “by 

relying on the resources ... of other entities, provided that, in such case, the bidder 

can prove to the contracting authority that it will have in its disposal the resources of 

such other entities to carry out the works.” Cosmelli Opinion at 3-4. The opinion 

also indicates that “the bidder who intends to avail itself of the third party’s 

resources shall produce ... a declaration certifying that it intends to avail itself of the 

third party’s resources in order to meet the necessary requirements ... .” Id. at 5. 

These statements are all reasonably supportive of the contracting officer’s 

conclusion that BBSSI’s reliance on BBH’s SOA was indicative of an intent to “have 

at its disposal the resources of [BBH] to carry out the [contract].” SSDD at 001134. 

The protester has provided no definitive information, other than its own legal 

opinion, establishing that the law permits it to use another firm’s SOA without 

involving that other firm in performance of the contract.2

 

 

(continued...) 

1

 We note, however, that the RFQ did include substantial text excerpted from a 

BBSSI attorney’s e-mail to agency counsel, setting forth BBSSI’s position regarding 

the effect of the SOA. RFQ at 3-4. We also note that some of the documentation 

BBSSI asserts the agency failed to include in the RFQ actually postdates the issuance 

of the RFQ. Comments at 6-9, 19-20. 

2

 The contracting officer further concluded, based on the legal opinion, that because 

of BBSSI’s use of BBH’s SOA, BBSSI actually would be required to make use of 

Page 5 B-402496 
Page 6 B-402496 

BBSSI also asserts that the SOA requirement was a definitive responsibility criterion, 

which it satisfied when it submitted BBH’s SOA, and that further examination of the 

SOA is unwarranted and an improper application of an unstated evaluation factor. 

Protest at 9-13. This argument is without merit. BBSSI was not found 

nonresponsible due to failure to meet the solicitation requirement for submission of 

an SOA; rather, it was found nonresponsible based on the circumstances discussed 

above and its submission of BBH’s SOA. FAR part 9.4. 

Finally, the protester asserts that the contracting officer’s negative responsibility 

determination constituted a wrongful de facto debarment, without affording BBSSI 

the procedural protections of FAR § 9.406-1(b). This argument is without merit. A 

de facto debarment occurs when the government uses nonresponsibility

determinations as a means of excluding a firm from government contracting or 

subcontracting, rather than following the debarment regulations and procedures set 

forth at FAR subpart 9.4. Firm Erich Bernion GmbH, B-233106, Dec. 28, 1988, 

88-2 CPD ¶ 632 at 4. A necessary element of a de facto debarment is that an agency 

intends not to do business with the firm in the future. Id.; Lida Credit Agency, 

B-239270, Aug. 6, 1990, 90-2 CPD ¶ 112 at 3 n.2. The nonresponsibility determination 

here was based on current information regarding BBSSI and BBH’s close business 

relationship, and BBSSI’s use of BBH’s SOA. The record does not show that the 

agency intends to exclude the firm from other procurements based on its specific 

determination here. 

The protest is denied. 

Lynn H. Gibson 

Acting General Counsel 

 

(...continued) 

BBH’s assets as a matter of law. SSDD at 1134. While BBSSI again disputes the 

contracting officer’s interpretation, Comments at 4-21, it has not established that this 

interpretation is incorrect. In any case, in light of our findings above, this conclusion 

is not essential to a finding that the agency acted reasonably.