IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

In re KIMBERLY LOUISE LONG

on Habeas Corpus.

S249274

Fourth Appellate District, Division Two

E066388

Riverside County Superior Court

RIF113354

November 30, 2020

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 

Kruger, Groban and Franson* concurred.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

In re LONG

S249274

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

Petitioner Kimberly Louise Long filed an original habeas 

corpus petition in this court seeking relief from a 2005 

conviction for second degree murder of her boyfriend, Oswaldo 

Conde, for which Long was sentenced to prison for 15 years to 

life. In 2015, upon finding that Long’s petition established a 

prima facie case for relief, we issued an order to show cause

before the Riverside County Superior Court as to “why trial 

counsel was not ineffective in his failure to: consult a time of 

death expert, investigate DNA evidence, present evidence 

petitioner did not change her clothes, and present evidence of 

the victim’s application for a restraining order, and why 

petitioner is not actually innocent of the crime as petitioner 

claims in [various] grounds.”

Long was convicted by a jury after an earlier jury trial had 

ended in a mistrial. In adjudicating Long’s habeas corpus 

petition, Judge Patrick Magers, who had presided over both of 

Long’s trials, held an evidentiary hearing over several days, 

adjudicated factual disputes, and ultimately found that Long’s 

trial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance that 

prejudiced Long’s case. The court granted Long’s petition, 

vacated her conviction, ordered a new trial, and released her on 

a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeal reversed and reinstated 

her conviction. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeal on the ground that trial counsel’s failure to investigate 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

2

the victim’s time of death was objectively unreasonable and 

prejudicial to Long’s defense.

I.

At the close of Long’s first trial, nine jurors favored 

acquittal and three favored guilt, and the court declared a 

mistrial. Long’s second trial took place in December 2005 and 

resulted in her conviction. The following facts were shown at 

the second trial.

On October 5, 2003, Long spent the day with Conde, their 

friend Jeffrey Dills, and others riding their motorcycles and 

drinking at various bars. Long had approximately 12 beers and 

10 shots of hard liquor that day. The others had also been 

drinking. At some point, an argument between Long and Conde 

escalated into a physical altercation when the two of them, along 

with Dills, returned to the couple’s home that evening in Corona. 

According to Dills, Long accused Conde of “not paying his share 

and being a loser and not having a job.”

Long and Dills left sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 

midnight and went to Dills’s home about 2.5 miles away. There, 

Dills and Long spent time in a jacuzzi, then moved to the 

bedroom and had oral sex. At some point, Long told Dills she 

had to return home because her ex-husband was supposed to 

drop off her child.

Dills informed police that he dropped Long off at her home 

around 1:20 or 1:25 a.m. Dills then returned to his own home; 

he recalled seeing his alarm clock by his bedside at 1:36 a.m. 

Long disputed this, testifying that she was dropped off by Dills 

around 2:00 a.m.

At 2:09 a.m., Long called 911 and said: “Oh my god 

something happened to my husband. . . . I just came home. He’s 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

3

bloody. I don’t know what’s going on. He’s still breathing. 

Something’s wrong.” She hung up and then called 911 again. 

During the second call, Long said she was an emergency room 

nurse but added, “I can’t give him medical attention. 

Something’s wrong with him.”

Police officers Jeffrey Glenn and Edward Hurtado were 

dispatched to the scene at 2:10 a.m. They arrived three to four 

minutes later and found Long waiting in the middle of the 

street, distraught. When they entered the home, they found 

Conde slumped over the couch with his feet on the floor, and 

they saw blood on the walls. Hurtado checked Conde’s body for 

a pulse and found none. When Hurtado touched Conde’s neck, 

a blood bubble burst in Conde’s mouth.

Paramedics arrived at 2:20 a.m. They confirmed Conde 

had no pulse and observed evidence of trauma to the right and 

back of Conde’s head. The paramedics noted that Conde’s 

wound was not actively bleeding and that his blood had already 

coagulated. They described Conde’s skin as “pale or ashen” and 

“cold” to the touch. Lividity, or skin discoloration resulting from 

internal pooling of blood, was present on the back of Conde’s 

arms and the left side of his face. They also observed rigidity, 

or rigor mortis, in Conde’s arms.

At 5:03 a.m., Deputy Coroner Richard Gomes arrived. 

Gomes inspected Conde’s body and noted in his report: “Rigor 

had not started. Lividity was almost fixed, with medium 

discoloration, and consistent with his position.” On the morning 

of October 7, Dr. Joseph Pestaner performed an autopsy and

noted in his report that “[r]igor mortis is mild to moderate and 

symmetric. Livor mortis is fixed on the posterior aspect of the 

body.” The coroner ultimately determined the cause of death 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

4

was blunt force injuries to the head. Based on the autopsy 

report and photographs, a pathologist testified that Conde had 

been hit with a blunt weapon three to eight times and that an 

injury of that nature would have resulted in Conde’s death 

within 10 to 15 minutes.

A forensic technician observed blood evidence 360 degrees 

around Conde’s body, including castoff on all four walls. Police

noticed broken glass in the kitchen and saw that the sliding 

glass door from the kitchen to the back yard was open. A

shotgun and shotgun shells were missing from a closet, as were 

a bowl of change and a stereo from the living room. 

Investigators found no evidence of an attempt to clean up the 

house, no sign of the murder weapon, no blood anywhere else in 

the house, and nothing to suggest the sinks or showers had been 

recently used. Officers searched the area, but they did not 

recover the murder weapon, any bloody clothing, or other 

evidence linked to the crime.

Corona police officers interviewed Long at the station. 

According to Long, she stayed at Dills’s house for “an hour and 

a half, two hours” but could not recall exactly when she arrived 

home. When she arrived home, she noticed that the front door 

was unlocked. She walked into the home and saw Conde was on 

the couch in the living room. Given the blood, she initially 

thought he had gotten into a fight. Long said that Conde was 

“gurgling,” so she believed he was still alive and breathing. Only 

after he remained inert did Long realize something was wrong. 

She turned on the lights and saw he was gravely injured. She 

told the police that she called 911 less than 10 minutes after 

arriving home, ran around the house screaming, hung up on 

911, ran outside, and called 911 again. In a second interview on 

October 9, Long told officers that she suspected Conde’s ex-
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

5

girlfriend Shiana Lovejoy murdered Conde because Lovejoy had 

repeatedly threatened Long and Conde.

The victim’s brother told law enforcement that on the 

Monday before Conde was killed, Lovejoy had threatened to 

“slice their throats” (referring to Long and Conde) and that 

Lovejoy’s behavior had gotten “pretty bad” in the weeks before 

Conde’s murder. Two weeks before Conde’s death, Lovejoy sent 

a letter to Long claiming that she (Lovejoy) was still 

romantically involved with Conde and calling Long a “whore” 

and Conde a “broke mother fucker.” Lovejoy repeatedly called 

Long and Conde and left harassing voicemails. Long and Conde 

reported these calls to the police and changed their phone 

number in response. Lovejoy also defaced Conde’s white truck 

with the phrase “asshole & deadbeat” while it was parked at 

Long’s house and put glue in the keyhole of his truck so he could 

not open the door.

A week before his death, Conde sought a restraining order 

against Lovejoy and orders regarding custody and visitation of 

their son. In the application, Conde wrote that Lovejoy “called 

and said that my girlfriend [Long] is going to get it and for me 

to watch my back,” and that Lovejoy “hates my girlfriend, and 

she is going to ruin our lives.” His request for a temporary 

restraining order was denied, but the court set a hearing on

Conde’s permanent restraining order application for October 20. 

On the same day Conde sought a restraining order against 

Lovejoy, Lovejoy filed a paternity suit against Conde. A few 

days before Conde’s murder, Lovejoy filed a competing child 

custody application. After Conde’s death, Lovejoy received 

Social Security payments on behalf of their son. 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

6

Lovejoy told police that on the night of Conde’s murder, 

she had dinner at T.G.I. Friday’s with Oscar Castaneda, whom 

she was dating at the time, and then went to the Days Inn in 

Whittier where they paid cash for a room and stayed until 

around 1:30 a.m. Police confirmed Castaneda’s credit card was 

used at the restaurant at 10:24 p.m. The Days Inn manager on 

duty that night recognized a photo of Castaneda but had no 

recollection of Castaneda at the motel that evening, and there 

was no computer record of their stay. Lovejoy’s mother was 

babysitting that night and told officers that Lovejoy arrived 

home in Anaheim around 1:30 a.m.

In a police interview, Lovejoy said she had a great 

relationship with Conde until the last six months, when he 

moved in with Long. Lovejoy admitted that she lied to the police 

when they visited her house to investigate the vandalism of 

Conde’s truck.

Long’s ex-husband, Joe Bugarski, was also investigated as 

a potential suspect. Long and Bugarski married in 1999 or 2000 

and had a son. Bugarski described two incidents in which he 

said Long was physically violent with him. According to a police 

report, the second of those incidents, in June 2000, resulted in 

Bugarski’s arrest for domestic violence. During that incident,

Bugarski held a butter knife to Long’s throat and threatened to 

kill her. In March 2003, Long kicked Bugarski out of the house 

and ended their marriage. On occasion, Long allowed Bugarski 

to stay at her home to watch their son when Long worked the 

graveyard shift. Bugarski installed a spy camera in Long’s 

bedroom and a voice-activated tape recorder under her bed 

because he suspected Long was intimately involved with Conde. 

Bugarski threatened to “kick [Conde’s] ass” and told Long’s 

mother he wanted to kill Conde. He occasionally stalked Long 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

7

“around town,” and about a month before Conde’s murder, he 

spied on Long and Conde at their home, which prompted a 

neighbor to call 911.

On the night of October 5, Bugarski was supposed to visit 

Long’s home around 9:00 p.m. to drop off their son, but he left a 

message on Long’s phone at 7:30 p.m. saying their son did not 

want to go and would stay with Bugarski that night. Long called 

back between 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. and told Bugarski that was fine 

because she could not be home that night. Bugarski said he and 

his son stayed at the home of Bugarski’s girlfriend, Chelsea 

Murray, that night and fell asleep on Murray’s bunkbed 

between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. Murray told police she fell asleep 

around 10:00 p.m. and awoke at 5:00 a.m. to Bugarski’s cell 

phone vibrating.

On October 22, police officers interviewed Alejandro and 

Juanita Sandoval, who lived next door to Long and Conde, and 

Phillip Virga, who lived across the street. Alejandro 

remembered waking up around 12:00 a.m. to the sound of a 

motorcycle engine revving multiple times from inside his 

neighbor’s garage. He told police he did not hear any voices at

that time. Alejandro went back to sleep and woke up again 

briefly when he heard Long’s car alarm around 2:00 a.m. 

Juanita believed she heard Conde attempting to start his 

motorcycle inside his garage at 1:30 a.m. The motorcycle stalled 

multiple times, and she recalled hearing someone yelling “fuck” 

and “shit” loudly at the motorcycle. Based on the engine’s 

noises, she believed Conde left home on his bike and returned 

around 1:45 a.m. Around 2:00 a.m., Juanita also heard Long’s 

car alarm for “a little while.”
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

8

Virga told officers that he went out for dinner with his 

family and spotted two motorcycles parked in front of Long and 

Conde’s house around 8:00 p.m. on October 5. By the time Virga 

returned at 9:30 or 9:45 p.m., the motorcycles were gone. Virga 

was awakened around 11:50 p.m. to the sound of a motorcycle’s 

roaring engine from inside the couple’s garage. He thought he 

heard a muffled female’s voice inside the garage. Virga fell 

asleep and woke up again around 12:10 a.m. to the sound of a 

motorcycle engine and a female voice. Around 1:20 a.m., he 

heard the sound of a motorcycle driving past. Virga woke up 

again around 2:00 a.m. when he heard Long’s car alarm go off. 

Dills died unexpectedly before trial, so his preliminary 

hearing testimony was admitted. Dills testified that he dropped 

off Long at her home at 1:20 to 1:25 a.m. and drove back to his 

own home by 1:36 a.m. on the night of Conde’s murder. Because 

Dills was the only person who saw Long after midnight, the 

prosecution at trial used his preliminary hearing testimony to 

establish a timeline for the crime, with Long arriving home 

around 1:20 a.m. and mortally wounding Conde some time 

before her call to 911 at 2:09 a.m. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Long 

arrived home intoxicated around 1:20 a.m., killed Conde, 

disposed of the murder weapon, and cleaned herself and the 

scene before calling 911 at 2:09 a.m. No physical or other direct 

evidence connected Long to Conde’s killing. The jury found Long 

guilty of second degree murder. On February 24, 2006, Long 

was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life. 

Long moved for a new trial. (Pen. Code, § 1181.) The trial 

court “reluctantly” denied Long’s motion, saying: “To make a 

perfectly clear record in this matter, if this was a court trial, if 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

9

the Court would have heard the evidence in this case, I would 

have found the defendant not guilty. I would have found that 

the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” In particular, the court found “troubling” that Dills’s 

preliminary hearing testimony featured so prominently in the 

prosecution’s case, despite the fact that the cross-examination of 

Dills “during the preliminary hearing was, as in most 

preliminary hearings, not extensive.” In particular, the court 

noted that “his level of intoxication was not fully addressed in 

the examination.” The Court of Appeal upheld Long’s conviction 

and denied her petition for rehearing. This court denied review. 

In February 2010, Long filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in federal court. Reviewing Long’s conviction under the 

standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA; 28 U.S.C. § 2254), the district 

court denied her petition but noted it was “unfortunate that 

[Long’s] conviction largely hinged on [Dills’s] preliminary 

hearing testimony.”

Long appealed, claiming insufficient evidence supported 

her murder conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that “[w]ere we the jury, 

we might have entertained a reasonable doubt. Were we sitting 

as the reviewing court on direct appeal, we might have found 

the evidence to be insufficient. But under AEDPA, which 

demands double deference, we are limited to deciding whether 

the California courts unreasonably applied Jackson [v. Virginia

(1979) 443 U.S. 307]. They did not.” (Long v. Johnson (9th Cir. 

2013) 736 F.3d 891, 897.) One judge said, “I have grave doubts 

about whether the State has convicted the right person in this 

case.” (Ibid. (conc. opn. of Watford, J.).)
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

10

Long then sought habeas corpus relief in state court on the 

grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual 

innocence. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) After the trial court and 

Court of Appeal summarily denied Long’s petitions, this court 

found that Long had stated a prima facie case for relief and 

issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted.

The trial court took judicial notice of the prior proceedings 

in Long’s case and conducted an evidentiary hearing over

several days. The court examined newly presented evidence and 

heard witness testimony proffered by both parties. Following 

the hearing, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Long’s trial counsel, Deputy Public Defender Eric Keen,

had rendered objectively deficient performance by failing to 

consult and present testimony from a time of death expert and 

by failing to present supporting evidence about Long’s clothing. 

The court granted Long’s petition, vacated her conviction, set 

bail, and ordered a retrial.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that “Keen’s 

representation of defendant did not fall below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.” (People v. Long (May 3, 2018, 

E066388) [nonpub. opn.].) Because it found no deficient 

performance, the court did not examine prejudice. We granted 

review.

II.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee 

a criminal defendant the “ ‘right to the effective assistance of 

counsel at trial.’ ” (In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 721; see 

ibid. [a defendant is “ ‘ “entitled to the reasonably competent 

assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

11

advocate” ’ ”]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687

(Strickland).) “The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect 

the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in 

its conduct and reliable in its result.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 

43 Cal.3d 171, 215 (Ledesma).)

We focus here on Long’s allegation that her trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult a time of 

death expert. To succeed, Long must show that this omission 

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” 

(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688; see In re Thomas (2006) 

37 Cal.4th 1249, 1257) in light of “the professional norms 

prevailing when the representation took place” (Bobby v. Van

Hook (2009) 558 U.S. 4, 7). Long must also show “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland, 

at p. 694.) Long “need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct 

more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” (Id. at 

p. 693.) It is enough to show “a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Id. at p. 694.)

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is a 

most deferential one.” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 

86, 105 (Harrington).) We “must indulge a ‘strong presumption’ 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that 

a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the 

harsh light of hindsight.” (Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 702.) 

“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 

relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and 

interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 

judge.” (Harrington, at p. 105.) Accordingly, we must 

“reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

12

and . . . evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 

time.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.)

Long prevailed on her habeas petition following an 

evidentiary hearing with several findings in her favor. In 

reviewing the trial court’s order granting relief, we apply “well 

settled” standards of review: “[W]e give great weight to those of 

the [trial court]’s findings that are supported by substantial 

evidence. This is especially true for findings involving 

credibility determinations. The central reason for referring a 

habeas corpus claim for an evidentiary hearing is to obtain 

credibility determinations; consequently, we give special 

deference to the [trial court] on factual questions ‘requiring 

resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ 

credibility, because the [trial court] has the opportunity to 

observe the witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying.’ [¶] 

. . . [I]n other areas we give no deference to the [trial court]’s 

findings. We independently review prior testimony, as well as 

all mixed questions of fact and law. Whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency 

prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to 

independent review. Ultimately, the [trial court]’s findings are 

not binding on us; it is for this court to make the findings on 

which the resolution of [petitioner’s] habeas corpus claim will 

turn.” (In re Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1256–1257, 

citations omitted.)

A.

The crux of Long’s claim is that Keen, her trial counsel, 

failed to sufficiently investigate Conde’s time of death. At the 

evidentiary hearing, Keen testified that the only expert he 

consulted on time of death was Daniel Vomhof, an accident 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

13

reconstruction expert with no medical degree or experience in 

pathology. Keen had contacted Vomhof in an effort to establish 

that Long was not physically capable of causing Conde’s 

injuries. During that consultation, Keen learned that Vomhof 

“was also a time-of-death expert or purported to be.” Although 

Keen said he “spoke to [Vomhof] about that issue,” he could not 

recall if Vomhof had seen the paramedics’ report or coroner’s 

report, nor could he “remember specifically what each of us 

said.” Keen confirmed that he “didn’t contact an actual 

pathologist” or “anyone else besides Dr. Vomhof” to discuss time 

of death. Defense investigator William Sylvester confirmed that 

Keen never instructed him to seek out a time of death expert in 

Long’s case.

Keen further testified that his view at the time of Long’s 

trials was that no medical expert could offer a time of death that 

excluded the prosecution’s theory of Long’s window of 

opportunity for committing the crime. Keen based this opinion 

on “what Dr. Vomhof told [him]” and on his “own experience,” 

which “at the time” consisted of “nothing more than [mandatory 

continuing legal education] for attorneys, homicide seminars, 

stuff of that nature.” Keen said, “It’s my belief that anybody who 

testified regarding time of death would have to give a range, and 

that the times we were dealing with . . . were too small, and then 

necessarily that range would encompass both theories, the 

prosecution’s theory and our theory.” Keen testified that if he 

were trying the case today, he would “seek the opinion of a 

pathologist, somebody who had performed on the order to 

thousands of autopsies over their career to render testimony.”

The defense’s Strickland expert, Gary Gibson, provided 

additional context during the evidentiary hearing. Gibson was 

a law professor at California Western School of Law, teaching 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

14

California evidence, forensic evidence, advanced criminal 

litigation, and California sentencing. He had also been a public 

defender for over 20 years in San Diego County and worked on 

200 to 300 homicide cases. He testified that Vomhof’s résumé

indicated he took a continuing education course on time of death 

in 1979 or 1980 but had no other training or expertise on time 

of death. Gibson said he would never seek a time of death 

opinion from “somebody who is not only not an M.D., but is [also] 

not a medical examiner.” He considered Keen’s reliance on 

Vomhof unreasonable because Vomhof is a biochemical engineer 

and not a medical doctor with expert knowledge of how to 

estimate time of death.

The trial court agreed, finding that Vomhof was “not a 

qualified expert to render an opinion regarding time of death” 

and that Keen made “no effort to contact or secure the testimony 

of such” an expert. The trial court reviewed Vomhof’s résumé 

and noted that he “holds a Ph.D. in biochemistry” but “is not a 

forensic pathologist or medical examiner” and “does not have a 

medical degree.” The court found that although Vomhof is an 

expert in biomechanics and accident reconstruction, “nothing” 

in Vomhof’s résumé showed he was qualified to provide an 

expert opinion on time of death.

In general, estimating time of death requires expert 

knowledge on how to measure and evaluate relevant 

postmortem bodily processes and indicators such as lividity, 

rigor mortis, body temperature, and decomposition. (See 

Henßge et al., Death Time Estimation in Case Work. II. 

Integration of Different Methods (1988) 39 Forensic Sci. Intl. 77, 

77–78 (hereafter Henßge); In re Richards (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 

303 [citing expert testimony that “time of death is a complex 

determination”].) In addition to Vomhof’s lack of medical 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

15

training or expertise to evaluate such indicators, Keen could not 

recall — and there is no indication in the record — that Vomhof 

was provided with the paramedics’ report, the coroner’s report, 

or other information necessary to reach an informed opinion as 

to Conde’s time of death. The trial court’s finding that Vomhof 

was not qualified to provide an expert opinion on time of death 

is supported by substantial evidence, and we adopt it.

The further question, to which we apply our independent 

judgment, is whether Keen’s failure to consult a time of death 

expert fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In 

addressing this question, we focus not on whether Keen “should 

have presented” expert testimony on Conde’s time of death, but 

on “whether the investigation supporting [counsel’s] decision 

not to [consult a time of death expert] was itself reasonable.” 

(Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 523 (Wiggins).)

Not every homicide case presents a significant issue 

regarding the time of death. Gibson testified that he recalled 

only two instances in which time of death was at issue among 

the hundreds of murder cases he worked on as a public defender. 

But Conde’s time of death was a particularly important issue in 

this case and therefore gave rise to a duty of defense counsel to 

investigate. The core of the prosecution’s theory regarding 

Long’s opportunity to commit the crime rested on Dills’s 

preliminary hearing testimony that he dropped off Long at her 

home between 1:20 and 1:25 a.m. Long repeatedly insisted she 

arrived home around 2:00 a.m., placing her outside the window 

of opportunity to murder Conde, clean herself up, and dispose of 

the evidence. A reasonably competent defense attorney would 

have recognized the importance of investigating Conde’s time of 

death to examine whether it was inconsistent with the 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

16

prosecution’s timeline and could cause the jury to have a 

reasonable doubt about Long’s guilt.

We acknowledge that time of death often cannot be 

estimated with precision and that reliable estimates are 

commonly stated as a time range. Even so, Keen’s inquiry on 

this issue “did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.” 

(Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 534.) Although Keen discussed 

Conde’s time of death with Vomhof, the discussion was 

serendipitous. Keen had contacted Vomhof to explore the level 

of force needed to fatally injure Conde; he did not contact 

Vomhof to discuss time of death, nor was he aware that Vomhof 

purported to have time of death expertise, nor is there any 

indication that he gave Vomhof the paramedics’ report, coroner’s 

report, or other information necessary to form a reliable opinion 

as to time of death. Under these circumstances, a competent 

attorney would have sought the opinion of a time of death expert 

on what the observations of lividity and rigor mortis in the 

paramedics’ and coroner’s reports implied for Conde’s time of 

death. At the time of Long’s trials, such observations had long 

been recognized in forensics literature and case law as 

indicators capable of informing time of death estimates. (See, 

e.g., Henßge, supra, 39 Forensic Sci. Intl. at pp. 78–81; People v. 

Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 614 [“routine examinations for 

lividity and rigor mortis” are “two crude measures used to 

approximate time of death”]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 

818, 825 [medical experts estimated time of death based on rigor 

mortis]; People v. Adkins (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 942, 948 

[forensic pathologist relied on observations of rigor mortis and 

lividity in estimating time of death]; People v. Culuko (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 307, 320 [pathologist estimated time of death based 

on rigor mortis].)
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

17

Keen testified that he did not seek an expert opinion on 

time of death because he believed any estimate would 

encompass a range too broad to exclude the prosecution’s 

timeframe for the crime. But there is scant evidence to indicate 

he sought expert advice to confirm that belief. Even accepting 

that time of death estimates are inexact and are stated as a 

range, it is not clear what led Keen to believe that any range 

derived from the available evidence would necessarily 

encompass the prosecution’s timeframe — a timeframe that 

tended to rule out the possibility that someone other than Long 

committed the crime. When asked what “specifically” in his 

training led him not to inquire further into Conde’s time of 

death, Keen identified nothing specific. Although Keen said he 

had knowledge about lividity and rigidity, his testimony 

provides no indication as to whether or how that knowledge 

informed his judgment. Without further inquiry, Keen had no 

basis to write off the possibility that a time of death estimate 

would help exculpate Long.

The Court of Appeal believed it was reasonable that Keen 

did not consult a time of death expert and instead focused Long’s 

defense on third party culpability. But the two lines of defense 

were potentially complementary, not mutually exclusive; an 

expert opinion that Conde likely died before 1:20 a.m. would 

have tended to bolster Long’s defense that another party 

committed the crime. In any event, we see no reason why 

competent counsel would not have at least inquired. (See 

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691 [“counsel has a duty to 

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary”]; 

Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 215 [counsel must “make a 

rational and informed decision on strategy and tactics founded 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

18

on adequate investigation and preparation”].) Without such 

investigation, Keen was not in a position to make a reasonable 

decision as to which defense or defenses to focus on at trial.

A reviewing court must apply “ ‘a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments’ ” in assessing the 

reasonableness of a particular decision not to investigate. 

(Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 522.) But “[i]n assessing the 

reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, [we] must 

consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to 

counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a 

reasonable attorney to investigate further.” (Id. at p. 527.) The 

prosecution’s theory of the case put Long at the crime scene no 

earlier than 1:20 a.m., roughly 45 minutes before the police 

arrived. Time of death was not only a central issue to 

investigate; it was also a viable issue for investigation in light of 

the lividity and rigidity observations by the paramedics and 

coroner. A reasonably competent attorney would have 

investigated further, and Keen had no reasonable basis for 

failing to do so. (See id. at p. 534.) We conclude that counsel’s 

failure to consult a time of death expert “was the result of 

inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment” (ibid.), and that 

counsel’s performance in this regard fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.

B.

We now consider whether counsel’s failure prejudiced 

Long’s defense. We examine what “evidence counsel failed to 

discover and present in this case” and whether there is “a 

reasonable probability that a competent attorney . . . would have 

introduced it” (Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at pp. 534–535), and 

then we address whether “there is a reasonable probability that 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

19

[the jury] would have returned” a different verdict if it “had 

. . . been confronted with [that] evidence” (id. at p. 536).

1.

The trial court found that “qualified medical opinions” 

concluding that Conde’s death occurred significantly earlier 

than 1:20 a.m. “were available at the time of trial” in 2005. This 

finding is supported by substantial evidence.

At the evidentiary hearing, Long presented the testimony 

of two pathology experts. Dr. Zhongxue Hua was a professor of 

pathology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine and 

previously served as chief medical examiner for Union County 

in New Jersey. He testified that he has performed around 3,000 

autopsies and has reviewed “at least the same amount” of

autopsy reports. He explained that the science undergirding 

time of death estimation is not precise down to minutes or 

seconds, but it can provide a meaningful range of possible times.

Upon reviewing the circumstances in this case, Dr. Hua

opined that it was “remotely possible” but “extremely unlikely” 

that Conde died after 1:20 a.m. Based on “the known set of 

evidence,” Dr. Hua concluded that Conde’s “time of death 

occurred long before 1:20 a.m.” In providing this estimate, Dr. 

Hua assigned particular importance to the paramedics’ 

observation of rigor in Conde’s arm around 2:20 a.m. He 

explained that although rigor may present as early as 30 

minutes to an hour after death in small muscles such as those 

in a person’s fingers or jaw, it would take “much, much later 

than 30 minutes” after a person’s death for rigor to present in 

the medium-sized muscles of the arms. Dr. Hua also considered 

the paramedics’ observations regarding the body’s lividity. He

noted that some lividity could present as early as 30 minutes to 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

20

one hour following a person’s death, suggesting that Conde must 

have died at least 30 minutes before the paramedics’ 

observation.

Dr. Hua placed less emphasis on the coroner’s report. As 

noted, the coroner arrived almost three hours after the

paramedics; Dr. Hua said he generally finds earlier observations 

to be more helpful than subsequent observations. He testified 

that the coroner’s observation of “almost fixed” lividity was 

inconsistent with the coroner’s notation that rigor “had not 

started,” since lividity and rigor tend to present together.

According to Dr. Hua, the coroner’s notation that rigor had not 

started was “impossible” as Conde had been dead for over two 

hours. Dr. Hua testified that any finding that rigor “had not 

started” by 5:03 a.m., when the deputy coroner arrived, was 

“extremely unlikely.” Further, Dr. Hua testified that there is no 

precise definition of “almost fixed” lividity, so he discounted fully 

fixed lividity by 50 percent in order to derive his “most 

conservative” time of death estimate. He opined that the 

earliest time when “almost fixed” lividity (so understood) could 

present is “minimum, minimum four hour[s]” after death, and 

he rejected the possibility that “almost fixed” lividity could occur 

within four hours after death. On cross-examination, Dr. Hua 

testified that even if the coroner had examined the body closer 

to 7:00 a.m., his time of death estimate would be “still before” 

1:20 a.m. given the paramedics’ observation of rigor in Conde’s 

arm at 2:20 a.m.

Long’s other expert was Dr. James Bonnell, who had

previously served as the chief deputy medical examiner for San 

Diego County and had performed over 7,000 autopsies and had 

provided sworn testimony over 585 times at the time of the 

hearing. Dr. Bonnell estimated that Conde died “much closer to 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

21

11:00 [p.m.] than 1 [a.m.].” He placed “great reliability” on the 

paramedics’ observations, as they “were the first people to 

actually examine the body.” Dr. Bonnell considered but did not 

credit the coroner’s findings. In his view, the coroner’s 

observation that rigor “had not started” was “inaccurate.” Dr. 

Bonnell highlighted the paramedics’ contrary observation that 

rigor was present in Conde’s arms at 2:20 a.m. According to Dr. 

Bonnell, if “rigidity was not present” during the coroner’s 

examination between 5:03 and 7:13 a.m., it “can equally mean 

that [rigor] has passed,” not that rigor had not yet started. If 

Conde had died before midnight, Dr. Bonnell noted, “it wouldn’t 

surprise [him] that [rigor] has passed at 7 o’clock.” Like Dr. 

Hua, Dr. Bonnell testified that the presence of “almost fixed”

lividity at the time of the coroner’s examination “totally 

contradicts” the coroner’s finding of absence of rigor. Especially 

in light of the paramedics’ observations, Dr. Bonnell 

characterized the prosecutor’s theory that Conde died at or after 

1:20 a.m. as “medically impossible.”

Dr. Bonnell also considered the testimony of a neighbor 

who thought she heard Conde in his garage at 12:30 a.m. He 

testified that given the strength of the evidence suggesting an 

earlier time of death, “I don’t place a whole lot of reliability on” 

the indicia that Conde was alive as late as 12:30 a.m. On crossexamination, Dr. Bonnell said he “wouldn’t rely . . . at all” on 

Long’s background as an emergency room nurse or her 911 call 

transcript in which she said Conde was “still breathing” 

because, “number one, she may have been in shock, and number 

two, I know she was intoxicated.”

The district attorney called Dr. Joseph Cohen, who was 

the chief forensic pathologist of the Riverside County SheriffCoroner’s Office and had performed over 7,000 autopsies. Dr. 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

22

Cohen disagreed with Dr. Hua’s assessment of the paramedics’ 

observation of rigor in Conde’s arms. He testified that rigor may

be observable “within minutes” of a person’s death, although he 

acknowledged that it generally takes “30 to 60 minutes” for rigor 

to appear. Dr. Cohen said he placed little weight on the 

paramedics’ report, as “the deputy coroner’s examination 

generally will trump the first responder’s impression — not 

always.” Even so, Dr. Cohen largely dismissed the observations 

of rigidity and lividity in the coroner’s report. Dr. Cohen 

doubted that rigor could be present at 2:20 a.m. but not at 6:00 

a.m., saying that such a finding “doesn’t make sense.” He also 

“disagree[d] that [lividity] would have been fixed or nearly fixed 

at the time of the coroner investigator’s examination,” 

describing the coroner’s finding of “almost fixed” lividity as 

“hard to believe” and an “impossibility.”

In estimating Conde’s time of death, Dr. Cohen said he 

would give “appropriate weight” to the testimony of Juanita 

Sandoval, who said she heard Conde attempting to start his 

motorcycle in his garage at 1:30 a.m., and to the 911 call in 

which Long said Conde was still breathing. Dr. Cohen also 

disagreed with Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s time of death 

estimates, describing them as “ludicrous,” “skewed,” “too 

inflexible,” and “too narrow of a range.” Ultimately, Dr. Cohen 

opined that Conde’s time of death was “as likely” before 1:20 

a.m. as after.

After hearing the testimony of all three experts, the trial 

court found that Dr. Hua and Dr. Bonnell “concluded to a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty that the postmortem 

changes observed in the victim’s body could not have occurred in 

less than an hour. Neither forensic pathologist could give an 

exact timing of the victim’s death. However, both forensic 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

23

pathologists testified in this court that the victim’s death 

occurred significantly earlier than 1:20 a.m., the earliest time 

the prosecution could place the petitioner at the scene. Their 

observations were based upon postmortem changes by the first 

responders as well as the deputy coroner’s report . . . . 

[¶] Hearing their testimony, this Court finds both opinions to be 

credible, convincing, and compelling. Their testimony indicates 

such qualified medical opinions were available at the time of 

trial and defense counsel failed to seek out medical experts to 

address the issue.” These findings, reflecting the trial court’s 

determination of the witnesses’ credibility, are supported by 

substantial evidence.

2.

The trial court further ruled that the testimony of a 

qualified time-of-death expert was evidence that a competent 

attorney would have presented at trial: “In making this ruling, 

I’m not saying that he should have contacted these two 

particular experts, but it’s apparent to the Court that these 

qualified opinions did exist in the medical field . . . . [¶] If such 

expert would have testified, it would have put the victim’s time 

of death at a time when petitioner could not have committed the 

crime, if believed by the jury. Obviously, it’s always a question 

of fact for the jury to either accept or reject the testimony of any 

witness that testifies, including an expert.”

The Court of Appeal “disagree[d] with the trial court’s 

conclusion that no reasonable attorney would have failed to 

present expert time of death evidence to the jury.” The Court of 

Appeal observed that “Hua estimated the victim died before 1:20 

a.m., but conceded that estimate could be effected [sic] by the 

timing of when Gomes [the coroner] observed the victim’s body; 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

24

the record fails to show at precisely what time Gomes examined 

the victim’s body.” The court also said Dr. Bonnell’s estimate 

that Conde died between 11:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. “was based 

upon not considering, or disregarding, all evidence of a later 

time period, such as [a neighbor’s] statement that she heard the 

victim at 1:30 a.m., defendant’s 2:09 a.m. observation that the 

victim was breathing, [the coroner’s] conclusion that rigor had 

not started by 5:03 a.m. on October 6, and Dr. Pestaner’s 

observation that the victim’s body was in a state of rigor on 

October 7.” Further, the court explained that Dr. Cohen’s 

inconclusive testimony “supports Keen’s reasoning” that a time 

of death estimate would be too broad to exclude the prosecution’s 

theory. In sum, the court said, “an attorney could reasonably 

conclude that reliance upon expert testimony, such as Bonnell’s, 

would have been a risky defense strategy because a jury could 

reasonably view such testimony with skepticism and therefore 

it would be unlikely to raise a reasonable doubt.”

In evaluating these competing views, we begin by noting 

that the Court of Appeal did not disagree with the trial court’s 

finding that “qualified medical opinions [that Conde died before 

1:20 a.m.] were available at the time of trial.” The Court of 

Appeal’s concern was that Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s opinions 

were not clear or not persuasive. However, the Court of Appeal 

appeared to ignore Dr. Hua’s testimony that he would place 

Conde’s time of death earlier than 1:20 a.m. even if the deputy 

coroner had not inspected the body until 7:00 a.m. And the court 

did not mention Dr. Bonnell’s testimony that he did not give 

weight to the coroner’s observation that rigor had not started 

because it “totally contradicts” the other time of death 

indicators, or to Long’s 2:09 a.m. observation that Conde was 

breathing in light of her shock and level of intoxication.
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

25

More fundamentally, all the experts who testified were 

aware that the various pieces of evidence bearing on Conde’s 

time of death were potentially inconsistent, and they took those 

inconsistencies into account. In their responses to extensive 

questioning, Dr. Hua and Dr. Bonnell explained why they placed 

greater reliance on some indicators and not others, and both 

experts placed significant weight on the observations of the 

paramedics, the first responders on the scene. (Cf. In re 

Richards, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 303 [noting forensic 

pathologist’s testimony that “the closer to the time of death 

observations are made, the more accurate the findings will be”].) 

Notably, all three experts were critical of key findings in the 

coroner’s report. Further, the trial court acknowledged that Dr. 

Cohen “is a highly qualified medical examiner” and that Dr. 

Cohen “disagreed with the expert testimony of Dr. Bonnell and 

Dr. Hua and opined the time of death was just as likely . . . 

before 1:20 a.m. as after.” Nevertheless, the trial court, after 

hearing all three experts’ lengthy testimony over several days, 

found Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s opinions “to be credible, 

convincing, and compelling.” This is not to say that contrary 

time-of-death opinions were not also available, as evidenced by 

Dr. Cohen’s testimony. But our assessment of prejudice focuses 

on the availability of credible opinions favorable to Long 

because, in light of our determination that counsel did not 

properly investigate the victim’s time of death, we cannot rule 

out a reasonable likelihood that had he done so, he would have 

discovered an opinion helpful to Long’s defense.

The Court of Appeal was correct to focus its inquiry not 

simply on whether expert testimony that Conde died before 1:20 

a.m. was available, but on whether a reasonable attorney could 

have chosen not to present such testimony. It is true that such 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

26

testimony could have been challenged on various grounds, and 

the trial court recognized that “[a] jury hearing this case could 

accept [Dr. Cohen’s] testimony and disregard petitioner’s 

experts, whoever those qualified experts will be.” But 

considering the totality of the experts’ testimony as well as the 

trial court’s findings, we conclude there is a reasonable 

probability that a competent attorney would have presented 

such evidence at trial.

As noted, a time of death defense would have potentially 

complemented defense counsel’s theory of third party 

culpability; evidence that Conde died before Long got home 

would have suggested that someone else committed the crime. 

Although such testimony would have been at odds with Long’s 

statements during her 911 call at 2:09 a.m. and her statements 

to investigators, a competent attorney could have argued she 

was mistaken due to her intoxication and the shock of 

discovering Conde. Indeed, Keen argued at trial that Long was 

“intoxicated” and “hysterical” when she came home “and saw 

[Conde] dead on the couch,” and Keen emphasized various 

aspects of the paramedics’ report to suggest Conde was dead 

before Long arrived. In other words, discounting Long’s 2:09 

a.m. statement that Conde was still breathing was in fact part 

of, not in tension with, the defense strategy. At the evidentiary 

hearing, Keen testified that expert testimony placing the time 

of death before Long’s arrival “would be consistent with our 

defense” and that he “would have fought to introduce that at 

trial” if he had known such testimony was available.

In sum, the record before us does not support the Court of 

Appeal’s conclusion that presenting a time of death expert 

“would have been a risky defense strategy.” As the trial court 

explained, such expert evidence, even if imperfect, would have 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

27

provided a potentially meritorious defense ruling out Long as 

the perpetrator. And even though a jury could have ultimately 

decided to reject it, such evidence would have had enough 

substance as to pose no serious risk of compromising the overall 

credibility of the defense. We conclude that there is “a 

reasonable probability that a competent attorney . . . would 

have introduced” expert testimony on the victim’s time of death 

in this case. (Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 535.) Keen was “not 

in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice” as to 

whether to present such testimony because his investigation 

into Conde’s time of death was unreasonable. (Ibid.)

3.

We now consider whether “there is a reasonable 

probability that [the jury] would have returned with a different” 

verdict (Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 536) if counsel had 

presented the testimony of a time of death expert. The trial 

court observed that “it’s always a question of fact for the jury to 

either accept or reject the testimony of any witness that testifies, 

including an expert.” And the court acknowledged that Dr. 

Cohen disagreed with the testimony of Dr. Bonnell and Dr. Hua, 

and “opined the time of death was just as likely . . . before 1:20 

a.m. as after.” Nevertheless, the court ruled that expert 

testimony estimating time of death before Long arrived home 

“could reasonably raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the 

jurors” and “could be fatal to the People’s case.” Applying our 

independent judgment, we agree.

The prosecution’s evidence against Long was not 

particularly strong. The case rested on circumstantial evidence 

of Long’s motive and opportunity to commit the crime. As noted, 

in the hours leading up to Conde’s murder, Long and Conde had 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

28

been involved in a verbal and physical altercation. Long was 

cheating on Conde with Dills, and she was heavily intoxicated. 

Although no neighbors saw Long or Conde, they heard several 

noises from the direction of the couple’s house late at night. 

When Long called 911, she said Conde was still breathing, yet 

she did not render assistance despite being a vocational nurse. 

Several items were missing from Long’s house, though it did not 

appear to police that the house had been ransacked. And the 

prosecution had called into doubt Long’s uncorroborated 

testimony that she had not changed her clothes that night. 

At the same time, the prosecutor offered no confession, no 

eyewitnesses, no murder weapon identified or recovered, and no 

bloody clothes or other physical or forensic evidence linking 

Long to the crime. Furthermore, the alibis of the other suspects, 

Bugarski and Lovejoy, were only weakly corroborated, if at all. 

In the months before Conde’s death, both Bugarski and Lovejoy 

had threatened the couple and had engaged in suspicious 

activity around Long’s house. Ultimately, the sole testimony 

placing Long at the scene of the crime came from Dills. As the 

trial court observed, “[O]bviously the People’s cornerstone to 

their prosecution was the reliability of Mr. Dills.” But Dills had 

also been drinking throughout that day; he was intimately 

involved with the victim’s girlfriend; he was a suspect in the 

crime when interviewed by the police; and because he died 

before trial, he never testified before a jury and was never crossexamined after full discovery.

The centerpiece of the prosecution’s case was its theory

that Long arrived at the murder scene at 1:20 a.m. and called 

911 at 2:09 a.m. Under that scenario, she would have had 

approximately 50 minutes to arrive, secure a weapon, bludgeon 

the victim to death, and then clean up the scene as well as 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

29

herself and dispose of the weapon. Under the timeframe offered 

by the defense, Long would have had only 10 minutes to 

accomplish all of those tasks. 

Several facts stand against the prosecution’s theory. 

There were two other people with a potential motive to kill the 

victim, and their alibis were not firm. In addition, the front door 

was unlocked, the kitchen slider was open, and items were 

missing from the home. It was a bloody crime scene with a 360-

degree blood splatter pattern. Yet there was no evidence that a 

sink or shower had been used to clean up. A search of the home, 

the car, and the neighborhood, including storm drains, 

uncovered no weapon, no bloody clothes, and no other evidence. 

In addition, the prosecution expert opined at trial that the 

victim’s head injuries would have caused death within 10 to 15 

minutes. The prosecution’s own evidence showed Long was over 

two miles away between 11:00 p.m. and 1:20 a.m. Defense 

counsel did not present available evidence from which the jury 

could have concluded that the victim could have died much 

earlier, when Long was nowhere near the crime scene. That 

evidence would have effectively negated the linchpin of the 

prosecution’s case and, together with the third party culpability 

evidence and the evidence of a possible break-in and theft, would 

have significantly enhanced the probability of a jury having a 

reasonable doubt as to Long’s guilt.

A “verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the 

record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one 

with overwhelming record support.” (Strickland, supra, 466 

U.S. at p. 696.) Given the totality of the trial evidence, there is 

a “substantial, not just conceivable,” likelihood that expert 

testimony that Conde died before 1:20 a.m. would have led to a 
In re LONG

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

30

more favorable result for Long. (Harrington, supra, 562 U.S. at 

p. 112.) We conclude it is reasonably probable that the 

presentation of expert testimony as to Conde’s time of death, 

along the lines of Dr. Hua’s and Dr. Bonnell’s testimony, would 

have led one or more jurors to harbor reasonable doubt about 

Long’s guilt. Counsel’s failure to investigate the time of death, 

in a case where the timeline was crucial, is an error “sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, at 

p. 694.)

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

LIU, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

FRANSON, J.*

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Long

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 5/3/18 – 4th Dist., Div. 2

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding 

Review Granted 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S249274 

Date Filed: November 30, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Riverside

Judge: Patrick F. Magers*

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Michelle Rogers, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Alissa Bjerkhoel for Petitioner Kimberly Louise 

Long.

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent the People.

*Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Alan D. Tate

Deputy District Attorney

3960 Orange Street

Riverside, CA 92501

(951) 955-0126

Michelle Rogers

Appellate Defenders, Inc.

555 West Beech St., Suite 300

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 696-0282

Alissa Bjerkhoel

225 Cedar Street

San Diego, CA 92101