United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 23-40591 

____________ 

Cheapside Minerals, Limited; Paul R. Lucas, Jr., 

individually and as independent executor of the Estate of Mary K. 

Lucas, deceased; James E. Natho; Mary Natho; 

McDougal Family 2003, Limited; Et al., 

Plaintiffs—Appellees, 

versus

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., formerly known as

GeoSouthern DeWitt Properties, L.L.C., 

Defendant—Appellant, 

consolidated with 

_____________ 

No. 24-40026 

_____________ 

Cheapside Minerals, Limited; McDougal Family 2003, 

Limited; Paul R. Lucas, Jr., individually and as independent executor 

of the Estate of Mary K. Lucas, deceased; James E. Natho; 

Mary Natho; Et al., 

Plaintiffs—Appellees, 

versus

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

March 1, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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2 

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., formerly known as

GeoSouthern DeWitt Properties, L.L.C., 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:23-CV-34 

______________________________ 

Before Jones, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge: 

 Defendant Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. appeals from 

the district court’s order remanding this oil-and-gas royalties dispute to 

Texas state court. Devon contends that the Class Action Fairness Act, 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (CAFA), requires that this case be 

heard in federal court. The district court disagreed, finding CAFA’s “local 

controversy” exception required the court to remand. We interpret the 

statute differently and, accordingly, VACATE its judgment remanding this 

case to state court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A group of 214 plaintiffs sued Devon in Texas state court, alleging that 

Devon had underpaid them in excess of $100 million in oil-and-gas royalties. 

Devon, a citizen of Oklahoma, is a lessee under certain leases concerning 

lands in Dewitt County, Texas.1

 Devon markets and sells hydrocarbons 

produced from wells on those lands and pays royalties to the Plaintiffs. 

Devon makes those payments to locations specified by Plaintiffs from its 

_____________________ 

1

 Although Devon is the only defendant bringing this appeal, it is not the only 

defendant in this case. The other defendants, BPX Operating Company, BPX Production 

Company, and GeoSouthern Energy Corporation, are all citizens of Texas. 

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offices in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. There is no dispute that more than twothirds of Plaintiffs are citizens of Texas but that some Plaintiffs do not reside 

in Texas. In fact, some Plaintiffs reside in places that are thousands of miles 

away from Texas, such as Alaska, Massachusetts, and the United Kingdom. 

Pursuant to CAFA, Devon removed this case to federal court. 

Plaintiffs sought remand based on CAFA’s “local controversy” exception.2

 

The district court agreed that the local controversy exception applied and 

ordered that the case be remanded.3

Devon appealed the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and also 

filed a request to challenge the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). We 

consolidated the separate filings.

II. DISCUSSION 

“We review de novo whether the local controversy exception to 

CAFA jurisdiction should apply in this case.” Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v. 

FairPay Sols., Inc., 655 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 

A. 

Before turning to the merits, we first address our appellate 

jurisdiction. We granted Devon permission to appeal under § 1453(c), but 

we asked the parties to brief whether we additionally have jurisdiction based 

_____________________ 

2

 Plaintiffs also argued that CAFA’s “local single event exclusion,” see 

§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I), warranted remand of this case. The district court did not address 

that argument in its remand order. Plaintiffs do not argue the local single event exclusion 

applies in their appellate brief. 

3

 The district court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ lost royalties were real property 

interests. As shown in part II.B.i. of this opinion, the district court erred in making this 

determination. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1975). 

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on § 1291.4 As it happens, both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits hold that 

appellants may rely on § 1291 for jurisdiction over an order remanding a case 

based on CAFA’s local controversy exception.5

 See Simring v. GreenSky, 

LLC, 29 F.4th 1262, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2022) (court could hear appeal under 

§ 1291 where appellant “did not rely at all on Section 1453” and “did not 

need to file a motion for permissive appeal”); Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, 

LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[A]fter recognizing that we had 

previously denied the appellants permission to appeal under § 1453(c), we 

nevertheless proceeded to address their separately filed § 1291 appeal, 

concluding that we had jurisdiction under § 1291 to review the district 

court’s application of the local-controversy exception.” (citing Jacks v. 

Meridian Res. Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224, 1228 n.2, 1229 (8th Cir. 2012)); see 

also 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 3931.2 (3d ed. 2023) (“An order remanding after removal 

under the Class Action Fairness Act . . . can be appealed as of right, and 

§ 1447(d) does not bar review if the remand is based not on a lack of 

jurisdiction but on a decision to decline jurisdiction under the localcontroversy exception or the home-state exception.” (footnotes omitted)). 

We follow this persuasive authority. 

Generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) limits this court’s jurisdiction to hear 

appeals from orders remanding cases to state court. Under § 1447(d), a 

remand order is unreviewable if the district court remands the case for lack 

_____________________ 

4

 Devon argues it could have brought this appeal under § 1453(c) or § 1291. But 

Devon concedes that, “when permitted” § 1453(c) is the “superior alternative, and so it 

should be utilized here.” Plaintiffs agree with Devon that § 1453(c) is the preferable route 

to hear appeals concerning CAFA but offer no argument as to whether Devon could have 

brought this appeal under § 1291. 

5

 The parties do not point to authorities exhibiting that other circuits have reached 

a contrary conclusion, nor are we aware of any. 

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of subject matter jurisdiction or a procedural removal “defect.” See Things 

Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127–28, 116 S. Ct. 494, 497 (1995); 

Schexnayder v. Entergy La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, 

when a case is remanded for a reason other than subject matter jurisdiction 

or a procedural “defect,” § 1447(d) does not bar review and an appellant can 

rely on § 1291 to appeal the remand order. See Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. Citco 

Group Ltd., 796 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2015) (“If the statutory bars to review 

do not apply, a remand order is a final order for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.” (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713, 116 S. Ct. 

1712, 1719 (1996)). 

CAFA provides a basis for expedited appellate review of appeals from 

orders that either remand or deny remand of class action litigation. It 

provides: “Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this 

section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may 

accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion 

to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed . . . .” 

§ 1453(c)(1) (emphases added). But § 1453(c) did not supplant § 1291 and 

become the lone vehicle by which an appellant can obtain review of a final 

order remanding class action litigation to state court; it simply permits 

certain appeals denying remand that §§ 1447(d) and 1291 would have 

otherwise prohibited. See BlackRock Fin. Mgmt. Inc. v. Segregated Account of 

Ambac Assur. Corp., 673 F.3d 169, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2012); BP Am., Inc. v. 

Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 613 F.3d 1029, 1032–33 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(Gorsuch, J.) (“Congress has specifically and explicitly suspended the 

operation of § 1447(d) with respect to CAFA remand orders arising, like this 

one, under § 1453(c)(1).”). 

Moreover, § 1447(d) does not trump § 1291 to deny appeal of a 

remand order based on the local controversy exception, because § 1447(d) 

does not prohibit review of remands based on “abstention principles.” 

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Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2006). 

This court has held that orders remanding cases under CAFA’s local 

controversy exception are based on abstention principles. Watson v. City of 

Allen, 821 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2016); accord Hollinger v. Home State Mut. 

Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 564, 570 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (referring to the local 

controversy exception as a “mandatory abstention provision of CAFA”). In 

sum, appellants may rely on § 1291 or § 1453(c) in appealing orders 

remanding a case under the local controversy exception. But only in appeals 

predicated on § 1453(c) is this court bound to rule within sixty days of our 

granting permission to appeal. Compare § 1453(c)(2), with § 1447; see also 

Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2006).

B. 

Turning to whether the district court erred in remanding this case, 

neither party disputes that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to CAFA, § 1332(d)(2).6

 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs urge, and the 

district court found, that this case belongs in state court because of CAFA’s 

local controversy exception. That exception provides: 

A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under 

paragraph (2)— 

(A)(i) over a class action in which— 

(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed 

plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in 

which the action was originally filed; 

_____________________ 

6

 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs, and is a class action in which—(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 

State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state 

or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any 

member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or 

a citizen or subject of a foreign state.” § 1332(d)(2). 

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(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant— 

(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the 

plaintiff class; 

(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the 

claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 

(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was 

originally filed; and 

(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any 

related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in 

which the action was originally filed; and 

(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class 

action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same 

or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on 

behalf of the same or other persons[.] 

§ 1332(d)(4). Plaintiffs “bear the burden of establishing that they fall within 

[the] exception.” Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 655 F.3d at 360. The parties 

also agree that prongs I and II of the exception’s statutory prerequisites are 

satisfied. 

 They dispute whether, as prong III requires, the “principal injuries” 

resulting from Devon’s underpayment of royalties were sustained in Texas. 

For the following reasons, we agree with Devon that Plaintiffs failed to show 

the “principal injuries” from royalty underpayments were “incurred” in 

Texas. 

i. Where were Plaintiffs’ injuries “incurred”? 

 According to prong III, a local controversy must be one in which the 

“principal injuries” were “incurred” in the state where the action was first 

filed. Devon asserts that Plaintiffs suffered their injuries where they reside. 

Devon contends that an underpayment of an oil or gas royalty is an injury to 

personal property, and a plaintiff’s residence is determinative of where the 

plaintiff suffers that injury. Plaintiffs see it differently. They argue that they 

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suffered their injuries “at the location specified for payment.” (emphasis 

omitted). That location, according to Plaintiffs, is DeWitt County, Texas, 

because the leases make royalty payments “payable” there. 

 “Texas law provides that oil and gas are realty when in place and 

personalty when severed from the land by production.” Phillips Petroleum 

Co., 513 F.2d at 363 (collecting cases); accord Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson 

Res. Co., 80 F.3d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The right to payment for 

minerals already severed from the ground is considered personal property, 

not realty.”). The distinction arises because “[t]he right to payment for past 

production obviously has no effect upon the value to the leaseholder of the 

oil and gas still in the ground,” and, therefore, “accrued royalty interests are 

personal property, . . . as is the right to payment for severed minerals.” 

Phillips Petroleum Co., 513 F.2d at 363. 

 Plaintiffs allege that Devon underpaid their royalties on sales of 

hydrocarbons that were already severed from the subject real property. Their 

royalties consist of the “gross proceeds received for the sale of production

from the Royalty Owners’ Leases.” (emphasis added). Underpayments of 

royalties owed thus comprise injuries to Plaintiffs’ personal property.7

 That still leaves unanswered where Plaintiffs suffered injuries to their 

personal property. To be sure, most Plaintiffs reside in Texas. But 

approximately ten percent of Plaintiffs either reside outside of Texas, 

requested that they be paid at addresses outside of Texas, or both.8

_____________________ 

7

 Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not dispute this conclusion in their appellate brief, even 

though Plaintiffs previously defended the district court’s conclusion that “under Texas 

law, royalty interests are interests in real property.” 

8

 Plaintiffs concede at least some Plaintiffs reside outside of Texas but note that 

approximately 90% reside in Texas. However, the exact number of Plaintiffs that reside in 

Texas is unclear. Devon points to twenty Plaintiffs who requested to be paid outside of 

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 Generally, a plaintiff sustains an economic injury where he resides. 

See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“We have repeatedly held that a corporation incurs economic loss, for 

jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of business.”); 

CMACO Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Wanxiang Am. Corp., 589 F.3d 235, 247 (6th Cir. 

2009) (“Because the economic injury [plaintiff] suffered . . . was clearly felt 

at its corporate headquarters [in California], the district court did not err in 

holding that CMA’s contract claim accrued . . . in California . . . .”); Cantor 

Fitzgerald Inc. v. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where . . . the 

injury is purely economic, the place of injury usually is where the plaintiff 

resides and sustains the economic impact of the loss.” (citation and 

quotations omitted)). Notably, this court has observed that a plaintiff feels 

the “direct effect” of being underpaid in the place where he resides. See 

Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1110–12 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding, in 

regard to sovereign immunity, that “the breach of the certificates of deposits 

had direct effects in the United States” where plaintiffs resided, even though 

Mexico was specified as the place of payment “on the certificates 

themselves”). It follows that the Plaintiffs who reside or were paid at 

addresses outside of Texas could not have sustained their economic injuries 

in Texas because the underpayment of their royalties did not occur in Texas 

nor were its effects felt there. See Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308, 

310, 312–14 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining the location of economic injury 

based on “where plaintiffs bought the [defective] guns,” not where those 

guns were manufactured); see also Racca v. EFG Gen. Partner Corp., No. 1:22-

CV-142, 2022 WL 2764735, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2022) (Crone, J.) 

_____________________ 

Texas. Of those twenty, Plaintiffs allege that nineteen reside in Texas. Devon points out 

that only one of those nineteen Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit stating he resides in Texas. 

In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs do not direct this court to any evidence in the record 

rebutting Devon’s evidence and their own allegations. 

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(concluding, in a CAFA case, that students who attended a Texas college 

remotely and lived outside of Texas sustained their injuries from the 

college’s closure in the places where they resided). Thus, the Plaintiffs who 

reside outside of Texas sustained their injuries outside of Texas. 

 Plaintiffs counter that Devon agreed to pay royalties in Texas with the 

consequence that Devon’s failure to satisfy its obligations occurred in Texas. 

Plaintiffs find support in the mineral leases, which state: “All royalties, 

surface damages, and other payments due under this lease shall be payable in 

DeWitt County, Texas, unless otherwise herein provided.”9

 (emphasis 

added). This argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, making 

royalties “payable” in DeWitt County does not necessarily mean the leases 

required Devon to pay Plaintiffs there. See Payable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2007) (“payable” means “that may, 

can, or must be paid”). Moreover, in no way does this lease provision mean 

all Plaintiffs were actually paid in DeWitt County. Second, it is undisputed 

that Devon paid Plaintiffs from its offices in Oklahoma, and a number of 

Plaintiffs requested that Devon pay them at addresses outside of Texas. 

Plaintiffs also concede that “[u]nder Texas law, a breach of contract injury 

occurs at the location specified for payment.” (emphasis in original). Thus, at 

least some of the Plaintiffs sustained their injuries outside of Texas. Plaintiffs 

have failed to demonstrate they all sustained or “incurred” injuries in the 

state in which they brought this lawsuit.

_____________________ 

9

 This quoted text derives from a lease executed in 2007, and Plaintiffs represent 

that all leases contain this quoted text. Devon, however, “does not concede that Plaintiffs 

established that the DeWitt County payment provision exists in ‘every single’ Plaintiffs’ 

lease.”

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ii. Must all injuries have occurred in Texas for the local controversy 

 exception to apply? 

The more challenging, and novel, question is how to interpret the 

“principal injuries” that must have been incurred within the forum state 

under prong III of the local controversy exception. The parties join issue over 

whether “principal injuries” means that all Plaintiffs, or some quantity of 

Plaintiffs, must have suffered their injuries in Texas. As a matter of statutory 

interpretation, “we follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of 

[§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III)], interpreting undefined terms according to their 

ordinary and natural meaning and the overall policies and objectives of the 

statute.” NPR Invs., L.L.C. ex rel. Roach v. United States, 740 F.3d 998, 1007 

(5th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotations omitted). 

 Plaintiffs contend they satisfy the principal injuries prong because the 

vast majority of Plaintiffs were underpaid their royalties in Texas and, 

therefore, their “principal injuries” occurred in the forum state. In other 

words, “principal” means “most” of the Plaintiffs who were injured. We 

hold, to the contrary, that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “principal” is contrary 

to the prong III provision’s plain meaning. As shown below, the meaning of 

“principal injuries” is unambiguous. “Principal injuries” qualitatively and 

comparatively evaluates the types of injury, not the quantity of plaintiffs who 

were injured. Thus, when some plaintiffs sustain their primary injuries in the 

forum state but others do not § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) is not satisfied.10

_____________________ 

10 To be sure, the legislative history of CAFA suggests that not all plaintiffs are 

required to suffer their principal injuries in the forum state to satisfy the principal injuries 

prong. See Sen. Rep. No. 109-14, 40, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38 (2005) (“[T]he principal 

injuries resulting from the actions of all the defendants must have occurred in the state 

where the suit was filed. By this criterion, the Committee means that all or almost all of the 

damage caused by defendants’ alleged conduct occurred in the state where the suit was 

brought.” (emphasis added)). But “[o]nly after application of principles of statutory 

construction, including the canons of construction, and after a conclusion that the statute 

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CAFA does not define the term “principal.” See § 1332(d). But in 

other contexts, the Supreme Court and this court have observed that 

“principal” is synonymous with “primary,” “chief,” and “[f]irst or highest 

in rank, quality, or importance.” See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 525, 

131 S. Ct. 1910, 1936 (2011); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lange, 480 F. 

App’x 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2012). Dictionaries in use at the time Congress 

enacted CAFA also attach this definition to “principal.” See Principal, 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“principal” means “[c]hief; 

primary; most important”); Principal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 

INT’L DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2002) (“principal” means “most important, 

consequential, or influential . . . relegating comparable matters, items, or 

individuals to secondary rank”).11 Read as an adjective that describes 

“injuries,” it is common sense that a defendant’s conduct can result in 

“principal injuries” that are more important than others. For example, as 

Devon explains, a “personal injury plaintiff may suffer bodily harm in Texas 

(the principal injury) but incur medical bills payable in Florida (a secondary 

injury).” 

 The structure of CAFA also supports our interpretation of “principal 

injuries.” First, CAFA ties the “principal injuries” sustained to the entire 

class, not just a subset of it. CAFA requires plaintiffs to show that the 

“principal injuries . . . were incurred in the State in which the action was 

originally filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). There is no exception for cases in 

which most plaintiffs sustain the principal injury in the forum state but some 

do not. Thus, to remand a case to state court when some plaintiffs sustained 

_____________________ 

is ambiguous may [we] turn to the legislative history.” United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 

647, 658 (5th Cir. 2015). Because § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) as enacted is unambiguous, we 

do not consider legislative history. 

11 Notably, Plaintiffs concur with this definition of “principal.”

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the principal injuries outside of the forum state would essentially rewrite the 

statute, which we may not do. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 

509 U.S. 155, 168 n.16, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 n.16 (1993) (“[W]e may not add 

terms or provisions [to a statute] where congress has omitted them . . . .” 

(citation omitted)). 

 In other parts of CAFA, Congress enumerated when fewer than all 

plaintiffs must meet certain requirements. See § 1332(d)(2),12 (3),13

(4)(A)(i)(I), (4)(B).14 Accordingly, the first prong of the local controversy 

exception is satisfied when “greater than two-thirds of the members of all 

proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which 

the action was originally filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I). But Congress did not 

enumerate the proportion of plaintiffs necessary under the nearby principal 

injuries prong. See § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). Had Congress intended to 

require that only two-thirds of plaintiffs suffer their principal injuries in the 

forum state to satisfy the principal injuries prong, it could have said so. See 

Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 

(1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that [Congress] says in a statute what it 

means and means in a statute what it says there.”). “[W]hen Congress 

includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another[,]” this court “presumes that Congress intended a difference in 

_____________________ 

12 See supra note 6. 

13 “A district court may . . . decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2) 

over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of 

all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the 

State in which the action was originally filed based on consideration of . . . .” § 1332(d)(3) 

(emphasis added). 

14 “A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2) 

[when] two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, 

and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally 

filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 

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meaning.” Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 161, 138 S. Ct. 767, 

777 (2018) (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted). 

 Moreover, Congress explicitly carved out exceptions to federal 

jurisdiction based on injuries that occurred inside and outside the forum 

state. CAFA provides that “mass actions”15 can be removed to federal 

court.16 But Congress provided that “the term ‘mass action’ shall not 

include any civil action in which . . . all of the claims in the action arise from 

an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and that 

allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that 

State . . . .” § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). Congress did not include similar 

language in the principal injuries prong. See § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). As 

explained above, we presume Congress deliberately omitted such language 

from § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) because it intended to require that all plaintiffs 

sustain their principal injuries in the forum state and nowhere else. See 

Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 583 U.S. at 161, 138 S. Ct. at 777; Conn. Nat. Bank, 

503 U.S. at 253–54, 112 S. Ct. at 1149.

 Finally, our interpretation of the local controversy exception complies 

with the requirement that we construe the exception narrowly and “with all 

doubts resolved in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.” Opelousas 

Gen. Hosp. Auth., 655 F.3d at 360 (citations and quotations omitted); see also 

_____________________ 

15 “[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action (except a civil action within 

the scope of section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are 

proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common 

questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose 

claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection 

(a) . . . .” § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 

16 “For purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action shall be deemed 

to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the 

provisions of those paragraphs.” § 1332(d)(11)(A). 

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Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 810 F.3d 

335, 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Congress crafted CAFA to exclude only a narrow 

category of truly localized controversies, and the exceptions provide a 

statutory vehicle for the district courts to ferret out the controversy that 

uniquely affects a particular locality to the exclusion of all others.” (citation 

and quotations omitted)). Indeed, “[t]he language, structure, and history of 

CAFA all demonstrate that Congress contemplated broad federal court 

jurisdiction with only narrow exceptions.” Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., 

Inc., 810 F.3d at 337 (citation and quotations omitted). 

 Here, the “principal injury” each Plaintiff sustained is obvious 

because there was only one type of injury: a financial harm resulting from 

Devon’s alleged underpayment of their royalties. While most Plaintiffs 

sustained that injury in Texas, others did not. Therefore, the principal 

injuries prong is not satisfied in this case, and Plaintiffs have failed to 

demonstrate that the local controversy exception applies. 

CONCLUSION 

Because CAFA’s local controversy exception does not apply, we 

VACATE the judgment of the district court, REMAND to the district 

court, and DIRECT that the case be reinstated on that court’s docket. 

Case: 23-40591 Document: 70-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/01/2024