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76–896 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–618 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL SECURITY 

LABORATORIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 18, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

ANN E. SAUER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL

SECURITY LABORATORIES

APRIL 18, 2012

Page 

Patel, Dr. C. Kumar N., President and Chief Executive Officer, Pranalytica, 

Inc.; Co-Chair, National Research Council Committee on Review of the 

Quality of the Management and of the Science and Engineering Research 

at the Department of Energy’s National Security Laboratories-Phase 1 ........ 9 

Shank, Dr. Charles V., Senior Fellow, Howard Hughes Medical Institute; 

Co-Chair, National Research Council Committee on Review of the Quality 

of the Management and of the Science and Engineering Research at the 

Department of Energy’s National Security Laboratories-Phase 1 ................... 14 

McMillan, Dr. Charles F., Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory ............... 15 

Albright, Dr. Penrose C., Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory .. 22 

Hommert, Dr. Paul J., Director, Sandia National Laboratories .......................... 31 

(III) 

(1) 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Inhofe, and 

Vitter. 

Majority staff member present: Jonathan S. Epstein, counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel Lerner, professional staff 

member. 

Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ryan Ehly, assistant to 

Senator Nelson; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and 

Charles Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator NELSON. Let me today call the hearing to order. 

Senator Sessions is in a budget hearing at the moment, so he is 

not going to be able to join us, but Senator Inhofe is a member of 

the subcommittee and he will be joining us shortly. In the meantime, I thought we might get started. 

I have two cans of pop here. I do not intend to drink both of 

them, but when there is only one and you run out, you do not have 

a successor. So it might be a two-drink hearing. [Laughter.] 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the relationship between the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), and its national security laboratories. We had a similar hearing on this topic 

on March 14 with the NNSA, and today it is the national security 

laboratories’ turn to comment on this relationship. 

We also have as a witness the Chairman and Vice Chairman of 

the National Academies of Science panel that examined how this 

relationship is affecting the quality of science and engineering at 

the labs. 

Let me thank all of you for agreeing to testify today. It is an exceptionally important hearing but also one whose time has come 

and is due. 

2 

This hearing will examine five issues that have been highlighted 

in part by the recent National Academies of Science report on laboratory management. 

First, how can the relationship between the NNSA and its laboratories be streamlined to avoid the layers of bureaucracy as it 

currently exists? 

Second, how can the NNSA and its laboratories restore a relationship of trust to minimize the detailed reporting requirements 

that have resulted from a lack of trust? 

Third, how can the NNSA be aligned within the Department of 

Energy (DOE) to achieve independence as originally envisioned 

when it was created 12 years ago? 

Fourth, how can your laboratories be viewed as national security 

assets to the U.S. Government as a whole? 

Fifth, can your laboratories, as currently configured and funded, 

meet the current Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear stockpile 

requirements? 

Those are the questions. 

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) brought 

great attention to modernizing the laboratories’ infrastructure 

which in many cases dates over 60 years to the Manhattan Project. 

The Budget Control Act has put constraints on the rate at which 

much of this modernization can be achieved, but its importance has 

not been lost on this Congress. That in order to safely reduce the 

number of nuclear weapons deployed, we must at a minimum ensure that our infrastructure can maintain these fewer numbers of 

weapons so they are safe, secure, and militarily effective. 

Many experts such as former Secretaries Bill Perry and Jim 

Schlesinger have stated the importance of this issue, and as recently as last month, General Kehler, the Commander in Chief of 

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), said before the full committee that, ‘‘of all the elements of the nuclear enterprise, I am 

most concerned with the potential for declining or inadequate investment in the nuclear weapons enterprise that would result in 

our inability to sustain the deterrent force.’’ These are very serious 

words from the combatant commander that is charged with ensuring our nuclear deterrent and that it is capable of meeting the requirements levied on it by the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

As we examine the needs of each of your laboratories and the 

large investments that they require to modernize, we in Congress 

are worried and concerned that these investments will not be used 

to the maximum extent possible if the relationship between the 

NNSA and its laboratories is, as described by our National Academies witnesses, ‘‘dysfunctional.’’ 

I look forward to hearing from each of you in the most candid 

manner possible. We are emphasizing candor, not that we would 

expect anything else, but I want to make sure that it is clear that 

we are really pushing hard because this is your chance to inform 

this subcommittee on the issues we must be concerned with to help 

fix a broken relationship between the NNSA and its laboratories as 

we begin to draft our annual authorization bill for DOD and DOE. 

3 

I also have the white paper endorsed by the three laboratory directors, and I would like to ask unanimous consent that it be entered into the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

4 


418str1.eps

III. Lawrence Livennore ~ National Laboratory 

SaOOia tit National 

Laboratories 

The Model for the National Nuclear Security Administration and its 

Laboratories: Recommendations for Moving Forward 

The Mission 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Laboratories have a core mission of 

nuclear weapons. This unique, demanding, and solemn mission is central to US national security 

and comes with an obligation that the laboratories have science and engineering capabilities that 

are second-to-none. Because of the distinctive capabilities developed and sustained at the 

laboratories for nuclear weapons, other elements ofNNSA, DOE, and other federal agencies 

depend on the labs to perform work for a wide spectrum of critical national security 

missions. This work outside the nuclear weapons program (referred to as interagency work in 

the remainder of this document) has been accomplished by the labs since the 1960s and has 

expanded in scope as national security threats increased in complexity and urgency. Today the 

integrated skills and knowledge this interagency work generates and the technical challenge it 

creates for the laboratories' staffhas become an essential element in sustaining the core nuclear 

weapons mission, and the present and future technical vitality of the labs. It is no longer 

imaginable that the laboratories could deliver consistently on the commitments to the nuclear 

weapons program without the synergistic interagency work that attracts top talent, hones our 

skills, and provides stability through the nuclear weapons program cycles. Government 

commitment for the broad national security work of the laboratories is essential for the US to 

ensure the preeminence of Our nuclear weapons and to enable multidisciplinary technical 

solutions to other complex and high-risk national security challenges. 

Today the interagency work conducted at the NNSA produces critical national security solutions 

and strengthens the core nuclear weapons program. However, the interagency work is not 

codified in statutory language of the labs' missions, and the processes to manage the broader 

national security missions into the future are not optimized. To advance this broad national 

security model it is critical that discussions on strategic support of enabling research, 

development, test and evaluation occur between the Laboratories, NNSA, and other federal 

agencies. A new comprehensive set of reduced requirements is also needed, tailored specifically 

to address how federal agencies access the capabilities ofNNSA's laboratories for national 

security related work. 

Recommendation #1: Include statutory language codifying the broad national security mission of 

the NNSA laboratories in legislation. In addition, establish a streamlined statutory and 

regulatory framework for the NNSA laboratories to accept and perform national security work 

for other US federal agencies. NNSA oversight of other agency work should focus on the 

portfolio of work rather than individual projects. 

The Federally Funded Research and Development Center Construct 

The construct of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) has been robust 

for 70 years. Today, the core tenets ofFFRDCs (from FAR Title 48CRF35.017) remain relevant 

to the NNSA Labs: 

Page I oi5 
5 


418str2.eps

The Model for the National Nuclear Security Adminislnlt'Qn 

and its Laboratories: Recommendations for Moving Forword 

• An FFRDC meets a special long-tenn research or development need 

April 17, 2012 

An FFRDC is required to conduct its business in a manner befitting its special relationship 

with the Government, to operate in the pu~lic interest with objectivity and independence 

• The long-tenn relationships between the Govermnent and FFRDCs should provide the 

continuity that helps attract high-quality personnel to the FFRDC. This relationship should 

also be of a type to encourage the FFRDC to maintain currency in its field(s) of expertise, 

retain objectivity and independence, preserve familiarity with the needs of its sponsor(s), and 

provide a quick response capability. 

While it remains clear the FFRDC construct is appropriate for the national security challenges the 

NNSA laboratories support, practical application of some of the intent of the construct has 

atrophied. Returning to the founding principles ofFFRDCs across the national security enterprise 

will help create a more efficient and impactful future for the ultimate benefit of the US 

public. Specifically, the Government should use the laboratories as mission partners, free from 

conflict of interest, to help defme strategic direction and provide innovative approaches. A 

strategic dialog between executive leaders of the NNSA FFRDCs and Government sponsors 

needs to be restored. Part of the dialog should include the laboratories' Directors' assessment of 

the health of the laboratories. 

Recommendation #2: Support a return to a strong partnership between the Government and the 

NNSA FFRDCs exemplified by active engagement of the Natronallaboratories • leaders in 

collaborative strategic discussion with the Government spansors regarding currency of expertise, 

health of the laboratories, and missiOn priorities. Restore the role of the laboratories /0 

contribute meaningfully to annual and long-term budget and program planning. 

Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated Model 

The Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) model remains well suited for the 

unique, core mission of the NNSA laboratories for nuclear weapons and the highly specialized 

facilities and associated liabilities needed to conduct that mission. The GOCO model allows the 

Government to make the substantial investments needed for the unique mission, and the private 

sector to provide best practices. In addition, the reachback of FFRDCs to their respective parent 

companies andlor universities provide important ties to the larger science and engineering 

communities. 

However, the Management and Operating (M&O) contracts have become very complex and 

overly prescriptive. The amount and level of detail in the contracts, supporting measurement 

vehicles (Perfonnance Evaluation Plans - PEPs), and resultant oversight exercised by NNSA and 

DOE headquarters and site offices, as well as third part¥ groups, are redundant and costly. The 

burden the NNSA oversight model imposes appears to be significantly higher than the models 

used by FFRDCs operated by other federal agencies such as the DoD and NASA. Many 

independent studies have come to this conclusion and recommended modifications, yet changes 

in the NNSA oversight model and M&O contracts have not occurred, and in fact the oversight 

has continually increased. 

The lack of progress in achieving cost-effective oversight is hampered by (1) the complexity 

associated with accurately assessing the costs of oversight versus risks, and (2) the general lack of 

trust between the DOEINNSA and the labs. Within the DOElNNSA, there are overhead costs 

Page 2 ofS 
6 


418str3.eps

The Model for the Naticnal Nuclear Scwrlty Administration 

and its Laboratories: Recommendations for Moving Forward April 17, 2012 

well beyond the number of people who have direct oversight responsibilities, many resulting from 

lack of clarity and dUplication of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities among 

DOE, NNSA, NNSA site offices, and the FFRDCs. 

It is critical to improve the current oversight practices now, and to begin to envision oversight 

practices for the future that include risk and performance evaluation sharing with other 

Government agencies. 

RecommendoJion #3: ImplemenJ improved contracting and oversight models based on best 

practices from other FFIWCs and FFRDC-like instituJions (e.g. DOE Office of Science, DoD, 

NASA) that would drive a cultural change in the way NNSA manages the labs - moving toward 

an efficient approach consistent with the original FFRDC intent. Provide greaJer flexibility to 

the laboratories to execute mission, sustain capability, and manage risk within an approved 

operating envelope, with roles, responsibilities. authorities, and accOWItability defined oJ a 

higher-level and with greater autonomy. Implement a risk management framework model to 

balance responsibilities between laboratories and NNSA to improve trust and increase 

effectiveness. 

Recommendation #4: Limit the fonding the NNSA uses for oversight to a percentage of the total 

agency budget consistent with best praClices from other FFRDCs or the private sector. Reinvest 

resulting cost savings in the laboroJories' infrastructure to ensure the unique facilities required 

for the broad noJional security missions are supported. Eliminate duplicative assessments and 

oversight, with a preference for inJernal and third party assessments inJegroJed into the 

cantractor peiformance management system. 

Managing the Health of Seience and Engineering 

The decreased flexibility within mission-driven programs and increased oversight on LaboratoryDirected R&D (LDRD) funds has led to a strain on the ability to sustain long-term excellence of 

science and engineering. Increasingly, mission work has become more milestone-driven, with 

short-tenn drivers that do not allow for supporting long-term capability needed to respond to 

future, and unanticipated, national soourity needs. No other institutions maintain this reservoir of 

talent for the nation, available as needed when urgent national needs arise. The recently 

completed National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study has a section devoted to recommendations 

to restore the flexibility of Lab Directors to manage capability with a multi-year horizon. 

RecommendoJion #5: Incentivize a longer-term perspective in managing the health of the 

laboratories by increasingjlexibility for laboratories to invest in core science and engineering 

capabilities. Rebalance fee incentives to value mission execution and strategic managemenJ of 

capability relative to compliance and operational oversight. Emphasize the importance of LDRD 

as an investment that benefits all current andfoture programs. Provide for approval of LDRD as 

a portfolio rather than project-hy-project, designate a single approval office. and focus oversight 

on high-risk projects. Restore programmatic investments in supporting science needed for longterm mission delivery and unanticipated noJionai security challenges. 

Page 3 of5 
7 


418str4.eps

The Modo! for tbe National Nud_ Security Administration 

and its LaOOtatoties: Recommendations fur Moving Forward 

NNSA Laboratories' Governance 

Apri!17.2012 

Many reports by independent committees have found the micromanagement of the NNSA labs is 

debilitating and costly, and other reports have called for increased oversight. While these finding 

appear to be in opposition, one conclusion is clear -the governance of the NNSA labs is broken 

and must be changed. 

From the laboratories' perspective, the NNSA involvement with the details of how the mission is 

accomplished is excessive and expensive, is not risk-based, and does not represent best 

practices. The governance is in urgent need of transformation. 

The 2002 "Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA" contains a 

strong set of organizational principles that, if followed, would move the institution to a more 

streamlined operational model. Since the current structure has now been in place for about twelve 

years and the original organizational principles not adhered to, the only practical way of 

achieving the kind of change needed is to institute a structural change, even though structure 

alone wm not ensure better governance. 

Options for structural changes have been reviewed by many and are nicely summarized in 

"America's Strategic Posture - The Final Report of the COngressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States" published in 2009. The options for a new structure range 

from strengthen NNSA autonomy within DOE to move all or some of the NNSA enterprise to 

000 to more complete independence ofNNSA with more attention from the President. In that 

report the Commission recommends creating NNSA as an independent agency reporting to the 

President through the Secretary of Energy. The Commission also states the preferred state is 

NNSA as an independent agency reporting to the President with a "Board of Directors" composed 

of the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, Homeland Security, and the Director of National 

Intelligence. 

We believe the time to act on a change in governance is now, although the desired end-state may 

take time to achieve. If governance changes are reinforced by structural changes, the changes are 

more likely to be effective over the long-range. Any changes should decrease costs and also 

result in increased effectiveness of Government and laboratories' management systems. 

Recommendation #6: Congress and the Administration should take immediate action to improve 

governance of the NNSA laboratories. 

Page 4 00 
8 


418str5.eps

The Model for the National Nuclear Security Administration 

atJd its Labonuories: Recommendations for Moving Forward 

Dr. Penrose C. Albright 

Director, Lawrence Livermore National Lab 

Dr. Paul J. Hommert 

Director, Sandia National Laboratories 

Page 5 of5 

April I?, 2012 
9 

Senator NELSON. When Senator Inhofe gets here—my good friend 

and colleague—we will ask him for any opening remarks that he 

may make. 

Now it is an opportunity, if we might just start with Dr. Patel 

and go down the line. I am going to emphasize brevity but, on the 

other hand, not at the risk of candor. Dr. Patel? 

STATEMENT OF DR. C. KUMAR N. PATEL, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PRANALYTICA, INC.; CO–CHAIR, 

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF 

THE QUALITY OF THE MANAGEMENT AND OF THE SCIENCE 

AND ENGINEERING RESEARCH AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY’S NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES–PHASE 1 

Dr. PATEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you so well pointed out 

the importance of the three national laboratories, this study dealt 

with the present state looking at the management of science and 

engineering and how it affects the long-term sustainability of these 

activities while these activities, science and engineering, are very 

important for maintaining the nuclear stockpile safety, security, 

and its reliance. 

Overall, we find that the status of management of science and 

engineering at the laboratories is in good shape, in good hands. 

However, there are a number of issues that need immediate attention, and these include, first of all, blurring of the responsibilities 

between NNSA and the laboratory managers, undue emphasis on 

formalities, and management by transaction rather than by oversight. The issue of management and oversight is not the same. 

Management at the microscopic level slows down individual’s capability to be creative. It slows down the amount of work that gets 

done and overall it turns out to be less cost-effective than what it 

should be. 

Yes, there were some problems earlier with respect to safety and 

security, but those are well under control. Now the time has come 

to carry out the management and oversight not by transaction but 

by having the proper systems in place because that, as we see from 

industrial experience, turns out to be the most cost-effective way of 

spending funds which are allocated, in this case public monies. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to open the 

hearing. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Shank and Dr. Patel follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CHARLES V. SHANK AND DR. C. KUMAR N. 

PATEL

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee: 

My name is C. Kumar N. Patel. I am the President and Chief Executive Officer 

(CEO) of Pranalytica, a company located in Santa Monica, CA. Concurrently, I am 

also a Professor of Physics and Astronomy at UCLA. I had the privilege of cochairing with Dr. Shank the Committee on Review of the Quality of the Management and of the Science and Engineering Research at the Department of Energy’s 

(DOE) National Security Laboratories at the National Research Council. Dr. Shank 

and I will provide the highlights of the committee’s findings and are available to 

respond to your questions. 

The National Research Council is the operating arm of the National Academy of 

Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the 

10 

National Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on 

matters of science and technology. 

STUDY TASK

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 identified concerns 

regarding the quality and management of Science and Engineering at the three National Security Labs and in turn mandated that NNSA task the National Research 

Council (NRC) to study the quality and management of Science and Engineering 

(S&E) at these Laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence 

Livermore Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The study 

is being conducted in two phases. Phase one, which is completed, concerns management of S&E. The second phase will look in detail at selected S&E subject areas. 

Health and vitality of science and engineering is critical for the long term viability 

of the National Security Laboratories and their ability to support the national defense and security needs, especially as they concern our nuclear weapons. The primary mission of these laboratories, assuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear 

stockpile, requires that the science and engineering that forms the underpinning of 

the needed technical capability, remain at the forefront by having the best possible 

scientists and engineers and by having the best management practices that maximizes the productivity of the available resources. 

Our report today addresses the management of the three NNSA laboratories with 

specific emphasis on how management affects the quality of the science and engineering needed to fulfill the charter of these laboratories. ‘‘Quality of S&E’’ for the 

purposes of the report measures the expertise and accomplishments in those areas 

of science and engineering that are necessary to accomplish the laboratories’ missions. ‘‘Quality of the management of S&E’’ measures management’s capability to 

build, maintain and nurture S&E personnel and expertise for current and future 

mission needs. Management includes government (primarily NNSA and its three 

site offices), operations (M&O) contractors, and onsite laboratory management. 

Our overall conclusion is that the laboratory management is aware of the importance of S&E for accomplishing their primary mission and that the management is 

committed to assuring the long term health and vitality of S&E. However, we have 

discerned a number of issues that need early, if not immediate, attention to meet 

the long-term goals of excellence of S&E. These include the blurring of the responsibilities of NNSA and the laboratory managers, undue emphasis on formalities of 

management, often as a result of congressional reporting requirements, an apparent 

loss of trust between NNSA and the Laboratories and last but not the least enormous pressure on the financial resources available for carrying out the S&E mission. We recognize that some of the onerous reporting requirements arose from serious lapses of safety and security matters. But we have also concluded that most if 

not all of the safety and security issues are under control and that it is appropriate 

now to transfer the responsibility for these activities to the local management. We 

have provided a number of recommendations, which if implemented would help the 

laboratory management in carrying out their task in a cost effective manner. 

CONDUCT OF THE STUDY

To conduct the first phase, the NRC formed a study committee whose membership 

was carefully chosen to provide broad and deep applicable expertise and experience 

in the management of science and engineering at major research and development 

laboratories. The committee members include former directors of major government 

and industry laboratories, current and former laboratory executives, and others with 

relevant experience and expertise. The primary mode of gathering information was 

through presentations and testimony from, and discussions with, a substantial number of experts. These included current and former managers and technical staff associated with the NNSA, the DOE, and the laboratories, and the site offices. The 

study committee’s meetings included visits to each of the three laboratories for extensive discussions with laboratory staff, as well as open public comment sessions 

at which current and former laboratory employees, union representatives, and others were given the opportunity to share their views and experiences. The committee 

also examined the most recent available management and operations (M&O) contracts, performance evaluation plans (PEP), performance evaluation reports (PER), 

contract management plans, parent organization oversight plans, and other similar 

documents for each of the three laboratories. 

The issue of management of these three laboratories is complex, and has a long 

history. Within the mandated terms of reference of the study, the committee concluded that the basic questions before it are: (1) how well does the current management system support the conduct of quality science and engineering now and into 

11 

the future? (2) are there significant management problems that need to be solved? 

(3) to what extent are these problems the result of the change in contractors at 

LANL and LLNL? (4) what are the most important problems, and what does the 

committee recommend to resolve those problems? The committee set as its goal the 

production of a short report that focuses on what it found to be most important. Accordingly, our report addresses four topics: the contracts; research base and the evolution of the mission; the broken relationship; and management of S&E at the laboratories. We will speak to these, and then conclude with our observations concerning the future. 

STUDY FINDINGS

Contracts 

The contracting relationships between the DOE and its laboratories have in some 

cases endured for many decades. In 2004, Congress mandated that the longstanding 

contracts with the University of California to manage Lawrence Livermore and Los 

Alamos national laboratories (LLNL and LANL) be re-competed. As a result, these 

two contracts were awarded to two independent limited liability corporations (LLCs) 

that both include Bechtel Corporation and the University of California in their parent organizations. Subsequently, Congress developed concerns about the quality of 

science and engineering at the Laboratories, including whether changes in contracts 

and contractors may have had a deleterious effect on the quality of science and engineering. 

The study committee heard testimony that LLNL and LANL were having morale 

crises as a consequence of the change of management from a public entity to a forprofit contractor. A number of current and former employees of these laboratories 

expressed concerns about deterioration of morale at the laboratories along with ongoing or potential declines in the quality of science and engineering. Many attributed those inferred trends to the new M&O contracts and contractors. While it is 

true that all three labs have been under cost and funding pressure, we did not find 

a morale crisis related to actions of the new contractors. The costs of the recompeted 

contracts are significantly greater than the previous contracting arrangements; this 

is due primarily to the changes in contractor fees, state taxes, and pensions. Some 

have been concerned that contractors pursuing fee might not act in the public interest. The laboratory directors stated that while fee is important, their primary objective remains to manage the laboratories in the public interest. This concern is an 

important one and constant vigilance will be required. 

Evolution of the Mission 

An evolution of the laboratory missions to ‘‘National Security Laboratories’’ is well 

underway. Deputy NNSA Administrator Don Cook presented to the Committee a vision for the laboratories, including a governance charter among four agencies (the 

Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Defense, plus the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) to take advantage of the S&E capabilities of these 

three laboratories. In a time of constrained budgets, broadening the mandate to a 

national security mission helps preserve S&E expertise by working on problems 

posed by partner agencies. Access to this problem set helps the NNSA laboratories 

to recruit and retain S&E capabilities beyond what could be achieved solely with 

available funds in the stockpile stewardship program. While such work for others 

is very important for the future of S&E at the laboratories, all three of the laboratory directors were very clear that maintenance of the stockpile remains the core 

mission of the labs. 

The committee recommends that Congress recognize that maintenance of the 

stockpile remains the core mission of the labs and that other national security mission work contributes to the accomplishment of that mission and in that context 

Congress should consider endorsing and supporting in some way the evolution of the 

NNSA laboratories to National Security Laboratories as described in the July 2010 

four-agency Governance Charter for an Interagency Council on the Strategic Capability of DOE National Laboratories. 

A crucial part of the laboratories’ ability to conduct their missions is derived from 

Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD), the primary source for internally directed R&D funding. Among its other benefits, LDRD provides a major 

resource for attracting, supporting and training staff at each laboratory. 

The committee recommends that Congress and NNSA maintain strong support of 

the LDRD program as it is an essential component of enabling the long-term viability of the laboratories. 

Historically, the laboratories had another source of discretionary research spending. 

12 

The weapons program (at each laboratory) had the flexibility to use part of its 

budget to fund a robust research program, in support of the core weapons mission. 

Currently, the weapons program budget is subdivided into so many categories with 

so many restrictions that this important flexibility is effectively lost. This loss in 

funding flexibility has significantly reduced the amount of core program research 

being performed at the laboratories. This lessens the appeal of the laboratories 

when recruiting. 

The committee recommends that Congress reduce the number of restrictive budget reporting categories in the Nuclear Weapons Program and permit the use of such 

funds to support a robust core weapons research program and further develop necessary S&E capability. 

Relationship Between the Labs and NNSA Oversight 

We observe that the relationship between NNSA and its National Security Laboratories is broken. This very seriously degrades the ability to manage for quality 

S&E. Both NNSA and the laboratories recognize the importance of quality S&E, and 

each believes it is working to achieve that goal, but their dysfunctional relationship 

seriously threatens that common goal. This is not a new observation, as it has been 

discussed in previous reports. There has been a breakdown of trust and an erosion 

of the partnering between the laboratories and NNSA to solve complex S&E problems. 

The basic substantive relationship between NNSA and the laboratories is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) partnership. The management relationship is a Government Owned, Contractor Operated relationship. The 

FFRDC relationship is based on a partnership between the government and the laboratory in which the government decides what problems need to be addressed, and 

the contractor determines how best to address those problems. There is a perception 

among staff at the three laboratories that NNSA has moved from partnering with 

the laboratories to solve scientific and engineering problems to assigning tasks and 

specific S&E solutions with detailed implementation instructions. This approach 

precludes taking full advantage of the intellectual and management skills that taxpayer dollars have purchased. Similar issues are found in transactional oversight 

of safety, business, security, and operations. Science and engineering quality is at 

risk when laboratory scientists and engineers are not encouraged to bring forth 

their creative ideas in partnership with NNSA to solve problems vital to our national security. 

There is conflict and confusion over management roles and responsibilities of organizations and individuals. For example, the committee heard reports of mid-level 

issues being elevated to the laboratory director level because there was no clarity 

about how to resolve disputes between a laboratory and an NNSA Site Office. These 

factors do not encourage the stable management that is necessary to ensure success 

of long-term investment and planning. Another example was a recent instance in 

which NNSA HQ tried to overrule a Laboratory’s best scientific judgment about how 

to carry out a scientific task. Subsequently, language appeared in a congressional 

report opposing that NNSA instruction. A better mechanism should be established 

for resolving technical disputes, and they should definitely not be elevated to top 

NNSA management and congressional levels. A technical advisory committee, established at the NNSA level, would be a helpful mechanism for filling this gap in S&E 

management. More generally, such an advisory committee could monitor progress 

on other aspects of roles and responsibilities. 

This erosion of the trust relationship is especially prominent with respect to Los 

Alamos, where past failures in safety, security, and business practices attracted 

much national attention and public criticism. But it has also spilled over to Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories. The loss of trust in the ability 

of the laboratories to maintain operational goals such as safety, security, environmental responsibility and fiscal integrity has produced detailed scrutiny by NNSA 

HQ and site offices and increased aversion to risk. A major byproduct of this has 

been to create a bias against experimental work. The bias is problematic because 

experimental science is at the very heart of the scientific method. 

The committee recommends that NNSA and each of the Laboratories commit to 

the goal of rebalancing the zmanagerial and governance relationship to build in a 

higher level of trust in program execution and laboratory operations in general. 

The committee recommends that NNSA and the Laboratories agree on a set of 

principles that clearly lay out the boundaries and roles of each management structure, and also that program managers at headquarters, the Site Offices, and in the 

laboratories be directed to abide by these principles. 

For example, the committee suggests that, among other measures, the Site Manager and the Director and/or Deputy Director of each laboratory apply a team-based 

13 

process to identify and agree on eliminating certain oversight procedures that are 

simply not necessary or related to the overall goals of the Laboratory. Similarly, 

some mechanism should be established to filter program tasks at both the headquarters level and at the laboratory senior management level to assure that each 

tasking is necessary and consistent with the agreed management principles. 

The committee recommends that the goal of rebalancing the relationship and the 

set of principles laying out the boundaries and roles of each management structure 

be memorialized in memoranda of understanding between NNSA and its Laboratories. Performance against these understandings should be assessed on an annual 

basis over a 5-year period and reported to Congress. 

THE FUTURE

A key to ongoing laboratory success has been a strong focus on the long-term and 

on maintaining deep technical capability. Looking forward, the new management 

structure of the Laboratories, which relies on the introduction of industrial and 

other private sector partners, must assure that this long-term focus is maintained 

in words and in deeds. 

A great deal of work that has been accomplished over the years in safety and security has required extensive effort by the NNSA and the laboratories. We believe 

these efforts have been strengthened to the point where they no longer need the current level special attention to assure high quality results in laboratory operations. 

The committee recommends that NNSA, Congress, and top management of the 

laboratories recognize that the safety and security systems at the Laboratories have 

been strengthened to the point where they no longer need special attention. NNSA 

and Laboratory management should explore ways by which the administrative, safety, and security costs can be reduced over time consistent with maintaining high 

quality efforts in these areas, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential S&E activities. 

The committee recognizes that this cannot happen unless the broken relationship 

is fixed, but the committee also recognizes that these operational problems contributed to the broken relationship. 

Senator NELSON. My colleague and friend has arrived. In case 

you have any opening remarks, Senator Inhofe, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

I am anxious to pursue this with this panel that we have, and 

I think we have the right people that are here right now. The 

Perry/Schlesinger Commission stated it was alarmed by the disrepair and neglect of our nuclear weapons stockpile and our complex. Vice President Biden has said maintaining our nuclear stockpile and modernization is essential. President Obama had said 

back in December 2010, I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment in the long term. He goes on, making the commitment to do what is necessary. 

However, at the same time, we hear from Dr. Michael Anastasio 

of Los Alamos National Lab. He said, I am very concerned about 

that budget profile. That profile delays many of the issues that are 

a concern to us today especially in the science and engineering 

area. Much of the planned funding increases for weapons and activities do not come to fruition until the second half of a 10-year 

period. Now, we are seeing a lot of that nowadays. They say, yes, 

we are going to do it and the amount is going to be same. However, 

it is not going to happen for 5 more years. I think we can read in 

there what we want to. 

Secretary Gates talked about it. He said, no way can we maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our 

stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program. I think we all understand. One or 

the other is necessary. After the New START program, we were 

14 

promised by the administration to have robust resources backing 

behind it, and yet that has not happened. 

So, I think in the full committee, we heard testimony from General Kehler, the Commander of STRATCOM, who informed us of 

his concern with the budget and its failure to demonstrate a viable, 

long-term modernization strategy. Our witnesses today provide yet 

another opportunity to assess the adequacy of the request. I look 

forward to hearing from them, our national nuclear weapons labs, 

to better understand the impact of the NNSA’s budget, what it will 

have on their ability to certify our existing stockpile. 

So I say this and I am anxious to hear the truth from you. Can 

we really do all these reductions? Can we not keep the commitment 

that we made at one time and carry out what you have an obligation, in terms of certification? 

So those are my concerns. Have we had one witness’ testimony 

so far? 

Senator NELSON. Yes, Dr. Patel. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, continue and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. We stress how we 

have a working relationship, and I look forward to the questions 

here shortly. 

Dr. Shank? 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES V. SHANK, SENIOR FELLOW, 

HOWARD HUGHES MEDICAL INSTITUTE; CO–CHAIR, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF 

THE QUALITY OF THE MANAGEMENT AND OF THE SCIENCE 

AND ENGINEERING RESEARCH AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY’S NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES–PHASE 1 

Dr. SHANK. Thank you for the opportunity to describe the results 

of our report on science and engineering management at the three 

national security laboratories. 

I wanted to emphasize in my remarks some of the recommendations that we made as a result of our deliberations of our committee. We visited all three laboratories. We heard from management and staff at all levels. 

First is the evolution of the mission. We heard a compelling discussion from the Deputy NNSA Administrator Don Cook talking 

about a new governance charter among four agencies, the DOE, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), that would allow the 

laboratories to make a transition from weapons laboratories, to 

more broadly national security laboratories and that these laboratories would use their capabilities to tackle problems of importance 

to all four agencies. We think that in a time of constrained budgets 

and the complexity of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), 

the opportunity to maintain capabilities by working on problems 

for other agencies is a win-win and it is something that we hope 

that this expertise can be taken advantage and it is something that 

is encouraged by Congress. 

Second, I want to spend some time discussing the relationship 

between the laboratories and oversight. We think that oversight is 

an extremely important responsibility of the NNSA. However, we 

observed that the relationship between the NNSA and the national 

15 

security labs appears be broken. We think that this seriously degrades the ability to manage quality science and engineering, and 

we recognize having that high quality in science and engineering 

is very important to achieve the mission ends, but a dysfunctional 

relationship seriously threatens that goal. 

This is not a new observation. It has been discussed in previous 

reports. We see what appears to be a breakdown of trust, an erosion of partnering between the labs and the NNSA to solve complex 

problems. As you are well aware, the basic elements of this relationship between NNSA and its laboratories are a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) relationship. We 

have seen an evolution of NNSA moving from partnering with the 

laboratories to solve scientific and engineering problems to assigning tasks with specific solutions and implementation instructions. 

This approach precludes taking full advantage of the intellectual 

and management skills that have been purchased to manage these 

laboratories under contract. In addition, we see issues in transactional oversight of safety, business, security, and operations. 

We think that there is a conflict and confusion over management 

roles and responsibility. We think this sometimes leads to scientific 

disputes. We have seen an example, a recent instance, in which 

NNSA headquarters tried to overrule a laboratory’s best scientific 

judgment on how to carry out a task and subsequently language 

appeared in a congressional report opposing the NNSA instruction. 

We think a better mechanism needs to be made to resolve scientific 

and technical issues. We are recommending that a technical advisory committee be established at the NNSA level. That would be 

a helpful mechanism in being able to resolve disputes and look at 

more broadly how the operations of the laboratories can be most effectively accomplished. 

The erosion of trust is especially prominent with respect to Los 

Alamos, where past affairs and safety and security and business 

practices have attracted much national attention. But it has also 

spilled over to the other laboratories as well. This loss of trust and 

emphasis on transactional management has created an environment in which there has been a bias against experimental work. 

We think that this is a very important issue and one that needs 

to be dealt with. 

We have heard from NNSA and all parties that Los Alamos has 

greatly improved its performance, and we think that it is time to 

recognize that this has occurred and that the laboratories have 

strengthened to the point where they no longer need clear, special 

attention. We are hoping that the relationship between DOE and 

the NNSA can be rationalized and renormalized in a way that will 

make the laboratories both effective and successful in their future 

missions. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much. 

Dr. McMillan. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES F. MCMILLAN, DIRECTOR, LOS 

ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Thank you, Chairman Nelson. Ranking Member 

Inhofe, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to speak here 

today. 

16 

I am Charlie McMillan. I am the Director at Los Alamos. I bring 

to this discussion 29 years of experience in the weapons program. 

Nearly 2 decades of that was with my colleagues at Livermore. The 

last 6 years have been at Los Alamos, and for about the last year 

I have been the Director. 

I am proud of the incredible staff at Los Alamos, especially during today’s budget challenges and the recent workforce actions I 

have had to take at the laboratory. Their service to the Nation has 

been unwavering as it has been for the last 70 years. 

Mr. Chairman, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), coupled 

with the 1251 report, set a course for the deterrent that in my view 

was credible and consistent. Now, because of budget pressure, I am 

concerned that we do not yet have a path forward for meeting all 

of our commitments. We continue to work closely with our colleagues at both DOE and DOD to find the best path forward. 

NNSA governance will inevitably play a key role as we address 

mission and budget challenges. 

The recent National Academy of Sciences report described the 

NNSA laboratory relationship as broken. Those were the words you 

used. It described a lack of trust, burdensome oversight, and structural flaws. 

The weapons laboratories have served as trusted technical advisors to the government. Today, we are often managed as traditional 

contractors rather than as partners who can provide expertise to 

solve technical issues. Trust has been replaced by reliance on operational formality. As the Academy said, this approach is a mismatch. It stifles the innovation we must have to address challenging issues in our nuclear deterrent. It is the ability to innovate 

that drives the staff, that I have responsibility for at Los Alamos, 

to produce at the highest levels for our Nation. I believe that a governance model must include the ability to work within a risk 

framework to accomplish goals and priorities set by Congress and 

the administration. 

Mr. Chairman, there are other issues in the nuclear enterprise. 

I am concerned that we are shifting the balance of priorities too far 

toward the near-term at the expense of longer-term science needed 

to address future problems that will affect the stockpile. Deferring 

the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR–NF) leaves the country with no 

known capability to meet the current expectation. Those expectations are something like 50 to 80 pits per year. Furthermore, because of limited and aging infrastructure, it will take significant investments to produce even 20 or 30 pits per year. 

With appropriate infrastructure investments, we can sustain a 

limited pit manufacturing capability. However, we will need to augment new pit production with a pit reuse strategy that is still in 

development. We have available legacy pits that are candidates for 

reuse. I am cautiously optimistic that we can reuse some of these 

pits, but we must do the scientific work to further understand the 

effects of aging and to provide modern safety, safety that starts 

within sensitive high explosive systems. If we choose this path, it 

will require an investment over the next 5 to 10 years. 

Let me offer an analogy for you. It is a little bit like taking an 

engine out of a 1965 Ford Mustang and putting it into a 2012 MusVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Nov 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76896.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
17 

tang and continuing to meet 2012 emission standards. You can 

probably do it but not without a lot of work. 

Mr. Chairman, we succeed today because of the investments our 

Nation has made over the last 20 years, investments that have produced capabilities and insights that are already addressing today’s 

challenges. Two examples would be the Dual-Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test Facility, as well as our modern high-performance computing capabilities. We must prepare today for the challenges we will inevitably face in the future. 

In closing, I am increasingly concerned. Today, I cannot say with 

confidence that we are on a path to a healthy program. The laboratories that we serve are among the greatest, supporting the deterrence with knowledge second to none. The country needs to decide 

whether it is willing to maintain this level into the future. If so, 

balanced investments must be made in life extension today, as well 

as in our abilities to solve the problems that we will inevitably face 

in the future. If not, we risk both the future of the deterrent and 

the ability of the laboratory to solve issues as they arise. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. McMillan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CHARLES F. MCMILLAN

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

I am Dr. Charles McMillan, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 

My 29-year commitment to America’s nuclear weapons program encompasses over 

two decades of service at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and 6 

years at Los Alamos. Following the moratorium on nuclear testing, I participated 

in the discussions that helped establish Stockpile Stewardship. 

Since I assumed leadership at Los Alamos almost a year ago, it has become clear 

that our Nation faces a difficult budget situation, and hard choices must be made. 

I am proud of the way that the men and women of Los Alamos have played their 

role in helping to meet these challenges with professionalism and innovation. 

Through difficult times, they are maintaining a focus that is delivering on the Laboratory’s mission. I look forward to working with you as we continue delivering national security science in both the present and the future by making challenging investment decisions—while keeping faith with a workforce that has demonstrated career-long dedication to the service of our Nation. 

I continue to believe that the direction laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR) and the 1251 Report provides an appropriate and technically sound course. 

These documents outline a consistent plan that, if implemented, would do the work 

necessary to support the Nation’s stockpile through modernization of our nuclear infrastructure and a warhead life extension program (LEP). 

Now, because of changes in budget and policy priorities, I am concerned that we 

do not yet have a clear path forward for meeting all of our commitments to the 

stockpile. 

The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) governance will play a key role in 

determining both our efficiency and effectiveness as we address looming mission and 

budget challenges. In my view, a strong partnership between NNSA and the laboratories, building on the full opportunities afforded by our status as Federally Funded 

Research and Development Centers (FFRDC), can serve to reestablish the trust that 

has been a source of solutions in previous challenges. 

GOVERNANCE

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on oversight of the NNSA labs 

is the latest in a series of reports that has highlighted governance issues for the 

laboratories: governance that is characterized by a lack of trust, burdensome oversight, and structural flaws. The issues they identified in their report ring true in 

my experience at the Laboratory. 

‘‘An erosion of trust on both sides of the relationship shapes the oversight 

and operation of the laboratories. This in turn has resulted in an excessive 

18 

reliance on operational formality in important aspects of Laboratory operations, including the conduct of science and engineering . . . ’’ (NAS report, 

page 23, emphasis added) 

In my view, we have become so focused on operational formality that we risk losing sight of the reasons why the government-owned, contractor-operated business 

arrangements were created in the first place. Our common objective is to safely 

maintain the stockpile using best business practices; operational formality is a 

means to that end. As the NAS report states, this formality can be a mismatch 

when applied to creative activities such as science and engineering (report, page 24). 

I agree with the report’s statements on oversight: 

‘‘ . . . the NNSA, Congress, and top management of the Laboratories recognize that safety and security systems at the Laboratories have been 

strengthened to the point where they no longer need special attention. 

NNSA and Laboratory management should explore ways by which the administrative, safety, and security costs can be reduced, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential S&E activities.’’ (NAS recommendation 5–1, page 31, emphasis added) 

While NNSA had an auspicious beginning, the promise of semi-autonomy has not 

yet been fulfilled. Duplication and overlap remain between the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA regulations and guidance. As an example, the DOE Office 

of Health, Safety, and Security still plays a significant role in NNSA—despite NNSA 

having its own regulations and guidance. 

Structural issues continue to be a challenge for NNSA: 

‘‘The 2001 Foster Panel report reiterated the points it made in its previous report, emphasizing that the Secretary of Energy must remove the 

unnecessary duplication of staff in such areas as security, environmental 

oversight, safety, and resource management.’’ (NAS report, page 51) 

The weapons laboratories are FFRDCs that serve as trusted, independent advisers to the government on complex technical issues—foremost among these being nuclear weapons. For much of the last decade, I have seen a trend within NNSA toward treating the laboratories more like traditional contractors rather than fully 

employing the capabilities they offer the government through the special FFRDC relationship (FAR 35.017). 

A maturing model between the labs and NNSA would include the ability to work 

within a framework to accomplish goals established by policies set by Congress and 

the administration. Changing the type of oversight from transactional to strategic 

can lead to a smaller bureaucracy, and thus reduce the size of the infrastructure 

needed to respond to that bureaucracy. 

In the last few months, the NNSA leadership has begun to reengage the lab directors in substantive dialogue on program priorities. This is a first step toward reestablishing the type of trust that was necessary to create the stewardship program. 

Many steps remain if we are to meet the challenge of the next decade: modernizing 

the stockpile at a pace that exceeds our past experience. 

There are examples of increasing burden and in other cases where there is a glimmer of hope. I mention two of the latter. 

• The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) has worked to balance the 

need for robust security with the reality of shrinking Federal security budgets. The DNS engages individual sites to understand programmatic needs 

and then develops a solid approach that allows work to be accomplished 

within a well-defined risk envelope. 

• In recent months, we have worked with our colleagues at the Los Alamos 

Site Office to develop a risk-based framework for evaluating computer system security and streamlining documentation required to operate these systems. This framework may reduce a bookshelf of documentation to a single 

binder. 

While these examples illustrate positive steps to reduce administrative costs, they 

remain the exception in a system that has become moribund over many years. Studies such as those cited above have examined structural options for NNSA; all have 

merit, none are perfect. Whichever path we adopt for the future governance of the 

laboratories, it is essential that all relevant branches of government are aligned to 

ensure its success. 

NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE

The existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility at Los Alamos is 

60 years old, sits on a seismic fault, and, as the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States said in 2009, ‘‘is already well past the end 

19 

of its planned life.’’ The facility is unable to meet the high-volume analysis needed 

to meet the Department of Defense (DOD) expectation of 50 to 80 newly manufactured pits per year. Three wings of CMR’s six have been closed because of their location over the fault and to reduce risk. At the direction of NNSA, we are preparing 

to retire the facility in 2019. 

The decision to defer construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR–NF) leaves the United States with no known capability to make 50 to 80 newly-produced pits on the timescales planned for stockpile modernization. This will affect our path forward on the W78 LEP. 

Let me be very clear: CMRR–NF is not a manufacturing facility for pits. It fulfills 

a critical mission in supporting the analytical chemistry and metallurgy needed to 

certify that the plutonium used in the stockpile meets basic material requirements. 

The ability at CMRR–NF to quickly analyze and characterize special nuclear materials—to know where they were made, their purity, and their chemical and mechanical properties—also underpins our work for the Nation in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and treaty verification missions. Pit production occurs and will continue 

in Building PF–4 at Los Alamos. CMRR–NF was designed to provide needed capacity for materials characterization, waste staging and shipment, non-destructive 

assay, and vault storage. In the absence of CMRR–NF, the limited floor space in 

PF–4 must be used to address these functions, albeit at reduced levels. 

At the direction of NNSA, we are in the process of completing a 60-day analysis 

of existing plutonium capabilities within the Radiation Laboratory Utility Office 

Building (RLUOB) at Los Alamos, Superblock at Livermore, and other sites. Because of our limited plutonium infrastructure, investments that are not in the current plan will be required to produce even 20 to 30 pits per year using all of these 

facilities. In this study, LANL is examining accelerating the removal of material 

from the vault in PF–4, expanding the capability of RLUOB, and constructing a system to transport materials between PF–4 and RLUOB. The not-yet-budgeted costs 

associated with these changes are expected to extend over 5 to 8 years. 

PIT REUSE

Pit reuse has been suggested as a way to bridge the shortfall in newly-produced 

pits caused by delaying CMRR–NF construction. The nation has pits that are not 

needed in current systems. These are candidates for use in a modernized stockpile. 

While I am cautiously optimistic that some of these pits can be reused, two important issues must be addressed before certification for stockpile use: 

• First, continued progress in understanding the effects of pit aging. • Second, the system modifications necessary to ensure that pits designed 

for use with conventional explosives can be reused in modern, insensitive 

high explosive systems. 

Both are challenging scientific problems. 

In 2006, the JASON issued a report on plutonium aging based on studies conducted by LANL and LLNL. In a letter responding to this report to then-chairman 

John Warner of the Senate Armed Services Committee, NNSA said that it ‘‘is imperative that we continue to assess plutonium aging through vigilant surveillance and 

scientific evaluation, since the plutonium-aging database only extends to approximately 48 years for naturally aged material and 60 years for the accelerated aged 

material. The primary performance database from underground testing is even more 

limited.’’ Unfortunately, since this letter was written, work in this area has been 

constrained by funding; much work remains to be done. 

The pits that are available for reuse were not designed to provide the safety of 

a modernized stockpile using insensitive high explosives. While we have concepts for 

using these pits in a modernized stockpile, the extensive work required to convert 

these concepts to systems that could be certified is yet to be done. 

Consider the following analogy: using old pits in a modernized stockpile would be 

like taking an engine from a 1965 Mustang and installing it in a 2012 model while 

continuing to meet 2012 emission requirements. It might be possible, but not without a lot of work, not to mention impacts to the other parts under the hood. Furthermore, certifying that it would work without ever driving the car would be challenging. 

LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

As our systems age, LEPs have become necessary to continue confidence in the 

safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. It is in LEPs that we see a return 

on investments made in long term science. 

I am pleased to report that Los Alamos Life Extension activities on the W76–1 

continue smoothly at the plants with Los Alamos providing technical support as 

20 

needed. We will continue our engagement to monitor product quality and ensure 

that design intent is maintained. 

As you are aware, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) authorized Phase 6.3 for 

the B61 LEP with a first production unit (FPU) in 2019. At Los Alamos, we are 

on a path to meet this deliverable because of investments that have been made over 

many years in the science and engineering campaigns. Tools such as the Dual Axis 

Radiographic Hydro-Test (DARHT) Facility, high performance computing and the 

Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program codes that we use to predict 

weapons performance are being applied today to the B61 LEP. We have used the 

investments in these campaigns to develop the technologies for gas transfer systems 

(GTS) so that we can quickly and cost-effectively implement specific designs for the 

B61. Given stable, predictable funding at levels consistent with the 6.2A study, I 

am confident that LANL will deliver on its responsibility for the B61. 

LONG-TERM SCIENCE

Science is the base that allows LANL to address challenging issues that face the 

stockpile. At LANL we have a scientific workforce that includes approximately 2,500 

PhDs. They form the core of our scientific base. The weapons program directly benefits when these scientists work on challenging technical problems using tools such 

as DARHT, the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), and the ASC Program. Our ability to do stockpile work today is the product of these investments. 

Our science and engineering campaigns produced mature technology that was ready 

when needed. Similar investments are needed today to ensure that the Laboratory 

has tools and technologies to be ready for tomorrow’s challenges. 

In addition to benefiting the Lab’s weapons program, we are able to leverage 

these capabilities for broader national interests. They, in turn, feed valuable technical insights directly back into the nuclear weapons program, including LEPs. Our 

work in nuclear forensics and medical isotope production illustrates these points. 

• Nuclear forensics and attribution: Los Alamos delivered a suite of models 

and databases for National Technical Nuclear Forensics applications, such 

as modeling debris signatures and other nuclear security applications. 

LANL’s capabilities in this area are a direct outgrowth of the former nuclear weapons testing program where scientists had to study the detailed 

chemistry of soil samples to determine various characteristics of detonation. 

Our experts in this area not only help with the current nuclear forensics, 

they also support the weapons program by helping to reinterpret data from 

previous underground tests. This information is then used to validate our 

weapons codes. 

• Thanks to the Isotope Production Facility at LANSCE, LANL is a national leader in producing strontium-82 for cardiac imaging and germanium-68 for calibrating proton emission tomography (PET) scanners. Other 

isotopes, such as aluminum-26 and silicon-32, are unique to Los Alamos 

and are not produced anywhere else in the world. With the demand for 

short-half-lived medical isotopes being one of the fastest-growing needs of 

health care providers, the industry and medical researchers are looking to 

Los Alamos to provide a stable supply of these isotopes. Providing these isotopes as a service to the Nation maintains the skills at Los Alamos for producing and handling exotic isotopes. 

Despite difficult and uncertain budgetary scenarios, a careful balance between 

LEPs and science, technology, and engineering must be maintained. 

LOOKING AHEAD

Just as training and equipping prepare our Armed Forces to fight in battle, the 

science done at the national laboratories prepares our employees with the knowledge and tools needed to sustain the stockpile. While the balance must shift as we 

apply our knowledge and tools to LEPs, we cannot abandon preparation for the future any more than the military can abandon training and equipping, even in the 

midst of fighting a war. 

In general, the budget for Directed Stockpile Work Services has seen successive 

cuts that have hampered progress toward goals set in the NPR, especially in the 

Component Maturation Framework, more sustainable hydrotest capability, nuclear 

safety research and development, and Plutonium Sustainment. 

Over the last few months, I have been asked to estimate the budget impacts of 

pit reuse as a way to bridge our manufacturing gap. We are still in the early phases 

of work that would allow pits designed for conventional-high-explosive systems to 

be used in systems using insensitive explosives. Should the Nation choose to pursue 

this path, we believe that approximately $50 million per year will be needed for the 

21 

next 5 to 10 years beyond already-planned investments before we could certify systems using these pits. Because this work must start now if this concept is to be viable for coming LEPs, we are planning experiments this summer to gain insight into 

system behavior. While we believe this a promising direction for innovation to meet 

a national challenge, we cannot confidently predict the outcome. There is risk. 

Whether the ultimate decision is to move forward with an alternative plutonium 

approach, or to continue with CMRR construction, every day that we do not address 

the issue is a day in which our risks increase. At a minimum, we need access to 

the $120 million appropriated in fiscal year 2012 that will remain after placing 

CMRR–NF in a stable state to make investments supporting a path forward. Furthermore, the $35 million already in the budget request for fiscal year 2013 will be 

needed to accelerate PF–4 vault clean-out. Access to these funds will allow us to 

continue making wise investments in our plutonium capability. This includes studying a transportation system between PF–4 and RLUOB, expanded use of RLUOB, 

and a migration of processes from CMR to PF–4. If we are to support the LEPs necessary over the next decade, we cannot afford to postpone action to address the Nation’s plutonium capability. 

FUNDING ISSUES

When looking at funding, we must address the issues we see today as well as the 

investments needed to meet challenges in an uncertain future. Today, the stockpile 

requires action—action to address changes that we see occurring in the stockpile on 

timescales that are dictated by nature. Chemistry and physics take an unrelenting 

toll on the aging stockpile. As we work to modernize the stockpile, the balance is 

shifting toward today’s issues as it must. However, I am concerned that short term 

stockpile needs may be shifting the balance too far to the present—putting our ability to care for the stockpile in the future at risk. 

I must speak about the difficult budget issues facing LANL this fiscal year. While 

planning in fiscal year 2011 for the increases outlined in the 1251 report, LANL was 

prudent in hiring. Nevertheless, as fiscal year 2012 began it seemed unlikely that 

we would see the full planned increase. In November 2011, I established the Laboratory Integrated Stewardship Council to ensure that we manage our resources in a 

consistent, conservative manner across the Laboratory. This council is chartered 

with making financial decisions to keep Laboratory spending in line with a highly 

constrained budget. 

For fiscal year 2012, LANL funding across our national security accounts is some 

$300 million lower than it was in fiscal year 2011. In the fiscal year 2013 budget 

request, funding at LANL appears to be down another $100 million. 

These cuts made it necessary for me to make the difficult decision to move forward with a voluntary separation program to reduce our workforce. Just over a 

week ago more than 550 employees left the Lab. Many had decades of experience 

in the Weapons Program. Despite succession planning, we are losing valued employees sooner than expected. 

PENSION RELIEF

In 2006. Los Alamos made major changes in its pension system. New employees 

are no longer able to enroll in a defined benefits pension system. Rather, they are 

part of a defined contribution plan. While this system no longer provides the incentive to remain at the Laboratory until retirement, it also relieves LANL of the longterm liabilities associated with a defined benefits program. 

The Laboratory remains committed to the benefits promised to employees who 

have, for many years, been participants in the defined benefits program—a program 

that has been closed since 2006. However, historically low interest rates coupled 

with the actuarial rules of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) have caused estimates 

of future liabilities to balloon. As a result, the Laboratory has been making contributions to the pension plan out of program funds for the last few years at well 

above the $100 million level. While we have increased employee contributions, they 

are only a partial offset to the contributions required by the PPA. If interest rates 

return to levels that have been typical over the last 25 years, it will not be long 

before our plan appears to be over-funded. 

Mr. Chairman, I urge Congress to pass the proposed changes to the Pension Protection Act (PPA) that include a permanent ‘‘funding stabilization’’ provision. Today’s unusually low interest rates, combined with existing pension funding legislation, have artificially increased our pension liabilities in the short term. This has 

reduced and will continue to reduce the funding available for the mission by tens 

of millions of dollars per year at a time when mission needs are growing and budgets are severely constrained. 

22 

In summary, I believe the proposed ‘‘funding stabilization’’ relief would provide a 

substantial amount of funding back to weapons program activities without incurring 

undue risk in pension funding over the long term. 

CLOSING

The fundamental premise of Stockpile Stewardship is that a healthy program can 

sustain a workforce able to make technically sound decisions supporting the stockpile, using the scientific tools they have developed. Today we are well-positioned to 

make these decisions because of the investments the country has made over the last 

two decades. However, I’m increasingly concerned that we may no longer be on a 

healthy path. As our budgets at LANL are reduced, our risks increase. Some risks 

may be acceptable, but I am sure that there will be a point at which those risks 

become unacceptable. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Albright? 

STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT, DIRECTOR, 

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. 

I have submitted my full statement to the subcommittee, which 

I ask be made part of the hearing record. 

Senator NELSON. Without objection. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. If I may, I will now make a brief opening statement. 

This is a challenging period for the Federal Government with 

many priorities that require attention at a time of budget austerity. 

This is also the case for the Nation’s SSP, including those activities 

at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 

I think it is worth reminding ourselves why we have a SSP. It 

was formally begun in the 1990s and it is really an ambitious experiment. It is founded on the premise that the expertise of a workforce and the judgments that they make that results from a detailed understanding of the fundamental science of how nuclear 

weapons work can serve as a substitute for the expertise and judgment that we historically developed back in the days when we had 

multiple and frequent design efforts and we did testing in the 

desert. 

It is important to note that at the time we stopped nuclear testing, we really did not think we understood well enough how weapons work. It is why we had the tests. There were a great number 

of empirical factors and approximations that were built into the 

weapons design process that allowed efforts to proceed, but there 

was also a landscape of test failures that had, over time, indicated 

our lack of understanding of the basic underlying science. Hence, 

for stockpile stewardship to work, we needed to learn far more 

about the physical processes that transpire in the functioning of a 

weapon. 

We have actually been quite successful in developing many of 

those science tools, in fact, probably more successful than many of 

the proponents, when the program started, would have imagined. 

But developing those tools remains extremely challenging. Our 

knowledge of the basic underlying physics is embodied ultimately 

in computer models. These models utilize scientifically justified approximations, and they are rendered more and more accurate by 

23 

improvements in computing power and by controlled experiments 

that we do at Livermore and other laboratories at Los Alamos to 

determine some of the important needed parameters. The idea here 

is to represent what we believe to be reality. 

However, the thing you have to always worry about with these 

models is that they cannot become holy writ. It is absolutely crucial 

that they be tested repeatedly against experiments conducted at 

relevant physical conditions so that the assumptions and approximations embedded in the models can be verified and corrected as 

needed. To do otherwise is to invite disaster. 

Hence, the pillars of the SSP have included both the development 

of independent analytical capabilities utilizing the world’s most capable computing platforms at Lawrence Livermore, at Los Alamos, 

at Sandia, but also the development of experimental facilities to 

collect data on the conditions that are relevant to the operation of 

a nuclear weapon. It is worth noting that every nuclear state that 

has abjured testing is following the same approach to maintaining 

their stockpile. 

Of course, the scientific understanding of nuclear weapons is not 

an end all by itself. It is rather a process that underlies our capability to maintain the stockpile. It informs our annual assessments. 

It informs how we react to issues that are raised during the surveillance program, and it informs how we conduct our life extension 

programs (LEP). 

We are very excited about the recent accomplishments that we 

have made in this program, and I highlight many of these in my 

written testimony. But we are also very concerned about impediments to current programs and the long-term success of stockpile 

stewardship. So let me stress four points. 

First, without sustained support for nuclear weapons science, 

stockpile stewardship will eventually fail. 

Second, provided that support is sustained, we do remain optimistic about the prospects for long-term success of this sciencebased stockpile stewardship. The skills that we derive from the 

science base, as I said earlier, enable the Nation to maintain a 

safe, secure, and effective deterrent and deliver on very challenging 

LEPs. 

Third, recognition and support of the NNSA laboratories serving 

as national security laboratories is actually very, very important to 

that nuclear stockpile mission. It complements and enhances the 

workforce. It adds depth and breadth and strength to the laboratories’ capabilities. 

Then finally, the NNSA laboratories would perform their vital 

national security mission far more effectively if they were managed 

as trusted partners of the Federal Government and governed in a 

more streamlined and cost-effective way consistent with the original intent of the FFRDC construct. 

Thank you for your attention, and I will be pleased to answer 

your questions during the hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:] 

24 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT

OPENING REMARKS AND SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today on the National Nuclear Security Administration Management of its 

National Security Laboratories. I am Parney Albright, Director of the Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). 

LLNL is one of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear design laboratories responsible for helping sustain the 

safety, security, and effectiveness of our Nation’s strategic deterrent. In addition to 

our stockpile stewardship efforts, we also leverage our capabilities to develop innovative solutions to major 21st century challenges in nuclear security, defense and 

international security, and energy and environmental security. I thank the committee for your continuing support for the important work we do. 

This is a challenging period for the Federal Government, with many priorities 

that require attention at a time of budget austerity. This is also the case for the 

Nation’s Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), including the activities at Livermore. We are very excited about recent and prospective major accomplishments, 

which I will highlight, but we are also very concerned about impediments to current 

programs and long-term success in stockpile stewardship. In particular, I stress four 

points: 

• Without sustained support for nuclear weapons science, stockpile stewardship will eventually fail. 

• We remain optimistic about the prospect of long-term success of ‘‘sciencebased’’ stockpile stewardship provided that support is sustained. The skills 

deriving from a solid science base will enable stockpile stewards to maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent and deliver on challenging lifeextension programs. 

• Recognition of and support for the NNSA laboratories serving as ‘‘national security laboratories’’ will better help the United States meet a broad 

set of 21st century security challenges. These broader activities complement 

our nuclear weapons responsibilities, adding depth, breadth, and strength 

to the laboratories’ capabilities. 

• The NNSA laboratories would perform their vital national security mission much more effectively if they were managed as trusted partners of the 

Federal Government and governed in a more streamlined/cost-effective way, 

consistent with the original intent of the Federally-Funded Research and 

Development Center (FFRDC) construct. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCIENCE

The SSP, which formally began in the 1990s with the decision to enter into a moratorium on nuclear testing, is an ambitious experiment. It is founded on the premise 

that the expertise of a workforce (and the judgments they make) that results from 

a detailed understanding of the fundamental science of how nuclear weapons work 

can serve as a substitute for the expertise (and judgment) developed historically 

through multiple and frequent design efforts—efforts that ultimately had to be proven in nuclear tests. To add to the complexity of this enterprise, this new workforce 

must deal with weapons that will be deployed well beyond their initially intended 

service lifetimes, and over time upgraded with the (highly desirable) safety and security features called for by the recent Nuclear Posture Review—features that represent changes to previously tested configurations of those weapons. 

It is important to note that at the time we stopped nuclear testing, we did not 

understand well enough how weapons worked (which is why we had to test); there 

were a great number of empirical factors and approximations built in to the weapons design process that allowed efforts to proceed, but with that there was a landscape of test failures that indicated our lack of understanding of the basic underlying science. Hence, for stockpile stewardship to work, we needed to learn far more 

about the physical processes that transpire in the functioning of a weapon. When 

the SSP was initiated, the nuclear stockpile was in good shape, which meant that 

we had a window of time to develop necessary nuclear weapons science tools and 

knowledge before more difficult-to-deal-with problems would likely arise. 

Developing these science tools has been—and remains—extremely challenging. 

Our knowledge of the underlying basic physics is ultimately embodied in computer 

models. These models utilize scientifically justified approximations—rendered more 

and more accurate by improvements in computing power, and by controlled experiments that determine needed parameters—to represent what we believe to be reality. However, these models cannot become ‘‘holy writ;’’ it is crucial that they be 

25 

tested repeatedly against experiments conducted at relevant physical conditions, so 

that the assumptions and approximations embedded in the models can be verified 

and corrected as needed. To do otherwise is to invite disaster. Hence, the pillars of 

the SSP have included both the development of independent analytic capabilities— 

utilizing the world’s most capable computing platforms—at Lawrence Livermore and 

Los Alamos national laboratories (each laboratory with differing approaches to modeling the underlying physics); but also the development of experimental facilities to 

collect data at the conditions relevant to the operation of a nuclear weapon. It is 

worth noting that every acknowledged nuclear state that has abjured testing is following the same approach to maintaining their stockpile. 

Of course, the scientific understanding of nuclear weapons is not an end, but rather, as noted above, a process that underlies our capability to maintain the stockpile. 

First, each laboratory director provides an annual assessment of the stockpile. 

Hence, a crucial component to the SSP is the ongoing surveillance of the stockpile 

and the development of better surveillance methods. Again, here, the underlying 

premise of the SSP—that developing a detailed understanding of fundamental weapons science will lead to a workforce with the judgment and intuition heretofore developed through new weapons design and testing—is critical. If an issue is identified 

in a stockpile weapon, we as a nation need to know whether it can be ignored, fixed 

in the field, or is critical enough to call into question the reliability of a portion of 

the deterrent. 

Finally, that judgment and experience must be turned toward Life Extension Programs (LEPs) that both sustain the extant stockpile and also allow for critical improvements in its safety and security. These advancements will in some cases result 

in deviations from fully tested configurations, and hence rely heavily on improvements in our understanding of fundamental weapons science. Furthermore, even if 

a weapon system were to have its lifetime extended without any deviations from the 

prior design, the reality is that component manufacturing processes change with 

time, some materials are no longer available, and no ‘‘blueprint’’ is sufficiently detailed to fill in all the decisions made historically on the production line. Certifying 

any weapon requires a workforce that understands the fundamental scientific aspects of nuclear weapons. 

The full spectrum of SSP activities—a fundamental understanding of weapons 

science (based on theory and, crucially, experiments); its application to assessments; 

stockpile surveillance and development of better surveillance methods; dealing with 

significant findings and fixes; and LEPs—all serve to sustain the stockpile, exercise 

the skills and judgments of stockpile stewards, and, importantly, train the next generation of stewards. When the next round of LEPs for the extant stockpile is expected to begin in the 2030s, the people executing those LEPs will have been 

trained by people who themselves have never engaged in the development of a new 

design, nor executed a full nuclear test. 

SSP depends on stockpile stewards being fully capable of identifying issues that 

arise in stockpiled weapons; resolving those issues through minor fixes or LEPs; and 

certifying the safety, security, and performance of the modified weapon without conducting a nuclear test. Strong support of all aspects of the SSP is required, because 

questions about safety, security, and performance will arise as long as the United 

States has nuclear weapons. Laboratory scientists and engineers must have the 

wherewithal to find and address problems, and the Nation must have confidence in 

their ability to do so. 

We have made remarkable progress in developing the necessary computational 

and experimental tools and in using them to gain knowledge about key issues. We 

are attending to the immediate needs of the stockpile. Today, however, the hard 

challenges are now much closer as weapons age beyond their intended service life 

and important work to resolve key issues in nuclear weapons science remains to be 

done. 

As noted briefly above, the simulation codes must have much higher fidelity than 

those originally used in the design of the weapon. Evaluating the performance of 

a weapon ‘‘as designed’’ is one issue; evaluating it when materials have aged and 

anomalies are present is much harder. Materials age at an accelerated rate when 

confined for years in the radioactive environment inside a nuclear weapon. The improved physics models required for science-based SSP are very complex (e.g., turbulence and the interaction of intense radiation with matter) and necessitate powerful 

computers. However, these codes—which embody our state of knowledge—must be 

tested against data. 

Data collection about nuclear weapons performance falls into two broad categories: information pertaining to dynamics of the primary implosion and information pertaining to the nuclear explosion itself. 

26 

We collect data about the hydrodynamics of a weapon primary implosion at 

LLNL’s Contained Firing Facility (CFF) and at the Dual Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamics Test (DARHT) Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 

For example, in fiscal year 2010, one of our large-scale tests explored advance safety 

and security concepts that could be used in future LEPs; another demonstrated advanced capabilities for assuring weapon performance. Through marked improvements in diagnostics, we are obtaining greater amounts of higher fidelity data about 

implosion dynamics. These data are compared to pre-shot predictions of results— 

performed with our most advanced computers—and gauge how well our physics 

models work. 

Other key experimental facilities managed by Livermore that provide information 

about non-nuclear performance include the High Explosives Applications Facility 

(HEAF), where state-of-the-art diagnostics are used to study the performance of 

aging high explosives in nuclear weapons, and the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. A 

two-stage gas gun, JASPER is used to produce an extremely high-pressure shock 

wave in plutonium and collect material properties data critical to the simulation 

codes. JASPER completed mandated upgrades in fiscal year 2011 and now operates 

as a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility. Since JASPER returned to operation, five 

plutonium shots so far have collected vital data for LLNL and LANL. 

A critical gap in our understanding of nuclear weapons science is the need for experimental data pertaining to the behavior of materials at the extreme conditions 

of a functioning nuclear weapon (100 million degrees temperature and 10 billion 

atmospheres pressure). With the National Ignition Facility (NIF) (and lesser but 

complementary capabilities in the Omega laser at University of Rochester’s Laboratory for Laser Energetics and the Z-machine at Sandia National Laboratories 

(SNL)), it is now possible to gather high-energy-density (HED) science data at a precision and experimental rate that simply would not be possible by other means. Crucially, the NIF holds the promise of probing experimentally the conditions in a nuclear weapon that occur during the initial detonation—in particular, the boost process that determines the performance of the primary, which, in turn, drives the overall performance of the weapon. The ability to anchor the simulation codes with ignition data is pivotal to any discussion of design margins and performance. 

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

My discussion of recent successes and challenges in the SSP will largely focus on 

NIF, high-performance computing, and the W78 LEP, which are crucial to long-term 

success. 

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) 

NIF was commissioned at LLNL in 2009, and since then, the 192-beam laser has 

been performing very reliably as a high-precision experimental tool. During fiscal 

year 2011, a total of 286 shots were fired on NIF, with 62 shots for the National 

Ignition Campaign (NIC) and 50 shots for stockpile stewardship and HED science 

applications. Over 100 shots were fired in January and February of 2012—a record 

performance for complex shots. The demands for experimental time are high. Even 

with NIF operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, the requests for shots in fiscal 

year 2012 total more than 500 days. 

Researchers are executing the program to achieve fusion ignition and energy gain, 

and the wide range of record breaking experiments results to date demonstrate the 

enormous utility of NIF as a users’ facility for nuclear weapon science, broader national security applications, frontier science, and pursuit of fusion power for energy 

security. We are making excellent progress toward transforming NIF into a users’ 

facility in fiscal year 2013. 

NIF Laser Performance 

In March 2012, NIF delivered a record-setting 1.875 million joules (MJ) of ultraviolet laser light to the center of the facility’s target chamber. NIF generates nearly 

100 times more energy than any other laser. This shot met a major milestone and 

exceeded NIF’s design specification of 1.8 MJ. NIF is now able to conduct routine 

operations at full power. Very importantly, the recordsetting event was also one of 

the most precise shots ever fired at NIF. The laser’s precision and enormous flexibility in how to use the beams make possible the fielding of many different types 

of ignition and HED science experiments for which more than 50 different types of 

diagnostic instruments, many developed specifically for NIF, are providing exceptional data for a wide range of types of experiments. 

27 

Support of Stockpile Stewardship 

NIF has already made a pivotal contribution to stockpile stewardship with resolution of the ‘‘energy balance’’ issue after a series of experiments performed last year. 

The issue was originally identified during the era of nuclear testing and it has remained a significant anomaly for 40 years—an anomaly that in the past was an important reason for full nuclear testing. Over the last decade, experiments on a variety of experimental facilities contributed to improving the understanding of this 

anomaly and pointed to its likely source. LLNL researchers developed a sophisticated computational model that better simulated nuclear weapons performance and, 

in particular the specific aspects of performance that could possibly explain the 

anomaly. The unique capabilities of NIF were required to validate simulation results. With resolution of the energy balance anomaly, LLNL and LANL will have 

more confidence in assessments of the current weapons, which continue to change 

with age, and will be able to make better-informed choices in upcoming LEPs. 

Additional SSP-supportive experiments were conducted in fiscal year 2011–2012 

to study how materials that are normally solids behave when subjected to unprecedented pressures—in this case tantalum and carbon. These experiments are important stepping stones toward understanding the more complex material behavior of 

substances like plutonium. fiscal year 2013 is projected to be a very busy year for 

SSP experiments at NIF. Future plans call for a wide range of types of experiments 

to be performed by LLNL and LANL to better understand the physics of boost (thermonuclear burn in the primary explosion) and answer questions crucial to stockpile 

assessments, investigation of significant findings, and certification of LEPs. 

The National Ignition Campaign 

The goal of the National Ignition Campaign (NIC) is to compress and heat a millimeter-size target filled with deuterium and tritium to achieve fusion ignition and 

energy gain (at least as much energy output as input). The NIC team is also 

transitioning NIF to routine operations as a highly flexible HED science experimental facility. NIC, which concludes at the end of fiscal year 2012, is managed for 

NNSA by the Laboratory and includes many national and international partners, 

representing national laboratories, academia, and industry. 

NIC is making substantial progress in the quest to achieve fusion ignition and 

burn. Activities are progressing through a series of milestones with ignition and 

burn as a major milestone scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012. The 

goal is to compress the cryogenically-cooled fusion fuel to a very small volume (compressed by more than a factor of 10,000 in density) and create a central ‘‘hot spot’’ 

that ignites and consumes a larger amount of surrounding hydrogen fuel. The goal 

is to turn mass into energy. A series of four shocks that must be precisely shaped 

and timed are used to implode the capsule and ignite the fuel. 

NIC researchers are conducting a series of experiments to optimize the target implosion following the standard scientific approach of interweaving experiments and 

theory. These experiments occur at energies, temperatures, and pressures that have 

never before been probed, and hence that are well outside of the domain where our 

simulation models have been anchored—a domain that approaches the conditions 

inside a nuclear weapon. Through the iterative process of pre-shot prediction, experiment, and post-shot data analysis, new ground is being broken on the path to ignition. We are learning new physics and gaining a more fundamental understanding 

of thermonuclear reactions. This information is being used to continue improving 

our models as we move through the program, which in itself is testimony to the 

need for anchoring data and skepticism of models that are based solely on theory 

or are validated outside the domain of interest. 

NIC (and more generally, the SSP) is a grand challenge with many scientific and 

engineering obstacles that test the skills and ingenuity of NNSA laboratory researchers. So far, we have overcome many obstacles and I have confidence that the 

NIC team will reach its objective of fusion ignition and burn. Others around the 

world see great value in having NIF-like capabilities and share confidence that the 

goal is within reach. China, Russia, and France are all committing to build (or have 

started to build) large laser systems for inertial confinement fusion (ICF); the 

United Kingdom works closely with NIF; and Japan and Korea are making substantial investments in ICF. 

High-Performance Computing (HPC) 

HPC is and always has been a defining strength of our Laboratory. SSP advances 

have required continuously pushing the envelope in HPC. As part of NNSA’s Advanced Strategic Computing (ASC) program, we work closely with U.S. computer 

manufacturers to improve capabilities, and every generation of state-of-the-art computers pioneered at LLNL or LANL has later found broad application in making 

28 

U.S. industry able to develop better products more quickly. Livermore is currently 

bringing into operation two highly capable machines: ‘‘Sequoia’’ and ‘‘Zin’’. 

Sequoia 

In January 2012, the IBM technical team began installation of the first four racks 

of Sequoia, the next leap forward in computing capability; the last of the 96 racks 

arrive this month. This next generation ‘‘BlueGene/Q’’ technology operates at an 

order of magnitude faster than previously deployed systems. Sequoia, which includes 1.5 million processors and 6 million threads, is capable of record-setting 20 

petaflops (20 quadrillion, or a million billion, floating point operations per second). 

Sequoia is also record-breaking in power efficiency—at over 2 billion calculations per 

watt, it is nearly 50 percent more power efficient than any competing technology. 

Our goal is to have the machine fully performing science simulations before the end 

of 2012 and dedicated to classified computing in mid-2013. 

Sequoia is an important step toward even larger computers that are needed to run 

predictive models of boost physics and thermonuclear burn processes in nuclear 

weapons. Equally importantly, considerable effort has gone into development of improved methods to efficiently characterize and bound margin to failure and its uncertainties. Quantification of Margin and Uncertainty (QMU) provides the underpinning of our assessment and certification processes. Rigorous implementation of 

QMU requires running many thousands of high fidelity simulations to map out the 

impact of uncertainties on weapon performance, which, in turn, requires more powerful computers. 

Zin 

In March 2012, LLNL completed installation and began classified computing on 

Zin, a machine with 1 petaflop performance. As part of the ASC Tri-Lab Capacity 

Cluster 2 (TLCC2) program, similar computers are being installed at LANL and 

SNL to increase computing capacity. LLNL led the vendor selection to procure 

standardized hardware and software environment through TLCC2 so that the laboratories would realize significantly reduced costs, increased efficiencies, and enhanced collaboration. Zin provides a substantial boost to classified computing at 

LLNL, and full deployment of TLCC2 will allow users from all three laboratories 

to begin preparing their codes on the actual architecture that they will experience 

when Sequoia goes into service. 

High-Performance Computing as a National Security Imperative. To meet the demanding needs of SSP, we urge support for an initiative to reach the challenging 

milestone of exascale computing (a billion billion calculations per second) by 2020. 

LLNL is working with other NNSA and DOE laboratories to formulate a strategy 

for how to achieve this ambitious goal. Exascale computing is also critical to our role 

as a broad national security laboratory, with Livermore bringing to bear on critical 

problems HPC as one of our principal strengths. Modeling and simulation of complex systems to understand and predict their behavior is key to solving challenging 

problems in national security, energy security, and economic competitiveness. Other 

nations equally recognize the value of leadership in HPC to their futures. Sequoia 

puts the United States back in the lead (surpassing Japan and China) and it is critical that we sustain leadership by reaching exascale performance level before competitor nations. 

The W78 Life-Extension Program (LEP) 

In June 2011, LLNL and the U.S. Air Force launched a concept development 

study to extend the life of the W78 Minuteman III warhead. The W78, which is the 

dominant system for the ICBM leg of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent, is well beyond 

its planned service life and will reach 40 years before the LEP production begins. 

We need to address concerns identified in the surveillance of W78 that do not now 

affect performance. The LEP process, which begins with concept development (Phase 

6.1), will take at least a decade to complete. As the program is conceived, production 

would start in fiscal year 2023. 

The concept development study is evaluating different LEP approaches including 

refurbishment, reuse, or replacement of weapon components. As required by the Department of Defense (DOD), the study encompasses options that improve safety and 

security features and that make the warhead adaptable for deployment on SLBMs 

as well as ICBMs. At the end of the study, which should conclude this year, the 

California team (LLNL and SNL–California) will report findings and recommendations to the DOD/NNSA Project Officers Group. A key issue is the manufacturability 

of LEP components and systems—cost-efficiency, waste reduction, and avoidance of 

use of hazardous materials are important factors. 

In addition to meeting the critical need to extend the service life of the W78, the 

LEP serves the long-term need to work on the full spectrum of stockpile stewardship 

29 

activities—including warhead development from physics and engineering design 

through production engineering. This is an essential part of hands-on training to increase skills and expert judgment. The young scientists and engineers who worked 

on the W87 LEP in the 1990s are now the technical leaders for the W78 LEP, and 

they are training the next generation of leaders. 

Other Stockpile Stewardship Program Successes and Challenges. 

Assessments and Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) 

LLNL completed Cycle 16 of the Annual Stockpile Assessment with support from 

the newly implemented Independent Nuclear Weapon Assessment Process to 

strengthen peer review. Cycle 16 benefited from reduced uncertainties and increased 

scientific rigor due to improved simulation models, results of recent plutonium aging 

experiments, and better fundamental nuclear data deriving from joint work with 

LANL. Livermore also effectively managed its Significant Finding Investigation 

workload and its stockpile surveillance activities. However, our weapon assessments 

and DSW support activities are funding constrained, and of the systems in the 

stockpile, the B83 bomb and W80 cruise missile warhead are the least supported. 

With the fiscal year 2013 proposed budget, we will likely have to curtail activities 

that impact our ability to assess the performance of these systems. Funding for 

technology development to improve certification and safety is also very constrained. 

Facilities 

LLNL sustained very nearly 100 percent availability of its mission-critical and 

mission-dependent facilities throughout fiscal year 2011 as part of its Readiness in 

Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) effort. However, we have not been able to keep 

pace with the needs for reinvestment in the Laboratory’s aging overall infrastructure. LLNL receives less RTBF funds (by a factor of greater than two) than any 

other site in the complex. RTBF activities include our ongoing effort to prepare for 

shipping from the site special nuclear material requiring the highest level of security protection. More than 93 percent of the material has been removed and the 

work is on schedule to be completed in 2012. Important programmatic activities continue at the Laboratory’s Superblock Facility and this well-maintained facility 

stands ready to support NNSA’s new plutonium strategy with the planned delay in 

construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement–Nuclear Facility (CMRR–NF) at LANL. 

Additional Budget Burdens 

The Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS), LLC, Defined Benefit Pension 

Plan up to now has been sufficiently funded that contributions have not been legally 

required. However, with interest rates at an historic low, liabilities have grown dramatically since mid-2009. As a consequence, statutory requirements of the Pension 

Protection Act of 2006 are forcing LLNS to act, and NNSA has granted LLNS approval to begin employee and employer contributions in fiscal year 2012. By starting 

now, we save NNSA almost $200 million through fiscal year 2022. I urge Congress 

to examine whether the provisions of the Pension Protection Act, designed to protect 

private sector pension plans, are appropriate for the NNSA complex of laboratories 

and plants. If a Pension Protection Act waiver/exception/modification is not enacted, 

$88 million will have to be diverted from programmatic work in fiscal year 2013. 

LLNL AS A NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORY

For many years, LLNL employees have applied their very special capabilities to 

develop innovative technical solutions to help meet a broader set of national needs. 

Work for NNSA on nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism, the Office of 

Science and others in DOE, other Federal agencies, and additional sponsors (e.g., 

in U.S. industry), is very important and has long been integrated into our mission 

and contribution to national security in the broadest sense. Our notable accomplishments in fiscal year 2011–2012 include: 

• Radiation Detection. LLNL researchers developed the first plastic material capable of identifying nuclear substances such as uranium and plutonium from benign radioactive sources. The new technology could be used 

in large, low-cost detectors for portals to reliably detect nuclear substances 

that might be used by terrorists. 

• Emergency response. Operating around the clock for 22 days, LLNL’s National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center provided up-to-date atmospheric dispersion predictions, plume projections, and radiation dose estimates to agencies in the United States and Japan responding to the 

Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster. 

30 

• Low-collateral-damage munition. The U.S. Air Force funded LLNL in 

May 2010 to rapidly develop the design for a new low-collateral damage 

munition (BLU–129/B). Fielding of the munition was approved in September 2011. The effective integration of experiments with HPC simulations enabled quick and effective optimization of munition performance 

while meeting demanding engineering requirements. 

• Cyber security. LLNL has created new capabilities for cyber-security 

work sponsors to provide real-time situational awareness inside a large 

computer network using a distributed approach to monitoring for anomalous behavior. 

• Space situational awareness. LLNL has developed detailed physics-based 

simulations to provide real-time analysis of space flight safety risks, and we 

are designing new prototype collision-warning mini-sensors for deployment 

in orbit. 

• Rapid development of new pharmaceuticals. Working with an industrial 

partner, LLNL researchers applied sophisticated computer models to sift 

through a large range of possibilities and identify three efficacious drug 

candidates in 3 months (normally a 2- to 5-year process). 

• Industrial partnering in HPC. In March 2012, LLNL selected six pilot 

projects to partner with industry to accelerate the development of energy 

technology using LLNL’s (unclassified) HPC resources through the Livermore Valley Open Campus (adjoining LLNL and SNL-California). 

It is widely appreciated that the NNSA laboratories are unique (in terms of capability, talent, scale, and dedication to mission) national resources that should be 

more broadly applied to address pressing 21st century needs in defense and international security, energy security, and innovations to enhance economic competitiveness. As a dual benefit, the activities crucially add depth, breadth, and strength to 

the laboratories’ technical base, which is important to long-term success in stockpile 

stewardship. Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, recently prepared by a National Academy of Sciences 

(NAS) committee at the behest of Congress, recommended ‘‘that Congress recognize 

that maintenance of the stockpile remains the core mission of the Labs, and in that 

context consider endorsing and supporting in some way the evolution of the NNSA 

Laboratories to National Security Laboratories . . . ’’ Formal recognition of our national security mission responsibility would be very beneficial—as would steps to 

help lower operating costs at the laboratories and simplify the processes for arranging interagency work. 

THE LABORATORIES AS TRUSTED PARTNERS IN NATIONAL SECURITY

Employees at the NNSA laboratories and plants are dedicated to national service. 

At the laboratories, we take on careers because we believe we can ‘‘make a difference’’ working with outstanding colleagues at state-of-the-art facilities on nationally important problems. As Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers 

(FFRDCs), our management contracts in principle place the day-to-day responsibility for national security research in the hands of non-Federal employees in order 

to ensure that staff and infrastructure of the highest quality are available and dedicated to the missions of our government sponsors. In this model, the government 

decides ‘‘what’’ needs to be done and provides the funding, and the laboratories decide ‘‘how’’ to assure the needed capabilities are available, and then how best to accomplish those tasks within the federally defined constraints. This partnership with 

the government should indeed be a partnership 

The national laboratories, along with the plants, are the sinew and muscle of the 

nuclear weapons enterprise; they are the corporate memory, the execution arm, and 

the infrastructure. In many ways, they fulfill the same role within NNSA as does 

the uniformed military within DOD. Such a relationship works well when there is 

mutual trust between the partners, a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, and a shared vision and clear focus on mission. 

The Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National 

Security Laboratories report by the NAS committee speaks of the broken relationship between NNSA and the laboratories, stemming from a fundamental lack of 

trust. We need to return to a strong partnership between the government and the 

laboratories with active engagement of the laboratory directors in collaborative strategic discussions with NNSA management about program direction, health of the 

laboratories, and mission priorities. 

The NAS committee’s findings are not new. America’s Strategic Posture, issued 

in 2009 as the final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, is highly critical of the governance structure and ‘‘microVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Nov 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76896.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
31 

management and unnecessary and obtrusive oversight.’’ An investigation of other 

FFRDC governance models should be able to provide alternatives and help affect a 

cultural change in the way the laboratories are managed. We need to move from 

a duplicative, multi-layered, and poorly aligned governance system to a more 

streamlined, cost-effective approach that would restore a focus on mission and a 

trusted partnership. An operational way to do this is to provide a level of funding 

for oversight that is consistent with best practices for other FFRDCs. The savings, 

which could be substantial—within the government and at the laboratories, which 

have to absorb the costs of transactional oversight—could be reinvested to make for 

stronger programs and healthier laboratories. 

As an example of how other agencies approach FFRDC governance, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is an instructive (but by no means unique) example. There 

are significant differences between JPL and LLNL; even so, the contrast in the 

FFRDC relationship is striking. JPL is a $1.5 billion center with more than 5,000 

employees, managed by the California Institute of Technology as an FFRDC for the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA governs the agency 

with three-agency level councils and the center directors are members. The Site Office at JPL performs no assessments and Headquarters performs Mission and Environment, Health, and Safety reviews three times per year. In contrast, over 1,300 

external audits were performed at LLNL in fiscal year 2011 as part of NNSA’s 

transactional oversight. 

NNSA monitors performance at LLNL using an annual Performance Evaluation 

Plan (PEP). In fiscal year 2011, the PEP had 11 Objectives, 42 Measures, 79 Targets, 5 Award Term Incentives, 12 Multi-site Targets (all but 2 applicable to LLNL), 

and a large number of supporting metrics to gauge performance. The DOE/NNSA 

Site Office at Livermore defines 324 elements in their management assessment 

plans. JPL and NASA dispensed with the PEP approach, deciding that it interfered 

with a focus on mission. 

There is one area where we have seen improvement toward an effective partnership with NNSA: reform of security policy and procedures. The effort, which began 

about 2 years ago, is led by NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Service (DNS) and is collaborative with NNSA sites and contractors. DNS formed combined teams (Federal and 

contractor) of subject matter experts (e.g., in Information Security and in Physical 

Protection). The goal was to review and replace DOE Office of Health, Safety and 

Security orders with a more streamlined set of NNSA policies (NAPs) that provide 

the security directors at NNSA sites greater flexibility to meet their particular 

needs. So far, two NAPs have been created, which is saving an estimated $37 million per year in operating costs at LLNL alone. Seven more NAPs are in the pipeline and expected to be released soon. 

CLOSING REMARKS

My overall message is a ‘‘good news’’ story with a note of caution. With continuing 

investments in HPC and with NIF coming on-line as a unique experimental facility 

to gather necessary input and validation data for nuclear weapons science simulation codes, science-based stockpile stewardship is on the path to success. However, 

vigilance and strong partnerships are required to sustain program support so that 

there will be skilled and motivated stockpile stewards as long as the Nation relies 

on nuclear deterrence. 

All of us at LLNL look forward to serving as a trusted partner in the Nation’s 

national security enterprise and are proud to provide innovative science and technology to meet a broad set of national security needs. We thank you for your continuing support. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Hommert? 

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA 

NATIONAL LABORATORIES 

Dr. HOMMERT. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Inhofe, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify. 

I would like to request that my full testimony be made part of 

the record. 

Senator NELSON. Without objection. 

Dr. HOMMERT. I am Paul Hommert, Director of Sandia National 

Laboratories, a multi-program national security laboratory. 

32 

I would like to begin by putting my testimony in an overall context. It is my view that we have entered a new era for the U.S. 

nuclear deterrent, a period when the nuclear weapons enterprise 

must address for the first time modernization of the stockpile, 

which depends critically on the use and continued advancement of 

the tools of stewardship; targeted upgrades to the production infrastructure; and maintenance of the current stockpile through a modernization transition period. Such imperatives create funding demands not seen in recent decades and will require risk-based 

prioritization of the program, along with continued emphasis on 

strong program management and cost-effectiveness. 

With this background, now let me discuss the four major points 

of my testimony. 

I am pleased to report that the appropriated fiscal year 2012 

budget will allow Sandia to complete the 6.2A cost study for the 

B61 LEP and initiate full-scale engineering development at a pace 

consistent with fiscal year 2019 first production unit (FPU) with 

the scope agreed by the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

Furthermore, the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request to 

Congress, if authorized and appropriated, does provide sufficient 

funds for Sandia to support the fiscal year 2019 FPU schedule for 

the B61–12. 

However, I must emphasize that beginning now consistent and 

timely, multiyear is vital if the B61 LEP schedule is to be maintained. 

Second, the schedule and scope of the B61 LEP relate to strong 

technical drivers, which are discussed in my classified September 

2011 annual stockpile assessment letter. I recommend the members read the letter, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss it 

further. 

Beyond the B61 program, as we move forward on modernization, 

we must have a clear understanding and broad agreement about 

the vision for our stockpile 20 years from now. That vision must 

be robust in the face of current and future treaty obligations, evolving policy direction, stockpile technical realities, our infrastructure 

capabilities, and fiscal constraints. I believe such a vision is possible and emerging and we are actively supporting DOD and NNSA 

as they work through this planning. 

Finally, I am encouraged by the recent discussion concerning 

governance of the NNSA laboratories. In my view, reinvigorating 

the government-owned and contractor-operated model, which implies government oversight at the strategic rather than transactional level, offers the potential for improvements in operational 

performance, contractor accountability, and cost-effectiveness at the 

labs with attendant cost savings on the Federal side. 

With respect to fiscal constraints, we recognize the funding required at Sandia for the B61–12 is significant. In my full testimony, I outline steps we have taken to control costs. These include 

changes to pension and medical benefits, leveraging the work we 

do for other Federal agencies, and the utilization of the tools of 

stewardship. Throughout this program, we will continue to see further cost efficiencies. 

I just mentioned the work that we do for other Federal agencies. 

I strongly believe that today it is no longer possible for my laboraVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Nov 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76896.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
33 

1Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation under Department 

of Energy prime contract no. DE–AC04–94AL85000. 

tory to continue to deliver consistently on the commitments to the 

nuclear weapons program without the synergistic interagency work 

that attracts top talent, hones our skills, and provides stability 

through the nuclear weapons program cycles. 

Regarding talent, I am pleased to tell you that we have been able 

to recruit to Sandia top talent to support the full range of our national security programs. Specifically since fiscal year 2010, we 

have hired about 300 outstanding advanced degreed scientists and 

engineers directly into the weapons program. Of these, well over 

one-half are recent graduates anxious to begin their careers working on the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. It is very important that we 

provide them with a stable environment to pursue the multiyear 

learning it takes to technically steward the Nation’s nuclear stockpile now and into the future. To enable their success, we must 

strive for a national commitment to the program, for in the end the 

Nation’s deterrent rests on the strength of our people. 

Let me close by summarizing the key points. 

Authorization and appropriation of the fiscal year 2013 budget 

request and consistent, timely multiyear funding are critical to a 

fiscal year 2019 FPU for the B61. 

The schedule and the scope for the B61–12 is based on strong 

technical drivers. 

We need a broadly agreed, 20-year detailed vision for our nuclear 

deterrent. 

We are staffed and ready to execute the B61–12. 

Operational performance, productivity, and cost-effectiveness can 

be increased at the laboratories by improvements to the government construct under which we currently operate. 

Thank you and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of the 

Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and Director of Sandia National 

Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the 

U.S. Government and operated by Sandia Corporation 1 for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility for stockpile 

stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation’s nuclear weapons. Within the 

U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, Sandia is uniquely responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile and for the design, 

development, qualification, sustainment, and retirement of nonnuclear components 

of nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons represent Sandia’s core mission, the 

science, technology, and engineering capabilities required to support this mission position us to support other aspects of national security as well. Indeed, there is natural, increasingly significant synergy between our core mission and our broader national security work. This broader role involves research and development in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, energy security, defense, and homeland security. 

My statement today will provide an update since my testimony of March 30, 2011, 

before this subcommittee. Starting from an overall perspective of the nuclear weapons program and the challenges facing us since the end of the Cold War, I will refer 

to the following major issues: 

34 

(1) modernization programs with emphasis on the B61 Life Extension Program 

(LEP), 

(2) U.S. nuclear stockpile assessment, 

(3) status of the capability base needed to support our mission, 

(4) nonproliferation, 

(5) broader national security work, 

(6) workforce, and 

(7) governance. 

These issues will be viewed within the context of the administration’s request to 

Congress for the fiscal year 2013 budget and of the appropriated fiscal year 2012 

budget. 

MAJOR POINTS OF THIS TESTIMONY

1. For the nuclear weapons enterprise to meet the B61 LEP scope and schedule 

as decided by the Nuclear Weapons Council in December 2011, it is essential 

that the funding levels in the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request to 

Congress be authorized and appropriated. In addition, funding disruptions that 

could result from a fiscal year 2013 continuing resolution would have an almost immediate impact on our ability to meet the fiscal year 2019 first production unit schedule for the LEP. Therefore, if the schedule is to be met, plans 

for uninterrupted execution under a possible continuing resolution will be 

needed. 

2. The schedule and scope of the B61 LEP relate to strong technical drivers, 

which are discussed in my September 2011 annual stockpile assessment letter. 

I recommend that members read the letter, and I welcome the opportunity to 

discuss it in an appropriate venue. 

3. Beyond the B61 LEP, further planning is needed to determine the details of 

the modernization activities consistent with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

framework. The planning update needs to reflect the current plutonium strategy, improved understanding of modernization costs, and technical state of the 

stockpile; it also needs to be consistent with overall fiscal constraints. We are 

supporting Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA planning efforts currently 

underway. 

4. I am encouraged by the recent discussion concerning governance of the NNSA 

laboratories. In my view, reinvigorating the government-owned and contractoroperated model, which implies government oversight at the strategic rather 

than transactional level, offers the potential for improvements in operational 

performance, contractor accountability, and cost-effectiveness at the laboratories, with attendant cost savings on the Federal side. 

PERSPECTIVE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

It is my view that we have entered a new era for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The 

nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the first time the following imperatives: modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile, which depends critically on the 

use and continued advancement of the tools of stewardship, upgrading production 

infrastructure in a targeted manner, and maintaining the current stockpile through 

a modernization transition period. Such an environment creates funding demands 

not seen in recent decades, and it will require risk-based prioritization of the program, along with continued emphasis on strong program management and cost-effectiveness. 

The current nuclear stockpile was largely developed, produced, and tested in the 

1970s and 1980s, during the Cold War. It was the time of the arms race, as new 

nuclear systems were frequently being developed and fielded. 

After the 1992 moratorium on underground testing, the nuclear weapons program 

went into its next phase, science-based stockpile stewardship. The advanced tools 

and deeper scientific understanding we developed in that period have been applied 

to our annual assessment of the stockpile, to stockpile maintenance activities such 

as replacement of limited-life components, and to the qualification of the W76–1 

LEP. Science-based stockpile stewardship has been successful in generating the required scientific competencies and resources and attracting talented staff, but it was 

not accompanied by a broad-based effort to modernize the nuclear arsenal. 

Now, some 20 years after the end of the Cold War, we have a stockpile that has 

become significantly smaller and older. Considering the average age (27 years) of 

the stockpile and our insights into the stockpile, we have clearly reached a point 

at which we must conduct full-scale engineering development and related production 

activities to modernize the nuclear arsenal. This work can be accomplished only by 

relying on the tools of stewardship and a revitalized, appropriately sized production 

35 

capability. Let me restate that, in my view, the nuclear weapons enterprise has 

never before faced the combined need to modernize the stockpile, address production 

infrastructure, and further stewardship while sustaining major elements of the current stockpile. 

The new era of the nuclear deterrent is guided by the strategic framework for 

U.S. nuclear weapons policy outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and associated documents, such as the fiscal year 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. However, in the past year, several factors have required further detailed 

planning to confidently establish the basis for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear deterrent. These factors include changes in the plutonium strategy, a deeper 

understanding of modernization costs, and the technical state of the stockpile. As 

we move forward, we must have a clear understanding and broad agreement about 

the vision for our stockpile 20 years from now. That vision must be robust in the 

face of current and future treaty obligations, evolving policy direction, stockpile 

technical realities, our infrastructure capabilities, and fiscal constraints. I believe 

such a vision is emerging, and we are actively supporting the DOD and NNSA as 

they work through this planning. Simultaneously, we are ensuring that Sandia is 

positioned to fulfill its responsibilities in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

We are confident in our ability to do so. 

BUDGET OVERVIEW

I am pleased to report that the appropriated fiscal year 2012 budget will allow 

Sandia to both complete the 6.2A cost study for the B61 LEP and initiate full-scale 

engineering development at a pace consistent with a fiscal year 2019 first production unit. In this context, I wish to extend my thanks to the key authorization and 

appropriation committees of Congress for having approved reprogramming of fiscal 

year 2012 funds to achieve the full budget level required to complete our work. 

Without reprogramming, staffing would have been impacted at a number of nuclear 

weapons enterprise sites, including Sandia. In my view, fiscal year 2013 is critical 

to sustaining modernization at the schedule and scope required by recent Nuclear 

Weapons Council decisions and the overall framework of the Nuclear Posture Review. Within this section, I will focus on key elements required for Sandia to execute 

its near- and long-term responsibilities and the manner in which the fiscal year 

2013 budget request to Congress reflects those requirements. 

The B61 Life Extension Program 

Sandia supports the administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget request to Congress, 

which addresses funding for the B61 life extension. If fully appropriated, the fiscal 

year 2013 site splits for Sandia provide the necessary budget growth that permits 

Sandia to meet program requirements. fiscal year 2013 is crucial for the B61 as all 

component designs must be brought to a level that ensures successful system qualification on the path to fiscal year 2019. We will complete detailed cost estimates 

for the required scope of the B61 program in June of this year; however, from work 

we completed in 2011, we know with high confidence that the level of funding included in the fiscal year 2013 budget request is commensurate with the technology 

maturation and integration that must be conducted in fiscal year 2013 in order to 

meet the required schedule. 

Last year I testified that the B61 LEP would complete the cost estimation for the 

full-scope B61 LEP in fiscal year 2011. Indeed, a detailed cost study was completed 

on schedule that met all the DOD and NNSA objective requirements. As it became 

clear that the cost of meeting all objective requirements with delivery in fiscal year 

2017 would exceed near-term resource availability, the B61 LEP system design 

team was directed to examine reduced-scope options, which meet a renegotiated set 

of threshold requirements that would represent acceptable risk for the weapon system going forward. This work led to the scope accepted by the Nuclear Weapons 

Council in December 2011, which reduces the cost of the program while ensuring 

a modernized B61 that meets military threshold requirements and addresses technical concerns expressed in my annual stockpile assessment letter from September 

2011. While I strongly support this scope, it is important to recognize that the new 

program does have increased risk resulting from the partial reuse of components 

and the loss of schedule margin. The schedule is now driven tightly by technical realities in the current system. The reuse of certain components further heightens the 

importance of a robust surveillance program. 

I cannot emphasize enough the significance of timely funding authorization and 

appropriation. Consistent, predictable multiyear funding is vital for the fiscal year 

2019 B61–12 first production unit as it allows for the seamless progression of development, qualification, and production and for development of the necessary workforce. Plans for uninterrupted execution under a possible continuing resolution in 

36 

fiscal year 2013 will be needed if the schedule is to be met. The success of the B61 

LEP also requires the necessary support for the nuclear explosive package agency 

(Los Alamos National Laboratory) and the production complex. 

The B61 LEP represents the largest nuclear weapon product development effort 

that the nuclear weapons complex has undertaken since the 1970s, an effort roughly 

three times that of the W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP, which is now in production. We recognize that the funding levels required at Sandia for this program 

are significant. Therefore, we are focused on efforts to reduce cost over the life of 

the program and to manage with full transparency and commitment to program 

rigor. Examples of our efforts include: (1) actions we have taken to reduce, by over 

$1 billion, labor costs associated with Laboratory-wide pension and medical care 

over the coming decade; (2) maximum leverage we have sought from other weapon 

development efforts and from the work we do for other Federal agencies; and (3) 

consistent use of the tools of stewardship to reduce the costs of weapon qualification 

by comparison with historical efforts. Throughout this program, we will continue to 

seek further cost efficiencies. For example, the governance reform efforts being considered also afford the opportunity for further savings. 

My last comment on the B61 program has to do with staffing. For this life extension, we have now approximately 30 product realization teams working to complete 

the Weapon Development and Cost Report and being prepared to initiate full-scale 

engineering design of components and subsystems upon entry into Phase 6.3. We 

aggressively staffed this program in fiscal year 2011 to accomplish our objectives on 

the current schedule. In July 2010, we had a core of approximately 80 staff on the 

B61 project. By the end of fiscal year 2011, we had staffed to more than 500. This 

group includes experienced weapon designers, individuals with design and program 

management experience from other large non-nuclear-weapon programs at Sandia, 

and many new professionals who represent the future intellectual base of our deterrent. It has been a challenge to assemble this team, but we have done so. Major 

instabilities in funding will make it difficult to keep this team stable and will lead 

to amplified schedule and cost impacts if we need to periodically reassemble the 

team. 

Further Modernization Efforts 

The B61 LEP is one in a series of programs with timelines extending to 2035 that 

have been documented in the fiscal year 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. Among them are the W88 Alteration (ALT), the modernization of elements of our ballistic missile capabilities, and a possible weapon system associated 

with long-range stand-off delivery vehicles. 

Sandia is pursuing work on the W88 ALT, which involves replacing the Arming, 

Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) system and other nonnuclear components. The W88 ALT 

is scheduled for first production unit in December 2018, driven by the overall Navy 

program and schedule, components reaching their end of life, the need for additional 

surveillance quantities, and alignment with the common fuze developed for the Air 

Force for the W87. 

The Nuclear Posture Review recommended ‘‘initiating a study of LEP options for 

the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead 

also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types’’ (p. xiv). A larger vision of 

an interoperable set of ballistic warheads has matured since the release of the Nuclear Posture Review 2 years ago; this approach will support a more flexible, responsive, resilient stockpile for an uncertain future. Indeed, the Phase 6.1 concept assessment study for this modernization effort is nearing completion, and Sandia provided the warhead systems engineering and integration. We are fully leveraging the 

work we have done over the past several years on modular warhead architectures 

and adaptable nonnuclear components, including a recent study focused on a modular AF&F design. 

By being adaptable to several weapon systems, our modular AF&F approach leads 

to significant cost savings. Using an envelope of the requirements for the W78, W88, 

and W87, our study concluded that the modular AF&F approach is technically feasible. While the modular AF&F cannot be identical in each weapon system because 

the nuclear explosive package is different, it can be designed to be adaptable, with 

many common components and common technologies. In each life extension, we will 

also make appropriate improvements in safety and security, which are enabled in 

part by miniaturization of electronics. Savings in weight and volume, at a premium 

in reentry systems, can be used for those additional safety and security features. 

The results of the W78 LEP Phase 6.1 concept assessment study are planned for 

briefing to the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee later this 

year. 

37 

Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment 

Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in assuring the nuclear 

deterrent. Findings from conducting this program provide us with knowledge about 

the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile, provide the technical basis for 

our annual stockpile assessment reported to the President of the United States 

through the annual assessment process, and inform decisions about required elements of the LEPs and their timelines. 

Multiple drivers heighten the importance of the surveillance program. Among 

them are the following: an unprecedented age of the stockpile, which includes many 

subsystems that were not originally designed for extended life; smaller stockpile 

numbers; and for at least the next 20 years, surveillance of a stockpile that will contain simultaneously both our oldest weapons and life-extended weapons, which must 

be examined for possible birth defects and for further aging of reused components. 

If fully appropriated, the fiscal year 2013 site splits for Sandia provide the resources to meet our highest priority surveillance needs, which include conducting 

planned system tests—both flight and laboratory tests—but they limit the pace at 

which we can implement additional component tests and develop new diagnostics 

needed to improve our predictive capabilities. These predictive capabilities, which 

provide a better understanding of margins, uncertainties, and trends, are needed to 

ensure lead times necessary to respond to aging issues that would have the potential to reduce stockpile safety, security, or reliability. To minimize the risk to the 

stockpile, given the realities of the current fiscal environment, we are implementing 

a risk-based prioritization of our surveillance activities. Success in this important 

area will require continued strong budget support in the out-years. 

Essential Infrastructure and Capabilities 

Sandia’s capabilities are essential to its full life cycle responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition to design, development, qualification, testing, and ultimately to ongoing stockpile surveillance and assessment. Let me point 

out a few examples. 

The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons program. Our facilities and equipment in this area are extensive: (1) 20 test facilities at Sandia; (2) 

the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada; and (3) the Weapon Evaluation Test Laboratory 

in Amarillo, TX. We use environmental test capabilities to simulate the full range 

of mechanical, thermal, electrical, explosive, and radiation environments that nuclear weapons must withstand, including those associated with postulated accident 

scenarios. In addition to these experimental and test facilities, Sandia’s high-performance computing capabilities are vital tools for our mission responsibilities in 

stockpile surveillance, certification, and qualification, and they have proved to be indispensable in our broader national security work. 

I am very pleased that funding for the completion of the Test Capabilities Revitalization Phase 2 is included in the administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget request 

for weapons activities. This funding will enable us to renovate our suite of mechanical environment test facilities, which are essential to support the design and qualification of the B61 life extension and subsequent life extensions. 

The administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget request also includes funding for the 

initial Tonopah Test Range upgrades in recognition of this facility being an essential 

mission requirement. However, sustained investment over multiple years is necessary to complete the required scope of the upgrades. Development flight tests will 

be conducted at the Tonopah Test Range for the B61 life extension. 

I am equally pleased that the new budget request addresses the beginning of a 

recapitalization program for our silicon fabrication facility, the requirements for 

which I addressed in my testimony last year. I will restate that Sandia stewards 

for the nuclear weapons program, as well as for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

nonproliferation payloads, the microelectronics research and fabrication facility, 

where we design and fabricate an array of unique microelectronics, specialty optical 

components, and microelectromechanical system devices. The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes funding for the first year of a 4-year program that will recapitalize the tooling and equipment in our silicon fabrication facility, much of which 

dates back about 15 years in an industry where technology changes almost every 

2 years. For completion of the program, commitment to multiyear funding is required. Recapitalization will reduce the risk for delivering the B61 LEP and ensure 

production of the radiation-hardened components required by the W88 ALT and all 

future reentry system LEPs. As we go forward on modernization, our microelectronics fabrication facilities, which form the basis of our trusted foundry, will be 

critical to ensuring the integrity of our supply chain. 

38 

Nonproliferation 

Sandia’s portfolio of nonproliferation activities contains a full array of programs 

aimed at combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Working collaboratively with Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories and 

several other DOE laboratories, we are: 

• developing technologies to ‘‘convert, remove, and protect’’ nuclear and radiological materials that could be used in nuclear and radiological weapons, 

• conducting international work for material protection, 

• increasing effectiveness in large-scale field experimentation for nonproliferation test monitoring and arms control, 

• ensuring that the on-orbit satellite program meets current requirements 

and adapts to future monitoring challenges, 

• developing ground-based systems for more effective seismic monitoring; 

• enabling other countries to develop nuclear security centers of excellence, 

and 

• conducting international work in support of cooperative threat reduction 

programs. 

In addition to working with other laboratories, we are engaging globally with 

international partners in more than 100 countries to reduce the threat of proliferation. Our primary customers for this work are the NNSA, Department of State, and 

DOD. As a general comment, I will state that nonproliferation funding has shown 

stability at Sandia. The administration’s fiscal year 2013 Budget Request to Congress continues that trend, with budget increases in certain areas and reductions 

in others. I am pleased to see balanced increases both in the technologies that respond to immediate national security needs and in the R&D necessary to sustain 

the flexibility to meet future national security requirements. In particular, the long 

lead time for satellite monitoring systems requires a sustained commitment to leading-edge R&D. This budget demonstrates that commitment and will enable the national labs to attract ‘‘the best and the brightest,’’ who are eager to participate in 

exciting R&D projects with an enduring impact on U.S. and global security. 

Synergy between Our Nuclear Weapons Mission and Broader National Security Work 

Today’s national security challenges are highly diverse. The NNSA laboratories 

are contributing solutions to the complex national security challenges. Indeed, as 

mentioned in the fiscal year 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Summary, ‘‘while NNSA nuclear weapons activities are clearly focused on the strategic deterrence aspects of the NNSA mission, they also inform and support with 

critical capabilities other aspects of national security’’ (p. 7). In turn, to sustain and 

sharpen these competencies, Sandia relies on its broader national security work. 

The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapon mission and broader national security missions prevents insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and engineering environment that attracts and retains the new talent that 

we need. Such an environment is essential to succeed against the challenges we now 

face. The following example highlights the way in which this symbiotic relationship 

works. 

Sandia has led the development of real-time processing and high performance-tovolume ratio technologies for synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Both technologies 

were made possible by our extensive design and development work for radars for 

nuclear weapon fuzing. The technologies have been leveraged and are currently 

used by the DOD. The extensive SAR work has sharpened our radar design competencies and kept Sandia aligned with advances in radar technology, such as radiofrequency integrated circuits. We are now applying these modern technologies to the 

design of the replacement radar for the B61 LEP and the W88 ALT. 

This symbiotic relationship enables leveraging not only capabilities and technologies, but also engineering practices and processes. One of these areas with direct application across business areas and customers is cost management. A new 

cost management process was developed and successfully implemented during our 

work on fuze development for the U.S. Navy. Once work was delivered within the 

Navy’s cost targets, many of the staff transitioned to work on the large satellite programs, where additional processes were developed for cost and change control. Once 

again, after delivery of expected results, many of those same staff transitioned onto 

NNSA’s current LEPs, including the B61 LEP. This synergistic rotation of staff 

across business areas and the lessons learned from a diverse set of customers and 

programs have created an environment of cost control and provided a set of cost 

management processes and practices that are now being implemented on NNSA’s 

current programs. In a climate of fiscal responsibility, Sandia is finding innovative 

solutions to control cost. 

39 

Today it is no longer imaginable that the laboratories could deliver consistently 

on the commitments to the nuclear weapons program without the synergistic interagency work that attracts top talent, hones our skills, and provides stability through 

the nuclear weapons program cycles. Government commitment for the broad national security work of the laboratories is essential for the United States to ensure 

the preeminence of our nuclear weapons and to enable multidisciplinary technical 

solutions to other complex and high-risk national security challenges. 

Workforce 

Our talented people are our most fundamental capability. Given the scope and nature of our work, it is mandatory to continue attracting, retaining, and training a 

highly capable workforce committed to ‘‘exceptional service in the national interest.’’ 

To do so, we must: (1) ensure that our work is aligned with the national purpose; 

(2) create a climate of innovation and creativity that inspires our workforce; and (3) 

create a balanced work environment that is both responsive to the fiscal realities 

of our times and attractive to the talented staff we need in the future. 

At Sandia, we have been proactive about hiring new staff into the weapons program, as experienced staff retired. The modernization program provides opportunities for the new technical staff to work closely with our experienced designers: from 

advanced concept development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2010, we have hired approximately 300 outstanding advanceddegree scientists and engineers directly into the weapons program as we execute 

modernization. Of these, well over one-half are essentially new graduates anxious 

to begin their careers working on the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. It is very important that we provide individuals such as these with an environment where they can 

undertake the multiyear learning it takes to technically steward the Nation’s nuclear stockpile now and into the future. Indeed, in the end, the Nation’s deterrent 

rests upon the strength of our people. We have a new generation of scientists and 

engineers prepared to take on that challenge now that we have entered the modernization era, but we must strive to provide the stability, focus, and national commitment that will enable their success. 

As I testified last year before this subcommittee and as I stated above, fiscal realities have forced us to reduce costs by addressing the funding liabilities in our pension program, restructuring the healthcare benefits, and simplifying internal processes. All these actions were necessary, but they can go no further without compromising our ability to attract and retain. 

Governance 

Finally, I would like to state that I am much encouraged by the recent broad discussion around NNSA’s oversight of the national security laboratories. Future improvements, as recommended by the National Academy of Sciences study ‘‘Observations on NNSA’s Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise’’ 

will allow us to reinvest needed resources back into the mission. 

A strategic oversight model is needed, which will bring to the forefront the need 

for such governance principles as mission clarity, commitment to using the robust 

construct of federally funded research and development centers, and commitment to 

the full use of the government-owned and contractor-operated model. 

We understand that effective government oversight of our operations is essential. 

However, I am concerned that the magnitude and detailed level of our current oversight model can impede our efforts to continually improve our safety, security, environmental, and cost performance. It is also not evident that the oversight model 

under which the NNSA laboratories operate is comparable to that of other federally 

funded entities engaged in similar work. I encourage the administration and Congress to consider improvements in this area. 

CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, ‘‘as long as nuclear weapons exist, 

the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal’’ (p. iii). 

Having embarked on the new era of the nuclear deterrent, we are guided by the 

strategic framework for U.S. nuclear weapons policy outlined in the 2010 Nuclear 

Posture Review and associated documents, such as the fiscal year 2012 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan. However, in the past year, several factors have 

required further detailed planning to confidently establish the basis for sustaining 

and modernizing our nuclear deterrent. Among these factors are changes in the plutonium strategy, a deeper understanding of modernization costs, and the technical 

state of the stockpile. As we move forward, we must have a clear understanding and 

broad agreement about the vision for our stockpile 20 years into the future. I believe 

40 

such a vision is emerging, and we are actively supporting the DOD and NNSA in 

their planning efforts. Simultaneously, we are ensuring that Sandia is positioned to 

fulfill its responsibilities in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. We are confident in our ability to do so. 

Sandia supports the administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget request to Congress. 

Seamless progression of development, qualification, and production on the B61 LEP 

requires funds appropriated in a timely manner in fiscal year 2013 and all subsequent years to meet the goal of a first production unit in fiscal year 2019. Our commitment to the demanding and solemn responsibility for stockpile modernization, 

stewardship, and annual assessment is unwavering. It also comes with an obligation 

to be second to none in science and engineering and to steward the Nation’s resources efficiently. Sandia is committed to fulfilling its service to the Nation with 

excellence and judicious cost management. The fact that the three national security 

laboratory directors were invited to speak before you today and answer your questions is a clear indication of the leadership role of Congress in authorizing a sound 

path forward for U.S. nuclear deterrence. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

We will do a 7-minute round. Senator Inhofe has to attend another hearing. So I will defer to him. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. 

I just returned from Afghanistan, and I will say the same thing 

to you that I said to some of the commanders there. There are a 

lot of things that we need that we are not getting. They are not 

adequately funded. This is true at the labs. This is not your fault. 

You did a great job. All three of you are doing a great job with the 

hand that you are dealt, but I think we need to deal you a better 

hand, if I have said that right, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just mention a couple of things that I would like to get 

on record. Then I do have to go to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee because I am actually the ranking member there. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget for the NNSA makes a number of 

significant changes to the nuclear weapons complex modernization 

plan the President supported when he asked for the Senate to ratify the New START treaty. Some of you were not really involved 

on a lot of those discussions, but in attempting to get the votes necessary for the New START treaty, commitments were made that 

affect you. 

By deferring a major construction project at Los Alamos, the 

NNSA effectively terminated a key enabler necessary to meet 

STRATCOM requirements as well as the confidence necessary to 

support the future reductions. During our hearing in March, General Robert Kehler, the head of STRATCOM, testified that he is 

concerned with the lack of a plan and strategy to meet STRATCOM 

requirements. According to General Kehler, he will be ‘‘concerned 

until somebody presents a plan that we can look at and be comfortable with and understand that it is being supported.’’ 

So, Dr. McMillan, Dr. Hommert, and Dr. Albright, if you would 

just answer these questions, I would like to get you on the record. 

Do you share General Kehler’s concerns? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Senator Inhofe, why don’t I start since CMRR is 

my responsibility? 

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I failed to ask to get my written comments into the record. So if they could please be included. 

Senator NELSON. Without objection. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. I would say we do not yet have a plan. In that 

I agree with General Kehler. However, from my perspective, I see 

a substantial amount of work going on both with DOD and with 

41 

DOE, and at the laboratory we have been involved with that work 

to develop a plan. 

I mentioned elements of that development in my testimony which 

is to talk about the concept of pit reuse. In my view, a plan is more 

than a concept. A plan involves ideas, a project plan, and funding 

that is consistent with that, and we are not yet at that stage. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

Comments, Dr. Albright? Basically do you agree with General 

Kehler? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, I would say I generally do agree with him. 

I would just make the caution that because of the deferral of 

CMRR, the technical solutions that we are looking at for our LEPs 

are constrained in a certain way that we are, I think, I would say, 

cautiously optimistic that we can accommodate those constraints, 

but it is by no means a done deal. 

Senator INHOFE. Not with the current resources you have. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. With the current resources we have. The issue 

here gets around to pit reuse and how you can accommodate that 

pit reuse within the constraints of the NPR. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you generally agree with that, Dr. 

Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. I would share General Kehler’s view that right at 

this moment we do not have a plan, as I mentioned in my oral 

statement. It is very important that we can see what the stockpile 

we want to have 20 years from now because when you back up 

from that, we have to make technical choices or begin scientific 

work today that would position us to have that stockpile in the future. I am encouraged that I think such a plan can be developed, 

but we do not have that in hand today. 

Senator INHOFE. The three of you heard me say in my opening 

statement that the commitment on behalf of the administration to 

modernize the nuclear weapons complex was a key element in the 

ratification of the New START treaty. Were you aware of that? 

Okay. 

Do you agree that modernization is universally recognized as essential to the future viability of the nuclear weapons complex and 

the prerequisite for future reductions? You would generally agree 

with that statement? 

Dr. HOMMERT. I would say that modernization from a technical 

standpoint is required for the U.S. stockpile, yes. 

Senator INHOFE. Is it true that this budget would result in a— 

and I am going to name some delays here—the 2-year delay in the 

B61 LEP and also delay of the completion of the W76 LEP by 4 

years and then by 3 years the W78, W88 LEP, those three extensions? This budget would result in those extensions? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. The budget is consistent with the timeframe. 

Senator INHOFE. Lastly, I would say, does your budget provide 

the resources necessary to meet the DOD requirements? 

Here is what I am trying to get at. These are not trick questions 

or anything. I am very much concerned. It harms those of us who 

are trying to expand this program trying to meet the commitments 

that are out there that we should be meeting as a committee. We 

are on your side, but when we do not get you on record saying that 

42 

there are some inadequacies we do not have much to hang our hat 

on. I am concerned about this, about the requirements. 

First of all, you talk about a letter that you sent. I am a little 

confused because I hear now and then the term ‘‘certification.’’ Do 

you folks have to certify and is this in the form of a letter? How 

does that work? 

Dr. HOMMERT. We are required annually to submit a letter to the 

Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, each individually 

stating our technical view of the annual assessment of the stockpile 

as to its safety and reliability. 

Senator INHOFE. And modernization and—— 

Dr. HOMMERT. Requirements that might flow from that. 

Senator INHOFE. That is good. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. In addition, when a system first enters the stockpile system, Senator, we certify it at that point, and then we review 

it annually to make sure that things have not changed in a way 

that would cause us to have—— 

Senator INHOFE. You are actually certifying for that point in 

time, that snapshot. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. That is right, and then we review that. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. The subcommittee has been told that 

1 or 2 years of additional funding will not be sufficient to put the 

U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise back on a sound footing. I believe, 

having visited with the STRATCOM people, that their requirement 

is for NNSA to generate up to 80 nuclear pits per year, and the 

NNSA will not be able to achieve that rate until a new CMRR facility is in operation. 

How critical are the uranium processing facility and the chemistry and metallurgy research replacement nuclear facilities to our 

future stockpile? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Senator, I have responsibility for that facility, so 

let me start. 

The purpose of that facility, just to make sure we are all on the 

same page, is that it provides the analytical capabilities to ensure 

the quality. It provides analytical capabilities that can serve in 

nonproliferation/counterproliferation missions. It is simply the ability to handle the number of samples that would be required when 

we produce pits in PF4 that we need that for. At this point, without CMRR, we do not have a way that I know of to be able to make 

as many as 50 to 80 pits. 

Senator INHOFE. I see. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. We can make, with investments that we do not 

yet have, we could make maybe 20 to 30 with the facilities we 

have. 

Senator INHOFE. That is a very good answer, a good answer to 

the question. Any disagreement with that? 

The last thing I want to mention, Mr. Chairman—I know my 

time expired and I do need to get back upstairs. But relating to 

these two $5 billion buildings, I do not quite understand. I have 

heard a lot of views on this that those funds and resources could 

be used elsewhere more effectively. Is there a reason that the two 

buildings have to be $5 billion buildings? Have you all looked into 

that and made recommendations? 

43 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Again, I have looked very hard at that because 

of my responsibilities, and I can assure you that I pressured my 

team substantially on that. 

What you always have with buildings like this is you have a 

range of prices. Our current estimate at Los Alamos is something 

in the region of $3.7 billion, but I can tell you as delay occurs, we 

are moving toward the upper end of that range. The range that— 

your $5 billion is closer to the top end of that range. 

But as a manager, I feel a deep responsibility for the taxpayers’ 

dollars, to use those as efficiently as we can, and I can assure you 

I have worked closely with my teams to get the costs as low as we 

can while ensuring safety for the material that we handle. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate your answer, and I think it is significant because a lot of the things that are happening there, 

delays, things that were not in my opinion agreed upon in advance 

when they signed the New START treaty, are budget-driven. So 

you look for places where the budget is on the other side of it. It 

just appears to me that some of that could be in better use. 

I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, your allowing me to do this so I 

can get back to my other committee. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate 

very much your being here. 

Dr. Shank, your recent study finds a lack of trust between the 

NNSA and its laboratories. I think you have outlined it as the relationship as oversight over transactions versus oversight over processes. Can you tell us a little bit how you determined that lack of 

trust to draw that conclusion? 

Dr. SHANK. In our discussions, we visited all three laboratories. 

We talked to site managers. We talked to all parties involved. We 

looked at the core issue of how one does oversight and does oversight effectively. If you do oversight with a trusted organization, 

you create an overall system and you audit that system. If you do 

oversight where there is a lack of trust, you want to look at every 

transaction. You want to look every time something moves. You 

want to look at every safety activity. 

We said, well, the really core problem is reestablishing trust so 

that one could put together a structure so that the laboratories 

could have very cost-effective oversight with fewer people more 

cost-effectively and begin to look how one does oversight in the industrial part of our society. We think it is eminently doable, but 

it means a very different way of going about doing this business. 

Sandia has a model that they have attempted to put in place. It 

has been more than a decade in coming. It is not making progress. 

It seems to me, unless we do something different, we will be stuck 

with our current situation. 

So, my view of this is there is a time now to think about not just 

doing oversight, but doing more effective oversight with less cost 

and that really is going to use some kind of national standards, 

taking advantage of other agencies that could do oversight, that do 

oversight more broadly and begin to make the laboratories look like 

not only other industry but even some other national laboratories 

in places outside NNSA. 

44 

Senator NELSON. You are not suggesting that there not be oversight. What you are saying is you just cannot have oversight over 

every transaction, every movement, everything every day. 

Dr. SHANK. Correct. Oversight is absolutely essential to assure 

the American taxpayer that the dollars are being spent well. We 

are in no way saying that that should be in any way done with less 

intensity. It should be done more efficiently, and when you do not 

trust an organization, you look at every movement. When you have 

trust and the laboratories have qualified through a process to have 

a system—they do not just have a system. You have to go through 

a qualification process—then you monitor that system and it is a 

more effective way of doing business. It is the way industry does 

this kind of thing. 

Senator NELSON. Monitoring and auditing. 

Dr. SHANK. Through auditing. 

Senator NELSON. I am going to ask each of the directors. Dr. McMillan, do you agree with what Dr. Shank has said? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. I do. If I could just maybe add a little to what 

Dr. Shank said. 

I think the operational issues of trust may be where things show 

up most for me, and by that, I do not just mean how people feel 

about it, but rather what shows up day-to-day at the laboratory. I 

firmly agree with the importance of oversight because we are in a 

government-owned/contractor-operated situation, there are substantial liabilities. So the government has, in my view, an important governmental function in ensuring that we who have the responsibility for managing those facilities are doing it well and carefully. 

Senator NELSON. Do you agree that the current situation involves a lack of trust? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. I certainly see that at the operational level, just 

as Dr. Shank described it, the evidence being that so many of the 

transactions are individually monitored. Yes. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Albright, do you agree that there is this 

lack of trust? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, I do, and let me elaborate just a little bit. 

The real issue here, I think, is part of it is the unwillingness of 

the government to allow the people who they have actually hired 

to operate these facilities to make rational assessments of risk and 

operate the facilities and make the trades that they need to make 

in order to do the mission. 

But I think the even larger issue is the idea that we at the national laboratories—we are the corporate memory. We are the sinews and muscle and the brains of the nuclear complex. We need 

to operate as partners with the Federal Government, not as suppliers or vendors in the kind of contractual model that, I think, 

really is a more pervasive attitude. 

So I think we have to restore this idea that we are really linked 

arm-and-arm. We are here for the mission, both the government 

side and the laboratories. We each have a role and responsibility 

to play, and we ought to be allowed to do that. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes, I would agree. I would just say that the terminology ‘‘lack of trust’’ to me equates to not functioning at the sysVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Nov 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76896.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
45 

tem level. I actually believe that the model we operate today, even 

from the government perspective, is not a highly effective oversight 

model in achieving an integrated overall improvement in the operational performance, the cost-effectiveness, the productivity of the 

institutions, which I think at a system level we share the same 

goal. I think we are actually not progressing on that as effectively 

as we could because of the model we operate in. 

Senator NELSON. If there were trust, then it would be much easier for the oversight to move away from transactional to more directional because you have been hired to do what now they do not 

trust you to do without their oversight. Right? Understandable. 

Thank you. 

Senator Vitter, you have arrived. Do you have some opening comments you might like to make or would you like to go to some questions? 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I will wait until the 

questions and discussion, if that is appropriate now or a little later. 

Senator NELSON. Okay, thank you. We are taking 7-minute 

rounds. 

Dr. Patel, your study found that the autonomy in the laboratories 

has significantly declined as FFRDCs, a hallmark of DOE dating 

back to the Manhattan Project which has given rise to scientific excellence. Can you explain this perhaps in a little bit more detail? 

Dr. PATEL. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What do I mean by autonomy? By autonomy, we mean a task is 

given and then it is monitored not on a transaction basis but on 

a performance basis, performance which is based on a system of 

checks and balances that, as the work is carried out, that are put 

in place. 

What has happened and what we observed through our visits to 

the three laboratories, as well as discussions with a number of scientists, engineers, and mid-level managers, is that many of the decisionmaking capabilities no longer exist with them, resulting in a 

more short-term look at how science and engineering are carried 

out and much of the long-term planning often does not get done 

principally because of the transactional oversight that I just mentioned and we have heard about earlier. 

So one issue is how do we go about getting to this issue of autonomy. I think especially in the science and engineering area where 

the work gets carried out not over a yearly period, but it is also 

over several years, and the importance of it cannot be minimized 

because that is what provides the underpinning of the primary responsibility of the three laboratories for the nuclear stockpile. In 

order to do that, what is required is a level of trust but, more than 

that, an understanding on the part of NNSA and other managers 

that the laboratory directors are the people who are closest to the 

real problems and should be given an opportunity to plan a program which assures the long-term reliability of the science and engineering, which then in turn impacts upon the long-term reliability of the nuclear stockpile. 

The second issue with autonomy is an increasing amount of nonscientific and non-technical operational oversight of what gets 

done, and this very quickly results in some parts of the activity 

seem to be being discouraged. Especially experimental activities 

46 

where a young scientist or an engineer wants to carry out an experiment to assure that certain expectations, certain modeling calculations are right, those are often slowed down. The ultimate result is that the autonomy which should reside with the young people in deciding how to get things done is not there. It leads to, over 

the long-term, difficulty in hiring the kind of outstanding people 

the laboratories need. 

I believe that a good example of an autonomous laboratory which 

produces a lot from my personal experience is Bell Laboratories 

where I managed all of their physics and material science activities 

for a fair period of time. We were given overall responsibility to ensure that the physics or material science that was needed by the 

company was there, but we were not told how to do each and every 

single experiment. Yes, we were audited at the end of the year. 

Yes, we were required to provide progress reports, but nobody second guessed us in terms of what we were doing. I think that level 

of autonomy should come back to the laboratory directors for us to 

assure that our taxpayers’ dollars get us the biggest bang for the 

buck. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. McMillan, do you agree that there has been pressure on the 

independence of your laboratory compared to prior years? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. I think there are two areas for that, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me refer back to the annual assessment process, the annual assessment of certification. In that regard, I feel no pressure 

on the outcomes of our studies, and were there any pressure there, 

I would be deeply concerned. 

However, in the types of activities that Dr. Patel described, I 

share his concern. In particular, he talked about the assignment of 

tasks and then monitoring to see that they are finished. I would 

add to that ensuring that that assignment is at the right level because if the assignment is at a very low level, it becomes do this, 

do that, do the other thing. On the other hand, if it accomplishes 

this goal, I think that draws on the laboratory’s skills. 

Finally, as Dr. Patel mentioned in Bell Labs, I think there are 

other examples that we need to look to today to understand relationships between the government and FFRDCs. Here, I think of 

places like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins, et cetera. We have examples, and I 

think looking at those examples for models could be very helpful. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Albright? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I actually have nothing to add. I think Dr. McMillan hit the nail right on the head. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes, I agree, Mr. Chairman. I would just add that 

I think this is a very pragmatic issue for us. As we approach modernization, it is very important that we can look to best leverage 

the funds. If we are tasked at a very fine level, we lose some of 

the ability to leverage and achieve overall cost-effectiveness and 

productivity as we try to accomplish modernization. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Vitter? 

47 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of 

you for being here and, more importantly, for your work. 

Like a lot of members on the subcommittee and otherwise, I have 

a single, very basic, fundamental concern which is funding for all 

this activity really being dramatically cut and changed since the 

New START treaty was passed in a way that is inconsistent with 

some of the fundamental discussions, including the section 1251 

updated report that led to it being passed. That is my big, big concern here. There are plenty of other areas of concern, but that is 

my big concern. 

So, Dr. Hommert, let me start with you because I think you 

signed onto a letter that is a clear example of the scenario I am 

talking about. In December you wrote Senators Kerry and Lugar 

as chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee with other national laboratory leadership saying that, 

‘‘we are very pleased by the update to the section 1251 report as 

it would enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective stockpile,’’ et cetera. 

Also, ‘‘it clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others have voiced in the past about potential future year funding 

shortfalls and it substantially reduces risk to the overall program.’’ 

Since then, we passed New START and since then the budgets 

have suffered. So what is your current assessment of our staying 

on that promised section 1251 report path? 

Dr. HOMMERT. It is clear that since that letter, which I think was 

probably late 2010, some of the conditions have changed. We have 

a different plutonium strategy that will require, as Dr. McMillan 

can speak to, a different approach. We have a better understanding 

of the costs of modernization, and I think that right now, as I mentioned earlier, we do not yet have a plan that is completely closed 

and by that I mean with an authorized and appropriated budget 

plan in multiyears that would lead me to believe the same level of 

confidence at that time. I believe we can get to that. Of course, in 

the intervening time, we have faced additional fiscal constraints 

overall which have clearly impacted the budget effort. So some further work is necessary to achieve that same level of confidence 

going forward at this point. 

Senator VITTER. Today, as we speak, would you be prepared to 

sign the same type of letter and express the same level of confidence? 

Dr. HOMMERT. I would not be able to do that today without seeing the details of the plan of how we would move the entirety of 

the stockpile through a modernization period given the current constraints we have. 

Senator VITTER. The changes that have occurred, including strategy that affects spending—do any of those justify in your mind the 

level of budget cuts that we have seen in proposals since that assurance to Congress since the section 1251 report update? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Let us see. I believe that we have pressure on 

both sides, downward pressure on the budget, also some cost estimates that in the intervening time both in the facility space and 

in the modernization effort require a new risk position on the program overall. We do not have that plan yet defined. So I guess I 

cannot quite answer that. What I can say is that clearly the budget 

48 

picture is more constrained from both the costs of the enterprise 

and also the overall fiscal constraints that you are dealing with. 

That requires a new plan which we do not have at this point fully 

developed. 

Senator VITTER. Dr. McMillan, I would like to ask you the same 

general sorts of things. You say in your testimony today that you, 

‘‘continue to believe that the direction laid out in the NPR and the 

1251 report provides an appropriate and technically sound course.’’ 

Dr. MCMILLAN. That is correct. 

Senator VITTER. Now, first of all, I assume when you say the 

1251 report, you mean that update. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. The updated report, yes. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. I agree that that is a sound course. My question 

is, are we on that course anymore? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. No, we are not on that course. 

In answer to elements of the other questions you had asked, I 

see us in a position where our risk is increasing. We are working 

very closely with our colleagues in DOD and DOE to develop the 

plan that my colleague, Dr. Hommert, talked about. However, I believe that is a plan that has higher risk than the plan that we had 

laid out in the 1251 updated report. 

Senator VITTER. So I take it from what you just said, first of all, 

the budget cuts since December 2010 did not flow out of developing 

a new plan. They just happened and we are trying to get a new 

plan built around that now. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. I cannot speak to all the details of how the budget occurred. That is not something I am an expert in. But I can tell 

you that in the current budget environment, which is understandably constrained with the overall budget that our Nation faces, that 

we are working now to say how can we move forward given the 

budget we have. It is a very difficult problem. 

Senator VITTER. My only point is that these new numbers, these 

cuts happened first and we are trying to cope with it. It is not the 

natural outflow of a new, improved plan. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. From my perspective, we do not yet have a plan 

because we do not have a budget that is associated with that plan 

that we understand yet. 

Senator VITTER. I think also what you said a few minutes ago is 

that when we get there, you expect that new plan to put us at 

higher risk. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. That is correct. This plan has more technical risk 

in it than the technical risk that we had in the plan that was laid 

out in 2010. 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Chairman, that is my big concern, and I 

think it is a pretty simple story. The Senate, I think, paid great 

attention to this testimony from these experts in December 2010, 

and I think the 1251 updated report was pivotal in passing New 

START through the Senate. Now, I did not vote for it, but I think 

it was pivotal in getting the affirmative votes. Here we are a year 

and a half later and it is all out the window, and all bets are off, 

and I am gravely concerned about that. 

Now, I know we are in a tough budget environment, but it is not 

like we were running surpluses in December 2010. It is not like we 

are in a very different budget environment. We knew all of that 

49 

then. I am real concerned about our collectively having passed New 

START based on these promises, this course, and now hardly a 

year and a half later, we are way off course. We are trying to get 

a plan to catch up with lower budget numbers, and the experts tell 

us when—and we are not there yet—we will be at higher risk. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

Dr. Shank, your report stressed the importance of NNSA laboratories being national security laboratories for the government as a 

whole, and this was put forth in a governance charter signed by 

Secretaries Chu, Gates, Director of National Intelligence Blair, and 

Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Lane. 

Can you explain the importance of this charter? Do you see it as 

competition to other government agency laboratories, and if there 

is, is competition such a bad thing? 

Dr. SHANK. I believe the governance charter gives the agencies 

who signed onto that charter an opportunity to utilize the unique 

skills of the laboratories that have been developed as a part of 

their weapons mission. The weapons mission is becoming much 

more complex and costly. We just heard about cost in discussing 

that. By having the core capabilities that allow one to execute the 

weapons mission, having those capabilities exercised in problems 

that are important to the Nation, I think that that is an extraordinary advantage and a cost-effective way for the laboratories to 

deliver on their mission. 

I believe the capabilities are so unique that I do not see the issue 

of competition arising. I do not think that is an issue from my perspective. However, I must say we, as a committee, did not study 

competition. We looked at what were the unique capabilities in the 

lab, and those are the ones that are likely to be used. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. McMillan, what is your view on the importance of this governance charter, and do you feel that it creates 

from your perspective competition with the other laboratories? Or 

do you, as Dr. Shank has indicated, feel that perhaps your approach is so unique that competition is not a factor? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Let me take the second question first, Mr. Chairman, if I may. I think, by and large, the reason that other organizations come to our laboratories is because we are able to offer 

unique capabilities to them. So we look very hard to say are the 

questions we are being asked, the problems we are being asked to 

solve by DOD, DHS—are they aligned with the capabilities we 

have from the nuclear weapons work that we do and do we bring 

uniqueness to that. 

In answer to your first question, I think in many ways the 

memorandum of understanding really is aimed at formalizing 

something that has been happening over time. I think it is good in 

that regard because if there are important national security problems that the capabilities of the laboratories can be brought to bear 

on, particularly ones that then feed back in a positive way to our 

nuclear weapons mission, which, I think, almost all do, that it is 

very appropriate that these other organizations have better access 

to the laboratories. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Albright? 

50 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. The NNSA national laboratories have the world’s 

fastest computers. We have the world’s biggest lasers. We have 

25,000 collectively among us of the world’s smartest people, who 

work at the laboratory because they are dedicated to the mission 

of national security. To not put that into the service of the broader 

national security mission, in my view, would be a dereliction of 

duty for us. In fact, it is written into each one of the laboratory’s 

charters. In fact, it is written into the NNSA charter that that is 

something that should happen. 

Any government program manager, whether he is sitting in DOD 

or DHS or anywhere—certainly DOD, for example—they have the 

ability and have had for a long time to make a decision as to 

whether they are going to one of their organic laboratories or they 

are going to go to a NASA laboratory or to a DOE laboratory. Generally, they choose to come to the national laboratories precisely because we have these kinds of capabilities. We are not cheap. So if 

you are a subject-matter expert with a particular problem to solve, 

you come to the national laboratories because you are trying to tap 

into that core set of capabilities. 

I think the Mission Executive Council and this memorandum of 

understanding that you are referring to, as Dr. McMillan pointed 

out, really just is aimed at trying to get rid of some of the viscosity 

associated with the ability of these other agencies to interact with 

the laboratories. All three of us have been part of the ecosystem 

within DOD for 50 years, and we have been within the ecosystem 

of the DHS from the day it was founded. So the real issue here is, 

how can we bring this to a more strategic plane, how can these 

other agencies have a bit more insight into what our capabilities 

are and our sustainment of those capabilities, so that they can 

make rational decisions. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just add to what my 

two colleagues have said. In my laboratory, we probably have the 

largest portfolio of work with other Federal agencies. To me, it is 

a very great example of win-win. For us to execute the nuclear 

weapons mission, you need a set of capabilities that we sustain 

over time. That means recruiting new talent, sustaining their competence, developing their competence. There is just no way to really 

do that practically without broadening that work. They also bring 

back skills that they learn on other problems that benefit the 

weapons program. 

A very practical example. The radar engineers at my laboratory 

today designing the B61–12 radar 5 years ago were working on 

things that were deployed in theater that supported our warfighter, 

very unique applications. That is, in my view, a really synergistic 

value for our taxpayers in the investments you are making for us 

to accomplish our core mission. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

We have already explored the problems and the challenges with 

funding. Is it true and my understanding is correct that unless 

something is done, additional funding, you cannot meet the expectations that we have in place for modernization of the weapons in 

accordance with what our expectations are for the New START 

51 

treaty? Dr. McMillan? If I have not stated the question properly, 

would you state it for me? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Let me try answering and see if I come close to 

the question. 

On the B61 LEP, if we have stable, predictable funding, as we 

have laid out in what we call the 6.2A study, I believe we are positioned to deliver on that system by 2019. 

Senator NELSON. Stable funding is what you are talking about. 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Stable funding is a very big deal at the levels 

that we have laid out. Unpredictability makes it very difficult for 

us. 

I am much more concerned in the areas of the W78 and the W88 

because the delay in CMRR directly affects our plans there. As I 

mentioned earlier, we are working today with both DOD and DOE 

to develop a plan forward for the 78 and the 88 systems. So we do 

not yet have that plan, and until we have it, I cannot really answer 

your question. 

Furthermore, there is a body of technical work—and I mentioned 

some of this in my written testimony—associated with pit reuse 

that we are working on with experiments coming this summer that 

could say that strategy looks like it is worth pursuing or that strategy may have serious problems. So there is a body of technical 

work that will have to be done. I think, in fact, it will stretch over 

about 5 years. 

So I am not sure that answers your question, Mr. Chairman. I 

hope it comes close. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Albright? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Let me first echo what Dr. McMillan said, that 

certainly in the near-term with some additional technical risk, we 

can execute, we believe, the LEPs that are over the near-term. But 

I will again reemphasize there is some technical risk associated 

with that. 

My larger concern is not so much what happens next year or the 

year after that. It is what happens 5 or 10 years from now. If we 

do not continue to sustain funding of the overall effort, particularly 

in the areas of understanding the science of nuclear weapons, both 

experimentally and analytically, we run a huge risk ultimately in 

our ability to continue to do assessments and to conduct future 

LEPs. I think it is worth noting that there are LEPs on the books, 

on the schedule today, where the people executing them will have 

been trained by people who themselves have never conducted a nuclear test or designed a nuclear weapon from scratch. 

So this idea that we have to continue to sustain the overall program—it is not just about LEPs, but the overall program—to assure that we have a workforce that is qualified to do these LEPs 

as they come up and is qualified to understand when an issue 

shows up during surveillance whether it is a minor problem or a 

major problem, that is where I worry, that over time, that sustained level of effort will be under huge pressures. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Mr. Chairman, I think your question was very 

well-articulated. Let me emphasize an area of concern that I have, 

and that is on the B61. When we changed the schedule from 2017 

to 2019, which I understood and agreed, we did, however, exhaust 

52 

the schedule margin that we had. The 2019 schedule is important 

for real technical reasons which we would discuss in a closed session. So that is putting a challenge to us overall as an enterprise, 

including Congress, that we have the consistent multiyear funding 

that is required. If we have significant breaks due to a continuing 

resolution or other changes that might occur that you all understand far better than I, that is going to put that schedule in a significant risk position. So I think that this is a near-term test for 

our national commitment to modernization in executing the B61– 

12. 

Beyond that, I do believe that we can craft a plan to take the 

larger scope of our deterrent forward, but I would agree with what 

Dr. McMillan said, that that will involve some increased risk because of where we are at in our overall production capabilities. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Vitter? 

Senator VITTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I can just try to clarify 

the same point because I think it is our big core concern. I do not 

mean to try to dumb down this question too much for our sake, but 

let me ask it in a very sort of real-world way. 

On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you have described your comfort 

level, your level of confidence, with the plan overall in December 

2010 based on the updated 1251 report, based on all of the commitments that were made at that time, and compared to that number, 

how would you peg your confidence level, your comfort level today? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Since I am the one whose signature is on that 

2010 letter, let me start. I never thought of it in quite those terms, 

Senator, but I would say that—it is hard, but let me try and use 

your scale. 

I would say back then if everything that we anticipated—and 

recognize we did not have the detailed costing yet on some of these 

programs, but if we assumed that the costing was in alignment 

with what we expected in the 1251—and that confidence was probably 8, just down from technical issues we knew we would have to 

deal with, budget realities, and budget uncertainties. 

If you look today, for my case, since my lab is so much on the 

hook with respect to the B61–12, I have confidence in what we 

have costed to execute that work and the plan we have laid out. 

We know exactly, I think, what we have to accomplish. If budgeted, 

I am at a 9 or 10 in our ability to do that. 

When I look at the entirety of the modernization, then I am back 

at a lower level of confidence, 5 or 6, because we have not adjusted 

a plan to some of the boundary conditions that you articulated earlier and changes of funding and production capability. 

I hope that is not too complicated an answer, but I do look at 

a near-term and long-term perspective of where I sit today. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. If you look at the situation that existed in 2010, 

the program that was in place in 2010 was adequately funded, 

given what we understood about the costs. At that point, you would 

have to give it something like a 9 or a 10. That was a pretty robust 

program. 

Two things, of course, changed: the costs went up and the budgets came down. One of the impacts of that budget, as we have all 

pointed out, has been some additional technical risk which drives 

53 

you down to—I hate to put a number on these things, but a 6 or 

a 7 or a 5 or something in that ballpark because we have not done 

the work yet to know whether or not we can actually overcome 

some of those technical issues. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Dr. McMillan? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Your scale is, of course, difficult to use but I will 

try anyway. It is interesting that we all are falling in the same 

range. 

I was involved in the weapons program in 2010. So while my 

name is not on the document, I certainly had discussions about it. 

I would say if 10 is a slam dunk, we know we can do it, the risks 

are very low, we were not there, but somewhere around an 8 or a 

9 is probably right. 

My reasons today for saying something more in the range of a 

6 are that I see higher risks in our path forward. As I said in an 

earlier answer, and I am very concerned about the long-term because I see the pressures of doing things in the here and now, 

which we have to do—I fully agree—possibly shifting the balance 

so far that we then increase the risk in the future. So those are 

the reasons why I would back off today. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

We are all talking about how we are able to do more with less 

and how we can be more cost-effective in delivering the required 

mission expectations. Let me turn to what some perceive as at 

least one way to streamline oversight and move away from transactional oversight and at the same time save funding because that 

is a critical piece as well. If current oversight is getting in the way, 

that is not cost-effective. If we can find a way to streamline it, perhaps we can save funding in the process and also increase productivity by reducing the size of the NNSA’s site offices that oversee 

the laboratories. It seems to me that now that the weapons design 

laboratories are operated by for-profit entities, that the site offices 

do feel obliged as civil servants to grade the approximately $200 

million in fee that is awarded to the operators of the three design 

laboratories. 

Now, I know that we are all interested in the savings. Let me 

start with you first, Dr. McMillan. Do you believe that the local site 

offices can be streamlined so that the oversight is not transactional, that it is more on the basis of trust and verified, to use 

an often used expression, the verification being operational as opposed to transactional? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. I think you have hit on really the key point 

there, Mr. Chairman, that the amount of oversight depends on 

what type of oversight you do. At some level, for the kinds of oversight we have today, it is probably the case the site offices are sized 

in the right ball park to provide that kind of oversight. 

Senator NELSON. Let me interrupt just for a second. How many 

positions are there at the local site? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. At Los Alamos, it is a bit over 100. 

So if we go to a different model for that oversight, I believe we 

could have smaller contingents both at the site, as well as possibly 

54 

at headquarters. The scale of the organization is determined by 

what it has to do, in my view. 

Senator NELSON. Is there a potential of cost savings by not having—not just in terms of the personnel costs of the local site offices, 

but of the costs associated with having to respond to the oversight? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Yes. At the laboratory, I do not know for sure 

what the numbers are, but I know that I have people whose main 

job is responding to oversight issues. If we were able, in the way 

that our National Academies’ colleagues have talked about, to 

change that model, I believe there would be efficiencies inside the 

laboratory as well. 

Senator NELSON. I am going to get to our experts here in a second too. 

Dr. Albright, how many are there located in your local site? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I do not think I have the exact number, but there 

are roughly over 100 Feds and about 20 or 30 support contractors. 

It is about 130 people all together. 

Just two points. First, the site offices are part of the oversight 

infrastructure in NNSA and DOE, but they are not the entire 

story. 

Senator NELSON. Under any set of circumstances, you might 

have fewer if they are doing a different kind of oversight. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I think to echo the point that Dr. McMillan made, 

you would have to ask yourself—so right now we have a transactional oversight model where everything is reviewed, everything 

is very hands-on. We have well over 1,000 audits that occur every 

year. If, on the other hand, you migrate to what the National Academies have been talking about, which is more of a set standards 

than audit model, then I think you have to ask yourself the question: what do I actually need to have physically located at the site 

in order to accomplish that? 

This is for comparison sake. I would point out that if you look 

at the way DOD does this at a place like Hopkins, APL, or Lincoln 

Lab, the numbers of people they have are—you can count on the 

fingers of one hand or two, and they have a relatively small office 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that periodically conducts 

audits and does all the things that they need to do, safety audits, 

that sort of thing. So again, the question comes up what do you actually have to have physically on site. That is one point. 

The other point again is that you have people—it is not just the 

site offices. In a lot of ways, they are responding to commands that 

come from headquarters. So you have a fairly large infrastructure, 

for example, Health, Safety, and Security Office within DOE. There 

are hundreds of people there. Then there are equivalent activities 

within NNSA itself. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. We have a similar size site office, order, 100 as 

well. 

I can use this one metric. I think we all have a performance evaluation plan that we do. It is a contractual statement of performance on a yearly basis with NNSA. That document is, in our case, 

60 to 65 pages of fairly detailed evaluation of performance against 

at, again, a somewhat overused term today, ‘‘transactional’’ level. 

We have talked with NNSA about this, about moving that to a 

55 

higher level to something leaner but still demanding upon our performance. I believe that that will allow cost savings on both sides 

of the equation very definitely. It will not happen overnight. We did 

not get to this position overnight, but it would allow us to change 

the direction of that, and I am encouraged that the dialogue is happening in that direction. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Shank and Dr. Patel, I know you have stated that streamlining the operations could save costs if there could 

be another way of doing it apart from a transactional analysis and 

oversight. Dr. Shank, what kinds of recommendations would you 

make to streamline the process, to change it so that you get the 

kind of oversight that is required that is cost-effective? 

Dr. SHANK. I think if we are going to have the number of people 

we have in the site offices, we are going to have the current model. 

Unless we change the oversight model, we are not going to see 

change. Then there is a chance to have a sharply reduced number 

of people. 

I think that just counting the number of people in the site offices 

is not correct. I think what was represented here by Dr. McMillan 

was he has people in his own lab each feeding each of these people 

in the site offices. It is also correct there is a large group of people 

in the Forrestal Building that also create work for all the people 

to do. 

We have to fundamentally rethink about how we can do oversight cost effectively. There is always an argument to be made if 

we just spend a little more money, we can be a little more safe or 

a little more this or a little more that. At some point, that last increment of cost gives us a very little for a great deal of money. I 

think there is a chance for substantial operational savings if we 

take a different model, and the way to look for models that will 

work—their description was two other laboratories that do things 

differently, do not have the huge overhang of people doing oversight. We can also look to industry for those models. 

I would say that in order to qualify a system, it is going to require some investment. I believe that over a period of time, a very 

short period of time, you would then get to reap the rewards of that 

and begin to wind the thing down into a more rational, understandable way that industry or other Federal FFRDCs would 

look—DOE would look similar to them. I think that we would have 

organizations within the laboratories also right-sized to be able to 

deal with a cost-effective approach. 

Senator NELSON. Is it fair to say that the uniqueness of the labs 

does not drive the unique method of oversight, that other labs have 

a different standard of oversight, different methodology of oversight 

that works? Can you describe, for example, in other labs where you 

have outside sources coming in and checking out and inspecting for 

safety or security or the like? 

Dr. SHANK. I think the example was given by Dr. Hommert that 

his laboratory, Mesa Laboratory, looks very much like an Intel 

Laboratory down the street. They have very similar safety records. 

The expenditure on the safety is much, much higher at the Mesa 

facility than it is at Intel. I think we can learn a great deal by looking at how Intel does this, and they do it in a way in which is done 

standard in industry. You have a system. You audit that system. 

56 

You keep track of where you are. It takes fewer people to do that 

if there is a system in place that you can recognize. Intel simply 

could not be in business if they did the level of transactional oversight that has been done in these laboratories. 

Senator NELSON. Who would go to the Intel Laboratory to check 

out for worker safety? 

Dr. SHANK. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA). Other agencies that do these kinds of oversight for industry seem to me to be some of the ideal skill base, maybe even the 

exact people, to do that kind of thing at the laboratories. In the 

past, having external oversight has been investigated. It is one of 

those things that is very difficult. There are many different issues 

one way or another whether to do that. 

I personally believe if the laboratories look like other institutions, they are better off because the people like OSHA who are investigating the laboratories do that in a way that would be most 

cost-effective. Industries have to operate. The laboratories have to 

operate. There is not an individual power base that says we do 

this, this, one kind of thing here regardless of cost. OSHA has the 

burden of making organizations safe, the safety and health of the 

workers, but it also has to do that in a way that it is actually possible to comply with cost-effectively. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Patel? 

Dr. PATEL. I think almost everything that needs to be said has 

been said. But let me comment on two things. 

Having the transactional oversight adds cost by having too many 

people both at site offices plus in the laboratories plus at NNSA. 

So that is one part of the cost. 

The second part of the cost, which is hidden cost that is incurred 

by the laboratory because that oversight gets in the way of getting 

people to do the right things at the right time at the right cost. 

What we will accomplish if we change from a transactional oversight to a systems-based oversight is that we will empower the laboratory directors and empower the people who are there to deliver 

the right product at the right price. 

Senator NELSON. Now I will ask the directors. Are you comfortable inviting OSHA into your operations versus having the site 

offices doing a similar sort of thing? There are probably other areas 

of oversight other than, let us say, worker safety or overall safety. 

Would there be, as in the case of any other lab, available outside 

inspection teams or agencies capable of doing the similar work? Dr. 

McMillan? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. It is interesting that we are having this discussion today because just yesterday, as part of a discussion with DOE 

and NNSA, the issue of OSHA was on the table. I do not know 

enough at this point, Senator, to be able to answer your question 

definitively. I would say that I am optimistic because industry 

makes it work. Other laboratories make it work. 

Senator NELSON. That is what I was going to say. If industry 

makes it work with other laboratories and if what they are looking 

for is similar to what they would be looking for within your laboratories, perhaps the one difference is nuclear? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. That might be an area where we would treat 

that differently because that is not a normal part of most indusVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:31 Nov 28, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\76896.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
57 

tries. It is different also than what happens in the nuclear power 

industry. So I think there may be some exceptions but I would say 

overall I am optimistic with a recommendation such as our National Academies’ colleagues have suggested, in part because it 

puts the laboratories on a level playing field. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Albright? You do not have to agree. 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. No, no, no. It is hard not to agree. 

Let me just give you some information on that. Just in the environmental safety and health area, we have reviews that are conducted by the DOE Health, Safety, and Security Office, the NNSA 

Safety and Health Office, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board. We have two people on site, 22 environmental safety and 

health functional managers at our site office with staff, and then 

there are 30 annual reviews by State and local governments. We 

actually are in California, so we have Cal–OSHO which is more 

stringent than OSHA. Then, of course, we do our biannual reviews 

and International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001 and 1801 as 

well. So what you see is a lot of overlap, a lot of duplicative effort. 

We would be delighted to fit within the OSHA regulatory framework along with the safety culture that you get with the ISO 

standards. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Hommert? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. I will make two comments in this regard. 

First of all, I think it is important to recognize that there is a 

difference from industry for us. These are government-owned facilities. So there is a very clear and appropriate role for effective government oversight. 

What I do believe, though, is that we have a vast body of industry standards that we can work against and that then the government can utilize and benefit from the fact that that is largely in 

place whether it is ISO or it is OSHA or other standards and construction or the like. I think getting that model right that says, 

yes, there is a reason that the government has to look at facilities 

they own but let us take advantage of what is already in place. 

The second thing I would like to say on this is, that as Dr. 

Albright has identified, while we deal with a model that has duplication in it—and that is true and we deal with a model that, I 

think, can be improved from a cost-effective standpoint, and I agree 

that that is true—the thing that concerns me the most in what we 

operate in today is that I actually believe the complexity of the 

model impedes the ability for me to advance the safety culture or 

the overall operational culture of my organization. While we have 

an outstanding safety record, we can be better. I believe the complexities of what we operate actually impede our ability to move to 

a higher level. In the end, since these are my coworkers, I care 

deeply about them. That is probably the strongest motivation I 

have to say, can we do something different. 

Senator NELSON. Would it not be appropriate to expect NNSA to 

establish what the standard is to begin with, as in the case of the 

other nongovernmental laboratories? So if you do not have a standard, what do you measure it against? So if the standard is established, then others can come and measure against that or against 

their own standards which might even be higher. Is that fair, Dr. 

Hommert? 

58 

Dr. HOMMERT. I agree, Mr. Chairman. There has to be clarity. 

Again, the government has to be clear on what their expectations 

are and how they wish us to be measured. But again, there is a 

lot available for them to take advantage of. Then they have to find 

a way to verify and appropriately audit that in a way and ultimately trust that we will operate at the system level against those 

standards. I agree. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. McMillan? 

Dr. MCMILLAN. Yes, I agree. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Albright? 

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I agree. 

Senator NELSON. To other panelists here, from your own experience looking at other laboratories, a simple question. Does it work 

having these other entities come in and measure against standards? 

Dr. SHANK. I have actually looked at that with respect to a lab 

that I used to manage compared to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 

and they have a more effective process than what we had then at 

DOE which is similar to what NNSA—it is actually more difficult 

today than in my days. But yes, they do have effective not only 

oversight of health and safety, but you also have financial oversight 

and there are systems for that and systems for oversight of human 

resources. There are, in fact, standards for all of these operational 

activities in laboratories that are standard throughout industry 

that could be brought in. 

The worry that I would have is that we bring those standards 

in and keep all the site offices and all there together. That is my 

nightmare. I think that if you make a different model, it has to be 

clear that it is a different model. You do not have both models. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Patel, do you agree with that? 

Dr. PATEL. Yes, I agree with that. Even though my experience 

has been limited to private industry, I can wholeheartedly say that 

having standards which are accepted by others being your guiding 

principles helps everybody. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. That is all the questions I have. 

Now, what question did I not ask that I should have? I know 

what I know. I do not know what I do not know. 

Thank you all for being here today, for being straightforward and 

candid in your remarks. We appreciate it very much. As we work 

toward finding some solutions here, your input is going to be extremely helpful. Thank you. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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