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“Baghdad’s new rulers 

believe that the United States 

is underestimating the possible dangers associated with 

a sudden ouster of Assad, 

including sectarian conflict 

in Syria or the emergence 

of a Sunni Islamist political 

order in Damascus.”

October 18, 2011

Baghdad’s Wary Support for the 

Syrian Status Quo

Summary

•	 Iraq’s reaction to the popular uprising in Syria is mostly determined by the chaos its Shiite-led 

government believes would follow the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 

•	 Baghdad possesses limited ability to influence the course of events in Syria, but is using this to 

provide modest support to the Assad regime. 

•	 The fractured and sectarian nature of Iraqi politics, however, militates against Baghdad developing a decisive position on the way forward in Syria. 

Baghdad Worried About Spillover

The starting point for understanding how Iraq’s Shiite-led government evaluates the popular 

unrest in Syria is its wariness towards the uncertainties associated with a change in the secular, 

Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus. Especially given the historic rivalry between the two 

countries and their repeated interventions in each other’s politics, the gradual improvement in 

bilateral relations over recent years is one of Iraq’s few foreign policy bright spots. Indeed, following encouragement from Iran, Assad played a role in brokering a second term in office for Iraqi 

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki late last year. 

Baghdad’s new rulers believe that the United States is underestimating the possible dangers 

associated with a sudden ouster of Assad, including sectarian conflict in Syria or the emergence 

of a Sunni Islamist political order in Damascus. They believe that either outcome could have a 

profoundly destabilizing effect on Iraq’s still fragile politics (or tilt the balance of power away from 

its current leading players). These concerns are buttressed by threats from some members of the 

Assad regime’s inner circle that Syria will not “suffer alone” from instability,1 with Iraq seen as one 

place where retaliation could occur. 

On the security front, with U.S. troops departing and Iraqi Security Forces not yet fully capable 

of policing the country’s borders, Iraqi officials are also concerned about the ramifications of 

sustained unrest in Syria for their country’s internal stability. This is because Syria was the main 

springboard for weapons and foreign fighters entering Iraq during the latter’s descent into sectarian conflict after 2003. More recently, the biggest exception to the warming in Syrian-Iraqi relations 

came in 2009 when Maliki publicly fingered Ba’athist exiles sheltering in Syria as responsible for a 

series of devastating truck bombings in the Iraqi capital.

Sean Kane

E-mail: skane@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3891

Dr. Elie Abouaoun

E-mail: eabouaoun@usip.org

Phone: 202.215.7842

peaceBrieF108
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo

page 2 • PB 108 • October 18, 2011

Notwithstanding these attacks, since 2007-2008 the Syrian regime has generally acted to 

restrict the flow of jihadists into Iraq through increasing cooperation with Iraqi intelligence 

services and, in some cases, even directly with the U.S. military. Now that Damascus has accused 

the U.S. of fomenting insurrection against it, this cooperation may be reversed. In this scenario, if 

Syrian forces are distracted by unrest, or if the country descends into full scale civil war, Baghdad 

worries that its porous desert border with Syria could once again become a major supply route 

for foreign fighters and arms. 

Finally, trade and particularly the import of Syrian goods into Iraq have been disrupted by the 

unrest. However, economic relations between Iraq and Syria are not as important to Baghdad 

as trade with Iran and Turkey. Iraqi trade with Syria was estimated to be $900 million in 2009 (as 

compared to $5 -$6 billion per year with both Iran and Turkey), with most imports consisting of 

agricultural and light industrial commodities. Iraqi exports to Syria meanwhile consist of energy 

products, primarily crude oil, and have been less affected by recent border closures by Damascus 

as they are considered essential to the Syrian economy.2

Modest Influence and Modest Support

The Iraqi government has taken a cautious approach towards the unrest in Syria, betraying a clear 

bias towards stability over popular Syrian demands. 

This policy has attracted widespread international commentary regarding Iranian influence over 

Baghdad’s foreign policy.3 But the Iraqi government has independent interests in the status quo 

and few immediate gains from regime change. This is not to discount Iranian influence in Baghdad, 

but to note that the relationship is complex, and only one of several factors determining Iraqi 

policy toward Syria. While many Iraqi leaders do desire good ties with Iran, they also wish to avoid 

becoming beholden to Tehran as the U.S. military departs Iraq. Paradoxically, some in Baghdad 

believe that the downfall of Assad could increase the likelihood of this by causing Iran to “double 

down” on its interests in Iraq and the broader Gulf region. 

In any case, Baghdad’s direct influence over the situation in Syria is relatively limited. Iraq is still 

in a state of internal flux and its military is unable to project power externally. Iraq’s only real hard 

option to affect the situation in Syria would be to reverse the flow of militants over the last decade 

and send weapons and supplies over the border to support Syrian protestors. Tribal ties and smuggling networks mean this is happening to some extent on a local level, but it is not state policy. 

Baghdad in fact likely perceives a shared interest with Damascus in limiting this cross-border tribal 

activity. The Iraqi government is nervous about the prospect of increased linkages between Saudi 

Arabia, a new Sunni political order in Syria, and Sunni Arab tribes in western Iraq.4 This is especially 

the case since groups like the Shammar tribal confederation span all three countries and because 

some of Iraq’s senior Sunni Arab politicians have hinted at the formation of an autonomous Sunni 

federal region in western Iraq. The Iraqi government now appears to be coordinating with their 

Syrian counterparts in managing the border, including closing a UNHCR camp set up to receive 

Syrian refugees and withdrawing Iraqi citizenship from tribal families purportedly of Syrian 

descent living along the border.5

The other arena in which the Iraqi government brings modest influence to bear is in the economic realm. Iraq is the biggest destination for Syrian exports (19% of their total) and a key source 

of energy imports for Damascus. In July, Iraq and Syria pledged to work together to strengthen 

their long-term trade relationship, including repairing an oil pipeline and build a new gas pipeline 

that would allow Iranian gas exports to reach Syria via Iraq. These steps may provide a boost to 

Damascus but are not game changers able to alter the trajectory of events in Syria. Nevertheless, 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo

page 3 • PB 108 • October 18, 2011

by continuing to host Syrian trade and diplomatic delegations, Baghdad has signaled support for 

the Assad regime when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states have recalled their ambassadors, and regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League 

have criticized the ongoing violence. 

In this sense, the economic relationship is probably of greater strategic significance to the embattled Syrian regime than it is to Iraq. This could become even more the case should additional 

sanctions be placed on Syria. In another potential role reversal, Damascus might look to its porous 

border with Iraq as way to skirt sanctions (as Saddam Hussein used Syria to subvert UN sanctions 

prior to 2003). 

Internal Debate and Discomfort

Just as there is no single unified Iraqi foreign policy, it would be a mistake to ascribe a single Iraqi 

point of view towards the complex events in Syria. This is especially the case as long as the organizing principle of Iraqi politics is the competition between Maliki’s State of Law and Ayad Allawi’s 

Iraqiyya coalitions and the strong overlay of regional and sectarian interests which they represent. 

Leading Shiite figures, such as Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr, have been hesitant to directly 

criticize the Assad regime and have implied that an overthrow of the Syrian “pillar of resistance” will 

benefit Israeli and other external interests in the region. In contrast, Osama Najaefi, the senior-most 

Sunni official in government, has said straightforwardly that the Assad government is suppressing 

the freedoms of the Syrian people and that it is unacceptable to use violence to put down protests. 

Iraqi Kurdish leaders meanwhile have welcomed recent developments, believing that Syria has 

been the supply line for the vast majority of terrorist attacks in northern Iraq and that short term 

instability is outweighed by the benefits of regime change. They have, however, been cautious in 

their public statements, and counseled Syrian Kurds to be strategic about not providing Damascus 

with the opportunity to paint developments as anything other than a nationalist uprising. 

The reality of the Iraqi response, however, is more complex than simple sectarian politics. Syria 

is not Bahrain, where the various Iraqi political blocs lined up with stark symbolic positions on the 

controversial Saudi-led military intervention in the tiny, Shiite majority island’s protests. Developments in Bahrain had little potential to directly affect Iraq’s political stability and security. This is not 

the case with Syria, with its size, regional heft and geographic proximity to Iraq.

There is also a degree of solidarity among the Iraqi public with Syrian protestors that the Iraqi 

government must balance. Local newspaper editorials and some Shiite political figures have 

expressed moral disappointment with the Iraqi government’s weak support for the Syrian people.6 

Some in Maliki’s own Da`wa party have privately expressed discomfort with government policy 

based on the perceived parallels between the current violent suppression of Syrian protests and 

their own struggle against the Iraqi Ba`ath. These realities have necessitated a more nuanced 

government position on Syria. Maliki has recently tempered his support for Assad and intermittent 

labeling of protestors as rioters by urging Syria to accelerate reforms. One of his closest advisors 

recently went as far as to say that Iraq is against dictatorship and one-party rule in Syria. But when 

it comes to how the Syrian system can be reformed, the adviser said that the Iraqi government has 

a different view from the U.S. because there is no way to guarantee that Assad’s departure does 

not create chaos in Syria, and, ultimately, for its next-door neighbor.7 
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About This Brief

This Peace Brief is part of a series 

examining the regional dimensions 

of Syria’s popular uprising. The 

Institute invited leading experts from 

the U.S. and across the Middle East 

to identify key vectors of influence 

Syria’s neighbors are bringing to bear 

on the conflict; to forecast how the 

on-going conflict in Syria will affect 

the delicate and volatile regional balance of power; and to examine how 

the Syrian opposition and the Syria 

regime are factoring in regional and 

cross-border dynamics. The series 

was edited by USIP’s Steven Heydemann, senior adviser for Middle 

East Initiatives; and Scott Lasensky, 

a senior program officer. Through 

this series, several related workshops 

and events held in September and 

October, and on-going programs 

that bring together experts, civil society figures and officials, the Institute 

aims to provide applied analysis and 

on-the-ground conflict management 

tools in support of political transitions 

across the Arab world.

Sean Kane is the senior program 

officer for Iraq at USIP and served 

with the United Nations in from 

2006 to 2009. Dr. Elie Abouaoun 

is the senior program officer for 

institutional development at USIP’s 

Baghdad Office and has worked 

in Iraq since 2003 for international 

organizations. 

Endotes

1. Ally of Assad Says Syria Will Fight Protests Till ‘the End’ (New York Times, Anthony Shadid, 

May 10)

2. SYRIA: Crisis may hurt economies of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq (Los Angeles Times, Ibrahim 

Saif, August 13)

3. Iraqi Leader Backs Syria, With a Nudge From Iran (New York Times, Michael Schmidt and Yasir 

Ghazi, August 12)

4. Iraqi Shi’ites fear fallout of Syria turbulence (Reuters, Rania El-Gamal, Sept 28)

5. Citizens in Al-Anbar state sectarian issues behind withdrawn citizenships (Sharqiya, Sept 12)

6. Iraq should back Syria’s uprising (The Guardian, Hayder al-Khoei, June 10)

7. Iraq Calls for Assad to Resign in Syria (New York Times, Michael Schmidt and Yasir Ghazi, September 20). In a sign of the complexity of this issue, the advisor quickly repudiated the comments 

attributed to him in the article.

Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo

page 4 • PB 108 • October 18, 2011