UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES N. HENRY, III, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 03-1121

BRUCE BRONSTEIN; AARON WHITAKER,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.

(CA-02-2790-L)

Submitted: April 30, 2003

Decided: May 27, 2003

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion. 

COUNSEL

Charles N. Henry, III, Appellant Pro Se. Robert William Metzler, Gilbert Steven Rothenberg, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Charles N. Henry, III, appeals from the district court’s orders: (1)

dismissing his action against two Internal Revenue Service agents; (2)

denying his motion for reconsideration; and (3) denying a second

post-judgment motion requesting the district court to issue findings of

fact and conclusions of law. We dismiss the appeal as to the first two

orders; with respect to the third order, we affirm. 

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the

notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry

of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is "mandatory and jurisdictional."

Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)

(quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). 

A timely motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 tolls

the notice of appeal period. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Here, the district court entered judgment on September 13, 2002. Henry’s motion

for reconsideration was timely filed on September 23, 2002; thus, the

appeal period did not begin to run until the district court denied the

motion for reconsideration on October 1, 2002. The sixty-day appeal

period expired on November 30, 2002. Notwithstanding Henry’s second post-judgment motion, his notice of appeal filed on January 9,

2003, was untimely as to the September 13, 2002, judgment and the

October 1, 2002, order denying his motion for reconsideration. See

Kraft, Inc. v. United States, 85 F.3d 602, 605 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that,

following initial Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion tolling appeal period, successive motions periods are not permitted), modified on other

grounds, 96 F.3d 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1996); accord EEOC v. Cent. Motor

Lines, Inc., 537 F.2d 1162, 1165 (4th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to those orders. 

Henry also appeals the district court’s November 19, 2002, order

denying his motion requesting that the court enter findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are only

2 HENRY v. BRONSTEIN
required where there is a bench trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Here,

the court dismissed the complaint because it failed to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. We find no error in the district

court’s order and therefore affirm. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process. 

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

HENRY v. BRONSTEIN 3