The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of 

America (2009) was revised in coordination with the National 

Counterintelligence Policy Board. Chaired by the National 

Counterintelligence Executive, the National Counterintelligence 

Policy Board consists of senior personnel of departments and 

elements of the United States Government, appointed by the 

head of the department or element concerned, as follows: 

 the Department of State; 

 the Department of Defense, 

including the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

 the Department of Justice, 

including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 

 the Department of Energy; 

 the Department of Homeland Security; 

 the Central Intelligence Agency. 

 
PREFACE 

Approved by the President, as required by Section 402a of Title 50 of the United States 

Code, the National Counterintelligence Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica (Strategy) 

serves as the United States Government's seminal planning document for government-wide 

counterintelligence efforts. This Strategy has been produced by the Office of the National 

Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), coordinated across the counterintelligence elements of 

the U.S. government, and endorsed by the National Counterintelligence Policy Board. 

This Strategy is consistent with the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), which 

for the first time elevated counterintelligence to a primary mission objective. The mission 

objective "Integrate Counterintelligence" is critical to accomplishing the NIS goals of enabling 

wise national security policies and supporting effective national security actions. 

As a core intelligence mission, counterintelligence will be more fully integrated into the 

intelligence process. To achieve these goals, I have recently made several significant changes. I 

have appointed our nation's foremost counterintelligence professionals to the position of 

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) and Deputy NCIX. The NCIX will lead the 

community efforts to identify and counter critical intelligence threats. 

In an age of globalization and information sharing, greater openness has made us more 

vulnerable. Our information is being stolen at an alarming pace. In order to meet this 

challenge, our government's counterintelligence human and technical capabilities must function 

in a more integrated and coordinated manner than ever before. The NCIX has implemented a 

comprehensive counterintelligence effort, employing offensive and defensive measures that 

inform both policy and operations. We must understand not simply what foreign intelligence 

activities are being directed against the United States and its interests, but why, how and what 

our adversaries have learned about us. 

Our nation expects us to lead the world in the intelligence arena. Our partners and allies 

expect the same. We are committed to keeping our national interests secure while building on 

the Intelligence Community's legacy of excellence. 

Dennis C. Blair 

Director of National Intelligence 

111 

 

FOREWORD

Strategy development is an ever-evolving and active process that ensures countries, 

institutions, and private industry look toward the future, provides direction, and sets 

appropriate goals and objectives. As the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), I am 

charged with producing the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of 

America (Strategy) on an annual basis. This Strategy provides strategic direction and guidance 

for counterintelligence activities of the United States Government to include the Intelligence 

Community. 

Upon review of the Strategy, I have determined that the current mission and enterprise 

objectives are consistent with the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), which for the first 

time, includes a mission objective for counterintelligence. The inclusion of the 

counterintelligence mission objective in the NIS reinforces the Director of National 

Intelligence’s position that counterintelligence is a critical mission of the Intelligence Enterprise. 

The NIS mission objective states: 

 

NIS Mission Objective 4: Integrate Counterintelligence. 

Provide a counterintelligence capability that is integrated with all 

aspects of the intelligence process to inform policy and operations. The 

Counterintelligence Community must build on its current efforts and 

focus on four areas: 

• Detect insider threats. Detect insiders who seek to exploit their 

authorized access in order to harm U.S. interests. 

• Penetrate foreign services. Penetrate hostile foreign 

intelligence services to determine their intentions, capabilities, and 

activities. 

• Integrate CI with cyber. Employ CI across the cyber domain to 

protect critical infrastructure. 

• Assure the supply chain. Assure the national security 

community's supply chain from foreign intelligence exploitation. 

The 2009 National Counterintelligence Strategy aligns to and supports the mission and 

enterprise objectives in 2009 National Intelligence Strategy and in particular addresses the 

four counterintelligence focus areas emphasized in NIS Mission Objective 4. 

Detect insider threats. Insiders have caused grave, long-term damage to national 

security. History has demonstrated the intent of foreign intelligence services and entities to 

penetrate the Intelligence Community and extract information through the use of a trusted 

insider – recruited or volunteer. The Intelligence Community must be positioned to detect, 

respond to, and deter this threat. Currently, the Intelligence Community is creating a unified

approach to combating insider threats. The Insider Threat Advisory Group (ITAG) leverages 

information assurance, security, and counterintelligence to detect, deter, and mitigate the 

 v 
Integrate CI with cyber. The Intelligence Community must integrate 

counterintelligence into all aspects of computer network operations, workforce development, 

education, and awareness programs. We must identify, monitor, exploit and defeat hostile cyber 

activities through both offensive and defensive measures. Implementing such strategic activities 

will demand closer collaboration between offensive and defensive network operations to create 

the necessary synergies required to develop defenses against enemy tradecraft. To this end, we 

must strengthen collaboration among policy makers, law enforcement, counterintelligence 

elements, security, and other key players across the US Government on cyber operations. 

Collaboration must also be improved among the defense industrial base, think tanks, academic 

institutions, critical infrastructure sectors, and private industry partners as they all contribute to 

the national security mission. 

Assure the supply chain. As US companies increasingly globalize their business 

structures and practices, foreign intelligence services may discover new avenues for penetration 

and exploitation of the United States government through its acquisition processes. Many 

Intelligence Community organizations and their counterintelligence elements are acting to 

address the unique threats and vulnerabilities in their own particular supply chains. 

The DNI designated me as the Director of National Counterintelligence to clarify my 

roles and responsibilities within the Intelligence Community. As both the National 

Counterintelligence Executive and the Director of National Counterintelligence, in the coming 

year, I will work closely with the DNI, the counterintelligence community, other United States 

Government agencies, and the private sector to review and modify, as needed, the mission and 

enterprise objectives in the next counterintelligence strategy. 

Continuity and agility in strategy, planning, and execution are important as we face 

threats that evolve slowly or change radically, year to year. As the Director of National 

Counterintelligence, I will lead the counterintelligence community's continuing efforts towards a 

unified and inlegraled nUh, lrale~

Robert M. Bryant 

National Counterintellige ce Executive 

VI 
THE STRATEGY

The nation’s counterintelligence 

elements will operate as a unified, 

coherent community and will jointly 

conduct their offensive and defensive 

activities consistent with their respective 

capabilities and authorities and 

accomplish their objectives in accordance 

with the priorities established by the 

National Counterintelligence Executive 

(NCIX). 

SECURE THE NATION AGAINST 

FOREIGN ESPIONAGE AND 

ELECTRONIC PENETRATION. 

The United States faces a wide 

range of threats to its security from foreign 

intelligence activities, terrorist elements, 

and other non-traditional adversaries 

designed to achieve advantage over U.S. 

military, diplomatic, and economic interests at home and abroad. The counterintelligence community must act jointly to 

understand, confound, manipulate, and 

thwart these threats, which exceed the 

ability or resources of any single U.S. 

agency or department to overcome. When 

necessary, we will disrupt these activities 

through arrest and expulsion. 

The counterintelligence community will therefore identify and prioritize adversarial intelligence activities 

targeting U.S. interests and leverage its 

collection, analytical, investigative, and 

operational resources to defeat these 

activities. We will also expand our capabilities in cyberspace. The cyber environment provides unprecedented 

opportunities for adversarial activities and 

is particularly vulnerable because of the 

nation’s heavy reliance on information 

systems. A strong and well-protected U.S. 

information infrastructure is critical to 

virtually every aspect of maintaining our 

nation’s security. Trusted insiders as well 

as external adversaries are targeting the 

U.S. information infrastructure for 

exploitation, disruption, and potential 

destruction. The counterintelligence 

community will exploit and defeat 

adversary intelligence activities through 

the application of the full range of 

intelligence techniques. 

 

In collaboration with our colleagues in the broader Intelligence

Community and pursuant to strategic 

threat guidance, counterintelligence 

The NCIX takes strategic threat guidance 

from the National Intelligence Priorities 

Framework (NIPF), the National Threat 

Identification and Prioritization 

Assessment (NTIPA), and other 

authorities. 

elements will assess the intelligence 

capabilities and activities of foreign powers 

and non-state groups, including terrorists, 

and will describe their resources, plans, 

methods of operations, and worldwide 

reach. Foreign intelligence establishments 

and terrorist groups acquire resources, train 

and deploy personnel, and execute both 

clandestine and covert intelligence 

operations against us. The counterintelligence community must understand 

who they are, who their intelligence allies 

are, what they do, why they do it, and what 

they can do. Counterintelligence elements 

will use this knowledge to direct activities 

that counter, exploit, and defeat adversary 

intelligence activities – particularly the 

rooting out of spies in our nation’s midst. 

 Accordingly, the counterintelligence community will conduct aggressive, 

strategically directed operations against 

priority intelligence targets around the 

world using the full range of operational 

means. The intelligence activities of foreign powers afford us opportunities to 

exploit their operations and gain access to 

their intelligence in order to corrupt its 

integrity. We will conduct worldwide 

operations to disrupt or defeat our 

intelligence adversaries as they assess and 

respond to the United States. Each agency 

1 
 

and department will contribute its own 

unique capabilities, authorities, and 

resources in a unified effort. 

PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE 

U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. 

The U.S. intelligence system must 

provide reliable information to the U.S. 

government and its allies. The integrity 

and reliability of this system – the people, 

the structure, the information systems, 

and the information they hold – depend 

on our ability to keep it free from 

penetration or influence. In pursuit of this 

objective, the counterintelligence 

community will work closely with our 

colleagues in security, acquisition, 

information assurance, and other relevant 

specialties across the U.S. government. 

The effectiveness of security 

countermeasures in preventing 

penetration will be enhanced by intelligence concerning the current nature and 

scope of the adversarial intelligence threat. 

No single department or agency alone can 

ensure the integrity of the U.S. intelligence 

system and of our critical national assets 

and critical infrastructure. 

Threats and vulnerabilities are 

inherent in the human and technological 

dimensions of our culture, practices, standards, tradecraft, methods, and resources. 

Assessing these threats and vulnerabilities 

is an integral part of the essential and 

continual task of risk management. 

Recommendations to address these risks 

will include threat and vulnerability mitigation measures such as the institution of 

countermeasures, rigorous standards and 

practices, and the identification of 

opportunities for exploitation. 

 The ability of foreign powers and 

hostile groups to threaten the integrity of 

the U.S. intelligence system relies in part 

on their knowledge of our security 

practices as well as intelligence and 

counterintelligence capabilities. Some of 

that knowledge has been made available 

to them through the robust workings of an 

open, democratic, and remarkably transparent society. Adversaries’ knowledge 

can also be enhanced by accessing our 

information systems and networks, our 

supply chain and procurement processes, 

and our many scientific and research and 

development projects where foreign 

collaboration is valued and pursued. That 

knowledge has been profoundly increased 

by foreign penetrations of our own 

government and by the treasonous acts of 

our own citizens. Thwarting the threat 

posed by foreign intelligence operatives 

depends on our skill in learning what they 

know, as well as confirming what they do 

not know about us, and in leveraging and 

exploiting that knowledge. That skill 

depends in large part on our success in 

penetrating these same adversaries in 

order to understand their full range of 

operational and analytical means. To the 

extent we do this, we will better protect 

our own secrets and decision making 

processes while producing superior 

foreign intelligence. 

 Decision makers require intelligence free from hostile control or 

manipulation. Since every intelligence 

discipline is subject to manipulation by 

our adversaries, validating the reliability of 

intelligence from all collection platforms is 

essential. Accordingly, each counterintelligence organization will validate the reliability of sources and methods that relate 

to the counterintelligence mission in 

accordance with common standards. For 

other mission areas, the counterintelligence community will examine 

collection, analysis, dissemination practices, and other intelligence activities and 

will recommend and implement improvements, best practices, and common 

standards. 

 Intelligence is vulnerable not only 

to external but also to internal threats. 

Subversion, treason, and leaks expose our 

vulnerabilities, our governmental and 

commercial secrets, and our intelligence 

2 
 

sources and methods. This insider threat 

has been a source of extraordinary damage 

to U.S. national security. Countering this 

threat will require an aggressive national 

effort. In coordination with organizations 

responsible for areas such as security, 

information assurance, intelligence and 

law enforcement, and science and 

technology, the counterintelligence 

community must develop new policies, 

tools, and methods to deter, discover, and 

negate insider threats. For example, more 

sophisticated audit and analytical tools 

designed to discover unexplained patterns 

of activities or anomalous events must be 

put in place, and they must be monitored. 

Adding these new tools and techniques to 

our nation’s existing arsenal, the counterintelligence community will seek to 

manipulate foreign spies, conduct aggressive investigations, make arrests and, 

where foreign officials are involved, expel 

them for engaging in practices inconsistent 

with their diplomatic status. 

 The Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 directed 

the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 

to “ensure maximum availability of and 

access to intelligence information within 

the intelligence community consistent 

with national security requirements.” 

More specifically, we have been required 

to do a much better job of sharing 

information and to jettison the notion of 

“ownership” of information – a notion that 

encourages hoarding rather than sharing. 

This mandate will receive the full support 

of the counterintelligence community. At 

the same time we must scrupulously protect those pockets of information that are 

so sensitive that they can be disseminated 

only to those that meet the criteria for 

access. Counterintelligence risk is in 

direct tension with the seamless sharing of 

information. That is, the more readily 

available one makes classified 

information, the more likely it is to be 

somehow compromised, and the easier it 

is to steal. 

Several espionage cases have 

already highlighted this vulnerability and 

have done incalculable harm to our 

national security. No counterintelligence 

official can guarantee our nation will 

never suffer another incident of treason or 

espionage. We can, however, assure the 

President, the Congress, and the 

American people that we have measurably 

increased the rigor of our system of 

national intelligence and have put in place 

systems, practices, and procedures that 

make foreign penetration more difficult to 

accomplish and easier to detect. To do 

this we must expand our efforts into 

cyberspace to counter foreign intelligence 

services and other adversaries who are 

using cyberspace to conduct intelligence 

activities directed against the U.S. We 

must act jointly to counter espionage; 

those counterintelligence elements that 

do not include security and law 

enforcement must be more closely tied to 

their security and law enforcement 

colleagues. 

SUPPORT NATIONAL POLICY AND 

DECISIONS.

Foreign powers and adversarial 

groups use intelligence activities to 

support their national security goals, 

project power in areas of vital interest and 

in some cases threaten the national 

security of the United States and its allies. 

When understood, these activities can 

provide indications of their strategic 

capabilities, limitations, and plans, and 

provide warning of unacceptable 

intentions. Such intelligence is vital to 

senior policy and decision makers as well 

as mission planners and operators. 

It is imperative that we enhance 

the Intelligence Community’s ability to 

advise our nation’s decision makers of 

impending threats, vulnerabilities and 

opportunities. The counterintelligence 

organizations will do this through a joint 

approach to strategic analysis and by 

collaboratively supporting intelligence 

3 
 

investigations and operations. National 

security plans, including counterterrorism 

and counterproliferation operations and 

the indications and warning function of 

our nation’s intelligence system, are 

vulnerable to foreign intelligence activities. As the intelligence capabilities of our 

adversaries evolve, our effectiveness in 

thwarting them will depend on our ability 

to identify and fill critical intelligence 

gaps in both collection and analysis. In 

meeting these goals, we will exploit all 

available sources, including open-source 

information, and will leverage new technologies and relationships. 

 Counterintelligence considerations 

must be included in mission planning to 

ensure that the operational community is 

aware of adversarial attempts to manipulate, deceive, or thwart their missions. As 

operations progress, a continued 

counterintelligence perspective also 

permits mission planners to take 

advantage of intelligence gathering 

opportunities that would otherwise be 

missed. This perspective is critical as we 

conduct our analysis of adversarial 

intelligence services and their relationship 

to terrorist organizations. 

 In coordination with the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the 

counterintelligence community will produce actionable analysis to support the 

disruption of terrorist operations and 

safeguard U.S. intelligence capabilities. To 

further support counterterrorism, the 

counterintelligence community will review 

operations and intelligence reporting to 

detect attempts by terrorist entities to 

penetrate or manipulate us. We will also 

assess how key foreign intelligence services advance or obstruct U.S. efforts to 

fight terrorism and counter those activities 

that are hostile. 

 Assessing the capabilities of foreign 

intelligence adversaries means understanding their collection platforms and 

their programs and activities. We must 

know how they are structured, how they 

operate, how their decision-making process works, and where they are deployed 

against U.S. interests. This is both a 

collection challenge that the counterintelligence community must support and 

an analytical challenge that we must meet. 

We will conduct a common effort to 

address the most critical gaps in our 

knowledge of these targets, and, based on 

those gaps, we will contribute to the 

integrated collection strategies of the 

Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI). 

 

 We will also provide strategic 

analysis, counterintelligence insight, and 

policy options to the National Security 

Council, the President’s Intelligence 

Advisory Board, and the DNI to support 

their national security deliberations. We 

will report our assessments of the intelligence environment on a regular basis and 

will suggest actionable alternatives as 

appropriate. 

Even with the most rigorous of 

security and counterintelligence practices 

we can expect compromises of classified 

information and operations. We must 

therefore conduct prompt and appropriately coordinated damage assessments 

that provide a strategic evaluation of the 

risk to U.S. national security while 

initiating actions to mitigate damage and 

prevent further loss. In consultation with 

the Department of Justice in those cases 

with criminal implications and as 

appropriate, the damage assessment 

process will in the future begin sooner and 

produce results faster. Merely reporting 

our losses is not enough. The NCIX will 

therefore implement a follow-up 

mechanism that will, in coordination with 

the appropriate inspectors general and 

budgetary authorities, drive actionable 

recommendations.

4 
 

PROTECT U.S. ECONOMIC 

ADVANTAGE, TRADE SECRETS AND 

KNOW-HOW. 

 

In collaboration with our colleagues throughout the government, the 

counterintelligence community will 

protect our critical national assets and 

critical infrastructure which include 

sensitive technologies, key resources, 

networks, and knowledge from 

intelligence-related attacks. Our water 

and sewer systems, electricity grids, 

financial markets, payroll systems, and 

air- and ground-traffic control systems – 

to name only the most obvious – are 

electronically controlled and subject to 

sophisticated attack by both state-sponsored and free-lance hackers. The supply 

chain of the Intelligence Community is 

also at risk of exploitation in a globalized 

marketplace. Foreign companies or U.S. 

companies engaged in overseas 

partnerships may become targets for 

exploitation by adversaries seeking to gain 

unauthorized or unintended access to 

sensitive U.S. systems and technologies. 

These activities are designed to steal our 

nation’s intellectual property or manipulate information to cause financial or

logistical chaos. While protecting the 

country’s physical infrastructure is a duty 

of other elements of the government, 

counterintelligence has an important role 

to play in understanding who is planning 

and carrying out those attacks or 

preparing the ability to do so in order to 

parry them and, in some cases, to turn 

them to our advantage. 

 We must assist in the identification 

and protection of the nation’s critical 

assets and infrastructure, which reside in 

myriad elements of the U.S. government, 

the private sector, and academia, and 

whose significance may be unknown even 

to those that control them. Collaboration 

between these parties and counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security 

officials is crucial to identify those targets 

of interest to our nation’s adversaries. It is 

also crucial to identify information that, if 

known to an adversary, would probably be 

targeted and the loss or compromise of 

which would be damaging to the nation’s 

security. Counterintelligence elements will 

work with law enforcement and security to 

develop, sustain, and leverage knowledge 

of our adversaries’ strategies, collection 

priorities, intentions, and technical needs, 

and we will translate this knowledge into 

proposed collection requirements. We will 

also provide threat information and 

warning to critical national asset and 

critical infrastructure owners, including 

those outside the U.S. government. 

SUPPORT U.S. ARMED FORCES. 

Counterintelligence activities 

protect those who protect America – especially the armed forces of the United 

States. To maintain the viability of this 

instrument of national power, the counterintelligence community must 

neutralize and exploit adversarial 

intelligence activities targeting the armed 

forces. 

 The armed forces have long been a 

priority target of terrorist attacks and the 

adversarial intelligence activities that support them. In recent decades we have 

witnessed attacks such as the bombings of 

the Marine barracks in Beirut, Khobar 

Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the USS Cole

in the port of Aden. Such terrorist acts are 

always preceded by intelligence operations 

to reconnoiter targets and plan attacks, 

and it is these operations that we must 

recognize and thwart. Executive Order 

12333, as amended, directs the nation’s 

counterintelligence elements to protect 

against espionage. In accordance with 

these mandates, the counterintelligence 

community will employ offensive and 

defensive capabilities to neutralize and 

exploit the full spectrum of adversarial 

intelligence activities targeting the armed 

forces, whether in garrison, in transit, or in 

their areas of responsibility. 

5 
 

The counterintelligence community will counter adversarial intelligence threats to military plans, operations, 

capabilities, intentions, and global 

posture, including the location and 

disposition of forces. Counterintelligence 

elements will support the full gamut of 

military operations from tactical activity to 

strategic initiatives. The armed forces’ 

effectiveness depends on their ability to 

conduct military operations uncompromised by adversaries’ foreknowledge. The 

obligation to support such operations 

extends beyond the Department of 

Defense to the entire counterintelligence 

community, which must collaborate to 

neutralize adversarial intelligence activity 

directed against our armed forces, especially the intelligence activities that 

precede terrorist attacks.

MANAGE THE 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY TO ACHIEVE 

EFFICIENT COORDINATION. 

 The integration and effective management of the counterintelligence 

programs of the agencies and departments 

of the Executive Branch is the NCIX’s top 

priority. Working with the DNI Chief 

Financial Officer (CFO), the ONCIX will 

develop a plan to assess current program 

development and performance, identify 

redundancy, and advise the DNI’s CFO of 

efficient ways to apply resources. 

Counterintelligence elements will provide 

the NCIX with the resource data and 

operational visibility required to perform 

the statutory functions of the office. In 

addition, continuity of operations of 

counterintelligence programs during 

emergencies and other contingencies must 

be maintained. 

IMPROVE TRAINING AND 

EDUCATION OF THE 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY. 

The increasing complexity of 

counterintelligence challenges requires us 

to address an ever-expanding range of 

threats. Meeting these emerging threats 

demands an adaptive, innovative, and 

broadly educated workforce drawn from a 

wide range of backgrounds. 

 As directed by the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as 

amended, and in consultation with the 

counterintelligence community, the 

ONCIX will develop policy and standards 

for training and professional development 

of individuals engaged in counterintelligence activities. Consistent with the Intelligence Community’s Five Year Strategic 

Human Capital Plan and other U.S. government efforts, we will engage in a 

unified effort to establish best practices, 

baseline our community’s competencies, 

create core training courses, set professional standards, and support research 

initiatives. To the extent feasible, we will 

integrate our training efforts and 

standards with those of the National 

Intelligence University. 

 We will also develop an adaptable, 

expert counterintelligence workforce to 

meet the challenge of evolving intelligence 

threats. Our efforts will focus on three key 

areas. First, we will recruit personnel with 

a broader range of skills and experiences 

from outside the counterintelligence community. Specifically, we will target those 

who have experienced other cultures, 

speak other languages, or have specialized 

skills in information technology. Second, 

we will provide this cadre with a core 

understanding in counterintelligence 

tradecraft, building on best practices from 

across the community. Third, we will 

develop structured career paths that 

emphasize professional growth by identifying key assignments and leadership 

6 
 

7 

development opportunities and by clearly 

articulating promotion goals and standards. This lifecycle approach to 

counterintelligence careers will be 

grounded in a rigorous assessment of 

needs and integrated into wider human 

capital development efforts in the 

Intelligence Community. 

EXPAND NATIONAL AWARENESS 

OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK 

IN THE PRIVATE AS WELL AS 

PUBLIC SECTOR. 

 In order to better fulfill the mission 

of identifying, assessing, and countering 

the intelligence threats to the nation, we 

must reach outward to other elements of 

the U.S. government, the private sector, 

and the general public. By engaging the 

private sector and academia in meaningful 

dialogue, there is much we can learn, and 

in turn we can provide a mechanism to 

coordinate the public dissemination of 

information on intelligence threats to the 

nation. 

 Foreign intelligence activities 

extend beyond traditional targets in the 

Intelligence Community and other U.S. 

national security structures. The private 

sector, other elements of government, and 

academia are fertile breeding grounds for 

advanced scientific discovery, cutting-edge 

technology, and advanced research and 

development that make them irresistible 

“soft targets” for foreign intelligence 

collectors. It is imperative that the 

American public understand that the cyber 

networks that federal, state, and local 

governments, businesses, universities, and 

ordinary citizens use every day are the 

object of systematic hostile activities by 

adversarial intelligence organizations, and 

that these activities threaten the integrity 

and safety of the nation’s infrastructure 

and electronic networks. The counterintelligence community will engage federal 

state, and local governments, the private 

sector, academia, and the general public in 

an ongoing dialogue regarding the threats 

we face and our responses to those threats. 

 

Counterintelligence elements will 

work with willing private sector and 

academic partners to advance intelligence 

community capabilities through research 

and development and to anticipate and 

identify emerging technical threats. 

Where the counterintelligence community 

can form liaisons with willing partners, it 

will reach outward for information critical 

to targeting foreign intelligence activities 

and defending national security. 

CONCLUSION

 These strategic objectives continue 

to guide counterintelligence community 

policy, planning, collection priorities, 

analysis, operations, programming, 

budgeting, and execution. The ONCIX, in 

consultation with the National Counterintelligence Policy Board will oversee the 

implementation of the objectives through 

an integrated counterintelligence 

community effort to capitalize on the 

comparative advantages of its constituent 

organizations. The ONCIX will also 

continue to monitor the counterintelligence community’s progress against 

these strategic objectives and provide our 

leaders with candid and accurate 

assessments on the state of the 

counterintelligence community.