### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE O ct obe r 23, 200 7 S es sio n DANIEL PANTOJ A GARCIA v . NORFOLK SO UTHE RN RAILW AY COMPANY Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 02C1949 Jeffery Hollin gsw orth, Judge

No. E2006-02674-COA- R3-CV- F ILED FEBRUARY22, 2008

I n this appeal of a

direc ted ver dict in a wrong ful death case , Daniel Pantoja Ga rcia (“H usband”) c la ims that N or fo lk S ou the rn Ra ilw ay Com pa ny (“No rf olk Sou the rn ” ) w a s n e g lig e nt i n f a ili ngto war n his now-de cea sed wife, L y dia Garcia (“Wife”) , of t he pre sence of diesel f uel inside a fue l tank that Wif e , a s an e mpl oy e e of Pr og re ss Ra il Ser vic e s Co rp or a tio n ( “ Pr og re ss R a il” ), wa s a ssi g ne d to dismantle. As Wife was c utting the tank w ith a torch-c utter on Norf olk Southern’s proper

ty , the tank exploded, kill ing Wife. The trial court g rante d a dire cted verdict bec ause it found no e vidence that No rf olk Sou the rn ow e d a ny du ty in t his c a se . We a ff

ir m. Tenn R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded
C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.
Mic ha e l M. Ra

uls ton , Ch att ano oga, T enn ess ee, f or t he ap pel lan t, Dan iel P ant oj a Garci a, i nd iv id ually and as the surviving spouse of L y dia Gar cia, dece ased, and as fathe r and next fr i en d o f Ismael Corona Ga

rcia , Manuel Corona Gar cia, and Daniel Corona Gar cia, minor c hildren of Ly dia Gar cia, dece ased. Craig R. Allen, Thomas A. Will iams, and Br uce D. Gill, Chattanooga , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, N o r f o l k S o u t h e r n R a i l w ay C o mp an y.
OP IN IONT hi s account o f ev ent s di f

f er s f r om t he r ecol l ect i on of bot h a t t orn ey s at ora l ar gu ment

. H us band’ s at t orn ey 1
sta te d tha t, a c c o rd ing to his r e c o llec tio n , t h e o ra l ar g u m e n t wa s g ra n te d a t th e c lo se o f all p ro o f. N o rfo lk S o u the rn ’s at t o rney de ni ed t hi s, s t at i ng t hat t he m o t i o n was grant ed at t he cl o se o f t he p l ai nt i f f ’ s p roo f , but “we di d put o ne o f our wi t ness es on o ut of t urn. ” H o wever, the t rans cri p t unam b i guo usl y i nd i cat es t hat nei t her r eco l l ect i o n i s accurat e, and t he act ual s eq uence o f

event s i s as descri b ed herei n. -2- I. As an initial matter, we note a pr ocedur al oddity in this case: althoug h Norfolk Southern’ s motion for direc ted ver dict was made immediately following the pre sentation of Hu s b a n d ’ s p r o o f

- inchief , the par ties ag ree d to finish a full day of testimony

instead of immediately

arguing the motion. Thus , thre e de fe ns e wi tne sse s te sti fi e d a ft e r t he mot ion wa s ma de

. At le a st on e a dd iti on a l N or fo lk

1 Southern witness was sc heduled to testify the following day , but the court g rante d the motion and, hence , no further

defe nse testimony

was pre sented. B eca

use the motion was n o t granted at the conclusion of all

the proof, w e would norma lly treat it as if it had been g rante d at the conc lusion of the plaintiff’s proof, and disreg ard all evidenc e that was offe red afte r the plaintiff re sted. Howe ver, in t his c a se – f

or the re a so ns we are a

bo ut t o d isc us s –

we have c on c lud e d that it i s mo re a pp ro pr ia te to consider a ll the evidence prese nted bef ore the motion was hear d and dec ided.
I n expla ini ng its de c isi on to g ra nt a dir e c te d ve rd ic t, the tr ia l court a pp e ars to h a ve re lie d, in part, upon Nor folk Southern’s evid en ce , an d Hu sband did not object to this at trial. Nor does Hu sb and ra ise an is su e re g ard ingthe c on sid e ratio n o f t his e vid e nc e on a

pp e a l. On

the c on tr a ry , in h i s b r i e f , H u s b an d

a c tu a l l y cites fr om t e sti mony re c e ived du ri ng the pr e se ntatio n o f N or fo lk Southern’s proof

-in-chie f, appa

rently indicating that he believes this evidenc e is helpful t o his case. Simi larly , at or al argument, when a sked about the c ourt’s consider ation of def ense e vidence , Husband’s attorney

stated that it is “important” to his case that the def ense e vidence be conside red. Norfolk Southern, for its pa rt, argued befor e us that whether we treat this as a direc ted ver dict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof or a dire cted ve rdict at the e nd o f al l t h e proof, “ the re sult would not chang e.”
I n the brief

s, neither party appea

rs to make a

ny distinction between the pla intiff’s evidenc e and the defense evidenc e. There fore , in view of all of t he above, we conclude that the par ties have acquie sced in the c onsideration of a ll proof prese nted at trial. This se ems to us the most prude nt and log ic a l w ay

to p ro c e e d, pa

rt ic ula rl y in l ig ht o f t

he a pp are nt r e li anc e pla c e d o n s ome of No rf olk Southern’s evide nce by Husband, the nonmoving party , who is entitled to the benefit of the doubt on fa c tua l matte rs g ive n th e c a se ’s pr oc e dura l post ur e
. I n ad dit ion , Nor fo lk Sou the rn ’s e vid e nc e is helpful in understa

nding the import of some of the f acts shown by

other e vidence . We note, howeve r, that we would r eac h the same holding with respec t to the motion if we consider ed only Husband’s evidenc e.Foreman deni es t hat an y s uch co nv er s at i on t oo k pl ace
. Fo r pur po s es of t hi s mo t i on, howev er , we as s ume t hat 2 H usband ’ s t est i m o ny i s accurat e and t hat t he co nvers at i o n did o ccur. -3- II.
Husband a

nd Wife worked f

or Prog ress Rail as torch-c utters. Their job involved dism antling old locomotives and railroa d ca rs and transporting the scra p metal bac k to Progr ess Rail’s he a dq ua rt e rs in A la

bama . In 2 00 1, No rf

olk Sou the rn so ld a loc omo tiv e and

thr e e ra ilw ay

c a rs to Prog ress Rail. Owne rship of t hese items shifted from Norfolk Sout hern to Prog ress Rail prior to the commence ment of the torc h -c u t t i n g, but the contra ct of sale require d that the box cars and locomotives be dismantled on Norf olk Southern’s rail y ard in Chattanoog a. The contra ct states as fo llo ws :
CA R( S) SOL D I N A S I S WHE RE I S CO ND I TI ON . CA R( S) MU ST B E CU T O N SI TE WI TH CO NTR ACTO R [i.e ., Pr og re ss R a il] OWN I NG AN D R EM OV I NG AL LS CR AP, PAR TS, AN D D EB RI S. (Capitalization in original.)
B e fo re Hu sb and

a nd Wif e be g an the ir wo rk , Nor fo lk Sou the rn str ipp e d the loc omo tiv e of a ll reus ab le elec trical pa

rts, and also va cuum-sucke d most of the diesel fue l out of the locomotive’s tank. The loc omotive was then turne d over to Prog ress Rail. Husband and Wife arr ived at the job site in early

November

2001, along with fore man J ames Painter ( “F orema n”), a lso an employ ee of Prog ress Rail. Over the course of sever al day s, Husband and Wife first dismantled the rail car s, then sta rt e d d ism antl ingthe loc omo tiv e . Wh e n th e y be g an w or

k o n th e loc omo tiv e , its f

ue l ta nk wa s st ill inside, so they

sever ed it from the locomotive, lea ving the tank itself intact. T h e tank was
a pp ro xima te ly

18 fe e t lo ng , 6 fe e t w ide and 4 f e e t hi g h, and cou ld h old 4, 00 0 g a llo ns of

fu e l. Acc ording to Husband’s testimony , afte r he and Wife started their work, F orema n inserted a

stick into the fuel tank and stated that it ha d 4 or 5 inches of diesel fue l inside. Husband claims he the n witnessed, fr om approxim ately 200 or 300 feet aw ay , a conversation betwe en F orema n and two Norfolk Sout hern employ ees, appare ntly about t he tank. Husba nd say s he saw F orema

n show the stick to the Norfolk Southern e mploy ees, a nd hear d him sa

y the word “cle an.” L ater , the tank wa s moved betwe en 200 and 300 f eet a way from the are a wher e Husband and Wife wer e wor king, to a spot near w here Hus b an d say s the conve rsation betwe en F orema n and the Nor folk Southern employ ees ha d ear lier take n place

. H u s b an d an d Wi f e f in is h e d c u tt in g u p th e r e ma in in g p arts o f th e lo c o mo ti v e o v e r th e n e xt two day s. On approximately three differ ent occ asions during those two day s, Husband say s he saw a Nor folk Southern truck parke d next t o the fue l tank. He testified that, based upon this observation, combined with For eman’ s use of the w ord “c lean” in his conversation with the Norfolk Southern 2 employ ees, he , Husband, believe d No rf olk Sou the rn ha d c le ane d th e tank

of a ll d ie se l f

ue l.-4-

Orig inally , the Prog ress Rail team – For eman, Husband and Wife – had intended to ship the fuel tank ba ck to Alabama i ntact. However , on the last day of the job, Nove mber 13, 2001, ther e wa s a chang e of plans. Acc ording to the investigative repor t from the fe dera l Occupational Safety and Hea lth Adminis tration (“O SHA”),

the tan k wa s t o o larg e for the truck. The onsite supervisor [i.e., For eman] called the p l ant for instruc tions. The plant administrator instructed the supe rvisor to cut the tank in ha lf so it would fit onto the tr uc ks

. For eman testified that he did not inform any one at Nor folk Southern about the decision t o torch-c ut the tank int o s e c tio ns
. The fue l tank was brought back to the work site. At around 10:00 a .m., Fore man instructed Husband a

nd Wife to beg in cutting it. Husband cut a small hole near the top of the tank a

nd sniffed it. Smelling no diesel fumes, a nd believing that the fuel ha d been c leane d out, he conc luded that the tank was safe f

or cutting . On cr oss-examination, Husband was a sked whe ther, on “ prior jobs, when y ou had cut up a

fuel tank, you had che cked to make sure that tank w as c l ea n b efore y ou started cutting on it? ” He replied, “Yes.” He was then asked, “B ut y ou didn’t this time? ” He r eplied, “N o.” Husband late r admitted t h at h e an d Wife “could have” c hecke d the tank for fuel with a stick, a s For eman had done previously , “but we didn’t do it be cause we wer e sure – we believed that the tank was c lean.” Trusting such a “ belief” appea rs to be a violation of P rog ress Rail’s safe ty rules, which
mand a te tha

t “ [b]e fo re tor c hin g be g ins , th e are a shal l be ins pe c te d a

nd c omb us tib le or

fl a mma ble materia ls removed” and fur ther that “[n] o welding , cutting, [or] other hot work may be per formed on used drums, barr els, tanks (pre ssurized or not) or other container s until t hey

have be en cle aned so thoroug hly

as to be a bsolutely cer tain that there are no flammable material[s] prese nt[ .]”
Husband and Wife stationed themselves on opposite sides of the tank and beg an cutting eac h sid e fr om t op to bottom

. Whe n Wife g ot a pp ro xima te ly

tw o- thi rd s o f t

he wa y do wn to t he bo tto m, her torc h-cutter

ignited the inside of the tank, appar ently due to the existence of f

uel, and ther e wa s an explosion and fire. Wife suffe red third deg ree burns t o her f ace , head a

nd neck, a

nd second a

nd third deg ree burns to her torso, ba ck, ar ms and leg s. She died from her injuries two wee ks after the
a c c ide nt. A subsequent OSHA investigation found safe ty violations by

Prog ress Rail. Husband f iled a lawsuit aga inst P rog ress Rail in Alabama on May 9, 2002. That ca se wa s later dismissed afte r Husband a

nd Prog ress Rail rea ched a s ettlement, the deta ils of which ar e not disclosed in the re cord. Prog ress Rail’s liability

is not at issue in thi s case
. On No ve mbe r 6, 200 2, Hu sb and fi le d suit in the tr ia l court a g a ins t N or fo lk S ou the rn . H is complaint alleg es that Norf olk Sout h er n fa i led to maintain its premises in a re asonably safe c on dit ion ; f

a ile d to pr ov ide Wif

e wi th a re a so na

bly sa fe pla c e to wo rk ; fa ile d to wa rn Wif e a bo ut a dang erous c ondition of which it w as awa re; failed to clean the tank af ter a ssuming a duty

to do so;-5-

and fa iled to comply

with OSHA regulations and thus, a ccor ding to H usband, committed neg lige nce per se . As will be seen, Hu s b and’s f ocus on appe al is on the latter thre e cla ims: failure to war n, fa ilure to d isc ha

rg e an a ssume d d

uty , a nd fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th O SHAre g ulatio ns
. I n it s ans we r, No rf

olk Sou the rn de nie d a ll o f H us ba

nd ’s op e rativ e a lle g a tio ns and a lso assert ed several a ffirmative defe nses, including a cla im that W ife’s r ecove ry is barre d by

the worke rs’ c ompensation statutes and a claim that Wi fe ’s o wn neg lige nce ba rs Husband’ s rec overy un de r t he do c tr ine of

c omp arativ e fa

ult . A t tr ia l, N or fo lk Sou the rn a lso c la ime d th a t it is n ot l ia ble be c a us e it s old

the loc omo tiv e on

an “ a s- is, wh e re -i s” ba sis

. Hu sb and ’s c la ims we re tr ie d to a jur y
. At th e co nc lus ion

of Hu sb and ’s c a se , N or fo lk Southern made a

motion for a directed verdict. As not ed ea rlier, by ag ree ment of the pa

rties, three of Norf olk Southern’s witnesses we re a llowed to testify out of turn af ter the motion was f

iled. The motion was then argued. The trial court g rant ed No rfolk S outhern a direc ted ver dict, finding no e vid e nc e that N or fo lk S ou the rn ow e d a du ty un de r t he fa c ts b e fo re the c ourt . H us ba nd a pp e a ls.
III

.

“ F or a ne g lig e nc e c a se to g o b e fo re a ju ry , the p la int if f h a s th e burd e n to pr e se nt f a c ts sufficie nt to establish the nec essar y elements of ne g lige nce.” Doe v. Linder Con st. Co., In c. , 845 S.W. 2d 17 3, 18 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . “I f, a s a matt e r of law, the pla int if f ha s f a ile d to a lle g e or

pr ov e fa c ts sufficie nt to establish notice, the exist ence of the duty to act, breac h of t he duty , or proximate cause , dismiss al, summary judgme nt, or a dire cted ve rdict would be a ppropriate .” Id. (q u o t i n g Tedde r v. Ras kin , 7 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d

3 4 3 , 3 4 9 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 8 7 )

. M o r e s u c c i n c t l y, “[t] he plaintiff in a ne g lige nce c ase must offe r some mater ial e vid e nc e sh ow ingthe e xiste nc e of a du ty and an injury pr oximate ly cause d by a bre ach of

that duty .” The standa

rd of r eview in this ca se, then, is whether

there i s an y d i sputed g enuine issue of materia l fac t conce rning the eleme nts o f t he alleg ed ca use of a ction. I f not, the dismiss al of the c omplaint must be af firmed.
Id. ( quoting Tedde r , 728 S.W .2d at 349) (c itation omit ted).
There was some dispute be tw e en the pa rties at ora l argument reg ardingwhether , for pur poses o f t h e i n s t an tc a s e , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f d u t y ( an d t h e e l e m e n t o f f

o r e s e e a b i l i t y a s a c o mp o n e n t o f

d u t y) is a qu e sti on fo r t he jur y or fo r th e jud g e . In a

se ns e , th e c or

re c t ans we r i s: b oth . A lth ou g h it is commonly

stated that duty

is a question of law to be decide d solely by the judg e, this formulation oversimplifies the issue somewhat. As the Supreme Court has state d:

I t is commonplace to say that a particular defenda nt owes a duty

to a pa rt ic ula r p la int if f, bu t su c h a

state me nt, a lth ou g h n ot i nc or re c t, merg es two distinct analy tical st eps. I t is for the cour t to determine,-6- as a matter of law , what cha rac teris t i cs must be pre sent for a re la tio ns hip t o g ive ri se to a du ty the br e a c h o f w hic h ma

y re su lt i n tor t li a bil ity . I t is for the jur

y to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he fa c ts i n eviden ce establish the eleme nts of that relationship. Thus, t he jury decide s the question of dut y o n l y in the sense that it deter mines whether the proofs e stablish the elements of a relationship which the court ha s alrea dy

conclude d g ive rise to a duty as a matter of law

. Ke lle y v . M idd le Te nne sse eEmerg

e nc y Phy sic ian s, P. C. , 133 S.W .3 d 5 87, 598 (Tenn. 2004) ( quoting Sm ith v. Al

lendale Mut. In s. Co. , 303 N.W.2d 702, 710 (Mich. 1981)) . I n the instant case , with the ex ception of the re g ulatory interpre tation question v is- a- v is OSH A, the iss ue s r a ise d r e la te to “ whether

the fa cts in evidenc e esta blish the elements of [a duty ] relationship,” id. 133 S.W .3d at 598, rathe r than what char acte ristics co n s t i t ute such a relationship as a matter of la w. Henc e, we re vie w the e vid e nc e be fo re us to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he ne c e ssa

ry pr e dic a te fa c ts t o e sta

bli shdu ty e xists in the re c or d and we do so purs ua nt to t he re g ula r s tand ard of re vie w o f a

dir e c te d v e rd ic t in a jury case
. A motion for a dire cted verdic t under Te nn. R. Civ. P . 50.01 “is appropr iate only when the evidenc e is sus ceptible to but one c onclusion.” Ale xa nde r v . Ar mentr out , 24 S.W .3d 267, 271 (Tenn. 2000). I n revie wing whether a trial court proper ly g rante d a motion for a dire cted ve rdict, we must “take the s trong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e fa voring the opponent of the motion.” Id. ( quoting Lo ng v

. M att ing ly , 7 97 S.W. 2d

88 9, 89 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 0) ). “ F ur the rm ore, al l rea sonable infere nces in f avor of the opponent of the motion must be allowed an d al l ev i d ence contra ry to the opponent’s position m ust be disreg arde d.” Chil dr ess v . Cur rie , 74 S.W .3d 324, 328 (Tenn. 2002) . I f re asonable minds could differ a s to the conclusions to be draw n from the e vidence prese nted, the motion must not be g rante d, and, if it was g rante d, the trial cour t’s rul i ng must be re ve rs e d o n a

pp e a l.
H u s b an d ar g u e s th a t t

h e e v id e n c e is s u f

f ic ie n t to s u

p p o rt t h r e e s e p ar a te th e o r ie s o f

d u ty

. We wi ll a dd re ss t he se the or ie s in

tur n, in t he fo llo wi ng or de r: fi rs t, wh e the r No rf olk Sou the rn vo lun tari ly assumed a duty to c lean the tank; second, whether Norfolk Southern had a common-law duty to warn Wife about a da

ng er of which it alleg edly

had superior knowledg e, name ly the pre sence of diesel f

uel in the fuel tank; and third, whether Norfolk Southern violated OSHA regulations a nd thus committ ed neg lige nce pe r se.
I V.
Hu sb and c ite s tw o s e pa

rate factual bases fo r h is c la im that N or fo lk S ou the rn vo lun tari ly assumed a duty to c lean the tank. F irst, he ar g ues that Norf olk Southern undertook to clea n the tank pr ior to the arr ival of the Prog ress Rail t ea m
. Second, he a rg ues that Husband sa

w ac tions that i n d i c a t e d t o h i m th a t N o r f

o l k S o u t h e r

n e mp l o ye e s w e r e a g a i n c l e an i n g t h e t an k d u r i n g t h e t w o d a ys prior to the ac cident. Havingthoroug hly revie wed the r ecor d, we f ind no evidence to support either
argume nt.T his l ast d ep o si t i o n e xc erp t wa s rea d i nto t he rec o rd wit ho ut o b je ctio n d u ring N o rf o l k S o uthe rn’s cro ss3

ex am i na t i o n o f

H usb an d ’ s exp ert wit ne ss, D r. T yl er K ress. -7- Hu sb and fi rs t argue s th a t, b e fo re Hu sb and and Wif e e ve n a rr ive d at the job sit e , N or fo lk Southern assumed a duty to dr ain the tank of diesel f uel and wa s theref

ore oblig ated to complete the job . In s up po rt

of thi s p ro po sit ion , h e c ite s th e fo llo wi ng dep os iti on te sti mony

by No rf olk Sou the rn ’s die se l sh op fo re ma n, Gr e g Swa

ny – te sti mony

of fe re d b y Hu sb and a t tr ia l: Q. What e ff

or t w a s ma de to d

ra in a ny die se l f ue l?
A. We would have ty

pically pumped the diesel fue l out of the tank.
Husband’s brief, howeve r, does not c ite the testimony that occur red immediately bef

o re t h at e xch ang e , w hic h w a s a s f oll ow s: Q. Duringthose months it s at at C h at t an oog a Diese l Shop, what eff ort was made to make sure that no diesel fue l was in this tank? A. None, that I ’m awa

re of . When y ou say

no diesel fue l, y ou mean no die se l f

ue l? Q. Rig ht.
A. Yea h, none.
No r d o e s H u s b an d ’ s b r i e f c i t e t h e f u rt h e r t e s t i m o n y f

r o m M r
. S w an y , t w o p a g e s l a t e r i n t h e sa me de po sit ion , th a t th e pumpi ngpr oc e ss h e ha d ju st d e sc ri be d “ do e s no t tot a lly de ple te the tank of a ll trac es of diese l fuel.” Yet these exchang es belie Husband’s assertion t hat t he evidence cre ates a fac t 3 issue reg ardingwhether

Norfolk Southern undertook to c lean the ta nk of all diesel f

uel. They show, in fa c t , t h a tt h e v e r

y w i t n e s s r e l i e d

u p o nb y H u s b an d t o e s t a b l i s h th e a l l e g e d

a s s u mp t i o no f

d uty actua lly testified just the opposite, that Norfolk Southern did not undertake to clean the die se l f ue l. The ba re snippet of Mr. S wany ’s t estimony relied upon by Husband – the w itness’s statement that “we would have ty

pically pumped the diesel fuel out of the tank” – cer tainly does not by

itself g ive rise to a r easona

ble infer ence that Norfolk Southern unde rtook to clean the fuel tan ko f a l l d i es el fuel, a s opposed to mere ly undertaking to r emove f

uel for later use.
The theor y that Norfolk Southern pumped out the fuel for late r use is supported by an excer pt from Mr. Swany ’s live testimony , also quoted in Husband’ s brief:

Q. Now, ther e’s be en some testimony in this case that ther e had be en some diesel fue l that had bee n remove d from this particular tank. What, i f a ny , k no wl e dg e do y ou

have re g ard ingthat?-8- A. When the locomotive came to the diesel shop at first . . . there was some rema ining diese l fuel in the tank. And a s part o f

. . . the par t sa lv ag ing pr oc ess that we did on the locomotive, we would have pumped the majority of the diesel fuel out of the tank, a

nd we did. (Emphase s added.) Husband c ites this testimony as establishi ng a duty to fully clea n the tank, but in fac t it proves just the opposite. I f Norf olk Southern only

undertook to pump out a “ma jority ” of the fue l

– n o t all of it – and did so as par t of a “ salvag ing pr ocess,” as opposed to a c leaning op e ratio n, that di re c tly

c on tr a dic ts H us ba

nd ’s the or

y that N or fo lk S ou the rn

a ssume d a

du ty to thoroug hly

clea n the tank. I n the cr oss-examination of Mr. Swany by Husband’s c ounsel, this point was c larified f

urther: Q:

. . . T he die se l fue l shop mus t hav e a pr oc e ss by wh ic h it c an s a fe ly dis po se of

die se l f ue l, d oe sn ’t

it?
A: Di sp os e of

it? Q: Ye s.
A: We d on ’t

dis po se of

it. We u se it. Q: Yo u r e us e it? A: Yes, sir. Q: Okay . You don’t dispose of old or use d or c o n t am inated diese l fu e l? A: Would y ou like an explanation? Q: Please.
A: I mean, the rea son for removing the fue l from the tank is, we have a boiler or

an ar ray of boilers fr om the shop, and the re moved diesel f u e l f r o m t h o s e t an k s g o e s i n t o t h e f u e l t o o p e r a t e t h o s e b o i l e r s
. It do e sn ’t g o ba c k int o the loc omo tiv e s. I t g oe s int o op e ratin g those bo ile rs
. The trial c ourt, addre ssing this issue during the parties’ arguments on Norfolk Southern’ s motion, p u ti tt h u s l y:
Icannot se e how Mr. Swa ny volunteere d to any

thing or assumed any duty there . He state d very

clea rly , and it’s uncontra dicted, I-9- have n’ t he ard

any thi ngto t he c on tr ary , th a t the

ypu mp e d it

ou t so that they could use the diesel fuel . They g ot as much out of it as they could so they

could use it to run their boilers. I mean, that’ s the on ly re a so n th e y

did it. (Emphasis adde d.) When asked by this court at ora l argument whether Husband ha d “pre sent[ed] any proof that they

undertook to cle an it . . . as opposed to just some proof that they did pump the fuel out,” H usband’s c ounsel conc eded, “ He didn' t use the word ‘ clea n.’ No, sir.”
T a k i n g a tf

a c e v a l u e t h e e v i d e n c e r e l i e d u p o nb y H u s b an d

t o s u p p o rth i s f

i r s t“ d u t y” argument, with all rea sonable infe renc es in his favor , the facts simply do not support the conc lusion t h a tN o r f o l k S o u t h e r nu n d e rt o o k

t o c o mp l e t e l y

c l e ant h e f

u e l t an k o f a l l f u e l an d f u e l r e s i d u e
. In addition, we note that e ven if Nor folk So u t h er n h ad undertaken suc h a duty , Husband’s ow n testimony establishes that he a

nd Wife cannot have bee n rely ing on the fulfillment of

that purported du t y wh en t h ey

decide d to proce ed with the torc h-cutting . By the morning of the a ccide nt, they al r e a dy kn e w th a t t

h e ta n k h a d c o n ta in e d

f u e l a f te r th e ir ar r iv a l o ns it e , a s th e y

h a d s e e nF o rema n test the tank for fuel and discover four to f ive inches of it in the bottom. Husband testified that he saw this, and that Wife was “standing rig ht ne x t to him.” Thus, the fa ctual pre dicate unde rlying the testimony of Husband’ s ex p er t , Dr

. T y l er K ress, that “ this [ tank] had been in the die sel shop for week s p re v ious to thi s . . . and that hazard w as there and unknown to the – undetec ted by the
su pe rv iso r [i.e ., Fo re ma n] an d th e wor k e rs ” (empha sis a dded) is flatly contra dicted by

the evidenc e be fo re us
. Th is l a tte r p oin t segue s into Hu sb and ’s se c on d ass ump tio n- of -d uty argume nt: that N or fo lk Southern assumed a duty

to clean the tank after

For eman’ s above- mentioned discover y of fue l in the bo tto m of the tank

. As no te d e arl ie r, Hu sb and te sti fi e d that a bo ut thr e e da

y s be fo re th e acci den t, For eman inser

ted a stick into the tank, stated that the tank had 4 or 5 inches of f

uel inside, then sh ow e d th e sti c k to tw o Nor fol k Southe rn e mpl oy e e s a

nd sa id t he wo rd “ c le an. ” Th is i s th e on ly word Husba

nd hear d. He sa

y s he hea rd this word at a

distance of

200 to 300 fee t. Husband then saw
a No rf olk Sou the rn tr uc k p ark e d n e xt to the tank a pp ro xima te ly thr e e tim e s ove r t he ne xt two da

y s.
These f acts simply

are not enoug h to me e t H usband’s e videntiary burden. Asingle overhe ard word a ccompa

nied by extremely

ambig uous conduct does not establish any thing of signific ant value or re le va nc e . T a kin g a ll of Hu sb and ’s te sti mony a s tru e , the fa c ts do not g ive ri se to a r e a so na ble infere nce that Norfolk Southern a ssumed a duty to clea n the t ank. The y

support the conc lusion that Husband believe d Norfolk Southern had assumed such a duty , but it appea rs, on these fa cts, to have been a n unrea sonable a

nd unjustified belief. I n any event, Husband’s beliefs are not a t issue here ; the issue is Norfolk Southern’ s actions, spec ifically their alleg ed assumpti o n o f a duty . On that c o u n t , t h e r e s i mp l y i s n o e v i d e n c e t o j u s t i f y s u b m i t t i n g t h i s qu e s t i o nt o a j u r y. Viewingthe e v i d en ce in the light most favora ble to Husband, we find no indication that Norfolk Southern took an y ac t i o n or made any repr esentation that would have indicate d they had-10-

a ssume d a

du ty to cl e an the fu e l tan k of a ll f ue l. H us ba

nd ’s c on te nti on

to t he c on tr ary

is f ound to be wi tho ut m e ri t.
V.
As a separ a te g r o u n d

f o r r e li e f , H u s b an d

ar g u e s th a t N o r f

o lk So u th e r nh a d s u p e r ior k n o wl ed ge o f a da

ng erous c ondition and theref ore ha d a common-la

w duty to warn Wife of

that condition. Howeve r, the fa cts clea rly do not bear

out this contention.
Husband off

ers no e vidence that Norf o l k S o uthern wa s awa

re of the Prog ress Rail team’ s int e nti on to c ut t he fu e l ta nk wi th a tor c h- c utt e r. I n f

a c t, t he e vid e nc e is und isp ute d th a t N or fo lk S ou th ern was ne ve r s pe c if ic a lly ma de awa

re , in a dv anc e of

the a c tua l c utt ing , th a t Pr og re ss R a il pla nn e d to c ut t

he tank on sit e . We no te that th e c on tr a c t be tw e e n N or fo lk S ou the rn and Pr og re ss Rail does not require the fue l tank to be torch-cut ; it mandates only that the locomotive, not ne c e ssa ri ly e a c h in div idu a l pa

rt th ereo f, “ be c ut o n s ite .” I n a dd iti on , M r. Swa ny of No rf olk Southern testified that

I ha d no re a so n to be lie ve , in my wi lde st dr e a ms, that any bo dy wo uld be cutti ng on that fuel tank w ith torches. I f they had aske d me, we wo uld have g la dly

c le ane d it

fo r t he m.
Husband ha s prese nted no evidenc e to the contra ry , and althoug h we must g ive him the benef it of t h e d o u b t o n f a c tu a l m a t t e r s , t h a tb e n e f

i to n l y e x t e n d s s o f

ar
. O n l y re as on ab le infere nces a re to be draw n in his favor, a

nd wher e he ha s prese nted no evidenc e to support an infere nce – such as, he re, an infe renc e that Nor folk Southern fore saw or should have for esee n the trag edy that befe ll W ife – we a re c onstrained to conc lude that t he inferenc e is unrea sonable. Put another wa y , as this Court has previously

stated, [i]f r e a so na

ble pe rs on s cou ld dr aw co nf lic tin g c on c lus ion s, the c a se s h o u l d g o t o t h e j u r

y [ r a t h e r t h anb e i n g s e t t l e d

b y d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t]

. These con cl u sions, however , cannot be base d on speculation,
c on je c tur e, o r gue

ssw or k

. Ne ev . Bi g Cre e k P

artne rs , 106 S.W .3d 650, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (empha sis added; citations omi tte d) . In s um, Hu sb and ha s n ot i ntr od

uc e d e vid e nc e fro m w hic h a jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly conclude or infer that Norfolk Southern should have fore seen Prog ress Rail’s last-minute dec ision to t or c h- c ut t

he fu e l ta nk , a nd wi tho ut s uc h fo re se e a

bil ity , No rf

olk Sou the rn c ann ot t ru ly be sa id t o have ha d knowledg e of the dang erous condition, since there was no da ng er unle ss the torch-c utter was to be use d. Secondly , and per

haps eve n more im portantly , the record in thi s case does not convince us that a jury could re asonably conclude that Wife lacke d knowledg e of the exis tence of some fue l or
r e s i d u e i nt h e t an k

. T h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a tt h e r e m i g h tb e f

u e l i n a f u e l t an k i s f a i r l y s e l f

- e v i d e n t

. It-11-

seems to us that a rea sonable jury would have to c onclude that any person a war e of a previously -used fu e l ta nk ’s in tr ins ic natur e wo uld be on c on str uc tiv e no tic e that it

mig ht p ote nti a lly

c on ta in f ue l. This is espec ially true in lig ht of the business of Prog ress Rail and the w ork that Husband a nd Wife wer e eng ag ed in. As Norfolk Sout hern arg ues i n its brief, “any sophisticated company that is in the sp e c if ic bu sin e ss o f t or c h c utt ingra ilr oa d c ars and loc omo tiv e s is awa

re that f ue l ta nk s ma y c on ta in combustible materials a

nd constitute hazardous conditions.” More over, H usband’s own te stimony on c ro ss- e xami natio n d e mon str a te s th a t he , at le a st, ha d s uc h a n a wa re ne ss: Q: ... [Y] ou knew it was a fuel tank?
A: Ye s.
* * * Q: And y ou knew that f

uel was f lammable?
A: Ye s. Ag ain, Husband ha s not presente d any evidenc e to the contr ary

on these points, nor has he sug g ested that Wife was any less awa re than he of the fuel’s flammability or of the likelihood that a fuel tank
may c on ta in f ue l.
The case cited by Husband in suppor t of the common-law duty to warn, Sout heastern St

eel and Ta nk M ain t. C o. v . L uttre ll , 348 S.W .2d 905 (Tenn. Ct. App

. 1 9 6 1 ), ac t ually reiter ates the duty ’s inapplicability

to a si tuation such as this one, wherein the very nature of the objec t in question makes the ha zard intrinsically obvious. I n support of i ts ruling on this point , the Lut tre ll court stated
a s f oll ow s: Where [] prop erty is delivered to a

bailee f

or work to be pe rf or me d .

. . on

it, the ba ilo r is lia

ble to the ba ile e fo r d e fe c ts l ike ly to c ause injury in the proce ss of perf orming the work if s uc h d e fe c ts ar e no t c om mo n to the pa rti c ula r sp e c ie s of p ro pe rty , and if they

are known, or should h ave be en known, to the ba ilor, and no notice of them is give n to the bailee.
Id. at 907 ( quoting

8 C.J .S. Ba ilm e nt § 52) (2008) (emphasis adde d). The pr esenc e of f uel in a fue l tank, if it c an be reg arde d as “def ect” at all, is c erta inly a “def ect[] .

. . commo n t o t h e p ar t i cu lar specie s of prope rty .”
Moreove r, as noted e arlier , Husband, with Wife st an d i n g beside him, ac tually witnessed For eman’ s discovery

of fue l in the tank approximately three day s befor e the accide nt, and he never saw a ny one cle an the tank a fter that point. Aga in quoting fr om his cross-examination:-12- Q: L et' s talk just for a mi nute about this acc ident here at Chattanoog a. You saw [For eman] put a stick down that fue l tank and pull it out and saw four or five inc hes of liquid on the bottom of that stick?
A: Ye s.
* * * Q: [Y]ou kn e w that th a t li qu id w a s f ue l?
A: Ye s. Q: An d y ou

c ou ld e ve n s me ll i t?
A: Ye s. Q: And [W ife] was standing rig ht next to y ou when this happe ned?
A: Ye s.
L a t e r , o n r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c h an g e o c c u r

r e d b e t w e e nH u s b an d

an d h i s a t t o r n e y: Q: Daniel, when y ou overhe ard the conver sation betwee n [Foreman] and the No rf olk Sou thern e mpl oy e e s, wa s [Wif e ] cl os e e no ug h to ov e rh e ar i t a s w e ll?
A: Ye s. Q: Did y ou ever

discuss with [ W i fe ] , after this, that there mig ht be fuel in the tank?
A: Ye s.
As ca n be see n, the par

ties ag ree that Husband a nd Wife were both awa

re of the pre sence of fue l ins ide the tank in the imm e diate a ft e rm a th of F or e man’ s use of the sti c k to mea sure the fu e l. T hu s, in order to be seen a s lacking knowledg e of the hazard at the time of the ac cident, Husba nd and Wife would have neede d to be come awa re of fac ts indicating that the tank had be en cle aned at some point
a ft e r F or e man’ s me a sure me nt. Ye t, i n f a c t, t he y did no t witn e ss it bei ng c le ane d, no r we re the y tol d that it had been c leane d. Quoting a g ain from Husba nd’s testimony

on cross-e x amination: Q: [D] uring that co u p l e of day s that y ou wer e cutting up the locomotive, while that fuel tank sat a couple hundr ed fe et awa y , y ou-13- never saw a ny body from Norfolk Southern put a ny thing in that fue l tank and pump i t out?
A: Ilooked and I saw a truck, but I was busy working and I

did not

. . . I be lie ve that th e y

we re c le anin g it o r e mpt

y ingit. Q: You neve r saw the m doing any thing, putting any

thing in that tank, did y ou?
A: Other tha

n the stick, no.
* * * Q: Okay . J ust so we’re clear, s o y o u never saw Nor folk Southern clea n out the tank?
A : N o
. I l o o k e d

an d I tho ug ht the y ha d c le ane d it

. * * * Q: After the tank wa s moved, y o u never saw [Fore man] over there , tr y ingto c le an th a t ta

nk ou t?
A: Isaw the m ov e r t

he re , [F or e man] and

so me on e from N or fo lk Southern. Q: But y ou never

saw [Fore man] cleaning out the tank?
A: No. Q: And [W ife] and y ou wer e wor king c lose by

eac h other?
A: Ye s. (Emphasis adde d). The e vidence is undisputed that Husband and Wife saw that the tank conta ined fu e l, or a t le a st fu e l slu dg e or re sid ue , and that ne ith e r o f t

he m w itn e sse d th a t mate ri a l su bs e qu e ntl y be ingre mov e d, no r r e c e ive d an y a ff ir ma tiv e a ssu

ra nc e s th a t it

ha d b e e n r e mov e d. I t is dif fi c ult to see how those fac ts could l end themselve s to the conclusion that anyone had su pe rio r knowledg e of the fu e l’ s c on tin

ue d p re se nc e in t

he tank . I f Husband

or Wif e ha d a sk e d s ome on e a t N or fo lk Sou the rn w he the r t

he tank wa s clean , and had be en told that it was, then our a naly sis would, of course , chang e. On these f acts, howe ver, the y

had no valid re ason to believe the tank wa s clea n and ever y rea son to believe that it might still contain fuel. The y cannot c l o s e their ey es to an obvious dang er a nd then claim they

knew nothing about it.-14-

I n light of the fac ts discussed here in, it would be unrea sonable for a jury to conclude, ba sed up on thi s e vid e nc e , that Wif e la c ke d kn ow le dg e of a da ng e ro us c on dit ion su c h th at N orf olk Sou the rn ’s kn ow le dg e of

that da ng e r w a s su

pe ri or . H us ba

nd ’s argume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.
V I. Finally , Husband claims that Norfolk Southern violated fede ral health and safe ty regulations reg ardingthe safe use of c utting and w elding equipment, and, a s a conse quen ce , wa s g uilty of ne g lig e nce per

se . Sp e c if

ic a lly , h e c ite s O SHAre g ulatio n 1 91 0. 25 2( a ), c on c e rn ingfi re sa fe ty in we ldi ngand

c utt ingop e ratio ns : Manag emen t. Manag ement shall re cog nize its responsibility for the safe usag e of c utting and w elding equipment on its property and:
* * * (D) A dvise all contra ctors about f lammable mater ials or hazardous conditions of which they

may not be awa

re. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(a) (2)( x iii) (2008).
We note first that this r eg ulation, w hich appea rs under the subheading“Specia l prec autions,” is applicable only

“[w]hen the nature of

the work to be performe d falls wit hin the scope of par ag raph (a) (1) ( ii ) o f th is s e c ti o n
. ” Pa r a g r a p h ( a ) ( 1 ) ( ii ) s tate s : “ I f th e o b je c t to b e w e ld e d o r c u t cannot be mov e d a nd if a ll the fi re ha zar ds c ann ot b e re mov e d, the n gua rd s sh a ll b e us e d to c on fi ne the he a t, sparks, a nd slag , and to protec t the immovable fire ha zards.” Given the undisputed testimony that the fue l tank was in fa ct moved ar ound the N o rf o l k S o u thern prope rty

on at least thre e occ asions (fr om inside the locomotive to outside of the locomotive, then from the job site to a pproxi mately

200 - 300 fee t awa

y and back), and g iven t hat Husband’ s whole ar g ument is premised on the notion that the sole fire hazard, the die sel fuel, c ou ld have be e n r e mov e d, we are not a t a ll s ur e that § 1910.252(a) (2)( x iii) even applies. Howeve r, as ne ither par ty has ra ised this point, we will not decide i tan d w i l l p r o c e e d

o nt h e a s s ump t i o nt h a tt h e r e g u l a t i o nd o e s a p p l y. Norfolk Southern argues that it should not be considere d “mana g ement” for pur poses of the regulation in question. I t alleg es t hat t here is a dis cre pancy betwee n the def inition of “supervisor” – a ter m tha t both pa

rt ie s ag re e a

pp lie s to F or e man, wh o is a Pr og re ss R a il e mpl oy e e , n ot a No rf olk Southern employ ee – a

nd the claim that Nor folk Southe rn shoul d be conside red “ manag ement.” Hu sb and re sp on ds by

c iti ngthe te sti mony of his e xpe rt wi tne ss, Dr

. Kr e ss, wh o s ta te d th a t N or fo lk Southern should indeed be c onsidered “ manag ement” unde r the re g ulatory scheme in question. We, of course , are not bound by the testimony

of an e x pert witness wi t h reg ard to the interpre tation of a fe dera l regulation, which is a question of law. Howeve r, we are inclined to ag ree with Dr. Kres s ’s testimony that there is not necessa rily a contr adiction in this contex t betwee n-15-

“mana g ement” r efe rrin g

to N o r f o lk So uth ern a

nd “super visor” re fer

ring to a Prog ress Rail employ ee. On the c on tr ary , o ur re a din g of the re g ulatio n lea ds us to b e lie ve that th e po ssi bil ity of su c h a re su lt was intended by the draf

ters of the regulation. The very first section of the re g ulation refe rs to the sh are d “ re sp on sib ili tie s o f w e lde rs a nd c utt e rs , th e ir

su pe rv iso rs (

inc lud ing ou tsi de c on tra c tor

s) and tho se in m a na g e me nt on who se pr op e rty cutting a nd welding is to be perf

ormed.” 29 C.F.R. § 191 0

. 2 5 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( e mp h a s e s a d d e d )

. A lt h o u g h “ ma

n a g e me n t” is n o w h e r e d e f in e d in the OSHA regulations, it appears to re fer here to the operator of the property on which the c utting or w elding is taking place , not ne cessa rily to the employ er of either the supervisor or the wor kers. Indeed, a s the re g ulatio n e xplic itl y

state s th a t “ ou tsi de c ontr a c tor s” c an b e “ su pe rv iso rs ,” it wou ld s e e m to follow nec essar ily

that “mana g ement” need not directly employ such “supe rvisors.” As suc h, and having found no helpful pre cede nt to help us define “ manag ement” in this context, we are disinclined to decide a g ainst Husband on this g round.
Howeve r, eve n if Norf

olk S o u t h er n i s “mana g ement” f or OSHA purpose s, it sti ll did not violate § 1910.252(a )(2) (xi ii)(D), f or the same rea sons noted i n a previous section: on the fac ts of thi s c a se , f

ue l in a fu e l ta nk do e s n ot c on sti tut e “ fl a mma ble ma te ri a ls o r h a zar do us c on dit ion s of whi c h [c on tra c tor

s] ma y no t be awa re .” On the contr ary , Husband’s te stimony clea rly states that For eman m ea s u re d t he fue l with a stick and then showe d that stick to two Norfolk Southern employ ees. Put another

way , acc ording to Husband’s own ve rsion of eve nts, Norfolk Southern knew that Pr og re ss Ra il’ s su

pe rv iso r w a s awa

re of the fu e l pr ior

to t he a c c ide nt; thu s, bo th f

ro m N or fo lk Sou the rn ’s pe rs pe c tiv e and in p oin t of

fa c t, i t w a s n ot a “ ha zar do us c on dit ion of wh ic h [c on tr a c tor s] may not be awa

re.” I f Foreman had asked Norfolk Sout hern to clea n the t ank and Norfolk Southern ha d f a ile d to do so , th a t w ou ld p ote nti a lly re e sta bli shNo rf

olk Sou the rn ’s purp or

te d OSH A d

uty to inform the contr actor s of the haz ar d

– b u t again, Husba nd’s testimony

does not establish that any such re quest was made . As alre ady noted, the mer e fa ct that Husband overhe ard the word “c lean” from 200 or 300 f

eet a way , and that the tank w as then re located f or seve ral day s, cannot, without more, g ive rise to a r easona ble pre sumption t hat Norf olk Southern was asked to c lean the tank or that it a g r e e d to d o s o
. A t m o s t, H u s b an d ’ s p r o o f s u g g e s ts th a t H u sband believe d the tank had be en clea ned, but the evide nce doe s not support the conclusion that this belief wa s rea sonable, nor that No rf olk Sou the rn wa s awa re of it – and No rf

olk Sou the rn c ann ot be pe na lize d f or fa ili ngto d isa

bu se Husband of a

n unrea sonable be lief of whic h Norfolk Southern w as unaw are
. I n sum , t h e e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t , a s f

ar a s N o r f o l k S o u t h e r nw a s c o n c e r

n e d , P r o g r e ss Rail’s employ ees, inc luding Wife, we re not just constructively awa re of the haz ard (in the sense that fuel tanks tend to c ontain fuel), the y wer e also a ctually , subjectively awa re of the hazard, a

nd had no valid rea son to believe it had been removed. There fore , even if § 1910.252(a) (2)( x iii) applies on theseB e c a u se w e re so lve this i ssu e in N o rfo lk S o u the rn ’s f a v o r, w e d o no t d e c id e o the r issu e s ra ise d b y N o rfo lk 4 S o u the rn : wh e the r, if ind e e d N o rfo lk S o u the rn is “m a n a g e m e n t” fo r O S H A p u rp o se s, it the re fo re fo llo w s tha t t h is
ac cid en t f

all s und er the w o rke r’ s co m p en sati o n stat ute, b arring t his l aw suit ; o r wh at eff ec t , i f an y, t he “as i s/ w he re is” nat ur e of t he cont r act woul d h ave had on any po s s i bl e dut y , i f a dut y ha d ot her wi s e a r i s en, un der O SH A or ot her wi s e. -16- fac ts, and eve n if Norf

olk Southern is “manag ement,” no OSHA violation occur red, a nd there fore ne g lig e nc e pe r s e do e s n ot a ri se . T his c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t. 4

V II. The judg ment of t he trial court is aff irmed. Costs on appea l are taxed to the appellant, Da niel Pantoja Gar cia. This ca se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for co l l ec t ion of costs assesse d below, pursuant to applica

ble law.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE