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Carlisle Paper

INSANITY:

FOUR DECADES OF U.S. COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Walther

December 2012

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-561-5
iii

PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect and capitalize on their career 

experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To ensure that the research conducted by USAWC students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, 

the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle Papers” series.

 

 ANTULIO J ECHEVARRIA II

 Director of Research

 Strategic Studies Institute 

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MICHAEL F. WALTHER is a recently retired Senior Executive of the U.S. Department 

of Justice (DoJ), having served most recently as Director of the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). He is also a recently retired U.S. Army Reserve Judge Advocate 

who has served in a variety of positions, including a deployment to Iraq (2006-07) as 

Legal Advisor to the Multi-National Force Iraq planning staff and Director of the Law 

and Order Task Force in Baghdad. He last served as a Military Judge, presiding over 

courts-martial in the U.S. Army’s Fourth Judicial District. Lieutenant Colonel Walther 

was originally commissioned as a U.S. Air Force Officer and attended law school under 

the USAF-funded Legal Education Program. As an Air Force Judge Advocate, he served 

in International Law-related positions in Greece and Germany before shifting the focus 

of his legal practice to military law and criminal justice matters. In 2003, he joined the 

U.S. DoJ as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was assigned to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. In 1999, he transferred to 

DOJ’s Criminal Division in Washington, DC, where he served as a Senior Trial Attorney, 

Deputy Chief, and Acting Chief of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section. Lieutenant Colonel Walther holds a B.A. in English from Tulane University, an M.A. in strategic 

studies from the U.S. Army War College, and a J.D. from the University of the Pacific, 

McGeorge School of Law.

vii

ABSTRACT

In the 4 decades since President Richard Nixon first declared war on drugs, the U.S. 

counterdrug strategy has remained virtually unchanged—favoring supply-reduction, 

law enforcement, and criminal sanctions over demand reduction, treatment, and education. While the annual counterdrug budget has ballooned from $100 million to $25 

billion, the availability of most illicit drugs remains at an all-time high. The human cost 

is staggering—nearly 40,000 drug-related deaths in the United States annually. The societal impact, in purely economic terms, is now estimated to be approximately $200 billion 

per year. The global illicit drug industry now accounts for 1 percent of all commerce on 

the planet—approximately $320 billion annually. Legalization is almost certainly not 

the answer; however, an objective analysis of available data confirms that: 1) the United 

States has pursued essentially the same flawed supply-reduction strategy for 40 years; 

and, 2) simply increasing the amount of money invested each year in this strategy will 

not make it successful. Faced with impending budget cuts and a future of budget austerity, policymakers must replace the longstanding U.S. counterdrug strategy with a pragmatic, science-based, demand-reduction strategy that offers some prospect of reducing 

the economic and societal impacts of illicit drugs on American society.

1

INSANITY:

FOUR DECADES OF U.S. COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY

The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different 

results.

 Albert Einstein1

For nearly 2 centuries, North America was “a dope fiend’s paradise.”2 American colonists and their native predecessors came to rely upon derivatives of natural substances 

to cure ailments, increase sexual potency, relieve pain, and provide pleasure.3 By the 

early-1800s, a burgeoning patent medicine industry advertised preparations containing 

large quantities of opium;4 in 1844, cocaine was first isolated in pure form from coca 

leaves;5 in 1874, heroin was synthesized and recommended as more effective, and less 

dangerous and addicting, than morphine;6

 and amphetamines were first synthesized in 

1887.7

 Most Americans know little of their nation’s antebellum drug history, i.e., the 200 

years that preceded the war on drugs, and nearly all are unaware that drugs were legal 

for most of that period. 

However, late in the 19th century, a nascent drug prohibition movement began to 

develop.8

 Before long, a combination of evangelical prohibitionists and Progressive Era 

reformers mounted a successful campaign for the first federal anti-narcotics legislation.9

The Harrison Act,10 passed in 1914, became the basis for narcotics regulation over the 

next half-century.11 In 1918, 3 years after the Act went into effect, a congressional study 

found that the use of drugs—narcotics as well as cocaine—had actually increased.12

On January 1, 1932, the Treasury Department’s newly formed Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics (FBN) assumed responsibility for the enforcement of federal drug laws. The 

FBN’s first director, Harry Anslinger, has been described as “the personification of the 

antinarcotic regime.”13 Over the course of 30 years and five administrations, he championed a punitive drug policy that today, more than a half-century later, still serves as the 

foundation of our prohibitionist drug strategy.14

Our national drug strategy has essentially always been two-dimensional: supplyreduction (controlling the supply of drugs through legislation, law enforcement, interdiction, prosecution, and incarceration); and demand-reduction (reducing the demand 

for drugs through education, prevention, and treatment).15 Although perhaps oversimplified, the distinction between supply and demand programs has framed much of the 

drug policy debate in America over the past 40 years.16 Every administration has advocated a “balanced” approach incorporating both supply-reduction and demand-reduction programs. However, the distribution of resources, i.e., the supply/demand split, 

has become “the metric for the debate.”17 Thus, accurate analysis of any administration’s 

drug strategy requires that we ignore the rhetoric and “follow the money.”18

Soon after his inauguration, President Nixon unveiled the first comprehensive national strategy aimed at reducing drug abuse and ameliorating its harmful effects. The 

early emphasis was on treatment and rehabilitation, and budget expenditures between 

1970 and 1974 included dramatic increases, with a spending distribution that disproportionately favored demand-reduction over enforcement.19 The 1973 drug budget was the 
2

high-water mark for demand-reduction funding—at approximately 70 percent of the 

total counterdrug budget.20

Was the Nixon approach favoring demand-reduction an effective strategy? If one 

measures results by falling crime rates in major cities, the large-scale successful treatment of addicts, and a reduction in the availability of illicit drugs, the answer is almost 

certainly “yes.”21 However, the 1972 reelection campaign and the Watergate scandal 

marked a turning point in the Nixon strategy.22 Despite evidence that a balance between law enforcement and demand-reduction could be effective, the need to be seen as 

“tough-on-crime” allowed politics to trump a well-reasoned public policy and a strategy 

based on science-driven methodologies.23 Future drug budgets would reflect this shift 

in strategy. 

The percentage of resources allocated to demand-reduction declined steadily after 

1973.24 By the end of the Gerald Ford administration, federal drug spending was nearly 

evenly divided between supply-reduction and demand-reduction, and remained that 

way through the Jimmy Carter administration.25 The Ronald Reagan administration 

and the drug strategies of the 1980s shifted the emphasis even further toward supplyreduction and “took a far more punitive approach toward drug use.”26 The allocation of 

the federal drug budget reflected this change in policy. The spending balance ultimately 

became two-thirds for supply-reduction and one-third for demand-reduction and, as 

detailed herein, that ratio has essentially remained unchanged. See Figure 1. 

Figure 1. Spending Ratio as a Percentage

of the Total Counterdrug Budget.

Over the past 40 years, the federal counterdrug budget has ballooned from $100 million to $25 billion.27 Yet, the availability of most illicit drugs remains at an all-time high, 

and the United States has an estimated 10 times as many hardcore users as it did in 

1969.28 The global illicit drug industry now accounts for 1 percent of all commerce on 

the planet—about $320 billion annually.29 An estimated 40,000 Americans die each year 
3

from drug-related causes; another 500,000 Americans are incarcerated for nonviolent, 

drug-related crimes;30 and, in purely economic terms, the cost of illicit drug use is nearly 

$200 billion per year.31 Yet, we continue to pursue the same failing strategy—favoring 

supply-reduction over demand-reduction—while expecting different results. 

The U.S. counterdrug strategy—its focus on supply-reduction largely unchanged 

over the last 4 decades—has been an abject failure. The current Drug Czar, Gil Kerlikowske, has conceded as much: “In the grand scheme, it has not been successful. . . . 

Forty years later, the concern about drugs and drug problems is, if anything, magnified, 

intensified.”32 Meanwhile, research (and history33) has shown that demand-reduction 

programs are “very effective in reducing drug demand, saving lives, and lessening 

health and crime consequences.”34 Moreover, demand-reduction programs make economic sense. Eradication of drugs in source countries and interdiction on the high seas is 

expensive and has had little effect on drug availability.35 In general, law enforcement efforts cost 15 times as much as treatment to achieve the same reduction in societal costs,36

whereas, every dollar spent on treatment saves taxpayers between $7.46 and $11.54.37

Clearly, law enforcement and the criminal justice system must remain among the pillars of any new strategy. They are powerful tools of “coercion” to help users stop abusing drugs and committing drug-related crimes. Therefore, we must focus our efforts on 

those drugs that inherently pose greater risk to the individuals and to society lest we 

squander valuable law enforcement resources and escalate the economic and societal 

cost of imprisoning hundreds of thousands of Americans. 

At the turn of the last century, Americans could generally buy cocaine, morphine, 

and heroin over the counter at any pharmacy.38 Addiction rates ranged from 0.4 percent 

to 1.2 percent of the adult population.39 Today, after 100 years of drug prohibition policies, an estimated 7 million Americans—approximately 2.3 percent of the adult population—depend on or abuse illicit drugs.40

A brief review of the counterdrug policies pursued by each administration over the 

last 40 years demonstrates that a new, more pragmatic, strategic approach is clearly 

required—one that begins with an armistice in the war on drugs and a reallocation of 

spending toward demand-reduction programs that have proven more effective in reducing drug use and its damaging consequences.41

The Nixon and Ford Administrations: 1969-77.

This Administration has declared all-out, global war on the drug menace.

 Richard M. Nixon42

The 1968 Presidential election occurred against a backdrop that included the assassinations of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., and presidential candidate Robert 

F. Kennedy; race riots in major cities across the country; widespread violent demonstrations against the Vietnam War; and a growing epidemic of drug use among America’s 

youth.43 Troubling accounts of drug abuse by servicemen in Southeast Asia filled the 

media,44 along with reports of escalating drug-related crime in major urban centers.45
4

Former Vice President Nixon won the election, following a campaign that promised to restore law and order to the nation’s cities. In a special message to Congress on 

July 14, 1969, Nixon declared the abuse of drugs “a serious national threat to the personal health and safety of millions of Americans.”46 Citing narcotics as “a primary cause 

of the enormous increase in street crimes over the last decade,” Nixon’s counterdrug 

strategy combined enhanced criminal penalties, interdiction, education, research, and 

rehabilitation.47

Nixon remained “viscerally opposed to drugs”48 and refused any suggestion of legalization.49 However, the center of gravity of his strategy was clearly demand-reduction.50

The best evidence of this is the drug program budget, which increased from $81.3 million in FY 1969 to $783.6 million in FY 1973, with two-thirds of the new resources allocated to treatment and only one-third to law enforcement.51 His appointment of an 

addiction-treatment specialist, Dr. Jerome Jaffe, as Director of the White House Special 

Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP), and his legislative agenda further 

demonstrated his administration’s commitment to a demand-reduction strategy.52

On June 17, 1971, Nixon officially declared the “War on Drugs.”53 Yet, despite the 

“get-tough” rhetoric, demand-reduction remained the strategic focus throughout his 

first term. Ever the pragmatist, Nixon recognized that “the laws of supply and demand 

function in the illegal drug business as in any other,” and that the best prospect for success lay in demand-reduction and treatment programs.54 For the first—and only—time 

in the history of the war on drugs, Nixon designated more federal funding for prevention and treatment than for law enforcement.55 See Figure 2.

Figure 2. The Nixon Drug Spending Record.56

During Nixon’s first term, new prevention strategies and data collection tools were 

introduced and innovative substance abuse treatment, rehabilitation, and research were 

supported. More funds were allocated for drug abuse prevention and treatment than for 

law enforcement. However, Nixon’s abbreviated second term, which ended with his resignation on August 9, 1974, witnessed a clear shift in emphasis toward supply-reduction 

and enforcement.57

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

1970 53 47 59 53

1971 82 48 89 52

1972 164 41 239 59

1973 214 31 466 69

1974 278 35 510 65

• FY 1970 represented a 50 

percent increase in the overall 

drug budget from FY 1969.

• Spending on demand-reduction consistently exceeded 

spending on supply-reduction.

• 1973 was the high-water mark 

for demand-reduction spending (as a percentage of the 

total counterdrug budget).
5

The national drug strategy saw little change during the Ford administration. Like 

Nixon, Ford appointed a task force to assess the extent of drug abuse in America. And, 

like Nixon, he ignored its recommendation that “priority in federal counterdrug efforts 

be directed to those drugs which inherently pose greater risk to the individuals and to 

society.”58 Smarting from criticism of the Nixon pardon and, hoping to gain support for 

his own election, it was politically inexpedient for Ford to appear “soft” on marijuana.59

The Ford administration’s rhetoric called for a “balance [of] the law enforcement effort with the provision of humane and effective treatment for drug users.”60 However, 

overall growth of the drug budget slowed, and the spending balance between supplyreduction and demand-reduction reached parity in 1976.61 See Figure 3.

Figure 3. The Ford Drug Spending Record.62

Unfortunately, parity in spending did not translate into a balanced counterdrug 

strategy—any more than an equal division of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget 

between the uniformed services would guarantee a balanced national defense strategy. 

Nevertheless, every politician wanted to be viewed as pro-law enforcement, and the 

“drug-abuse industrial complex”63 soon became a powerful lobbying force, causing 

policy, strategy, and funding to tilt even further toward a supply-reduction orientation. 

The Carter Administration: 1976-80.

Penalties against possession of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than 

the use of the drug itself; and where they are, they should be changed.

 Jimmy Carter64

Jimmy Carter was inaugurated President on January 20, 1977, following a campaign 

that included calls to decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana. 

Drug abuse was no longer “public enemy number one.” It was merely “a serious social 

problem.”65

Carter appointed Dr. Peter Bourne to serve as Director of the newly created Office 

on Drug Abuse Policy66 and, soon thereafter, consistent with his campaign pledge, proFY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

1975 300 40 447 60

1976 362 50 367 50

1977 368 50 369 50

• Overall growth of counterdrug 

budget slowed from Nixon era.

• FY 1976 brought a 10 percent 

decline in demand-reduction 

spending.

• Spending between demand-reduction and supply-reduction reached 

parity
6

posed legislation to decriminalize federal penalties for possession of up to one ounce of 

marijuana.67 Carter made a very clear distinction between marijuana and “hard drugs.”68

Consistent with that view, he called for federal resources to be allocated “intelligently,” 

urging Congress to “revise our penalty structure where necessary to concentrate on the 

actions (and the drugs) that are the most dangerous.”69

Whatever hopes Carter may have had for effecting meaningful changes in drug policy were shattered on July 19, 1978, by a Washington Post headline: “Carter Aide Signed 

Fake Quaalude Prescription.”70 The story revealed that Dr. Bourne had written a prescription sedative for a fellow White House aide, using a pseudonym to mask her identity.71 The incident erupted into a major scandal when the Washington Times reported 

that Bourne had used cocaine and marijuana at a DC party 7 months earlier.72 Bourne 

quickly resigned in disgrace, and Carter retreated from drug-law reform for the rest of 

his embattled term.73

In the area of demand-reduction, Carter called on the National Institute on Drug 

Abuse (NIDA) to develop more programs for abusers of barbiturates and amphetamines, 

and supported rehabilitation and job-training programs for former heroin addicts. Like 

his predecessors, he frequently acknowledged the need for better coordination of federally sponsored research efforts on a variety of drugs, including opiates, alcohol, and 

tobacco, and expressed hope that this would save money and “lead to greater scientific 

understanding of addiction problems.” However, in retrospect, it appears the Carter 

administration misjudged public and political support for any “softening” of the prohibitionist drug strategy. 

Like his predecessors (and successors), Carter publicly supported international 

law-enforcement efforts to eradicate drugs and dismantle international trafficking networks.74 He promoted law enforcement programs calling for “swift and severe punishment” of drug traffickers, including easing restrictions on law enforcement access to tax 

records of suspected traffickers, the freezing of trafficker assets, and bail restrictions for 

major offenders. See Figure 4.

Figure 4. The Carter Drug Spending Record.75

Carter’s drug strategy ultimately proved indistinguishable from that of Nixon and 

Ford. The decline in demand-reduction spending that began in 1973 continued and, in 

Carter’s last drug budget, the demand share stood at only 43 percent. The results of the 

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

1978 417 376 47

1979 470 415 47

1980 553 410 43

1981 860 672 43

• Decline in demand-reduction 

spending that began in 1974 

continued. 

• Decline in demand-reduction 

spending would eventually stabilize 

at + 33 percent 

during the Reagan administration.
7

strategy were also indistinguishable. By the end of Carter’s term, illegal drugs were less 

expensive, more available, and more widely used than on the day of his inauguration.

The Reagan Administration: 1981-89.

We’ve taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we’re going to win the war 

on drugs.

 Ronald Reagan76

“Government is the problem” was a slogan often repeated during the election campaign of Ronald Reagan. However, the underlying philosophy was not always practiced 

by his presidential administration, particularly in the area of drug policy.77 Oversight of 

drug policy became concentrated in the White House, and the national drug strategy 

took a decidedly more supply-reduction approach, with an increased emphasis on law 

enforcement and increased military involvement in the war on drugs.78

Although the White House announced another “new, more-balanced, and bettercoordinated strategy” of supply-reduction and demand-reduction programs,79 the 1980s 

saw the passage of four major antidrug bills increasing criminal sanctions for drug-related offenses.80 As evidenced by budget distribution, demand-reduction programs were a 

low priority. Funding for law enforcement rose to three times that for abuse-prevention 

and treatment programs.81

It was the age of “zero tolerance.”82 Reagan shifted responsibility for the anti-drug 

effort from Health and Human Services to the Department of Justice.83 Oversight and 

funding of demand-reduction and treatment programs were largely left to the states 

and the private sector.84 In 1984, First Lady Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” anti-drug 

campaign became a centerpiece of the Reagan administration’s demand-reduction effort.85 In addition to “Just Say No,” the Partnership for a Drug-Free America launched 

a similarly memorable television ad campaign in 1987 featuring a hot skillet, a raw egg, 

and the phrase, “This is your brain on drugs.”86 See Figure 5.

Figure 5. The Reagan Drug Spending Record.87

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

%

1982 1,052 61 667 39

1983 1,259 63 738 37

1984 1,579 67 784 33

1985 1,896 69 855 31

1986 2,013 70 868 30

1987 3,379 71 1,413 29

1988 3,225 68 1,483 32

1989 4,584 69 2,080 31

• FY 1982 included a 25 percent increase for 

supply-reduction over FY 1981 levels, but a 1 

percent decrease in demand-reduction spending.

• Demand-reduction spending steadily grew, 

reaching a maximum of 71 percent in FY 1987.

• FY 1982-FY 1989 witnessed the largest 

increases in the counterdrug budget over the 

last 4 decades.

• In just 13 years (FY 1973 - FY 1986), the ratio 

of spending—demand-reduction versus supply-reduction—shifted from 70/30 to 30/70. 
8

Reagan gave Vice President George Bush the drug portfolio and free rein to expand 

military and intelligence community involvement in the counterdrug effort.88 In January 1982, in response to increasing drug violence in Miami—the primary locus of cocaine smuggling at the time—Reagan created the “Vice President’s Task Force on South 

Florida,” which combined agents from Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Customs; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Internal Revenue Service (IRS); Army; and Navy to mobilize against drug traffickers.89

To whatever extent the administration’s supply-reduction efforts were successful, they 

also had unintended consequences.90 The South Florida Drug Task Force’s successes led 

Colombian traffickers into partnerships with Mexican marijuana smugglers to move cocaine across the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border. As more and more cocaine entered the 

smuggling pipeline, prices fell. Between 1980 and 1988, the wholesale price of cocaine 

in the United States dropped from $60,000 to $10-15,000 per kilo.91 The per-ounce price 

declined from over $120 in early 1981 to just $50 in late 1988.92

By August 1986, Reagan had to admit that: “Despite our best efforts, illegal cocaine 

is coming into our country at alarming levels, and 4 to 5 million people regularly use 

it.”93 In October 1986, Reagan signed the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, appropriating 

$1.7 billion to fight the drug crisis; however, only about 25 percent of that amount was 

dedicated to education and treatment.94 The bill’s most consequential action was the 

creation of mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses.95

By the mid-80s, cocaine use had spread to middle-class and poor Americans, in part 

because it could be purchased in smaller and less expensive units. It was the beginning 

of the “crack epidemic.”96 Cocaine powder retailed for $50-75 per gram, but crack sold 

in small vials for $5 or less.97 It was powerfully addictive and began to devastate inner 

city neighborhoods.98

While reasonable men and women can argue how best to measure success and failure in the war on drugs, it is clear that the supply-reduction strategy of the Reagan 

administration failed. The magnitude of the drug problem was at least as great when 

Reagan left office as when he entered it.99 In the words of one drug policy writer:

When Reagan came into office, marijuana was cheap and plentiful, cocaine was scarce and 

expensive, and AIDS was unknown. When Reagan left office, pot was expensive and hard to 

find, cocaine was cheap and plentiful, and AIDS had become a full-blown epidemic.100

The George H. W. Bush Administration: 1989-93.

Take my word for it: This scourge will stop.

 George H. W. Bush101

During his presidential campaign, Vice President Bush promoted an expansion of 

the supply-reduction strategy, declaring: “The logic is simple. The cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source. . . . We need to wipe out crops wherever they are grown and take out labs wherever they exist.”102 However, the strategy he 
9

outlined in the first prime-time address of his presidency differed significantly from his 

campaign rhetoric.103 The primary focus, he announced, would be ending illicit drug use 

by Americans.104 Although not abandoning foreign eradication and interdiction efforts, 

Bush embraced a prohibitionist strategy employing measures designed to deter drug 

use by enhancing the punitive consequences of such use. 

Bush’s Drug Czar, William Bennett, renewed the call for an all-out war on drugs—

with more resources for police, more prosecutors, and more convictions.105 He also campaigned to make drug abuse socially unacceptable—an approach he called “denormalization.”106 This would be accomplished, Bennett argued, through a media campaign 

aimed at “deglamorizing” drug use and a legislative strategy aimed at denying drug 

abusers welfare and social services.107 The workplace also became a new front in the war 

on drugs.108 Despite a 20 percent increase in the overall federal drug budget between 

1990 and 1993, the emphasis remained supply-reduction, maintaining a two-thirds to 

one-third ratio between supply-reduction and demand-reduction.109 See Figure 6.

Figure 6. The George H. W. Bush Drug Spending Record.110

As Vice President, Bush had orchestrated an expansion of the military’s role in the 

drug war.111 As President, he gave the DoD increased responsibility for monitoring, detecting, and intercepting illicit drug trafficking;112 for quadrupling funding for military 

drug interdiction missions; military assets; and counterdrug personnel.113 Nevertheless, 

despite the $2.4 billion budgeted for it in Bush’s initial proposal, the interdiction effort 

failed to have a meaningful impact on the drug supply.114 In 1989, 181,000 pounds of 

cocaine were seized, compared with only 12,000 pounds in 1982.115 However, this significant increase in seizures produced only a modest rise in wholesale prices and no affect 

at all on street prices.116 Between 1980 and 1989, the United States spent $10 billion on 

interdiction, and successfully confiscated perhaps 10 percent of all cocaine entering the 

country.117

In his public rhetoric, Bush urged support for demand-reduction programs; however, research to identify and develop more effective treatment regimens remained underfunded.118 The “treatment gap” continued to grow.119 In contrast to Nixon’s commitment that “no addict should have to commit a crime because he can’t get treatment,”120

Drug Czar Bennett argued that facilities to treat only one-quarter of America’s four 

million addicts were enough, because two million could help themselves (without the 

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

1990 6,594 68 3,165 32

1991 7,263 66 3,695 34

1992 7,815 66 4,095 34

1993 7,957 65 4,214 35

• Steady growth in overall counterdrug 

budget.

• Decline in demand-reduction 

spending stabilized at + 33 percent.
10

help of a treatment facility) and the other million were lost causes.121 The reality—ignored by Bennett and his successors—is that treatment is substantially less expensive 

than incarceration.122 Providing inpatient services to four million addicts would cost a 

maximum of $60 billion annually, whereas holding them in jail would cost $100 billion 

annually.123 Incarceration is neither a cost efficient nor an effective strategy for America’s 

drug problems.124

As the Bush administration neared an end, more people were using drugs than when 

the war on drugs began, and the crime rate was higher than ever.125 America’s jails were 

bursting at the seams, as drug arrests rose from 56,013 in 1985 to 94,490 in 1989, an 

increase of almost 69 percent.126 Overcrowding meant shorter sentences,127 and shorter 

sentences meant drug dealers and untreated drug abusers were soon back on the street, 

fueling demand.128

The Clinton Administration: 1993-2001.

When I was in England, I experimented with marijuana a time or two, and I didn’t like it. I 

didn’t inhale and never tried it again.

 William J. Clinton129

During his presidential campaign, Governor Clinton raised the hopes of many advocates for a change in the national drug strategy by calling for treatment on demand, 

regardless of the cost.130 When President Clinton took office in January 1992, specialists 

in academia, health care, and law enforcement around the country expected immediate 

and significant changes in the way the federal government addressed the national drug 

problem.131 Many were disappointed when, in the early days of the Clinton administration, illicit drug use was not given the prominence and visibility that it had during the 

Reagan-Bush eras.132 More would be disappointed when electoral politics and the need 

to appear “tough” on drugs led Clinton to adopt the same strategy and budget policies 

as his predecessors.133

It took 15 months before Clinton finally nominated a drug advisor.134 However, the 

choice he ultimately made seemed to presage a new and more balanced drug strategy. 

Lee Brown had impeccable law enforcement credentials,135 but was also viewed as an 

intellectual, with a Ph.D. in Criminology from the University of California, Berkeley. Although Clinton raised the status of the drug czar to cabinet level, he did little to enhance 

the prestige and nothing to enhance the authority of that office.

136

In 1993, Clinton presented a $13.04 billion anti-drug budget that offered little change 

from the widely criticized approach followed by Presidents Reagan and Bush.137 The 

budget designated $8.30 billion for law enforcement and $4.74 billion for rehabilitation 

and education—a proportional split of 63.66 percent to 36.34 percent—about 1 percent 

more for demand-reduction than Bush included in his last drug budget.138 Overall, the 

Clinton budget proposal increased the funding of drug enforcement efforts to four times 

what they had been under Reagan.139 See Figure 7. 
11

Figure 7. The Clinton Drug Spending Record.140

Clinton’s FY 1995 budget included increases of $355 million for treatment of “chronic 

hard-core drug users” and $191 million for “safe and drug-free school programs.”141 The 

budget provided additional funding to increase the availability of treatment services by 

9 percent.142 However, despite Clinton’s campaign promises of “treatment on demand, 

regardless of the cost,”143 it would still leave approximately one million hard-core users 

without access to rehabilitation.144

The Clinton administration introduced several initiatives designed to deter illicit 

drug use, including: Operation SAFE HOME,145 the National Violent Crime Initiative,146

and a program calling for drug testing of high school athletes.147 However, when juvenile 

drug use continued to climb, and the rate of drug-related crimes increased throughout 

the country, administration critics demanded a more aggressive approach. Drug Czar 

Brown’s tenure soon ended with his resignation on December 12, 1995.148

Giving the war on drugs a more literal spin, Clinton named General Barry McCaffrey as Drug Czar during his State of the Union address in February 1996.149 The Senate 

confirmed McCaffrey’s appointment 2 days later without debate.150 McCaffrey introduced the 1996 Drug Control Strategy, a 10-year strategy that again promised a balanced 

approach. Rather than “zero tolerance,” it established a goal of returning America to 

“a 1960s level, pre-Vietnam era level of drug use.”151 However, despite a substantial increase to $15.1 billion, the FY 1997 drug budget continued the two-third/one-third ratios 

between supply- and demand-reduction program funding.152

The Clinton administration continued the international supply-reduction efforts 

begun under Bush. In July 2000, Congress approved an emergency supplemental assistance request for fiscal years 2000-01 of $1.32 billion, as part of “Plan Colombia.”153 In 

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

1994 7,760 64 4,425 36

1995 8,560 65 4,692 35

1996 9,013 67 4,441 33

1997 10,182 67 4,977 33

1998 11,106 69 4,991 31

1999 11,578 68 5,464 32

2000 12,387 67 6,067 33

2001 12,656 70 5,397 30

• Despite a steady growth in the overall 

counterdrug budget, the ratio of 

spending—supply-reduction/demand-reduction—remained + 66/33 

percent.

• Despite calls for treatment on demand, demand-reduction spending 

failed to match the rhetoric.
12

addition to funding the Colombian counternarcotic effort, the aid would also be used 

to combat leftist guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC), which were also involved in narcotrafficking.154

The Clinton administration record on demand-reduction programs was, at best, 

mixed. The Behavioral Therapies Development Program, begun in 1994, broadened the 

scope of NIDA-supported behavioral research beyond clinical studies of established 

treatments for drug abuse.155 The 2000 Drug Addiction Treatment Act (DATA) permitted physicians, for the first time in more than 80 years, to legally prescribe opioid medications for the nonregulated, outpatient treatment of opioid dependence.156 However, 

Clinton prevented the Department of Health and Human Services from implementing 

its plans for a politically volatile needle-exchange program.157

In the end, despite the campaign rhetoric, there was no fundamental change in drug 

control policy during the Clinton administration. The drug budget grew from $12.1 billion in 1993 to $19.2 billion in FY 2000.158 However, expenditures for the criminal justice 

system and supply-reduction programs continued to outstrip investment in prevention, 

treatment, and research. Incarceration for drug-law violations increased 1,100 percent 

between 1980 and 2002. By 1997, one million Americans were being arrested each year 

for violating drug laws.159 Meanwhile, cocaine and heroin prices fell by 80 percent, and 

14,000 Americans were dying annually from drug-related causes.160

The George W. Bush Administration: 2001-09.

When I was young and irresponsible, I was young and irresponsible.

 George W. Bush161

During the presidential election campaign, Governor George W. Bush called teen 

drug statistics “one of the worst public policy failures of the ‘90s.” Under the Clinton 

administration, Bush claimed, fighting drug abuse had ceased to be a national priority; drug policy was underfunded and lacked consistency.162 Despite candidate Bush’s 

tough talk, some elements of the drug-reform community hoped that President Bush—

a man who confessed his own struggle with alcohol addiction—might favor a more 

demand-reduction-oriented strategy. Those reformists were soon disappointed when 

Bush formed a counterdrug team consisting of Congressman Asa Hutchinson,163 John 

Walters,164 and former-Senator John Ashcroft.165

Bush’s initial drug strategy included three short-term initiatives designed to “reinvigorate” the drug war: 1) establishment of a faith-based initiative office to fund religious groups engaged in anti-drug efforts; 2) a survey of drug treatment needs and 

capacity along with proposals to close the treatment gap; and, 3) expanded drug testing 

of federal prisoners, probationers and parolees.166 The administration also renewed its 

commitment to the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, calling it “the most visible symbol of the federal government’s commitment to drug prevention.”167

The administration’s FY 2003 drug budget requested $19.2 billion, an increase of 

about 2 percent over FY 2002.168 Still smarting from the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terror 
13

attacks, the government accompanied the budget request with a campaign designed to 

highlight the link between drugs and terrorism.169 See Figure 8. 

Figure 8. The George W. Bush Drug Spending Record.170

In announcing his strategy, Bush promised an increased emphasis on treatment and 

prevention and major new funding for demand-reduction initiatives.171 Drug Czar Walters echoed the President’s rhetoric, insisting that the administration was “putting a 

larger emphasis on treatment than the last budget and strategy did.”172 However, despite continued annual increases in the counterdrug budget, a simple review of the math 

demonstrates that the Bush “strategy” was the same as the Clinton strategy—”talking 

treatment and funding law enforcement.”173 The single largest increase in funding (10 

percent) was for foreign eradication and interdiction, one of the most expensive and 

least effective drug fighting techniques,174 while spending for treatment increased by 

only 6 percent.175

Like his predecessors, George W. Bush tried to spend his way to victory, allocating 

nearly $200 billion to the war on drugs over 8 years. Yet, a poll in October 2008, found 

that three in four Americans believed that the war on drugs was failing.176 In 2009, an 

estimated 20 million Americans aged 12 or older used illicit drugs on a current, i.e., past 

month, basis—statistically unchanged since 2002.177 Moreover, nearly half of all drug addicts who needed treatment, approximately 3.5 million, did not have access to suitable 

programs. 

Despite the clear record of failure, the drug budget remained overwhelmingly 

weighted toward supply-reduction. Less than one-third of the total was designated for 

treatment or prevention, and much of that was appropriated for anti-drug commercials 

and school programs of questionable efficacy. Although overall funding grew by 39 

percent between 2002 and 2009 (approximately $4.2 billion), 90 percent of the increase 

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

2002 12,686 67 6,136 33

2003 13,315 69 5,847 31

2004 6,705 55 5,377 45

2005 7,639 61 5,005 39

2006 7,765 62 4,810 38

2007 8,164 65 4,492 35

2008 8,344 64 4,618 36

2009 9,862 65 5,417 35

• Beginning in FY 2004, ONDCP 

made significant changes in the 

methodology used to compute the 

cross-cutting national drug budget. 

The impact of the new accounting 

methodology (indicated by shaded 

area in chart) “reduced” overall totals 

beginning in FY 2004 by excluding at 

least $7.5 billion in costs associated 

with the prosecution and incarceration of federal prisoners. Yet, even 

with these changes in methodology, 

the spending ratio remained virtually 

unchanged.
14

went to supply-reduction, while only 10 percent went to demand-reduction programs.178

According to John Carnevale, former director of planning and budget at the ONDCP: 

“The strategy totally failed to achieve any progress in this key goal area. . . . Eight years 

were wasted.”179

The Obama Administration: 2009-. 

I inhaled frequently. That was the point.

 Barack Obama180

Barack Obama was not the first candidate to admit drug use; however, he was the 

first to be so completely open about it. To some, Obama’s honesty about drugs reflected 

a generational change in politics. Voters cared more about having an honest person in 

the White House and less about youthful drug use.181 Supporters and drug policy reformers were impatient for the “change” Obama promised. 

Although candidate Obama called the war on drugs “an utter failure,” President 

Obama’s drug strategy has not differed significantly from that of previous administrations.182 His Drug Czar, Gil Kerlikowske, pledged to “change the conversation on our 

drug problem” and abandon the “drug war” metaphor. However, the change in that 

rhetorical convention has meant little in the face of spending patterns, which still disproportionately favor supply-reduction over demand-reduction. 

President Obama and his Drug Czar publicly express support for expanding demand-reduction initiatives, but the budget dollars have failed to match the rhetoric. 

The FY 2010 drug budget of $15.1 billion ($1 billion more than the Bush administration’s final budget request) included the usual two-to-one spending ratio in favor of 

supply-reduction, as in previous administrations.183 The Obama spending plan called 

for an increase in every aspect of drug-war funding except drug-use prevention (which 

decreased by 11 percent).184 See Figure 9.

Figure 9. The Barack Obama Drug Spending Record.185

FY

$ Supply 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

$ Demand 

Reduction 

(Millions)

Percent

2010 9,772 65 5,260 35

2011 9,952 64 5,600 36

2012 9,690 64 5,618 36

2013 15,062 59 10,538 41

• Further changes in accounting methodology make precise comparison to 

earlier drug budgets difficult. However, there is no significant change in 

the supply-reduction/demand-reduction spending ratio.
15

ONDCP promised at the time that future budgets would “reflect the President’s 

balanced and evidence-based approach to reducing illicit drug use and will encompass

. . . prevention, enforcement, and treatment.” However, the 2011 drug budget still 

maintained the roughly two-to-one imbalance between supply-reduction and 

demand-reduction.186

On February 13, 2012, the Obama administration released its FY 2013 National Drug 

Control Budget, requesting nearly $26 billion for anti-drug programs. What appears to 

be a dramatic increase in the overall budget, however, is merely the result of another 

change in accounting methodology.187 The FY 2013 proposal would increase total funding by only 1.6 percent over FY 2012, and is remarkable only in the way it closely tracks 

previous budgets regarding allocation of resources.188

As a result of this accounting “sleight of hand,” the spending ratio also appears to 

have incrementally shifted toward demand-reduction, allocating 41.2 percent for treatment and prevention and 58.2 percent for law enforcement.189 However, as in the previous Obama budgets, the accuracy of these percentages is questionable, since changes 

in the accounting methodology actually undercount the real cost of the drug war “by 

failing to include some significant drug policy-driven costs.”190

In adopting talking points about treating drug abuse as a health problem, the 

administration has scored political points with those Americans who see the war on 

drugs as a failure; however, the budget has not matched the rhetoric.191 Nowhere is the 

contrast clearer than in a comparison between spending for punishment and interdiction and spending for prevention, treatment, and other health approaches. In the view 

of many, little or nothing has changed. Despite Obama’s politically popular statement 

that “we have to think more about drugs as a public-health problem,” only appearances, not realities, have changed. While declaring that “we cannot arrest our way out 

of the drug problem,”192 prevention and treatment remain severely underfunded, while 

law enforcement and incarceration continue to dominate our national drug strategy and 

consume the lion’s share of the counterdrug budget.193

President Obama now presides over a war on drugs that employs a strategy virtually 

indistinguishable from that of his predecessors.194 “The Obama drug budget is the Bush 

drug budget, which was the Clinton drug budget.”195 The rhetoric has remained largely 

unchanged for 4 decades. Successive administrations have promised new, balanced 

approaches while delivering the same failed strategy favoring supply-reduction (which 

actually did little to reduce supply196) over more effective and less expensive demandreduction strategies.197

Proposal for an Armistice: Ending the Insanity.

By nearly every measure, America’s 40-year war on drugs has been an expensive 

failure.198

• $1 trillion—estimated total federal, state, and local expenditures in support of the 

national drug strategy since 1969.199

• 150 million—estimated number of Americans who will use illicit drugs at some 

time in their lives (nearly 50 percent of the population).200
16

• 38 million—estimated number of Americans who use illicit drugs each year 

(roughly 12 percent of the population).201

• 20 million—estimated number of Americans aged 12 and older who use illicit 

drugs on a current, i.e., past month, basis (about 6% of the population).202

• 7.5 million—estimated number of Americans (about 2.3 percent of the adult population) categorized as abusers or dependent on illicit drugs.203

• 6.3 million—estimated number of Americans needing drug treatment, but not 

receiving it.204

• 400,000—estimated number of state prisoners (approximately 25 percent of all 

state prisoners) serving time today for drug convictions.205

• 100,000—estimated number of federal prisoners (approximately half of all federal 

prisoners) serving time today for drug convictions.206

• 40,000—estimated number of Americans who die each year from drug-related 

causes.207

• 1—estimated number of drug addicted babies born every hour.208

Our supply-reduction efforts have had some impact on production and trafficking 

patterns. However, as the center of gravity of our national strategy, supply-reduction 

is “doomed to failure . . . by the structure and size of the drug industry.”209 Research 

indicates that even if the U.S. supply-reduction strategy pursued for the last 40 years 

had been relatively “successful” in its goals of eradication and interdiction, it would not 

have substantially reduced U.S. illicit drug supply.210 Nevertheless, we have continued 

to invest more each year in the same, failed strategy while expecting different results.

Reasonable minds may differ regarding the exact details of a new strategy, but not 

about the need for one.211 We must make demand-reduction the focal point of our new 

strategy.212 The 2011 Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy213 incorporated 

important recommendations regarding drug abuse and trafficking, including treatment 

for nonviolent drug offenders and a concentrated international effort to combat violent 

criminal organizations rather than nonviolent, low-level offenders.214 These recommendations are supported by ample research showing that most people who enter and remain in treatment stop using drugs; decrease their criminal activity; and improve their 

occupational, social, and psychological functioning.215

Moreover, there is abundant evidence of treatment’s cost-effectiveness.216 Accordingly, treatment on demand must finally become a reality, because the societal cost 

of untreated addiction is simply too high.217 To be effective, treatment must be tailored 

to the individual and, in many cases, will require a combination of drug and behavioral therapy.218 Research has shown such approaches effective, with 40-70 percent of 

patients remaining drug free.219 Moreover, the potential for failure or relapse should not 

deter our efforts. Successful treatment for addiction typically requires continual evaluation and modification, just as treatments for other chronic diseases. In fact, relapse rates 

for addiction resemble those of other chronic diseases such as diabetes, hypertension, 

and asthma.220

Statistics show that most people who need treatment are not seeking it.221 Therefore, 

our new strategy must create incentives and opportunities for addicts to choose treatment voluntarily.

222 Drug courts have proven to be an extremely effective incentive for 
17

many.223 While our primary strategy should not be criminalization, studies have shown 

that treatment does not need to be voluntary to be effective.224 Thus, any new strategy 

must include criminal sanctions to serve as “an instrument for exercising therapeutic 

leverage.”225 This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, including diverting nonviolent offenders to treatment and mandating treatment as a condition of probation or 

pretrial release.226

In the past, funding has never been sufficient to provide treatment on demand. Now, 

faced with record budget deficits and a future of austere budgets, it will be extremely 

difficult to find “new money” to support demand-reduction initiatives. Therefore, we 

should begin by cutting wasteful spending—especially in unproductive supply-reduction programs.227 Reducing or eliminating expensive crop eradication programs and 

aid programs for foreign police and military counterdrug units that do little to directly 

reduce drug availability in the United States is a good place to start.228 In addition, we 

should reduce DoD counterdrug dollars and reprogram the savings to fund additional 

drug courts along with the necessary support network. 

A prerequisite to any reorientation of the national drug strategy will be a major 

reorganization of ONDCP.229 In order to become a more effective policy leadership organization and eliminate the unhealthy interagency rivalries that have hampered productivity and led to duplication of effort and wasteful spending, ONDCP must be given 

more control of the counterdrug budget. Until then, no administration’s rhetoric will 

ever become a reality.230

America’s drug problem is extraordinarily complex. However, described in the simplest terms, it is a matter of supply and demand—the demand for drugs makes trade in 

illicit drugs profitable, and the resulting profits drive supply.231 An objective review of 

our experience over the past 40 years confirms that our supply-reduction-focused strategy has failed. Even with unlimited resources, we could not hermetically seal America’s 

borders to prevent illicit drugs from entering.232

While it would be folly to suggest that we abandon all supply-reduction efforts,233

it is clear that prohibition “is no match for the obstinacy and ingenuity of many human 

beings,”234 and, therefore, more punitive drug policies are not the answer.

235 Instead, 

we must adopt a pragmatic, science-based, demand-reduction strategy that offers some 

hope of reducing the economic and societal impacts of illicit drugs on America.

ENDNOTES 

1. Although most frequently attributed to Albert Einstein, this definition of insanity has also been 

variously attributed to either Benjamin Franklin or Mark Twain. Another quote (indisputably Einstein’s) is 

perhaps just as relevant to the discussion that follows:

The prestige of government has undoubtedly been lowered considerably by the prohibition law. 

For nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the law of the land than passing 

laws which cannot be enforced. It is an open secret that the dangerous increase of crime in this 

country is closely connected with this. 

Albert Einstein, “My First Impression of the U.S.A.,” 1921.
18

2. Edward M. Brecher and the Editors of Consumer Reports, Licit and Illicit Drugs, Mount Vernon, NY: 

Consumers Union, 1972, p. 3.

3. Ibid.

4. These elixirs claimed to cure everything from nerves to marital problems, and were available at a 

modest price. Ibid.

5. In Atlanta, Confederate veteran and pharmacist John Pemberton developed his own cocktail—a 

combination of wine and an extract from coca leaves—which he called Pemberton’s French Wine Coca. In 

1885, when Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia, enacted temperance legislation, Pemberton replaced the 

wine in his recipe with a non-alcoholic syrup, and the “tonic” assumed the now-more-well-known name 

“Coca-Cola.” Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country, and Coca-Cola: The Definitive History of the Great American 

Soft Drink and the Company that Makes It, New York: Basic Books, enlarged 2nd Ed., 2000, p. 24. Federal pure 

food and drug laws, enacted in 1906, forced Pemberton’s successors to switch from using unadulterated 

coca leaves to decocainized leaves. Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs, p. 6. 

6. Samuel M. Levine, Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Cincinnati, OH: The W.H. Anderson Company, 1974. 

7. Elaine Casey, History of Drug Use and Drug Users in the United States, from “Facts About Drug Abuse—

Participant Manual,” The National Drug Abuse Center for Training Resource and Development, 1978, 

available from www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/casey1.htm.

8. This prohibition movement targeted the immigrant Chinese laborers building the transcontinental railroad, who brought their opium-smoking habit with them to America. Dale Gieringer, Anniversary 

of the Opium Exclusion Act, Free Internet Press, February 15, 2006, available from drugnewsvault.blogspot.

com/2006/02/anniversary-of-opium-exclusion-act.html.

9. In mid-1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, which effectively eliminated cocaine and 

opium from all patent medicines and soft drinks by requiring accurate labeling. However, the legislation 

did not prohibit or outlaw the use of cocaine and opiate drugs. Lana D. Harrison, Michael Backenheimer, 

and James A. Inciardi, “History of Drug Legislation,” available from www.cedro-uva.org/lib/harrison.cannabis.05.html . 

10. P.L. 63-223. For a full discussion of the Act, its historic underpinnings and repercussions, see ibid.

11. The Act was an effort to simplify record keeping for the dispensing of narcotic drugs and regulate 

the production and distribution of opium and coca derivatives through licensing and taxation. Edward Jay 

Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America, 1977, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, p. 26. 

There was little or no debate over the policy and health consequences of the Act. It was a result of the administrative fiat of the Department of the Treasury—the same agency later charged with enforcing alcohol 

prohibition—and gave no consideration to the views of the mainstream medical community. David Courtwright, Dark Paradise: Opiate Addiction in America Before 1940, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1992.

12. Brecher, “Licit and Illicit Drugs.” The Congressional Committee, which included Dr. A. G. Du Mez, 

Secretary of the United States Public Health Service, released these findings: 

Opium and other narcotic drugs [including cocaine] . . . were being used by about a million 

people. The underground traffic in narcotic drugs was about equal to the legitimate medical traffic. The dope peddlers appeared to have established a national organization, smuggling the drugs 

in through seaports or across the Canadian or Mexican borders. . . . 

The wrongful use of narcotic drugs had increased since the passage of the Harrison Act. Twenty cities, 

including New York and San Francisco, had reported such increases.
19

13. Courtwright, Dark Paradise: Opiate Addiction in America Before 1940.

14. Anslinger had previously served as Assistant Commissioner for Prohibition. He served as Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from 1930 until 1962.

15. Incarceration can be both a method of demand-reduction and supply-reduction. Supply is arguably 

reduced, at least temporarily, whenever a drug producer or dealer goes to prison. Similarly, when a drug 

user goes to prison there is, albeit temporarily, a reduction in demand. In addition, many would argue 

that the possibility of incarceration itself has a deterrent effect on both the supply and demand elements. 

However, history has shown that the mere threat of incarceration—even the relative certainty of eventual 

incarceration—is insufficient to overcome the desire for profit and the power of addiction. Moreover, as the 

present Drug Czar has said on more than one occasion: “We cannot arrest our way out of the problem.” R. 

Gil Kerlikowske, “Study: More Than Half of Adult Male Arrestees Test Positive for at Least One Drug,” The 

Huffington Post, May 17, 2012, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/news/arrestee-drug-use. As discussed 

here, the issue is not whether we should do one or the other, i.e., either demand-reduction or supply-reduction; the question is whether supply-reduction should remain the center of gravity of our strategy when, 

after 40 years, it has failed to produce the desired results. 

16. John Carnevale and Patrick Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars: Twenty-Five Years of Federal 

Drug Strategies and Budgets,” Journal of Drug issues, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 1999.

17. Patrick Murphy, “Keeping Score: The Frailties of the Federal Drug Budget,” Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand Corporation, 1994, available from www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP138/index2.html.

18. “Follow the money,” may be the most famous “made-up” line about the Watergate reporting of The

Washington Post. The comment, attributed to the stealthy “Deep Throat” source cultivated by Bob Woodward of The Washington Post, was a quote from the screenplay of All the President’s Men, the movie about the 

work of Woodward and his Post colleague, Carl Bernstein. However, the phrase, “Follow the money” does 

not appear in Woodward and Bernstein’s book about Watergate, nor was it uttered it real life by “Deep 

Throat.” W. Joseph Campbell, “Those delicious but phony quotes ‘that refuse to die’,” Media Myth Alert, 

June 25, 2011, available from mediamythalert.wordpress.com/2011/06/25/those-delicious-but-phony-quotes-thatrefuse-to-die/. 

19. Overall, the federal drug budget increased nearly tenfold, from $81.3 million in FY 1969 to $783.6 

million in FY 1973. Only $228.3 million, approximately 30 percent of the total, went to law enforcement and 

supply-reduction efforts. The remaining 70 percent was committed to treatment, rehabilitation, research, 

and education. Only $58.2 million was allocated to drug treatment programs in 1971; however, by 1973, this 

budget had increased to $256.7 million. Strategy Council on Drug Abuse, Executive Office of the President, 

Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing 

Office,1973; Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars,” p. 6.

20. Demand-reduction funding, as a percentage of the total budget, began to decline during Nixon’s 

abbreviated second term, eventually leveling off at approximately one-third of the total budget. Ibid.

21. The impact was almost immediate. In New York City, the crime rate in 1972 dropped 18 percent, 

and, in Washington, 26.9 percent. Nationally, the crime rate fell by 3 percent, the first decline in 17 years. 

The rate of heroin overdose deaths, hepatitis transmission, and drug-related hospital visits also declined. 

Michael Massing, “Winning the Drug War Isn’t So Hard After All,” The New York Times, September 7, 1998.

22. Ibid.

23. In a speech on November 17, 1973, Nixon assured the American public: “I am not a crook.” Richard 

Nixon’s Question-and-Answer Session at the Annual Convention of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, held at the Contemporary Hotel at Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida, on November 

17, 1973, Emerson Kent.Com, available from www.emersonkent.com/speeches/i_am_not_a_crook.htm. 
20

24. Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars,” p. 15.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 7.

27. An increase of approximately 40,000 percent over 40 years, adjusted for inflation. Although regular 

estimates of expenditures by state and local governments are not available, a 1991 federally sponsored 

study estimated that such expenditures nearly equaled those of the federal government. Peter Reuter, “An 

Assessment of ONDCP’s Budget Concept,” Testimony presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Government, February 10, 2005.

28. Michael Massing, “The Fix,” Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000, p. 271. The same 

period saw only about a one-third increase in the total U.S. population, from 203 million in 1969 to 313 million in 2012.

29. Martha Mendoza, “U.S. Drug War Has Met None of its Goals,” Associated Press, May 13, 2010, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37134751/ns/us_news-security/t/us-drug-war-has-met-none-its-goals/. 

30. Between 1980 and 2005, the total number of inmates incarcerated for drug possession in state prisons or local jails grew by more than 1,000 percent. Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2005, 

Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005. By 2004, 419,000 drug possessors were incarcerated in 

state prisons or local jails at a cost of nearly $8.3 billion annually. The estimated number of inmates is based 

on an analysis of data collected through the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails and the Survey of Inmates in State 

Correctional Facilities conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The costs of incarceration are based on 

the conservative estimated cost of $20,000 per inmate per year. Don Stemen, “Reconsidering Incarceration: 

New Directions for Reducing Crime,” Crime and Incarceration, January 2007.

31. U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, “The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug 

Use on American Society,” April 2011.

32. Mendoza, “U.S. Drug War Has Met None of its Goals.” 

33. Evidence that treatment works can be found by examining the one time it was actually tried—during the Nixon administration. Massing, “Winning the Drug War Isn’t So Hard After All.”

34. John Carnevale, “FY02-09 Budget Emphasizes Least Effective Ingredients of Drug Policy,” PRNewswire, February 20, 2009, available from www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fy02-09-budget-emphasizesleast-effective-ingredients-of-drug-policy-57040872.html. 

35. Ibid.

36. Study by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, Johnathan Harris, 

Drugged America, New York: Four Winds Press, 1991, p. 154; C. P. Rydell and S. S. Everingham, “Controlling Cocaine,” Prepared for the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the United States Army, Santa 

Monica, CA: Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corporation, 1994, p. xvi.

37. Ibid.

38. Dale Gieringer, “America’s Hundred Years War on Drugs: Centennial of the 1st Congressional 

Anti-Drug Law Prohibiting Opium in the Philippines—March 3, 1905-2005,” 2005, available from www.

drugsense.org/dpfca/DrugWarCentennial1.htm. 

39. Brecher, Licit and Illicit Drugs, p. 3.
21

40. Carnevale Associates, “Policy Brief: The Continued Standstill in Reducing Illicit Drug Use,” Gaithersburg, MD: September 2009. While one can hardly say that drug prohibition caused the addiction rate 

to double in America, it can be said with certainty that our prohibitionist approach has not prevented the 

increased addiction rate. A survey of 17 countries published in 2008 found that despite its punitive drug 

policies, the United States has the highest levels of illegal cocaine and cannabis use. The study, by Louisa 

Degenhardt, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, and colleagues, is based on the World 

Health Organization’s Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI). A summary of the report and 

its findings can be found in “United States Has Highest Level Of Illegal Cocaine And Cannabis Use,” Science Daily, June 30, 2008, available from www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/06/080630201007.htm. The authors found that 16.2 percent of people in the United States had used cocaine in their lifetime, a level much 

higher than any other country surveyed; the second-highest level of cocaine use was in New Zealand, 

where 4.3 percent of people reported having used cocaine. Cannabis use was also highest in the United 

States, at 42.4 percent, followed by New Zealand at 41.9 percent. The authors also concluded that drug use 

“does not appear to be simply related to drug policy, since countries with more stringent policies towards 

illegal drug use did not have lower levels of such drug use than countries with more liberal policies.” For 

example, in the Netherlands, which has more liberal policies than the United States, 1.9 percent of people 

reported cocaine use, and 19.8 percent reported cannabis use.

41. The scope of this paper, limited to 6,000 words, is necessarily narrow. It is a brief examination of 

the two-dimensional national drug strategy pursued by eight administrations over 4 decades. Any change 

in the strategy, or the absence of change, is measured not by the overall growth of the drug budget, but by 

changes in the ratio of spending between demand-reduction and supply-reduction programs. It is safe to 

assume that with unlimited resources, the United States would eventually spend enough on the “right” 

programs, or combination of programs, to ensure success regardless of our spending strategy. However, 

as this paper suggests, faced with the reality of finite budget resources, one must adopt a new strategy that 

uses limited resources for programs that promise the greatest likelihood of success. 

42. Richard Nixon: “Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973 Establishing 

the Drug Enforcement Administration,” March 28, 1973. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 

The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4159. 

43. “Mixing of Mind-Altering Drugs Rises as Spread of Heroin Addiction Slows,” The New York Times, 

March 25, 1973.

44. Peter Brush, “Higher and Higher: American Drug Use in Vietnam,” Vietnam, Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2002. Shortly after the United States began military support to South Vietnam, a high incidence of 

drug abuse, particularly of marijuana and more-dangerous drugs such as amphetamines and barbiturates 

occurred among the military stationed there. The DoD appointed several Task Forces, which reported there 

was a relatively low rate of drug abuse in the services. However, based on independent research, it is now 

generally accepted that there were anywhere from 25,000 to 50,000 American troops in Vietnam were heroin users by mid-1971, and this estimate does not include addicted servicemen who had previously served 

in Vietnam and returned to civilian life. Levine, Narcotics and Drug Abuse. In 1971, U.S. Army medical officers estimated that 10 to 15 percent of the lower-ranking enlisted personnel in Vietnam were heroin users. 

Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill, 1991, pp. 222-223; George S. Prugh, Law 

at War: Vietnam 1964-1973, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975, p. 107.

45. The number of heroin users has always been difficult to estimate. One author estimates the number 

of heroin users rose from about 50,000 in 1960 to roughly a half-million in 1970. David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control, 3rd Ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 248. Musto cites 

the rapid rise of narcotic-related hepatitis cases, from about 4,000 in 1966 to about 36,000 in 1971, as an indicator of the increase in intravenous heroin use. Ibid., citing Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, White 

Paper on Drug Abuse, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, p 15. An editorial on the election 

in Time Magazine stated that “law and order is a rallying cry that evokes quieter days. To some, it is also a 

shorthand message promising repression of the Black community,” Time Magazine, “The Fear Campaign,” 

October 4, 1968, available from www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,838794,00.html#ixzz0k9Zo4DEX. 
22

46. Richard Nixon: “Special Message to the Congress on Control of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.,” 

July 14, 1969; Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2126. See also, www.williammhynes.com/uploads/6/3/6/7/6367404/nixon_drug_

policy_paper.pdf. 

47. Ibid.

48. David F. Musto and Pamela Korsmeyer, The Quest for Drug Control, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Nixon also strongly opposed heroin-maintenance programs as an approach to reducing 

drug-related crime, calling heroin maintenance “a concession to weakness and defeat in the drug abuse 

struggle, a concession which would surely lead to the erosion of our most cherished values for the dignity of man.” Richard Nixon, “Letter to Representative Peter A. Peyser Supporting Legislation To Prevent Heroin Maintenance Program,” August 20, 1972, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 

American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3533. Nixon once told his drugpolicy adviser, “You’re the drug expert, not me, on every issue but one, and that’s decriminalization of 

marijuana. If you make any hint of supporting [it], you are history.” Richard Cortes, “Sketches of the Drug 

Czars,” Vanity Fair, July 29, 2009, available from www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/07/drug-czarsslideshow200907#slide=1.

49. In March 1972, Nixon created the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse to examine 

the nature and extent of drug abuse demand-reduction activities and issue recommendations for future 

action by the administration. The Shafer Commission, named for its Chairman, Ray Shafer, conducted the 

first surveys of the drug use of the noninstitutionalized civilian population over 12 years of age. The Shafer 

Committee’s report, Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, offered the following unanimous conclusion: 

“We believe that experimental or intermittent use of this drug carries minimal risk to the public health, and 

should not be given overzealous attention in terms of a public health response.” The Shafer Committee 

recommended the decriminalization of marijuana, which Nixon rejected out of hand. 

50. In March 1970, Nixon created the National Clearinghouse on Drug Abuse Information. Richard 

Nixon: “Statement Announcing an Expanded Federal Program To Combat Drug Abuse,” March 11, 1970, 

online by Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=2906. In July 1970, he established the Domestic Council to formulate and coordinate domestic 

policy recommendations. Executive Order 11151, July 1, 1970. 

51. On the day he announced the War on Drugs, Nixon proposed additional FY 1972 budget appropriations of $105 million for treatment and $10 million for education and training. Richard Nixon: “Statement 

on Establishing the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement,” January 28, 1972, online by Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3552. 

52. Executive Order 11599. Richard Nixon: “Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse 

Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971, online by Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 

available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048. The mission of the SAODAP was to provide “overall planning and policy and establish objectives for all Federal demand-reduction programs.” The 2-year 

period between 1971 and 1973 saw the development of more treatment capacity than in the preceding 50 

years. Methadone maintenance doubled in size, while nonmaintenance programs expanded by a factor of 

five. The Narcotics Treatment Administration (NTA) was established in 1970 to implement a bold public 

health strategy of providing addiction treatment on a massive scale in an effort to deal with the escalating heroin epidemic and related crime wave in Washington, DC. After only 1 year, burglaries in DC had 

decreased by 41 percent. DuPont worked with heroin addicts and methadone treatment in Washington, 

DC, during the early 1970s. Interview of Dr. Robert DuPont, PBS Frontline, available from www.pbs.org/

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/dupont.html. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) was 

created in 1972 to serve as the centerpiece for a major Federal effort in demand-reduction. Richard Nixon: 

“Statement About the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972,” March 21, 1972, Peters and Woolley

The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3782.
23

53. In one of his most frequently quoted speeches, Nixon said, “America’s public enemy number one 

in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, 

all-out offensive.” See Richard Nixon: “Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3047. Nixon would return to the “war” metaphor throughout his administration, often in Pattonesque terms:

I consider keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States just as important as keeping armed 

enemy forces from landing in the United States. Dangerous drugs which come into the United 

States can endanger the lives of young Americans just as much as would an invading army landing in the United States. Every government which wants to move against narcotics should know 

that it can count on this country for our wholehearted support and assistance in doing so.

[W]e launched our crusade to save our children and now we can see that crusade moving off the 

defensive and on to the offensive, and beginning to roll up some victories in country after country 

around the world and in the United States as well. 

And what is our goal now? We are living in an age, as we all know, in the era of diplomacy, when 

there are times that a great nation must engage in what is called a limited war. I have rejected that 

principle in declaring total war against dangerous drugs.

Our goal is the unconditional surrender of the merchants of death who traffic in heroin, our goal 

is the total banishment of drug abuse from American life, our children’s lives are what we are 

fighting for, our children’s future is the reason we must succeed. 

We are going to fight this evil with every weapon at our command, and, with your help and the 

support of millions of concerned Americans, we are going to win.

Richard Nixon: “Remarks to the Washington Conference on International Narcotics Control,” September 18, 1972, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=3578. 

54. Richard Nixon: “Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 

17, 1971, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=3048. 

55. Richard Nixon: “Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” 

June 17, 1971, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=3408. 

56. John Carnevale and Patrick Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars: Twenty-Five Years of Federal 

Drug Strategies and Drug Budgets,” Journal of Drug Issues, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 1999.

57. The reasons for the shift toward a strategy of supply-reduction and law enforcement are not entirely clear. In January 1972, 6 months before the Watergate scandal erupted, Nixon established the Office of 

Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) to provide advice on the effective enforcement of drug laws and 

to establish joint federal/local task forces to fight the drug trade at the street level. Richard Nixon: “Statement on Establishing the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement,” January 28, 1972, Peters and Woolley, 

The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3552. ODALE was intended to be an 18-month experimental project involving a dozen different departments and agencies designed 

to enhance cooperation between federal and local forces in the war on drug in the streets. The Executive 

Order that created ODALE also established the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence. A year later, both 

agencies would be merged into the new Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the Justice Department. As 
24

time went on, and perhaps as an unintended consequence of the Watergate scandal, Nixon appears to have 

concluded that being tough on crime in general and drugs in particular would help him get re-elected. 

58. In September 1975, Ford’s Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force released a report recommending that “priority in Federal efforts in both supply and demand-reduction be directed toward those drugs 

which inherently pose a greater risk to the individual and to society.” The White Paper called marijuana 

a “low priority drug” in contrast to heroin, amphetamines and mixed barbiturates. Public Broadcasting 

System, “Thirty Years of America’s Drug War—A Chronology,” PBS Frontline, available from www.pbs.org/

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/. 

59. Smarting over criticism of his decision to pardon Nixon, Ford may have realized that being tough 

on drugs would help him get re-elected. J. Y. Smith and Lou Cannon, “Gerald R. Ford, 93, Dies; Led in Watergate’s Wake,” The Washington Post, December 27, 2006, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122601257.html.

60. Gerald R. Ford: “Remarks Upon Signing the Drug Abuse Message,” April 27, 1976, Peters and 

Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5874. 

61. In addition, the Ford administration proposed a revival of mandatory minimum sentencing for 

drug trafficking, The Narcotics Sentencing and Seizure Act of 1976. Ford’s proposal was ultimately rejected 

by Congress. Gerald R. Ford: “Statement on Actions To Combat Drug Abuse,” December 26, 1975, Peters 

and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5458; Gerald 

R. Ford: “Statement on Drug Abuse,” February 23, 1976, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5609; Gerald R. Ford: “Special Message to the Congress 

on Drug Abuse,” April 27, 1976, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, , available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5875 ; Gerald R. Ford: “Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of 

the Senate Transmitting Proposed Narcotic Sentencing and Seizure Legislation,” April 30, 1976, Peters and 

Woolley, The American Presidency, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5926. 

62. Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars.”

63. David Musto, “Historical Perspectives,” J. Lowinson, P. Ruiz, R. Millman, and J. Langrod, eds., 

Substance Abuse: A Comprehensive Textbook, 4th Ed., Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, 2005.

64. Jimmy Carter: “Drug Abuse Message to the Congress,” August 2, 1977, Peters and Woolley, The 

American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws?pid=7908.

65. Ibid. Some popular media outlets even glamorized cocaine use. A May 30, 1977, Newsweek story 

reported:

Among hostesses in the smart sets of Los Angeles and New York, a little cocaine, like Dom Perignon and Beluga caviar, is now de rigueur at dinners. Some partygivers pass it around along with 

the canapes on silver trays . . . the user experiences a feeling of potency, of confidence, of energy.

“The Cocaine Scene,” Newsweek, May 30, 1977, pp. 20-25.

66. Jimmy Carter: “Office of Drug Abuse Policy Memorandum for the Heads of Certain Departments 

and Agencies,” March 14, 1977, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7174; Jimmy Carter: “Office of Drug Abuse Policy Nomination of Peter G. 

Bourne to Be Director and Lee I. Dogoloff To Be Deputy Director.,” February 7, 1977, Peters and John T. 

Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7655.

67. Jimmy Carter: “Drug Abuse Remarks on Transmitting a Message to the Congress,” August 2, 1977, 

Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7907. 
25

Carter’s proposal to Congress left “the States free to adopt whatever laws they wish concerning marijuana.” Ibid. Interestingly, Carter cited the recommendations of the National Commission on Marijuana 

and Drug Abuse—recommendations that were rejected out of hand by President Nixon—in support of his 

call for decriminalization. Jimmy Carter: “Drug Abuse Message to the Congress,” August 2, 1977, Peters 

and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws?pid=7908; Time 

Magazine, “Carter’s Grass-Roots Appeal: Can 35 million Americans be wrong about pot?” August 15, 1977.

68. Since “heroin, barbiturates and other sedative/hypnotic drugs account for 90 percent of the deaths 

from drug abuse,” Carter argued, “they should receive our principal emphasis.” Ibid.

69. Testifying before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control in July 1978, the Associate 

Director of the Domestic Policy Staff went even further, arguing that the administration’s position regarding small amounts of marijuana for personal use would, in effect, “merely codify what is already occurring, 

since Federal law enforcement efforts should not be directed at people who possess small amounts of any 

drug, particularly marijuana.” Harrison, Backenheimer, and Inciardi, History of Drug Legislation; “Cannabis 

Use in the United States: Implications for Policy,” Cannabisbeleid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en deVerenigde Staten

(Cannabis Policy in Germany, France, and the United States), Peter Cohen and Arjan Sas, eds., Amsterdam, 

The Netherlands: Centrum voor Drugsonderzoek,Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1996, pp. 179-276, available from www.cedro-uva.org/lib/harrison.cannabis.pdf. 

70. Lawrence Meyer and Alfred E. Lewis, “Carter Aide Signed Fake Quaalude Prescription,” The 

Washington Post, July 19, 1978, p. A-1.

71. “Flak over fake prescription puts Carter’s drug fighter on paid leave,” Miami Times, July 20, 1978.

72. Reporter Gary Cohn published the story regarding a party hosted by the National Organization for 

the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML). The guests at the December 1977 party included author Hunter 

Thompson; Christie Hefner, daughter of Hugh Hefner; Tom Forcade, founder of High Times magazine; 

White House drug chief Bourne; and Post reporter Cohn. The July 21st Washington Post story reported that 

Bourne had used cocaine and marijuana at the NORML party. Bourne resigned from his position at the Office on Drug Abuse Policy within 24 hours. Cortes, Sketches of the Drug Czars. 

73. The “Bourne Affair” was not the only drug-related embarrassment suffered by the Carter administration; other Carter associates, including White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan and White House 

Appointments Secretary, and later National Campaign Manager, Tim Kraft, also faced allegations of drug 

use. In Jordan’s case, a special prosecutor ultimately found insufficient evidence to support an allegation 

that Jordan had used cocaine at Studio 54, a Manhattan discotheque, in 1978. Kraft resigned from his post 

as National Campaign Director in September 1980, following allegations he had used cocaine in 1977. 

Bourne’s successor, his deputy Lee Dogoloff, helped shift policy away from the hard drugs/soft drugs 

distinction, away from the concern for treatment solutions for heroin addicts, and toward concerns about 

marijuana. He and DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger advocated for increasing, rather than eliminating, 

federal penalties for marijuana possession. Andrew B. Whitford and Jeff Yates, “Presidential Rhetoric and 

the Public Agenda: Constructing the War on Drugs,” p. 54. Carter, through Dogoloff, distanced himself 

from decriminalization. Baum, 1996, p. 129. As Dogoloff would later write, “Decriminalizing marijuana 

flies in the face of public opinion and, more importantly, scientific evidence of the physical damage this 

drug causes.” Lee I. Dogoloff, “On Health—Don’t Legalize Marijuana,” The New York Times Op-Ed., December 1, available from www.nytimes.com/1987/12/01/opinion/l-on-health-don-t-legalize-marijuana-979187.html. In 

the view of some critics, Dogoloff helped effect the biggest change in drug policy since Nixon launched the 

war on drugs. Baum, 1996, p. 135.

74. Jimmy Carter: “Illegal Drug Traffic on the High Seas Statement on Signing H. R. 2538 into Law,” 

September 15, 1980, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45047. 
26

75. Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars”; The White House, Drug Abuse Policy Office, “Federal Strategy For Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking 1982,” Washington, DC: 1982.

76. Ronald Reagan: “Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy,” October 2, 1982, Peters and 

Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43085.

77. Bill Piper, Director of National Affairs for the Drug Policy Alliance, www.drugpolicy.org, quoted in: DRC Net, “The Reagan-Era Drug War Legacy,” June 11, 2004, available from stopthedrugwar.org/

chronicle-old/341/reagan.shtml.

78. Reagan vetoed the bill creating a “Drug Czar” within the Executive Branch with the power to coordinate and direct all domestic and international Federal drug efforts. Ronald Reagan: “Memorandum 

Returning Without Approval a Bill Concerning Contract Services for Drug Dependent Federal Offenders,” 

January 14, 1983, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.

edu/ws/?pid=41310. The administration found substantial support in the Democratically controlled Congress. In the 1980s, the drug war was a bipartisan issue. Congress was controlled by Democrats, “who not 

only did not need to have their arms twisted, but in many cases were trying to get to Reagan’s right on 

these issues.” DRC Net, “The Reagan-Era Drug War Legacy.” Reagan later compared his administration’s 

determination to discourage the flow and use of banned substances to the obstinacy of the French army at 

the Battle of Verdun in World War I, quoting a French soldier who said: “There are no impossible situations. There are only people who think they’re impossible.” Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368, Concerning Federal Drug Abuse Policy Functions,” June 24, 1982, Peters and Woolley, 

The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42671.

79. The President frequently acknowledged the importance of demand-reduction in his public 

statements:

All the confiscation and law enforcement in the world will not cure this plague as long as it is 

kept alive by public acquiescence. So, we must now go beyond efforts aimed only at affecting the 

supply of drugs; we must affect not only supply but demand.

Ronald Reagan: “Remarks Announcing the Campaign Against Drug Abuse and a Question-and-Answer 

Session With Reporters,” August 4, 1986, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available 

from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37701. Reagan expressed the same view in more succinct terms in 

1988, “The real answer must come from taking the customer away from the drugs, not the other way 

around.” See Ronald Reagan: “Remarks at a Seminar on Substance Abuse in the Workplace in Durham, 

NC,” February 8, 1988, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35188. 

80. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 broadened criminal and civil asset forfeiture laws 

and increased federal criminal sanctions for drug offenses. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, while providing 

money for prevention and treatment, also restored mandatory prison sentences for large-scale distribution 

of marijuana, imposed new sanctions on money laundering, and other demand-reduction components. 18 

U.S.C. Section 1, Repealed Pub. L. 98-473, title II, Sec. 218(a(1, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2027. The 1988 AntiDrug Abuse Amendment Act primarily increased the sanctions for crimes related to drug trafficking and 

established several new federal offenses. Eric Schlosser, “Reefer Madness,” The Atlantic Monthly, 1994, p. 

52. The fourth bill, the Crime Control Act of 1990, was focused on supply-reduction and law enforcement, 

doubling the appropriations for drug law-enforcement grants to states and localities, and strengthening 

forfeiture and seizure statutes. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992, Crime and the Justice System, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, p. 86. 

81. Between 1981 and 1987, federal spending on drug abuse tripled, reaching nearly $4 billion. Ronald 

Reagan: “Radio Address on Drug Abuse and Trafficking,” May 30, 1987, Peters and Woolley, The American 

Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34347. However, the two-thirds/one-
27

third, supply/demand ratio that took shape in the second Nixon term and continued through the Ford 

and Carter presidencies would become three-fourths/one fourth under Reagan. Cortes, Sketches of the Drug 

Czars.

82. Ronald Reagan: “Remarks at the National Conference on Corporate Initiatives for a Drug Free 

Workplace,” June 9, 1988, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35950.

83. As Assistant Attorney General of DOJ’s Criminal Division, Rudolph Giuliani helped orchestrate the 

expansion of the FBI into the drug fight; he added 500 DEA agents, established 13 regional anti-drug task 

forces, and chalked up record numbers of drug seizures and convictions. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The 

Role of a Lifetime, New York: Touchstone, 1991, p. 813.

84. President Reagan’s signature of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 repealed the Mental Health Systems Act of 1980 signed by President Carter. Under the new Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental 

Health Services Block Grant, the percentage of federal funding was reduced and the burden of financing 

shifted to state and local agencies. Services were cut back, and the development of partnerships and alternative funding strategies became a vital necessity. Minnesota Psychiatric Society, The Minnesota Mental 

Health System: Demand, Capacity, and Cost, St. Paul, MN: MPS Report, 2004. Much of the effort was left 

to philanthropic foundations, professional organizations, nongovernment organizations, and community 

groups. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a White House Briefing for Service Organization Representatives 

on Drug Abuse,” July 30, 1986, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37676.

85. As drug use among children became more of a national issue, Nancy Reagan toured elementary 

schools warning students about the danger of illegal drug use. When one fourth-grader at Longfellow 

Elementary School in Oakland, CA, asked Mrs. Reagan what she should do if approached by someone offering drugs, Reagan responded: “Just say no.” The slogan, and Nancy Reagan’s activism on the issue, became central to the administration’s antidrug message. Within a year, 5,000 “Just Say No” clubs had formed 

around the country, with Soleil Moon Frye (Punky Brewster) as honorary chairperson. See www.time.com/

time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html#ixzz17k2sruhh.

86. Ibid.

87. Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars.”

88. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1876, which essentially banned military involvement in domestic lawenforcement activities, was amended in 1981 to permit the military to provide training, intelligence, and 

investigative assistance in cases involving violations of federal drug laws. Harrison, Backenheimer, and 

Inciardi, History of Drug Legislation. As early as 1982, Vice President Bush and his aides began pushing for 

the involvement of the CIA and U.S. military in drug interdiction efforts. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan 

Marshall, Cocaine Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, p. 2. 

89. Ronald Reagan, “Statement Announcing the Establishment of a Federal Anticrime Task Force for 

Southern Florida,” January 28, 1982, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from 

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42775. Reagan later created other regional task forces throughout the 

United States based on the South Florida Drug Task Force model. These eventually became known as the 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF, pronounced “Osa Def”), which currently falls 

under the authority and supervision of the Deputy Attorney General.

90. In what experts have come to call the “balloon effect,” destroying drug crops in one region causes 

cultivation to move to another. Similarly, disruption of a supply route in one place simply forces traffickers 

to adopt a new route. In the 1970s and early-1980s, almost all the cocaine consumed in the United States was 

grown in Colombia and shipped to South Florida along a variety of sea and air routes. Colombian traffick-
28

ers fighting for market share turned Miami into a city where shootouts, contract killings, and kidnappings 

became part of daily life. Bernd Debusmann, “Drug wars and the balloon effect,” Reuters Online, March 26, 

2009, available from blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/03/26/drug-wars-and-the-balloon-effect/. Within weeks 

of its formation, the South Florida Task Force scored several spectacular successes, including a number of 

major seizures of cocaine and marijuana. In response, Colombian trafficking organizations simply shifted 

their smuggling routes to Mexico, where they partnered with Mexican criminal networks. “By 1988, the 

balloon effect had become obvious: The Mexican Defence Ministry reported it had discovered 4.8 tons of 

cocaine in a cave in Chihuahua near the U.S. border. It was then the world’s biggest seizure of the drug. Its 

Colombian origin was not in doubt—Mexico produced no cocaine of its own.” Ibid. Today, the U.S. State 

Department and DOJ’s National Drug Intelligence Center estimate that as much as 90 percent of the cocaine 

consumed in the United States comes through Mexico.

91. Rensselaer W. Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1989, p. 100. See also Musto, Illicit price of cocaine, p. 323.

92. U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, Price and Purity of 

Cocaine: The Relationship to Emergency Room Visits and Deaths, and to Drug Use Among Arrestees, Washington, 

DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1992, pp. 5-6. 

93. Some have referred to this as the “Len Bias effect.” In June 1986, the nation was shocked when 

University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias died from a cocaine overdose shortly after being drafted 

by the Boston Celtics. Ensuing media reports highlighted the health risks of cocaine, and drugs become a 

significant political issue. After Bias’s death, in another display of the bipartisan nature of the drug war, 

House Speaker Tip O’Neill, D-MA, was determined to “get the Republicans on drugs.” O’Neill tasked the 

Democrats and their staffers to come up with harsh measures, and “they did.” DRC Net, “The ReaganEra Drug War Legacy,” June 11, 2004, available from stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/341/reagan.shtml. In 

August, President Reagan ordered that all federal employees refrain from using illegal drugs or risk losing 

their jobs. The Executive Order further required every federal agency to develop a comprehensive drugfree workplace program. Executive Order No. 12564.

94. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, enacted October 27, 1986, H.R. 5484. 

The $1.7 billion included $97 million to build new prisons, $200 million for drug education, and $241 million for treatment. Ibid.

95. Possession of at least one kilogram of heroin or five kilograms of cocaine was made punishable by 

at least 10 years in prison. In response to the crack epidemic, the sale of just five grams of the drug carried 

a mandatory 5-year sentence. Ibid.

96. David T. Courtwright, “Cocaine in the United States,” Jordan Goodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sherratt, eds., Consuming Habits: Drugs in History and Anthropology, London, UK: Routledge Publishers, 1995, p. 217. Heating cocaine powder in a solution of baking-soda-and-water produced a residue of 

cocaine that could be smoked in a pipe. “Because these chunks made a crackling sound when smoked, they 

came to be called ‘crack’.” Ibid., p. 218.

97. Because crack was so inexpensive and did not have to be injected, an unusually high percentage 

of its smokers were women. Ibid., p. 219. “Like their turn-of-the-century counterparts, they frequently resorted to prostitution or its equivalent, trading sex for drugs. . . . Thus crack contributed to the other great 

American epidemic of the 1980s, the spread of HIV infection.” Ibid.

98. DRC Net, “The Reagan-Era Drug War Legacy,” 6/11/04, available from stopthedrugwar.org/

chronicle-old/341/reagan.shtml. 
29

99. Cannon, The Role of a Lifetime, p. 813. It is estimated that there was 10 times more cocaine in the 

United States in 1988 than in 1982. 

100. Drug abuse and addiction have been inextricably linked with HIV/AIDS since the beginning of 

the epidemic. The link has to do with heightened risk—both of contracting and transmitting HIV, often 

through intravenous drug use or prostitution to support a drug addiction, and of worsening its consequences. National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Drug Facts: HIV/AIDS and Drug Abuse: Intertwined Epidemics,” May 2012, available from www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/hivaids-drug-abuse-intertwinedepidemics. Eric Sterling, President of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation and former Counsel to the 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary from 1979 until 1989, quoted in DRC Net, “The 

Reagan-Era Drug War Legacy,” 6/11/04, available from stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/341/reagan.shtml. 

Sterling also served on the staff of the Subcommittee on Crime, Representative William J. Hughes, D-NJ, 

Chairman, and was responsible for drug enforcement, gun control, money laundering, organized crime, 

pornography, terrorism, corrections, and military assistance to law enforcement, among many issues. He 

was a principal aide in developing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse 

Acts of 1986 and 1988, and other laws. See flexyourrights.org/about/board_of_advisor/sterling.

101. George W. Bush: “Inauguaral Address,” January 20, 1989, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16610. In a 1988 poll, 48 percent of Americans 

reported that drugs were the most important foreign policy challenge, and 63 percent believed that drugs 

should take precedence over America’s anti-Communist efforts. R. Crandall, Driven by Drugs: US Policy 

toward Colombia, London, UK: Phillips, 2002, p. 32.

102. P. Andreas et al., “Dead-End Drug Wars,” Foreign Policy, No. 85, Winter 1991-92, p. 108.

103. Jonathan Harris, Drugged America, New York: Four Winds Press, 1991, p. 146.

104 . Bernard Weintraub, “President Offers Strategy for United States on Drug Control,” The New York 

Times, September 6, 1989, p. B7. Although Bush committed himself to ending all drug abuse, his administration actually set more modest goals: a 10 percent decrease in casual drug use over 2 years, and a 50 

percent reduction over 10 years. Richard L. Berke, “No Change in Basics,” The New York Times, September 

6, 1989; Harris, Drugged America, p. 149.

105. In 1990, 1 year into his term, Bennett proposed extending capital punishment to “drug kingpins.” 

Bennett was the first U.S. drug chief in 20 years with no professional expertise in health or science. He was 

also a heavy smoker—he went through two packs a day, or about one ounce of tobacco—and promised 

to kick his addiction upon taking office. Dan Check, “The Success and Failure of George Bush’s War on 

Drugs,” available from tfy.drugsense.org/bushwar.htm, overall Federal spending on treatment and law enforcement increased during Bennett’s tenure, but treatment consistently remained less than one-third of 

the total budget.

106. Public Broadcasting System, “Thirty years of America’s drug war—a chronology,” PBS Frontline, 

available from www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/. 

107. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, P.L. 104-193, otherwise known as the 

Welfare Reform Act, subjected individuals convicted of drug offenses to a lifetime ban on cash assistance 

and food stamps, and gave states the authority to institute drug-testing requirements for welfare recipients. 

108. In March 1989, the Supreme Court approved the requirement of drug testing as part of the security 

clearance process. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 US 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 

2d 685, 1989, the Court validated the requirements for drug testing of U.S. Customs Service employees applying for jobs involving interdiction of illegal drugs or possession of a gun. The safety and security risks 

associated with those jobs, the court reasoned, make such searches “reasonable,” and thus permissible 

under the Fourth Amendment even without a suspicion of wrongdoing. In another case involving drug 
30

tests in the workplace, the Court upheld mandatory testing of railroad employees following rail accidents. 

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 1989. The court 

cited public safety concerns as its reason for concluding that such testing is a “reasonable” search under 

the Fourth Amendment.

109. Bernard Weintraub, “President Offers Strategy for United States on Drug Control,” The New York 

Times, September 6, 1989. It is somewhat ironic that in 1989, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 

released a report stating that there had been a 37 percent drop in casual, nonaddicted use from 1979 to 1989. 

Harris, Drugged America, p. 156. In FY 1990, 40 percent of the drug-control budget was specified for law 

enforcement, 20 percent for the construction of correctional facilities, and less than 12 percent for improvement of drug-abuse treatment. Sidney H. Schnoll, Lori D. Karan, “Substance Abuse,” Journal of the American 

Medical Association, May 1990, Vol. 263, pp. 2682-2683. Estimated 1990 antidrug expenditures illustrate the 

growing burden on the states: Expenditures for law enforcement at the federal level were $7 billion and 

$17 billion at the state/local level.

110. Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars.”

111. In January 1990, Bush proposed a further increase of $1.2 billion for the war on drugs, including 

a 50 percent increase in military spending for DoD’s part in the drug war. Amendments to the National 

Defense Authorization Acts, Public Laws 101-189, 101-510, and 102-190.

112. Ibid. The Pentagon was designated as the lead federal agency for anti-drug intelligence. It integrated U.S. command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems; provided an improved 

interdiction role for the National Guard; directed the armed forces to conduct training exercises in known 

drug-trafficking areas in the United States; and expanded military authority to assist foreign police and 

military in anti-drug operations. David Isenberg, “Militarizing the Drug War,” Covert Action, Fall 1992, p. 

42. In November 1989, under the direction of then-Defense Secretary Cheney, Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) 

was established at Fort Bliss in El Paso, TX, to coordinate military and law enforcement anti-drug operations along the U.S.-Mexico border. Chad Thevenot, “The ‘Militarization’ of the Anti-Drug Effort,” July 

1997, available from www.ndsn.org/july97/military.html. See also Martin Jelsma, “The Development of International Drug Control: Lessons Learned and Strategic Challenges for the Future,” Working Paper Prepared 

for the First Meeting of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, January 24, 2011.

113. M. Falco, “Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars, “ Daedalus, No.121, Summer 1992, p. 65. Major Kimberly 

J. Corcoran, “DOD Involvement in the Counterdrug Effort—Contributions and Limitations,” Montgomery, 

AL: Air Command and Staff College, AU/ACSC/0077/97-03, March 1997. Few were surprised when, on 

December 20, 1989, the U.S. military executed Operation JUST CAUSE, an invasion of Panama to arrest 

Panamanian President Manuel Noriega and return him to the United States for trial on drug traffickingrelated charges. The operation employed 25,000 troops. Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1991. On July 10, 1992, Noriega was convicted in the Southern District of Florida of 

drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering, and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. Ibid. 

114. Louis Krane, “How to Win the War on Drugs,” Fortune, March 12, 1990, p. 75. Congress wanted to 

know what percentage of all cocaine coming into the country was seized, and how much it would cost to 

seize half of it. Paul A. Yost, Commandant of the Coast Guard, responded by saying that the Coast Guard 

had seized only 3 percent of all cocaine entering the country, and that there wasn’t enough money in the 

entire federal budget to seize half the cocaine entering the United States. Harris, Drugged America, p. 152. 

115. Ibid., p. 157.

116. Treaster, “Four Years of Bush’s Drug War: New Funds but an Old Strategy,” p. A12. This meant 

reduced profits for those involved in the production, traffic, and sale of drugs. However, since the ultimate 

goal of the war on drugs was to decrease drug use in the United States, and since interdiction did nothing 

toward that end, it can be safely said that interdiction was a failure.
31

117. Harris, Drugged America, p. 157.

118. Ibid.

119. Public facilities were overcrowded, and those who wanted treatment were often put on long waiting lists. Richard L. Berke, “No Change in Basics,” The New York Times, September 6, 1989, p. B7.

120. David E. Smith, “San Francisco Roots: The Evolution of Addiction Medicine,” California Society of 

Addiction Medicine History, June 2010, available from www.csam-asam.org/csam-history.

121. Krane, “How to Win the War on Drugs,” p. 72.

122. Imprisoning an addict costs between $25,000 and $50,000 annually; inpatient treatment for addiction costs only $15,000. According to Dr. Peter Pinto of the Samaritan Village, Inc. Harris, Drugged America, 

p. 155.

123. Krane, “How to Win the War on Drugs,” p. 71.

124. In 1989, soon after becoming Drug Czar, Bennett had suggested that the nation’s capital should 

stand as a test case for the administration’s strategy. After a year of fighting drugs in Washington, DC, Bennett admitted failure. Drug use did not decline, and the homicide rate remained steady. Joseph B. Treaster, 

“Echoes of Prohibition; 20 Years of War on Drugs, and No Victory Yet,” The New York Times, June 14, 1992.

125. Ibid.

126. Treaster, “Police in New York Shift Drug Battle Away From Streets,” p. A1. By 1992, there were 

more people in federal jails on drug charges than there were for all crimes in 1980. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Rehnquist publicly remarked that there were just too many arrests. Twice as many 

people were arrested for possession of drugs as for selling them. Dan Baum, “The Drug War on Civil Liberties,” The Nation, June 29, 1992, p. 886.

127. Despite spending $1.6 billion to build new federal prisons, there were still not enough cells. Treaster, “Police in New York Shift Drug Battle Away From Streets.” 

128. Ibid. Another impact of the shorter sentences was that many prisoners preferred to serve out their 

prison term rather than go into treatment because the prison sentences were so much shorter than any 

treatment program. Ian Fisher, “Selling Addicts on Treatment Rather Than Prison,” The New York Times, 

December 1, 1992. Drug dealers did an average of 8 months at Riker’s Island in New York City. Ibid. Drug 

traffickers did an average of 22 months. Krane, “How to Win the War on Drugs,” p. 75. Drug-addicted 

dealers who showed a good chance of recovery were offered an alternative to serving out their sentences: 

rehabilitation at Phoenix House. The treatment was rejected by many, simply because it can take up to 2 

years. Ian Fisher, “Selling Addicts on Treatment Rather Than Prison,” The New York Times, December 1, 

1992, p. B3.

129. Gwen Ifill, “The 1992 Campaign: New York; Clinton Admits Experiment with Marijuana in 1960s,” 

The New York Times, March 30, 1992.

130. Joseph B. Treaster, “Clinton Continues Old Drug Policies,” April 12, 1993, available from www.

cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb026.pdf. Clinton’s campaign position was that rehabilitation should be made available to anyone who asked for it, despite the fact that it would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Ibid. It 

appears that no one in the news media noticed that the last President to call for treatment on demand was 

Richard M. Nixon.
32

131. Ibid. 

132. William S. Smith, a senior official in the White House anti-drug office under President Bush, said 

national drug policy appeared to be “on cruise control.” Ibid. One of Clinton’s first decisions was to reduce 

the size and budget of the Office of National Drug Control Policy by 80 percent. Ted Galen Carpenter, 

“Declaring an Armistice in the International Drug War,” Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, No. 26, July 

26, 1993. 

133. He had also left most other drug-related federal positions in the hands of acting directors or holdovers from the Bush administration. Treaster, “Clinton Continues Old Drug Policies.” Many in law enforcement were disappointed by Clinton’s decision to sign the North American Free Trade Agreement, 

which resulted in an enormous increase in legitimate trade across the U.S.-Mexican border. The increased 

volume of trade also made it more difficult for U.S. Customs officials to find narcotics hidden within legitimate goods.

134. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the Appointment of the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and an Exchange with Reporters,” April 28, 1993, Peters and Woolley, The American 

Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46491. Brown was not sworn into office 

until July 1, 1993. William J. Clinton, “Remarks on the Swearing-In of National Drug Control Policy Director Lee Brown,” July 1, 1993, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid-46783. 

135. Brown previously headed the police departments of Atlanta, Houston, and New York City. Ibid.

136. ONDCP’s mission was continually criticized by members of Congress, who called for a stiffer 

anti-drug message from the White House. Pierre Thomas and Jim McGee, “Brown Ends Two-Year Tenure 

as Drug Policy Chief,” The Washington Post, December 13, 1995, p. A27, available from www.ndsn.org/jan96/

drugczar.html.

137. Treaster, “Clinton Continues Old Drug Policies.” “What we have here is a budget that says ‘business as usual,’“ said Dr. LaMond Tullis, a professor of political science at Brigham Young University in 

Provo, Utah, and a drug policy consultant to the United Nations. “It seems we’re going to go on doing 

things we know don’t work.” Ibid. Carpenter, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 26. 

138. Treaster, “Clinton Continues Old Drug Policies.”

139. Ibid. In his last year in office, President Bush cut $336 million from international operations and 

anti-smuggling efforts. He increased spending for drug treatment by $168 million while President Clinton 

proposed a $170 million increase. Ibid. Administration officials apologetically explained that the budget 

had been prepared before a detailed drug strategy could be worked out, and suggested that “the healthcare overhaul being developed under the leadership of Hillary Rodham Clinton was likely to include increased spending for drug treatment.” 

140. Carnevale and Murphy, “Matching Rhetoric to Dollars”; 1998 figures are available from the White 

House: Office of National Drug Control Policy website, available from https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/00ndcs/v.html. Federal drug-control agencies received an emergency supplemental appropriation of $844 billion in FY 1999 that is not reflected in these totals. The supplemental appropriation was 

divided as follows: Defense, $42 million; Justice, $11.7 million; ONDCP, $3.2 million; State, $232.6 million; 

Transportation, $264.7 million; Treasury, 266.7 million; All others, $23.0 million. For FY 2000, see White 

House Office of National Drug Control Policy; and for FY 2001 figures, see Executive Summary, White 

House Office of National Drug Control Policy.

141. William J. Clinton: “Press Briefing by Director of National Drug Control Policy, Dr. Lee Brown,” 

February 9, 1994; Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.
33

edu/ws/?pid=59752. In announcing the new budget, Brown emphasized that there would be no reduction in 

the funding for supply-reduction, law enforcement, and interdiction. The enhanced funding requested for 

treatment and prevention was “new money.” Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Joseph B. Treaster, “Clinton Continues Old Drug Policies,” April 12, 1993, available from www.

cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb026.pdf. Clinton’s campaign position was that rehabilitation should be made available to anyone who asked for it, despite the fact that it would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Ibid.

144. Ibid. ONDCP then estimated the hard-core drug population was then about 2.7 million, approximately 600,000 heroin addicts, and the rest, crack cocaine and cocaine addicts.

145. William J. Clinton, “Press Briefing by Attorney General Janet Reno, Secretary of H.U.D. Henry 

Cisneros, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Lee Brown, and Assistant Secretary of 

Treasury Ron Noble,” March 29, 1994, Peters and Woolley, The American Preisdency Project, available from 

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59891. 

146. Among other things, the initiative funded a designated prosecutor in every U.S. Attorney’s Office to coordinate the investigation and prosecution of federal violent crimes. William J. Clinton, “Press 

Briefing by Attorney General Janet Reno, Secretary of H.U.D. Henry Cisneros, Director of the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy Lee Brown, and Assistant Secretary of Treasury Ron Noble,” March 29, 1994, 

Peters and Woolley, The American Preisdency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59891. 

William J. Clinton, “Press Briefing by Attorney General Janet Reno, Secretary of H.U.D. Henry Cisneros, 

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Lee Brown, and Assistant Secretary of Treasury 

Ron Noble,” March 29, 1994, Peters and Woolley, The American Preisdency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59891. 

147. William J. Clinton, “Statement on the Resignation of Lee Brown as Director of the Office of National Drug Control policy,” December 12, 1995, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50889. Most significant was the passage of the Violent Crime 

Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. “Three strikes and you’re out” became the law of the land, and 

the federal government provided funding for 100,000 new police officers and 30,000 additional prison cells. 

William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,” 

September 13, 1994, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49072. Whatever their long-term potential might have been, Clinton’s demand-reduction 

initiatives produced little in the way of positive, short-term results. As in other administrations, political 

expediency demanded a pro-law enforcement, “tough-on-crime” approach, with little regard for the cost 

or outcome.

148. Pierre Thomas and Jim McGee, “Brown Ends Two-Year Tenure as Drug Policy Chief,” The Washington Post, December 13, 1995, p. A27. Announcing his resignation in Houston, Brown expressed frustration at the current climate in Washington. “At a time when we see a rise in the use of illegal drugs by 

our adolescents, the proposed budget cuts in drug-fighting are wrong-headed and must be reversed,” 

he said. Ibid.

149. Clinton’s selection of McCaffrey was “widely seen as a direct response to Republican election–year 

criticisms that the president was soft on drugs.” Major Barrett K. Peavie, U.S. Army, “United States War 

on Drugs: Addicted to a Political Strategy of No End,” Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military 

Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff, College, January 2001 28, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391171&Location=U2&doc=GetTRD. 

150 . Ibid. 
34

151. William J. Clinton, “Press Briefing by General Barry McCaffrey,” April 29, 1996, Peters and 

Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48807. The 

“Five Pillar Strategy,” called for motivating American youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse 

but did not include “treatment on demand.” Other pillars of the strategy included: reducing drugrelated crime and violence; eliminating the social consequences of illegal drug use; shielding our frontiers against drug trafficking; and reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking abroad and 

at home. The get-tough approach included get-tough legislation, such as the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, which was designed to “stop meth before it becomes the crack of the 

1990s.” The Act followed the doubling of methamphetamine-related deaths between 1994 and 1996. 

William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996,” 

October 3, 1996, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52038. William J. Clinton, “Press Briefing by General Barry McCaffrey,” April 29, 

1996, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=48807. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy and 

an Exchange with Reporters,” February 25, 1997, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 

available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53779.

152 . Ibid. Peavie, “United States War on Drugs,” p. 46. The FY 1998 budget climbed to $17.4 billion, 

with virtually no change in the funding ratio. William J. Clinton, “Press Briefing by General Barry McCaffrey,” December 11, 1997, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48650. In 1998, President Clinton and Director McCaffrey launched a 5-year, $2 

billion National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, the largest targeted effort ever to teach youth about 

the dangers of drugs. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy 

and an Exchange with Reporters,” February 25, 1997, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 

available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53779. The media campaign created a public furor when it 

was revealed that ONDCP had violated domestic propaganda and publicity prohibitions by preparing prepackaged news stories that did not disclose to television viewers that the government had produced them 

and had illegally spent appropriations to develop, produce, and distribute the covert propaganda. “Office 

of National Drug Control Policy—Video News Release,”Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. 2005-01-04, available from www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/303495.htm. Retrieved 2008-09-06.

153. Most of that amount, $862.3 million, was allocated to Colombia and the balance to neighboring 

countries, primarily Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and to U.S. agencies’ Andean region antidrug operations. 

Of the $862.3 million allocated to Colombia, $521.2 million was new assistance to the Colombian armed 

forces, and $123.1 million was assistance to the police, with the rest, $218 million, going to alternative economic development, aid to displaced persons, judicial reform, law enforcement, and promotion of human 

rights. Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Instability, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, pp. 62-63, available from www.

rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339/MR1339.ch6.pdf. The bulk of the military assistance was intended 

to support the Colombian armed forces’ three counternarcotics battalions, which received 16 UG-60 Black 

Hawk and 30 UH-1H transport helicopters. In addition, the cap on U.S. military personnel assisting in the 

Colombian drug/insurgent conflict was doubled to 500. Ibid.

154. Ibid. In 2010, the Washington Office on Latin America concluded that both Plan Colombia and 

the Colombian government’s security strategy “came at a high cost in lives and resources, only did part of 

the job, are yielding diminishing returns and have left important institutions weaker.” “Colombia: Don’t 

Call it a Model,” The Washington Office on Latin America, July 13, 2010, available from www.wola.org/index.

php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=1134&Itemid=2.

155. The development of treatment for co-occurring mental and substance abuse disorders was one of 

the program’s goals. H. Harwood, D. Fountain, and G. Livermore, The Economic Costs of Alcohol and Drug 

Abuse in the United States 1992, NIH Pub. No. 98-4327, Rockville, MD: National Institutes of Health, 1998. 
35

156. This change in the law permits Schedule III, IV, or V narcotic medications that are FDA-approved 

for treatment of narcotic-use disorders to be used for medically supervised detoxification or maintenance, 

facilitates patients’ access to treatment by addiction-medicine specialists, and makes office-based care possible. Ibid.

157. Between 1999 and 2007, over 48,000 persons died in the United States from AIDS due to transmission through infected needles. Eric Sterling, “40 Years of Drug War Hasn’t Worked; ‘Time for a Change,’ 

Says 9-Year Veteran,” Alternet, June 15, 2011, available from www.alternet.org/story/151306/40_years_of_drug_

war-hasn percent27t_worked percent3B_ percent22time_for_a_change percent2C percent22_says_9-year_veteran. 

158. William J. Clinton, “Press Briefing by Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy General Barry McCaffrey, Deputy Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Dr. Donald Vereen, 

and Chief of Staff of the Office of Drug Control Policy, Janet Crist,” January 4, 2001, Peters and Woolley, 

The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47890. 

159. William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy and an Exchange with Reporters,” February 25, 1997, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available 

from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53779. The annual federal drug budget for criminal justice tripled 

from $2.76 billion in 1989 to $8.45 billion in 1999.

160. William J. Clinton, “Message to the Congress Transmitting the 1997 National Drug Control Strategy,” February 25, 1997, Peters and Woolley, The American Presidency Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53780. One objective of supply-reduction efforts has been to reduce the availability 

of drugs sufficiently to create scarcity, which, at least in theory, should drive prices up and, thereby, make 

drug users unable or unwilling to continue their drug use. This proposition has been the subject of numerous studies, which have attempted to explain why, from 1981 to 2003, the prices of powder cocaine and 

heroin fell and the purity of these drugs increased, while their demand grew. See Executive Office of the 

President, ONDCP, The Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs: 1981 Through the Second Quarter of 2003, November 

2004, p. 70.

161. Michael Kramer, “Snow in August: Candidate George W. Tries to Stop the Cocaine Avalanche,” 

New York Daily News, August 22, 1999.

162. Anne E. Kornblut and Glen Johnson, The Boston Globe, October 7, 2001, p. A6. Not surprisingly, the 

Gore campaign offered its own statistics, arguing that the number of drug users ages 25 to 34 had dropped 

39 percent, and drug use by teenagers ages 12 to 17 had declined 21 percent between 1997 and 1999. 

Moreover, a Gore spokesman stated, “Al Gore and this administration proposed the largest antidrug 

budget ever.”

163. Hutchinson would serve as DEA Administrator until January 2003, when he moved to the newly 

created Department of Homeland Security to lead the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, later 

renamed the Transportation Security Administration. Phillip Smith, “Bush’s Drug Policy Troika,” Alternet, 

May 14, 2001, available from www.alternet.org/story/10856/bush’s_drug_policy_troika/?page=entire. Hutchison 

co-sponsored the 2000 Methamphetamine Antiproliferation Act and advocated strongly against a medical 

marijuana initiative and needle-exchange programs in the District of Columbia. Ibid.

164. As Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Drug Czar Walters was fond 

of military interventions and long prison sentences, and made only token efforts to address concerns that 

he would ignore the treatment and prevention components of drug policy. Phillip Smith, “Bush’s Drug 

Policy Troika,” Alternet, May 14, 2001, available from www.alternet.org/story/10856/bush’s_drug_policy_

troika/?page=entire.
36

165. As Attorney General, Ashcroft’s focus became the threat of terrorism after the attacks of 9/11. 

He played no significant role in the development of the national drug strategy. Peter Baker and Susan 

Schmidt, “Ashcroft’s Complex Tenure At Justice,” The Washington Post, May 20, 2007, available from www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/19/AR2007051901275.html.

166. Phillip Smith, “Bush’s Drug Policy Troika,” Alternet, May 14, 2001, available from www.alternet.org/

story/10856/bush’s_drug_policy_troika/?page=entire.

167. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: How to Ensure the Program Operates Efficiently and Effectively, Testimony to Congress, August 1, 2001. Walters was so confident in the efficacy of the program that 

he invested $7 million a year in performance measurement-related spending to determine the effectiveness 

of the campaign. However, in 2002, a study commissioned by ONDCP reported that teenagers exposed to 

federal anti-drug ads were no less likely to use drugs for having viewed them, and some young girls said 

they were even more likely to give drugs a try. Walters blamed poor ads that failed to resonate with teenagers, and promised in 2002 Senate testimony that he would show results within a year or admit failure. 

Congress agreed to extend the campaign through 2003, while cutting funding for the ads from $170 million 

in 2002 to $150 million in 2003. An entirely new advertising campaign was created. Shawn Zeller, “Ads, 

Drugs & Money,” Government Executive, September 19, 2003. In February 2005, a new research company 

hired by ONDCP and the National Institute on Drug Abuse reported that the government’s ad campaign 

aimed at dissuading teens from using marijuana, a campaign that cost $1.4 billion between 1998 and 2006, 

did not work. “[G]reater exposure to the campaign was associated with weaker anti-drug norms and increases in the perceptions that others use marijuana.” The research company was paid $42.7 million for the 

5-year study. After the February 2005 report was received, the office continued the ad campaign, spending 

$220 million on the anti-marijuana ads in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Ryan Grim, “A White House Drug 

Deal Gone Bad: Sitting on the Negative Results of a Study of Anti-Marijuana Ads,” Slate magazine, September 7, 2006. 

168. Jeff Zeleny, “Bush’s Drug Policy Highlights Terror Link,” Chicago Tribune, February 13, 2002, available from articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-13/news/0202130313_1_illegal-drugs-drug-control-prescriptiondrug-fraud. The budget request included $52 million in DEA’s budget to be used to fight terrorism. In 

2004, DEA announced its participation in the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Implementation Plan, 

designed to reduce heroin production in Afghanistan, the world’s leading opium producer. 

169. Zeleny, “Bush’s Drug Policy Highlights Terror Link.” On February 13, 2002, Bush suggested that 

the 9/11attacks were made possible through the sale of illegal substances like heroin and other drugs. 

Nearly 70 percent of the world’s heroin supply comes from Afghanistan, officials say. Even though the 

ousted Taliban regime had banned the production of opium poppies during its rule, Bush said the drug 

trade provided “a significant amount of money to the people that were harboring and feeding and hiding 

those who attacked and killed thousands of innocent Americans.” Ibid. The President’s remarks continued 

a theme the White House had launched during the February 3rd Super Bowl, with graphic television commercials linking drug sales to terrorism. Ibid. 

170. For FY 2002 figures, see White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, “National Drug Control Strategy: FY 2003 Budget Summary,” Washington, DC: Office of the President, February 2002, Table 

2, p. 6. For FY 2003, CDSP Research Report, “Revising the Federal Drug Control Budget Report: Changing 

Methodology to Hide the Cost of the Drug War?” Common Sense for Drug Policy, Washington, DC, 2003. 

Beginning in FY 2004, ONDCP made significant changes in the way it computed the national drug budget. 

The new methodology was designed, according to ONDCP, so that the budget would reflect “only those 

expenditures aimed at reducing drug use rather than, as in the past, those associated with the consequences 

of drug use.” Peter Reuter, “An Assessment of ONDCP’s Budget Concept, Testimony presented to the 

House of Representatives Committee on Government,” February 10, 2005. As a result, the FY 2004 budget 

request of $11.7 billion was touted as including an increase of $440.3 million over the FY 2003 budget, 

despite the fact that the FY 2003 budget was $19.2 billion. This feat of mathematical gymnastics was accomplished by retrospective application of the new budget accounting methodology to effectively reduce 
37

the FY 2003 budget total by approximately $75 billion by excluding, among other things, almost all costs 

associated with the prosecution and incarceration of federal drug prisoners—approximately $4.5 billion. 

On the other hand, the new drug budget approach expanded the amount of money reported for drug treatment spending by including hundreds of millions of dollars in alcohol treatment spending not previously 

included in the drug budget. For example, SAMHSA’s full substance abuse treatment block grant funding 

will be included in the drug treatment budget report, including $55 million for alcohol treatment. This, 

despite a specific Congressional prohibition on ONDCP’s involvement in alcohol abuse treatment matters. CSDP Research Report, “Revising the Federal Drug Control Budget Report: Changing Methodology 

to Hide the Cost of the Drug War?” Common Sense for Drug Policy, Washington, DC, available from proxy.

baremetal.com/csdp.org/research/ondcpenron.pdf. White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, FY 2003 

Budget Summary Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget 

Survey, Washington, DC: March 2004, available from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/203723.pdf. White 

House Office of National Drug Control policy, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Survey, Washington, DC, February 2006, available from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/212977.pdf. White House Office of National Drug Control policy, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2008 Budget Survey, Washington, 

DC, February 2007, available from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/216432.pdf. For 2009 figures, see U.S. 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics and Crime Facts: Drug Control Budget, available from 

bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/dcb.cfm.

171. Maia Szalavitz, “Tearing Apart Bush’s Drug Plan,” Alternet, February 19, 2002, available from 

www.alternet.org/story/12439/tearing_apart_bush’s_drug_plan/. Bush’s plan promised to cut drug use by 25 

percent in 5 years, unduly optimistic, but modest in comparison with Congress’s 1988 plan, which had 

America entirely drug-free by 1995. Ibid. 

172. Nearly $1.6 billion has been pledged for treatment programs over the next 5 years, he said. Zeleny, 

“Bush’s Drug Policy Highlights Terror Link.” 

173. The administration’s proposal drew criticism from treatment advocates, who argued that the drug 

problem would be solved only through health programs, not heightened law enforcement. Critics said the 

drug budget devotes two-thirds of its money to military-style enforcement, with the rest going to treatment 

and prevention programs. Ibid. 

174. Bush signed the Mérida Initiative in 2008, committing $1.4 billion to Mexico and other countries 

over 3 years to help combat drug trafficking and transnational crime. The funds were earmarked for military and law enforcement training and equipment, as well as technical advice and training to strengthen 

the national justice systems. Claire Suddath, “Brief History: The War on Drugs,” Time.com, March 25, 2009, 

available from www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html#ixzz17k4ZwMak; “Mexico’s 2008 Defence Budget Goes Under Review,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 11, 2007, available from www.janes.com/

news/defence/business/jdw/jdw071211_1_n.shtml; Politico.com, “Bush pushes Mexico money in Iraq bill,” May 

8, 2008, available from www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10180.html. However, the flow of drugs across the 

U.S. Southwest border did not diminish.

175. According to a study by the Rand Corporation, it would take 11 times as much money to reduce 

the demand for cocaine by 1 percent using interdiction, than it would to do so via treatment spending; 

similar figures are believed to apply for other drugs. C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling 

Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs, Prepared for the Office of National Drug Control Policy and the 

United States Army, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Drug Policy Research Center, 1994, p. xvi. 

176. “Public Views Clash with U.S. Policy on Cuba, Immigration, and Drugs,” Zogby International, October 2, 2008, available from www.zogby.com/news/readnews.cfm?ID=1568.

177. The Bush administration’s 2002 goal of reducing all illegal drug use by 25 percent led to unprecedented numbers of marijuana-related arrests; however, marijuana use declined only by 6 percent, and the 

use of other drugs actually increased. Claire Suddath, “Brief History: The War on Drugs,” Time.com, March 

25, 2009, available from www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html#ixzz17k4ZwMak. 
38

178. John Carnevale, “The Policy-Budget Mismatch,” Carnevale Associates Policy Brief, Gaithersburg, 

MD: September 2009; CSDP Research Report, “Revising the Federal Drug Control Budget Report: Changing Methodology to Hide the Cost of the Drug War?” Common Sense for Drug Policy, Washington, DC, 

available from proxy.baremetal.com/csdp.org/research/ondcpenron.pdf; White House Office of National Drug 

Control Policy, FY 2003 Budget Summary Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control 

Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Survey, Washington, DC: March 2004, available from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/

ondcp/203723.pdf.

179. Cortes, “Sketches of the Drug Czars,”Vanity Fair. 

180. Katharine Q. Seelye, “Barack Obama, Asked About Drug History, Admits He Inhaled,” The New 

York Times, October 24, 2006. As he revealed in his book, Dreams from My Father: “Pot had helped, and 

booze; maybe a little blow when you could afford it. Not smack though.” Barack Obama, Dreams from My 

Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004. 

181. John K. Wilson, Barack Obama: This Improbable Quest, Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008, pp. 12-13.

182. Candidate Obama had also insisted that medical marijuana was an issue best left to state and local governments, promising an end to the Bush administration’s high-profile raids on providers of medical marijuana. Attorney General Holder vowed that Justice Department resources would not be used to 

circumvent state marijuana laws. However, the federal détente soon collapsed. Tim Dickinson, “Obama’s 

War on Pot,” Rolling Stone, February 16, 2012, available from www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-waron-pot-20120216. The public comments of Drug Czar Kerlikowske began to sound remarkably similar to 

those of his predecessors. “Marijuana is dangerous and has no medicinal benefit,” see Cortes, “Sketches of 

the Drug Czars,” Vanity Fair.

183. B. Curley, “Obama’s first drug budget fails to shift priorities,” available from www.jointogether.org/

news/features/2009/obamas-first_drug-budget.html. 

184. Cortes, “Sketches of the Drug Czars,” Vanity Fair. 

185. Office of National Drug Control policy, “National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2011 Budget Survey,” 

White House: Washington, DC, February 2010. In February 2011, ONDCP announced that it had once again 

restructured the Federal drug control budget “to more accurately represent the full range of federal spending, including costs associated with the consequences of drug use.” According to ONDCP, “the new budget 

structure and framework prove[es] an inclusive and true description of the Federal contribution dedicated 

to the drug-control problem.” The fact sheet does not provide a detailed explanation of the methodology; 

however, it does provide a list of new agencies and programs added to the FY 2012 National Drug Control 

Budge calculation, most of which appear to be traditional supply-reduction activities, Office of National 

Drug Control Policy, Fact Sheet: Changes to the National Drug Control Budget, February 2011. Under the 

“revised budget structure,” ONDCP claims an increase of 100 percent in demand-reduction expenditures, 

as compared with an increase of only 50 percent in supply-reduction expenditures for FY 2010-12. Whether 

the change in methodology was designed to hide the true cost of the war on drugs or distort the ratio 

between supply/demand spending, it has that result. The figures used in the table were also included in 

the ONDCP fact sheet and described as computations made under the “previous budget structure.” The 

figures clearly understate the totals expended; however, the percentages apportioned between demandreduction and supply-reduction appear sufficiently accurate for comparison to the figures for earlier years. 

For FY 2011 and FY 2012, see White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug 

Control Strategy, FY 2011 Budget Survey, Washington, DC: February 2010, available from www.whitehouse.

gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/fy11budget.pdf. For FY 2013, see White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Budget: FY 2013 Funding Highlights, Washington, DC: 

February 2012, available from www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/the-national-drug-control-budget-fy-2013-fundinghighlights. Changes in accounting methodology create a misleading appearance of dramatic increases in 
39

both supply-reduction and demand-reduction spending. Phillip Smith, “What’s in Obama’s New Drug 

War Budget? Hint: Same, Old Broken Policies,” Drug War Chronicle, February 18, 2012, available from 

www.alternet.org/story/154178/what percent27s_in_obama percent27s_new_drug_war_budget_ percent28hint percent3A_same percent2C_old_broken_policies percent29.

186. The $15.5 billion represents an increase of 3.5 percent over the 2010 budget; two-thirds of it is $9.7 

billion for law enforcement and other supply-reduction efforts, and one-third, about $5.6 billion, for prevention and treatment. Phillip S. Smith, “Obama Wants More Money for the Failed Drug War,” Drug War 

Chronicle, February 5, 2010, available from www.alternet.org/drugs/145563/obama_wants_more_money_for_the_

failed_drug_war/?page=1. Yet, Drug Czar Kerlikowske called the imbalanced budget “balanced.” “The new 

budget proposal demonstrates the Obama administration’s commitment to a balanced and comprehensive 

drug strategy,” said Kerlikowske. “In a time of tight budgets and fiscal restraint, these new investments are 

targeted at reducing Americans’ drug use and the substantial costs associated with the health and social 

consequences of drug abuse.” Ibid. The promise of a balanced approach is one that has been made by every 

administration since Nixon.

187. In February 2011, ONDCP announced that it had once again restructured the Federal drug-control 

budget “to more accurately represent the full range of federal spending, including costs associated with 

the consequences of drug use.” According to ONDCP, “the new budget structure and framework prove[es] 

an inclusive and true description of the Federal contribution dedicated to the drug-control problem.” The 

fact sheet does not provide a detailed explanation of the methodology; however, it does provide a list of 

new agencies and programs added to the FY 2012 National Drug Control Budge calculation, most of which 

appear to be traditional supply-reduction activities, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Fact Sheet: 

Changes to the National Drug Control Budget,” February 2011. Under the “revised budget structure,” 

ONDCP could claim an increase of 100 percent in demand-reduction expenditures in the FY 2013 budget, 

as compared with an increase of only 50 percent in supply-reduction expenditures. Whether the change 

in methodology was designed to hide the true cost of the war on drugs or distort the ratio between supply/demand spending, it has that result. The figures used in the table were also included in the ONDCP 

fact sheet and described as computations made under the “previous budget structure.” The figures clearly 

understate the totals expended; however, the percentages apportioned between demand-reduction and 

supply-reduction appear sufficiently accurate for comparison to the figures for earlier years.

188. The proposed budget increases federal anti-drug funding by 1.6 percent over Fiscal Year 2012. 

Although funding for prevention and treatment would increase by 4.6 percent, some treatment and grant 

programs would be cut, while supply-reduction programs would see increases. The budget emphasizes 

drug courts and criminal justice-based drug treatment; it cuts SAMHSA, which provides treatment resources, but increases spending for prison-based treatment. The $364 million earmarked for SAMHSA’s 

treatment programs is a $61 million reduction from FY 2012. Meanwhile, drug courts are in for a $17 million increase to $52 million, and BOP drug treatment programs would get a $16 million increase to $109 

million. In sum, the 2013 budget request represents a 3 percent increase for treatment and an 11 percent 

decrease for prevention. Smith, “What’s in Obama’s New Drug War Budget?”

189. Smith, “What’s in Obama’s New Drug War Budget?” 

190. Ibid. Those include operations for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, budgeted at $8.3 billion for 2011. 

Since more than half of all federal prisoners are serving time for drug offenses, the argument goes, the real 

cost of current drug policies should be increased by at least $4 billion. Only $79 million of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ budget is counted as part of the national drug strategy budget. Ibid.

191. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. Drug Policy, April 

17, 2012; Zogby International., October 2008; Zogby/Inter-American Dialogue Survey: Public Views Clash with 

U.S. Policy on Cuba, Immigration, and Drugs, available from www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1568. 
40

192. Remarks of ONDCP Director Gil Kerlikowske as Prepared for Delivery to the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, May 1, 2012. Copy in author’s files, available from www.c-spanvideo.org/

program/305743-1. 

193. The latest available federal data show that drug arrests during President Obama’s first year in office are up compared to those during the first year of President Bush’s administration. The arrest rate hasn’t 

changed significantly, despite the White House’s own admission that we cannot “arrest or incarcerate our 

way out of a problem this complex.” Ending the Drug War: A Dream Deferred,” Law Enforcement Against 

Prohibition, June 2011, p. 8, available from www.CopsSayLegalizeDrugs.com/40years.

194. Although the Obama administration hasn’t matched its deeds to its words with respect to a real 

shift in the drug-control strategy, the fault for our long-entrenched drug policies does not solely lie with 

this or any particular President. “Ending the Drug War: A Dream Deferred,” Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, June 2011, p. 15, available from www.CopsSayLegalizeDrugs.com/40years.

195. Ibid. “This is very much the same drug budget we’ve been seeing for years,” said Bill Piper, national affairs director for the Drug Policy Alliance, DPA.

196. In a February 2000 report prepared for the National Institute of Justice, a team of researchers concluded that a strategy based on supply-reduction simply cannot work:

Given experiences since the beginning of the war on drugs, which initiated major expansions in 

expenditures on supply-based programs, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the Nation 

will not be able to have any large future influence on decreasing the availability and increasing 

the price of illicit drugs.

Abt Associates, Inc., “Illicit Drugs: Price Elasticity of Demand and Supply,” February 2000, available from 

www.abtassociates.com/reports/20008744845311.pdf.

197. Rydell and Everingham, “Controlling Cocaine,” pp. xvi. The Rand Report analyzes the relative 

cost-effectiveness of four available drug interventions: 1) source country control; 2) interdiction; 3) domestic enforcement; and 4) treatment of heavy users. The first three focus on supply-control, whereby the cost 

of supplying cocaine is increased by seizing drugs and assets and by arresting and incarcerating dealers 

and their agents. The fourth is a demand-control program, because it reduces consumption directly, without going through the price mechanism. The Rand researchers confirm that the bulk of the drug budget, 

an estimated $13 billion in the year prior to publication is spent on domestic enforcement, and only a small 

percentage of the total budget is allocated to the treatment of heavy users. Given the high cost of supply 

control programs, treatment of heavy users may be a more cost-effective way of dealing with drug interventions. See also Peavie, “United States War on Drugs,” p. 45. 

198. Fully 76 percent of the American people and 67 percent of chiefs of police have declared the drug 

war a failure, according to polls. “Ending the Drug War: A Dream Deferred,” Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, June 2011, available from www.CopsSayLegalizeDrugs.com/40years.

199. Sterling, “40 Years of Drug War Hasn’t Worked; ‘Time for a Change,’ Says 9-Year Veteran.” The 

U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, “The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use 

on American Society 2011”; Peter Reuter, “An Assessment of ONDCP’s Budget Concept,” Testimony presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Government, February 10, 2005.

200. Carnevale Associates, “Policy Brief.” 

201. National Survey on Drug Use and Health, available from https://nsduhweb.rti.org/; FBI Uniform 

Crime Reports, available from www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr. In 2010, 82 percent of high school seniors 

report that marijuana is easy to obtain—a decrease in perception of only 2 percent in 20 years. American 
41

Civil Liberties Union, “Feds Don’t Walk Their Talk in Drug Control Budget,” 2012, available from www.

aclu-wa.org/blog/feds-dont-walk-their-talk-drug-control-budget.

202. Claire Suddath, “Brief History: The War on Drugs,” Time.com, March 25, 2009, available from www.

time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html#ixzz17k4ZwMak.

203. The rate has remained unchanged since 2002. Carnevale Associates, “Policy Brief: The Continued 

Standstill in Reducing Illicit Drug Use,” Gaithersburg, MD: September 2009.

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid. The total number of drug offenders in the prison system, federal and state combined, is approximately one-half million, as large as the entire addict population of 1900. 

206. United States Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, p. III.

207. In his 1971 message, Nixon lamented 1,000 narcotics deaths in New York City, then the epicenter 

of the heroin addiction problem in 1970. At the end of 1979, the annual number of drug abuse deaths was 

7,101. That number rose to 9,976 in 1986, the year basketball star Len Bias died from a cocaine-induced seizure. However, in 2007, there were an estimated 38,000 drug overdose deaths nationwide. The death rate 

has grown from 3.0 per 100,000 in 1980 to 12.8 in 2006. Sterling, “40 Years of Drug War Hasn’t Worked.” 

‘Time for a Change,’ Says 9-Year Veteran.” 

208. Liz Szabo, “Addicted infants triple in decade,” USA Today, May 1, 2012, approximately 13,539 

infants per year.

209. Peter Reuter, “The Limits and Consequences of U.S. Foreign Drug Control Efforts,” The Annals of 

the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 521, May 1992. 

210. The vast size of the drug market “has the power to negate all supply-side drug control efforts 

aimed at reducing the availability of illicit drugs to U.S. consumer.” Wes Fryer, “U.S. Drug Control Policy: 

Where We Have Been,” available from www.wesgryer.com/drugwar.html#past. 

211. Even if we are uncertain what shape the new strategy should take, we cannot continue to repeat 

the mistakes of the past. See, e.g., George Santayana, “The Life of Reason,” Vol. 1, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This quote is not originally from the cited text. 

212. Nearly every administration has conceded, at least privately, that the best way to affect supply is 

to reduce demand for drugs. However, the rhetoric has never matched the reality. See e.g., Szalavitz , “Tearing Apart Bush’s Drug Plan.”

213. See www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/themes/gcdp_v1/pdf/Global_Commission_Report_

English.pdf. 

214. The Commission includes the former Presidents or prime ministers of five countries, a former 

Secretary General of the United Nations, human rights leaders, and business and government leaders, 

including Richard Branson, George P. Shultz, and Paul A. Volcker. The report describes the total failure of 

the present global antidrug effort, with particular emphasis on America’s 40 year “war on drugs.” It notes 

that the global consumption of opiates has increased 34.5 percent; cocaine, 27 percent; and cannabis, 8.5 

percent, from 1998 to 2008. Ibid.

215. National Institute on Drug Abuse, “InfoFacts: Treatment Approaches for Drug Addiction,” September 2009, available from www.drugabuse.gov/publications/infofacts/treatment-approaches-drug-addiction. 
42

Addiction need not be a life sentence. Like other chronic diseases, it can be managed successfully. Treatment enables people to counteract addiction’s powerful effects on the brain and behavior and regain control of their lives. National Institute on Drug Abuse, “The Science of Addiction,” National Institute of 

Health Pub Number 10-5605, rev’d August 2010; Caron Treatment Centers, “Relapse & Recovery: Behavioral Strategies for Change,” pp. 15-17.

216. The average cost for 1 year of methadone-maintenance treatment is approximately $4,700 per patient, compared with approximately $24,700 for 1 year of imprisonment. Ibid.

217. In a study sponsored by ONDCP and the U.S. Army, researchers C. Peter Rydell and Susan Everingham compared the effectiveness of four types of drug-control programs: source-country efforts, interdiction, domestic law enforcement, and drug treatment. How much money, they asked, would the Government have to spend on each approach to reduce national cocaine consumption by 1 percent? Rydell 

and Everingham developed a model of the national cocaine market, then fed into it more than 70 variables, from seizure data to survey responses. Relying solely on domestic law enforcement, the Government 

would have to spend an additional $246 million to reduce U.S. cocaine consumption by 1 percent. Relying 

on interdiction, it would have to spend $366 million, and, on source-country programs, $783 million. Relying solely on drug treatment, however, the Government would only have to spend $34 million more. In 

other words, treatment was 7 times more cost effective than domestic law enforcement, 10 times more effective than interdiction, and 23 times more effective than attacking drugs at their source. C. Peter Rydell 

and Susan S. Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand Programs, Prepared for the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy and the United States Army, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Drug Policy Research 

Center, 1994, p. xvi. In another study by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, $1 in treatment brings a return of $11.54 for society. Harris, Drugged America, p. 154. The legal structure 

that is needed for increasing access has been in place since 1972. The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act 

was probably the most important statute enacted during the short era of enlightened and progressive drug 

policy. Similarly, when effective pharmacotherapies emerge, we should also subsidize their use.

218. Examples of this type of treatment include Methadone and Levo-alpha-acetylmethadol (LAAM) 

for opiate withdrawal, benzodiazepine, and anti-seizure drugs for barbiturate withdrawal. To prevent relapses, other drugs, like Naltrexone and Buprenorphine/naloxone, reduce cravings and block the effects of 

opiates. Researchers continue to investigate effective treatments for cocaine and amphetamine addiction, 

and several drugs are currently in clinical trials. Doctors around the globe are exploring other promising 

addiction treatments. Ibogaine, a hallucinogenic drug used in some African religious rites, is an example 

of one such approach. Although the drug is illegal in the United States, between 20 and 30 ibogaine clinics 

operate in various countries to treat heroin addiction. “Addiction Treatments Past and Present,” available 

from learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/addiction/issues/treatments.html; National Institute on Drug Abuse, “InfoFacts: Treatment Approaches for Drug Addiction,” September 2009, available from www.drugabuse.gov/

publications/infofacts/treatment-approaches-drug-addiction.

219. “Addiction Treatments Past and Present.” 

220. National Institute on Drug Abuse, “InfoFacts: Treatment Approaches for Drug Addiction,” September 2009, available from www.drugabuse.gov/publications/infofacts/treatment-approaches-drug-addiction.

221. SAMHSA has estimated that about 1 in 10 people with serious substance abuse problems, 2.3 million of 23 million received treatment in 2005. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 

Results from the 2005 National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, DHHS 

Publication No. SMA 06-4194, 2006.

222. Over time, we ought to be able to reduce our reliance on the criminal justice system substantially. 

Richard J. Bonnie, “The Virtues of Pragmatism in Drug Policy,” Journal of Health Care Law and Policy, The 

Stuart Rome Lecture, University of Maryland Law School, College Park, MD: November 7, 2008, Vol. 13, 

2010, p. 7.
43

223. Treatment alternatives to criminal punishment were an important component of the strategy of the 

1970s that eroded during the 1980s and early-1990s. Bonnie, “The Virtues of Pragmatism in Drug Policy.” 

The establishment of more than 2000 drug courts since 1995 is a good step in that direction. Ibid. Conditional dispositions linked to drug treatment also remain available in many, ordinary criminal courts. 

224. National Institute on Drug Abuse, “InfoFacts: Treatment Approaches for Drug Addiction.” 

225. Family members, friends, and employers regularly provide the same type of therapeutic leverage. 

Ibid. Also, as Bonnie, “The Virtues of Pragmatism in Drug Policy” suggests:

Criminalization of consumption-related offenses is legitimate—as an instrument of deterrence 

and prevention for non-addicted offenders, and, most importantly for our present topic, as an 

instrument of therapeutic leverage for addicted offenders.

Ibid. See also Redonna K. Chandler, Bennett W. Fletcher, and Nora D. Volkow, “Treating Drug Abuse and 

Addiction in the Criminal Justice System: Improving Public Health and Safety,” Journal of the American 

Medical Association, No. 183, 2009, p. 301.

226. Although this is already occurring in several thousand state and local courts nationwide, there is 

no similar federal program. The Department of Justice recently changed its own policies, as codified in the 

U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, to make alternatives to incarceration more available. In March 2011, DOJ expanded the permissible pretrial diversion programs “to include those that address addicted defendants through 

treatment and monitoring, rather than prosecution.” Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Speaks on 

Alternatives to Incarceration Programs: the Use of “Drug Courts” in the Federal and State Systems, New 

York, May 21, 2012, available from www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2012/dag-speech-120521.html. Efforts 

to implement drug courts and other alternatives to federal incarceration have, thus far, been sporadic and 

largely dependent on the energy and initiative of individual U.S. Attorneys. Examples include the Central 

District of Illinois, where the Pretrial Alternatives to Detention Initiative (PADI), permits some defendants 

charged with felony drug offenses to be offered pretrial diversion and to have their charges reduced or 

dismissed upon successful completion of rehabilitation. The Conviction and Sentence Alternative (CASA) 

program in the Central District of California and the BRIDGE court program in the District of South Carolina are similar programs, which provide diversion options for defendants with substance abuse problems. 

Ibid. Studies by the National Institute on Drug Abuse have confirmed the efficacy of such programs:

Combining prison- and community-based treatment for addicted offenders reduces the risk of 

both recidivism to drug-related criminal behavior and relapse to drug use, which, in turn, nets 

huge savings in societal costs.

National Institute on Drug Abuse, “InfoFacts: Treatment Approaches for Drug Addiction.” 

227. For 40 years, the budget trends have run counter to what research would otherwise suggest: efforts 

to reduce demand are best addressed through treatment and prevention rather than supply-reduction. Ibid. 

“The virtue of pragmatism in drug policy is that it focuses our attention on what works best.” Bonnie, “The 

Virtues of Pragmatism in Drug Policy.”

228. Massing, “The Fix,” p. 272. Defenders of the current drug prohibition approach argue that the fall 

in drug prices following legalization or even after some slackening of enforcement would lead to a large 

increase in drug “abuse.” This claim rests on the standard prohibitionist assumption that all use is abuse 

and the further assumption that price is a major consideration for most users or would-be users. Many 

researchers insist that drug prices directly affect the “bottom line”; that is, higher prices result in reduced 

use and fewer emergency room visits. Dhaval Dave, “The effects of cocaine and heroin price on drug-related emergency department visits,” Journal of Health Economics, August 2005, available from www.appstate.

edu/~whiteheadjc/eco4810/crap/jhe-drugs.pdf. However, in the view of other experts, personal preferences and 
44

social norms influence most people more than the price of drugs. Mary M. Cleveland, “Economics of IIIegal Drug Markets: What Happens If We Downsize the Drug War?” available from www.mcleveland.org/

publications/Economics_of_Illegal_Drug_Markets.CV.pdf. In either case, we can be certain of one thing. An 

increase in the price of drugs will result in an increase in violent crime as hard-core users struggle to feed 

their habit. Higher prices require higher user income. If users cannot earn enough by legal means to pay 

higher prices, then they may be induced to engage in illegal conduct—theft, burglary, robbery—that they 

would not otherwise engage in. Mark H. Moore, Buy and Bust, Cambridge, MA: Lexington, 1977, Chap. 2. 

See also Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, “How the Plummeting Price of Cocaine Fueled the Nationwide Drop in 

Violent Crime,” The Atlantic Cities, November 11, 2011, available from www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-andeconomy/2011/11/cocaine-plummeting-price-nationwide-drop-violent-crime/474/.

229. John Carnevale, “The Failure of the Office of National Drug Control Policy,” The Huffington 

Post, July 14, 2008, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/john-carnevale/the-failure-of-the-office_b_112693.

html?view=p.

230. Wesley A. Fryer, “U.S. Drug Control in the Americas: Time for a Change,” August 30, 1993, available from www.wesfryer.com/drugwar.html#conclusion. See also John Carnevale, “Is the Policy-Budget Mismatch to Blame,” Carnevale Associates Policy Brief, Gaithersburg, MD: September 2009.

231. In the words of one anonymous wag: “The most powerful drug law is the law of supply and 

demand.”

232. Even if we could, domestically produced marijuana, methamphetamine, and a host of illicit synthetic drugs would still be available to meet demand. Yet, for 40 years, successive administrations have annually sought additional funds to bolster supply-reduction efforts. The unspoken promise in each annual 

budget request has been: “With just a bit more money and a few more agents and prosecutors, the strategy 

is certain to succeed.” The scene is reminiscent of a famous New Yorker cartoon, based on the well-known 

nursery rhyme “Humpty Dumpty” in which a crowned king, addressing his royal cabinet, declares: “Gentlemen, the fact that all my horses and all my men couldn’t put Humpty together again simply proves to 

me that I must have more horses and more men.” Dana Fradon, The New Yorker, July 24, 1978.

233. We must ensure that the “cost” of manufacturing, importing, and distributing drugs in America 

remains painfully high and the potential “profit” unattractively low. Some administrations have adopted 

strategies promising to “take the profit out of drugs,” by seizing the ill-gotten gains of traffickers, usually in 

the form of bulk cash and international currency transfers. Unfortunately, our success rate on seizing outbound dollars has been little more successful than our efforts to seize inbound drugs. Improved strategic 

intelligence and analysis could enhance our supply-reduction efforts. In the opinion of some experts, most 

of the advantages of prohibition can be attained with modest levels of overall enforcement, coupled with 

targeting of dealers whose behavior poses a particular risk to the community, e.g., use of juvenile distributors, violence against competitors. Tougher enforcement across the board does not appear to significantly 

raise drug prices or restrict availability; it imposes rather high individual and social costs. Jonathan P. 

Caulkins and Peter Reuter, “How Drug Enforcement Affects Drug Prices,” August 26, 2010, available from 

www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/uploads/cms/faculty/reuter/Drug percent20Enforcement percent20and percent20Drug 

percent20Price.pdf. While it may be politically popular to have DEA Regional Enforcement Teams making 

street-level busts in Middle America, it does not reduce supply or demand; it produces only a temporary 

increase in the “cost of doing business” and a substantially longer-term increase in the federal prison population. Likewise, Foreign Assistance Support Teams (FAST) in places like Afghanistan have allowed DEA 

to claim a role in the war on terrorism and a share of the new budget dollars devoted to all-things counterterrorism. However, since very little Southwest Asian heroin ever reaches the United States, the efforts of 

these FAST teams would have no impact on the availability of drugs there. 

234. Steve Chapman, “In the Drug War, Drugs Are Winning,” Reason.Com, March 29, 2010, available 

from reason.com/archives/2010/03/29/in-the-drug-war-drugs-are-winn. “Iran has a repressive theocratic regime 
45

that imposes severe penalties for using and selling drugs—including death by hanging. Yet, Iran has one 

of the highest rates of addiction in the world.” Ibid.

235. A survey of 17 countries published in 2008 found that, despite its punitive drug policies, the 

United States continues to have the highest levels of illegal cocaine and cannabis use. The study, by Louisa 

Degenhardt, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia and colleagues, is based on the World 

Health Organization’s Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI). “United States Has Highest 

Level Of Illegal Cocaine And Cannabis Use,” Science Daily, June 30, 2008, available from www.sciencedaily.

com/releases/2008/06/080630201007.htm. The authors found that 16.2 percent of people in the United States 

had used cocaine in their lifetime—a level much higher than any other country surveyed; the second highest level of cocaine use was in New Zealand, where 4.3 percent of people reported having used it. Cannabis 

use was also highest in the United States, with 42.4 percent, followed by New Zealand, with 41.9 percent. 

The authors also concluded that drug use “does not appear to be simply related to drug policy, since countries with more stringent policies towards illegal drug use did not have lower levels of such drug use than 

countries with more liberal policies.” For example, in the Netherlands, which has more liberal policies than 

the United States, 1.9 percent of people reported cocaine use, and 19.8 percent reported cannabis use.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Walther

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil