1808 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, and 135 

[Docket No. FAA–2002–6717; Amendment 

Nos. 1–55, 21–89, 25–120, 33–21, 121–329, 

135–108] 

RIN 2120–AI03 

Extended Operations (ETOPS) of MultiEngine Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This final rule applies to air 

carrier (part 121), commuter, and ondemand (part 135) turbine powered 

multi-engine airplanes used in 

extended-range operations. However, 

all-cargo operations in airplanes with 

more than two engines of both part 121 

and part 135 are exempted from the 

majority of this rule. Today’s rule 

establishes regulations governing the 

design, operation and maintenance of 

certain airplanes operated on flights that 

fly long distances from an adequate 

airport. This final rule codifies current 

FAA policy, industry best practices and 

recommendations, as well as 

international standards designed to 

ensure long-range flights will continue 

to operate safely. To ease the transition 

for current operators, this rule includes 

delayed compliance dates for certain 

ETOPS requirements. 

DATES: Effective date: These 

amendments become effective February 

15, 2007. Compliance date: Some 

sections of the final rule have a delayed 

compliance date as discussed in section 

VI of this document and provided in 

Table 2 of the appendix. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical information on operational 

issues, contact Robert Reich, Flight 

Standards Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–8166; facsimile 

(202) 267–5229; e-mail Robert 

Reich@faa.gov. For technical 

information on certification issues, 

contact Steve Clark, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, ANM–140S, 1601 Lind 

Ave., Renton, WA 98055; telephone 

(425) 917–6496; facsimile (425) 917– 

6590; e-mail Steven.P.Clark@FAA.gov. 

For legal information, contact Bruce 

Glendening, Office of the Chief Counsel, 

Division of Regulations, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 

20591; telephone (202) 267–3073; 

facsimile (202) 267–7971; e-mail 

Bruce.Glendening@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

You can get an electronic copy using 

the Internet by: 

(1) Searching the Department of 

Transportation’s electronic Docket 

Management System (DMS) Web page at 

http://dms.dot.gov/search 

(2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking’s 

web page at http://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies/rulemaking/ 

recently_published. 

(3) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

You can search comments in the 

docket by the name of the individual 

submitting or signing the comment. You 

may review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 

65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you 

may visit http://dms.dot.gov. 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act 

The Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996 requires FAA to comply with 

small entity requests for information or 

advice about compliance with statutes 

and regulations within its jurisdiction. If 

you are a small entity and you have a 

question about this document, you may 

contact your local FAA official, or the 

person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out 

more about SBREFA on the Internet at 

http://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies/rulemaking/ 

sbre_act. 

Glossary of Terms Used in This Final 

Rule 

Technical terms used in this final rule 

are located in 14 CFR 1.2. Definitions 

used in the rule are found in sections 

1.1 and 121.7, and appendix G to part 

135 of the final rule language. 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Summary of the FAA’s Existing ETOPS 

Program 

A. Airplane-Engine Type Design Approval 

B. Operational Requirements 

C. Polar Policy 

III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking To Codify 

and Expand Existing ETOPS Program 

A. Development of the NPRM 

B. Summary of the NPRM 

C. Summary of Comments 

IV. Safety Need for the Final Rule 

A. Safety Risk Associated With ETOPS 

B. Impact of ETOPS Requirements on 

Engine Reliability 

C. Fuel Exhaustion 

D. Cargo or Baggage Compartment Fire 

Suppression Requirements 

E. Decompression Scenarios 

F. Satellite-Based Voice Communications 

V. Applicability of the Final Rule 

VI. Delayed Compliance Dates and 

Grandfather Provisions 

VII. In-Flight Shutdown Rates 

VIII. Definition of ETOPS Significant System 

IX. Airplane and Engine Certification 

Requirements 

A. Transport Category Airplane 

Airworthiness Standards (Part 25) 

1. General 

2. Additional Airworthiness Requirements 

for Approval of an Airplane-Engine 

Combination for ETOPS (Part 25, 

Appendix K) 

B. Engine Certification (Part 33) 

1. Engine Design and Test Requirements 

for ETOPS Eligibility 

2.Engine Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness 

C. ETOPS Reporting Requirements for 

Manufacturers (Part 21) 

1. Early ETOPS: Reporting, Tracking, and 

Resolving Problems 

2. Reliability of Two-Engine Airplanes 

X. Operator Maintenance Requirements 

A. Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance 

Program 

B. Limitations on Dual Maintenance 

C. Maintenance Actions 

1. ETOPS pre-departure service check 

2. Engine condition monitoring program 

3. Oil consumption monitoring program 

4. Verification procedures 

5. Task identification 

6. Configuration Maintenance and 

Procedures (CMP) Document 

7. Training and documentation 

D. Operator Reporting Requirements 

XI. Operational Requirements (Part 121) 

A. Route Limitations 

B. ETOPS Alternate Airports 

1. Determination of ETOPS alternate 

airports 

2. Passenger recovery plans 

3. Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) 

C. Crewmember and Dispatcher Training 

D. Communication Requirements 

E. Time-Limited System Planning and the 

Critical Fuel Scenario 

F. Dispatch or Flight Release 

1. Original dispatch or flight release, redispatch or amendment of dispatch or 

flight release 

2. Dispatch release: U.S. flag and domestic 

operations 

G. Engine Inoperative Landing 

XII. ETOPS Authorization Criteria 

A. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 

Operations—Airplanes With Two 

Engines 

B. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 

Operations—Airplanes With More Than 

Two Engines 

C. ETOPS Approvals for Part 135 

Operations 

D. Airplane Approvals in the North Polar 

and South Polar Areas 

1. Part 121 operations 

2. Part 135 operations 

XIII. Comments on the Costs and Benefits of 

the Proposed Rule 

XIV. Rulemaking Notices and Analyses 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1809 

1Airplanes with more than two engines are 

excluded from the section 121.161 requirement to 

remain within 60 minutes from an adequate airport. 

Section 121.193 is a requirement limiting all 

airplanes to 90 minutes from an airport unless they 

have the performance, after the failure of two 

engines, to land at an adequate airport. Section 

121.329 requires all turbine powered airplanes to 

have enough supplemental oxygen after a 

decompression to ‘‘allow successful termination of 

the flight.’’ Section 121.565 requires only two 

engine airplanes to ‘‘land at the nearest suitable’’

airport after engine failure. For airplanes that have 

three or more engines the rule allows the pilot to 

proceed to an airport that he selects if, after 

consideration, he decides that proceeding to that 

airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable 

airport. Section 121.645 requires similar ‘‘normal’’

fuel carriage for all turbine-powered airplanes. 

2Section 121.645 allows an operator to fly farther 

from an airport in a two-engine airplane if 

authorized by the FAA. The FAA granted such 

authorizations for Caribbean operations in the 

1970’s. Since the mid-1980’s, the FAA has provided 

formal ETOPS guidance for part 121 operators on 

how to receive two-engine ETOPS authorization. 

XV. Appendix of Tables 

Table 1—Applicability of Final Rule 

Table 2—Part 121 and Part 135 Operational 

Requirements Timetable 

Table 3—Certification Requirements 

Table 4—Comparison of Current ETOPS 

Guidance; Regulations Proposed by the 

NPRM; and Final Rule 

Table 5—Design Requirement Objectives 

Table 6—Part 25, Appendix K Revised 

Numbering 

XVI. The Final Rule 

I. Executive Summary 

This rule is a result of the FAA’s 

desire to review the current body of 

rules and guidance for extended-range 

flight operations and to codify a uniform 

set of regulations for airplane and 

engine design in parts 21, 25, and 33, 

and airplane operations in parts 121 and 

135. 

Extended operations, or ETOPS, for 

long-range international travel provide 

many benefits related to savings in time, 

fuel, and operational efficiencies. 

However, there are unique safety 

concerns associated with these 

operations. When one travels great 

distances from airports, the safety of 

these operations depends on the risk of 

critical loss of engine thrust, additional 

system failures during a diversion for 

any cause, the distance from an 

adequate airport used in a diversion, 

and the conditions encountered upon 

arrival at the diversion airport. 

Part 121 domestic, U.S. flag, and 

supplemental rules have limited the 

amount of time two-engine airplanes 

could fly from an airport (14 CFR 

121.161). In the past, the risks 

associated with longer flights were 

accepted as a function of the number of 

engines on an airplane and were based 

on the reliability of engines existing at 

the time the part 121 rules were initially 

issued. Airplanes with more than two 

engines had minimal part 121 regulatory 

guidance since engine and system 

redundancies reduce the safety risk 

associated with engine failures during 

diversions.1 Current part 121 

regulations for airplanes with more than 

two engines require adequate oxygen 

supplies to address emergencies (14 

CFR 121.329), but do not explicitly 

require the operator to consider other 

risk mitigation measures, such as 

providing the extra fuel necessary to 

reach a diversion airport. Likewise, the 

FAA has regulated turbine-powered ondemand operations under separate part 

135 guidance, which specifies 

performance criteria when an engine is 

inoperative but not any restrictions 

based on the potential distance from an 

airport. (See 14 CFR 135.381 and 

135.383.) A lack of regulatory oversight 

in areas of equipment requirements and 

fuel planning for a maximum diversion 

creates a very real safety risk apart from 

engine reliability. 

As engine reliabilities increased 

during the previous three decades, there 

had been increasing pressure from the 

airline industry for the FAA to 

recognize technological advances and 

allow part 121 two-engine airplanes to 

fly farther from airports than § 121.161 

allowed. The FAA developed advisory 

circulars (AC 120–42, June 6, 1985; AC 

120–42A, December 30, 1988) that 

provided guidance for the operation of 

part 121 two-engine airplanes beyond 

the regulatory limits.2 These advisory 

circulars introduced the term ‘‘ETOPS’’

for these extended operations and 

addressed airplane and engine design 

aspects, maintenance programs, and 

operations. Under this guidance, ETOPS 

operations for part 121 two-engine 

airplanes are permitted to fly up to 180 

minutes from an airport sufficient to 

accommodate a landing, provided 

certain criteria are met. The FAA 

Administrator thus authorizes qualified 

operators to engage in long-range 

operations in remote areas. As a result 

of the FAA’s ETOPS programs, twoengine airplane operators can fly over 

most of the world other than the South 

Polar Region, a small section in the 

South Pacific, and the North Polar area 

under certain winter weather 

conditions. 

Operations under these programs 

have been highly successful. Although 

part 121 two-engine ETOPS have 

increased worldwide from less than 

1,000 per month in 1985 to over 1,000 

per day in 2004, engine reliability, as 

measured by the in-flight shutdown rate 

(IFSD rate), has improved to a point that 

is better than one-half the rates 

experienced in the 1980s. 

With the growing success of the 

current ETOPS guidelines established 

for part 121 two-engine operators, the 

FAA recognized in the 1990s that we 

could no longer continue to administer 

this program as a special authorization 

under an operating rule. The FAA also 

recognized that there were certain 

aspects of the ETOPS guidelines not 

solely relevant to two-engine airplanes. 

Also during this period, the 

International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) established 

international standards requiring 

member states to define diversion time 

thresholds for all two-engine airplane 

operations. For the United States, this 

requirement includes airplanes operated 

under part 135. In addition, the airline 

industry requested the FAA develop 

standards extending the existing limit 

beyond which two-engine airplanes may 

operate. 

The FAA tasked the Aviation 

Rulemaking Advisory Committee 

(ARAC) in June 2000 to codify the 

existing policies and practices to be 

applicable to all airplanes, regardless of 

the number of engines, by developing 

comprehensive ETOPS standards for 14 

CFR parts 25, 33, 121, and 135, as 

appropriate. The FAA also tasked ARAC 

to develop ETOPS operational 

requirements for diversion times greater 

than 180 minutes up to whatever extent 

may be justified. 

During this same period, the FAA 

developed guidance for polar 

operations. These operations became 

more commonplace with the opening up 

of Siberian airspace following the fall of 

the former Soviet Union. Although not 

defined as ETOPS, this guidance has 

been expanded in today’s rule to 

include both the North and South Polar 

Areas and has been incorporated into 

the overall ETOPS rule package. 

Significantly, this aspect of the rule 

applies to all turbine-powered multiengine operations including all-cargo 

operations. 

Today’s rule codifies and expands 

existing FAA policy and route 

authorizations for all part 121 twoengine airplanes conducting ETOPS 

beyond certain distances from an 

adequate airport. This final rule also 

extends most requirements previously 

applicable only to part 121 two-engine 

airplanes to a limited number of part 

121 passenger-carrying three- and fourengine airplane operations and applies 

the same limitations to comparable part 

135 operations. Significantly, this rule 

excludes the ETOPS maintenance 

requirements from the operation of 

airplanes with more than two engines in 

both part 121 and 135. The FAA has 

accepted the safety case that current 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1810 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

engine reliabilities and the level of 

engine redundancy on such airplanes is 

sufficient to protect such operations. 

The appendix has several charts and 

tables that demonstrate the 

interrelationship between the affected 

parts of Title 14, as well as their 

applicability and compliance schedules. 

Under past ETOPS guidance, a part 

121 operator of a two-engine airplane 

was required to use an airplane-engine 

combination approved for ETOPS. The 

manufacturer of the airplane obtained 

the ETOPS type design approval on 

behalf of the operator. Under today’s 

rule (§ 121.162, G135.2.3), two-engine 

airplane-engine combinations already 

approved for ETOPS under previous 

FAA guidance can continue to be used 

in ETOPS operations under parts 121 

and 135. No re-certification under the 

new § 25.1535 is required. Likewise, 

this rule allows airplanes with more 

than two engines manufactured within 

8 years of when this rule becomes 

effective to be used in ETOPS 

operations without type design approval 

under the new § 25.1535. Airplanes 

with more than two engines 

manufactured more than 8 years after 

the effective date of this final rule must 

meet the certification requirements for 

airplane-engine combinations adopted 

today. Today’s rule allows two-engine 

airplanes with existing type certificates 

to be approved for up to 180-minutes 

ETOPS without meeting requirements 

for fuel system pressure and flow, low 

fuel alerting, and engine oil tank design. 

These three provisions are new to this 

rule, and are not in the guidance 

previously used to approve two-engine 

airplanes for ETOPS. 

The FAA is adopting a compliance 

schedule to allow an orderly transition 

to future safety requirements as the 

industry adjusts to the new, broader 

ETOPS operating criteria. We recognize 

that, in some cases, it is appropriate to 

permit existing airplanes to continue to 

operate under existing authorization. It 

is also appropriate in some cases to 

delay implementation of certain 

portions of the rule to minimize its 

economic impact. We are setting a 1- 

year compliance date for most 

requirements involving a set-up or 

installation program. In all cases when 

a delayed compliance date is 

established, we have determined that 

there is a minimal increase in safety 

benefit for implementing the rule 

immediately. In addition, the FAA has 

provided grandfather provisions for part 

121 ETOPS operations using airplanes 

with more than two engines and for all 

ETOPS operations conducted under part 

135. 

The total anticipated costs of today’s 

rule are estimated at $20.9 million over 

a 16-year period or $12.4 million, 

present value. The costs of the rule to 

part 121 operators and U.S. 

manufacturers of airplanes with more 

than two engines are estimated to be 

$7.7 million ($3.8 million, present 

value). Benefits to the rule are attributed 

to increased safety resulting from 

design, dispatch, and operational 

requirements. In addition, operators of 

two-engine airplanes may realize cost 

savings from decreased fuel 

requirements. 

II. Summary of the FAA’s Existing 

ETOPS Program 

The requirements adopted today are 

based almost exclusively on the FAA’s 

existing ETOPS program, with some 

additions. Accordingly, the FAA 

believes it helpful to discuss in some 

detail the existing guidance. As noted 

earlier, all airplanes operated under 14 

CFR part 121 are required to comply 

with § 121.161. Unless otherwise 

authorized by the Administrator, this 

regulation limits the operation of twoengine airplanes to routes that contain 

a point no farther than 60 minutes flying 

time at an approved one-engine 

inoperative cruise speed in still air from 

an adequate airport. This restriction 

applies to all airplanes operating under 

this rule regardless of the terrain or area 

to be over flown. 

The first deviations to § 121.161 were 

issued for 75-minutes ETOPS in the 

Caribbean Sea in 1977. In June of 1985, 

responding to an increasing desire by 

industry to obtain further deviations 

that would allow flights from the United 

States to Europe, the FAA issued 

Advisory Circular (AC) 120–42, which 

defined a process for obtaining 

authorization for ETOPS diversions up 

to 120 minutes. This AC was amended 

in 1988 with the publication of AC 120–

42A, which expanded the maximum 

diversion period to no more than 180 

minutes. This AC defined a process for 

obtaining three categories of ETOPS 

operational approval, i.e., guidance for 

75-minute ETOPS (based on the earlier 

Caribbean approvals), 120-minute 

ETOPS, and 180-minute ETOPS. The 

AC 120–42A guidance contains a twofold approval process: a type design 

approval of the airplane-engine 

combination and an operational 

approval consisting of ETOPS 

maintenance, flight dispatch, and crew 

training elements. The ETOPS 

maintenance program also incorporates 

supplemental processes to the nonETOPS continuous airworthiness 

maintenance program (CAMP). 

The original guidance for extended 

range operations with two-engine 

airplanes in AC 120–42 allowed for an 

increase of up to 15 percent above the 

120-minute limit (138-minute ETOPS). 

This provision was eliminated with the 

release of the guidance in AC 120–42A 

providing for operations up to 180 

minutes. 

However, recognizing a need for 

ETOPS diversion authority between 120 

and 180 minutes, the FAA reinstated the 

138-minute provision by issuing policy 

letter EPL 95–1 in 1994. In March of 

2000, at the request of the industry, the 

FAA issued ETOPS Policy Letter EPL–

20–1, ‘‘207-minute ETOPS Operation 

Approval Criteria’’. This document 

provided a similar 15 percent increase 

in the 180-minute maximum diversion 

time, i.e., 207 minutes. However, this 

approval was limited to ETOPS 

operators flying in the North Pacific and 

only when weather or airport conditions 

did not permit normal 180-minute 

ETOPS flights. 

The basic principles expressed 

throughout this body of guidance are 

that (1) the design of the airplane and 

its systems must be acceptable for the 

safe conduct of the intended operation, 

and (2) the operator must have the 

requisite experience and ability to 

maintain and operate the airplane at the 

required level of reliability and 

competence. The design standards and 

operational processes for ETOPS were 

designed to prevent circumstances that 

could cause an engine in-flight 

shutdown or otherwise cause a 

diversion and to protect the safety of a 

diversion if one does occur. 

A. Airplane-Engine Type Design 

Approval 

Since the introduction of AC 120–42, 

airplane-engine combinations have had 

to be approved by the FAA before 

ETOPS flights could be conducted. The 

type design approval of airplanes for 

ETOPS under AC 120–42 and –;42A 

involves a two-part process. First, the 

FAA determines that airplane systems 

meet certain design standards for safe 

operations during an airplane diversion. 

One criterion for approval is that a 

candidate airplane have at least three 

independent electrical generators. 

Another criterion is that a required 

auxiliary power unit (APU) can start 

after the airplane has been at high 

altitude for several hours (cold-soaked) 

and can run reliably for the remainder 

of the flight. There are other criteria 

governing airplane systems such as 

cargo compartment fire suppression, 

communication, navigation, flight 

control, wing and engine ice protection, 

cabin pressurization, and cockpit and 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1811 

3For a 180-minute ETPOS approval, these timelimited systems would have a 195-minute capacity 

to meet this requirement. 

4The CMP document is an extension of the 

airplane type for an ETOPS approval. An operator 

wishing to fly an airplane in ETOPS has to comply 

with the CMP document as a condition for 

obtaining its operational approval. 

5Although the AC was never officially revised to 

include these appendices, the FAA has approved 

operators for ETOPS using the draft policy. 

6 ‘‘Adequate airport’’ is a new definition that 

codifies various references in current regulatory 

language and practice. It defines the minimum 

requirements for sufficiency based on the landing 

limitations contained in 121.197 and the airport 

requirements of part 139. 

cabin environment. System safety 

analyses have to show that expected 

system failures will not prevent safe 

landing at a diversion airport. Systems 

with time limited capabilities, such as 

the cargo compartment fire suppression 

system, need to have the capacity to 

support a maximum length diversion, 

including a 15-minute allowance for a 

hold or go-around at the diversion 

airport.3

The second part of the approval 

process is an evaluation of engine inflight shutdowns and other significant 

airplane system failures that have 

occurred while the airplane-engine 

combination has been in service. The 

candidate airplane-engine combination 

should accumulate at least 250,000 

engine-hours of service experience for a 

meaningful evaluation, although the AC 

allows a lower number of hours with 

adequate compensating factors. An 

assessment of the causes of these inflight shutdowns and other significant 

failures leads to a list of corrective 

actions that will prevent future 

occurrences of these events for similar 

causes. This list of corrective actions is 

contained in a configuration, 

maintenance, and procedures (CMP) 

document. The CMP document also 

contains minimum equipment 

requirements that come out of the 

airplane systems assessment from the 

first part of the process.4

AC 120–42A utilizes a relative risk 

model to support the expansion of 

maximum ETOPS diversion time for up 

to 180 minutes. This relative risk model 

is based on an airplane-engine 

combination maintaining a target IFSD 

rate at or below 0.02 per 1,000 enginehours, which the model shows would 

allow a safe ETOPS flight for a 180- 

minute diversion. An applicant for 

ETOPS approval under this method has 

to show that the candidate airplaneengine combination has achieved this 

in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate before the 

FAA will grant a 180-minute ETOPS 

approval. However, an applicant may 

also get an ETOPS approval for 120- 

minute ETOPS if the candidate airplaneengine combination IFSD rate is 

approximately 0.05 per 1,000 engine 

hours. For an IFSD rate that meets this 

standard, but is above the 0.02 for 180- 

minute ETOPS approval, the FAA 

conducts an assessment of the causes of 

in-flight shutdowns in the same manner 

as under AC 120–42, including the 

incorporation of corrective actions into 

a CMP document. The applicant must 

show that the incorporation of these 

corrective actions will bring the IFSD 

rate down to the target 0.02 level. After 

a year in service operating in 120- 

minute ETOPS, an airplane-engine 

combination is eligible for an expansion 

of its approval up to 180 minutes. 

Once an ETOPS approval is granted, 

the FAA monitors the propulsion 

system IFSD rate of the world fleet to 

make sure that it remains at or below 

the target rate. If the IFSD rate for a 

particular airplane-engine combination 

in the world fleet goes above the target 

rate, the FAA asks the airplane and 

engine manufacturers what corrective 

actions they are taking to bring the rate 

below the target level. If, in our review 

of the manufacturer’s corrective actions 

we determine that an unsafe condition 

exists, we may issue an airworthiness 

directive (AD) to correct the unsafe 

condition. We may also issue an AD to 

withdraw an ETOPS approval, or to 

require several corrective actions for 

causes that individually do not 

constitute an unsafe condition, but in 

the aggregate create an IFSD rate that is 

unacceptably high. In such cases, an 

operator’s ETOPS approval may be 

predicated on compliance with the AD. 

With the introduction of the Boeing 

Model 777, the FAA introduced a new 

method for an applicant to obtain an 

ETOPS type design approval without 

the service experience required for an 

approval under AC 120–42A. This 

method is known as the ‘‘early ETOPS’’

approval process. 

The early ETOPS process takes a 

systems approach to the development of 

an airplane and engine. Without service 

experience to identify design flaws that 

could lead to in-flight shutdowns or 

diversions, an applicant must 

demonstrate that the design flaws on 

previously designed airplanes are not 

present in the new airplane. The 

applicant must also consider how the 

maximum length flight and diversion 

affect the design and function of 

airplane systems to ensure that they 

have the capability and reliability for 

safe ETOPS flight. 

Rigorous ground and flight tests are 

required to demonstrate that the 

airplane-engine combination can 

successfully support an ETOPS 

program, including validation of 

maintenance procedures for systems 

whose failures could lead to an engine 

in-flight shutdown or a diversion. An 

enhanced problem reporting and 

resolution system identifies and corrects 

significant problems before the airplane 

is certified. After approval, this same 

system remains in place during the early 

service period to identify and correct 

such problems before they can lead to 

additional in-flight shutdowns and 

diversions. 

B. Operational Requirements 

AC 120–42A requires that each 

operator demonstrate its ability to 

maintain and operate the airplane so as 

to achieve the necessary reliability and 

to train its personnel to achieve 

competence in ETOPS. The operational 

approval to conduct ETOPS is made via 

amendment to the operator’s operations 

specifications. Operator approval is 

based on the following levels of operator 

in-service experience: 

1. 75-minute ETOPS—no minimum 

level required. 

2. 120-minute ETOPS—12 

consecutive months of operational 

experience with the airplane-engine 

combination listed in its application. 

3. 180-minute ETOPS—12 

consecutive months of operational 

experience at 120-minute ETOPS with 

the airplane-engine combination listed 

in its application. 

4. 207-minute ETOPS—hold current 

approval for 180-minute ETOPS. 

These in-service requirements can be 

reduced, or equivalent in-service 

experience can be substituted, based on 

a review by the FAA. The reduction of 

operator in-service requirements is 

called ‘‘accelerated ETOPS’’ and the 

substitution of equivalent experience is 

called ‘‘simulated ETOPS.’’ As a 

minimum, an ETOPS validation flight or 

flights must be completed prior to FAA 

approval. Guidance for both of these 

approval mechanisms are contained in 

draft appendices to the AC 120–42A.5

Certain operational requirements are 

also placed on the operator. The most 

prominent requirement is for the 

operator to plan airplane routings and to 

dispatch airplanes so as to remain 

within the approved diversion distance 

from adequate airports.6 Further, these 

adequate airports must have certain 

required weather minimums both at 

dispatch and during the flight and must 

have minimum levels of rescue and fire 

fighting services (RFFS). The operator 

must have programs in place to monitor 

the conditions at these airports during 

ETOPS and have a methodology to 

provide the flight crew with this data. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1812 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

7AC 120–42A describes this scenario as any 

combination of engine failure and decompression at 

the most critical (furthest) distance from the 

airports used to plan the flight. 

8Some examples of the increasing requirements 

of the MMEL for ETOPS approvals are (1) ETOPS 

beyond 120 minutes requires three generators; (2) 

ETOPS beyond 180 minutes requires SATCOM 

equipment, an engine-out auto land system, an auto 

throttle system, a fuel quantity indicating system, 

and minimum requirements for fuel cross feed and 

fuel boost pump electrical power. 

The operator must also have a 

methodology to calculate the fuel and 

oil supply for the ‘‘critical fuel 

scenario.’’ 7 Further, the operator must 

provide in its operations manual 

airplane performance data to support 

both this critical fuel requirement and 

any other area of operations calculations 

in their operations manual. 

AC 120–42A also provides guidance 

on airplane system redundancy levels 

appropriate for ETOPS. An operator’s 

Minimum Equipment List (MEL) based 

on this guidance may be more restrictive 

than the Master Minimum Equipment 

List (MMEL) when considering the kind 

of operation proposed and equipment 

and service problems unique to the 

operator. The FAA has established 

criteria for MMEL based on this 

guidance and the ETOPS approval level. 

Operational dispatch of an ETOPS flight 

is based on these criteria.8

Since the quality of maintenance and 

reliability programs can have an 

appreciable effect on the reliability of 

the propulsion system and the airframe 

systems required for ETOPS, AC 120–

42A requires a two-engine airplane 

operator to have a maintenance and 

reliability program sufficient to 

maintain a satisfactory level of airplane 

systems reliability for the particular 

airplane-engine combination. The 

elements of such a program are 

contained in an ETOPS-approved 

CAMP. This CAMP begins with a basic 

CAMP that is approved for use in nonETOPS operation, which is then 

supplemented for ETOPS with: 

1. An ETOPS maintenance document, 

2. An ETOPS pre-departure service 

check, 

3. Dual maintenance procedures, 

4. Verification procedures for 

corrective action to ETOPS significant 

systems, 

5. ETOPS task identification, 

6. Centralized maintenance control 

procedures, 

7. ETOPS parts control program, 

8. An airplane reliability program, 

9. Propulsion system monitoring, 

10. Engine condition monitoring 

program, 

11. Oil consumption monitoring 

program, 

12. An APU in-flight start program, if 

APU in-flight start capability is required 

for ETOPS, 

13. Maintenance training for ETOPS, 

and 

14.A system to ensure compliance 

with the minimum requirements set 

forth in the CMP document or the type 

design document for each airframe and 

engine combination. 

C. Polar Policy 

In February 2001, in response to 

several U.S. carriers’ plans to conduct 

polar operations with two-engine 

airplanes, the FAA developed a ‘‘Polar 

Policy Letter.’’ This policy letter 

documented the requirement for airlines 

to develop necessary plans in 

preparation for polar flights and 

identified the necessary equipment and 

airplane configuration requirements for 

all airplanes regardless of the number of 

engines. The FAA’s intent in issuing the 

policy letter was to establish a process 

that can be applied uniformly to all 

applicants for polar route authority. 

This policy letter placed the following 

requirements on the operator: 

1. Defined area of application, 

2. Enhanced facilities requirements 

for ETOPS alternate airports, 

3. Passenger recovery plan for 

diversion airports used to support 

operations, 

4. A fuel freeze strategy, 

5. Enhanced MEL requirements to 

include emergency medical kits and 

crew foul weather gear, 

6. Consideration of solar flare, 

7. Polar specific crew and dispatcher 

training, 

8. MEL requirements similar to those 

for operations beyond 180-minute 

ETOPS, and 

9. A validation flight prior to 

approval. 

III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking To 

Codify and Expand Existing ETOPS 

Program 

A. Development of the NPRM 

In response to FAA’s tasking, the 

ARAC formed an ETOPS working group 

consisting of more than 50 

representatives of U.S. and foreign 

airlines, aircraft and engine 

manufacturers, pilot unions, industry 

groups and airline accident family 

support groups, as well as 

representatives from the Joint Aviation 

Authority (JAA), ICAO, and the FAA. 

After 2 years, the ETOPS working 

group produced a draft notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM), advisory 

material, and a proposed preamble 

discussion to explain how the working 

group arrived at its recommendations. 

The ARAC presented the ETOPS 

working group final product to the FAA 

as a consensus document, which the 

FAA published, largely unchanged, as 

an NPRM on November 14, 2003 (68 FR 

64730). 

Among the recommendations were: 

• Given the current reliability of part 

121 two-engine airplanes, successful 

ETOPS processes should be expanded to 

allow two-engine ETOPS throughout the 

world. 

• A comprehensive ETOPS rule 

should include all part 121 and part 135 

airplanes used in specific long-range 

operations regardless of the number of 

engines. 

• The term ETOPS should be 

retained, but its definition should be 

changed to ‘‘extended operations’’ to 

highlight its application to all extended 

airplane operations. 

The ARAC ETOPS working group 

recognized that although engine 

reliability has improved significantly, 

diversions are sometimes necessary for 

reasons unrelated to engine 

performance, such as onboard fire, 

medical emergency or cabin 

decompression. Ensuring availability of 

en-route alternate airports, adequate fire 

fighting capabilities at these airports, 

and fuel planning to account for 

decompression are sound operational 

practices for all airplanes. Likewise, 

limits on an airplane’s maximum 

allowable diversion time for certain 

time-limited systems (e.g., cargo fire 

suppression) that were applied to twoengine airplanes under the existing AC 

guidance should also apply to airplanes 

with more than two engines. 

Accordingly, ARAC recommended 

adding certain safety requirements to 

long-range operations for parts 121 and 

135 independent of the number of 

engines on an airplane. 

B. Summary of the NPRM 

The NPRM proposed an expansion of 

ETOPS for part 121 two-engine 

airplanes and implementation of 

consistent ETOPS requirements for 

airplanes flying beyond 180 minutes 

from an adequate airport. The NPRM 

addressed three specific areas: airplane 

and engine design and reporting 

requirements (parts 21, 25, and 33), air 

carrier operations and maintenance 

(part 121), and commuter and ondemand operations and maintenance 

(part 135). The NPRM also proposed 

definitions in part 1 for terms used in 

these three areas. 

The two main objectives of the 

proposed airplane and engine design 

requirements were to prevent failures 

that result in airplane diversions and to 

protect the safety of diversions when 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1813 

they do occur. The proposed airplane 

and engine design requirements fell into 

five categories: 

1. Designing to reliably provide 

functions necessary for safe ETOPS 

flights. 

2. Eliminating sources of airplane 

diversions that occurred in current or 

past designs. 

3. Ground and flight testing. 

4. Reporting and correcting design 

problems. 

5. Demonstrating reliability. 

The airplane design requirements in 

part 25 were further divided into three 

parts: those applicable to all airplanes; 

those applicable to two-engine airplanes 

only; and those applicable to airplanes 

with more than two engines. Within 

each of the two latter parts, an applicant 

could choose to certify its airplane using 

existing service experience with the 

candidate airplane-engine combination, 

by conducting more thorough analysis 

and testing to certify a new airplaneengine combination without service 

experience (early ETOPS method) or 

through a combination of the two. Table 

5 in the appendix summarizes how 

today’s rule meets these design 

objectives from the NPRM. 

Requirements specifically applicable 

to engines to make them eligible for 

installation on an ETOPS airplane were 

proposed for part 33. Only engines 

intended for installation on two-engine 

airplanes being certified for ETOPS, 

using the early ETOPS method in part 

25 were contemplated under the 

proposed engine test requirements. 

The NPRM proposed part 121 

amendments to codify current twoengine ETOPS guidance, including the 

designation of areas where the ETOPS 

rule would apply. It also proposed 

additional communications 

requirements; fire-fighting capabilities 

necessary at an ETOPS alternate airport; 

a recovery plan for caring for stranded 

passengers; utilization of an expanded 

ETOPS CAMP; airplane system 

performance requirements; and 

additional training and reporting 

requirements for crewmembers and 

dispatchers. 

Additionally, the FAA proposed other 

requirements for part 135 operations 

conducted beyond 180 minutes from an 

airport. The proposed part 135 

amendments were similar to part 121 

but recognized the differing regulatory 

history and nature of part 135 

operations. For example, the fire and 

rescue equipment required at diversion 

airports for part 121 operations would 

not be required for part 135 operations 

since these operations are irregular and 

few in number. 

Although most current air carrier 

operations can be conducted within 180 

minutes flying time from an adequate 

airport, there are certain remote and 

demanding routes where diversion 

times greater than 180 minutes are 

required to reach an adequate en-route 

alternate airport. Knowing that all 

operators flying routes with greater than 

180-minute diversion times would 

experience the same operating demands, 

the FAA proposed an ETOPS program to 

regulate flights in remote areas, which 

would benefit part 121 three- and fourengine airplanes and all part 135 

airplane operations, regardless of the 

number of engines. The NPRM provided 

a public comment period to end on 

January 13, 2004. In response to 

requests, the FAA extended the 

comment period to March 15, 2004 (69 

FR 551; January 6, 2004). 

C. Summary of Comments 

More than 50 commenters 

representing foreign regulatory bodies, 

associations, manufacturers, and foreign 

and U.S. operators responded to the 

NPRM. In general, the comments 

supported the work of the ARAC and 

agreed with the framework of the 

NPRM. 

However, commenters took issue with 

the economic summary of the NPRM 

and its stated cost benefits. They 

believed, and we now agree, that these 

benefits were based on the incorrect 

premise that the operations proposed to 

be regulated as ETOPS for part 121 

three- and four-engine and all part 135 

airplanes were previously restricted and 

consequently would provide new 

opportunities to the industry. In 

addition, many of the commenters 

disputed specific provisions of the 

proposal. In most cases, those who 

disagreed are operators or 

manufacturers of three- and four-engine 

airplanes, or part 135 operators. 

Currently, these operators and 

manufacturers are not subject to any 

ETOPS safety provisions such as enroute alternate planning, time-critical 

systems analysis (e.g., cargo fire 

suppression), and the more rigorous 

ETOPS maintenance program. They 

expressed a strong opinion that 35 years 

of experience shows such rules are 

unnecessary, cost-prohibitive, and add 

nothing to aviation safety. The FAA also 

received detailed comments on satellite 

communications, certification 

standards, engine monitoring, fuel 

requirements, maintenance 

requirements and passenger recovery 

plans—all related ultimately to 

additional costs for operators. The FAA 

has mitigated many of these costs with 

extended compliance dates as shown in 

Table 2 of the appendix to this 

document. In addition, we have decided 

against adopting the ETOPS 

maintenance program for airplanes with 

more than two engines and have 

excluded all-cargo operations aboard 

airplanes with more than two engines 

from all aspects of the rule other than 

the minimal requirements for safe 

operation in the North and South polar 

areas for part 121 operations and the 

North polar area for part 135 operations. 

We justify the safety need for applying 

this rule to airplanes with more than 

two engines in section IV of this 

preamble. A more detailed discussion of 

the commenters’ recommended changes, 

a number of which the FAA adopt 

today, is provided in the substantive 

discussion of this final rule. 

In addition, some commenters 

provided extensive comments and 

suggestions on the risk of smoke and fire 

in ETOPS operations and asked the FAA 

to establish smoke detection standards. 

However, smoke in the cockpit issues 

are beyond the scope of this proposal. 

Since the issues raised by these 

commenters introduce new safety 

requirements, the FAA may consider 

them for future rulemaking, but will not 

discuss them further here. 

Several commenters, including the 

JAA, National Air Carrier Association 

(NACA) and the Civil Aviation 

Authority of the United Kingdom (UK 

CAA), recommended use of the acronym 

‘‘LROPS’’—meaning ‘‘Long Range 

Operations’’—for three- and four-engine 

ETOPS, to avoid confusion, particularly 

for those operations beyond 180- 

minutes diversion time. The FAA has 

decided to use the single term, 

‘‘extended operations,’’ or ETOPS, for 

all affected operations regardless of the 

number of engines on the airplane. As 

discussed in the NPRM, the ARAC had 

determined that the use of a single term 

would be less confusing than two 

separate terms that govern the same 

types of operations. We agree with this 

assessment and believe any confusion 

created by expanding the term to threeand four-engine airplanes will be shortlived. 

IV. Safety Need for the Final Rule 

A. Safety Risks Associated With ETOPS 

The FAA believes that operations of 

all long-range passenger-carrying 

airplanes, regardless of the number of 

engines, need a viable diversion airport 

in the case of an onboard fire, medical 

emergency, or loss of cabin pressure. 

Ensuring availability of diversion 

airports, adequate fire fighting coverage 

at these airports, passenger recovery 

plans, and fuel plans for the diversion 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1814 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

are sound operational practices for all 

airplanes. Likewise, all airplane timecritical systems should account for the 

maximum allowable diversion and 

worst-case scenarios. Many commenters 

to the NPRM disagreed with this 

fundamental premise and questioned 

why new regulations should be imposed 

on operations that have been safely 

flown without any regulatory 

restrictions. 

In response to these comments, the 

FAA has reviewed the historic data for 

past long range operations and has come 

to several conclusions. 

First, the operating environment for 

certain long-range operations has 

changed significantly in the past 35 

years. In the past, most operations 

conducted under part 121 and part 135 

have flown over routes that remain 

within a reasonable distance from 

adequate airports. As technology has 

increased the range and endurance of all 

airplanes, operators are increasingly 

flying over regions of the world that 

both are less likely to be served by 

sizable airports and present extreme 

weather conditions. Some of the airports 

that would support a diversion are over 

180 minutes away from the airplane 

during some portion of the flight, the 

previous limit for two-engine ETOPS. 

While the frequency of long-range 

operations is increasing, the aviation 

infrastructure to support these 

operations in remote areas of the world 

is decreasing. The U.S. military has 

abandoned long-standing diversion 

airports in the Aleutians and Pacific 

such as Adak and Wake Islands. In 

addition, Canada no longer provides 

financial support for its airports. At the 

same time, opening up of North Polar 

routes has resulted in an increase in 

operations over a particularly harsh and 

remote environment. The aviation 

industry expects that with increased 

route authority for two-engine airplanes 

and increasing use of polar routes, by 

2010 there will be 39,000 flights a year 

over the four current Polar routes alone. 

In 2004, U.S. operators conducted 1,600 

flights over these routes. Conservative 

industry estimates are that the number 

of these flights by U.S. operators will 

double by 2010. In the Southern Pacific 

and Atlantic Oceans and the Antarctic 

area, only a few routes are being flown 

today, mostly by non-U.S. carriers. The 

industry estimates that by 2010 there 

will be 3,200 flights per year in these 

areas. Transport Canada stated that 

operations over the Canadian Arctic 

rose from 85,000 in 1999 to 142,000 in 

2004 and predicts a 7% yearly increase 

in these operations. 

Second, in-service data shows that all 

airplanes, regardless of the number of 

engines, occasionally divert for reasons 

unrelated to engine failure. Since most 

operations are conducted over areas of 

robust infrastructure where the crew 

usually has numerous choices in 

airports, most diversions are not 

problematic. The same cannot be said 

for diversions over remote areas of the 

world, particularly in light of 

operational infrastructure changes that 

have eroded the basic safety net upon 

which long-range operations of all types 

of airplanes have come to rely. 

In its development of proposed new 

regulations for expanded part 121 twoengine operations, ARAC recommended 

extending the authority of these twoengine airplanes to operate on routes 

that are greater than 180 minutes from 

an airport. The additional operational 

challenges of these more remote routes 

are equally demanding of all airplanes, 

regardless of the number of engines, and 

include such issues as extremes in 

terrain and climate, as well as limited 

navigation and communications 

infrastructure. Support of a necessary 

diversion and subsequent recovery in 

such areas demand added training, 

expertise, and dedication from all 

operators. Therefore ARAC concluded 

that there is a need to address these 

issues for all airplanes flying in these 

areas. ARAC recommended that some of 

the same ETOPS guidance developed for 

part 121 two-engine airplanes be 

applied to common elements of all 

airplane operations, both part 121 and 

part 135. The FAA agrees that such 

issues are relevant to all operations but 

is unable to justify the cost of this rule 

for all-cargo operations in airplanes 

with more than two engines and has 

accepted this recommendation only for 

passenger carrying operations. 

As a result, the same limited 

geographic areas that would cover 

greater than 180-minute two-engine 

ETOPS would also be applicable to part 

121 and part 135 passenger-carrying 

operations in three- and four-engine 

airplanes and all part 135 two-engine 

airplanes under this rule. Operations in 

these very limited areas are the only 

ones the FAA intends to regulate for 

these airplanes. All long-range 

operations could benefit from an ETOPS 

program. However, we believe, as do 

some commenters, the increased 

systems redundancy of the three- and 

four-engine airplane operating less than 

180 minutes is sufficient to maintain 

acceptable levels of risk associated with 

engine failure at a distance far from an 

adequate airport. We also believe 

imposing new regulatory guidance on 

part 135 two-engine airplanes below 

this threshold would impose costs on 

these operations that cannot be justified. 

However, for the limited case of 

operations beyond 180 minutes from an 

adequate airport, we are convinced 

these operations must meet the 

minimum requirements of this rule. 

The whole premise of ETOPS has 

been to prevent a diversion and, if one 

were to occur, to have programs in place 

that protect the diversion. ETOPS 

demands that propulsion systems are 

designed and tested to ensure an 

acceptable level of in-flight shutdown 

risk, and it demands that other airplane 

systems are designed and tested to 

ensure their reliability. Maintenance 

practices must be adopted to monitor 

the condition of the engines and take 

aggressive steps to resolve problems 

with airplane systems and engines, thus 

minimizing the potential for procedural 

and human errors that could lead to a 

diversion. 

However, despite the best design, 

testing, and maintenance practices, 

situations may occur which require an 

airplane to divert. Regardless of whether 

the diversion is for technical (airplane 

systems or engines related) or nontechnical reasons, there must be a flight 

operations plan in place to protect both 

crew and passengers during that 

diversion. Such a plan may include 

ensuring pilots are knowledgeable about 

diversion airport alternatives and 

weather conditions at those airports; 

pilots have the ability to communicate 

with the airline’s dispatch office and air 

traffic control; and airplanes have 

sufficient fuel to divert to the alternate 

airport. Under the ETOPS ‘‘preclude 

and protect’’ concept, various failure 

scenarios also need to be considered by 

the operator. The best available options 

are then provided to the pilot before and 

during the flight. 

Unlike the ETOPS guidance provided 

for two-engine airplanes, there has been 

no regulatory framework governing the 

long-range operations airplanes with 

more than two engines. For example, in 

emergencies such as loss of cabin 

pressure, current regulations require 

adequate oxygen supplies but do not 

require the operator to consider the 

amount of extra fuel necessary to reach 

a diversion airport. An analysis by 

Boeing shows that between 1980 and 

2000, 33 of the 73 cruise 

depressurization events occurred on 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

A study conducted by this manufacturer 

using a modern four-engine aircraft 

carrying normal route planning fuel 

reserves raises issues about the 

adequacy of the current fuel planning 

requirements in the event of a diversion. 

Accordingly, the FAA finds there is a 

need for all passenger-carrying 

operations beyond 180 minutes from an 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1815 

9Operators of three- and four-engine airplanes 

have benefited from the engine reliability 

improvements introduced into the same engine 

models that are also used on two-engine airplanes 

in ETOPS. Because of industry lease pool 

arrangements, there is a very strong industry 

incentive to maintain all engines to the ETOPS 

standard so that they can be swapped easily from 

non-ETOPS to ETOPS fleets. 

10Boeing analysis drawing from Boeing and other 

industry sources. Boeing presented this analysis to 

the ARAC ETOPS Working Group. 11 Docket No. 20139, January 21, 2005. 

adequate airport to adopt the same 

‘‘preclude and protect’’ concept 

contained in the two-engine ETOPS 

rules for all types of operations. 

Part 135 operations are subject to the 

same types of causal factors resulting in 

accidents as large transport operations 

are under part 121. Therefore, the FAA 

is applying the same safety provisions 

required for part 121 operators to part 

135 operators in these limited 

operations. 

The FAA also recognizes the need to 

respond to the ICAO Annex 6 

requirement for states to establish 

ETOPS thresholds for all two-engine 

turbine powered airplanes, including 

on-demand operations. Unlike other 

ICAO member states, the U.S. 

recognizes several categories of air 

carrier operations and has never 

imposed ETOPS rules on operators that 

conduct non-scheduled flights with 

‘‘business jets.’’ The FAA is adopting 

these amendments for part 135 twoengine operations and passenger 

operations using airplanes with more 

than two engines in recognition that 

these operations are very similar to part 

121 operations in terms of both the 

types of airplane used and the particular 

long-range routings. The FAA believes 

the rule is a legitimate and necessary 

step to harmonize with international 

aviation standards. 

B. Impact of ETOPS Requirements on 

Engine Reliability 

ETOPS design and maintenance 

requirements have contributed greatly to 

the reliability of the engines used in 

two-engine airplanes and appear to have 

had some impact on engines used in 

three- and four-engine airplanes. 

Applying these requirements to all 

airplanes that fly long distances from 

airports would improve the reliability of 

all engines. However we agree with 

many commenters that the current level 

of engine reliability coupled with the 

engine and system redundancy on 

airplanes with more than two engines is 

sufficient to protect the operation from 

critical loss of thrust. Consequently 

there is no requirement for an ETOPS 

maintenance program for ETOPS on 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

Operators and manufacturers of 

airplanes with more than two engines 

have benefited from improvements in 

engine safety resulting from ETOPS 

requirements for airplanes with two 

engines.9 Prior to ETOPS, we 

considered a 0.02 IFSD rate the best rate 

the industry could achieve. Since 

ETOPS began in 1985, the IFSD rates 

have improved to 0.01 or lower, half of 

what we previously thought possible. 

This overall improvement in the IFSD 

rate for all airplanes was a result of 

design improvements and aggressive 

maintenance programs introduced by 

the engine and airplane manufacturers 

to correct in-service events to maintain 

the world fleet IFSD rate below the 

ETOPS maximum. 

C. Fuel Exhaustion 

In 1983, a U.S.-manufactured twoengine airplane (foreign operator) made 

a no power landing at an airport in 

North America that was caused by an 

inadequate amount of fuel being loaded 

on the airplane for the flight. 

In August 2001, a foreign 

manufactured two-engine airplane 

(foreign operator) made a no-power 

landing at an airport in the Eastern 

Atlantic, due to the fact that the flight 

crew was unaware of a fuel leak that 

resulted in a critical amount of fuel 

being leaked overboard. 

Both of these airplane types are used 

in long-range passenger service in U.S. 

operations. Due to the similarity of the 

operating environment, it is the FAA’s 

view that these particular incidents 

could have occurred in U.S. operations 

and, therefore, we view them as viable 

data points. We were extremely lucky 

that both airplanes in these instances 

made safe landings. The low fuel 

alerting requirement in the ETOPS rule 

will prevent low fuel quantity problems 

from becoming accidents on ETOPS 

flights. The low fuel alert will tell the 

flight crew when the quantity of fuel 

available to the engines falls below the 

level required to fly to the destination 

airport. The alert must be given while 

there is still enough fuel remaining to 

safely complete a diversion. 

D. Cargo or Baggage Compartment Fire 

Suppression Requirements 

The historical rate of occurrence of inflight cargo and baggage compartment 

fires is approximately 1 × 10¥7 per 

flight hour.10 This rate translates to 

about one cargo fire per 10 million flight 

hours. The FAA Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office received five reports 

of cargo or baggage compartment fires 

for the period 1999 to 2004. In-flight 

fires can be particularly hazardous. The 

cargo and baggage compartment fire 

suppression system requirement will 

ensure all ETOPS airplanes whose cargo 

or baggage compartments require fire 

suppression systems will have systems 

capable of putting out fires and 

suppressing re-ignition for the longest 

duration diversion for which the 

airplane is approved. 

E. Decompression Scenarios 

Most estimates for the probability of 

decompression on a commercial 

airplane are on the order of 1 × 10¥6 or 

1 × 10¥7 per flight hour. Airbus, in a 

recent exemption request for the A380 

stated in comments to the docket that 

there have been nearly 3,000 

depressurization events since 1959.11 It 

notes the probability of decompression 

due to the pressurization system alone 

to be in the order of 3.5 × 10¥6 per flight 

hour (3.5 decompression events per 

million flights). Boeing has provided a 

sample of depressurization events on 

Boeing airplanes from 1980 to 2000. 

Their sample shows 33 of 73 events 

occurred on three- and four-engine 

aircraft. Two-engine ETOPS 

requirements have always required 

those operations to flight plan their fuel 

requirements for a ‘‘critical fuel 

scenario.’’ This requirement has been 

codified into the new approval process 

in this rule. 

Unlike ETOPS guidance for twoengine airplanes, there is no existing 

regulatory framework governing the 

long-range operations of airplanes with 

more than two engines other than the 

requirements of 14 CFR 121.193, which 

only governs the operation up to 90 

minutes from an airport. The only rule 

governing decompression on a these 

airplanes addresses oxygen supplies and 

not fuel necessary for a successful 

diversion (14 CFR 121.329). The 

regulation does not require the operator 

of an airplane with more than two 

engines to check the conditions at 

possible diversion airports where the 

flight might terminate or check for fuel 

sufficiency. 

Boeing conducted a study using a 

modern four-engine airplane carrying 

normal route planning fuel reserves. On 

any route that is 16 hours long, if a fourengine airplane has a major 

decompression anywhere in the cruise 

phase between approximately 7.25 

hours to 12.5 hours, the airplane will 

not have sufficient fuel to descend and 

cruise at 10,000 ft and reach its point of 

origin or destination. A similar 

calculation for a 10-hour flight shows 

that between the 4.5 to 7.5 hours into 

the flight that same airplane would not 

have enough fuel to be able to continue 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1816 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

12Because of the potential benefits associated 

with the superior design of airplane-engine 

combinations demonstrated under the existing 

ETOPS certification programs, the FAA has decided 

to extend those requirements to the airplanes with 

more than two engines should the manufacturer 

wish to market these airplanes as suitable for 

ETOPS operation. The FAA anticipates the cost 

associated with this requirement ultimately will 

result in greater engine reliability at a very low cost. 

This is because these requirements are optional and 

will not take effect for such airplanes within the 

next 8 years. 

to its destination or turn back to its 

origination airport. Without a suitable 

airport at which to land, the results 

would be catastrophic. Under today’s 

final rule, 14 CFR 121.646 now covers 

this omission and requires three- and 

four-engine operators flying more than 

90 minutes to have enough fuel to fly to 

an adequate airport. The rule also 

extends ETOPS requirements on their 

operations that are greater than 180 

minutes from an airport. 

F. Satellite-Based Voice 

Communications 

The use of SATCOM is a new 

requirement that applies only to ETOPS 

conducted beyond 180-minutes. Other 

available communication systems in use 

(VHF, HF voice, and datalink) all have 

significant limitations. The range of very 

high frequency (VHF) radio is limited to 

line-of-sight distances, typically less 

than 200 miles at high altitude. High 

frequency (HF) radio works at the longer 

distances from transmitting and 

receiving stations associated with 

ETOPS flights, but is subject to 

unreliable voice quality and loss of 

signal. This is particularly true during 

periods of intense solar flare activity. 

Datalink capability (both HF and 

SATCOM) is limited by message length 

and ability to clearly state the issue or 

message. A bigger limitation on datalink 

is the full attention required by the 

flight crew to interact with a small and 

compactly designed keypad. The device 

is difficult to use without error during 

turbulence and airplane maneuvering. 

Its use also requires crew coordination 

and verification of message content. 

This is extremely distracting during a 

time that requires the pilot’s focused 

attention on a problem at hand. In 

comparison, the use of SATCOM voice 

allows clear and immediate 

conversation that can quickly convey 

the situation and needs for the flight. 

In March 2004 during a period of 

intense solar flare activity, a 

certification test flight was aborted 

because the crew could not 

communicate with air traffic using the 

HF radio. The purpose of this flight test 

was to simulate an airplane failure 

condition that made SATCOM 

unavailable and was conducted in a part 

of the world beyond the range of normal 

VHF radio signals. The test pilot 

decided the safety risk was too high to 

continue the flight test without his 

ability to communicate the airplane’s 

position with air traffic control. This 

situation is similar to one an airline 

crew would face under similar solar 

conditions during a flight in areas 

outside the range of normal line-of-sight 

VHF radio in an airplane not equipped 

with SATCOM. The requirement for 

satellite-based voice communications 

adopted today will ensure that ETOPS 

flight crews will be able to communicate 

emergency situations with air traffic 

control or their airline during an ETOPS 

flight. 

V. Applicability of the Final Rule 

This final rule is applicable to all 

‘‘extended operations (ETOPS)’’ as now 

defined. These are long-range operations 

beyond certain distances from adequate 

airports. Specifically they are: (1) Twoengine airplanes operated under part 

121 when more than 60 minutes from an 

adequate airport; (2) passenger-carrying 

airplanes with more than two engines 

operated under part 121 when more 

than 180 minutes from an adequate 

airport; and (3) flight operations of all 

two-engine transport category turbine 

powered airplanes and all passengercarrying transport category turbine 

powered airplanes with more than two 

engines under part 135 when more than 

180 minutes from an adequate airport. 

Because of the harsh and remote 

environments of the Polar areas, 

portions of this rule are also applicable 

to all airplane operations in those areas, 

although these operations are not 

classified as ETOPS. 

Today’s rule imposes a requirement 

for a passenger recovery plan for certain 

operations of all U.S. flag and 

supplemental passenger operators. The 

rule also affects manufacturers of both 

airplanes and engines used in ETOPS by 

mandating certain certification 

standards for their manufacture. Should 

the manufacturers choose not to meet 

the new requirements of parts 25 and 

33, their products could not be used for 

ETOPS operations.12

Current ETOPS guidance only covers 

part 121 two-engine operations between 

60 and 180 minutes from adequate 

airports. This rule codifies current 

guidance up to 180 minutes and is 

expanded to include unlimited twoengine operations in certain parts of the 

world. We have responded to certain 

comments to the NPRM by enlarging the 

geographic area defined for the current 

207-minute approval and the geographic 

area defined for the new 240-minute 

ETOPS approval. 

In keeping with the ARAC 

recommendation, the rule applies 

certain elements of current part 121 

two-engine ETOPS guidance to 

operations in remote and demanding 

areas of the world, defined by flights 

more than 180 minutes from an 

adequate airport, of part 121 passengercarrying airplanes with more than two 

engines and to comparable part 135 

operations using turbine-powered 

airplanes. Many commenters to the 

original NPRM expressed concern over 

the cost of the rule and the difficulty in 

its application. Where the FAA 

determined that no reduction in safety 

would occur, we made changes from the 

NPRM. For example, the passenger 

recovery plan requirements are 

applicable only to part 121 ETOPS 

operations beyond 180 minutes from an 

airport or in the Polar areas and are no 

longer applicable to cargo operations. 

Similarly, such plans are only 

applicable to part 135 passenger 

operations in the North Polar Region. 

Likewise, we have eliminated ETOPS 

requirements for part 121 operations 

using airplanes with more than two 

engines operating at less than 180 

minutes from an adequate airport in the 

Polar Regions. We have also excluded 

all-cargo operations of airplanes with 

more than two engines in both part 121 

and part 135 from the ETOPS 

requirements of the rule. 

Many commenters were concerned 

that airplanes they were currently using 

in operations that would be covered 

under the ETOPS rule would have to be 

re-certified when the new rule becomes 

effective. That is not our intent. A new 

§ 25.3 has been created specifying the 

applicability of the new airworthiness 

standards to airplanes with existing type 

certificates on the effective date of the 

rule, or to airplanes for which an 

application for an original type 

certificate was submitted before the 

effective date. A new § 121.162 has been 

created delineating the airworthiness 

standards required for airplanes to be 

used in part 121 ETOPS. Appendix G, 

paragraph G135.2.3, has been revised to 

make the requirements applicable to all 

airplanes operated under that part 

similar to the requirements in § 121.162 

for airplanes with more than two 

engines. Table 4 in the appendix 

compares the applicability of both the 

NPRM and the final rule to current 

guidelines. 

VI. Delayed Compliance Dates and 

Grandfather Provisions 

In this final rule the FAA has adopted 

a compliance schedule that will ease the 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1817 

13An engine-hour is an operating hour 

accumulated on each engine installed on an 

airplane. Similarly, an airplane-hour is an 

operating-hour accumulated on an airplane 

independent of the number of engines installed. For 

example, one airplane-hour on a four-engine 

airplane would correspond to four engine-hours 

(one engine-hour for each engine.) 

burden of compliance and make the rule 

less costly. Airplane-engine 

combinations that have been previously 

approved for ETOPS can continue to be 

used in those operations without recertification. Manufacturers of twoengine airplanes who seek type design 

approval for ETOPS after the effective 

date of the rule must meet certain 

requirements based on whether they 

request approval for ETOPS up to and 

including 180 minutes, or beyond 180 

minutes. For type design approvals of 

180 minutes or less, two-engine 

airplanes with existing type certificates 

are exempted from the fuel system 

pressure and flow requirements, low 

fuel alerting, and oil engine tank design 

requirements. These three requirements 

are beyond what has been required 

under AC 120–42A. 

For airplanes with more than two 

engines, the new airplane certification 

requirements found in part 25 applies 

only to airplane-engine combinations 

that are manufactured more than 8 years 

after the effective date of this rule. 

Likewise, the operational 

requirements under part 121 have 

delayed compliance dates. Some 

requirements, such as dispatch, weather 

minimums and fuel supply, are already 

required by either regulation or ETOPS 

approvals and may require minimum 

adjustment to an operator’s ETOPS 

program within 30 days of publication 

of today’s rule. For requirements that 

take additional planning and 

implementation time—such as 

SATCOM, training and passenger 

recovery plans—the FAA established a 

1-year extended compliance period. 

Cargo fire suppression may present a 

retrofit requirement for airplanes with 

more than two engines, and so the FAA 

is allowing 6 years to meet this 

requirement. Some requirements 

proposed in the NPRM have been 

eliminated. Passenger recovery plans are 

not required for part 121 ETOPS of 180 

minutes or less or for all-cargo 

operations. For part 135 operations, 

passenger recovery plans are only 

required in the North Polar Region. An 

ETOPS maintenance program is not 

required for passenger airplanes with 

more than two engines operated in 

ETOPS, and the ETOPS requirements 

are not applicable to all-cargo 

operations in airplanes with more than 

two engines in either part 121 or part 

135. 

Because part 135 operators will have 

limited ETOPS operations, the FAA has 

decided to grandfather from today’s rule 

all part 135 airplanes manufactured up 

to 8 years from the effective date of the 

rule. For purposes of airworthiness 

requirements, part 135 operators may 

use these airplanes in ETOPS without 

certification under § 25.1535. This is a 

change from the NPRM, which proposed 

grandfathering only those airplanes that 

were on an operator’s operations 

specifications up to 8 years after the 

rule. Under the NPRM, they would then 

have had to remain on the operator’s 

operations specifications to continue to 

operate ETOPS. 

To meet the operational requirements, 

the FAA has allowed a delayed 

compliance date of 1 year for part 135 

operators to meet the North Polar, 

passenger recovery, and training 

requirements of the final rule. For cargo 

fire suppression, the final rule allows 8 

years for currently approved part 135 

ETOPS operators to comply. 

Tables 2 and 3 of the appendix 

present these delayed compliance dates. 

VII. In-Flight Shutdown Rates 

A 12-month rolling average IFSD rate 

is the primary measuring tool the FAA 

uses to determine if an airplane-engine 

combination has acceptable propulsion 

system reliability before approving it for 

ETOPS. It is also used to monitor the 

health of a fleet of existing ETOPS 

approved airplanes in service. A 12- 

month rolling average IFSD rate is 

calculated by dividing the number of inflight shutdowns that occur in an 

airplane fleet by the total number of 

engine-hours 13 that accumulate in that 

fleet during the same 12-month period. 

Each month, the number of in-flight 

shutdowns and engine-hours from the 

same month 12 months earlier are 

dropped from the calculation and 

replaced by the number of IFSD’s and 

engine-hours in the current month. In 

this way, the resulting IFSD rate ‘‘rolls’’

from one month to the next. 

The manufacturer of an airplane 

approved for ETOPS and the 

manufacturer of the engines installed on 

that airplane monitor the IFSD rate of all 

airplanes and engines of that type, 

whether or not those airplanes and 

engines are operated on ETOPS routes. 

Today’s rule refers to these airplanes as 

the ‘‘world fleet.’’ Operators of that 

airplane-engine combination monitor 

the IFSD rate of only the airplanes and 

engines in their fleet. In-flight shutdown 

rates are discussed in several parts of 

the rule. Section 1.1 defines ‘‘in-flight 

shutdown,’’ which an operator or 

manufacturer uses, for ETOPS purposes 

only, to determine which in-service 

occurrences count in the calculation of 

an IFSD rate. 

Part 25, appendix K identifies the 

IFSD rate limits that a two-engine 

airplane must remain at or below in 

order to receive an ETOPS type design 

approval. 

Paragraph 21.4(b)(2) identifies IFSD 

rate limits for airplanes approved for 

ETOPS in service. The manufacturer of 

an airplane approved for ETOPS and the 

manufacturer of the engines installed on 

that airplane must issue service 

information to the operators of that 

airplane-engine combination, as 

appropriate, to maintain the world-fleet 

IFSD rate at or below the regulatory 

limit. Operators may incorporate this 

service information as part of their 

reliability program to maintain the IFSD 

rate of their fleet at or below the worldfleet limits. 

Paragraph 121.374(i)(1) identifies the 

IFSD rate limits that prompt an 

investigation into whether there are any 

common cause or systemic problems in 

an operator’s ETOPS program that are 

contributing to the high IFSD rate. The 

operator must report the results of its 

investigation and any necessary 

corrective action it is taking to the FAA. 

The IFSD rates specified in this 

paragraph are higher than the worldfleet rates in recognition that this action 

is taken only after the operator’s normal 

reliability program fails to maintain the 

operator’s rate at or below the worldfleet IFSD rate objective. 

Several factors may cause in-flight 

shutdowns that contribute to an 

operator’s IFSD rate exceeding the 

world-fleet rate. First, there may be 

causes of in-flight shutdowns for which 

the manufacturer has not issued service 

information. There may be existing 

service information available to prevent 

causes of in-flight shutdowns that the 

operator has not yet incorporated into 

its fleet. An operator may have unique 

maintenance or operational procedures 

that unknowingly cause in-flight 

shutdowns. Finally, an operator may 

experience a higher IFSD rate for no 

known reason other than statistical 

chance. 

Another factor affecting an operator’s 

IFSD rate is the numerical effect that a 

single in-flight shutdown has on the rate 

of a small fleet of airplanes. An IFSD 

rate of 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours 

results in an in-flight shutdown 

approximately once every 100,000 

engine-hours. A fleet of 100 two-engine 

airplanes operating an average of 10 

hours a day would accumulate 2,000 

engine-hours per day or 730,000 enginehours in 12 months. This fleet of 

airplanes could experience seven inmstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1818 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

flight shutdowns during that 12-month 

period and still have an IFSD rate below 

the 0.01 limit. A 10-airplane fleet of the 

same type operated in the same manner 

would accumulate only 73,000 enginehours in a 12-month period. One inflight shutdown on the 10-airplane fleet 

would result in an IFSD rate of 0.014, 

which is above the 0.01 limit. Thus, one 

in-flight shutdown on an operator of a 

small fleet of airplanes can place their 

fleet above the limit. To further 

compound the impact of fleet size, an 

in-flight shutdown that occurs in June of 

one year continues to count in the IFSD 

rate until the next June. A single inflight shutdown would place the 

operator of the 10-airplane fleet above 

the 0.01 limit for an entire year. 

This one factor showing the magnified 

effect an in-flight shutdown has on the 

IFSD rate of a small fleet has generated 

the most concern from both the 

manufacturers and operators since AC 

120–42A introduced IFSD rates into the 

ETOPS standard. They are concerned 

the FAA, or other airworthiness 

authorities, will adopt an FAA ETOPS 

standard that improperly uses IFSD 

rates in the rule to revoke the ETOPS 

authority of an operator who 

experiences in-flight shutdowns due to 

causes beyond its control, simply 

because its rate exceeds the allowable 

limit. Many comments to the NPRM 

were in some way connected to 

reducing the number of occurrences that 

count toward the IFSD rate, or in 

lessening the regulatory effect of a rate 

that exceeds the limit. 

The FAA will not revoke an existing 

ETOPS operational approval solely 

because of a high IFSD rate. The 

operating rules require the operator to 

investigate the cause of each in-flight 

shutdown and report to the FAA any 

corrective actions it is taking to prevent 

future occurrences. Only after 

additional in-flight shutdowns in the 

operator’s fleet cause the FAA to believe 

the operator’s corrective actions are 

insufficient to reduce the IFSD rate 

below the limit, will the FAA 

investigate taking further action. During 

this subsequent investigation, we will 

consider how a small fleet, even with 

successful corrective actions, may need 

up to a year to reduce the IFSD rate to 

below the required limit. However, if we 

determine that a series of in-flight 

shutdowns is caused by a common 

cause or systemic problem in the 

operator’s ETOPS program, we may 

reduce the maximum allowable 

diversion time or revoke the ETOPS 

approval until we are satisfied that the 

operator has corrected the problem. 

The FAA received several comments 

on the proposed IFSD rate requirements. 

Continental Airlines (Continental) and 

United Airlines (United) were 

concerned that the definition of in-flight 

shutdown, as proposed, would cause 

certain events to count against their 

IFSD rate even if the engine was not 

actually shut down by the flightcrew. 

Continental also stated that the 

proposed definition does not address 

modern engine auto-relight capability in 

which an engine flameout is detected by 

the engine control and an engine re-start 

is initiated automatically without any 

flightcrew action. 

The FAA finds these concerns have 

merit. We have revised the NPRM 

definition of in-flight shutdown to 

clarify our intent and address these 

commenters’ concerns. First, we have 

replaced ‘‘in-flight’’ with ‘‘when an 

airplane is airborne’’ which more clearly 

indicates that a condition for an in-flight 

shutdown is that the airplane is in the 

air (wheels not touching the ground). 

There has been some disagreement in 

the past about whether an engine failure 

that occurs during the takeoff roll 

should be considered an in-flight 

shutdown. This change clarifies our 

intent that the airplane must be in the 

air. 

We have clarified that an in-flight 

shutdown includes a situation when a 

flight crew member cycles the engine 

start control, however briefly, even if 

the engine operates normally for the 

remainder of the flight. This 

clarification addresses confusion over 

events that have occurred in service 

where a pilot has cycled the engine start 

control switch to re-establish normal 

engine operation following a 

compressor stall that causes the engine 

to not respond to throttle changes. Some 

have argued that such events, even 

though the engine was temporarily shut 

down, should not be counted in the 

IFSD rate because normal engine 

operation was reestablished and the 

engine operated normally for the 

remainder of the flight. 

We agree that an engine control 

system that performs this cycling as part 

of its normal design without any flight 

crew action should not be counted as an 

in-flight shutdown. The engine control 

system is performing a function that the 

engine was certified to perform. 

Accordingly, we have specifically 

excluded this type of ‘‘auto-relight’’

function from the revised definition. 

We have also excluded from the 

revised definition the situation where 

an engine does not achieve desired 

thrust, but is not shutdown. There have 

been such events in service where some 

have argued that they should be counted 

as an in-flight shutdown because the 

engine does not produce usable thrust 

for the remainder of the flight. 

Historically, we have not counted these 

‘‘loss of thrust control’’ events as inflight shutdowns because the engines 

were not physically shutdown by the 

flight crew. All of these changes to the 

definition of in-flight shutdown are 

consistent with our past interpretations 

under AC 120–42A. 

United, American Airlines 

(American), and Continental all said 

that the IFSD rates contained in various 

parts of the rule were inconsistent. 

United suspects that some of the rates 

are based on the individual operator’s 

rates and others are based on the world 

fleet rates. American and Continental 

requested further clarification as to why 

the rates in § 121.374 were different 

from those in part 25, appendix K. 

American also said there is no guidance 

or timeline to establish when or if the 

120-minute initial rate of 0.05 will be 

reduced down to 0.02. 

The Air Line Pilots Association 

(ALPA) commented that since the IFSD 

rates are a benchmark by which a 

regulator must manage an operator’s 

performance and measure its success, 

the critical issue is what number above 

this rate will the FAA use to manage inflight shutdowns. ALPA asked what the 

consequence of such a process would 

be? 

The FAA agrees that the NPRM 

created confusion with how IFSD rates 

are used for propulsion system 

reliability monitoring. We have revised 

the rule to clarify the differences in the 

various sections of the type design and 

operating rules that address IFSD rates. 

Part 25, appendix K, K25.2, defines 

the world-fleet IFSD rates that a twoengine airplane would have to achieve 

before it could receive an ETOPS type 

design approval based on service 

experience. As noted by Boeing, 

calculation of this rate is not based 

solely on ETOPS operations. There are 

no comparable IFSD rate requirements 

for airplanes with more than two 

engines in K25.3 of appendix K. 

Because of the greater number of 

engines per airplane, the corresponding 

rates for these airplanes would be so 

high that we were concerned we may 

inadvertently encourage a lower 

standard than is already normally 

achieved without a specific IFSD rate 

requirement. 

The NPRM proposed that IFSD rates 

for the purpose of obtaining type design 

approval for ETOPS would be 

approximate rates. This terminology 

came from AC 120–42A, which had 

been successfully applied to those 

airplanes currently used in ETOPS. 

However, for the purposes of a final 

rule, such terminology does not convey 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1819 

14Boeing had suggested the FAA merely specify 

the IFSD rate as approximate. Such a qualifier 

results in an ambiguous regulation. The FAA 

believes that it can retain the desired flexibility by 

approving, on a case-by-case basis, those IFSD rates 

that exceed the regulatory cap because of unique 

circumstances. 

15The NPRM did not clearly state in proposed 

paragraph 21.4(b)(2) that a reduction in the IFSD 

rate from 0.05 to 0.02 for 120-minute ETOPS was 

linked to compliance with a CMP document that 

was required as a condition for an airplane’s ETOPS 

approval. We have revised the language of this 

paragraph to clarify this intent. 

that a candidate airplane-engine 

combination must be at or below these 

IFSD rates before the FAA would grant 

an ETOPS type design approval. We 

recognize that there are circumstances 

where a candidate airplane-engine 

combination may be slightly above the 

regulatory limit, but because of factors 

such as the small fleet size effect 

discussed earlier, we may determine 

that the rate meets the intent of the rule. 

Therefore, we have revised K25.2.1(b) of 

this final rule to say that the world-fleet 

must be at or below the limit unless 

otherwise approved by the FAA.14

K25.2.2(b)(2) of appendix K, requires 

an applicant for Early ETOPS approval 

to design an airplane’s propulsion 

system to minimize failures and 

malfunctions so as to achieve the same 

IFSD rate objectives as apply to 

airplanes with service experience. 

Paragraph 21.4(b)(2) defines IFSD 

rates for airplanes that have received 

ETOPS type design approval. These 

rates are requirements that apply to 

airplane and engine manufacturers, and 

they are used to monitor the reliability 

of the world fleet in service. 

Additionally, the world-fleet IFSD 

rate applies to operators who must show 

the FAA that they have the ability to 

achieve and maintain these rates before 

the FAA will grant approval to conduct 

ETOPS. This requirement comes from 

AC 120–42A, paragraph 10(b) and is 

now codified in the final rule in part 

121, Appendix P, section I, paragraph 

(a). (Note that the FAA proposed this 

appendix as Appendix O in the NPRM. 

Because an Appendix O was adopted in 

a separate final rule after the ETOPS 

NPRM was issued, the FAA is adopting 

proposed Appendix O as Appendix P in 

this final rule.) 

The IFSD rates in § 121.374 are for an 

individual operator’s propulsion system 

monitoring program. They were derived 

from AC 120–42A, Appendix 4, and 

were recommended by the ARAC. These 

rates are slightly higher than those for 

the world fleet required elsewhere in 

the rule. Although operators are 

required to investigate the cause of each 

in-flight shutdown in order to maintain 

their fleet IFSD rate at or below the level 

required for the world fleet, these higher 

rates provide a trigger for when the 

operator must do a comprehensive 

review of its operations to determine if 

there are any common cause or systemic 

errors contributing to the high rate. 

The IFSD rate required to obtain type 

design approval for 120-minute ETOPS 

in part 25 is 0.05 per 1,000 engine-hours 

or less. However, unless the IFSD rate 

is 0.02 or less, the manufacturer must 

provide a list of corrective actions in the 

CMP document specified in K25.1.6 of 

Appendix K that, when taken, would 

result in a rate of 0.02 per 1,000 enginehours or less.15

The Air Transport Association (ATA) 

concurs with the IFSD rate requirements 

for two-engine airplanes under the 

propulsion system monitoring 

requirements in § 121.374(i) as they 

simply codify the existing ETOPS policy 

and guidance. However, it objects to 

including IFSD rate standards for threeand four-engine airplanes. The ATA 

stated that the proposed rate threshold 

for these airplanes is significantly 

higher than the current IFSD rates of the 

industry. It also says that the existing 

reliability programs and reporting 

requirements of § 121.703 has provided 

a safe and reliable system for these 

airplanes. 

The FAA agrees that the IFSD rates 

identified in § 121.374(i) are 

significantly higher for three- and fourengine airplanes than for airplanes with 

two-engines. These rates were the result 

of applying established risk models and 

an analysis of the probability of losing 

a critical number of engines on 

airplanes with three and four engines. 

We also agree that the industry is 

achieving IFSD rates that are 

significantly lower than the threshold 

rates in § 121.374(i). However, if an 

operator of a three- or four-engine 

airplane were to actually have a rate 

higher than the threshold, this provision 

will aid the FAA and the operator in 

determining if there are any common 

cause or systemic errors contributing to 

the high IFSD rate. 

JAA and the UK CAA believe that the 

0.01 IFSD rate standard for greater than 

180-minute ETOPS should apply to 207- 

minute approval in the North Pacific as 

well. Airbus makes a similar comment, 

but they also suggest that for the 207- 

minute exception-based operation, the 

0.01 rate should be applied in a similar 

manner to 120-minute ETOPS: That is, 

start out with an initial rate of 0.02 with 

a CMP standard that results in a rate of 

0.01. 

The FAA disagrees that the 0.01 per 

1,000 engine-hours IFSD rate 

requirement should be applied to the 

specific exception based 207-minute 

ETOPS approval. This operation is 

fundamentally a 180-minute operation. 

The 207-minute allowance is only 

permitted when the alternate airports 

normally available within 180 minutes 

diversion time are not available for a 

particular flight in the North Pacific area 

of operations. The baseline airplane 

requirement for 207-minute ETOPS is a 

180-minute type design approval. 

The JAA and UK CAA comment that 

the IFSD rate targets should not be 

specified in part 21 as it creates an 

immediate non-compliance in case of an 

excessive rate, particularly early in the 

life of an airplane. As discussed earlier, 

this rule only requires a type certificate 

holder to issue service information, as 

appropriate, to maintain the world-fleet 

IFSD rate at or below the limit. 

Paragraph 21.4(b)(2) does not apply to 

an Early ETOPS airplane until the world 

fleet has accumulated a minimum of 

250,000 engine-hours. Accordingly, 

these commenters’ concern about an 

immediate non-compliance in the early 

life of an airplane is unwarranted. 

The JAA and UK CAA also comment 

the FAA proposal for diversion times 

greater than 180 minutes has a fixed 

IFSD rate requirement unrelated to the 

maximum approved diversion time, 

whereas the JAA criteria provide a curve 

of IFSD rate target from 0.014 to 0.01 per 

1000 flight hours for diversion times 

ranging from 3 to 10 hours. 

The FAA requirements are intended 

to eliminate propulsion system 

reliability as a consideration from the 

maximum diversion time capability of 

the airplane. Only the most timelimiting airplane system capability will 

determine the maximum diversion time 

capability for a two-engine airplane 

under the new requirements for 

airplanes certified for ETOPS greater 

than 180 minutes in part 25. The FAA’s 

risk model, discussed in detail in the 

NPRM, established that the probability 

of complete loss of thrust due to 

independent failures with an IFSD rate 

for two-engine airplanes of 0.01 per 

1000 engine-hours would be sufficiently 

low that the main focus of long-range 

operational safety should be on 

reducing the possibility of other risk 

factors. This approach eliminates the 

need to re-evaluate an airplane-engine 

combination’s propulsion system 

reliability each time the applicant seeks 

to increase the airplane’s approved 

maximum diversion time. 

Dassault comments that there are no 

IFSD rate requirements for airplanes 

that will be operated under part 135. 

Thus, they posited that appendix K 

should be revised to say that the 

minimum IFSD rates only apply to 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1820 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

16The first two provisions, contained in 

subparagraphs (a) and (b) of § 25.1535 in the NPRM, 

are also specific airworthiness requirements that are 

airplanes that will be used in part 121 

operations. Dassault’s comment was 

made with respect to the Early ETOPS 

method of approval of Appendix K. 

However, this comment has equal 

applicability for airplanes certified for 

ETOPS using the service experience or 

combined service experience and Early 

ETOPS methods. 

We disagree with Dassault’s position. 

At the time an airplane receives a type 

certificate, the FAA cannot determine 

what rules an airplane will be operated 

under throughout its service life. Part 25 

airworthiness standards apply equally 

to all airplanes receiving part 25 type 

certificates regardless of the operating 

part they will be flown under. 

Boeing commented that the term 

‘‘IFSD’’ in the rate implies that only 

‘‘flight’’ hours should be used as the 

denominator for the statistic. Boeing 

recommends changing how the rate is 

based from ‘‘engine-hours’’ to ‘‘engine 

flight hours.’’ To do as Boeing suggests 

would constitute a change in the way 

IFSD rates have been calculated since 

ETOPS began in 1985. The FAA 

discussed whether to calculate the IFSD 

rate calculations using engine flighthours when the IFSD rate definition was 

established in 1985. At that time, the 

industry had already established 

methods for tracking engine-hours, and 

the FAA did not want to create an 

additional burden on the industry by 

requiring it to track engine-flight hours 

for the purpose of calculating an IFSD 

rate for ETOPS. Given the historical 

method of calculation is well 

understood, we have decided against 

adopting Boeing’s suggestion. 

Boeing also recommended replacing 

the word ‘‘operations’’ with ‘‘type 

design approval’’ for each IFSD rate 

listed in K25.2.1(b) of Appendix K. 

Boeing stated that part 25 pertains to 

type design approval and using the 

word ‘‘operations’’ could create 

unnecessary confusion with the 

operational approvals granted under 

parts 121 and 135. We agree and have 

made this change as Boeing 

recommended. 

The NPRM proposed a new paragraph 

21.4(c), which defined what actions the 

FAA would take if the world-fleet IFSD 

rate were exceeded. General Electric 

(GE) stated that section 21.4(c) is 

inconsistent with AC 39–8, which stated 

that any IFSD rate less than 2 × 10¥4 per 

cycle is not an unsafe condition. We 

disagree with GE. AC 39–8 provides 

general policy the FAA Engine and 

Propeller Directorate uses as a guideline 

for determining whether an unsafe 

condition exists for engines used in all 

types of airplane operations. Since it is 

advisory in nature, this policy is subject 

to change. 

Proposed paragraph 21.4(c) stated the 

FAA will review the IFSD rate to 

determine if an unsafe condition exists. 

The FAA will review all in-service 

problems to determine if an unsafe 

condition exists and may issue ADs as 

necessary to correct each unsafe 

condition found. If each individual 

cause for an in-flight shutdown does not 

constitute an unsafe condition, the FAA 

has the discretion to determine that a 

high IFSD rate by itself constitutes an 

unsafe condition and may issue an AD 

mandating a revised CMP document 

containing several corrective actions 

that collectively will bring the IFSD rate 

back down to a safe level. Because the 

FAA already has this discretionary 

authority, proposed paragraph 21.4(c) is 

unnecessary and has been withdrawn 

from this final rule. 

VIII. Definition of ETOPS Significant 

System 

Boeing, Airbus, and ALPA had 

comments on the proposed definitions 

of ETOPS significant systems, ETOPS 

Group 1 systems, and ETOPS Group 2 

systems. 

Boeing stated that the definition of 

ETOPS significant systems should be 

revised to add ‘‘extended’’ before 

‘‘diversion’’ at the end of the first 

sentence to clarify that ETOPS 

significant systems relate to extended 

diversions of ETOPS flights, not any 

length diversion. ALPA recommended 

deleting the last part of the definition of 

ETOPS significant systems ‘‘based on 

the relationship to the number of 

engines, or to continued safe engine 

operation’’ since the definition of 

ETOPS significant systems make this 

redundant. Boeing recommended 

deleting the parenthetical examples 

from the definition of ETOPS Group 1 

systems. They felt that the examples 

could be confusing or misinterpreted for 

designs where these systems may not be 

associated with the number of engines. 

Airbus commented that the NPRM 

introduced definitions for ETOPS Group 

1 and ETOPS Group 2 systems, but did 

not use them anywhere in the proposed 

rule. It recommended the FAA 

withdraw these two definitions. 

The FAA agrees that the definition of 

ETOPS significant systems needs 

clarification. We agree with the 

recommended changes from Boeing and 

ALPA for the reasons they cited. We 

have made these changes in the final 

rule. 

Airbus is correct that nowhere in the 

NPRM was ETOPS Group 2 significant 

systems used. However, the term 

‘‘ETOPS group 1 significant systems’’

was used in several places in the NPRM, 

including the problem reporting 

requirements for Early ETOPS airplanes 

in paragraph 21.4(a) and the relevant 

experience assessment required for 

Early ETOPS two-engine airplanes in 

K25.2.2(a) of Appendix K. The generic 

term ‘‘ETOPS significant systems’’ is 

also used in several places, including 

paragraph 21.4(a) and the time limited 

systems requirement of K25.1.3(c). 

We looked at whether we could 

eliminate the group 2 definition and 

combine the group 1 definition with the 

basic ETOPS significant system 

definition. However, there is a sufficient 

difference between the group 1 systems, 

whose design depends on the number of 

engines on the airplane, and the other 

ETOPS significant systems, such as a 

cargo fire suppression system, whose 

design does not depend on the number 

of engines, but whose failure or 

malfunctioning could adversely affect 

the safety of extended operations. We 

could not eliminate this broader class of 

ETOPS significant systems from the 

rule, nor could we include these 

systems in those requirements that only 

apply to the group 1 systems without 

increasing the burden of those 

requirements. Even though ‘‘ETOPS 

group 2 significant systems’’ is not used 

in the rule, we have decided to keep this 

term for completeness. We have revised 

the definition to clarify that an ETOPS 

group 2 system is any ETOPS significant 

system that is not a group 1 system. 

IX. Airplane and Engine Certification 

Requirements 

A. Transport Category Airplanes 

Airworthiness Standards (Part 25) 

As proposed in the NPRM, we are 

adding a new § 25.1535 to part 25 as a 

general requirement for manufacturers 

seeking ETOPS type design approval. 

The FAA decided against adopting a 

new subpart into part 25 because 

ETOPS approval is an optional 

certification for manufacturers. The 

NPRM contained three provisions under 

this section. These included showing 

compliance with part 25 requirements 

considering the maximum mission time 

and longest diversion time, considering 

crew workload and operational 

implications and the flight crew’s and 

passengers’ physiological needs 

following system failures, and 

complying with the requirements of a 

new part 25 appendix. The specific 

airworthiness requirements applicable 

to ETOPS type design approval are 

contained in that appendix.16

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1821 

more appropriately located in new appendix K. In 

this final rule, we have re-identified these 

subparagraphs as paragraphs K25.1 and K25.1.2. 

17The FAA believes the accommodation to 

existing type certificate designs should relieve the 

concerns raised by NACA regarding the economic 

impracticability of the new requirements for 

existing airplane designs, a concern shared by the 

FAA. 

18The particular section mentioned in Dassault’s 

comment codifies a provision of the 207-minute 

ETOPS policy letter EPL 20–1. As stated in the 

preamble to the NPRM, loss of normal electrical 

power to the boost pumps is the primary cause of 

the loss of fuel system boost pressure. The FAA 

finds it necessary to include this requirement in 

order to address this specific cause of loss of fuel 

boost pressure on airplanes being certified for 

greater than 180 minute ETOPS. Paragraph 

K25.1.4(a) defines the basic objective for the fuel 

system design. Changes to this rule in response to 

Boeing comments on that provision provide a less 

restrictive requirement while maintaining the basic 

objective. 

1. General 

Today’s rule adopts a regulatory 

scheme that airplane manufacturers 

must follow to receive ETOPS type 

design approval. Airplanes with existing 

type certificates at the time this rule 

becomes effective are exempted from 

some or all of the new part 25 

requirements (see § 25.3).17 The 

inclusion of type design requirements 

and reliability validation methods in the 

rule has been objected to by the JAA and 

the UK CAA. They state a regulatory 

approach is too prescriptive and does 

not allow any flexibility for alternative 

reliability methods. These commenters 

add that the design materials are already 

included as objective requirements in 

Title 14 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations. Further, they state that the 

reliability validation process should be 

included as interpretive material to be 

agreed upon at the time of application. 

The FAA understands that the 

European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) may be taking a different 

approach in overseeing ETOPS design 

criteria. We believe JAA’s and UK 

CAA’s comments reflect this 

philosophy. The type design 

requirements and reliability validation 

methods adopted today are the result of 

nearly 20 years of successful experience 

in certifying airplanes for ETOPS. 

However, most of this experience comes 

from the two major transport airplane 

manufacturers in the world today. As 

ETOPS has grown, and now with the 

new operating requirements expanding 

ETOPS to part 135 airplanes, we expect 

many more manufacturers to apply for 

ETOPS type design approval. 

The type design requirements 

contained in this rule provide a 

consistent standard of proven ETOPS 

type design approval methods for the 

new applicants. This will ensure that all 

manufacturers use the same methods as 

used successfully in previous ETOPS 

approvals the FAA granted under AC 

120–42A and the Boeing Model 777 

ETOPS special conditions. 

We also disagree that the 

airworthiness standard contained in 

appendix K does not allow any 

flexibility for alternative reliability 

methods. If an applicant chooses to 

pursue validation methods different 

from those in appendix K, the applicant 

may do so under § 21.21(b)(1). 

Dassault stated that parts of the 

proposal, such as the requirement for an 

independent electrical power source for 

fuel boost pumps and cross-feed valve 

actuation, would impose a system 

architecture. Dassault notes that the goal 

of a requirement should be to set safety 

objectives rather than drive airplane 

systems design. 

We agree with Dassault’s basic 

premise that the goal of a requirement 

should be objective rather than 

prescriptive. We have made every effort 

to define objective requirements 

whenever possible except where 

existing experience dictates that a 

specific design requirement is necessary 

to provide an acceptable level of 

safety.18

Dassault also stated that the NPRM 

lacked information that normally would 

be part of an advisory circular. It 

recommended the FAA publish the 

advisory circular and then reopen the 

comment period. We have decided 

against delaying this rule until after 

publication of an advisory circular on 

the proposed rule. Since the advisory 

circular defines an acceptable method of 

compliance, but not the only method, it 

is not a necessary element of the rule. 

Dassault will have an opportunity to 

comment on the associated advisory 

circular under a separate notice of 

availability. 

2. Additional Airworthiness 

Requirements for Approval of an 

Airplane-Engine Combination for 

ETOPS (Part 25, Appendix K) 

The NPRM proposed adding a new 

appendix K, which defines specific 

airworthiness requirements for type 

certification of an airplane for ETOPS. 

The appendix is divided into three 

parts. Section K25.1 is applicable to all 

airplanes, K25.2 is applicable to 

airplanes with two engines, and K25.3 

is applicable to airplanes with more 

than two engines. 

The NPRM divided the appendix into 

three sections I, II, and III. Paragraphs of 

each section were labeled sequentially 

as (a), (b), (c), and so on. This 

numbering system led to confusion on 

how to refer to paragraphs from 

different sections with the same 

number. In this final rule, we have 

reorganized the paragraph numbering to 

include the applicable section in the 

paragraph number. This renumbering 

more clearly identifies which section of 

the appendix a particular paragraph is 

in. 

Appendix K—Design Requirements 

(K25.1) 

We moved paragraphs (a) and (b) from 

proposed § 25.1535 in the NPRM to 

K25.1 as these are design requirements 

that an applicant must comply with for 

all airplane-engine combinations 

proposed for ETOPS type design 

approval. The following discussion of 

comments refers to the designation of 

these paragraphs in the final rule. 

Boeing stated that the ARAC proposal 

did not discuss how system safety 

assessments are conducted for ETOPS. 

Boeing points out that the JAA’s draft 

Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 

addresses how to conduct system safety 

assessments for group 1 versus group 2 

systems and recommends the FAA 

include similar information in its 

guidance material. Boeing recommends 

the FAA acknowledge in the preamble 

that the system safety assessments are 

different for group 1 and group 2 

systems and reference the JAA’s draft 

NPA. 

Boeing is correct that ARAC did not 

discuss how airplane system safety 

assessments are to be conducted for 

ETOPS. However, we disagree with 

Boeing that there should be a difference 

between Group 1 and Group 2 systems. 

Section K25.1 simply requires an 

applicant to comply with the 

requirements of part 25 considering the 

maximum flight time and the longest 

diversion time for which the applicant 

seeks approval. Airplane safety 

assessments would be covered under 

the specific objectives of §§ 25.901(c) 

and 25.1309 considering these 

additional factors. 

The FAA has already established a 

body of policy for showing compliance 

with these sections. These policies do 

not differentiate between systems whose 

design depends on the number of 

engines from those that do not. Boeing 

did not provide any justification for 

treating relevant system failure 

conditions for ETOPS assessment 

differently just because they are 

associated with Group 2 systems. The 

main impact that ETOPS will have on 

airplane safety assessments is a 

potential increased hazard when 

considering the long range and 

diversion distances associated with an 

ETOPS flight. The purpose of 

conducting the airplane safety 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1822 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

assessments required by §§ 25.901(c) 

and 25.1309 are to evaluate the airplane 

for potentially hazardous safety 

conditions that are not specifically 

addressed elsewhere in the rule. 

Boeing also provides suggested 

language for system safety assessments 

to be included in the ETOPS advisory 

circular. That language is not relevant to 

the specific safety objective of paragraph 

K25.1.1. However, Boeing will have an 

opportunity to comment on the part 25 

ETOPS AC under a separate notice of 

availability. 

Although paragraph K25.1.1 would 

require an applicant to consider the 

flight crew’s and passengers’

physiological needs following failures 

during a maximum length diversion, 

Transport Canada is concerned about 

the introduction of new technologies 

such as onboard oxygen generating 

systems. These systems would allow 

flight with a depressurized cabin at 

altitudes in excess of 15,000 feet, which 

would require less fuel for diversions on 

ETOPS flights because airplanes do not 

use as much fuel at higher altitudes. 

Transport Canada stated that the 

NPRM does not adequately address the 

potential physiological problems for 

crewmembers or passengers associated 

with continued exposure to higher 

altitudes even if breathing 100 percent 

oxygen. Therefore, Transport Canada 

recommends the FAA revise the 

appendix to include a maximum 

decompression profile altitude, such as 

18,000 feet. 

We agree that Transport Canada’s 

comment has merit, but is beyond the 

scope of this rulemaking project, which 

was to codify existing ETOPS standards 

and certain ARAC recommendations. 

The FAA is investigating specific policy 

or future regulations for the certification 

of onboard oxygen generating systems. 

When we receive an application for 

approval of such a system, we will 

apply this policy as interpretation of 

existing regulations or introduce special 

conditions if appropriate. 

Appendix K—Operation in icing 

conditions (K25.1.3(a)) 

The NPRM proposed that an ETOPS 

airplane must be certified for flight in 

icing conditions in accordance with 

§ 25.1419, which is otherwise optional. 

In addition, the NPRM proposed that 

the ice protection systems must be 

capable of continued safe flight and 

landing at engine inoperative and 

decompression altitudes in icing 

conditions, and the applicant show the 

unprotected areas of the airplane would 

not collect a load of ice that would make 

the airplane uncontrollable or create too 

much drag to safely complete a 

diversion in icing conditions. 

Only ALPA supported the proposed 

requirements for operation in icing 

conditions without change. New World 

Jet stated the manufacturer already 

demonstrates that its airplanes can 

operate in icing conditions and 

questions why the proposal would be 

different from normal requirements. 

Although airplanes are regularly 

certified for flight into known icing 

conditions under § 25.1419, part 25 does 

not require that certification in order to 

be granted a type certificate. Paragraph 

K25.1.3(a)(1) of today’s rule makes 

certified flight into known icing 

conditions a prerequisite for ETOPS 

approval. The other part of paragraph 

K25.1.3(a)(2) addresses the unique 

aspects of operation in icing conditions 

during an ETOPS flight not now covered 

in a basic part 25 evaluation of flight 

into icing conditions. 

Boeing agrees the FAA needs to 

codify the icing criteria in AC 120–42A, 

paragraph 8(b)(11). However, Boeing is 

concerned the proposed requirement 

could create confusion with respect to 

compliance with § 25.1419 and the 

operational fuel planning requirements 

in parts 121 and 135. Boeing 

recommends the rule be rewritten to a 

single requirement stating, ‘‘The 

airplane must be able to safely conduct 

an ETOPS diversion in icing 

conditions.’’

The FAA does not believe paragraph 

K25.1.3(a) will create confusion with 

respect to compliance with the basic 

§ 25.1419 icing regulation and the 

operational fuel planning requirements 

in parts 121 and 135. In addition to 

applying to airplane manufacturers 

under part 25, rather than operators 

under parts 121 or 135, the objectives of 

paragraph K25.1.3.(a), including 

§ 25.1419, are different from the fuel 

planning requirements of parts 121 and 

135. The part 25 requirements establish 

that an airplane can operate safely in 

icing conditions that could be 

encountered during an ETOPS flight. 

The operational requirements ensure 

enough fuel is onboard to safely 

complete a flight along a route with 

known icing conditions. In order to 

establish safe operation, the 

manufacturer must define the most 

critical ice accumulation that may occur 

on the airplane. This accumulation 

usually also results in the highest fuel 

usage. Thus, it is likely the airplane 

manufacturer will use the testing and 

analysis performed for compliance with 

paragraph K25.1.3(a) to develop the 

performance data an operator will need 

for compliance with the fuel planning 

requirements of parts 121 and 135. 

The JAA and UK CAA state the terms 

‘‘load of ice’’ and ‘‘too much drag’’ in 

the proposed appendix are not 

appropriate language for regulatory 

material because they lack precision. 

Airbus recommends the FAA withdraw 

the proposed requirement because this 

issue is not unique to ETOPS and would 

be more appropriately addressed under 

a general rulemaking action. 

We agree the proposed paragraphs 

lacked normal regulatory precision. We 

also agree with Boeing that the intent of 

AC 120–42A was to ensure the airplane 

would continue to be airworthy, 

considering the exposure to potential 

icing conditions during an ETOPS 

diversion at engine-inoperative or 

decompression altitudes. 

The NPRM proposed requirements to 

meet this objective, but did not clearly 

state that continued safe flight and 

landing at engine inoperative and 

decompression altitudes in icing 

conditions applies to all of the flight 

phases during an ETOPS diversion, 

including a 15-minute hold. The NPRM 

also did not define the icing conditions 

to consider during each of these flight 

phases. 

In § 25.1419, safe operations with ice 

accretions on the protected and 

unprotected areas are considered, but 

not specifically mentioned. The FAA 

has revised this final rule to more 

clearly state which flight phases and 

associated icing conditions must be 

considered during an ETOPS diversion. 

Paragraph K25.1.3(a)(2), requires that 

the airplane must be able to safely 

conduct an ETOPS diversion with the 

most critical ice accretion resulting 

from: 

(A) Icing conditions encountered at an 

altitude that the airplane would have to 

fly following an engine failure or cabin 

decompression; and 

(B) A 15-minute hold in the 

continuous maximum icing conditions 

of Appendix C with a liquid water 

content factor of 1.0. 

(C) Ice accumulated during approach 

and landing in Appendix C icing 

conditions. 

This new paragraph makes the rule 

language similar to § 25.1419 while 

adding the icing conditions encountered 

during an altitude-limited diversion to 

those factors currently evaluated under 

§ 25.1419. 

Boeing, Dassault, and Airbus all state 

additional guidance for this rule is 

needed in an associated advisory 

circular. Dassault and Airbus stated the 

NPRM would require analytical and 

flight testing to assess the impact of ice 

accumulation. The commenters add that 

without guidance material describing 

the assessment, they cannot comment 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1823 

19The Atmospheric Environment Service (AES) 

of Canada with support from the National Research 

Council (NRC) of Canada conducted the Second 

Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP II) out of 

St. John’s, Newfoundland during the period of 

January 16 through March 16, 1992. The objective 

of this program was to study the icing climatology 

off the east coast of Canada to provide better short 

term, severe weather forecasting for the area around 

the Hibernia Oil Fields and the cod fishing ground 

in the Grand Banks. ARAC used the data from this 

research to evaluate the severity and extent of icing 

conditions that may be encountered during an 

ETOPS diversion. 

properly on this section. Airbus also 

adds that it is inappropriate for the FAA 

to define a critical test parameter in an 

advisory circular. 

As discussed above, the FAA has 

revised this final rule to clarify the flight 

phases and associated icing conditions 

to consider during an ETOPS diversion. 

The FAA disagrees that the associated 

guidance material is necessary to 

properly comment on the proposal. 

Airbus rightfully notes that it is 

inappropriate for the FAA to define a 

critical test parameter in an advisory 

circular, and the FAA is not doing that. 

Rather, the advisory circular merely will 

describe an acceptable method for 

showing compliance with the new rule. 

The rule as revised stands on its own 

merit. The second and third provisions 

of the revised paragraph K25.1.3(a)(2) 

are based on Appendix C icing 

conditions that are currently evaluated 

for compliance with § 25.1419. There is 

currently no accepted industry standard 

for icing conditions that may be 

encountered during an altitude-limited 

diversion due to an engine failure or 

cabin decompression. Until such an 

industry standard is developed and 

accepted by the FAA, each applicant 

will have to propose an acceptable 

method for showing compliance with 

this requirement. 

Airbus stated that the preamble does 

not indicate why the FAA increased the 

severity of the certification standards 

and does not relate the increase to a 

clearly documented service event or 

safety problem that has occurred. Nor 

does the economic impact assessment 

compare the cost of the proposed type 

design assessment to the expanded 

safety benefit. Airbus stated the FAA 

proposed to reduce the contribution of 

icing in the ETOPS fuel reserve 

calculations compared with the reserves 

required by current ETOPS criteria as a 

result of the CASP II 19 icing research 

program that ARAC extensively used to 

show that prolonged substantial icing 

was virtually impossible during a 

diversion. On the other hand, Airbus 

pointed out that the type design rule 

seems to assume that extremely severe 

icing beyond the level covered by 

normal certification criteria may be 

encountered during engine inoperative 

diversions at decompression altitudes. 

Thus, Airbus posited that the proposed 

type design rule appears to contradict 

the operating rule, which excludes 

significant prolonged icing. 

We have not increased the severity of 

part 25 certification standards as 

indicated by Airbus’ comments. ETOPS 

approvals accomplished in accordance 

with AC 120–42A have included 

conditions that were not previously 

considered during a part 25 certification 

program. This rule codifies the existing 

ETOPS policies and practices. 

Consequently, the part 25 regulations 

address the ETOPS-related issues that 

were addressed in previous ETOPS 

approvals. The FAA has determined 

that the current policies applied to 

approve airplanes for ETOPS have 

provided an acceptable level of safety. 

This rule simply codifies these policies. 

The FAA does not agree that the type 

certification and operating rules are 

contradictory. Previous ETOPS type 

design approvals have included an 

evaluation of the drag effects of 

conservative ice accumulations on 

airplane surfaces. The FAA determined 

that this conservatism, combined with 

the operational fuel reserves resulting 

from the original ETOPS icing fuel 

planning requirements, has been 

excessive. The NPRM proposed to 

reduce the fuel reserves required for 

ETOPS operational dispatch on the 

assumption that the fuel consumption 

used for fuel planning would be based 

upon the conservative ice shapes used 

during the type certification of the 

airplane. 

The Final Regulatory Evaluation 

includes the overall cost to comply with 

the proposed rulemaking and the overall 

benefit of the rule. The ETOPS icing 

requirements define additional 

conditions that an applicant must 

consider when showing compliance 

with § 25.1419 to certify an airplane for 

flight in icing. The maximum ice 

accretion on an airplane during an 

ETOPS diversion will be compared to 

the maximum accretion from other icing 

conditions used for icing certification to 

determine the most critical ice shapes to 

demonstrate during certification flight 

testing. The applicant will also likely 

use these ice shapes to define fuel 

consumption in icing conditions that 

the operators will use for ETOPS fuel 

planning. 

Airbus indicates that the rule seems to 

assume the airplane will encounter 

‘‘extreme severe icing’’ during a 

diversion. This interpretation of the 

proposed amendment is incorrect. The 

rule requires an applicant consider icing 

conditions expected to occur at the 

altitudes an airplane would fly during a 

maximum length diversion with an 

inoperative engine or depressurized 

cabin. The rule merely requires the 

consideration that the airplane may be 

at altitudes conducive to icing for 

extended distances. The FAA does not 

consider this to be extremely severe 

icing, although the resulting ice 

accumulations may be greater than that 

resulting from traditional compliance 

with § 25.1419. 

We acknowledge the CASP II icing 

research that Airbus cites showing that 

prolonged substantial icing is virtually 

impossible during a diversion. However, 

the CASP II data only covers a limited 

part of the globe in the North Atlantic 

region. Since a significant future growth 

is forecast for ETOPS in the Arctic, 

Antarctic and Southern oceanic areas, 

we are concerned about the ice 

accumulation that may occur during 

altitude-limited diversions in those 

areas. 

As we indicated above, each applicant 

will have to propose an acceptable 

method for showing compliance with 

the icing requirements. The applicant 

may use whatever data at its disposal to 

justify the icing conditions used to 

determine the most critical ice accretion 

during an altitude limited diversion. 

Dassault recommends the FAA not go 

beyond already established certification 

standards, in particular the maximum 

three inches of ice in the JAA’s 

proposed Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) 

25.1419. Dassault’s proposal would 

impose a specific design requirement in 

this rule. In keeping with our overall 

objective of basing regulations on the 

safety objectives, instead of driving 

airplane design, we are not adopting 

Dassault’s recommendation. Each 

applicant will have to propose an 

acceptable method for determining the 

ice thickness to be evaluated in order to 

meet the overall objectives of the 

requirement. 

The British Air Line Pilots 

Association (BALPA) notes that an 

auxiliary power unit could be 

susceptible to icing during prolonged 

exposure to icing conditions while on 

the ground. BALPA is concerned that 

running the APU in flight during 

prolonged icing conditions may result 

in surging or failure and loss while the 

APU is being used as a critical power 

source. As a result, BALPA recommends 

the FAA amend the rule to require an 

APU to continue to function in icing 

conditions. 

The FAA agrees with BALPA that an 

APU could be susceptible to icing 

during prolonged exposure to icing 

conditions. The FAA evaluates APU 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1824 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

20Four commenters remarked that the threegenerator requirement was too prescriptive. These 

commenters believe that the rule should allow the 

safety analyses to dictate the number of electrical 

power sources rather than specifying a number in 

the rule. We disagree that the rule is too 

prescriptive. This paragraph establishes a consistent 

industry minimum standard for ETOPS in keeping 

with the original objective of paragraph 8(b)(8) of 

AC 120–42A. 

exposure to icing conditions during 

basic certification of the airplane for 

compliance with § 25.1093(b). This 

evaluation includes the ground 

operating condition, which historically 

has been the most severe operating 

environment for an APU in icing 

conditions. This finding correlates with 

the commenter’s own experience. 

However, the FAA does not believe that 

a change to the rule is necessary. New 

section K25.1 will require an applicant 

to consider the ETOPS mission in 

showing compliance with the 

requirements of part 25. For an APU, 

this would include operation in icing 

conditions for compliance with the 

applicable part 25 APU icing 

requirements. 

Airbus stated that three- and fourengine airplane service experience 

indicates that depressurization events 

almost never occur in cruise or during 

the ETOPS portion of the flight. It goes 

on to state that engine failures do not 

put three- and four-engine airplanes at 

icing altitudes. Airbus contends that 

there is no support for applying the type 

design rule to three- and four-engine 

airplanes. 

Though uncommon, decompression 

events have occurred at cruise altitudes. 

Furthermore, most decompression 

events are independent of the number of 

engines on the airplane. Following 

decompression, it is common practice to 

descend to and maintain an altitude 

where supplemental oxygen is not 

required. This would result in operation 

of the airplane at altitudes where icing 

can occur. 

The FAA agrees that the engine 

inoperative altitudes for three- and fourengine airplanes may place them above 

altitudes conducive to icing. This would 

mean that the engine inoperative 

diversion would not contribute to the 

most critical ice accretion that the 

applicant must consider for compliance 

with the rule. However, the applicant 

would still have to consider the ice 

accretion during a 15-minute hold, 

approach and landing as those phases of 

flight are relevant to all airplanes 

regardless of the number of engines. 

Appendix K—Electrical power supply 

(paragraph K25.1.3(b)) 

The NPRM proposed requirements for 

airplane electrical system reliability, 

including a requirement that airplanes 

certified for ETOPS greater than 180 

minutes must be equipped with at least 

three independent electrical generation 

sources. 

The JAA and the UK CAA state that 

the second and third electrical system 

requirements proposed in the NPRM are 

objective requirements already covered 

in part 25 and JAR 25. The FAA agrees. 

These proposed paragraphs are 

essentially restatements of 

§ 25.1309(b)(1) and (2), which are 

already required for ETOPS airplanes by 

new paragraph K25.1.1. These 

paragraphs are deleted from the final 

rule. 

ALPA expressed concern that the 

proposal did not conform to the current 

standard of requiring three independent 

electrical power sources for all twoengine airplanes approved for ETOPS, 

including for diversion times less than 

180 minutes. ALPA stated that ARAC 

was tasked with codifying current 

design and MMEL relief provisions for 

two-engine airplanes. ALPA expressed 

discomfort with the lack of justification 

in the NPRM for ignoring current 

requirements. ALPA also suggested that 

future three- and four-engine airplanes 

could be developed with fewer than 

three electrical power sources. ALPA 

proposed changes to the rule to ensure 

that all ETOPS airplanes covered by part 

121 and two-engine airplanes covered 

by part 135 would comply with the 

three-generator requirement. 

The FAA acknowledged in the NPRM 

that the three-generator requirement 

would apply only to airplanes being 

certified for greater than 180-minute 

ETOPS. AC 120–42A specifies three 

generators for any airplane approved for 

ETOPS under this guidance. However, 

the FAA also stated in the NPRM that 

the proposed requirement represented a 

compromise position that allowed 

ARAC consensus on the proposal. ALPA 

is the only organization to comment that 

the rule should apply to ETOPS 

approval of any two-engine airplane 

intended for part 121 operations, 

indicating general support for this 

compromise. 

However, after further consideration, 

and in order to establish a consistent 

industry minimum standard for ETOPS, 

the FAA has revised paragraph 

K25.1.3(b) to require a minimum of 

three independent sources of electrical 

power for all airplanes being approved 

for ETOPS without regard to maximum 

diversion time. Manufacturers already 

have to comply with § 25.1309. The 

FAA has determined from service 

experience that a minimum of three 

electrical power sources is necessary to 

comply with the objectives of § 25.1309 

when considering long ETOPS 

diversions. Paragraph K25.1.3(b) 

codifies the ‘‘three-generator’’ criteria of 

paragraph 8.(b)(8) of AC 120–42A.20

New World Jet commented that levels 

of risk are defined based upon systems 

design and failure rate and then 

compared to a determined level of 

acceptable risk for the operation to be 

conducted. If the risk is within an 

acceptable level, the aircraft should be 

allowed to operate at the specified 

number of minutes from an airport. The 

probability of an event associated with 

aircraft system failures, rather than the 

number of generators, should determine 

if an aircraft is qualified for a route. 

The FAA agrees that the level of risk 

of a system failure should be 

commensurate with its effect on the 

safety of the airplane. The airplane 

system assessments required by 

§ 25.1309 do exactly as New World Jet 

suggested. New section K25.1 would 

require an applicant to show 

compliance with this section 

considering the effects of a system 

failure during an ETOPS flight. The 

three generator requirement of 

paragraph K25.1.3(b) is an 

acknowledgement that electrical 

generator technology has not yet 

achieved a level of reliability that would 

allow an electrical system design with 

fewer than three generator sources and 

still meet the system safety objectives of 

§ 25.1309 for ETOPS approval. 

The JAA and the UK CAA stated that 

the JAA specifies what loads each 

electrical power source should be 

capable of powering in an Advisory 

Circular Joint. Since each new airplane 

may have unique electrically powered 

functions that are critical to continued 

safe flight and landing, the FAA is 

reluctant to specify a list of functions. 

The safety assessments required under 

§ 25.1309 will determine what system 

functions must be powered by the three 

required electrical power sources. These 

assessments should consider the 

cumulative effect on airplane safety 

from the loss of seemingly unrelated 

airplane system functions resulting from 

the same loss of power. 

The JAA and UK CAA add that for 

beyond 180-minute ETOPS, a fourth 

stand-by power source is needed, 

because it is unlikely that three power 

sources would meet the safety objectives 

associated with the total loss of 

electrical power. The FAA does not 

have any data to confirm a fourth standby electrical power source would be 

required to meet the safety objectives 

associated with the total loss of 

electrical power for diversion times 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1825 

greater than 180 minutes. Accordingly, 

the FAA is comfortable in letting the 

safety analyses of § 25.1309 determine if 

additional power sources are required. 

American Airlines asks whether a ram 

air turbine generator would be 

considered an alternative source of 

electrical generation for compliance 

with the rule or whether the APU is the 

only acceptable third independent 

source of power for a ‘‘legacy’’ aircraft 

like the Boeing Model 777. It further 

queries whether the determination of 

the three independent electrical 

generation sources is left to the 

discretion of the individual operators or 

the aircraft manufacturer. 

The airplane manufacturer will 

decide what power sources constitute 

the three independent electrical power 

sources for compliance with paragraph 

K25.1.3(b). Any electrical power source 

that provides those airplane functions 

for continued safe flight and landing 

during an ETOPS diversion would 

qualify as one of the three independent 

sources of electrical power. Electrical 

power sources the FAA has accepted for 

meeting this requirement include 

generators powered by a ram air turbine 

(RAT), APU generators, or dedicated 

back-up generators driven by the main 

engines. Future airplanes may have 

other arrangements to meet this 

requirement. 

Appendix K—Time-limited systems 

(K25.1.3(c)) and Airplane flight manual 

(K25.1.7(d)) 

The NPRM proposed to add a new 

requirement to existing § 25.857(c)(2) 

that would require an applicant to 

provide the certified time capability of 

a Class C cargo compartment fire 

suppression system in the airplane 

flight manual for ETOPS approval. One 

paragraph in the proposed appendix 

would have required an applicant to 

define each ETOPS significant system 

that is time-limited while a separate 

paragraph in that appendix would have 

required the airplane flight manual to 

contain the maximum diversion time 

capability of the airplane. 

The JAA and the UK CAA commented 

that it is not clear whether the certified 

time capability of the cargo fire 

extinguishing system under the 

proposed § 25.857(c)(2) would be 

considered as a particular case or if it 

would be treated separately as 

additional time limited information 

under the proposed appendix. They also 

commented that the rule should 

indicate how to translate the maximum 

system capability into maximum 

diversion time. 

The FAA agrees that the NPRM was 

unclear how proposed § 25.857(c)(2) 

and the two paragraphs of the proposed 

appendix are related to each other. We 

also agree that it was not clear how 

cargo and baggage compartment fire 

suppression system information and 

other limiting airplane systems’ timecapability should be defined in the 

airplane flight manual. We have revised 

this final rule to state that the applicant 

must define the system time-capability 

of each ETOPS Significant System that 

is time-limited under appendix K 

(K25.1.3(c)). A time-limited cargo fire 

suppression system for any cargo or 

baggage compartments would be 

included under this requirement. 

We have also revised the airplane 

flight manual requirement in paragraph 

K25.1.7(d) to require the operator to 

identify in the airplane flight manual 

the system time-capability for both the 

most limiting fire suppression system 

for any cargo or baggage compartment 

and the most limiting ETOPS 

Significant System other than fire 

suppression for cargo and baggage 

compartments. It is necessary to specify 

both times in the airplane flight manual 

because of how they are used in the 

operating rules to determine the 

maximum diversion time that an 

airplane may fly. We are withdrawing 

the proposed change to § 25.857(c)(2), 

because we have determined it is no 

longer needed and is potentially 

confusing. 

The FAA likewise recognizes that the 

proposed paragraph on maximum 

diversion time capability for the flight 

manual was confusing. We did not 

intend to require the maximum 

diversion time capability be stated in 

the airplane flight manual. The 

maximum diversion time that an 

airplane may operate is controlled by 

the operating rules in parts 121 and 135. 

Our changes to this requirement in 

paragraph K25.1.7(d) described above 

clarify our original intent. 

Boeing stated the FAA needs to issue 

advisory material to clarify the 

compliance methods for obtaining 

ETOPS approval of cargo compartments. 

Boeing recommended the FAA allow 

certification of any required changes 

using the policies and certification 

methodology in place at the time of 

original type certification of the 

airplane. Boeing also stated that 

compliance with the flight test 

requirements in § 25.855(h)(3) should be 

allowed based on data from the original 

certification flight tests of the airplane 

model being modified. Boeing added 

that additional flight testing should be 

required only if novel systems designs 

are used. 

In its comment, Boeing seemed to be 

concerned about the certification of 

increased capacity cargo or baggage 

compartment fire suppression systems 

on currently certified airplanes. The 

requirements of the Changed Product 

Rule, § 21.101, will apply to the 

modification of currently certificated 

airplanes. The certification of timelimited cargo or baggage compartment 

fire suppression systems will be done in 

accordance with the applicable 

certification requirements, methods, and 

policy as determined through 

compliance with § 21.101. 

Appendix K—Fuel system design 

(K25.1.4(a)) 

The NPRM proposed three 

requirements for an airplane fuel system 

design. The first would require that the 

system supply fuel to the engines at a 

pressure required by the engine type 

certificate for any failure condition not 

shown to be extremely improbable. The 

second would require one fuel boost 

pump in each tank and at least one 

crossfeed valve to be powered by a backup electrical generation source other 

than the primary engine or APU driven 

generators. The third fuel system 

provision would require alerts to be 

displayed to the flight crew when the 

quantity of fuel falls below the level 

required to complete a flight. 

Boeing stated the FAA has 

unintentionally proposed an increase to 

the safety requirements for existing 

ETOPS approvals. This section 

presented objective requirements but 

does not take into consideration the 

practical impact on fuel system design. 

Boeing noted the FAA’s explanation in 

the NPRM suggests that there must 

always be a method for boosting the fuel 

pressure delivered to the engine beyond 

what is available from head pressure or 

fuel tank ram air rise. Boeing pointed 

out that with today’s fuel boost pumps 

and their associated reliability, the 

standard design configuration of two 

fuel boost pumps per tank would not 

meet the intent of this section. 

Boeing agreed it is important that fuel 

be available to the operating engine or 

engines at the pressure and flow 

required for safe operation. Boeing 

pointed out that the ARAC and the JAA 

working groups extensively discussed 

this issue and the intent of this 

requirement was to ensure the fuel boost 

pumps would function following all 

power supply failures not shown to be 

extremely improbable. Boeing stated 

ARAC found the two fuel boost pumps 

per tank configuration was satisfactory 

for any length ETOPS operation and 

determined adding boost pumps to a 

fuel tank would be detrimental and 

introduce additional complexity to the 

fuel system without any benefit. Boeing 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1826 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

21Boeing recommended rule changes that add 

certain conditions that an applicant must consider 

if suction feed is to be a means to comply with the 

rule. We agree that these conditions further clarify 

the meaning of the rule and have added them to the 

final rule as paragraph (1), (1)(i) and (1)(ii) with 

editorial changes to state the requirement in proper 

regulatory language. The following paragraphs 

proposed in the NPRM have been re-numbered 

sequentially. 

stated the JAA’s draft Notice of 

Proposed Amendment allows engine 

operation at negative fuel pressures 

(suction feed) provided appropriate 

criteria are met. Boeing disagreed with 

the NPRM and stated that not allowing 

suction feed is overly restrictive. Boeing 

also suggested rule language changes 

consistent with their comments 

including provisions for demonstrating 

suction feed operation. 

We disagree with Boeing’s proposal to 

limit consideration of loss of fuel boost 

pressure to only fuel pump power 

supply failures. The proposed rule 

stated a clear objective that the airplane 

fuel system must deliver fuel to the 

engines at the pressure and flow they 

require for any intended operation 

following airplane failure conditions 

that are not extremely improbable. 

These may include failures to more than 

just the fuel pump power supply. 

This rule intentionally increases the 

safety standard from that applied to 

airplanes approved under the previous 

guidance. The FAA went to great 

lengths in the NPRM to explain the 

safety justification for this requirement. 

Section 25.1351(d) requires an applicant 

to show that an airplane can operate 

safely in visual flight rule weather 

conditions for at least 5 minutes with 

normal electrical power inoperative 

using the type fuel most likely to cause 

an engine flameout with the airplane 

initially at its maximum altitude. 

Airplane manufacturers show 

compliance with this requirement by 

demonstrating that an engine will start 

on suction feed following an expected 

engine flameout at this altitude. The 

reason this demonstration is required 

for a minimum of five-minutes is to give 

time for the flight crew to restore normal 

electrical power to the fuel boost pumps 

after engine restart. 

Current regulations do not require 

applicants to demonstrate the engines 

will operate at negative pump inlet 

pressures (suction feed) for extended 

periods of time. The types of engine 

failure conditions that could result from 

suction feed operation fall into two 

categories, engine operating problems 

and mechanical failures. Engine 

operating problems could mean engine 

instability, permanent loss of thrust, or 

flameout. Mechanical failures to the 

engine pump would result in flameout 

and permanent loss of the engine for the 

remainder of the flight. 

The FAA is aware of at least one 

engine pump failure that occurred on a 

test stand during a non-required 

demonstration of suction feed operation. 

A loss of fuel boost pressure to more 

than one engine during an ETOPS 

diversion on an airplane with engines 

with this kind of vulnerability could 

potentially result in the failure of 

multiple engines from the same cause. 

However, contrary to Boeing’s 

comments, certifying an engine for 

extended suction feed operation is an 

acceptable option for complying with 

paragraph K25.1.4(a). In this case, the 

airplane manufacturer must design a 

fuel feed system to deliver fuel to the 

engine above a certified suction feed 

pump inlet pressure limit established 

for the engine under § 33.7. The engine 

manufacturer must demonstrate 

acceptable engine operation and 

integrity under part 33 in order to 

establish this suction feed limit. 

The effect of today’s rule is to ensure 

that the engines will always have fuel 

delivered at normal pump inlet 

pressure, or that the engines are 

certified to operate for the longest 

diversion time for which the airplane 

manufacturer is requesting approval at 

the lowest engine pump inlet pressure 

expected to occur during operation with 

the normal airplane fuel boost pumps 

inoperative. If an applicant chooses to 

use suction feed as a means to comply 

with this rule, it must demonstrate safe 

operation of the airplane in that 

configuration.21

When using suction feed to comply 

with this requirement, the Instructions 

for Continued Airworthiness developed 

in accordance with § 25.1529 must 

include procedures for maintaining the 

integrity of the fuel system plumbing. 

The purpose of these procedures is to 

prevent the introduction of air into the 

fuel feed lines during suction feed 

operation. Any air in the fuel feed lines 

can lead to flameout of a turbine engine. 

Boeing recommends revising the 

proposed requirement for an alternative 

fuel boost pump power source to not 

limit it to a back-up electrical generator. 

Boeing stated that an acceptable design 

could be a four-generator system, all 

with equal capability. We agree with the 

intent of Boeing’s comment that the 

back-up generator source required in 

proposed requirement could include a 

fourth main electrical generator instead 

of a back-up generator system. We have 

broadened the requirement of 

K25.1.4(a)(2) to state that for two-engine 

airplanes to be certified for ETOPS 

beyond 180 minutes, one fuel boost 

pump in each main tank and the 

actuation capability of at least one 

crossfeed valve must be capable of being 

powered by an independent electrical 

generation source other than the three 

required to comply with K25.1.3(b). 

This requirement does not apply if the 

required fuel boost pressure or crossfeed 

valve actuation is not provided by 

electrical power. 

Dassault commented that it 

understands the FAA’s intent for an 

automatic warning to clearly indicate to 

the flight crew what’s wrong with the 

fuel system, but believes this is not the 

only way to achieve this goal. Dassault 

stated that pilot training and fully 

developed flightcrew procedures are 

another efficient way to achieve the 

same goal. Dassault pointed out that 

automatic fuel alerts would require 

flightcrew initialization before the 

flight. Dassault noted that the human 

error during this procedure is of the 

same order of magnitude as the 

application of procedures. Therefore, 

Dassault stated that adequate pilot 

training and procedures provide an 

equivalent means of compliance. 

UPS stated that an automatic warning 

is not necessary for three- and fourengine ETOPS airplanes because of their 

demonstrated safety and reliability. UPS 

pointed out that the rule seems to 

assume a two-crew airplane and does 

not take airplanes with three 

crewmembers into account. UPS added 

that compliance with this section would 

require extensive modifications to threeand four-engine airplanes to add flight 

management computers to provide the 

required alerts. It argued this burden is 

unjustified because there is no need for 

the automatic warning. 

The FAA does not believe crew 

training and fuel management 

procedures are a long-term solution for 

the types of fuel exhaustion events the 

FAA is addressing with this 

requirement. Dassault’s proposal in 

effect would not require anything not 

already done operationally. The low 

fuel alerting system will provide a safety 

net for major fuel loss events or fuel 

loading errors perhaps too difficult to 

detect by operational procedures alone, 

such as occurred in 2001 when an Air 

Transat A330 was forced to land in the 

Azores following an all engine flameout 

from fuel exhaustion. 

However, we recognize some existing 

airplanes may have difficulty in 

complying with this requirement 

without substantial airplane system 

modifications. Also, older three-crew 

airplanes have a flight engineer who 

monitors fuel quantity throughout a 

long flight. The FAA considers this 

additional crewmember to be an 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1827 

acceptable alternative to the automatic 

low fuel alerting for those airplanes. 

In recognition of these concerns and 

the compensation that a flight engineer 

provides, the FAA has modified the rule 

to exempt existing airplanes from this 

requirement. However, all new twocrew airplanes, and two-crew airplanes 

with existing type certificates 

manufactured 8 years after the effective 

date of the rule must comply with this 

requirement. 

Appendix K—APU design (K25.1.4(b)) 

When APUs are necessary for an 

airplane to comply with the ETOPS 

requirements, the NPRM proposed that 

these APUs have adequate reliability 

and be capable of starting and providing 

their required functions up to the 

maximum operating altitude of the 

airplane, but no higher than 45,000 feet. 

Dassault, Air New Zealand, New 

World Jet, the JAA, and UK CAA 

questioned the proposed requirement to 

substantiate that the APU in-flight start 

envelope extends up to the maximum 

altitude of the airplane, but need not 

exceed 45,000 feet. Dassault, Air New 

Zealand, and New World Jet indicated 

that 45,000 feet was too high. The JAA 

and UK CAA commented the 

demonstration of APU starting should 

cover all altitudes for which the 

airplane is approved. 

The ARAC ETOPS Working Group 

discussed whether required APUs on 

ETOPS airplanes should be capable of 

starting throughout the entire flight 

envelope. The FAA was concerned that 

an electrical generator failure should not 

force an ETOPS flight to a lower altitude 

in order to successfully start an APU. 

Doing so could create problems with 

other traffic on the same track in areas 

with limited communications 

capability. Also, the additional fuel 

consumed during a descent to start an 

APU and climb back to the assigned 

altitude could itself lead to a diversion 

later on in the flight if the remaining 

fuel reserves become too low. However, 

certain members of the working group 

stated that some part 25 airplanes were 

certified for altitudes above 50,000 feet 

and that it may not be possible to design 

an APU to start at those altitudes. The 

45,000 foot minimum altitude start 

capability requirement is an 

acknowledgement of this possibility 

while still mandating a minimum start 

envelope that would keep any necessary 

altitude changes above the more densely 

traveled altitudes along these routes. 

New World Jet commented that a 

need to start an APU at the maximum 

operating altitude is unlikely. Dassault 

stated that the need to start an APU in 

flight is likely to occur following an 

engine failure, which would result in an 

altitude substantially less than 

maximum certificated altitude. Dassault 

recommended changing the requirement 

to the one-engine inoperative maximum 

altitude. New World Jet commented that 

the 45,000-foot start requirement 

assumes that an airplane experiences a 

dual generator failure, is then unable to 

receive a clearance to descend and has 

to declare an emergency. They say that 

this scenario seems unlikely. 

We disagree with these commenters. 

Dassault implies an APU would only be 

started in flight following an engine 

failure. More commonly, the APU is 

started following a main engine-driven 

generator failure. Generator failures may 

occur at any altitude that the airplane is 

certified to fly. Typical mean time 

between failures of main engine-driven 

generators is approximately 10,000 

hours while the mean time between 

failures for engines on ETOPS airplanes 

operating under the existing 180-minute 

standard is 50,000 hours. For ETOPS 

approval on a two-engine airplane for 

greater than 180 minutes, the required 

engine reliability will be 100,000 hours 

between engine shutdowns. Therefore, 

an electrical generator will fail 5 to 10 

times more frequently than an engine on 

the same ETOPS airplane. Additionally, 

the loss of two electrical generators in 

flight is not uncommon. Dassault’s 

proposal would lower the existing level 

of safety compared to airplanes 

approved under the criteria of AC 120–

42A, which have had APU start and run 

capability up to the maximum 

certificated altitude of the airplane. 

Air New Zealand stated the APU on 

the Boeing 767, which is currently 

approved for ETOPS, is certified to start 

up to 35,000 feet, while the airplane 

maximum altitude is 43,100 feet. Air 

New Zealand’s statement is in error. We 

required design changes to the 767 APU 

so that it would start up to 43,100 feet 

when we approved that airplane for 

180-minute ETOPS. These design 

changes are required by the Boeing 767 

ETOPS CMP document before that 

airplane may be flown on 180-minute 

ETOPS routes. 

United expressed concern that an 

APU should only be required on 

airplanes with more than two engines to 

meet the design requirements if the APU 

is one of the three sources for back-up 

in-flight electrical power. The final rule 

does address United’s concern. We have 

revised paragraph K25.1.4(b) to clarify 

that the APU reliability and starting 

requirements apply only if an APU is 

needed to comply with that appendix K. 

Appendix K—Engine condition 

monitoring (K25.1.5) 

The NPRM proposed that an applicant 

must develop procedures for engine 

condition monitoring in accordance 

with part 33, appendix A. 

Transport Canada recommended the 

FAA eliminate the term ‘‘condition 

monitoring’’ because its use was 

discontinued in reliability centered 

maintenance and Maintenance Steering 

Group MSG–3, and contends there is an 

inherent safety risk associated with 

mixing terminologies and maintenance 

program development processes. 

Transport Canada recommended a 

harmonized and standardized approach 

for setting terminology and maintenance 

program requirements. 

Transport Canada recommended 

substantial changes to the proposal to 

permit manufacturers, operators, and 

regulatory authorities to participate in a 

structured maintenance review board 

process for the development of an 

airplane ETOPS maintenance program 

and engine health assessment program. 

Transport Canada made some 

interesting points, but they involve 

concepts that are beyond the scope of 

the proposed ETOPS rule, which was to 

codify the existing ETOPS standard 

contained in AC 120–42A. This 

advisory circular used the term ‘‘engine 

condition monitoring’’ which has been 

successfully applied since its inception. 

Transport Canada’s other suggested 

changes would involve a level of 

integration that has never been used 

before. Although such an integrated 

approach is in the FAA’s long term 

goals of improving safety, we do not 

want to compromise those future longterm goals by introducing such concepts 

into this rule without a much larger 

review in the context of that effort. 

Appendix K—Configuration, 

maintenance, and procedures (CMP) 

(K25.1.6) 

The NPRM proposed that any 

configuration, maintenance, and 

operational standards necessary to 

maintain appropriate reliability for 

ETOPS must be contained in a CMP 

document. 

Transport Canada proposed 

eliminating the CMP document 

requirement and placing the 

information that would be contained in 

the CMP document into the illustrated 

parts catalog, the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness required by 

§ 25.1529, or the airplane flight manual. 

It states a separate CMP document is 

duplicative for a new airplane being 

evaluated for ETOPS as part of a basic 

type certificate program. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1828 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

The CMP document is an extension of 

the airplane type design definition 

described in § 21.31 as a prerequisite for 

the airplane being eligible for extended 

operations. FAA airworthiness 

inspectors use compliance with the 

CMP requirements to determine if an 

airplane may be added to a carrier’s 

operations specifications. 

Since the CMP requirements are a 

condition for the ETOPS approval, they 

have to be in an FAA approved 

document. The Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness required by 

§ 25.1529 must be accepted by the FAA, 

but are not approved. The illustrated 

parts catalog is a manufacturer 

document and is not even reviewed by 

the FAA. The airplane flight manual 

may contain ETOPS procedures since it 

is approved for issuance of the type 

certificate. However, the airplane flight 

manual would not contain the other 

information that would be included in 

a CMP document. Therefore, we are 

adopting paragraph K25.1.6 as proposed 

with editorial changes to make the rule 

easier to understand. 

Appendix K—Two-engine airplanes 

(K25.2) 

Section K25.2 defines the ETOPS 

design requirements applicable to twoengine airplanes. Three methods are 

provided for ETOPS certification. An 

applicant may assess a candidate 

airplane-engine combination already in 

service by a review of service 

experience gained on that airplane. If an 

airplane-engine combination has not yet 

been certified, an applicant may use the 

Early ETOPS method, which takes a 

systems approach to the design, testing, 

and monitoring of a new airplaneengine combination as a substitute for 

service experience. This method 

establishes more rigorous analysis and 

test requirements than for an airplane 

with existing service experience. If the 

candidate airplane-engine combination 

has some service experience, but not 

enough to use the service experience 

method, the applicant may substitute 

15,000 engine-hours of world-fleet 

service experience in place of the 

rigorous airplane demonstration test 

required by the Early ETOPS method. 

All of the other Early ETOPS 

requirements would apply in this case. 

Appendix K—Service experience 

method (K25.2.1) 

After obtaining a minimum of 250,000 

engine-hours of service experience, an 

applicant using the service experience 

method would conduct airplane and 

propulsion system assessments to 

evaluate the safety and reliability of 

those systems for ETOPS. A two-engine 

airplane must also meet minimum IFSD 

rate requirements and demonstrate by a 

flight test that it has the capability to 

safely conduct ETOPS flights for the 

maximum diversion time being 

assessed. 

Boeing and GE commented that the 

proposed requirement to have corrective 

actions for all causes or potential causes 

of engine in-flight shutdowns or loss of 

thrust control occurring in service does 

not recognize that even engines with 

IFSD rates well below the rate required 

for ETOPS approval occasionally fail in 

service. While they agreed with the 

philosophy of the rule to correct causes 

of engine in-flight shutdowns or loss of 

thrust control, there are situations in 

service where no cause is identified or 

no technology is currently available to 

prevent future failures. They posited the 

FAA has accepted situations where 

industry did not have corrective actions 

for some causes if the IFSD rate was at 

an acceptable level without these 

corrective actions. They go on to state 

the intent of the ARAC proposal was to 

ensure an acceptable IFSD rate for the 

ETOPS approval being sought. 

These commenters propose similar 

changes to address these concerns. 

Boeing proposes the causes of in-flight 

shutdowns and loss of thrust control be 

assessed and appropriate corrective 

actions be taken to ensure an 

appropriate IFSD rate will be 

maintained. GE proposes all causes or 

potential causes of engine IFSD or loss 

of thrust control must have corrective 

actions, unless it can be shown the rate 

of the causes or potential causes will not 

result in IFSD rates exceeding the 

requirement. 

The FAA agrees the proposed rule 

needs clarification. Sometimes a 

corrective action is either not 

technologically feasible or cannot be 

determined because the root cause of 

the failure is unknown. We also agree 

we have accepted situations where 

industry did not have corrective actions 

for some causes or potential causes of 

in-flight shutdowns if the rate was at an 

acceptable level without these 

corrective actions. However, we 

disagree with commenters’ proposed 

changes. 

The commenters’ proposed changes 

suggest that for an airplane with an 

existing IFSD rate above the maximum 

allowable for approval, the 

identification or development of 

corrective actions could stop at a point 

when the applicant predicts the IFSD 

rate would just meet the maximum 

allowable with incorporation of those 

corrective actions already identified or 

developed. The FAA found from 

airplanes approved using the guidance 

of AC 120–42A, Appendix 1, the basis 

for the proposed rule, that it is 

necessary to correct as many causes of 

in-flight shutdowns or loss of thrust 

control as possible at the time the 

applicant conducts the propulsion 

system assessment in order to offset 

unforeseen problems that would cause a 

higher IFSD rate in the future. 

However, we want to be consistent 

with how we have required corrective 

actions for causes of engine in-flight 

shutdowns and loss of thrust control in 

past airplane ETOPS approvals. 

Therefore, we have revised paragraph 

K25.2.1(c)(2) to say that corrective 

actions are not required for events 

where the manufacturer is unable to 

determine a cause or potential cause, for 

events where it is technologically 

unfeasible to develop corrective actions, 

or where the world fleet IFSD rate 

already complies with the final IFSD 

rate required by paragraph K25.2.1(b) 

for the level of ETOPS approval being 

sought. However, the FAA emphasizes 

that we will respond to any cause of an 

engine in-flight shutdown or loss of 

thrust control that we determine to be 

an unsafe condition even if the IFSD 

rate meets the required rate. In such a 

case, we will issue an airworthiness 

directive (AD) requiring corrective 

action on all airplanes that may fail 

from the same cause. If the FAA 

determines an unsafe condition would 

exist only during the ETOPS portion of 

a flight, we would require the corrective 

action be specified in the CMP 

document as a condition for ETOPS 

approval of the airplane under the 

provisions of § 21.21(b)(2). That 

paragraph requires an airplane to have 

no feature or characteristic that makes it 

unsafe for the issuance of a type 

certificate. In addition, the FAA 

reiterates that an operator must comply 

with the provisions of the CMP 

document as a condition for ETOPS 

operational approval under part 121. 

Boeing stated that the NPRM 

unintentionally requires a more 

comprehensive airplane systems 

assessment under the proposed service 

experience approval method than it 

does for the proposed Early ETOPS 

method. Boeing stated that assessing, 

providing corrective action for, and 

showing effectiveness of the corrective 

action as proposed in the NPRM creates 

an extraordinary amount of work if it 

includes all ETOPS significant systems, 

including Group 1 and Group 2 systems. 

Boeing recommends changing the 

requirement to apply the airplane 

systems assessment only to ETOPS 

group 1 significant systems. 

The FAA acknowledges that the 

NPRM would have required a more 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1829 

comprehensive airplane systems 

assessment under the service experience 

method than the comparable relevant 

experience assessment under the Early 

ETOPS method. The proposed service 

experience method would have required 

corrective actions for ‘‘all’’ causes or 

potential causes of ETOPS significant 

system failures while the Early ETOPS 

method would have required the 

applicant to identify specific corrective 

actions for ‘‘relevant’’ design, 

manufacturing, operational and 

maintenance problems. Also, the 

proposed Early ETOPS method relevant 

experience assessment would not 

require corrective actions if the nature 

of the problem is such that it would not 

significantly impact the safety or 

reliability of the system. This proposed 

requirement also defines what types of 

problems are ‘‘relevant’’ for this 

assessment. 

Boeing is correct the FAA did not 

intend to create this inconsistency. The 

requirements for conducting 

assessments of the airplane systems for 

ETOPS should be similar when using 

either the service experience or the 

Early ETOPS method. The only 

difference between the two methods is 

that the data used under the service 

experience method would come from 

the candidate airplane-engine 

combination; whereas for the Early 

ETOPS method, the data would come 

from previously certified part 25 

airplanes manufactured by the 

applicant. The FAA has changed the 

requirements for these two assessments 

to be similar in paragraphs K25.2.1(d) 

and K25.2.2(a) in this final rule. 

Boeing comments that it may not be 

clear from the proposal that the flight 

test requirements are related specifically 

to ETOPS operations. Boeing stated that 

it is not necessary for every conceivable 

failure condition to be demonstrated. It 

says that the intent of the rule is to 

codify AC 120–42A, paragraph 8.d.(3), 

which was meant to focus on failures of 

ETOPS significant systems, primarily 

group 1 systems, or group 2 systems 

whose failure would be more hazardous 

during an ETOPS diversion. To clarify 

this intent, Boeing proposes changing 

the rule to state a flight test must be 

conducted to validate the adequacy of 

the airplane’s flying qualities, 

performance, and the flight crew’s 

ability to safely conduct an ETOPS 

diversion with engine inoperative and 

non-normal worst case ETOPS 

significant system failure conditions 

that are expected to occur in service. 

The FAA agrees that the required 

flight test evaluation is related to safely 

conducting an ETOPS diversion. We 

also agree the intent of the flight test is 

to evaluate ETOPS significant systems. 

Any airplane system whose failure 

would be worse the farther an airplane 

is from a place to land would make the 

associated system an ETOPS significant 

system by definition. We have changed 

K25.2.1(e) as Boeing recommends. We 

have also revised the similar 

requirement for airplanes with more 

than two engines in paragraph 

K25.3.1(c) for consistency. 

Appendix K—Early ETOPS method 

(K25.2.2) 

The NPRM proposed an Early ETOPS 

approval method that takes a systems 

approach to the design, testing, and 

monitoring of a new airplane-engine 

combination. This method contains 

several elements designed to minimize 

the number of design, maintenance or 

operational problems that could result 

in engine in-flight shutdowns or 

diversions. This method also includes 

elements to demonstrate that the 

airplane systems have the capability to 

meet the operational requirements for 

ETOPS. An applicant using this method 

must evaluate problems that occurred 

on previous airplanes it has 

manufactured and describe how it will 

prevent these same problems from 

occurring on the new airplane. The 

applicant must design the propulsion 

system to preclude failures or 

malfunctions that could result in an inflight shutdown. The applicant must 

validate all maintenance and 

operational procedures for ETOPS 

significant systems. There are ground 

and flight test requirements and a 

problem-tracking and resolution system 

requirement the FAA will use to 

evaluate the airplane prior to ETOPS 

approval. This problem-tracking and 

resolution system continues in 

accordance with new § 21.4(a) after an 

airplane receiving ETOPS approval 

under this method enters service. 

Finally, the rule defines reliability 

demonstration acceptance criteria used 

to compare the type and frequency of 

failures that occur on a candidate 

airplane-engine combination with those 

that we expect could occur on airplanes 

with existing ETOPS approvals. 

ALPA commented that the objective 

for the propulsion system design in the 

proposed appendix did not match the 

explanation in the preamble of the 

NPRM. The rates should have been 

specified as 0.02 or less for 180-minute 

ETOPS and 0.01 or less for ETOPS 

beyond 180 minutes. We agree with 

ALPA’s comment. We had intended the 

rule specify that the IFSD rate objective 

for the propulsion system design would 

be the target rate or less. This was an 

inadvertent omission from the rule text 

in the NPRM that we have corrected in 

the final rule. 

Dassault stated that the proposed rule 

requires that new technology be 

demonstrated through testing. Dassault 

points out that it is not able to identify 

the exact criteria the FAA will use to 

determine if such technology is defined 

as a new technology. Dassault 

recommends the FAA better define the 

scope of this requirement to require 

testing only for systems defined as 

‘‘time limited systems,’’ and those for 

which the occurrence of any failure 

condition is probable, that is, greater 

than 1 × 10¥5 per flight hour. 

The FAA believes the proposed rule 

was clear in stating that the requirement 

is applicable to technology new to the 

‘‘applicant,’’ and has adopted the 

requirement as proposed. The applicant 

will determine which technology is new 

to it when the airplane is designed. The 

purpose for requiring testing of new 

technology is to provide a process to 

evaluate airplane components designed 

or manufactured using technology with 

which the applicant has had no 

previous experience. In an Early ETOPS 

program, this testing substitutes for the 

service experience that we would 

otherwise require before approving an 

airplane for ETOPS. 

Boeing recommends limiting the 

demonstration of non-normal failures 

during the airplane demonstration flight 

testing under the Early ETOPS method 

to ETOPS significant systems, the same 

as they recommend for the flight test 

required under paragraph K25.2.1(e) of 

this service experience method. We 

agree with Boeing’s recommendation for 

the same reasons as we gave for the 

flight testing required under the service 

experience method. However, for an 

Early ETOPS airplane, we want to make 

sure that an applicant considers all 

relevant failures early in an airplane 

development program to determine 

what systems are ‘‘ETOPS significant.’’

It may not be obvious during the 

airplane design phase what failure 

conditions may potentially affect the 

safety of an ETOPS diversion. We also 

want to leave open the possibility that 

unforeseen failure effects may be 

identified during other flight testing that 

changes the list of ETOPS significant 

systems and the failure conditions that 

must be demonstrated during the 

ETOPS airplane demonstration. We 

have revised the similar requirement for 

airplanes with more than two engines in 

K25.3.2(d)(1)(iv) for consistency. 

Dassault comments that the nonnormal failure conditions demonstrated 

during the airplane demonstration test 

should come from the system failure 

analyses, taking into account the 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1830 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

specific airplane design. We agree the 

system failure analyses would be a good 

method for identifying failure 

conditions that could occur in service. 

However, in using this method, Dassault 

is proposing a particular method of 

compliance that may not fit all 

situations. Each applicant will have to 

propose a list of failure conditions the 

FAA accepts for the airplane 

demonstration. In coming up with this 

list, an applicant must consider the 

effects that failures in one system may 

have on other airplane systems. An 

example is the loss of multiple systems 

following the loss of all normal 

electrical power. Individual system 

failure analyses alone may not be 

sufficient to determine the worst case 

failure conditions. In this instance, an 

airplane-level failure analysis that 

considers the combined effect of 

multiple system failures would be the 

best guide for determining what failure 

conditions to demonstrate. 

Dassault comments that the 

requirement to demonstrate airplane 

diversions into representative 

operational diversionary airports is 

typically an operational requirement. 

Dassault recommends moving this 

requirement from the proposed 

appendix to parts 121 and 135. We 

disagree with Dassault’s 

recommendation. The overall objective 

of the airplane demonstration flight 

testing during type certification is to 

simulate the operational environment 

that an operator of the airplane may 

expect in service. We require such a 

demonstration to verify the candidate 

airplane has the capability to operate in 

extended operations. With this objective 

in mind, it is appropriate that the 

applicant conduct diversions into 

airports that represent airports normally 

used for ETOPS diversions. 

Boeing acknowledges that the 

wording of the proposed airplane 

demonstration test requirement for 

repeated exposure to humid and 

inclement weather on the ground 

followed by long-range operations at 

normal cruise altitude, is identical to 

what ARAC proposed and what appears 

in the 777–300ER ETOPS Special 

Conditions. However, Boeing contends 

that the intent of this rule is to expose 

the airplane and engines to moisture 

that could potentially become trapped 

and freeze at altitude. This freezing 

could cause a system to malfunction 

causing an in-flight shutdown or loss of 

thrust control. 

Boeing stated the use of the word 

‘‘inclement’’ may be misinterpreted to 

imply that an airplane must be exposed 

to all types of inclement weather, 

including snow, hail, sleet, hurricanes, 

and typhoons. Boeing stated that as 

demonstrated during the 777–300ER 

ETOPS flight test program, cycling the 

airplane in and out of high humidity 

airports sufficiently demonstrates the 

intent of the rule. Boeing recommends 

the FAA replace ‘‘humid and inclement 

weather’’ with ‘‘high humidity.’’

The FAA never intended the test 

requirement in the 777 ETOPS special 

conditions to be limited to high 

humidity, and we do not intend such a 

limitation in today’s rule. Rather, the 

inclement weather requirement should 

be interpreted exactly as Boeing has 

indicated in their comment. Inclement 

weather is not solely limited to high 

humidity conditions, but may include 

such meteorological conditions as heavy 

rain, high winds, snow, and extreme 

cold. We want to expose an airplane to 

the types of conditions on the ground 

that may be encountered in service to 

demonstrate that there are no 

unexpected design problems associated 

with such exposures. 

We agree that a major source of engine 

problems on long duration flights 

typical of ETOPS has been moisture 

becoming trapped in engine control 

pressure sense lines and freezing at 

altitude, causing engine operating 

problems. Heavy precipitation on the 

ground and high humidity intensify the 

amount of moisture available to create 

this type of failure mode. 

This rule does not require specific 

types of inclement weather for the 

airplane demonstration, except for high 

humidity, in recognition of the chance 

nature of encountering such conditions. 

We expect, however, an applicant 

would take advantage of any available 

inclement weather conditions during 

the required airplane demonstration 

test. 

Dassault comments that the inclement 

weather requirements are not 

specifically relevant to ETOPS 

operations. Dassault recommends the 

FAA remove these two paragraphs from 

the final rule. While none of the 

environmental conditions we are 

requiring for the airplane demonstration 

would be unique to ETOPS, the 

potential consequences of system 

failures resulting from these conditions 

could be worse the farther an airplane 

is from a suitable place to land. 

Accordingly, we have decided against 

dropping the requirement. 

Boeing, ALPA, and BALPA 

commented on the post-airplane 

demonstration inspection requirement. 

The NPRM proposed that an applicant 

conduct on-wing inspections or tests of 

ETOPS significant systems installed on 

the test airplane or airplanes used for 

the airplane demonstration in 

accordance with the tasks defined in the 

proposed Instruction for Continued 

Airworthiness to establish their 

condition for continued safe operation. 

These inspections or tests must be 

conducted in a manner to identify 

abnormal conditions that could result in 

an in-flight shutdown or diversion. 

Boeing stated it considers an external 

inspection of the engine and an internal 

inspection of the airflow path of the fan, 

compressor, combustor and turbine 

sections of the engine to provide the 

most valuable information for ETOPS. 

Boeing noted the ETOPS flight test 

demonstrates an airplane’s capability. It 

is not an endurance test. Boeing 

recommended changing the rule to 

require only a complete external onwing inspection of the engines and 

engine-mounted equipment. 

The FAA agrees with Boeing that the 

ETOPS airplane demonstration is not an 

endurance test, such as the 3000-cycle 

propulsion system validation test. This 

flight test is a demonstration of an 

airplane’s ability to safely operate in 

ETOPS. We did not intend that it be a 

test of durability. However, the FAA 

does not agree with Boeing that a 

complete on-wing external inspection of 

the engines and engine-mounted 

equipment alone would be adequate for 

a completely new airplane being 

evaluated under the Early ETOPS 

approval method. Many of the airplane 

ETOPS significant systems that need to 

be evaluated are located inside the 

engine compartment or airplane 

fuselage, and such wording could be 

confusing. 

ALPA does not believe that a cursory 

‘‘visual inspection’’ such as those 

performed on routine overnight or even 

weekly or monthly checks would meet 

the intent of this requirement. ALPA 

commented that the requirement should 

include the types of airplane 

inspections performed in conjunction 

with major, heavy, or ‘‘D’’ checks. ALPA 

proposed that a robust inspection 

process similar to that required at the 

conclusion of the 3000 cycle propulsion 

system validation test could uncover 

potential future failure modes. 

The FAA does not believe that a 

robust post-test inspection requirement 

applied to the airplane demonstration 

test would uncover any significant 

information. Unlike the 3000-cycle test 

(which is designed to identify potential 

failures resulting from high stresses 

caused by repeatedly starting the 

engine, running it to high power then 

shutting it down), the airplane 

demonstration test would not 

accumulate a large enough number of 

these ‘‘cycles’’ to inflict noticeable 

damage. Similarly, the few hundred 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1831 

hours accumulated during the airplane 

demonstration would not be enough to 

create a significant amount of wear on 

moving parts. 

BALPA said that a visual inspection 

is inadequate for some ETOPS 

significant systems. BALPA 

recommended a change in this section 

to state there must be an assessment of 

the ability of essential components or 

systems to function within their 

specified performance and tolerance 

limits by appropriate test methods. 

We agree with BALPA that a visual 

inspection is not adequate for some 

ETOPS significant systems. The 

instructions for continued airworthiness 

required by § 25.1529 define appropriate 

inspections or tests to establish that a 

system or component is in a condition 

for safe operation. However, these are 

not necessarily ‘‘visual’’ inspections. As 

such, we have changed paragraph 

K25.2.2(g)(4), and the same requirement 

for airplanes with more than two 

engines under paragraph K25.3.2(d)(4), 

to require that each ETOPS significant 

system must undergo an on-wing 

inspection or test in accordance with 

the tasks defined in the proposed 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to establish their 

condition for continued safe operation. 

We have included the qualifier ‘‘onwing’’ to clarify that we are not 

requiring any equipment be removed 

from the airplane for these inspections. 

These inspections are of the type that an 

airline would do to establish the 

airworthiness of the airplane in service, 

with the exception that the inspections 

must be conducted in a manner to 

identify abnormal conditions that could 

result in in-flight shutdowns or 

diversions. 

ALPA and BALPA commented the 

FAA has proposed deleting wording 

recommended by ARAC for the use of 

non-ETOPS fleets in the reliability 

demonstration acceptance criteria for 

two-engine airplanes, but retained this 

provision in the corresponding 

requirement for airplanes with more 

than two engines. ALPA and BALPA 

want the ARAC wording in both 

locations. BALPA avers that the nonETOPS fleet may provide a significant 

‘‘heads up’’ on cyclic related failures. 

ALPA contends that the wording is 

meant to ensure consideration of similar 

airplanes and engine types, which may 

be certified and flown in both ETOPS 

and non-ETOPS environments. 

We are not including non-ETOPS 

airplanes in the reliability acceptance 

criteria of paragraph K25.2.2(i). It 

appears these two commenters are 

confusing the reliability benchmark that 

we judge a new airplane against under 

this requirement with the relevant 

experience assessment of K25.2.2(a). For 

the relevant experience assessment, we 

expect that a manufacturer of a new 

airplane to consider any relevant 

failures from ETOPS and non-ETOPS 

airplanes that may be applicable to the 

new design. The objective of the 

reliability acceptance criteria 

requirement is to demonstrate a level of 

reliability similar to that of airplanes 

currently approved for ETOPS. 

Including non-ETOPS airplanes in the 

reliability comparison would result in a 

lower safety standard because the types 

and frequency of failures that would be 

expected to occur on non-ETOPS 

derivative models may be more severe 

than would be expected on a currently 

approved ETOPS fleet that has 

established a high level of reliability. 

We explained in the NPRM our 

rationale for allowing non-ETOPS 

airplanes to be used in the reliability 

comparison of airplanes with more than 

two engines. We said previous ETOPS 

experience might not exist on airplanes 

with more than two engines at the time 

this proposed rule becomes effective. 

However, the rule as proposed would 

limit the use of non-ETOPS airplanes to 

derivative models of the same airplane 

and engine. Under this provision, an 

applicant for a new type certificate 

would have no derivative models of the 

airplane to use in place of existing 

ETOPS approved airplanes. For the 

same reason, we outlined above for twoengine airplanes, derivative models of a 

candidate airplane and engine may not 

have a service history that is consistent 

with our expectations for an airplane 

approved for ETOPS. After further 

consideration, we find a comparison 

with any non-ETOPS fleet of airplanes 

would not be consistent with the 

objectives of this rule. An applicant can 

predict the type and frequency of the 

failures and malfunctions expected to 

occur in service on airplanes with more 

than two engines based on whatever 

data the FAA accepts to meet this 

requirement. 

Only airplanes with more than two 

engines manufactured 8 years after the 

effective date of this rule will have to be 

approved for ETOPS under the 

grandfathering provisions of new § 25.3. 

Airplanes manufactured before that date 

may be operated under the new 

operating requirements from the 

effective date of the rule. For the initial 

type design approvals of airplanes with 

more than two engines under § 25.1535, 

world-fleets of newer, more reliable 

airplanes with previous experience in 

extended operations would provide the 

best source for the comparison specified 

in paragraph K25.3.2(f). As a larger 

number of airplanes with more than two 

engines receive ETOPS type design 

approval and are operated under the 

new part 121 ETOPS operational 

requirements, the comparison database 

for compliance with this provision will 

grow. 

We inadvertently included the use of 

non-ETOPS fleets from the original 

ARAC proposal in the corresponding 

engine certification requirement under 

proposed § 33.200(e)(iii). For the 

reasons noted here, the FAA is changing 

§ 33.201(e)(4) to be consistent with 

appendix K. 

Appendix K—Combined service 

experience and Early ETOPS method 

(K25.2.3) 

The NPRM proposed an alternative to 

either the service experience or Early 

ETOPS methods for airplane approval. 

This combined method would use all of 

the design, analyses, and tests required 

by the Early ETOPS method except for 

the airplane demonstration test. In place 

of the airplane demonstration test, this 

method would allow the much less 

rigorous flight test of the service 

experience approval method, providing 

the candidate airplane-engine 

combination had obtained at least 

15,000 engine-hours of service 

experience. The NPRM also contained a 

provision for a reduction of service 

experience below 15,000 engine-hours 

as long as the applicant had 

compensating factors that provide an 

equivalent level of safety. 

ALPA commented it understands how 

the combined service experience and 

Early ETOPS method can be used to 

reduce the service experience required 

for type design approval of an airplane 

for ETOPS. However, it expressed 

concern that the equivalent level of 

safety provision as proposed might 

unintentionally allow an applicant to 

use a method resulting in a lower level 

of safety than provided of the other 

defined approval methods. Without 

listing specific additional requirements 

in a manner similar to that contained in 

the first paragraph of the combined 

method, ALPA stated that an applicant 

could attempt to completely bypass the 

requirements of any of these methods. 

ALPA recommended the FAA amend 

this paragraph to say that the in-service 

experience requirements may be 

reduced to some other level, provided 

the applicant defines compensating 

factors that provide an equivalent level 

of safety as the provisions of paragraph 

K25.2.3 (a). 

The FAA agrees with ALPA’s concern 

that without further definition the 

proposed wording of the equivalent 

safety provision in the combined 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1832 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

approval method might unintentionally 

lead to a level of validation substantially 

less than provided by the other 

provisions of section K25.2. After 

further review, we have determined that 

this proposal and the related paragraph 

for airplanes with more than two 

engines are just a restatement of existing 

authority under § 21.21(b)(1) and are not 

necessary. Therefore, we have deleted 

these sections in the final rule. 

Appendix K—Airplanes with more than 

two engines (Section K25.3) 

The requirements for airplanes with 

more than two engines are organized 

similarly to section K25.2 for twoengine airplanes. We created this 

separate section, K25.3, so that an 

applicant for airplanes of this 

configuration would not be confused 

about which requirements applied to it. 

Many commenters made the same 

comments on paragraphs in section 

K25.3 for airplanes with more than two 

engines than they did for the 

corresponding paragraphs in section 

K25.2. Our responses for those 

comments in section K25.2 also apply to 

this section. We are only discussing 

those comments on section K25.3 here 

that are unique to airplanes with more 

than two engines. 

ALPA expressed concern that under 

the NPRM an applicant could apply for 

ETOPS approval of an airplane with 

more than two engines that has a high 

IFSD rate (such as those experienced 

during introduction of the B–747, DC–

10, and L–1011 airplanes almost 30 

years ago). ALPA stated the original 

ARAC draft proposal required a ‘‘review 

* * * utilizing reliability data for all 

airplane, propulsion and ETOPS 

significant systems.’’ ALPA noted the 

ARAC proposal would apply equally to 

all airplane types regardless of the 

number of engines. ALPA commented 

this level of ‘‘benign’’ review would 

provide the FAA with satisfactory 

regulatory guidance to prevent the 

certification of a design otherwise 

unsatisfactory for the challenging 

ETOPS environment. 

The FAA does not believe a 

propulsion system assessment is 

necessary for airplanes with more than 

two engines to get a type design 

approval for ETOPS. We do not envision 

any modern propulsion system 

experiencing the kinds of high IFSD 

rates experienced by the airplanes in 

their examples. The IFSD rates required 

for three- and four-engine airplanes to 

reach an unsafe level are so high that 

the normal FAA engine safety 

management program and the 

propulsion system monitoring 

requirements of § 121.374 would correct 

any major causes of engine in-flight 

shutdowns before that level could be 

reached. 

The JAA and the UK CAA stated that 

the required 250,000 engine-hours of 

service experience seems excessive for 

three- and four-engine airplanes 

considering the lower in-flight 

shutdown objectives for these types of 

airplanes and the built-in systems 

redundancy. 

The FAA disagrees with this 

comment. Since there are no IFSD rate 

requirements for three- and four-engine 

airplanes in the proposed rule, the 

service experience requirement is 

primarily focused on obtaining a 

significant experience base to properly 

evaluate the airplane systems. 

The 250,000 engine-hours service 

experience requirement came from AC 

120–42A. Taken in the context of the 

actual exposure of the airplane systems 

under this requirement, those airplane 

systems on a two-engine airplane would 

accumulate a total of 125,000 airplane 

hours during this period while the same 

systems on a four-engine airplane would 

only accumulate a total of 62,500 

airplane hours. This is a significant 

reduction in the total amount of 

required service experience compared to 

the same systems on a two-engine 

airplane. This constitutes a natural 

compensation for the added redundancy 

of systems on airplanes with more than 

two engines. 

Dassault commented that the flight 

test requirements of paragraph 

K25.3.1(c) should not require an 

applicant for an airplane with more than 

two engines to demonstrate the loss of 

all normal electrical power. This 

proposed requirement would require an 

applicant to conduct a flight test to 

evaluate non-normal worst case system 

failure conditions expected to occur in 

service. Dassault posited this 

requirement would be unfair to 

airplanes with more than two engines, 

which it claims should not be treated at 

the same level as two-engine airplanes. 

Dassault recommended the FAA 

withdraw the loss of all normal 

electrical power from the required flight 

testing for airplanes with more than two 

engines. 

The FAA disagrees with Dassault. 

Although the electrical systems on 

airplanes with more than two engines 

may have additional redundancy that 

would make loss of normal electrical 

power less likely than on a two-engine 

airplane, we cannot assume that this 

would not occur. Most occurrences of 

the loss of normal electrical power in 

service are the result of multiple 

generator or electrical bus failures from 

a common source. Airplanes with more 

than two engines are not immune to 

these types of failures. An example from 

service experience of a common cause 

failure mode would be spilled fluids 

from galleys that leak through floor 

panels onto electrical equipment. 

Also, we cannot assume that an 

airplane manufacturer would always 

design an electrical system to take full 

advantage of the inherent isolation and 

redundancy that the additional engines 

provide. For example, an electrical 

system architecture consisting of four 

engine-driven generators supplying two 

main electrical busses would not 

provide any more isolation from bus 

failures than for a two-engine airplane. 

ALPA commented that the reliability 

acceptance criteria for airplanes with 

more than two engines should include 

airplane and propulsion systems, not 

just ETOPS significant systems. They 

said that the ARAC proposal did not 

limit the reliability acceptance criteria 

to ETOPS significant systems only. 

We are not making the suggested 

change. The only systems that would be 

relevant in assessing an airplane’s 

readiness for ETOPS would be those 

whose failure could impact the safety of 

ETOPS. By definition, an ETOPS 

significant system means an airplane 

system, including the propulsion 

system, the failure or malfunctioning of 

which could adversely affect the safety 

of an ETOPS flight, or the continued 

safe flight and landing of an airplane 

during an ETOPS diversion. The 

propulsion system is covered already by 

the proposed reliability acceptance 

criteria because it is an ETOPS 

significant system. Airplane systems of 

interest are also ETOPS significant 

systems. Thus, ALPA’s concern is 

already addressed by the existing 

language of paragraph K25.3.2(f). For 

consistency, we have revised the 

corresponding paragraph K25.2.2(i) for 

two-engine airplanes to be the same as 

this requirement for airplanes with more 

than two engines. 

B. Engine Certification (Part 33) 

For certain ‘‘early ETOPS’’

applications, the part 33 amendments 

require engine manufacturers to address 

all ETOPS relevant malfunctions (e.g., 

lost of thrust control or in-flight 

shutdown) and design-related 

maintenance errors that have occurred 

in the manufacturer’s current FAAcertified engine models. The part 33 

amendments also include a test 

requirement for these ‘‘early ETOPS’’

applications, and certain, specific type 

design requirements for all ETOPS 

applications. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1833 

1. Engine Design and Test Requirements 

for ETOPS Eligibility 

The JAA and UK CAA stated the 

introduction of precise and detailed 

testing requirements in the rule 

(proposed § 33.200; hereafter § 33.201) 

is too prescriptive and prevents tailoring 

of the testing program to the different 

intermediate cases that may be 

encountered between the completely 

new design and the derivatives. The 

commenters recommend the FAA make 

reference to an approved testing 

program and transfer the detailed 

content into an advisory circular, such 

as the JAA has done. 

The FAA does not concur with 

deleting the specific test requirements 

from § 33.201 and placing them in an 

advisory circular. This requirement is 

for Early ETOPS eligibility for twoengine applications without any service 

experience. These requirements have 

been carefully developed to address this 

specific case, and successful completion 

of this test should provide a suitably 

reliable engine for the purpose of Early 

ETOPS approval at the airplane level. 

To place these test requirements in an 

advisory circular as an option, would 

likely result in instances of nonstandard testing that is not the 

equivalent to the contemplated safety 

standard, and potentially not suitable to 

support the Early ETOPS concept. Also, 

§ 33.201 would not generally be 

required for an existing engine design 

that has the requisite service experience, 

and therefore this section’s applicability 

to ‘‘intermediate cases’’ should be 

relatively uncommon. However in the 

event such a situation occurs, the test 

requirements of § 33.201 can be 

modified using a part 21 Equivalent 

Level of Safety approach to optimize a 

test for a specific ‘‘intermediate case’’

situation. 

Pratt and Whitney stated that it is not 

clear when the rule must be completed 

with regard to the overall part 33 type 

certification and asks if part 33 

certification will be held until all the 

requirements of § 33.201 are complete. 

The FAA clarifies that compliance with 

§ 33.201 is only required when an 

applicant desires Early ETOPS 

eligibility for a two-engine-engine 

application under § 25.1535 authority. 

Compliance with § 33.201 is not 

required for basic engine type 

certification. The lead-in sentence of 

§ 33.201 is clear on this. 

ALPA fully supported the guidance 

presented for part 33. Because various 

part 33 regulatory design and testing 

requirements would establish a ‘‘limit’’

of ETOPS engine suitability, ALPA 

suggested that an engine type certificate 

data sheet note be required stating the 

specific diversion time limit. NACA 

recommended the FAA clarify that the 

text simply codifies current engine 

certification procedures for two-engine 

airplanes and apply any new 

requirements to new engine designs in 

the future (that is, ‘‘grandfather’’ current 

designs). 

The FAA does not agree the engine 

Type Certificate Data Sheet should 

specifically note ETOPS diversion time 

limitations nor does it believe a 

‘‘grandfather’’ provision is appropriate. 

Approved ETOPS diversion times are 

controlled through the operating 

standards (i.e., parts 121 and 135) and 

airplane type design (§ 25.1535) 

certification. The part 33 requirements 

do not establish an independent 

maximum diversion time limitation for 

ETOPS. ETOPS diversion times are 

dependent upon many factors, most of 

which are beyond basic engine 

certification. However, for Early ETOPS 

eligibility for two-engine applications 

where compliance with § 33.201 is 

required, FAA will include a discussion 

in advisory material for the use of a 

Type Certificate Data Sheet Note to state 

that § 33.201 has been complied with 

(i.e., ETOPS eligibility granted), along 

with the applicants demonstrated 

diversion time from that test. 

The JAA and UK CAA agreed with the 

proposal that each oil cap provide an 

oil-tight seal. Along with Federal 

Express (FedEx), International Air 

Transport Association (IATA), and 

Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), they 

commented that the design 

requirements for oil tank cap 

installation errors causing hazardous oil 

loss should apply to all types of 

operations, and the FAA should not 

limit them to ETOPS. The commenters 

added that an in-flight engine shutdown 

due to massive oil loss after an incorrect 

oil tank cap installation will most likely 

occur early in the flight and probably 

well outside any ETOPS segment. These 

commenters recommended the FAA 

word the rule as a generic requirement 

applicable to all new engine models. 

ALPA fully supported the requirement 

for engine oil tank filler cap design, as 

proposed. 

The FAA has decided against 

expanding applicability of this new 

regulation to all new engine models at 

this time. While it is true that oil tank 

cap installation errors can, and have, 

occurred in all types of operations, this 

proposal was only evaluated for ETOPS 

operations where suitable alternate 

landing sites are limited, especially 

when considering the multi-engine 

nature of many of these types of events. 

Also, the FAA does not agree that 

hazardous oil loss due to such errors 

would only occur early in a flight, as it 

is impossible to predict the exact error 

(e.g., cap loose vs. cap off) or how a 

given design may be affected by that 

particular error. A range of outcomes is 

possible, including hazardous oil loss 

near the maximum diversion time point 

in an ETOPS operation. The FAA will 

continue to monitor related service 

experience, and will consider 

expanding the applicability of this 

requirement by future rulemaking if 

service data so dictates. 

2. Engine Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness 

Appendix A to part 33 proposed an 

engine condition monitoring program to 

ensure continuing engine reliability. 

Transport Canada recommended the 

FAA delete the rule, or replace the term 

‘‘condition monitoring’’ with ‘‘engine 

health assessment programs’’ which is a 

more descriptive term. It added that a 

power assurance check methodology 

should not be required in the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness and validated at the part 

33 design certification stage when the 

engine would not as yet be installed on 

an ETOPS type certificated airplane; 

these requirements should more 

appropriately be required as part of the 

part 25 design certification process. 

Transport Canada stated the operational 

requirements determine a viable health 

assessment program for a particular 

airframe-engine installation. Thus, the 

most effective time for developing an 

engine health assessment program 

would be when the engine is installed 

in an identified airplane and when the 

operational role of that airplane has 

been defined. Transport Canada 

concluded the development of ETOPS 

maintenance and health assessment 

programs would be most effectively 

managed when the airplane’s total 

maintenance program is being 

developed. 

The FAA does not agree with 

eliminating the term ‘‘condition 

monitoring’’ from the rule to be replaced 

with the term ‘‘engine health 

assessment’’. The agency believes either 

term is adequate, but will retain the 

currently used and proposed term 

‘‘condition monitoring’’. Compliance 

with this section is only required when 

an applicant desires ETOPS eligibility 

under § 25.1535. Compliance with this 

section is not required for basic engine 

type certification. The lead-in sentence 

of Appendix A to part 33, paragraph 

A33.3(c) makes this clear. However, 

conversely, an engine applicant could 

choose to obtain ETOPS eligibility 

without identifying a specific airplane 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1834 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

installation identified. The engine 

manufacturer would define generic 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to comply with part 33 

Appendix A, which in turn may be 

modified once the engine is installed on 

a particular airplane model. The FAA 

does not want to preclude an engine 

manufacturer from the option of 

obtaining engine ETOPS eligibility 

without a defined airplane application. 

GE expressed a concern with repairs 

to and parts installed on engines from 

sources other than the engine Type 

Certificate (TC) holder. These would 

include engine parts approved by the 

FAA under a Parts Manufacturing 

Approval (PMA) or engine repairs 

approved by a Designated Engineering 

Representative, which are not reported 

to the holder of the TC. GE expressed 

concern that common cause multiple 

failures may be masked by calculating 

the reliability of an entire fleet, while a 

certain segment may be afflicted by 

unreliable parts from a supplier other 

than the engine TC holder. This should 

not be acceptable for the types of 

operations conducted under ETOPS 

where high reliability is necessary. The 

commenter also stated the results of the 

3,000-cycle test could also be affected if 

other than GE parts are installed in the 

field. GE asks the FAA for either 

supplemental rulemaking or a safety 

determination on other engine parts. 

The FAA does not agree that 

additional rulemaking is necessary to 

specifically address PMA or repaired 

parts usage in ETOPS operations. PMA 

parts comply with the applicable 

airworthiness standards and are 

approved as replacements for 

corresponding TC holder parts. Repairs 

approved by the FAA or a Designated 

Engineering Representative must also 

meet the applicable airworthiness 

standards. Likewise, follow-on TC 

holder parts and repairs meet those 

same standards whether processed as 

major or minor type design changes. 

Note that major design changes by a 

non-TC holder can only be processed as 

a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), 

which must also meet the applicable 

airworthiness standards. With respect to 

service difficulty reporting, the FAA 

monitors service data to identify unsafe 

conditions and other situations affecting 

ETOPS operations. This data is 

collected from TC holders, operators, 

repair stations, PMA holders, and other 

sources as applicable. The FAA will 

take appropriate corrective action to 

eliminate identified unsafe conditions 

or other situations negatively affecting 

ETOPS operations. 

C. ETOPS Reporting Requirements for 

Manufacturers (Part 21) 

To support the FAA’s safety 

monitoring program for airplanes in 

service, the NPRM proposed a new 

§ 21.4 for reporting, tracking and 

resolving problems on ETOPS approved 

airplanes. These requirements apply to 

the type certificate holder of an airplane 

approved for ETOPS, and the type 

certificate holder of an engine installed 

on an airplane approved for ETOPS. 

These requirements are separate from 

the ETOPS reporting that an airline 

must do under parts 121 and 135. 

Section 21.4 is organized into two 

parts. The first part defines 

requirements for reporting, tracking, and 

resolving problems on an airplaneengine combination approved using the 

Early ETOPS approval method in part 

25. The second part defines general 

reporting requirements for all airplanes 

approved for ETOPS, including the 

reporting of engine IFSD rates the FAA 

uses to monitor propulsion system 

reliability. 

1. Early ETOPS: Reporting, Tracking, 

and Resolving Problems 

ALPA recommended revising 

proposed paragraph 21.4(a)(1) to reflect 

the original ARAC philosophy that the 

tracking requirements were not limited 

to ETOPS significant systems. ALPA 

recommended that the rule be revised to 

require the prompt identification of 

ETOPS significant problems. 

The list of occurrences that must be 

reported and resolved under § 21.4(a) 

are defined in paragraph (a)(6). The type 

certificate holder must report these 

occurrences and propose solutions to 

the FAA to resolve the cause of each 

occurrence regardless of which airplane 

or propulsion system caused the event. 

The significance of these occurrences to 

ETOPS is implicit by their inclusion in 

the list. Therefore, it is not necessary to 

change the rule as ALPA recommended. 

However, we have revised this 

paragraph to delete reference to ‘‘ETOPS 

significant systems’’ to clarify that the 

type certificate holder of an Early 

ETOPS airplane-engine combination 

must use a system for reporting, 

tracking, and resolving each problem 

resulting in one of the occurrences 

specified in paragraph (a)(6) of this 

section. For consistency, we have made 

a similar change to the related sections 

in part 25 appendix K (K25.2.2(h)(1)(i) 

and K25.3.2(e)(1)(i)) for the problem 

tracking and resolution system required 

for the Early ETOPS type design 

approval method. 

The JAA and the UK CAA 

recommended removing the words 

‘‘Early ETOPS’’ from the heading of 

§ 21.4(a) and ‘‘without service 

experience’’ from the first sentence 

because they imply that the 

requirements would only apply to new 

type-certificated airplanes. The 

commenters asserted that the ETOPS 

reporting should apply to all 

manufacturers holding an ETOPS 

approval. Paragraph (a) only applies to 

airplanes approved for ETOPS without 

service experience. This paragraph 

codifies the special conditions applied 

to the Boeing Model 777 airplane for 

Early ETOPS certification. Paragraph (b) 

of § 21.4 defines the reporting 

requirements for all two-engine 

airplanes approved for ETOPS. 

Boeing recommended the FAA insert 

‘‘significantly’’ after ‘‘systems that have 

changed’’ in § 21.4(a)(3) to give the FAA 

authority to allow an applicant to 

exclude reporting on systems with only 

minor changes that do not affect system 

reliability on derivative airplanes or 

engines. We disagree with Boeing’s 

comment. This rule already allows an 

applicant to not report on unchanged 

areas of a derivative airplane as agreed 

to by the FAA. Adding the word 

‘‘significantly’’ as Boeing suggests adds 

nothing to the proposed language that 

would help an applicant or the FAA 

differentiate what specific changes 

would not require reporting under the 

rule from those that would. However, 

we have clarified what is meant by a 

derivative airplane or engine in the rule. 

A derivative airplane or engine is one 

where the changes are not so significant 

as to require an application for a new 

type certificate in accordance with 

§ 21.19. We have added a table in 

§ 21.4(a)(3), and in part 25, appendix K, 

to clarify the applicability of the 

problem reporting, tracking, and 

resolution system for derivative 

airplanes and engines. 

Boeing recommended § 21.4(a)(4) 

should make it clear that the type 

certificate holder, not the operator, is 

responsible for tracking the data. We 

agree and have revised this section to 

refer to the type certificate holder 

throughout. Since § 21.4 applies to 

airplanes that have already received a 

type certificate, the airplane or engine 

manufacturer is no longer an 

‘‘applicant’’ but a type certificate holder. 

The JAA and UK CAA stated that the 

list of reportable occurrences in 

§ 21.4(a)(6) implies in-flight shutdown 

events do not include the inability to 

control the engine or obtain desired 

thrust or precautionary thrust 

reductions. They contended this 

contradicts the definition of in-flight 

shutdown in part 1 and recommended 

the FAA revise the rule to make it clear 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1835 

that these events are also in-flight 

shutdowns. These commenters are 

correctly interpreting our intent that the 

inability to control the engine or obtain 

desired thrust or precautionary thrust 

reductions are separate from in-flight 

shutdowns. The revised part 1 

definition of ‘‘in-flight shutdown’’

clarifies our intent that this reporting 

requirement does not contradict the 

definition. 

The NPRM included a parenthetical 

exception to the proposed requirement 

to report precautionary thrust 

reductions, which would exclude 

precautionary thrust reductions for 

normal troubleshooting as allowed in 

the aircraft manual. The ARAC provided 

no justification for this exception in its 

recommended rule, upon which the 

NPRM was based. We believe ARAC 

intended that this exception cover 

special flights conducted for 

maintenance purposes to evaluate 

airplane problems that occurred on a 

previous flight. Such a flight may 

include a thrust reduction. However, we 

do not see how an intentional thrust 

reduction for maintenance 

troubleshooting purposes could be 

confused with the intent of this 

requirement in § 21.4(a)(6), which 

would be a thrust reduction in direct 

response to a problem in flight in order 

to mitigate that problem. Also, the 

exception is so broadly written that 

some parties may infer that any 

precautionary thrust reduction is for 

normal troubleshooting purposes so as 

to avoid reporting an occurrence. After 

further consideration, we have decided 

to delete this exception from the final 

rule. 

GE stated that the majority of in-flight 

shutdowns are not restartable and the 

requirement to report degraded ability 

to start an engine in flight appears to 

address a situation where there is an inflight shutdown of an engine that is 

restartable, but with degraded start 

capability and a need to restart that 

engine. GE contended that ETOPS does 

not rest on the engine being restartable, 

it rests on the engine being reliable so 

there is no need to restart that engine. 

GE stated that this requirement diverts 

resources from higher priority safety 

issues. The FAA disagrees with GE. 

Many engines are shutdown for 

indications that later turn out to be 

false. If there is a subsequent problem 

with another engine, the ability to 

restart an engine improves safety by 

giving the flight crew more landing 

options. If an engine flames out during 

cruise, but is otherwise operational, 

restarting the engine may allow the 

flight to continue without a diversion. 

Thus, it is critical to know about and 

correct problems that degrade an 

engine’s capability to restart in flight. 

Boeing recommended combining the 

requirement to report failures of a 

backup system with reporting of a 

complete loss of any electrical power 

generating system or hydraulic power 

system. Boeing said there is no clear 

definition of ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘backup’’

systems and that the backup function 

could be provided by another equivalent 

primary system. We agree with Boeing 

that these sections may not clearly state 

the intended requirement. We also agree 

that they may be combined into one. In 

order to clarify the rule, we have 

replaced the two NPRM sections with 

the following wording: 

‘‘Loss of any power source for an 

ETOPS group 1 significant system, 

including any power source designed to 

provide backup-power for that system.’’

2. Reliability of Two-Engine Airplanes 

We rearranged § 21.4(b)(1) and (b)(2) 

to clarify the intent of the rule. We have 

moved the requirement for FAA 

approved corrective actions for causes 

of in-flight shutdowns from paragraph 

(b)(1) to (b)(2). We also clarified that the 

requirement on the type certificate 

holder under this paragraph is to issue 

appropriate service information to the 

operators. The implementation of such 

service information would be conducted 

under the operating certificate for the 

operator. 

X. Operator Maintenance Requirements 

A. Continuous Airworthiness 

Maintenance Program (CAMP) 

The premise of an ETOPS 

maintenance program is to continually 

provide airworthy airplanes that will 

prevent mechanically related 

diversions. Under this concept, engines 

are designed and tested to assure an 

acceptable level of in-flight shutdowns 

in the worldwide fleet. Similarly, other 

key airplane systems are designed and 

tested for enhanced airplane reliability. 

ETOPS maintenance practices reduce 

diversions through disciplined 

procedures like engine condition 

monitoring, oil consumption 

monitoring, aggressive resolution of any 

identified reliability issues, and 

procedures that avoid human error 

during the maintenance of airplane 

systems and engines. 

Maintenance issues are addressed in 

§ 121.374 of the final rule. Before flying 

ETOPS, a certificate holder operating 

two engine airplanes must develop an 

ETOPS ‘‘continuous airworthiness 

maintenance program’’ (CAMP) and 

provide the necessary training to ensure 

those airplanes are maintained at the 

highest level of safety. The elements of 

an ETOPS-approved CAMP begin with a 

basic CAMP that is approved for use in 

non ETOPS operation, which is then 

supplemented for ETOPS with: (1) A 

system to ensure compliance with the 

minimum requirements set forth in the 

CMP document or the type design 

document for each airplane and engine 

combination; (2) an ETOPS predeparture service check; (3) procedures 

limiting dual maintenance; (4) 

procedures verifying corrective action to 

ETOPS significant systems; (5) ETOPS 

task identification; (6) centralized 

maintenance control procedures; (7) an 

ETOPS parts control program; (8) a 

reliability or enhanced continuing 

analysis and surveillance system 

(CASS); (9) propulsion system 

monitoring; (10) an engine condition 

monitoring program; (11) an oil 

consumption monitoring program; (12) 

an APU in-flight start program; (13) 

maintenance training for ETOPS; (14) an 

ETOPS maintenance document; and (15) 

procedures to have the initial program 

and subsequent revisions approved by 

the FAA’s certificate holding district 

office (CHDO). 

The requirement is to ‘‘develop and 

follow a continuous airworthiness 

maintenance program based on the 

manufacturer’s maintenance program or 

one currently approved for the operator 

and be supplemented for ETOPS for 

each airframe and engine combination.’’

Each operator’s current maintenance 

program must be approved by its 

principal maintenance inspector via 

operations specifications. Continental 

and United commented that it was the 

understanding of the ARAC that each 

operator’s approved ETOPS 

maintenance program would, by inservice demonstration, be accepted. If 

the currently approved program 

contains all maintenance elements 

necessary for ETOPS, then it will be 

adequate without change. However, 

after evaluating its current program, an 

operator may have to supplement its 

program to incorporate any missing 

ETOPS elements prior to operating 

ETOPS. 

There were comments by the aviation 

industry supporting incorporation of the 

ETOPS supplemental requirements for 

two-engine airplanes. However, Airbus, 

UK CAA, JAA, Singapore Airlines and 

others commented negatively regarding 

the same requirements for three- and 

four-engine airplanes. Some comments 

suggested that because long range 

operations with three- and four-engine 

airplanes for the past 30 to 50 years has 

been so successful, there is no 

justification for incorporation of the 

ETOPS supplements. Qantas agreed 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1836 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

with the approval requirements for 

ETOPS and notes that the robust 

maintenance programs have contributed 

to the success of ETOPS. It found, 

however, that this success has brought 

on increased operational restrictions for 

political reasons that are not based on 

safety. 

The FAA strongly believes that all 

operators would benefit from an ETOPS 

maintenance program. However, the 

FAA agrees with many of the 

commenters that the cost of 

implementing this new requirement for 

airplanes with more than two engines 

would be significant. The FAA has 

determined that this cost cannot be 

justified based on the current level of 

safety achieved by the combination of 

engine reliability and the engine 

redundancy of this fleet of airplanes. 

Airbus and UK CAA cited confusion 

regarding when ETOPS maintenance 

requirements apply. The elimination of 

ETOPS maintenance program 

requirements for all part 121 operations 

for airplanes with more than twoengines eliminates most of the 

confusion. Part 121, Appendix P has 

also been amended to provide any 

remaining clarification necessary. An 

operator’s maintenance program for all 

two-engine ETOPS airplanes, regardless 

of diversion time, must comply with 

§ 121.374. 

B. Limitations on Dual Maintenance 

The FAA has included provisions in 

today’s rule to prevent dual 

maintenance on two-engine ETOPS 

significant systems during the same 

routine or non-routine visit. This 

requirement is a codification of existing 

policy and is necessary to recognize and 

preclude common cause human failure 

modes without proper verification 

processes or operational test prior to 

conducting ETOPS. 

Many ETOPS maintenance 

requirements focus on preventing 

human error from threatening flight 

safety. Of these, common cause failures, 

where the same mistakes are made more 

than once during maintenance, are the 

greatest threat to long-range operational 

safety in these airplanes. Since 1982, the 

FAA has recorded ten multiple engine 

failure events resulting from 

maintenance errors. 

FedEx, KLM, and IATA commented 

that additional ETOPS dual 

maintenance limitations are 

unnecessary since requirements are 

found in existing maintenance programs 

such as those identified in the 

manufacturers Maintenance Planning 

Document (MPD). 

The FAA disagrees that dual 

maintenance limitations for all ETOPS 

operations are unnecessary. We also 

disagree that dual maintenance 

limitations for ETOPS already exist and 

are identified in an airplane’s MPD. The 

FAA agrees an MPD appendix provides 

a critical systems list. However, the 

tasks identified in that list do not 

necessarily include all ETOPS 

significant systems. 

It is not the intent of the rule to 

specifically require a certain number of 

mechanics per airplane. It is incumbent 

on the operator to have processes in 

place to avoid common cause failure 

modes. Section 121.374(c)(ii) addresses 

those situations where dual 

maintenance cannot be avoided, 

providing specific requirements under 

those circumstances. Operators need to 

identify their ETOPS significant systems 

with the assistance of the manufacturers 

in order to adequately address dual 

maintenance requirements that may 

arise during scheduled and 

unscheduled maintenance. 

FedEx noted part 121 operators 

already have a Required Inspection Item 

(RII) program to eliminate maintenance 

errors and believes this program will 

discover any problems arising from dual 

maintenance. Although the FAA agrees 

an operator’s current RII procedures 

may be used as one method to ensure 

proper maintenance of ETOPS 

significant systems, it is not necessarily 

sufficient by itself to avoid dual 

maintenance risks. Furthermore, the 

FAA does not believe ETOPS certificate 

holders would want to include all their 

ETOPS significant system items into 

their RII program, nor is the FAA 

advocating it. Verification of ETOPS 

dual maintenance, when unavoidable, 

can include an RII visual inspection as 

one method of verification, but 

additional methods may need to be 

employed to meet ETOPS dual 

maintenance ground verification 

requirements. 

ATA, United, Continental and others 

suggested we change the NPRM’s 

proposed dual maintenance provisions. 

The FAA agrees and has revised the 

final rule language. The FAA’s intent is 

for operators to package routine 

maintenance tasks so dual maintenance 

is never scheduled on the same 

maintenance visit. 

Obviously, it is best never to perform 

dual maintenance since a major cause of 

airplane diversions and turnbacks due 

to mechanical failures is common-cause 

human factors. However, the FAA 

understands unforeseen situations may 

arise necessitating unscheduled dual 

maintenance on an airplane. The FAA 

expects operators to have in place 

procedures that prevent identical 

mistakes being made on two systems 

when dual maintenance is 

accomplished. These procedures must 

be included in the operator’s ETOPS 

Maintenance Document. 

C. Maintenance Actions 

1. ETOPS Pre-Departure Service Check 

ATA stated the pre-departure check is 

specifically designed for a two-engine 

airplane and to extend this check to the 

three- and four-engine airplane is 

confusing and may contribute to human 

error. FedEx, KLM and IATA 

commented that this check would add 

man-hours and costs due to the new oil 

consumption, verification, and dual 

maintenance requirements associated 

with the pre-departure service check. 

The FAA, as stated previously, has 

removed this requirement along with all 

ETOPS maintenance program elements 

for airplanes with more than two 

engines. For two-engine ETOPS the 

FAA believes the pre-departure service 

check is a significant factor in ETOPS’

past success. The specific content of the 

check is developed by each ETOPS 

operator and based on ETOPS 

significant systems verification and 

historical operational data. Accordingly, 

the check’s content varies significantly 

among operators. 

The operator’s ETOPS maintenance 

program should include necessary 

training requirements and work form 

task identification to eliminate 

confusion. This is one reason for having 

each operator develop a pre-departure 

check tailored to its own operation 

based upon the equipment and 

performance history of the operator’s 

fleet. 

2. Engine Condition Monitoring 

Program 

ATA commented it is unnecessary for 

three- and four-engine airplanes to have 

an engine condition monitoring program 

since current practices have served the 

part 121 operators adequately for the 

last 30 years. Many certificate holders 

currently use engine condition 

monitoring programs for their three- and 

four-engine airplanes as an economic 

tool to detect engine deterioration and 

to reduce full thrust take off 

requirements. The ETOPS engine 

condition monitoring program is 

required to ensure engine inoperative 

flight can be safely conducted in the 

event of long diversions. 

The FAA acknowledges these 

comments and has removed this 

requirement along with all ETOPS 

maintenance program elements for 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1837 

3. Oil Consumption Monitoring Program 

ATA, FedEx, KLM and IATA 

commented that it is unnecessary for 

airplanes with more than two engines to 

have an oil consumption monitoring 

program since current practices have 

served the part 121 operators adequately 

for the last 30 years. Additionally, 

commenters said that with the current 

IFSD rate there is no justification for 

requiring such a program. 

The FAA agrees with these comments 

and has removed this requirement along 

with all ETOPS maintenance program 

elements for airplanes with more than 

two engines. 

4. Verification Procedures 

ATA stated the FAA provided no 

justification for its proposed verification 

program and additionally stated that 

any safety issue that arises in the future 

can be specifically dealt with through 

the AD process. It appears the 

commenter may be confusing the AD 

process with routine maintenance 

procedures. This type of verification is 

in no way related to an AD. 

ATA and others commented that there 

is no justification for having a 

verification program for airplanes with 

more than two engines that goes beyond 

what is already required by a CASS. 

The FAA agrees with these comments 

and has removed this requirement along 

with all ETOPS maintenance program 

elements for airplanes with more than 

two engines 

5. Task Identification 

Commenters said recommended 

ETOPS-specific tasks should be clearly 

defined for two-engine airplanes, but 

not for three- and four-engine airplanes. 

The FAA agrees with these comments 

and has removed this requirement along 

with all ETOPS maintenance program 

elements for airplanes with more than 

two engines 

6. Configuration Maintenance and 

Procedures (CMP) Document 

IATA, FedEx, KLM and others 

directed comments toward the 

certificate holder’s requirement to have 

a ‘‘system to ensure compliance with 

CMP.’’ We believe that many of the 

comments stemmed from a 

misunderstanding of the requirement. 

The CMP document is a type 

certification document that some 

manufactures have produced to 

establish a specific standard for a 

particular make and model airplaneengine combination intended for ETOPS 

operations. A certificate holder must 

evaluate the CMP documents, if 

applicable, and incorporate the CMP 

requirements. This requirement has 

been applicable to two-engine 

operations throughout the history of 

ETOPS. 

However, an existing three-or fourengine airplane may not have a CMP 

document. Accordingly, there is no 

requirement to comply with a CMP. For 

airplanes with more than two engines, 

this CMP requirement is included in the 

event that manufacturers develop a CMP 

document for existing three- and fourengine airplanes and for new airplanes 

being type certificated for ETOPS 

operations that may have a CMP 

document. The FAA does not intend for 

operators to develop their own CMP, 

which would be tantamount to recertification Compliance with a CMP is 

comparable to compliance with a 

manufacturer’s Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness (ICA), which 

the FAA already requires all operators 

to comply with. Accordingly, the FAA 

has decided to require compliance with 

the CMP for any airplane used in 

ETOPS when a CMP is available. 

FedEx, KLM and IATA recommended 

that an ETOPS minimum system/ 

subsystem list be provided by the 

manufacturer, approved by the FAA, 

and made part of the CMP. The FAA 

believes that an ETOPS minimum 

system/subsystem list, otherwise 

referred to as an ETOPS significant 

systems list, may be developed by the 

manufacturers, and approved by the 

FAA as part of future aircraft 

certifications. It is impractical to 

develop such a list at this time. The 

final rule requires that each certificate 

holder, in coordination with the 

manufacturers and their CHDO, develop 

a list tailored to the certificate holder’s 

operation. The FAA believes the list 

should not be part of a CMP because not 

all ETOPS airplanes will have a CMP. 

Rather, the list should be contained in 

the certificate holder’s ETOPS 

Maintenance Document. 

IATA, Boeing, FedEx and KLM 

commented that since there are no CMP 

documents for three- and four-engine 

aircraft, there is no parts control 

program. The FAA agrees that with no 

CMP, there is no issue of ETOPS parts 

control for airplanes that do not have a 

CMP. However, Continental went 

further and suggested that once all 

aircraft are modified with the new time 

duration parts, there is no need for a 

parts control program. The FAA 

disagrees. All ETOPS operators must 

have an ongoing parts control program 

to ensure an ETOPS airplane is 

maintained and to account for all 

sources of supply, including parts 

borrowing and parts pooling. 

7. Training and Documentation 

ATA did not support additional 

training requirements for three- and 

four-engine airplanes, stating that the 

existing training has served the industry 

well. ATA had the same comment for 

procedural changes. The FAA agrees 

with these comments and has removed 

this requirement along with all ETOPS 

maintenance program elements for 

airplanes with more than two engines 

D. Operator Reporting Requirements 

The final rule includes certain 

proactive safety requirements to prevent 

the occurrence of unsafe conditions that 

may occur in ETOPS service instead of 

reacting to unsafe conditions after they 

occur. 

For example, the FAA uses a world 

fleet IFSD rate, as defined in part 25, to 

monitor airplane propulsion system 

reliability. This final rule contains IFSD 

rates in § 121.374, above which an 

operator must submit a report to the 

CHDO, reporting the operator’s 

investigation and any necessary 

correction action taken. 

Various comments were made relative 

to the need for an ETOPS reliability 

program for three- and four-engine 

airplanes, the structure of the program, 

and the reporting requirements of the 

program. Because the FAA has decided 

that the additional engines establish a 

sufficient level of redundancy to merit 

not imposing additional engine-related 

requirements on operators of airplanes 

with more than two engines, we have 

removed the reliability program 

requirement, including IFSD rate 

reporting, along with all ETOPS 

maintenance program elements for 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

United and Continental discussed the 

maintenance reporting requirements in 

§ 121.374 with American requesting 

withdrawal of the requirements, 

believing it is redundant to § 121.703. 

During ARAC meetings, there was 

considerable discussion about these 

reporting requirements. Since § 121.703 

does not already contain all the 

requirements found in current ETOPS 

policy, the final rule codifies current 

policy, creating a new section for a 

reporting program that has successfully 

served the industry for many years 

without ambiguity. In particular, the 

reporting requirements for ‘‘problems 

with systems critical to ETOPS’’ and 

‘‘any other event detrimental to ETOPS’’

were taken directly from AC 120–42A 

and the ARAC proposal. The FAA needs 

to be aware of significant mechanical 

failures that could affect the safety of an 

ETOPS flight, regardless of whether it 

occurs in the air or on the ground. Since 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1838 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

22NACA also commented that the definition of 

‘‘ETOPS area of operation’’ includes the entire 

NOPAC and the North Pacific. This commenter 

objected to any new requirements for three- and 

four-engine airplanes that previously had approved 

operations specifications. NACA did not see the 

correction made to this section that was published 

in the Federal Register 11/18/2003. NOPAC and 

North Pacific are not designated as applicable for 

ETOPS. ETOPS in these areas is defined as a 

function of distance from adequate alternates and 

not the simple transiting of these areas. 

we have decided against imposing 

maintenance requirements on operators 

using airplanes with more than two 

engines, this reporting requirement does 

not apply to those operations. 

Responding to requests by ATA, 

Continental and United, the agency has 

revised several reporting requirements 

in the final rule involving airplane 

diversions or turnbacks due to 

mechanical reasons and their effect on 

future ETOPS operations. 

In addition, the final rule adopts the 

term ‘‘ETOPS significant systems’’ to 

address the ambiguities found by many 

commenters including Fed Ex, Boeing, 

Singapore Airlines, ALPA and IATA. 

The key intent of the program is to 

discover mechanical failures on ETOPS 

airplanes so they can be appropriately 

addressed in the operator’s maintenance 

program. 

United and Continental disputed the 

72-hour reporting requirement, asserting 

that it does not allow enough time for 

an operator to determine the cause of 

the occurrence, take corrective action, 

and report that action to the FAA. This 

requirement is solely to report the event, 

not determine its root cause and take 

action within a certain time limit. This 

initial reporting requirement is not 

intended to include the final solution 

but to notify the CHDO of all problems 

associated with ETOPS. The FAA 

understands many ETOPS diversions 

are for reasons other than mechanical 

failures. The certificate holder needs to 

identify in its ETOPS maintenance 

document, how these flights will 

continue after a diversion for nonmechanical reasons, such as a medical 

emergency. 

XI. Operational Requirements (Part 

121) 

A. Route Limitations 

The FAA proposed to define ‘‘ETOPS 

area of operation’’ to mean, for turbineengine-powered-airplanes with two 

engines, an area beyond 60 minutes 

from an adequate airport, or for turbineengine-powered-airplanes with more 

than two engines, an area beyond 180 

minutes from an adequate airport. These 

areas are further defined as within the 

authorized ETOPS maximum diversion 

time approved for the operation being 

conducted and are the basis for FAA 

approval of ETOPS authorities for 

operators. Finally, ETOPS area of 

operation was to include the North 

Polar and South Polar areas. An ETOPS 

area of operation is calculated at an 

approved one-engine inoperative cruise 

speed under standard conditions in still 

air. The FAA further proposed that 

operations in these areas must be 

approved by the Administrator and 

would be authorized in the certificate 

holder’s operations specifications based 

on the criteria defined in part 121, 

appendix P. 

KLM commented the ARAC did not 

complete its task assignment, which was 

to revise the 60-minute requirement 

because modern aircraft are much more 

reliable. They further stated that modern 

aircraft should be allowed to operate at 

least 90 minutes without the ETOPS 

burden. These subjects were not part of 

the ARAC tasking statement and were 

not included in their proposal to the 

FAA. Since we did not consider any 

changes to the current ETOPS 

authorizations in the NPRM beyond 

those recommended by the ARAC, 

KLM’s suggestions are beyond the scope 

of the final rule. 

JAA and UK CAA did not support the 

application of ETOPS by area. These 

commenters posited it is preferable to 

set a safety standard for ETOPS 

operations in general, without 

specifying specific geographic areas of 

applicability. ALPA suggested that the 

wording in the definition be changed to 

‘‘areas of ETOPS applicability’’. 

The ETOPS authority granted an air 

carrier since 1985 has always been 

based on an airplane/engine 

combination, a specific diversion time, 

and the area of operation for which the 

approval is valid. The ‘‘area of ETOPS 

applicability’’ concept was developed 

and recommended by the ETOPS ARAC. 

Although we have maintained the 

relationship between ETOPS approvals 

and specific geographic areas in most 

ETOPS authorities, we have modified 

the definition of ‘‘ETOPS area of 

operation’’ to exclude the North and 

South Polar areas and have removed the 

specific definition of ‘‘ETOPS Area of 

Applicability.’’ Operations in the polar 

areas now have certain requirements in 

this rule based on the codification of 

current polar policy guidance but are 

not subject to other ETOPS 

requirements unless they meet the 

‘‘distance from adequate airports’’

criteria of 121.161.22

Airbus and IATA supported clear and 

concise requirements for ETOPS 

approvals. However, these commenters 

and others, stated there is no safety 

justification for applying the 

requirements for two-engine airplanes to 

three- and four-engine airplanes that 

have built-in redundancies. We do not 

agree with the commenters that ETOPS 

should not be applied under any 

conditions to airplanes with more than 

two engines. The basic concept of 

ETOPS is to prevent a diversion but, if 

a diversion is required, to protect that 

diversion. As discussed earlier, the 

diversion rate for all airplane-related 

and non-airplane-related causes are 

comparable between two-engine 

airplanes and airplanes with more than 

two engines. Therefore, the concept of 

precluding and protecting the diversion 

has equal validity, regardless of the 

number of engines. In addition, the 

ETOPS requirements for three- and fourengine aircraft apply only to passenger 

operations and then only when these 

operations are greater than 180 minutes 

from an alternate airport. Applied to 

current technology aircraft and engines, 

such operations encompass only a very 

few, distinct areas of the world. More 

importantly, these areas, which 

comprise the South Pacific between the 

west coast of the United States and 

Australia, the South Atlantic and South 

Polar region, are indicative of 

demanding operations over remote areas 

with minimal operational infrastructure. 

In the case of the Poles, the areas also 

include harsh operating conditions. 

B. ETOPS Alternate Airports 

1. Determination of ETOPS Alternate 

Airports 

The FAA proposed to codify the 

definition of ‘‘adequate airport’’ found 

in AC 120.42A. Although the term is 

used elsewhere in part 121, its use is not 

unique to ETOPS. It has not been 

defined previously in part 121. 

Airbus is concerned with the 

inclusion of military airports in the 

definition. It questions the ability of a 

military airport to support a recovery 

plan and recommends that the rule be 

amended to indicate that the operator 

must obtain written permission from the 

responsible military authority to use a 

military airport for an en-route ETOPS 

alternate airport, for safety audit and 

training, and for implementing a 

recovery plan. JAA and JAL made 

similar comments. UK CAA makes a 

similar comment but adds that a 

military airport should meet the public 

protection requirements of § 121.97. 

Other commenters such as FedEx, 

Singapore Airlines and IATA professed 

confusion over the definition and 

request clarification. 

The FAA believes much of the 

confusion relates to the criteria required 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1839 

23PROB40 is the probability of 40%. TEMPO is 

a temporary condition. 

for an ETOPS alternate airport and those 

required for the more general ‘‘adequate 

airport.’’ An adequate airport may not 

be appropriate for an ETOPS diversion 

because it cannot support a recovery 

plan, cannot provide sufficient rescue 

and firefighting support, or is 

experiencing inclement weather 

conditions. ‘‘Adequate airport’’ should 

not be defined in terms specific to 

ETOPS because this new definition is 

intended to cover the term wherever it 

is used in part 121, not just in meeting 

ETOPS requirements. The criteria for 

the designation and use of ETOPS 

alternate airports are contained in 

§ 121.624. The requirements of 

§ 121.624 apply to all ‘‘adequate 

airports’’ (including those that are 

military airports) and must be met 

before a military airport may be 

designated as an ETOPS alternate for 

that flight. The FAA agrees that the 

proposed definition was unclear and 

has amended it to state that an alternate 

airport must meet the requirements of 

§ 121.97. A certificate holder must 

comply with § 121.97 for each airport it 

uses, including military airports, and so 

it is unnecessary to repeat this 

limitation on the use of military airports 

in the definition of an adequate airport. 

The FAA proposed that an airplane 

could not be dispatched for an ETOPS 

flight unless the ETOPS alternate 

airports could be reached within the 

maximum diversion time under which 

the flight is to be dispatched. Each 

required ETOPS alternate airport must 

be listed in the dispatch or flight release 

and meet the specified criteria, 

including passenger protection, and 

weather minima. 

The FAA proposed that an airport 

listed as an ETOPS alternate airport 

must have weather forecasts that are at 

or above the minimums specified in the 

operator’s operations specifications. 

Both JAA and UK CAA supported this 

aspect of the proposal. Airbus and JAA 

commented that this section would 

require an operator to consider all 

adequate airports within the diversion 

limits of that operator and some airports 

may not support a recovery plan 

without the investment of considerable 

resources with no safety benefits. ATA 

also suggests clarification of what a 

carrier must do in considering whether 

an adequate airport can be an ETOPS 

alternate airport for the purpose of a 

particular flight. Airbus suggests that 

either the definition of ‘‘adequate 

airport’’ be amended to include a 

passenger recovery plan, or § 121.624 be 

amended to require operators to 

consider all adequate airports capable of 

supporting a passenger recovery plan. 

JAA also recommends the FAA revise 

the definition of an adequate airport to 

require that such an airport should have 

the necessary infrastructure to support a 

passenger recovery plan. 

The requirement for the operator to 

consider all adequate airports within the 

diversion limits of the operation will 

likely be accomplished when route 

planning is conducted for a proposed 

departure and destination airport. It is 

not the intent of this rule that an 

operator make a determination that all 

adequate airports within a diversion 

limit fulfill the requirements of an 

ETOPS alternate airport. It is only 

necessary that every adequate airport in 

an operator’s operations specification be 

used in determining those that, in fact, 

qualify for designation as ETOPS 

alternate airports during dispatch. This 

information will then be used at the 

dispatch or flight planning stage for the 

given flight to determine which airport 

meeting the alternate weather criteria 

will be designated as the ETOPS 

alternate airport. Accordingly, the FAA 

does not agree that the definition of 

‘‘adequate’’ airport needs to be changed. 

ATA, IATA and several carriers 

requested the FAA include suggestions 

from the ARAC that alternate weather 

criteria provide guidance for relief from 

most conditional elements of an 

airport’s weather forecast. ATA, IATA, 

and United commented that the ARAC 

also included a revised method of 

determining alternate minima, based on 

applying Category II and III approaches. 

The ETOPS ARAC developed a 

weather criteria table for use by 

operators to determine appropriate 

weather criteria needed in order to 

designate airports as ETOPS alternate 

airports. The FAA has adopted this 

table, and it will be contained in the 

advisory material. The FAA intends to 

formulate operator operations 

specifications for ETOPS alternate 

weather criteria based on this standard. 

The table includes a provision on how 

to handle conditional (PROB40 and 

TEMPO)23 forecasts, and permits the use 

of weather visibility minimums of 700m 

rather than 800m to allow for variations 

in the international metric weather 

forecasting standard. This flexibility has 

been maintained. The ETOPS alternate 

weather criteria table contains the 

provision for Category II and III 

approaches, as well as single or separate 

runway criteria. 

ATA and Fed Ex also commented that 

the ARAC recommended the 

consideration of the use of GPS/RNAV. 

Singapore, IATA, and United 

recommended that GPS/RNAV be 

considered at airports where other 

navigational aids are not available. 

ARAC did not include such approaches 

in its final proposal, and we believe that 

the request to allow GPS/RNAV 

approaches is beyond the scope of this 

regulatory change. Operators may 

request to receive this authorization 

through the FAA, which would be 

reflected in the operator’s operations 

specifications. 

JAA recommended the extension of 

diversion time when necessary to allow 

operators to reach an adequate airport or 

when necessary to allow applicants to 

disregard airports that present 

unacceptable standards that may impose 

passenger safety risks. 

The FAA cannot agree with the 

recommendation. The ETOPS rules are 

predicated on the ability of the airplane 

and its systems to support a possible 

diversion during the particular 

operation. Arbitrary extension of 

diversion times is contrary to the entire 

premise behind ETOPS, i.e., 

management of risk by an operator that 

is controlled through an approved 

ETOPS program. In addition, the pilotin-command can exercise his command 

authority to proceed to another airport 

if he decides that proceeding on is as 

safe or safer than landing sooner. 

However, airports should not be 

designated as ETOPS alternate airports 

by the operator if they do not meet the 

required minimum standards for use. 

Japan Airlines commented that some 

airports may not report as open when 

dispatching is taking place but may be 

quite normal and usable en route. This 

commenter suggested the language 

should reflect an operator looking at 

‘‘expected field conditions’’ instead of 

‘‘filed condition reports.’’ The FAA does 

not agree, and the final rule keeps the 

NPRM language. The agency’s intent is 

to direct the operator to use specific 

field condition reports to determine 

actual conditions at an airport. It is not 

the FAA’s intent to preclude an operator 

from using an airport assumed to be 

open at time of use, ‘‘from the earliest 

to the latest possible landing time’’ as 

stated in the rule language. 

Qantas disagrees with the proposed 

weather requirements, stating that the 

older a weather forecast, the more 

inaccurate it is likely to be. Qantas also 

notes omissions from the NPRM. For 

example, the NPRM does not mention 

Safety Height Planning to account for 

some areas of the world where special 

tracking procedures are required due to 

terrain. Also, the NPRM requires a 

descent to 10,000 feet when many 

aircraft have passenger oxygen systems 

that allow extended operations at 14,000 

feet. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1840 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

The FAA does not understand the 

comment on special tracking 

procedures. The en-route fuel supply 

requirement of § 121.646 (b) requires a 

descent following a rapid 

decompression to a safe altitude in 

compliance with the oxygen supply 

requirements of § 121.333. This would 

accommodate an altitude higher than 

10,000 feet if the operator were 

equipped with an augmented passenger 

oxygen system. 

2. Passenger Recovery Plans 

The FAA proposed in the NPRM that 

all U.S. flag and supplemental 

operations include a passenger recovery 

plan applicable to each approved enroute alternate airport listed in the air 

carrier’s operations specifications. This 

proposal was not limited to ETOPS 

operations. Airbus commented the FAA 

has defined neither the purpose nor 

scope of such plans nor the approval 

process. Along with several other 

commenters, it also stated that it finds 

it difficult to comment on details yet to 

be defined for a recovery plan. Airbus, 

JAA, KLM and other commenters also 

posited that such plans should only 

pertain to airports in harsh 

environments or to airports located in 

areas where a diversion conducted 

without specific advance planning 

might result in a hazard to passengers. 

They believe that there is no safety 

justification for any other plans and to 

include all airports creates an 

administrative burden with no safety 

justification. UK CAA makes similar 

comments. Airbus further stated there is 

no justification for requiring a plan for 

airports other than ETOPS alternate 

airports, and does not support any other 

application. Airbus further stated that 

the costs of this rule would be 

prohibitive and the FAA should include 

all costs of developing passenger 

recovery plans in the rule. Air New 

Zealand supported the concept of the 

need for a plan that addresses the 

shelter, well-being, and recovery of 

passengers. 

The FAA agrees in principle with the 

concept that such plans need to 

particularly address only those airports 

that would present a challenge to 

protecting passengers in the event of a 

diversion. The FAA accepts the premise 

that the general application of this 

philosophy is satisfied for the majority 

of airports by generic contingency 

planning by operators. Consequently we 

have limited the requirement for 

recovery plans in this rulemaking A 

specific recovery plan is only required 

for ETOPS alternate airports used in 

ETOPS greater than 180 minutes and for 

diversion airports that support 

operations in the North Polar and South 

Polar areas. The FAA does not agree that 

this requirement should apply only to 

ETOPS alternates. Current FAA policy 

for Polar flying requires that ‘‘a 

sufficient set of alternate airports’’ must 

be able to ‘‘provide for the physiological 

needs of the passengers and crew for the 

duration until safe evacuation’’. No 

safety justification has been given for 

the elimination of this requirement 

during the ARAC process or by the 

commenters, and it is retained in this 

rulemaking for all airplanes not engaged 

in all-cargo operations. The regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule 

includes the estimated costs of 

providing these specific passenger 

recovery plans. Airbus, IATA, and 

several operators believe that cargo 

operators should be exempted from the 

requirement for passenger recovery 

plans. We agree that passenger recovery 

plans are not necessary for all-cargo 

operators. The language in § 121.135 has 

been changed to specify only 

‘‘passenger’’ flag and supplemental 

operations. 

ALPA noted that some operations 

may have only one choice for diversion 

and therefore it is critical that alternate 

airports have the capabilities, services, 

and facilities to safely support the 

diversion. The FAA agrees. The rule 

stated this requirement for all alternate 

airports in the North Polar and South 

Polar areas and for ETOPS greater than 

180 minutes. 

ATA commented that with its limited 

operations, any rigid requirements 

would add significant costs. Therefore, 

this operator requested a compliance 

period of 18 months. The FAA agrees 

that a delayed compliance period is 

appropriate but considers 18 months 

excessive. The FAA has changed the 

rule to allow U.S. flag and supplemental 

air carriers a 12-month implementation 

period to develop airport specific 

passenger recovery plans. 

FedEx and IATA commented the FAA 

should accept regional plans rather than 

require airport specific plans and that 

facilities on site that protect passengers 

from the elements for 48 hours should 

be acceptable. 

The FAA does not believe the 

designation and use of certain airports 

in extreme climatic areas can be covered 

adequately by a ‘‘regional’’ type plan. 

The FAA agrees that current 

contingency planning is sufficient to 

eliminate the need for regional plans for 

most operations but agrees with most 

commenters that specific plans are 

appropriate for airports in harsh 

environments or to airports located in 

areas where advanced planning could 

be hazardous to passengers. For this 

reason the requirement for a regional 

plan has been eliminated from this 

rulemaking. The ARAC considered the 

possible costs and logistics for recovery 

plans and recommended that 48 hours 

is sufficient time to effect passenger 

recovery. The FAA agrees with this 

premise. 

IATA commented that limiting the 

airports to those that offer sufficient 

shelter and can satisfy the physiological 

needs of passengers may reduce the 

number of airports that can be 

considered. This commenter believes 

the capabilities of the aircraft (blankets, 

dinghies, etc.) should be considered. 

There is no question that onboard 

equipment such as blankets can be used 

for the safety and comfort of passengers 

for a short period of time. However, in 

a diversion, advanced planning should 

dictate there would be sufficient 

availability of facilities for the 

protection of passengers and crew. A 

plan depending on long-term use of the 

airplane hull to protect passengers and 

crew from the elements is not 

considered acceptable. 

The FAA proposed to clarify the 

‘‘public protection’’ requirement of 

§ 121.97 to include data showing the 

availability of facilities at each airport or 

in the immediate area sufficient to 

protect the passengers and crew from 

the elements and to see to their welfare. 

FedEx commented the FAA is 

demanding data that is not available in 

such detail at all airports around the 

world. JAA seeks clarification as to the 

detail of such required information. 

That is, what is ‘‘adequate’’ in areas 

of severe climate? Several commenters 

suggested an enhanced definition of 

‘‘adequate’’, to include severe climate 

area, and typical weather and seasonal 

variations. The JAA maintained that a 

more enhanced definition could then be 

used to define an operation as ETOPS or 

non-ETOPS. 

Providing ‘‘public protection’’ data is 

a current regulatory requirement. 

However, in response to this concern, 

the FAA is limiting this expanded 

requirement only to airports used by 

passenger-carrying airplanes for ETOPS 

beyond 180 minutes and for operations 

in the North Polar and South Polar 

areas. By definition, airports used in 

these operations are either in remote or 

demanding areas of the world. By their 

nature such airports will require extra 

attention to the safety of passengers in 

a diversion scenario. It is incumbent on 

all passenger-carrying operators to have 

contingencies for such an event. It is 

expected that more than one carrier will 

serve such routes and the data will be 

shared and readily available. We agree 

in principle with the JAA’s comment, 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1841 

24Although not completely equivalent to part 

139, ICAO RFFS categories are applied in a similar 

manner. ICAO category 4 is generally equivalent to 

part 139 Index A and is defined as suitable for the 

needs of an ATR–42 or equivalent airplane. It can 

consist of 1 truck and 500 lbs. of halon and 100 

gallons of AFFF (fire fighting foam). ICAO category 

7 is generally equivalent to Index C, suitable for a 

B–757 and can consist of two trucks and 3000 

gallons of AFFF. 

but do not agree that it is necessary to 

change the definition of ‘‘adequate 

airport’’. The ‘‘public protection’’

requirements of this rule have always 

applied to all airports used by an 

operator. The expanded definition of 

this rulemaking likewise does not 

differentiate with regard to weather 

extremes. 

3. Rescue and Firefighting Services 

(RFFS) 

The FAA proposed in the NPRM to 

codify current two-engine ETOPS RFFS 

criteria for all ETOPS alternate airports. 

ICAO Category 4 RFFS at alternate 

airports would be required for ETOPS 

operations up to 180-minute diversion 

length. For all ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes ICAO Category 7 services 

would be required.24

Current RFFS standards for airports 

are contained in part 139. These 

requirements are indexed to a formula 

based on aircraft width and length and 

the number of operations of a particular 

type of airplane at the airport. Section 

121.590 specifies the conditions U.S. 

domestic, flag and supplemental carriers 

must use in their operations at part 139 

certified airports and imposes these 

requirements on destination airports but 

not on alternate airports. AC 120–42A 

placed RFFS requirements on alternate 

airports used in ETOPS. 

KLM noted that in the case of a fire 

in the cargo hold, the plane will divert 

to the nearest airport, which may not be 

the designated category 7. Qantas claims 

that since the introduction of ETOPS 

there has never been an ETOPS related 

incident where RFFS were required. 

ATA and many operators did not 

support the NPRM requirement for 

Category 7 for ETOPS greater than 180 

minutes and recommend that the less 

stringent criteria for current two-engine 

207-minute ETOPS apply. IATA and 

FedEx commented that there is no 

scientific reason to connect RFFS to the 

length of the diversion. KLM made a 

similar comment. IATA noted that if an 

operator needed to rely on airports with 

a greater than category 4 RFFS, the 

proposed rule might result in forcing the 

selection of an alternate airport further 

from the planned route than necessary. 

ALPA, however, supported an ICAO 

category 7 capability for all ETOPS 

alternate airports. 

The requirement for RFFS levels for 

ETOPS below 180 minutes and for 207 

minutes are well known and set the 

precedent for these rules. It is the FAA’s 

position that such requirements are 

applicable for all long range operations 

defined by this rule. The captain (pilot 

in command) of any flight, ETOPS 

included, is allowed by regulation to 

land the plane safely wherever 

necessary in an emergency. The purpose 

of this rule is to ensure that all alternate 

airports supporting these demanding 

operations have a reasonable minimum 

capability. The FAA does not believe it 

can justify the requirement to have an 

increased RFFS level of ICAO category 

7 at each designated ETOPS alternate 

airport for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes. 

Although the recommendation for a 

category 7 RFFS capability in the ARAC 

report was accepted by the FAA, several 

commenters have pointed out the 

restrictions and limitations that such a 

requirement presents to the planning 

and conduct of ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes. There is, however, overall 

support for the requirement to have 

RFFS capability at ETOPS alternate 

airports, and there is general acceptance 

that the ICAO category 4 represents the 

minimum acceptable level. 

The proposed RFFS requirement was 

developed as a logical extension of the 

standard establishment for the 207- 

minute ETOPS policy. The FAA 

continues to believe that it is important 

that there be at least one airport 

available with sufficient RFFS 

capability to deal with a significant 

safety hazard. Accordingly, the FAA has 

amended § 121.106 to be consistent with 

the RFFS requirements established for 

the 207-minute ETOPS policy. For 

ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, ICAO 

category 4 would be required with at 

least one adequate airport within the 

authorized diversion time having a 

RFFS category 7 capability. This change 

will allow for optimum route planning 

as well as providing the flight crew with 

available alternate airport options in the 

event a situation requires a higher RFFS 

capability. 

Omni commented that the majority of 

ETOPS diversions are for medical 

emergencies, yet there are no 

requirements for adequate medical care 

on the ground. This commenter also 

found an airport may downgrade its 

declared fire fighting capabilities at 

some point without the knowledge of 

the operator, or that an airport may be 

unable to inform operators of 

downgrades because of lack of authority 

from the State Civil Aviation Authority. 

Qantas noted GPS or Required 

Navigation Performance (RNP) 

approaches would make landing much 

safer, yet no requirements for these 

approaches appear in the NPRM. 

There is no regulated plan for a 

medical emergency because the FAA 

cannot assess the relative risk associated 

with medical emergencies. These are 

events that defy risk analysis. Certain 

guidelines have been codified for 

passenger recovery and public 

protection in today’s rule the FAA 

considers adequate. Regulating the 

standards for airport approaches as 

urged by Qantas is beyond the scope of 

this regulation. 

C. Crewmember and Dispatcher 

Training 

Today’s rule requires training for 

crewmembers and dispatchers in their 

roles and responsibilities in the 

certificate holder’s passenger recovery 

plan. 

JAA, UK CAA, and United supported 

such a requirement. FedEx and IATA 

concur with additional training for 

pilots and dispatchers, but note that 

training for pilots of three- and fourengine airplanes may result in a tradeoff 

with other training. Therefore, they 

requested training only in fields where 

there is an obvious justification or safety 

benefit. American Trans Air concurred 

with the training requirement but 

requests a compliance period of 18 

months. 

The FAA agrees that air carriers need 

a reasonable compliance period to make 

necessary adjustments as a result of a 

new rule. However we do not agree with 

the proposed 18-month period, and 

instead will allow a 12-month 

compliance period from the effective 

date of the rule. We also understand that 

an air carrier may need to adjust the 

pilot training syllabus in order to 

accommodate the new training unit for 

three- and four-engine flight crews. This 

should not be a significant change. 

Therefore, it should not be a significant 

cost to operators. 

Northwest assumed that its 

experience on trans-oceanic flights is 

sufficient, but if additional training is 

required by the certificate management 

office, then it would like to do so 

through bulletins and written 

procedures to minimize costs. It is the 

FAA’s position that the training syllabus 

as well as the means to provide that 

training is within the air carrier’s 

discretion. It can and should be tailored 

to fit within the existing training and 

operational experience of the carrier. 

Qantas commented that the NPRM 

did not consider the simplified ETOPS 

training rules that have been in place in 

Australia for 18 years that require little 

or no training. These rules have resulted 

in no ETOPS-related incidents. Qantas 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1842 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

25Flight watch is a shortened term for use in airground contacts to identify a flight service station 

providing ‘‘En-route Flight Advisory Service 

(Weather)’’. 

further noted that the pilot and 

dispatcher are only a small component 

of the diversion process. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter 

that straightforward and understandable 

rules establishing minimum acceptable 

standards are needed. We believe 

today’s rule establishes those standards. 

We do not agree, however, that 

established standards, no matter how 

‘‘simplified’’ they may be, need not be 

part of pilot and dispatcher training. 

The FAA is well aware that for ETOPS, 

and in particular with an ETOPS flight 

that encounters the need to divert, it is 

the entire company that mobilizes to 

support that diversion. Both the pilot 

and the dispatcher are a critical part of 

the diversion and need to be trained 

accordingly. 

D. Communications Requirements 

The FAA proposed that a certificate 

holder conducting U.S. flag operations 

provide voice communications for 

ETOPS flights. For ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes the certificate holder must have 

a second communication system that 

provides immediate SATCOM with 

‘‘landline telephone-fidelity’’. Section 

121.122 extends this ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes requirement to supplemental 

passenger-carrying operations and to 

two-engine all-cargo operations. 

Continental and other commenters 

objected to the prescriptive requirement 

for SATCOM. They suggested a more 

flexible requirement for voice-based 

systems. ATA, Airbus, and other 

commenters urged the FAA to 

coordinate any new ETOPS 

communication requirements with the 

Terminal Area Operations Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee (TAOARC) 

recommended language. 

The FAA has coordinated the 

amendment to §§ 121.99 and 121.122 

with the parallel activity by the 

TAOARC and Area Navigation (RNAV) 

rulemaking initiative (Docket No. FAA–

2002–1–4002). As of this writing, the 

RNAV final communications rule 

(§ 121.99) has not been finalized. The 

FAA has determined that there is a 

significant safety benefit associated with 

an ETOPS flight having the ability to 

communicate via a satellite based voice 

system, especially for those situations 

that occur while on long, remote ETOPS 

routes. The need for safety is best served 

through information and technical 

assistance that is clearly and rapidly 

transmitted to the flight crew in a way 

that requires the least amount of 

distraction to piloting duties best serves 

the need for safety. The FAA has 

determined that the best way to assure 

clear and timely communication in 

general is via voice communication. 

Other than the area north of 82 degrees 

latitude, satellite communications 

provides the best means to provide that 

capability because it is not limited by 

distance. 

FedEx, IATA, United, and Continental 

and others noted that SATCOM may not 

be useable beyond 82 degrees North 

latitude, and is thus ineffective for 

operations in Polar areas. The FAA 

recognizes the limitations of SATCOM 

in the North Polar Area above this 

latitude, and in such an area an 

alternate communication system such as 

HF voice or data link is to be used. The 

relatively short period of time that the 

flight is above latitude 82 degrees North 

in relation to the total planned flight 

time is a small fraction of the total 

flight. The ability to use SATCOM for 

all other portions of the flight, which for 

some routes could be longer than 15 

hours duration, is advantageous to the 

flight. For flights above 82 degrees 

latitude the operator must also ensure 

that communications requirements can 

be met by the most reliable means 

available, taking into account the 

potential communication disruption 

due to solar flare activity. 

Several commenters noted that the 

proposed communication requirements 

are more restrictive than the current 

207-minute policy letter. Continental 

asserted that ARAC recognized that 

SATCOM was costly and arbitrary and 

chose to recommend it because it was 

first specified in the 207-minute 

operations letter. In its development of 

the 207-minute policy, the FAA and 

industry agreed that the areas of the 

world defined by ETOPS greater than 

180 minutes were remote areas where 

the safety benefits of SATCOM would 

be significant. There is considerable 

difference in the level of operational 

authority allowed with the 207-minute 

North Pacific area of operation (NOPAC) 

authority, which is a limited extension 

of the 180-minute ETOPS authority and 

an infrequent operation and that of the 

proposed approval for beyond 180- 

minute operations. ETOPS 

authorizations in Appendix P to part 

121 for greater than 180 minutes allows 

operations on a continuous basis up to 

the certified time-limited system 

capability of the airplane. 

IATA and FedEx proposed that 

operators of three- and four-engine 

airplanes be allowed to continue ETOPS 

without SATCOM for a period not to 

exceed 6 years. JAL proposed a similar 

exemption consistent with the 6 months 

allowed in § 121.633 for system 

planning. We agree with the 

commenters that a period of time should 

be allowed for the air carrier to install 

the required satellite communication 

system on airplanes not currently 

subject to ETOPS authorization 

restrictions but believe 6 years is too 

long a period of time. We have amended 

§§ 121.99 and 121.122 to allow for a 12- 

month installation period for airplanes 

with more than two engines used for 

ETOPS. 

ATA commented that HF voice and 

HF data link communication are 

sufficient for the safety of ETOPS. We 

agree that the use of data link for 

communications is a very effective tool 

especially when used to transfer blocks 

of data such as revised flight plans or 

updated winds aloft data or to downlink 

airplane performance data. It is also 

very effective when used for controller 

pilot data link communication to 

transmit air traffic service clearances 

and flight crew responses using prestored messages. However, data link 

becomes more cumbersome when used 

in free text message form. The use of 

data link (both HF and SATCOM) is 

limited by message length and ability to 

clearly state the issue or message, and 

tasks the flight crew more than voice 

communication by requiring full 

attention to the task of interacting with 

a small and compact keypad. 

Turbulence and airplane maneuvering 

compounds the difficulty in using the 

device without error. Its use also 

necessitates crew coordination/ 

verification of message content prior to 

sending the message. This is extremely 

distracting during a time of flight that 

requires the pilot’s focused attention to 

the problem at hand. In comparison, the 

use of voice SATCOM allows clear and 

immediate conversation that can 

quickly convey the situation and needs 

for the flight. 

Omni commented that the proposal 

does not meet its intended safety 

purpose: it requires an operator to 

structure its operations around the 

availability of SATCOM rather than 

more sophisticated communications 

systems. Moreover, this commenter and 

Airbus found the FAA did not clearly 

define ‘‘landline fidelity’’ in 

quantifiable terms. Several commenters 

stated that flight watch 25 can be 

adequately conducted with HF voice 

communication, and that in most 

regions of the globe there are adequate 

ground and communication facilities 

available. 

The use of SATCOM is a new 

requirement that applies only to ETOPS 

conducted beyond 180 minutes. The 

other available communication systems 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1843 

in use (VHF and HF voice and data link) 

all have significant limitations. VHF has 

poor range capability. HF two-way voice 

communications are routinely degraded 

by voice distortion, background noise, 

static, and can be unclear and 

unintelligible due to atmospheric 

conditions and frequency clutter. Voice 

SATCOM allows for immediate 

clarification by use of questions and 

dialogue that will result in important 

and relevant information being clearly 

transmitted. This occurs with minimum 

workload and distraction to the flight 

crew from their piloting duties. It is by 

many factors over, a quantum leap 

improvement in communications that 

can greatly benefit the safety of a flight; 

particularly an ETOPS flight that could 

be 4 or more hours from a landing site. 

The capabilities of SATCOM to connect 

with the communications satellite are 

not hindered by the altitude of the 

airplane, and are useable on the ground 

following a diversion. The 

communication benefits are clear. 

The words selected in the rule ‘‘of 

landline telephone-fidelity’’ are to 

convey to the average person in the 

United States the communication 

qualities expected. A person 

knowledgeable of the communication 

qualities of SATCOM understands the 

equivalent relationship in comparison 

to landline telephone fidelity. The 

quantifiable term ‘‘landline telephonefidelity’’ is in reference to the 

experience one would have using the 

telephone system in the United States. 

The FAA disagrees with the comment 

that the rule would require operators to 

structure its operations around the 

availability of SATCOM before 

considering alternatives. The rule 

language does not restrict operations 

based on the availability of satellite 

based voice communication. 

Airbus, IATA and FedEx commented 

that although operators may initially 

ensure communication infrastructures, 

demonstrating the reliability and 

response time to local air traffic 

personnel on a continuing basis may be 

an impossible task. The FAA does not 

understand the commenters’ objection 

to § 121.122(a). The requirement for the 

air carrier to identify the ground- or 

satellite-based communication 

installations to ensure reliable and rapid 

communications with air traffic services 

has been a long-standing requirement 

for U.S. flag air carriers (§ 121.99(a)). 

Boeing recommended deleting the 

word ‘‘additional’’ to dispel any 

interpretation of needing a second 

satellite-based communication system. 

It is not possible for an air carrier to 

have a SATCOM system installed in 

place of the communication system 

required by § 121.99(a) because 

SATCOM does not have broadcast 

capability. If, however, an air carrier has 

already installed SATCOM as an 

additional communications system, as 

Boeing suggests, to meet the 

requirement of § 121.99(c), then there 

would not be a requirement for a second 

‘‘additional’’ system to satisfy 

§ 121.99(d). The air carrier is not 

required to install two ‘‘additional’’

satellite-based communication systems 

to meet the regulatory requirement. The 

FAA requires the additional voice 

communication system to be a satellitebased system. 

Airbus also noted that operators may 

have to bear expenses charged by 

owners of satellite systems, particularly 

in Polar areas, a cost not included in the 

FAA’s economic evaluation. JAA also 

urged the FAA to consider these 

prescriptive requirements in its cost/ 

benefit analysis. The FAA agrees, and 

the Final Regulatory Evaluation 

includes the costs for installation and 

use of SATCOM. 

ATA objected to a requirement for 

SATCOM for supplemental operators, 

while ALPA supports such a 

requirement. As stated earlier, the FAA 

has agreed that for the particular case of 

all-cargo, supplemental operations on 

airplanes with more than two engines 

the cost of the ETOPS requirements 

such as SATCOM cannot be justified. 

This communication requirement has 

been withdrawn from this rule 

E. Time-Limited System Planning and 

the Critical Fuel Scenario 

The FAA proposed that planned 

ETOPS diversion times not exceed the 

time limit specified in the airplane’s 

most time limited system minus 15 

minutes. In the case of cargo firesuppression systems for airplanes with 

more than two engines, the proposal 

allowed 6 years for compliance. The 

FAA anticipates that the most timelimited system would typically be either 

the cargo fire suppression system if 

required, or the en-route fuel supply. 

Current two-engine ETOPS guidance 

codified in this rule for operations up to 

180 minutes bases diversion times on a 

one-engine inoperative cruise speed 

(under standard conditions in still air). 

Required system capabilities are then 

based on this calculation. The rule 

requires wind to be considered for 

ETOPS beyond 180 minutes to ensure 

that system time limits are not 

exceeded. Since data has shown the 

likelihood of a simultaneous engine 

failure and cargo fire to be extremely 

remote, for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, 

the cargo fire suppression system 

requirement is based on an all engine 

operating speed calculating the effect of 

wind. 

The FAA proposed to define ‘‘one 

engine inoperative cruise speed’’ for 

ETOPS as a speed within the certified 

operating limits of the airplane, selected 

by the certificate holder and approved 

by the FAA, that is used for calculating 

fuel reserve requirements and the still 

air distance associated with the 

maximum approved one-engineinoperative diversion distance for the 

flight. 

FedEx, Singapore Airlines, JAL, and 

IATA recommended the FAA develop 

more detailed information for 

determining one-engine inoperative 

cruise speeds to increase operational 

flexibility. These commenters also 

recommended the FAA establish 

conditions or scenarios for calculating 

the maximum approved distances (using 

still air) associated with one-engine 

inoperative operations. 

The definition is already flexible in 

that the certificate holder selects the 

speed as long as that speed is within the 

certified operating limits for the 

airplane. This gives operational 

flexibility for different areas of 

operation where the engine inoperative 

net level-off altitude may require 

consideration of terrain and other 

factors. The certificate holder must also 

get FAA approval to use that speed. 

This selected and approved speed is 

also the speed used to determine the 

critical fuel reserves required for ETOPS 

by § 121.646(b). While this approval 

gives the certificate holder flexibility, it 

would not be acceptable to the FAA for 

a certificate holder to designate the 

fastest possible speed in order to 

achieve the largest ETOPS area of 

operation, and then use a slower speed 

in determining critical fuel reserves to 

reduce the amount of fuel reserves. The 

speed used by the certificate holder to 

determine the critical fuel reserves must 

be the same speed used to determine the 

ETOPS area of operation in that 

geographical area. 

Air New Zealand commented that the 

proposed requirement for ETOPS flights 

beyond 180 minutes for cargo 

suppression time to be adjusted for 

wind and temperature is unreasonable. 

FedEx and United echo this objection. 

The ETOPS ARAC Working Group 

deliberated extensively over the concept 

of applying wind and temperature 

values in calculating ETOPS distances. 

The conclusion reached was that for 

ETOPS up to and including 180 

minutes, the present standard of 

calculating the distance in still air was 

adequate and should continue. However 

with the diversion times increasing to 

240 minutes and beyond, it was deemed 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1844 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

appropriate to require diversion time 

computations for longer ETOPS 

distances to account for winds and 

temperature, because the total effect on 

long flights could be considerable. The 

FAA has accepted the ARAC 

recommendation. The FAA does not 

agree with the commenter that 

calculations with actual and forecast 

wind and temperature are unreasonable. 

All fuel planning and critical fuel 

reserves needs are already computed 

based on forecast wind data. 

The FAA also agrees that the planning 

for an ETOPS flight beyond 180 minutes 

is more complex in that wind and 

temperature are factored into 

determining an all engine speed 

distance as well as an engineinoperative speed distance. The FAA 

expects that an airline would first 

conduct a route planning exercise for 

each planned city pairing to determine 

the diversion authority needed in still 

air conditions. If the route or segments 

of the route exceed 180 minutes based 

on one engine inoperative speed and 

still air, then a secondary planning 

exercise (that may be required 

seasonally) should be conducted that 

factors in expected winds and 

temperatures on that route. The distance 

between adequate alternate airports on 

the route is converted into time 

(minutes) computed for an all engine 

cruise speed, as well as an engine 

inoperative speed. The number of 

minutes cannot exceed the time-limited 

system (cargo fire suppression and the 

other most limiting system) that is 

identified in the airplane flight manual 

less the 15-minute pad. The operator 

needs to determine how much system 

capability is required for the planned 

route and equip its airplane to have 

sufficient margins. The FAA expects 

that manufacturers will provide system 

capability with a margin greater than the 

15 minutes required by the rule so that 

the operator has more flexibility when 

unforecast adverse winds are 

encountered. Thus, the operator, in 

coordination with the manufacturer, 

needs to determine how much extra 

margin should be allocated to provide 

greater flexibility when encountering 

the unexpected on the planned routes. 

Finally for the actual flight, the 

operator’s flight planning must be 

within the airplane systems capability 

for the selected ETOPS alternate airports 

on the planned route based on diversion 

times that are calculated using known or 

forecast winds and temperature 

conditions. Airplane flight manual 

system limits must be adhered to. Any 

segment planning that provides only a 

minimum of excess time-limited system 

capability compared to the maximum 

distance from an airport on the route 

should be backed up with an alternate 

course of action. 

ALPA, FedEx, Singapore, and IATA 

commented that there is no fire 

suppression limit for ETOPS up to and 

including 180 minutes. Because of this, 

FedEx and United suggested a fire 

suppression time guideline beyond 180 

minutes rather than final limit. ALPA, 

on the other hand, stated this limit 

should be applied to operations up to 

180 minutes as well as those over 180 

minutes. United requested clarification 

that this requirement is an amendment 

to part 25. 

The FAA acknowledges the apparent 

disparity created by applying timelimited systems capability, such as 

cargo fire suppression capability, only 

to those three- and four-engine airplanes 

conducting ETOPS and not to those 

airplanes operating 180 minutes or less. 

Since the overwhelming number of 

airplanes with three or four engines will 

not be used in ETOPS, the FAA 

recognizes that the costs to retrofit the 

cargo fire suppression system for all of 

the other airplanes would be significant, 

and simply overwhelm the benefit that 

would be derived. 

In response to FedEx and United’s 

comment, the principle of requiring 

system capabilities that are sufficient to 

support the operation and to protect the 

operation from occurrences that are not 

extremely improbable is a basic tenet of 

all previous ETOPS guidelines. These 

have been instrumental in the success of 

current ETOPS in the absence of 

rulemaking. Now tasked with 

developing regulatory language for such 

operations, the FAA finds it prudent to 

define them as rules and not guidelines. 

This is a part 121 limitation on the 

operation. The only part 25 requirement 

is to place this time capability into the 

airplane flight manual. 

ATA recommends that the cargo 

suppression requirements be revised to 

apply only to airplanes that do not 

incorporate procedures for fire 

suppression through oxygen starvation. 

This section should clearly state that its 

provisions apply only to Class C cargo 

compartments. Boeing, IATA, and many 

operators make similar comments. 

Northwest comments that since the 

majority of all-cargo operations have 

only Class E compartments, they should 

be excluded from this requirement. The 

FAA agrees that the intent of ARAC and 

the final rule would only apply to those 

cargo and baggage compartments that 

have an ‘‘active’’ fire suppression 

system installed, i.e., systems that 

incorporate fire-suppressing agents in 

containers that limit the length of time 

that these agents can suppress a fire. 

Most airplanes used in part 121 

passenger-carrying service have only 

Class C cargo or baggage compartments, 

or Class D compartments retrofitted 

with time-limited fire suppression 

systems. Some all-cargo two-engine 

airplanes may have Class C 

compartments or retrofitted Class D 

compartments, although most have only 

Class E compartments. Class E 

compartments may only be installed in 

all-cargo airplanes. The rule announced 

today requires that carriers determine—

in terms of time—the most limiting fire 

suppression system capability. This rule 

does not apply to Class E compartments, 

whose method of extinguishing a fire is 

not time-limited. 

Boeing suggested adding ‘‘or CMP’’ to 

paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) to permit 

ETOPS operators to continue their 

operations without potential disruption. 

Boeing also suggested the proposed rule 

should allow the all engine speed for 

determining allowable ETOPS time to 

an alternate airport for time-limited 

systems other than the cargo fire 

suppression system. Their premise is 

that there may be other non-engine 

related time-limited systems that would 

be appropriate to consider as all-engine 

operations for calculating the ETOPS 

time to an alternate airport. 

The FAA agrees that the time-limited 

system capability may be included in 

the CMP document, and has amended 

the rule accordingly. The FAA does not 

agree that § 121.633(c) should be 

changed as suggested. Diversion lengths 

have always been limited by the most 

time-limited system, which has 

historically been the cargo fire 

suppression system. During ETOPS 

ARAC discussions material was 

presented to show that the probability of 

an engine failure and a simultaneous 

cargo fire both occurring at the most 

critical point in flight was extremely 

improbable. This analysis supported the 

decision to separate diversion lengths 

for cargo fire suppression system 

capability from other time-limited 

systems capability. This was 

accomplished by allowing the use of allengine speed calculation for the cargo 

fire suppression limit, and the oneengine inoperative speed calculation for 

the other most limiting systems. There 

has not been any other time-limited 

system identified by anyone that would 

justify a similar procedure as is allowed 

for the cargo fire suppression system. 

FedEx, KLM, and IATA commented 

that the proposed cargo fire suppression 

system might be technically and/or 

economically difficult to accomplish. 

These commenters suggested an 8-year 

compliance period. Boeing 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1845 

recommended ‘‘grandfathering’’ threeand four-engine airplanes for paragraph 

(c) of § 121.633 because the installation 

of such systems would essentially 

require recertification of airplanes 

manufactured over 30 years ago. 

The FAA agrees that older and current 

three- and four-engine airplanes should 

be given consideration in application of 

this rule. However, the commenters 

have not submitted any data to support 

their position and the FAA cannot 

independently justify extending this 

exemption to 8 years based on the data 

it has. The 6-year period was a 

recommendation from industry 

following extensive discussion and 

debate. 

FedEx, United, and IATA also 

suggested that the manufacturer should 

provide a list of time-limited systems to 

enable a consistent industry application 

of this rule. 

The rule requires that the 

manufacturer provide the systems limit 

in the airplane flight manual for the 

cargo fire suppression system, and the 

next most time-limited system that is 

installed on the airplane. The FAA does 

not anticipate a need to account for 

more than the top two time-limited 

systems, although a manufacturer is 

welcome to provide more information if 

it so chooses. 

FedEx, KLM, and IATA asked about 

the diversion considerations caused by 

headwinds and whether the flight 

should be cancelled if this factor cannot 

be accommodated. The FAA clarified 

that the time limited system capability 

that is stated in the airplane flight 

manual cannot be exceeded. If the 

airplane systems capability is not 

adequate for the intended route, then 

the flight cannot proceed. The operator 

must ensure that the airplanes systems 

capability is sufficient for the intended 

route. 

KLM commented that the only timelimiting system that can be justified is 

the cargo hold fire suppression. They 

stated that oxygen cannot be limiting 

since this has to be covered by 

procedures. The FAA cannot agree. 

Although the best-known and 

understood limiting capability system is 

the cargo fire suppression system, the 

manufacturer must still identify the next 

most limiting system, because the 

incident requiring diversion may be 

unrelated to a fire in the cargo hold. For 

some airplanes this second limiting 

factor may be the fuel load capability of 

the airplane, which needs as a 

minimum the capability to support the 

required ETOPS critical fuel reserves. 

UK CAA and the JAA agreed with the 

proposal but noted that UK CAA 

airplanes incorporate the required 15 

minutes within the calculation of all 

time-limited functions. Commenters 

stated that the 15 minutes should not be 

incorporated twice. The FAA agrees that 

the European regulation should not 

require the 15-minute pad twice. These 

and other issues require harmonization 

to be resolved in follow-on discussions 

that would determine applicability. 

The FAA proposed to define 

‘‘maximum diversion time’’ to mean, for 

the purposes of ETOPS in part 121, the 

diversion time, under standard 

conditions in still air at the one-engine 

inoperative cruise speed. JAA and UK 

CAA found this definition misleading as 

it refers only to still air time. These 

commenters suggested that an approved 

still airtime be given to operators and 

that the maximum diversion time be 

defined as the system limit (to be 

determined on the day of the flight in 

the forecast conditions). 

We generally agree with this 

comment. For ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes use of this term is only 

applicable to prior ETOPS route 

planning, not day-to-day operations. 

Accordingly, the definition is clarified 

to read, ‘‘for ETOPS route planning,’’

thus applying to all ETOPS planning 

(including operations beyond 180 

minutes). This does not contradict the 

new § 121.633, which applies to day-today operations since the term 

‘‘maximum diversion time’’ is not used 

in that section. 

Today’s rule requires in § 121.646 that 

an airplane have enough fuel on board, 

assuming combinations of an engine 

failure and a rapid decompression at the 

most critical point of the route, to land 

at an adequate airport with enough 

additional fuel to hold for 15 minutes at 

1500 feet above field elevation. It adds 

additional fuel requirements to 

compensate for wind, icing, and an APU 

unit, if one is required as a power 

source. This subject has been termed the 

‘‘critical fuel scenario’’ and has been a 

significant part of two-engine ETOPS 

guidance from AC120.42A. Based on the 

weather forecasting techniques of the 

early 1980s, the advisory circular 

required very conservative calculations 

for wind and icing effects. The advisory 

circular required a 5% fuel addition to 

total fuel to account for wind forecast 

errors and required the operator to 

assume icing and ice drag for the entire 

scenario. However, winds-aloft 

forecasting has improved dramatically 

in the last twenty years. The use of these 

products and techniques has reduced 

the need for such conservative 

calculations and the FAA is requiring 

only a 5% adjustment to the forecast 

wind if approved techniques are 

employed. Based on studies done by the 

Atmospheric Environment Service of 

Canada such as CASP II, the probability 

of a continuous or repetitive significant 

icing encounter is very small on a long 

flight segment. For these reasons the 

proposed icing calculations have been 

reduced to the effects of ice drag during 

only 10% of the time ice is forecast or 

the use of icing systems during the 

entire time of forecast icing. 

ATA, Northwest, United, and IATA 

commented that the requirement for an 

additional 15 minutes of fuel for the 

three- and four-engine airplane for more 

than 90 minutes, but less than 180 

minutes, will add costs to operators. 

ATA suggested that the current fuel 

requirements be retained for these 

aircraft. 

The FAA accepts the comment that 

the additional 15 minutes of holding 

fuel is a new requirement that has been 

added to § 121.646(a) to require 

sufficient fuel for a decompression 

scenario. However, the added 15-minute 

holding-fuel requirement does not 

represent an additional cost to 

operators. Part 121 currently has two 

separate fuel requirements that apply to 

three- and four-engine operators 

conducting U.S. flag and supplemental 

operations. Section 121.645(b)(4) 

requires fuel for 30 minutes at holding 

speed at 1,500 feet with all engines 

operating. Section 121.193(c)(2)(iv) 

requires fuel to fly with two engines 

inoperative to an airport to arrive 1500 

feet directly overhead and then fly for 

an additional 15 minutes at cruise 

power. The requirement of § 121.646(a) 

for holding fuel is a value less than fuel 

reserves already required for the 

operation and therefore is not an 

additional cost to the operator. 

BALPA commented that the reduction 

of the 5% additional fuel for wind is 

overly optimistic given the ICAO 

standard of a 20% forecasting error and 

the fact that typically fuel-indicating 

systems are accurate only to a 1–1.5% 

scale. BALPA suggested that the critical 

fuel calculation have an additional sum 

of fuel to allow for an overall error of 

not less than 3% of the calculated fuel 

from the critical point to the alternate 

airport. Qantas however, supported the 

reduction in critical fuel values. Qantas 

also concurred with an additional fuel 

requirement if an APU unit is required. 

UK CAA commented the FAA should 

either retain the 5% fuel factor or use a 

reduction analysis based on historical 

data and proof that the operator is using 

the World Area Forecasting System 

unequivocally. 

The FAA concurs with the ETOPS 

ARAC conclusion that the industry has 

a better and more accurate wind forecast 

ability than previously available. This 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1846 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

26Section 121.7 defines ETOPS Entry Point as the 

first point on the route of an ETOPS flight, 

determined using a one-engine inoperative cruise 

speed under standard conditions in still air, that 

is—

(1) More than 60 minutes from an adequate 

airport for airplanes with two engines; or 

(2) More than 180 minutes from an adequate 

airport for airplanes with more than two engines. 

enhanced capability justifies the change 

in determining fuel required for a flight. 

The FAA does not accept BALPA’s 

recommendation to increase the 

contingency fuel to a 3% value as 

proposed. Likewise, the FAA does not 

agree with the UK CAA. The basis for 

the contingency fuel values in 

§ 121.646(b) is the service experience 

gained in ETOPS for almost two decades 

and the vast improvement in accuracy 

of the World Area Forecasting System 

wind forecasting. 

FedEx, Singapore, and IATA 

commented that in the current 

regulatory language additional fuel for 

icing is implied for operations beyond 

90 minutes and is now required in 

ETOPS. They have requested 

clarification. To clarify, the intent to 

include icing in § 121.646(a) is to clearly 

state that the fuel required to operate 

engine and wing anti-ice systems as 

well (as to account for the induced drag 

from ice accumulation on unheated 

surfaces) must be included. The FAA 

has, however, modified the language of 

this section to be consistent with the 

language used in other sections of part 

121. Section 121.646(a) is modified to 

read: ‘‘* * * considering wind and 

other weather conditions expected, it 

has enough fuel * * *’’. The intent with 

this change remains the same in that if 

icing conditions are expected, then the 

fuel requirements for this condition 

need to be accounted for in the fuel 

calculation. 

FedEx, Singapore, IATA, and Japan 

Airlines commented that the rationale 

for adopting a 90-minute threshold for 

three- and four-engine airplanes is not 

clearly addressed. The 180-minute 

threshold seems to be based on the 

ETOPS threshold for rapid 

decompression, which several 

commenters found unreasonable. The 

rationale for selecting the 90-minute 

threshold in § 121.646(a) is based on 

§ 121.193(c), that established the 90- 

minute threshold for three- and fourengine airplanes. 

Qantas questioned the need to allow 

extra fuel for decompression and a 

simultaneous engine failure, noting that 

most engine failures occur at times of 

major thrust. Qantas suggested that in 

the extremely unlikely event that these 

two events should occur 

simultaneously, the flight variable 

reserve would suffice. The FAA does 

not agree with this rationale. The 

connection with the loss of an engine 

combined with the loss of 

pressurization has previously occurred 

due to an uncontained engine failure. 

Such a failure can occur on all 

airplanes, especially four-engine 

airplanes where the inboard engines are 

located in closer proximity to the 

fuselage. In determining the critical fuel 

reserve required for ETOPS, § 121.646(b) 

requires the operator to use the greater 

fuel burn rate between flying all engines 

unpressurized versus flying one-engine 

inoperative unpressurized. Planning for 

this type of failure ensures that 

sufficient fuel is onboard to fly to and 

land at an alternate airport. This fuel 

planning allows the other contingency 

fuel requirements to be available to the 

pilot for the non-planned variables. 

Qantas commented the FAA has 

overlooked two factors: additional 

oxygen for passengers and high or 

mountainous terrain areas where longer 

decompression tracks will be required. 

The FAA crew and passenger 

supplemental oxygen requirements are 

contained in §§ 121.329 and 121.333 of 

current regulations. These requirements 

are applicable to all flights. Special 

escape tracks over high or mountainous 

terrain are necessary in the event the 

flight cannot maintain the necessary 

obstruction clearances due to an engine 

loss or loss of pressurization. Such 

routes require approval by the FAA, and 

are listed in the operator’s operations 

specifications. 

Transport Canada commented that 

future technology aircraft may allow 

airplanes to fly decompression profiles 

at altitudes higher than 15,000 feet. 

Therefore, Transport Canada proposed 

that analysis be done to verify altitudes 

greater than 15,000 feet and whether the 

5% alternative still remains valid. The 

FAA agrees that continued assessments 

as to the accuracy of wind forecasts 

would be needed. If data indicates that 

a desired level of accuracy has not been 

achieved, then appropriate fuel margins 

up to the standard 5% value are 

appropriate. 

F. Dispatch or Flight Release 

1. Original Dispatch or Flight Release, 

Re-Dispatch or Amendment of Dispatch 

or Flight Release 

The FAA proposed that before passing 

the ETOPS entry point, weather 

conditions at alternate airports must be 

evaluated to ensure that they are at or 

above the operating minimums 

specified in the operator’s operations 

specifications. This rule codifies current 

ETOPS requirements expressed in AC 

120–42A. 

ATA requested the FAA clarify its 

intent concerning the ETOPS entry 

point to include the intended authority 

of the captain and dispatcher to 

determine the suitability of an en-route 

alternate airport. FedEx, United, 

Singapore and IATA made a similar 

comment, saying that it is not clear 

whether weather changes at alternate 

airports, once the ETOPS entry point is 

passed, may require a turn back. 

The FAA agreed that clarification is 

needed for the situation where the flight 

has passed the ETOPS entry point.26 An 

operator is not required to turn back 

once the flight has gone beyond the 

ETOPS Entry Point if an unexpected 

worsening of the weather at the 

designated ETOPS alternate airport 

drops the airport below operating 

landing minima (or any other event 

occurs that makes the runway at that 

airport unusable). The FAA expects that 

the pilot-in-command, in coordination 

with the dispatcher if appropriate, will 

exercise judgment in evaluating the 

situation and make a decision as to the 

safest course of action. This may be a 

turn back, re-routing to another ETOPS 

alternate airport, or continuing on the 

planned route. Should the operator 

become aware of a potential weather 

problem prior to the airplane entering 

the ETOPS stage of the flight, the rule 

allows the operator to designate a 

different alternate airport at the ETOPS 

entry point in order to continue the 

flight. 

UK CAA recommended that the 

requirement be amended to say that the 

flight crew are to remain informed of 

changes in conditions at designated enroute alternate airports. If conditions are 

identified that preclude safe approach 

and landing, the crew should take an 

appropriate action. The FAA believes 

that the language of the NPRM and final 

rule adequately convey a practice that 

has been required for all two-engine 

ETOPS conducted up to 180 minutes as 

well as the 207-minute ETOPS policy 

letter. 

Airbus and JAA found this 

requirement impractical for polar 

routes, where the ETOPS alternate 

airport may be located outside the 

ETOPS area. Airbus therefore 

recommended the FAA exclude polar 

flights with a diversion time not 

exceeding 60 minutes for a two-engine 

airplane or 180 minutes for a three-or 

four-engine airplane from the scope of 

this requirement. The FAA agrees that 

the original intent of the NPRM—to 

establish the Polar Areas as areas where 

the ETOPS rules apply—created 

confusion. We have therefore 

abandoned this concept. The 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1847 

application of the ETOPS rules for these 

areas are no different than for any other 

area of the world and are only required 

for two-engine airplanes whose routes 

take them farther than 60 minutes from 

an adequate airport and for passenger 

airplanes with more than two engines 

whose routes take them farther than 180 

minutes from an adequate airport. The 

FAA believes that the particular 

requirements of current polar policy 

codified in this rule are sufficient to 

ensure the safety of all other non-ETOPS 

flights in these areas. 

2. Dispatch Release: U.S. Flag and 

Domestic Operations 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 

adding ETOPS approvals to the items 

that must be included in a flight 

dispatch release. A flight dispatch 

release for each flight is a regulatory 

requirement for each certificate holder 

conducting domestic or flag operations. 

It must contain information on the 

flight, list the airports to be used by the 

flight including alternates, and contain 

pertinent weather and maintenance 

information. It must be signed by both 

the pilot and dispatcher. 

Qantas commented that this 

requirement is unnecessary, arguing the 

pilot already knows of the ETOPS 

approvals for a particular fleet. The 

pilot-in-command should be notified 

only when there are changes. Qantas 

objected to application of this 

requirement to supplemental 

operations. United agreed with the 

proposal and suggested that it simply be 

added to the Flight Plan Forecast. 

The purpose of the requirement to 

show the ETOPS time basis on the 

dispatch or flight release is to ensure 

that the status of the equipment, flight 

planning, and crew qualification all 

match for the planned flight. The time 

an ETOPS flight is released for flight 

requires that all personnel involved be 

focused on that flight’s requirements. 

The dispatch and flight planning 

process considers not only the airline’s 

approved ETOPS authority, but also the 

status of the airplane and its equipment 

to meet those standards. The dispatch 

and flight planning personnel, the 

maintenance personnel, and the flight 

crew must all be aware of what is 

required for the flight so that last minute 

adjustments or decisions are correctly 

applied. We agree that the use of the 

Flight Plan Forecast is the most logical 

method of compliance. 

G. Engine Inoperative Landing 

Today’s rule requires that under 

certain circumstances a pilot must land 

the airplane at the nearest suitable 

airport as soon as a safe landing can be 

made. The FAA proposed a change in 

the wording of this rule from ‘‘* * * 

whenever the rotation of an engine is 

stopped to prevent possible damage,’’ to 

‘‘whenever an engine is shut down to 

prevent possible damage.’’ This minor 

revision was made to delete the 

reference to stopping the rotation of an 

engine, which applies only to propeller 

driven airplanes, and adding a reference 

to engine shutdown, which applies to 

all airplane engines. In the final rule 

this application is extended to all 

relevant paragraphs in § 121.565. 

Although JAA and UK CAA 

supported the proposal, many operators 

took the opportunity to discuss the term 

‘‘suitable’’ in the rule language. They 

commented that while this section is 

consistent with today’s ETOPS 

operations, the ARAC and ICAO 

Operations Panel recommended a more 

flexible plan by allowing the pilot to 

determine the optimum airport based on 

factors such as weather or facilities. 

These commenters believe that the pilot 

should be able to choose the most 

appropriate airport if the diversion time 

is only slightly different. Omni makes a 

similar comment. Boeing commented 

that it assumes the FAA will define 

‘‘nearest suitable airport’’ in its advisory 

circular. 

The FAA understands the 

commenters’ concern about determining 

what would be the best airport for 

diversion. The ETOPS ARAC Working 

Group recommended to the FAA 

material that provides guidance and 

clarification to pilots to determine the 

‘‘suitability’’ of an airport for landing. 

The FAA believes such material is better 

suited to an advisory circular. The FAA 

does not require any pilot to land at an 

airport that the pilot-in-command does 

not deem to be suitable. The 

requirement of § 121.565(a) does require 

landing at the ‘‘nearest suitable airport’’. 

However, a pilot-in-command may 

exercise his command authority to land 

at an airport other than the nearest 

suitable airport, and then file a report as 

required by § 121.565(d). 

XII. ETOPS Authorization Criteria 

The final rule creates a new Appendix 

P to part 121, which specifies the 

criteria the FAA Administrator will 

evaluate in approving ETOPs 

operations. These ETOPs authorities 

must be listed in the certificate holder’s 

operations specifications. Appendix P is 

divided into three sections, approvals 

for two-engine airplanes, approvals for 

passenger-carrying airplanes with more 

than two engines, and approvals for all 

airplanes in Polar operations. 

A. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 

Operations—Airplanes With Two 

Engines 

The FAA proposed certain criteria for 

extended operations, from 60 minutes to 

more than 240 minutes, for two-engine 

airplanes. We have codified the step 

ETOPS approvals in AC 120–42A (75, 

120, 138, 180, and 207 minutes), added 

a 90 minute approval for Micronesia, 

and have expanded the operation of 

two-engine airplanes to include new 

authorities of 240 minutes and ‘‘greater 

than 240 minutes’’. Like all previous 

approvals discussed in section I of the 

preamble, these new authorities are area 

specific and have operator experience 

and minimum equipment (MEL) 

requirements. 

Additionally, we have added to the 

NPRM language a reference to the 

propulsion system reliability for ETOPS 

that is required by § 21.4(b)(2) and 

which comes from the original guidance 

of AC120–42A, paragraph 10(b). This 

guidance required that before the FAA 

grants ETOPS operational approval, an 

assessment should be made of the 

applicant’s ability to achieve and 

maintain the demonstrated level of 

propulsion system reliability of the 

world fleet. This determination can be 

based on service experience, ETOPS 

process validation or a combination of 

both and will be addressed in advisory 

material. This language is now codified 

in the final rule in part 121, Appendix 

P, section I, paragraph (a). 

IATA and United correctly noted that 

allowing 138-minute ETOPS to be 

applied in any geographical location 

adds flexibility. The 138-minute 

diversion authority is no longer 

restricted to the North Atlantic area of 

operation. The operator may request the 

use of 138-minute ETOPS in 

geographical areas that have sufficient 

adequate airports that could, for the 

given flight, be used as ETOPs alternate 

airports within 138-minutes diversion 

distance. 

United commented that the proposal 

to add all of the 207-minute ETOPS 

requirements on all operations beyond 

180 minutes may be too restrictive to 

some operators. United also contended 

that the 207-minute ETOPS should be 

allowed in all areas where the operator 

is authorized to conduct 240-minute 

ETOPS. This should apply to the polar 

region and South Pacific. 

The development of the 207-minute 

ETOPS authority was in response to a 

request from United and others and was 

a joint effort between the FAA, ATA and 

several U.S. carriers. Its goal was to 

develop methodologies to extend 

ETOPS beyond 180 minutes while 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1848 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

maintaining the level of safety in the 

operation. The FAA does not agree with 

the expansion of 207-minute ETOPS as 

suggested. The 207-minute diversion 

authority was developed to deal with a 

particular problem in the NOPAC. The 

FAA approved the use of a 207-minute 

ETOPS in NOPAC based on safety 

benefits for the flight. Airlines could 

dispatch the flight on a preferred air 

traffic route that actually placed the 

flight in closer proximity to a greater 

number of adequate airports located in 

northern Russia and the Aleutians even 

though the flight was up to 207 minutes 

from its declared ETOPS alternate 

airport at its farthest point. This type of 

dispatch is limited to only those flights 

where the normal 180-minute dispatch 

will not work. Since this safety 

argument was only applied to NOPAC, 

it would not be appropriate to have the 

207-minute NOPAC authority apply to 

other areas that have different 

conditions. More importantly, for the 

case of 207-minute ETOPS, the airplaneengine combination need only be 

ETOPS type design approved for 180- 

minutes. For other two-engine ETOPS 

approvals for beyond 180-minutes, the 

airplane-engine combination needs to 

have a world fleet IFSD rate of 0.01 per 

1,000 engine hours, and also be ETOPS 

type design approved for a minimum of 

240 minutes. 

Both United and Continental 

commented that in the absence of a rule 

expanding the 207-minute authority, the 

FAA should expand the 240-minute 

ETOPS areas of approval. Further, 

United requested that this extension 

apply to areas of the South and Central 

Pacific as well as the North Pacific. 

United also commented that the area of 

the North Pacific should be expanded 

from the current proposal of 40° N 

latitude to those routes north of the 

equator between North America and 

Asia and between Hawaii and Asia. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

that it is necessary to clarify the areas 

where both the 207-minute and 240- 

minute ETOPS authority may be 

exercised. Likewise we have agreed to 

expand both areas of operation. The 

FAA has modified the 207-minute 

ETOPS authority to cover the ‘‘North 

Pacific area of operations’’, defined as 

Pacific Ocean areas north of 40° N 

latitudes including NOPAC air traffic 

routes, and published PACOTS (Pacific 

Organized Track System) tracks between 

Japan and North America. The FAA has 

modified Appendix P to allow 240- 

minute ETOPS for the Pacific Ocean 

area north of the equator. 

United commented that the IFSD rate 

for the 240-minute ETOPS in a small 

fleet could cause an operator to lose 

ETOPS authority for 12 months with 

just one IFSD. However, if the 207- 

minute ETOPS were available in areas 

other than the north Pacific, it would 

allow operators to employ the lesser 

207-minute ETOPS IFSD target rate. The 

FAA agrees that this is a legitimate 

concern for a small fleet IFSD, but the 

FAA will not manage ETOPS approvals 

only by operator IFSD rates. Many 

factors are considered, especially the 

commitment and proactive response by 

the operator to determine the root cause 

of each failure. Once the cause has been 

determined, planned corrective actions 

are taken as well as a means to ensure 

that the problem is fixed. There may be 

no safety need to change the operator’s 

ETOPS authority provided the operator 

shows that it is effectively managing the 

problem. The FAA does not see this as 

a valid reason to expand the 207-minute 

ETOPS area of authority. 

United commented further that the 

existence of special MEL requirements 

for 120, 180, and presumably 240- 

minute ETOPS means that additional 

‘‘must be available’’ MEL requirements 

would be added for 240-minute ETOPS. 

Any amendment to the MMEL for 240- 

minute ETOPS will be processed 

through the FAA FOEB process. 

Airbus stated that the proposal was 

not specific in the amount of 

prerequisite ETOPS experience required 

of two-engine operators applying for 

routes between 180 and 240 minutes. 

Airbus also questioned the criteria an 

operator must use to determine what 

‘‘extreme weather’’ conditions would 

allow an operator to utilize 240-minute 

ETOPS authority in the Pacific Ocean 

areas north of the equator. They 

suggested that the choice to select more 

distant diversion airports be predicated 

on medical data-link and cargo hold 

monitoring capabilities on the airplane. 

The rule requires that all operators 

requesting ETOPS approval beyond 180 

minutes must have existing 180-minute 

ETOPS approval for the airplane-engine 

combination in their application. The 

FAA believes this is satisfactory. Rather 

than requiring a minimum experience 

level and allowing for reductions based 

on compensating factors similar to past 

guidance, the FAA believes that the 

language is satisfactory to limit any 

accelerated approval process to an 

initial authority beyond 180 minutes 

while still leaving the approval decision 

to the particular merits of the operator’s 

application. The FAA believes that the 

discussion of what constitutes 

acceptable criteria to extend diversion 

times to 240 minutes can be discussed 

within the context of advisory language. 

As stated in the rule language, the 

definition of extreme weather ‘‘must be 

established by the certificate holder and 

accepted by the FAA.’’

Qantas found the limits in Appendix 

P arbitrary and not based on any 

scientific method. They posited that the 

historical and safety analysis would 

show that 120-minute ETOPS should be 

the starting point for two-engine 

airplanes and that the smaller step 

approvals for modern airplanes (60-, 

75-, and 90-minute) are inappropriate 

and should be withdrawn. There should 

also be grandfathering rights for 

operators who have flown ETOPS routes 

for decades, requiring no additional 

approval processes. 

Qantas has not provided sufficient 

data to support its premise. Past 

progress and successes achieved in 

ETOPS have been due to the deliberate 

and limited step process of extending 

diversion lengths in response to 

improvements in type design and the 

needs of the operational environment. 

The FAA believes maintaining current 

ETOPS authorities adds flexibility for an 

operator to choose ETOPS approvals 

that match their specific needs. 

Changing the threshold for two-engine 

ETOPS was not part of the ARAC 

tasking and is beyond the scope of this 

rulemaking. The success of past ETOPS 

shows the importance of the operator’s 

continued airworthiness maintenance 

program that is a requirement for all 

ETOPS authority levels. We therefore do 

not accept the recommendation that the 

ETOPS threshold for two-engine 

airplanes should start at 120 minutes. It 

is not necessary to address 

grandfathering since there is no 

language in the NPRM or this rule that 

requires new ETOPS approvals for 

airplanes or operators to continue flying 

routes for which they already have 

ETOPS approval. As stated earlier in 

this preamble we have added a new 

§ 121.162 which clarifies the ability of 

current ETOPS qualified operators to 

continue operating their ETOPS routes 

without a new approval process. 

B. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 

Operations—Passenger-Carrying 

Airplanes With More Than Two Engines 

The FAA proposed certain criteria for 

extended operations for airplanes with 

more than two engines. These criteria 

include certification requirements for 

the airplane-engine combination, 

requirements for en-route flight 

planning to ETOPS alternate airports 

based on system limitations, an ETOPS 

maintenance program and certain 

system and MEL requirements. 

FedEx, IATA, and KLM noted that 

adding three- and four-engine airplanes 

to ETOPS will add maintenance and 

other training requirements for these 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1849 

airplanes. The FAA agrees in part to the 

comment regarding possible additional 

training for employees. The FAA 

strongly believes that all operators 

would benefit from an ETOPS 

maintenance program. However, the 

FAA agrees with many of the 

commenters that the cost of 

implementing this new requirement for 

airplanes with more than two engines 

would be significant. The FAA has 

determined that this cost cannot be 

justified based on the current level of 

safety achieved by the combination of 

engine reliability and the engine 

redundancy of this fleet of airplanes. 

Therefore, the requirement for an 

ETOPS maintenance program for 

airplanes with more than two engines in 

ETOPS has been withdrawn. The 

remaining costs have been calculated 

and are presented in the final regulatory 

evaluation for today’s rule. If the 

operator is an existing two-engine 

ETOPS operator, the training burden 

should be minimal. If the operator is a 

new ETOPS operator, the burden will be 

more substantial but is necessary to 

ensure safe operation. The individual 

operators, with concurrence from the 

FAA principal inspectors, will 

determine what, if any, additional 

training employees will require. It will 

be up to each individual operator to 

develop a training program that suits its 

operation. 

JAA commented the FAA should 

introduce a compliance time for 

operators of three- and four-engine 

airplanes to meet the requirements of 

this section that will not disrupt 

operations. This commenter also 

requested the FAA add a paragraph to 

this section that addresses greater than 

240-minute operations as it did for the 

two-engine airplane. The FAA agrees 

that a compliance period is justified for 

those operators with airplanes with 

more than two engines conducting 

ETOPS. We are adopting a compliance 

period of 1 year following publication of 

today’s rule. There is no need to address 

those operations beyond 240 minutes in 

section II in the same manner as for twoengine ETOPS in section I because the 

rule does not require the operator to do 

anything more than designate the 

nearest available ETOPS alternate 

airport on the planned route of flight. 

However the rule language has been 

modified to drop the reference to a 

specific 240-minute approval since this 

might cause confusion. 

Qantas opined this is a commerciallybased rule and has no safety relevance 

for more than two-engine airplanes that 

have been operating safely for years. 

They stated that the rule would all but 

stop flights between Australia and the 

U.S., Australia and South America, and 

Australia and Africa. Qantas stated that 

restrictions based on a time limit from 

an alternate airport is arbitrary and that 

the rule should be based on reliability 

requirements. They noted that the 

NPRM does not address the major cause 

of diversions—passenger requirements. 

Qantas posited that paramedics may be 

required on flights in the future, and 

this would have a greater impact than 

any flight time limit to a diversion 

airport. Qantas also noted there has 

never been an on-board fire, yet the 

NPRM would require cargo 

compartment fire protection while 

ignoring passenger compartment fires. 

The FAA does not accept the 

assertion that this rule is commercially 

based or has no safety basis for ETOPS 

operational application for airplanes 

with more than two engines. These 

same requirements have been in place 

for two-engine engine ETOPS for many 

years and the commenter has not shown 

justification for limiting its use to twoengines. The FAA reiterates its position 

that the risk analysis shows that threeand four-engine operations are similar 

enough to demand certain, common 

application of the rules. Throughout this 

rule the FAA has based its reasoning on 

the safety risk associated with long 

range flying over remote and hazardous 

areas that are far from adequate airports. 

We agree that some of those areas 

mentioned by the commenter would be 

subject to these new ETOPS rules under 

certain conditions. It will be the 

operator’s choice to accept the rule 

requirements or reroute to avoid their 

application. The FAA believes that no 

rule could ever address all issues that 

would cause a diversion. However, the 

examples given by the commenter are 

further justification for this rule and the 

need to protect those listed diversions 

when they occur. 

C. ETOPS Approvals for Part 135 

Operations 

The rule incorporates a new § 135.364 

which stated that no certificate holder 

may operate an airplane other than an 

all-cargo airplane with more than two 

engines on a planned route that exceeds 

180 minutes flying time (at the oneengine inoperative cruise speed under 

standard conditions in still air) from an 

adequate airport outside the continental 

United States unless the operation is 

approved by the FAA in accordance 

with Appendix G of this part, Extended 

Operations (ETOPS). The FAA has 

revised the part 135 rule to be consistent 

with part 121 operations to exclude allcargo operations on airplanes with more 

than two engines from the ETOPS 

requirements and has limited the 

ETOPS maintenance program 

requirements to two-engine ETOPS 

airplanes. Appendix G defines ETOPS 

requirements for such things as operator 

experience, airplane certification, 

operational procedures and training of 

personnel. New language has been 

added to § 135.411 that requires twoengine airplanes used in ETOPS to 

conform to the additional maintenance 

requirements of the same Appendix G. 

Airbus commented that currently part 

135 operators do not need approval for 

ETOPS flights since the current ETOPS 

operations are deviations from 

§ 121.166. There is no FAA guidance 

for, and FAA inspectors have not 

approved, any part 135 ETOPS flights. 

Dassault echoed this observation, stating 

that the cost assumptions in the draft 

regulatory evaluation were accordingly 

incorrect. Airbus noted, however, that 

there may currently be long-range 

business jets that fly from the West 

Coast of the U.S. to Australia. NBAA 

commented that the primary cost for 

operations with airplanes that meet the 

ETOPS requirements will be 

maintenance-related. 

The FAA acknowledges that this rule 

imposes new requirements on part 135 

operations. However, along with ARAC, 

the FAA has determined that part 135 

operations in remote areas pose the 

same risk to crew and passengers as part 

121 operations. Recognizing that many 

part 135 operations are not frequently 

recurring, as is the case with part 121 

scheduled service operations, the rule 

imposes fewer restrictions on part 135 

ETOPS than on part 121 ETOPS. The 

FAA agrees that a major cost of 

implementing an ETOPS program is the 

cost to develop and apply an ETOPS 

maintenance program. The FAA has 

determined that based on the 

probability of critical loss of thrust for 

two-engine airplanes the cost of an 

ETOPS maintenance program is 

justified. However, because of the 

combination of current engine reliability 

and engine redundancy, the FAA has 

decided against adopting an ETOPS 

maintenance requirement for airplanes 

with more than two engines. 

The Final Regulatory Evaluation 

assesses the cost of the rule for part 135 

operators as new costs since no ETOPS 

restrictions have been imposed on these 

operators until now. 

135.364 Maximum distance from an 

airport. 

The FAA proposed that no part 135 

operation could be conducted outside 

the continental U.S. unless the planned 

route remains within 180 minutes flying 

time from an airport meeting the ETOPS 

requirements of §§ 135.385, 135.387, 

135.393 or 135.395 (as applicable), and 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1850 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

27Equi-Time Point is a point on the route of flight 

where the flight time, considering wind, to each of 

two selected airports is equal. 

§§ 135.219 or 135.221 (as applicable). In 

response to many commenters concerns 

with the cost justification of the 

proposal, the FAA has withdrawn this 

requirement for all-cargo operations in 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

Netjets requests that the rule be 

revised to require that at no time will 

the airplane be operated in such as 

manner that it cannot reach a suitable 

airport from the Equal Time Point 27 of 

the planned route. The FAA notes that 

equal time points are based on an 

engine failure only. Accordingly, it is 

inappropriate to consider that engine 

failure or a loss of pressurization can 

only occur separately in determining 

necessary fuel reserves. The regulatory 

standard required by the ICAO Annex 6 

is for a threshold to be established by 

the State that clearly defines when 

ETOPS requirements and standards take 

effect for all two-engine airplanes. 

Section 135.364 establishes that 

threshold and is consistent with many 

years of FAA/JAA deliberation that 

involved the U.S. industry on this 

matter. The wording is such that 

consideration by users is not necessary 

until flights are planned that are outside 

of the continental United States. 

Part 135, Appendix G, Certificate 

holder experience prior to conducting 

ETOPS. 

The FAA proposed 12 months of 

international operating experience in 

transport category turbine engine 

powered airplanes (excluding Canada 

and Mexico, but including Hawaii), 6 

months of which could be domestic (if 

conducted before the effective date of 

the rule); or ETOPS experience in other 

aircraft as approved by the 

Administrator. 

NetJets commented that these 

requirements do not recognize the 

exemplary safety record of part 135 

operators currently conducting ETOPS 

operations and that full credit should be 

given to current operations. NATA 

disagreed with the exclusion of Canada 

and Mexico, noting that flights over 

these countries could include remote 

areas. 

Netjets stated it can reach the same 

objective of having the full 12-month 

credit apply to all its ‘‘ETOPS’’ type 

flights because of the delayed effective 

date of this rule. The FAA will not 

require compliance with part 135 

ETOPS until 1 year following the 

publication of the rule, allowing for 

more operating experience that will be 

creditable. In response to NATA, the 

intent of the rule is to ensure a carrier’s 

ability to deal not only with routes over 

remote areas, but also routes in 

dissimilar, international airspace. If 

ETOPS requirements were to apply to 

such routes in these countries, then 

current flights to those countries would 

also satisfy the experience requirement. 

Part 135 Appendix G.—Airplane 

requirements. 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that 

any airplane added to an operator’s 

operations specifications 8 years after 

the effective date of the final rule must 

meet the certification standards of 

§ 25.1535. The NPRM proposed that 

those aircraft added on or before 8 years 

must only meet certain electrical and 

fuel redundancies. 

Gulfstream commented the FAA 

should change the 8-year compliance 

date to 10 years or make the certification 

applicable to airplanes certificated 5 

years after the effective date of the rule. 

In a related comment, NBAA 

commented that there is no safety 

justification for this requirement. This 

commenter found that the rule does not 

recognize the actual useful life of 

turbine-powered business airplanes. 

The association posited that continuing 

ETOPS operations beyond 8 years 

should be based on operator experience 

and its safety record. 

The FAA partially agrees with the 

commenter about the useful life of these 

airplane types. Thus, we have changed 

the basis for grandfathering current part 

135 airplanes. The criterion is now 

based on a ‘‘manufactured date’’ rather 

than the time an airplane is placed on 

a certificate holder’s operations 

specifications. 

Airbus commented that the NPRM 

discussion falsely stated that current 

135 operations are restricted from those 

operations proposed to be regulated by 

this rule. NetJets and Actus Aviation 

stated that the rule will restrict the 

current mainland to Hawaii operations 

of certain types of their aircraft. 

The FAA agrees that the NPRM was 

incorrect in assuming that part 135 

operations defined as ETOPS in this 

rule were previously restricted. The 

FAA has corrected that assumption in 

the analysis of this final rule and agrees 

with the commenter and others that this 

rule will impose costs on those 

operators who chose to operate in 

ETOPS. 

The question of whether or not 

operations between the mainland U.S. 

and Hawaii are defined as ETOPS for 

part 135 operators is dependent on the 

computed single engine cruise speeds 

for their airplanes. The FAA does not 

agree that the majority of those airplanes 

whose range and endurance legitimately 

qualifies them for such operations 

would be considered ETOPS in this 

case. But the FAA does agree that there 

is difficulty in obtaining sufficient 

single engine data across all fleets of 

airplanes to accurately account for the 

cost of the rule’s application in this 

case. Without this data there is no way 

to calculate the costs and which 

operators would be affected. In 

consideration of this fact and because of 

a lack of incident data in this operation, 

the rule provides a grandfathering 

provision for all those airplanes 

manufactured up to eight years beyond 

the effective date of this rule. Further, 

the fuel and electric requirements for 

airplanes added to an operator’s 

operation specifications between the 

effective date of the rule and 8 years 

later, contained in the NPRM, have been 

deleted. 

Gulfstream commented that the 

proposed rule implies that compliance 

with Appendix G will be retroactive to 

existing operators approved for more 

than 180-minute ETOPS. This 

commenter asks the FAA provide relief 

in the form of an alternate means of 

compliance for the operator that cannot 

meet portions of the rule that provide no 

safety benefit. The rule does not impose 

a retroactive requirement within 

Appendix G for operators to conduct 

ETOPS. Paragraph (c)(2) of Appendix G 

gives consideration for the use of 

existing airplanes in ETOPS. The FAA 

fully understands that it would not be 

economically feasible to require any 

retrofit on existing airplanes to the new 

part 25 ETOPS requirements. This is 

why it is grandfathering airplanes 

manufactured up to 8 years after the 

effective date of the rule and used in 

part 135. 

NATA questioned the intent of the 

rule that the operator has available, in 

flight, current weather and operational 

information for all airports. This 

commenter found the requirement 

vague and asked what equipment would 

be acceptable. They questioned whether 

the communications equipment 

required by new Appendix G is 

sufficient. The FAA has not considered 

requiring any additional 

communications equipment for the 

flight crews to use in-flight to update 

weather reports and other operational 

information. The communications 

required by paragraph (F) in Appendix 

G should meet all communication 

needs. 

Both NBAA and NATA questioned 

the intent of the rule as it pertains to the 

requirements for weather analysis at the 

ETOPS entry point and beyond. NATA 

questioned what is the basis of 

determining whether or not an en-route 

alternate airport is ‘‘above minimums.’’

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1851 

NATA recommended a requirement that 

the airport be at or above approach 

minima, not alternate airport minima. 

NATA appeared to confuse the 

ETOPS dispatch requirements of an 

ETOPS alternate in part 121 with this 

rule language. Part 135 requires only 

that the alternate be ‘‘at or above 

operating minimums’’. The FAA agrees 

that clarification is needed for the 

situation where the flight has passed the 

ETOPS Entry Point. As with part 121 

operations, once the flight has gone 

beyond the ETOPS Entry Point, an 

unexpected worsening of the weather at 

the designated ETOPS alternate to 

below operating landing minima, or any 

event that makes the runway at that 

airport unusable does not require a turn 

back by this regulation. It is expected 

that the pilot-in-command, in 

coordination with the dispatcher if 

appropriate, will exercise judgment in 

evaluating the situation and make a 

decision as to the safest course of action. 

This may be a turn back, or re-routing 

to another ETOPS alternate, or 

continuing on its planned routing. 

Dassault disagreed with the 

requirement for sufficient fuel to fly to 

an alternate airport at cruise speed 

assuming a rapid decompression and a 

simultaneous engine failure at the most 

critical point. We discussed the 

potential for simultaneous failure of 

these systems earlier in this document. 

The purpose of the ETOPS critical fuel 

reserves is to protect that flight by 

ensuring that it will have sufficient fuel 

to fly to an alternate airport. Having an 

ETOPS alternate airport designated for 

use, and then not carrying sufficient fuel 

to make that alternate viable for a 

possible failure scenario is not 

managing known risks to the operation. 

UK CAA commented on the 5% fuel 

factor for wind by saying that it should 

remain in place for events that cannot 

be predicted, unless the operator 

produces historical data to show that 

the extra fuel is superfluous (fuel 

remaining at the critical point), or the 

operator proves that the World Area 

Forecasting System is unequivocally 

being used in the flight plan. The FAA 

does not agree. The basis for the 

contingency fuel values in paragraph (G) 

of Appendix G is the service experience 

gained in ETOPS for almost two 

decades, and the vast improvement in 

accuracy of the World Area Forecasting 

System wind forecasting. For those 

operators that cannot show the use of a 

wind model acceptable to the FAA, then 

5% of the total ETOPS fuel is to be 

added to compensate for errors in wind 

forecast data. 

NBAA agreed with the FAA’s 

proposal for extra fuel for anti-icing 

systems; however, it notes that not all of 

its members’ airplane flight manuals 

have information on increased fuel burn 

due to anti-icing systems. This 

commenter opined the FAA should not 

require a performance factor that 

operators cannot figure out from the 

airplane flight manual. The FAA agrees 

that performance data for the particular 

airplane is necessary for operators to 

apply correct values when determining 

fuel requirements. Airplanes that have 

the range and technology to undertake 

operations of this complexity and stage 

length are limited and unique to the 

industry. The FAA is aware of 

significant performance history and 

supporting manufacturer data for most 

of these types. The FAA has also been 

assured by manufacturers and GAMA 

that this data will be available for those 

airplanes that qualify for ETOPS. The 

FAA will not require the application of 

part 135 ETOPS until 1 year following 

the publication of the final rule. 

Part 135, Appendix G, Definitions. 

The FAA proposed definitions for 

ETOPS and ETOPS dual maintenance. 

For this final rule, the definition of 

ETOPS Alternate Airport and ETOPS 

Entry Point have been added for 

clarification, while limitations on dual 

maintenance are now specified rather 

than defined. For part 135, any 

passenger-carrying operation outside the 

continental United States more than 180 

minutes flying time (in still air at 

normal cruise speed with one engine 

inoperative) from an airport is 

considered ETOPS. This operation is 

further limited to a maximum of 240 

minutes. 

JAA, UK CAA, and Airbus 

commented that the definition of 

ETOPS would limit the maximum 

diversion time for part 135 airplanes to 

240 minutes and argued that this 

limitation for three- and four-engine 

airplanes should be removed. NBAA 

likewise disagreed with the maximum 

240-minute diversion, noting that 

operations that have been flown beyond 

the 240-minute limit would now be 

prohibited. They also opined that a 

restriction on airplanes with more than 

two engines is unnecessary. NBAA 

stated it would support some limited 

additional requirement, such as 

limitations on dual maintenance for 

ETOPS critical components, to allow 

approval beyond 240-minute operations. 

The FAA continues to believe that 

three- and four-engine airplanes 

conducting ETOPS should be limited to 

240-minute diversion authority. This 

subject was discussed extensively 

during the ARAC process, and the same 

conclusion was reached each time. The 

industry agreed that for operations 

conducted under part 135, a 240-minute 

diversion limit was sufficient. It was the 

consensus of the industry that the 240- 

minute diversion limit met the industry 

needs. Part 135 on-demand flight 

operations have few restrictions on the 

type of airport required for use. Thus, 

the number of airports that could be 

used as an ETOPS alternate airport is far 

greater than what is available for a part 

121 ETOPS operator. For the part 135 

ETOPS operator, the airport is not 

required to have part 139 equivalent 

safety standards. Likewise, part 135 ondemand operators are not required to 

have a minimum RFFS capability at the 

selected ETOPS alternate airports. 

Because of the different performance 

capabilities with small turbojet 

airplanes used in part 135 on-demand 

ETOPS, the minimum airport runway 

length is far less, typically around 5,000 

feet. Thus there are many more airports 

available in all areas of the world that 

may be used as an ETOPS alternate 

airport by the part 135 ETOPS operator. 

As a result, the 240-minute limit will 

not restrict flight operations, and a 

diversion time exceeding 240-minutes is 

not supported. Although NBAA now 

disagrees with the 240-minute limit, this 

organization supported the ARAC 

proposal. 

NATA and NBAA commented that 

the manufacturer, not the operator, must 

determine the air speeds necessary for 

ETOPS approval. They stated they are 

not aware of any publicly approved data 

to meet this need and that the lack of 

information on air speeds prevents any 

meaningful comment on the effect of the 

proposed rule on part 135 on-demand 

operators. Without the ability to 

determine a 180-minute range, no 

operator can comply with the proposed 

regulations. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter 

that the manufacturer must develop the 

required data on engine-inoperative 

cruise speeds. The General Aviation 

Manufacturers Association (GAMA) 

organization has assured the FAA that 

the manufacturers will have this data 

available to operators before this rule is 

effective. The FAA is committed to 

provide the necessary time for part 135 

operators to evaluate the applicability of 

the rule to their operation, and to make 

any necessary ETOPS program and 

associated training program changes. 

This time will also be available to 

manufacturers to develop and publish 

the necessary performance data. The 

FAA has adjusted the effective date of 

the part 135 rule for the operational 

requirements to be 1 year from the 

effective date. Likewise, the FAA has 

expanded the grandfathering criteria of 

the NPRM to provide a uniform 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1852 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

application between parts 121 and 135. 

Those airplanes manufactured up to 8 

years after the effective date of this rule 

do not have to comply with the 

airworthiness requirements of this rule. 

NATA requested the regulation 

specifically state how the 180-minute 

distance is calculated once ETOPS 

speeds are available. For example, the 

preamble stated the ETOPS threshold is 

based on ‘‘a single-engine inoperative 

speed in still air and standard 

conditions’’; Appendix G fails to state 

the standard conditions and only ‘‘still 

air’’ is indicated. 

Calculations made to determine the 

distance represented by 180 minutes 

should use standard conditions and still 

air. Section 135.364 has been changed to 

reflect this requirement. In calculating 

the distance flown at the selected oneengine inoperative cruise speed, the 

operator may select a speed provided by 

the manufacturer that best suits the area 

of operation being flown. A slower 

speed will result in a higher engineinoperative service ceiling, but in less 

distance flown. A slower speed may be 

required when terrain clearance is an 

issue. Conversely, the selection of the 

fastest speed will result in a further 

distance flown, but at a much lower 

engine-inoperative ceiling. The 

selection of a higher speed will also 

result in a higher fuel burn, and that 

fuel burn rate for the planned oneengine inoperative speed must be used 

in the ETOPS critical fuel calculation. 

This calculation can result in a larger 

critical fuel reserve requirement for the 

flight, and that may impact the useable 

payload for that flight. Since the 

operator is in the best position to know 

what factors to consider on a particular 

flight, the FAA has provided operators 

with the flexibility to make those 

determinations. 

D. Airplane Approvals in the North 

Polar and South Polar Areas 

1. Part 121 Operations 

The current FAA Polar Policy letter 

guidance, discussed earlier in this 

document, is codified in this section 

and is expanded to include the South 

Pole. 

Qantas and IATA commented that 

Polar operations are unique and 

therefore, requirements for operations in 

this area should be addressed in a 

separate rule. While the polar 

requirements could be addressed in 

another rule, they were proposed in the 

NPRM and the FAA does not believe 

there is any reason to further delay their 

adoption. Operations in these areas are 

necessarily conducted over parts of the 

globe subject to hazardous conditions 

and have many of the same 

characteristics as areas of the world 

containing routes that are greater than 

180 minutes from adequate airports. The 

current polar guidance codified in this 

rule contains requirements specific to 

these areas, including some ETOPS-like 

requirements such as passenger 

recovery plans and diversion planning. 

The South Polar area by this rule is 

defined in this rule as the area South of 

60° S latitude. The FAA is aware that 

there is not a great amount of industry 

experience conducting flight operations 

in this area of the world. However the 

forecast for traffic growth prepared by 

both major airplane manufacturers 

indicate that the South Polar area, like 

the North Pole, will become a major 

region for commercial air transportation 

as direct routes over the polar cap to, 

from, and between South America, 

Australia, New Zealand, and South 

Africa are established. The rules that 

will apply to the South Polar area 

provide a proven safety process for 

these future operations. 

Several commenters, including JAA, 

NACA, and Airbus, noted that meeting 

the ETOPS planning, equipage, and 

operational requirements for polar areas 

may not be practical, and may give some 

operators an economic advantage. 

FedEx found while the dispatch 

requirements may be reasonable, other 

ETOPS requirements, such as 

maintenance and reporting, should not 

be an issue for three- and four-engine 

airplanes operating in the Polar region 

today. 

The Polar policy letter already 

requires planning, equipage and 

operational requirements similar to 

ETOPS in these areas and the rule 

codifies such practices in this section 

III. To the extent some operators may 

face greater costs than others, the FAA 

has made certain changes to the NPRM 

necessary to address the economic 

burden on those operators. Specifically, 

for the polar areas where flight 

operations can be conducted at less than 

180 minutes, Appendix P, section II has 

been changed to eliminate ETOPS 

requirements from polar route approval. 

If the operator flight plans the route in 

a manner that would classify the 

operations as ETOPS under other 

circumstances, the operator must meet 

both the ETOPS requirements and the 

polar requirements established by this 

rule. 

FedEx commented that the NPRM 

would require any aircraft operating 

north of 78° N latitude to comply with 

these requirements, yet it has operations 

specifications that already address 

operations in Polar areas. FedEx 

believes that the NPRM addresses 

passenger-carrying aircraft and that 

these issues have already been 

addressed for all-cargo operations. 

The commenter’s reference to current 

operations specifications represents the 

current FAA Polar Policy codified in 

this rule. Because the FAA intends all 

operations in the polar areas to be 

governed by the agency’s polar policy, 

we believe it is more appropriate to 

regulate these operations through a rule 

of general applicability rather than by 

operations specifications. The Polar 

policy outlined in Appendix P, Section 

III of this rule apply to all air carrier 

operations in these areas including allcargo operations. 

JAA fully supported the concern of 

the FAA concerning the use of airports 

in severe weather conditions, but found 

that the proposed rule does not achieve 

its intended purpose in that it does not 

account for the variability of airports in 

Polar regions. Some airports may 

present an unacceptable level of risk, 

regardless of the season, and others are 

safe during the summer, but not 

otherwise. While the JAA takes into 

account safety precautions (based on 

seasonal, wind and temperature factors) 

for specific airports, the NPRM does not 

take such factors into account. 

The FAA does not agree with the 

conclusion reached by the JAA that 

today’s rule fails to meet the intended 

purpose of applying safety precautions 

to those airports designated for use as 

alternates that are in severe climate 

areas. The FAA fully understands the 

JAA/European approach to designated 

airports located in severe climate areas, 

i.e., operators need only consider 

specified alternate airports already 

deemed adequate by the JAA. We 

believe the FAA rule is sufficiently 

robust, and ultimately places the 

responsibility with the operator as to the 

required amount of detail and 

preparation necessary for passenger 

protection and recovery. The operator 

also has the flexibility to modify the 

procedures if seasonal variations for that 

airport exist. The JAA draft proposal as 

currently written does not require any 

preparation for those airports used as 

ETOPS alternate airports that are not 

determined to be severe climate 

airports. We believe that this system 

might encourage some operators to 

avoid those ‘‘designated severe climate 

airports’’ to avoid the need for a 

passenger recovery plan, even when the 

use of that airport may be the most 

appropriate action for the given problem 

encountered. 

2. Part 135 Operations 

This rule likewise codifies the current 

FAA Polar Policy letter guidance for 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1853 

part 135 operations in § 135.98. This 

section covers only the North Polar area 

and although the operation is not 

considered ETOPS, certificate holders 

must follow these standards whenever a 

route is flown and a portion of the route 

traverses this area. The FAA proposed 

that, except for intrastate operations 

within the State of Alaska, any 

operations in the region north of 78° N 

latitude, designated as Polar, must be 

authorized by the Administrator and 

have certain items addressed in the 

operator’s operation specifications. 

Included in these items were 

identification of alternate airports, 

recovery plans, specific communication 

systems, changes to the operator’s MEL 

including the requirement for special 

equipment and consideration of solar 

flare activity. 

Dassault commented that the proposal 

implies that an operator may not enter 

the Polar area unless the weather and 

operating conditions of the required 

alternate airports are reviewed and are 

expected to be above minimums 

specified in the operations 

specifications. It recommended the FAA 

specify the type of weather in the 

weather information requirement. 

Dassault also commented the FAA 

should consider a reduced recovery 

plan for airplanes with a maximum 

seating capacity of 19 or fewer 

passengers. Dassault goes on to say the 

FAA should allow a 1-year compliance 

period for setting up an MEL that takes 

Polar operations into account which 

becomes effective one year after, and 

apply only to those airplanes that were 

added to the operator’s operations 

specifications, 8 years after the effective 

date of the rule. Dassault noted the 

proposal would require considerations 

during solar flare activity and 

recommends the FAA allow a predictive 

method for evaluation of radiation, 

since measuring equipment is not yet 

available on the market. Finally, 

Dassault recommended the requirement 

for Polar equipment only apply to the 

crewmembers, and the FAA should 

specify the contents of the Polar kit. 

The FAA does not agree that the rule 

need be so detailed that it specifies the 

weather information required. In general 

it is understood that the weather reports 

should provide the present weather 

conditions including surface winds, any 

adverse trends, and the updated weather 

forecast for the expected time of use, if 

available. In addition, field condition 

reports should be obtained. The pilot 

will need to evaluate this information to 

determine that the weather minimums 

required for the instrument approach 

can be met. 

The FAA agrees that the recovery plan 

for a part 135 passenger-carrying 

operator will require far less complexity 

than a plan for a similar part 121 

operator because of the limited number 

of passengers. However, it does not 

agree that a further reduced plan is 

appropriate if the maximum seating 

capacity is less than 20. Currently, part 

135 applies to certain passengercarrying airplanes with a maximum 

seating capacity of 30 or less. Should 

the FAA change the current restriction 

on seating capacity in part 135 

operations, it may consider permitting a 

tailored passenger recovery plan based 

on the seating capacity of a particular 

airplane. 

In response to Dessault’s comment, 

the FAA has determined that a 1-year 

compliance period is acceptable for 

development of an MMEL and MEL. As 

discussed earlier, the certification 

requirements of this rule apply 

specifically to those aircraft 

manufactured 8 years after publication 

of today’s rule. The FAA is not requiring 

operators to equip their airplanes with 

radiation measuring equipment. There 

is advisory material already available to 

set up a predictive system for measuring 

solar flare activity. AC 120–52, 

Radiation Exposure of Air Carrier 

Crewmembers, and AC 120–61, 

Crewmember Training on In-Flight 

Radiation Exposure, are excellent 

resources for the operator to consult in 

developing a system and any necessary 

training. Likewise, today’s rule does not 

require a part 135 operator to keep any 

‘‘polar kits’’ on board the airplane. 

Rather, cold weather anti-exposure suits 

are for use by the crewmembers. No 

provision is made for passengers, 

although operators may choose to 

provide such suits should they transport 

passengers through the polar regions. 

XIII. Comments on the Costs and 

Benefits of the Proposed Rule 

Many commenters noted that current 

part 121 and part 135 regulations do not 

prohibit operations beyond 180 minutes 

and that the initial regulatory 

assessment was wrong. The FAA 

acknowledges the error and the final 

regulatory evaluation does not attribute 

any cost savings to more efficient 

routings. The following is a summary of 

the proposed provisions that would 

entail costs and an analysis of the 

comments concerning economic 

impacts from the NPRM. 

In response to the certifications 

requirements of the proposed rule, 

Airbus and other commenters stated the 

proposed rule might be understood to 

require manufacturers of current 

generation ETOPS aircraft to apply 

retroactively for type design approval 

under this section and appendix K, 

which would impose very high costs. 

Airbus estimated costs for 

manufacturers at $500,000 per aircraft 

family to perform an assessment of all 

time-limited systems in normal and 

degraded system configurations, with a 

full numerical system safety assessment 

of all aircraft systems in the order of $1 

million per aircraft family. Any design 

change found necessary as a result of 

these assessments would increase this 

cost. 

The FAA has recognized that existing 

aircraft designs may have difficulty 

complying with the new part 25 

requirements and has added § 25.3. 

Airplanes with existing type certificates 

at the time this rule becomes effective 

are exempted from some or all of the 

new part 25 requirements. Therefore the 

FAA does not find that these systemwide costs will be incurred. 

Airbus and Dassault commented that 

the icing requirements in the proposal 

go beyond the current requirement and 

would require analytical and flight test 

assessment. Airbus stated that 

manufacturers would incur costs in the 

order of $1.5 million per aircraft family 

to complete an analysis and a flight 

demonstration of icing on unprotected 

areas of the airplane in order to comply 

with this provision. 

The FAA agrees that this requirement 

may add additional analysis to the 

certification of a new airplane to meet 

the requirements of the rule. However, 

evaluating ice accumulation on an 

airplane in icing conditions is required 

for a new part 25 airplane regardless of 

whether it’s ETOPS certified. The effect 

of the ETOPS rule will be to add another 

criterion for determining the size of the 

ice shapes simulated during 

certification testing. The ETOPS 

environment will not necessarily be the 

most critical condition for the maximum 

ice accumulation. An applicant will 

determine the maximum ice accretion 

on an airplane during an ETOPS 

diversion and compare that to the 

maximum accretion from other icing 

conditions used for basic part 25 

compliance. The additional costs 

associated with flight testing an airplane 

for ETOPS icing will be minor since an 

applicant will likely only test the most 

critical ice accretion from all these 

conditions as is done for basic part 25 

certification. 

UPS stated that the installation of a 

low fuel alerting system ‘‘would require 

extensive modifications to three- and 

four-engine aircraft to add flight 

management computers that will allow 

the system to provide the required flight 

deck alerts * * *’’ but did not provide 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1854 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

any cost information. Airbus stated that 

the design and certification costs would 

be in the order of $2.5 million per 

aircraft family not yet fitted with any of 

the prescribed alerts and up to $1 

million per aircraft family partly 

compliant. The FAA estimates the cost 

of a full retrofit will be $200,000 per 

aircraft; the cost of a partial retrofit will 

be up to $110,000 per aircraft. 

Dassault recommended allowing 

alternate solutions to the fuel alert 

display. 

The FAA recognizes that some 

existing airplanes may have difficulty in 

complying with this requirement 

without substantial airplane system 

modifications. Older three-crew 

airplanes, in particular, have a flight 

engineer who monitors fuel quantity 

throughout a long flight and the FAA 

considers this additional crewmember 

to be an acceptable alternative to the 

automatic low fuel alerting for those 

airplanes. As such, the requirement for 

a low fuel alerting system does not 

apply to three- and four-engine 

airplanes with a required flight 

engineer, or to three- and four-engine 

airplanes with existing type certificates 

manufactured up to eight years after the 

effective date of this rule. This rule will 

also not apply to two-engine airplanes 

with existing type certificates being 

approved for ETOPS up to 180-minutes. 

However, all newly type-certificated 

airplanes, and two-engine airplanes 

being approved for ETOPS greater than 

180 minutes must comply. The FAA 

will continue to use its estimate of $2.25 

million that substantially agrees with 

Airbus’ estimate. 

Air New Zealand, Dassault, JAA, New 

World Jet, Northwest, and United made 

comments on various technical aspects 

of the APU requirements. KLM 

commented that the NPRM is unclear if 

existing three- and four-engine aircraft 

on long range routes must have an APU 

In-flight Start Capability, noting that 

MD11s have an APU in-flight start 

capability below and up to flight level 

(FL) 250 and all 747–400s APUs do not 

have an in-flight start capability at all. 

This requirement will have a large cost 

impact that is not addressed in the 

NPRM. FedEx made a similar statement. 

UPS noted that APUs are not currently 

installed on its DC8 fleet, and it is 

unclear whether this proposal would 

require installation for ETOPS. ATA 

noted those efforts would include 

design or adaptation of an APU, 

development of new interface 

equipment, and extensive ground and 

flight testing. The effort also would 

include potentially extensive aircraft 

structural modifications to 

accommodate the APU installation. 

The FAA has amended the final rule 

language to make it clear that an APU 

in-flight start and run program is only 

required if APU in-flight start and run 

capability is required by the type 

certificate for ETOPS. ETOPS requires 

that the airplane must be equipped with 

at least three independent sources of 

electrical power. For airplanes that must 

use the availability of the APU to satisfy 

this requirement, an APU in-flight start 

and run program is required. Since 

current models of the 747–400 satisfy 

this certification requirement without 

the APU, no such program is required. 

The rule is written to take into account 

possible future airplane designs or 

existing airplane modifications which 

would make this requirement 

applicable. The cost of designing an 

APU program for a new model is 

minimal. The final economic evaluation 

does not include any costs related to the 

APU requirement. 

Boeing proposed changing the 

requirements to obtain certification for a 

two-engine airplane for ETOPS to state 

that a flight test must be conducted to 

validate the adequacy of the airplane’s 

flying qualities, performance and the 

flight crew’s ability to safely conduct an 

ETOPS diversion with an engine 

inoperative and under non-normal 

worst case ETOPS significant system 

failure conditions. The FAA agrees that 

the intent of the flight testing is to 

evaluate ETOPS significant systems. We 

have included the cost of this testing. 

In response to Boeing, the Air Line 

Pilots Association, International 

(IALPA), and the BALPA comment on 

the post-airplane demonstration 

inspection requirement, the FAA has 

changed the first sentence of paragraph 

K25.2.2(g)(4) to require that the ETOPS 

significant systems must undergo onwing inspections in accordance with the 

tasks defined in the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness required by 

§ 25.1529 to establish the ETOPS 

significant system condition for 

continued safe operation. The engines 

must also undergo a gas path inspection. 

These inspections must identify 

abnormal conditions that could result in 

an in-flight shutdown or diversion. Any 

abnormal conditions must be identified, 

tracked and resolved in accordance with 

paragraph (l) of section K25.2. The costs 

of these assessments are contained in 

the final rule. 

The FAA’s preliminary economic 

assessment for additional voice 

communication equipment for all 

ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes 

estimated the installed cost per unit at 

$223,000 or $209,000, discounted. The 

operating costs per unit include weightrelated fuel consumption, a fixed 

monthly fee, and a variable usage 

charge. The FAA estimated that 

revenues derived from passenger use of 

the SATCOM capabilities or improved 

maintenance procedures made possible 

by the new system would offset the 

variable usage fee. The annual operating 

costs per unit were estimated at 

approximately $2,500 ($2,000 fixed fee 

+ $500 fuel cost). Atlas Air estimated 

that the first-year cost of installing and 

maintaining SATCOM would be roughly 

$225,000 per aircraft. FedEx estimated 

the unit cost of installing SATCOM and 

alternate communication capabilities at 

$263,035 and annual costs of $3,035. 

ATA surveyed members and reported an 

average one-time charge of $329,892. (A 

key assumption in ATA’s estimate is an 

anticipated need to install a dual HF/DL 

communication system in addition to 

the SATCOM at an additional cost of 

$105,000 per unit.) ATA members did 

not take issue with the FAA’s estimate 

of annual recurring charges. Airbus 

stated, depending on the SATCOM 

system, charges-per-minute may be 

incurred which may also include air 

traffic system use. FedEx, and IATA 

requested that three- or four-engine 

operators not meeting the requirement 

be permitted to continue ETOPS for a 

period not to exceed 6 years from the 

rule’s effective date. Commenters also 

said that SATCOM was ineffective in 

Polar areas. 

The FAA does not agree that a dual 

HF/DL system will need to be installed 

under the requirements of this rule. 

Adjusting FedEx’s estimate by the 

$105,000 it included in its estimate 

reduces its estimate to $158,035, 

significantly below the FAA’s estimate. 

The same adjustment to the ATA cost 

estimate results in a cost of $224,892, 

also below the FAA estimate. These 

lower estimates reflect lower initial 

equipment costs. The higher fuel costs 

cited by FedEx result in an additional 

cost of fuel of approximately $160 per 

year. The FAA also does not agree with 

Airbus’ assertion that the variable use 

costs were not addressed; the FAA 

believes these costs will be offset as 

noted above. The FAA, in order to be 

conservative, will retain its higher 

initial cost estimate and we have 

substituted fuel price projections 

provided by the Office of Management 

and Budget, which are higher than 

FedEx’s estimate. 

As discussed earlier, the FAA does 

not agree to the 6-year phase-in period 

requested for the communications 

equipment; we allow a 12-month 

installation period for three- and fourengine airplanes used for ETOPS. 

The FAA agrees that for the polar 

areas, three- and four-engine passenger 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1855 

carrying operators do not have to meet 

the ETOPS requirements provided the 

flight operations are planned not to 

exceed 180-minutes to an ETOPS 

alternate airport. The FAA has amended 

Appendix P to clarify this fact. As stated 

earlier, all-cargo operations using 

airplanes with more than two engines 

never have to comply with ETOPS 

requirements. 

The FAA did not assign any cost to 

the fire fighting requirements proposed 

in the NPRM. Omni International stated 

the additional costs to upgrade the 

capabilities of an aerodrome, including 

the cost of training additional 

personnel, are not one that a 

municipality or State will entertain 

willingly on the off chance that an 

aircraft might divert there. It is entirely 

conceivable that carriers like Omni will 

be compelled to bear these costs either 

through consortia established to protect 

the integrity of an ETOPS route, or 

through radical increases in user’s fees 

like navigation charges. 

The FAA has amended § 121.106 to be 

in-line with the RFFS requirements 

established for the 207-minute ETOPS 

policy. For ETOPS beyond 180-minutes, 

the minimum acceptable RFFS for 

ETOPS alternates remains at ICAO 

category 4 as long as the aircraft remains 

within the authorized diversion time 

(for that flight) to an adequate airport 

that has a ICAO category 7 RFFS 

capability or higher. Since operators 

currently do not fund RFFS operations 

and the agency cannot speculate on 

future conditions, the FAA does not 

find a cost to be associated with this 

change. 

A commenter stated that the public 

protection requirements of the NPRM 

demand data regarding the provision of 

public protection including facilities to 

a detail that is not available in all parts 

of the world but are obviously required 

to complete the proposed aerodrome 

specific passenger recovery plans. 

The FAA clarifies that additional data 

may be required to complete the 

passenger recovery plan. However, the 

airline is responsible to obtain the data 

under the existing regulation, even if 

that requires visiting some airports. 

Furthermore, it is expected that more 

than one carrier will serve such routes 

and the data will be shared and readily 

available. 

The rule will require certificate 

holders with passenger operations 

beyond 180 minutes from an ETOPS 

alternate airport or operating in a polar 

area to prepare passenger recovery plans 

that are robust enough to handle a 

diversion. The FAA estimated that the 

initial development of a plan would cost 

$7,500 and $3,000 annually to maintain 

the robustness of each plan. In a 

discussion of the benefits, the FAA 

sought information on the costs of 

diversions and provided a hypothetical 

‘‘worse case’’ scenario of recovery costs 

as high as $1 million. FedEx, IATA, and 

KLM stated that in some cases this 

would require a spare aircraft and/or 

crew with all related costs. American 

Trans Air stated that this requirement 

would require the addition of full time 

employees at significant costs. It also 

requested an 18-month phase-in period. 

The ATA stated that, based on the 

‘‘worse case’’ scenario, costs and the 

number of projected diversions of threeand four-engine airplanes would result 

in costs of $2.05 million. The 

Association also stated that 73 percent 

of ETOPS-candidate three- and fourengine airplanes of ATA members are 

all-cargo operators. 

The FAA requested information on 

the number and cost of diversions. 

While the possibility exists that a spare 

aircraft may be needed, the history of 

mechanically related diversions 

indicates that this will be a rare event 

and the need for a spare aircraft even 

rarer. The commenters provided no cost 

information so the FAA cannot consider 

this issue. The FAA does not agree with 

American Trans Air’s assertion for the 

need to add full-time employees 

because of this provision. The estimated 

hours necessary to set-up and maintain 

recovery plans do not warrant full-time 

employees and it should be noted that 

expert contract employees can be 

retained to develop and respond to this 

requirement. The FAA acknowledges 

ATA’s estimate of all-cargo operations 

and has removed the passenger recovery 

plan requirement for such operations. 

The FAA however does not oppose 

that the air carrier passenger recovery 

plan being a part of the air carrier’s 

emergency response plan. The FAA 

cannot use the ‘‘worst case’’ cost offered 

by the ATA since it is unsubstantiated. 

The FAA requested comments and 

supporting data on the impact of the 

requirement that all MEL items, the Fuel 

Quantity Indicating System, and the 

communication system must be 

operational. American Trans Air stated 

that the proposed regulation would 

restrict and/or remove its L1011 aircraft 

from North Polar Operations. Airbus 

commented that the cost for operators to 

modify two-engine aircraft and longrange three- and four-engine aircraft 

procedures, documentation, training 

and the software applications that they 

use in fuel planning, flight planning, 

and other related activities has not been 

taken into account in the Economic 

Impact Assessment. The lead-time for 

the companies that supply 

computerized flight-plan and map 

plotting systems to release new versions 

of their applications compliant with the 

new rules is 12 months after the 

publications date of the rule. The cost 

of the updating the necessary software 

applications ranges from $7,000 to 

$15,000 depending on the application 

and supplier. The overall cost of 

documentary modifications and reissuing of documents and manuals is 

estimated to $200,000 for an operator 

with one ETOPS aircraft. The lead-time 

is in the order of 6 months. Fuel reserve 

training is estimated at $200,000 and 

passenger recovery training is estimated 

at $100,000 for a fleet of six aircraft. In 

addition, three- and four-engine aircraft 

operators would have to undergo a full 

process of operational assessment and 

approval including an assessment of 

their service experience and reliability 

record. This assessment is comparable 

to an ETOPS assessment for a first 

approval under current ETOPS criteria 

and requires 6 months notice with FAA. 

The overall cost of the approval process 

is estimated to cost $500,000 per 

applicant based on data from former 

ETOPS assessments. Three- and fourengine aircraft operators would have to 

train their flight crew, dispatchers, 

maintenance personnel and cabin crew 

to the entire extent of the operation and 

maintenance rules instead of just to the 

modified elements. The overall cost for 

a fleet of six four-engine aircraft of one 

type is estimated at $2.5 million. 

The FAA is allowing delayed 

compliance to minimize the costs to 

operators. The commenter does not 

explain the basis for its estimated costs. 

Existing regulations in section 121 

already require operators of airplanes 

with more than two engines to take into 

consideration adequate airports along 

the route in the event of one or two 

engines becoming inoperative. The new 

requirement for ETOPS en-route 

alternate airports does not constitute a 

big impact; the final regulatory 

evaluation includes a per flight charge 

to account for this task. Existing 

regulations require fuel reserves. The 

commenter has not shown how the 

incremental cost of the new passenger 

recovery training requirements will be 

$100,000. However, the FAA has 

included the cost of four hours of initial 

ETOPS training for pilots and 

dispatchers in the final rule in addition 

to passenger recovery training for pilots, 

dispatchers, and flight attendants where 

applicable. If the operator intends to 

only fly the North or South Pole at or 

below 180 minutes, there are no 

additional ETOPS requirements. 

Operators currently serving the North 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1856 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

Pole must meet current polar policy 

guidance and its operational 

requirements such as having a recovery 

plan, listing en-route alternate airports, 

and having effective communication 

capability for all portions of the flight 

route. For operators desiring to operate 

ETOPS in any other geographical area 

subject to ETOPS, an ETOPS application 

process will need to be completed. The 

commenter did not explain what they 

mean by data from former ETOPS 

assessments and has not provided detail 

to support this cost estimate. 

The FAA believes it is reasonable to 

assume that an operator will make a 

decision that minimizes costs and 

creates the most efficient operations. 

Experience with other rules in part 121 

provide evidence that operators do not 

train every flight crewmember and every 

maintenance person on every new rule. 

However, we cannot determine that 

only four airplanes and five mechanics 

per airplane used in the initial 

economic assessment accurately reflect 

the most efficient operation. Therefore, 

in order not to underestimate the costs 

of the final rule, we assume that the 

operator will have to train a full crew 

and ground personnel and equip all or 

most airplanes for ETOPS. 

FedEx and IATA recommended that 

ETOPS regulations not be applied to 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

The FAA does not agree completely 

with the commenter that ETOPS should 

not be applied to airplanes with more 

than two engines. The basic concept of 

ETOPS is to preclude the diversion and, 

if a diversion is required, to protect that 

diversion. We do however agree that for 

airplanes with more than two engines, 

passenger carrying operations may be 

excluded from the ETOPS maintenance 

program requirements and that all-cargo 

operations may be excluded from all 

ETOPS requirements. 

The concept of precluding and 

protecting the diversion has equal 

validity among all passenger-carrying 

airplanes, regardless of the number of 

engines. In addition, the increased 

frequency of operations on routes that 

are distant from en-route airports and 

the recent opening of routes over the 

Canadian and Russian far North bring 

additional challenges that affect the 

operations of all airplanes, regardless of 

the number of engines. Even though 

these passenger-carrying airplanes with 

more than two engines have operated 

safely and successfully on long range 

routes in all areas of the world for many 

decades, it is reasonable to expect 

airplanes with more than two engines to 

designate the nearest alternate airport, 

and be flight planned at 240-minute 

diversion authority, if possible. The 

application of such ETOPS concepts as 

recovery plans; designating the nearest 

alternate airport, and pre-flight planning 

to operators of airplanes with two-ormore engines will enhance the safety of 

their operations and benefit the 

industry. 

Section 121.374 sets forth the ETOPS 

maintenance elements: CMP; CAMP; 

monitoring of propulsion system, engine 

condition, and oil consumption; APU 

in-flight start program; maintenance 

training; and procedural changes 

approval. While many of these elements 

are a normal part of an operator’s 

maintenance program, some may need 

to be supplemented in consideration of 

the special requirements of ETOPS. 

Airbus commented that these additions 

would require that operators engaged in 

any of the ETOPS operations covered in 

Appendix P of part 121 apply all ETOPS 

maintenance elements. The FAA 

acknowledges possible confusion 

regarding the maintenance elements 

required in appendix P. Section 121.374 

has been amended. An operator’s 

maintenance program for all two-engine 

ETOPS airplanes, regardless of 

diversion time, must comply with 

§ 121.374. An operator of three- and 

four-engine airplanes operating beyond 

180 minutes will not be required to have 

an ETOPS maintenance program. 

FedEx noted three- and four-engine 

aircraft, pursuant to the provisions of a 

CMP, do not have parts and systems that 

must be equipped on aircraft in ETOPS 

operations. Presumably, the 

manufacturers will develop and offer 

these parts for sale once a CMP has been 

created. FedEx anticipates buying and 

storing these parts will be very 

expensive. FedEx also estimated 

certification costs (including the costs of 

developing CMP documents, and 

certification of aircraft parts and 

systems) as a one-time cost of 

$4,962,000. The development of ETOPS 

parts Control Programs, maintenance 

training, creation of centralized 

maintenance control system, additional 

parts inventory, performance of predeparture service checks and other 

§ 121.374 programs would be 

$17,033,000 as a one-time cost, and 

$847,000 per year. 

The FAA does not agree. As stated in 

the preamble, if there is no CMP 

document for an existing airplane, then 

there is no requirement to comply with 

a CMP. The certification costs are a cost 

to manufacturers and not operators. 

These costs are discussed in parts 21, 

25, and 33. Most likely the existing IPC 

program will satisfy the ETOPS parts 

control needs. Most airlines already 

have a centralized maintenance control 

program and if they do not it will 

require minimal cost to establish and 

the operator has a year to accomplish it. 

The FAA does not have a specific 

ETOPS parts inventory requirement. 

Continental noted the time estimated 

by the FAA of 6 weeks to create the predeparture check does not include the 

timeframe for FAA approval. When the 

FAA approval time is factored in 

development time would be 14 weeks. 

The FAA has provided a 1-year period 

to implement the maintenance 

requirements. The FAA also estimated 

the continuing costs of several elements 

of the CAMP program. A pre-departure 

check was estimated to take two staffhours at a cost of $90. 

ATA did not concur with proposed 

pre-departure check for three- and fourengine airplanes. It posited utilizing the 

proposed ETOPS pre-departure service 

check would prevent none of the 

incidents cited in the proposal risk 

analysis. The FAA has agreed to 

withdraw this requirement and all other 

elements of the ETOPS maintenance 

program for airplanes with more than 

two engines in ETOPS. 

FedEx commented that it agrees with 

the additional training for passenger 

recovery training for crewmembers and 

dispatchers of three- and four-engine 

aircraft pilots as required, as well as 

generally on ETOPS procedures. 

Northwest stated that it would like to 

minimize cost and operational impact 

by training through bulletins and 

written procedures. 

We understand that an air carrier may 

need to adjust the pilot training syllabus 

in order to accommodate the new 

training unit for three- and four-engine 

flight crews. We have included the costs 

of 4 hours of initial pilot and dispatcher 

training and recurring costs for ETOPS 

related training, and 1 hour for 

passenger recovery training for pilots 

and dispatchers and one-half hour for 

flight attendants for those operators 

conducting ETOPS greater than 180 

minutes from an ETOPS alternate 

airport and for operations in the polar 

areas. 

The training syllabus, as well as the 

means to provide that training, is at the 

discretion of the air carrier, as it should 

be tailored to fit within existing training 

and operational experience. 

Airbus stated the cost of training 

cabin and flight crews for their roles in 

the passenger recovery plan is estimated 

to be $100,000 for a fleet of six ETOPS 

aircraft not involved in Polar and 

NOPAC operations using airports 

subject to extreme Polar weather. 

Airbus did not provide supporting 

data, and the FAA cannot accept its 

estimate. This requirement will only 

entail minimum training of cabin and 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1857 

flight crews. An air carrier’s existing 

emergency response plan includes many 

of the elements of a passenger recovery 

plan. In addition, there are expert 

contract services available to implement 

the passenger recovery plan. The FAA 

has included initial training and 

recurring training costs for pilots, flight 

attendants and dispatchers for those 

operators conducting ETOPS greater 

than 180 minutes from an ETOPS 

alternate airport and for operations in 

the polar areas in the final regulatory 

evaluation. 

Several carriers including Atlas Air, 

Omni International, FedEx, and UPS 

included aggregate costs of training 

maintenance, crewmembers, flight 

attendants, dispatchers, and other 

operational personnel covering all or 

significant portions of their fleets. 

The FAA in this final regulatory 

evaluation has estimated the cost of 

training all maintenance personnel, all 

dispatchers, all international pilots and 

flight attendants, and included all or 

significant portions of operators fleets 

that have operation specifications for 

affected areas and have or may have 

conducted flights in the affected areas 

during a one-year period. 

Airbus stated that the requirement to 

consider all alternate airports in its 

dispatch or flight release would result in 

a severe increase in the cost of 

implementing the rule. Airbus 

recommends that the definition of an 

adequate airport be amended such that 

these airports would be required to have 

the infrastructure and services necessary 

to support a passenger recovery plan. 

Alternatively, the rule might be 

amended to require that the operator 

consider all adequate airports ‘‘capable 

of supporting a passenger recovery plan 

for the concerned aircraft.’’

The FAA does not agree. The 

requirement to consider all adequate 

airports in an operator’s selection of 

ETOPS alternates for a specific flight 

will likely occur during the route 

planning stage and will be a minimal 

addition to the route planning process. 

It is a requirement of the rule that only 

adequate airports that meet such 

passenger recovery criteria be used as 

ETOPS alternate airports during the 

dispatch planning. The final regulatory 

evaluation includes a computer 

programming cost. 

The final rule requires that flight 

plans for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes be 

calculated based on certain criteria so 

that the resulting time not exceed the 

time specified in the airplane flight 

manual for the airplane’s cargo fire 

suppression time minus 15 minutes. 

Three- and four-engine airplanes not 

meeting this requirement will have a 

period not to exceed 6 years from the 

date of this regulation to meet the 

requirement. The FAA estimated the 

cost of the upgrade kit and an additional 

Halon bottle at $75,000 plus a $1,400 

installation cost per aircraft. Additional 

fuel costs will also be incurred. ATA’s 

survey of its members indicated an 

average of $62,500 for parts. Atlas Air 

estimated first year cargo fire 

suppression cost at $81,200. FedEx 

estimated installation of fire 

suppression upgrades at $54,800 per 

aircraft and annual costs of $1,450. They 

indicate that the time to modify the 

cargo fire extinguishing system should 

be at least 8 years. IATA and KLM agree 

with the 8-year time frame. 

The ATA survey results were 17 

percent lower than the FAA estimate 

with an average ten-year total cost per 

aircraft eight percent less than the FAA 

estimate. The Atlas Air and FedEx 

estimates were also lower. In order to 

not underestimate the costs of installing 

the fire suppression system, the FAA 

will retain its estimate of installation 

costs and revise its annual cost to reflect 

higher fuel costs. The FAA does not 

agree with the request to extend the 

installation deadline by an additional 2 

years. 

The final rule prohibits the dispatch 

or release of a flight by an airplane with 

more than two engines for more than 90 

minutes at full cruise speed unless it 

has adequate fuel, considering wind and 

weather conditions, assuming a rapid 

decompression, followed by descent to 

a safe altitude to fly to an adequate 

airport, including enough fuel to hold 

for 15 minutes at 1,500 feet. ETOPS 

flights greater than 180 minutes have to 

comply with similar conditions in flight 

planning. The FAA estimated flightplanning costs to be minimal since they 

are generally computerized. Airbus 

commented the cost of retraining 

dispatchers and flight crews on the new 

fuel reserves and dispatch criteria is 

estimated to be $150,000 for a fleet of 

six ETOPS aircraft of one type. The 

lead-time is 3 months after the new 

software applications have been 

deployed and validated. FedEx noted 

this additional rule will increase rapid 

decompression fuel requirements for 

three- and four-engine aircraft, with the 

addition of 15 minutes holding fuel at 

1500 feet whenever the aircraft is 

operated more than 90 minutes but less 

than 180 minutes from an adequate 

airport. This rule represents a cost not 

required in current operations. 

Northwest requested further review of 

the increase to the decompression fuel 

requirements for three- and four-engine 

aircraft. This all engine reserve is not 

currently required and represents an 

additional cost (either fuel cost to carry 

or payload limiting) to operators. 

The FAA disagrees. The added 15 

minutes of holding fuel does not 

represent an additional cost to 

operators. There is currently within part 

121 two separate fuel requirements that 

apply to 3- and 4-engine operators 

conducting flag and supplemental 

operations. The requirement of 

§ 121.646(a) for holding fuel is a lesser 

amount of fuel reserves already required 

for the operation and is therefore not an 

additional cost to the operator. 

Appendix P to part 121 sets forth the 

ETOPS approval requirements and 

limitations for various areas of operation 

and diversion time limits. Airbus stated 

that the retroactivity of type design 

requirements would impose very high 

costs for existing ETOPS aircraft and for 

three- or four-engine aircraft. It 

recommends a compliance time of at 

least 6 years for all two-engine ETOPS 

aircraft already assessed or in the 

process under current criteria and at 

least 8 years for three-or four-engine 

aircraft. 

The FAA is not making the type 

design requirements retroactive as 

explained earlier in the preamble. 

The rule will require a part 135 

operator to be ETOPS certified for 

operations outside the continental 

United Stated unless the route is 

planned to remain with 180 minutes 

flying time of an adequate airport or the 

operation involves an all-cargo 

operation aboard an airplane with more 

than two engines. NATA believes that 

this will require proof that a flight was 

below the 180 minute threshold. The 

FAA, however, holds that it is the 

responsibility of the operator to 

determine what is and is not ETOPS. If 

it is, then they must flight plan 

accordingly. There is no requirement to 

prove a flight is not ETOPS. The rule 

does not impose any burden of proof in 

this case and therefore there is no 

additional paperwork or associated cost. 

Part 135 operators will have to 

comply with the continuous 

maintenance program and the 

requirements of Appendix G if the 

operations use two-engine airplanes. 

NetJets stated the cost/benefit analysis 

does not adequately address the added 

costs of maintaining ‘‘9 passenger seat 

or less’’ aircraft under a continuous 

maintenance program currently required 

for aircraft with ‘‘10 or more’’ passenger 

seats. These costs not only include the 

actual development and approval of the 

program, but the added costs associated 

with maintaining personnel for the 

program. Also, the ‘‘dual maintenance’’

requirement will mandate that more 

maintenance technicians be made 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1858 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

available for maintenance conducted on 

ETOPS aircraft. This cost is not 

addressed in the cost/benefit analysis. 

The FAA’s database indicates that 

only 37 operators have aircraft that 

currently meet the aircraft requirements 

but do not meet the maintenance 

provisions for aircraft type certificated 

for 10 or more seats that is a 

requirement for operations beyond 180 

minutes. None are authorized for 

operations in the Polar regions. The 

only other route beyond the ETOPS 180- 

minutes threshold is a portion of the 

South Pacific, which can be avoided by 

some additional flying time. The FAA 

concludes that these operators can 

continue to fly non-ETOPS international 

routes and therefore will not incur 

ETOPS-related costs. Also the FAA has 

eliminated the ETOPS maintenance 

requirements for ETOPS on passengercarrying airplanes with more than two 

engines. 

ETOPS flights beyond 180 minutes 

but planned to remain within 240 

minutes have, in addition to the 

maintenance requirements, certain 

planning, operational, experience, and 

equipment requirements. Dassault 

commented that the check required 

immediately before a flight and certified 

by an ETOPS qualified maintenance 

person is unrealistic for part 135 

operators who do not fly ETOPS routes 

on a regular basis. 

The FAA disagrees that a predeparture service check is unrealistic for 

135 operators. Part 135 operators are 

already required to have procedures in 

place to ensure that maintenance is 

performed by properly qualified 

maintenance personnel. Allowing a 

pilot to perform a pre-departure service 

check degrades the importance of the 

check and places a safety critical task 

below the level of performance required 

to change a tire or replace a light bulb 

for reading. 

NetJets, Inc., commented that it 

manages and/or operates approximately 

500 turbojet aircraft in fractional 

ownership programs and part 135 

operations. The flight operations of 

approximately 220 of those aircraft will 

be directly impacted by this proposed 

rule. The most significant impact is for 

operations conducted between the west 

coast of the United States and Hawaii. 

In 2003, they conducted more than 760 

flights to and from Hawaii and the 

contiguous U.S. At the present pace, 

more than 1100 flights will occur in 

2004. Based on the data available at this 

time, approximately 75–80% of these 

flights will not be possible if the 

proposed rule is adopted as written. It 

is estimated that over the 10-year period 

following adoption of the proposed rule, 

21,420 flights would be eliminated. 

Actus Aviation stated that residents of 

the state of Hawaii rely on long-range air 

ambulance flights to transport them to 

the mainland where more advanced 

critical medical treatment is available. 

Currently part 135 operators are 

utilizing Lear 36 aircraft and 1125 Astra 

Jets to fly these missions. Actus believes 

that if this rule becomes final, the next 

aircraft to conduct the flights would be 

a Falcon 50 or larger aircraft. The cost 

differential between the Astra and a 

Falcon 50 would be a minimum of 

$1,000 per hour. 

The FAA has corrected its assumption 

that operations between the west coast 

and Hawaii would be classified as 

ETOPS. The question of whether or not 

operations between the mainland U.S. 

and Hawaii are defined as ETOPS for 

part 135 operators is dependent on the 

computed single-engine cruise speeds 

for their airplanes. The FAA does not 

agree that the majority of those airplanes 

whose range and endurance legitimately 

qualifies them for such operations 

would be considered ETOPS in this 

case. But the FAA does agree that there 

is difficulty in obtaining sufficient 

single-engine data across all fleets of 

airplanes to accurately account for the 

cost of the rules application in this case. 

Without this data there is no way to 

calculate the costs and which operators 

would be affected. In consideration of 

this fact and because of a lack of 

incident data in this operation, the rule 

provides an exemption for all those 

airplanes listed on an operator’s 

operations specification for up to eight 

years beyond the effective date of this 

rule. Further, the fuel and electric 

requirements for airplanes added to an 

operator’s operation specifications 

between the effective date of the rule 

and 8 years later, contained in the 

NPRM, have been deleted. 

NetJets was also concerned that all 

maintenance personnel performing 

maintenance on ETOPS aircraft must be 

trained in accordance with the 

certificate holder’s ETOPS maintenance 

training program. The vast majority of 

maintenance work for part 135 operators 

is conducted by repair stations and/or 

manufacturer service centers, which 

places a substantial training burden on 

the certificate holder. Coupled with the 

fact that all manual changes would 

require approval before adoption, 

NetJets asserted that a very ponderous 

maintenance requirement is being 

proposed. 

The FAA finds that the operator is 

already required to train persons 

performing preventative maintenance 

functions in accordance with § 135.433. 

The amount of additional burden for 

ETOPS-specific training depends on the 

type of training program the operator 

chooses to incorporate. The FAA has 

limited the ETOPS maintenance 

requirements to only two-engine 

operations in part 135. 

TriCoastal Air, a part 135 on-demand 

air cargo carrier, stated that the two Lear 

35As operated by that firm are capable 

of exceeding the 180-minute range. This 

carrier estimated that compliance with 

this rule was estimated at $150,000 per 

aircraft not including the cost of pilot 

training. The commenter realized the 

possible payback in terms of monies 

saved from fuel stops, but noted that it 

simply does not have the financial 

resources for the upfront investment. 

The rule provides an exemption for 

all airplanes that are manufactured up 

to 8 years beyond the effective date of 

this rule. In addition, part 135 operators 

are likewise given 8 years to comply. In 

view of the fact that the only route 

beyond the ETOPS 180-minutes 

threshold is located in a portion of the 

South Pacific, the operator can maintain 

the safety of its operations by avoiding 

this area. 

NetJets questioned the basis for the 

estimated cost savings; it finds the 2 

hours of flying time per round trip for 

operations beyond 180 minutes to be 

inaccurate. The FAA has corrected that 

assumption in the analysis of this final 

rule and agrees that this rule will 

impose costs on those operators who 

chose to operate in ETOPS. 

XIV. Rulemaking Notices and Analyses 

Economic Summary 

Proposed changes to Federal 

regulations must undergo several 

economic analyses. First, Executive 

Order 12866 directs each Federal agency 

to propose or adopt a regulation only 

upon a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation 

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies 

to analyze the economic impact of 

regulatory changes on small entities. 

Third, the Trade Agreements Act 

prohibits agencies from setting 

standards that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. In developing U.S. 

standards, this Trade Act also requires 

agencies to consider international 

standards and, where appropriate, use 

them as the basis of U.S. standards. 

Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform 

Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare 

a written assessment of the costs, 

benefits, and other effects of proposed 

or final rules that include a Federal 

mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local, or tribal 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1859 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation.) 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined this rule (1) has benefits 

that justify its costs, is a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and is 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (2) 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (3) will not place U.S. operators 

at a significant competitive 

disadvantage to foreign operators of 

three- and four-engine airplanes; and (4) 

does not impose an unfunded mandate 

on state, local, or tribal governments, or 

on the private sector. These analyses, 

available in the final regulatory 

evaluation supporting today’s rule, are 

summarized below. 

Total Costs and Benefits of This 

Rulemaking 

The total costs to the industry are 

estimated at $20.2 million over a 16- 

year period or $11.9 million, in present 

value. These costs assume: 

• An Operator of four-engine 

airplanes that has conducted operations 

in the South Pacific area beyond 180- 

minutes will elect to incur extra flying 

time costs rather than comply with the 

ETOPS requirements. 

• No Part 135 operator will seek 

North polar area authorization or serve 

the South Pacific area beyond 180- 

minutes. 

• There are two ‘‘makes’’ of U.S. 

manufactured three-or four-engine 

airplanes (B–747, MD–11) that will 

obtain supplemental certification. 

• Only one ‘‘major’’ business airplane 

manufacturer will comply with the 

aircraft manufacturing provisions of the 

rule. 

Who is Potentially Affected by This 

Rulemaking 

• Part 121 operators with operations 

beyond 180 minutes from an alternate 

airport or operating in the polar regions 

• Part 135 operators with operations 

beyond 180 minutes from an alternate 

airport or operating in the North Polar 

Region 

• Engine and airplane manufacturers 

Our Costs Assumptions and Information 

A number of fundamental changes 

since the NPRM regulatory evaluation 

have been made to the cost assumptions 

in the preparation of this final 

regulatory evaluation as outlined below: 

• Current Parts 121 regulations for 

airplanes with more than two engines 

and 135 regulations do not impose 

requirements for operations beyond 180- 

minutes from a suitable airport. The 

NPRM assumed that policy letters and 

operation specifications prevented 

operations beyond 180 minutes, and 

thus cost savings would result from 

more efficient routings. 

• Type design requirements are not 

retroactive. Airplanes manufactured up 

to eight years after the effective date of 

the rule are grandfathered. 

• Recovery plans are required for all 

part 121 operators with operations 

beyond 180 minutes or in a polar area. 

The initial regulatory assessment 

incorrectly estimated the cost of 

recovery plans as only for ETOPS 

operations on a single route. 

• Recovery plan training hours were 

incorrectly estimated in the initial 

regulatory assessment and no training 

hours were estimated for ETOPS 

training. The final regulatory assessment 

corrects these mistakes. 

• The NPRM assumed only one route 

for all operations specification holders. 

In the regulatory evaluation for this final 

rule, activity is based on FAA internal 

records of flight operations. If an 

operator did not conduct ETOPS area 

flights, no costs are estimated for that 

operator. 

• Hourly wage estimates for most 

positions are based at the 75th 

percentile level rather than the mean 

level used in the NPRM. Adjustments to 

these base rates for benefits and 

overhead costs are the same as the 

initial evaluation. Pilot and flight 

attendant wage estimates based on 

industry input; other wages based on 

Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 

• Airplanes cost estimates are based 

on the number of planes operated by a 

Part 121 carrier. Communication 

equipment costs exclude airplanes that, 

according to industry information, 

already have the equipment installed. 

Part 135 cost estimates are calculated on 

an assumed fleet size. 

• The cost analysis has been extended 

to 16 years to include the effects of the 

cargo fire suppression provisions that 

have a six-year phase-in. 

In addition to changes to the cost 

assumptions, a number of regulatory 

changes to the final rule affect the costs 

of the rule. These are discussed in the 

‘‘Changes from the NPRM to the Final 

Rule’’ section. 

Alternatives Considered 

The basic framework of the ETOPS 

rule represents the consensus of a 

working group consisting of over 50 

members, including U.S. and foreign 

airlines, aircraft and engine 

manufacturers, pilot unions, industry 

associations, international regulatory 

bodies, and the FAA. During the course 

of their discussions many alternatives 

were considered and the NPRM 

reflected their views. In general, the 

more than 50 commenters to the NPRM 

agreed with the framework of the NPRM 

but disputed specific provisions. 

The FAA rejected some of the 

proposals but adopted a number that 

significantly change provisions of the 

final rule and are discussed in the 

‘‘Changes from the NPRM to the Final 

Rule’’ section. 

Benefits of This Rulemaking 

The upgraded fire suppression and 

communications systems, coupled with 

ETOPS procedures and planning will 

help reduce the risks of flying over 

remote areas, distant from alternate 

airports. The cargo and baggage 

compartment fire suppression system 

requirement will ensure that all ETOPS 

airplanes will have fire suppression 

systems capable of putting out fires and 

suppressing any chance of re-ignition 

for the longest duration diversion that 

the airplane is approved for. The 

SATCOM requirement will result in a 

significant improvement in 

communications that can greatly benefit 

the safety of an ETOPS flight that could 

be three or more hours from a landing 

site. The ETOPS safety enhancements 

contained in this rule focus on defining 

methods of preventing potential threats 

caused by known sources of potential 

failures. 

The passenger recovery plan will 

ensure the safety of the passengers and 

crew. The FAA is projecting that there 

could be between 220 and 300 

diversions during the next sixteen years 

for ETOPS flights. Some of these 

diversions may involve airports that are 

in rather remote locations, where it 

would not be safe to off-load passengers 

and crew until help arrived and where 

it may not be safe to keep them on-board 

the aircraft either. 

Cost Summary 

The Part 121 operators with passenger 

operations beyond 180 minutes from an 

ETOPS alternate airport will incur costs 

for passenger recovery plans and related 

training totaling $158,000 or $94,000, 

present value. The total cost to operators 

in the South polar area is estimated at 

$305,000 or $185,000, present value 

excluding passenger recovery related 

costs. The costs to the operators that 

have conducted operations in the area of 

the South Pacific where some flights 

may exceed 180-minutes from an 

alternate airport will be $1.386 million 

or $735,000, present value. The total 

cost to Part 121 operators is estimated 

at $1.9 million or $1.0 million, present 

value over a 16-year period. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1860 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

Part 135 operators seeking to avoid 

operating over 180-minutes from an 

alternate airport will incur extra flying 

time costs of $396,000 or $224,000, 

present value. 

A business aircraft manufacturer will 

incur reporting and investigation costs 

that will be required by the provisions 

of Part 21 estimated at $5.3 million or 

$3.1 million, present value. The 

manufacturer will also incur airplane 

ETOPS certification costs of $5.4 

million. This would consist of design 

costs of $4.5 million, and assessment 

and validation costs of $900,000. Engine 

certification costs (for a model that does 

not require Early ETOPS) to make an 

engine ETOPS eligible will cost $1.4 

million or $800,000, present value. This 

will consist of design and certification 

costs of $1.0 million and establishing 

engine condition monitoring procedures 

at a cost of $375,000. The total cost to 

a business aircraft manufacturer for 

reporting and investigation, and 

airframe and engine certification will be 

$12.1 million or $7.1 million, present 

value. The absence of any significant 

activity in the North polar area or in 

other areas beyond 180 minutes from an 

alternate will result in only one 

manufacturer complying with the 

provisions of the rule. 

The manufacturer of an existing fourengine airplane will incur additional 

reporting costs under part 21 of $3.7 

million to include operators that choose 

to fly beyond 180-minutes, 

supplemental certification costs of $1.9 

million to allow operators of existing 

three- or four-engine airplanes to 

increase the capacity of the cargo fire 

suppression system required for beyond 

180-minutes ETOPS and other required 

costs of $200,000 for a total cost of $5.8 

million, or $3.6 million, present value. 

Benefits 

The FAA is projecting that there 

could be between 220 and 300 

diversions during the next 10 years 

involving multi-engine aircraft 

performing an ETOPS operation. Some 

of the ETOPS operations have alternate 

airports, which are beyond 180 minutes 

and these airports are in rather remote 

locations, where it would not be safe to 

off-load passengers and crew until help 

arrived and it may not be safe to keep 

them on-board the aircraft either. Some 

of the above diversions are bound to 

happen at a remote airport where this 

might be the case. Therefore, the FAA 

is requiring operators to develop airport 

specific passenger recovery plans for 

ETOPS alternate airports beyond 180- 

minutes. 

The historical rate of occurrence of inflight cargo and baggage compartment 

fires is approximately 1 × 10¥7 per 

flight hour. Since these events cannot be 

considered extremely improbable the 

possibility must be addressed. For this 

reason, aircraft cargo and baggage 

compartment fire suppression systems 

must be capable of putting out fires and 

suppressing any chance of re-ignition 

for the longest duration diversion for 

which the aircraft is approved. 

Currently this is not the case for some 

three- and four-engine aircraft used in 

ETOPS operations. This rule will 

require that all aircraft have a fire 

suppression capability to put out the 

fire and suppress any re-ignition during 

the longest duration diversion. 

Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule will have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the agency determines that it 

will, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the RFA. 

However, if an agency determines that 

a proposed or final rule is not expected 

to have a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities, section 605(b) of the RFA 

provides that the head of the agency 

may so certify and a regulatory 

flexibility analysis is not required. The 

certification must include a statement 

providing the factual basis for this 

determination, and the reasoning should 

be clear. 

The final rule will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of airframe and 

engine manufacturers or part 121 and 

part 135 operators. All United States 

manufacturers of transport category 

airplanes exceed the Small Business 

Administration small entity criteria of 

1,500 employees for aircraft 

manufacturers. Those U.S. 

manufacturers include: Boeing, Cessna, 

Gulfstream, Lockheed Martin, 

McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and 

Sabreliner. All United States 

manufacturers of ETOPS-capable 

engines exceed the Small Business 

Administration small entity criteria of 

1,000 employees for aircraft engine 

manufacturers. Those U.S. 

manufacturers include: General Electric, 

Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls Royce. All 

United States operators of transport 

category airplanes that are currently 

authorized to conduct 180-minute 

ETOPS operations exceed the Small 

Business 0Administration small entity 

criteria of 1,500 employees for 

scheduled and non-scheduled air 

transportation firms. Those U.S. 

operators include: American, American 

Trans Air, Continental, Delta, United, 

and U.S. Airways. 

All United States operators of 

transport category airplanes that are 

currently authorized to conduct 180- 

minute ETOPS operations exceed the 

Small Business Administration small 

entity criteria of 1,500 employees for 

scheduled and non-scheduled air 

transportation firms. Those U.S. 

operators include: American, American 

Trans Air, Continental, Delta, United, 

and U.S. Airways. 

Two part 121 operators that have 

operation specifications to serve the 

South polar area are small entities. To 

assess the cost impact to these airlines, 

the FAA uses the highest estimated 

annual cost to operators in the period of 

analysis. This analysis indicates that 

neither of these carriers will experience 

a significant economic impact. One nonscheduled part 121 operators that 

operate in the South Pacific area is not 

a small entity. It also will not incur 

significant avoidance costs to continue 

operating in the area. The FAA, 

therefore, certifies that the final rule 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

part 121 operators. 

One of the 14 part 135 operators with 

flight activity in the South Pacific is a 

large entity and the 13 others are small 

entities under the SBA criteria. We 

determined annual revenues for six of 

the 13 small entities and the amounts 

ranged from $1.4 million to $50 million. 

We believe the revenues of none of the 

operators with unknown revenues are 

less than the lowest amount of $1.4 

million. Two of the operators with 

unknown revenues flew three flights in 

the area where some flights may exceed 

180-minutesd from an alternate airport 

and the rest flew two or less. Even if all 

three flights were to incur avoidance 

costs (which is unlikely since only 20 

percent of flights may encounter 

conditions requiring extra flying time) 

the total cost will be only seven-tenths 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1861 

of one percent of the estimated revenues 

of $1.4 million. None of the operators 

with known revenues will incur 

significant costs. The FAA therefore 

certifies that the final rule will not have 

a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small part 135 

operators. 

International Trade Impact Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

prohibits Federal agencies from 

establishing any standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 

safety, are not considered unnecessary 

obstacles. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has 

assessed the potential effect of this final 

rule and concludes that these 

requirements may have some potential 

affect on a small number of U.S. 

operators under certain conditions 

unless other countries adopt similar 

aviation regulations. The requirements 

imposed on both domestic and foreign 

airframe and engine manufacturers 

create no obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among 

other things, to curb the practice of 

imposing unfunded Federal mandates 

on State, local, and tribal governments. 

Title II of the Act requires each Federal 

agency to prepare a written statement 

assessing the effects of any Federal 

mandate in a proposed or final agency 

rule that may result in an expenditure 

of $100 million or more (adjusted 

annually for inflation) in any one year 

by State, local, and tribal governments, 

in the aggregate, or by the private sector; 

such a mandate is deemed to be a 

‘‘significant regulatory action.’’ The 

FAA currently uses an inflationadjusted value of $128.1 million in lieu 

of $100 million. The Trade Agreements 

Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing any standards or 

engaging in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 

safety, are not considered unnecessary 

obstacles. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has 

assessed the potential effect of this final 

rule and concludes that these 

requirements may have some potential 

affect on a small number of U.S. 

operators under certain conditions 

unless other countries adopt similar 

aviation regulations. The requirements 

imposed on both domestic and foreign 

airframe and engine manufacturers 

create no obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

This final rule does not contain such 

a mandate. The requirements of Title II 

do not apply. 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We 

determined that this action will not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, or the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and therefore does 

not have federalism implications. 

International Compatibility 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

comply with ICAO Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these regulations. 

Plain English 

Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, 

Oct. 4, 1993) requires each agency to 

write regulations that are simple and 

easy to understand. To the extent 

possible, the regulations adopted today 

meet these criteria. However, in some 

instances terms that are not readily 

understandable to the general public 

have been used. Today’s rule imposes 

no obligation on the general public. The 

entities regulated under this final rule, 

airplane and engine manufacturers and 

air carriers and on-demand operators, 

are familiar with the terminology 

included in the regulation. Accordingly, 

the FAA believes the regulation meets 

the requirements of Executive Order 

12866. 

Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from the preparation of an 

environmental impact statement under 

the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) in the absence of extraordinary 

circumstances. The FAA has 

determined that this rulemaking action 

qualifies for the categorical exclusion 

and involves no extraordinary 

circumstances. 

Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We 

have determined it is not a ‘‘significant 

energy action’’ under the executive 

order because it is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ under Executive 

Order 12866, and it is not likely to have 

a significant adverse effect on the 

supply, distribution, or use of energy. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

As required by the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 

3507(d)), the FAA has submitted a copy 

of the new information collection 

requirements(s) in this final rule to the 

Office of Management and Budget for its 

review. 

The FAA included a detailed 

discussion of the new information 

collection requirements of the proposed 

rule at 68 FR 64782, November 14, 2003. 

No comments were received on these 

estimated requirements. 

However, with certain revisions to the 

proposal, the FAA finds that the 

information collection burden on the 

public will be less than originally 

estimated in the NPRM. Some of the 

reasons for this are that type design 

requirements are not retroactive; 

therefore, there is no paperwork burden 

for recertification of airplanes used in 

existing ETOPS. In addition, based on 

operator comment and internal FAA 

research, this paperwork estimate is 

based on actual activity levels of 

individual operators rather than 

averages for potential fleet operation. 

Regional recovery plans also have been 

omitted from the final rule, reducing 

that burden. The following chart shows 

the record keeping requirements of 

today’s final rule. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1862 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

SUMMARY OF INITIAL AND TOTAL PAPERWORK HOURS AND COSTS

Category Initial 

hours Initial cost Sixteen year hours 

Sixteen year 

costs 

Part 121 

Passenger Recovery Plans ..................................................................................... 200 $20,600 1,320 $135,960 

Recovery Training .................................................................................................... 55 8,960 132 21,504 

South Polar—flare planning ..................................................................................... 200 20,000 480 132,000 

South Polar—fuel strategies .................................................................................... 200 20,000 480 132,000 

§ 121.415 training: 

Pilots ................................................................................................................. 200 34,600 480 83,040 

Dispatchers ....................................................................................................... 20 1,240 48 2,976 

§ 121.415 computer planning .................................................................................. ................ 29,200 ........................ 438,000 

Part 21 

ETOPS Reporting .................................................................................................... 4,160 187,200 66,560 2,995,200 

Investigations ........................................................................................................... 2,000 146,000 32,000 2,336,000 

Part 25 

Electrical system design .......................................................................................... 30,000 2,250,000 30,000 2,250,000 

Fuel system design .................................................................................................. 30,000 2,250,000 30,000 2,250,000 

System assessments ............................................................................................... 12,000 898,000 12,000 898,000 

Part 33 

Engine Monitoring .................................................................................................... 5,000 375,000 5,000 375,000 

Part 135 

South Pacific Operations ......................................................................................... 64 4,608 288 20,736 

Total .................................................................................................................. ................ ........................ ........................ 12,049,416 

XV. Appendix of Tables 

TABLE 1.—APPLICABILITY OF FINAL RULE

Current requirements Final Rule 

Up to 60 minutes 

Beyond 60 

minutes up to 

180 minutes 

Beyond 180 

minutes 

Up to 60 

minutes 

Beyond 60 minutes up to 180 

minutes Beyond 180 minutes 

Part 121 twoengine.Section 

121.161 applies.

Advisory material and 

policy letters.

Currently restricted................... Would codify previous 

ETOPS guidance with 

some reductions in 

requirements*.

New ETOPS rules would 

apply. Airport specific PRP. 

Part 121 more 

than two-engine.

No current 

regulation.

No current 

regulation.

No current 

regulation.

.................. (From 90–180 minutes) New 

requirement: Fuel for depressurization.

New ETOPS rules would 

apply to passenger-carrying operations only. Airport specific PRP. No 

ETOPS maintenance program. 

Part 135 ........... No current 

regulation.

No current 

regulation.

No current 

regulation.

No change No change ............................. New ETOPS rules would 

apply. All-cargo airplanes 

with more than two engines excluded. PRP in 

North Polar region only. No 

ETOPS maintenance program for airplanes with 

more than two engines. 

PRP = passenger recovery plan. 

* a. Fuel requirements for icing and wind calculations in the critical fuel scenario have been reduced. 

b. The area of applicability for 207-minute ETOPS has been increased. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1863 

TABLE 2.—PART 121 AND PART 135 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS TIMETABLE

Requirement Compliance date 

Part 121 Airplanes with two engines Airplanes with more than 

two engines 

Part 1 & 121.7 Definitions .............................................................................. 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.97 Airport required data .......................................................................... 1 year ................................................. 1 year. 

121.99 & 121.122 SATCOM .......................................................................... 1 year (except for 207-minute 

ETOPS approval in the North Pacific area of operation).

1 year. 

121.106 Rescue and firefighting equipment at alternate airports .................. 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.135 Passenger recovery plan ................................................................. 1 year ................................................. 1 year. 

121.161 Airplane limitations ........................................................................... 30 days .............................................. 1 year. 

121.162 ETOPS Type Design Approval ........................................................ 30 days .............................................. 8 years. 

121.374 Maintenance ..................................................................................... 30 days .............................................. Not required. 

121.415 Crew training .................................................................................... 1 year ................................................. 1 year. 

121.565 Reporting—engine inoperative landing ............................................ 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.624 ETOPS alternates ............................................................................ 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.625 Alternate weather minimums ............................................................ 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.631 Dispatch ............................................................................................ 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.633 Cargo fire suppression ..................................................................... 30 days .............................................. 6 years. 

121.646 En-route fuel supply ......................................................................... 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

121.687 & 689 Contents of dispatch .............................................................. 30 days .............................................. 30 days. 

Part 135 All airplanes 

135.98 North Polar Operations ...................................................................... 1 year. 

135.345 Passenger Recovery Training .......................................................... 1 year. 

135.364 Maximum Flying Time ...................................................................... 1 year. 

135.411 Applicability ....................................................................................... 1 year. 

Part 135 Appendix G (General) ..................................................................... 1 year. 

a. Time-Limited Systems ................................................................................ 8 years. 

b. Airplane Requirements ............................................................................... 8 years. 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1864 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.000</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1865 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.001</GPH>
1866 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.002</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1867 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.003</GPH>
1868 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.004</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1869 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.005</GPH>
1870 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C 


mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2ER16JA07.006</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1871 

TABLE 6.—PART 25, APPENDIX K 

REVISED NUMBERING

NPRM 

(old Appendix L) 

Final Rule 

(Appendix K) 

Section I ............................. K25.1. 

§ 25.1535(a) ................ K25.1.1. 

§ 25.1535(b) ................ K25.1.2. 

(a) ............................... K25.1.3. 

(a)(1) ........................... K25.1.3(a). 

(a)(2) ........................... K25.1.3(b). 

(a)(3) ........................... K25.1.3(c). 

(b) ............................... K25.1.4. 

(b)(1) ........................... K25.1.4(a). 

(b)(2) ........................... K25.1.4(b). 

(b)(2)(i) ........................ K25.1.4(b)(1). 

(b)(2)(ii) ....................... K25.1.4(b)(2). 

(b)(3) ........................... K25.1.4(c). 

(c) ............................... K25.1.5. 

(d) ............................... K25.1.6. 

(e) ............................... K25.1.7. 

Section II ............................ K25.2. 

(a) ............................... K25.2.1. 

(a)(1) ........................... K25.2.1(a). 

(a)(2) ........................... K25.2.1(c). 

(a)(3) ........................... K25.2.1(d). 

(a)(4) ........................... K25.2.1(b). 

(a)(5) ........................... K25.2.1(e). 

(b) ............................... K25.2.2. 

(b)(1) ........................... K25.2.2(a). 

(b)(2) ........................... K25.2.2(b). 

(b)(3) ........................... K25.2.2(c). 

(b)(4) ........................... K25.2.2(d). 

(b)(5) ........................... K25.2.2(e). 

(b)(6) ........................... K25.2.2(f). 

(b)(7) ........................... K25.2.2(g). 

(b)(9) ........................... K25.2.2(i). 

(c) ............................... K25.2.3. 

Section III ........................... K25.3. 

(a) ............................... K25.3.1. 

(a)(1) ........................... K25.3.1(a). 

(a)(2) ........................... K25.3.1(b). 

(a)(3) ........................... K25.3.1(c). 

(b) ............................... K25.3.2. 

(b)(1) ........................... K25.3.2(a). 

(b)(2) ........................... K25.3.2(b). 

(b)(3) ........................... K25.3.2(c). 

(b)(4) ........................... K25.3.2(d). 

(b)(5) ........................... K25.3.2(e). 

(b)(6) ........................... K25.3.2(f). 

(c) ............................... K25.3.3. 

XVI. The Final Rule 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 1 

Air transportation. 

14 CFR Part 21 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Exports, 

Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 33 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

14 CFR Part 121 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol 

abuse, Aviation safety, Drug abuse, Drug 

testing, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Safety, Transportation. 

14 CFR Part 135 

Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol 

abuse, Aviation safety, Drug abuse, Drug 

testing, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The Amendment 

■ For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Aviation 

Administration amends 14 CFR parts 1, 

21, 25, 33, 121, and 135 as follows: 

PART 1—DEFINITIONS AND 

ABBREVIATIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 1 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

■ 2. Amend § 1.1 by adding the 

following definitions in alphabetical 

order to read as follows: 

§ 1.1 General definitions. 

* * * * * 

Configuration, Maintenance, and 

Procedures (CMP) document means a 

document approved by the FAA that 

contains minimum configuration, 

operating, and maintenance 

requirements, hardware life-limits, and 

Master Minimum Equipment List 

(MMEL) constraints necessary for an 

airplane-engine combination to meet 

ETOPS type design approval 

requirements. 

* * * * * 

Early ETOPS means ETOPS type 

design approval obtained without 

gaining non-ETOPS service experience 

on the candidate airplane-engine 

combination certified for ETOPS. 

* * * * * 

ETOPS Significant System means an 

airplane system, including the 

propulsion system, the failure or 

malfunctioning of which could 

adversely affect the safety of an ETOPS 

flight, or the continued safe flight and 

landing of an airplane during an ETOPS 

diversion. Each ETOPS significant 

system is either an ETOPS group 1 

significant system or an ETOPS group 2 

significant system. 

(1) An ETOPS group 1 Significant 

System—

(i) Has fail-safe characteristics directly 

linked to the degree of redundancy 

provided by the number of engines on 

the airplane. 

(ii) Is a system, the failure or 

malfunction of which could result in an 

IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other 

power loss. 

(iii) Contributes significantly to the 

safety of an ETOPS diversion by 

providing additional redundancy for 

any system power source lost as a result 

of an inoperative engine. 

(iv) Is essential for prolonged 

operation of an airplane at engine 

inoperative altitudes. 

(2) An ETOPS group 2 significant 

system is an ETOPS significant system 

that is not an ETOPS group 1 significant 

system. 

Extended Operations (ETOPS) means 

an airplane flight operation other than 

an all-cargo operation in an airplane 

with more than two engines during 

which a portion of the flight is 

conducted beyond a time threshold 

identified in part 121 or part 135 of this 

chapter that is determined using an 

approved one-engine-inoperative cruise 

speed under standard atmospheric 

conditions in still air. 

* * * * * 

In-flight shutdown (IFSD) means, for 

ETOPS only, when an engine ceases to 

function (when the airplane is airborne) 

and is shutdown, whether self induced, 

flightcrew initiated or caused by an 

external influence. The FAA considers 

IFSD for all causes: for example, 

flameout, internal failure, flightcrew 

initiated shutdown, foreign object 

ingestion, icing, inability to obtain or 

control desired thrust or power, and 

cycling of the start control, however 

briefly, even if the engine operates 

normally for the remainder of the flight. 

This definition excludes the airborne 

cessation of the functioning of an engine 

when immediately followed by an 

automatic engine relight and when an 

engine does not achieve desired thrust 

or power but is not shutdown. 

* * * * * 

■ 3. Amend § 1.2 by adding the 

following abbreviations in alphabetical 

order to read as follows: 

§ 1.2 Abbreviations and symbols 

* * * * * 

AFM means airplane flight manual. 

* * * * * 

APU means auxiliary power unit. 

* * * * * 

ATS means Air Traffic Service. 

CAMP means continuous 

airworthiness maintenance program. 

* * * * * 

CHDO means an FAA Flight 

Standards certificate holding district 

office. 

CMP means configuration, 

maintenance, and procedures. 

* * * * * 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1872 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

Equi-Time Point means a point on the 

route of flight where the flight time, 

considering wind, to each of two 

selected airports is equal. 

ETOPS means extended operations. 

* * * * * 

IFSD means in-flight shutdown. 

* * * * * 

MEL means minimum equipment list. 

* * * * * 

NOPAC means North Pacific area of 

operation. 

* * * * * 

OPSPECS means operations 

specifications. 

PACOTS means Pacific Organized 

Track System. 

* * * * * 

PTRS means Performance Tracking 

and Reporting System. 

* * * * * 

RFFS means rescue and firefighting 

services. 

* * * * * 

SATCOM means satellite 

communications. 

* * * * * 

PART 21—CERTIFICATION 

PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND 

PARTS 

■ 4. The authority citation for part 21 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44707, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

■ 5. Add § 21.4 to read as follows: 

§ 21.4 ETOPS reporting requirements. 

(a) Early ETOPS: reporting, tracking, 

and resolving problems. The holder of a 

type certificate for an airplane-engine 

combination approved using the Early 

ETOPS method specified in part 25, 

Appendix K, of this chapter must use a 

system for reporting, tracking, and 

resolving each problem resulting in one 

of the occurrences specified in 

paragraph (a)(6) of this section. 

(1) The system must identify how the 

type certificate holder will promptly 

identify problems, report them to the 

responsible FAA aircraft certification 

office, and propose a solution to the 

FAA to resolve each problem. A 

proposed solution must consist of—

(i) A change in the airplane or engine 

type design; 

(ii) A change in a manufacturing 

process; 

(iii) A change in an operating or 

maintenance procedure; or 

(iv) Any other solution acceptable to 

the FAA. 

(2) For an airplane with more than 

two engines, the system must be in 

place for the first 250,000 world fleet 

engine-hours for the approved airplaneengine combination. 

(3) For two-engine airplanes, the 

system must be in place for the first 

250,000 world fleet engine-hours for the 

approved airplane-engine combination 

and after that until—

(i) The world fleet 12-month rolling 

average IFSD rate is at or below the rate 

required by paragraph (b)(2) of this 

section; and 

(ii) The FAA determines that the rate 

is stable. 

(4) For an airplane-engine 

combination that is a derivative of an 

airplane-engine combination previously 

approved for ETOPS, the system need 

only address those problems specified 

in the following table, provided the type 

certificate holder obtains prior 

authorization from the FAA: 

If the change does not require a new airplane type certificate and . . . Then the Problem Tracking and Resolution System must address . . . 

(i) Requires a new engine type certificate ............................................... All problems applicable to the new engine installation, and for the remainder of the airplane, problems in changed systems only. 

(ii) Does not require a new engine type certificate .................................. Problems in changed systems only. 

(5) The type certificate holder must 

identify the sources and content of data 

that it will use for its system. The data 

must be adequate to evaluate the 

specific cause of any in-service problem 

reportable under this section or § 21.3(c) 

that could affect the safety of ETOPS. 

(6) In implementing this system, the 

type certificate holder must report the 

following occurrences: 

(i) IFSDs, except planned IFSDs 

performed for flight training. 

(ii) For two-engine airplanes, IFSD 

rates. 

(iii) Inability to control an engine or 

obtain desired thrust or power. 

(iv) Precautionary thrust or power 

reductions. 

(v) Degraded ability to start an engine 

in flight. 

(vi) Inadvertent fuel loss or 

unavailability, or uncorrectable fuel 

imbalance in flight. 

(vii) Turn backs or diversions for 

failures, malfunctions, or defects 

associated with an ETOPS group 1 

significant system. 

(viii) Loss of any power source for an 

ETOPS group 1 significant system, 

including any power source designed to 

provide backup power for that system. 

(ix) Any event that would jeopardize 

the safe flight and landing of the 

airplane on an ETOPS flight. 

(x) Any unscheduled engine removal 

for a condition that could result in one 

of the reportable occurrences listed in 

this paragraph. 

(b) Reliability of two-engine 

airplanes—(1) Reporting of two-engine 

airplane in-service reliability. The 

holder of a type certificate for an 

airplane approved for ETOPS and the 

holder of a type certificate for an engine 

installed on an airplane approved for 

ETOPS must report monthly to their 

respective FAA type certificate holding 

office on the reliability of the world fleet 

of those airplanes and engines. The 

report provided by both the airplane 

and engine type certificate holders must 

address each airplane-engine 

combination approved for ETOPS. The 

FAA may approve quarterly reporting if 

the airplane-engine combination 

demonstrates an IFSD rate at or below 

those specified in paragraph (b)(2) of 

this section for a period acceptable to 

the FAA. This reporting may be 

combined with the reporting required 

by § 21.3. The responsible type 

certificate holder must investigate any 

cause of an IFSD resulting from an 

occurrence attributable to the design of 

its product and report the results of that 

investigation to its FAA office 

responsible for administering its type 

certificate. Reporting must include: 

(i) Engine IFSDs, except planned 

IFSDs performed for flight training. 

(ii) The world fleet 12-month rolling 

average IFSD rates for all causes, except 

planned IFSDs performed for flight 

training. 

(iii) ETOPS fleet utilization, including 

a list of operators, their ETOPS 

diversion time authority, flight hours, 

and cycles. 

(2) World fleet IFSD rate for twoengine airplanes. The holder of a type 

certificate for an airplane approved for 

ETOPS and the holder of a type 

certificate for an engine installed on an 

airplane approved for ETOPS must issue 

service information to the operators of 

those airplanes and engines, as 

appropriate, to maintain the world fleet 

12-month rolling average IFSD rate at or 

below the following levels: 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1873 

(i) A rate of 0.05 per 1,000 world-fleet 

engine-hours for an airplane-engine 

combination approved for up to and 

including 120-minute ETOPS. When all 

ETOPS operators have complied with 

the corrective actions required in the 

configuration, maintenance and 

procedures (CMP) document as a 

condition for ETOPS approval, the rate 

to be maintained is at or below 0.02 per 

1,000 world-fleet engine-hours. 

(ii) A rate of 0.02 per 1,000 world-fleet 

engine-hours for an airplane-engine 

combination approved for up to and 

including 180-minute ETOPS, including 

airplane-engine combinations approved 

for 207-minute ETOPS in the North 

Pacific operating area under appendix P, 

section I, paragraph (h), of part 121 of 

this chapter. 

(iii) A rate of 0.01 per 1,000 worldfleet engine-hours for an airplane-engine 

combination approved for ETOPS 

beyond 180 minutes, excluding 

airplane-engine combinations approved 

for 207-minute ETOPS in the North 

Pacific operating area under appendix P, 

section I, paragraph (h), of part 121 of 

this chapter. 

PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS 

STANDARDS: TRANSPORT 

CATEGORY AIRPLANES 

■ 6. The authority citation for part 25 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702 and 44704. 

■ 7. Add § 25.3 to subpart A to read as 

follows: 

§ 25.3 Special provisions for ETOPS type 

design approvals. 

(a) Applicability. This section applies 

to an applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval of an airplane: 

(1) That has an existing type 

certificate on February 15, 2007; or 

(2) For which an application for an 

original type certificate was submitted 

before February 15, 2007. 

(b) Airplanes with two engines. (1) For 

ETOPS type design approval of an 

airplane up to and including 180 

minutes, an applicant must comply with 

§ 25.1535, except that it need not 

comply with the following provisions of 

Appendix K, K25.1.4, of this part: 

(i) K25.1.4(a), fuel system pressure 

and flow requirements; 

(ii) K25.1.4(a)(3), low fuel alerting; 

and 

(iii) K25.1.4(c), engine oil tank design. 

(2) For ETOPS type design approval of 

an airplane beyond 180 minutes an 

applicant must comply with § 25.1535. 

(c) Airplanes with more than two 

engines. An applicant for ETOPS type 

design approval must comply with 

§ 25.1535 for an airplane manufactured 

on or after February 17, 2015, except 

that, for an airplane configured for a 

three person flight crew, the applicant 

need not comply with Appendix K, 

K25.1.4(a)(3), of this part, low fuel 

alerting. 

■ 8. Add § 25.1535 to read as follows: 

§ 25.1535 ETOPS approval. 

Except as provided in § 25.3, each 

applicant seeking ETOPS type design 

approval must comply with the 

provisions of Appendix K of this part. 

■ 9. Add Appendix K to read as follows: 

Appendix K to PART 25—EXTENDED 

OPERATIONS (ETOPS) 

This appendix specifies airworthiness 

requirements for the approval of an airplaneengine combination for extended operations 

(ETOPS). For two-engine airplanes, the 

applicant must comply with sections K25.1 

and K25.2 of this appendix. For airplanes 

with more than two engines, the applicant 

must comply with sections K25.1 and K25.3 

of this appendix. 

K25.1 Design requirements. 

K25.1.1 Part 25 compliance. 

The airplane-engine combination must 

comply with the requirements of part 25 

considering the maximum flight time and the 

longest diversion time for which the 

applicant seeks approval. 

K25.1.2 Human factors. 

An applicant must consider crew 

workload, operational implications, and the 

crew’s and passengers’ physiological needs 

during continued operation with failure 

effects for the longest diversion time for 

which it seeks approval. 

K25.1.3 Airplane systems. 

(a) Operation in icing conditions. 

(1) The airplane must be certificated for 

operation in icing conditions in accordance 

with § 25.1419. 

(2) The airplane must be able to safely 

conduct an ETOPS diversion with the most 

critical ice accretion resulting from: 

(i) Icing conditions encountered at an 

altitude that the airplane would have to fly 

following an engine failure or cabin 

decompression. 

(ii) A 15-minute hold in the continuous 

maximum icing conditions specified in 

Appendix C of this part with a liquid water 

content factor of 1.0. 

(iii) Ice accumulated during approach and 

landing in the icing conditions specified in 

Appendix C of this part. 

(b) Electrical power supply. The airplane 

must be equipped with at least three 

independent sources of electrical power. 

(c) Time limited systems. The applicant 

must define the system time capability of 

each ETOPS significant system that is timelimited. 

K25.1.4 Propulsion systems. 

(a) Fuel system design. Fuel necessary to 

complete an ETOPS flight (including a 

diversion for the longest time for which the 

applicant seeks approval) must be available 

to the operating engines at the pressure and 

fuel-flow required by § 25.955 under any 

airplane failure condition not shown to be 

extremely improbable. Types of failures that 

must be considered include, but are not 

limited to: crossfeed valve failures, automatic 

fuel management system failures, and normal 

electrical power generation failures. 

(1) If the engine has been certified for 

limited operation with negative engine-fuelpump-inlet pressures, the following 

requirements apply: 

(i) Airplane demonstration-testing must 

cover worst case cruise and diversion 

conditions involving: 

(A) Fuel grade and temperature. 

(B) Thrust or power variations. 

(C) Turbulence and negative G. 

(D) Fuel system components degraded 

within their approved maintenance limits. 

(ii) Unusable-fuel quantity in the suction 

feed configuration must be determined in 

accordance with § 25.959. 

(2) For two-engine airplanes to be 

certificated for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, 

one fuel boost pump in each main tank and 

at least one crossfeed valve, or other means 

for transferring fuel, must be powered by an 

independent electrical power source other 

than the three power sources required to 

comply with section K25.1.3(b) of this 

appendix. This requirement does not apply if 

the normal fuel boost pressure, crossfeed 

valve actuation, or fuel transfer capability is 

not provided by electrical power. 

(3) An alert must be displayed to the 

flightcrew when the quantity of fuel available 

to the engines falls below the level required 

to fly to the destination. The alert must be 

given when there is enough fuel remaining to 

safely complete a diversion. This alert must 

account for abnormal fuel management or 

transfer between tanks, and possible loss of 

fuel. This paragraph does not apply to 

airplanes with a required flight engineer. 

(b) APU design. If an APU is needed to 

comply with this appendix, the applicant 

must demonstrate that: 

(1) The reliability of the APU is adequate 

to meet those requirements; and 

(2) If it is necessary that the APU be able 

to start in flight, it is able to start at any 

altitude up to the maximum operating 

altitude of the airplane, or 45,000 feet, 

whichever is lower, and run for the 

remainder of any flight . 

(c) Engine oil tank design. The engine oil 

tank filler cap must comply with § 33.71(c)(4) 

of this chapter. 

K25.1.5 Engine-condition monitoring. 

Procedures for engine-condition 

monitoring must be specified and validated 

in accordance with Part 33, Appendix A, 

paragraph A33.3(c) of this chapter. 

K25.1.6 Configuration, maintenance, and 

procedures. 

The applicant must list any configuration, 

operating and maintenance requirements, 

hardware life limits, MMEL constraints, and 

ETOPS approval in a CMP document. 

K25.1.7 Airplane flight manual. 

The airplane flight manual must contain 

the following information applicable to the 

ETOPS type design approval: 

(a) Special limitations, including any 

limitation associated with operation of the 

airplane up to the maximum diversion time 

being approved. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1874 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

(b) Required markings or placards. 

(c) The airborne equipment required for 

extended operations and flightcrew operating 

procedures for this equipment. 

(d) The system time capability for the 

following: 

(1) The most limiting fire suppression 

system for Class C cargo or baggage 

compartments. 

(2) The most limiting ETOPS significant 

system other than fire suppression systems 

for Class C cargo or baggage compartments. 

(e) This statement: ‘‘The type-design 

reliability and performance of this airplaneengine combination has been evaluated 

under 14 CFR 25.1535 and found suitable for 

(identify maximum approved diversion time) 

extended operations (ETOPS) when the 

configuration, maintenance, and procedures 

standard contained in (identify the CMP 

document) are met. The actual maximum 

approved diversion time for this airplane 

may be less based on its most limiting system 

time capability. This finding does not 

constitute operational approval to conduct 

ETOPS.’’

K25.2. Two-engine airplanes. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval of a two-engine airplane must use 

one of the methods described in section 

K25.2.1, K25.2.2, or K25.2.3 of this appendix. 

K25.2.1 Service experience method. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval using the service experience 

method must comply with sections 

K25.2.1(a) and K25.2.1(b) of this appendix 

before conducting the assessments specified 

in sections K25.2.1(c) and K25.2.1(d) of this 

appendix, and the flight test specified in 

section K25.2.1(e) of this appendix. 

(a) Service experience. The world fleet for 

the airplane-engine combination must 

accumulate a minimum of 250,000 enginehours. The FAA may reduce this number of 

hours if the applicant identifies 

compensating factors that are acceptable to 

the FAA. The compensating factors may 

include experience on another airplane, but 

experience on the candidate airplane must 

make up a significant portion of the total 

service experience. 

(b) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) rates. The 

demonstrated 12-month rolling average IFSD 

rate for the world fleet of the airplane-engine 

combination must be commensurate with the 

level of ETOPS approval being sought. 

(1) For type design approval up to and 

including 120 minutes: An IFSD rate of 0.05 

or less per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours, 

unless otherwise approved by the FAA. 

Unless the IFSD rate is 0.02 or less per 1,000 

world-fleet engine-hours, the applicant must 

provide a list of corrective actions in the 

CMP document specified in section K25.1.6 

of this appendix, that, when taken, would 

result in an IFSD rate of 0.02 or less per 1,000 

fleet engine-hours. 

(2) For type design approval up to and 

including 180 minutes: An IFSD rate of 0.02 

or less per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours, 

unless otherwise approved by the FAA. If the 

airplane-engine combination does not meet 

this rate by compliance with an existing 120- 

minute CMP document, then new or 

additional CMP requirements that the 

applicant has demonstrated would achieve 

this IFSD rate must be added to the CMP 

document. 

(3) For type design approval beyond 180 

minutes: An IFSD rate of 0.01 or less per 

1,000 fleet engine-hours unless otherwise 

approved by the FAA. If the airplane-engine 

combination does not meet this rate by 

compliance with an existing 120-minute or 

180-minute CMP document, then new or 

additional CMP requirements that the 

applicant has demonstrated would achieve 

this IFSD rate must be added to the CMP 

document. 

(c) Propulsion system assessment. (1) The 

applicant must conduct a propulsion system 

assessment based on the following data 

collected from the world-fleet of the airplaneengine combination: 

(i) A list of all IFSD’s, unplanned ground 

engine shutdowns, and occurrences (both 

ground and in-flight) when an engine was not 

shut down, but engine control or the desired 

thrust or power level was not achieved, 

including engine flameouts. Planned IFSD’s 

performed during flight training need not be 

included. For each item, the applicant must 

provide—

(A) Each airplane and engine make, model, 

and serial number; 

(B) Engine configuration, and major 

alteration history; 

(C) Engine position; 

(D) Circumstances leading up to the engine 

shutdown or occurrence; 

(E) Phase of flight or ground operation; 

(F) Weather and other environmental 

conditions; and 

(G) Cause of engine shutdown or 

occurrence. 

(ii) A history of unscheduled engine 

removal rates since introduction into service 

(using 6- and 12-month rolling averages), 

with a summary of the major causes for the 

removals. 

(iii) A list of all propulsion system events 

(whether or not caused by maintenance or 

flightcrew error), including dispatch delays, 

cancellations, aborted takeoffs, turnbacks, 

diversions, and flights that continue to 

destination after the event. 

(iv) The total number of engine hours and 

cycles, the number of hours for the engine 

with the highest number of hours, the 

number of cycles for the engine with the 

highest number of cycles, and the 

distribution of hours and cycles. 

(v) The mean time between failures 

(MTBF) of propulsion system components 

that affect reliability. 

(vi) A history of the IFSD rates since 

introduction into service using a 12-month 

rolling average. 

(2) The cause or potential cause of each 

item listed in K25.2.1(c)(1)(i) must have a 

corrective action or actions that are shown to 

be effective in preventing future occurrences. 

Each corrective action must be identified in 

the CMP document specified in section 

K25.1.6. A corrective action is not required: 

(i) For an item where the manufacturer is 

unable to determine a cause or potential 

cause. 

(ii) For an event where it is technically 

unfeasible to develop a corrective action. 

(iii) If the world-fleet IFSD rate—

(A) Is at or below 0.02 per 1,000 world-fleet 

engine-hours for approval up to and 

including 180-minute ETOPS; or 

(B) Is at or below 0.01 per 1,000 world-fleet 

engine-hours for approval greater than 180- 

minute ETOPS. 

(d) Airplane systems assessment. The 

applicant must conduct an airplane systems 

assessment. The applicant must show that 

the airplane systems comply with 

§ 25.1309(b) using available in-service 

reliability data for ETOPS significant systems 

on the candidate airplane-engine 

combination. Each cause or potential cause of 

a relevant design, manufacturing, 

operational, and maintenance problem 

occurring in service must have a corrective 

action or actions that are shown to be 

effective in preventing future occurrences. 

Each corrective action must be identified in 

the CMP document specified in section 

K25.1.6 of this appendix. A corrective action 

is not required if the problem would not 

significantly impact the safety or reliability of 

the airplane system involved. A relevant 

problem is a problem with an ETOPS group 

1 significant system that has or could result 

in, an IFSD or diversion. The applicant must 

include in this assessment relevant problems 

with similar or identical equipment installed 

on other types of airplanes to the extent such 

information is reasonably available. 

(e) Airplane flight test. The applicant must 

conduct a flight test to validate the 

flightcrew’s ability to safely conduct an 

ETOPS diversion with an inoperative engine 

and worst-case ETOPS Significant System 

failures and malfunctions that could occur in 

service. The flight test must validate the 

airplane’s flying qualities and performance 

with the demonstrated failures and 

malfunctions. 

K25.2.2 Early ETOPS method. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval using the Early ETOPS method 

must comply with the following 

requirements: 

(a) Assessment of relevant experience with 

airplanes previously certificated under part 

25. The applicant must identify specific 

corrective actions taken on the candidate 

airplane to prevent relevant design, 

manufacturing, operational, and maintenance 

problems experienced on airplanes 

previously certificated under part 25 

manufactured by the applicant. Specific 

corrective actions are not required if the 

nature of a problem is such that the problem 

would not significantly impact the safety or 

reliability of the airplane system involved. A 

relevant problem is a problem with an 

ETOPS group 1 significant system that has or 

could result in an IFSD or diversion. The 

applicant must include in this assessment 

relevant problems of supplier-provided 

ETOPS group 1 significant systems and 

similar or identical equipment used on 

airplanes built by other manufacturers to the 

extent such information is reasonably 

available. 

(b) Propulsion system design. (1) The 

engine used in the applicant’s airplane 

design must be approved as eligible for Early 

ETOPS in accordance with § 33.201 of this 

chapter. 

(2) The applicant must design the 

propulsion system to preclude failures or 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1875 

malfunctions that could result in an IFSD. 

The applicant must show compliance with 

this requirement by analysis, test, in-service 

experience on other airplanes, or other means 

acceptable to the FAA. If analysis is used, the 

applicant must show that the propulsion 

system design will minimize failures and 

malfunctions with the objective of achieving 

the following IFSD rates: 

(i) An IFSD rate of 0.02 or less per 1,000 

world-fleet engine-hours for type design 

approval up to and including 180 minutes. 

(ii) An IFSD rate of 0.01 or less per 1,000 

world-fleet engine-hours for type design 

approval beyond 180 minutes. 

(c) Maintenance and operational 

procedures. The applicant must validate all 

maintenance and operational procedures for 

ETOPS significant systems. The applicant 

must identify, track, and resolve any 

problems found during the validation in 

accordance with the problem tracking and 

resolution system specified in section 

K25.2.2(h) of this appendix. 

(d) Propulsion system validation test. (1) 

The installed engine configuration for which 

approval is being sought must comply with 

§ 33.201(c) of this chapter. The test engine 

must be configured with a complete airplane 

nacelle package, including engine-mounted 

equipment, except for any configuration 

differences necessary to accommodate test 

stand interfaces with the engine nacelle 

package. At the conclusion of the test, the 

propulsion system must be—

(i) Visually inspected according to the 

applicant’s on-wing inspection 

recommendations and limits; and 

(ii) Completely disassembled and the 

propulsion system hardware inspected to 

determine whether it meets the service limits 

specified in the Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness submitted in compliance with 

§ 25.1529. 

(2) The applicant must identify, track, and 

resolve each cause or potential cause of IFSD, 

loss of thrust control, or other power loss 

encountered during this inspection in 

accordance with the problem tracking and 

resolution system specified in section 

K25.2.2 (h) of this appendix. 

(e) New technology testing. Technology 

new to the applicant, including substantially 

new manufacturing techniques, must be 

tested to substantiate its suitability for the 

airplane design. 

(f) APU validation test. If an APU is needed 

to comply with this appendix, one APU of 

the type to be certified with the airplane 

must be tested for 3,000 equivalent airplane 

operational cycles. Following completion of 

the test, the APU must be disassembled and 

inspected. The applicant must identify, track, 

and resolve each cause or potential cause of 

an inability to start or operate the APU in 

flight as intended in accordance with the 

problem tracking and resolution system 

specified in section K25.2.2(h) of this 

appendix. 

(g) Airplane demonstration. For each 

airplane-engine combination to be approved 

for ETOPS, the applicant must flight test at 

least one airplane to demonstrate that the 

airplane, and its components and equipment 

are capable of functioning properly during 

ETOPS flights and diversions of the longest 

duration for which the applicant seeks 

approval. This flight testing may be 

performed in conjunction with, but may not 

substitute for the flight testing required by 

§ 21.35(b)(2) of this chapter. 

(1) The airplane demonstration flight test 

program must include: 

(i) Flights simulating actual ETOPS, 

including flight at normal cruise altitude, 

step climbs, and, if applicable, APU 

operation. 

(ii) Maximum duration flights with 

maximum duration diversions. 

(iii) Maximum duration engine-inoperative 

diversions distributed among the engines 

installed on the airplanes used for the 

airplane demonstration flight test program. 

At least two one-engine-inoperative 

diversions must be conducted at maximum 

continuous thrust or power using the same 

engine. 

(iv) Flights under non-normal conditions to 

demonstrate the flightcrew’s ability to safely 

conduct an ETOPS diversion with worst-case 

ETOPS significant system failures or 

malfunctions that could occur in service. 

(v) Diversions to airports that represent 

airports of the types used for ETOPS 

diversions. 

(vi) Repeated exposure to humid and 

inclement weather on the ground followed by 

a long-duration flight at normal cruise 

altitude. 

(2) The airplane demonstration flight test 

program must validate the adequacy of the 

airplane’s flying qualities and performance, 

and the flightcrew’s ability to safely conduct 

an ETOPS diversion under the conditions 

specified in section K25.2.2(g)(1) of this 

appendix. 

(3) During the airplane demonstration 

flight test program, each test airplane must be 

operated and maintained using the 

applicant’s recommended operating and 

maintenance procedures. 

(4) At the completion of the airplane 

demonstration flight test program, each 

ETOPS significant system must undergo an 

on-wing inspection or test in accordance 

with the tasks defined in the proposed 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to 

establish its condition for continued safe 

operation. Each engine must also undergo a 

gas path inspection. These inspections must 

be conducted in a manner to identify 

abnormal conditions that could result in an 

IFSD or diversion. The applicant must 

identify, track and resolve any abnormal 

conditions in accordance with the problem 

tracking and resolution system specified in 

section K25.2.2(h) of this appendix. 

(h) Problem tracking and resolution 

system. (1) The applicant must establish and 

maintain a problem tracking and resolution 

system. The system must: 

(i) Contain a process for prompt reporting 

to the responsible FAA aircraft certification 

office of each occurrence reportable under 

§ 21.4(a)(6) encountered during the phases of 

airplane and engine development used to 

assess Early ETOPS eligibility. 

(ii) Contain a process for notifying the 

responsible FAA aircraft certification office 

of each proposed corrective action that the 

applicant determines necessary for each 

problem identified from the occurrences 

reported under section K25.2.2. (h)(1)(i) of 

this appendix. The timing of the notification 

must permit appropriate FAA review before 

taking the proposed corrective action. 

(2) If the applicant is seeking ETOPS type 

design approval of a change to an airplaneengine combination previously approved for 

ETOPS, the problem tracking and resolution 

system need only address those problems 

specified in the following table, provided the 

applicant obtains prior authorization from 

the FAA: 

If the change does not require a new airplane type certificiate and . . . Then the Problem Tracking and Resolution System must address . . . 

(i) Requires a new engine type certificate ............................................... All problems applicable to the new engine installation, and for the remainder of the airplane, problems in changed systems only. 

(ii) Does not require a new engine type certificate .................................. Problems in changed systems only. 

(i) Acceptance criteria. The type and 

frequency of failures and malfunctions on 

ETOPS significant systems that occur during 

the airplane flight test program and the 

airplane demonstration flight test program 

specified in section K25.2.2(g) of this 

appendix must be consistent with the type 

and frequency of failures and malfunctions 

that would be expected to occur on currently 

certificated airplanes approved for ETOPS. 

K25.2.3. Combined service experience and 

Early ETOPS method. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval using the combined service 

experience and Early ETOPS method must 

comply with the following requirements. 

(a) A service experience requirement of not 

less than 15,000 engine-hours for the world 

fleet of the candidate airplane-engine 

combination. 

(b) The Early ETOPS requirements of 

K25.2.2, except for the airplane 

demonstration specified in section K25.2.2(g) 

of this appendix; and 

(c) The flight test requirement of section 

K25.2.1(e) of this appendix. 

K25.3. Airplanes with more than two 

engines. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval of an airplane with more than two 

engines must use one of the methods 

described in section K25.3.1, K25.3.2, or 

K25.3.3 of this appendix. 

K25.3.1 Service experience method. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval using the service experience 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1876 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

method must comply with section K25.3.1(a) 

of this appendix before conducting the 

airplane systems assessment specified in 

K25.3.1(b), and the flight test specified in 

section K25.3.1(c) of this appendix. 

(a) Service experience. The world fleet for 

the airplane-engine combination must 

accumulate a minimum of 250,000 enginehours. The FAA may reduce this number of 

hours if the applicant identifies 

compensating factors that are acceptable to 

the FAA. The compensating factors may 

include experience on another airplane, but 

experience on the candidate airplane must 

make up a significant portion of the total 

required service experience. 

(b) Airplane systems assessment. The 

applicant must conduct an airplane systems 

assessment. The applicant must show that 

the airplane systems comply with the 

§ 25.1309(b) using available in-service 

reliability data for ETOPS significant systems 

on the candidate airplane-engine 

combination. Each cause or potential cause of 

a relevant design, manufacturing, operational 

or maintenance problem occurring in service 

must have a corrective action or actions that 

are shown to be effective in preventing future 

occurrences. Each corrective action must be 

identified in the CMP document specified in 

section K25.1.6 of this appendix. A corrective 

action is not required if the problem would 

not significantly impact the safety or 

reliability of the airplane system involved. A 

relevant problem is a problem with an 

ETOPS group 1 significant system that has or 

could result in an IFSD or diversion. The 

applicant must include in this assessment 

relevant problems with similar or identical 

equipment installed on other types of 

airplanes to the extent such information is 

reasonably available. 

(c) Airplane flight test. The applicant must 

conduct a flight test to validate the 

flightcrew’s ability to safely conduct an 

ETOPS diversion with an inoperative engine 

and worst-case ETOPS significant system 

failures and malfunctions that could occur in 

service. The flight test must validate the 

airplane’s flying qualities and performance 

with the demonstrated failures and 

malfunctions. 

K25.3.2 Early ETOPS method. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval using the Early ETOPS method 

must comply with the following 

requirements: 

(a) Maintenance and operational 

procedures. The applicant must validate all 

maintenance and operational procedures for 

ETOPS significant systems. The applicant 

must identify, track and resolve any 

problems found during the validation in 

accordance with the problem tracking and 

resolution system specified in section 

K25.3.2(e) of this appendix. 

(b) New technology testing. Technology 

new to the applicant, including substantially 

new manufacturing techniques, must be 

tested to substantiate its suitability for the 

airplane design. 

(c) APU validation test. If an APU is 

needed to comply with this appendix, one 

APU of the type to be certified with the 

airplane must be tested for 3,000 equivalent 

airplane operational cycles. Following 

completion of the test, the APU must be 

disassembled and inspected. The applicant 

must identify, track, and resolve each cause 

or potential cause of an inability to start or 

operate the APU in flight as intended in 

accordance with the problem tracking and 

resolution system specified in section 

K25.3.2(e) of this appendix. 

(d) Airplane demonstration. For each 

airplane-engine combination to be approved 

for ETOPS, the applicant must flight test at 

least one airplane to demonstrate that the 

airplane, and its components and equipment 

are capable of functioning properly during 

ETOPS flights and diversions of the longest 

duration for which the applicant seeks 

approval. This flight testing may be 

performed in conjunction with, but may not 

substitute for the flight testing required by 

§ 21.35(b)(2). 

(1) The airplane demonstration flight test 

program must include: 

(i) Flights simulating actual ETOPS 

including flight at normal cruise altitude, 

step climbs, and, if applicable, APU 

operation. 

(ii) Maximum duration flights with 

maximum duration diversions. 

(iii) Maximum duration engine-inoperative 

diversions distributed among the engines 

installed on the airplanes used for the 

airplane demonstration flight test program. 

At least two one engine-inoperative 

diversions must be conducted at maximum 

continuous thrust or power using the same 

engine. 

(iv) Flights under non-normal conditions to 

validate the flightcrew’s ability to safely 

conduct an ETOPS diversion with worst-case 

ETOPS significant system failures or 

malfunctions that could occur in service. 

(v) Diversions to airports that represent 

airports of the types used for ETOPS 

diversions. 

(vi) Repeated exposure to humid and 

inclement weather on the ground followed by 

a long duration flight at normal cruise 

altitude. 

(2) The airplane demonstration flight test 

program must validate the adequacy of the 

airplane’s flying qualities and performance, 

and the flightcrew’s ability to safely conduct 

an ETOPS diversion under the conditions 

specified in section K25.3.2(d)(1) of this 

appendix. 

(3) During the airplane demonstration 

flight test program, each test airplane must be 

operated and maintained using the 

applicant’s recommended operating and 

maintenance procedures. 

(4) At the completion of the airplane 

demonstration, each ETOPS significant 

system must undergo an on-wing inspection 

or test in accordance with the tasks defined 

in the proposed Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to establish its condition for 

continued safe operation. Each engine must 

also undergo a gas path inspection. These 

inspections must be conducted in a manner 

to identify abnormal conditions that could 

result in an IFSD or diversion. The applicant 

must identify, track and resolve any 

abnormal conditions in accordance with the 

problem tracking and resolution system 

specified in section K25.3.2(e) of this 

appendix. 

(e) Problem tracking and resolution system. 

(1) The applicant must establish and 

maintain a problem tracking and resolution 

system. The system must: 

(i) Contain a process for prompt reporting 

to the responsible FAA aircraft certification 

office of each occurrence reportable under 

§ 21.4(a)(6) encountered during the phases of 

airplane and engine development used to 

assess Early ETOPS eligibility. 

(ii) Contain a process for notifying the 

responsible FAA aircraft certification office 

of each proposed corrective action that the 

applicant determines necessary for each 

problem identified from the occurrences 

reported under section K25.3.2(h)(1)(i) of this 

appendix. The timing of the notification must 

permit appropriate FAA review before taking 

the proposed corrective action. 

(2) If the applicant is seeking ETOPS type 

design approval of a change to an airplaneengine combination previously approved for 

ETOPS, the problem tracking and resolution 

system need only address those problems 

specified in the following table, provided the 

applicant obtains prior authorization from 

the FAA: 

If the change does not require a new airplane type certificate and . . . Then the Problem Tracking and Resolution System must address . . . 

(i) Requires a new engine type certificate ............................................... All problems applicable to the new engine installation, and for the remainder of the airplane, problems in changed systems only. 

(ii) Does not require a new engine type certificate .................................. Problems in changed systems only. 

(f) Acceptance criteria. The type and 

frequency of failures and malfunctions on 

ETOPS significant systems that occur during 

the airplane flight test program and the 

airplane demonstration flight test program 

specified in section K25.3.2(d) of this 

appendix must be consistent with the type 

and frequency of failures and malfunctions 

that would be expected to occur on currently 

certificated airplanes approved for ETOPS. 

K25.3.3 Combined service experience and 

Early ETOPS method. 

An applicant for ETOPS type design 

approval using the Early ETOPS method 

must comply with the following 

requirements: 

(a) A service experience requirement of 

less than 15,000 engine-hours for the world 

fleet of the candidate airplane-engine 

combination; 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1877 

(b) The Early ETOPS requirements of 

section K25.3.2 of this appendix, except for 

the airplane demonstration specified in 

section K25.3.2(d) of this appendix; and 

(c) The flight test requirement of section 

K25.3.1(c) of this appendix. 

PART 33—AIRWORTHINESS 

STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES 

■ 10. The authority citation for part 33 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–

44702, 44704. 

■ 11. Amend § 33.71 by revising 

paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 33.71 Lubrication system. 

* * * * * 

(c) * * * 

(4) Each oil tank cap must provide an 

oil-tight seal. For an applicant seeking 

eligibility for an engine to be installed 

on an airplane approved for ETOPS, the 

oil tank must be designed to prevent a 

hazardous loss of oil due to an 

incorrectly installed oil tank cap. 

* * * * * 

■ 12. Revise § 33.90 to read as follows: 

§ 33.90 Initial maintenance inspection test. 

Each applicant, except an applicant 

for an engine being type certificated 

through amendment of an existing type 

certificate or through supplemental type 

certification procedures, must complete 

one of the following tests on an engine 

that substantially conforms to the type 

design to establish when the initial 

maintenance inspection is required: 

(a) An approved engine test that 

simulates the conditions in which the 

engine is expected to operate in service, 

including typical start-stop cycles. 

(b) An approved engine test 

conducted in accordance with § 33.201 

(c) through (f). 

■ 13. Add subpart G to read as follows: 

Subpart G—Special Requirements: 

Turbine Aircraft Engines 

§ 33.201 Design and test requirements for 

Early ETOPS eligibility. 

An applicant seeking type design 

approval for an engine to be installed on 

a two-engine airplane approved for 

ETOPS without the service experience 

specified in part 25, Appendix K, 

K25.2.1 of this chapter, must comply 

with the following: 

(a) The engine must be designed using 

a design quality process acceptable to 

the FAA, that ensures the design 

features of the engine minimize the 

occurrence of failures, malfunctions, 

defects, and maintenance errors that 

could result in an IFSD, loss of thrust 

control, or other power loss. 

(b) The design features of the engine 

must address problems shown to result 

in an IFSD, loss of thrust control, or 

other power loss in the applicant’s other 

relevant type designs approved within 

the past 10 years, to the extent that 

adequate service data is available within 

that 10-year period. An applicant 

without adequate service data must 

show experience with and knowledge of 

problem mitigating design practices 

equivalent to that gained from actual 

service experience in a manner 

acceptable to the FAA. 

(c) Except as specified in paragraph (f) 

of this section, the applicant must 

conduct a simulated ETOPS mission 

cyclic endurance test in accordance 

with an approved test plan on an engine 

that substantially conforms to the type 

design. The test must: 

(1) Include a minimum of 3,000 

representative service start-stop mission 

cycles and three simulated diversion 

cycles at maximum continuous thrust or 

power for the maximum diversion time 

for which ETOPS eligibility is sought. 

Each start-stop mission cycle must 

include the use of take-off, climb, 

cruise, descent, approach, and landing 

thrust or power and the use of thrust 

reverse (if applicable). The diversions 

must be evenly distributed over the 

duration of the test. The last diversion 

must be conducted within 100 cycles of 

the completion of the test. 

(2) Be performed with the high speed 

and low speed main engine rotors 

independently unbalanced to obtain a 

minimum of 90 percent of the 

recommended field service maintenance 

vibration levels. For engines with three 

main engine rotors, the intermediate 

speed rotor must be independently 

unbalanced to obtain a minimum of 90 

percent of the recommended production 

acceptance vibration level. The required 

peak vibration levels must be verified 

during a slow acceleration and 

deceleration run of the test engine 

covering the main engine rotor 

operating speed ranges. 

(3) Include a minimum of three 

million vibration cycles for each 60 rpm 

incremental step of the typical highspeed rotor start-stop mission cycle. The 

test may be conducted using any rotor 

speed step increment from 60 to 200 

rpm provided the test encompasses the 

typical service start-stop cycle speed 

range. For incremental steps greater 

than 60 rpm, the minimum number of 

vibration cycles must be linearly 

increased up to ten million cycles for a 

200 rpm incremental step. 

(4) Include a minimum of 300,000 

vibration cycles for each 60 rpm 

incremental step of the high-speed rotor 

approved operational speed range 

between minimum flight idle and cruise 

power not covered by paragraph (c)(3) of 

this section. The test may be conducted 

using any rotor speed step increment 

from 60 to 200 rpm provided the test 

encompasses the applicable speed 

range. For incremental steps greater 

than 60 rpm the minimum number of 

vibration cycles must be linearly 

increased up to 1 million for a 200 rpm 

incremental step. 

(5) Include vibration surveys at 

periodic intervals throughout the test. 

The equivalent value of the peak 

vibration level observed during the 

surveys must meet the minimum 

vibration requirement of § 33.201(c)(2). 

(d) Prior to the test required by 

paragraph (c) of this section, the engine 

must be subjected to a calibration test to 

document power and thrust 

characteristics. 

(e) At the conclusion of the testing 

required by paragraph (c) of this section, 

the engine must: 

(1) Be subjected to a calibration test at 

sea-level conditions. Any change in 

power or thrust characteristics must be 

within approved limits. 

(2) Be visually inspected in 

accordance with the on-wing inspection 

recommendations and limits contained 

in the Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness submitted in compliance 

with § 33.4. 

(3) Be completely disassembled and 

inspected—

(i) In accordance with the applicable 

inspection recommendations and limits 

contained in the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness submitted in 

compliance with § 33.4; 

(ii) With consideration of the causes 

of IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other 

power loss identified by paragraph (b) of 

this section; and 

(iii) In a manner to identify wear or 

distress conditions that could result in 

an IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other 

power loss not specifically identified by 

paragraph (b) of this section or 

addressed within the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness. 

(4) Not show wear or distress to the 

extent that could result in an IFSD, loss 

of thrust control, or other power loss 

within a period of operation before the 

component, assembly, or system would 

likely have been inspected or 

functionally tested for integrity while in 

service. Such wear or distress must have 

corrective action implemented through 

a design change, a change to 

maintenance instructions, or operational 

procedures before ETOPS eligibility is 

granted. The type and frequency of wear 

and distress that occurs during the 

engine test must be consistent with the 

type and frequency of wear and distress 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1878 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

that would be expected to occur on 

ETOPS eligible engines. 

(f) An alternative mission cycle 

endurance test that provides an 

equivalent demonstration of the 

unbalance and vibration specified in 

paragraph (c) of this section may be 

used when approved by the FAA. 

(g) For an applicant using the 

simulated ETOPS mission cyclic 

endurance test to comply with § 33.90, 

the test may be interrupted so that the 

engine may be inspected by an on-wing 

or other method, using criteria 

acceptable to the FAA, after completion 

of the test cycles required to comply 

with § 33.90(a). Following the 

inspection, the ETOPS test must be 

resumed to complete the requirements 

of this section. 

■ 14. Add paragraph A33.3(c) to 

Appendix A to read as follows: 

Appendix A to Part 33—Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness 

* * * * * 

A33.3 Content 

* * * * * 

(c) ETOPS Requirements. For an applicant 

seeking eligibility for an engine to be 

installed on an airplane approved for ETOPS, 

the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 

must include procedures for engine 

condition monitoring. The engine condition 

monitoring procedures must be able to 

determine prior to flight, whether an engine 

is capable of providing, within approved 

engine operating limits, maximum 

continuous power or thrust, bleed air, and 

power extraction required for a relevant 

engine inoperative diversion. For an engine 

to be installed on a two-engine airplane 

approved for ETOPS, the engine condition 

monitoring procedures must be validated 

before ETOPS eligibility is granted. 

* * * * * 

PART 121—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, 

AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS 

■ 15. The authority citation for part 121 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 

41706, 44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–

44711, 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901, 

44903–44904, 44912, 45101–45105, 46105, 

46301. 

■ 16. Add § 121.7 to read as follows: 

§ 121.7 Definitions. 

The following definitions apply to 

those sections of part 121 that apply to 

ETOPS: 

Adequate Airport means an airport 

that an airplane operator may list with 

approval from the FAA because that 

airport meets the landing limitations of 

§ 121.197 and is either—

(1) An airport that meets the 

requirements of part 139, subpart D of 

this chapter, excluding those that apply 

to aircraft rescue and firefighting 

service, or 

(2) A military airport that is active 

and operational. 

ETOPS Alternate Airport means an 

adequate airport listed in the certificate 

holder’s operations specifications that is 

designated in a dispatch or flight release 

for use in the event of a diversion 

during ETOPS. This definition applies 

to flight planning and does not in any 

way limit the authority of the pilot-incommand during flight. 

ETOPS Area of Operation means one 

of the following areas: 

(1) For turbine-engine-powered 

airplanes with two engines, an area 

beyond 60 minutes from an adequate 

airport, computed using a one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air. 

(2) For turbine-engine-powered 

passenger-carrying airplanes with more 

than two engines, an area beyond 180 

minutes from an adequate airport, 

computed using a one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air. 

ETOPS Entry Point means the first 

point on the route of an ETOPS flight, 

determined using a one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air, that is—

(1) More than 60 minutes from an 

adequate airport for airplanes with two 

engines; 

(2) More than 180 minutes from an 

adequate airport for passenger-carrying 

airplanes with more than two engines. 

ETOPS Qualified Person means a 

person, performing maintenance for the 

certificate holder, who has satisfactorily 

completed the certificate holder’s 

ETOPS training program. 

Maximum Diversion Time means, for 

the purposes of ETOPS route planning, 

the longest diversion time authorized 

for a flight under the operator’s ETOPS 

authority. It is calculated under 

standard conditions in still air at a oneengine-inoperative cruise speed. 

North Pacific Area of Operation 

means Pacific Ocean areas north of 40° 

N latitudes including NOPAC ATS 

routes, and published PACOTS tracks 

between Japan and North America. 

North Polar Area means the entire 

area north of 78° N latitude. 

One-engine-inoperative-Cruise Speed 

means a speed within the certified 

operating limits of the airplane that is 

specified by the certificate holder and 

approved by the FAA for —

(1) Calculating required fuel reserves 

needed to account for an inoperative 

engine; or 

(2) Determining whether an ETOPS 

alternate is within the maximum 

diversion time authorized for an ETOPS 

flight. 

South Polar Area means the entire 

area South of 60° S latitude. 

■ 17. Amend § 121.97 by revising 

paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to read as follows: 

§ 121. 97 Airports: Required data. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) * * * 

(ii) Public protection. After February 

15, 2008, for ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes or operations in the North Polar 

area and South Polar area, this includes 

facilities at each airport or in the 

immediate area sufficient to protect the 

passengers from the elements and to see 

to their welfare. 

* * * * * 

■ 18. Amend § 121.99 by revising the 

section heading and adding paragraphs 

(c), (d) and (e) to read as follows: 

§ 121.99 Communications facilities—

domestic and flag operations. 

* * * * * 

(c) Each certificate holder conducting 

flag operations must provide voice 

communications for ETOPS where voice 

communication facilities are available. 

In determining whether facilities are 

available, the certificate holder must 

consider potential routes and altitudes 

needed for diversion to ETOPS 

Alternate Airports. Where facilities are 

not available or are of such poor quality 

that voice communication is not 

possible, another communication 

system must be substituted. 

(d) Except as provided in paragraph 

(e) of this section, after February 15, 

2008 for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, 

each certificate holder conducting flag 

operations must have a second 

communication system in addition to 

that required by paragraph (c) of this 

section. That system must be able to 

provide immediate satellite-based voice 

communications of landline-telephone 

fidelity. The system must be able to 

communicate between the flight crew 

and air traffic services, and the flight 

crew and the certificate holder. In 

determining whether such 

communications are available, the 

certificate holder must consider 

potential routes and altitudes needed for 

diversion to ETOPS Alternate Airports. 

Where immediate, satellite-based voice 

communications are not available, or are 

of such poor quality that voice 

communication is not possible, another 

communication system must be 

substituted. 

(e) Operators of two-engine turbinepowered airplanes with 207 minute 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1879 

ETOPS approval in the North Pacific 

Area of Operation must comply with the 

requirements of paragraph (d) of this 

section as of February 15, 2007. 

■ 19. Add § 121.106 to read as follows: 

§ 121.106 ETOPS Alternate Airport: 

Rescue and fire fighting service. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(b) of this section, the following rescue 

and fire fighting service (RFFS) must be 

available at each airport listed as an 

ETOPS Alternate Airport in a dispatch 

or flight release. 

(1) For ETOPS up to 180 minutes, 

each designated ETOPS Alternate 

Airport must have RFFS equivalent to 

that specified by ICAO as Category 4, or 

higher. 

(2) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, 

each designated ETOPS Alternate 

Airport must have RFFS equivalent to 

that specified by ICAO Category 4, or 

higher. In addition, the aircraft must 

remain within the ETOPS authorized 

diversion time from an Adequate 

Airport that has RFFS equivalent to that 

specified by ICAO Category 7, or higher. 

(b) If the equipment and personnel 

required in paragraph (a) of this section 

are not immediately available at an 

airport, the certificate holder may still 

list the airport on the dispatch or flight 

release if the airport’s RFFS can be 

augmented to meet paragraph (a) of this 

section from local fire fighting assets. A 

30-minute response time for 

augmentation is adequate if the local 

assets can be notified while the 

diverting airplane is en route. The 

augmenting equipment and personnel 

must be available on arrival of the 

diverting airplane and must remain as 

long as the diverting airplane needs 

RFFS. 

■ 20. Add § 121.122 to read as follows: 

§ 121.122 Communications facilities—

supplemental operations. 

(a) Each certificate holder conducting 

supplemental operations other than allcargo operations in an airplane with 

more than two engines must show that 

a two-way radio communication system 

or other means of communication 

approved by the FAA is available. It 

must ensure reliable and rapid 

communications under normal 

operating conditions over the entire 

route (either direct or via approved 

point-to-point circuits) between each 

airplane and the certificate holder, and 

between each airplane and the 

appropriate air traffic services, except as 

specified in § 121.351(c). 

(b) Except as provided in paragraph 

(d) of this section, each certificate 

holder conducting supplemental 

operations other than all-cargo 

operations in an airplane with more 

than two engines must provide voice 

communications for ETOPS where voice 

communication facilities are available. 

In determining whether facilities are 

available, the certificate holder must 

consider potential routes and altitudes 

needed for diversion to ETOPS 

Alternate Airports. Where facilities are 

not available or are of such poor quality 

that voice communication is not 

possible, another communication 

system must be substituted. 

(c) Except as provided in paragraph 

(d) of this section, for ETOPS beyond 

180 minutes each certificate holder 

conducting supplemental operations 

other than all-cargo operations in an 

airplane with more than two engines 

must have a second communication 

system in addition to that required by 

paragraph (b) of this section. That 

system must be able to provide 

immediate satellite-based voice 

communications of landline telephonefidelity. The system must provide 

communication capabilities between the 

flight crew and air traffic services and 

the flight crew and the certificate 

holder. In determining whether such 

communications are available, the 

certificate holder must consider 

potential routes and altitudes needed for 

diversion to ETOPS Alternate Airports. 

Where immediate, satellite-based voice 

communications are not available, or are 

of such poor quality that voice 

communication is not possible, another 

communication system must be 

substituted. 

(d) Operators of turbine engine 

powered airplanes do not need to meet 

the requirements of paragraphs (b) and 

(c) of this section until February 15, 

2008. 

■ 21. Amend § 121.135 by—

■ a. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(23) 

and (b)(24) as paragraphs (b)(25) and 

(b)(26); 

■ b. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(10) 

through (b)(22) as paragraphs (b)(11) 

through (b)(23); and 

■ c. Adding paragraphs (b)(10) and 

(b)(24) to read as follows: 

§ 121.135 Contents. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(10) For ETOPS, airplane performance 

data to support all phases of these 

operations. 

* * * * * 

(24) After February 15, 2008, for 

passenger flag operations and for those 

supplemental operations that are not allcargo operations outside the 48 

contiguous States and Alaska, 

(i) For ETOPS greater than 180 

minutes a specific passenger recovery 

plan for each ETOPS Alternate Airport 

used in those operations, and 

(ii) For operations in the North Polar 

Area and South Polar Area a specific 

passenger recovery plan for each 

diversion airport used in those 

operations. 

* * * * * 

■ 22. Amend § 121.161 by revising 

paragraph (a) and adding paragraph (d) 

to read as follows: 

§ 121.161 Airplane limitations: Type of 

route. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(e) of this section, unless approved by 

the Administrator in accordance with 

Appendix P of this part and authorized 

in the certificate holder’s operations 

specifications, no certificate holder may 

operate a turbine-engine-powered 

airplane over a route that contains a 

point—

(1) Farther than a flying time from an 

Adequate Airport (at a one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air) of 60 minutes for 

a two-engine airplane or 180 minutes for 

a passenger-carrying airplane with more 

than two engines; 

(2) Within the North Polar Area; or 

(3) Within the South Polar Area. 

* * * * * 

(d) Unless authorized by the 

Administrator based on the character of 

the terrain, the kind of operation, or the 

performance of the airplane to be used, 

no certificate holder may operate a 

reciprocating-engine-powered airplane 

over a route that contains a point farther 

than 60 minutes flying time (at a oneengine-inoperative cruise speed under 

standard conditions in still air) from an 

Adequate Airport. 

(e) Operators of turbine-engine 

powered airplanes with more than two 

engines do not need to meet the 

requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this 

section until February 15, 2008. 

■ 23. Add new § 121.162 to read as 

follows: 

§ 121.162 ETOPS Type Design Approval 

Basis. 

Except for a passenger-carrying 

airplane with more than two engines 

manufactured prior to February 17, 2015 

and except for a two-engine airplane 

that, when used in ETOPS, is only used 

for ETOPS of 75 minutes or less, no 

certificate holder may conduct ETOPS 

unless the airplane has been type design 

approved for ETOPS and each airplane 

used in ETOPS complies with its CMP 

document as follows: 

(a) For a two-engine airplane, that is 

of the same model airplane-engine 

combination that received FAA 

approval for ETOPS up to 180 minutes 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1880 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

prior to February 15, 2007, the CMP 

document for that model airplaneengine combination in effect on 

February 14, 2007. 

(b) For a two-engine airplane, that is 

not of the same model airplane-engine 

combination that received FAA 

approval for ETOPS up to 180 minutes 

before February 15, 2007, the CMP 

document for that new model airplaneengine combination issued in 

accordance with § 25.3(b)(1) of this 

chapter. 

(c) For a two-engine airplane 

approved for ETOPS beyond 180 

minutes, the CMP document for that 

model airplane-engine combination 

issued in accordance with § 25.3(b)(2) of 

this chapter. 

(d) For an airplane with more than 2 

engines manufactured on or after 

February 17, 2015, the CMP document 

for that model airplane-engine 

combination issued in accordance with 

§ 25.3(c) of this chapter. 

■ 24. Add § 121.374 to read as follows: 

§ 121.374 Continuous airworthiness 

maintenance program (CAMP) for twoengine ETOPS. 

In order to conduct an ETOPS flight 

using a two-engine airplane, each 

certificate holder must develop and 

comply with the ETOPS continuous 

airworthiness maintenance program, as 

authorized in the certificate holder’s 

operations specifications, for each 

airplane-engine combination used in 

ETOPS. The certificate holder must 

develop this ETOPS CAMP by 

supplementing the manufacturer’s 

maintenance program or the CAMP 

currently approved for the certificate 

holder. This ETOPS CAMP must 

include the following elements: 

(a) ETOPS maintenance document. 

The certificate holder must have an 

ETOPS maintenance document for use 

by each person involved in ETOPS. 

(1) The document must—

(i) List each ETOPS significant 

system, 

(ii) Refer to or include all of the 

ETOPS maintenance elements in this 

section, 

(iii) Refer to or include all supportive 

programs and procedures, 

(iv) Refer to or include all duties and 

responsibilities, and 

(v) Clearly state where referenced 

material is located in the certificate 

holder’s document system. 

(b) ETOPS pre-departure service 

check. Except as provided in Appendix 

P of this part, the certificate holder must 

develop a pre-departure check tailored 

to their specific operation. 

(1) The certificate holder must 

complete a pre-departure service check 

immediately before each ETOPS flight. 

(2) At a minimum, this check must—

(i) Verify the condition of all ETOPS 

Significant Systems; 

(ii) Verify the overall status of the 

airplane by reviewing applicable 

maintenance records; and 

(iii) Include an interior and exterior 

inspection to include a determination of 

engine and APU oil levels and 

consumption rates. 

(3) An appropriately certificated 

mechanic that is ETOPS Qualified must 

accomplish and certify by signature, 

ETOPS specific tasks. A certificated 

mechanic, with an airframe and 

powerplant rating, who is ETOPS 

Qualified must certify by signature, that 

the ETOPS pre-departure service check 

has been completed. 

(c) Limitations on dual maintenance. 

(1) Except as specified in paragraph 

(c)(2), the certificate holder may not 

perform scheduled or unscheduled 

maintenance during the same 

maintenance visit on more than one 

ETOPS Significant System listed in the 

ETOPS maintenance document, if the 

improper maintenance could result in 

the failure of an ETOPS Significant 

System. 

(2) In the event an unforeseen 

circumstance prevents the certificate 

holder from complying with paragraph 

(c)(1) of this section, the certificate 

holder may perform maintenance on 

more than one ETOPS Significant 

System provided: 

(i) The maintenance action on each 

ETOPS Significant System is performed 

by a different technician, or 

(ii) The maintenance action on each 

ETOPS Significant System is performed 

by the same technician under the direct 

supervision of a second qualified 

individual; and 

(iii) For either paragraph (c)(2)(i) or 

(ii) of this section, a qualified individual 

conducts a ground verification test and 

any in-flight verification test required 

under the program developed pursuant 

to paragraph (d) of this section. 

(d) Verification program. The 

certificate holder must develop and 

maintain a program for the resolution of 

discrepancies that will ensure the 

effectiveness of maintenance actions 

taken on ETOPS Significant Systems. 

The verification program must identify 

potential problems and verify 

satisfactory corrective action. The 

verification program must include 

ground verification and in-flight 

verification policy and procedures. The 

certificate holder must establish 

procedures to indicate clearly who is 

going to initiate the verification action 

and what action is necessary. The 

verification action may be performed on 

an ETOPS revenue flight provided the 

verification action is documented as 

satisfactorily completed upon reaching 

the ETOPS Entry Point. 

(e) Task identification. The certificate 

holder must identify all ETOPS-specific 

tasks. An appropriately certificated 

mechanic that is ETOPS Qualified must 

accomplish and certify by signature that 

the ETOPS-specific task has been 

completed. 

(f) Centralized maintenance control 

procedures. The certificate holder must 

develop and maintain procedures for 

centralized maintenance control for 

ETOPS. 

(g) Parts control program. The 

certificate holder must develop an 

ETOPS parts control program to ensure 

the proper identification of parts used to 

maintain the configuration of airplanes 

used in ETOPS. 

(h) Reliability program. The certificate 

holder must have an ETOPS reliability 

program. This program must be the 

certificate holder’s existing reliability 

program or its Continuing Analysis and 

Surveillance System (CASS) 

supplemented for ETOPS. This program 

must be event-oriented and include 

procedures to report the events listed 

below, as follows: 

(1) The certificate holder must report 

the following events within 72 hours of 

the occurrence to its certificate holding 

district office (CHDO): 

(i) IFSDs, except planned IFSDs 

performed for flight training. 

(ii) Diversions and turnbacks for 

failures, malfunctions, or defects 

associated with any airplane or engine 

system. 

(iii) Uncommanded power or thrust 

changes or surges. 

(iv) Inability to control the engine or 

obtain desired power or thrust. 

(v) Inadvertent fuel loss or 

unavailability, or uncorrectable fuel 

imbalance in flight. 

(vi) Failures, malfunctions or defects 

associated with ETOPS Significant 

Systems. 

(vii) Any event that would jeopardize 

the safe flight and landing of the 

airplane on an ETOPS flight. 

(2) The certificate holder must 

investigate the cause of each event listed 

in paragraph (h)(1) of this section and 

submit findings and a description of 

corrective action to its CHDO. The 

report must include the information 

specified in § 121.703(e). The corrective 

action must be acceptable to its CHDO. 

(i) Propulsion system monitoring. (1) 

If the IFSD rate (computed on a 12- 

month rolling average) for an engine 

installed as part of an airplane-engine 

combination exceeds the following 

values, the certificate holder must do a 

comprehensive review of its operations 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1881 

to identify any common cause effects 

and systemic errors. The IFSD rate must 

be computed using all engines of that 

type in the certificate holder’s entire 

fleet of airplanes approved for ETOPS. 

(i) A rate of 0.05 per 1,000 engine 

hours for ETOPS up to and including 

120 minutes. 

(ii) A rate of 0.03 per 1,000 engine 

hours for ETOPS beyond 120-minutes 

up to and including 207 minutes in the 

North Pacific Area of Operation and up 

to and including 180 minutes 

elsewhere. 

(iii) A rate of 0.02 per 1,000 engine 

hours for ETOPS beyond 207 minutes in 

the North Pacific Area of Operation and 

beyond 180 minutes elsewhere. 

(2) Within 30 days of exceeding the 

rates above, the certificate holder must 

submit a report of investigation and any 

necessary corrective action taken to its 

CHDO. 

(j) Engine condition monitoring. (1) 

The certificate holder must have an 

engine condition monitoring program to 

detect deterioration at an early stage and 

to allow for corrective action before safe 

operation is affected. 

(2) This program must describe the 

parameters to be monitored, the method 

of data collection, the method of 

analyzing data, and the process for 

taking corrective action. 

(3) The program must ensure that 

engine-limit margins are maintained so 

that a prolonged engine-inoperative 

diversion may be conducted at 

approved power levels and in all 

expected environmental conditions 

without exceeding approved engine 

limits. This includes approved limits for 

items such as rotor speeds and exhaust 

gas temperatures. 

(k) Oil-consumption monitoring. The 

certificate holder must have an engine 

oil consumption monitoring program to 

ensure that there is enough oil to 

complete each ETOPS flight. APU oil 

consumption must be included if an 

APU is required for ETOPS. The 

operator’s oil consumption limit may 

not exceed the manufacturer’s 

recommendation. Monitoring must be 

continuous and include oil added at 

each ETOPS departure point. The 

program must compare the amount of 

oil added at each ETOPS departure 

point with the running average 

consumption to identify sudden 

increases. 

(l) APU in-flight start program. If the 

airplane type certificate requires an 

APU but does not require the APU to 

run during the ETOPS portion of the 

flight, the certificate holder must 

develop and maintain a program 

acceptable to the FAA for cold soak inflight start-and-run reliability. 

(m) Maintenance training. For each 

airplane-engine combination, the 

certificate holder must develop a 

maintenance training program that 

provides training adequate to support 

ETOPS. It must include ETOPS specific 

training for all persons involved in 

ETOPS maintenance that focuses on the 

special nature of ETOPS. This training 

must be in addition to the operator’s 

maintenance training program used to 

qualify individuals to perform work on 

specific airplanes and engines. 

(n) Configuration, maintenance, and 

procedures (CMP) document. If an 

airplane-engine combination has a CMP 

document, the certificate holder must 

use a system that ensures compliance 

with the applicable FAA-approved 

document. 

(o) Procedural changes. Each 

substantial change to the maintenance 

or training procedures that were used to 

qualify the certificate holder for ETOPS, 

must be submitted to the CHDO for 

review. The certificate holder cannot 

implement a change until its CHDO 

notifies the certificate holder that the 

review is complete. 

■ 25. Amend § 121.415 by adding 

paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 121.415 Crewmember and dispatcher 

training requirements. 

(a) * * * 

(4) After February 15, 2008, training 

for crewmembers and dispatchers in 

their roles and responsibilities in the 

certificate holder’s passenger recovery 

plan, if applicable. 

* * * * * 

■ 26. Amend § 121.565 by revising 

paragraphs (a), (b) introductory text, 

(b)(2) and (c) to read as follows: 

§ 121.565 Engine inoperative: Landing; 

reporting. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(b) of this section, whenever an airplane 

engine fails or whenever an engine is 

shutdown to prevent possible damage, 

the pilot in command must land the 

airplane at the nearest suitable airport, 

in point of time, at which a safe landing 

can be made. 

(b) If not more than one engine of an 

airplane that has three or more engines 

fails or is shut down to prevent possible 

damage, the pilot-in-command may 

proceed to an airport that the pilot 

selects if, after considering the 

following, the pilot makes a reasonable 

decision that proceeding to that airport 

is as safe as landing at the nearest 

suitable airport: 

* * * * * 

(2) The altitude, weight, and useable 

fuel at the time that the engine is 

shutdown. 

* * * * * 

(c) The pilot-in-command must report 

each engine shutdown in flight to the 

appropriate ground radio station as soon 

as practicable and must keep that 

station fully informed of the progress of 

the flight. 

* * * * * 

■ 27. Add § 121.624 to read as follows: 

§ 121.624 ETOPS Alternate Airports. 

(a) No person may dispatch or release 

an airplane for an ETOPS flight unless 

enough ETOPS Alternate Airports are 

listed in the dispatch or flight release 

such that the airplane remains within 

the authorized ETOPS maximum 

diversion time. In selecting these 

ETOPS Alternate Airports, the 

certificate holder must consider all 

adequate airports within the authorized 

ETOPS diversion time for the flight that 

meet the standards of this part. 

(b) No person may list an airport as an 

ETOPS Alternate Airport in a dispatch 

or flight release unless, when it might be 

used (from the earliest to the latest 

possible landing time)—

(1) The appropriate weather reports or 

forecasts, or any combination thereof, 

indicate that the weather conditions 

will be at or above the ETOPS Alternate 

Airport minima specified in the 

certificate holder’s operations 

specifications; and 

(2) The field condition reports 

indicate that a safe landing can be made. 

(c) Once a flight is en route, the 

weather conditions at each ETOPS 

Alternate Airport must meet the 

requirements of § 121.631 (c). 

(d) No person may list an airport as 

an ETOPS Alternate Airport in the 

dispatch or flight release unless that 

airport meets the public protection 

requirements of § 121.97(b)(1)(ii). 

■ 28. Revise § 121.625 to read as 

follows: 

§ 121.625 Alternate Airport weather 

minima. 

Except as provided in § 121.624 for 

ETOPS Alternate Airports, no person 

may list an airport as an alternate in the 

dispatch or flight release unless the 

appropriate weather reports or forecasts, 

or any combination thereof, indicate 

that the weather conditions will be at or 

above the alternate weather minima 

specified in the certificate holder’s 

operations specifications for that airport 

when the flight arrives. 

■ 29. Amend § 121.631 by redesignating 

paragraphs (c) and (d) as paragraphs (f) 

and (g), respectively, and adding 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1882 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) to read as 

follows: 

§ 121.631 Original dispatch or flight 

release, redispatch or amendment of 

dispatch or flight release. 

* * * * * 

(c) No person may allow a flight to 

continue beyond the ETOPS Entry Point 

unless—

(1) Except as provided in paragraph 

(d) of this section, the weather 

conditions at each ETOPS Alternate 

Airport required by § 121.624 are 

forecast to be at or above the operating 

minima for that airport in the certificate 

holder’s operations specifications when 

it might be used (from the earliest to the 

latest possible landing time); and 

(2) All ETOPS Alternate Airports 

within the authorized ETOPS maximum 

diversion time are reviewed and the 

flight crew advised of any changes in 

conditions that have occurred since 

dispatch. 

(d) If paragraph (c)(1) of this section 

cannot be met for a specific airport, the 

dispatch or flight release may be 

amended to add an ETOPS Alternate 

Airport within the maximum ETOPS 

diversion time that could be authorized 

for that flight with weather conditions at 

or above operating minima. 

(e) Before the ETOPS Entry Point, the 

pilot in command for a supplemental 

operator or a dispatcher for a flag 

operator must use company 

communications to update the flight 

plan if needed because of a reevaluation of aircraft system 

capabilities. 

■ 30. Add § 121.633 to read as follows: 

§ 121.633 Considering time-limited 

systems in planning ETOPS alternates. 

(a) For ETOPS up to and including 

180 minutes, no person may list an 

airport as an ETOPS Alternate Airport 

in a dispatch or flight release if the time 

needed to fly to that airport (at the 

approved one-engine inoperative cruise 

speed under standard conditions in still 

air) would exceed the approved time for 

the airplane’s most limiting ETOPS 

Significant System (including the 

airplane’s most limiting fire suppression 

system time for those cargo and baggage 

compartments required by regulation to 

have fire-suppression systems) minus 15 

minutes. 

(b) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, 

no person may list an airport as an 

ETOPS Alternate Airport in a dispatch 

or flight release if the time needed to fly 

to that airport: 

(1) at the all engine operating cruise 

speed, corrected for wind and 

temperature, exceeds the airplane’s 

most limiting fire suppression system 

time minus 15 minutes for those cargo 

and baggage compartments required by 

regulation to have fire suppression 

systems (except as provided in 

paragraph (c) of this section), or 

(2) at the one-engine-inoperative 

cruise speed, corrected for wind and 

temperature, exceeds the airplane’s 

most limiting ETOPS Significant System 

time (other than the airplane’s most 

limiting fire suppression system time 

minus 15 minutes for those cargo and 

baggage compartments required by 

regulation to have fire-suppression 

systems). 

(c) For turbine-engine powered 

airplanes with more than two engines, 

the certificate holder need not meet 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section until 

February 15, 2013. 

■ 31. Add § 121.646 to read as follows: 

§ 121.646 En-route fuel supply: flag and 

supplemental operations. 

(a) No person may dispatch or release 

for flight a turbine-engine powered 

airplane with more than two engines for 

a flight more than 90 minutes (with all 

engines operating at cruise power) from 

an Adequate Airport unless the 

following fuel supply requirements are 

met: 

(1) The airplane has enough fuel to 

meet the requirements of § 121.645(b); 

(2) The airplane has enough fuel to fly 

to the Adequate Airport—

(i) Assuming a rapid decompression 

at the most critical point; 

(ii) Assuming a descent to a safe 

altitude in compliance with the oxygen 

supply requirements of § 121.333; and 

(iii) Considering expected wind and 

other weather conditions. 

(3) The airplane has enough fuel to 

hold for 15 minutes at 1500 feet above 

field elevation and conduct a normal 

approach and landing. 

(b) No person may dispatch or release 

for flight an ETOPS flight unless, 

considering wind and other weather 

conditions expected, it has the fuel 

otherwise required by this part and 

enough fuel to satisfy each of the 

following requirements: 

(1) Fuel to fly to an ETOPS Alternate 

Airport. 

(i) Fuel to account for rapid 

decompression and engine failure. The 

airplane must carry the greater of the 

following amounts of fuel: 

(A) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS 

Alternate Airport assuming a rapid 

decompression at the most critical point 

followed by descent to a safe altitude in 

compliance with the oxygen supply 

requirements of § 121.333 of this 

chapter; 

(B) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS 

Alternate Airport (at the one-engineinoperative cruise speed) assuming a 

rapid decompression and a 

simultaneous engine failure at the most 

critical point followed by descent to a 

safe altitude in compliance with the 

oxygen requirements of § 121.133 of this 

chapter; or 

(C) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS 

Alternate Airport (at the one engine 

inoperative cruise speed) assuming an 

engine failure at the most critical point 

followed by descent to the one engine 

inoperative cruise altitude. 

(ii) Fuel to account for errors in wind 

forecasting. In calculating the amount of 

fuel required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of 

this section, the certificate holder must 

increase the actual forecast wind speed 

by 5% (resulting in an increase in 

headwind or a decrease in tailwind) to 

account for any potential errors in wind 

forecasting. If a certificate holder is not 

using the actual forecast wind based on 

a wind model accepted by the FAA, the 

airplane must carry additional fuel 

equal to 5% of the fuel required for 

paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, as 

reserve fuel to allow for errors in wind 

data. 

(iii) Fuel to account for icing. In 

calculating the amount of fuel required 

by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section 

(after completing the wind calculation 

in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section), 

the certificate holder must ensure that 

the airplane carries the greater of the 

following amounts of fuel in 

anticipation of possible icing during the 

diversion: 

(A) Fuel that would be burned as a 

result of airframe icing during 10 

percent of the time icing is forecast 

(including the fuel used by engine and 

wing anti-ice during this period). 

(B) Fuel that would be used for engine 

anti-ice, and if appropriate wing antiice, for the entire time during which 

icing is forecast. 

(iv) Fuel to account for engine 

deterioration. In calculating the amount 

of fuel required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of 

this section (after completing the wind 

calculation in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this 

section), the airplane also carries fuel 

equal to 5% of the fuel specified above, 

to account for deterioration in cruise 

fuel burn performance unless the 

certificate holder has a program to 

monitor airplane in-service 

deterioration to cruise fuel burn 

performance. 

(2) Fuel to account for holding, 

approach, and landing. In addition to 

the fuel required by paragraph (b)(1) of 

this section, the airplane must carry fuel 

sufficient to hold at 1500 feet above 

field elevation for 15 minutes upon 

reaching an ETOPS Alternate Airport 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1883 

and then conduct an instrument 

approach and land. 

(3) Fuel to account for APU use. If an 

APU is a required power source, the 

certificate holder must account for its 

fuel consumption during the 

appropriate phases of flight. 

■ 32. Amend § 121.687 by adding 

paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows: 

§ 121.687 Dispatch release: Flag and 

domestic operations. 

(a) * * * 

(6) For each flight dispatched as an 

ETOPS flight, the ETOPS diversion time 

for which the flight is dispatched. 

* * * * * 

■ 33. Amend § 121.689 by adding 

paragraph (a)(8) to read as follows: 

§ 121.689 Flight release form: 

Supplemental operations. 

(a) * * * 

(8) For each flight released as an 

ETOPS flight, the ETOPS diversion time 

for which the flight is released. 

* * * * * 

■ 34. Add Appendix P to read as 

follows: 

Appendix P to Part 121—Requirements 

for ETOPS and Polar Operations 

The FAA approves ETOPS in accordance 

with the requirements and limitations in this 

appendix. 

Section I. ETOPS Approvals: Airplanes 

with Two engines. 

(a) Propulsion system reliability for ETOPS. 

(1) Before the FAA grants ETOPS operational 

approval, the operator must be able to 

demonstrate the ability to achieve and 

maintain the level of propulsion system 

reliability, if any, that is required by 

§ 21.4(b)(2) of this chapter for the ETOPSapproved airplane-engine combination to be 

used. 

(2) Following ETOPS operational approval, 

the operator must monitor the propulsion 

system reliability for the airplane-engine 

combination used in ETOPS, and take action 

as required by § 121.374(i) for the specified 

IFSD rates. 

(b) 75 Minutes ETOPS—(1) Caribbean/ 

Western Atlantic Area. The FAA grants 

approvals to conduct 

ETOPS with maximum diversion times up 

to 75 minutes on Western Atlantic/Caribbean 

area routes as follows: 

(i) The FAA reviews the airplane-engine 

combination to ensure the absence of factors 

that could prevent safe operations. The 

airplane-engine combination need not be 

type-design-approved for ETOPS; however, it 

must have sufficient favorable experience to 

demonstrate to the Administrator a level of 

reliability appropriate for 75-minute ETOPS. 

(ii) The certificate holder must comply 

with the requirements of § 121.633 for timelimited system planning. 

(iii) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(iv) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374, except that a pre-departure 

service check before departure of the return 

flight is not required. 

(2) Other Areas. The FAA grants approvals 

to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion 

times up to 75 minutes on other than 

Western Atlantic/Caribbean area routes as 

follows: 

(i) The FAA reviews the airplane-engine 

combination to ensure the absence of factors 

that could prevent safe operations. The 

airplane-engine combination need not be 

type-design-approved for ETOPS; however, it 

must have sufficient favorable experience to 

demonstrate to the Administrator a level of 

reliability appropriate for 75-minute ETOPS. 

(ii) The certificate holder must comply 

with the requirements of § 121.633 for timelimited system planning. 

(iii) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(iv) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374. 

(v) The certificate holder must comply 

with the MEL in its operations specifications 

for 120-minute ETOPS. 

(c) 90-minutes ETOPS (Micronesia). The 

FAA grants approvals to conduct ETOPS 

with maximum diversion times up to 90 

minutes on Micronesian area routes as 

follows: 

(1) The airplane-engine combination must 

be type-design approved for ETOPS of at 

least 120-minutes. 

(2) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(3) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374, except that a pre-departure 

service check before departure of the return 

flight is not required. 

(4) The certificate holder must comply 

with the MEL requirements in its operations 

specifications for 120-minute ETOPS. 

(d) 120-minute ETOPS. The FAA grants 

approvals to conduct ETOPS with maximum 

diversion times up to 120 minutes as follows: 

(1) The airplane-engine combination must 

be type-design-approved for ETOPS of at 

least 120 minutes. 

(2) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(3) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374. 

(4) The certificate holder must comply 

with the MEL requirements for 120-minute 

ETOPS. 

(e) 138-Minute ETOPS. The FAA grants 

approval to conduct ETOPS with maximum 

diversion times up to 138 minutes as follows: 

(1) Operators with 120-minute ETOPS 

approval. The FAA grants 138-minute 

ETOPS approval as an extension of an 

existing 120-minute ETOPS approval as 

follows: 

(i) The authority may be exercised only for 

specific flights for which the 120-minute 

diversion time must be exceeded. 

(ii) For these flight-by-flight exceptions, the 

airplane-engine combination must be typedesign-approved for ETOPS up to at least 120 

minutes. The capability of the airplane’s 

time-limited systems may not be less than 

138 minutes calculated in accordance with 

§ 121.633. 

(iii) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(iv) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374. 

(v) The certificate holder must comply 

with minimum equipment list (MEL) 

requirements in its operations specifications 

for ‘‘beyond 120 minutes ETOPS’’. Operators 

without a ‘‘beyond 120-minute ETOPS’’ MEL 

may apply to AFS–200 through their 

certificate holding district office for a 

modified MEL which satisfies the master 

MEL policy for system/component relief in 

ETOPS beyond 120 minutes. 

(vi) The certificate holder must conduct 

training for maintenance, dispatch, and flight 

crew personnel regarding differences 

between 138-minute ETOPS authority and its 

previously-approved 120-minute ETOPS 

authority. 

(2) Operators with existing 180-minute 

ETOPS approval. The FAA grants approvals 

to conduct 138-minute ETOPS (without the 

limitation in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of section I of 

this appendix) to certificate holders with 

existing 180-minute ETOPS approval as 

follows: 

(i) The airplane-engine combination must 

be type-design-approved for ETOPS of at 

least 180 minutes. 

(ii) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(iii) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374. 

(iv) The certificate holder must comply 

with the MEL requirements for ‘‘beyond 120 

minutes ETOPS.’’

(v) The certificate holder must conduct 

training for maintenance, dispatch and flight 

crew personnel for differences between 138- 

minute ETOPS diversion approval and its 

previously approved 180-minute ETOPS 

diversion authority. 

(f) 180-minute ETOPS. The FAA grants 

approval to conduct ETOPS with diversion 

times up to 180 minutes as follows: 

(1) For these operations the airplane-engine 

combination must be type-design-approved 

for ETOPS of at least 180 minutes. 

(2) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(3) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374. 

(4) The certificate holder must comply 

with the MEL requirements for ‘‘beyond 120 

minutes ETOPS.’’

(g) Greater than 180-minute ETOPS. The 

FAA grants approval to conduct ETOPS 

greater than 180 minutes. The following are 

requirements for all operations greater than 

180 minutes. 

(1) The FAA grants approval only to 

certificate holders with existing 180-minute 

ETOPS operating authority for the airplaneengine combination to be operated. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1884 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

(2) The certificate holder must have 

previous ETOPS experience satisfactory to 

the Administrator. 

(3) In selecting ETOPS Alternate Airports, 

the operator must make every effort to plan 

ETOPS with maximum diversion distances of 

180 minutes or less, if possible. If conditions 

necessitate using an ETOPS Alternate Airport 

beyond 180 minutes, the route may be flown 

only if the requirements for the specific 

operating area in paragraph (h) or (i) of 

section I of this appendix are met. 

(4) The certificate holder must inform the 

flight crew each time an airplane is proposed 

for dispatch for greater than 180 minutes and 

tell them why the route was selected. 

(5) In addition to the equipment specified 

in the certificate holder’s MEL for 180- 

minute ETOPS, the following systems must 

be operational for dispatch: 

(i) The fuel quantity indicating system. 

(ii) The APU (including electrical and 

pneumatic supply and operating to the APU’s 

designed capability). 

(iii) The auto throttle system. 

(iv) The communication system required 

by § 121.99(d) or § 121.122(c), as applicable. 

(v) One-engine-inoperative auto-land 

capability, if flight planning is predicated on 

its use. 

(6) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

(7) The certificate holder must comply 

with the maintenance program requirements 

of § 121.374. 

(h) 207-minute ETOPS in the North Pacific 

Area of Operations. (1) The FAA grants 

approval to conduct ETOPS with maximum 

diversion times up to 207 minutes in the 

North Pacific Area of Operations as an 

extension to 180-minute ETOPS authority to 

be used on an exception basis. This 

exception may be used only on a flight-byflight basis when an ETOPS Alternate Airport 

is not available within 180 minutes for 

reasons such as political or military 

concerns; volcanic activity; temporary airport 

conditions; and airport weather below 

dispatch requirements or other weather 

related events. 

(2) The nearest available ETOPS Alternate 

Airport within 207 minutes diversion time 

must be specified in the dispatch or flight 

release. 

(3) In conducting such a flight the 

certificate holder must consider Air Traffic 

Service’s preferred track. 

(4) The airplane-engine combination must 

be type-design-approved for ETOPS of at 

least 180 minutes. The approved time for the 

airplane’s most limiting ETOPS significant 

system and most limiting cargo-fire 

suppression time for those cargo and baggage 

compartments required by regulation to have 

fire-suppression systems must be at least 222 

minutes. 

(5) The certificate holder must track how 

many times 207-minute authority is used. 

(i) 240-minute ETOPS in the North Polar 

Area, in the area north of the NOPAC, and 

in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. (1) 

The FAA grants approval to conduct 240- 

minute ETOPS authority with maximum 

diversion times in the North Polar Area, in 

the area north of the NOPAC area, and the 

Pacific Ocean area north of the equator as an 

extension to 180-minute ETOPS authority to 

be used on an exception basis. This 

exception may be used only on a flight-byflight basis when an ETOPS Alternate Airport 

is not available within 180 minutes. In that 

case, the nearest available ETOPS Alternate 

Airport within 240 minutes diversion time 

must be specified in the dispatch or flight 

release. 

(2) This exception may be used in the 

North Polar Area and in the area north of 

NOPAC only in extreme conditions 

particular to these areas such as volcanic 

activity, extreme cold weather at en-route 

airports, airport weather below dispatch 

requirements, temporary airport conditions, 

and other weather related events. The criteria 

used by the certificate holder to decide that 

extreme weather precludes using an airport 

must be established by the certificate holder, 

accepted by the FAA, and published in the 

certificate holder’s manual for the use of 

dispatchers and pilots. 

(3) This exception may be used in the 

Pacific Ocean area north of the equator only 

for reasons such as political or military 

concern, volcanic activity, airport weather 

below dispatch requirements, temporary 

airport conditions and other weather related 

events. 

(4) The airplane-engine combination must 

be type design approved for ETOPS greater 

than 180 minutes. 

(j) 240-minute ETOPS in areas South of the 

equator. (1) The FAA grants approval to 

conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion 

times of up to 240 minutes in the following 

areas: 

(i) Pacific oceanic areas between the U.S. 

West coast and Australia, New Zealand and 

Polynesia. 

(ii) South Atlantic oceanic areas. 

(iii) Indian Ocean areas. 

(iv) Oceanic areas between Australia and 

South America. 

(2) The operator must designate the nearest 

available ETOPS Alternate Airports along the 

planned route of flight. 

(3) The airplane-engine combination must 

be type-design-approved for ETOPS greater 

than 180 minutes. 

(k) ETOPS beyond 240 minutes. (1) The 

FAA grants approval to conduct ETOPS with 

diversion times beyond 240 minutes for 

operations between specified city pairs on 

routes in the following areas: 

(i) The Pacific oceanic areas between the 

U.S. west coast and Australia, New Zealand, 

and Polynesia; 

(ii) The South Atlantic oceanic areas; 

(iii) The Indian Oceanic areas; and 

(iv) The oceanic areas between Australia 

and South America, and the South Polar 

Area. 

(2) This approval is granted to certificate 

holders who have been operating under 180- 

minute or greater ETOPS authority for at least 

24 consecutive months, of which at least 12 

consecutive months must be under 240- 

minute ETOPS authority with the airplaneengine combination to be used. 

(3) The operator must designate the nearest 

available ETOPS alternate or alternates along 

the planned route of flight. 

(4) For these operations, the airplaneengine combination must be type-designapproved for ETOPS greater than 180 

minutes. 

Section II. ETOPS Approval: Passengercarrying Airplanes With More Than Two 

Engines. 

(a) The FAA grants approval to conduct 

ETOPS, as follows: 

(1) Except as provided in § 121.162, the 

airplane-engine combination must be typedesign-approved for ETOPS. 

(2) The operator must designate the nearest 

available ETOPS Alternate Airports within 

240 minutes diversion time (at one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air). If an ETOPS alternate 

is not available within 240 minutes, the 

operator must designate the nearest available 

ETOPS Alternate Airports along the planned 

route of flight. 

(3) The MEL limitations for the authorized 

ETOPS diversion time apply. 

(i) The Fuel Quantity Indicating System 

must be operational. 

(ii) The communications systems required 

by § 121.99(d) or § 121.122(c) must be 

operational. 

(4) The certificate holder must operate in 

accordance with the ETOPS authority as 

contained in its operations specifications. 

Section III. Approvals for operations whose 

airplane routes are planned to traverse either 

the North Polar or South Polar Areas. 

(a) Except for intrastate operations within 

the State of Alaska, no certificate holder may 

operate an aircraft in the North Polar Area or 

South Polar Area, unless authorized by the 

FAA. 

(b) In addition to any of the applicable 

requirements of sections I and II of this 

appendix, the certificate holder’s operations 

specifications must contain the following: 

(1) The designation of airports that may be 

used for en-route diversions and the 

requirements the airports must meet at the 

time of diversion. 

(2) Except for supplemental all-cargo 

operations, a recovery plan for passengers at 

designated diversion airports. 

(3) A fuel-freeze strategy and procedures 

for monitoring fuel freezing. 

(4) A plan to ensure communication 

capability for these operations. 

(5) An MEL for these operations. 

(6) A training plan for operations in these 

areas. 

(7) A plan for mitigating crew exposure to 

radiation during solar flare activity. 

(8) A plan for providing at least two cold 

weather anti-exposure suits in the aircraft, to 

protect crewmembers during outside activity 

at a diversion airport with extreme climatic 

conditions. The FAA may relieve the 

certificate holder from this requirement if the 

season of the year makes the equipment 

unnecessary. 

PART 135—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS; COMMUTER AND 

ON DEMAND OPERATION AND RULES 

GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD 

SUCH AIRCRAFT 

■ 35. The authority citation for part 135 

continues to read as follows: 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1885 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 44113, 

44701–44702, 44705, 44709, 44711–44713, 

44715–44717, 44722. 

■ 36. Add § 135.98 to read as follows: 

§ 135.98 Operations in the North Polar 

Area. 

After February 15, 2008, no certificate 

holder may operate an aircraft in the 

region north of 78° N latitude (‘‘North 

Polar Area’’), other than intrastate 

operations wholly within the state of 

Alaska, unless authorized by the FAA. 

The certificate holder’s operation 

specifications must include the 

following: 

(a) The designation of airports that 

may be used for en-route diversions and 

the requirements the airports must meet 

at the time of diversion. 

(b) Except for all-cargo operations, a 

recovery plan for passengers at 

designated diversion airports. 

(c) A fuel-freeze strategy and 

procedures for monitoring fuel freezing 

for operations in the North Polar Area. 

(d) A plan to ensure communication 

capability for operations in the North 

Polar Area. 

(e) An MEL for operations in the 

North Polar Area. 

(f) A training plan for operations in 

the North Polar Area. 

(g) A plan for mitigating crew 

exposure to radiation during solar flare 

activity. 

(h) A plan for providing at least two 

cold weather anti-exposure suits in the 

aircraft, to protect crewmembers during 

outside activity at a diversion airport 

with extreme climatic conditions. The 

FAA may relieve the certificate holder 

from this requirement if the season of 

the year makes the equipment 

unnecessary. 

■ 37. Amend § 135.345 by removing the 

word ‘‘and’’ from the end of paragraph 

(a)(7), redesignating paragraph (a)(8) as 

(a)(10), and by adding new paragraphs 

(a)(8) and (a)(9) to read as follows: 

§ 135.345 Pilots: Initial, transition, and 

upgrade ground training. 

* * * * * 

(a) * * * 

(8) ETOPS, if applicable; 

(9) After February 15, 2008, passenger 

recovery plan for any passenger-carrying 

operation (other than intrastate 

operations wholly within the state of 

Alaska) in the North Polar area; and 

* * * * * 

■ 38. Add § 135.364 to read as follows: 

§ 135.364 Maximum flying time outside the 

United States. 

(a) After February 15, 2008, no 

certificate holder may operate an 

airplane, other than an all-cargo 

airplane with more than two engines, on 

a planned route that exceeds 180 

minutes flying time (at the one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air) from an Adequate 

Airport outside the continental United 

States unless the operation is approved 

by the FAA in accordance with 

Appendix G of this part, Extended 

Operations (ETOPS). 

(b) For the purposes of this section 

Adequate Airport means an airport that 

an airplane operator may list with 

approval from the FAA because that 

airport meets the requirements of 

§§ 135.385, 135.387, 135.393, 135.395, 

135.219 and 135.221, as applicable. 

■ 39. Amend § 135.411 by adding 

paragraph (d) to read as follows: 

§ 135.411 Applicability. 

* * * * * 

(d) A certificate holder who elects to 

operate in accordance with § 135.364 

must maintain its aircraft under 

paragraph (a)(2) of this section and the 

additional requirements of Appendix G 

of this part. 

■ 40. Add appendix G to read as 

follows: 

Appendix G to Part 135—Extended 

Operations (ETOPS) 

G135.1 Definitions. 

G135.1.1 Adequate Airport means an 

airport that an airplane operator may list 

with approval from the FAA because that 

airport meets the landing limitations of 

§ 135.385 or is a military airport that is active 

and operational. 

G135.1.2 ETOPS Alternate Airport means 

an adequate airport that is designated in a 

dispatch or flight release for use in the event 

of a diversion during ETOPS. This definition 

applies to flight planning and does not in any 

way limit the authority of the pilot in 

command during flight. 

G135.1.3 ETOPS Entry Point means the 

first point on the route of an ETOPS flight, 

determined using a one-engine inoperative 

cruise speed under standard conditions in 

still air, that is more than 180 minutes from 

an adequate airport. 

G135.1.4 ETOPS Qualified Person means 

a person, performing maintenance for the 

certificate holder, who has satisfactorily 

completed the certificate holder’s ETOPS 

training program. 

G135.2 Requirements. 

G135.2.1 General. After February 15, 

2008, no certificate holder may operate an 

airplane, other than an all-cargo airplane 

with more than two engines, outside the 

continental United States more than 180 

minutes flying time (at the one engine 

inoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air) from an airport 

described in § 135.364 unless—

(a) The certificate holder receives ETOPS 

approval from the FAA; 

(b) The operation is conducted in a multiengine transport category turbine-powered 

airplane; 

(c) The operation is planned to be no more 

than 240 minutes flying time (at the one 

engine inoperative cruise speed under 

standard conditions in still air) from an 

airport described in § 135.364; and 

(d) The certificate holder meets the 

requirements of this appendix. 

G135.2.2 Required certificate holder 

experience prior to conducting ETOPS. 

Before applying for ETOPS approval, the 

certificate holder must have at least 12 

months experience conducting international 

operations (excluding Canada and Mexico) 

with multi-engine transport category turbineengine powered airplanes. The certificate 

holder may consider the following 

experience as international operations: 

(a) Operations to or from the State of 

Hawaii. 

(b) For certificate holders granted approval 

to operate under part 135 or part 121 before 

February 15, 2007, up to 6 months of 

domestic operating experience and 

operations in Canada and Mexico in multiengine transport category turbojet-powered 

airplanes may be credited as part of the 

required 12 months of international 

experience required by paragraph G135.2.2(a) 

of this appendix. 

(c) ETOPS experience with other aircraft 

types to the extent authorized by the FAA. 

G135.2.3 Airplane requirements. No 

certificate holder may conduct ETOPS in an 

airplane that was manufactured after 

February 17, 2015 unless the airplane meets 

the standards of § 25.1535. 

G135.2.4 Crew information requirements. 

The certificate holder must ensure that flight 

crews have in-flight access to current weather 

and operational information needed to 

comply with § 135.83, § 135.225, and 

§ 135.229. This includes information on all 

ETOPS Alternate Airports, all destination 

alternates, and the destination airport 

proposed for each ETOPS flight. 

G135.2.5 Operational Requirements. 

(a) No person may allow a flight to 

continue beyond its ETOPS Entry Point 

unless—

(1) The weather conditions at each ETOPS 

Alternate Airport are forecast to be at or 

above the operating minima in the certificate 

holder’s operations specifications for that 

airport when it might be used (from the 

earliest to the latest possible landing time), 

and 

(3) All ETOPS Alternate Airports within 

the authorized ETOPS maximum diversion 

time are reviewed for any changes in 

conditions that have occurred since dispatch. 

(b) In the event that an operator cannot 

comply with paragraph G135.2.5(a)(1) of this 

appendix for a specific airport, another 

ETOPS Alternate Airport must be substituted 

within the maximum ETOPS diversion time 

that could be authorized for that flight with 

weather conditions at or above operating 

minima. 

(c) Pilots must plan and conduct ETOPS 

under instrument flight rules. 

(d) Time-Limited Systems. 

(1) Except as provided in paragraph 

G135.2.5(d)(3) of this appendix, the time 

required to fly the distance to each ETOPS 

Alternate Airport (at the all-enginesoperating cruise speed, corrected for wind 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

1886 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

and temperature) may not exceed the time 

specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for 

the airplane’s most limiting fire suppression 

system time required by regulation for any 

cargo or baggage compartments (if installed), 

minus 15 minutes. 

(2) Except as provided in G135.2.5(d)(3) of 

this appendix, the time required to fly the 

distance to each ETOPS Alternate Airport (at 

the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise 

speed, corrected for wind and temperature) 

may not exceed the time specified in the 

Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane’s 

most time limited system time (other than the 

airplane’s most limiting fire suppression 

system time required by regulation for any 

cargo or baggage compartments), minus 15 

minutes. 

(3) A certificate holder operating an 

airplane without the Airplane Flight Manual 

information needed to comply with 

paragraphs G135.2.5(d)(1) and (d)(2) of this 

appendix, may continue ETOPS with that 

airplane until February 17, 2015. 

G135.2.6 Communications Requirements. 

(a) No person may conduct an ETOPS 

flight unless the following communications 

equipment, appropriate to the route to be 

flown, is installed and operational: 

(1) Two independent communication 

transmitters, at least one of which allows 

voice communication. 

(2) Two independent communication 

receivers, at least one of which allows voice 

communication. 

(3) Two headsets, or one headset and one 

speaker. 

(b) In areas where voice communication 

facilities are not available, or are of such poor 

quality that voice communication is not 

possible, communication using an alternative 

system must be substituted. 

G135.2.7 Fuel Requirements. No person 

may dispatch or release for flight an ETOPS 

flight unless, considering wind and other 

weather conditions expected, it has the fuel 

otherwise required by this part and enough 

fuel to satisfy each of the following 

requirements: 

(a) Fuel to fly to an ETOPS Alternate 

Airport—(1) Fuel to account for rapid 

decompression and engine failure. The 

airplane must carry the greater of the 

following amounts of fuel: 

(i) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS 

Alternate Airport assuming a rapid 

decompression at the most critical point 

followed by descent to a safe altitude in 

compliance with the oxygen supply 

requirements of § 135.157, 

(ii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS 

Alternate Airport (at the one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air) assuming a rapid 

decompression and a simultaneous engine 

failure at the most critical point followed by 

descent to a safe altitude in compliance with 

the oxygen requirements of § 135.157; or 

(iii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS 

Alternate Airport (at the one-engineinoperative cruise speed under standard 

conditions in still air) assuming an engine 

failure at the most critical point followed by 

descent to the one engine inoperative cruise 

altitude. 

(b) Fuel to account for errors in wind 

forecasting. In calculating the amount of fuel 

required by paragraph G135.2.7(a)(1) of this 

appendix, the certificate holder must 

increase the actual forecast wind speed by 

5% (resulting in an increase in headwind or 

a decrease in tailwind) to account for any 

potential errors in wind forecasting. If a 

certificate holder is not using the actual 

forecast wind based on a wind model 

accepted by the FAA, the airplane must carry 

additional fuel equal to 5% of the fuel 

required by paragraph G135.2.7(a) of this 

appendix, as reserve fuel to allow for errors 

in wind data. 

(c) Fuel to account for icing. In calculating 

the amount of fuel required by paragraph 

G135.2.7(a)(1) of this appendix, (after 

completing the wind calculation in 

G135.2.7(a)(2) of this appendix), the 

certificate holder must ensure that the 

airplane carries the greater of the following 

amounts of fuel in anticipation of possible 

icing during the diversion: 

(1) Fuel that would be burned as a result 

of airframe icing during 10 percent of the 

time icing is forecast (including the fuel used 

by engine and wing anti-ice during this 

period). 

(2) Fuel that would be used for engine antiice, and if appropriate wing anti-ice, for the 

entire time during which icing is forecast. 

(d) Fuel to account for engine 

deterioration. In calculating the amount of 

fuel required by paragraph G135.2.7(a)(1) of 

this appendix (after completing the wind 

calculation in paragraph G135.2.7(a)(2) of 

this appendix), the certificate holder must 

ensure the airplane also carries fuel equal to 

5% of the fuel specified above, to account for 

deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance 

unless the certificate holder has a program to 

monitor airplane in-service deterioration to 

cruise fuel burn performance. 

(e) Fuel to account for holding, approach, 

and landing. In addition to the fuel required 

by paragraph G135.2.7 (a) of this appendix, 

the airplane must carry fuel sufficient to hold 

at 1500 feet above field elevation for 15 

minutes upon reaching the ETOPS Alternate 

Airport and then conduct an instrument 

approach and land. 

(f) Fuel to account for APU use. If an APU 

is a required power source, the certificate 

holder must account for its fuel consumption 

during the appropriate phases of flight. 

G135.2.8 Maintenance Program 

Requirements. In order to conduct an ETOPS 

flight under § 135.364, each certificate holder 

must develop and comply with the ETOPS 

maintenance program as authorized in the 

certificate holder’s operations specifications 

for each two-engine airplane-engine 

combination used in ETOPS. This provision 

does not apply to operations using an 

airplane with more than two engines. The 

certificate holder must develop this ETOPS 

maintenance program to supplement the 

maintenance program currently approved for 

the operator. This ETOPS maintenance 

program must include the following 

elements: 

(a) ETOPS maintenance document. The 

certificate holder must have an ETOPS 

maintenance document for use by each 

person involved in ETOPS. The document 

must—

(1) List each ETOPS Significant System, 

(2) Refer to or include all of the ETOPS 

maintenance elements in this section, 

(3) Refer to or include all supportive 

programs and procedures, 

(4) Refer to or include all duties and 

responsibilities, and 

(5) Clearly state where referenced material 

is located in the certificate holder’s 

document system. 

(b) ETOPS pre-departure service check. 

The certificate holder must develop a predeparture check tailored to their specific 

operation. 

(1) The certificate holder must complete a 

pre-departure service check immediately 

before each ETOPS flight. 

(2) At a minimum, this check must: 

(i) Verify the condition of all ETOPS 

Significant Systems; 

(ii) Verify the overall status of the airplane 

by reviewing applicable maintenance 

records; and 

(iii) Include an interior and exterior 

inspection to include a determination of 

engine and APU oil levels and consumption 

rates. 

(3) An ETOPS qualified person must 

accomplish all ETOPS required items 

specified in the ETOPS pre-departure service 

check and certify by signature that the check 

has been completed. 

(c) Limitations on dual maintenance. (1) 

Except as specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this 

appendix, the certificate holder may not 

perform scheduled or unscheduled 

maintenance during the same maintenance 

visit on one or more ETOPS significant 

system listed in the ETOPS maintenance 

document, if the improper maintenance of 

the systems could result in the failure of an 

ETOPS significant system. 

(2) In the event an unforeseen 

circumstance prevents the certificate holder 

from complying with paragraph G135.2.8 

(c)(1) of this appendix, the certificate holder 

may perform maintenance on more than one 

ETOPS significant system provided it: 

(i) Has maintenance action on each ETOPS 

significant system performed by a different 

technician, or 

(ii) Has maintenance action on each ETOPS 

Significant System performed by the same 

technician under the direct supervision of a 

second qualified individual; and 

(iii) Conducts a ground verification test 

and any in-flight verification test required 

under the program developed pursuant to 

paragraph G135.2.8 (d) of this appendix. 

(d) Verification program. The certificate 

holder must develop a program for the 

resolution of discrepancies that will ensure 

the effectiveness of maintenance actions 

taken on ETOPS Significant Systems. The 

verification program must identify potential 

problems and verify satisfactory corrective 

action. The verification program must 

include ground verification and in-flight 

verification policy and procedures. The 

certificate holder must establish procedures 

to clearly indicate who is going to initiate the 

verification action and what action is 

necessary. The verification action may be 

performed on an ETOPS revenue flight 

provided the verification action is 

documented as satisfactorily completed upon 

reaching the ETOPS entry point. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 1887 

(e) Task identification. The certificate 

holder must identify all ETOPS-specific 

tasks. An ETOPS qualified person must 

accomplish and certify by signature that the 

ETOPS-specific task has been completed. 

(f) Centralized maintenance control 

procedures. The certificate holder must 

develop procedures for centralized 

maintenance control for ETOPS. 

(g) ETOPS parts control program. The 

certificate holder must develop an ETOPS 

parts control program to ensure the proper 

identification of parts used to maintain the 

configuration of airplanes used in ETOPS. 

(h) Enhanced Continuing Analysis and 

Surveillance System (E–CASS) program. A 

certificate holder’s existing CASS must be 

enhanced to include all elements of the 

ETOPS maintenance program. In addition to 

the reporting requirements of § 135.415 and 

§ 135.417, the program includes reporting 

procedures, in the form specified in 

§ 135.415(e), for the following significant 

events detrimental to ETOPS within 72 hours 

of the occurrence to the certificate holding 

district office (CHDO): 

(1) IFSDs, except planned IFSDs performed 

for flight training. 

(2) Diversions and turnbacks for failures, 

malfunctions, or defects associated with any 

airplane or engine system. 

(3) Uncommanded power or thrust changes 

or surges. 

(4) Inability to control the engine or obtain 

desired power or thrust. 

(5) Inadvertent fuel loss or unavailability, 

or uncorrectable fuel imbalance in flight. 

(6) Failures, malfunctions or defects 

associated with ETOPS Significant Systems. 

(7) Any event that would jeopardize the 

safe flight and landing of the airplane on an 

ETOPS flight. 

(i) Propulsion system monitoring. 

The certificate holder, in coordination with 

the CHDO, must—

(1) Establish criteria as to what action is to 

be taken when adverse trends in propulsion 

system conditions are detected, and 

(2) Investigate common cause effects or 

systemic errors and submit the findings to 

the CHDO within 30 days. 

(j) Engine condition monitoring. 

(1) The certificate holder must establish an 

engine-condition monitoring program to 

detect deterioration at an early stage and to 

allow for corrective action before safe 

operation is affected. 

(2) This program must describe the 

parameters to be monitored, the method of 

data collection, the method of analyzing data, 

and the process for taking corrective action. 

(3) The program must ensure that engine 

limit margins are maintained so that a 

prolonged engine-inoperative diversion may 

be conducted at approved power levels and 

in all expected environmental conditions 

without exceeding approved engine limits. 

This includes approved limits for items such 

as rotor speeds and exhaust gas temperatures. 

(k) Oil consumption monitoring. The 

certificate holder must develop an engine oil 

consumption monitoring program to ensure 

that there is enough oil to complete each 

ETOPS flight. APU oil consumption must be 

included if an APU is required for ETOPS. 

The operator’s consumption limit may not 

exceed the manufacturer’s recommendation. 

Monitoring must be continuous and include 

oil added at each ETOPS departure point. 

The program must compare the amount of oil 

added at each ETOPS departure point with 

the running average consumption to identify 

sudden increases. 

(l) APU in-flight start program. If an APU 

is required for ETOPS, but is not required to 

run during the ETOPS portion of the flight, 

the certificate holder must have a program 

acceptable to the FAA for cold soak in-flight 

start and run reliability. 

(m) Maintenance training. For each 

airplane-engine combination, the certificate 

holder must develop a maintenance training 

program to ensure that it provides training 

adequate to support ETOPS. It must include 

ETOPS specific training for all persons 

involved in ETOPS maintenance that focuses 

on the special nature of ETOPS. This training 

must be in addition to the operator’s 

maintenance training program used to qualify 

individuals for specific airplanes and 

engines. 

(n) Configuration, maintenance, and 

procedures (CMP) document. The certificate 

holder must use a system to ensure 

compliance with the minimum requirements 

set forth in the current version of the CMP 

document for each airplane-engine 

combination that has a CMP. 

(o) Reporting. The certificate holder must 

report quarterly to the CHDO and the 

airplane and engine manufacturer for each 

airplane authorized for ETOPS. The report 

must provide the operating hours and cycles 

for each airplane. 

G135.2.9 Delayed compliance date for all 

airplanes. A certificate holder need not 

comply with this appendix for any airplane 

until February 15, 2008. 

Issued in Washington, DC on January 4, 

2007. 

Marion C. Blakey, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 07–39 Filed 1–8–07; 2:00 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with RULES2