HOMELAND 

SECURITY

DHS Requires More 

Disciplined 

Investment 

Management to Help 

Meet Mission Needs

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2012

GAO-12-833

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-833, a report to 

congressional requesters 

September 2012

HOMELAND SECURITY

DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment 

Management to Help Meet Mission Needs

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS invests extensively in major 

acquisition programs to develop new 

systems that help the department 

execute its many critical missions. In 

2011, DHS reported to Congress that it 

planned to invest $167 billion in these

major acquisition programs. We 

previously found that DHS had not 

managed its investments effectively, 

and its acquisition management 

activities have been on GAO’s High 

Risk List since 2005. This report 

addresses the extent to which (1) 

major DHS acquisition programs face 

key challenges; (2) DHS has policies 

and processes to effectively manage 

individual acquisition programs; (3) 

DHS has policies and processes to 

effectively manage its portfolio of 

acquisition programs as a whole; and 

(4) DHS has taken actions to address 

the high-risk acquisition management 

issues GAO has identified in previous 

reports. GAO surveyed all 77 major 

program offices DHS identified in 2011

(92 percent response rate), reviewed 

available documentation of acquisition 

decisions from November 2008 to April 

2012, and interviewed officials at DHS 

headquarters and components. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS modify its 

policy to better reflect key program and 

portfolio management practices, 

ensure acquisition programs fully 

comply with DHS acquisition policy, 

prioritize major acquisition programs 

departmentwide and account for 

anticipated resource constraints, and

document prerequisites for delegating 

major milestone decision authority. 

DHS concurred with all of GAO’s 

recommendations, and noted its 

progress on a number of fronts, which 

is accounted for in the report. 

What GAO Found

Nearly all of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program managers 

GAO surveyed reported their programs had experienced significant challenges. 

Sixty-eight of the 71 respondents reported they experienced funding instability, 

faced workforce shortfalls, or their planned capabilities changed after initiation, 

and most survey respondents reported a combination of these challenges. DHS 

lacks the data needed to accurately measure program performance, but GAO 

was able to use survey results, information DHS provided to Congress, and an 

internal DHS review from March 2012 to identify 42 programs that experienced 

cost growth, schedule slips, or both. GAO gained insight into the magnitude of 

the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs, which increased from $19.7 billion in 

2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent.

DHS acquisition policy reflects many key program management practices that 

could help mitigate program risks. It requires programs to develop documents 

demonstrating critical knowledge that would help leaders make better informed 

investment decisions when managing individual programs. However, DHS has 

not consistently met these requirements. The department has only verified that 

four programs documented all of the critical knowledge the policy requires to 

proceed with acquisition activities. Officials explained that DHS’s culture has 

emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions more than sound acquisition 

management practices. Most major programs lack reliable cost estimates, 

realistic schedules, and agreed-upon baseline objectives, limiting DHS 

leadership’s ability to effectively manage those programs and provide information 

to Congress. DHS recognizes the need to implement its acquisition policy more 

consistently, but significant work remains. 

DHS acquisition policy does not fully reflect several key portfolio management 

practices, such as allocating resources strategically, and DHS has not yet reestablished an oversight board to manage its investment portfolio across the 

department. As a result, DHS has largely made investment decisions on a 

program-by-program and component-by-component basis. The widespread risk 

of poorly understood cost growth, coupled with the fiscal challenges facing the 

federal government, makes it essential that DHS allocate resources to its major 

programs in a deliberate manner. DHS plans to develop stronger portfoliomanagement policies and processes, but until it does so, DHS programs are 

more likely to experience additional funding instability, which will increase the risk 

of further cost growth and schedule slips. These outcomes, combined with a 

tighter budget, could prevent DHS from developing needed capabilities. 

DHS has introduced seven initiatives that could improve acquisition management

by addressing longstanding challenges GAO and DHS survey respondents have

identified, such as funding instability and acquisition workforce shortfalls. 

Implementation plans are still being developed, and DHS is still working to 

address critical issues. Because of this, it is too early to determine whether the 

DHS initiatives will be effective, as GAO has previously established that agencies 

must sustain progress over time to address management challenges. DHS is 

also pursuing a tiered-governance structure, but it must reduce risks and improve 

program outcomes before regularly delegating major milestone decision 

authority. 

View GAO-12-833. For more information, 

contact John Hutton at (202) 512-4841 or 

huttonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Letter 1 

Background 3

Nearly All Program Managers Surveyed Reported Significant 

Challenges 10

Programs Proceed without Meeting Sound DHS Acquisition Policy 21

DHS Needs Policy and Process Enhancements to Effectively 

Manage Its Portfolio of Investments 33

DHS Acquisition Management Initiatives Target Longstanding 

Challenges, but Key Implementation Issues Remain 39

Conclusions 45

Recommendations for Executive Action 46

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 47

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 51

Appendix II Key Acquisition Management Practices 54

Appendix III Program Office Survey Results 60

Appendix IV Major DHS Acquisition Programs and their Key Acquisition 

Documents 94

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 99

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 103

Related GAO Products 104

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Tables

Table 1: DHS Acquisition Levels for Major Acquisition Programs 4

Table 2: Key DHS Acquisition Documents Requiring Departmentlevel Approval 7

Table 3: GAO Assessment of DHS’s Acquisition Policy Compared to 

Key Program-management Practices 23

Table 4: GAO Assessment of DHS’s Acquisition Policy Compared to 

Key Portfolio-management Practices 34

Table 5: GAO Assessment of DHS Acquisition Management 

Initiatives 43

Table 6: Programs that responded to our survey 94

Table 7: Programs that did not respond to our survey 98

Table 8: Programs cancelled in 2011 98

Figures

Figure 1: DHS Acquisition Life Cycle and Document Requirements 

for Major Acquisition Programs 6

Figure 2: DHS Acquisition Managers 9

Figure 3: Breakdown of 68 Major Acquisition Programs 

Experiencing One or More Significant Management 

Challenges 11

Figure 4: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Experiencing 

Cost Growth or Schedule Slips 12

Figure 5: Programs that Changed Planned Capabilities and 

Experienced Cost Growth or Schedule Slips 14

Figure 6: Reasons Programs Changed Their Planned Capabilities 15

Figure 7: Effects of Funding Instability on Programs, as Identified 

by Program Managers 17

Figure 8: Reasons Programs Experienced Funding Instability 18

Figure 9: Functional Areas Contributing to Workforce Shortfalls 20

Figure 10: DHS Acquisition Documents Requiring Department-level 

Approval 25

Figure 11: Programs That Have Key Acquisition Documents 

Approved in Accordance with AD 102 27

Figure 12: Programs Reviewed by DHS’s Executive Review Board 28

Figure 13: Programs with Department-approved APBs, Reliable 

Cost Estimates, and Realistic Schedules 30

Figure 14: Councils and Offices in DHS’s Proposed IILCM 36

Figure 15: Acquisition Management Challenges and Corresponding 

Initiatives 40
Page iii GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 16: Initiatives that Slipped from DHS’s Original January 2011 

Schedule to the June 2012 Update 42

Figure 17: DHS’s Proposed IRB/ESC Governance Structure 44

Abbreviations

AD 102 Acquisition Management Directive 102-01

AOA Analysis of alternatives

APB Acquisition Program Baseline

CAE Component Acquisition Executive

CASR Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report

CRC Capabilities and Requirements Council

DHS Department of Homeland Security

ESC Executive Steering Committee

FYHSP Future Years Homeland Security Program 

IILCM Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model

IT Information Technology

IRB Investment Review Board

JRC Joint Requirements Council

MAOL Major Acquisition Oversight List

MNS Mission Need Statement

OCFO Office of the Chief Financial Officer

PA&E Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation

PARM Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management

QPAR Quarterly Program Accountability Report

USM Under Secretary for Management

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Page 1 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

September 18, 2012

Congressional Requesters

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invests extensively in 

acquisition programs to develop new systems that help the department 

execute its many critical missions. DHS is acquiring systems to help 

secure the border, facilitate trade, screen travelers, enhance cyber 

security, improve disaster response, and execute a wide variety of other 

operations. Several of DHS’s major acquisition programs—the 

department’s most expensive and critical investments—existed prior to 

the creation of DHS and were managed by one of the 22 separate 

agencies that merged to form the department. These acquisition 

programs are now managed by senior officials at DHS headquarters and 

12 component agencies. In 2011, DHS reported to Congress that it 

planned to ultimately invest $167 billion in its major acquisition programs. 

In fiscal year 2012, DHS reported it was investing more than $18 billion in 

the department’s acquisition programs.

DHS acquisition management issues have been highlighted in our HighRisk List since 2005.1 Over the past several years, our work has identified 

significant shortcomings in the department’s ability to manage an 

expanding portfolio of complex acquisitions.2

 

1

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, 

In 2008, DHS revised its 

acquisition review process to include more detailed guidance for key 

acquisition decision events, documentation requirements, and the roles 

and responsibilities of DHS decision makers. In January 2010, DHS again 

updated its acquisition policy, but later that year, we found that the 

department still was not effectively carrying out its acquisition 

GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005)

2

For examples, see GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major 

Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, GAO-09-29 (Washington, D.C.: November 18, 

2008); Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: 

Controls over Contractor Payment for the Technology Component Need Improvement, 

GAO-11-68 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2011); High-Risk Series: An Update, 

GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011); Opportunities to Reduce Potential 

Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, 

GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011); Coast Guard: Action Needed As

Approved Deepwater Program Remains Unachievable, GAO-11-743 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 28, 2011) 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

management responsibilities.3 We have previously established that a 

program must have a sound business case that includes firm 

requirements, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, and realistic cost 

estimates in order to reduce program challenges.4

Because DHS invests significant resources developing capabilities to 

support the department’s mission, you asked us to assess the extent to 

which (1) DHS’s major acquisition programs face challenges that increase 

the risk of poor outcomes; (2) DHS has policies and processes in place to 

effectively manage individual acquisition programs; (3) DHS has policies 

and processes in place to effectively manage its portfolio of acquisition 

programs as a whole; and (4) DHS has taken actions to address the highrisk acquisition management issues we have identified in previous 

reports. In addition to this report, we are also issuing a report focused on 

the performance of DHS’s major information technology (IT) 

investments.

These conditions 

provide a program a reasonable chance of overcoming challenges yet 

delivering on time and within budget.

5

To determine the extent to which major acquisition programs identified by 

DHS in 2011 face challenges, we surveyed all 77 major program offices 

from January to March 2012, and achieved a 92 percent response rate.6

 

3

Through our survey, we collected information regarding major programs’ 

performance, program managers’ understanding of acquisition guidance, 

challenges developing requirements, and funding issues. We also 

reviewed all available documentation of department-level acquisition 

decisions from November 2008 to April 2012 and interviewed acquisition 

officials at DHS headquarters and components to understand program 

GAO-10-588SP. 

4

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes, GAO-10-374T

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010).

5

This forthcoming report assesses the extent to which subsidiary projects within DHS IT 

investments are meeting their cost and schedule commitments, and the primary causes of 

any commitment shortfalls. The report focuses on investments that had one or more 

subsidiary projects exceeding 10 percent of their cost and schedule commitments. A 

project is a temporary effort (e.g. 9 months) to accomplish a unique product or service, 

such as adding enhancements to a system.

6

DHS originally identified 82 major acquisition programs in the 2011 major acquisition 

oversight list, but five of those programs were subsequently cancelled in 2011. Seventyone program managers responded to the survey. See appendix IV.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

risks, management challenges, and data limitations—particularly data 

limitations regarding program performance. Further, we reviewed 

resource plans and DHS performance reports to establish the extent to 

which major acquisition programs are achieving their cost, schedule and 

capability objectives. To determine the extent to which DHS has policies 

in place to effectively manage individual acquisition programs, as well as 

the department’s acquisition portfolio as a whole, we compared our key 

acquisition management practices to DHS acquisition policy, and 

identified the extent to which DHS has implemented its policy.7

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to September 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We also 

met with DHS officials to discuss our analysis, identify relevant sections of 

the policy that we had not yet accounted for, and solicit their thoughts on 

those key practices that were not reflected in the policy. To determine the 

extent to which DHS has taken actions to address the high-risk 

acquisition management issues we have identified in previous reports, we 

analyzed the department’s recently proposed efforts to address high-risk 

acquisition management challenges, including the department’s progress 

in implementing new initiatives and any challenges DHS must overcome 

moving forward.

DHS invests in major acquisition programs to develop capabilities 

intended to improve its ability to execute its mission. DHS generally 

defines major programs as those expected to cost at least $300 million 

over their respective life cycles, and many are expected to cost more than 

$1 billion. DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 (AD 102) and 

DHS Instruction Manual 102-01-001 (Guidebook), which includes 12 

appendixes, establish the department’s policies and processes for 

managing these major acquisition programs. DHS issued the initial 

version of AD 102 in 2008 in an effort to establish an acquisition 

 

7

Appendix II identifies key acquisition management practices established in our previous 

reports examining DHS, the Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, and private sector organizations.

Background
 

Page 4 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

management system that effectively provides required capability to 

operators in support of the department’s missions.8 AD 102 establishes 

that DHS’s Chief Acquisition Officer—currently the Under Secretary for 

Management (USM)—is responsible for the management and oversight 

of the department’s acquisition policies and procedures.9

Table 1: DHS Acquisition Levels for Major Acquisition Programs

The USM, 

Deputy Secretary, and Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) are the 

Acquisition Decision Authorities for DHS’s major acquisition programs. 

Table 1 identifies how DHS categorizes the 77 major acquisition 

programs it identified in 2011.

Level Life-cycle cost Acquisition Decision Authority

Number of 

programs in

fiscal year 2011

1 Greater than or equal to $1 billion Deputy Secretary, Chief Acquisition Officer, or the Under 

Secretary for Management 43

2 $300 million or more, but less than 

$1 billion

Chief Acquisition Officer, Under Secretary for Management, or 

the Component Acquisition Executive 34

Source: GAO analysis of AD 102 and DHS’s fiscal year 2011 Major Acquisition Oversight List.

Notes: Currently, the USM is designated DHS’s Chief Acquisition Officer, but another official could 

serve in that role in the future. 

Non-major acquisition programs expected to cost less than $300 million are designated Level 3. An 

acquisition may be raised to a higher acquisition level if (a) its importance to DHS’s strategic and 

performance plans is disproportionate to its size, (b) it has high executive visibility, (c) it impacts more 

than one component, (d) it has significant program or policy implications, or (e) the Deputy Secretary, 

Chief Acquisition Officer, or Acquisition Decision Authority recommends an increase to a higher level. 

Level 1 and 2 acquisitions may be delegated to components through formal letters of delegation from 

the Acquisition Decision Authority. 

The Acquisition Decision Authority is responsible for reviewing and 

approving the movement of DHS’s major acquisition programs through 

four phases of the acquisition life cycle at a series of five predetermined 

Acquisition Decision Events. These five Acquisition Decision Events 

 

8

The interim version of AD 102 replaced Management Directive 1400, which had 

governed major acquisition programs since 2006. DHS originally established an 

investment review process in 2003 to provide departmental oversight of major investments 

throughout their life cycles, and to help ensure that funds allocated for investments 

through the budget process are well spent. DHS issued an updated version of AD 102 in 

January 2010 and subsequently updated the guidebook and appendices. 

9

The Secretary of DHS designated the USM the department’s Chief Acquisition Officer in 

April, 2011.

The Acquisition Life Cycle and 

Key Documents 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

provide the Acquisition Decision Authority an opportunity to assess 

whether a major program is ready to proceed through the life-cycle 

phases. The four phases of the acquisition life cycle, as established in AD 

102, are:

1. Need phase: Department officials identify that there is a need, 

consistent with DHS’s strategic plan, justifying an investment in a new 

capability and the establishment of an acquisition program to produce 

that capability;

2. Analyze/Select phase: the Acquisition Decision Authority designates a 

qualified official to manage the program, and this program manager 

subsequently reviews alternative approaches to meeting the need, 

and recommends a best option to the Acquisition Decision Authority;

3. Obtain phase: The program manager develops, tests, and evaluates 

the selected option; during this phase, programs may proceed through 

ADE 2B, which focuses on the cost, schedule, and performance 

parameters for each of the program’s projects; and ADE 2C, which 

focuses on low rate initial production issues; and

4. Produce/Deploy/Support phase: DHS delivers the new capability to its 

operators, and maintains the capability until it is retired; this phase 

includes sustainment, which begins when a capability has been 

fielded for operational use; sustainment involves the supportability of 

fielded systems through disposal, including maintenance and the 

identification of cost reduction opportunities; this phase tends to 

account for up to 70 percent of life-cycle costs. 

Figure 1 depicts the acquisition life cycle.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 1: DHS Acquisition Life Cycle and Document Requirements for Major Acquisition Programs

a

Programs with multiple increments are categorized based on their most mature increment. We were 

unable to identify the phase for one program. 

b

Documents identified for ADE 2B are required for capital assets. Programs providing services only 

require an APB and AP at ADE 2B. 

c

Analyses of Alternatives and Concepts of Operations are approved at the component level at ADE 

2A. 

d

Level 2 programs’ life-cycle cost estimates do not require department-level approval. 

An important aspect of the Acquisition Decision Events is the review and 

approval of key acquisition documents critical to establishing the need for 

a major program, its operational requirements, an acquisition baseline, 

and testing and support plans. AD 102—and the associated DHS 

Instruction Manual 102-01-001 and appendixes—provide more detailed 

guidance for preparing these documents than DHS’s predecessor policy. 

See table 2 for descriptions of the key acquisition documents requiring 

department-level approval before a program moves to the next acquisition 

phase.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Table 2: Key DHS Acquisition Documents Requiring Department-level Approval

Document Description

Mission Need Statement Provides a high-level description of the mission need, whether from a current or impending 

gap. Outlines only the concept of the solution to fill the gap and does not provide information 

on specific types of acquisitions that could provide that capability.

Capability Development Plan Serves as the agreement between the component head, program manager and the 

Acquisition Decision Authority on the activities, cost, and schedule for the work to be 

performed in the Analyze/Select phase.

Operational Requirements Document Provides a number of performance parameters that must be met by a program to provide

useful capability to the operator by closing the capability gaps identified in the Mission Need 

Statement. 

Acquisition Plan Provides a top-level plan for the overall acquisition approach. Describes why the solution is 

in the government’s best interest and why it is the most likely to succeed in delivering 

capabilities to operators. 

Integrated Logistics Support Plan Defines the strategy for ensuring the supportability and sustainment of a future capability. 

Provides critical insight into the approach, schedule, and funding requirements for integrating 

supportability requirements into the systems engineering process.

Life-Cycle Cost Estimate10 Provides an exhaustive and structured accounting of all resources and associated cost 

elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program.

Acquisition Program Baseline Establishes a program’s critical baseline cost, schedule, and performance parameters. 

Expresses the parameters in measurable, quantitative terms, which must be met in order to 

accomplish the investment’s goals.

Test and Evaluation Master Plan Documents the overarching test and evaluation approach for the acquisition program. 

Describes the Developmental and Operational Test and Evaluation needed to determine a 

system’s technical performance, operational effectiveness/suitability, and limitations. 

Source: DHS acquisition policy.

DHS acquisition policy requires that the DHS Investment Review Board 

(IRB) support the Acquisition Decision Authority by reviewing major 

acquisition programs for proper management, oversight, accountability, 

and alignment to the department’s strategic functions at Acquisition 

Decision Events and other meetings as needed. DHS acquisition policy 

establishes that the IRB shall be chaired by the Acquisition Decision 

Authority and consist of individuals that manage DHS’s mission 

objectives, resources, and contracts, including:

• Under Secretary for Science and Technology,

• Assistant Secretary for Policy,

• General Counsel,

 

10Level 2 programs’ life cycle cost estimates do not require department-level approval. 

Acquisition Management 

Officials 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

• Chief Financial Officer,

• Chief Procurement Officer,

• Chief Information Officer,

• Chief Human Capital Officer,

• Chief Administrative Services Officer,

• Chief Security Officer,

• CAE responsible for the program being reviewed, and

• User representatives from component(s) sponsoring the capability.

The Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) is 

responsible for DHS’s overall acquisition governance process, supports 

the IRB, and reports directly to the USM. PARM, which is led by an 

executive director, develops and updates program management policies 

and practices, oversees the acquisition workforce, provides support to 

program managers, and collects program performance data. In March 

2012, PARM issued its first Quarterly Program Accountability Report, 

which provided an independent evaluation of major programs’ health and 

risks.

The department’s program management offices are responsible for 

planning and executing DHS’s individual programs within cost, schedule, 

and performance goals. The program managers provide the IRB key 

information by preparing required acquisition documents that contain 

critical knowledge about their respective programs, facilitating the 

governance process. Nearly all of DHS’s program management offices

are located within 12 of the department’s component agencies, such as 

the Transportation Security Administration, or U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection.11

 

11According to DHS’s fiscal year 2011 Major Acquisition Oversight List, the department’s 

major acquisition programs were sponsored by 12 different component agencies, as 

identified in appendix IV. 

Within these components, CAEs are responsible for 

establishing acquisition processes and overseeing the execution of their 

respective portfolios. Additionally, under AD 102, the USM can delegate 

Acquisition Decision Authority to CAEs for programs with life-cycle cost 

estimates between $300 million and $1 billion. Figure 2 depicts the 

relationship between acquisition managers at the department, 

component, and program level.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 2: DHS Acquisition Managers

The Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), within the Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), is responsible for advising the 

USM, among others, on resource allocation issues. PA&E coordinates 

with DHS’s Office of Policy on the department’s long-term strategic 

planning efforts, analyzing budget submissions, cost estimates, and 

resource constraints. PA&E also oversees the development of the Future 

Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP). DHS is required to submit 

the FYHSP to Congress annually with each budget request. The FYHSP 

is DHS’s 5-year funding plan for programs approved by the Secretary that 

are to support the DHS strategic plan. The FYHSP provides a detailed 

account of time-phased resource requirements for each component, as 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

well as programs’ cost estimates, milestones, and performance 

measures.12

Nearly all of the program managers we surveyed reported their programs 

had experienced significant challenges increasing the risk of poor 

outcomes, particularly cost growth and schedule slips. Sixty-eight of the 

71 programs that responded to our survey reported that they experienced 

funding instability, faced workforce shortfalls, or their planned capabilities 

changed after initiation. Most program managers reported a combination 

of these challenges, as illustrated in figure 3.

 

126 U.S.C. § 454.

Nearly All Program 

Managers Surveyed 

Reported Significant 

Challenges
 

Page 11 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 3: Breakdown of 68 Major Acquisition Programs Experiencing One or More 

Significant Management Challenges

Note: Fifty-nine survey respondents reported whether their program’s planned capabilities changed 

since design and development activities began; 71 survey respondents reported whether their 

programs experienced funding instability; 62 survey respondents reported whether their program’s 

experienced workforce shortfalls. 

We have previously reported that these challenges increase the likelihood 

acquisition programs will cost more and take longer to deliver capabilities 

than expected.13

 

13GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

Although DHS lacks the reliable cost estimates and 

realistic schedules needed to accurately measure program performance, 

GAO-10-388SP (Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010); Best Practices: Better Matching of 

Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288

(Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2011); GAO-10-588SP; GAO-11-743. 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

it has submitted some cost information to Congress, and PARM 

conducted an internal review of its major acquisition programs in March 

2012. We used this information and our survey results to identify 42 

programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both.14

Figure 4: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Experiencing Cost Growth or 

Schedule Slips

Cost 

information DHS submitted to Congress provides insight into the 

magnitude of the cost growth for 16 of the 42 programs. Using this 

information, we found total project costs increased from $19.7 billion in 

2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011, an aggregate increase of 166 percent. See 

figure 4.

Note: We calculated the magnitude of the total-project cost growth using DHS FYHSPs issued in 

2008 and 2011. DHS did not submit FYHSPs in 2009 or 2010. FYHSP cost estimates are presented 

in then-year dollars. Additionally, 40 survey respondents reported having a DHS approved Acquisition 

Program Baseline and whether their program had experienced cost growth or schedule slips. 

We have previously reported that cost growth and schedule slips can lead 

to reduced capabilities, decreasing the value provided to the operator—as 

well as the value of the resources invested in the programs.15

 

14The cost estimates DHS reported to Congress were presented in then-year dollars.

This poor 

15GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to 

Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2005); 

GAO-10-588SP. 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

performance threatens the department’s ability to successfully field the 

capabilities it is pursuing. 

Prior to entering the Obtain phase, programs are to establish the specific 

capabilities they plan to develop to improve DHS’s ability to execute its 

mission. Forty-three survey respondents reported that their programs 

changed planned capabilities after the initiation of design and 

development activities, which occurs between ADE 2B and testing. We 

have previously found that both increases and decreases in planned 

capabilities are associated with cost growth and schedule slips.16

 

16

We 

have found that increasing planned capabilities can lead to cost growth or 

schedule slips because programs are more costly to change after they 

begin development activities. Alternatively, we have stated that programs 

may choose to decrease their planned capabilities in response to cost 

growth or schedule slips in an effort to maintain affordability or deliver 

certain capabilities when needed. At DHS, we found that more than half 

of the 43 programs that reported changing their capabilities had 

experienced cost growth or schedule slips, regardless of whether their 

planned capabilities increased, decreased, or both. See figure 5.

GAO-10-388SP. 

Most Major Programs 

Reported Their Planned 

Capabilities Changed after 

Initiation
 

Page 14 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 5: Programs that Changed Planned Capabilities and Experienced Cost 

Growth or Schedule Slips

Note: Fifty-nine survey respondents replied to whether their program had changed planned 

capabilities. Forty respondents reported having a DHS approved Acquisition Program Baseline and 

whether their program had experienced cost growth or schedule slips. 

The 43 survey respondents that reported their planned capabilities 

changed identified five key reasons for the changes. Nineteen of the 43 

survey respondents reported more than one reason. See figure 6.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 6: Reasons Programs Changed Their Planned Capabilities

Note: Fifty-nine survey respondents replied to whether their programs’ planned capabilities changed; 

43 reported reasons their planned capabilities changed; 19 of the 43 reported multiple reasons. 

Survey respondents identified operator input as the most common reason 

for increasing planned capabilities after the initiation of development 

efforts, even though officials at the department, component, and program 

levels all said operator input at the initiation of design and development is 

very useful. For example, in 2011, we reported that the U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services’s Transformation program did not fully define its 

planned capabilities before it awarded a contract to develop a new 

system to enhance the adjudication of applications. After the contract was 

awarded, the program office worked with those officials most familiar with 

adjudication operations and discovered that the functions were more 

complex than expected. As a result, the program office revised the 

requirements, and the deployment date for key capabilities slipped from 

April 2011 to October 2012.17

 

17GAO, Immigration Benefits: Consistent Adherence to DHS’s Acquisition Policy Could 

Help Improve Transformation Program Outcomes, GAO-12-66 (Washington, D.C.: 

November 22, 2011).
 

Page 16 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Alternatively, DHS program managers identified funding availability as the 

most common reason for decreasing planned capabilities after the 

initiation of development efforts. In the past, we have stated that agencies 

may reduce planned capabilities in this manner when their programs 

experience cost growth.18 Decreasing planned capabilities in response to 

affordability concerns may be fiscally responsible, but as a result, 

operators may not receive the capability originally agreed upon to 

address existing capability gaps.

DHS is required to establish out-year funding levels for programs annually 

in the FYHSP. Changes to planned out-year funding levels create funding 

instability, which we have previously found increases the risk of cost 

growth, schedule slips, and capability shortfalls.19 Sixty-one survey 

respondents reported that their programs have experienced funding 

instability, and we found that 44 of the 61 programs had also realized cost 

growth, schedule slips, or capability reductions.20 Additionally, 29 survey 

respondents reported that their programs had to resequence the delivery 

of certain capabilities.21

 

18GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 

For example, Coast Guard officials told us they 

deferred some of the HH-60 helicopter’s capabilities because of funding 

constraints across their portfolio of programs. The Coast Guard delayed 

delivery of dedicated radar to search the surface of the water in order to 

replace critical components, such as main rotor blades, as planned. 

Figure 7 identifies how program managers reported funding instability has 

affected their programs.

GAO-11-233SP (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2011).

19GAO-01-288. 

20Seventy-one survey respondents replied to whether their program experienced funding 

instability. 

21Forty survey respondents reported at least one effect of funding instability.

Most Major Programs 

Reported They 

Experienced Funding 

Instability
 

Page 17 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 7: Effects of Funding Instability on Programs, as Identified by Program 

Managers

Note: Seventy-one survey respondents replied to whether their program experienced funding 

instability; 61 survey respondents reported whether they experienced an effect of funding instability; 

40 reported at least one effect; 30 of the 40 reported multiple effects. 

Forty-five of the 61 survey respondents that reported their programs 

experienced funding instability also reported reasons for the funding 

instability. Twenty-two survey respondents reported more than one 

reason. See figure 8.
 

Page 18 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 8: Reasons Programs Experienced Funding Instability

Note: Seventy-one survey respondents replied to whether their program experienced funding 

instability; 45 reported reasons for their funding instability; 22 of the 45 reported multiple reasons for 

funding instability. 

Eighteen survey respondents reported that their program experienced a 

funding decrease because of another program’s funding needs. We have 

previously reported that agencies often change funding levels in this 

manner when they commit to more programs than they can afford.22

 

22GAO, Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve 

Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, 

 A 

PA&E official told us that DHS’s resource requirements exceed the 

department’s funding levels, and that the department has allowed major 

acquisition programs to advance through the acquisition life cycle without 

identifying how they will be funded. Furthermore, a PA&E official stated 

that DHS has not been able to determine the magnitude of its forthcoming 

funding gap because cost estimates are unreliable. The director of the 

department’s cost analysis division determined that only 12 major 

acquisition programs met most of DHS’s criteria for reliable cost 

GAO-08-619 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 

2008). 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

estimates when it reviewed the components’ fiscal year 2013 budget 

submissions.23 In 2010, we reported that DHS officials had difficulty 

managing major programs because they lacked accurate cost 

estimates.24

Given the fiscal challenges facing the federal government, funding 

shortfalls may become an increasingly common challenge at DHS, 

leading to further cost growth that widens the gap between resource 

requirements and available funding.

DHS acquisition policy establishes that each program office should be 

staffed with personnel who have appropriate qualifications and 

experience in key disciplines, such as systems engineering, logistics, and 

financial management.25 Fifty-one survey respondents reported that their 

programs had experienced workforce shortfalls—specifically a lack of 

government personnel—increasing the likelihood their programs will 

perform poorly in the future. We have previously reported that a lack of 

adequate staff in DHS program offices—both in terms of skill and staffing 

levels—increased the risk of insufficient program planning and contractor 

oversight, which is often associated with cost growth and schedule slips.26

Figure 9 below identifies the functional areas where DHS acquisition 

programs reported workforce shortfalls.

 

23The department’s cost analysis division was combined with the acquisition program 

management division to create PARM in 2011. The Cost Estimating and Analysis center 

of excellence is now responsible for supporting cost analyses within DHS. 

24GAO-10-588SP

25DHS Instruction Manual 102-01-001, Appendix E, Acquisition Program Office and 

Component Acquisition Executive Core Staffing Requirements (Oct. 1, 2011).

26GAO-10-588SP

Most Major Programs 

Reported They 

Experienced Workforce 

Shortfalls
 

Page 20 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 9: Functional Areas Contributing to Workforce Shortfalls

Note: Sixty-two survey respondents reported whether their program experienced workforce shortfalls 

in government full-time-equivalents in three functional areas; 46 of the 51 reported shortfalls in 

multiple functional areas. 

a

Includes auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and 

purchasing 

b

Includes systems planning, research, development, and engineering; life-cycle logistics; test and 

evaluation; production; quality and manufacturing; and facilities engineering. 

We found that 29 of the 51 DHS programs that identified workforce 

shortfalls had also experienced cost growth or schedule slips.27

 

27Sixty-two survey respondents reported whether their program experienced a workforce 

shortfall in government full-time-equivalents in three functional areas; 40 reported that 

their program had a DHS-approved Acquisition Program Baseline and whether the 

program had experienced cost growth and schedule slips.

The 

workforce shortfalls have led to insufficient program planning, hindering 

the development of key acquisition documents intended to inform seniorlevel decision making. For example, CAEs and program managers said 

that workforce shortfalls limited program management offices’ interaction 

with stakeholders and operators, and delayed or degraded test plans and 

cost estimates. In addition, a PARM official explained that DHS has had 

to rely on contractors to produce cost estimates because of workforce 

shortfalls, and the quality of these cost estimates has varied.
 

Page 21 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

The USM has stated that properly staffing programs is one of DHS’s 

biggest challenges, and we have previously reported that the capacity of 

the federal government’s acquisition workforce has not kept pace with 

increased spending for increasingly complex purchases.28 PARM officials 

told us that the IRB’s program reviews include assessments of the 

program office workforce, but that the IRB considers staffing issues a 

relatively low priority, and we found the IRB has formally documented 

workforce-related challenges for only 11 programs.

DHS acquisition policy reflects many key program management 

practices.29 It requires programs to develop documents demonstrating 

critical knowledge that would help leaders make better informed 

investment decisions when managing individual programs. This 

knowledge would help DHS mitigate the risks of cost growth and 

schedule slips resulting from funding instability, workforce shortfalls, and 

planned-capability changes. However, as of April 2012, the department 

had only verified that four programs documented all of the critical 

knowledge required to progress through the acquisition life cycle. In most 

instances, DHS leadership has allowed programs it has reviewed to 

proceed with acquisition activities without meeting these requirements. 

Officials explained that DHS’s culture has emphasized the need to rapidly 

execute missions more than sound acquisition management practices, 

and we have found that most of the department’s major programs are at 

risk of cost growth and schedule slips as a result. In addition, they lack

the reliable cost estimates, realistic schedules, and agreed-upon baseline 

objectives that DHS acknowledges are needed to accurately track 

program performance, limiting DHS leadership’s ability to effectively 

manage those programs and provide information to Congress. DHS 

recognizes the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, 

but significant work remains.

 

28GAO, The Office of Management and Budget’s Acquisition Workforce Development 

Strategic Plan for Civilian Agencies, GAO-10-459R (Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2010).

29DHS acquisition policy consists of AD 102-01, an associated guidebook, and 12 

appendices.

Programs Proceed 

without Meeting 

Sound DHS 

Acquisition Policy
 

Page 22 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

In 2005, we reported that DHS established an investment review process 

that adopted many practices to reduce risk and increase the chances for 

successful outcomes.30

A knowledge-based approach to capability development allows 

developers to be reasonably certain, at critical points in the acquisition life 

cycle, that their products are likely to meet established cost, schedule, 

and performance objectives.

In 2010, we reported that AD 102 provided more 

detailed guidance for preparing key acquisition documents than the 

department’s predecessor policy. In October 2011, DHS updated the 

Guidebook and its appendixes, and we have found that it establishes a 

knowledge-based acquisition policy for program management that is 

largely consistent with key practices.

31 This knowledge provides them with 

information needed to make sound investment decisions, and it would 

help DHS address the significant challenges we identified across its 

acquisition programs: funding instability, workforce shortfalls, and 

planned-capability changes. Over the past several years, our work has 

emphasized the importance of obtaining key knowledge at critical points 

in major system acquisitions and, based on this work, we have identified 

eight key practice areas for program management. These key practice 

areas are summarized in table 3, along with our assessment of DHS’s 

acquisition policy.

 

30GAO, Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create an 

Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2005).

31In our past work examining weapon acquisition issues and best practices for product 

development, we have found that leading commercial firms pursue an acquisition 

approach that is anchored in knowledge, whereby high levels of product knowledge are 

demonstrated by critical points in the acquisition process. See GAO-11-233SP. 

DHS Acquisition Policy 

Generally Reflects Key 

Program Management 

Practices
 

Page 23 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Table 3: GAO Assessment of DHS’s Acquisition Policy Compared to Key Program-management Practices 

GAO key practice area Summary of key practices

GAO assessment of

DHS acquisition policy

Identify and validate needs Current capabilities should be identified to determine if there is a 

gap between the current and needed capabilities. A need statement 

should be informed by a comprehensive assessment that considers 

the organization’s overall mission. 



Assess alternatives to select 

most appropriate solution 

Analyses of Alternatives should be conducted early in the 

acquisition process to compare key elements of competing 

solutions, including performance, costs, and risks. Moreover, these 

analyses should assess many alternatives across multiple 

concepts. 



Clearly establish well-defined 

requirements 

Requirements should be well defined and include input from 

operators and stakeholders. Programs should be grounded in wellunderstood concepts of how systems would be used and likely 

requirements costs. 



Develop realistic cost 

estimates and schedules 

A cost estimate should be well documented, comprehensive, 

accurate, and credible. A schedule should identify resources 

needed to do the work and account for how long all activities will 

take. Additionally, a schedule should identify relationships between 

sequenced activities. 



Secure stable funding that 

matches resources to 

requirements 

Programs should make trade-offs as necessary when working in a 

constrained budget environment. 

Demonstrate technology, 

design, and manufacturing 

maturity 

Capabilities should be demonstrated and tested prior to system 

development, making a production decision, and formal operator 

acceptance. 

◑

Utilize milestones and exit 

criteria 

Milestones and exit criteria—specific accomplishments that 

demonstrate progress—should be used to determine that a 

program has developed required and appropriate knowledge prior 

to a program moving forward to the next acquisition phase. 

◕

Establish an adequate 

workforce 

Acquisition personnel should have appropriate qualifications and 

experience. Program managers should stay on until the end of an 

acquisition life-cycle phase to assure accountability. Government 

and contractor staff should also remain consistent.

◑

Source: GAO analysis of DHS acquisition policy.

Note: Appendixes I and II present a more detailed description of key program-management practices 

and how we assessed them. 

Legend:  DHS policy reflects key practices; ◕ DHS policy substantially reflects key practices; 

◑ DHS policy partially reflects key practices. 

We found that DHS’s acquisition policy generally reflects key programmanagement practices, including some intended to help develop 

knowledge at critical points in the acquisition life cycle. Furthermore, the 

revised policy the department issued in October 2011 better reflects two 

key practice areas by bolstering exit criteria and taking steps to establish 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

an adequate acquisition workforce. Specifically, the revised Guidebook 

and its appendixes require that refined cost estimates be reviewed at 

major milestones after the program baseline has been established, and 

used to determine whether a program has developed appropriate 

knowledge to move forward in the acquisition life cycle. These reviews 

can help reduce risk and the potential for unexpected cost and schedule 

growth. Additionally, the revised policy establishes that major program 

offices should be staffed with personnel with appropriate qualifications 

and experience in key acquisition disciplines. We have previously 

identified that the magnitude and complexity of the DHS acquisition 

portfolio demands a capable and properly trained workforce and that 

workforce shortfalls increase the risk of poor acquisition outcomes. The 

policy revisions could help mitigate this risk.

However, there are three areas where DHS could further enhance 

acquisition oversight:

• The policy requires that DHS test technologies and manufacturing 

processes, but it does not require that 1) programs demonstrate 

technologies in a realistic environment prior to initiating development 

activities at the outset of the Obtain phase, or 2) manufacturing 

processes be tested prior to production. These practices decrease the 

risk that rework will be required, which can lead to additional cost 

growth and schedule slips.

• The policy requires that DHS establish exit criteria for programs 

moving to the next acquisition phase, and standardizes document 

requirements across all major programs, but it does not require that 1) 

exit criteria be quantifiable to the extent possible, or 2) consistent 

information be used across programs when approving progress within 

the Obtain phase, specifically at ADE 2B and 2C. These practices 

decrease the risk that a program will make an avoidable error 

because management lacks information needed to leverage lessons 

learned across multiple program reviews.

• The policy requires that program managers be certified at an 

appropriate level, but it does not state that they should remain with 

their programs until the next major milestone when possible. This 

practice decreases the risk that program managers will not be held 

accountable for their decisions, such as proceeding without reliable 

cost estimates or realistic schedules.

PARM officials generally acknowledged DHS has opportunities to 

strengthen its program-management guidance. Officials reported that 

they are currently in the process of updating AD 102, which they plan to 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

complete by the end of fiscal year 2012. They also plan to issue revisions 

to the associated guidebook and appendixes in phases. PARM officials 

told us that they plan to structure the revised acquisition policy by 

function, consolidating guidance for financial management, systems 

engineering, reporting requirements, and so forth. PARM officials 

anticipate that this organization will make it easier for users to identify 

relevant information as well as streamline the internal review process for 

future updates.

DHS acquisition policy establishes several key program-management 

practices through document requirements. AD 102 requires that major 

acquisition programs provide the IRB documents demonstrating the 

critical knowledge needed to support effective decision making before 

progressing through the acquisition life cycle. For example, programs 

must document that they have assessed alternatives to select the most 

appropriate solution through a formal Analysis of Alternatives report, 

which must be approved by component-level leadership. Figure10

identifies acquisition documents that must be approved at the department 

level and their corresponding key practice areas.

Figure 10: DHS Acquisition Documents Requiring Department-level Approval 

DHS acquisition policy requires these documents, but the department 

generally has not implemented its acquisition policy as intended, and in 

practice the department has not adhered to key program management 

DHS Has Approved Few 

Programs’ Key Acquisition 

Documents
 

Page 26 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

practices. DHS’s efforts to implement the department’s acquisition policy 

have been complicated by the large number of legacy programs initiated 

before the department was created, including 11 programs that PARM 

officials told us were in sustainment when AD 102 was signed.

32 We 

found that the department has only approved four programs’ required 

documents in accordance with DHS policy: the National Cybersecurity 

and Protection System, the Next Generation Network, the Offshore Patrol 

Cutter, and the Passenger Screening Program. Additionally, we found 

that 32 programs had none of the required documents approved by the 

department. See figure 11. 

 

32Sustainment begins when a capability has been fielded for operational use, and it 

involves the supportability of fielded systems through disposal, including maintenance and 

the identification of cost reduction opportunities. System operations, support, and 

sustainment costs tend to approach up to 70 percent of life-cycle costs. 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 11: Programs That Have Key Acquisition Documents Approved in 

Accordance with AD 102

Note: Appendix IV identifies which documents have been approved for each of the 71 programs that 

responded to our survey. Five programs are not accounted for in this figure because their documents 

did not require department-level approval. See appendix IV for additional information. 

According to PARM officials, 10 of the 32 programs with no documents approved were in sustainment 

at the time AD 102 was signed, as was 1 of the 30 programs with some documents approved – the 

Application Support Center. DHS approved the Application Support Center’s Mission Need Statement 

and Acquisition Program Baseline in March 2011. 

Since 2008, DHS leadership—through the IRB or its predecessor body 

the Acquisition Review Board—has formally reviewed 49 of the 71 major 

programs that responded to our survey. It permitted 43 of those programs 

to proceed with acquisition activities without verifying the programs had 

developed the knowledge required for AD 102’s key acquisition 

documents. See figure 12. 
 

Page 28 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 12: Programs Reviewed by DHS’s Executive Review Board

Officials from half of the CAE offices we spoke to reported that DHS’s 

culture has emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions more than 

sound acquisition management practices. PARM officials agreed, 

explaining that DHS has permitted programs to advance without 

department-approved acquisition documents because DHS had an 

operational need for the promised capabilities, but the department could 

not approve the documents in a timely manner. PARM officials explained 

that, in certain instances, programs were not capable of documenting 

knowledge, while in others, PARM lacked the capacity to validate that the 

documented knowledge was adequate. In 2008 and 2010, we reported 

that several programs were permitted to proceed with acquisition 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

activities on the condition they complete key action items in the future.33

Because DHS has not generally implemented its acquisition policy, senior 

leaders lack the critical knowledge needed to accurately track program 

performance: (1) department-approved APBs, (2) reliable cost estimates, 

and (3) realistic schedules. Specifically, at the beginning of 2012, DHS 

leadership had approved APBs for less than one-third of the 63 programs 

we reviewed that are required to have one based on their progression 

through the acquisition life cycle. Additionally, we found that none of the 

programs with a department-approved APB also met DHS’s criteria for 

both reliable cost estimates and realistic schedules, which are key 

components of the APB. This raises questions about the quality of those 

APBs that have been approved, as well as the value of the DHS review 

process in practice. Figure 13 identifies how many programs currently 

have department-approved APBs, reliable cost estimates, and realistic 

schedules.

However, PARM officials told us that many of these action items were not 

addressed in a timely manner. Additionally, program managers reported 

that there has been miscommunication between DHS headquarters and 

program offices regarding implementation of the acquisition policy, and 

we found that DHS headquarters and program managers often had a 

different understanding of whether their programs were in compliance 

with AD 102. For example, DHS headquarters officials told us that 19 of 

the 40 programs that reported through our survey they had departmentapproved acquisition program baselines (APB) in fact did not.

 

33GAO-09-29, GAO-10-588SP. 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 13: Programs with Department-approved APBs, Reliable Cost Estimates, and 

Realistic Schedules

Note: We analyzed DHS acquisition decision memorandums to determine whether a program had an 

approved APB, and we reviewed an internal DHS assessment to determine the reliability of programs’ 

cost estimates. Sixty-eight survey respondents replied to our scheduling questions. 

The APB is a critical tool for managing an acquisition program. According 

to DHS’s acquisition Guidebook, the program baseline is the agreement 

between program, component, and department level officials, establishing 

how systems will perform, when they will be delivered, and what they will 

cost.34

 

34DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001: Appendix K, Acquisition Program 

Baseline; October 1, 2011.

In practice, when the Acquisition Decision Authority approves a 

program’s APB, among other things, it is concurring that the proposed 

capability is worth the estimated cost. However, we found that DHS plans 

to spend more than $105 billion on programs lacking current, departmentapproved APBs. Specifically, when DHS submitted the FYHSP to 

Acquisition Program Baselines
 

Page 31 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Congress in 2011, it reported that 34 of the 43 programs lacking 

department-approved APBs were expected to cost $108.8 billion over 

their acquisition life cycles. DHS did not provide cost estimates for the 

other 9 programs because the data were unreliable.

In addition to overall cost, schedule, and performance goals, the APB 

also contains intermediate metrics to measure a program’s progress in 

achieving those goals. These intermediate metrics allow managers to 

take corrective actions earlier in the acquisition life cycle. DHS’s lack of 

APBs, PARM officials explained, makes it more difficult to manage 

program performance. In March 2012, PARM reported that 32 programs 

had experienced significant cost growth or schedule slips in its internal 

Quarterly Program Accountability Report. However, DHS has only 

formally established that 8 of its programs have fallen short of their cost, 

schedule, or performance goals, because approximately three-quarters of 

the programs PARM identified lack the current, department-approved 

APBs needed to authoritatively measure performance.

To accurately assess a program’s performance, managers need accurate 

cost and schedule information. However, DHS acquisition programs 

generally do not have reliable cost estimates and realistic schedules, as 

required by DHS policy.35

PARM and PA&E officials said that cost estimates provided by program 

management offices often understate likely costs. PA&E officials 

explained that many programs have not included operations and 

maintenance activities in their cost estimates, which we have previously 

reported can account for 60 percent or more of a program’s total costs.

In June 2012, the department reported to GAO 

that its senior leaders lacked confidence in the performance data they 

receive, hindering their efforts to manage risk and allocate resources.

36

 

35DHS’s criteria for assessing the cost estimates are based on GAO Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, 

The director of the department’s cost analysis division determined that 

only 12 major acquisition programs met most of DHS’s criteria for reliable 

cost estimates, and 6 of these programs lacked current, departmentGAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

36GAO-10-588SP. 

Cost Estimates and Schedules
 

Page 32 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

approved APBs.37 Additionally, only 12 program offices reported that they 

fully adhered to DHS’s scheduling guidance, which requires that 

programs sequence all activities, examine the effects of any delays, 

update schedules to ensure validity, and so forth. Eight of these programs 

lacked department-approved APBs.38

DHS’s lack of reliable performance data not only hinders its internal 

acquisition management efforts, but also limits Congressional oversight. 

Congress mandated the department submit the Comprehensive 

Acquisition Status Report (CASR) to the Senate and House Committees 

on Appropriations as part of the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget, 

which was submitted in February 2012. However, DHS told us that it did 

not do so until August 2012. Congress mandated DHS produce the CASR 

in order to obtain information necessary for in-depth congressional 

oversight, including life-cycle cost estimates, schedules, risk ratings, and 

out-year funding levels for all major programs. The CASR has the 

potential to greatly enhance oversight efforts by establishing a common 

understanding of the status of all major programs.

In April 2012, PARM officials told us that DHS had begun to implement its 

acquisition policy in a more disciplined manner. They told us that they had 

adequate capacity to review programs, and would no longer advance 

programs through the acquisition life cycle until DHS leadership verified 

the programs had developed critical knowledge. For example, in February 

2012, the IRB denied a request from the BioWatch Gen 3 program—

which is developing a capability to detect airborne biological agents—to 

solicit proposals from contractors because its draft APB was not valid. 

PARM officials said they are using a risk-based approach to prioritize the 

approval of the department’s APBs. Specifically, they explained that one 

of their fiscal year 2011 initiatives was to attain department-level approval 

of APBs for all Level 1 programs in the Obtain phase of the acquisition life 

cycle. However, we found only 8 of the 19 programs PARM said fell into 

 

37The department’s cost analysis division was combined with the acquisition program 

management division to create PARM in 2011. The Cost Estimating and Analysis center 

of excellence is now responsible for supporting cost analyses within DHS. 

38One of these eight programs—the Medium Endurance Cutter Sustainment program—is

not required to have a department-approved APB. 

DHS Recognizes the Need 

to Implement Its 

Acquisition Policy More 

Consistently, but 

Significant Work Remains
 

Page 33 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

this category had current, department-approved APBs as of September

2012.

In an effort to improve the consistency of performance data reported by 

program managers, PARM officials stated that they are establishing 

scorecards to assess cost estimates and standard work breakdown 

structures for IT programs. The PARM officials also explained that CAE’s 

performance evaluations now include an assessment of the 

completeness and accuracy of performance data reported for their 

respective programs. However, DHS must overcome significant 

challenges in order to improve the reliability of performance data and 

meet key requirements in the department’s acquisition policy. For 

example, department and component-level officials told us that program 

managers do not report on their programs in a consistent manner. 

Additionally, DHS officials told us that they lack cost estimating capacity 

throughout the department and that they must rely heavily on contractors, 

which do not consistently provide high-quality deliverables. In August 

2012, a PARM official stated that DHS was currently in the process of 

hiring eight additional government cost estimators to support programs. 

DHS acquisition policy does not fully reflect several key portfoliomanagement practices, such as allocating resources strategically, and 

DHS has not yet reestablished an oversight board to manage its 

investment portfolio across the department. As a result, DHS has largely 

made investment decisions on a program-by-program and component-bycomponent basis. The widespread risk of poorly understood cost growth, 

coupled with the fiscal challenges facing the federal government, makes it 

essential that DHS allocate resources to its major programs in a 

deliberate manner. DHS plans to develop stronger portfolio-management 

policies and processes, but until it does so, DHS programs are more likely 

to experience additional funding instability in the future, which will 

increase the risk of further cost growth and schedule slips. These 

outcomes, combined with a tighter budget, could prevent DHS from 

developing needed capabilities.

DHS Needs Policy and 

Process 

Enhancements to 

Effectively Manage Its 

Portfolio of 

Investments
 

Page 34 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

In our past work, we have found that successful commercial companies 

use a disciplined and integrated approach to prioritize needs and allocate 

resources.39

Table 4: GAO Assessment of DHS’s Acquisition Policy Compared to Key Portfolio-management Practices

As a result, they can avoid pursuing more projects than their 

resources can support, and better optimize the return on their investment. 

This approach, known as portfolio management, requires companies to 

view each of their investments as contributing to a collective whole, rather 

than as independent and unrelated. With this enterprise perspective, 

companies can effectively (1) identify and prioritize opportunities, and (2) 

allocate available resources to support the highest priority—or most 

promising—opportunities. Over the past several years, we have 

examined the practices that private and public sector entities use to 

achieve a balanced mix of new projects, and based on this work, we have 

identified four key practice areas for portfolio management, summarized 

in table 4, along with our assessment of DHS acquisition policy.

GAO key practice area Summary of key practices

GAO assessment of DHS 

acquisition policy

Clearly define and empower 

leadership 

Portfolio managers, with the support of cross-functional teams, 

should be empowered to make investment decisions, and held 

accountable for outcomes.

◑

Establish standard assessment 

criteria, and demonstrate 

comprehensive knowledge of 

the portfolio 

Investments should be ranked and selected using a disciplined 

process to assess the costs, benefits, and risks of alternative 

products to ensure transparency and comparability across 

alternatives.

◑

Prioritize investments by 

integrating the requirements, 

acquisition, and budget 

processes

Organizations should use long-range planning and an integrated 

approach to prioritize needs and allocate resources in accordance 

with strategic goals, so they can avoid pursuing more products 

than they can afford and optimize return on investment.

◑

Continually make go/no-go 

decisions to rebalance the 

portfolio 

Reviews should be scheduled (1) annually to consider proposed 

changes, (2) as new opportunities are identified, (3) whenever a 

program breaches its objectives, and (4) after investments are 

completed. Information gathered during these reviews should be 

used to adjust and balance the portfolio to achieve strategic 

outcomes. 

◔

Source: GAO analysis of DHS acquisition policy.

Note: Appendixes I and II present a more detailed description of key portfolio management practices 

and how we assessed them. 

Legend: ◑ DHS policy partially reflects key practices; ◔ DHS policy minimally reflects key practices 

 

39GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington, 

D.C.: March 30, 2007). 

DHS Acquisition Policy 

Shortfalls Hinder Portfolio 

Management Efforts
 

Page 35 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

We found that DHS’s acquisition policy reflects some key portfoliomanagement practices. DHS has not designated individual portfolio 

managers, but it requires that the department’s Chief Acquisition Officer—

currently the USM—be supported by the IRB, which includes officials 

representing key functional areas, such as budget, procurement, IT, and 

human capital. DHS’s acquisition policy also establishes that 

requirements, acquisition, and budget processes should be connected to 

promote stability.

However, as acknowledged by DHS officials, the policy does not reflect 

several other key portfolio-management practices:

• The policy does not empower portfolio managers to decide how best 

to invest resources. This practice increases the likelihood resources 

will be invested effectively, and that portfolio managers will be held 

accountable for outcomes.

• The policy does not establish that investments should be ranked and 

selected using a disciplined process. This practice increases the 

likelihood the portfolio will be balanced with risk spread across 

products.

• The policy does not establish that (1) resource allocations should 

align with strategic goals, or (2) the investment review policy should 

use long-range planning. These practices increase the likelihood that 

the right amount of funds will be delivered to the right projects, 

maximizing return on investments.

• The policy does not require portfolio reviews (1) annually to consider 

proposed changes, (2) as new opportunities are identified, or (3) 

whenever a program breaches its objectives. These practices provide 

opportunities for leaders to increase the value of investments, 

determine whether or not the investments are still relevant and 

affordable, and help keep programs within cost and schedule targets.

PARM officials acknowledge that the department does not currently have 

a policy that addresses these key portfolio-management practices. 

Further, they told us that there has been less focus on portfolio 

management than program management to date because the acquisition 

process is still relatively immature. As a result, DHS largely makes 

investment decisions on a program-by-program and component-bycomponent basis. In our work at the Department of Defense, we have 

found this approach hinders efforts to achieve a balanced mix of 
 

Page 36 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

programs that are affordable and feasible and that provide the greatest 

return on investment.40

PARM officials anticipate that DHS will improve its portfolio-management 

guidance in the future by formalizing its proposed Integrated Investment 

Life Cycle Model (IILCM). In January 2011, DHS presented a vision of the 

IILCM as a means to better integrate investment management functions, 

including requirements development, resource allocation, and program 

governance. DHS explained that the IILCM would ensure mission needs 

drive investment decisions and establish a common framework for 

monitoring and assessing the department’s investments. The IILCM 

would be implemented through the creation of several new departmentlevel councils, as illustrated in figure 14, which would identify priorities 

and capability gaps.

Figure 14: Councils and Offices in DHS’s Proposed IILCM 

 

40GAO-07-388. 
 

Page 37 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

In 2003, DHS established the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) to 

identify crosscutting opportunities and common requirements among DHS 

components, and help determine how DHS should use its resources. 

However, as we have previously reported, the JRC stopped meeting in 

2006.41

In the absence of a JRC, or the proposed CRC, DHS budget officials 

explained it is difficult to develop a unified strategy to guide trade-offs 

between programs because of the diversity of the department’s missions. 

Poor program outcomes, coupled with a tighter budget, could prevent 

DHS from developing needed capabilities. In our work at the Department 

of Defense, we have found that agencies must prioritize investments, or 

programs will continually compete for funding by promising more 

capabilities than they can deliver while underestimating costs.

In 2008, we recommended that the JRC be reinstated, or that 

DHS establish another joint requirements oversight board. At that time, 

DHS officials recognized that strengthening the JRC was a top priority. 

The department has proposed the creation of a Capabilities and 

Requirements Council (CRC) to serve in a similar role as the JRC, but the 

CRC is not yet established.

42 We also 

found that success was measured in terms of keeping a program alive 

rather than efficiently delivering the capabilities needed.43

Until recently, the responsibility for balancing portfolios has fallen on 

components. However, DHS policy officials noted that component-level 

officials have a relatively limited perspective focused on those programs 

under their authority, making it more difficult to ensure the alignment of 

mission needs to department-level goals. Additionally, component-level 

officials can only make trade-offs across the portion of the DHS portfolio 

that falls under their purview, limiting opportunities to increase the 

department’s return on its investments.

It appears the 

lack of prioritization is affecting DHS in the same way. As discussed 

earlier in our assessment of program challenges, 18 of the department’s 

programs reported DHS decreased their out-year funding levels because 

of another program’s funding needs, and 61 programs reported they 

experienced some form of funding instability.

 

41GAO-09-29. 

42GAO-08-619. 

43GAO-06-110. 

DHS Investment Process 

Shortfalls Hinder Portfolio 

Management Efforts
 

Page 38 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

The USM and PARM officials have stated they recognize the value of 

portfolio management, and they have taken some steps to fill the gap left 

without a functioning JRC or CRC. A PARM official stated that, starting in 

2012, PARM is collaborating with the Offices of the Chief Information, 

Financial, and Procurement Officers, as well as the Office of Policy, to 

conduct portfolio reviews from a functional, cross-component perspective. 

In the past, PARM’s portfolio reviews focused on each component 

individually. This new functional approach is establishing portfolios based 

on departmentwide missions, such as domain awareness or screening, 

and PARM officials intend to produce trade-off recommendations for 

prioritizing funding across different components. They also intend to use 

functional portfolio reviews to provide greater insight into the effects of 

funding instability, and the USM has stated that the portfolio reviews will 

inform the department’s fiscal year 2014 budget. DHS intends for the 

proposed CRC to make trade-offs across the functional portfolios.

PARM’s Quarterly Program Accountability Report (QPAR), issued in 

March 2012, also has the potential to inform DHS’s portfolio management 

efforts. In developing the QPAR, PARM used a standardized set of five 

criteria to measure the value of each program: mission alignment, 

architectural maturity, capability gap, mission criticality, and DHS benefit. 

This allowed PARM to identify 48 high-value and 13 low-value programs. 

However, the QPAR does not recommend using the information to 

prioritize resource allocations, which would address a key portfolio 

management practice. Further, DHS’s widespread lack of departmentapproved Mission Need Statements (MNS) undermines efforts to improve 

portfolio management and prioritize investments. The MNS links 

capability gaps to the acquisitions that will fill those gaps, making it a 

critical tool for prioritizing programs. The MNS also provides formal 

executive-level acknowledgment that there is a mission need justifying 

the allocation of DHS’s limited resources. However, only about 40 percent 

of DHS’s major acquisition programs have a department-approved MNS.
 

Page 39 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

DHS has introduced seven initiatives that could improve acquisition 

management by addressing longstanding challenges we have identified—

such as funding instability and acquisition workforce shortfalls—which 

DHS survey respondents also identified in 2012. Implementation plans 

are still being developed for all of these initiatives, and DHS is still 

working to address critical issues, particularly capacity questions. 

Because of this, it is too early to determine whether the DHS initiatives 

will be effective, as we have previously established that agencies must 

sustain progress over time to address management challenges.44 DHS is 

also pursuing a tiered-governance structure that it has begun to 

implement for IT acquisitions. Before the department can regularly 

delegate ADE decision authority through this tiered-governance structure, 

DHS must successfully implement its seven acquisition management 

initiatives and apply its knowledge-based acquisition policy on a more 

consistent basis to reduce risks and improve program outcomes.

In 2005, we identified acquisition management as a high-risk area at 

DHS.45 Since then, we have issued multiple reports identifying acquisition 

management challenges.46

In 2011, DHS began to develop initiatives to address these challenges, 

and DHS has continued to evolve these plans in 2012. In January 2011, 

DHS produced the initial iteration of its Integrated Strategy for High Risk 

Management in order to measure progress in addressing acquisition 

management challenges we had identified, as well as financial 

management, human capital, IT, and management integration issues. 

The department subsequently produced updates in June 2011, December 

In 2008, we made several recommendations 

intended to help DHS address those challenges, and in September 2010, 

we provided DHS a list of specific acquisition management outcomes the 

department must achieve to help address the high-risk designation. This 

list largely drew from our past recommendations, and stressed that the 

department must implement its knowledge-based acquisition policy 

consistently. DHS has generally concurred with our recommendations, 

but still faces many of the same challenges we have previously identified.

 

44GAO-11-278. 

45GAO-05-207. 

46For examples, see GAO-09-29, GAO-10-588SP, GAO-11-68, GAO-11-278, 

GAO-11-318SP, GAO-11-743. 

DHS Acquisition 

Management 

Initiatives Target 

Longstanding 

Challenges, but Key 

Implementation 

Issues Remain

DHS Initiatives Are 

Intended to Address 

Longstanding Acquisition 

Management Challenges
 

Page 40 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

2011, and June 2012. These updates present the department’s progress 

in developing and implementing its initiatives. Additionally, in December 

2011, DHS issued the Program Management and Execution Playbook

(Playbook), which expounded on some of those initiatives, and introduced 

a vision for a “more mature, agile, and effective process for program 

governance and execution.” Figure 15 identifies seven key DHS initiatives 

and how they correspond to acquisition management challenges we have 

identified.

Figure 15: Acquisition Management Challenges and Corresponding Initiatives 

As envisioned, the DHS initiatives would better position the department to 

implement its knowledge-based acquisition policy on a more consistent 

basis to reduce risks and ultimately improve individual program 

outcomes. The initiatives would also help address challenges identified by 

survey respondents in 2012, particularly funding instability and acquisition 
 

Page 41 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

workforce shortfalls. Additionally, the IILCM would enhance DHS’s ability 

to effectively manage its acquisition portfolio as a whole.

DHS has made progress implementing some of the initiatives intended to 

address the challenges we have identified. In June 2012, DHS reported 

that all of its components had an approved CAE in place and the 

Procurement Staffing Model had been completed. In August 2012, DHS 

told us that eight Centers of Excellence had been chartered. However, 

from January 2011 to June 2012, the schedules for four of the seven 

initiatives slipped by at least 6 months, including the schedule for the 

IILCM, which slipped by a year. In March 2012, an official responsible for 

the IILCM initiative stated that many acquisition officials throughout the 

department do not yet understand the intended benefits of the IILCM. 

Thirty-two survey respondents reported that they were not at all familiar 

with the initiative, as opposed to nine that reported they were very familiar 

with the IILCM.47 Additionally, officials from three CAE offices, including 

two CAEs, told us that they were not familiar with the IILCM. Previously, 

we have reported that it is important to involve employees and obtain their 

ownership when transforming organizations.48 Figure 16 identifies the 

schedule slips and their causes.

 

47Sixty-seven survey respondents reported on their familiarity with the IILCM. 

48GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).

Some Initiatives Are 

Taking Longer to 

Implement Than Originally 

Envisioned, and Capacity 

Issues Could Create 

Further Challenges
 

Page 42 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Figure 16: Initiatives that Slipped from DHS’s Original January 2011 Schedule to the June 2012 Update

Moving forward, all seven acquisition management initiatives face 

significant implementation challenges that could affect DHS’s efforts to 

address the challenges we have identified. We have previously 

established that agencies must have top leadership commitment, 

adequate capacity, corrective action plans, and performance measures to 

address high-risk issues.49 We have also established that agencies must 

demonstrate progress in implementing corrective actions. Table 5 

summarizes our assessment of DHS’s initiatives, identifying challenges to 

successful implementation.

 

49GAO-11-278. 
 

Page 43 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Table 5: GAO Assessment of DHS Acquisition Management Initiatives

DHS initiative Implementation challenges GAO’s assessment

The Integrated Investment Life 

Cycle Model

DHS is still developing guidance for implementing and 

operating the IILCM, and it has not yet developed a 

resource estimate or dedicated a funding source

Questionable capacity 

Acquisition Workforce 

Development

DHS reports it currently has adequate resources to 

develop and deliver training, but future training 

requirements are better understood for personnel that 

award and administer contracts, than other disciplines, 

such as systems engineers and cost estimators

Questionable capacity

Program Management Corps DHS has reported critical resource shortfalls; the 

department previously identified the need for 150 

additional positions; additionally, performance metrics are 

subjective, such as: “Ensure Program Managers are 

engaged in advancing the department’s acquisition and 

program management capabilities” 

Questionable capacity and lacks 

objective measures

Procurement Staffing Model DHS reports it has developed the model; however, the 

initiative is only intended to identify workforce needs and 

DHS has not established an initiative to meet those needs

Questionable capacity and inadequate 

corrective action plan

Centers of Excellence DHS officials anticipate the Centers of Excellence will face 

capacity challenges; additionally, performance metrics 

have not yet been established 

Questionable capacity and lacks 

objective measures

Component Acquisition Executive 

Structure 

DHS has established meaningful performance measures, 

such as percentage of components with appropriate 

staffing levels, but it has reported critical resource 

shortfalls

Questionable capacity

Business Intelligence DHS reports that the initiative has critical resource 

shortfalls, and the corrective action plan does not explicitly 

address the enduring need to improve the quality of 

underlying performance data, particularly cost estimates 

and schedules

Questionable capacity and inadequate 

corrective action plan

Source: GAO analysis of DHS initiatives.

Capacity issues resulting from resource shortfalls have the potential to 

undermine DHS’s efforts to address longstanding acquisition 

management challenges. DHS officials said the department established 

Centers of Excellence in an effort to increase the effectiveness of their 

limited number of skilled acquisition personnel. Additionally, the 

department plans to reassign high-performing staff to high-priority 

programs in order to cope with workforce shortfalls. However, DHS 

officials anticipate that capacity issues will endure, and in June 2012, the 

department reported that it may require 250 personnel to implement the 

IILCM, which would further strain DHS’s limited capacity.
 

Page 44 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

In December 2011, DHS presented a vision of acquisition management 

that includes a new tiered-governance structure dividing acquisition 

decision authority between the headquarters-level IRB and a group of 

component-level Executive Steering Committees (ESC). See figure 17. 

According to the Playbook, DHS will adopt this tiered-governance 

structure because the current process does not provide consistent or 

timely decisions, ensure appropriate stakeholders are involved, or allow 

high risk/impact issues to get sufficient senior-level attention. In fiscal 

year 2011, DHS established ESCs for 14 IT programs.

Figure 17: DHS’s Proposed IRB/ESC Governance Structure

According to the Playbook, the ESCs would be the primary decisionmaking authority for each program, approving ADE decisions. 

Additionally, many ESCs would not include headquarters-level officials 

and the program management offices overseen by the ESCs would 

provide the necessary administrative support. Programs would be 

elevated for IRB-level reviews if they experienced difficulty with schedule, 

budget, or scope.

Since the Playbook was issued, PARM officials and DHS’s Chief 

Information Officer clarified that ADE decision authority should not be 

delegated to component-level officials unless the USM has approved a 

program’s APB and the program is being executed within agreed-upon 

cost, schedule, and performance thresholds. However, DHS has not 

clearly documented these conditions as prerequisites for delegating ADE 

decision authority. Additionally, as we have identified, DHS lacks the 

knowledge needed to effectively manage its programs, nearly all of which 

Acquisition Management 

and Program Performance 

Must Improve Before 

Delegating Major 

Milestone Decision 

Authority
 

Page 45 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

are at risk of poor outcomes. Because of this, DHS generally is not 

prepared to delegate ADE decision authority to component-level officials.

DHS has a diverse, critical, and challenging mission that requires it to 

respond to an ever-evolving range of threats. Given this mission, it is 

important that DHS maintain an agile and flexible management approach 

in its day-to-day operations. However, DHS must adopt a more 

disciplined and systematic approach for managing its major investments, 

which are intended to help meet critical mission needs. DHS has taken 

some steps to improve investment management, but most of its major 

acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to 

deploy than planned, or deliver less capability than promised. These 

outcomes are largely the result of DHS’s lack of adherence to key 

knowledge-based program management practices, even though many 

are reflected in the department’s own acquisition policy. DHS leadership 

has authorized and continued to invest in major acquisition programs 

even though the vast majority of those programs lack foundational 

documents demonstrating the knowledge needed to help manage risks 

and measure performance. This limits DHS’s ability to proactively identify 

and address the challenges facing individual programs. Further, although 

the department’s acquisition policy contains many key practices that help 

reduce risks and increase the chances for successful outcomes, the 

policy does not include certain program management practices that could 

further enhance acquisition management. For example, the policy does 

not require that programs demonstrate technologies in a realistic 

environment prior to initiating development activities, or that exit criteria 

be quantifiable to the extent possible.

Cost growth and schedule slips at the individual program level complicate 

DHS’s efforts to manage its investment portfolio as a whole. When 

programs encounter setbacks, the department has often redirected 

funding to troubled programs at the expense of others, which in turn are 

more likely to struggle. Additionally, DHS acquisition policy does not fully 

reflect key portfolio-management practices that would help improve 

investment management across the department. For example, the policy 

does not empower portfolio managers to invest resources in a disciplined 

manner or establish that investments should be ranked and selected 

using a disciplined process. DHS acknowledges the importance of having 

strong portfolio-management practices. However, DHS does not have a 

process to systematically prioritize its major investments to ensure that 

the department’s acquisition portfolio is consistent with DHS’s anticipated 

resource constraints, which is particularly important because of the 

Conclusions
 

Page 46 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

diversity of the department’s missions. Since 2008, we have emphasized 

the need for DHS to re-establish an oversight board dedicated to 

addressing portfolio management challenges. DHS has produced plans to 

establish such a board, but the concept is still under development.

It is essential that DHS take a more disciplined acquisition management 

approach moving forward, particularly as the department must adjust to a 

period of governmentwide funding constraints. Without greater discipline, 

decisionmakers will continue to lack critical information and the 

department will likely continue to pay more than expected for less 

capability than promised, which will ultimately hinder DHS’s day-to-day 

operations and its ability to execute its mission. Further, Congress’s 

ability to assess DHS funding requests and conduct oversight will remain 

limited. To its credit, DHS has undertaken a variety of initiatives over the 

past two years designed to address the department’s longstanding 

acquisition management challenges, such as increasing acquisition 

management capabilities at the component-level. However, more 

disciplined program and portfolio management at the department-level is 

needed before DHS can regularly delegate major milestone decision 

authority to component-level officials. Widespread challenges—including 

funding instability and acquisition workforce shortfalls—cost growth, and 

schedule slips indicate how much further DHS must go to improve 

acquisition outcomes.

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under 

Secretary for Management to take the following five actions to help 

mitigate the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and strengthen the 

department’s investment management activities:

• Modify DHS acquisition policy to more fully reflect the following 

program management practices:

• Require that (1) programs demonstrate technologies in a realistic 

environment prior to initiating development activities, and (2) 

manufacturing processes be tested prior to production;

• Require that (1) exit criteria be quantifiable to the extent possible, 

and (2) consistent information be used across programs at ADE 

2B and 2C;

• State that program managers should remain with their programs 

until the next major milestone when possible;

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 47 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

• Modify DHS acquisition policy to more fully reflect the following 

portfolio management practices:

• Empower portfolio managers to decide how best to invest 

resources;

• Establish that investments should be ranked and selected using a 

disciplined process;

• Establish that (1) resource allocations should align with strategic 

goals, and (2) the investment review policy should use long-range 

planning; and

• Require portfolio reviews (1) annually to consider proposed 

changes, (2) as new opportunities are identified, and (3) whenever 

a program breaches its objectives;

• Ensure all major acquisition programs fully comply with DHS 

acquisition policy by obtaining department-level approval for key 

acquisition documents before approving their movement through the 

acquisition life cycle;

• Once the department’s acquisition programs comply with DHS 

acquisition policy, prioritize major acquisition programs 

departmentwide and ensure that the department’s acquisition portfolio 

is consistent with DHS’s anticipated resource constraints; and

• Clearly document that department-level officials should not delegate 

ADE decision authority to component-level officials for programs 

lacking department approved APBs or not meeting agreed-upon cost, 

schedule, and performance thresholds.

DHS provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. In its 

comments, DHS concurred with all five of our recommendations and 

noted that two should be closed based on actions taken. The 

department’s written comments are reprinted in appendix V. DHS also 

provided technical comments that we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate.

DHS identified specific actions the department would take to address 

three of our recommendations. DHS stated that it was in the process of 

revising its policy to more fully reflect key program management 

practices. Additionally, DHS stated that it would continue to mature and 

solidify the portfolio review process over the next few years, and that it 

would revise its policy to reflect this process. DHS anticipates that this 

effort will also help the department prioritize its major acquisition 

programs departmentwide, and help ensure that the department’s 

acquisition portfolio is consistent with anticipated resource constraints. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 48 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

DHS concurred with and requested we close our recommendation that 

the department ensure all acquisition programs fully comply with DHS 

acquisition policy by obtaining department-level approval for key 

acquisition documents before approving their movement through the 

acquisition life cycle. DHS stated that, in effect, its executive review board 

is approving a program’s documents when it advances the program, thus 

satisfying this recommendation. As we noted in our report, DHS officials 

told us in April 2012 that the department has begun to implement its 

acquisition policy in a more disciplined manner and that it will no longer 

advance programs through the acquisition life cycle until DHS leadership 

verifies the programs have developed critical knowledge. However, it 

would be premature to close this recommendation until DHS 

demonstrates, over time, the consistent verification of the critical 

knowledge captured in key documents, especially as we found that nearly 

all of the department’s major acquisition programs lack at least some of 

these acquisition documents. 

DHS also concurred with and requested we close our recommendation 

that the department clearly document that department-level officials 

should not delegate ADE decision authority to component-level officials 

for programs lacking department approved APBs or not meeting agreedupon cost, schedule, and performance thresholds. DHS stated that it 

amended AD 102 to clarify that decision authority for any program that 

breaches an approved APB’s cost, schedule or performance parameters 

will not be delegated to component-level officials, thus satisfying this 

recommendation. However, the amendment DHS provided does not 

include this language or clearly document the department’s stated 

position. For this reason, it would be premature to close this 

recommendation at this time. 

In addition to commenting on our recommendations, the department 

made a number of observations on our draft report. For example, DHS 

stated that the report references many practices that occurred prior to the 

time period of the audit, and that the department has made measurable 

progress on a number of fronts. While we reviewed investment 

management activities going back to November 2008 to coincide with the 

issuance of AD 102, we also accounted for progress made through 

August 2012 by assessing ongoing DHS initiatives intended to address 

investment management challenges in the future.

DHS also noted that our survey of 71 programs captured valuable 

information, but suggested the survey data cannot be generalized and 

expressed concern that it would be used as the basis for a 
 

Page 49 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

recommendation. To clarify, none of the recommendations in this report 

are based on the survey data. In the absence of reliable program data, 

we surveyed program managers to obtain their perspectives on 

challenges facing the department’s acquisition programs, and we 

obtained responses from 92 percent of the major acquisition programs 

DHS identified in 2011. DHS noted that programs can experience cost 

growth and schedule slips without a “breach.” We recognize the validity of 

this point and our findings are consistent with this position.

DHS incorrectly suggested that our data sources for quantifying cost 

growth – the Future Years Homeland Security Programs (FYHSP) issued 

in 2008 and 2011 – did not consistently account for costs beyond the 

initial five-year period. However, these two FYHSPs aggregated funding 

levels for each program to produce a total project cost. To measure total 

project cost growth for the 16 programs, as depicted in figure 4, we 

compared the total project costs reported in the 2008 FYHSP to the total 

project costs reported in the 2011 FYHSP. Thus, we measured changes 

in total project costs, not just costs over two different five-year periods. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until September 19, 

2012. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix VI.

John P. Hutton

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
 

Page 50 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

List of Requesters

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government 

Information, Federal Services and International Security

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 51 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

The objectives of this review were to assess the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) acquisition management activities. Specifically, we 

assessed the extent to which: (1) DHS’s major acquisition programs face 

challenges that increase the risk of poor outcomes; (2) DHS has policies 

and processes in place to effectively manage individual acquisition 

programs; (3) DHS has policies and processes in place to effectively 

manage its portfolio of acquisition programs as a whole; and (4) DHS has 

taken actions to resolve the high-risk acquisition management issues we 

have identified in previous reports. To answer these questions, we 

reviewed 77 of the 82 programs DHS included in its fiscal year 2011 

Major Acquisition Oversight List (MAOL), which identified each program 

the department designated a major acquisition in 2011.1

To determine the extent to which major DHS acquisition programs face 

challenges increasing the risk of poor outcomes, we surveyed the 

program managers for all 77 programs, and received usable responses 

from 71 programs (92 percent response rate). Appendix III presents the 

survey questions we asked, and summarizes the responses we received. 

The web-based survey was administered from January 12, 2012, to 

March 30, 2012. Respondents were sent an e-mail invitation to complete 

the survey on a GAO web server using a unique username and 

password. During the data collection period, nonrespondents received a 

reminder e-mail and phone call. Because this was not a sample survey, it 

has no sampling errors. The practical difficulties of conducting any survey 

may also introduce nonsampling errors, such as difficulties interpreting a 

particular question, which can introduce unwanted variability into the 

survey results. We took steps to minimize nonsampling errors by 

pretesting the questionnaire in person with program management officials 

for five different programs, each in a different component. We conducted 

pretests to make sure that the questions were clear and unbiased, the 

data and information were readily obtainable, and that the questionnaire 

did not place an undue burden on respondents. Additionally, a senior 

methodologist within GAO independently reviewed a draft of the 

questionnaire prior to its administration. We made appropriate revisions to 

We excluded 5 

programs that were canceled in 2011; these are identified in appendix IV. 

The 77 selected programs were sponsored by 12 different components 

and departmental offices.

 

1

Undersecretary for Management, DHS, Fiscal Year 2011—Major Acquisition Oversight 

List. Memo. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2011).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 52 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

the content and format of the questionnaire after the pretests and 

independent review. All data analysis programs used to generate survey 

results were independently verified for accuracy.

To determine the extent to which major DHS acquisition programs face 

challenges increasing the risk of poor outcomes, we also reviewed the 

2008 and 2011 versions of the Future Years Homeland Security Program 

(FYHSP), all acquisition decision memoranda documenting DHS 

executive review board decisions from November 2008 to April 2012, the 

Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management’s (PARM) initial 

Quarterly Program Assessment Report (QPAR), issued March 2012, and 

other management memos identifying available program-performance 

data. The survey results and documentation review allowed us to identify 

program performance, and the reasons for any poor performance. We 

also interviewed individuals at the component and department-level to 

enhance our understanding of common challenges. At the component 

level, we interviewed six of the eight Component Acquisition Executives 

that had been designated by the USM, and interviewed representatives of 

the remaining two. At the department level, we interviewed policy, budget, 

and acquisition oversight officials, including the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for the Office of Strategic Plans, the department’s Chief 

Information Officer, the Executive Director of PARM, and the Director of 

Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). These officials provided a 

strategic perspective on program management challenges, and shared 

valuable insights regarding the limitations of available program 

performance data. Based on their input, we chose to use FYHSP data to 

calculate cost growth for individual programs where possible because the 

document is provided to Congress and constitutes DHS’s most 

authoritative, out-year funding plan.

To determine the extent to which DHS policies and processes are in 

place to effectively manage individual acquisition programs, as well as the 

department’s acquisition portfolio as a whole, we identified key acquisition 

management practices and assessed the extent to which DHS policies 

and processes reflected those practices. We identified the key practices 

through a review of previous GAO reports, which are listed in appendix II. 

We compared DHS Acquisition Directive 102-01 (AD 102), an associated 

guidebook—DHS Instruction Manual 102-01-001—and the guidebook’s 

12 appendixes to those key practices, and identified the extent to which 

they were reflected in the department’s acquisition policy using a basic 

scoring system. If the DHS policy reflected a particular key practice, we 

assigned the policy a score of 5 for that practice. If the policy did not 

reflect the key practice, we assigned it a score of 1. We then took the 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 53 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

average score for all the key practices in a particular area—as identified 

in appendix II—to establish an overall score for each key practice area. 

We concluded that key practice areas that scored a 5 were reflected in 

the policy, scored a 4 were substantially reflected, scored a 3 were 

partially reflected, and scored a 2 were minimally reflected. We 

subsequently met with PARM officials to discuss our analysis, identify 

relevant sections of the policy that we had not yet accounted for, and 

solicit their thoughts on those key practices that were not reflected in the 

policy. In order to assess DHS’s processes for implementing its policy, we 

surveyed program managers, and interviewed component and 

department-level officials. We also reviewed DHS’s plans for the 

Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM), which is being designed 

to better integrate the department’s investment management functions. 

Further, we reviewed all acquisition decision memoranda documenting 

DHS executive review board decisions from November 2008 to April 

2012, the March 2012 QPAR, and other management memos identifying 

available program-performance data, and any limitations of that data.

To determine the extent to which DHS has taken actions to resolve the 

high-risk acquisition management issues we have identified in previous 

reports and this audit, we reviewed the first three versions of the DHS 

Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management—issued in January, June, 

and December 2011. We also reviewed the DHS Program Management 

and Execution Playbook, issued in December 2011. We identified 

initiatives intended to improve acquisition management, the department’s 

progress in implementing those initiatives, and enduring challenges 

confronting the department. We also surveyed program managers, and 

interviewed component and department-level officials to obtain their 

perspectives on the initiatives.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to September 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Page 54 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) has policies and processes in place to effectively manage 

individual acquisition programs, and the department’s acquisition portfolio 

as a whole, we identified key acquisition management practices 

established in our previous reports examining DHS, the Department of 

Defense, NASA, and private sector organizations. The specific programand portfolio-management practices, as well as the reports where we 

previously identified the value of those practices, are presented below.

The following list identifies several key practices that can improve

outcomes when managing an individual program.

Identify and validate needs

• A need statement should be informed by a comprehensive 

assessment that considers the organization’s overall mission

• Current capabilities should be identified to determine if there is a gap 

between the current and needed capabilities

• Noncapital alternatives and the modernization of existing assets 

should be evaluated before deciding how best to meet the gap

• Needs should be communicated within the context of a business case

Assess alternatives to select most appropriate solution

• Analyses of alternatives (AOA) should compare the performance, 

costs, and risks of competing solutions, and identify the most 

promising system solution to acquire

• AOAs should be conducted early in the acquisition process, before 

requirements are set

• AOAs should be sufficiently broad to assess many alternatives across 

multiple concepts

Clearly establish well-defined requirements

• Programs should be grounded in well-understood concepts of how 

systems would be used and likely requirements costs

• Operators and stakeholders should be involved in the development of 

requirements

• Firm requirements should be presented in a business case at the 

outset of a program

• Requirements should be well defined to ensure clear communication 

about what the government needs

Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Key Program Management 

Practices
Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Page 55 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Develop realistic cost estimates and schedules

• A cost estimate should be well documented, and include source data, 

clearly detailed calculations, and explanations of why particular 

methods were chosen

• A cost estimate should be comprehensive enough to ensure that cost 

elements are neither omitted nor double counted

• A cost estimate should be accurate, unbiased, and based on an 

assessment of most likely costs

• A cost estimate should be credible, and discuss any limitations of the 

analysis because of uncertainty or assumptions; uncertainty analyses 

and independent cost estimates should be conducted

• A schedule should account for how long all activities will take—

including a risk analysis—and identify resources needed to do the

work

• A schedule should identify relationships between sequenced 

activities—including the critical path representing the schedule’s 

longest total duration—and how much a predecessor activity can slip 

before affecting successor activities

• A schedule should be planned so that critical project dates can be 

met, and continuously updated using logic and durations

Secure stable funding that matches resources to requirements

• Technologies, time, funding, and other resources should be consistent 

with established requirements before development begins

• Programs should invest in systems engineering resources early, and 

make trade-offs by reducing or deferring requirements, in order to 

address capability needs in achievable increments with shorter cycle 

times and more predictable funding needs

• Prior to the initiation of system development activities, realistic cost 

estimates—validated against independent cost estimates—should be 

developed to establish a sound basis for acquiring new systems

• Acquisition strategies should provide sufficient time and money for 

design activities before construction start

• Projects should be budgeted in useful segments when dealing with a 

capped budget environment

Demonstrate technology, design, and manufacturing maturity

• Program officials should maintain regular communication with the 

contractor to track technical performance, risks, and issues

• Prior to the start of system development, critical technologies should 

be demonstrated to work in their intended environment
Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Page 56 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

• Prior to a critical design review, design should be stable, and a 

prototype should demonstrate that the design can meet requirements

• Prior to a production decision, (a) a fully integrated, capable prototype 

should demonstrate that the system will work as intended in a reliable 

manner; and (b) the program should demonstrate that manufacturing 

processes are stable

• Prior to formal operator acceptance, operators should participate in 

the testing of system functionality

Utilize milestones and exit criteria

• Exit criteria and decision reviews should be used to determine that 

product managers captured required and appropriate knowledge—

including a more refined cost estimate—before a program moves 

forward to the next acquisition phase

• To the extent possible, exit criteria should be quantifiable, and 

decision reviews should be consistent across programs

• Independent program assessments should be conducted at each key 

decision point

Establish an adequate program workforce

• The right people, with the right skill sets, should be assigned to the 

right programs

• Program managers should stay on until the next major milestone to 

assure accountability; government and contractor staff should also 

remain consistent

The following list identifies several key practices that can improve 

outcomes when managing a portfolio of multiple programs.

Clearly define and empower leadership

• Those responsible for product investment decisions and oversight 

should be clearly identified and held accountable for outcomes

• Portfolio managers should be empowered to make decisions about 

the best way to invest resources

• Portfolio managers should be supported with cross-functional teams 

composed of representatives from key functional areas

Establish standard assessment criteria, and demonstrate 

comprehensive knowledge of the portfolio

• Specific criteria should be used to ensure transparency and 

comparability across alternatives

Key Portfolio Management 

Practices
Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Page 57 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

• Investments should be ranked and selected using a disciplined 

process to assess the costs, benefits, and risks of alternative products

• Knowledge should encompass the entire portfolio, including needs, 

gaps, and how to best meet the gaps

Prioritize investments by integrating the requirements, acquisition, 

and budget processes

• Requirements, acquisition, and budget processes should be 

connected to promote stability and accountability

• Organizations should use an integrated approach to prioritize needs 

and allocate resources, so they can avoid pursuing more products 

than they can afford, and optimize return on investment

• Resource allocation across the portfolio should align with strategic 

goals/objectives, and investment review policy should use long-range 

planning

Continually make go/no-go decisions to rebalance the portfolio

• Program requirements should be reviewed annually to make 

recommendations on proposed changes/descoping options

• As potential new products are identified, portfolios should be 

rebalanced based on those that add the most value

• If project estimates breach established thresholds, the product should 

be immediately reassessed within the context of the portfolio to 

determine whether it is still relevant and affordable

• Agencies should use information gathered from post-implementation 

reviews of investments, as well as information learned from other 

organizations, to fine-tune the investment process and the portfolios 

to shape strategic outcomes

Information Technology: Critical Factors Underlying Successful Major 

Acquisitions. GAO-12-7. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2011.

Acquisition Planning: Opportunities to Build Strong Foundations for Better 

Services Contracts. GAO-11-672. Washington, D.C.: August 9, 2011.

NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. GAO-11-239SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2011.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-11-233SP. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2011.

Previous Reports 

Establishing Key 

Acquisition Management 

Practices
Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Page 58 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and 

Executing Stable Weapon Programs. GAO-10-522. Washington, D.C.: 

May 6, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided 

a Robust Assessment of Weapon Systems Options. GAO-09-665. 

Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.

Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs 

Lack Appropriate Oversight. GAO-09-29. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2008.

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 

Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Sound Business Case Needed to Implement 

Missile Defense Agency’s Targets Program. GAO-08-1113. Washington, 

D.C.: September 26, 2008.

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could 

Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. GAO-08-619. 

Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008.

Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy 

Shipbuilding Programs. GAO-07-943T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007.

Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 

System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes. 

GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers 

Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: 

November 30, 2005.

NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to 

Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources. GAO-05-242. 

Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2005.
Appendix II: Key Acquisition Management 

Practices 

Page 59 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for 

Assessing and Improving Process Maturity. GAO-04-394G. Washington, 

D.C.: March 2004.

Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making. 

GAO/AIMD-99-32. Washington, D.C.: December 1998.
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 60 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

To help determine the extent to which major Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) acquisition programs face challenges increasing the risk 

of poor outcomes, we surveyed the program managers for all 77 

programs, and received usable responses from 71 programs (92 percent 

response rate). The web-based survey was administered from January 

12, 2012, to March 30, 2012. We present the survey questions we asked 

and summarize the responses we received below.

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has 

asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine the 

progress the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in 

improving its acquisition management. 

In order to gain the program manager's perspective on acquisition 

management activities being implemented and challenges that may 

impede achieving program's cost, schedule, and performance objectives, 

we are conducting a survey of all major DHS acquisition programs. Since 

we do not plan on scheduling meetings with each program, this survey is 

your primary opportunity to share how you are managing your program 

and any challenges you face. Additionally, information from this survey 

will help determine whether DHS's planned acquisition management 

initiatives may mitigate challenges facing program management offices or 

if any additional efforts may be needed. 

We ask that you please complete this survey within 2 weeks of receipt. 

The survey should take about 60 to 90 minutes to complete and can be 

completed over multiple sittings. Your responses can be saved and 

accessed at a later date. If you are unsure of how to respond to a 

question, please contact us for assistance. 

We will not release individually identifiable data outside of GAO, unless 

required by law or requested by a member of Congress. We will generally 

report the results of this survey in the aggregate, but if we incorporate 

individual responses into the report, we will do so in a manner designed 

to ensure that individual respondents cannot be identified. 

Thank you for your time and assistance.

Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results

Introduction
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 61 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Section I: Program Profile

1. What is your program's name?

data intentionally not reported

2. How many years and/or months of experience do you have as a program manager at DHS and outside of DHS?

a. At DHS:

Year(s) 

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number

of 

respondents

5.6 5 0 31 70

Month(s)

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number

of 

respondents

5.3 6 0 10 56

b. Outside of DHS:

Year(s) 

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number

of 

respondents

10.6 10 0 40 52

Year(s) 

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number

of 

respondents

2.1 0 0 11 28
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 62 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

3. In what phase(s) of the DHS Acquisition Directive (AD) 102 acquisition lifecycle is your program currently? (select all that 

apply)

1. Need (Prior to Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) 1)

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

64 6 70

2. Analyze/Select (Between ADE 1 and ADE 2)

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

60 10 70

3. Obtain (Between ADE 2 and ADE 3)

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

42 28 70

4. Production/deploy/support (Post ADE 3)

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

23 47 70

5. Do not know

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

69 1 70
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 63 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Section II: DHS Acquisition Guidance, AD 102

4. How often, if at all, do you refer to each of the following resources to help you manage your acquisition program?

DHS AD 102 guidebook and appendices

Daily Weekly Monthly Semi-annually Annually 

I do not refer

to this source

Number of 

respondents

1 12 17 20 7 11 68

Component's guidance

Daily Weekly Monthly Semi-annually Annually 

I do not refer

to this source

Number of 

respondents

4 17 28 7 4 9 69

Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) staff

Daily Weekly Monthly Semi-annually Annually 

I do not refer

to this source

Number of 

respondents

7 23 19 10 5 4 68

DHS Acquisition Program Management Division (APMD)/ Program Analysis and Risk Management (PARM)

Daily Weekly Monthly Semi-annually Annually 

I do not refer

to this source

Number of 

respondents

1 9 17 23 10 9 69

Other (please specify below)

Daily Weekly Monthly Semi-annually Annually 

I do not refer

to this source

Number of 

respondents

3 4 7 2 0 10 26

If other resource, please specify:

data intentionally not reported
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 64 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

5. Which of the following DHS-provided opportunities, if any, has your program management office used to understand DHS 

acquisition guidance, AD 102; and if used, how useful was the opportunity, if at all?

1. Check box at left if your program is not required to follow AD 102, and then click here to skip to question 13

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents 

68 3 71

Training session(s) on AD 102 hosted by DHS headquarters

Did your program management office use this opportunity?

Yes 

No, the 

opportunity

is available 

but we did not 

use it.

No, 

opportunity

is not 

available

Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

30 10 12 11 63

If used, how useful was the opportunity, if at all?

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful 

Not at all 

useful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

11 16 1 2 30

Manuals and templates for implementing AD 102 provided by DHS headquarters

Did your program management office use this opportunity?

Yes 

No, the 

opportunity

is available 

but we did not 

use it.

No, 

opportunity

is not 

available

Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

50 8 4 4 66

If used, how useful was the opportunity, if at all?

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful 

Not at all 

useful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

17 29 2 2 50
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 65 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Direct support for your program from DHS Acquisition Program Management Division (APMD)/ Program Analysis and Risk 

Management (PARM)

Did your program management office use this opportunity?

Yes 

No, the 

opportunity

is available 

but we did not 

use it.

No, 

opportunity

is not 

available

Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

49 9 4 3 65

If used, how useful was the opportunity, if at all?

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful 

Not at all 

useful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

24 22 2 1 49

Other (please specify below)

Did your program management office use this opportunity?

Yes 

No, the 

opportunity

is available 

but we did not 

use it.

No, 

opportunity

is not 

available

Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

17 1 3 6 27

If used, how useful was the opportunity, if at all?

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful 

Not at all 

useful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

11 2 1 2 16

If other opportunity, please specify:

data intentionally not reported
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 66 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

6. How clear or unclear is the DHS AD 102 acquisition guidance and framework for managing the following types of 

acquisitions?

Developmental

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

11 22 4 4 0 22 63

Non-developmental

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

4 23 5 5 1 24 62

IT systems

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

12 19 5 5 1 22 64

Services 

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

7 21 6 4 4 20 62

7. How clear or unclear is DHS AD 102 acquisition guidance, including the guidebook and appendices, regarding each of the 

following?

Understanding the Acquisition Review Board (ARB)'s roles and responsibilities

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

23 26 3 5 1 7 65

Understanding Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)'s roles and responsibilities

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

25 20 7 5 1 7 65

Implementing the Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) framework to ensure capabilities are effectively delivered

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

15 24 6 7 3 10 65
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 67 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Conducting testing and evaluation

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

13 28 4 6 3 11 65

Managing and prioritizing requirements across multiple DHS components

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

4 18 10 12 5 16 65

Aligning AD-102 guidance with Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

(PPBE) guidance to match resources and requirements

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

10 24 9 9 5 8 65

Aligning DHS and your component's guidance

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

8 20 8 10 8 9 63

Other (please specify below)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

2 2 1 1 1 15 22

If other, please specify:

data intentionally not reported
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 68 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

8. How clear or unclear is DHS AD 102 acquisition guidance, including the guidebook and appendices, on how to develop 

each of the following key acquisition documents?

Mission Needs Statement (MNS)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

27 25 2 2 0 8 64

Operational Requirements Document (ORD)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

23 24 4 3 2 7 63

Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

13 28 8 4 4 7 64

Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

24 22 6 4 2 6 64

Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) 

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

19 24 9 2 3 7 64

Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

18 21 7 5 2 11 64

Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

15 23 8 6 3 9 64
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results

Page 69 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

9. How long is the average component and DHS review period for key acquisition documents required by AD 102 (e.g. MNS, 

ORD, LCCE and APB)?

Component review

Less than 1 

month 

1 month to 3 

months 

3 months to 6 

months

6 months to 1 

year 

More than 1 

year

Not 

Applicable

Number of 

respondents

6 22 20 6 2 5 61

DHS review

Less than 1 

month 

1 month to 3 

months 

3 months to 6 

months

6 months to 1 

year 

More than 1 

year

Not 

Applicable

Number of 

respondents

1 15 24 10 5 8 63

10. After an Acquisition Review Board (ARB) review, how adequately does an Acquisition Decision Memo (ADM) 

communicate action items?

Very 

adequately

Somewhat 

adequately 

Not at all 

adequately No opinion Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

26 25 2 6 5 64

11. How has the introduction of AD 102 helped or hindered your ability to manage your program's cost and schedule and the 

overall acquisition program?

Program's cost and schedule

Significantly

helped 

Somewhat 

helped

Neither helped 

nor hindered

Somewhat 

hindered

Significantly

hindered No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

8 16 22 7 3 9 65

Overall ability to manage your acquisition program

Significantly

helped 

Somewhat 

helped

Neither helped 

nor hindered

Somewhat 

hindered

Significantly

hindered No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

7 21 18 6 5 8 65
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 70 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

12. If you would like to elaborate on any of your previous responses regarding the clarity and/or implementation of DHS 

acquisition guidance (AD 102) please use the following space.

data intentionally not reported

Section III: Program Performance

13. Does your program have a DHS-approved Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)?

Yes 

No (please 

explain

below)

Number of 

respondents

40 31 71

13a. If your program does not have a DHS-approved APB, please explain why it does not have one in the box below.

data intentionally not reported

After answering 13a above,

14. How does your program's current projected cost compare against its DHS-approved APB?

Cost is below

the APB 

Cost meets 

the 

APB 

Cost exceeds

the APB by 

less

than 8 percent

Cost exceeds

the APB by 8

percent or 

more 

Number of 

respondents

8 23 4 5 40

15. How does your program's current projected schedule compare to its DHS-approved APB?

Schedule is 

ahead

of the APB

Schedule 

meets

the APB 

Schedule is 

behind

the APB 

Number of 

respondents

3 21 16 40

16. How do your program's current planned system capabilities compare to its DHS-approved APB?

System 

capabilities

exceed APB 

System 

capabilities

meet APB 

System 

capabilities

fall short of

APB

Number of 

respondents

1 31 7 39
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 71 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

17. How frequently, if at all, does your program management office use each of the following performance metrics to monitor 

your program's progress?

Earned Value Management data

Used all or 

most of the 

time

Used 

sometimes

Used rarely or 

not at all Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

24 9 9 1 27 70

Integrated Master Schedule

Used all or 

most of the 

time

Used 

sometimes

Used rarely or 

not at all Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

42 17 2 1 8 70

Technology readiness levels to assess the maturity of critical technologies

Used all or 

most of the 

time

Used 

sometimes

Used rarely or 

not at all Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

19 22 11 1 17 70

Percentage of design drawings completed

Used all or 

most of the 

time

Used 

sometimes

Used rarely or 

not at all Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

20 5 12 3 29 69

Percentage of production processes under statistical control

Used all or 

most of the 

time

Used 

sometimes

Used rarely or 

not at all Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

16 8 14 1 31 70

Other (please specify below)

Used all or 

most of the 

time

Used 

sometimes

Used rarely or 

not at all Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

11 0 2 1 9 23
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 72 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

If other performance metrics, please specify:

data intentionally not reported

Section IV: Cost Estimates and Program Schedule

18. If your cost estimate was developed after AD 102 went into effect, to what extent did the GAO Cost Estimating Guide, i.e. 

Appendix I to DHS's AD 102 guidebook, inform your efforts to develop your program's LCCE?

Greatly 

informed

Somewhat 

informed Did not inform

Program does

not have a 

LCCE

Not 

applicable, 

cost estimate 

was 

developed 

prior to AD 

102

Number of 

respondents

29 17 1 2 21 70

19. What obstacles, if any, did your program management office encounter when using the GAO Cost Estimating Guide to 

develop your program's LCCE?

data intentionally not reported

20. How fully, if at all, does your integrated master schedule (IMS) account for each of the following practices?

Capturing and sequencing all activities

Fully 

accounts

for 

Partially 

accounts

for 

Does not 

account

for Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

38 21 4 5 68

Assigning resources (i.e. dollars, FTEs, etc.) to all activities

Fully 

accounts

for 

Partially 

accounts

for 

Does not 

account

for Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

12 32 19 5 68

Establishing duration of all activities, noting start and end dates, and keeping durations as short as possible

Fully 

accounts

for 

Partially 

accounts

for 

Does not 

account

for Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

38 20 4 5 67
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 73 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Establishing a critical path to examine the effects of any activities slipping along this path

Fully 

accounts

for 

Partially 

accounts

for 

Does not 

account

for Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

38 18 7 5 68

Identifying float (i.e. the time that a predecessor activity can slip before the delay affects successor activities) between activities

Fully 

accounts

for 

Partially 

accounts

for 

Does not 

account

for Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

33 25 4 5 67

Updating the schedule to ensure valid status dates are captured

Fully 

accounts

for 

Partially 

accounts

for 

Does not 

account

for Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

42 19 2 5 68

Section V: Requirements

21. Have each of the following documents been approved by DHS leadership for your program?

Mission Needs Statement (MNS)

Yes, approved

Submitted to 

DHS 

leadership, 

not yet 

approved

Not approved Do not know Number of 

respondents

44 6 14 4 68

Operational Requirements Document (ORD)

Yes, approved

Submitted to 

DHS 

leadership, 

not yet 

approved

Not approved Do not know Number of 

respondents

29 10 22 5 66
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 74 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)

Yes, approved

Submitted to 

DHS 

leadership,

not yet 

approved

Not approved Do not know Number of 

respondents

31 7 22 6 66

Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)

Yes, approved

Submitted to 

DHS 

leadership,

not yet 

approved

Not approved Do not know Number of 

respondents

28 9 23 8 68

22. When setting operational requirements, which of the following processes best describes your program's efforts to 

consider alternatives at the program level?

An Analysis of 

Alternatives 

(AOA) was 

conducted 

prior to 

operational 

requirements 

being set

An AOA was 

conducted 

after 

operational 

requirements 

were set 

A trade-off 

analysis was 

conducted 

prior to 

operational 

requirements 

being set 

A trade-off 

analysis was 

conducted 

after 

operational 

requirements 

were set 

No AOA or 

trade-off 

analysis was 

conducted Do not know 

Not 

applicable, 

operational 

requirements 

have not yet 

been set. 

Number of 

respondents

27 18 5 1 5 3 4 63

23. At the initiation of design and development activities, how useful were each of the following stakeholders' contributions 

when defining proposed system capabilities/ requirements?

1. Check box at left if design and development activities have not yet been initiated, and then click here to skip to question 28

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

61 10 71

End-user(s) 

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

46 9 1 2 0 58
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 75 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Subject Matter Expert(s)

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

51 5 0 2 0 58

Systems Engineer(s)

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

37 13 0 2 4 56

Component's CAE office

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

12 18 9 8 11 58

APMD/ PARM

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

7 14 5 12 20 58

Test & Evaluation and Standards Division

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

16 12 2 11 16 57

DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

13 9 9 6 21 58

DHS Office of Finance (including PA&E)

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

4 10 7 10 27 58
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results

Page 76 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

DHS Office of Policy

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

6 8 7 10 25 56

DHS Acquisition Review Board (ARB)

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

15 14 4 7 17 57

Federal Partners

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

27 14 1 7 9 58

Other (please specify below)

Very useful 

Somewhat 

useful Not useful No opinion 

Did not seek

input from 

stakeholder

Number of 

respondents

9 2 0 1 5 17

If other stakeholders, please specify:

data intentionally not reported

24. How many key performance parameters (KPPs) did the program have at development start, and how many KPPs does the 

program currently have?

24a. At start:

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number

of 

respondents

7.0 5 0 51 52

24b. Currently:

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number

of 

respondents

8.0 5 0 51 53
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 77 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

25. If your program's KPPs have changed or been redefined since development activities began (ADE 2A), how clear or 

unclear was the process for each of the following?

1. Check box at left if there have been no revisions to the KPPs, and then click here to skip to question 27

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

28 32 60

Revising key acquisition documents to reflect the change in requirements

Very clear 

Somewhat

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

10 10 1 1 1 3 26

Obtaining component leadership approval

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

13 10 1 1 0 1 26

Obtaining DHS leadership approval

Very clear 

Somewhat 

clear

Neither clear

nor unclear

Somewhat 

unclear Very unclear No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

10 8 2 3 1 2 26

26. Which of the following are reasons your program's KPPs have changed or been redefined since development activities 

began (ADE 2A)?

To clearly communicate performance parameters to the contractor

A reason Not a reason Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

9 12 3 24

To make requirements measurable for testing

A reason Not a reason Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

12 10 2 24

Desired performance could not be met with current technology

A reason Not a reason Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

6 15 3 24
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 78 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Associated capabilities were determined unnecessary

A reason Not a reason Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

6 14 2 22

To demonstrate traceability between MNS, ORD, and TEMP

A reason Not a reason Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

10 11 3 24

Other (please specify below)

A reason Not a reason Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

4 1 1 6 

If other reasons, please specify:

data intentionally not reported

27. Since your program's design and development activities began (ADE 2A), how have each of the following factors affected 

your planned capabilities, if at all?

Funding availability

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities Not a factor Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

11 16 21 9 1 58

Changes in the program's schedule

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities

Not a factor Do not know Number of 

respondents

8 18 15 16 0 57

Mission(s) changed

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities

Not a factor Do not know Number of 

respondents

9 11 2 35 0 57
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 79 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Key Performance Parameter(s) (KPP) changed

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities

Not a factor Do not know Number of 

respondents

5 13 2 37 0 57

End-user(s) input

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities

Not a factor Do not know Number of 

respondents

21 19 2 15 0 57

Technology development efforts/ availability

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities

Not a factor Do not know Number of 

respondents

11 15 6 25 0 57

Other (please specify below)

Resulted in 

increased

planned 

capabilities

Planned 

capabilities

remained the

same 

Resulted in 

decreased

planned 

capabilities

Not a factor Do not know Number of 

respondents

0 0 2 8 2 12

If other factors, please specify:

data intentionally not reported

Section VI: Technology Maturity

28. Prior to the initiation of development activities (ADE 2A), how many of your program's critical technologies demonstrated 

full functionality in realistic environments, if any?

All critical

technologies

demonstrated

full 

functionality 

Some critical

technologies

demonstrated

full 

functionality 

No critical 

technologies

demonstrated

full 

functionality

Do not know 

Not 

applicable,

critical 

technologies

had not been

identified at

that time

Not 

applicable,

the program 

has

not initiated

development 

activities

Number of 

respondents

25 19 1 5 5 11 66
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 80 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

29. Prior to the initiation of low-rate initial production (ADE 2C), how many reliability goals were met, if any, by productionrepresentative prototypes demonstrated in the intended environment?

Prototypes 

met all 

reliability

goals 

Prototypes 

met some 

reliability

goals 

Prototypes 

met no 

reliability

goals Do not know 

Not 

applicable,

the program 

has not 

initiated

low-rate initial

production

Not 

applicable,

the program 

will not use 

low-rate initial 

production

Number of 

respondents

14 13 0 5 14 21 67

30. Has the program used an independent testing authority? 

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

35 15 0 15 65

Section VII: Resource Allocation

31. Does your program rely on any funds other than DHS appropriations?

Yes No Do not know

Number of 

respondents

21 49 0 70

32. Does your program use a five-year funding plan to project resource needs?

Yes No Do not know

Number of 

respondents

65 3 0 68

33. Did your program's funding levels in each of the following budget documents meet your program's required funding 

needs as reflected in your APB?

1. Check box at left if your program does not have an APB, and then click here to skip to question 34

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

56 15 71
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 81 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

At program start, component's commitment in a Resource Allocation Plan (RAP) 

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document 

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

38 2 6 5 4 55

At program start, DHS's commitment in a Resource Allocation Decision (RAD)

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document 

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

33 0 8 6 7 54

Component's FY11 RAP

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

29 3 16 2 2 52

DHS's FY11 RAD

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document 

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB

Do not know Not applicable Number of 

respondents

30 1 17 2 2 52

OMB's FY11 decision

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document 

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB

Do not know Not applicable Number of 

respondents

30 2 16 2 1 51
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 82 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

FY11 budget request submitted to Congress

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document 

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB

Do not know Not applicable Number of 

respondents

31 1 15 1 4 52

FY11 Congressional enacted funds

Yes, funds 

were

equivalent 

No, funds in

document 

were

above the 

APB

No, funds in 

the document 

were below 

the APB

Do not know Not applicable Number of 

respondents

28 2 17 1 4 52

34. Which of the following events, if any, have attributed to overall funding instability (e.g. a change in planned out-year 

funding from one five-year funding plan to the next five-year funding plan)?

1. Check box at left if anticipated funding levels have not changed from one year to the next, and then click here to skip to question 36

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

61 10 71

Congressional mark did not match the President's budget

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

5 4 17 17 15 58

Continuing Resolution

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

3 30 10 2 14 59
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results

Page 83 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Program delays resulting from technical challenges

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

0 12 3 25 18 58

Mission/requirements change

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

3 7 7 25 16 58

Another program's acquisition funding levels affected this program's own planned funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

1 2 18 17 19 57

Original cost estimates did not reflect true costs

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

4 7 3 26 18 58

Other (please specify below)

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

increased 

Event 

occurred

but no change

to out-year 

funding

Event 

occurred

and out-year

funding 

decreased 

Event did not 

occur Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

2 0 3 0 12 17
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 84 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

If other events, please specify:

data intentionally not reported 

35. If your program has experienced funding instability (e.g. a change in planned out-year funding from one five-year funding 

plan to the next five-year funding plan), did it affect your program in each of the following ways?

Increased costs by less than eight percent

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

10 24 3 21 58

Increased costs by eight percent or more

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

9 24 4 21 58

Resequencing of program's discrete segments, increments or delivery of capabilities

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

29 9 2 18 58

Pushed out delivery and caused a schedule breach

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

23 13 3 18 57

Reduced performance parameters

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

8 29 2 16 55

Other (please specify below)

Yes No Do not know Not applicable

Number of 

respondents

7 1 0 14 22

If other events, please specify:

data intentionally not reported
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 85 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

36. If a gap existed between FY11 enacted funding and FY11 required funding, how effectively were you, as a program 

manager, able to directly communicate the impact on your program to DHS and component leadership?

1. Check box at left if your program did not experience a gap between FY11 enacted and required funding, and then click here to skip 

to question 37

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

36 35 71

Component leadership (Component head, CAE, etc.)

Very 

effectively

Somewhat 

effectively Not effectively No opinion 

No direct 

communication

Number of 

respondents

19 5 1 8 2 35

DHS leadership (Deputy Secretary, USM, PARM officials, etc.)

Very 

effectively

Somewhat 

effectively Not effectively No opinion 

No direct 

communication

Number of 

respondents

14 3 1 7 10 35

37. If you would like to elaborate on how resource allocation (i.e. funding) has affected the program's ability to achieve cost, 

schedule and performance goals, please use the following space.

data intentionally not reported

Section VIII: Workforce

38. Since the program was initially staffed, how many program managers have overseen the program management office 

(PMO)? 

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

2.5 2 0 12 61

1. Check box at left if do not know

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

63 8 71
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 86 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

39. What is the number of government FTEs in your PMO for each of the following functional areas?

Program Management

Number of government FTEs staffed at initiation of development activities

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

3.5 2 1 15 51

Number of government FTEs currently staffed

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

4.7 3 0 23 60

Number of government FTEs currently identified as a need by the program

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

5.9 4 1 18 49

Business functions (includes auditing, business, cost estimating, financial management, property management, and purchasing)

Number of government FTEs staffed at initiation of development activities

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

5.6 2 1 63 43

Number of government FTEs currently staffed

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

10.7 3 1 252 53

Number of government FTEs currently identified as a need by the program

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

14.4 4 1 346 47
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 87 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Engineering and technical (includes systems planning, research, development and engineering; life cycle logistics; test and evaluation; 

production, quality and manufacturing; and facilities engineering)

Number of government FTEs staffed at initiation of development activities

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

4.9 3 0 25 40

Number of government FTEs currently staffed

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

15.5 8 1 150 48

Number of government FTEs currently identified as a need by the program

Mean Median Minimum Maximum

Number of 

respondents

13.7 6 1 98 43

40. Please describe the source(s) and/ or method(s) used for identifying the numbers of FTEs in question 39.

data intentionally not reported

41. Please use the following space to comment on how personnel shortfalls, if any, have affected your program.

1. Check box at left if there have been no personnel shortages, and then click here to skip to question 42

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

52 19 71

data intentionally not reported
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 88 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Section IX: Communication to DHS

42. How effective, if at all, are each of the following tools for communicating your program's performance to DHS leadership?

Next-generation Periodic Reporting System (nPRS)

Very effective

Somewhat 

effective 

Not at all 

effective No opinion Do not use 

Number of 

respondents

8 34 13 10 4 69

Investment Management System (IMS)

Very effective

Somewhat 

effective 

Not at all 

effective No opinion Do not use 

Number of 

respondents

10 35 7 13 4 69

ARB reviews

Very effective

Somewhat 

effective 

Not at all 

effective No opinion Do not use 

Number of 

respondents

25 27 2 7 8 69

Informal communication with DHS HQ

Very effective

Somewhat 

effective 

Not at all 

effective No opinion Do not use 

Number of 

respondents

28 23 1 6 11 69

Other (please specify below)

Very effective

Somewhat 

effective 

Not at all 

effective No opinion Do not use 

Number of 

respondents

8 2 0 2 3 15

If other tools, please specify:

data intentionally not reported 
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 89 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

43. If you reported that any of the tools listed above are not at all effective in communicating your program's current 

performance to DHS headquarters, or if you have any concerns related to communication tools, please elaborate below.

data intentionally not reported

44. For the data entered into nPRS, who is responsible for entering and/or validating the information?

1. Check box at left if your program does not report into nPRS, and then click here to skip to question 45

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

65 6 71

Program Manager

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

4 50 6 1 61

Program Management Staff other than Program Manager

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

37 17 5 1 60

Contractor in the Program Management Office

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

39 1 15 1 56

Other (please specify below)

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

3 3 6 3 15

If other personnel, please specify:

data intentionally not reported 
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 90 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

45. For the data entered into IMS, who is responsible for entering and/or validating the information?

1. Check box at left if your program does not report into IMS, and then click here to skip to question 46

Not checked checked 

Number of 

respondents

66 5 71

Program Manager

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

1 51 7 2 61

Program Management Staff other than Program Manager

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

30 19 6 4 59

Contractor in the Program Management Office

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

38 4 11 4 57

Other (please specify below)

Enters 

Information Validates 

Information

Does not have 

a role in data 

entry or 

validation Do not know 

Number of 

respondents

1 3 7 5 16

If other personnel, please specify:

data intentionally not reported 
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 91 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Section X: DHS Acquisition Management Initiatives

46. How familiar are you with each of the following DHS initiatives?

Establishing the Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM)

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

9 24 32 2 67

Establishing PARM

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

19 38 9 2 68

Establishing the Program Manager Corps

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

12 22 31 2 67

Empowering the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs)

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

19 27 18 2 66

Establishing Functional Coordination Office (e.g. Screening Coordination Office)

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

8 11 45 2 66

Creating Executive Steering Councils for program governance

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

23 21 23 1 68

Forming the Capabilities and Requirements Council

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

4 22 40 1 67
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 92 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Developing APEX, a decision support tool owned by PARM to capture and synthesize information from nPRS and IMS

Very familiar

Somewhat 

familiar 

Not at all 

familiar No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

5 24 37 2 68

47. How helpful, if at all, will the following DHS initiatives be in helping you manage your acquisition program?

Establishing the Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM)

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

8 18 8 32 66

Establishing PARM

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

9 32 5 21 67

Establishing the Program Manager Corps

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

13 20 6 26 65

Empowering the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs)

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

25 21 7 13 66

Establishing Functional Coordination Office (e.g. Screening Coordination Office)

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

4 13 9 37 63
Appendix III: Program Office Survey Results 

Page 93 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Creating Executive Steering Councils for program governance

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

18 17 8 24 67

Forming the Capabilities and Requirements Council

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

7 14 8 36 65

Developing APEX, a decision support tool owned by PARM to capture and synthesize information from nPRS and IMS

Very helpful

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not at all 

helpful No opinion 

Number of 

respondents

4 16 9 38 67

48. Please use the following space to describe any additional actions that DHS could implement that would help you better 

manage your acquisition program (i.e. improvements for acquisition governance and document development).

data intentionally not reported 

Section XI: Summary Statements

49. Please identify any significant challenges affecting your program's ability to achieve program objectives (i.e. cost, 

schedule, and capabilities) that have not been adequately addressed above.

data intentionally not reported

50. If you would like, please identify any practices your program has found significantly helpful in managing your program.

data intentionally not reported
Appendix IV: Major DHS Acquisition Programs 

and their Key Acquisition Documents

Page 94 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Table 6 below identifies the 71 major Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) acquisition programs that responded to our survey. It consists of all 

the programs DHS included in its 2011 Major Acquisition Oversight List, 

with the exception of the 6 programs that did not respond to our survey 

(see table 7), and the 5 programs that were cancelled in 2011 (see table 

8). Table 6 also identifies whether each program’s Mission Need 

Statement (MNS), Operational Requirements Document (ORD), 

Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), Integrated Logistics Support Plan 

(ILSP), and Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) have been 

approved at the department level.

Table 6: Programs that responded to our survey

Sponsor Program Level

Information 

Technology

(IT) vs. Non-IT

Department-approved documents

MNS ORD APB ILSP TEMP 

Analysis and Operations 

(A&O) 

Common Operational Picture (COP) 2 IT

Chief Administrative 

Officer (CAO)

St. Elizabeth’s 2 Non-IT

Chief Human Capital 

Officer 

HR-IT 2 IT

Chief Information Officer Infrastructure Transformation 

Program (ITP) 1 IT

Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP)

Automated Commercial Environment 

(ACE) / International Trade Data 

System (ITDS)

1 IT X 

CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS) 

Maintenanceh 2 IT

CBP Border Patrol Facilities 1 Non-IT

CBP Facilities Management and 

Engineering Tactical Infrastructure 

(FM&E TI)

1 Non-IT

CBP Fleet Management Program (FMP) 1 h Non-IT

CBP Land Ports of Entry Modernization 2 Non-IT

CBP Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) 

Systems Program 1 IT

CBP SAP 2 h IT

CBP Strategic Air and Marine Plan 1 Non-IT

CBP Tactical Communication (TAC-COM) 2 IT X 

CBP TECS Modernization 1 d IT X X X 

CBP Transportation 1 Non-IT X 

Appendix IV: Major DHS Acquisition 

Programs and their Key Acquisition 

Documents 
Appendix IV: Major DHS Acquisition Programs 

and their Key Acquisition Documents 

Page 95 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Sponsor Program Level

Information 

Technology

(IT) vs. Non-IT

Department-approved documents

MNS ORD APB ILSP TEMP 

CBP Western Hemisphere Travel 

Initiative (WHTI) 1 IT X X 

Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office

Advanced Spectroscopic Portal 

(ASP) 1 Non-IT

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

(FEMA) 

Housing Inspection Services (HIS)

2 Non-IT

FEMA Integrated Public Alert and Warning 

System (IPAWS) 2 Non-IT X 

FEMA Logistics Supply Chain Management 

System (LSCMS) 2 IT

FEMA Risk Mapping, Analysis and 

Planning (Risk Map)a 1 Non-IT X X 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE)

Atlas 2 IT

ICE Detention and Removal Operations 

(DROM) 2 IT X 

ICE DRO Electronic Health Record 

(EHR) System 2 IT

ICE Enforcement Information Sharing 

(EIS) 2 IT

ICE Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System (SEVIS I & II)d 2 IT

ICE TECS Modernization 1 IT X X X X 

National Protection and 

Programs Directorate 

(NPPD) 

Federal Protective Services 

2 Non-IT

NPPD Infrastructure Information Collection 

Program and Visualization (IICV 

IICP)

2 g IT X 

NPPD National Cybersecurity and 

Protection System (NCPS) 1 IT X X X X X 

NPPD Next Generation Network (NGN) 1 IT X X X X X 

NPPD United States Visitor and Immigrant 

Status Indicator Technology (USVISIT) 

1 IT X X X X 

Office of Health Affairs Bio Watch Gen-3 1 Non-IT

Science and Technology 

(S&T) 

National Bio and Agro-Defense 

Facility (NBAF) 1 Non-IT

S&T National Biodefense Analysis and 

Countermeasures Center (NBACC) 

Facility

1 Non-IT
Appendix IV: Major DHS Acquisition Programs 

and their Key Acquisition Documents 

Page 96 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Sponsor Program Level

Information 

Technology

(IT) vs. Non-IT

Department-approved documents

MNS ORD APB ILSP TEMP 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA)

Electronic Baggage Screening 

Program (EBSP) 1 Non-IT X 

TSA Field Real Estate Management 

(FREM) 2 Non-IT

TSA HRAccess 1 h Non-IT

TSA National Explosives Detection 

Canine Team Program (K9) System 2 Non-IT

TSA Information Technology 

Infrastructure Program (ITIP)h 1 IT

TSA Passenger Screening Program 

(PSP) 1 Non-IT X X X X X 

TSA Screening Partnership Programh 1 Non-IT

TSA Secure Flight 1 IT X X X 

TSA Security Technology Integrated 

Program (STIP) 2 IT X X 

TSA Specialized Training 2 h Non-IT

TSA Transportation Worker Identification 

Credentialing (TWIC)h 1 IT

TSA TTAC Infrastructure Modernization 

(TIM) 2 IT X X X X 

United States Coast 

Guard (USCG)

C4ISR 1 

d

IT X X X X 

USCG CG Logistics information 

Management System (CG-LIMS)e 2 IT X 

USCG Core Accounting System (CAS) 2 h IT

USCG Fast Response Cutter (FRC) 1 d Non-IT X X X 

USCG HC-130H Conversion/Sustainment 

Projects 1 Non-IT X X X 

USCG HC-130 J Fleet Introduction 2 Non-IT X X X 

USCG HC-144A Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

(MPA)d 1 Non-IT X X X X 

USCG HH-60 Conversion Projects 1 d Non-IT X X X X 

USCG HH-65 Conversion/Sustainment 

Projects 1 Non-IT X X X X 

USCG Interagency Operations Center 

(IOC) 2 IT X X X X 

USCG Medium Endurance Cutter 

Sustainmentb 1 Non-IT X 

USCG National Security Cutter (NSC) 1 Non-IT X X X 

USCG Nationwide Automatic Identification 

System (NAIS)d 1 IT X X 
Appendix IV: Major DHS Acquisition Programs 

and their Key Acquisition Documents 

Page 97 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Sponsor Program Level

Information 

Technology

(IT) vs. Non-IT

Department-approved documents

MNS ORD APB ILSP TEMP 

USCG Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) 1 Non-IT X X X X X 

USCG Patrol Boats Sustainment 2 b Non-IT X 

USCG Rescue 21 1 IT X X 

USCG Response Boat – Medium (RB-M) 1 b Non-IT

USCG Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 1 c, f Non-IT X 

United States Citizenship 

and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) 

Application Support Center (ASC)

2 

h

Non-IT X X 

USCIS Benefit Provision – Verification 

Information System (VIS) 2 IT X 

USCIS Integrated Document Production 

(IDP)h 2 IT

USCIS Transformation 1 IT X X 

United States Secret 

Service 

IT Modernization (ITM) 2 IT X X X 

Legend: 

Document was required at the time of our review. 

Document was not required at the time of our review. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS and survey data.

a

Program’s document requirements were waived because it is in sustainment. 

b

Program’s document approval authority was delegated to a component. 

c

Program does not yet require any documents because it is in the Need phase. 

d

DHS reported that the program breached its baseline after the department approved its APB. An 

APB breach of cost, schedule, or performance is an inability to meet the threshold value set for each. 

Within 90 days of the breach, DHS acquisition policy requires that either a new APB be approved, 

baseline-revision recommendations be made to the Acquisition Decision Authority, or the program is 

back within APB parameters. 

e

Program was designated a non-major acquisition program April 2012. 

f

Program has two MNSs. The land-based MNS has been approved at the department-level. The 

cutter-based MNS has not. 

g

Program was reorganized as the Critical Infrastructure Technology and Architecture (CITA) program 

in fiscal year 2012. 

h

PARM officials stated the program was in sustainment at the time AD 102 was signed. 
Appendix IV: Major DHS Acquisition Programs 

and their Key Acquisition Documents 

Page 98 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Table 7 identifies the programs that were included in DHS’s 2011 Major

Acquisition Oversight List, but did not respond to our survey.

Table 7: Programs that did not respond to our survey

Sponsor Program Level IT vs. Non-IT

A&O Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) 2 IT

CBP Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) 2 IT

I&A National Security System Program (NSSP) 1 IT

ICE Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) 2 Non-IT

ICE Tactical Communications (TAC-COM) 1 IT

USCG Coastal Patrol Boat 1 Non-IT

Source: GAO analysis of DHS and survey data.

Table 8 identifies the programs that were included in DHS’s 2011 Major 

Acquisition Oversight List, but were cancelled in 2011.

Table 8: Programs cancelled in 2011

Sponsor Program Level IT vs. Non-IT

CAO Electronic Records Management System (ERMS) 2 IT

Chief Financial Officer Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) 1 IT

CBP Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) 1 IT

FEMA Grants Management Integrated Environment (GMIE) 2 IT

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Online Tracking Information System 2 IT

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 99 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 100 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 101 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 102 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 103 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

John Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Katherine Trimble (Assistant 

Director), Nathan Tranquilli (Analyst-in-Charge), John Crawford, David 

Garcia, Jill Lacey, Sylvia Schatz, Rebecca Wilson, Candice Wright, and 

Andrea Yohe made key contributions to this report.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 104 GAO-12-833 Homeland Security 

Immigration Benefits: Consistent Adherence to DHS’s Acquisition Policy 

Could Help Improve Transformation Program Outcomes. GAO-12-66. 

Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2011.

Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains 

Unachievable. GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. Washington, 

D.C.: March 1, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 

2011.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-11-233SP. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2011.

Secure Border Initiative: Controls over Contractor Payment for the 

Technology Component Need Improvement. GAO-11-68. Washington, 

D.C.: May 25, 2011.

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

The Office of Management and Budget’s Acquisition Workforce

Development Strategic Plan for Civilian Agencies. GAO-10-459R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD’s Weapon Programs 

Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. GAO-09-543T. Washington, 

D.C.: April 1, 2009.

Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs 

Lack Appropriate Oversight. GAO-09-29. Washington, D.C.: November 

18, 2008.

Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition 

Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006.

Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to 

Create an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, 

D.C.: March 29, 2005.

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Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 

2003

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2001.

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