SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4438-17T2

IN THE MATTER OF TROOPER 1

WILLIAM CARVOUNIS #6165.

_______________________________

Argued April 30, 2019 – Decided June 3, 2019

Before Judges Hoffman, Suter and Geiger.

On appeal from the New Jersey Division of State 

Police, Docket No. 2014-0015.

Christopher A. Gray argued the cause for appellant

William Carvounis (Sciarra & Catrambone, LLC, 

attorneys; Charles J. Sciarra, of counsel; Christopher A. 

Gray, on the briefs).

Christopher J. Hamner, Deputy Attorney General,

argued the cause for respondent Division of State 

Police (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; 

Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Christopher J. Hamner, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant New Jersey State Trooper William Carvounis appeals from the

May 16, 2018 final decision of Acting Superintendent Patrick J. Callahan that 

terminated Carvounis for misconduct. We affirm. 

I. 

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history leading to 

the disciplinary action under review. 

Carvounis was charged with violating three of the Rules and Regulations

of the Division of State Police (Division). Charge 1 alleged a violation of Article 

XI, Section 4, which reads: "No member shall violate the laws, statutes or 

ordinances of the United States, its territories or possessions or of any state or 

any political subdivision thereof." Charge 2 alleged a violation of Article VI, 

Section 2.b., which reads: "No member shall act or behave in an unofficial or 

private capacity to the personal discredit of the member or to the discredit of the 

Division." Charge 3 alleged a violation of Article XIII, Section 15, which reads: 

"No member should use or attempt to use such member's official position to 

secure unwarranted privileges or advantages for such member or others." 

Carvounis contested the charges. The matter was transmitted to the Office 

of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case and assigned to an 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for hearing. Hearings were held on July 23 
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and July 24, 2015. The record remained open for submission of post-hearing 

briefs and documentary evidence, and closed on February 10, 2016. Following 

multiple extensions, the ALJ issued her Initial Decision on April 5, 2018.

The ALJ made the following factual findings pertinent to our analysis:

Many of the material facts in this matter are not 

in dispute. In January 2014, Carvounis was assigned to 

the Executive Protection Bureau of the Governor's 

Security Unit. On January 8, 2014, he traveled with 

friends to a Cabela's Outfitters, a sporting goods store 

in Hamburg, Pennsylvania. While at the store he 

removed items from their packaging and placed them in 

his cargo-pants pockets. After removing the packaging, 

he placed the empty packages in other parts of the store. 

He also took two differently priced items and switched 

packages so that a binocular strap valued at $29.99 was 

incorrectly priced at $19.99. Further, as he walked 

toward the checkout he removed the price tag on a cap 

and placed the cap on his head.

The total cost of the items concealed from 

Cabela's at checkout was $277.38. At the checkout 

Carvounis purchased approximately $200 worth of 

merchandise, but did not take the concealed items from 

his pocket, nor did he inform the cashier that he was 

purchasing the cap on his head. As he tried to exit the 

store, a Cabela's loss-prevention agent and assistant 

store manager stopped him, along with an officer of the 

Tilden Township Police Department. He was taken to 

the asset-protection office in the store and, after an 

interview, charged with retail theft under Pennsylvania 

law. Specifically, he was charged with two counts of 

retail theft, a Class B misdemeanor. On February 10, 

2014, Carvounis applied for and was accepted into 

Pennsylvania's Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition 
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(ARD) program. He completed all conditions of the 

program on August 25, 2014, and all charges were 

dismissed and his arrest records were expunged.

. . . . 

The Division then presented the testimony of 

Barbara Smith, who was a loss-prevention agent for 

Cabela's at the time of the incident. She described her 

duties at the store in Hamburg and the store's extensive 

surveillance-camera footage. It was that surveillancecamera coverage that led to her spotting Carvounis's 

activity in the store that day. She noticed him as she 

was monitoring the surveillance cameras. Smith 

testified as to her observations of Carvounis and the 

report on the incident that she authored. After 

observing his actions in secreting items in his cargo 

pants, placing the packaging for those items throughout 

the store, and changing prices on items, she and other 

employees and Officer Schwoyer confronted him after 

he had exited the store. She stated that it is Cabela's 

policy to wait until the patron exits the store, in the 

event the patron changes his mind and returns with the 

items. Carvounis was then escorted to an office on the 

premises where he was interviewed by . . . assistant 

manager for asset protection Jared Taggart, and 

Schwoyer.

At the start of the interview Carvounis was asked 

for his identification, and when he produced his driver's 

license he also produced his Division ID. Taggart 

returned them to him, and he was asked if he had 

weapons on his person. Schwoyer then took 

Carvounis's gun and a knife from him, and the interview 

continued. According to Smith, Carvounis first stated 

that he did not know why he was there, and he was 

asked to empty his pockets. When the "product" was 

taken out of his pockets he first stated that he had 
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brought the eight stolen items in with him. He was then 

confronted with the empty packaging that Taggart had 

retrieved from the retail floor. Smith stated that 

Carvounis stopped arguing at that point and began to 

describe his duties at the Division, including being on 

the Governor's detail. He also stated that the items were 

for his use on the job, and that he needed to purchase 

them himself due to budgetary cutbacks. Carvounis 

asked that he be charged with an amount under $150, 

which constituted a lesser offense under Pennsylvania 

law. Smith further testified that Carvounis asked 

Schwoyer for professional courtesy in the matter. At 

the end of the interview Carvounis left with Schwoyer, 

and he was charged with retail theft, as Smith put it, 

like anyone else.

. . . . 

In further discussing the statements he made in 

the Cabela's interview, Carvounis described his state of 

mind as being in shock. He said his reactions were the 

result of panic as everything came crashing down on 

him. He did admit to playing "dumb" at first. He said 

his State Police ID came out of his wallet when he 

produced his driver's license. According to Carvounis, 

it was Schwoyer who asked him for more information 

on his duties as a State trooper. As to his request that 

he not be charged with a theft over $150, he recalled 

Taggart explaining what offenses he could be charged 

with, and his request was merely in response to that 

explanation. As to his request for professional 

courtesy, he stated that he asked everyone in the 

interview room for help with his situation.

Carvounis testified that the theft occurred during 

a period of extreme personal and work stress in his life. 

It was his first day off in a while, and he and his family 
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were going through tough financial times as he 

attempted to help his mother maintain her residence.

The ALJ found Carvounis guilty of Charges 1 and 3, but not guilty of 

Charge 2 because he was not acting in his official capacity. The ALJ explained 

that Carvounis "was on his day off, not on duty, and not performing his official 

duties. While he invoked his status as a State trooper in discussions at Cabela's, 

he was not acting in his official capacity." While recognizing the infractions 

were serious, the ALJ found the evidence presented in mitigation of penalty to 

be substantial. Taking into account Carvounis's service record, acceptance of 

responsibility, and character testimonials, the ALJ determined the "more 

appropriate penalty" was a suspension until the date of the Initial Decision. 

Both parties filed written exceptions. On May 16, 2018, the Acting 

Superintendent issued a final decision adopting in part, rejecting in part, and 

modifying in part the Initial Decision. The Acting Superintendent adopted the 

ALJ's guilty findings on Charges 1 and 3, rejected the not guilty finding on 

Charge 2, and modified the recommended penalty of suspension to termination

from employment with the Division. In reaching those determinations, the 

Acting Superintendent engaged in the following analysis: 

The record in this case is clear that Trooper 

Carvounis'[s] actions failed to meet these exacting 

standards. It is undisputed that he engaged in 
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shoplifting. Further, when confronted with this crime, 

he initially stated that he did not know the reason that 

he was detained from leaving the sporting goods store. 

In addition, as found by [the ALJ,] he contended "that 

the stolen items were for his use at work due to 

budgetary cutbacks." Further, he sought favorable 

treatment due to his status as a State Trooper.

. . . . 

In this matter, [the ALJ] determined, based upon 

the above-conduct, that Trooper Carvounis "acted in a 

manner that discredited himself." Therefore, the 

prerequisite for a guilty determination of Charge #2 has 

been satisfied. Similarly, Trooper Carvounis'[s]

aforementioned conduct also satisfies the separate 

element of this Charge of acting "to the discredit of the 

Division[.]"

Moreover, the basis for [the ALJ's] not guilty 

finding for this charge was that Trooper Carvounis was 

off duty. However, there is no requirement in Charge 

#2, Article VI, Section 2.b to [be] acting in an official 

capacity. It appears that [the ALJ] inadvertently 

applied the official capacity standard set out in Article 

VI, Section 2(a). Thus, the duty status of Trooper 

Carvounis at the time of the theft is irrelevant for the 

purpose of assessing his guilt to Charge #2.

Therefore, for all of the above-reasons, [the 

ALJ's] not guilty determination as to Charge #2 is 

hereby rejected.

. . . . 

In this case, [the ALJ] recommended the 

suspension of Trooper Carvounis. However, in light of 

the nature of the actions of Trooper Carvounis, such a 
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penalty is insufficient. As previously noted, a State 

Trooper is held to a higher code of conduct, whether on 

or off duty. In this case, Trooper Carvounis failed to 

meet this threshold.

There is no dispute that Trooper Carvounis 

engaged in shoplifting, an illegal act, of goods that 

exceeded $200. In Pennsylvania, this conduct is 

classified as a misdemeanor offense. However, the 

equivalent offense in New Jersey is a fourth degree 

crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(3). Thus, this conduct 

alone, shoplifting, constitutes a serious breach of the 

standard of behavior required of a State Trooper. 

However, Trooper Carvounis'[s] misconduct did not 

end upon his detention by store employees and the local 

police officer for shoplifting as he exited the sporting 

goods store. Rather, he compounded his misconduct 

through a series of additional actions.

Trooper Carvounis initially informed the store 

employees that he did not know the reason he was 

detained after exiting the store. This comment belies 

the various items that he had concealed in the pockets 

of his pants. Moreover, he stated that the goods in his 

possession were his own property. This assertion was 

contradicted by the empty packaging retrieved by the 

store employee. In addition, he also maintained that he 

needed these items for his position as a State Trooper 

due to budget cuts. Further, he contended that he told 

the cashier to charge him for the hat that was on his 

head. This assertion was directly contradicted by the 

store employee. Trooper Carvounis also requested that 

the store lower the value of the goods so that the total 

value would not exceed the threshold for a more serious 

criminal charge.

Trooper Carvounis also engaged in additional 

unacceptable conduct. He sought to utilize his position 
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for favorable treatment. During his interview with the 

store employees and Officer Schwoyer, Trooper 

Carvounis discussed his duties as a State Trooper and 

requested "professional courtesy."

. . . . 

Here, Trooper Carvounis, a law enforcement 

officer in this State, failed to adhere to the laws by

engaging in shoplifting. Further, his subsequent 

misconduct also violated the standards of integrity and 

professionalism required of a State Trooper. Trooper 

Carvounis'[s] actions stand in direct contradiction to the 

conduct expected and required of State Troopers. In 

addition, his misconduct jeopardized the public's trust 

in the State Police.

Therefore, for all the above-reasons, the penalty 

of suspension recommended by [the ALJ] must be 

modified. In light of the gravity of Trooper 

Carvounis'[s] actions, the appropriate penalty in this 

matter is termination from employment with the New 

Jersey State Police.

This appeal followed. 

II.

Established precedents guide our task on appeal. Appellate review of an 

administrative agency decision is limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 

(2007). A strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Superintendent's 

decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001). The burden 
10 A-4438-17T2

is on appellant to demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002).

"Appellate courts ordinarily accord deference to final agency actions, 

reversing those actions if they are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if 

the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a 

whole.'" N.J. Soc'y for the Prev. of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 

196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway 

State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). 

Under the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard, our scope of 

review is guided by three major inquiries: (l) whether the agency's decision 

conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial 

credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, 

the administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion. In re 

Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). 

When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord substantial 

deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal conclusions, while 

acknowledging the agency's "expertise and superior knowledge of a particular 

field." Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 

1, 10 (2009) (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 
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513 (1992)). We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though 

we might have reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194.

This same deferential standard applies to our review of the agency's choice 

of a disciplinary sanction. Id. at 195. We review discipline only to determine 

whether the "punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all 

of the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Ibid. (quoting 

In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007)).

III.

With those principles in mind, we turn to Carvounis's contentions. 

Carvounis argues the Acting Superintendent's decision to modify the penalty 

from suspension to termination is shocking to one's sense of fairness. We 

disagree. 

"[T]he responsibility for determining whether a trooper has committed a 

violation of the Rules and Regulations, and the discipline to be imposed therefor, 

are plainly matters of inherent managerial prerogative to be discharged by the 

Superintendent and his designated staff." State v. State Troopers Fraternal 

Ass'n, 134 N.J. 393, 416 (1993). The Court noted that unlike the discipline of 

State employees in other departments, "the discipline of state troopers implicates 

not only the proper conduct of those engaged in the most significant aspects of 
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law enforcement, involving the public safety and the apprehension of dangerous 

criminals, but also the overall effectiveness, performance standards, and morale 

of the State Police." Id. at 416-17.

Law enforcement officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than 

other public employees, and are obliged to act in a reasonable manner. In re 

Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576-77 (1990). Law enforcement officers "must present 

an image of personal integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of 

the public." Moorestown Twp. v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. 

Div. 1965). "Every police officer has an inherent duty to obey the law" and 

serve with "honesty, integrity and good faith." State v. Stevens, 203 N.J. Super. 

59, 65, 66 (Law Div. 1984). This higher standard of conduct applies to the 

behavior of law enforcement officers on or off-duty. Phillips, 117 N.J. at 577.

The theft of merchandise exceeding $200 in value would have been a 

fourth-degree crime if committed in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(3). The 

fact that the charge was diverted into a program similar to pre-trial intervention, 

dismissed after completion of the diversionary program, and subsequently 

expunged, does not diminish its seriousness or the impact on the Division. 

Unfortunately, Carvounis's misconduct did not end with the theft. He 

compounded his misconduct by falsely claiming the stolen items belonged to 
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him, and then claiming the stolen items were needed for work due to budgetary 

cutbacks. He further compounded his misconduct by requesting special 

treatment in the form of professional courtesy by virtue of his position. 

We recognize that Carvounis was never previously disciplined and was 

respected in the Division. While the absence of prior discipline was considered 

by the Acting Superintendent, the serious nature of Carvounis's conduct led to 

the decision to terminate him. 

"[P]rogressive discipline is a worthy principle but it is not subject to 

universal application when determining a disciplined employee's quantum of 

discipline." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 36. "[P]rogressive discipline is not a 

necessary consideration . . . when the misconduct is severe, when it is 

unbecoming to the employee's position or renders the employee unsuitable for 

continuation in the position, or when application of the principle would be 

contrary to the public interest." Id. at 33. "Our appellate courts also have upheld 

dismissal of employees, without regard to whether the employees have had 

substantial past disciplinary records, for engaging in conduct that is unbecoming 

to the position." Id. at 34.

"We are mindful of the special status of the Division of State Police and 

the special standards of discipline that apply to its members, and of the 
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Superintendent's duty to maintain discipline among the troopers as one means 

of promoting the public interest and safety." Div. of State Police v. Jiras, 305 

N.J. Super. 476, 481 (App. Div. 1997) (citations omitted). Considering the 

Division's need to maintain order and discipline among its troopers, we decline 

to substitute our judgment for that of the Acting Superintendent, "especially 

where considerations of public policy are implicated." Id. at 482. We see no 

reason to depart from that standard in this case.

The findings and conclusions reached by the Acting Superintendent are 

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. Termination for 

Charges 1, 2, and 3 is not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking 

to our sense of fairness, and we see no reason to disturb the Acting 

Superintendent's decision. The final decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable.

Carvounis's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.