UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4073

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE LEO HAWKINS, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda L. Wright Allen, 

District Judge. (2:04-cr-00060-AWA-TEM-1)

Submitted: July 20, 2015 Decided: August 13, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harry Dennis Harmon, Jr., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, William D. Muhr, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Leo Hawkins, Jr., appeals the district court’s 

order imposing a 24-month sentence after it revoked his

supervised release. Hawkins asserts that the district court 

erred when it denied his motion for a continuance of the 

revocation hearing, and also argues that his status as a 

Moorish-American National divested the district court of 

jurisdiction over him.1 Hawkins has also filed a self-styled 

“‘Affidavit of Sworn Truth-Supplemental Appeal’ Brief[,]” in 

which he requests an extension of time to file a memorandum of 

law.2 Finding no error, we affirm.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a 

continuance for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

 1 Although Hawkins’ counsel asserts that the issue 

pertaining to the motion for a continuance is meritorious, he 

asserts that the jurisdictional issue is raised pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and concedes that the 

issue is meritless. Because we conclude that counsel’s effort 

to combine a meritorious claim with a claim conceded to be 

lacking in merit does not comport with the Anders framework, see 

id. at 744-45 (setting forth procedure to be followed when 

counsel finds “case to be wholly frivolous”), we decline to 

consider this appeal pursuant to Anders.

2 Because Hawkins is represented by counsel who has filed a 

merits brief, he is not entitled to file a pro se supplemental 

brief. Accordingly, we deny his motion for an extension of time 

to file a memorandum of law. See United States v. Penniegraft, 

641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011) (denying motion to file 

pro se supplemental brief because the defendant was represented 

by counsel).
3

Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 531 (4th Cir. 2013). A district court 

abuses its discretion when its denial of a motion for 

continuance is “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon 

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for 

delay[.]” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Even if such an abuse of discretion 

is found, the defendant must show that the error specifically 

prejudiced his case in order to prevail.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 

531 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

The district court did not err when it denied Hawkins’ 

motion for a continuance. It is undisputed that Hawkins was 

provided the full panoply of due process rights during his 

federal trial, including that the offenses be proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Thus, Hawkins’ convictions provided

sufficient grounds for the district court to conclude, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Hawkins’ violated the terms 

of his supervised release. Accordingly, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion when it refused to continue the 

revocation hearing pending the conclusion of his direct appeal. 

See United States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 

2005) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the district court 

abused its discretion in revoking his supervised release based 

on evidence of his state murder conviction, which was still 

pending on appeal at the time that supervision was revoked); 
4

United States v. Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253, 1254 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(“The conviction itself, whether or not an appeal is taken, 

provides adequate proof of the violation of state law to justify 

revoking probation.”). 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.3 We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3 We agree with counsel that Hawkins’ argument pertaining to 

the district court’s jurisdiction over him is meritless. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3231 (2012) (“The district courts of the United States 

shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the 

States, of all offenses against the laws of the United 

States.”).