[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 147 (Wednesday, August 1, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 42016-42041]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-3736]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AB80


Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front-End Strength of Cab 
Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to further the safety of passenger train 
occupants by amending existing regulations to enhance structural 
strength requirements for the front end of cab cars and multiple-unit 
locomotives. These enhancements would include the addition of 
deformation and energy absorption requirements specified in revised 
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) standards for front-
end collision posts and corner posts for this equipment. FRA is also 
proposing to make miscellaneous clarifying amendments to current 
regulations for the structural strength of passenger equipment.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by October 1, 2007. 
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent 
possible without incurring additional expense or delay.
    (2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a 
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a 
public, oral hearing prior to August 31, 2007, one will be scheduled, 
and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to 
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such 
hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, 
Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
    <bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
    <bullet> Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department 
of

[[Page 42017]]

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    <bullet> Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without 
change to http://dms.dot.gov including any personal information. Please 
see the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary Information section of 
this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted 
comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to the 
Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except 
Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary G. Fairbanks, Specialist, Motive 
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Mail Stop 25, 
Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, 
DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6282); Eloy E. Martinez, Program Manager, 
Equipment and Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad 
Development, RDV-32, Federal Railroad Administration, 55 Broadway, 
Cambridge, MA 02142 (telephone 617-494-2243); or Daniel L. Alpert, 
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone 202-493-6026).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
    A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate
    B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
    C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
    E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force
    F. Development of the NPRM
III. Technical Background
    A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service
    B. Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    C. Accident History
    D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front-End Frame Structures of 
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    E. Testing of Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU 
Locomotives
    1. Designs Evaluated by FRA
    2. FRA Dynamic Impact Testing
    3. Industry Quasi-Static Testing
    4. Comparative Analyses
    F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements
    G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front-End Frame 
Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Trade Impact
    I. Privacy Act

I. Statutory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation convened a 
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with 
the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising 
from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would 
begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a 
five-year period. In November of 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's 
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations 
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 
(November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult 
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for 
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as 
issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of the Act is codified at 
49 U.S.C. 20133.

II. Proceedings to Date

A. Proceedings to Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate

    The Secretary of Transportation delegated these rulemaking 
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator, see 49 CFR 
1.49(m), and FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
Working Group to provide FRA advice in developing the regulations. On 
June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety standards 
for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM provided 
background information on the need for such standards, offered 
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented 
questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration 
of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on 
September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for 
railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to 
requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment 
at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the 
comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule establishing 
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, which was 
published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed 
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements 
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the 
following subject areas: structural design; fire safety; training; 
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective 
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and 
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final 
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue, 
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the 
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and 
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response 
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of 
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions 
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR 
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised 
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those 
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002, 
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by 
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning 
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more 
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's 
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The

[[Page 42018]]

product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238 
(part 238) and also at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
    Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency 
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63 
FR 24629; May 4, 1998. The rule addresses passenger train emergencies 
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains. 
The rule requires railroads that operate intercity or commuter 
passenger train service or that host the operation of such service to 
adopt and comply with written emergency preparedness plans. The 
emergency preparedness plans must address subjects such as 
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations, 
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency 
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each 
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable 
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is 
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires 
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency 
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency 
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could 
reasonably be expected to occur. In addition, the rule contains 
requirements for the identification and usage of emergency window 
exits, rescue access windows, and door exits.

B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking

    Although FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified 
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be 
addressed following the completion of additional research, the 
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of 
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned enhancing 
the requirements for corner posts on cab cars and MU locomotives. See 
64 FR 25607; May 12, 1999. Current FRA requirements for corner posts 
are based on conventional industry practice at the time, which had not 
proven adequate in then-recent side swipe collisions with cab cars 
leading. Id. FRA explained that the current requirements were being 
adopted as an interim measure to prevent the introduction of equipment 
not meeting the requirements, that FRA was assisting APTA in preparing 
an industry standard for corner post arrangements on cab cars and MU 
locomotives, and that adoption of a suitable Federal standard would be 
an immediate priority. Id. In broader terms, this issue concerned the 
behavior of cab car and MU locomotive end frames when overloaded, as 
during an impact with maintenance-of-way equipment or with a highway 
vehicle at a highway-rail grade crossing, and thus concerned collision 
post strength as well. FRA and interested industry members also began 
identifying other issues related to the passenger equipment safety 
standards and the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations. 
FRA decided to address these issues with the assistance of FRA's 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee.

C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview

    In March 1996 FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on 
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes 
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. A list of current member groups follows:
    <bullet> American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners 
(AARPCO);
    <bullet> American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO);
    <bullet> American Chemistry Council;
    <bullet> American Petroleum Institute;
    <bullet> APTA;
    <bullet> American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
(ASLRRA);
    <bullet> American Train Dispatchers Association;
    <bullet> Association of American Railroads (AAR);
    <bullet> Association of Railway Museums;
    <bullet> Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
    <bullet> Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
    <bullet> Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division;
    <bullet> Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
    <bullet> Chlorine Institute;
    <bullet> Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*;
    <bullet> Fertilizer Institute;
    <bullet> High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
    <bullet> Institute of Makers of Explosives;
    <bullet> International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers;
    <bullet> International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
    <bullet> Labor Council for Latin American Advancement*;
    <bullet> League of Railway Industry Women*;
    <bullet> National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
    <bullet> National Association of Railway Business Women*;
    <bullet> National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
    <bullet> National Railroad Construction and Maintenance 
Association;
    <bullet> National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
    <bullet> National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*;
    <bullet> Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
    <bullet> Safe Travel America (STA);
    <bullet> Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte*;
    <bullet> Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
    <bullet> Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
    <bullet> Transport Canada*;
    <bullet> Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
    <bullet> Transportation Communications International Union/BRC 
(TCIU/BRC);
    <bullet> Transportation Security Administration*; and
    <bullet> United Transportation Union (UTU).
    *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The task force then provides that information to the 
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous 
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to 
the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple 
majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then 
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff 
play an active role at the working group level in discussing the issues 
and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA 
is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation. However, 
FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency 
exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule 
achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly

[[Page 42019]]

supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. 
Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in 
developing the actual regulatory proposal or final rule. Any such 
variations would be noted and explained in the rulemaking document 
issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is unable to reach 
consensus on recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the 
issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of 
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in 
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established 
the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task 
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of 
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
    <bullet> AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company, CSX 
Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
    <bullet> AAPRCO;
    <bullet> AASHTO;
    <bullet> Amtrak;
    <bullet> APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., LDK 
Engineering, Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Long Island Rail Road 
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast 
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern 
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
    <bullet> BLET;
    <bullet> BRS;
    <bullet> FTA;
    <bullet> HSGTA;
    <bullet> IBEW;
    <bullet> NARP;
    <bullet> RSI;
    <bullet> SMWIA;
    <bullet> STA;
    <bullet> TCIU/BRC;
    <bullet> TWU; and
    <bullet> UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to 
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with 
the Working Group when possible. The Working Group has held nine 
meetings on the following dates and locations:
    <bullet> September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
    <bullet> November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
    <bullet> May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
    <bullet> October 26-27, 2004, in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
    <bullet> March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
    <bullet> September 7, 2005, in Chicago, IL;
    <bullet> March 21-22, 2006, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
    <bullet> September 12-13, 2006, in Orlando, FL; and
    <bullet> April 17-18, 2007, in Orlando, FL.
    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with 
representatives of Tri-County Commuter Rail and Metra, respectively, 
and toured their passenger equipment. The visits were open to all 
members of the Working Group, and FRA believes they have added to the 
collective understanding of the Group in identifying and addressing 
passenger equipment safety issues.

E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting 
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to 
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's 
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces include 
various representatives from the respective organizations that were 
part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned 
the job of identifying and developing issues and recommendations 
specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of 
passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of 
safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was 
published on December 8, 2005, see 70 FR 73069, and a final rule was 
published on October 19, 2006, see 71 FR 61835. Another of these task 
forces was established to identify issues and develop recommendations 
related to emergency systems, procedures, and equipment, and helped to 
develop an NPRM on these topics that was published on August 24, 2006, 
see 71 FR 50276. Another task force, the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task 
Force (Task Force), was assigned the job of developing recommendations 
related to glazing integrity, structural crashworthiness, and the 
protection of occupants during accidents and incidents. Specifically, 
this Task Force was charged with developing recommendations for glazing 
qualification testing and for cab car/MU locomotive end frame 
optimization. Although being developed by the same Task Force, the 
glazing and cab car/MU locomotive end frame recommendations are being 
handled separately, and glazing is not a subject of this NPRM. The Task 
Force was also given the responsibility of addressing a number of other 
issues related to glazing, structural crashworthiness, and occupant 
protection and recommending any research necessary to facilitate their 
resolution. Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the 
following:
    <bullet> AAR;
    <bullet> Amtrak;
    <bullet> APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., General 
Electric Transportation Systems, General Motors--Electro-Motive 
Division, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK 
Engineering Services, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts 
Bay Commuter Rail Corporation (MBCR), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern 
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), Rotem Company, Saint 
Gobian Sully NA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad (Coaster), SEPTA, 
and STV, Inc.;
    <bullet> BLET;
    <bullet> California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
    <bullet> NARP;
    <bullet> RSI; and
    <bullet> UTU.
    While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from 
the NTSB attended certain of the meetings and contributed to the 
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center 
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical 
discussions.
    The Task Force held six meetings on the following dates and 
locations:
    <bullet> March 17-18, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
    <bullet> May 13, 2004, in Schaumberg, IL;
    <bullet> November 9, 2004, in Boston, MA;
    <bullet> February 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
    <bullet> April 21-22, 2005, in Cambridge, MA; and
    <bullet> August 11, 2005, in Cambridge, MA.

F. Development of the NPRM

    This NPRM was developed to address concerns raised and issues 
discussed about cab car and MU locomotive front-end frame structures 
during the Task Force meetings and pertinent Working Group meetings. 
Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the docket in 
this proceeding and are available for public inspection. With the 
exception discussed below, the Working

[[Page 42020]]

Group reached consensus on the principal regulatory provisions 
contained in this NPRM at its meeting in September 2005. After the 
September 2005 meeting, the Working Group presented its recommendations 
to the full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting in October 2005. All of 
the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its October 2005 meeting 
accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group. 
Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's 
recommendations to FRA in this matter. After reviewing the full RSAC's 
recommendations, FRA agreed that the recommendations provided a good 
basis for a proposed rule, but that test standards and performance 
criteria more suitable to cab cars and MU locomotives without a flat 
forward end or with energy absorbing structures used as part of a crash 
energy management design (CEM), or both, should be specified. As 
discussed below, the NPRM provides an option for the dynamic testing of 
cab cars and MU locomotives as a means of demonstrating compliance with 
the rule. However, FRA makes clear that this proposal was not the 
result of an RSAC recommendation. Otherwise, FRA has adopted the RSAC's 
recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes of clarity 
and formatting in the Federal Register.
    Overall, this NPRM is the product of FRA's review, consideration, 
and acceptance of the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group, 
and full RSAC. In the preamble discussion of this proposal, FRA refers 
to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of 
the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC, as they are identified or 
contained in the minutes of their meetings. FRA does so to show the 
origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions concerning those 
issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA 
believes this serves to illuminate factors it has weighed in making its 
regulatory decisions, as well as the logic behind those decisions. The 
reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC makes 
recommendations to FRA. However, as noted above, FRA is in no way bound 
to follow the recommendations, and the agency exercises its independent 
judgment on whether the recommendations achieve the agency's regulatory 
goal(s), are soundly supported, and are in accordance with policy and 
legal requirements.

III. Technical Background

    Transporting passengers by rail is very safe. Since 1978, more than 
11.2 billion passengers have traveled by rail, based on reports filed 
monthly with FRA. The number of rail passengers has steadily increased 
over the years, and since the year 2000 has averaged more than 500 
million per year. On a passenger-mile basis, with an average of about 
15.5 billion passenger-miles per year, rail travel is about as safe as 
scheduled airline service and intercity bus transportation, and it is 
far safer than private motor vehicle travel. Passenger rail accidents--
while always to be avoided--have a very high passenger survival rate.
    Yet, as in any form of transportation, there are risks inherent in 
passenger rail travel. Although no passengers died in train collision 
or derailments in 2006, 12 passengers did in 2005. For this reason, FRA 
continually works to improve the safety of passenger rail operations. 
FRA's efforts include sponsoring the research and development of safety 
technology, providing technical support for industry specifications and 
standards, and engaging in cooperative rulemaking efforts with key 
industry stakeholders. FRA has focused in particular on enhancing the 
crashworthiness of passenger trains.
    In a passenger train collision or derailment, the principal 
crashworthiness risks that occupants face are the loss of safe space 
inside the train from crushing of the train structure and, as the train 
decelerates, the risk of secondary impacts with interior surfaces. 
Therefore, the principal goals of the crashworthiness research 
sponsored by FRA are twofold: First, to preserve a safe space in which 
occupants can ride out the collision or derailment, and, then, to 
minimize the physical forces to which occupants are subjected when 
impacting surfaces inside a passenger car as the train decelerates. 
Though not a part of this NPRM, other crashworthiness research focuses 
on related issues such as fuel tank safety, for equipment with a fuel 
tank, and the associated risk of fire if the fuel tank is breached 
during the collision or derailment.
    The results of ongoing research on cab car and MU locomotive front-
end frame structures help demonstrate both the effectiveness and the 
practicality of the structural enhancements proposed in this NPRM to 
make this equipment more crashworthy. This research is discussed below, 
along with other technical information providing the background for 
FRA's proposal.

A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service

    FRA's focus on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness should be 
considered in the context of the predominant types of passenger rail 
service in North America. The first involves operation of passenger 
trains with conventional locomotives in the lead, typically pulling 
consists of passenger coaches and other cars such as baggage cars, 
dining cars, and sleeping cars. Such trains are common on long-
distance, intercity rail routes operated by Amtrak. On a daily basis, 
however, most passenger rail service is provided by commuter railroads, 
which typically operate one or both of the two most predominant types 
of service: Push-pull service and MU locomotive service.
    Push-pull service is passenger train service typically operated in 
one direction of travel with a conventional locomotive in the rear of 
the train pushing the consist (the ``push mode'') and with a cab car in 
the lead position of the train; and, in the opposite direction of 
travel, the service is operated with the conventional locomotive in the 
lead position of the train pulling the consist (the ``pull mode'') and 
with the cab car in the rear of the train. (A cab car is both a 
passenger car, in that it has seats for passengers, and a locomotive, 
in that it has a control cab from which the engineer can operate the 
train.) Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical 
lines providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes.
    MU locomotive service is passenger rail service involving trains 
consisting of self-propelled electric or diesel MU locomotives. MU 
locomotives typically operate semi-permanently coupled together as a 
pair or triplet with a control cab at each end of the consist. During 
peak commuting hours, multiple pairs or triplets of MU locomotives, or 
a combination of both, are typically operated together as a single 
passenger train in MU service. This type of service does not make use 
of a conventional locomotive as a primary means of motive power. MU 
locomotive service is very similar to push-pull service as operated in 
the push mode with the cab car in the lead.
    By focusing on enhancements to cab car and MU locomotive 
crashworthiness, FRA seeks to enhance the safety of the two most 
typical forms of passenger rail service in the U.S.

[[Page 42021]]

B. Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU locomotives

    Structurally, MU locomotives and cab cars built in the same period 
are very similar, and both are designed to transport and be occupied by 
passengers. The principal distinction is that cab cars do not have 
motors to propel themselves. Unlike MU locomotives and cab cars, 
conventional locomotives are not designed to be occupied by 
passengers--only by operating crewmembers. Concern has been raised 
about the safety of cab car-led and MU locomotive train service due to 
the closer proximity of the engineer and passengers to the leading end 
of the train than in conventional locomotive-led service.
    The principal purpose of cab car and MU locomotive end frame 
structures is to provide protection for the engineer and passengers in 
the event of a collision where the superstructure of the vehicle is 
directly engaged and the underframe is either not engaged or only 
indirectly engaged in the collision. In the event of impacts with 
objects above the underframe of a cab car or MU locomotive, the end 
frame members are the primary source of protection for the engineer and 
the passengers. There are various types of cab cars and MU locomotives 
in current use. As discussed below, a flat-nosed, single-level cab car 
has been used for purposes of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness research. 
(The cab car was originally constructed as an MU locomotive but had its 
traction motors removed for testing.) Flat-nosed designs are 
representative of a large proportion of the cab car and MU locomotive 
fleet.
    In a typical flat-nosed cab car, the end frame is composed of 
several structural elements that act together to resist inward 
deformations under load. The base of the end frame structure is 
composed of the end/buffer beam, which is directly connected to the 
draft sill of the vehicle. For cars that include stepwells, the side 
sills of the underframe generally do not directly connect to the end/
buffer beam. There are four major vertical members connected to the 
end/buffer beam: two collision posts located approximately at the one-
third points along the length of the beam, and two corner posts located 
at the outermost points of the beam. These structural elements are also 
connected together through two additional lateral members: a lateral 
member/shelf located just below the window frame structure, and an 
anti-telescoping plate at the top. The attachment of the end frame 
structure to the rest of the vehicle typically occurs at three 
locations. The first location is at the draft sill at the level of the 
underframe. This is the main connection where a majority of any 
longitudinal load applied to the end frame is reacted into the 
underframe of the vehicle. There are two other connections at the cant/
roof rail located at either side of the car just below the level of the 
roof. When a longitudinal load is applied to the end frame, it is 
reacted by the draft sill and the cant rails into the main carbody 
structure. A schematic of a typical arrangement is depicted in Figure 
1.

[[Page 42022]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.000

C. Accident History

    In a collision involving the front end of a cab car or an MU 
locomotive, it is vitally important that the end frame behaves in a 
ductile manner, absorbing some of the collision energy in order to 
maintain sufficient space in which the engineer and passengers can ride 
out the event. An example of a collision where the end frame did not 
effectively absorb collision energy occurred in Portage, IN, in 1998 
when a NICTD train consisting of MU locomotives struck a tractor-tandem 
trailer carrying steel coils that had become immobilized on a grade 
crossing.\1\ The leading MU locomotive impacted a steel coil at a point 
centered on one of its collision posts, the collision post failed, and 
the steel coil penetrated into the interior of the locomotive, 
resulting in three fatalities. Little of the collision energy was 
absorbed by the collision post, because the post had failed before it 
could deform in any significant way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision of 
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Train 102 with a 
Tractor-Trailer Portage, Indiana, June 18, 1998,'' RAR-99-03, 07/26/
1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are additional examples of incidents where the end frame of a 
cab car or an MU locomotive was engaged during a collision and a loss 
of survivable volume ensued due to the failure of end frame structures. 
As detailed in the NTSB accident reports referenced below, one such 
incident was the 1996 Secaucus, NJ collision between a cab car-led 
consist with a conventional locomotive-led consist,\2\ in which the 
right corner post of the cab car and its supporting end frame structure 
had separated from the car.

[[Page 42023]]

Another such incident was the 1996 Silver Spring, MD collision between 
a cab car-led consist with a locomotive-led consist, in which the cab 
car's left corner post and its supporting end frame structure had 
separated from the car.\3\ Although the speeds associated with certain 
past events are greater than what can be fully protected against, and 
even though enhancements to passenger train emergency features and 
other requirements unrelated to crashworthiness, such as fire safety, 
may overall do as much or more to prevent or mitigate the consequences 
of these types of events, they do provide indicative loading conditions 
for developing structural enhancements that can improve crashworthiness 
performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Railroad Accident 
Report: Near Head-On Collision and Derailment of Two New Jersey 
Transit Commuter Trains Near Secaucus, New Jersey, February 9, 
1996,'' RAR-97-01, 03/25/1997.
    \3\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision and 
Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC Train 286 and National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring, 
Maryland, February 16, 1996,'' RAR-97-02, 06/17/1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA also notes that on January 26, 2005 in Glendale, CA, a 
collision involving an unoccupied sport utility vehicle (SUV) that was 
parked on the track, two Metrolink commuter trains, and a standing 
freight train resulted in 11 deaths and numerous injuries. Eight of the 
fatalities occurred on a cab car-led passenger train which derailed 
after striking the SUV, causing the cab car to be guided down a 
railroad siding, which resulted in an impact at an approximate speed of 
49 mph with the standing freight train. After the collision with the 
standing freight train, the rear end of the lead cab car buckled 
laterally, obstructing the right-of-way of an oncoming, conventional 
locomotive-led passenger train. The rear end of the cab car raked the 
side of the conventional locomotive-led train, which was moving at an 
approximate speed of 51 mph, crushing occupied areas of that train. 
This incident involved enormous quantities of kinetic energy, and the 
underframe of the leading cab car crushed more than 20 feet inward. 
Because the strength of the end frame is ultimately dependent on the 
strength of the underframe, which failed, stronger collision posts and 
corner posts on the front end of the leading cab car would have been, 
in themselves, of little benefit in absorbing the collision energy. For 
this reason, as discussed below, FRA has been exploring other 
crashworthiness strategies, such as CEM, to help mitigate the effects 
of collisions involving higher impact speeds. Nevertheless, CEM will 
also require proper end frame performance in order to function as 
intended.

D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front-End Frame Structures of Cab 
Cars and MU Locomotives

    Both the Federal government and the passenger railroad industry 
have been working together to improve the crashworthiness of cab cars 
and MU locomotives. As noted above, in 1999, after several years of 
development and in consultation with a working group comprised of key 
industry stakeholders, FRA promulgated the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards final rule. The rule included end frame structure 
requirements and other crashworthiness-related requirements for cab 
cars, MU locomotives, and other passenger equipment. In particular, the 
final rule provided for strengthened collision posts for new cab cars 
and MU locomotives (i.e., those ordered on or after September 8, 2000, 
or placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002).
    APTA also issued industry standards in 1999, in furtherance of its 
initiative to continue the development and maintenance of voluntary 
industry standards for the safety of railroad passenger equipment. In 
particular, APTA Standards SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 included 
provisions on end frame designs for cab cars and MU locomotives.\4\ 
Specifically, APTA's standards included increased industry requirements 
for the strength of cab car and MU locomotive vertical end frame 
members--collision posts and corner posts. The 1999 APTA standards also 
included industry requirements for the deformation of these end frame 
vertical members, specifying that they must be able to sustain ``severe 
deformation'' before failure of the connections to the underframe and 
roof structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ American Public Transportation Association, Member Services 
Department, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices for 
Passenger Rail Equipment, Issue of July 1, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In January 2000, APTA requested that FRA develop information on the 
effectiveness of APTA's then-recently introduced Manual of Standards 
and Recommended Practices for passenger rail equipment, which included 
APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and APTA SS-C&S-014-99, and FRA's then-recently 
issued Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule. This review was 
intended to look in particular at what increase in crashworthiness was 
obtained for cab cars and MU locomotives through the combination of 
these standards and regulations. FRA shared APTA's interest and 
included full-scale impact tests and associated planning and analysis 
activities in its overall research plan to gather this information. FRA 
then developed the details of the testing process in conjunction with 
APTA's Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Construction-
Structural (C&S) Subcommittee.
    Around this same time, questions arose in the passenger rail 
industry in applying the APTA standards for collision posts and corner 
posts to new cab cars and MU locomotives. Views differed as to what the 
standards actually specified-namely, the meaning of ``severe 
deformation'' in the provisions calling for corner and collision posts 
to sustain ``severe deformation'' before failure of the posts' 
attachments. Consequently, there was not common agreement as to whether 
particular designs met the standards. On May 22, 2003, APTA's PRESS 
Committee accepted the recommendation of its C&S Subcommittee to 
replace these provisions in the standards with a recommended practice 
that the corner and collision post attachments be able to sustain 
minimum prescribed loads with negligible deformation.\5\ Both APTA 
Standards SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 were then otherwise 
incorporated in their entirety into APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Standard for 
the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock. (APTA 
combined these and other structural standards for the design of rail 
passenger equipment into a single document, for ease of reference for 
railroads and car builders.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ American Public Transportation Association, Member Service 
Department, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices for 
Passenger Rail Equipment, Issue of May 1, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, when the decision to turn these provisions into a 
recommended practice was made, ongoing research from full-scale impact 
tests was showing that a substantial increase in cab car and MU 
locomotive crashworthiness could be achieved by designing the posts to 
first deform and, thereby, absorb collision energy before failing.\6\ 
As discussed below, in August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee 
accepted a revised ``severe deformation'' standard for collision and 
corner posts. The standard includes requirements for minimum energy 
absorption and maximum deflection. The standard thereby eliminates a 
deficiency in the 1999 APTA standards by specifying test criteria to 
objectively measure ``severe

[[Page 42024]]

deformation.'' This NPRM proposes to codify this standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Mayville, R., Johnson, K., Tyrell, D., Stringfellow, R., 
``Rail Vehicle Cab Car Collision and Corner Post Designs According 
to APTA S-034 Requirements,'' American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Paper No. MECE2003-44114, November 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Testing of Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU locomotives

    This section summarizes the work done by FRA and the passenger rail 
industry on developing the technical information to make 
recommendations for regulations requiring that corner and collision 
posts in cab car and MU locomotive front-end frames fail in a 
controlled manner when overloaded. Due to the collaborative work of FRA 
with the passenger rail industry, APTA's current passenger rail 
equipment standards include deformation requirements, which prescribe 
how these vertical members should perform when overloaded.
1. Designs Evaluated by FRA
    Two end frame designs were developed for purposes of evaluating 
incremental improvements in the crashworthiness performance, in 
highway-rail grade crossing collision scenarios, of modern corner and 
collision post designs when compared against the performance of older 
designs. The first end frame design was representative of typical 
designs of passenger rail vehicles in the 1990s prior to 1999. (The 
first end frame design is referred to as the ``1990s design.'') The 
second end frame design incorporated all the enhancements required 
beginning in 1999 by FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule in 
part 238 and also recommended beginning in 1999 by APTA's standards for 
corner post and collision post structures, respectively, SS-C&S-013 and 
SS-C&S-014. (The second end frame design is referred to as the State-
of-the-Art (SOA) design.) The two end frame designs developed were then 
retrofitted onto two Budd Pioneer passenger rail cars for testing.
    The SOA design differed principally from the 1990s design by having 
higher values for static loading of the end structure and by 
specifically addressing the performance of the collision and corner 
posts when overloaded. As noted above, the 1999 APTA standards for cab 
car and MU locomotive end structures included the following statement 
for both corner and collision posts:

    [The] post and its supporting structure shall be designed so 
that when it is overloaded * * * failure shall begin as bending or 
buckling in the post. The connections of the post to the supporting 
structure, and the supporting car body structure, shall support the 
post up to its ultimate capacity. The ultimate shear and tensile 
strength of the connecting fasteners or welds shall be sufficient to 
resist the forces causing the deformation, so that shear and tensile 
failure of the fasteners or welds shall not occur, even with severe 
deformation of the post and its connecting and supporting structural 
elements.

    (See paragraph 4.1 of APTA SS-C&S-013-99, and paragraph 3.1 of APTA 
SS-C&S-014-99.) Although the term ``severe deformation'' was not 
specifically defined in the APTA standards, discussions with APTA 
technical staff led to specifying ``severe deformation'' in the SOA 
design as a horizontal crush of the corner and collisions posts for a 
distance equal to the posts' depth. Some failure of the parent material 
in the posts was allowable, but no failure would be allowed in the 
welded connections, as the integrity of the welded connections prevents 
complete separation of the posts from their connections.
    An additional difference in the designs was the exclusion of the 
stepwells for the SOA design, to allow for extended side sills from the 
body bolster to the end/buffer beam. By bringing the side sills forward 
to support the end/buffer beam directly at the corners, the end/buffer 
beam can be developed to a size similar to the one for the 1990s 
design. In fact, recent cab car procurements have provided for 
elimination of the stepwells at the ends of the cars.
    As compared to the 1990s design, the SOA design had the following 
enhancements: More substantial corner posts; a bulkhead sheet 
connecting the collision and corner posts, extending from the floor to 
the transverse member connecting the posts; and a longer side sill that 
extended along the engineer's compartment to the end beam, removing the 
presence of a stepwell. In addition to changes in the cross-sectional 
sizes and thickness of some structural members, another change in the 
SOA design was associated with the connection details for the corner 
posts. In comparison to the corner posts, the collision posts of both 
the 1990s and SOA designs penetrated both the top and bottom flanges of 
both the end/buffer beam and the anti-telescoping plate. This was based 
upon typical practice in the early 1990s for the 1990s design, and a 
provision in the APTA standard for the SOA design. Yet, the corner 
posts differed in that the corner posts for the 1990s design did not 
penetrate both top and bottom flanges of the end/buffer and anti-
telescoping beams, while those in the SOA design did. The SOA design 
therefore had a significantly stiffer connection that was better able 
to resist torsional loads transferred to the anti-telescoping plate.
2. FRA Dynamic Impact Testing
    Two full-scale, grade crossing impact tests were conducted as part 
of an ongoing series of crashworthiness tests of passenger rail 
equipment. The grade crossing tests were designed to address the 
concern of occupant vulnerability to bulk crushing resulting from 
offset/oblique collisions where the primary load-resisting-structure is 
the equipment's end frame design. Both tests were conducted in June 
2002, and in each test a single cab car impacted a 40,000-lb steel coil 
resting on a frangible table at a nominal speed of 14 mph. The steel 
coil was situated such that it impacted the corner post above the cab 
car's end sill. The principal difference between the two tests involved 
the end frame design tested: in one test, the cab car was fitted with 
the 1990s end frame design; in the other, the cab car was fitted with 
the SOA end frame design.
    Prior to the tests, the crush behaviors of the cars and their 
dynamic responses were simulated with car crush and collision dynamics 
models. The car crush model was used to determine the force/crush 
characteristics of the corner posts, as well as their modes of 
deformation.\7\ The collision dynamics model was used to predict the 
extent of crush of the corner posts as a function of impact velocity, 
as well as the three-dimensional accelerations, velocities, and 
displacements of the cars and coil.\8\ Pre-test analyses of the models 
were used in determining the initial test conditions and 
instrumentation test requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J., ``Rail-Car Impact 
Tests with Steel Coil: Car Crush,'' American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1656, April 2003.
    \8\ Jacobsen, K., Tyrell, D., Perlman, A.B., ``Rail-Car Impact 
Tests with Steel Coil: Collision Dynamics,'' American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1655, April 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The impact speed of approximately 14 mph for both tests was chosen 
so that there would be significant intrusion (more than 12 inches) into 
the engineer's cab in the test of the 1990s design, and limited 
intrusion (less than 12 inches) in the test of the SOA design. This 12-
inch deformation metric was chosen to demarcate the amount of intrusion 
that leaves sufficient space for the engineer to ride out the collision 
safely.
    During the full-scale tests, the impact force transmitted to the 
1990s design end structure exceeded the corner post's predicted 
strength, and the corner post separated from its upper attachment. Upon 
impact, the corner post began to hinge near the contact point with the 
coil; subsequently, tearing at the upper connection occurred. The 
intensity of

[[Page 42025]]

the impact ultimately resulted in the failure of the upper connection 
of the corner post to the anti-telescoping plate. More than 30 inches 
of deformation occurred.
    The SOA design performed very closely to pre-test predictions made 
by the finite element and collision dynamics models. See Figure 2. The 
SOA design crushed approximately 9 inches in the longitudinal 
direction.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.001

    Pre-test analyses for the 1990s design using the car crush model 
and collision dynamics model were in close agreement with the 
measurements taken during the actual testing of the cab car end frame 
built to this design. The pre-test analyses also nearly overlay the 
test results for the force/crush characteristic of the SOA design. As a 
result, FRA believes that both sets of models are capable of predicting 
the modes of structural deformation and the total amount of energy 
consumed during a collision. Careful application of finite-element 
modeling allows accurate prediction of the crush behavior of rail car 
structures.
    Both the methodologies used to design the cab car end frames and 
the results of the tests show that significant increases in rail 
passenger equipment crashworthiness can be achieved if greater 
consideration is given to the manner in which structural elements 
deform when overloaded. Modern methods of analysis can accurately 
predict structural crush (severe deformation) and consequently can be 
used with confidence to develop structures that collapse in a 
controlled manner. Modern testing techniques allow the verification of 
the crush behavior of such structures.
3. Industry Quasi-Static Testing
    While FRA's full-scale, dynamic testing program was being planned 
and conducted with input from key industry representatives, several 
passenger railroads were incorporating in procurement specifications 
the then-newly promulgated Federal regulations and industry standards 
issued in 1999. Specifically, both LIRR and Metro-North had contracted 
with Bombardier for the development of a new MU locomotive design, the 
M7 series. Bombardier conducted a series of qualifying quasi-static 
tests on a mock-up, front-end structure of an M7, including a severe 
deformation test of the collision post. In addition to the severe 
deformation test, the other end frame members were also tested 
elastically at the enhanced loads specified in the APTA standards. The 
severe deformation qualification test was conducted on February 20, 
2001.
    The quasi-static testing of the M7 collision post was conducted on 
a mock-up test article. The first 19.25 feet of the car structure was 
fabricated, from the car's body bolster to the front end, so that the 
mock-up contained all structural elements. Load was applied at 
incrementally increasing levels with hydraulic jacks while being 
measured by load cells at the rear of the longitudinal end frame 
members. Initially, the elastic limit was determined for the post, and 
then the large deformation test was conducted. The test was stopped, 
for safety considerations, prior to full separation of the collision 
post with the end/buffer beam.
    The maximum deflection in the collision post before yielding 
occurred at a position 42 inches above the end beam, near the top of 
the plates used to reinforce the collision post. The plastic shape the 
collision post acquired during testing was `V'-shaped, with a plastic 
hinge occurring at 42 inches above the end beam. Some cracking and 
material failure occurred at the connection of the post with the end 
beam. The anti-telescoping plate was pulled down roughly three inches, 
and load was shed to the corner post via the shelf member and the 
bulkhead sheet. The shape that the collision post experienced is very 
similar to what was observed from the dynamic testing of the SOA corner 
post, as discussed above.
4. Comparative Analyses
    Under FRA sponsorship, the Volpe Center, with cooperation from 
Bombardier, conducted non-linear, large deformation analyses to 
evaluate the performance of the cab car corner and collision posts of 
the SOA end frame design and the Bombardier M7 design under dynamic 
test conditions. One of the purposes of this research was to determine 
whether the level of crashworthiness demonstrated by the SOA prototype 
design could actually be achieved by a general production design--here, 
the M7 design. Pre-test

[[Page 42026]]

analysis predictions of the dynamic performance of the SOA corner post 
closely matched test measurements.\9\ A similar analysis of the corner 
post was performed on the M7 design, and the results compared closely 
with the SOA design test and analysis results. Overall, the 
crashworthiness performance of the collision posts of the SOA and M7 
designs were found to be essentially the same, and the M7 corner post 
design was even found to perform better than the SOA corner post 
design. This latter difference in performance is attributable to the 
sidewall support in the M7 design, which is not present in the SOA 
design.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J. Brassard, J., ``Review 
of Severe Deformation Recommended Practice Through Analyses--
Comparison of Two Cab Car End Frame Designs,'' American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. IMECE2005-70043, March 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Having established the fidelity of the models and modeling 
approach, a number of comparative simulations were conducted of both 
the SOA end frame and the M7 end frame under both dynamic and quasi-
static test conditions to assess the equivalency of the two different 
tests for demonstrating compliance with the severe deformation 
standard. For both sets of tests, the modes of deformation were very 
similar at the same extent of longitudinal displacement, and the 
locations where material failure occurred were also similar. In 
addition, the predicted force-crush characteristics showed reasonable 
agreement within the repeatability of the tests. Figure 3, below, shows 
a comparison of the deformation modes for the M7, as observed from the 
quasi-static testing and as predicted for the dynamic coil loading 
condition.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.002

F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements

    As discussed above, APTA's initial ``severe deformation'' standard, 
published in 1999, did not contain specific methodologies or criteria 
for demonstrating compliance with the standard. Consequently, the 
dynamic tests performed by FRA and the Volpe Center, static tests 
performed by members of the rail industry, and analyses conducted by 
the Volpe Center and its contractors all helped to develop the base of 
information needed to identify the types of analyses and test 
methodologies to use. Further, evaluation of the test data, with the 
analyses providing a supporting framework, allowed development of 
appropriate criteria to demonstrate compliance.
    The principal criteria developed involve energy absorption through 
end frame deformation and the maximum amount of that deformation. As 
shown by FRA and industry testing, energy can be imparted to 
conventional flat-nosed cab cars and MU locomotives either dynamically 
or quasi-statically. As shown by Volpe Center analyses, currently 
available engineering tools can be used to predict the results of such 
tests. Given the complexity of such analyses, and commensurate 
uncertainties, there is a benefit to maintaining dynamic testing as an 
option for evaluating compliance with any ``severe deformation'' 
standard.
    There are tradeoffs between quasi-static and dynamic end frame 
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Both sets of tests prescribe a 
minimum amount of energy for end frame deformation. However, the manner 
in which the energy is applied is different, and the setup of the two 
types of tests is different. As demonstrated by the tests

[[Page 42027]]

conducted by Bombardier, quasi-static tests can be conducted by rail 
equipment manufacturers at their own facilities. Dynamic tests require 
a segment of railroad track with appropriate wayside facilities; there 
are few such test tracks available. Nevertheless, dynamic tests do not 
require detailed knowledge of the car structure to be tested, and allow 
for a wide range of structural designs. Quasi-static tests require 
intimate knowledge of the structure being tested, to assure appropriate 
support and loading conditions, and development of quasi-static test 
protocols requires assumptions about the layout of the structure, 
confining structural designs. In addition, dynamic tests more closely 
approximate accident conditions than quasi-static tests do.
    In August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee accepted a revised 
``severe deformation'' standard for collision and corner posts. The 
standard includes requirements for minimum energy absorption and 
maximum deflection. The form of the standard is largely based on the 
testing done by Bombardier, and therefore is quasi-static. The standard 
eliminates a deficiency of the 1999 standards by specifying test 
criteria to objectively measure ``severe deformation.'' The standard 
can be readily applied to conventional flat-end cab cars and MU 
locomotives, but is more difficult to apply to shaped-nosed cab cars 
and MU locomotives or those with crash energy management designs.
    In addition, APTA as well as several equipment manufacturers have 
expressed an interest in maintaining the presence of a stairwell on the 
side of the cab car or MU locomotive opposite from where the locomotive 
engineer is situated. This feature enables multi-level boarding from 
both low and higher platforms. As such, FRA and the APTA PRESS C&S 
group worked together to develop language associated with providing a 
safety equivalent to the requirements stipulated for cab car and MU 
locomotive corner posts in terms of energy absorption and graceful 
deformations. The group agreed that for this arrangement there is 
sufficient protection afforded by the presence of two corner posts (an 
end corner post and an internal adjacent body corner post) that are 
situated in front of the occupied space. The load requirements 
stipulated for such posts differ in that longitudinal requirements are 
not equal to the transverse requirements. This in effect changes the 
shape of these posts so that they are not equal in both width and 
height. For the end corner post the longitudinal loads are smaller than 
the transverse loads. The opposite is true for the body corner post. 
Despite the changes in the loading requirements from longitudinal to 
transverse, it was agreed to allow for the combined contribution of 
both sets of corner posts to provide an equivalent level of protection 
to that required for corner posts in other cab car and MU locomotive 
configurations. See the discussion in the section-by-section on the 
structural requirements for cab cars and MU locomotives with a 
stairwell located on the side of the equipment opposite from where the 
locomotive engineer is situated.

G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front-End Structures of 
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    Research has shown that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in 
train-to-train collisions can be significantly increased if the 
equipment structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner. One 
manner of doing so is to design sacrificial crush zones into unoccupied 
locations in the equipment. These crush zones are designed to crush 
gracefully, with a lower initial force and increased average force. 
With such crush zones, energy absorption is shared by multiple cars 
during the collision, consequently helping to preserve the integrity of 
the occupied areas. While developed principally to protect occupants in 
train-to-train collisions, such crush zones can also potentially 
significantly increase crashworthiness in highway-rail grade-crossing 
collisions.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Tyrell, D.C., Perlman, A.B., ``Evaluation of Rail Passenger 
Equipment Crashworthiness Strategies,'' Transportation Research 
Record No. 1825, pp. 8-14, National Academy Press, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The approach of including crush zones in passenger rail equipment 
is termed CEM, and it extends from current, conventional practice. 
Current practice for passenger equipment operated at speeds not 
exceeding 125 mph (i.e., Tier I passenger equipment under part 238) 
requires that the equipment be able to support large loads without 
permanent deformation or failure, but does not specifically address how 
the equipment behaves when it crushes. CEM prescribes that car 
structures crush in a controlled manner when overloaded and absorb 
collision energy. In fact, for passenger equipment operating at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph (i.e., Tier II passenger 
equipment under part 238), FRA requires that the equipment be designed 
with a CEM system to dissipate kinetic energy during a collision, see 
Sec.  238.403, and Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets were designed with 
a CEM system complying with this requirement.
    FRA notes that Metrolink is in the process of procuring a new fleet 
of cars utilizing CEM technology. As part of its response to the 
Glendale, CA train incident on January 26, 2005, Metrolink determined 
that CEM design specifications should be included in this planned 
procurement, and, in coordination with APTA, approached FRA and FTA to 
draft such specifications. In turn, FRA and FTA formed the ad hoc Crash 
Energy Management Working Group in May 2005. This working group 
included government engineers and participants from the rail industry, 
including passenger railroads, suppliers, labor organizations, and 
industry consultants, many of whom also participated in the 
Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force. The working group developed a 
detailed technical specification for crush zones in passenger cars for 
Metrolink to include in its procurement specification, as well as for 
other passenger railroads to include in future procurements of their 
own. Metrolink released its specification as part of an invitation for 
bid, and then awarded the contract to manufacture the equipment to 
Rotem, a division of Hyundai.
    Rotem is currently developing a shaped-nose, CEM design for new 
Metrolink cab cars. Because of the shaped-nose, it is more difficult to 
engineer structural members identifiable as full-height collision posts 
and corner posts that extend from the underframe to the cantrail or 
roofline at the front end, as specified in the current APTA standard. 
Consequently, to meet the APTA standard, FRA believes that Rotem will 
need to locate the collision and corner posts inboard of the crush 
zone, rather than place them at the extreme front end of the cab car. 
Further, as currently written, the APTA quasi-static standard does not 
expressly take into account the energy absorption capability of the 
crush zone, even if the crush zone would likely be engaged in a grade-
crossing impact. Although the APTA standard acknowledges the use of 
shaped-nose and CEM designs, there remains uncertainty in the standard 
associated with demonstration of compliance with such designs. (The 
APTA standard does provide that on cars with CEM designs, compliance be 
demonstrated either through analysis or testing as agreed to by the 
vehicle builder and purchaser, but no test methodology or criteria are 
provided.)
    A dynamic test standard would place fewer constraints on the layout 
of the cab car end structure and would allow

[[Page 42028]]

the energy absorption capability of the crush zone to be expressly 
taken into account in the design of the collision and corner post 
structures. As noted, the NPRM provides an option for the dynamic 
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Nevertheless, FRA makes clear 
that the Task Force did not reach consensus on recommending the 
inclusion of dynamic testing in this NPRM. However, FRA believes that 
the results of the crashworthiness research discussed above provide 
strong support for including dynamic testing in the rule, and that it 
is particularly necessary to address what FRA believes will be a 
growing number of cab cars and MU locomotives utilizing CEM designs. 
This need has become more apparent since the Task Force meetings 
occurred, and FRA has scheduled additional, full-scale crash testing to 
facilitate the use of both quasi-static and dynamic test standards.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 238, Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 238.13 Preemptive Effect
    Existing Sec.  238.13 informs the public as to FRA's views 
regarding the preemptive effect of this part by citing and restating 
the statutory provision that governed the regulation's preemptive 
effect at the time that it was promulgated (49 U.S.C. 20106). See 64 FR 
25581. This statutory provision was amended by the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2319 (November 25, 
2002), subsequent to the issuance of the May 12, 1999 final rule 
promulgating the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. Consequently, 
FRA is proposing to amend Sec.  238.13 so that it is more consistent 
with the revised statutory language expressly addressing railroad 
security.
    As amended to date, 49 U.S.C. 20106 provides that all regulations 
and orders prescribed or issued by the Secretary of Transportation 
(with respect to railroad safety matters) and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security (with respect to railroad security matters) preempt any State 
law, regulation, or order covering the same subject matter, except an 
additional or more stringent provision necessary to eliminate or reduce 
an essentially local safety or security hazard that is not incompatible 
with a Federal law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably 
burden interstate commerce. The Congressional intent behind the statute 
is to promote national uniformity in railroad safety and security 
standards and to avoid subjecting the railroads to a variety of 
enforcement in 50 different State judicial and administrative systems. 
The courts have construed the ``essentially local safety or security'' 
exception very narrowly, holding that it is designed to enable States 
to respond to local situations which are not statewide in character and 
not capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform national 
standards. With the exception of such a provision directed at an 
essentially local safety or security hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 preempts 
any State statutory, regulatory, or common law standard covering the 
same subject matter as a Federal law, regulation, or order, including 
an FRA regulation or order.
    In addition, since issues have arisen regarding the preemptive 
effect of this part on the safety of operating a cab car as the leading 
unit of a passenger train, FRA believes that clarification of its views 
on the matter is needed to address any misunderstanding. As described 
below, through a variety of initiatives spanning more than a decade, 
FRA has comprehensively and intentionally covered the subject matter of 
the requirements for passenger equipment, planning for the safe use of 
passenger equipment, and the manner in which passenger equipment is 
used. In so doing, FRA believes that it has preempted any State law, 
regulation, or order, including State common law, concerning the 
operation of a cab car or MU locomotive as the leading unit of a 
passenger train. This NPRM on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness 
further refines FRA's comprehensive regulation of passenger equipment 
safety and serves to show that the operation of cab cars and MU 
locomotives is a matter regulated by FRA, and not one which FRA has 
left subject to State statutory, regulatory, or common law standards 
covering that subject matter.

Emergency Order No. 20

    In the wake of two serious accidents, each involving a passenger 
train operating with a cab car in the lead position in ``push-pull 
service,'' FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (EO 20) on February 22, 
1996 (61 FR 6876), amended on March 5, 1996 (61 FR 8703). EO 20 
generally required passenger railroads operating push-pull or MU 
locomotive service to have in their operating rules a delayed-in-block 
rule and a rule requiring communication of wayside signals, and 
required passenger railroads to mark and test exits used for emergency 
egress. EO 20 also required passenger railroads which operated push-
pull or MU locomotive service to develop and submit interim system 
safety plans for the purpose of enhancing the safety of such 
operations. FRA noted that it would review the plans submitted and, 
based on that review, it would ``determine whether other mandatory 
action appears necessary to address hazards associated with the subject 
rail passenger service.'' 61 FR 6882. Thus, FRA's approach was to have 
passenger railroads review their approach to push-pull and MU 
operations, and FRA would then review the railroads' plans and 
determine what further action to take. FRA ultimately did take further 
action to regulate push-pull and MU operations as part of its overall 
regulation of passenger equipment safety.

Passenger Safety Rulemakings

    At the time EO 20 was issued in February 1996, FRA had been moving 
forward with rulemakings to establish comprehensive safety standards 
for railroad passenger equipment. As noted above, the rulemakings arose 
out of the Secretary of Transportation's commitment in 1994 to develop 
safety standards for railroad passenger equipment, soon followed by 
enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994. In 
Section 215 of the Act, Congress directed the Secretary to specifically 
consider a number of matters before prescribing regulations, such as 
the crashworthiness of the cars, interior features (including luggage 
restraints, seat belts, and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger 
safety, and any operating rules and conditions that directly affect 
safety not otherwise governed by regulations. Congress granted the 
Secretary the authority to make applicable some or all of the standards 
to cars existing at the time the regulations were prescribed, as well 
as to new cars. Moreover, as noted above, Congress authorized the 
Secretary, when prescribing regulations, issuing orders, and making 
amendments under this section, to consult with Amtrak, public 
authorities operating railroad passenger service, other railroad 
carriers transporting passengers, organizations of passengers, and 
organizations of employees. 49 U.S.C. 20133. As delegated from the 
Secretary, FRA has exercised these grants of authority.

Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness

    Using the consultative authority granted by Congress, FRA convened 
the first meeting of the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working

[[Page 42029]]

Group in August 1995, focused on the development of emergency 
preparedness planning requirements for commuter and intercity passenger 
train operations. The rulemaking culminated in the publication of a 
final rule on Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness on May 4, 1998. 63 
FR 24630.
    As described above, this regulation requires railroads that operate 
intercity or commuter passenger train service or that host the 
operation of such service to adopt and comply with written emergency 
preparedness plans approved by FRA. In addition, as noted above, the 
regulation specifies marking and instruction requirements for emergency 
window and door exits, and provides for the inspection, maintenance, 
and repair of emergency window and door exits. The regulation therefore 
codified and expanded EO 20's requirements to mark and inspect 
emergency exits.
    In formalizing a planning requirement for emergency preparedness, 
FRA acknowledged that the plans would be integrated into commuter 
railroads' overall system safety planning efforts. 63 FR at 24636. FRA 
announced that it would monitor the implementation of the rule and 
evaluate whether further rulemaking or other action were necessary to 
achieve the desired improvements in emergency preparedness. Id.

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

    Using the same consultative authority granted by Congress, FRA 
convened the first meeting of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
Working Group in June 1995, as mentioned above. Thereafter in June 
1996, FRA issued an ANPRM on Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. 61 
FR 30672. In that notice, FRA stated its views and solicited comments 
on possible safety regulations, including requirements addressing 
inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures, equipment design and 
performance criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in the 
event of a train accident, and the safe operation of passenger train 
service. FRA considered system safety planning to be the heart of its 
approach to passenger equipment safety. 61 FR 30684.
    In the ANPRM, FRA stressed the need for flexibility in the 
development of system safety plans, noting that they could range from a 
relatively simple document to a detailed document laying out a 
comprehensive approach for designing, testing, and operating state-of-
the-art high-speed passenger rail systems. In this regard, FRA provided 
an example of how system safety could be approached, breaking down the 
railroad system into four major component systems: interfaces; right-
of-way; equipment; and transportation. 61 FR 30685. FRA noted that many 
passenger railroads operate at least partially as a tenant on the 
right-of-way and property of another railroad, and may have little or 
no control over some of the major risk components of the risk analysis, 
such as the interfaces and right-of-way components. 61 FR 30686. 
Nevertheless, FRA explained that the ``systems'' methodology still has 
considerable merit when applied to the remaining subsystems, in that 
the analysis could help define the equipment crashworthiness features 
required for its intended purpose or the operational limitations needed 
to improve or retain safety levels, but that a true system safety 
approach cannot be applied to a system that has major risk components 
that are constrained.
    FRA also solicited comments on various aspects of system safety 
planning, including information regarding any existing plans in use at 
the time. FRA was particularly interested in ways to tailor system 
safety programs to fit individual situations, so that the process made 
good business sense and addressed safety needs, and was not a 
regulatory burden that did not benefit safety.
    Following the consideration of comments received on the ANPRM and 
recommendations of the Working Group, FRA issued an NPRM to establish 
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, including cab 
cars, as discussed above. 62 FR 49728; September 23, 1997. Among FRA's 
proposals in the NPRM were requirements for system safety plans and 
programs which would apply to both Tier I and Tier II passenger 
equipment. FRA indicated that through the system safety process, 
railroads would be required to identify, evaluate, and seek to 
eliminate or reduce the hazards associated with the use of passenger 
equipment over the railroad system. FRA noted that the importance of 
system safety planning had been recognized in EO 20, and that the 
commuter railroads had subsequently committed to the development of 
comprehensive system safety plans, which went beyond the limited scope 
of the interim system safety plans that had been required by EO 20. 62 
FR 49733.
    In the NPRM, FRA explained that while consensus was reached within 
the Working Group on system safety planning requirements as they would 
apply to Tier II passenger equipment, the Working Group did not reach 
consensus on the requirements as they would apply to Tier I passenger 
equipment. 62 FR 49760. Although the Working Group agreed that 
passenger rail systems should apply system safety planning to Tier I 
passenger equipment, some members of the Working Group questioned 
whether this should be required by law. In particular, FRA noted the 
position of the American Public Transit Association (now American 
Public Transportation Association, APTA), which objected to FRA's 
regulation of any aspect of system safety planning. 62 FR 49734. APTA 
suggested that the commuter railroads be allowed to regulate themselves 
in this area because the system safety efforts they were undertaking 
were more comprehensive in nature than anything FRA sought to require, 
and were not limited to rail equipment issues. FRA therefore invited 
comment on APTA's suggestion and on a number of other issues with 
respect to system safety planning requirements, so that it could decide 
what approach to take in the final rule with respect to system safety 
plans. In addition, FRA proposed numerous other requirements for the 
safe operation of passenger train service, including equipment design 
and performance criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in 
the event of a train accident, and inspection, testing, and maintenance 
procedures.
    FRA received extensive comments on the NPRM, including comments 
regarding the question of system safety planning. Some comments 
suggested that system safety planning should be completely voluntary, 
to allow for maximum flexibility. Other commenters, however, argued 
that FRA had to prescribe specific mandatory requirements for those 
aspects of system safety that it chose to address. All of the comments 
received on the proposed rule, both written and oral, were considered 
by FRA in promulgating the final rule on May 12, 1999. 64 FR 25540. 
FRA's ultimate regulatory decision in issuing a final rule on passenger 
equipment safety standards was to address only certain aspects of 
system safety planning, focused primarily on rail passenger equipment, 
rather than to require generally that the railroads implement 
comprehensive system safety plans. 64 FR 25549. While FRA acknowledged 
that the plans required by the regulation would be part of larger 
system safety planning efforts, only the elements specifically 
addressed in the rule would be enforced. As with most of FRA's 
regulations, the final rule prescribed minimum Federal safety

[[Page 42030]]

standards and did not restrict a railroad and other persons subject to 
the regulation from adopting additional or more stringent requirements 
not inconsistent with the final rule. 64 FR 25575.
    FRA made a conscious decision to regulate in a way that allowed 
greater flexibility in overall system safety planning for Tier I 
passenger equipment, stating in the final rule that:

    FRA will closely monitor Tier I railroad operations in their 
development and adherence to voluntary, comprehensive system safety 
plans. FRA has already established a liaison relationship with APTA 
and has already begun participating in system safety plan audits on 
commuter railroads. FRA is using this involvement to enrich FRA's 
Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) efforts on these 
railroads-which, unlike the triennial audit process for system 
safety plans, is a continuous activity with frequent on-property 
involvement by FRA safety professionals. FRA will reconsider its 
decision not to impose a general requirement for system safety plans 
on Tier I railroad operations if the need to do so arises. 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 25549.

    FRA's participation in the APTA audit process was intended to 
complement FRA's regulatory requirements, and other initiatives such as 
the SACP process. It was not, however, a delegation of responsibility 
to the industry to regulate itself.
    FRA did not impose system safety planning requirements that 
specifically addressed push-pull or MU locomotive operations for Tier I 
passenger equipment. However, FRA considered the proper scope of system 
safety planning requirements that it should impose for such operations, 
and chose not to impose general system safety requirements for this 
equipment. Instead, in the 1999 final rule FRA imposed a myriad of 
substantive requirements intended to ensure the safety of the equipment 
in whatever operational mode it is used. For instance, using the 
statutory authority to apply requirements of the final rule to existing 
passenger equipment, FRA generally required that all Tier I passenger 
equipment, including both new and existing cab cars, have a minimum 
buff strength of 800,000 pounds, as specified in 49 CFR 238.203. FRA 
also noted that these substantive requirements, like the system safety 
planning requirements, might be further addressed in subsequent 
rulemaking. For example, FRA specifically stated in the final rule that 
additional effort needed to be made to enhance corner post safety 
standards for cab cars and MU locomotives--leading to the NPRM that FRA 
is issuing today. 64 FR at 25607. However, FRA made clear that the very 
fact that it identified the possibility of specifying additional 
regulations did not nullify the preemptive effect of the final rule, 
both in terms of the issues addressed by the specific requirements 
imposed, and those as to which FRA considered specific requirements but 
ultimately chose to allow a more flexible approach.
    FRA extended additional requirements to Tier II passenger 
equipment, both in terms of system safety planning and substantive 
requirements that eliminated the possibility of operating Tier II 
passenger equipment in the push-pull mode, or in any mode with 
passengers occupying the leading car in a train. In addition to the 
specific system safety planning requirements generally applicable to 
all passenger equipment (fire safety; hardware and software safety; 
inspection, testing, and maintenance; training, qualifications, and 
designations; and pre-revenue service testing), FRA required additional 
system safety planning for Tier II passenger equipment. Railroads are 
required to have a written plan for the safe operation of the 
equipment, both prior to its operation and also before introducing new 
technology in the equipment that affects a safety system on the 
equipment. These plans may be combined with the other plans required 
for all passenger equipment. See 64 FR 25646-25647; 49 CFR 238.601 and 
238.603. Although the rule does not require FRA approval of the plans, 
it does generally require FRA approval of Tier II passenger equipment 
operations, pursuant to 49 CFR 238.111(b)(7).
    FRA also adopted structural requirements for Tier II passenger 
equipment that require the equipment to withstand collision forces not 
possible for conventional cab cars or MU locomotives to withstand, thus 
effectively prohibiting the use of such equipment in Tier II passenger 
trains. FRA specifically stated with regard to Tier II passenger 
equipment that the crash energy management requirements ``will 
effectively prevent a conventional cab car from operating as the lead 
vehicle in a Tier II passenger train because such equipment cannot 
absorb 5 MJ of collision energy ahead of the train operator's 
position.'' 64 FR at 25630. Morever, FRA expressly prohibited passenger 
seating in the leading unit of Tier II passenger trains, see 49 CFR 
238.403(f), which, in turn, effectively prohibits the operation of 
push-pull or MU locomotive service-methods of operation in which 
passengers can occupy the lead unit of a train. In fact, FRA 
specifically stated that cab cars ``should not be used in the forward 
position of a train that travels at speeds greater than 125 mph.'' Id. 
FRA imposed no such prohibition on passenger seating in the lead unit 
of a Tier I passenger train.
    FRA's decisions to require more general system safety planning for 
Tier II passenger operations, and to impose substantive requirements 
that in both effect and application prohibit passenger seating in the 
leading unit of Tier II passenger trains, make clear that these issues 
were carefully considered in the 1999 final rule. Of course, by virtue 
of imposing stricter standards on Tier II passenger equipment than Tier 
I passenger equipment, FRA did not intend States to step in and 
regulate Tier I passenger equipment. On the contrary, FRA recognized 
the operational differences between Tier I and Tier II passenger 
equipment, and purposely chose to address these two types of equipment 
differently. Where FRA has prohibited one thing and chosen not to 
prohibit another, such as prohibiting cab car-forward operations for 
Tier II and not for Tier I, FRA intended to allow a railroad to do that 
which FRA did not prohibit. FRA's regulatory choice was intended to be 
preemptive of State standards with regard to both Tier I and Tier II 
passenger equipment.
    As FRA understands the Supreme Court's standard for covering the 
subject matter, State or local governments, courts or litigants may not 
carve out subsets of subject matters FRA has covered. Accordingly, when 
FRA has regulated the construction of a railcar, FRA clearly permits 
its operation on the general system of railroad transportation unless 
FRA explicitly sets limits on its operation, and State or local 
governments may not prohibit certain of those operations or impose an 
independent duty of care with respect to those operations. FRA's 
comprehensive regulation of this area has covered the subject matter of 
all aspects of the safe operation of cab cars and MU locomotives, 
leaving no room for State standards. States are free of course to craft 
standards to address the extremely rare ``essentially local safety or 
security hazard,'' so long as the standards otherwise meet the three 
part test of 49 U.S.C. 20106.
    Nevertheless, as explained below, a State or local entity which 
owns or controls a railroad may direct that railroad to exceed FRA's 
requirements, provided that it does so in a capacity that is wholly 
distinct, and does not derive, from the statutory provision governing 
the preemptive effect of FRA's regulation of this area. Commuter rail 
service is typically provided by

[[Page 42031]]

public benefit corporations chartered by State or local governments, 
whereas freight rail service is provided almost exclusively by non-
governmental entities. Just as the owner of a freight railroad may 
direct that its railroad's operations exceed FRA's minimum safety 
standards, so may a State or local body, acting through the public 
benefit corporation that it has chartered, direct its railroad to 
operate in a manner more restrictive than, but not inconsistent with, 
FRA's requirements. FRA makes clear that, when a State or local 
government entity acts in this capacity, it is not acting as a 
regulator of railroad operations. It is effectively acting in a private 
capacity concerning the operation of its own railroad, and the fact 
that it is a public entity does not somehow change its action into a 
law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security that 
invokes the statutory provision governing the preemptive effect of 
FRA's regulation of this area. A State or local entity's ability to act 
in this capacity concerning its own railroad is wholly distinct, and 
does not derive, from any provision of 49 U.S.C. 20106.
    Because FRA's safety standards are minimum safety standards, a 
State or local entity's ability to act in this manner is the same 
ability that a non-governmental entity which owns a freight railroad 
would have, should it decide to provide passenger service, to direct 
its passenger operations in a manner more stringent than, but not 
inconsistent with, FRA's requirements. The fact that a State or local 
entity is involved--and not a private entity--does not alter in any way 
FRA's views as to the preemptive effect of FRA's comprehensive 
regulation of passenger equipment safety, and the safe operation of cab 
cars and MU locomotives in particular.
    Similarly, where FRA has required passenger railroads to engage in 
system safety planning or has not required such planning because the 
passenger railroads, in FRA's judgment, are doing an adequate job of 
system safety planning, FRA intends to preempt State and local 
regulation precisely because FRA has already decided what system safety 
planning each railroad should be doing based on its own circumstances. 
The relevant circumstances vary more widely among passenger railroads 
than among freight railroads and, at this level of specificity, the 
best and most effective planning is aimed squarely at the circumstances 
of each individual passenger railroad. Therefore, State or local 
regulation of such system safety planning is also preempted.
    Further, FRA's decision to revisit in this NPRM subjects addressed 
in the 1999 final rule does not change the preemptive effect of the 
comprehensive requirements imposed in that rule. As noted earlier, 
FRA's recognition in the 1999 final rule that additional work needed to 
be completed to enhance the crashworthiness of cab cars and MU 
locomotives does not nullify the preemptive effect of the standards 
then imposed for this equipment. In the same way, FRA's recognition in 
this NPRM that fuller application of crash energy management 
technologies to cab cars and MU locomotives could enhance their safety 
would not nullify the preemptive effect of the standards arising from 
the rulemaking. FRA continually strives to enhance railroad safety, has 
an active research program focused on doing so, and sets safety 
standards that it believes are necessary and appropriate for the time 
that they are issued with a view to amending those standards as 
circumstances change. The proposed imposition of enhanced 
crashworthiness requirements for cab cars and MU locomotives in Tier I 
passenger trains, and the specific recognition that this equipment will 
be operated cab car forward in the push mode, demonstrate that FRA has 
imposed, and will continue to impose, the requirements that it deems 
necessary for the safe operation of cab cars and MU locomotives in all 
of the configurations in which they will be operated. FRA is thoroughly 
familiar, through the inspections it performs regularly, with the 
physical properties and operating characteristics of each passenger 
railroad. FRA has applied that knowledge in deciding to permit those 
railroads to operate cab cars and MU locomotives as the leading units 
of Tier I passenger trains, and FRA is not aware of any circumstances 
on any of those passenger railroads which would qualify under the 
statute as essentially local safety or security hazards affecting those 
operations.

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

Section 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism
    FRA is proposing to amend paragraph (a) of this section to correct 
an error in the rule text. In the relevant part, this paragraph 
currently states that ``all passenger equipment * * * shall have at 
both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing mechanism capable of 
resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds 
without failure.'' However, FRA had intended that the words ``without 
failure'' actually read as ``without permanent deformation,'' as stated 
in the preamble accompanying the issuance of this paragraph. 
Specifically, FRA explained in the accompanying preamble that the anti-
climbing mechanism must be capable of resisting an upward or downward 
vertical force of 100,000 pounds ``without permanent deformation.'' See 
64 FR 25604; May 12, 1999. Use of the ``without permanent deformation'' 
criterion is consistent with North American industry practice, and FRA 
had not intended to relax that practice. Consequently, FRA is proposing 
to correct Sec.  238.205(a) to expressly require that the anti-climbing 
mechanism be capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force 
of 100,000 pounds without permanent deformation.
Section 238.211 Collision posts
    FRA is proposing to adopt the provisions of paragraphs (a) through 
(d) of section 5.3.1.3.1, Cab-end collision posts, of APTA Standard SS-
C&S-034-99, Rev. 1. FRA is also proposing to modify these provisions 
for purposes of their adoption as a Federal regulation.
    This proposal would enhance current requirements for collision 
posts at the forward ends of cab cars and MU locomotives. In sum, 
paragraph (b) currently requires that each locomotive, including a cab 
car and an MU locomotive, ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or 
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002, 
have two collision posts at its forward end, each post capable of 
withstanding a 500,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with 
the top of the underframe and a 200,000-pound longitudinal force 
exerted 30 inches above the joint of the post to the underframe. These 
requirements were based on AAR Standard S-580, and had been the 
industry practice for all locomotives built since August 1990. See 64 
FR 25606. Subsequently, industry standards for locomotive 
crashworthiness have been enhanced, with APTA focusing on standards for 
passenger-occupied locomotives, i.e., cab cars and MU locomotives, and 
the AAR focusing on standards for freight locomotives. The AAR's 
efforts helped support development of the Locomotive Crashworthiness 
rulemaking, published as a final rule on June 28, 2006. See 71 FR 
36887. That final rule specifically addresses the safety of freight 
locomotives and does not apply to passenger-occupied locomotives (i.e., 
cab cars and MU locomotives). Nevertheless, FRA believes that 
conceptual approaches taken in the

[[Page 42032]]

Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule are applicable to this 
rulemaking, as discussed below. To clearly delineate the relationship 
between the Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule and part 238, FRA 
proposes that a cross-reference be inserted in the introductory 
language of paragraph (b) to indicate that as the locomotive 
requirements for collision posts become effective for locomotives 
manufactured on or after January 1, 2009, those more stringent 
requirements will apply to conventional locomotives (though not to cab 
cars or MU locomotives).
    FRA is proposing to correct paragraph (b)(2) so that the rule text 
is consistent with the clear intent of the provision. As explained in 
the preamble accompanying the issuance of this paragraph, paragraph 
(b)(2) provides for the use of an equivalent end structure in place of 
the two forward collision posts described in paragraph (b)--
specifically, paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii). See 64 FR 25606. However, 
the rule text makes express reference only to the collision posts in 
``paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.'' This provision was not 
intended to be limited to the collision posts described in paragraph 
(b)(1)(i) alone, but instead to the collision posts described in 
paragraph (b)(1) as a whole--both paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii). FRA 
is, therefore, proposing to correct this clear error in the rule text.
    FRA is proposing to redesignate current paragraph (c) as paragraph 
(d) and add a new paragraph (c) in its place. Specifically, proposed 
paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (ii) are similar to paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and 
(ii). One principal difference is that the proposed regulation would 
require that each collision post be able to support the specified loads 
for angles up to 15[deg] from the longitudinal. In effect, this would 
require each post to support a significant lateral load, and is 
intended to reflect the uncertainty in the direction a load is imparted 
during an impact. The proposed standard is also intended to encourage 
the use of collision posts with closed (e.g., rectangular) cross 
sections, rather than with open (e.g., I-beam) cross sections. Beams 
with open cross sections tend to twist and bend across the weaker axis 
when overloaded, regardless of the direction of load. Beams with closed 
cross sections are less likely to twist when overloaded, and are more 
likely to sustain a higher load as they deform, absorbing more energy.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(iii) does not have a counterpart in 
paragraph (b). This paragraph would require that the collision post be 
able to support a 60,000-pound longitudinal load applied anywhere along 
its length, from its attachment to floor-level structure up to its 
attachment to roof-level structure. This proposed regulation is 
intended to provide a minimum level of collision post strength at any 
point along its full height-not only at its connection to the 
underframe or at 30 inches above that point. The proposed requirement 
must also be met for any angle within 15 degrees of the longitudinal 
axis.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2) would require that each collision post 
also be able to absorb a prescribed amount of energy without separation 
from its supporting structure. This proposed requirement is intended to 
provide a level of protection similar to the SOA design, as discussed 
in the Technical Background section of the preamble, above. A quasi-
static test, such as the test conducted by Bombardier on the M7 design, 
may be used to show compliance, or the builder may utilize the dynamic 
test method.
    Designs without flat forward ends include shaped-nosed designs such 
as those by Colorado Railcar and, as discussed above, the design being 
developed by Rotem for Metrolink. Because such designs place the 
engineer back from the extreme forward end of the vehicle, there is the 
potential for significantly increased protection for the engineer in 
collisions. In this regard, FRA is proposing to add paragraph (e) to 
require an equivalent structure to be present in front of occupied 
space but set back from the very end of the cab car or MU locomotive. 
Such structures may be part of the nose of the equipment or the CEM 
system, or both. Paragraph (e) would provide relief from utilization of 
a traditional end frame structure provided that an equivalent level of 
protection is afforded by the components of the CEM system. In the FRA 
CEM design tested in March 2006, the end frame structure was reinforced 
in order to support the loads introduced through the deformable anti-
climber. Significantly more energy was absorbed in the deformation of 
the deformable anti-climber than the combined requirements outlined for 
both collision and corner posts while preserving all space for the 
locomotive engineer and passengers. In the design under development for 
Metrolink in southern California, an equivalent end frame structure is 
placed outboard of occupied space with crush elements between the very 
end of the nose and the equivalent end frame. For a grade crossing 
collision above the underframe of the cab car it is expected that 
perhaps an order of magnitude or larger of collision energy will be 
absorbed prior to any deformations into occupied space.
    As noted, the APTA Standard does recognize the need to address 
shaped-nosed designs and CEM designs. Specifically, the Standard 
provides that cab end collision posts and corner posts (and their 
supporting structure) on MU locomotives and cab cars without flat ends, 
or on equipment utilizing crash energy management designs, meet the 
``severe deformation'' requirements, but that compliance with the 
requirements be demonstrated either through analysis or testing as 
agreed to by the vehicle builder and purchaser. See paragraph (e) in 
both sections 5.3.1.3.1, Cab-end collision posts, and 5.3.2.3.1, Cab 
end corner posts, of APTA Standard SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 1. While FRA 
supports applying the ``severe deformation'' requirements to such 
designs, FRA does not believe it viable as a Federal regulation to have 
the application of these requirements essentially depend on an 
agreement between the vehicle builder and the purchaser of the vehicle-
without the involvement of the Federal government or public input. In 
particular, since the ``severe deformation'' requirements were 
developed from research on typical flat-end cab cars and MU 
locomotives, FRA believes that there may be too much uncertainty for 
applying such requirements to other designs and that the industry would 
benefit from the inclusion of a more specific standard.
    Within the Task Force, FRA proposed that a dynamic test standard be 
added to address the issue. However, as noted above, the Task Force 
could not reach consensus on a recommendation for such a dynamic 
standard. Concern was raised about the validity of any dynamic test 
standard chosen and whether such a standard could be used for valid 
comparisons with a quasi-static test standard. This concern included 
the need to first conduct full-scale testing on an actual prototype for 
a production design. Further, APTA was concerned that its member 
railroads might feel compelled to conduct both quasi-static and dynamic 
testing to demonstrate compliance, even if the regulations were 
expressly written to state that compliance with only one test standard 
would be required. FRA wishes to make clear that nothing in this 
proposal would require that both types of qualification procedures be 
used. Either may be clearly adequate for the purpose, depending on the 
technical challenge presented; and conducting two analyses or types of 
tests would clearly be excessive and wasteful. Again, FRA proposes two 
alternative methods in order to provide maximum flexibility,

[[Page 42033]]

recognizing that other-than-flat-nosed cars will be offered in the 
marketplace and further recognizing that equipment utilizing crush 
zones may also present difficulties should the quasi-static test be the 
only approach considered.
    Concern was also raised as to the safety of conducting full-scale, 
dynamic testing. The technical tradeoffs between quasi-static and 
dynamic test standards are discussed in the Technical Background 
section of the preamble, above. FRA notes that there are safety 
concerns associated with both quasi-static and dynamic testing, and in 
a quasi-static test particular care must be taken due to the potential 
for the sudden release of stored energy should there be material 
failure. Proper planning and execution of each test are required. (By 
noting that caution must be exercised in planning and executing the 
tests, FRA does not intend in any way to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. Department of 
Labor with regard to the safety of employees performing the tests.)
    FRA believes that dynamic test standards have been sufficiently 
validated and that dynamic testing should be included as an option for 
demonstrating compliance with the rule. For this reason, FRA is 
proposing that paragraph (c)(2) include an option for the dynamic 
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Although FRA expects that this 
method will be applied to designs with shaped-nose designs or with CEM 
designs, or both, it may also be used for a conventional flat-nosed 
design; and the quasi-static method may be applied to shaped-nose or 
CEM designs.
    FRA recognizes that questions may arise in applying these methods 
in situations not clearly anticipated today. FRA requests comment on 
whether the final rule should include either an option or requirement 
that the test methodology be submitted for FRA review prior to the 
conduct of destructive testing. FRA also requests comment on whether 
and under what circumstances analysis and scale model or fixture 
testing might be accepted as satisfying the dynamic standard.
    The dynamic standard itself is a performance standard involving 
impact with a proxy object. The proxy object must have a cylindrical 
shape, diameter of 48 inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight 
of 10,000 pounds. The longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be 
offset by 19 inches from the longitudinal axis of the cab car or MU 
locomotive, which must be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 
pounds. At impact, the longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be 30 
inches above the top of the finished floor. The cab car or MU 
locomotive and its end structure must withstand a 21 mph impact with 
the proxy object resulting in no more than 10 inches of intrusion 
longitudinally into the occupied area of the vehicle, and without 
separation of the attachments of any structural members. FRA is 
including a graphical description of this collision scenario as Figure 
1 to subpart C.
    FRA notes that in the Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule, the 
front-end structure requirements are principally stated in the form of 
performance criteria for given collision scenarios. See Appendix E to 
part 229; 71 FR 36915. In fact, the performance criteria in Appendix E 
to part 229 involve dynamic loading conditions stated in a way similar 
to what FRA is proposing here as the example to demonstrate compliance. 
In the Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule, FRA adopted performance 
criteria, rather than more prescriptive design standards, to allow for 
greater flexibility in the design of locomotives and better encourage 
innovation in locomotive designs. See 71 FR 36895-36898. Of course, the 
requirements proposed in paragraph (c)(2)(i) are a form of performance 
criteria. The distinction is that the performance criteria relate to 
quasi-static loading conditions--instead of dynamic loading conditions, 
which more approximate actual collision scenarios.
    FRA also notes that recently adopted European standards, prEN 15227 
FCD Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway Vehicle Bodies, include 
four collision scenarios. Collision Scenario 3 of the European standard 
involves a ``train unit front end impact with a heavy obstacle (e.g. 
lorry on road crossing).'' Commuter and intercity trains are required 
to be able to sustain an impact with a deformable object weighing 33 
kips (15,000 kg) at 68 mph (110 kph). Calibration tests on components 
and numerical simulations of the scenario are recommended for showing 
compliance. Key differences between the European standard and the 
dynamic testing collision scenarios FRA is proposing to apply to both 
collision posts and corner posts, below, include the amount of energy 
involved and the character of the object. Assuming that the mass of the 
train is more than about 25 times greater than the mass of the object 
(which roughly corresponds to the mass of a commuter train made up of a 
cab car, four coaches, and a locomotive, or made up of six MU 
locomotives) then the total energy dissipated in a prEN 15227 Scenario 
3-impact is 5.0 million foot-pounds. The total energy absorbed in the 
collision scenarios included in this NPRM are 135,000 foot-pounds for 
the collision post and 120,000 foot-pounds for the corner post. 
However, in the European standard, the impacted object is deformable 
and potentially absorbs a significant amount of the available energy; 
in the collision scenarios included in the NPRM, the impacted object is 
rigid and all of the energy is absorbed by the cab car or MU 
locomotive.
    FRA invites comment on the proposal to provide for dynamic testing 
to demonstrate compliance by cab cars and MU locomotives. Specifically, 
FRA invites comment on the dynamic testing collision scenario included 
in the proposed rule for collision posts, and invites comment 
suggesting any alternative collision scenario or way to address such 
cab cars and MU locomotives.
Section 238.213 Corner posts
    FRA is proposing to adopt the provisions of paragraph (a) through 
(d) of Section 5.3.2.3.1, Cab end corner posts, of APTA Standard SS-
C&S-034-99 Rev. 1, and Section 5.3.2.3.3, Cab end-non-operator side of 
cab-alternate requirements. FRA is also proposing to modify these 
provisions for purposes of their adoption as a Federal regulation and 
to specify standards for a cab car or MU locomotive with a stairwell 
located on the side of the equipment opposite from where the locomotive 
engineer is situated. Together with the proposal for collision posts, 
this action would increase the strength of the front-end structure of 
cab cars and MU locomotives up to what the main structure can support, 
and also require explicit consideration of the behavior of the front-
end structures when overloaded.
    Overall, FRA is proposing to revise this section in its entirety by 
redesignating current paragraph (b) as paragraph (a)(2), making 
conforming changes to paragraph (a), and adding new paragraphs (b), 
(c), and (d).
    Proposed paragraph (b) is intended to augment the current 
requirements of paragraph (a) for cab cars and MU locomotives ordered 
on or after October 1, 2009, or placed in service for the first time on 
or after October 2, 2011. Proposed paragraph (b) would require higher 
loads at the specified locations than its counterpart in paragraph (a).
    Paragraph (b)(2) addresses alternative methods of demonstrating 
that the corner posts absorb energy while deforming. Proposed paragraph 
(b)(2)(i) sets forth quasi-static test requirements.

[[Page 42034]]

The corner post would have to be able to absorb a prescribed amount of 
energy without separation from its supporting structure. This proposed 
requirement is intended to provide a level of protection similar to the 
SOA design, as described in the Technical Background section of the 
preamble, above. A quasi-static test, similar to the test conducted by 
Bombardier on the M7, may be used to demonstrate compliance.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(ii) would provide for alternative dynamic 
qualification. The end structure would need to be capable of 
withstanding a frontal impact with a proxy object that is intended to 
approximate lading carried by a highway vehicle under the following 
conditions. The proxy object must have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 
48 inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. 
The longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be aligned with the 
outboard edge of the side of the cab car or MU locomotive, which must 
be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be 30 inches above the top 
of the finished floor. The cab car or MU locomotive and its end 
structure must withstand a 20 mph impact with the proxy object 
resulting in no more than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally into 
the occupied area of the cab car or MU locomotive, and without 
separation of the attachments of any structural members. FRA is 
including a graphical description of this collision scenario as Figure 
2 to subpart C.
    Paragraph (c) prescribes the corner post standards for cab cars and 
MU locomotives ordered on or after October 1, 2009, or placed in 
service for the first time on or after October 2, 2011, utilizing low-
level passenger boarding on the side of the equipment opposite from 
where the locomotive engineer is seated. In this arrangement the non-
operating side of the vehicle is protected by two corner posts (an end 
corner post and an internal adjacent body corner post) that are 
situated in front of occupied space and provide protection for the 
occupied space; the proposed rule allows for the combined contribution 
of both sets of corner posts to provide an equivalent level of 
protection to that required for corner posts in other cab car 
configurations.
    Paragraph (c) would require that the corner post load requirements 
of paragraph (b) be met for the corner post on the operating side of 
the cab. The requirements for the two corner posts on the opposite side 
of the operator control stand are described in paragraphs (c)(1) and 
(2). The structural requirements for the end corner post are described 
in paragraph s (c)(1)(i) through (vii). The longitudinal load 
requirements for the end corner post as set forth in paragraph (c)(1) 
are as follows: (1)(i) is a 150,000-pound shear load applied at the 
base of the corner post with its connection with the underframe where 
the load must not exceed the shear strength of the post; (1)(ii) is a 
30,000-pound bending load applied 18 inches above the top of underframe 
and no permanent deformation can occur; (1)(iii) is a 30,000-pound 
shear load applied at the attachment point with the roof structure, 
again without permanent deformations; and (1)(iv) is a 20,000-pound 
bending load applied anywhere between the underframe connection up to 
the roof structure connection without permanent deformation. The 
transverse load requirements for the end corner post are described in 
paragraph (c)(1) as follows: (1)(v) is a 300,000-pound shear load 
applied at a point even with the top of the underframe without 
exceeding the shear strength of the post or the carbody supporting 
structure; (1)(vi) is a 100,000-pound bending load applied 18 inches 
above the top of underframe and no permanent deformation can occur; and 
(1)(vii) is a 45,000-pound shear load at the connection between the 
corner post and the roof structure without deforming the post or the 
supporting structure. The higher magnitude loads applied in the 
longitudinal direction will result in a corner post that is wider than 
it is deep.
    The structural load requirements for the body corner post are 
described in paragraphs (2)(i) through (vi). The longitudinal load 
requirements are as follows: (2)(i) is a 300,000-pound shear load 
applied at the base of the body corner post with its connection with 
the underframe where the load must not exceed the shear strength of the 
post; (2)(ii) is a 100,000-pound bending load applied 18 inches above 
the top of underframe and no permanent deformation can occur; (2)(iii) 
is a 45,000-pound bending load applied anywhere between the underframe 
connection up to the roof structure connection without permanent 
deformation. The transverse load requirements for the body corner post 
are described in paragraph (2) are as follows: (2)(iv) is a 100,000-
pound shear load applied at a point even with the top of the underframe 
without exceeding the shear strength of the post or the carbody 
supporting structure; (2)(v) is a 30,000-pound bending load applied 18 
inches above the top of underframe and no permanent deformation can 
occur; and (2)(vi) is a 20,000-pound shear load applied at the 
connection between the body corner post and the roof structure without 
deforming the post or the supporting structure. The higher magnitude 
loads applied in the transverse direction will result in a corner post 
that is deeper than it is wide.
    FRA is also proposing that the combination of the corner post and 
the adjacent body corner post be capable of absorbing collision energy 
prior to or during structural deformation, as demonstrated by either a 
quasi static test or alternative dynamic qualification similar to the 
provisions set out for qualification under paragraph (b).
    FRA notes that it is proposing different speeds and different 
points of contact for the dynamic testing alternatives given for 
collision post equivalents and corner post equivalents. The collision 
post equivalents are to be tested at 21 mph, and the corner post 
equivalents at 20 mph--a difference of about 10% in total energy 
involved. As the dynamic testing alternatives are intended to provide 
an equivalent level of safety, the higher speed for dynamically testing 
the collision posts reflects the more stringent quasi-static testing 
requirements for collision posts. The collision posts have more 
available space and a stronger support structure; hence, they can 
absorb more energy than the corner posts. Nevertheless, the proposed 
requirements for corner posts would more than double the amount of 
energy required for the posts to fail, when compared to current FRA 
requirements. Together, the proposed requirements for collision posts 
and corner posts would significantly enhance the performance of the 
posts in protecting occupants of cab cars and MU locomotives.
    As noted above, FRA invites comment on the proposal to provide for 
dynamic testing to demonstrate compliance by cab cars and MU 
locomotives. Specifically, FRA invites comment on the dynamic testing 
collision scenario included in the proposed rule for corner posts, and 
invites comment suggesting any alternative collision scenario or way to 
address possible future designs. Moreover, FRA invites comment whether 
the final rule should provide for all cab cars and MU locomotives to be 
tested dynamically to demonstrate compliance--whether or not they have 
a shaped-nosed design or a CEM design--and, if so, whether the 
collision scenario included in the proposed rule is appropriate or 
whether another collision scenario would be.
    Paragraph (d) would provide relief from utilization of a 
traditional end frame structure provided that an

[[Page 42035]]

equivalent level of protection is afforded by the components of the CEM 
system. In the FRA CEM design tested in March 2006, the end frame 
structure was reinforced in order to support the loads introduced 
through the deformable anti-climber. Significantly more energy was 
absorbed in the deformation of the deformable anti-climber than the 
combined requirements outlined for both collision and corner posts 
while preserving all space for the locomotive engineer and passengers. 
In the design under development for Metrolink in southern California, 
an equivalent end frame structure is placed outboard of occupied space 
with crush elements between the very end of the nose and the equivalent 
end frame. For a grade crossing collision above the underframe of the 
cab car it is expected that perhaps an order of magnitude or larger of 
collision energy will be absorbed prior to any deformations into 
occupied space.

Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties

    Appendix A to part 238 contains a schedule of civil penalties for 
use in connection with this part. FRA may revise the schedule of civil 
penalties in issuing the final rule to reflect revisions made to part 
238. Because such penalty schedules are statements of agency policy, 
notice and comment are not required prior to their issuance. See 5 
U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to submit 
suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions for 
each proposed regulatory section that would subject a person to the 
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend 
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness 
of each type of violation.
    FRA notes that in December 2006 it published proposed statements of 
agency policy that would amend the 25 schedules of civil penalties 
issued as appendixes to FRA's safety regulations, including part 238. 
See 71 FR 70589; Dec. 5, 2006. The proposed revisions are intended to 
reflect more accurately the safety risks associated with violations of 
the rail safety laws and regulations, as well as to make sure that the 
civil penalty amounts are consistent across all safety regulations. 
Although the schedules are statements of agency policy, and FRA has 
authority to issue the revisions without having to follow the notice 
and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA has 
provided members and representatives of the general public an 
opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions before amending them. 
FRA is currently evaluating all of the comments received in preparing 
final statements of agency policy, and the schedule of civil penalties 
to part 238 may be revised as a result, independent of this rulemaking 
proceeding.

V. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing 
policies and procedures, and it has been determined not to be 
significant under either Executive Order 12866 or DOT policies and 
procedures (44 FR 11034; Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in 
the docket a regulatory evaluation addressing the economic impact of 
this proposed rule. Document inspection and copying facilities are 
available at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. Access to the docket may 
also be obtained electronically through the Web site for the DOT Docket 
Management System at http://dms.dot.gov. Photocopies may also be 
obtained by submitting a written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at 
Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590; please refer to Docket No. 
FRA-2006-25268. FRA invites comments on the regulatory evaluation.
    The regulatory evaluation explains that the proposed requirements 
are based on industry standards, which every affected cab car or MU 
locomotive from currently producing manufacturers would now meet. 
Consequently, the proposed requirements are not expected to affect any 
units in production by current manufacturers, and are, therefore, 
estimated to have zero costs and benefits for such units. The proposed 
requirements would affect cab cars and MU locomotives from other 
potential manufacturers if those units were of a design which would not 
meet the proposed requirements. However, it is highly speculative 
whether any non-conforming cab car or MU locomotive would ever be 
produced, even in the absence of this proposal. Further, as discussed 
in detail above, States are preempted from imposing by regulation 
other, potentially conflicting, or more burdensome requirements.
    Were any cab cars or MU locomotives to be affected by this 
proposal, the estimated benefits would be about $16,000 per cab car or 
MU locomotive, discounted at 7% over 20 years, and the estimated costs 
would be only about $2,000 per cab car or MU locomotive, also 
discounted at 7% over 20 years. Therefore, FRA estimates that the net 
benefit, discounted at 7% over 20 years, would be about $14,000 per 
such cab car or MU locomotive. However, because FRA believes that no 
units will be affected, FRA estimates that the present value of the 
total 20-year costs which the industry would be expected to incur to 
comply with the requirements proposed in this rule is zero, as is the 
anticipated benefits.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive 
Order 13272 require a review of proposed and final rules to assess 
their impact on small entities. FRA has prepared and placed in the 
docket an Analysis of Impact on Small Entities (AISE) that assesses the 
small entity impact of this proposal. Document inspection and copying 
facilities are available at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. Docket 
material is also available for inspection on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a written 
request to the FRA Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10, 
Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, 
DC 20590; please refer to Docket No. FRA-2006-25268.
    The AISE developed in connection with this NPRM concludes that this 
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The principal entities impacted 
by the rule would be governmental jurisdictions or transit 
authorities--none of which is small for purposes of the United States 
Small Business Administration (i.e., no entity serves a locality with a 
population less than 50,000). These entities also receive Federal 
transportation funds. Although these entities are not small, the level 
of costs incurred by each entity should generally vary in proportion to 
either the size of the entity, or the extent to which the entity 
purchases newly manufactured passenger equipment, or both. Tourist, 
scenic, excursion, and historic passenger railroad operations would be 
exempt from the rule, and, therefore, these smaller operations would 
not incur any costs.

[[Page 42036]]

    The rule would impact passenger car manufacturers. In general, 
these entities are principally large international corporations that 
would not be considered small entities. However, it is possible that a 
smaller entity, such as a small domestic manufacturer of rail cars, 
could be impacted if the requirements of the final rule do not provide 
sufficient flexibility for shaped-nosed MU locomotives and cab cars of 
the type it manufactures.
    Having made these determinations, FRA certifies that this proposed 
rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act or Executive Order 13272.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    FRA has analyzed the proposed rule in accordance with the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) to determine whether it 
would result in any new or additional information collection 
requirements. FRA has determined that no new or additional information 
collection requirements would result from the rule as proposed. FRA 
invites comment on this determination and whether the proposed rule 
would in fact result in any new or additional information collection 
requirements. Should any new or additional information collection 
requirements result from this rulemaking, FRA intends to obtain current 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control numbers for any such 
collection requirement prior to the effective date of a final rule. FRA 
is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating 
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB 
control number, if required.

D. Federalism Implications

    FRA has analyzed this proposed rule in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132, issued on 
August 4, 1999, which directs Federal agencies to exercise great care 
in establishing policies that have federalism implications. See 64 FR 
43255. This proposed rule would not have a substantial direct effect on 
the States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
various levels of government.
    FRA does note that it is clarifying the preemptive effect of this 
proposed rule and the underlying regulations it is proposing to amend. 
See the discussion of Sec.  238.13, Preemptive effect, above. In 
particular, FRA believes that it has preempted any State law, 
regulation, or order, including State common law, concerning the 
operation of a cab car or MU locomotive as the leading unit of a 
passenger train. FRA has taken into account the federalism principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 in making this 
determination.
    One of the fundamental federalism principles, as stated in Section 
2(a) of Executive Order 13132, is that ``[f]ederalism is rooted in the 
belief that issues that are not national in scope or significance are 
most appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the 
people.'' Congress expressed its intent that there be national 
uniformity of regulation concerning railroad safety matters when it 
issued 49 U.S.C. 20106, which provides that all regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary with respect to railroad safety matters and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to railroad security 
matters preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same 
subject matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal 
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce. This intent was expressed even more specifically 
in 49 U.S.C. 20133, which mandated that the Secretary of Transportation 
prescribe ``regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety 
of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers'' and 
consider such matters as ``the crashworthiness of the cars'' before 
prescribing the regulations. This proposed rule is intended to add to 
and enhance these regulations, originally issued on May 12, 1999, 
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20133.
    Further, federalism concerns have been considered in the 
development of this NPRM both internally and through consultation 
within the RSAC forum, as described in Section II of this preamble, 
above. The full RSAC, which reached consensus on the proposal (with the 
exception discussed above concerning cab cars and MU locomotives 
without flat-ends or with CEM designs, or both) and then recommended it 
to FRA, has as permanent voting members two organizations representing 
State and local interests: AASHTO and ASRSM. As such, these State 
organizations concurred with the proposed requirements (again, with the 
exception noted above). The RSAC regularly provides recommendations to 
the FRA Administrator for solutions to regulatory issues that reflect 
significant input from its State members. To date, FRA has received no 
indication of concerns about the Federalism implications of this 
rulemaking from these representatives or from any other representative 
on the Committee.
    For the foregoing reasons, FRA believes that this proposed rule is 
in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive 
Order 13132.

E. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this proposed regulation in accordance with its 
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures) 
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National Environmental 
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, 
Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA has 
determined that this proposed regulation is not a major FRA action 
(requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment) because it is categorically excluded from 
detailed environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's 
Procedures. 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. In accordance with section 4(c) 
and (e) of FRA's Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no 
extraordinary circumstances exist with respect to this regulation that 
might trigger the need for a more detailed environmental review. As a 
result, FRA finds that this proposed regulation is not a major Federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless 
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory 
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector 
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate 
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act 
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general 
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the 
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may 
result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation)[currently $120,700,000] in any 1 year, and 
before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice of 
proposed rulemaking was published, the agency shall prepare a written 
statement'' detailing the effect

[[Page 42037]]

on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. The 
proposed rule would not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of 
$120,700,000 or more in any one year, and thus preparation of such a 
statement is not required.

G. Energy Impact

    Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a 
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' 66 
FR 28355 ( May 22, 2001). Under the Executive Order, a ``significant 
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally 
published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to 
lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including 
notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices 
of proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant regulatory action 
under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is likely 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy 
action. FRA has evaluated this NPRM in accordance with Executive Order 
13211. FRA has determined that this NPRM is not likely to have a 
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of 
energy. Consequently, FRA has determined that this regulatory action is 
not a ``significant energy action'' within the meaning of Executive 
Order 13211.

H. Trade Impact

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. No. 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 
et seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or 
related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 
safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign 
commerce and believes that the proposed requirements are consistent 
with the Trade Agreements Act. The requirements proposed are safety 
standards, which, as noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to 
trade. Moreover, FRA has sought, to the extent practicable, to propose 
the requirements in terms of the performance desired, rather than in 
more narrow terms restricted to a particular design, so as not to limit 
alternative, compliant designs by any manufacturer--foreign or 
domestic.
    For related discussion on the international effects of this part, 
please see the preamble to the May 12, 1999 Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards final rule on the topic of ``United States international 
treaty obligations,'' 64 FR 25545.

I. Privacy Act

    FRA wishes to inform all potential commenters that anyone is able 
to search the electronic form of all comments received into any agency 
docket by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing 
the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor 
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in 
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; 
Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 238

    Passenger equipment, Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

The Proposed Rule

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA proposes to amend 
part 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of Title 49, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as follows:

PART 238--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303, 
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 
CFR 1.49.

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

    2. Section 238.13 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  238.13  Preemptive effect.

    Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of these regulations preempts any 
State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject matter, 
except an additional or more stringent law, regulation or order that is 
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or 
security hazard; that is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or 
order of the United States Government; and that does not unreasonably 
burden interstate commerce.
    3. Section 238.205 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read:


Sec.  238.205  Anti-climbing mechanism.

    Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all passenger 
equipment placed in service for the first time on or after September 8, 
2000 shall have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing 
mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 
100,000 pounds without permanent deformation. When coupled together in 
any combination to join two vehicles, AAR Type H and Type F tight-lock 
couplers satisfy this requirement.
* * * * *
    4. Section 238.211 is amended by revising the introductory text of 
paragraph (a), the introductory text of paragraph (b) and paragraph 
(b)(2), redesignating paragraph (c) as paragraph (d) and revising it, 
and by adding new paragraphs (c) and (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.211  Collision posts.

    (a) Except as further specified in this paragraph and paragraphs 
(b) through (d) of this section--
* * * * *
    (b) Each locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive, 
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the 
first time on or after September 9, 2002 (except a conventional 
locomotive manufactured on or after January 1, 2009, which shall be 
subject to the requirements of subpart D of part 229 of this chapter), 
shall have at its forward end, in lieu of the structural protection 
described in paragraph (a) of this section either:
    (1) * * *
    (2) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of the 
forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1) of this section is 
required to withstand.
    (c) Each cab car and MU locomotive ordered on or after October 1, 
2009, or placed in service for the first time on or after October 2, 
2011, shall have at its forward end, in lieu of the structural 
protection described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, two 
forward collision posts, located at approximately the one-third points 
laterally, meeting the following requirements:
    (1) Each collision post, with the supporting car body structure, 
shall be capable of withstanding the following loads individually 
applied at any angle within 15 degrees of the longitudinal axis:
    (i) A 500,000-pound longitudinal force applied at the connection to 
the top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of 
the post or supporting car body structure;

[[Page 42038]]

    (ii) A 200,000-pound longitudinal force applied 30 inches above the 
connection of the post to the underframe, without exceeding the 
ultimate strength of the post or supporting car body structure; and
    (iii) A 60,000-pound longitudinal force applied at any height along 
the post above the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation 
of the post or supporting car body structure; and
    (2) Each collision post shall also be capable of absorbing 
collision energy prior to or during structural deformation, as 
demonstrated by one of the following methods:
    (i) Quasi-static method. Each collision post shall be demonstrated 
to absorb a minimum of 135,000 ft-lbs (0.18 MJ) of energy when loaded 
longitudinally at a height of 30 inches above the connection of the 
post to the underframe, while not permanently deflecting more than 10 
inches longitudinally. There shall be no complete separation of the 
post from its connections to the supporting structure; or
    (ii) Dynamic method. The front end structure shall be demonstrated 
to be capable of withstanding a frontal impact with a proxy object that 
is intended to approximate lading carried by a highway vehicle under 
the following conditions:
    (A) The proxy object shall have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 48 
inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. The 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be offset by 19 inches from 
the longitudinal axis of the cab car or MU locomotive, which shall be 
ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be 30 inches above the top 
of the finished floor; and
    (B) The cab car or MU locomotive and its end structure must 
withstand a 21 mph impact with the proxy object resulting in no more 
than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally into the occupied area of 
the vehicle, and without separation of the attachments of any 
structural members. (A graphical description of the frontal impact is 
provided in Figure 1 to subpart C.)
    (d) The end structure requirements of this section apply only to 
the ends of a semi-permanently coupled consist of articulated units, 
provided that:
    (1) The railroad submits to the FRA Associate Administrator for 
Safety under the procedures specified in Sec.  238.21 a documented 
engineering analysis establishing that the articulated connection is 
capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent 
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post 
requirements contained in this subpart; and
    (2) FRA finds the analysis persuasive.
    (e) In the case of a cab car or MU locomotive designed to provide 
the benefits of crash energy management, the end structure requirements 
of this section are satisfied if the requirements of this section are 
met with respect to the portion of the car or MU locomotive outboard of 
the areas occupied by crew members and passengers.
    5. Section 238.213 is revised to read as follows:


Sec.  238.213  Corner posts.

    (a) Except as further specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section, each passenger car and MU locomotive shall have at each end of 
the car, placed ahead of the occupied volume, two full-height corner 
posts capable of resisting:
    (1)(i) A horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the point of 
attachment to the underframe, without failure;
    (ii) A horizontal load of 20,000 pounds at the point of attachment 
to the roof structure, without failure; and
    (iii) A horizontal load of 30,000 pounds applied 18 inches above 
the top of the floor, without permanent deformation.
    (2) For purposes of this paragraph (a), the orientation of the 
applied horizontal loads shall range from longitudinal inward to 
transverse inward.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, each cab 
car and MU locomotive ordered on or after October 1, 2009, or placed in 
service for the first time on or after October 2, 2011, shall have at 
its forward end, in lieu of the structural protection described in 
paragraph (a) of this section, two corner posts ahead of the occupied 
volume, meeting the following requirements:
    (1) Each post, with the supporting car body structure, shall be 
capable of withstanding the following loads individually applied toward 
the inside of the vehicle at all angles in the range from longitudinal 
to lateral:
    (i) A 300,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with the 
top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the 
post or supporting car body structure;
    (ii) A 100,000-pound longitudinal force exerted 18 inches above the 
joint of the post to the underframe, without permanent deformation of 
the post or supporting car body structure; and
    (iii) A 45,000-pound longitudinal force applied at any height along 
the post above the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation 
of the post or supporting car body structure; and
    (2) Each corner post shall also be capable of absorbing collision 
energy prior to or during structural deformation, as demonstrated by 
one of the following methods:
    (i) Quasi-static method. Each corner post shall be demonstrated to 
be capable of absorbing a minimum of 120,000 ft-lbs (O.16 MJ) of energy 
when loaded longitudinally at a height of 30 inches above the 
connection of the post to the underframe, while not permanently 
deflecting more than 10 inches longitudinally. There shall be no 
complete separation of the post from its connections to the supporting 
structure; or
    (ii) Dynamic method. The front end structure shall be demonstrated 
to be capable of withstanding frontal impact with a proxy object that 
is intended to approximate lading carried by a highway vehicle under 
the following conditions:
    (A) The proxy object shall have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 48 
inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. The 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be aligned with the 
outboard edge of the side of the cab car or MU locomotive, which shall 
be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be 30 inches above the top 
of the finished floor; and
    (B) The cab car or MU locomotive and its end structure must 
withstand a 20 mph impact with the proxy object resulting in no more 
than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally into the occupied area of 
the cab car or MU locomotive, and without separation of the attachments 
of any structural members. (A graphical description of the frontal 
impact is provided in Figure 2 to subpart C.)
    (c) Each cab car and MU locomotive ordered on or after October 1, 
2009, or placed in service for the first time on or after October 2, 
2011, utilizing low-level passenger boarding on the non-operating side 
of the cab end shall meet the corner post requirements of paragraph (b) 
of this section for the corner post on the side of the cab containing 
the control stand, and the following structural requirements for the 
corner post and the adjacent body corner post on the opposite side of 
the cab from the control stand:
    (1) The corner post on the opposite side of the cab from the 
control stand, with the supporting car body structure, shall be capable 
of withstanding the following horizontal loads individually applied 
toward the inside of the vehicle:
    (i) A 150,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with the 
top of

[[Page 42039]]

the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post or 
supporting car body structure;
    (ii) A 30,000-pound longitudinal force at a point 18 inches above 
the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation;
    (iii) A 30,000-pound longitudinal force at the point of attachment 
to the roof structure, without permanent deformation;
    (iv) A 20,000-pound longitudinal force anywhere between the top of 
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the 
underframe, without permanent deformation of the post or supporting 
structure;
    (v) A 300,000-pound transverse force at a point even with the top 
of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post 
or supporting car body structure;
    (vi) A 100,000-pound transverse force at a point 18 inches above 
the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation; and
    (vii) A 45,000-pound transverse force anywhere between the top of 
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the 
underframe, without permanent deformation of the post or supporting 
structure.
    (2) The body corner post on the opposite side of the cab from the 
control stand, with the supporting car body structure, shall be capable 
of withstanding the following horizontal loads individually applied 
toward the inside of the vehicle:
    (i) A 300,000-pound longitudinal force at a point even with the top 
of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post 
or supporting car body structure;
    (ii) A 100,000-pound longitudinal force at a point 18 inches above 
the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation;
    (iii) A 45,000-pound longitudinal force anywhere between the top of 
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the 
underframe, without permanent deformation or supporting structure;
    (iv) A 100,000-pound transverse force at a point even with the top 
of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post 
or supporting car body structure;
    (v) A 30,000-pound transverse force at a point 18 inches above the 
top of the underframe, without permanent deformation; and
    (vi) A 20,000-pound transverse force anywhere between the top of 
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the 
underframe, without deformation of the post or supporting structure, 
and
    (3) The combination of the corner post and the adjacent body corner 
post shall also be capable of absorbing collision energy prior to or 
during structural deformation, as demonstrated by one of the following 
methods:
    (i) Quasi-static method. The two posts in combination shall be 
demonstrated to be capable of absorbing a minimum of 120,000 ft-lbs 
(O.16 MJ) of energy when loaded longitudinally at a height of 30 inches 
above the connection of the posts to the underframe, while not 
permanently deflecting the body corner post than 10 inches 
longitudinally. There shall be no complete separation of the body 
corner post from its connections to the supporting structure; or
    (ii) Dynamic method. The front end structure on the non-operating 
side of the cab shall be demonstrated to be capable of withstanding 
frontal impact with a proxy object that is intended to approximate 
lading carried by a highway vehicle under the following conditions:
    (A) The proxy object shall have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 48 
inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. The 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be aligned with the 
outboard edge of the side of the cab car or MU locomotive, which shall 
be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the 
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be 30 inches above the top 
of the finished floor; and
    (B) The cab car or MU locomotive and its end structure on the non-
operating side of the cab must withstand a 20 mph impact with the proxy 
object resulting in no more than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally 
into the occupied area of the cab car or MU locomotive, and without 
separation of the attachments of the body corner post. (A graphical 
description of the frontal impact is provided in Figure 3 to subpart 
C.)
    (d) In the case of a cab car or MU locomotive designed to provide 
the benefits of crash energy management, the end structure requirements 
of this section are satisfied if the requirements of this section are 
met with respect to the portion of the cab car or MU locomotive 
outboard of the areas occupied by crew members and passengers.
    6. Add Appendix to Subpart C of Part 238, consisting of figures 1, 
2, and 3, to read as follows:

Appendix to Subpart C of Part 238

BILLING CODE 4910-06-P

[[Page 42040]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.003


[[Page 42041]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.004


    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 26, 2007.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 07-3736 Filed 7-31-07: 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C