EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DOT’S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM 

(112–104) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DOT’S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

75–852 PDF 2013

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DOT’S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM 

(112–104) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

VACANCY 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York, Vice Chair 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

VACANCY 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

BOB FILNER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

TESTIMONY 

Anne Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ....... 5 

Steve Owings, President and Cofounder, Road Safe America (RSA) .................. 5 

David L. Palmer, Assistant Chief, Texas Department of Public Safety, on 

behalf of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) ............................... 5 

Scott A. Mugno, Vice President of Safety, Fedex Ground Package System, 

Inc., on behalf of the American Trucking Associations (ATA) .......................... 5 

Ruby L. McBride, Vice President of Corporate Systems, Colonial Freight 

Systems, Inc., on behalf of the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive 

Truck Transportation (ASECTT) ........................................................................ 5 

Bruce Johnson, Director of Carrier Services, C.H. Robinson, on behalf of 

the Transportation Intermediaries Association (TIA) ....................................... 5 

William Gentry, President, Gentry Trailways, on behalf of the American 

Bus Association and United Motorcoach Association ........................................ 5 

PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, of West Virginia ............................................................... 49 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Anne Ferro ............................................................................................................... 51 

Steve Owings ............................................................................................................ 69 

David L. Palmer ....................................................................................................... 76 

Scott A. Mugno ......................................................................................................... 88 

Ruby L. McBride, including ASECTT’s position paper and appendices A– 

G ............................................................................................................................ 98 

Bruce Johnson .......................................................................................................... 202 

William Gentry, including supplemental material provided by the United 

Motorcoach Association ........................................................................................ 214 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. Nick J. Rahall II, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

West Virginia, request to submit statement for the record of Todd Spencer, 

Executive Vice President, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association ........................................................................................................................ 23

Anne Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

responses to questions from: 

Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Tennessee ................................................................................. 65 

Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Missouri .................................................................................................. 67 

Hon. Bill Shuster, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Pennsylvania .......................................................................................... 67 

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), statement for the record .............. 233 

Ruby L. McBride, Vice President of Corporate Systems, Colonial Freight 

Systems, Inc., on behalf of the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive 

Truck Transportation (ASECTT), request to submit: 

Additional information .............................................................................. 238 

Irwin Shires, Panther Expedited Services, Inc., ‘‘Position Paper on 

Percentile Scoring in SMS Methodology,’’ September 26, 2012 ......... 245 

Chart of actual groupings of carriers in the unsafe driving category 

of BASIC ................................................................................................. 247 

Page

VI 

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD 

Cynthia Hilton, Executive Vice President, Institute of Makers of Explosives, 

letter to Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., and Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, September 

10, 2012 ................................................................................................................. 250 

John Lannen, Executive Director, Truck Safety Coalition, letter to Hon. John 

J. Duncan, Jr., and Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, October 3, 2012, and five 

case studies which provide examples of incorrect and incomplete Police 

Accident Reports .................................................................................................. 257 

Lee Brown, Executive Director, California Construction Trucking Association 

and its interstate conference, Western Trucking Alliance, statement for 

the record .............................................................................................................. 288 

National Association of Small Trucking Companies, statement for the record .. 292 

Roy Crawford, P.E., Fellow of the National Academy of Forensic Engineers; 

and Kentucky and West Virginia Volunteer Coordinator, Truck Safety Coalition; and Administrator, Underride Network, request to submit: 

Letter to Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., and Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon, October 

1, 2012 .................................................................................................... 297 

Police Accident Report from the fatal truck collision of Mr. Crawford’s 

son, Guy .................................................................................................. 300 

Roy Crawford, P.E., National Academy of Forensic Engineers, ‘‘The 

Reconstruction of Eastern Kentucky Rear Coal Truck Crashes,’’ 

June 1999 ............................................................................................... 302 

Snack Food Association, statement for the record ................................................ 313 

vii 


Insert offset folio 1 here 75852.001

]fohn 11.. jl'\im 

\ll:h,lIrm~n 

(:otl1miHee On\Jran£lportation 

:mil[: 20515 

September 7, 2012 

HRlEFING l\U:MORANnUM 

TO: 

FROM: 

Mcmbcrs, Subcommittee on Highways ,md Transit 

Slan~ Subcommittee on Highways and Transil 

.t11!li jJ. 'i&<lV.l n. 1l.l! 

'i&an!!ing jl'\tmbrr 

RE: Subcommittee Hearing on "Evaluating the Eftectivcness of Dor s Tl11ck and Bus 

PUR.POSE 

The Subcommittee on Highways and Transit witl meet on Thursday, Septemher 13, 2012, 

at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2167 of the Rayburn House Ot1ice Building to receive testimony rciared 

to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance. Satety, 

Accountability (CSA) program. At this hearing the Subcommittee will review FMCSA's new 

motor carrier safety enforcement and compliance program and identify issues related to its 

implementation. The SubcOlmnittee will hear ti'om the Administrator of FMC SA, CO-Fowlder 

of Road Safe America, Assistant Chief of tile Texas Department of Public Satety, Vice President 

of Safety and Maintenance of fcdEx Ground, Vice President of Colonial freight Systems. Inc., 

Director for Carrier Services of C.It Robinson, and Presidenl of Gentry Tmilways. 

BACKGROlJND 

F?vfCSA 's Compliance SCllely Accountability Program 

On January I, 2000, FMCSA was established through the Motor Carrier Safety 

Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L 106-159) witb the mission of reducing crashes. injuries, and 

fatalities involving large lrucks and buses. In order lo manage limited resources, FMCSA 

created the Motor Callier Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) to target unsafe truck 

and bus companies (motor carriers) identified through accidcnt records and vchicle and driV<.'f 

violations thai result in out-or .. service orders. Data collected into SafeStat was cowbined to 

create a SafeStat score tor a motor can.ier. If a score fell below a cenain threshold .. FMCSA 

would conduct a comprehensive on-site compliance review oftha! molor carrier and issue a 

rating of satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory. 
viii 


Insert offset folio 2 here 75852.002

Alter a 200·[ audit hy the Departmcilt ofTransportalioll 's ()nice of Inspector (iennailhar 

reportcd significant data problems with SalcStaL' HvlCSA began to develop CS:\, Like 

SafeSlat, the goal ofCSi\ is to intervene wilh unstife carriers in ordeT to prevent future crashes, 

This goal is achieved through CSA's three emphasis are;}s: measurement evaluation ami 

intervention. 

('S.I '.I' Carrit!1' SafelY Measltl'cllIel1i ,~:vs1Cm (SMS) 

In December 2010, FMCSA replaced SafeSla( wilh the CS!\ program, The main 

component oCCSA is the Safety Measarement System (SMS) lhal anal)~"s safety \ iolations 

from inspections and crash data to 'denti!) high-risk l11(\t01' c{llliers fc)r compliance reviews and 

o[h~r more-focused interventions to address specific problems. The SrvlS uses sev-cn safety 

imprO\ ('ment eat0gories called Ilcbavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Calcgori~s \BASIC) 

to c.'\amine a carrier's on-mad pcrform:mce and potential crash risk. The scY'Cn B,\S[Cs arc 

Unsafe Driving. Filtigucd Driving (llours-of.Serviee). Driver Fitness. Controlled 

Substances/Alcohol. Vehicle j\,l:lintcllullce, Cargo-Related and Crash Indicator,: 

Data ('rom inspections ami crash reports arc classified into one of these seven 1~,\SICs, i\ 

calTier's measure Tor each BASIC depends on the perceived severity of the violation or crash 

{sevcrity weight), number oCadversc said: events), and when the event oceun-ed (ti1l1~ weight),. 

Severity weights an; scaled Irom 1 to 10. where 1 is the lowes! crash risk and 1 U is the highest 

crash risJ.:. After a measurcment is detel111incd, the canter is then placed in a peer group {based 

011, fill' c'(aml'le, each eanier's numher or power units. vehicle miles traveled. and inspections) 

and a rank and percentile is assigned, SMS is available Oil the Tnteme! to the general public. 

('o,,('ems Regarding the l:flee/i,'clless o[SMS 

BeJorc implementing CS,-\, FMCSA conducted the CSA Opcrational Model 'kst from 

Fcbruury 2008 through JUlle 20 i 0, The goals of the Operational I-dode! Tcst wcre to assess the 

new CSi\ design, detcrmine \-vhether it was likely to result in improved carrier sarct) 

pcrfollllancc, and to identify any features that needed 10 bc adjusted prior to implc1l1l'ntation. 

The Opcrational1\lodcl Test divided motor carriers Ii'om !()ur States (Colorado, Georgia. 

Misoouri. and New Jersey) into tcst gTOUpS (utili/ing tbe Jl.cw SMS) and control (utiii/,ing 

SafeSta!) groups, 

In order to evaluate the ellcctivcness ot'the Operationall\'!odcl Tc:sL FMCS;\ 

commissioned a study by the Uni\crsity of IVlichigan's Transportation Resc:lrch Institute:' Tile 

slndv f(llll1d that motor caniers that exceeded the SMS thresholds. especial!y in the Unsafe 

Driving, Fatigued Driver. and Controlicd Suhstancc and Alcohol BASICs, have a higher crash 

risk thaulllotor catTiers not exceeding the thresholds. ('he study concluded that a carrier's 

B .. \SICs ar" signilicantly rdaled to thal can'icr's salclY and fulure crash risk. 

I /llli)!"()'i.\'IIIt'Il(S V .. ',-'d('d ill lhe :ltotoJ' Carrier ,\'a/t:(l' 5Iufll.\' M2t!slli't!meJ// ,~l'SfCfl/ (Fcbrllm') !:;, ~OO--l). U 5. 

Dl';,w.rtmcnt OrTr~lnsportJtion, Office offnspectoi" (it'Ocr31, ~·Hl-20{}I-n3 I. 

http· 'jJ.i. tlr~f.l.o~Q.Lg,0v/~m.2!:.klQ.Fi [('so S ~lS !'vJ~JlQ~tQh=!~ :p~it 

;; tki\,,-~rsity oj r'\'lidltgan Tran~PtJrl.;j~inn Rese'1lTh 1!l:,1J!\l!e, F'v~1h.wtiull oftlw C~;\ 2010 Opt.'r~Hinn!\! f'vjodcl Tl';:.L 

(21) I 1 I. lilllL:~i;.;a. nlK<::J.(h.H.~Ov""DoctlmCll1~![ !..ill!.Lqli~)!.1-Qf:th~-CS.\ -\ l]2-;"I.1Ddt;1-~ r.~iLp(JJ 
ix 


Insert offset folio 3 here 75852.003

('omersL'ly, it study or ('SA by Wdls Fargu Securities, f J ,C [(JUnd no eondation 

between it ealTier' s actual accident incidence and the SC0res j()r Unsafe Driving, Fatigued 

Driving, or Driver ['itlless BASICs. I The study suggests that interested pal1ics should not rely 

exclusively on it calTier's composite BASIC scores to 3SSCSS overall risk. Several isslles wele 

iLientilied in the study lhat may eOlltribmc to the di Ih:rillg conclusions of the \Veils Fargo slUdl 

and the University or Michigan's Transportation Research InslitLttc study: 

Fven though CSA is a Federally administered program, eilations arc isslied and 

inspections arc carried out at the St~te IevcL Each State has different enforcement 

and inspc;crion priorities that may result in a canin receiving a disproportitll1,l(c 

number of violations depending on where the carrier conducts most of its 

buslness. 

Fach \'iolation of a motor Lanier rcguiatinn is assigned a severity wcighl1hat, 

according to [,MCSA, is indicative of the potential danger of the \iolation. For 

cxanlple, in the Un:,afc Driving categories a se"crity \vcighi of 7 is given to --not 

wearing a seatbe\t" but "following (00 close" and "improper lane change'" are 

each assigned a 5, In (he Driver htness categnry, severity weight is high le)r 

railure to haw a "'tlid Commercial Driver License (CDU, IlowC\er, a driwr 

may not hav'c a valid CDL due to non·driving related in1i'actions that havc nothing 

to do \vith highway safety - sut:h as missed child support payments, The study 

cOllcludes s(\mc severity weights given to eenain violations arc illogical. 

Another study by the [lnh'ersity of IVlaryJand's James Gimpel questions I\hether there is 

an adequate amount of data to accurately generate a BASIC score.' Variations in data collection 

1i'om State to Statc, tbe exclusion of canicrs with no inspection violations, and the lad or a clear 

stalislic,tl relation bcll\een some BASTC scores and thc mtrnher of crashes lead 10 a weak 

conclntion with a carrier's crash risk. Given (hal FMeSA only generates data io assess 12 

percent of active curricrs in a BASIC the number of inspections can have a significant impact on 

a B:\SIC score. CHlTiers that are inspected infrcqu~Jl[!y may not have enough data (0 g.cncratc a 

reliable BASIC score. 

The trucking industry has raised concerns over the inclusion of crash data thai may nor be 

attributable to a comrncrcialll1otor vehicle drivel'. Currently, crash data is included in the 

BASIC score regardless ot'who is allimlt for the crrlsh. If a motor carrier is imoJv.cd in a crash 

where a passenger vehicle is found to have CD.lls(.'d the rlecidcnt, the crash wil! still be counted 

"against" the motor carrier in their fl A.SIC score. H'vICSi\ staks that there is a concem 

regarding the consistency or police erash reports and how C1111t is assessed. 110\\c\'cl', no 

progress has been made by FMCSA to address thi, iSSL!~. 

1 Antht)ny G2110 8:. l\iid)(~c! Busht..:e, V,:l'!is Fargo SC'curitic-;, CS/\: Good Intl..'ntir~%, Ullclear Olikonh;, (]O! ]), 

Ii icsiF;JcDli" ',:O.'\§,'Ij£icsi ii llT ,:1 (SA if[ IdS ["W cllsfargQ,rI:;.c.\",:;;ll 03 II : 
x 


Insert offset folio 4 here 75852.004

'1 he LhtaQ System that aH,)\Vs slakci10ldccs and the public to challenge erroneous datil in 

the SMS has been criticized for being inCLlnsistent, which could result in a carrier being 

identified 35 having a high crash risk. /\n individual can file a claim through a Request fiJI' Data 

Review (RDR). I lowever. some c3tTiers report inconsistent handling of RDRs due to varying 

jurisdictional procedures on the State level. 

Additionally, tl"cight brokclO and shippers have raised concems that BASIC scores may 

have an impact on vicarious liability. They arc conccmed that a com! lllay consider BASIC 

scores in determining liability and negligent hiring claims brought forth by victims of crashes 

involved with a carrier hired hy 3 broker or shipper. If a motor carrier is sned for damagcs 

causcd by an accident the broker ean be liahlc t(lr t!lnse damage,; even though brokers and 

cJlTiers haven'( traditionally been considered to have an employer-employee relationship. It is 

unclear how a broker should view a carricr that is deemed satisfaclory by FMCSA but has a high 

score in one ofthc BASICs. 

WITNI':SS LIST 

Ms. Anne Ferro 

Administrator 

Fed"ral Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

Mr. Stew Owings 

Co-rounder 

Road Safe America 

[vlr. David Palmer 

Assistant Chief 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

1\1r. Scott A. Mugno 

Vice Presidenl, Safety and Maintenance 

FcdEx Ground 

Mrs. Ruby McBride 

Vice President, Corporale Systems 

Colonial Freight Systems, Inc. 

tvlr. Brucc Johnson 

Director, Cunicr Service'S 

C.I1. RobinsPll 

'VIr. Hill Gentry 

President 

(lentry Trailways 
(1) 

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DOT’S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr. 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We are going to go ahead and call this hearing to 

order today. The subcommittee is convening to receive testimony 

from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the trucking and bus industry, law enforcement officials, and safety advocates on the Administration’s Compliance, Safety, Accountability 

program, or what is commonly referred to as CSA. I think everyone 

will agree that decreasing fatalities and injuries resulting from 

truck and bus crashes is the most important goal the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration is charged with. 

With this goal in mind, FMCSA implemented CSA in December 

of 2010. CSA was designed to maximize the agency’s resources by 

compiling carrier violations from inspections and crash reports in 

order to determine the future crash risk of a truck or bus company. 

This data is used to create a type of safety profile for truck and 

bus companies so consumers can make educated choices when selecting companies. 

However, in July of last year, I spoke to a group that is a member of the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation, and I heard numerous people from around the Nation 

who raised concerns related to the methodology used in CSA, specifically in the Safety Measurement System, or what is referred to 

as SMS. Some of these concerns arise from the fact that 40 percent 

of the 500,000 active truck and bus companies generate a score in 

at least 1 of the 7 SMS categories, which are called ‘‘BASICs.’’ The 

number of companies that generate a score in all BASICs is unknown. A comprehensive understanding of a carrier’s safety is difficult to achieve with this lack of data. 

In addition, not all States report every violation to FMCSA, so 

the SMS methodology is only as good as the data flowing into the 

system. These data problems present a significant challenge for 

small trucking companies, in particular, which make up the majority of commercial motor vehicles. Since many of these small companies generate little or no data into the SMS, their scores can flucVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:28 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\HT\9-13-1~1\75852.TXT JEAN
2 

tuate dramatically. And the small companies that generate no 

score are misconceived sometimes as being unsafe. 

Questions have also been raised over the relationship of some 

violations and whether they are indicators of future crash risk. 

Scores generated in certain BASICs may not have the core relation 

to future crash risk, and may inadvertently focus FMCSA’s enforcement measures on the wrong carriers. Problems also sometimes result in companies becoming more vulnerable to lawsuits than they 

should be. 

Shippers and brokers are also left wondering how to evaluate the 

safety fitness of carriers with a score in only one BASIC, or no 

score at all. Recent court rulings have established duty of reasonable care requirements that brokers and shippers must meet when 

hiring a carrier in order to avoid negligent hiring lawsuits. Brokers 

and shippers are now in the position to determine whether a carrier is sufficiently safe to hire, based on incomplete or misleading 

scores. And this sometimes results in wrong or unfair decisions in 

that regard. 

The intentions behind CSA are good, but it is not a perfect system. We are holding this hearing today to identify where we can 

improve CSA and how we can reduce fatalities and injuries while 

keeping the engine of our economy moving. This country could be 

booming beyond belief today if we would allow it to do so. But in 

many ways we are holding it back through over-regulation of different types. 

I hope this hearing will help Members and interested parties better understand these concerns that have been raised from around 

the country, and generate proposals to make CSA a more effective 

tool. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for taking time out of their 

busy schedules to be here with us today. I want to say on a personal note that in my 24 years in Congress I think I have participated probably in maybe 1,000 hearings, congressional hearings. In 

only a very small number of those have we had one witness from 

Tennessee. In this—and only about five or six witnesses have ever 

been from my particular district. But on this very distinguished 

panel of seven people I have two witnesses here not only from Tennessee, but two of whom are from my district, and both of whom 

happen to be personal friends of mine: Ruby McBride and Bill Gentry. And they are both very active in our community and are very 

respected people, not only in business, but in civic and cultural affairs. And it is certainly an honor and a privilege for me to have 

two of my most distinguished constituents here. I tell people all the 

time I have 750,000 bosses. I have got two of my main bosses here 

today. 

With that, we are—I am very pleased and honored—we also have 

the ranking member of the full committee, my friend Congressman 

Rahall from West Virginia, here. And I would like to turn to him 

for any comments he wishes to make at this time. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for conducting this oversight hearing on the Federal Motor 

Carrier Safety Administration’s motor carrier safety program. Certainly advancing safety on our highways is a paramount concern of 

3 

all involved, from those who get behind the wheel, to local law enforcement, to Federal regulators. 

In this regard, a decision was made during the George W. Bush 

administration to move away from the resource-intensive and ultimately inadequate strategy of relying on compliance reviews to the 

development of the compliance, safety, and accountability system— 

in essence, a technological leap similar to the move away from the 

corded wall phone to the smart phone. 

Today, however, 8 years after CSA started to emerge as a new 

enforcement and compliance model, the question remains just how 

smart is GSA—CSA, sorry. While the old adage of ‘‘garbage in, garbage out’’ does not completely apply here, there are questions about 

the reliability and integrity of the data utilized under CSA’s safety 

management system and the effect of the scores that it assigns to 

trucking companies and independent truckers with respect to their 

relationship with freight brokers, shippers, and insurers. 

I would also note, in conclusion, that this entire system has been 

and continues to be developed without formal rulemakings. Collaborative efforts are to be applauded, certainly. But there are 

some issues which more properly lend themselves to a rulemaking 

process so that the public has the opportunity to formally comment. 

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. And I look 

forward to the witnesses’ testimony today. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. I understand Mr. Crawford 

does not wish to make an opening statement. Mr. Holden doesn’t, 

either. Ms. Richardson, do you want to? Mr.—well, thank you very 

much. Mr. Cummings, I understand, wants to make a statement—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be 

brief. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, for convening—I want to thank you for convening this hearing to examine 

the safety of commercial vehicles on our Nation’s roadways. 

Deaths from accidents involving large commercial vehicles have 

fallen. Administrator Ferro’s testimony records the decline as 26 

percent from 2006 to 2010. That said, approximately 100,000 people are still injured annually in crashes involving commercial vehicles, while thousands more die in such accidents. Any death or injury is one too many. And, therefore, I look forward to learning 

today what more can be done to reduce these numbers. 

Our hearing will focus on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s new compliance, safety, and accountability system, 

which is intended to give the FMCSA a wide and deep overview of 

safety in the commercial vehicle industry to enable it to identify 

firms that are not compliant with regulations and that pose a safety risk. This system relies on assessments of a firm’s performance 

in seven categories called the Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories, or the BASICs. There appears to be ongoing 

debate about how data is collecting to populate the BASIC assessments, and on how certain data is weighed and scored. 

I look forward to the hearing from—I look forward to hearing 

from today’s witnesses on the data collection process can be improved, and how we can ensure that the assessments made through 

the BASIC process more accurately identify the risks posed by individual carriers. That said, any refinements must be informed by 

4 

objective studies and analysis, and must not be allowed to undermine what appear to be the clear benefits of the use of the CSA 

system, which has demonstrably expanded the FMCSA’s reach over 

the commercial vehicle industry, as well as the extent of the data 

it is able to assess. 

After implementation of the CSA system, violations identified 

through roadside inspections have fallen, and studies have found 

that carriers that have unacceptable scores in BASIC assessments 

such as unsafe driving and fatigued driving have higher crash 

risks, a finding that confirms the system is able to properly identify 

those carriers that pose high risks on our Nation’s highways. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses, particularly Mr. 

Ferro—Ms. Ferro, the former administrator of the Maryland Motor 

Vehicle Administration. And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Shuster, would you like 

to—all right. Mr. Boswell, you wish to make an opening statement? 

Mr. BOSWELL. I do want to participate when we get the panel 

going. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. 

Mr. BOSWELL. But I think I will hold on that so we can move forward. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We will be joined by other Members. But we will 

not have any other opening statements, except for I understand 

that the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. DeFazio, is on 

his way. 

We have a very distinguished panel, and we have Ms. Anne 

Ferro, who is the administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration; Mr. Steve Owings, who is the cofounder of Road 

Safe America; Mr. David Palmer, who is assistant chief of the 

Texas Department of Public Safety; Mr. Scott A. Mugno, who is the 

vice president of safety for FedEx Ground; Ms. Ruby McBride, who 

is vice president of corporate systems for Colonial Freight Systems 

on behalf of the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck 

Transportation; Mr. Bruce Johnson, director of carrier services for 

C.H. Robinson; and Mr. Bill Gentry, who is president of Gentry 

Trailways, testifying on behalf of the American Bus Association 

and the United Motorcoach Association. 

We appreciate all of you being here, and your full statements will 

be placed in the record. We do ask that you try to limit your opening statements to 5 minutes. If you run a little bit over, that is all 

right, but roughly that amount of time. 

And we will now be pleased to hear from Administrator Ferro. 

5 

TESTIMONY OF ANNE FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 

MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; STEVE OWINGS, 

PRESIDENT AND COFOUNDER, ROAD SAFE AMERICA (RSA); 

DAVID L. PALMER, ASSISTANT CHIEF, TEXAS DEPARTMENT 

OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ON BEHALF OF THE COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE (CVSA); SCOTT A. MUGNO, VICE 

PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, 

INC., ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS (ATA); RUBY L. MCBRIDE, VICE PRESIDENT OF CORPORATE SYSTEMS, COLONIAL FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., ON 

BEHALF OF THE ALLIANCE FOR SAFE, EFFICIENT AND COMPETITIVE TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (ASECTT); BRUCE 

JOHNSON, DIRECTOR OF CARRIER SERVICES, C.H. ROBINSON, ON BEHALF OF THE TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARIES ASSOCIATION (TIA); AND WILLIAM GENTRY, 

PRESIDENT, GENTRY TRAILWAYS, ON BEHALF OF THE 

AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION AND UNITED MOTORCOACH 

ASSOCIATION 

Ms. FERRO. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Rahall, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to 

discuss how the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s improved compliance and enforcement model is furthering highway 

safety. That model is known as Compliance, Safety, Accountability, 

or CSA, for short, as the chairman indicated. 

America’s roads and highways are safer today than they have 

ever been. In fact, as Congressman Cummings indicated, truck-related deaths were reduced 26 percent between 2006 and 2010. And 

this is good news. It is the result of very deliberate action and hard 

work by a number of stakeholders on this issue, some of whom are 

here in this room today. 

But the fact is our roads can, and they must, be safer. Almost 

4,000 people die, and over 100,000 people are injured in large truck 

and bus crashes each year. While trucks make up 5 percent of all 

registered vehicles, 10 percent of all vehicle miles traveled, they account for 12 percent of all fatal crashes. 

CSA is FMCSA’s safety enforcement platform designed to improve compliance and safety in truck and bus operations so crashes 

can be prevented. It is a safety performance measurement system 

that analyzes inspection and crash data to help us identify and 

focus our resources on the higher risk carriers. The purpose of the 

program is to improve our ability to help all stakeholders prevent 

crashes and save lives. 

CSA is a three-part program. It is a system, a process, and a 

rule. The system is the safety measurement system that most everybody sees today on our Web site, which uses all inspection and 

crash data to give priority to high-risk and noncomplying carriers 

for inspection and investigation. The process element of the program refers to the range of intervention tools we use once we have 

analyzed and applied the data, so that we can engage more carriers 

in understanding their compliance and safety performance. It is a 

process that helps us and carriers get at why a pattern of violations is occurring—not just what is happening—but why it is happening. 

6 

And finally, the rule refers to the safety fitness determination 

rule that we will be proposing early next year that would replace 

today’s compliance review, which is the only way we have today of 

establishing an official safety rating. The safety fitness rating proposal will incorporate the analysis that is in the SMS today, again, 

and apply it in a proposed rulemaking standard using certain 

threshold analyses. 

CSA enables FMCSA and its State safety enforcement partners 

to identify and address compliance and safety deficiencies of a larger segment of carriers. The SMS system, which is, again, the first 

component of the CSA program, has sufficient data to assess nearly 

200,000 companies out of the 525,000 active motor carriers operating on our highways on an interstate basis today. And even more 

importantly, those 200,000 carriers are involved in 90 percent of all 

fatal crashes. It is the right group to be looking at. 

Since carrying out the first two components of CSA—that is the 

system and the process—we have seen improvements in truck and 

bus safety operations. A component of the program known as warning letters, which have been sent to tens of thousands of carriers 

who have first begun to first show signs of safety problems, are a 

critical element of the program. It allows a company to take action 

on their performance matters before any sort of situation gets 

worse. 

Preliminary crash estimates for 2011 show a 4-percent reduction 

in fatalities in truck and bus crashes over 2010. Also in 2011, as 

Congressman Cummings indicated, roadside violation rates have 

decreased dramatically. Eight percent in driver violation rates, 

and—8 percent for all carriers, 10 percent for driver violation rates. 

These are unprecedented drops in violation patterns, something we 

haven’t seen in a decade. 

Our agency initiated this program over 6 years ago through demonstrating a commitment to listening to stakeholders and building 

the improved process, to responding to that and being very transparent in our analysis. Just last month we announced modifications based on analysis and testing of recommendations that came 

from all these various stakeholders: carriers, drivers, the general 

highway public, brokers, law enforcement, and other stakeholders 

of this program. 

This is a program that we are driven and committed to routinely 

seek feedback about, and routinely fine tune. But it is a program 

that is working. It is a program that is here at the right time, 

doing the right things, and elevating the discussion about safety in 

commercial vehicle operations like nothing anyone has seen before. 

And it is a program that carries through on our commitment to be 

transparent and responsive, all the while driving towards putting 

safety first in CMV operations on our Nation’s highways. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I thank you for 

the time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Owings. 

Mr. OWINGS. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of the subcommittee. I am Steve 

Owings, a businessman who became concerned about truck safety 

through a tragedy. So I am here as president and cofounder, with 

7 

my wife, Susan, of Road Safe America. I am speaking today on behalf of RSA, the Truck Safety Coalition, Parents Against Tired 

Truckers, and Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways. We all 

work together on behalf of the tens of thousands of people who 

have become victims of preventable truck crashes each year, and 

are committed to improving truck safety and making America’s 

roads safer. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today on FMCSA’s Compliance, Safety, Accountability, or CSA, program. 

The CSA program is a significant improvement over the previous 

SAFESTAT program, and is enabling the FMCSA to make more efficient and effective use of its very limited resources. It has been 

credited as inspiring ‘‘the start of a cultural change in the industry 

by forcing carriers to focus on the details of safety management.’’ 

As changes continue to be made to improve the CSA program, it 

is essential that the program continues to be efficient, cost effective, and fair. My testimony will comment on changes being considered to the Crash BASIC, and the need to preserve public access 

to CSA information. 

My family’s introduction to our Nation’s truck safety challenges 

began on December 1, 2002, the Sunday after Thanksgiving that 

year, when our sons, Cullum and Pierce, were hit from behind 

while stopped in holiday congestion by a tractor trailer truck that 

was speeding 8 miles per hour over the posted speed limit using 

cruise control. That evening, Susan and I were waiting to get the 

call that the boys were safely back at school. But instead, got the 

call from Pierce, in an ambulance, telling us that his big brother 

and hero had just died in his arms. 

That night Pierce was too upset to speak with the State trooper 

in charge of the scene, so the trooper spoke only to the truck driver. 

The truck driver lied about the circumstances leading to the crash, 

and the trooper took the driver’s word, of course. And that is the 

version of the crash reflected on the police accident report, or PAR. 

Since Pierce miraculously survived, thank God, the truth was 

quickly discovered. However, in order to prove Pierce’s account of 

the crash, Susan and I had to hire a private investigator to find 

other eye witnesses, all of whom verified our son’s version. If we 

had been limited to the PAR, the truth would not have been discovered or proven. 

Now, the FMCSA is considering changes to the way the CSA 

Crash BASIC treats crash data. Currently, all crashes are counted 

in the crash data because truck crashes, in and of themselves, and 

regardless of fault, are very effective predictors of future crashes. 

Studies confirm this, noting that a past truck crash increased the 

likelihood of a future truck crash by 87 percent. 

The change being considered would classify crashes as preventable or nonpreventable, based solely on the PAR. Crashes deemed 

nonpreventable would then be removed from the carrier’s Crash 

BASIC score. Not only are these changes completely unnecessary 

to predicting crash risk, they have the potential to corrupt existing 

crash data. Furthermore, it is disingenuous to say that the current 

system is unfair and that some trucking companies are being 

blamed for crashes that they did not cause. Fault is not and never 

has been a part of this process, a process intended to predict future 

8 

crash risk, enabling FMCSA to intervene and prevent another 

crash from ever happening. 

It is also a critical mistake to consider classifying crashes based 

solely on the PAR. PARs do not even include information on crash 

preventability. My own family’s crash is just one of many examples 

of how PARs may lack complete and accurate information. A recent 

Illinois DOT study found that more than 70 percent of crash reports filled out by Chicago police were missing data, and 30 percent 

had errors. 

Now, our police officers do a tremendous job at the scene of 

crashes. But they are limited in their ability to investigate beyond 

the BASIC information. Should FMCSA pursue changes to classify 

crash data as default in spite of all these issues, cost and inefficiency would quickly overwhelm them. The FMCSA simply does not 

have the resources to develop and maintain a reliable system to do 

this. My written testimony explains this in more detail. 

Finally, continued public access to CSA program information and 

improvements is essential to maintaining a fair, transparent process. This information is disseminated by public agencies, relates to 

crashes that occur on public roads, is paid for by taxpayer dollars, 

and ultimately affects public health and safety. Public access has 

already resulted—and perhaps CSA’s greatest influence. The trucking industry and its safety record have the highest public visibility 

ever. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning, and thank 

you for your part in passing the truck safety improvements included in MAP–21, the best legislation for truck safety in the past 

30 years. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Palmer. 

Mr. PALMER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Rahall, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this 

important hearing, and for inviting me to testify. I am Assistant 

Chief David Palmer of the Texas Department of Public Safety, and 

the president of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance. 

The Alliance represents State, provincial, and local agencies 

tasked with enforcing motor carrier safety and hazardous material 

regulations. At the outset I think it is important to say, from the 

enforcement community’s perspective, that CSA program is working much more effectively than the previous approach. Overall, inspectors and investigators are pleased with their experience and, 

most importantly, the results. 

Quite frankly, CSA has brought commercial vehicle safety to the 

forefront of industry and enforcement like no other program in my 

time before it. And I would like to commend Administrator Ferro 

and her team at FMCSA for their transparent and collaborative approach. 

CSA is meeting its goals of improved targeting of high-risk operators and increased contact with carriers, which ultimately allows 

enforcement to leverage its limited resources. The improvement is 

partly due to the new intervention process, which is comprised of 

a suite of tools giving enforcement increased flexibility to focus specifically on carrier compliance issues, as well as behaviors that are 

9 

factors in crashes, making their contacts with carriers and drivers 

more effective. 

However, we have a few recommendations for improvement. 

First, CVSA members see a need for additional training and outreach, both for enforcement and industry. It is critical that those 

using CSA and those being evaluated fully understand how the system functions. Otherwise, it won’t matter whether or not CSA 

works. If people cannot understand and implement it effectively or 

appropriately, it cannot realize its fully potential. 

In Texas, since the CSA launch, we have seen a dramatic increase in phone calls, emails, and questions, as well as requests for 

our troopers to visit safety meetings to talk about CSA and regulatory compliance. Carriers want to learn more about what CSA 

means, what the scores indicate, and how to improve them. As a 

result, we are doing more outreach than ever before. And that is 

a good thing. It means people are focusing more closely on regulatory compliance and safety, which can only benefit industry and 

the general public. 

All this additional outreach, however, draws on already strained 

resources. As FMCSA continues to implement CSA, States need the 

resources to meet the increasing demand for information, not just 

externally with the regulated community, but internally, as well, so 

their enforcement personnel have the most current and complete 

information. 

We encourage you to work with your colleagues in Congress and 

with FMCSA to ensure that the agency has enough funding to create and maintain comprehensive training and outreach programs 

for inspectors, investigators, drivers, and carriers. 

Second, data is the foundation of CSA. And for it to function effectively, that data must be accurate, timely, and complete. Compliance and safety performance data is used to determine where the 

enforcement community should focus its limited resources. While it 

is important to note that overall commercial vehicle data quality 

has improved significantly since 2004, it is imperative that the 

data entering the system be as accurate as possible. 

Our third recommendation deals with the DataQ system, which 

is the process by which the carrier can challenge a violation they 

believe is inaccurate. One issue with the DataQ process is the lack 

of uniformity from State to State in how challenges are reviewed. 

FMCSA has provided some guidance, but the final process is left 

up to each State. We believe that feedback from FMCSA on how 

the DataQ program is working from a national perspective, along 

with information on best practices, should provide for a more uniform and equitable system. 

States are also seeing a high number of incomplete or inappropriate DataQ submissions. FMCSA should provide carriers and 

drivers with comprehensive, ongoing education about DataQs, focusing on when a challenge is appropriate, and what information 

should be included. 

Third, as CSA is evaluated and improved, it is critical to make 

sure that regulatory compliance remains a cornerstone of the program. The focus of CSA is to reduce crashes and save lives. And 

therefore, behaviors that can be linked to crash risks must take 

precedence. However, CVSA members strongly believe that reguVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:28 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\HT\9-13-1~1\75852.TXT JEAN
10 

latory compliance is also a critical factor. Those in industry who 

choose to ignore regulations, or perhaps are not in compliance because they do not understand them, pose a risk to highway safety, 

and CSA must continue to monitor and factor in motor carriers’ 

level of regulatory compliance. 

Finally, I would like to mention the issue of crash accountability. 

Currently, CSA incorporates all crashes that a motor carrier is involved in, regardless of fault. In order to ensure that the scores are 

most closely tied to high-risk and unsafe operators, CVSA believes 

it is critical for FMCSA to address the crash accountability issue 

as quickly and comprehensively as possible. 

Again, thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting me to 

participate, and I am very happy to answer questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Mugno. 

Mr. MUGNO. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, members of the 

subcommittee. I am Scott Mugno, vice president of safety at FedEx 

Ground Package System of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Though I am 

testifying today on behalf of the American Trucking Associations, 

I would like to note that FedEx Ground currently holds the highest 

DOT safety rating a company can achieve and maintains an exceptionally favorable crash history. 

However, despite FedEx Ground’s high safety rating, favorable 

crash history, and longstanding commitment to safety, our CSA 

score in the driver fitness category is above FMCSA’s set threshold. 

Many ATA member carriers with excellent safety records and low 

crash rates, like FedEx Ground, find themselves singled out due to 

high CSA scores that erroneously reflect unsafe performance. 

FMCSA’s own analysis confirms that scores in certain CSA measurement categories, including the driver fitness category, do not reliably identify those carriers that are more likely to have future 

crashes. 

ATA has been supportive of the objective of CSA, to reduce commercial motor vehicle crashes, injuries, and fatalities, since the program’s inception. However, ATA has significant concerns with the 

program in its current form. ATA is frustrated by Federal Motor 

Carrier Safety Administration’s unwillingness to acknowledge the 

program’s weaknesses and correct them. 

Since the release of FMCSA’s analysis, a growing number of researchers and credible organizations, including analysts from Wells 

Fargo and a researcher from the University of Maryland, have cast 

further doubt on the relationship between carriers’ CSA scores and 

crash risk. These analyses have led ATA to believe the system creates flawed carrier safety measurement scores that undermine the 

efficient use of Federal resources to identify and impact unsafe carriers and drive third parties to make improper safety-related business decisions. 

The limitations that impact CSA fall into two distinct categories: 

one, problems with the underlying data that feed the system; and 

two, problems with the system’s methodology used to assign scores. 

The principal data weakness is the lack of information upon 

which to measure carrier safety performance. FMCSA only has 

adequate data to score 40 percent of active motor carriers in at 

11 

least one of the measurement categories, but does not report how 

few carriers are scored in all or even most categories. 

CSA scores are also impacted by a number of methodology problems. Perhaps the single biggest problem is that CSA measures 

motor carriers on all crashes they are involved in, regardless of 

fault. In other words, a carrier that is rear ended while stopped at 

a red light is perceived as being just as unsafe as one that rear 

ends another motorist. FMCSA should direct its limited resources 

where they would be most effective in preventing future crashes by 

focusing on unsafe carriers that are causing them. Doing so would 

help better meet the objective of CSA, which is to reduce crashes, 

injuries, and fatalities. 

ATA has become increasingly concerned with CSA’s serious flaws 

like this one, and by FMCSA’s unwillingness to acknowledge and 

fix them. Rather than acknowledging that scores often don’t relate 

to crash risk, the agency points to the importance of highlighting 

compliance with regulations, even those that do not have a statistical relationship to safety. There is no doubt that FMCSA’s intent 

in designing the CSA system was to identify carriers that are less 

safe. 

The current program does not meet that intent. ATA questions 

the merits of assigning a higher priority to carriers with compliance issues than those that are actually less safe. Since the intent 

of the system is to prioritize carriers for Government oversight, less 

safe carriers should be assigned higher scores than safe carriers 

that have paperwork-related violations that are not safety-related. 

While ATA takes issue with certain specific elements of CSA, 

there is an overarching theme: CSA scores must reflect future 

crash risk. If they did, ATA would support the system, since it 

would provide a means for responsible fleets to distinguish themselves from those that do not share their commitment to safety, to 

properly leverage third parties to drive carriers to invest in safety, 

and to make better use of Federal enforcement resources. 

To achieve these benefits, FMCSA must take three very specific 

steps. First, FMCSA must acknowledge that CSA scores are often 

not a reliable predictor of future crash risk. Second, the agency 

must confirm that CSA’s highest priority should be to focus on the 

least safe carriers. And finally, FMCSA must establish a specific 

plan to develop and implement the changes necessary to ensure 

that the system functions as intended. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation. Thank you for the 

time today. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. We have now been joined 

by the ranking member, Mr. DeFazio. I earlier announced we 

would stop and allow him to give an opening statement, if he 

wished, but he wants to proceed with the panel. 

But we also have been joined by several other Members: Mr. 

Walz, Mrs. Capito, and Mr. Coble. So, we will go ahead with the 

panel at this time, and Mrs. McBride. 

And I earlier said you were here for the American Trucking Association. Mr. Mugno is here for the trucking association. You are 

here testifying on behalf of the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and 

Competitive Truck Transportation. Thank you very much. 

12 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, Congressman Rahall, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of 

ASECTT, the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck 

Transportation. 

ASECTT is a coalition of more than 600 carriers, brokers, shippers, and others concerned about the effect of compliance, safety, 

and accountability program is having on the trucking industry. We 

believe FMCSA must afford regulated carriers due process, and the 

shipping public needs certainty that certified carriers can be chosen 

based upon routes, rates, and service alone, without vicarious liability concerns. 

Colonial is a private, family-owned business based in Knoxville, 

Tennessee. My father-in-law, C.E. McBride, founded Colonial in 

1943. We currently run between 250 and 280 power units, primarily owner-operators, in 48 States. Many of our contractors have 

been with us for more than a decade. Some more than 30 years. 

Many of them have logged over 1 million miles without a single 

chargeable accident. Some over 3 million miles. Colonial is self-insured, and has been for more than 25 years. We were one of the 

first motor carriers in the industry to become self-insured. Colonial 

has an excellent safety record. 

Current regulations require a carrier, after accounting for nonpreventable accidents, to have fewer than 1.5 accidents per million 

miles driven in order to keep a satisfactory rating. Colonial travels 

about 40 million miles per year. Our reported crash ratio, including 

nonpreventable accidents, is 0.4 per million miles, less than 28 percent of the regulatory limit. When nonpreventability is considered, 

our accident ratio drops to 0.2 per million. Based on Colonial’s experience, I am convinced the CSA program, one, doesn’t accurately 

measure carrier safety performance and, two, its progressive intervention goals aren’t being realized. 

The FMCSA says its goal is to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities. We agree. However, CSA’s methodology is flawed. Also, the 

data used to label motor carriers includes factors having absolutely 

nothing to do with actual safety risk. 

Among CSA’s numerous systemic flaws, the one that affects us 

the most is the so-called fatigued driving BASIC. Colonial’s percentile ranking in this BASIC hovers around 80 percent, 15 percentage points above the agency’s artificial threshold. This high 

percentile ranking has nothing to do with fatigue. CSA groups carriers who use paper logs with local carriers and others exempt from 

that requirement. Over half of the points that feed the percentile 

ranking in the fatigued driving BASIC come from paperwork violations. These violations have no actual effect on fatigue, much less 

crash risk. 

Notwithstanding the agency’s sole obligation to certify carriers as 

safe to use, and our satisfactory safety rating, published CSA 

rankings mislead some shippers into believing that carriers like 

Colonial are unsafe. Some feel they cannot rely on the agency’s 

safety fitness determination to trump negligent selection lawsuits. 

Our firsthand knowledge of how the CSA program actually works 

differs from the progressive monitoring the agency purports. 

13 

When the CSA program was launched in December of 2010, 

FMCSA told the industry the intervention process would occur in 

steps. First, a warning letter would notify a motor carrier of any 

identified deficiency in a particular BASIC. The motor carrier 

would then have an opportunity to address the deficiency prior to 

an on-site audit. This is not what happened with Colonial. The 

FMCSA Nashville field office called on Thursday afternoon, August 

11, 2011, saying they would be in our office on Monday morning, 

August 15th, to begin a focused audit. There was no warning letter 

or opportunity to address the concern. 

The first week, the investigator spent 4 days in our corporate office requesting multiple documents on 19 drivers. On August 29th, 

the investigator returned with a second investigator. They remained at Colonial until the audit was completed on September 

2nd. The final report dated September 26, 2011, left Colonial’s satisfactory rating unchanged. And the report was labeled, ‘‘This review is not rated.’’ To justify its methodology, the agency has said 

that focused audits are less time consuming than compliance reviews, which result in safety ratings and require an average of 3 

to 4 days. Well, the agency spent 9 work days auditing Colonial. 

However, we are still branded as a high-risk carrier in the fatigued 

driving BASIC. We are losing opportunities to transport shipments 

because some shippers are frightened by agency pronouncements 

implying that they can be sued if they don’t self-credential each 

carrier using SMS rankings. 

Had Colonial received a conditional or unsatisfactory rating, our 

25-year self-insurance program would have been in jeopardy. We 

would likely have been faced with closing our doors after almost 70 

years of running one of the safest companies in the industry. Yet 

we are thankful this didn’t happen. Yet we hear this has happened 

at countless other trucking companies throughout the country. We 

have firsthand experience of CSA’s anticompetitive effects. We ask 

Congress to stop FMCSA from publishing the misleading SMS 

scores, and urging shippers and brokers to rely on them. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me today. I am 

happy to answer questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. McBride. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

DeFazio, and members of the Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee, thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to testify at today’s oversight hearing. My name is Bruce Johnson, I am 

the director of carrier services for C.H. Robinson and a member of 

the TIA board of directors. My remarks today are geared towards 

the significant impact the CSA initiative is having on the carrier 

eligibility process that freight brokers and shippers conduct to ensure the hiring of safe, legally registered, and properly insured 

motor carriers. 

As one of the Nation’s largest freight transportation brokerages, 

C.H. Robinson has seen the risk of negligent hiring lawsuits based 

on carrier selection grow significantly since 2004. I am here to communicate to you the tremendous confusion exists in the industry 

about the risks of carrier eligibility and selection, and what the 

BASIC data and safety ratings mean for those hiring motor carVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:28 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\HT\9-13-1~1\75852.TXT JEAN
14 

riers. This confusion has added cost to the brokers and the industry. In addition, it has added legal risk to any entity that hires a 

motor carrier. 

While the BASIC data is used as a compass to guide enforcement 

actions by FMCSA, safety rating is widely seen as the safety seal 

of approval for those who hire trucks. Currently, the BASIC data 

is not directly linked to the safety rating, and the agency is waiting 

for a rulemaking to draw clear lines and correlations between the 

two. 

When FMCSA implemented the BASICs in December 2010, 

many in the industry anticipated that a rulemaking linking BASIC 

data directly to the safety rating would occur quickly. What was 

supposed to be temporary, however, continues to be delayed by the 

agency, and every day that goes by without a fair and accurate 

safety fitness determination, the transportation industry will continue to be negatively impacted. 

We encourage FMCSA to be clear and consistent with shippers 

and brokers on which carriers and which information should be 

used to select motor carriers to haul Freight. What the industry 

needs is a bright line differentiation of which carriers are unsafe. 

Since 2004, a series of court cases have established a new interpretation of responsibility for shippers and brokers known as the 

Duty of Reasonable Care. Subsequent court cases expanded and redefined the responsibilities of parties engaging independent contractors, and settlement and/or jury awards have grown substantially. In almost every case, the motor carrier’s public liability insurance is exhausted, the carrier has filed bankruptcy, and brokers 

or shippers are sought to fill the loss and make the injured person 

or family whole. 

A common theme used by plaintiffs’ lawyers is—in most negligent hire cases—is that brokers and shippers should second-guess 

the FMCSA’s decision of which carriers are safe to operate by examining the detailed safety record of each carrier before use. This 

second-guessing scenario is why the conflicting interpretations of 

BASIC data and safety rating are of such great importance to 

freight brokers. 

Until FMCSA provides firm guidance on what BASIC thresholds 

constitute a safe carrier, differing opinions will proliferate, and the 

courts will arbitrate those opinions. There can be no question that 

the brokerage industry seeks to promote higher safety standards 

for our Nation’s highways. That being said, the brokerage industry 

is displeased with the current state of affairs, with the courts holding brokers and shippers to an ever-changing standard in carrier 

selection. 

Congress and the FMCSA can reset this standard to one that is 

more reasonable and static. It should not be the responsibility of 

industry stakeholders without having access to all of the information to determine which carriers are safe to operate on American 

highways. It should be the sole responsibility of the agency charged 

with issuing licenses to carriers and making sure those carriers adhere to safety standards established by the agency to tell the public 

which carriers are safe to use and which carriers are not. 

The only way to accomplish this task is for the FMCSA to complete the new safety fitness determination rulemaking and fully 

15 

link the BASIC data to the safety rating. However, we do not want 

the FMCSA to develop a safety fitness determination prior to addressing industry concerns regarding the methodology used to 

evaluate carriers’ BASIC scores and percentages. 

Until this safety fitness determination rulemaking is developed 

for public comment and ultimately developed into a final rule, we 

would recommend the following. 

One, that FMCSA should immediately add the current compliance review-based safety rating to all screen shots that display a 

carrier’s BASIC data, so there is no confusion about the two systems. 

Two, that FMCSA should remove any language from its Web site 

and outreach that encourages shippers, brokers, or the public to 

use the BASIC data for their own purposes. 

And, three, that Congress develops legislation that would create 

a uniform standard against liability without fault by preempting 

State vicarious liability laws imposing liability on non-negligent 

transportation brokers and shippers. 

In conclusion, we fully support FMCSA and its mission to improve motor carrier safety on the Nation’s roadways. TIA and C.H. 

Robinson look forward to productively working with industry participants, FMCSA, and Congress to ensure that FMCSA publishes 

a safety fitness determination for all motor carriers that is based 

on accurate and fair data, and that does not discriminate based on 

carrier, size, or type. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gentry. 

Mr. GENTRY. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this 

opportunity to testify on behalf of the members of the American—— 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I am still having difficulty—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. We are still having trouble hearing some of the witnesses. I guess you will have to put that real close to you, and 

maybe it will work better. 

Mr. GENTRY. Test. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Real close. OK. 

Mr. GENTRY. All right. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

DeFazio, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the members of the American Bus 

Association and the United Motorcoach Association. My name is 

Bill Gentry, and I operate Gentry Trailways in Knoxville, Tennessee. We have operated school bus service for Knox County 

schools since 1953, and provide charter and tour service with overthe-road motorcoaches. We take great pride in serving our community safely and economically for nearly 60 years. 

When CVSA launched, hopes were high that it would afford new 

tools to better predict the likelihood of the commercial motor vehicle crashes. Unfortunately, at this point, evidence suggests that 

CSA may fall severely short of its intended goals. We do not believe 

the current data fed into the CSA program and the current 

prioritization scheme will result in a significant reduction in crashes. 

16 

Studies indicate that vehicle defects are responsible for less than 

2 percent of commercial motor vehicle accidents, while driver error 

is responsible for over 95 percent of the commercial motor vehicle 

accidents. All of the highest indicators of an increased propensity 

for an accident relate to basic traffic law enforcement. The industry 

has urged the enforcement community to issue citations when drivers violate basic traffic laws, and insist that courts avoid reducing 

or modifying the original charges. 

Another issue with CSA is that it does not account for carriers 

that terminate drivers for poor driving records, as good companies 

do. CSA scores do not reflect the elimination of the risk when that 

driver is dismissed. The carrier must endure the punitive scores associated with this violation for 2 years. Meanwhile, the dismissed 

driver simply finds another carrier that is more tolerant for his 

traffic infractions. And there is no effect on that carrier’s score. 

Perhaps CSA’s most controversial subject is to issue—is the issue 

of crashes. Simply stated, all crashes, regardless of accountability, 

are the number one indicator that a commercial motor vehicle company and/or driver will incur another crash. However, the CSA system contains no information regarding the severity or the accountability of a crash. Unfiltered, this information cannot serve as credible consumer information upon which a carrier selection can be 

made. 

While we believe the crash data serves a critical role in the predicting of carriers’ propensity for an accident, the information in its 

current form is inappropriate and—for consumers, and should be 

restricted to enforcement in motor carrier views only. 

Congress recently passed legislation that would require FMCSA 

to develop an easy-to-understand writing system for consumers of 

passenger carrier services. We feel the development of this system 

should be the highest priority by FMCSA. CSA also fails to recognize the vast differences in the level of State participation for inspection activity. We also have a concern that FMCSA advising 

States that inspections can occur at the weight stations, where 

there is not any safe accommodations for the passengers. 

The leadership at FMCSA has been responsive to our recommendations on improving CSA, and we applaud their leadership 

for willingness to listen to the industry. We have two final recommendations for the—improving CSA. 

First, we recommend that the GAO encourage the services—or 

engage the services of the American Academy of Actuaries in an effort to move—effectively explore the links between the most significant causes of motor vehicle crashes and the CSA safety measurement system. 

Second, under CSA, carriers are inappropriately placed into peer 

groups with carriers such as long-haul truckers. Passenger carriers 

should be rated with other passenger carriers, oranges to oranges, 

to more readily identify those that need the interventions. 

In conclusion, we believe that CSA is well-intended, but has 

room for significant improvement. And we look forward to working 

with the committee and FMCSA to achieve its intended goals. On 

behalf of the members of the American Bus Association and United 

Motorcoach Association, I appreciate this opportunity to express 

our views, and am pleased to answer any questions at this time. 

17 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gentry. And thanks to 

all the witnesses for their very helpful testimony. And since he was 

not here to give an opening statement because he had to be on the 

floor, I am going to turn now to Ranking Member DeFazio for any 

statement or questions that he wishes to make at this time. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is just a little 

bit more than 2 years since, prior to implementation, we held a 

hearing in this subcommittee regarding this new system. And at 

that time we expressed a number of concerns that still endure. The 

system was implemented before results of a study and concerns 

about, in particular, the crash issue was raised at that time, and 

they seem to still be outstanding. 

I will probably have a couple of rounds of questions. But first, 

I want to get to a couple of things. 

Mr. Johnson, you raised the issues about TIA and wanting a 

bright line. I am going to ask Ms. Ferro about that in a moment. 

But I heard another concern which is that, you know, basically, 

only about 40 percent of the carriers have some sort of a rating. 

Sixty percent haven’t had a violation or roadside inspection or anything. And I have heard that some of your members are reluctant 

to utilize people—those people, because they are essentially unknown. I mean—we do know they haven’t had a violation, but we 

don’t know much else about them. Is that true? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I believe that is true. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So 60 percent of the carriers out there are, at this 

point, somewhat disadvantaged by this system because they are 

not in the system because they haven’t had a violation or roadside 

inspection. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I don’t know the exact number or the percentage, but I know there is a significant amount. And it is the smaller 

carriers that aren’t getting any inspection data. So then it is left 

to the broker or the shipper around how much fare they have, or 

tolerance for risk in what a court may do to them if someone like 

that were to have an accident and they would know that they had 

no data. So there is fear around using those, for sure. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Ms. Ferro, we talked about this the other day, 

and I suggested some ideas about how we might get people into the 

system in a benign way. And we sort of speculated—he is saying 

it is a real problem. And this is 60 percent of the industry. I mean 

how are we going to deal with this? I mean this is—I mean there 

are many problems we need to discuss today, but this is one that 

was new to me. 

Ms. FERRO. Well, let me—let’s talk real quickly about the database of active carriers. We are all using the standard of a 525,000 

active carriers in operation today. About 60 percent of those are 

private carriers. So there is really—so, right off the bat—now, what 

I don’t have is the breakout on the 200,000. But I do want to clarify that all 325,000 carriers that you just identified as having insufficient data to actually be analyzed within those BASICs, many of 

those, very many of those, are private carriers. So they wouldn’t be 

in competition for some of the shipping services that Mr. Johnson 

is speaking about. Because, again, they are moving their own products. 

18 

Now, that aside, when it comes to ensuring that as many carriers 

as possible are touched in some way by an inspector or an investigator to be sure we do have adequate data to monitor their safety 

performance, we are taking a couple different approaches. One you 

and I discussed: Is it feasible to allow carriers to go through weigh 

stations in a cooperative way, as we see happens periodically in Oregon, to get additional inspections? 

More importantly, the process that we have been working with 

the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance on is ensuring that when 

a carrier goes through a weigh station or is inspected at roadside, 

and the inspector chooses to wave the carrier on because everything looks good, to be sure that we are turning that into an inspection, recorded inspection that is uploaded into the system. 

Today, out of 3.5 million inspections that are carried out each year, 

one-third are clean inspections. It is very important that we touch 

all carriers that are operating on our highways. 

Keep in mind one last piece, as well. Of those carriers that are 

not within the CSA analysis today, they haven’t come on our radar 

because they haven’t had a crash, as well. So there are a number 

of factors indicating that those carriers may be doing very well. 

Many of them are private carriers. But we also are increasing both 

the inspection strategies to ensure we are touching everybody, and 

randomizing some of the automated bypass systems to ensure those 

with no data are being pulled in for an inspection. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And then the crash which was an issue 2 years 

ago—— 

Ms. FERRO. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO [continuing]. And still is an issue today, we also 

discussed that. And it is my understanding that the agency is moving towards some sort of a crash weighting system because—what 

I still find extraordinary about the data, and I don’t know whether 

the study—you know, what their sample had and, you know, and 

whether they drilled down to at fault, not at fault, or anything, 

they just said any kind of a crash is an 88 percent indicator of future problem. 

I still find it hard to believe if, you know, one person or one company had one incident where they were legally, properly, you know, 

stopped, and someone crashed into them, by their entire negligence, that that is an indicator that somehow that person is going 

to be involved in a future crash. I mean I am still having trouble 

with that, you know, the validity of that conclusion from that 

study. 

But my understanding, in part, you are going to deal with that 

with crash weighting. Do you want to address that? 

Ms. FERRO. I will. Thank you, thank you, Ranking Member 

DeFazio. 

We are all familiar with instances like you describe, where there 

seems to be clear evidence that the crash was not preventable on 

the part of the commercial vehicle operator. But all of our analysis 

and the American Transportation Research Institute analysis indicates that past crash experience is a strong predictor of future 

crash risk. 

We recognize some of the—that the aggregate number is—includes data such as the example that you just described. And so, 

19 

in the first phase of this program, we have kept the crash indicator, which, again, is an indicator for us of potential crash risk, 

which we need to take into consideration. But we have kept it 

available to enforcement in the motor carrier community, or the individual motor carrier themselves, not available to the public, 

again, just on the basis of fairness. 

At the same time, we initiated a process to figure out how we 

could determine whether a crash was or was not preventable, what 

data could we use to use it, how valuable or valid or uniform and 

consistent are police accident reports that would provide the foundation of that inquiry, and then how do we set up a process that 

looks at all 100,000-plus reportable crashes in a fair way, so that 

we are not doing this on onesies and twosies, and skewing the data 

outcome and the comparative nature of this program, but actually 

doing it comprehensively. 

So, we did a preliminary analysis of a police accident record report, and how well it can be used to determine preventability, and 

we are now analyzing the question of how to set up a process that 

could manage all reportable crashes, analyze preventability in a 

fair manner. And, at the end of that process, does it, in fact, make 

CSA a sharper and more focused tool in examining who we need 

to be looking at? Our premise is that it could, and that it does, but 

we need to prove it out. 

So, we expect to have the results of this study by early summer 

of next year, 2013. We have got the schedule for the study and the 

basis and elements for the analysis on our Web site, so it is available to everybody to look at. And, frankly, we look forward to reporting out on the results of that analysis and identifying what our 

next steps would be with regard to crash weighting. The underlying premise is that a nonpreventable crash would have a very low 

weighting, a completely preventable crash would have the highest 

weighting. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. You said not available to the public. But do 

brokers ask shippers to provide—or not shippers—ask the carriers 

to provide that data sometimes? 

Mr. JOHNSON. My company does not ask motor carriers for that. 

But maybe some of the motor carriers could use their experiences 

to see if they have been asked that before. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, OK. Anybody—I mean since—I am just wondering. Just because it doesn’t appear on the screen or on the rating system as exists, is it being utilized by some of the shippers? 

Anybody have any experience with that? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. I did speak with someone—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mrs. McBride, we are still—try the other one, 

there. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Is this one on? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Be personal with the microphone. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. OK. I apologize. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. I spoke with a carrier last week in my area who 

did tell me that he had been refused freight because the broker 

asked for a copy of his crash history. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. 

20 

Mr. MUGNO. Yes. I can confirm that ATA members have been 

asked that question by brokers on occasion, without a doubt. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. And that is—but that is just now the raw 

data, where we can’t attribute fault or no fault. 

Mr. MUGNO. Correct. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. All right. Thank you. I will have another 

round of questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much, Mr. DeFazio. We 

will go first on our side to Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good hearing, good panel. 

You put together a good—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Mr. COBLE [continuing]. [Inaudible] today. Ms. Ferro, I am told 

that there is no impartial appeals process for DataQs challenges. 

And, if so, that is different from any other administrative penalty 

system within the Government, where motorists could be hit with 

a violation, to have the ability to appeal that to an administrative 

law judge. Why does not the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration have such a process in place? 

Ms. FERRO. Let me just put it in the context of the population 

of violations we are talking about. So I mentioned earlier that, 

through our State law enforcement partners and our commercial 

vehicle safety grant program, 31⁄2 million commercial vehicle inspections are carried out each year. The number of appeals, as you 

described, which we call DataQs, number 34,000. 

Mr. COBLE. And you call them what? 

Ms. FERRO. They are called a data query. 

Mr. COBLE. OK. 

Ms. FERRO. In effect, an appeal of a violation—— 

Mr. COBLE. Got you. 

Ms. FERRO [continuing]. Or of an inspection. So it is just 1 percent of the total body of inspections that are carried out each year. 

And that is under the new CSA program. This is not counting prior 

to CSA, when very few data queries were made. 

So, out of those 34,000 queries, there—we have established 

guidelines. We were very sensitive to the concern that you raised, 

because these are the result of a sort of a record of inspection of 

a carrier, they are not taking away a right of any kind. And so they 

are not in that adjudication process that you described on an appeals—sort of an administrative adjudication appeals process. 

But we did set up a DataQs process whereby, when a carrier requests a specific inspection be reviewed, the carrier appeals either 

the data in that inspection or the validity of the inspection results. 

It is put through the DataQ process very quickly, reassigned to the 

State where the inspection was carried out, and the State commercial vehicle enforcement team reviews the inquiry and determines 

what action needs to be taken, whether to grant it, to correct data, 

if in fact it was a violation applied to the wrong carrier, or actually 

remove the violation because of the information and the substance 

that the carrier reported. 

Out of the 34,000 data queries that occurred in 2011, roughly 

half were actually acted upon. Either data was updated and corrected or removed. But it—so, in fact, what we have provided is a 

clear set of guidelines for States to follow, to take into account all 

21 

information the carrier presents, and be both respectful of the process, respectful of the inspector’s work, and give it a fair analysis 

and make a determination. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you. I thank you for your response. 

Mr. Johnson, as a business owner who is obviously concerned 

about safety, what information could the FMCSA provide that 

would help you to make good decisions, decisions good for safety, 

good for your customers, good for the economy in general? 

Mr. JOHNSON. What we really need, we just need a clear picture 

of who is not safe. If FMCSA was able to tell us who is not safe, 

our industry would not use those motor carriers, and they would 

fail at that point. But by having very much—many gray areas— 

and if you ask FMCSA to tell you who is a safe carrier and who 

is not, they can’t really tell you that today, based on their own 

data. And also, much of the data is not made public. 

So, just clear up the confusion. Give us a clear distinction of who 

is unsafe. And our industry will stop using those carriers. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Coble. And I will save 

all my questions until everybody else has a chance. But I did want 

to clear up one thing when you responded to Mr. Coble. Does the— 

when it—something is appealed, does it go back to the same officer 

who issued the violation? 

Ms. FERRO. It generally goes to that officer’s commander, and 

whatever team or individual the commander has established to 

analyze those data queries. And that individual generally does ask 

the officer their perspective. That is absolutely correct. 

And we will say we use this process as an improvement process, 

because there are times—as I said, about half—are acted upon. The 

other half are preserved, as they—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. So my staff was wrong when they said it goes back 

to—the appeal goes back to the same person who issued the violation. 

Ms. FERRO. No, your staff is right to the extent that, invariably, 

the team or the individual officer assigned to handle the data inquiry in the State does ask the officer—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. But that officer doesn’t decide the—make the decision. It goes to—the commander makes the decision, or somebody— 

is that correct? 

Ms. FERRO. If I may suggest that Chief Palmer address that for 

the specific operation in Texas—in our—in many cases that we see, 

it goes back to the person responsible for managing the DataQ 

process, which may be the commander, it may be a staff support 

person. But not the officers, per se, not the individual officer. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, it—in some cases it—in Texas, for 

example, which is, I think, fairly consistent across the enforcement 

community, as a general rule in Texas, when we get that DataQ 

from a motor carrier, then what we do is we put it together and 

we send that, all the information, the supporting documents, to 

the—in our case, the captain of that particular district in the State. 

And then it is that captain’s responsibility to look into that DataQ 

and then make a decision as to what to do. They do speak with the 

original officer, in case there is additional information that is not 

included on the inspection report, or, especially in the cases of a 

22 

crash report, which can be very complex, then they do speak with 

them. But the final decision rests with that officer’s immediate supervisor. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, all right. We will go next to Ranking 

Member Rahall. 

Mr. RAHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have 

a statement from Mr. Todd Spencer, the executive vice president, 

the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, and I ask 

unanimous consent it be made part of the record. 

[No response.] 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

23 


Insert offset folio 5 here 75852.005

Statement for the Record of 

TODD SPENCER 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION 

Before the 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Regarding 

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY 

PROGRAM 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

************************** 

On behalfof 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association 

1 NW OOIDA Drive 

Grain Valley, Missouri 64029 

Phone: (816) 229-5791 

Fax: (8[6) 427-4468 
24 


Insert offset folio 6 here 75852.006

Good afternoon Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and distinguished 

members of the Subcommittee. 

As you likely know. the majority of the trucking community in this country is made up of 

small busincsses. as 93 percent of all carriers have 20 or fewer trucks in their fleet and 78 percent 

of carriers have fleets of just si;; or fewer trucks. In fact. one-truck motor carriers represent 

nearly half of the totaillumber of motor carriers operating in the United States. 

OOIDA is the national trade association reprcsenting the interests of independent owneroperators and professional drivers on all issues that affect small-business truckers. The 

appro;;imately 150.000 members of OOIDA are small business men and women in aliSO states 

who collectively own and operate more than 200.000 individual heavy-duty trucks. 

OOIDA is pleased to share the e;;perience of it's members with the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration (FMCSA),s Compliance, Safety, and Accountability program, commonly 

known as CSA. Small trucking companies - the lillie guys out on the road have unfortunately 

experienced the oppressive and punitive nature ofCSA in its current form. While FMCSA is 

making adjustments and improvements to CSA, those changes are not coming fast enough and 

are not broad enough to prevent negative impact on the livelihood small truckers with histories 

of safe driving on Ollr nation's highways. 

While no one would dispute the lact that SAFESTAT needed to undergo improvements 

and offer a more accurate reflection of safety in the industry. CSA in its current form is a 

complicated and far reaching program with wide sweeping implications for the industry beyond 

safety enforcement. In short. CSA, although well-intended, is today a program with considerable 

flaws that have real-life implications for motor carriers. We therefore believe that the program 

overall could have ben eli ted greatly from the ruleillaking process, as it seems as if the program 

was designed to accomplish a wide variety of questionable objcctives- including influencing 

market decisions and offering assistance to insurance companies. 

Regardless, OOIDA remains supportive of the program's overall goal to improve 

highway safety, although we greatly question the correlation between much of the data collected 

and its impact on highway safety - including arbitrary severity weightings and a fundamentally 

flawed ranking system. FMCSA urges shippers and brokers to use carriers who have been 

inspected and are therefore reflected in the CSA system versus those who have not been 

inspected. However, an inspection will only be identilied if there is a violation. It seems counter 

2 
25 


Insert offset folio 7 here 75852.007

intuitive to the program's goal to encourage carriers to receive violations. although that is 

precisely the case in a post CSA world. Also. brokers and shippers feel as if they will be liable if 

they do not use carriers with positive CSA rankings. somcthing only achievable if a carrier 

undergoes lots of clean inspections. Small carricrs are less likely to be inspected as oftcn as a 

carrier who has hundreds. ifnot thousands. of trucks. so it is diftlcult for thcm to show a score, 

much less the positive scorcs demanded by shippers and brokers. 

Moreover, once a carrier is in the system. they are compared among a peer group and 

assigned a percentile ranking. Carriers then compete for safety rankings, as you arc not judged 

on your individual safcty rccord but assigned a score according to a "grading curve". Thcrefore 

you are only as bad or as good as thc next motor carrier in the system. In essence. for one carrier 

10 succeed, another carrier must fail. How does encouraging carriers to fail improve highway 

safety? As a goal we should want all motor carriers to be striving for perfect safety records. 

Curing a negative ranking also offers a particular problem for small carriers as, as 

previously stated, they are simply have less exposure to inspections because of their small 

operations. All along the way it seems as ifsmall carriers are punished in this system. Once a 

small carrier gets into the system, roadside inspections are highly subjectivc. and law 

enforcement can be over-zealous at times. Just a few minor violations can send a score sky 

rocketing. putting the carrier nearly out of business as it becomes evident no one no one will 

employ your services because the system shows you are a risk. even though you operate safely. 

Small carriers do not have the resources to tight citations and violations in court continuously, 

and evcn if they are successful, overturned adjudications are irrelevant to the CSA system 

anyway, as citations are reflected as safety violations in the system even when they are 

overturned in court. 

OOIDA also finds issue with CSA's tailing to allow truckers their day in court as 

"alleged" violations are reported in the system. Procedurally, FMCSA provides only one way to 

dispute or challenge violations LInder CSA, the DATA Q system. This is true whether or not a 

citation versus a warning is issued or if that citation is upheld by a court of law - under CSA 

these are all considered violations. And under DATA Q, even if you win in court. the violation 

still remains in CSA's database. Complaints in thc DATA Q system simply go back to the state 

police officcr who wrote up the violations at the roadside - as is FMCSA policy to follow state 

3 
26 


Insert offset folio 8 here 75852.008

proccdure. The citing officer then becomes judge and jury in the Data 0 process any complaints. 

Needless to say. the bulk of alleged violations still stand after the Data Os review. 

It is important to remember that these are "alleged violations" because a citation is 

issued at roadside and that citation may be challenged in court with the opportunity filr it to be 

overturned. However. within the CSA system, the individual is assumed guilty at the time of the 

roadside citation. and it is at that time it is reported as a CSA safety violation. which is separate 

from a citation issued under state law. 

Often small business truckers do not have the resources or timc to continuously fight 

roadside citations in court·- despite the fact that many citations may be egregious or arbitrmy in 

nature and many are overturned in court. Large carriers, on the other hand, have legal 

departments and budgets thaI allow them to fight violations while keeping their drivers Oil the 

road. Take for example when a driver who may have no control over the equipment. is cited for 

an equipment violation. such as sleeper birth on a company-owned truck not meeting the size 

requirements under the law. Thm driver will likely decide that he has no way to fight the 

citation in court because he cannot affbrd to take time away from trucking in ordcr to appear in a 

courtroom hundreds of miles away from his home or vvhere business takes him on the court date. 

However, even if the trucker takes the citation to court and wins, will still appear on the 

CSA system as a violation. The driver's only option is then to fight the CSA violation through 

the DATA 0 system, which FMCSA uses to send the challenge back to the state for 

detenn inotion. 

CSA is also flawed because its scoring system. which is centered around Behavior 

Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories, or BASICs, is prejudicial. arbitrary. or otherwise 

(as in the case oCthe "Crash Indicator BASIC") awaiting implementation - yet the impacts of 

this partial system arc far reaching and disproportionately punish small businesses. 

In the CSA system, higher scores under each BASIC correlate with the perception of 

"unsafe" practices. Violations and citations issued at the state level are inputted into the system 

and they arc assigned a severity weighting to then place drivers into percentile rankings based on 

a range of 0 to 100. The higher the percentile, the more unsafe a driver or carrier is considered to 

be and hence, considered more likely to crash. 

4 
27 


Insert offset folio 9 here 75852.009

The experience of an OOIDA member is important to see as an illustration. The small 

three truck carrier saw a period of violations that led their Fatigue Driving BASIC to go from 0 

to 79 in a matter ofwecks. The carrier inquired with FMC SA on how to improve his score. and 

the answer they provided him with was to obtain more "clean" inspections. The carrier then 

underwent a number of inspections. all of which came back clean. However. under CSA. the 

score under the Fatigue Driving BASIC bizarrely went up to over SO without any justification 

and stayed that way for more than a year since the initial violations. This is exactly the opposite 

result of what should have happened according to information provided by FMCSA on CSA. 

Ilowever. for a medium to large size carrier. the same three violations during a two week 

period are likely to hardly cause a blip in their BASIC scores. And for these larger carriers. it 

does scem that clean inspections do have a far-greater impact in reducing their CSA scores. But 

why should this only work for larger carriers? Further. for larger carriers a series of violations is 

likely to point at a systematic problem across the carrier. where the same thing for a small carrier 

is more likely to be someth ing that is easier to correct. However. under CSA, the small carrier 

gets little to no credit For taking the corrective action and getting the clean inspections that 

FMCSA tells us we need to improve our scores. 

In addition to the lack of "due process" safeguards. the severity weights used in CSA are 

arbitrary and assign accountability based on no correlation to increased crash-risk. This is 

especially true in the Fatigue BASIC. where a large percentage of the violations captured are not 

true hours of service safety violations, but are rather "limn and manner" or administrative 

violations (e.g. the driver forgot to write down a bill of lading number rather than exceeding a 

daily driving limit). According to FMCSA. approximately 35% of all hours-of-service violations 

are simply form and manner violations and not a result of exceeding allotted driving or on-duty 

hours. For example. a driver who is cited for failing to sign his Daily Vehicle Inspection Report 

(DVIR) is assigned a severity weighting of 4 under the Fatigue BASIC- despite the fact that the 

signing of this report has nothing to do with fatigue or saFety. It is simply a paperwork violation 

associated with an innocent mistake. yet the severity level assigned by FMCSA for this violation 

is only slightly lower than that assigned to a violation resulting from not keeping a current record 

of duty status. 

Another primary problem with CSA revolves around the Crash Indicator BASIC. Under 

CSA. crash data is collected without any determination of tau It. despite the fact that police 

5 
28 


Insert offset folio 10 here 75852.010

reports collcct this information for use throughout the criminal justice process. Just to be clear. 

FMCSA relics heavily on police input. but inconsistcntly docs not in the aspect of fault 

determination. Whereas in DATA Q FMCSA defers completely to law enforcement to judge 

their own inspections. FM(SA docs not rely upon law enforcement when it determines that a 

truck driver is not at fault in an accident. This means that without the fault determination. any 

truck involved in an accident is indistinguishable from another in FMCSA databases. and that 

has significant prejudicial impact on both driver and motor carrier safety profiles. 

For example. nearly 20% of all crashes or other "negative interactions" with trucks 

involve another vehicle rear-ending a moving truck. However. (SA displays this type of crash 

without any indication that the trucker was not at fault. An OOIDA member serves as probably 

the most significant example of the impacts of this failure to address crash fault. The member's 

trllck that was hit by multiple vehicles as part of a 50-vehicle accident. Despite the fact that the 

trucker was able to stop his truck and not hit anyone. the seven fatalities that resulted from this 

major accident are all listed in the trucker's record under CSA with no distinction or notation 

about what really happened. With this tlawed data publicly available to freighl brokers and 

shippers, incomplete and false (SA data is being used to essentially red-line carriers. As 

illustrated with my example, regardless of fault or control, once a small carrier receives a 

negative score. it is nearly impossible to cure before your business is pul in serious jeopardy. 

FMCSA has stated that accident involvemcnt is a reliable indicator in predicting future 

accidents and therefore is relevant. This line of thinking, regardless of what the research 

indicates, is repugnant to our fundamental philosophies of justice. Under this line of thinking. 

truck drivers arc being tried and convicted for crimes that haven't even occurred or Illay never 

occur. It's simplistic and flawed reasoning that fails to take mUltiple things into account. for 

example. a driver who spends It)rty years of his life on the road has been exposed to greater risk 

and real world scenarios than a driver who has held a CDL for 6 months. Who is to say how 

Illany accidents the veteran driver has avoided because of his experience and training? Fault in 

accidents matters - simply because the police may not have a good system lor reporting fault 

should not automatically mean that therefore the driver must be punished. In addition. the 

concept that accident involvement can predict future accidents should be seriously questioned. 

(SA replaced SafeStat as FMCSA's safety management and performance system in 

December of2010. We are now a year and a halfinto the new system and its flaws are 

6 
29 


Insert offset folio 11 here 75852.011

becoming more obvious. In short, CSA. while well meaning, in its incomrlcte form is having 

real-life imracts on motor carriers. 

Given the significant role that CSA is rrimeo to rlay in FMCSA's future enforcement 

and regulatory activities, it is imrortant that the agency get the system right. Unfortunately, 

there are still major hurdles it must overcome. 

7 
30 

Mr. RAHALL. Then, quoting from that testimony, I have a question for Administrator Ferro. According to Mr. Spencer’s testimony—and I quote—‘‘Small carriers are less likely to be inspected 

as often as a carrier who has hundreds, if not thousands, of trucks, 

so it is difficult for them to show a score, much less the positive 

scores demanded by shippers and brokers.’’ 

And this question follows up on concerns raised earlier by Mr. 

DeFazio, and that is it almost seems like one must commit a crime 

and then receive a full pardon just to get into the system. Your 

thoughts on that? 

Ms. FERRO. My immediate response would be that is not the 

case, that is not correct. Let me again walk through the numbers. 

Out of the 525,000 active carriers, 85 percent are 5 trucks or 

fewer. We have such a significant impact on small business, we are 

very sensitive to it. That is about 425,000 to 450,000 carriers out 

of the 525,000. Those numbers are well represented within the 

200,000 carriers on whom we have data, because there is only 

75,000 others with 6 or more trucks in that mix, and actually, a 

far fewer number of really large carriers. 

The reason large carriers have a high number of inspections is 

they generally are operating far more equipment and have a higher 

exposure rate on our highways. We do work very hard to ensure 

that we are also inspecting—law enforcement across the country 

works on inspecting all vehicles that identify a risk to them that 

come their way, for one reason or another, either there is a weight 

issue or they have pulled it in through some of the randomized systems that we have identified through the inspection selection process. 

So, while—do all small or owner-operators—have all of them had 

an inspection? Maybe not in the past 2 years. Probably yes, some 

time in the past several years, if they are operating. But this system works off of 2 years of data. 

Mr. RAHALL. OK. Let me ask you another question, another concern expressed by OOIDA. They have expressed concerns over alleged—how alleged violations are handled under CSA. A citation 

issued at roadside is reflected in CSA, even though it may be challenged and overturned in court. How does CSA handle these type 

of situations? 

Ms. FERRO. In our guidance to the States on the DataQ process, 

we identify the matter of a State charge along with a violation and 

the State charge being dropped, and to again recommend to the 

commanding officer or the DataQ contact in that State that they 

take into account whatever information the individual driver or 

company owner presented to the court that resulted in the decision 

of dismissing the particular case, and to use their best judgment 

in making their final decision. We do not today direct States to 

drop a violation if, in fact, a State charge was dropped. 

This is a matter that continues to be of real importance to the 

carrier community and the enforcement community. And one of the 

ways we have ensured that we are going to have an ongoing forum 

to have these kinds of discussions and address these kind of issues 

is we created a CSA subcommittee within the Motor Carrier Safety 

Advisory Committee, just created last month when the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee met. And I feel fairly certain that 

31 

the CSA subcommittee is going to have this—actually, I know that 

it is already on their list of issues that they want to discuss, this 

matter of how do you handle a violation in the DataQ process if 

the State conviction has been dropped, or the State charge. So that 

one I think will continue to get some attention, and probably some 

additional recommendations. 

Mr. RAHALL. Any other member of the panel wish to comment on 

either question? 

[No response.] 

Mr. RAHALL. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. We are always honored to 

have a former chairman of the full committee. And, Mr. Young, I 

don’t know whether you want a few minutes to catch your breath, 

or do you have something you wish to say at this point, or—you 

just got here, so—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I never have to catch my breath. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, first let me say I appreciate having 

this hearing, because—and for the chairman, Ms. Ferro, and the 

rest of you at this table, the reason we have these hearings—we 

are beginning to get complaints. And my biggest concern, Mr. 

Chairman, is I have watched over the years agencies that lose contact with what they are trying to do through—I call it gobbledygook. I love that word, gobbledygook. 

Bureaucrats that have a paycheck which really don’t understand 

why they get it, but they are doing it because they can, and that 

disturbs me. And I just—that is my comment. 

Now, questions. And, by the way, Mr. Chairman, I do believe I 

will ask you respectfully to have an audit of the CSA and see 

where they arrived at the decisions they have arisen at. You know, 

the formula—let me give you an example. The formula they used 

in CSA was written by the FMCSA. And is that correct, that is 

what was—that is the formula, right? 

Ms. FERRO. The analysis—— 

Mr. YOUNG. I can’t hear you, by the way. 

Ms. FERRO. Pardon me. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. Oh, it was written—so that means the chicken was 

telling the fox what they are supposed to do. Or vice versa. It is 

my understanding that these formulas mean that scores were reduced based on time passed since the violation, the number of 

clean inspections since that violation. Is that correct? 

Ms. FERRO. Could you repeat that question? I am not understanding—— 

Mr. YOUNG. It was the—it is my understanding that the formula 

means that scores are reduced based on time passed since the violation and a number of clean inspections since the violation was— 

the violation. Is that correct? 

Ms. FERRO. Well, let me clarify. This is not a scoring system. It 

is a set of algorithms and analysis that was developed with the assistance of the Volpe Transportation Center and with input from 

all of these stakeholders here over the course of 6 years. 

Mr. YOUNG. Was their input listened to? 

Ms. FERRO. Absolutely. 

Mr. YOUNG. Oh, absolutely. 

32 

Ms. FERRO. Absolutely. 

Mr. YOUNG. There may be difference of opinion on that. So, let’s 

say a large carrier has hundreds of trucks, and we will see their 

score go down faster than a small carrier with one or two trucks. 

Simply by nature, they are going to see more inspections. Is that 

correct? 

Ms. FERRO. That is not correct. Again, the system uses clean inspections, as well as inspections with violations over the course of 

a 2-year period. 

Mr. YOUNG. So you think your formula is good? 

Ms. FERRO. We have a very sound system. Is it perfect? No, and 

I—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Then why are we having this hearing if it is so 

sound? Someone doesn’t think it is sound. Mr. Chairman, is that 

correct? 

Mr. DUNCAN. There is a lot I can say about that, Mr. Chairman—I mean we have been getting a lot of complaints around the 

Nation. And I was going to get into this later, but you—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, that is what I am saying. Madam Chairman— 

and just cool it for a while, OK? I am not hostile yet. I can get hostile. I guarantee you that. But I am—as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, there are complaints. I have complaints. And there is a 

reason those complaints are coming forth. 

Now, you may not be hearing it. It may be just from your staff 

alone. That is why I do think, Mr. Chairman, if you don’t do it, I 

will ask for a GAO report, just to make sure that there is some understanding where we are going in this program. 

I think that, you know, this is supposed to be a working program, work together. And I have always been one to try to make 

sure you understand just because you get a paycheck, that you 

have a responsibility to those you are serving, to make sure it 

works correctly, not because you have an illusion on how it should 

work. You have to listen to those that you serve on the bureaucratic system. 

That is wrong with our Government today, Mr. Chairman. We 

are not being run by a legislative process. We are being run by bureaucrats. The President. Not just this President, all Presidents. 

And it is our responsibility to review, find out if there is a problem. 

And if there is a problem, you will fix it. If you don’t, we will. That 

is very simple. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions at this time. I may 

have some later on. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Holden. 

Mr. HOLDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Ferro, in 

addition to the CSA program, your agency administers the HMSP 

program, which covers less than a half percent of the estimated 

525,000 active carriers on the agency’s roll. And this program operates as a fitness determination standard for this universe of motor 

carriers. 

Congress included provisions in MAP–21 to prompt rulemaking 

addressing flaws in the CSA program. It is my understanding that 

your agency has stated that the HMSP rulemaking must wait publication of the CSA safety fitness determination final rule. 

33 

I believe that lessons learned from the hazmat safety program 

would be helpful to your goal to transition CSA into the agency 

safety fitness determination standard. Would it not be a better 

course of action to perfect the hazmat safety program with its 

smaller client base first, then use that to—template to anticipate 

the larger CSA population? 

Ms. FERRO. It very well could, just as you describe, because 

again, the hazardous material operators in many ways already 

demonstrate, by virtue of their obligations and their cargo, a high 

degree of safety in operations. 

There is a challenge within our rules themselves that sets the 

safety fitness determination as driven by, today, a compliance review. That element of the rules that we operate under needs to be 

changed first, before we can incorporate these performance elements in the CSA program into a safety fitness rating. But we will 

go back and again examine if there is a way that we can carve out 

a smaller piece. In the meantime we are pressing forward. We understand the importance of putting a safety fitness determination 

rule on the street, and we are very eager to have a proposed rule 

published early next year. But we will absolutely go back and examine the approach that you described. 

Mr. HOLDEN. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. Mr. Boswell? 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for having 

this hearing. 

I guess I would first like to start off with a compliment. It is a 

good panel, good discussion. The time is right we need to be doing 

this. And I thank all of you for participating. I think you came with 

a desire to participate and appreciate that. The criticism is I would 

like to see somebody on the panel in the future from the—as Mr. 

Rahall just made a comment about the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. If they represent 90 percent of the 

carriers out there, those 1, 2, 3-truck owners, I would like to have 

one on the panel. And I would just like to leave that for your consideration. 

I took some interest in the comments made by some of the 

panel—well, all of you, in fact—but some of the comments made by 

Mr. Mugno about the small trucking firms. I thought a very good 

point was made by Mr. Rahall. In order for that individual trucker 

to receive a score, he must first receive a violation. And in order 

to receive a violation, you must be inspected. And to—a bad score, 

obtaining as many clean scores as possible is the objective. Small 

carriers are off the radar, and those who have negative scores have 

little opportunity to cure. I think it points out a problem. And we 

ought to really try to do something about it. And I trust that is 

what we will try to do. So I am going to encourage we do that. 

I think it has been brought out—it would be redundant for me 

to repeat what Mr. DeFazio said, and Mr. Rahall, or others. And 

we see a need. And I ask that, one, we put members of the OwnerOperators on panels in the future, if we possibly can. I wouldn’t 

know why not. I would like to be able to ask him or her that is 

out there trying to make a living and do something you like to do 

and something I used to do a little bit. And I have a lot of small 

operators, one or two rigs, in my district that haul grain and farm 

34 

supplies and all those things that go with it. And I would like to 

include them in the process more. 

I appreciate the fact that, Mr. Mugno, that you kind of referred 

to those folks, and thank you for doing that. Appreciate it, Mr. 

Johnson and others. And they are very part of our economy and we 

need to take them into mind. 

So, with that, I will just yield back and anticipate what we can 

do to, as you said, Ms. Ferro, make it better. That is what we are 

all about. I don’t know why we didn’t have opportunities when we 

went through the process to have a little more time, but I think 

we are doing the right thing. But we got to do it right, and I think 

we have opportunity to do it better. And I will encourage that. I 

yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Walz? 

Mr. WALZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, I want to 

thank all of you for being here. It is obvious that everybody here’s 

goal is the same of working toward zero deaths and safety amongst 

all, and making sure our operators are able to do what they need 

to do to create those jobs that are so important. So I am very grateful for that. 

I spent August at several carriers, got out in preparation to talk 

about this issue, went out and talked to our folks. I represent a 

rural agricultural district. This time of year it gets pretty busy on 

our roads. Lots of things moving. And people are very cognizant of 

this. And I can tell you, in every one of those carriers, safety is the 

top concern for them. Their families are on the road. Their kids are 

going to school in the morning. They understand this probably 

more so than those of us who might be blissfully ignorant of some 

of the gaps that are there. So, I think it is there, and I have no 

doubt that the Administration wants to do everything possible to 

this. 

I just had several questions. I mean it seems like it always comes 

down to this. The vast majority of our good actors end up getting 

caught up for what the bad actors do, and everybody gets caught 

in that same net. And we are not necessarily doing what we all 

want to do, is to reduce specifically where those problems are. 

And I think Mr. Gentry brought up a really good point that we 

have to focus on. The issue many times comes down to drivers. It 

is not necessarily equipment. We have done much on that. We had 

many hearings in here on wetlines, on the transport of fuel and 

flammable materials, and how some of that happens. 

I just had a question on this. This is one of the things—this is 

for you, Mr. Ferro—that my carriers ask me if it is possible to do. 

They want to hire the best drivers, but they believe—they don’t 

have access—and I am very cognizant of personal privacy and everything else, but they want access to that driver safety record, including access to drug/alcohol testing, and the driver’s accident history. They believe if that could be maintained by you, accessed by 

them prior to hiring practices, they would be better off. 

I know this is a big can of worms. But they are convinced that, 

if all the things we do, if they have that opportunity—they are 

being accountable for the liability of that driver. If that knowledge 

is out there, someone has it, and it impacts their performance, can 

you explain to me maybe the legal—or the concerns with that? And 

35 

I say that because they are very honest about this. They want to 

follow the rules, but they think the biggest thing stopping them is 

that they don’t have that. 

Ms. FERRO. Yes. Well, so, quick things. It is all about the driver. 

And 9 out of 10 crashes are the result of something a driver did 

or didn’t do. Consequently, out of the seven BASICs, really, four of 

them are very specific to driver behavior: unsafe driving, driver fitness, drug and alcohol compliance, and hours of service compliance. 

That is CSA. Your constituents are right on target. They need a 

tool to prescreen before they make a hiring decision. 

We have a program that we rolled out about the same time as 

CSA that was mandated by Congress called the pre-employment 

screening program, or PSP. And it provides employers access to a 

driver’s violation history for 5 years, a 5-year period—actually, 3 

years on violations, 5 years on crashes. And an employer, with the 

sign-off from a perspective employee, can access the system, obtain 

that violation history record, and use it in their pre-employment 

decisionmaking. And many employers are using that today. It has 

been a very—— 

Mr. WALZ. And the thought is if the person didn’t allow them to 

sign off, that there was a reason they weren’t allowing them to sign 

off? 

Ms. FERRO. That would be an indicator. And I think most drivers 

who are applying for a job with a company will sign off on that acknowledgment. It is not a new acknowledgment requirement on 

any kind of a record access. So that is one important piece. 

The second piece you mentioned: drug and alcohol compliance. 

And we are proceeding with a proposed rule on—to establish a 

drug and alcohol clearinghouse that would allow employers to determine if a driver-applicant or a current driver, actually, has tested positive somewhere else, either with another job they had applied for, or while they were working part-time somewhere else 

while under that individual’s employ. 

We are fairly close in completing a proposed rule, in terms of it 

still has to go over to OMB. But—and at the same time—again, 

Steve Owings mentioned MAP–21. MAP–21 includes a mandate for 

us to put forward a drug and alcohol clearinghouse rule and system. And so we are very excited about that. We are pressing forward on it. 

Mr. WALZ. For some of the carriers I have just a little bit of time 

left. Is this a legitimate concern they are talking about—that help 

you, if there is more access to those records before you make hiring 

decisions? I don’t know if anybody wants to tackle that. Mr. Gentry? 

Mr. GENTRY. Yes, sir. Absolutely. It is almost like it would be 

good if you had a eligibility roster on the Federal level to where 

somebody comes in my door and they are asking for a job, I can 

go online, I can look and see if they are eligible. Because if they 

have been fired from another position, from another job, if they had 

failed drug screens or if they had accidents and they were fired, 

see, there is nothing that protects—— 

Mr. WALZ. Right. 

Mr. GENTRY. Well, let me put it this way. They can leave my 

company and, as bad as the need is for drivers, somebody is going 

36 

to hire that person if they are breathing and they have got their 

CDL. 

Mr. WALZ. Yes. 

Mr. GENTRY. As long as they pass their pre-employment drug 

screen, they pass their background check. But it doesn’t tell us that 

they were just involved in, you know, three crashes that were last 

week or—— 

Mr. WALZ. Yes, I feel very strongly about that. I think that is 

right, because they want to make the right decision. And I would 

have to say, Ms. Ferro—and I certainly know the commandment to 

getting this right—but I think Mr. Young is right. I am certainly 

hearing this out there. And it is not done in a combative manner, 

it is done in a ‘‘We want to be your partners in making this safe, 

but please listen to us when we tell you some of the things that 

aren’t working.’’ So I am very appreciative of all of you here expressing that. And I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. I didn’t know Mr. Barletta 

had come back a few minutes ago. But Mr. Barletta? 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ferro, could you 

please explain to me the connection that exists between crash risk 

and violations like having an inoperative license plate light or the 

sleeper berth not having a blanket? 

Ms. FERRO. The—let’s walk through the BASICs. The seven elements of analysis in the CSA system are not all highly correlated 

to crash risk. The ones that are the strongest are unsafe driving, 

which would not incorporate the two items that you identified, the 

crash indicator, and hours of service compliance—today known as 

the fatigue BASIC, but will soon be the hours of service compliance 

BASIC. 

The others are all indicators of compliance, and compliance is a 

core component of ensuring not just that you are following the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, but that you are demonstrating the behaviors to be a safe carrier. That is why those 

rules are in place and established through Federal mandate and 

the rulemaking process. 

What we have found, and what our analysis shows, is that on 

those BASICs that are compliance-specific, say in some of the vehicle maintenance areas, there is a—generally, three out of four carriers that are high in one of the compliance BASICs, specifically 

the driver fitness—three out of four of those carriers are going to 

have another BASIC where they are exceeding a threshold and is 

an indicator that we need to go and look at them. 

But each of those violations, those violations you mentioned, 

probably have lower weights than others, because they are an indicator of compliance or lack of compliance, but not necessarily that 

safety risk that you identified. The system together is what we utilize for making decisions. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Do you think, for example, not wearing a seat 

belt gets a weight of seven, but following too close or improper lane 

change is a five. How do you justify that? 

Ms. FERRO. Not wearing a seat belt is a high indicator of a problem, if you are in a crash, not just for that driver—seat belts save 

lives—but the fact that a seat belt also keeps you in place if that— 

if you start losing control of that vehicle and you are not belted. 

37 

Mr. BARLETTA. How about improper lane change, though? If you 

are driving on the mountains of Pennsylvania, I could tell you if 

I had to choose between somebody not wearing a seat belt, a truck 

driver, or an improper lane change, 10 out of 10 of us are going 

to say an improper lane change is a much more severe violation 

than not wearing a seat belt, or following too close. 

You know, I am all for truck safety. My family was in the trucking business and construction business. But, you know, I think if 

we look at this practically, I don’t know if there is anybody here 

would say that an improper lane change is less severe than not 

wearing a seat belt. 

Ms. FERRO. Well, if I could just—I mean your point is very well 

taken. And the whole concept of listening to the concerns that have 

come forward is very relevant to us. We had the Motor Carrier 

Safety Advisory Committee last year look at the weightings for this 

very reason, because, again, the concerns came up early in the 

process. We want to address them. 

So, it is part of the analysis that we have undertaken. The Advisory Committee recommended some changes to the weighting system. And we just announced in August, when we rolled out some 

of the changes, that the next round of changes we are analyzing 

include the weights and the relationship of weights to—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. I just think it makes more sense to—— 

Ms. FERRO. Yes. 

Mr. BARLETTA [continuing]. Really focus on driver error and driver abuse. 

Mr. Mugno, what are the biggest problems FedEx has experienced with CSA, and how do you recommend fixing the problem? 

Mr. MUGNO. As I indicated in my statement, it is the lack of a 

relationship between the carrier’s CSA score and crash risk. It is 

the underlying data that we have a concern with, and its inconsistency. And then it is the system’s methodology. Almost got through 

today without pronouncing that word correctly. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Sorry about that. 

Mr. MUGNO. What happens with those, then, it creates these 

symptoms that result from those. And it is an inefficient use of resources, not just for the agencies, State or Federal, but, quite 

frankly, for in-house safety programs of ATA carriers, as well. We 

too have to prioritize, we too have resources that we have to try 

to maximize as much as possible. 

And, obviously, we would like to put them where the priorities 

are. And, as we stated today, we think the priority ought to be on 

future crash risks, and reducing those as best we can. It is the use 

of the flawed scores by either the agencies—even ourselves—and 

focusing on that to change that, because that is what everybody is 

focused on, and/or these third parties that we are talking about, as 

well. 

And then, finally, one of the other symptoms that really bothers 

us—and it was talked about here today—is the DataQ system, the 

appeal process, and the amount of time and resources and efforts 

that go on there, the lack of consistency that is going on with those. 

I do want to also, though, say that there is—we want to end on 

a high note and good note here on this. We are very much in favor 

and positive on the CSA principle, in and of itself. Again, carriers 

38 

are very supportive of that. We like the additional focus that has 

been put on this. We like the additional dialogue that we are having with law enforcement agencies, the agency itself, others, drivers, carriers, and all that. That is working. That is what attracted 

ATA and its members—for me, personally, when I went to my very 

first CSA 2010 stakeholder meeting about 6-plus years ago, I guess 

it was, now. And doing that. So, I mean, all those things remain 

positive. 

The problem, obviously now, is that the new channel of dialogue 

is more focused, unfortunately, on these issues that we are talking 

about today, as opposed to, in our opinion, getting—taking care of 

the future crash risk that we really want to get to. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Ms. Ferro, Administrator 

Ferro, the Wells Fargo study said there is no meaningful statistical 

correlation between BASIC scores and actual accident incidents. 

And Dr. Gimpel of the University of Maryland said for many carriers, the association between crash risk and the BASIC scores is 

so low as to be irrelevant. And Mr. Mugno earlier said scores don’t 

relate to crash risk. 

Now, what do you say about those three different—that is coming at you from three different directions, all saying the same 

thing. 

Ms. FERRO. The analysis approach on CSA differs among the different parties doing the analysis. Our analysis that, again, validates this model, this model which uses inspection data—folks 

have been carrying out inspections for 30 years, but much improved inspection data in the past 5 and 6 years—utilizing current 

inspection data to analyze and help us determine a company’s performance so we can prioritize our resources. That is the underlying 

principle. And we have analyzed it across the entire body of carriers and inspection data. 

The two studies you mentioned use smaller populations of data, 

smaller populations of carriers, and not necessarily the full database that included smaller companies, as well. We have found—because we met with the Wells Fargo analyst—that we are coming 

at the analysis from different directions, which is OK, because if 

we keep talking we can continue to challenge ourselves in understanding how this model works, and reinforcing where it is working 

and how it is working well. 

So, in terms of our analysis on crash risk and compliance risk, 

we go back in time. We look forward at carriers that have had 

crashes, and go back in time with their compliance and inspection 

history, and determine where there is a corollary or a correlation 

in outcomes. In terms of the studies that you just described, they 

are using today’s data to determine today’s crash date, which is not 

one and the same. The whole focus of our work is to make sure we 

are intervening with carriers, where carriers are looking at their 

own information and taking the right actions before a crash occurs. 

So, from this perspective that it is both—it is a relative system 

but it is all driven on a preventative concept, that the warning letter concept, the focused review that Mrs. McBride mentioned, are 

all geared to have the conversation with the carrier where trends 

are going the wrong way to avoid something happening down the 

39 

road, so that they can take the actions, understand the why, and 

perhaps modify their behavior. 

Mr. DUNCAN. What do you say to Mr. Gentry when he says he 

thinks it is unfair to keep on a Web site a violation by a company 

where they have fired a driver, and it is still on there 2 years later? 

What do you say about that? 

Ms. FERRO. I say that has been an ongoing discussion for all of 

us. 

Number one, we don’t know when a company has or has not fired 

a driver, because we don’t have drivers recorded with company. We 

can only tell after an inspection has happened through our PSP 

database what company they might be with on the day of that inspection. So we don’t know when you have hired or fired a driver, 

to begin with. 

But also, the whole focus is on patterns. It is not a single violation that is going to put you in a threshold or above a threshold. 

It is patterns of violations. And firing a single driver may not be 

an indication that the company is changing its hiring practices. 

And that is why the data stays on for 2 years. It ages over time. 

And if it is of the severity or a pattern that prompts us to actually do a review with the company, it is going to result in a discussion as to what is the company doing, or what has the company 

done to modify its overall hiring practice, if there was a pattern. 

If it was a unique instance with that driver and they fired him and 

we are doing a safety rating review, it will probably be reflected 

in the safety rating. 

But again, it stays in the data because it is an element of looking 

for patterns. And those do age over time, if that—when that company—if, in fact, that was a unique or stand-alone instance. 

Mr. DUNCAN. What about his suggestion that you have an actuarial study done on this? 

Ms. FERRO. I like that. I wrote that one down. That is the—I 

think a very valuable discussion. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want—before Chairman Young has to leave, I 

want Mrs. McBride to—we were having a little trouble with your 

microphone and he wasn’t here, but you—your company, you said, 

started 70 years ago. And it has operated all that time, and has 

been one of the most respected, successful companies in the industry. And you said you have an accident rate of—was it—that was 

your fault, was it .02 of—per million? Would you repeat that, exactly what that was? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. 0.2, yes, sir. Basically—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. We are having a lot of trouble with your particular 

microphones. I do not understand why. But anyway—— 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. I apologize. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That—now we can hear you. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Much better, much better. Yes, sir. It is 0.2. 

Wow. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Per million? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Per million miles. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And yet they came in with two inspectors who 

spent 9 days, is that correct? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. That is correct. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And they were there full-time in all that time. 

40 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. They spent 9 business days at—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Nine business days. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE [continuing]. At our office. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And what—and tell Chairman Young about that. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. They conducted a focused audit, and at the end 

of the time Colonial’s satisfactory rating remained unchanged. 

I would like to, if I could, get into—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. But before you go on, though—but you said that 

you would have—you came close to—you would have had to shut 

down, though, or almost. Explain that part, about your self-insurance and so forth, what you said a while ago. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Colonial is self-insured, and has been for the past 

25 years. And it is our understanding from the FMCSA, had we received a conditional or unsatisfactory rating, that our self-insurance program would have been in jeopardy. And this could have 

caused us to have to close our doors. 

Mr. DUNCAN. After 70 years. 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. After 70 years. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Anyway—— 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. That is correct. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, if I may just follow through on that. 

Madam Chairman, where do these guys come from? They go in 

to an outfit that has gone that long and spend 9 days. Did someone 

complain about them? 

Ms. FERRO. It is actually a great example of how the process 

works. The data showed that this company in particular had a very 

high rate of noncompliance relative to companies that had a similar 

number of inspections. 

Mr. YOUNG. After 70 years? And what was the percentage, Mrs. 

McBride, .02? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. Of a million miles? Now, there is people that do better than that? 

Ms. FERRO. So, again, it was hours of service. Hours-of-service 

violations have a high correlation to crash risk. But here is where 

our investigators went in, they—the company data, their own 

records, their own performance, demonstrated their strong safety 

practices. It was an unrated review. They have got their satisfactory rating and we move on. But again, it was—we hope that the 

result of that discussion is that the company also is looking more 

closely at driver violations on their log books. 

Mr. YOUNG. Again, if I can say, this is a classic example of an 

agency that doesn’t answer to anyone. 

Mr. Chairman, again, this is what is wrong with our country. I 

want to ask all of you here. Let’s say you are the trucking companies and I am a CDL holder. I drive a truck once in a while. I have 

to haul the nonsense out I create all the time. But having said 

that, I do not create the accident for the company I work for. Someone else creates it. Does that affect your rating? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. It does affect—even though the driver is not at fault, 

but it goes on their record and stays as an accident of your company? 

Mrs. MCBRIDE. Yes, sir. It does. 

41 

Mr. YOUNG. Now, even in the insurance company that doesn’t 

happen. How come you can do that? 

Ms. FERRO. Well, to clarify, the accident—the crash actually does 

not affect her company’s safety rating. 

Mr. YOUNG. But it is registered. It is on the record. 

Ms. FERRO. It absolutely is on the system and the database—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Why? 

Ms. FERRO [continuing]. As a recordable crash. 

Mr. YOUNG. Why? 

Ms. FERRO. Well, that is part of transparency in Government—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Transparency? When it is not their fault? And yet 

someone sees that record? 

Ms. FERRO. Well, down the road we are looking at this whole 

concept of preventability and nonpreventability. But that answer 

isn’t with us today. But the crash event itself, the crash report, is 

on our database, and has been for many years. 

Mr. YOUNG. Again, I go back. I drive a truck. It is not my accident. Some idiot is on a cell phone, drives under my truck, which 

has happened, and it is my fault? And it is my company’s fault? 

Now, where is the rhyme behind that? Where is the logic? 

See, I have got a new idea, Mr. Chairman. I am a quasi-inventor. 

I am going to invent a logic pill. And I am going to require every 

bureaucrat—and even every congressman; I will fit us in there— 

to take one logic pill a day or they can’t serve. Logic. Solves problems, not adversarial position. 

Mr. Chairman, I have had enough of this. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Let me ask this. Mr. Palmer, if a carrier 

has a dismissed violation, I am told that that continues to be listed 

on the SMS as a violation. Is that correct? 

Mr. PALMER. When they have received a citation and it was dismissed, sir? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. 

Mr. PALMER. In some cases it could. It is typically—and it is the 

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance’s position and—typically enforcements that—what we do is just because a violation is dismissed, we don’t automatically say that it needs to come off. What 

we do is we still look at it, and we determine whether, based on 

its merit, whether or not it should still remain on that inspection 

report. If there is supporting documentation, if there is support to 

show that it should be off, then we absolutely take it off. 

But what we try to avoid is taking a violation off of an inspection 

report solely because of a technicality or some other reason. So we 

try to use—to Mr. Young’s point, we try to use logic in that process. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Let me ask this, and I will go back to Mr. 

DeFazio. 

Mr. Johnson, you all came and met with me, and you said that 

your company had the—was it $25 million in a lawsuit where you 

had hired a truck or something? Tell me about that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Correct. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We didn’t get into details about that in our meeting. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Correct. We had a juried judgment against us a couple of years ago for $25 million for a motor carrier accident with 

some passenger vehicles. And C.H. Robinson was found to be liable 

42 

for the excess amounts beyond the carrier’s insurance limit, and 

their ability to pay, just because it was the vicarious liability argument. So because we had hired the truck, or the motor carrier, we 

were found that they acted as an agent of ours. So it changed the 

whole independent contractor scenario for motor property brokers 

like ourselves. 

If you think about it, it is kind of similar to if you get in a taxi 

cab and you ask him to take you somewhere, if he hits a pedestrian 

along the way, should you, as the passenger, be found liable for 

those damages? Because you were the one that was telling him 

where to go. So—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Mr. DeFazio? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Ferro, 

let me see if I can—because Congressman Young raised the same 

concerns I raised earlier about at-fault crashes. And we discussed— 

I think he wasn’t here at that point—that you are looking at working toward a rating system for fault, at fault. 

I think if you, you know, got from Congressman Young, there is 

a lot of focus and concern around this. And, you know, I raised it 

2 years ago. And I mean it is not going to go away. You know, I 

think we have got to find that there is going to be a system that 

will work, that will attribute fault, no fault, and that—you know, 

otherwise it really is an unfair burden, I think, even though there 

may be some study that says there is a correlation when your truck 

is parked and, you know, you are sleeping, and someone crashes 

into it, that you are more likely to have a crash in the future, I 

just don’t—I would question the basis for that. 

Anyway, so when—it is my understanding you are developing 

a—you know, there is going to be a final conclusion here. Mr. Johnson talked about they want a bright line. Are we going to have a 

bright line, or are we going to have the existing system, which is 

a—three part, which is, you know, satisfactory, conditional, unsatisfactory? What are we going to end up with? Are we going to end 

up with a safe, unsafe? What are you finally looking at? And you 

are going to go through a rulemaking when you come to that final 

point. Is that correct? 

Ms. FERRO. That is correct. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Could you tell us—is it going to be—are we 

going to get a bright line, or are we going to get, you know, two 

lines and a gray area? Or what are we going to get? 

And I guess three-part question, because I—you know, the— 

there is—I am having—you know, I mean, obviously ending fatalities and deaths and unsafe driving is our ultimate objective, which 

I think is shared, despite some differences here. But is this ultimately a program whose objective is to really try and move people 

towards safer practices and companies towards safer practices, a 

self-help system? Or is it ultimately just going to be a rating system? Or is it going to be all things, somehow? 

Ms. FERRO. Well, let me go back to the question about the safety 

fitness determination process and rule, the proposal itself. 

Number one, absolutely. For us to change the way we establish 

a safety rating, we must go through a rulemaking process. Today 

the safe—the satisfactory—conditional, unsatisfactory are tied to 

an on-site compliance review. A full compliance review, not the foVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:28 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\HT\9-13-1~1\75852.TXT JEAN
43 

cused, as was described by Mrs. McBride. That rulemaking is what 

we call a safety fitness determination rule. It should be—we expect 

it to be an NPRM on the streets for extensive comment next year, 

really in the first quarter of next year. 

Without going too far—I am a little bit in that cone of silence period with the rulemaking—but I can say one of the aspects of the 

rule will be that it will establish thresholds. Today, the SMS system which we use to prioritize our work, law enforcement uses to 

prioritize inspection work, is a relative measure. You are compared 

to others in your same grouping, and you are relatively good or bad 

or above or below, depending on it. 

Under the safety fitness determination rule concept, there will be 

thresholds, so a company really knows. Am I above or below? In 

terms of the actual ratings, that is the part that I won’t move on 

to today, because that is still part of the rule under development. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And that goes to another concern that has been expressed about how today you can have a static record. You know, 

you have been rated. But other people’s performance changed. And 

then you move. You know, I mean it seems to me that somehow 

we ought to be able to—and I think you just addressed that, you 

said it is—now it is relative, i.e., you know, you can move up and 

down, you can end up below the threshold all of a sudden, even 

though you didn’t have any further violations—that this will have 

something that is more stable. 

I mean I know you said you can’t be specific, but will it be more 

stable, or are we still going to be rating everybody against everybody? 

Ms. FERRO. The safety rating itself—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Within category. 

Ms. FERRO [continuing]. Will have a set threshold. And we think, 

yes, there will be that stability that comes along with am I in the 

right spot or am I not in the right spot. That we absolutely—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Ms. FERRO. Keep in mind where we came from. We are tied to 

a compliance review process today that allows us to do about 

16,000 safety ratings a year. We probably have only about 50,000 

carriers out of the 525,000 today that have a safety rating—satisfactory, conditional, unsatisfactory—because resources are so limited. And it is the very reason why Congress, over the years, has— 

and GAO—has said, ‘‘Use the data you are collecting, performance 

data’’—stakeholders have said the same—‘‘to really hone in on 

where your resources can best be applied, and try and utilize that 

data to establish a broader method of rating carriers.’’ 

So, that is what that safety fitness determination rating capability will do, it will take us from rating 16,000 companies a year 

to rating 200,000 companies in a year. And we need to be sure it 

is a very fair process, that the NPRM gets lots of room for comment, and that there are some clear thresholds for carriers, so they 

know—because that is a big change from what we are doing today. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. We did hear some testimony about—I mean we are 

focusing on how you are going to use the data that you receive. We 

have also discussed a little bit about the quality of that data. But 

in Mr. Mugno’s testimony he said that 15 percent of States report 

less than 75 percent of their crashes. 

44 

Is that—Mr.—do you want to give us a citation on that, or—I 

mean where you are—and then I could ask her to—is that accurate? That is what I believe was in your testimony. 

Mr. MUGNO. I can’t—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, can’t find it right now. I know. Whenever 

you—— 

Mr. MUGNO. I am sorry, I can’t put my fingers on it right now, 

but we will certainly submit that—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But does that sound right? 

Mr. MUGNO. It does. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. All right. How are we dealing with that? 

Ms. FERRO. We are dealing with it—through—actually, I think 

the number is much higher now. That is an older number. And we 

will provide a followup, for the record, to the—access to the data, 

which is on our Web site today. 

The safety data improvement process was started because of a 

number of concerns over the timeliness and accuracy of data that 

States were reporting on inspection reports, on crash reports. The 

process was started—the grant program was started under 

SAFETEA–LU, and it provides $3 million a year for States to apply 

for money to improve their reporting systems and their training for 

their reporting systems. 

And over the course of the 6 years that the program has been 

in place, we have seen a significant improvement in the quality of 

data and the timeliness of data, including fatal crash reporting. Injury crash reporting is still an area where there are some gaps, and 

that is why we have highlighted it in this past year for States, in 

terms of kind of, again, raising the bar on the quality and integrity 

and timeliness of the data. So, again, we—Mr. Mugno will also provide kind of the source of the data, and the distinctions that we are 

drawing. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. That would be helpful. And then, the—that 

sort of basic question, because we did discuss a little bit about now 

we are finally getting the—you know, we are moving toward the 

drug, alcohol testing clearinghouse. We apparently now have an integrated database so someone who has had their license suspended 

or revoked in one State can’t go to another without—you know, 

that these—we now are—we have—basically dealing with those 

problems. 

So the question becomes why wouldn’t we be looking at a system 

that rates drivers individually, as opposed to aggregate companies? 

I mean maybe you need to do both. 

Ms. FERRO. And we have discussed doing both. We want to get 

the carrier measurement system in place before we take the next 

step in rating drivers. We have an internal mechanism we use 

when we are going out to look at a company that does give us— 

one of the indicators may be a highlight, a driver measurement 

system using, again, the violation data I discussed earlier. But 

there is no project today, or plan today, to put a driver safety measurement system in place. It is absolutely something that we are 

very interested in. 

There was some component in our technical assistance that requested some clarification in our authorizing language to be sure 

we had the authority to do that. It wasn’t adopted. But again, we 

45 

will be pleased to report back as we move forward. But our first 

and primary goal is to put the carrier safety determination rating 

system in place on the heels of the SMS system. 

Mr. DUNCAN. OK—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 

generous amount of time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. DeFazio. We were joined a few 

minutes ago by Mr. Hanna. And I certainly want to give him a 

chance to make any statement or ask any questions. 

Mr. HANNA. How can you do one without the other? In a State 

like I live in, in New York—and I was in heavy equipment business 

for many years—how can you separate, when we have third-party 

liability rules that are directly related to acts of an individual? 

I suggest to you that it is more important to do the individual 

than the trucking company, that you ought to think about that. 

And I don’t think you can do one without the other. I mean every 

person that ever fell off a ladder knew what he was doing when 

he went up that ladder. And everybody who gets into a truck that 

has had drug—or has a drug or alcohol problem puts himself out 

there at a risk to the owner of the company, yet the company accepts the liability for that. 

So, I just throw this out as a comment, that I think you can’t do 

one, even nearly correctly, without doing the other at the same 

time. 

Ms. FERRO. And if I may, I absolutely respect that point of view, 

and it is built into the CSA program today. It is why the majority 

of the analysis groups that we call BASICs are actually reflective 

of driver behavior. 

Companies have a very clear influence on what a driver can or 

can’t do. They—and the level of support a driver has to do things 

the right way. And so, the first component of the system is moving 

towards how a carrier is handling the violations that drivers are 

incurring. But we absolutely incorporate driver behavior through 

the unsafe driving BASIC, again, the driver fitness BASIC, whether they have a license, proper medical qualifications, the drug and 

alcohol compliance BASIC. All of those do really reflect on how 

much a driver impacts that carrier’s business. 

Mr. HANNA. No, I appreciate that. I would say, just from my own 

experience, the problem was always enforcement. All the liability 

and all the expenses and all the responsibility falls back on the 

owner of the vehicle. And there is precious little opportunity, other 

than threat of loss of your job, to control what individuals do, so 

that the information that you might accumulate over time—I suggest to you that can drive the outcome more for the company than 

how they actually do what they have control over. It is just a 

thought. 

But thank you, Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. OWINGS. Mr. Chairman, may I jump in and say a couple of 

things on behalf of the safety community? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Sure. 

Mr. OWINGS. We heard a lot of talk about a couple of things. 

First of all, this whole fault issue. Again, the Crash BASIC is intended to be predictive of future crashes. The science says that if 

you count all of the crashes, they are predictive. And we have 

46 

talked about fault versus nonpreventable. Those are two different 

things. They are not synonymous. We have civil courts that do a 

lot of work to try to figure out fault. Figuring out nonpreventable, 

which means the driver couldn’t have made a reasonable decision 

or move to possibly prevent the crash, is a whole higher level of 

scrutiny. And the FMCSA does not have the resources to address 

that. 

Now, the second thing I would like to address is there has been 

a lot of discussion in here about the small businessmen who have 

trucking companies. I am a small businessman. And let me suggest 

that the most important thing that could be done to improve road 

safety in this country where trucks are concerned is to pay truck 

drivers like the professionals they are expected to be. They should 

not be paid by the hour, which incentivizes dangerous behavior. It 

is common sense, or—and the way they should be paid is an hourly 

wage or a salary for every hour they work, whether or not their 

truck is moving, and regardless at what speed. 

Mr. HANNA. Ma’am—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Hanna? Go ahead. 

Mr. HANNA. Thank you, Chairman. The way you work things is 

basically a bell curve, right? 

Ms. FERRO. That is correct. 

Mr. HANNA. I would suggest to you that you ought to be dealing 

with something that looks more like an algorithm. The whole process is much more complicated, and there are much more—many 

more factors, and many of them that people are graded on a bell 

curve, like the truckers, don’t have control over. But I know you 

know that, it is just—— 

Ms. FERRO. Well, and I appreciate that perspective. And we 

would be pleased to come and brief you. There are a host of algorithms underlying this system, and I think there are some opportunities to peer review it, so more extensively, again, following the 

discussion today. And we will be happy to brief you on it, if you 

have some time—— 

Mr. HANNA. Thank you, ma’am. I yield back. 

Ms. FERRO. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Well, thank you very much. Let me see 

if I can sum up on a couple things. 

Number one, there is nobody who wants less to have a crash or 

an accident than the owners of the trucking and bus companies, because, first of all, they wouldn’t have some goal to go out and hurt 

people, because there would be much easier, less expensive ways 

to do it than to crash trucks or buses into them. Secondly, they 

don’t want to ruin their equipment. They don’t want to unintentionally harm anybody. And above all, they know that they are 

likely to be sued. 

But, having said all that, we do need to have an agency like Administrator Ferro’s. And I can tell you while there has been—I 

have been pleased that there have been four Members here today— 

Chairman Young and Mr. Rahall, Mr. DeFazio, and Mr. Coble, all 

of whom are more senior than me—I have been on this committee 

for 24 years. I can tell you that whether it has been led by Republicans or Democrats, while we have been concerned about the inVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:28 Feb 01, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\HT\9-13-1~1\75852.TXT JEAN
47 

dustry and various things that go on in this country, our number 

one concern for this committee has always been safety. 

Now, we have two witnesses, as I mentioned at the start—very 

unusual—from my home town of Knoxville. And I am pleased to 

have them here. But if I thought this was just a Knoxville problem 

or a Tennessee problem, I would have never even agreed to have 

this hearing. I would have thought there was some other way to 

settle this thing. But I heard about this—I started hearing complaints from people all over the Nation before I heard about anybody from Tennessee having a problem with this. In fact, I still 

haven’t met with Mr. Gentry about problems that he has had. I did 

have a meeting with Mrs. McBride and some other trucking company people, and they told me about some problems. 

We have got these studies saying there is problems with it. We 

have heard people testify here today there is problems with it. 

Nothing is perfect. It is not all bad. But it seems to me that there 

needs to be a little more flexibility in this program, Administrator 

Ferro, and there needs to be a quicker, easier, simpler way for a 

company to tell their side. If they get put on—listed as an unsafe 

company, there needs to be a quicker, easier, simpler way for them 

to defend themselves with you and your agency. 

So, I hope that over these next few months—I hope you won’t 

punish—number one, most of all, I hope you won’t try and do something to Mrs. McBride’s wonderful company—because I can tell you 

they are a great company—because they have had the guts to come 

here and testify. We run into that sometimes. Some companies, 

they don’t want to come testify, because they are afraid that they 

will get hit harder by these administrative agencies. But there 

needs to be a way for these companies to get delisted if they have 

been listed unfairly. 

And then too, you know, these violations—Mr. Barletta said 

something about a violation because a blanket wasn’t in a cab. We 

need to not have things like that. 

But I thank everybody for coming. You want to kind of close out, 

Mr. DeFazio? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, a specific 

random question, again, on our data is only as, you know, so good. 

And this is from another hearing I held. I am pleased to see we 

are moving toward a drug-alcohol clearinghouse. But have we done 

anything to clean up the abuses in the testing system? And we had 

ample testimony on that, a Web site that we found that would sell 

you Whizzinators and things so you could cheat on the tests. And 

I mean, you know, it—there was no controls over the testing system, whatsoever. 

Have we done anything to improve the testing system? Because 

if we establish a database, you know, there is a question of the validity of the data that is in it. 

Ms. FERRO. I would like to respond as a followup on that one. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. 

Ms. FERRO. I do not have specifics for you today. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Sure, OK. 

Ms. FERRO. I will have to respond for the record. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That was the—— 

Ms. FERRO. Thank you. 

48 

Mr. DEFAZIO [continuing]. Subject of another hearing. Well, I 

would just like to observe that, I mean, I think that the one common ground here is we have a common objective, and that is we 

want to improve the safety of the system, of the traveling public. 

And we—there is some questions about, you know, particulars of 

this approach. And I can only hope that, you know, some of the 

concerns that have been raised here will be taken to heart as you 

move into an actual rulemaking, where people will be able to formally comment, and there will be other additional scrutiny applied 

to how we finally establish the criteria, and how we apply the criteria, and then, hopefully, how the criteria might or might not be 

used. 

But also dealing with, you know, the issues of if we have only 

captured a part of the universe, that—you know, which I raised 

early on—that has to be thoughtfully approached, also. Because if 

you are going to establish a rating system that ultimately, through 

a rulemaking, people feel is valid and will be routinely used to determine who gets carriage and who doesn’t, we have got to have 

a way to include everybody in it. And there was—you know, at one 

point you said that they were including clean inspections, but at 

another point you said we have got to make sure that they send 

along the data of clean inspections. Because many times they don’t 

bother. 

And so, I mean, we—there is, I think, a lot yet to be done here. 

So that is—thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you. I guess just to put in a plain, 

down-to-earth kind of way, east Tennessee way, we want the bad 

companies acted on, but we don’t want good companies treated like 

they are bad companies. And most of the trucking and bus companies out there are good companies and doing good things for this 

country. 

Thank you very much. That will conclude this hearing. And I 

would like to ask unanimous consent that the record of today’s 

hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 

writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 

days for any additional comments and information submitted by 

Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today’s hearing. 

[No response.] 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Thank you again to all the members of the panel. That will conclude this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

49 


Insert offset folio 12 here 75852.012

OPENING REMARKS OF U.S. REP. NICK J. RAHALL, II 

Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure 

Before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

September 13, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for conducting this oversight hearing 

on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's motor carrier 

safety program. 

Certainly, advancing safety on our highways is a paramount 

concern of all involved, from those who get behind the wheel to local 

law enforcement to federal regulators. 

In this regard, a decision was made during the George W. Bush 

Administration to move away from the resource intensive and 

ultimately inadequate strategy of relying on Compliance Reviews to 

the development of the Compliance, Safety and Accountability 

system. 

In essence, a technological leap similar to the move away from 

the corded wall phone to the Smartphone. 

Today, however, eight years after CSA started to emerge as a 

new enforcement and compliance model, the question remains: Just 

how smart is CSA? 
50 


Insert offset folio 13 here 75852.013

While the old adage of 'garbage in garbage out' does not 

completely apply here, there are questions about the reliability and 

integrity of the data utilized under CSA's Safety Management System, 

and the effect of the scores it assigns to trucking companies and 

independent truckers with respect to their relationship with freight 

brokers, shippers and insurers. 

I would also note that this entire system has been and continues 

to be developed without formal rulemakings. Collaborative efforts are 

to be applauded, certainly. But there are some issues which more 

properly lend themselves to a rulemaking process so that the public 

has the opportunity to formally comment. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to hearing 

some of the testimony today. 

2 
51 


Insert offset folio 14 here 75852.014

STATEME:\fT OF 

ANNE FERRO 

ADMINISTRATOR 

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

V.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATJON 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND I:\fFRASTRUCTlJRE 

SUBCOMMlTTEE ON HrGHW A YS AND TRANSIT 

SEPTE!\1BER 13,2012 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of the Subcommittee on 

Highways and Transit, thank you tix the opportunity to appear before you today to speak aboLlt 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance. Safety. 

Accountability (CSA) Program. CSA is FMCSA's compliance model to improve commcrcial 

motor vehicle safety and ultimately reduce large truck and bus crashes. injuries. and fatalities on 

our nation's high\v'ays. CSA enables the Agency to idcntify high risk motor carriers and achieve 

improved levels of compliance with Federal eommercialmotor vehicle safety and hazardous 

materials regulations. Additionally. through increased operational efficiencies. CSA is enabling 

FMCSA and its State safety enforcement partners to identilY and address compliance and safety 

deficiencies of a larger scgment of the motor carrier industry than we did previously with less 

interruption to motor carriers' business operations. 

Core Priorities 

FMCSA has a number of initiatives and programs underway aimed at achieving our core 

safety mission. We have set a strategic framework in which to prioritize our responsibilities and 
52 


Insert offset folio 15 here 75852.015

clcarly f()cus our efllms and resources on a vision of eliminating crashcs involving commercial 

vehicles. FMCSA aims to: 

I. Raise the safety bar to enter thc industry: 

2. Require operators to maintain high safety standards to remain in the industry: and 

3. Remove high-risk operators from OUf roads and highways. 

This strategic framcwork applies to companies, drivers, brokers. and scrvice-providers alike. 

While recognizing the important safety work that remains to be accomplished, I would 

like to point to some of the recent improvements in motor carrier sakty: 

• Even with continued growth in all vehicle miles traveled. and an 8 percent increasc in 

miles traveled by commercial motor vehicles from 2000 to 20 I O. fewer fatalities from 

crashes involving large trucks and buses occurred in the past 2 years than in any othcr 

2-year period since filial crash data collection began in 1975. 

• Fatalities from large truck and bus crashcs have declined 26 percent since 2006 

(5,347) to 2010 (3.944). 

• Safety improvements have been realized not only in terms of fatal crashes, but also in 

injury crashes. In 20 I O. 106,000 people were il1jurcd in crashes involving large trucks 

and buses, the second-lowest number of persons injured in these crashes since 1988. 

the first year of injury crash data collection. 

2 
53 


Insert offset folio 16 here 75852.016

• According to Federal Highway Administration data. the number of people injured in 

large trllck and bus crashes declined 16 percent from 2006 to 20 I 0 and declined 36 

percent from 2000 to 2010.1 

The reduction in severe and fatal crashes involving commercial motor vehicles comes 

about through the dedication and hard work of many people represented by the stakeholders in 

this room. We have made great progress, but nearly 4,000 fatalities and more than 100.000 

injuries in large truck and bus crashes each year. we can and must do more. FMCSA's 

employees are passionate about saving lives. With clellr priorities and productive stakeholder 

relationships, I llssure this Committee and the public that we arc on a path to increase the 

cfTeetiveness of our sarety oversight of the motor carrier industry. 

WhvCSA? 

Since 1986. the Compliance Review (CR) has been the primary intcrvention and 

investigative tool used by FMCSA to compcl compliance and determine the safety fitness of 

large trucks and buses. A CR is a comprehensive, on-site assessment ora lTlotor carrier's records 

by one of FMC SA's (or a State's) safety investigators at the carrier's principal place of business. 

If a cnrrier's snfety fitness is determined through a CR to be unsatist:1CtOlY FMeSA may 

prohibit it from operuting. 

The CR is very effective in changing unsafe behavior; however, it can also be very time 

consuming and labor intensive for both the motor carrier and safety investigators. It limits the 

I I'he V,\IT and registmtion data can be found in the Federal Higlmay Administrution (FHWi\)llighllay Statistics 

rcron (Highway Statistics 20 I 0. 5.2.1 V chick-miles of tra\ cl. by functional s) stem. I 980-200X VM-I). The crash 

lbtu comes ti-l)!TI NHTSA 's F<.lta!ity Analysis R.eporting System, Gt:ncral Estimates Sysh:m (rataiity Ani.ll) sis 

Rcp0l1ing System General Estimates System 2010 Data Summary). 

3 
54 


Insert offset folio 17 here 75852.017

Ag~llcy and its State pm1ners' to evaluate the safety performance of less than 3pcrcent of the 

approximately 525,000 active carriers each year, Moreover, our current regulations for issuing 

statutorily-required safety fitness determinations for motor carriers is tied to the CR, meaning the 

Agency cannot incorporate on-road performance Lo issue a safety fitness determination on a 

carrier. no matter how far a motor carrier's on-road performance may have slipped or improved. 

To address these shortcomings. the Agency worked to improve its ability to improve 

safety and compliance, resulting in the CSA program we have today. 

The Three Components ofCSA 

CSA consists ofthrce components: (I) the system. (2) the process and (3) the rule. The 

system is the Safety Mcasurement System (SMS), which lIses all available inspection and crash 

data to assist the Agency in prioritizing motor carriers for review. The process refers to the 

Agency's intervention tools. designed to allow the Agency to reach more carriers with its limited 

resources. Finally, the rule refers to the Safety Fitness Determination rulemaking that would 

allow the Agency to utilize all available roadside inspection data in conjunction with on-site 

investigative data to nlle the safety performance of motor carriers, and to determine whether they 

are fit to continue to operate. The Agency plans to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on the 

Safety Fitness Determination early next year. 

Throughout the process of developing and rolling out CSi\, FMCSA has involved all of 

our stakeholders and actively sought out comments and input from all interested parties. 

For example. last month the Agency established a CSA subcomJl1ittee within the Motor 

Carrier Safety Advisory Committee (MCSAC) to provide concepts, ideas, and recoJl1mendations 

on the program. This MCSi\C subcommittee will be another avenue for the Agency to receive 

4 
55 


Insert offset folio 18 here 75852.018

input regarding (SA from an established forum ofrepresenlatives from across the spectrum of 

safety and other motor carrier stakeholders. 

Additionally, the Agency also announced last month its latest round of improvemcnts to 

CSA, which incorporate public comments received from a preview of proposed changes to the 

Agency's SMS website. These changes to the CSA program f()llow public input and 

demonstrate the Agency's commitment to a program of continuous improvement and 

transparency, and reflect our commitment to regularly invite and consider concerns of our 

stakeholders. 

The Safety Measurement System 

SMS is the tool FMCSA uses to allocate its resources toward the highest risk 1110tor 

carriers to improve safety. The SMS analyzes compliance and safety violations discovered 

during roadside inspections along with data gathered during investigations and repOltable crashes 

to measure a carrier's performance in seven Behavior Analysis Safety Improvement Categories. 

or BASICS. The BASICs are: (1) Unsafe Driving, (2) Fatigued Driving (Hours-of-Servicc), (3) 

Driver Fitness. (4) Controlled Suhstances/Alcohol. (5) Vehicle Maintenance. (6) Cargo-Related. 

and (7) Crash Indicator. Thc BASICs group violations into specific and distinct categories 

related to unsafe or non-compliant behavior. providing the Agency a morc comprehensive. 

rohust and granular view of the specific performance and compliance issues of individual motor 

carriers. SMS has sufficient performance data to make an intervention prioritization assessment 

in at least one BASIC for nearly 200.000 of the approximately 525.000 active interstate or 

intrastate hazardous materials motor carriers for which FMC SA has satety oversight 

5 
56 


Insert offset folio 19 here 75852.019

responsibilities. More importantly. analysis reveals that those same 200.000 motor carriers are 

involved in approximately 93 percent of the crashes reported to FMCSJ\ by our State partners. 

Additional analysis by FMCSA and the University of Michigan Transportation Research 

Institute (UMTRI) shows that SMS is an effective tool to identity the motor carriers at highest 

risk of crashes. In fact. UMTRI found SMS is a significant improvement over the prior SafeStat 

system in identifying carriers with high crash rates and fMCSA effectiveness testing has 

demonstrated that motor carriers designated as high-risk by SMS BASICs have future crash rates 

that are more than double the crash rates orall active carriers. With respect to the individual 

BASICs. both FMCSA and UMTRI analyses show particularly strong associations between high 

scores in the Unsafe Driving and Fatigued Driving (Hours-of-Service) BASICs and future crash 

rates. 

FMCSA has been transparent in explaining that analysis docs not suggest an association 

between some BASICs and future crash rates. What we have seen. however. is a relationship 

between non-compliance in one BASIC and non-compliance and unsafe behaviors in other areas. 

For example. three out of tour motor carriers that are above FMCSA's intervention threshold in 

the Driver Fitness BASIC are also above our intervention threshold in at least one other basic. 

FMCSA uses such correlating informatiDn to optimize its resources by placing more emphasis on 

thDse BASICs where non-compliance has a stronger statistical association with future crashes. 

for example. speeding and driving over allowable hours. At the same time, FMCSA holds motor 

carriers aceountahle fDr BASICs that measure compliance with important safety regulations such 

as ensuring their drivers arc properly licensed and medically qualitied. 

6 
57 


Insert offset folio 20 here 75852.020

FMCSA 's deployment of SMS has signiticantly raised safety awareness throughout the 

motor carrier industry. In calendar year 201 I, the public website that provides a motor carricr's 

status in the SMS prioritization systcm hosted nearly 30 million user sessions, up from 4 million 

user sessions under the prior public SafeStat systcm in calendar year 20 I O. FMCSA continues to 

rcceivc feedback that this increased awareness and transparency has raised the status of safety 

within corporate cultures and wc are seeing this increased awareness in improved safety 

compliance and pcrformance data. For example, violations per roadside inspection were down by 

8 percent in 20 II, and driver violations per inspection were down by 12 percent. This is the most 

dramatic improvement in violation rates in the last 10 years. 

Whilc FMCSA recognizes the clear safety benefits from being transparent and making 

carrier prioritization status in the SMS largely available to the pUblic. FMSCA is also cognizant 

of the need to provide proper context to the data and to be responsivc to stakeholder concerns. To 

that end. FMCSA clearly states on its SMS public website that SMS data only prioritizes motor 

carriers for safety interventions and do not constitute formal safety ratings. The Agency also 

encourages the public to use all available safety data, including not only SMS, but Liccnsing and 

Insurance information. and formal safety ratings. 

We recognize that FMCSA's use of crash data in SMS is a concern for some of 

FMCSA's stakeholders, particularly. the fact that the State-reported crash data utilized by the 

Agency does not distinguish crashes based on whether they are the responsibility. or "limit," of 

the motor carrier. We acknowledge the perception of unfairness ofa system that uses data from 

crashes that are not the fault of the carrier in question. Howcver, FMCSA utilizes crash history 

data because repeated analyses have shown that crashes -- regardless of the carrier's role in the 

crash are a strong predictor of future crashes. The Agency has clearly stated that the crash 

7 
58 


Insert offset folio 21 here 75852.021

data are based on cra,h involvement, without determination of responsibility. In addition, the 

Crash BASIC itself is not shown to the public. 

FMCSA is looking at variolls options to best use crash data to identify carriers that have 

the greatest risk offuture crashes. As part of this effort, FMCSA is pursuing a program called 

"crash weighting." The premise of the program is to identify crashes for which a carrier had 

greater responsibility, and consider weighting them differently than other crashes in the SMS. 

Earlier this year the Agency presented its draft proposal to the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory 

Committee (MCSAC). Based on questions from MCSAC members following the presentation, it 

became clear that our proposal warranted further study to ensure that the Agency develops the 

most effective, cfficient and fair proccss to address the approximately 130,000 crashes that are 

reported each year. 

Two months ago, the Agency released the scope and schedule for a crash weighting 

study. As part of this study, the Agency is reviewing the uniformity and consistency of police 

accident reports; the process for making "Iinal" crash determinations: the process lor accepting 

public input; and the actual effect on SMS's ability to better idcntify carriers that have a high 

crash risk. As part of this effort. the Agency released the results of a report that analyzcd the 

coding accuracy and consistency of Police Accident Reports for consideration as a potential 

source of intormation lor determining a motor CatTier's role in crashes. While this study 

provided useful infonnation, it did not address key questions that will be examined as part of our 

study, including whether or not the carrier's rok in the crash is a better indicator offuture crash 

risk and what other information including public input should be used in a comprehensive crash 

weighting system. FMCSA intends for this study to guide the Agency in determining if crash 

weighing makes SMS a better, sharper tool. and ifso, what demands would be placed on the 

8 
59 


Insert offset folio 22 here 75852.022

Agency to administer such a system. The Agency intends to release the results of this study in 

the summer of2013. Based on the results, FMCSA will develop the Agency's plan forward for 

determining a carrier's role in a crash and the potential use ofthis new inlClrInation in the 

Agency's safety programs - including SMS. 

FMCSA is committed to continuously improving the SMS. Throughout the lite of the 

program, we have carefully considered constructive teed back from the motor carrier industry. 

drivers. enforcement personnel, safety advocates. and other stakeholders in making data-driven 

and analysis-based retinements. In fact. FMCSA recently announced improvements to CSA that 

incorporate public comments received from a preview of proposed changes to the Agency's SMS 

website. The changes me the latest rollnd of improvements to the CSA program and will address 

longstanding concerns and include the creation of a new Hazardous Materials Compliance 

BASIC, to increase the focus on violations that can lead to severe consequences of a cmsh 

involving hazardous materials. Other changes that were included address longstanding concerns 

of the industry, while aiming to improve the effectiveness of SMS to identify carriers with poor 

safety and compliance histories. The Agency also has recently addressed the relative weighting 

of suspended license violations, to focus resources on drivers that arc suspended for safety 

related reasons. In a future effort we are going to continue the process of improvement by 

assessing the impact of adjusting the unsafe driving and crash basic denominator lor higher fleet 

utilization and analyzing the weights applied to certain high-volume violations as well as 

considering the MCSACs recommendation to simplify the violation severity weighting system. 

9 
60 


Insert offset folio 23 here 75852.023

The key to SMS is quality data. In addition to the 130,000 reported crashes annually, the 

SMS utilizes data from 3.5 million roadside inspections conducted by our State partners each 

year. It is worth noting that one-third of these inspections have no violations, which shows it is 

possible for carriers to improve their SMS scores with clean inspections. To manage our Data 

Quality initiatives, the Agency has developed the "DataQs" system to allow individuals and 

carriers to submit challenges to correct erroneous data in the system. The challenges are routed 

to the issuing State f()r review. Currently, of the 3.5 million inspections, less than one percent is 

challenged and the Statcs have been responsive to those requests. 

We continue to work with the States to ensure uniformity and consistency in the handling 

of DataQs requests. For example, the Agcncy has prepared a detailed guidance manual for State 

DataQs analysts, which is also posted on our website. 

We are committed to continually working with our enforcement stakeholders, including 

the States and the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance to improve the quality of data submitted 

to SMS to ensure the SMS is the most effective tool possible. 

Interventions 

The Agency's second major component ofCSA is the intervention process. As stated 

above, prior to CSA, the Compliance Review (CR) was the primary intervention and 

investigative tool FMCSA used to compel compliance and to determine the safety fitness of large 

truck and bus companies. Thc CR is labor intensive and, in turn. limits the number of carriers 

with problem-indicators that FMCSA can investigate. The FMCSA now has more tools in its 

toolbox frolll which to choose in response to a Illotor carrier's compliance and safety 

performance. These include warning letters and focused and comprehensive investigations. 

10 
61 


Insert offset folio 24 here 75852.024

Additionally. the Agency is in the process of preparing to deploy off-site investigations in all 

States. 

The interventions approach is designed to compel compliance and remedy demonstrated 

on-road performancc deficiencies early. before a crash occurs. A motor carrier that has not 

demonstrated past safety and compliance deficiencies. but is beginning to do so, will receive a 

warning letter from FMCSA highlighting the specific BASICs that may require attention. This 

letter serves to notify the carrier of the SMS results and provides them an opportunity to address 

any safety management practices prior to a more significant intervention taking place. UMTRI 

analysis of this intervention tool indicates that 83 percent of carriers that receive a warning letter 

and no further interventions had resolved the identified safety or compliance problem within 

twelve months of receiving the letter. The Agency monitors a carrier's performance following 

the warning letter, and should the carrier's compliance improve, the carrier is no longer 

identified for further intervention. 

The Agency has received various responses from industry regarding these warning 

letters, with some carriers expressing appreciation for the early notification and opportunity to 

make changes in safety management practices prior to a more significant and time consuming 

intervention. 

The SMS BASICs provide specific measurement of a motor carrier's compliance and 

allows the Agency to conduct a "Iocused intervention." 8y focusing on specific problems and 

highlighting the area of concern. the Agency interventions are more strategic and less labor 

intensive than the CR and more efficient for the carrier. This focused intervention model 

ultimately improves compliance behavior, and reaches more carriers while being less intrusive 

11 
62 


Insert offset folio 25 here 75852.025

and time consuming for all parties. Smaller motor carriers and owner operators subject to 

focused investigations or offsite investigations will spend less time in the office working with the 

safety investigator. and more time on the road in operations. Analysis of the 30-month CSA 

Operational Model Test, demonstrated an overall 35 percent increase in the number of carriers 

reached per safety investigator, in comparison to the prior SafeStat / CR model and these focused 

interventions take less time and cost approximately 53 percent less than CRs. 

CSA has changed the investigative process as well. Federal and State safety 

investigators are trained not just to identify violations, but also to identify the root cause of the 

safety deficiency and review these root causes with carrier officials. This approach is known as 

the Safety Management Cycle. As an example. with hours-of-service violations the root cause 

could be training and communication, or a lack of internal oversight policies. practices and 

procedures on the part of the motor carrier. We believe that by working with those motor carriers 

that demonstrate a willingness to correct their safety deficiencies, identifying the root cause not 

only facilitates quicker corrective action, but corrective action that will be more sustainable over 

time. Later this year the Agency will begin performing o!Tsite investigations nationwide. In an 

offsite investigation. the carrier submits documentation to a division office for review. without 

the need for a safety investigator to visit the motor carrier's place of business. 

Analysis of the CSA Operational Model test indicated that the CSA focused 

investigation, incorporating the Safety Management Cycle, can be more effective than the 

traditional compliance review. The Agency will continue to conduct comprehensive onsite 

investigations on those motor carriers that dcmonstrate safety deficiencies across multiple 

BASICs. as well as on passenger carriers and certain hazardous materials carriers, because of 

their inherent risk. In addition. the Agency will continue to fully meet its Congressional mandate 

12 
63 


Insert offset folio 26 here 75852.026

with respect to high risk motor carriers by requiring that this population receive onsite 

investigations of their safety practices. As discussed below. until an Agency rulemaking is 

completed. the on-site investigation will remain the Agency's method for issuing safety fitness 

determinations under current rules. 

In summary, by leveraging SMS and more focused interventions. the CSA program 

improves safety pertormance. provides less resourcc- and time-consuming interventions for both 

the Agency and motor carriers. and allows the Agency to reach more carriers. These 

interventions are more effective and designed to identify compliance problems early. before 

crashes occur. 

Safety Fitness Determinations Rulemaking 

The third component of the CSA model is a revision to the Safety Fitness Determination 

(SFD) methodology specified under current regulation. This proposed new methodology will be 

published for notice and public comment in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking early next year. 

The proposed new SFD would be designed to replace the current labor-intensive process in 

which the Agency may propose and issue a safety rating only fl)liowing an onsite CR 

investigation. With current resources. the Agency is limited to issuing safety fitness ratings 

through the approximately 18.000 onsite reviews conducted each year. on a population of 

525,000 active carriers. The new SFD process would propose use of all available data in the 

system to make this determination. The SFD rulcmaking also would address a long-standing 

National Transportation Safety Board recommendation, 1-1-99-006, to "Change the safety fitness 

rating methodology so that adverse vehicle and driver performance-based data alone are 

sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier." 

13 
64 


Insert offset folio 27 here 75852.027

Conclusion 

I would like to thank you lor the opportunity to provide these comments. I feel strongly 

that over the last few years. FMCSA has made significant progress in implementing CSA and 

improving the efficiency and effectiveness of our program. The net result is improved safety in 

commercial motor carrier operutions. We are continuing to build on these successes as we 

finalize the program. through data-driven decision making and processes as transparent and 

inclusive as possible. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. 

14 
65 


Insert offset folio 275 here 75852.275

House Committee on Transportation ,md Infrastructure 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

"E,,'aluating The Ef'fcctivencss of OOT's Truck And Bus Safety Programs" 

Septemher 13, 2012 

Questions from Chairman .John .J. Duncan, .Jr. 

1. FMCSA claims that CSA has sutIicient (hIla to score 40% of active carriers (200,000 of 

the roughly 500,000 active carriers) in at least one category. What percentage of 

carriers is FMCSA able to score in all or even most categories? 

Response: FMCSA has sufficient data to assess over 17,000 motor carriers, or 3 percent of 

all active motor carriers in all Safety Management System (SMS) categories. As is correctly 

stated, FMCSA's analysis shows there arc approximately 200,000 motor carriers with 

sufficient data to be assessed in at least one Safely Measurement System (SMS) Behavior 

Analysis Safety Improvement Category (IlASIC), Most importantly, these carriers arc 

involved in over 90 percent of the crashes that arc reported to FMCSA by our State partners, 

which clearly demonstrates that the Agency is fi:)cLlsing on the correct motor carriers. 

Furthermore, the approximately 50,000 motor carriers above FMCSA's intervention 

threshold in at least one IlASIC make up less than 10 percent of all active motor carriers, but 

are responsible for 45 percent of the crashes reported to FMCSA by our State partners, 

FMCSA's principal mission is to reduce crashes. injuries and fatalities involving large trucks 

and buses. The SMS elTectively identities motor calTiers with demonstrated perflmnance 

and compliance problems for intervention, thereby furthering FMCSA's mission to improve 

safety. SMS also allows FMCSA to maximize its limited resources, The table below 

summarizes different categories of motor carriers based on their standing in the SMS, Active 

motor calTiers with insutlicicnt data to be assessed by SMS arc rcsponsible for less than 10 

pcrcent of reported crashes. 

ApproxiInate p:e~.~~n~egt: ~f 

Nnmber U·IOIid~d>Cllrrihs ~----------------------_+7?~~----~~~~~~~~ 

Carriers with recent activity "pulse" 525K 100% 

in last!Jlr.c,c=c'-cy,-e::c'::::lr::::s-c-c~ ______ + ____ , _______ --+ -----------1 

Carricrs with insufficient data 

Carii;;;:;;-~h:sut1icie;;-t data to bc 

assessed in at least onc BASIC --------- -------t-:=---------t--=-::-,------- ----------1 

Carriers with suHicient negative 

infonnation to have a percentilc 

assigne~ ___________ _ 

Carriers with at least onc BASIC 

above FMCSA intervention threshold 

SOK ----+------------ 45% 

__L _________ ~ __ 
66 


Insert offset folio 276 here 75852.276

2. In your testimony you pointed to a 2005 American Transportation Research Institute 

(A TRI) study which found that drivers involved in a crash were 87'% more likely to be 

involved in a future crash. Naturally, the risk of crash invoh'ement is often a function 

of exposure (i.e. carriers operating in urban environments are at greater risk of crash 

involvement, past and future). Does FMCSA have any data to show the likelihood that a 

carrier involved in a crash will cause a future crash'! 

Response: As indicated in our testimony, ATR!, FMCSA, and the University of Michigan 

Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) studied past crash involvement as a predictor of 

future crash involvement. The studies show that crashes. regardless of the carrier's role in 

the crash, are a strong predictor of future crashes. The FMC SA, therefore, uses this 

information to prioritize motor carriers for intervention. 

Regarding the impacts of a driver's role in a crash as a predictor of future crashes. in July 

2012, the Agency released the scope and schedule fi,)r a crash weighting study. As part of 

this study, FMCSA is determining if a carrier's role in the crash is a better predictor of fllture 

crash risk. The Agency intends to release the results of this study in the summer of2013. 

3. FMCSA claims to have sufficient data to sCOl'e carriers involved in 93% of the crashes 

reported to FMCSA. However, according to FMCSA's website, IS states report fewer 

than 75% of the non-fat:l\ crashes th:lt occur in their states to FMCSA's database. If all 

non-fatal crashes were reported, how would this 93%. figure change'! 

Response: The FMCSA has no reason to believe that the crashes that are not reported would 

be distributed among the motor carrier industry differently than the crash reports we do 

receive. Theretore, we do not believe that this lack of crash reporting would change the 93 

percent figure in any significant way. 

The statistics cited arc Irom a series of reports produced by the UMTRI. This work took 

place from 2003 through 2010 and evaluated the percent of reporting of large truck and bus 

crashes to the Motor Carrier Management lnl()rmation System (MCMIS) crash tile. This 

analysis was conducted and presented to the States to be used to identify needed data 

reporting improvements. These analytical reports became the basis for the new Non-Fatal 

Crash Completeness (NFCC) measure. 
67 


Insert offset folio 277 here 75852.277

Utilizing the NFCC, only 3 States and the District of Columbia are considered poor reporting 

States according to the NFCC measure. Detailed information on States reporting is available 

at the following link: http://ai.fmcsa.dot.govlDataQuality/improvc/overaILaspx?ns=N&i=9 

Questions from Rep. Sam Graves 

1. On November 14,2011, FMCSA llcknowledged deficiencies in the Hazardous Materials 

Safety Permit (HMSP) program and accepted a petition for rulemaking to correct these 

dcficiencies. However, in accepting the petition, FMCSA stated that it could not begin 

this rulemaking until the agency finalized the safety fitness determination rule undcr 

the CSA program. Some permit holders have proposed providing interim relief by 

establishing an alternative way to demonstrate their safety fitness other than waiting to 

"age out" of disqualifying out-of-service (OOS) vioilltiolls that are 1I0t linked to crash 

causation. This alternative approach would allow HMSP holders to request a full 

review of their safety management controls and an opportunity, if appropriate, to file a 

corrective aetion plan prior to denying them an HMSP. What would it take to get 

FMC SA, either through administrative discretion or interim final rule, to promptly act 

to institute snch a procedure'! 

Response: The FMCSA acknowledges concerns regarding the current regulatory process 

that does not allow a carrier to file a corrcctive action plan as a remedy for regulatory 

violations or crashes that result in a denial, suspension, or revocation of a HMSP based on its 

crash or out-ot:service rates. Section 33014 ofMAP-21 requires, however, that the Agency 

conduct a study of the HMSP program prior to instituting any changes. FMCSA intends to 

conduct the required study and identify necessary program refonns, including changes to the 

HMSP process. 

Questions from Rep. Bill Shuster 

1. There have been incidents with drivers who were inside their own homes and had their 

tractors parked on their own private property when a drunk driver hit the truck. That 

aecident counts against the company's CSA score. How is including this aceident, where 

the driver wasn't even in the truck, in the company's CSA score an accurate reflection 

of carrier safety? How is this productive to the goals of improving carrier safety? Does 

FMCSA plan to address this issue? If so, how? If not, why not? 

Responsc: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) define an accident as 

an occurrence involving a commercial motor vehicle operating on a highway in interstate or 

intrastate commerce which results in: (I) a fatality; (2) bodily injury to a person who, as a 

result of the injury, immediately receives medical treatment away from the scene of the 

accident; or (3) one or more motor vehicles incurring disabling damage as a result of the 
68 


Insert offset folio 278 here 75852.278

accident, requiring the motor vehicle(s) to be transported away from the scene by a tow truck 

or other motor vehicle, 

An accident in which a commercial motor vehicle that is legally parked on private property 

and not engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce does not meet the definition of an 

accident and should not be included in a motor carrier's SMS Crash BASIC. 

2. The CSA website has a disclaimer advising customers that the BASIC scores are not 

meant to be used by customers to draw conclusions about carrier safety. From the 

disclaimcr- "Readers should not draw conclusions about a carrier's overall safety 

condition simply based on the data displayed in this system." Regardless ofthe 

disclaimer, customers are drawing conclusions anyway. Morgan Stanley estimates 55% 

of shippers will not usc carriers with what they believe to be "elevated" CSA scores. 

According to carriers in my district, shippers are ignoring the disclaimer and adding 

CSA and BASIC provision in their contracts, which can result in CSAIBASIC being 

used in litigation. If the carrier doesn't sign the contract with the CSA language, it 

looks bad to the customer and they may refuse to do business with the carrier. How is 

FMCSA planning on addressing this issue? 

Response: The FMCSA has taken great care to inform the public how FMC SA uses CSA 

Safety Measurement System (SMS) data. In addition to informing SMS users that they should 

not draw conclusions simply based on the data displayed, the disclaimer int()rms users that SMS 

data are used to prioritize motor carriers for intervention. Importantly. the disclaimer clearly 

states that the data are not safety ratings and further explains that "unless a motor carrier has 

received an UNSATISFACTOR Y safety rating or has otherwise been ordered to discontinut; 

operations by the FMSCA, it is authorized to operate on the nation's roadways." The FMCSA 

will continue to provide this clear guidance to public users of SMS data through ongoing 

outreach efforts and online. 
69 


Insert offset folio 28 here 75852.028

Statement of Steve Owings, Father of Cullum Owings, 

Killed in a Truck Crash Involving an Inattentive and Speeding Trucker 

And 

President and Co-Founder, Road Safe America (RSA) 

Before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

United States House of Representatives 

September 13, 2012 

Good morning Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and Members of the 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, ofthe Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure. I am Steve Owings, President and CO-Founder, with my wife Susan, of Road Safe 

America (RSA) which we formed after our son Cullum was killed in a crash caused by a speeding 

tractor trailer in 2002. I also serve as a member of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration's (FMCSA) Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee (MCSAC) along with 

representatives from the motor carrier industry, safety organizations, and the law enforcement 

sector. I am speaking today on behalf of Road Safe America, the Truck Safety Coalition (TSC), 

Parents Against Tired Truckers (P.A.T.T.l, and Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH). 

These safety organizations are committed to improving truck safety and making America's 

roads safer. Together with surviving families and friends, we all work on behalf of the tens of 

thousands of people who become victims of preventable truck crashes each year. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before you today on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) Program. 

Introduction and Support for CSA Program 

The CSA Program was created to address the need to utilize all data more quickly to focus the 

FMCSA's limited resources on intervention with high risk carriers in order to prevent truck 

crashes and the resulting deaths and injuries. It is a significant improvement over the previous 

SafeStat Program which it replaced in December 2010. As changes continue to be considered 

and made to hone the CSA Program, it is essential that the Program retains the ability to 

efficiently analyze data for timely intervention, that it is cost effective given FMCSA's limited 

resources, and that it remains fair to truck crash victims and their surviving family and friends. 

Our volunteers have first-hand experience with the devastating consequences of truck crashes 
70 


Insert offset folio 29 here 75852.029

and appreciate the truck safety improvements resulting from the CSA Program. We support the 

CSA Program and FMCSA's ongoing efforts toward fulfilling its Congressional mandate to save 

lives and prevent injuries by improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles. 

In a recent MCSAC meeting, CSA benefits were discussed and committee members noted that 

the system "is dispensing more data and giving the agency the ability to reach more carriers 

without a dramatic increase in resources" and inspiring "the start of a cultural change in the 

industry by forcing carriers to focus on the details of safety management" 

( http://www.truckinginfo.com/news/news-detail.asp ?newsjd= 77855). In dependent analysis 

indicates MCSAC's assessment is accurate and that the CSA Program is a significant 

improvement over the prior system. Several key points from FMCSA's own evaluation include: 

CSA is effectively monitoring the industry with an interventions model that 

demonstrates an overall 35 percent increase in the number of carriers reached per 

Safety Investigator; 

From the CSA rollout in December 2010 until the end of 2011, violations per roadside 

inspection declined by eight percent and driver violations per inspection declined by 12 

percent; 

Compliance improved while being less intrusive and time-consuming for all motor 

carriers (both large and small); and, 

An overwhelming majority (93 percent) of small carriers do not score poorly in any area 

of the CSA Safety Measurement System (SMS), supporting the CSA Program's lack of 

bias against small carriers (FMCSA Testimony, House Small Business Committee, July 11, 

2012). 

These results show the most significant improvement in violation rates in the last 10 years. 

The advances achieved with the CSA program are necessary and long overdue and should not 

be modified in ways that will hinder their effectiveness. My testimony will comment on changes 

being considered to crash data maintained within the CSA Crash BASIC, thresholds for 

intervention and the intervention process, greater transparency, and the necessity of 

preserving public access to information. 

Cullum and Pierce Owings' Truck Crash 

My family's involvement in truck safety advocacy began on December 1, 2002. Susan and I went 

to church and then to the Waffle House for breakfast with our sons Cullum and Pierce who 

were home from college for Thanksgiving. At breakfast, we talked with the boys about things 

they could do to be safe, knowing they would be leaving to return to school on the busiest 

travel day of the year. After breakfast, we went home and the boys loaded up their car and 
71 


Insert offset folio 30 here 75852.030

started their drive from our home in Atlanta to their school in Virginia. They were within three 

miles of arriving there when they were stopped in traffic and were hit from behind by a 

speeding truck with the cruise control set at eight miles per hour over the posted speed limit. 

That evening, when Susan and I were waiting to get a call that the boys were safely back at 

school, we instead got the call from Pierce telling us that his big brother and hero had been 

killed. 

Right after the crash, Pierce was too upset to speak with the state trooper in charge of the 

crash scene. Consequently, the trooper only spoke to the truck driver. He told the trooper that 

Cullum and Pierce's car had been in the right lane and, at the very last moment, pulled in front 

of the truck, causing the truck to hit their car. The truck driver reported that both vehicles then 

continued into the median of the highway, ending up between the road and the embankment 

in the median. Although there were many witnesses, the trooper did not interview any of them 

or record any of their names. Therefore, the resulting police accident report (PAR) reflected 

only the truck driver's false statements about how the crash happened. 

Since Pierce miraculously survived the crash, the truth was quickly discovered. The boys' car 

had always been in the left lane and was stopped there. When Cullum looked in his rearview 

mirror and realized that a truck was bearing down on them fast, he had to make a split-second 

decision to flee or to stay where he was and take his chances. Cullum had done exactly what we 

had trained him to do; he had stopped with enough maneuvering room in front of him and 

looked in his rear-view mirror and then he chose to flee. He drove onto the median which is 

where the crash occurred, not in the left lane as the truck driver had stated. At the last second, 

the truck driver realized that he was not going to be able to stop and he drove the truck into 

the median, hitting one car, my son's car, instead of many. 

Based on the truck driver's statement, the trooper in charge at the scene believed that if it had 

not been for Cullum's decision to pull into the left lane in front of the truck, there would have 

been no injuries that night, let alone a death. The trooper did recognize that the truck driver 

was driving too fast for the conditions and charged him with reckless driving. The state trooper, 

I'm sure was doing his best and, after hearing the truck driver's story, probably didn't see the 

need to interview other witnesses. My younger son Pierce, was too distraught to give a 

statement at the scene, and the trooper had other responsibilities to take care of at the crash 

scene, Yet, the bottom line is that the trooper took the truck driver's word about what 

happened, and this is the only version of the crash reflected in the PAR. However, in advance 

of the truck driver's trial, Susan and I had to hire a private investigator to find other eye 

witnesses, all of whom came forward and corroborated Pierce's version of the crash, As a 

result of this eyewitness testimony, the truck driver was convicted of reckless driving, but 

served only 30 days in jail for killing our son, 

3 
72 


Insert offset folio 31 here 75852.031

If we we re limited only to the version of the crash recorded in the PAR, and Pierce had not 

survived, or if Susan and I lacked the means to pay for an additional investigation, the truth 

would not have been discovered or proven. We would have lived the rest of our lives not only 

with the loss of our son, but also with the devastating belief that he had caused his own demise 

by not being attentive on the road, Our family is haunted to think about how many parents, 

spouses, and loved ones of victims of truck crashes erroneously think just that and lack the 

knowledge or the financial resources to take the steps to find the truth. 

Changes Being Considered to CSA Crash BASIC 

The FMCSA is considering changing the way the CSA Crash BASIC handles crash data. Currently, 

all crashes, regardless of fault, are counted in the crash data. The FMCSA uses this data because 

past crash history is an accurate predictor of future crash involvement. The change being 

considered would classify crashes as "preventable," "non-preventable," and "undetermined," 

based solely on the PAR. Crashes deemed "non-preventable" would then be removed from the 

carrier's Crash BASIC score, These changes are not only unnecessary, but have the potential to 

compromise the data integrity short term when it is used for intervention and compliance, as 

well as when it is used in longer term studies. The Crash BASIC is working as intended to 

successfully identify high risk carriers for intervention, and the data should not be manipulated. 

It is well established within the truck research community that crashes, in and of themselves 

and regardless of fault are effective predictors of future crashes, A 2005 American 

Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) study determined that a past truck crash increased the 

likelihood of a future crash by 87 percent (http://www,atri-online.org/research/results/OnePager%20CMVE.pdf). Past crashes are indicative of future crash risk irrespective of a finding of 

"fault" or "preventability" in a particular crash and support FMCSA's process of including all 

crash data. 

It is a tremendous mischaracterization to say that this process is unfair and that some trucking 

companies are being blamed for crashes that they did not cause. Fault is not, and never has 

been, a part of this process, FMCSA's materials and public display of crash data clearly state 

that the crash data is based on crash involvement without determination of responsibility 

(FMCSA Testimony, House Small Business Committee, July 11, 2012). The crash data is used 

solely as an analytical tool to identify motor carriers that can benefit prospectively from 

intervention by the agency, Additionally, with all companies being held to the same standard of 

inclusion, the playing field is level and fair. 

Another critical issue with classifying crashes is that the determination would be based solely 

on information contained in the PAR. My own family's crash is but one of many examples of 

how PARs may lack complete and accurate information and cannot be used to determine truck 

4 
73 


Insert offset folio 32 here 75852.032

crash preventability. Indeed, PARs do not even include information on crash preventability. 

Moreover, missing and incomplete information on PARs is an unavoidable consequence oft ruck 

crashes in which 97 percent of the injuries and deaths are suffered by car passengers who 

cannot speak for themselves at the scene of the crash. A recent study conducted by the Illinois 

Department ofTransportation found that more than 70 percent of crash reports filled out by 

Chicago Police Department officers were missing data and 30 percent had errors 

(http://articles.chicagotribu ne .com/2012-04-23/ classified/ ct -met -getti ng-arou nd-0423-

20120423_1_crash-reports-red-light-cameras-data). Our police officers do a tremendous job at 

the scene of crashes, but they are necessarily limited in their ability to investigate beyond basic 

information. Their extensive duties at a crash scene include: securing the scene; managing 

traffic to prevent further collisions; checking for injuries; providing basic care to the injured if 

necessary; and, identifying immediate hazards such as fires and summoning assistance as 

necessary (http:Uwww.theiacp.org!LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6lEWlkF%2BafU%3D&tabid=87). 

The information in a PAR is inadequate to answer questions of why or how a crash occurred 

above what is reported by the conscious and able survivors, and cannot provide a reliable basis 

for such a determination. 

Should FMCSA pursue changes to classify crash data, in spite of issues with maintaining data 

integrity and PAR inadequacy, cost and inefficiency would quickly overwhelm the process. In 

order to proceed in a fair and comprehensive manner, FMCSA would need to undertake a 

massive investment in qualified personnel to first develop a system to determine preventability 

and then to staff and monitor a separate department to provide determinations of fault or 

preventability in a manner that would provide the public and the industry with sufficient 

confidence in accuracy and integrity of the system. A fair and thorough system would require 

that all pertinent crash information, including any subsequent crash investigation or accident 

reconstruction report, be included in the review, that only qualified and experienced crash 

reconstruction personnel evaluate the relevant information, and that parties involved in the 

crash be allowed to participate in the review and submit evidence and eyewitness and expert 

testimony. The failure to establish a fair and transparent procedure will doom the enterprise. 

Moreover, the FMCSA simply does not have the resources to properly develop and maintain a 

system which would require investigation, documentation, evaluation and the expertise 

necessary to prove fault and determine preventability in truck crashes. After all, that is the 

function of the criminal and civil courts and, again, fault assignment is not pertinent to 

predicting future crashes (the intent ofthe Crash BASIC) via CSA. 

The FMCSA's resources are better spent expanding the CSA Program in ways to reach more 

carriers who could benefit from intervention and current SMS data shows that there is room 

for improvement. The CSA Program is intervening with approximately 50,000 carriers who are 

involved in 45 percent of known crashes while it has data on 200,000 carriers who are involved 

5 
74 


Insert offset folio 33 here 75852.033

in 92 percent of known crashes (FMCSA presentation to MCSAC, August 2012). Expanding a 

working system to reach a greater percentage of carriers who are involved in crashes but have 

not crossed a threshold for intervention is a much better use of limited agency resources than 

creating an expensive, time consuming bureaucratic process with little possibility of producing a 

reliable result or an identifiable improvement. 

CSA BASIC Thresholds for Intervention 

The setting of thresholds for intervention, within the CSA BASIC categories, is an area that 

warrants examination to improve efficiency and increase effectiveness. For example, carriers 

are currently rated using a comparison or "benchmark" approach in each BASIC category. This 

type of approach allows acceptance of poor or mediocre safety performance, since a carrier is 

only measured against other carriers. If a large portion of carriers are performing poorly in a 

particular BASIC category, this allows a poorly performing carrier below the threshold to avoid 

intervention. The carrier is not performing well, and may not necessarily be safe, but it is just 

performing better than other poorly performing carriers. In other words, they are being graded 

on a curve. Since the tragic airline crash in Buffalo, NY on February 12, 2009, which caused the 

deaths of 50 people, more than 12,000 people's lives have been lost in large truck crashes. 

Rather than accepting an average and sometimes poor performance from carriers, our goal 

must be to aggressively reduce this devastating, high level of truck crash related fatalities and 

injuries. 

This system could and should be improved by determining a safety rating reflective of safe 

practices and good performance and requiring carriers to achieve that rating in order to avoid 

intervention. It is likely that more carriers would then be targeted for intervention more 

quickly. Even when carriers have exceeded the threshold level for a BASIC, they will most likely 

only get a letter in the mail, with the assurance that no further action will be taken for 12 

months unless they do something drastic that forces the agency to take real action. These 

carriers, that are performing badly enough to exceed the threshold, can then continue to 

operate for a year without making improvements before the agency will consider any additional 

action. The combined effect is that the agency is tolerating a situation in which tens of 

thousands of motor carriers are allowed to continue to operate at a persistently poor and 

substandard level of safety. Improvements within these areas are necessary as well as 

increasing transparency as to how the agency determines the threshold levels in each BASIC, 

and how and when the agency determines what type of intervention or enforcement action 

should be undertaken within those threshold levels. 

6 
75 


Insert offset folio 34 here 75852.034

Public Access to Information 

Public access to CSA Program information, data, and improvements is essential to maintaining a 

fair and transparent process. The information and data FMCSA collects for its CSA Program 

comes through public agencies, regarding crashes that occur on public roads, paid for by taxpayer dollars and ultimately affecting public health and safety. FMCSA Administrator Anne 

Ferro has said, "CSA is raising the bar for truck and bus safety." This bar is being raised because 

bad actors within the industry are being held accountable in the public venue for their safety 

practices and rightly judged as unsafe when failing to meet standards. Perhaps the greatest 

influence is that the trucking industry and its safety record have a higher visibility. Doing 

business safely must be reinforced, especially considering that the trucking industry is adding 

approximately 75,000 new carriers each year (FMCSA Data). Public access to safety information 

is essential to attaining and perpetuating safe roadways. 

Conclusion 

FMCSA's CSA Program is a positive step in the right direction. It has already yielded significant 

improvements to truck safety and should not be changed in ways to diminish or dilute its 

effectiveness. We urge preservation of CSA's practice of including all crashes in its Crash BASIC 

because it is an efficient, highly effective predictor of future truck crashes. In addition, 

transparency, regarding the methodology and logic behind the threshold settings being 

employed is essential, as well as ensuring public access to safety rating information. 

Unlike the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) whose budget to promote safety within its 

industry is very large compared with the number of deaths and injuries that occur each year in 

plane crashes, the FMCSA's budget is extremely small and must be used with great purpose and 

efficiency to prevent as many of the tens of thousands of deaths and injuries caused by truck 

crashes every year as possible. The FMCSA should have resources commensurate with the size 

and scope of the industry it attempts to monitor and make safe. Unfortunately, while the 

FMCSA is responsible for an industry significantly larger than the aviation industry, it has only a 

fraction of the FAA's resources. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. Our organizations look forward to 

working with the Subcommittee and the full Committee Members to continue to make 

improvements to truck safety. We urge you to support the CSA advances that are changing the 

culture within some of the trucking industry to engender a competitive safety environment that 

benefits all drivers on our roadways. 

7 
76 


Insert offset folio 35 here 75852.035

Commercial Vehicle 

Safety Alliance 

promoting commercial motor vehicle safety and securIty 

STATEMENT OF 

ASSISTANT CHIEF DAVID L. PALMER 

PRESIDENT 

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE 

BEFORE THE 

HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT SUBCOMMITTEE 

OFTHE 

HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE 

ON 

"EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM" 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

63 C 3 f "'y L.' ij~ 31 G;~ei:helt, MD 20770-(.: 1 ''; 

Fh::.·~? 301 ?3Cl·t~4: Fox ?(Jl 30·61tl4 www (VSO org 
77 


Insert offset folio 36 here 75852.036

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for holding this important hearing and for 

inviting the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) to testify today. 

I am Assistant Chief David Palmer, with the Texas Department of Public Safety and I am testifying here 

today in my role as the President of CVSA. CVSA is an international organization representing state, 

provincial, and federal officials responsible for the administration and enforcement of commercial 

motor carrier safety laws in the United States, Canada and Mexico. We work to improve commercial 

vehicle safety and security on the highways by bringing federal, state, provincial and local truck and 

bus regulatory, safety and enforcement agencies together with industry representatives to solve 

problems and save lives. Every state in the United States, all Canadian provinces and territories, the 

country of Mexico, and all u.S. territories and possessions are CVSA members. 

This testimony will focus on the performance of the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program 

to date and areas of the program that could be enhanced, including: 

l. Data Collection & Uniformity 

2. Data Measurement 

3. Safety Evaluation 

4. Intervention Process 

5. Outreach 

6. Purpose and Use of CSA 

Before addressing possible improvements to the program, it's important to note that, from the 

enforcement community's point of view, CSA l.? working. When the program was rolled out in 2010, 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) hoped that the new model would allow for 

contact with more carriers and drivers, through an improved system to evaluate data, more effectively 

target carriers that pose a higher safety risk with respect to non-compliance and crashes, and provide 

enforcement with a better range of intervention tools to address problematic behavior in a more 

proactive manner, all while making more efficient use of agency resources. It is our opinion that the 

program is performing reasonably well on all accounts. 

I'd also like to commend FMCSA for the openness and transparency with which they have approached 

the deployment and refinement of the CSA program. Officials at FMCSA have made it clear that they 

are willing and eager to listen to concerns expressed by all interested parties. During the development 

and testing phase of CSA, FMCSA worked closely with its state partners to build and test the program. 

More recently, we were especially pleased to see the Administrator announce the formation of a CSA 

subcommittee as part of the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee. We believe the subcommittee 

will provide another vehicle for useful, thoughtful discussion regarding possible improvements and 

adjustments to the CSA program. 

CVSA Written Testtmony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 
78 


Insert offset folio 37 here 75852.037

According to the 2011 "Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test," conducted by the 

University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI), the new Safety Measurement 

System (SMS) is a "significant improvement" over the previous system, SafeStat. A recent survey of the 

enforcement community, conducted by the American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) and 

CVSA, indicates that 70 percent of officers surveyed believe that the Inspection Selection System (iSS), 

which is used to guide enforcement in making decisions on which vehicles to inspect, is becoming 

"increasingly effective" in targeting carriers as a result of the new approach. This means state agencies 

are making better use of their limited commercial motor vehicle (CMV) enforcement resources. 

Further, the CSA program allows FMCSA to 'touch' a greater percentage of carriers; and those 

interactions are of a higher quality. The new intervention model provides enforcement with a wider 

range of tools and greater flexibility to specifically address a carrier's problem areas - a vast 

improvement over the previous 'one-size-fits-all' intervention approach. In fact, according to the ATRI 

survey results, 100 percent of inspectors surveyed believe that the program is performing as well as or 

better than they expected. 

As Congress works with FMCSA to continue to improve the CSA program, we offer some thoughts for 

consideration. This testimony has been structured to mirror the current CSA model - Data Collection, 

Data Management, Safety Evaluation, and Intervention. Our suggestions are therefore not presented in 

any particular order of priority. 

1. Data Collection & Uniformity 

Accurate, timely, and complete data are the foundation of the CSA program. Compliance and safety 

performance data are collected, applied to the seven performance categories, known as Behavior 

Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs), then analyzed and used principally to determine 

where the motor carrier enforcement community should focus its limited resources to best improve 

commercial vehicle safety. Therefore compliance and safety performance data is critically important, 

because it serves as the foundation of the entire program. Unless and until FMCSA addresses the issues 

outlined in this section, the efficacy of improvements and changes to other parts of the system, in our 

view, will not be fully realized. Most importantly, the data being entered and maintained in the system 

must be accurate for CSA's SMS to produce accurate scores and to be fully effective. 

DataQs 

One area of improvement for enforcement and industry alike is the DataQs system - the process by 

which a motor carrier can challenge a violation they believe is inaccurate, requires further clarifying 

information, or is mistakenly assigned to them. Carriers submit a Request for Data Review (RDR) 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 
79 


Insert offset folio 38 here 75852.038

through the DataQs system to FMCSA, who then assigns it to the appropriate state or local agency for 

review. The challenge and any supporting documents are then reviewed and a determination is made 

regarding the disposition of the challenge or the violation(s). Inaccurate or inappropriate data or 

violations are then removed from the carrier's record. 

When this process works effectively, everyone benefits. Carriers are not penalized for inaccurate 

violations or inappropriate data. Inspectors can be confident that the information they are using is 

leading them to the highest-risk carriers on the roads, helping them meet their goals of increasing 

safety and preventing motor vehicle crashes. 

While some in industry may argue that the CSA model lacks due process, statistics from the DataQs 

process shows this is not the case. According to FMCSA, in 2011, there were approximately 3.6 million 

inspections conducted. From those inspections, FMCSA received approximately 34,000 RDRs. This 

translated to RDRs representing less than 1 percent of the inspection records in 2011- over 99 percent 

of violations were not challenged by motor carriers. Of the RDRs filed, changes were made to 

approximately 63 percent of them. This demonstrates that carriers challenge inspection data less than 

1 percent of the time and, when RDRs are filed, the requests are being reviewed and corrective action 

is taken when appropriate. The system is working. However, we believe there is some room for 

improvement. 

In order to improve the process, we feel Congress and FMCSA should consider providing more 

resources and training to the states, which will assist in providing for a more uniform and equitable 

system. FMCSA has provided the states with a guidance document on managing the DataQs process. 

However, each state is able to establish their own approach. Some states have put in place 

comprehensive, tiered review processes that ensure that RDRs are being reviewed as objectively and 

fairly as possible, while other states have less developed systems. In order to further encourage 

uniformity and effective best practices, FMCSA should provide the states with more feedback and 

evaluation on how the system is working from a national perspective, as well as additional training 

based upon this evaluation. 

In addition, FMCSA should better inform industry of how to submit proper RDRs. Often, legitimate 

RDRs are filed without the necessary supporting documentation. Without the appropriate supporting 

documentation, the inspecting agency cannot conduct a comprehensive evaluation. 

Finally, FMCSA should provide more instruction to the motor carrier industry in terms of what 

constitutes a legitimate basis for an RDR. Our members have seen examples of motor carriers 

challenging every violation received, even if they have not provided any basis or explanation for the 

challenge, hoping perhaps, that those reviewing them will be so overwhelmed by the volume that 

they'll overturn violations that should not necessarily be removed. This floods the state agency with 

illegitimate challenges, consuming limited state agency time and resources and hindering the process 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOl's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 4 
80 


Insert offset folio 39 here 75852.039

for the legitimate challenges in the system. This obstruction can taint the user's view of the system and 

lead to frustration. To prevent this, FMCSA should provide carriers and drivers with comprehensive, 

ongoing education about the DataQs process, focusing on when a challenge is appropriate and what 

information should be included. For our part, CVSA has been working with our members to share best 

practices in DataQs and RDR adjudication processes. 

Data Transfer 

Another opportunity for improving the flow of data into the system lies with the transfer of roadside 

inspection data from the states to FMCSA's Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS). 

MCMIS is the centralized repository for inspection and other data from the states. MCMIS pulls data on 

an ongoing basis from the state field enforcement systems, which are used to gather inspection data. 

For example, an inspector will enter inspection information, including all violations, into whatever field 

enforcement system is used in that state. Aspen is an example of a field enforcement system used by 

many states, but there are others. Once the information is entered into the state field enforcement 

system, that data will be transferred to the MCMIS system, where it is fed into the SMS and used to 

calculate CSA BASICs scores. However, MCMIS and field enforcement systems, such as Aspen, are not 

aligned to share data as effectively and accurately as possible. For example, violation codes made 

available to an inspector roadside in Aspen do not necessarily match those in MCMIS, resulting in 

unnecessary DataQs. In order to minimize data inaccuracy and error, MCMIS must mirror the field 

enforcement systems employed by the states. 

Additional Data 

FMCSA's 2006 Large Truck Crash Causation Study shows that most CMV crashes are caused, at least in 

part, by driver behavior. Driver behavior violations can range from inattention or speeding to reckless 

driving, distracted driving or driving under the influence. Safe, healthy drivers are critical to CMV safety 

and it's important for inspectors and investigators to have all relevant information available to them 

when assessing a CMV driver and their employing carrier's record. However, currently some driver 

violation and/or conviction information is not available for inclusion. We see this as an opportunity. 

Under the current CSA model, inspection reports, compliance reviews, crashes and other reports 

generated by CMV inspectors and investigators supply the data that are processed and converted into 

CSA scores. On the other hand, general traffic law violations and/or convictions (Le. speeding, illegal 

lane change, etc.) issued to drivers while operating a CMV that are issued by a non-CMV enforcement 

officer, or as adjudicated through a court proceeding, are not captured anywhere in a coordinated 

fashion to potentially be considered by FMCSA as part of CSA or for any other purpose to advance 

safety. While non-CMV officers are not trained to conduct a North American Standard Inspection, they 

are certainly qualified to issue violations for traffic offenses. We believe this concept is worth exploring 

further and would suggest that FMCSA investigate the feasibility and potential benefits and challenges 

of incorporating this data into the safety assessment process. 

eVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 
81 


Insert offset folio 40 here 75852.040

2. Data Measurement 

The Safety Measurement System (SMS) is the model used to quantify the safety performance of 

carriers and drivers. This helps enforcement prioritize carriers for interventions and helps identify 

specific areas where improvement is needed. SMS uses data from roadside inspections, including 

commercial vehicle inspection violations, results from compliance reviews, state-reported crashes, and 

the federal motor carrier census to quantify performance into the BASICs. After accurate and timely 

data collection, accuracy in structuring the SMS is critical to the effectiveness of the CSA program. 

CVSA members strongly believe that the new SMS is an improvement over the previous system, 

SafeStat. The previously mentioned UMTRI evaluation bears this out. The SMS model is, overall, more 

accurate when it comes to identifying crash risk and provides more flexibility to better target specific 

safety concerns for a motor carrier, rather than the 'one-size-fits-all' approach under the previous 

program. The SMS approach also allows FMCSA and the states to 'touch' a larger portion of the 

industry. However, as with any program, there is room for improvement. 

Safety Measurement System (SMS) 

In order to ensure that the SMS algorithm identifies the carriers most likely to present a safety hazard, 

the point values, weightings, and peer groupings used must be balanced correctly. FMCSA needs to 

continually evaluate the violation weightings and peer groupings to ensure that the process is 

balanced, can be substantiated in terms of their linkage to safety, is equitable across the diversity of 

the industry, and will ultimately help FMCSA meet its goal of improving commercial vehicle safety. 

For example, until recently, hours of service (HOS) violations were weighted differently for carriers 

using electronic logging devices than those using traditional paper records of duty status, or logs. 

FMCSA recognized that the violation is the same in either case and that the method of retaining data 

should not impact the weight of the violation in the SMS model. FMCSA adjusted the SMS to account 

for paper log and electronic logging device HOS violations in the same manner. 

Another example deals with peer groupings. As an example, there generally are two types of carriers 

dealing with hazardous materials (hazmat) loads - those who specialize in hazmat loads as their main 

course of business and those who, on rare occasions due to the nature of their operation, find 

themselves responsible for a hazmat load. FMCSA should consider the question of whether or not 

these types of operations should be peer grouped together. 

Regulatory Compliance 

When considering the weighting of various violations within the SMS, CVSA members strongly believe 

that regulatory compliance must be taken into account. Some have suggested that the purpose of CSA 

is to prevent crashes and therefore the SMS should point directly, and only, to crash risk. We agree 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Cornmittee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 6 
82 


Insert offset folio 41 here 75852.041

that factors shown to have a high correlation to crash risk are, obviously, very important, However, 

compliance with regulations is also a critical factor in terms of CMV safety, 

For example, some may say that HOS records that do not include items like location changes of duty 

status or list miles driven are simply 'paperwork' violations, with no tie to regulatory compliance or 

driver or carrier safety performance, However, to an inspector, these violations are indicators that a 

driver could be concealing major violations, such as exceeding HOS driving time or on-duty time limits, 

Another example is that of a driver not having a valid Commercial Driver's License, Not having a valid 

license in and of itself does not necessarily pose a crash risk, but no one can argue that this 

noncompliance issue is not a safety risk, 

A motor carrier's habit of noncompliance with any safety regulation, whether tied directly to crash risk 

or not, indicates either a lack of understanding or a disregard for that particular regulation or set of 

regulations, A carrier that does not understand, or actively chooses to disregard, certain regulations is 

not one with a strong safety culture, Keeping track of these trends helps inspectors and investigators 

identify where bad habits may exist and enables corrective action to bring the carrier back into 

compliance, 

Crash Accountability 

Another major issue for Congress and FMCSA to consider when looking at the CSA program is the issue 

of 'crash accountability' Currently, any and all collisions involving a CMV are entered into the SMS and 

reflected in the motor carrier's Crash BASIC. That means that if a CMV driver is driving too fast and 

collides with the vehicle in front of it that collision is reflected on the motor carrier's score, However, 

other incidents, such as an inattentive non-CMV driver colliding with a parked or slowed CMV would 

also go on the motor carrier's score, regardless of whether or not the CMV driver was at fault or even 

in the vehicle at the time, 

In order to ensure that the results from the SMS are most closely tied to unsafe drivers and motor 

carriers, CVSA believes it is critical for FMCSA to address the crash accountability question as quickly 

and comprehensively as possible, FMCSA, in consultation with the states and industry, should 

determine the degree to which fault is an indicator of future crash risk and how best to account for 

fault in the CSA Program, We believe that when fault in a crash involving a CMV can clearly be 

determined and is not assigned to the CMV driver, that crash should be weighted less in the Crash 

BASIC than a crash where the CMV driver is found to be at fault, FMCSA also needs to address issues 

associated with crash data collection and reporting, We understand FMCSA is looking into this issue 

more closely in the coming year and we look forward to the results of their research, 

Alterna tive COlllpliallce 

Finally, CVSA members believe that FMCSA should consider looking more closely into a 'carrot and 

stick' approach when it comes to CSA. The current model, in our view, does not do all it can to 

(VSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 
83 


Insert offset folio 42 here 75852.042

encourage carriers to develop and sustain a robust safety culture. Clearly, the first order of business is 

for the carrier to stay in compliance and avoid crashes. Under the CSA model, carriers that remain in 

compliance and have a robust safety program should not have any significant issues. 

The goal needs to be to avoid having violations entered into the system in the first place. Once a 

violation is recorded, it stays on a carrier's record for two years. This can be problematic for smaller 

carriers who, because of their size, are less likely to experience a roadside inspection and may not be 

inspected enough during the CSA data retention period to have a significant impact on their scores. 

Currently, the only opportunity for a carrier to 'improve' their score is to receive violation-free, or 

'clean', inspections and/or time since the violations are all time weighted. While some in the industry 

will say that there are very few 'clean' inspections entered in the system, this simply is not the case. In 

2011 there were approximately 1.1 million 'clean' roadside inspections entered into the federal 

database, which is roughly 1/3 of the total inspections conducted in the United States that year. 

A concept called 'alternative compliance' encourages carriers to strive for excellence in compliance and 

safety performance. One of the original goals of the CSA program was to encourage compliance and 

best practices for safety. CVSA believes that providing carriers with the opportunity to improve their 

scores through a demonstrated safety commitment and performance improvement would benefit the 

CSA system and overall CMV safety. We believe this concept will provide a more accurate snapshot of a 

carrier's attitude towards safety and will show demonstrated safety improvements, alloWing inspectors 

to better target their enforcement efforts on those who need it. Further, giving carriers credit for 

employing best practices and demonstrating a commitment to safety on an ongoing basis is an 

excellent way to facilitate non-regulatory compliance by industry and promote proven safety solutions. 

CVSA is currently working with a group of like-minded organizations to make recommendations on 

how best to pursue the alternative compliance concept. We would be happy to provide the Committee 

with additional details. 

3. Safety Evaluation 

The third step in the CSA process is the Safety Evaluation, which is the process FMCSA uses to 

determine how to address carriers with poor safety performance. 

Scoring 

Currently, to help enforcement personnel and agencies target the most egregious safety risks, the CSA 

program uses a bell curve approach, with all carrier scores being relative to one another. This approach 

can be useful for enforcement, as it helps shine a light on carriers who require the most attention and 

helps to improve resource management. However, with this type of approach, scores are not entirely 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 
84 


Insert offset folio 43 here 75852.043

under a carrier's control, Improvements or deterioration of safety performance by one carrier can have 

an impact on another carrier's score. 

For example, if several carriers receive violation-free roadside inspections, lowering their scores, other 

carriers, who have not received any additional roadside inspections, or violations, could still see their 

scores increase due to the relative nature of the SMS. Likewise, a series of bad inspections for one or 

two carriers could improve another carrier's score, without any improvements internally. Another 

factor is peer grouping. How a carrier is classified and therefore what group of carriers is used for its 

score comparison is referred to as the 'peer grouping'. A carrier's score depends, in part, on which peer 

grouping it is assigned to. 

We suggest that FMCSA continue to look at this issue and the performance of carriers under CSA in 

preparation for its Safety Fitness Determination Rulemaking. Clearly the UMTRI evaluation shows at 

the macro level that the CSA model is targeting those carriers that are presenting the greatest risk to 

crashes; however, continual evaluation of the model and its results will assist the agency in 

determining whether this approach is providing the desired results for the long term. 

Safety I;itness Determination 

Another issue for consideration is the release of FMCSA's Safety Fitness Determination (SFD) Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), expected early next year. As FMCSA prepares to issue the NPRM, CVSA 

recommends that the agency consider whether or not all violations should factor into a carrier's SFD, 

as well as the weightings that are assigned to the violations, 

Currently, violations are grouped into three categories by FMCSA when the agency is determining a 

carrier's Safety Rating 'acute' regulations, 'critical' regulations, and a third group of violations, which 

do not factor into a carrier's Safety Rating at aiL 

FMCSA might consider a using similar process when developing the new SFD, Violations could be 

divided into four categories: those directly tied to crash risk; acute regulations; critical regulations; and, 

all other regulatory violations. FMCSA, through the rulemaking process, will be able to gather 

additional feedback and research and seek comments from industry and enforcement on how best to 

categorize the violations, using, perhaps, the current list of acute and critical regulations used to 

determine a carrier's Safety Rating as a starting point 

4. Intervention Process 

The final step in the CSA program is the Intervention Process. Using the data entered into the SMS, 

carriers are selected for an intervention using the Safety Evaluation. Interventions can range from 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 
85 


Insert offset folio 44 here 75852.044

warning letters to onsite comprehensive investigations and can result, if warranted, in enforcement 

actions and out of service orders. 

CVSA is pleased to say that for a number of carriers, the intervention process is working. Often times, 

the first level, a warning letter detailing the problems and possible consequences of leaving the issues 

unaddressed, is enough to prompt a response from the carrier. According to the UMTRI study, 83 

percent of carriers who received a warning letter as their first intervention made improvements to 

address safety issues. This is particularly true for smaller carriers, who may not have realized there was 

a problem in the first place. In other instances, an onsite investigation can help address the issues. 

Other findings from the UMTRI study indicate that other aspects of the intervention process, such as 

the focused onsite review, are allowing investigators to streamline the process and allowing them to 

reach more carriers, address the specific safety performance problems of the carrier, and be more 

efficient. In practice, enforcement feels the interventions are moving the ball forward with respect to 

safety impacts, but has mixed feelings on whether the interventions are operating at maximum 

effectiveness. We believe that this could be due, in part, to the relative newness of the intervention 

component. 

5. Outreach 

One trend we see throughout all facets of the CSA program is the need for additional training and 

education. Inspectors, drivers, and carriers all need to fully understand the program and how the 

individual mechanisms work towards FMCSA's goal of reducing crashes and fatalities involving 

commercial vehicles. 

From the survey recently conducted by ATRI and CVSA, we have learned that nearly three-quarters of 

respondents believe that more (SA training is needed for inspectors. In particular, inspectors are 

interested in receiving 'refresher' training courses on the program, as well as timely updates on 

relevant methodology changes. 

In order to fully realize the goals of CSA, a well trained workforce is critical. Based on feedback we have 

received from the states, additional resources and training courses may need to be made available 

through FM CSA to train state inspectors and investigators on an ongoing basis. The CSA program will 

continue to evolve; new inspectors and investigators will need to receive training; and states will need 

assistance as they continue to deploy the relatively new Intervention Process. Further, Congress should 

work with FMCSA to ensure that the states are receiving adequate funding to process incoming DataQs 

efficiently and effectively. 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectrveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & tnfrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 10 
86 


Insert offset folio 45 here 75852.045

Consideration should be given to the allocation of more resources to create and implement ongoing 

driver and carrier training programs so that the regulated industry has a better understanding of CSA, 

which will help ensure that those being evaluated by the CSA program understand how the system 

works and how their actions impact their driving record and the company performance. 

6. Purpose and Use of (SA Data 

CSA was established as a tool for enforcement, operating under limited resources, to identify and 

target those motor carriers that pose the greatest risk to safety. However, the program is being used 

for more than simply enforcement screening and prioritization. The public has begun to access the 

data and is using it to make decisions on which carriers to use, which drivers to hire, etc. This is not, in 

and of itself, a bad thing. For some carriers, the fines and compliance reviews currently in place are 

simply not enough to motivate them to come into compliance and improve their safety performance. 

However, if poor safety records result in lost business, those less inclined to maintain an adequate 

level of safety may change their minds. An informed public could, in fact, drive industry to improve. 

Another twist to the Intervention Process is evolving as more information has been made available to 

the public. Essentially, before the Intervention Process can play out, the public is using the SMS scores 

made available online to make determinations regarding carriers. In other words, the court of public 

opinion is creating a new aspect to the "Intervention Process" by interpreting the scores and using it 

for various purposes. Unfortunately, though, the general public is not currently informed enough to 

understand and evaluate the information presented to them. Many do not understand how the system 

works, what the scores mean, that the ratings are relative and that they can shift often. This lack of 

understanding is having real world impacts. There are some entities using the CSA data in ways that it 

was not originally designed for or intended. Further, concerns over data quality, weightings, peer 

groupings, and point values addressed in this testimony become more of an issue if they are 

contributing to a score that is being used by the public to make business decisions. 

Making carrier safety performance data available to the public is not a new concept. It has been done, 

in some form, for more than a decade, and CVSA is supportive of this practice. A number of benefits 

can be derived from empowering consumers and the general public to make more informed decisions. 

However, we recommend that FMCSA continually work with the states and industry to determine how 

best to portray the CSA data to benefit both enforcement and the public to ensure that the ultimate 

goal of highway safety is being met. It also is critically important that it is clear to those who are 

viewing the information what it represents so it is not misinterpreted. There needs to be a better 

explanation of what the data means, as well as what it is intended for and its limitations. 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13,2012 11 
87 


Insert offset folio 46 here 75852.046

Conclusion 

The bottom line is that (SA is working. FM(SA should be commended for all the effort they have put 

into trying to change the paradigm in how we collectively view (MV safety in this country. The (SA 

program has shown already to have had a number of positive impacts with changing behavior and 

helping to instill a more robust safety culture in the motor carrier industry. The program is still 

somewhat new and FM(SA is continuing to work out the bugs and fine tune the program; and industry 

and enforcement continue to adapt to the new system. 

(SA is a significant improvement over the previous approach. That said, there are some fundamental 

areas that need strengthening, and there are improvements that can be made, such as changing how 

the data is presented and adding ways to improve a carrier's score. These improvements will create a 

more effective system and will result in better industry buy in to the program, which will, in turn, 

benefit FM(SA and the program itself and ultimately improve safety and reduce crashes. 

CVSA Written Testimony on 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 12 
88 


Insert offset folio 47 here 75852.047

COMMHl'EE ON l'RANSPORTA l'ION AND 

liNFRASTRUCTURE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

V,S·, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 

HEARING 

Evaluating the E.ffectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program 

September 13, 2012 

-~ ... ATA ~ AMERICAN 

TRUCKING 

AlSSOCIATtlONS 

Driving Trucking"s Success 

American Trucking Associations 

950 N. Glebe Road, Suite 210 

Arlington, VA 22203·4181 
89 


Insert offset folio 48 here 75852.048

Introduction 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of the Subcommittee, my name is 

Scott Mugno and I am the Vice President of Safety for FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. 

(FedEx Ground), a nationwide provider of small-package delivery services, headquartered in 

Pittsburgh, PA. i am testifying today on behalf of the American Trucking Associations (ATA). 

AT A IS the national trade association for the trucking industry and is a federation of affiliated 

State trucking associations, conferences, and organizations that together are comprised of more 

than 37,000 motor carrier members representing every type and class of motor carrier in the 

country. 

ATA is a strong advocate for highway safety and has a long history of supporting safety 

initiatives. While I am testifying on behalf of the ATA, I note that FedEx Ground currently holds 

the highest DOT safety rating a company can achieve and maintains an exceptionally favorable 

crash history. However, despite FedEx Ground's high safety rating, favorable crash history, and 

longstanding commitment to safety, our Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) score in the 

Driver Fitness measurement category is above the FMCSA's set threshold. Many ATA member 

carriers with exemplary safety records and low crash rates, like FedEx Ground, find themselves 

singled out by the agency due to high CSA measurement category scores. Yet, these scores 

erroneously reflect unsafe pertormance since the data and methodology supporting some of the 

CSA measurement categories are flawed. 

CSA, as currently structured, often focuses FMCSA enforcement resources on the wrong 

carriers. As discussed below, FMCSA's own analysis confirms that scores in certain 

measurement categories of CSA, including the Driver Fitness category. do not reliably identify 

those carriers that are more likely to have future crashes. In fact, in the Driver Fitness 

category, the analysis concluded that there appeared to be no difference in crash rates for 

carriers with scores exceeding the FMCSA intervention threshold to carriers whose scores did.' 

FMCSA should be focusing on companies that present a crash risk, rather than on those 

carriers, like many ATA members, that have a record of safe operations yet a high score in a 

CSA category that does not reliably reflect crash risk. This would be a more appropriate use of 

Federal resources in contrast to FMCSA's current approach. 

Before discussing the CSA program in more detail. I want to reiterate that ATA supports efforts 

to improve molor carrier safety and has been supportive of the objective of CSA, to reduce 

commercial mOlor vehicle crashes, injuries and fatalities,' since the program's inception. By 

design. CSA leverages performance-based data to provide real-time measures of safety 

pertormance. In doing so, CSA is intended to focus FMCSA's limited enforcement resources on 

the least safe carriers. Through its streamlined intervention process. CSA helps FMCSA "touch" 

1 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Evaluation olthe Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 

Operational Model Test, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, August 2011, available at 

http://csa.fmcsa.dot.govIOocuments/Evaluation-of-the·CSA-Op-Model·Test.pdf,at 33, 42. 

2 CSA is an FMCSA "initiative to Improve large truck and bus safety and ultimately to reduce crashes, 

injuries, and fatalities that are related to commercial motor vehicles." See http://csa.fmcsa.gov/aboUl 
90 


Insert offset folio 49 here 75852.049

more carriers annually, Finally, CSA has the polentiallo provide meaningful information to third 

parties (e,g" shippers, insurers) in their efforts to make safely-based business decisions, 

CSACcmcems 

Though supportive 01 the objective o! CSA, ATA ilas significant concerns with the program in its 

current form, Specifically, ATA is troubled by the low reliability, accuracy and significance of 

CSA scores, especially the lack of a relationship between carriers' scores and their future crash 

risk. Moreover, AT A is frustrated by FMCSA's unwillingness 10 acknowledge these weaknesses 

and correct them before making carriers' scores public and implying lilat tiley are measures of 

safety performance, 

Prior 10 implementing CSA nationwide, FMCSA conducted a test of tile system in nine stales, 

called tile Comprehensive Safety Analvsis 2010 Operational Model Test, and gatilered data on 

tile program's effectiveness. A subsequent evaluation of this test, sponsored by FMCSA and 

conducted by tile University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI), found that 

scores in some measurement categories did not have a strong relationship to future crasil risk, 

if any. In fact, tile FMCSAiUMTRI analysis concluded lila! scores in lile Driver Fitness category 

ilave an inverse relationship to crash risk, That is, as carriers' Driver Fitness scores get higher, 

tileir crash risk actually drops. Yet, even after this report was published, FMCSA issued written 

guidance 10 shippers and others saying lilat all BASICs "are important to safety performance.'" 

A chart depicting tile relationship between crasil rates and Driver Fitness scores is below. 

r:()'mnrPhpn.<,ivp Safety Analvsis 2010 

2011. available at 

j;illJrJ1QgJ!Ilfjill4ru~Qillill!!!gnt~@!ygjjQ!l:Ql:ttli~~Q£::MQ!~~tQQ[,a! 42. 

available at 

http://csa,fmcsa,dotgov/Oocuments/FMC-CSA-12-013,,SMS,,JusC F act-508.pdl. 
91 


Insert offset folio 50 here 75852.050

Since the release of the FMCSAlUMTRI evaluation, a growing number of researchers and 

credible organizations have conducted analyses casting further doubt on the relationship 

between carriers' scores and crash risk. For example, in November 2011 Wells Fargo Securities 

conducted an analysis of the scores belonging to the 200 largest carriers in the North Americas 

In doing so, they were unable to find any "meanlngful statistical relationship between poor 

BASIC scores and accident incidence."6 In order to validate their findings, Wells Fargo 

conducted an additional study in July 2012 using a broader data set - 4,600 motor carriers. ThiS 

more recent study also failed to find a meaningful statistical relationship between most GSA 

BASIC scores and actual crash rates.' 

More recently, Dr. James Gimpel, a statistician and professor in the Department of Government 

and Politics at the University of Maryland, published his analysis of the statistical validity of the 

GSA scoring methodology. In particular, he focused on the system's efficacy in identifying and 

prioritizing the least safe carriers and the relationship between carrier's scores and crash risk. 

In short, he also found that the statistical association between crash risk and BASIC scores was 

"so low as to be irrelevant."s In one measurement category, he found the use ot CSA scores as 

a predictor of crash risk as "little better than guessing."g In another, he found the relationship 

between GSA scores and crash risk to be negative W In other words, as carriers' scores got 

worse, their crash risk improved. He went on to say that " There are serious problems with the 

design of these instruments themselves that render them unreliable."" 

These findings lead AT A to draw two important conclusions. First. the system creates flawed 

measurements of carriers' relative safety performance. These measurements undermine the 

efficient use of Federal resources to identify and Impact unsafe carriers, as well as drive third 

parties relying on GSA data to make improper safety-related business decisions. Second, this 

lack of a statistical relationship between compliance measures and safety performance confirms 

that motor carriers bear an unnecessary regulatory burden. In short, GSA measures regulatory 

compliance but also shows that non-compliance with certain regulations does not correspond to 

crash risk. 

The limitations that impact GSA fall into two distinct categories: 

1) Problems with the underlying data that feed the system; and 

2) Problems with the methodology used to assign motor carrier's safety performance scores. 

A discussion of these problems follows. 

, Anthony P. Gallo & Michael Bushce, Wells Fargo Securities, CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear Outcomes, 

November 4, 2011. 

6 Anthony P. Gallo & Michael Bushce, Wells Fargo Securities, CSA: Another Look with Similar 

Conclusions. June 2, 2012. at 1. 7 1

d. 

B James Gimpel. University of Maryland. Statistical Issues in the Safety Measurement and Inspection of 

Motor Carriers, at 9-10. 

9 Id. at 5. 

10 Id. at 6 

" Id. at8-g. 

3 
92 


Insert offset folio 51 here 75852.051

Data Problems 

The effectiveness of CSA is plagued by a variety of data problems. The principal data 

weakness is the fundamental lack of information upon which to measure carrier satety 

periormance. FMCSA acknowledges that it only has adequate data to score 40% of active 

motor carriers in alleast one of the measurement categories, but does not report how few 

carriers are scored in all or even most categories.'2 In short, critical safety data for the vast 

majority of motor carriers is not generated or, when it is generated, not reported to FMCSA. 

Because the foundation of CSA is measurement of carrier periormance relative to others, this 

lack of data represents a substantial weakness, and impacts the accuracy and relevance of 

CSA scores. Carriers with "poor" scores are measured relative to only those carriers for whom 

the FMCSA has adequate data from which to draw a comparison, not against the entire 

industry. 

The shortage of data has a particularly profound effect on small trucking companies. Due to a 

lack of exposure (e.g., few roadside inspections), many small companies do not generate 

adequate data to produce CSA scores. Those carriers that do generate scores are then 

perceived to be less safe, simply because they have scores, when compared against other 

carriers that are not scored. Also, given the small amount of data on which small carrier 

periormance is often measured, just a few events (e,g., violations/crashes) can cause a small 

carrier's scores to change dramatically. As the aforementioned Gimpel study pointed out 

"smaller trucking firms are subject to few inspections, meaning that whatever BASIC scores they 

generate, high or low, are not reliable indicators of these firms' propensity to operate safely and 

in compliance with regulatory standards.,,'3 

Other data problems hamper CSA as well. For instance, some states engage in vastly 

disproportionate enforcement of certain regulations. 14 As a result, carriers in these states are 

far more likely to be cited for these infractions. These fleets appear to be less safe when 

compared to carriers operating in other states, not because they are less safe, but because 

they travel in states with more robust enforcement programs. This problem more profoundly 

impacts small carriers operating in these states.'5 

Also, a number of states fail to report many of the commercial motor vehicle crashes occurring 

on their roadways to FMCSA's database. In fact, according to UMTRI'6 and FMCSA17 analyses, 

12 FMCSA has adequate data to score roughly 200,000 of the estimated 500,000 estimated active 

carriers in at least one measurement category. See CSA: Proposed Changes to Improve on a Solid 

Foundation. June 2012, slide 5. available at h1tp:iicsa.fmcsa.dot.gov/resources.aspx 

'3 Gimpel, University of Maryland, Statistical Issues in the Safety Measurement and Inspection of Motor 

Carriers, at 12. 

'4 Id. at 2.12. 

15 The impact to large carriers is mitigated because data from a single state only represents a small 

portion of their total data (since they often operate In many states). Conversely, a small carrier may 

operate in onl\t a few states. 

1 Daniel Blower & Anne Matteson, Evaluation of 2008 Mississippi Crash Data Reported to the MCMIS 

Crash File, January 2010, available afhtlp:l/www.umtri.umich.eduicontentiMlssissippi200B fmal.pdf. at B. 

4 
93 


Insert offset folio 52 here 75852.052

15 states report less than 75% of their crashes to the database. Interestingly, FMCSA attempts 

to minimize its lack of CSA violation data by pOinting out that it has adequate information to 

score the carriers involved in 92% of crashes reported to the agency.'8 Yet, this argument is 

circular since many crashes do not get reported to FMC SA. 

Methodology Problems 

The accuracy and significance of CSA scores are also impacted by a number of methodology 

problems. One of the most significant of these problems is the assignment of "points" or 

severity weights to vanous violations in the system. By design. each lIiolation is supposed to be 

assigned a weight on a scale of 1- 10 based on its relative severity (relationship to crash risk). 

However, many of the weights are illogical or. as UMTRI called them in its evaluation of the 

program, "arbitrary." Other methodology issues impact scores as well. For instance, warnings 

issued for moving violations bear the same weight as citations and, in many cases, citations 

dismissed in court bear the same weight as convictions, 

Perhaps the single biggest problem with the CSA methodology is that it measures motor 

carriers on all crashes they are involved in, regardless of fault Intuitively, at-fault crashes are 

the best measures of safety performance. However, FMCSA measures carriers based on these 

crashes and those they did not cause nor could have prevented. In other words, a carrier that is 

rear-ended while stopped at a red light is perceived as being just as safe/unsafe as one that 

rear ends another motorist or crosses a median and strikes another vehicle head-on. 

For more than three years, ATA has been calling on FMCSA to establish a process to evaluate 

crash accountability and modify the CSA methodology accordingly, In mid-2010, the agency 

conducted a study of the reliability of police accident reports (PARs) in making crash 

accountability determinations. Researchers found that those tasked with reviewing the reports 

were able to make consistent crash accountability determinations in 93% of the instances 

tested. Subsequently, FMCSA developed a process to make crash accountability 

determinations and was prepared to implement it, but in March 2012 reversed course saying the 

issue needed further study. 

Just over a month ago, FMCSA announced that it would be spending another year studying the 

issue before developing a corresponding solution and that solution may not be implemented 

until months afterwards, if at all. While ATA appreciates FMCSA responding to calls for a 

timeline of next steps, our members are frustrated by the delays in resolving this fundamental 

flaw in the system. It now appears that FMCSA may not be poised to even propose a solution, 

Jet alone implement one, until three years after the agency first began studying the issue. 

17 As reported by the FMCSA, Nevada. New Mexico. Mississippi and Florida have a crash reporting rating 

of "poor." A rating of "poor" means that less than 50% of non-fatal crashes were reported to the FMCSA. 

See http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov!DataQuality!improve!nfcc.aspx?i~6&ns-N . 

18 FMCSA's Response to Public Comments of Safety Measurement System Changes. 77 Fed. Reg. 

52110 at 52111 (Aug. 28, 2012). 

5 
94 


Insert offset folio 53 here 75852.053

I\laturally, AT A recognizes that it will be difficult to make accountability determinations with 

respect to some crashes. However, there are others, such as when a motor carner is rearended while stopped at a red light, that are very straightforward. In ATA's view, It is 

unnecessary to complete 12 months of research to conclude that a carrier involved in such a 

crash should not be labeled as unsafe and subsequently prioritized for enforcement. 

Accordingly, FIVICSA should establish a near-term process to address these crashes where 

accountability is so plainly evident. 

FMCSA contends that it is appropriate to score carriers based on all crashes, not just 

preventable ones, because its analysis reflects that past crash involvement, regardless of fault, 

IS a strong predictor of future crash involvement. This conclusion may be true. however crash 

involvement is not an indicator of a fleet's likeliness to cause crashes but rather a consequence 

of the environment in which it operates. Fleets operating in urban and congested areas have 

more crashes than fleets operating in rural areas, but that does not mean they are any more 

prone to causing them. 

In fact, FMCSA's current safety rating methodology acknowledges the role exposure plays in 

crash risk. Specifically, FMCSA sets a higher threshold for acceptable crash rates for those 

carriers operating exclusively in urban environments. The language in the safety rating 

methodology reads as follows: 

Experience has shown that urban carriers, those motor carriers operating 

primarily within a radius of less than 100 air miles (normally in urban areas), have 

a higher exposure to accident situations because of their environment and 

normally have higher accident rates.'9 

For most carriers, FMC SA has established a threshold of 1.5 crashes per million miles as 

acceptable performance. Carriers with crash rates above that threshold are assigned a 

rating of "Unsatisfactory" in the accident factor of the safety rating methodology and, as a 

result, are unable to obtain an overall safety rating better than "ConditionaL" However, 

for urban carriers the acceptable threshold for measuring safe performance is 1.7 

crashes per million miles. 

Rather than devoting attention to carriers that endure greater exposure due to their 

operating environment, FMCSA should direct its limited resources where they would be 

most effective In preventing future crashes - by focusing on unsafe carriers that are 

causing them. After all, doing so would help better meet the objective of CSA. which is to 

reduce crashes injuries and fatalities. 20 

19 See 49 C.F.R Part 385 Appendix B- Explanation of Safety Rating Process, B. Accidenl Factor. 

20 See note 1. 

6 
95 


Insert offset folio 54 here 75852.054

Acknowledgement' of the Program's Limitations 

Though an early advocate of the CSA program, ATA has become increasingly concerned with 

CSA's serious flaws. Moreover, ATA is troubled by FMCSA's unwillingness to acknowledge 

CSA's limitations and fix them. 

A good example of this approach is FMC SA's continued use of the Driver Fitness measurement 

category. As discussed above, the UMTRI evaluation found that there appeared to be no 

difference in crash rates between carriers with Driver Fitness scores exceeding the FMCSA 

intervention threshold and carriers whose scores do not exceed the threshold.'i In other words, 

the Driver Fitness category measures a fleet's compliance with regulations, but not its 

propensity to actually be involved in a crash. For example, a common Driver Fitness violation 

occurs when a driver fails to keep a medical certificate in his/her possession while operating a 

commercial motor vehicle. While the driver's failure to carry a medical certificate on his or her 

person is a violation of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, the failure to carry this 

type of paperwork does not make the driver any more likely to be involved in a crash.'2 Rather 

than acknowledging this problem and working to correct it, the agency points to the importance 

of highlighting compliance with regulations, even those that do not have a statistical relationship 

to safety. 

There is no doubt that FMCSA's intent in designing the CSA system was to identify carriers that 

are less safe - in other words, those more likely to have crashes. For instance, the CSA 

methodology says the goal of CSA is to reduce commercial motor vehicle (CMV) crashes, 

fatalities, and injuries. Consistent with this goal, FMCSA's intent (according to its document 

outlining the process for assigning violation severity) was to assign weights to violations based 

on their statistical correlation to crash incidence and crash severity.23 FMCSA has repeatedly 

acknowledged that the objective of the program is to yield 'the greatest safety benefits' 

(emphasis added). 

FMCSA is now perpetuating this flaw by making modifications to the program. In a few months 

the agency will implement a new measurement category to rank carriers that haul hazardous 

materials. FMCSA candidly acknowledges that the goal of this category " ... is not to predict 

future crash risk.,,'4 Instead, FMCSA says the category better identifies carriers that are more 

likely to commit future hazardous materials violations. The agency points to the importance of 

identifying such carriers since hazardous materials can increase the consequences of a crash, 

but presents no data to show that HM carriers have crashes with worse outcomes as a result of 

hazardous materials violations. 

2i University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Evaluation of the Comprehensive Safety 

Analysis 2010 Operational Model Test. at 42. 

22 Notably, drivers still receive this violation even though they are properly qualified to drive by a medical 

examiner. 

23 Carrier Safety Measurement System (CSMS) Violation Severity Weights, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration, November 2009. 

24 Safety Measurement System Changes, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, June 2012. at 7. 

7 
96 


Insert offset folio 55 here 75852.055

While compliance with regulations is Important. ATA questions the merits of assigning a higher 

priority to these carriers than those that are actually less safe. If, as FMGSA contends, the 

Intent of the system is to prioritize carners, then less safe carriers should be assigned higher 

scores than safe carriers that have patterns of violations that are not safety· related. Intuitively, 

this is the most efficient and effective use of Federal resources. 

The inability of the system to identify the least safe carriers impacts more than FMGSA's 

enforcement prioritization program. GSA scores are used by third parties to make business 

decisions as well. The following paragraph from FMGSA's GSA methodology explains that: 

In addition to supporting the CSA Operational Model, the Safety Measurement 

System (SMS) results can provide other stakeholders, such as insurers and 

shippers, with valuable safety information. The SMS results will be easi/y 

accessible via the Internet to encourage improvements in motor carrier safety 

Findings from the SMS will allow the evaluated carriers an assessment of their 

weaknesses in various safety areas. In turn, the SMS will empower motor carriers 

and other stakeholders involved with the motor carrier industry to make safety· 

based business decisions25 

The implication, of course, is that the GSA scores are a measure of safety - not compliance. Of 

course, as mentioned above, the system sometimes measures compliance with regulations 

which, according to the FMGSAlUMTRI, Wells Fargo and Gimpel analyses, do not have a 

statistical correlation to crash risk. GSA scores, therefore, can lead stakeholders such as 

shippers and insurers to believe that safe carriers are unsafe. This is simply poor public policy. 

As an example, the chart below reflects GSA scores from several large, national motor carriers 

as of May 2012. The data indicate that these carriers' high scores in the Hazardous Materials 

category are inconsistent with their performance in all other categories. Most importantly, their 

Crash Indicator scores are all in the top 30'h percentile, meaning that they pertorm better in this 

category than 70% of like carriers. 

I Unsafe 

I Driving 

I I I Controlled I 

Fatigued Driver [ Substancesl I 

Driving' I Fitness i Alcohol 

I Carrier A 6.9 39.5 24.7 N/A 

Carrier C 21.5 12.1 40,4 

:....._C_a_rr_ie_r_D_--,f ... ~_J_228 --r-2fi:S' 

~ier B 33.1 39.2 41.5 0,4 

2 

0.1 

Vehicle 

Maintenance 

58,4 

51.7 

62.8 

24.1 

Hazardous 

Materials"'· 

78.2 

91 

91.7 

86.9 

i Crash I 

I Indicator 

25.6 

21.9 

29.8 

29.3 J 

25 Safety Measurement System (SMS) Methodology, Version 2.2, Federal Molor Carrier Safety 

Administration, January 2012. available at htlp:.ucsa2010.fmcsa.dot gov/documentsismsmethodology.pdf, 

, all·2 

8 
97 


Insert offset folio 56 here 75852.056

• FMCSA has indicated in thai the Fatigued Driving BASIC will be renamed the Hours 01 Service 

Compliance BASIC in December 2012 

H FMCSA has indicated that this category will be the named the Hazardous Materials Compliance 

BASIC in December 2012 

Conclusion 

ATA supports the laudable objective of GSA, to reduce commercial motor vehicle crashes, 

injuries, and fatalities. GSA is a potentially powerful tool to achieve this objective. However, 

data and methodology problems undermine the effectiveness of the system. Ultimately, these 

problems hamper the system's ability to accurately measure relative safety performance. As a 

result, FMGSA is less effective at targeting unsafe carriers for enforcement and third parties are 

encouraged to make business decisions based, in part, on erroneous safety measurements. 

While ATA takes issue with certain specific elements of the GSA methodology, there is an 

overarching theme: GSA scores must reflect future crash risk. If they did, the system would 

provide a means for responsible fleets to distinguish themselves from those that do not share 

their commitment to safety, to properly leverage third parties to drive carriers to invest in safety, 

and to make better use of Federal enforcement resources. To achieve these benefits, FMGSA 

must take three very specific steps. 

First, FMGSA must acknowledge that the system does not accurately and reliably identify 

unsafe carriers, In other words, GSA scores are not a reliable predictor of future crash risk, 

Second, the agency must confirm that, since the goal of the program is to reduce crashes, 

injuries and fatalities, GSA's highest priority should be to focus on the least safe carriers, not 

merely those carriers that have compliance problems. And finally, FMGSA must establish a 

specific plan to develop and implement the data and methodology changes necessary to ensure 

that the system functions as intended, Only then will GSA reach its fullest potential as a tool to 

improve highway safety. 
98 


Insert offset folio 57 here 75852.057

Testimony of 

Ruby L. McBride 

Vice President of Corporate Systems 

for 

COLONIAL FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. 

KNOXVILLE, TN 

Before the 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

September 13, 2012 

Regarding 

The "Effect" of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration's Compliance, Safety, Accountability 

Program on the Trucking Industry 
99 


Insert offset folio 58 here 75852.058

Good morning, Chairman Duncan. Ranking Member DeFazio and distinguished 

members of the Highways and Transit Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today 

and have the opportunity to speak with you on behalf of ASECTL (which stands for The 

Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation) regarding the effect that the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMC SA) Compliance. Safety and Accountability 

(CSA) Program has had on the trucking industry. ASECTT is a nonprofit organization 

composed of interested carriers, brokers, shippers and allied industry participants who are 

committed to working with the U.S. DOT and FMCSA to enhance highway safety, while 

confinning that the FMCSA, the Federal agency that certifies carriers as safe to operate on the 

nation's roadways, affords the regulated carriers due process and the shipping public certainty 

that the carriers certified as safe by the Agency may be chosen for usc by brokers and shippers 

based upon routes, rates and service, without vicarious liability concerns under di ffering and 

inconsistent state law principles. 

My name is Ruby McBride. I have 36 years experience in the motor calTier industry. 

am Vice President of Corporate Systems for Colonial Freight Systems. My responsibilities 

include overseeing the Insurance and Safety Department. My husband, Tom McBride, is 

president of Colonial and he is here with me today. 

Colonial is a private family owned business with its corporate office in Knoxville, TN. 

Colonial was founded by my father-in-law, C. F. McBride, in 1943 (nearly 70 years). C. E. and 

his wife, Lura, built the business back when it was extremely difficult to obtain operating 

authority-long before dcregulation-·when a motor carrier had to interline with mUltiple other 

carriers just to get from point "a" to point "b". Some of you may be old enough to remember the 

Interstate Commerce Commission (lCC). We currently operate between 250 and 280 power 

units, primarily independent contractors/owner operators in all 48 states. Many of our 

contractors have been with us for more than a decade; some, more than 30 years. Many of them 

have logged over a million miles without a single chargeable accident; some over three million 

miles without any chargeable accidents. This is more miles than most of us will drive in our 

entire lifetime. According to the Federal Highway Administration, the average person would 

take 74 years to drive that distance. (http://.www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onhOO/bar8.htm). 

2 
100 


Insert offset folio 59 here 75852.059

C. E. McBride believed in providing opportunities for owner operators and 

independent contractors. His philosophy was based upon the principle that if someone had a 

vested interest, they were more apt to take pride in their equipment, be more conscientious, be a 

proud face before the shippers and be able to earn more money for their own families. This same 

philosophy has been cauied forward throughout the years and still holds true today. 

Colonial is self~insured and has been for more than 25 years. We were one of the first 

motor caniers in the industry to become self-insured. If my information is couect, there is only 

one other self-insured motor cauier in the entire state of Tennessee. So, we are unique. We 

believe in "Safety." Under existing law and regulations, Colonial has an exemplary safety 

record. Section 385, the governing regulations, provides that on an audit, a carrier, after 

accounting for non-preventable accidents, will receive an unsatisfactory rating if its number of 

accidents exceeds 1.5 per million miles driven. 

Colonial travels approximately 40 million miles per year (80 million miles in the past 

24 months). Our reported crash ratio, including non-preventable accidents, is 0.4 per million 

miles or less than 28% of the standard required to be found unsatisfactory after audit. When the 

non-preventability is considered, our accident ratio drops to 0.2 per million or less than 14% of 

the number of accidents required to receive an unsatisfactory rating under existing law. 

Based upon Colonial's experience, as Viee President in charge of safety for a 

substantial and experienced carrier, I am convinced that the Agency's current CSA/SMS 

program (J) does not accurately measure carrier safety perfomlance; and (2) that the progressive 

intervention goals set out as its major benefit are not being realized. 

When the FMCSA says its goal is to "reduce crashes, injuries and/alalilies," we are 

in lock step with them. However, the methodology which is being used is flawed. The data used 

to label and/or brand motor carriers is comprised of significant other factors that have absolutely 

nothing 10 do with whether or not a motor carrier or driver should be labeled a "high safety risk." 

Although the numerous systemic flaws in CSNSMS methodology are well known to 

the Agency, the one that affects us the most is the use of the so-called "Fatigued Driving" 

BASIC, which tbe Agency claims is an accurate predictor of safety performance. Colonial's 

percentile ranking in this BASIC hovers around 80%, 15 percentage points above the artificial 

threshold established by the Agency for "progressive monitoring." 
101 


Insert offset folio 60 here 75852.060

Our high percentile ranking has nothing to do with fatigue. ColoniaL like many other 

carriers who use independent contractors and paper logs, is grouped for ranking purposes with 

carriers that are not required to prepare a log and fleets that use electronic logging devices. Over 

half of the points that feed our percentile ranking in the "Fatigued Driving" or "hours of service" 

BASIC come from paperwork violations (form and manner or last change of duty violations). 

These violations, which have no demonstrable effect on fatigue, much less crash scores, set up 

Colonial for high percentile scores and monitoring. Because the rankings me published and 

mislead the public into believing we are under some "safety watch" or identified as a "high risk 

carrier," we are unfairly branded for loss of business, as welL 

This problem of branding by publishing misleading scores prejudices our ability to 

compete in the open marketplace. Notwithstanding the current statutes and the Agency's sole 

obligation for certifying carriers as safe to usc, and our satisfactory safety rating, many shippers 

are being mislcd into believing that carriers like Colonial are unsafe based on SMS methodology 

and that they cannot rely upon the Agency's ultimate safety fitness determination to trump 

negligent selection suits under state law. 

Now, I want to tell you about my own firsthand knowledge of how the CSA program 

actually worked relative to ColoniaL When the C:SA program was implemented in December of 

2010, we were informed that the FMCSA intervention process would occur in steps. First a 

waming letter would be sent notifying the motor carrier of any identified deficiency in a 

particular BASIC. The motor carrier would have an opportunity to respond and address the 

deficiency prior to an on-site audit. This is still how the Agency claims SMS methodology 

works and is almost verbatim to the statement provided by its Deputy Administrator, William 

Bromott, before the House Committee on Small Business on July 11,2012, 

Yet, this is t!!2I what happened with ColoniaL We received a call from the FMCSA 

Nashville field office on Thursday aftemoon, August 11,2011, advising that they would be in 

our office on Monday morning, August 15, 2011, to begin a focused audit. There was NO 

waming letter. The iirst week, the investigator spent four days in our corporate office requesting 

multiple documents on 19 different drivers, On August 29,2011, the investigator retumed with a 

second investigator. They remained at Colonial until the audit was completed on September 2, 

2011. 

4 
102 


Insert offset folio 61 here 75852.061

When Colonial received the final report, dated September 26, 2011, Colonial"s 

"satisfactory" rating remained unchanged and the report was labeled "This Review i.1 not Raled," 

To justify the usc of SMS methodology, the Agency has said that focused audits not 

contemplated under the current rules are less time-consuming than compliance reviews which 

result in safety ratings and require an average of J to 4 days, The Agency spent 9 work days 

auditing Colonial and did not change its satisfactory safety rating, To add insult to injury, the 

misleading and inaccurate percentile ran kings that triggered the audit remain unchanged and we 

are still branded as a high-risk carrier in that BASIC. We are losing opportunities to transport 

shipments for shippers frightened by the Agency's pronouncements implying that they can bc 

sued if they do not self-credcntial each carrier, using SMS rankings. 

On thc other hand, had Colonial rcceived a "Conditional" or "Unsatisfactory" rating, 

our 25-year self-insurance program would have been in jeopardy. We would likely havc been 

faced with having to close our doors, after almost 70 years of running one of the safcst trucking 

companies in the industry. This could have resulted in almost 400 jobs lost and many more 

families added to the unemployment roll, as many of our trucks run team drivers and we 

employee almost 100 people. We are vcry thankful that the latter sccnario did not happen to 

Colon ial. Y ct, wc havc bcen told that this has happened to countless other trucking companies 

throughout the country. We have firsthand experience of the anti-competitive effect of 

publication of misleading SMS scores in the public declarations by thc Agency that SMS 

methodology should be used by shippers and brokers. We believe Congress should exercise 

oversight to ensure that efficiency, competition and small busincsses are not irrevocably 

damaged by premature publication and use of SMS methodology. (Please see attached summary 

ofASECTT's position.) 

Thank you for inviting me here today and the opportunity to provide these comments. 

will be happy to answer questions. 
103 


Insert offset folio 62 here 75852.062

Before the 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, D.C 

September 13,2012 

Evaluating the Effectiveness of 

DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program 

ASECTT'S POSITION 

regarding the "Effect" of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration's Compliance, Safety, Accountability Program 

on the Trucking Industry 

Submitted by 

The Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck 

Transportation (ASECTT) 

4:".1)1)792 I 'SPfl S556.'I.Wl,'O<J!OI 2 
104 


Insert offset folio 63 here 75852.063

ASECTT'S POSITION 

The Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation (ASECTT) is a 

50 I (c)( 4) non-profit association comprised of over 600 carriers, brokers, shippers and freight 

forwarders involved in the interstate transportation of goods by commercial motor vehicles. 

ASECTT is committed to encouraging a balanced federal regulatory policy which requires the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMC SA" or the "Agency") to perform its 

statutory obligations, by efiiciently and effectively issuing safety fitness determinations for all 

interstate motor carriers upon which the traveling and shipping public can rely. 

ASECTT's conecm is that fMCSA, in its zeal to "raise the safety bar;' has lost sight of 

its other statutory duties and obligations under the National Transportation Policy (49 U.S.c. 

1310 I). These include ensuring an open, competitive and efficient interstate marketplace which 

allows entrepreneurship and does not prejudice small catTiers and new entrants. 

ASECTT supports the initial goal of the Safcty Measurement System ("SMS") 

methodology created in the program originally called "Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010," 

later renamed "Compliance, Safety, Accountability." and at all times known as "CSA." That goal 

was to develop an improved monitoring capacity to allow progressive intervention and better use 

of the Agency's limited resources. Yet, ASECTT submits that what has been delivered to date, 

and touted as a success by the Agency, does not meet the Agency's original goal. Nor has the 

program been vetted or approved for the Agency's own use in accordance with the requirements 

of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 

Worse yet, the Agency seems to have walked away from a court approved settlement of 

an APA-based challenge to SMS in 20 II, where FMCSA had stipulated that "[ u ]nless a motor 

can'ier in the SMS has received an UNSATISFACTORY safety rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 

385, or has otherwise been ordered to discontinue operations by the FMeSA, it is authorized to 

2 
105 


Insert offset folio 64 here 75852.064

operate on the nation's roadways." Now, without any concem for the economic consequences of 

its actions, the FMCSA has advised the alamled shipper and freight broker communities that 

they can no longer rely upon the Agency to perform its statutory duty of credentialing carriers as 

safe, but instead must use arbitrary percentile ran kings under SMS to self-credential carriers 

before use in order to protect themselves against potential lawsuits. 

The Agency's abdication of its statutory duties to certify carriers as safe, and its de facto 

establishment of SMS methodology as an altemative rule for enforcement by a frightened 

shipping public, culminated in its website publication of "New Resources Available for Shippers, 

Brokers, and Insurers" of May 16. See hltps:licsa.fmcsa.dot.goviI~sources.aspx?locationid=115. 

This Intemet release advises the public tbat unvelted SMS scores arc at least as valid indicators 

of a carrier's fitness as its official safety rating under the Agency's longstanding, APA-compliant 

fitness regulations in 49 CFR Part 385. 

At the outset, ASECTT must disclose that it. together with 4 trade associations and 12 

other named petitioners, has challenged this Agency action undcr the Hobbs Act. and its petition 

for review is pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Case 

No, 12-1305. 

Yet, for purposes of Congressional oversight, it is important for the Committee to 

understand how CSA and SMS, dcspite 8 years in the developmental stage, still are not fulfilling 

Congressional mandates, are inflicting adverse consequences on the efficient and competitive 

transportation system envisioned by motor carrier deregulation, and are imposing 

disproportionately prejudicial hardships on small businesses. Attached hereto as Appendix A is 

an article by Brandon Fried, the President of the Air Forwarders Association, which explains the 

economic predicament caused for his members (who use trucks for significant portions of their 

business) by the Agency's failure to atllml its statutory mandate. 

3 ..JJl0?9? 1/SP/l)5~6/12()I/091012 
106 


Insert offset folio 65 here 75852.065

Background 

For over 75 years since the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Federal 

Government, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, has assumed the sole responsibility for 

certifying carriers as safe to operate on the nation's roadways, superseding inconsistent state 

laws and regulations through legal doctrines known as implied and conflict preemption. The 

deregulation statutes of 1980 through 1995 removed most federal regulations with respect to 

routes, rates and services, but expressly transferred the regulations governing safety fitness 

determinations without change from the former Interstate Commerce Commission to the U.S. 

Department of Transportation ("U .S.OOT"). Prccmpti vc federal jurisdiction over safety 

remained. Congress made clear that deregulation did not create a vacuum for the vicissitudes of 

state law. It did this by passing an express preemption statute (49 UB.e. 14501(c)) and,just as 

importantly, by enaeting a National Transportation Policy expressly requiring U.S. DOT (and 

FMCSA as part of U.S DOT) to administer its duties giving full consideration to marketplacc 

efficiency, competition and effects on small businesses. See 49 U.S.e. 1310\(a)(2). 

In 2003, the U.S.OOT's Inspcctor Gencral, in a report to Congress, was expressly critical 

of the Agency's publication of SafeStat data (a predecessor of SMS to some extent) and the 

potential adverse effect it could have on carriers branded as "unsafe" by this data. The Agency 

was directed to correct this problem. (See Appendix B.) 

In the 2005 transportation authorization bill known as SAFETEA-UJ, Congress directed 

the FMCSA to overhaul its safety fitness determination regulations and develop a program which 

would allow lh(~_8--1Lency, and only the Agency, to actually make safety fitness determinations for 

each of the over 600,000 regulated operators of commercial motor vehicles in interstate 

commerce. 

4 
107 


Insert offset folio 66 here 75852.066

CSA was initiated by tbe FMCSA in August of 2004. Its goal was "to increase the 

efficicncy and effectiveness of FMC SA 's compliancc and cnforccment program (73 Fed. Reg" p. 

53481, September 16, 2008, emphasis supplied,) CSA was hilled as "a new approach for using 

Agency resources to identify drivers and motor carriers that post safety risks based on crash 

experience and violations of safety regulations and to intervene to reduce those risks as soon as 

they hecome apparent." Thus, the stated mission was not to publish a percentile rating system of 

carriers for use by the shipping public in self-credentialing carricrs - but that is what CSA/SMS 

methodology bas become, 

The outlines of CSA were developed by FMCSA and discussed at "Listcning Sessions" 

in September and October of 2004, November 16, 2006, December 4, 2007, and October 2008. 

In comparing SMS with the SafeStat system it replaccd, the Agcncy complained that the CUlTent 

regulations, which it still has not yet sought to rcplace, are labor intensive because each 

compliance review or "CR" takes an average of 3 to 4 days to complete and as a result, the 

Agency can perform CRs "at prescnt level of staffing on only a small portion of its over 700,000 

interstate carriers listed in the Agency's census." (73 Fed, Reg" p. 53485, September 16, 2008.) 

The FMC SA said that CSA/SMS would improve the current process for "monitoring, 

assessing and enforcing the safety perfOimance of motor carriers and drivers." No mention was 

made of imposing safety credentialing duties upon shippers or hrokers, 

Rather than abandoning SafeStat and its percentile rankings of carriers based upon four 

compliance areas and proposing a simplified annual audit procedure or some other ohjcctive 

alternative, the Agency has spent 8 years trying to perfect compliancc data, construct arbitrary 

peer groups and invent artificial enforcement thresholds to accomplish Congress' directive. 

The stated purpose of the 2008 Federal Rcgister Notice quoted above was to define 

interim goals for CSA, to roll out the new SMS as a purported sllccessor to SafeStat, and to 

rVP9? I:SPiIS556iI201!()91012 
108 


Insert offset folio 67 here 75852.067

propose fUliher "Listening Sessions'". The 2008 notice touted SMS as different from SafeStat in 

six ways (77 Fed.Reg. at 53485): 

(I) It is organized by specific behaviors (BASICs) while SafeStat was organized into 

four broad safety evaluation areas or SEAs. 

(2) SMS coupled with progressive intervention allows the Agency to address specific 

concerns without a compliance review. 

(3) SMS uses all safety based inspections while SafeStat uses only out-of~service 

violations and selected moving violations. 

(4) SMS uses risk based violation ratings while SafeStat does not. 

(5) SMS impacts safety fitness determination of an entity while SafeStat has no 

impact on an entity's safety rating (yet to be completed). 

(6) SMS assesses individual drivers and carriers while SafeStat assesses only carriers. 

The key to CSA, as envisioned by the FMC SA in 2008, was to develop SMS 

methodology to replace 49 U.S.C. 31144 and 49 C.F.R. Part 385, which require an objective 

compliance review at a carrier's place of business before making a safety fitness detennination. 

i.e., assigning a safety rating. In particular, the thrust of SMS methodology was to "change the 

safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse vehicle and driver perfonnance based data 

alone are sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier." 

On this basis. without any feasibility or effectiveness study or support, the Agency 

announced a program wOLtld be developed to replace the Agency's current safety fitness rules. 

including the objecti vc compliance rcvicw carriers are guaranteed prior to being placed out of 

service. The Agency professed to be responding to concerns about the traditional safety rating 

process both within and outside the Agency. (See. for example, the National Transportation 

Safety Board recommendations cited with approval by FMCSA at 7J Fed.Reg. 53486.) 

6 
109 


Insert offset folio 68 here 75852.068

Nonetheless, four years after the 2008 Federal Register Notice, and 21 months after the 

SMS methodology and data were first made public without opportunity for public scrutiny in a 

rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), it has become abundantly clear 

that SMS percentile rankings and performance based data are not an improvement over 

traditional safety ratings, and that SMS alone cannot and should not result in an overall 

unsatisfactory carrier safety rating. 

It was during Congressional oversight hearings in June of2010 that PMCSA 

Administrator Ferro first told this Committee that SMS scores would be made publicly available 

in 2010, even though rulemaking would not be complete and the University of Michigan study 

commissioned by the Agency to validate the SMS methodology would not be finished. 

Representative DeFazio asked the Administrator on multiple occasions why the data would be 

made public ifnot vetted or supported by the University of Michigan study. 

Even so, over the objection of 3 trade associations, and aner a Small Business 

Administration Roundtable and SBA sponsored negotiations with the Agency, the Agency 

rcmained adamant the data was fit for publishing and that carriers above any of the reported 

arbitrary thresholds should be publicly branded as under "Alert". 

As a result of the Agency's December 16,2010 publication ofSMS data on its website, 

the trade associations instituted a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit (NASTC v. FMCSA), 

which resulted in a mediated settlement under Court auspices in early 2011. As part of the 

settlement, the Agency represented that SMS data was merely a replacemcnt for SafcStat and 

adopted the following disclaimer language for use on-line: 

The SMS results displayed on the SMS website are not intended to imply any 

federal safety rating of the carrier pursuant to 49 USC 31144. Readers should not 

draw conclusions about a carrier's overall safety condition simply based on the 

data displayed in this system. Unless a motor carrier in the SMS has received an 

UNSATISFACTOR Y safety rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or bas otherwise 

7 
110 


Insert offset folio 69 here 75852.069

been ordered to discontinue operations by the FMCSA, it is authorized to operate 

on the nation's roadways. 

Eighteen months atter this settlement, the long awaited rulemaking which would atlc)l'd 

critics of SMS methodology an opportunity to discuss their concerns has not been forthcoming. 

SMS methodology remains a work in progress, with the Agency selectively tweaking its severity 

weightings, its peer groups, its BASIC categories and charging its Motor CatTier Safety Advisory 

Committee with recommending additional changes. 

ASECTT submits that the results are in. As will be shown, SMS methodology, despite 

all the tweaking which can be done, cannot bc perfected to meet Congress' goals. More 

impoltantly, the collateral damage done by the Agency's publication of unvetted SMS scores, its 

touting of SMS methodology and its abdication of its own safety fitness credentialing 

responsibilities far outweighs any benefit for the reasons shown herein. 

Agency's Repudiation of its Statutory Duty to Cel,tify 

Carriers Creates Chaos for Shipping Puhlic 

SMS methodology has not been approved under APA for even the Agency's own use. 

Under 49 U.S.c. 31144 and 49 C.F.R. Part 385, FMCSA is required to issue safety fitness 

detenninations and to publish the ultimate findings upon which the consumer (shippers, brokers 

and freight forwarders) can rely with certainty, frec from the vicissitudes of state law or higher 

credentialing duties. The Commerce Clause, the legal doctrines of conflict preemption and field 

preemption, as well as the language of49 U,S.c. 14501(c) require no less. Yet, notwithstanding 

its statutory credentialing obligation and its express settlement in NASTe. v. FMCSA, the Agency 

continues to tout SMS methodology as fit for use by the shipping public in order to "raise the 

safety bar.". [t has undercut the effectiveness of its own safety fitness determinations and 

attempted to impose a higher and different standard upon the shipping, brokering and forwarding 

8 42W2021'SPJ!'i):'N!20If09101? 
111 


Insert offset folio 70 here 75852.070

community under fear of state law tort liability if a carrier they select has an accident while 

transporting their freight. 

The Agency's actions in this regard are contrary to its Congressional mandate and the 

requirements of the National Transportation Policy which instructs the U.S. DOT to take a 

balanced approach to regulation of interstate trucking and to consider efficiency. competition and 

the effect of its decisions on small carriers (49 U.S.c. 13 101 (b)(2)). The touting of SMS 

methodology as fit for use to shippers, brokers and carriers, already frightened by the prospects 

of vicarious liability or negligent selection suits, threatens commerce and the ability of the over 

50,000 carriers above one or more of the arbitrary SMS enforcement thresholds with loss of 

business, loss of revenue, higher insurance costs and bankruptcy. Current estimates, including 

one by Morgan Stanley, suggest that at least 55 percent of the shippers and brokers feci 

compelled to look at SMS percentile scores in making carrier selection -- thus making safety into 

a competitive game. not an objective standard which all otherwise qualified carriers can meet. 

Notwithstanding the settlement in NASTC el al. v. FMCSA. and despite the repeated 

formal and informal expressions of industry concerns to the Agency. FMCSA recently doubled 

down on its apparent doctrine ofSMS llber alles. On May 16,2012 the Agency published on its 

website a package of documents entitled "New Resources Available for Shippers. Brokers, and 

Insurers". Therein, the Agency made the following statements in the portion of that package 

entitled "Shipper and Insurer Briefing Memorandum" (emphasis supplied); 

Slide 9 NOles: 

A motor carrier that has received a compliance review from FMCSA and whose 

operations were rated at that point in time by FMCSA as Satisfactory or 

Conditional is authorized to operate in interstate commerce. That rating. with the 

date of the review, appears in SAFER. A Satisfactory or Conditional rating 

does not mean, however, that the public should ignore all other reasonably 

available information about the motor carrier's operations. CSA's SMS data. 

addressed lat."r in tbis presentation, are one of many possible resources that the: 

public can use to assess a motor cauier's ~i1J~!YJ!eriOn1)!!I-1Ce rce,:grsl· 

9 
112 


Insert offset folio 71 here 75852.071

Slide 10 Language. 

What are the limitations of SAFER and safety ratings? 

A Satisfactory safety rating does not mean carrier is currently in compliance 

and operating safely. 

Slide 13 Notes. 

SMS identifies about the same number of small carriers (7.4%) that SafeStat did 

(7.1 %). 

Slide 25 Notes: 

Questions that concem private litigation matters. such as claims for vicarious 

liability and negligent hiring. arc outsidc the scope of FMCSA's area of 

responsibility. CSA users are reminded, however, that although CSA is a new 

operational model, the data collected and analyzed in SMS are the same data as 

were publicly available online for 10 years through SafeStat. The SMS data are 

not a SFD, do not alter a carrier's safcty rating, and do not impact a carrier's 

operating authority. 

From the notes on the last page: 

FMCSA believes that an examination of a motor carrier's official safety rating in 

SAFER and their authority and insurance status on L&I, combined with their 

intervention prioritization status in CSA's SMS, provide users with an 

informed, current, and comprehensive picture of a motor carrier's safety and 

compliance standing with FMCSA. FMCSA encourages the public to use the 

FMCSA information available to help make sound business judgments. 

The quotations above suggest the Agency has repudiated its obligations under Section 31144 and 

has elevated SMS methodology to at least co-equal status with a final safety fitness 

determination. By internet publication it has effectively created a new rule and a new burden on 

brokers contrary to its broker regulations at 49 C.F.R. 371. 

ASECTT submits that the issues posed by the May 16 documents are Ilotjust cosmetic 

tweaks to a perfeeti ble methodology. There are principial issues involving the role of federal 

regulation and the effectiveness of the Agency's safety fitness determination based upon 

objective standards in certifying carriers as safe for the public to use for the protection of the 

shipping as well as the traveling public. 

10 ·P,9292 IISPil "556/1101 'Of) 101 ~ 
113 


Insert offset folio 72 here 75852.072

It was for these reasons that ASECTT along with four other trade associations and 12 

named petitioners instituted new litigation against the Agency on July 16, 2012 in ASECD' el al. 

v. FMCSA (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Case No. 12-1305). 

That petition was filed within the deadline prescribed by the Hobbs Act in order to challenge the 

Agency's de facto rule adopted in the above-quoted May 16 pronouneements. This de facto rule 

was summarily announced without due process to shippers, brokers and insurers. It in effect 

repudiated the effectiveness of the Agency's statutory duty to certify carriers as safe to operate, 

exposing the shipping public to the vicissitudes of statc law and negligcnt selection suits. 

ASECTT maintains that the SMS methodology, in its current form, cannot be approved even for 

the Agency's own use in celiifying carriers as safc. Much less can tbe Agency be allowed to 

place a duty on every shipper and broker to make independent safety fitness detenninations using 

SMS methodology under peril of vicarious liability under state law. 

Such state-law exposures are precluded by federal preemption under the Commerce 

Clause of the Constitution of the United States, as well as by statute and regulation. The entire 

history of federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce confirms that federal law trumps state 

law. This was made clear as early as 1324 by Cbief Justice Marshall, speaking for the United 

States Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. 1, who held that the federal government, not 

the States, was responsible for regulating interstate commerce and credentialing carriers for use. 

In the public interest and for thc purpose ofnationalunifonnity. the FMCSA and its 

predecessor, the fonner Interstate Commerce Commission, have been charged with the sole 

responsibility for determining carrier fitness. Under the doctrines of implied preemption and/or 

field preemption (through FMC SA 's adoption and implementation of comprehensive motor 

carrier safety regulations). the federal rules arc intended to occupy the field of carrier safety and 

to prevail in any conflict lVith state law. 

II ·1~J9291 I/SI'/I'1556/)}0 \/00101! 
114 


Insert offset folio 73 here 75852.073

Congress did not change the applicable federal statutes governing safe operation of 

commercial motor vehicles as part of deregulation. In fact, the safety statutes establishing the 

Agency's sole credentialing obligation remained unchanged, and a 1994 statute (now codified at 

49 U.S.c. l4S01(c) confinned with express statutory preemption that freer competition as to 

routes, rates and services was not intended to limit field preemption or to permit expansion of 

state law causes of action in the field of commercial motor carrier transportation. 

Elsewhere in Title 49 of the U.S. Code, Section 31144 makes clear that FMCSA, through 

delegation of authority vested in the Secretary of Transportation, is solely responsible for 

credentialing motor carriers as safe to operate under objective criteria established by regulation. 

Under section 31144(b) (emphasis supplied), the Agency must "maintain by regulation a 

procedure for determining the safety fitness" of a motor carrier. Under section 31144(a) 

(emphasis supplied), the Agency must "make slIch final safety fitness determinations readily 

available to the public." Thus, the Agency must make a "final" safety fitness detemlination 

available to the public as a single-source validation of the calTier's credentials, and this 

detenninationmust be made pursuant to a "regulation." Yet, the Agency on May 16 purported to 

dilute the validity and preemptive effect of its own safety fitness detcnninations under its 

existing, APA-compIiant regulations, and indeed abdicated its statutory duty as the sole 

dctemliner of motor carrier safety fitness. 

Svstemic Problems and Flaws in SMS Methodology 

The following problems, data and statistical flaws in SMS methodology have been 

presented to the FMCSA in the past, both fonnally and informally. In the absence of formal 

rulemaking, the Agency has chosen not to address these issues. In July of 20 II, the Agency 

requested the submission of comments to its Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee 

CMCSAC'), noting that the Committee was to makc only limited changes and was not chargeJ 

12 
115 


Insert offset folio 74 here 75852.074

with "reinventing the wheel." Attached as Appendix C are the Comments filed by ASECTT with 

MCSAC on July 28, 20 II. 

Whilc MCSAC's report, released in December, did not address all of the issues ASECTT 

raised, it did highlight data quality issues relating to SMS. Page 2 of the report noted that 

"violation severity weights" in SMS methodology" should be based on data reflecting the 

relationships between individual violations and crashes," stated that the committee "did not havc 

such data," and warned that "[a]n approach to the assignment of iSMS] severity weights based 

on observations and opinions may ultimately result in BASIC scores that do not closely 

correspond to crash risk." 

At a hearing requested by the Small Business Administration on February 14,2012, 

similar problems with SMS methodology were presented to the Agency by several members of 

ASECTT, and by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. The Agency listened 

but no alTirmative action was taken. 

Ultimately the Agency did recognize the need to review some severity weightings and 

make other limited adjustments to its methodology in its Dockct No. 2012-0074 (opened on 

March 27, 2012), but it has yet to undertake a comprehensive data quality review of SMS with 

full public input under APA rulemaking procedures. In response to FMCSA's request for 

informal comments in Docket No. 2012-0074, however, ASECTT did filed Comments on July 5, 

pertinent portions of which are attached hereto as Appendix D. On August 28, the Agency 

announced a series of minor "enhancements" to its methodology, some of which will not be 

effective until December of2012. Once again, however, the Agency did not address the 

substantive issues raised by ASECTT and detailed herein. 

13 
116 


Insert offset folio 75 here 75852.075

1. SMSJ'ActhociQlQgy is Not Comp~_hensive 

As noted earlier, the hC" in "CSA" no longer means "Comprehensive." This re-Iabeling 

of the program by FMCSA speaks volumes. Although Congress directed the Agency to devise a 

system for establishing a safety rating of all 600,000 carriers - a goal affirmed by the Agency in 

2008 - the facts today are that fewer than 100.000 of the 600.000-plus known carriers are 

publicly measured in even one BASIC, and fewer than 12percent are evaluated in all 5 published 

BASICs. The Agency professes to have data on 200,000 carriers or approximately one-third of 

its regulated universe, but that data has not been made public. 

2. SMS PercentileJ~allkings Have No Proven COlTelqtion to Safety. As 

Representative DeFazio correctly pointed out two years ago. SMS methodology cannot be used 

to provide safety fitness determinations unless it is shown to be an accurate predictor of calTier 

safety. The long awaited University of Michigan study was not published until 5 months after 

the Agency published its percentile rankings and has been much criticized. Wells Fargo 

conducted two independent studies and concluded, "Quite simply, we found very little 

relationship (i.e .. not statistically significant) between Unsafe Driver or Fatigued Driver scores 

and actual Accidents per Power Unit." 

The Iyoob study shows that the Agency's rcliance on statistical avcraging of carrier 

performance at each percentile ranking is an invalid measure of carrier safety performance which 

is of little or no value in determining carrier safety fitness. See Appendix D. 

3. SMS Methodologv Unfairly Prejudices SmallCalTicrs. The motor calTier 

industry is a small business success story. The vast majority of registrants, or well over 98%, are 

small businesscs under SBA standards. As a statistical matter, a small carrier that is subject to a 

limited number of inspections is subject to the "law of large numbers." under which limited data 

docs not result in an accurate assessment of performance. The Gimpel study (see Appendix D) 

14 
117 


Insert offset folio 76 here 75852.076

clearly shows the prejudicial enect of3MS mcthodology in that regard and has not been 

challenged by the Agcncy. The effect of SM3 methodology on small businesses has recently 

been considered by the Small Business Committee and attached as Appendix E is a letter to 

Administrator Ferro from Chairman Graves of that Committee addressing SMS problems in that 

context. 

(a) Gr<.lding on a Curve. Under existing law, every carrier is entitled to be 

assessed on objective, consistent performance standards. SMS percentile rankings grade carriers 

on a curve under 7 BASICs, each with an arbitrarily determined percentile threshold for 

perfonnance deemed acceptable by the Agency. The system also assigns carriers to ten peer 

groups that purportedly are based on type of operation, miles traveled and/or number of 

inspections. As initially envisioned and promoted by the Agency, the artificial percentile 

thresholds would be established for the Agency's use in further monitoring, but in effect 

publication of these percentile rankings with an Alert or now the "golden triangle" symbol ("'Lb.") 

is intended by the Agency to publicly identify and brand carriers as "high safety risks". Like a 

game of Survivor or perhaps more precisely, Dancing With The Stars, those carriers who 

perfoml poorly in one of the publicly disclosed BASICs are to be voted out of business as a 

result of non-usc by shippers afraid of vicarious liability. 

The anti-competitive effect of grading on a curve and publicly failing half of the carriers 

that are measured is profound when, based upon the SMS methodology, over fifty percent of the 

carriers currently certified as safe to operate on the nation's roadways by the Agency are 

nonetheless compromised by the "'goldcn triangle" in soliciting and handling trame. 

(b) Enforcem<;J1.lAnom!llif.~. One of the criteria for challenging the validity of 

any study in court under the Daubert standard cited in Appendix D is (0 show that countervailing 

factors taint the statistical analysis. SMS methodology is contaminated by geographical and 

15 
118 


Insert offset folio 77 here 75852.077

enforcement anomalies which cannot be easily extricated from the data. The enforcement 

policies of 50 different States fced the Agency's weighted data bank for SMS, yet for the 

purposes of statistical ranking, carriers are compared regardless of local enforcement anomalies 

in their States of operation. For example, SMS data shows that 5 states (Indiana, Michigan, New 

Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Texas) account for 46 percent of the speeding tickets and warnings 

which Iced the Unsafe Driving BASIC. To the FMCSA's credit, it recently announced that in 

December 01'2012, two years aner SMS scores first became public, it will try to compensate for 

this anomaly by reducing the points for speed warnings, but the solution is imperfect. 

Other anomalies still exist and are unaddressed. As one example, Louisiana has a bounty 

on failing to wear seatbclts and the Driver Fitness BASIC measures so few calTiers that I or 2 

violations can brand a catTier domiciled there as a higher safety risk. As another example. 

V chicle Maintenance violations have been selected lor heavy enforcement in Texas and 

Alabama, and the heaviest point accumulators in the Vehicle Maintenance BASIC are non-out of 

service items for which there is no demonstrable safety impact, yct carriers domiciled in those 

states are unduly prejudiced in this BASIC. 

4. Flawed ~nd (lTele,vant Da!;!. 

(a) Crash Indicator BASIC. Nowherc is the effect of l1awed and 

contaminated data more apparent as an indictment of SMS methodology than in the "crash 

indicator" BASIC. While ASECTT agrees that accident data is important in assessing any 

ultimate cOlTelation between carrier roadside compliance and safety performance, the question is 

"which accidents?" SMS data includes as part of the carrier profile both preventable and nonpreventable accidents. All parties agree that inclusion of non-preventable accidents in raw motor 

calTier data distorts any assessment of carrier accident culpability by 300% to 400%. Under 

existing FMCSA rules assigning safety ratings ancr an audit, a carrier can prove non16 ,1:V)2n I '.-;1-'1) ~556i!~{)1 il<)!() I 2 
119 


Insert offset folio 78 here 75852.078

preventability on an accidcnt-by-accident basis and if it reduces its preventable crash ratio below 

1.5 preventable accidents per million miles, it will not be placed out of service. 

A similar methodology cannot be adopted, however, to cal! balls and strikes on all 

crashcs involving motor carriers annually. Although the Agency, under extreme pressure from 

all credible stakeholdcrs, has committed to establish an administrative procedure to accomplish 

this task, the cost and efficiency of fairly determining all such crashes nationwide has not been 

calculated. Under current methodology, when SMS methodology is run by the numbers, 

thousands of small carriers which have never had even a reported fender bender are profiled as 

high risk carriers and branded as unfit for use. If preventability is ever taken into account there 

will be even less data to feed the methodology and if SMS methodology alone were used, as the 

Agency originally proposed, one accident could drive an unsatisfactory safety rating for most 

small carriers. 

(b) Hours of Service Violations. As the eharts accompanying the Iyoob study 

clearly show, the correlation betwcen crash preventability and percentile ran kings in unsafe 

driving or fatigued driving with respect to any particular carrier, belies any argument that these 

acute BASICs arc predictors of future crashes. Over 50% of the points chargeable against 

carriers in this BASIC result from paperwork errors (either form and manner or last change of 

duty violations) which only carriers who maintain paper logs can accumulate. Yet carriers which 

use paper logs are peer grouped with carriers that operate with electronic on-board recorders 

(EOBRs), and with carriers that are not required to log at all. The resulting anomalies defy any 

demonstrable correlation between percentile rankings and crash predictability in this Agencyproclaimed "acute BASIC". 

Ironically, if and when all carriers are required to purchase electronic on-board recorders. 

the number of hours of service violations measured by the SMS system will drop precipitously, 

17 
120 


Insert offset folio 79 here 75852.079

yet under its existing methodology 35% of the carriers measured will still be branded as high 

safety risks. 

5. Due Process and Data Quality. Clearly, the data which fccds SMS methodology 

is insut1icient to accurately measure and rate carrier perfornlancc, and thc SMS methodology for 

manipulating this data has not been vetted in accordancc with the requirements of the 

Administrative Procedure Act. On this basis, ASECTT and others have voiced due process 

conccrns concerning the methodology, its enforcement and its appeals process. 

(a) Profiling. As a result of SMS methodology, each measured carrier is 

given a so-called ISSP score which is used by scale house inspectors to profile carriers for 

inspection. As a result, small carriers who are currently unrated and carriers who exceed a 

particular threshold are targeted for inspections and identified as potential "bad actors" to be 

given hard looks and more than a cursory inspection. Because SMS methodology, unlikc 

SafeStat, includes as violations a large number of discretionary non-out of service violations. 

profiled carriers tend to pick up even more violations than the non-targeted carriers with which 

they are compared. 

(b) Peer GrQ1lQ Creep. In a majority of the BASICs, percentile rankings are 

established on the basis of safety event groupings. The more inspections a catTier gets, the 

bigger and more substantial the peer grouped carriers with which it must compete. As a result of 

this peer group creep, carrier can find their scores increasing 20% to JO% without any additional 

violations. Small carriers with less than 10 trucks can be stopped at the scales 10 to 15 times 

more often than larger fleets with lower percentile rankings. 

(c) Barriers to Data Challenges. The Agency's "DataQ" process refers any 

written petition back to the State for a response. Although a law-enforcement group called the 

Commercial Vehicle Satety Alliance, to its credit, is working on some efforts at uniformity. a 

18 42W?92 1 "SPii S556!!20110910!2 
121 


Insert offset folio 80 here 75852.080

number of States leave the appeal up to the en/()rcement oftlcer who. in his or her own eyes, is 

seldom if ever wrong. ASECTT can fUl1her document from several States that DataQ challenges 

will not be honored even when the carrier is proven not guilty in a court oflaw for the violation 

that was cited. 

CONCLUSION 

Despite eight years in the development stage. SMS methodology has not met its stated 

goals. In an effort to capture more data to rank more carriers and meet the goals of a 

"comprehensive" safety analysis, the Agency expanded its number of major metrics from four to 

seven, including three new metrics or "BASICs" which each measure less than 5% of the carriers 

the Agency regulates. In the five published BASICs the system can still only measure 100,000 of 

the 600,000 carriers. and is now contaminated with numerous non-out of service violations with 

even less proven correlation to safety than the much criticized SafeStat system it replaces. 

Small carriers, which make up the vast majority of the regulated carriers, are prejudiced 

by the methodology due to the law oflarge numbers, are profiled for extra scrutiny and have 

been targeted for extra inspection and have been publicly branded by the Agency's touting of 

SMS methodology as fit if not required for use by the shipping public. 

The principial question asked by Representative DeFazio remains unanswered. How can 

the Agency publish and advocate a percentile ranking of carriers when there is 110 credible 

evidence to support the conclusion that safety perfornlance is actually measured? In its zeal to 

heighten the safety bar, the Agency has (1) overlooked its important obligation to encourage 

efficiency, competition and small businesses under the National Transportation Policy; (2) 

ignored the warnings of its own Inspector General in 2003 as well as its own Motor Carrier 

Safety Advisory Committee in December of 20 II: and (3) has in effect abdicated its 

19 
122 


Insert offset folio 81 here 75852.081

responsibility to make safety fitness determinations under existing law upon which the shipping 

public can rely. 

In response to the anticipated Agency pronouncement that SMS methodology works 

because deaths involving commercial motor vehicles were down last year, ASECTT submits an 

article written by its President Tom Sanderson as Appendix F. The motor calTier industry 

consistently performs in a safer manner year after year under existing statutes. Any effort to 

attribute 2011 results to SMS methodology is misleading and inappropriate. 

ASECTT does not oppose the goal of progressive intervention or more el1icient use of 

Agency resources to work with carriers to improve highway safety. The focused audits the 

Agency proposed in its 2008 Federal Register Notice were portrayed as a more efficient 

replacement for fiIlI-fledged compliance reviews which took 3 to 4 work days. Nonetheless, the 

focused review of Colonial, a carrier with a crash ratio of less than a third of the ratio which 

would trigger an Unsatisfactory safety rating under current FMC SA regulations, took 14 work 

days and is hardly an exemplar that the SMS system meets its goals. Sec testimony of Ruby 

McBride prepared for this hearing. 

Maybe it is time for the Agency to consider a better alternative, a simple annual or biannual audit of all carriers using objective standards, funded by a modest registration fee and 

conducted by state partners and outside contractors. This, ASECTT submits, is a viable 

alternative to traditional compliance reviews, but would still allow for an objective detailed audit 

of carriers found to be most in need of intervention. See Appendix G. 

This proposal would result in an objective evaluation of all carriers, would restore the 

confidence of the shipping community in the Agency's ultimate safety fitness detemlination, and 

would eliminate the devastating collateral damage that publication ofSMS data is causing the 

surface transportation industry. 

20 Ci9?92 I '~1'1\5'i56'1?Ol,tl<)1!)1.: 
123 


Insert offset folio 82 here 75852.082

APPENDIX A 
124 


Insert offset folio 83 here 75852.083

Brandon Fri-ed is: the exemtive director of the U5, r\lrfo[l;varders Association 

Credentials for truckers p'rotect forwarders 

I

f. a speeding trucker making a pick 11P for a forwarder 

gets in a wreck, chances are that not only the motor 

carrier~ but also the forwarder) wHJ be sued. 

Highway acrjdent victims are already successfully holding property brokers and shippers liable for the 

negligent conduct of their selected motor carriers and 

forwarders could easily be next. These "negligenl·selection" luw"uiLs often allege that the 

suItjng prejudicial effect on safe carriers bnmded under 

SM3 methodolo"V. 

Critics of the SMS methodolo"V contend that there is no 

proven correlation between traffic violations --- warnings 

and dtatiollS, on the one hand, and safety. on the other. In 

fact, recent report issued by Wells Fargo could not :find 

a meaningful statistical relationship between a carrier's 

actual accident inddence and the 

freight intemlCdiary, when choos- BASIC scores. 

ing the motor carrier, failed to 

heed adverse safety da.tu) including scores maintained by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance, 

Safety! Accountability program on 

m.otor cuniers operating trucks in 

excess of 10!000 pounds. 

are successfully 

Attorneys Daniel R. Barney 

and Nathanial G. Saylor recently 

wrote that because the CQIll"tS are 

nonetheless allowing SMS information into evidence) forward·" 

ers selecting motor carriers to 

perform pick ups) deliveries or 

long-haul ground moves should 

"sLrongly consider adopUng motor carrier selection criteria." 

They contend that establishing 

a reasonable selection protocol 

could go a long way toward protecting forwarders and their 3PL 

holding property brokers 

and shippers liable for 

the negligent of The scores) derived from traffic 

citations, cl'ashesj and other roadside inspecLion data; are reported 

under sevel't Behavioral .Analysis 

and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs), which include Imtheir selected cal'~ 

riel'S - and forwarders 

could 

safe driving, fa.tigued driving, and driver fitness. 

Some say that more, than hall' of the carriers have concerning sc.ores in at least one of these categories. One carrier's representative recently described the situation as 

"rocket fuel" for plaintiffs' attorneys. Forwarders may [md 

themselves defending negligent selection claims as a result 

of a lnlCker's excessive scores. 

A lawsuit recently filed by the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and CompeUtive Truck Transportation, [;.Ogcther with 

numerous other plaintiffs, challengeR the federal govern~ 

menes use of its own agency publication descrihin.g available resources for shippers, brokers and ll1sufcrs. The publication includes FMGSA's Safety Measurement System 

(8MS) as a resource, and the organization has previously 

recognized and affirmed it' statutory duty to make a safety 

fitnBss determination upon which brokers and shippers 

could rely. The plantiffs contend, then, that FMSGA is "b· 

dkating jts safety fitness obligations to the shippe.r and 

broker community, and they havk; no concern for the rc-

.45 SEPltMBfR 2012 ACW 

next. 

counterparts from liability. 

Any selection pfDto-colj they say, should also cheek for 

a earrier's active operating authorit,YJ l"'MeSA "Satisfa-ctmy" safety rating (which exists separately from ehe GSA 

3cores), and liability insurance. 

The government has an inherent responsibility to credential motor CID.'TicI'S) ai.rlines and other public utilities [or 

our safe usc. Deputizing f{)r~rardf'xs) third-party intermediaries and Shippers to assist in the obligation undermines 

the mMdate by forcing ,hmn to make Iitness determinations using a potentially fiaw"Bd and llilprovcn scoring sys·· 

tem. This dra,qs freight transportation purchasers jnto a 

fisk-laden situation, where picking the wrong option could 

render them and our mition's commerce losers in lhc process. 

Still, until the 113, Congress conects the situ!ltjon, 

forwarders can and flhould help themsc]ves limit their 

-exposure to potentially devastating lawsuits by adoptin,g 

reasonable canit~r selection protocols. A(W 
125 


Insert offset folio 84 here 75852.084

APPENDIXB 
126 


Insert offset folio 85 here 75852.085

Memorandum U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: Audit Report on Improvements Needed 

in the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement 

System 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

MH-2004-034 

From: Alexis M. Stefani/4--k ~ ~ Principal Assistant Inspector General 

for Auditing and Evaluation 

To: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrator 

Date: February 13, 2004 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JAAO 

This report presents the results of our audit of the Motor Carrier Safety Status 

Measurement System (SafeStat). An executive summary of the report follows this 

memorandum. 

Our objectives were to determine whether the: 

SafeStat model is valid and whether the scores calculated arc consistent with 

the model's design. 

• data used by SafeStat are complete, consistent, accurate, and timely. 

• data quality control systems are adequate to ensure information quality for 

intended uses. 

We found that SafeStat generally calculated scores consistent with its design, and 

a 1998 study supported the model's validity. However, the model needs to be 

revalidated because changes have occurred since the earlier study, and more 

sophisticated analysis, not previously conducted, would optimize the model's 

effectiveness. Moreover, we found material weaknesses in the SafeStat data 

reported by states and motor carriers and with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration's (FMC SA) processes for correcting and disclosing data problems. 

Consequently, while SafeStat is sufficient for internal use, its continued public 

dissemination and extemal usc require prompt corrective action. Improvements in 

the model are important, but getting better data is essential. 
127 


Insert offset folio 86 here 75852.086

2 

A draft of this report was provided to FMCSA on December 10, 2003. In its 

comments, FMCSA agreed with our concerns for improving data quality and cited 

a number of improvements already implemented or ongoing to address the 

recommendations in the report. The improvements reported included: 

• hiring a contractor to conduct a new study to revalidate the SafeStat model; 

• implementing an improved system for tracking public challenges to the 

accuracy of SafeStat data; 

• providing SafeStat users with comprehensive information on data limitations; 

• assigning staff to review monthly state reports that address state data quality 

issues and to work with the states to resolve them; 

• establishing goals for completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of data; and 

• making state grant funding contingent on participation in certain data quality 

programs. 

In commenting on the findings in the draft report, FMCSA did not agree with all 

of our assertions as to the impact of data quality problems on SafeStat. 

Specifically, FMCSA commented that the language in the draft report overstated 

the problem of out-of-date census data on SafeStat. FMCSA also disagreed with 

any implication in the report that some motor carriers who are categorized by 

SafeStat as high risk, may be categorized as high-risk carriers only because of the 

existing data problems. 

We appreciate FMCSA's positive response to our recommendations and have 

revised the final report to recognize corrective actions that have been taken or that 

are ongoing. We do not agree that the language in the draft report overstated the 

problem with out-of-date census data, and we have provided additional 

information on the issue in this final report. 

On the question of whether some carriers may be categorized as high-risk only due 

to the existing data quality problems, we agree with FMCSA that data quality 

problems are more likely to make a high-risk carrier look good. However, we 

continue to maintain that the opposite situation can also occur. Because SafeStat 

scoring involves a relative ranking of one carrier against another, missing data 

may place a lower-risk carrier in a deficient category because data for a higherrisk carrier is not included in the calculation. Missing crash data were most 

significant with six states failing to report any crashes for the 6 months analyzed. 

Nationwide, estimates for the underreporting of large trucks involved in crashes 

varied in magnitude with some states underreporting by 60 percent or more and 

other states underreporting by less than 20 percent. 
128 


Insert offset folio 87 here 75852.087

3 

The eXlstmg data quality problems should not prevent FMCSA from using 

SafeStat as an internal dccisiornnaking tool. However, while the data used for 

SafeStat calculations are sufficient for internal purposes, if public dissemination of 

SafeStat results is to continue, the data must meet higher standards for 

completeness, accuracy, and timeliness. 

We request that within 30 days FMC SA provide clarifications and target 

completion dates for several planned actions, as noted in the attached report. In 

instances where we are in agreement on the corrective actions and target 

completion dates are provided, the recommendations are considered resolved 

subject to the follow-up provisions of Department of Transportation Order 

8000.1C. 

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of representatives from FMCSA, the 

Volpe Transportation Systems Center, state government offices, and motor carrier 

companies during this audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, 

please call me at (202) 366-1992 or Debra Ritt, Assistant Inspector General for 

Surface and Maritime Programs, at (202) 493-0331. 

Attachment 

# 

cc: National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator 
129 


Insert offset folio 88 here 75852.088

APPENDIXC 
130 


Insert offset folio 89 here 75852.089

July 28, 2011 

Comments to the Motor Carrier Safetv Advisory Committee 

COMES NOW, the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation 

(ASECTI) the undersigned and files this its comments to the Motor Carrier Safety 

Advisory Commitftee (MCSAC) based upon the Notice which appeared in Transport 

Topics on July 4, 2011 and states as follows: 

Petitioner's Interest 

The Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation is a nonprofit 

corporation formed for the purpose of ensuring a balanced regulatory approach to 

highway safety, ensuring that efficiency and competition is not sacrificed due to overregulation which has no demonstrable safety benefit. 

ASECTI is composed of interested carriers, brokers, shippers and allied industry 

participants which are committed to working with the U.S. DOT and the FMCSA to 

enhance highway safety while confirming that as the regulating body, the Federal 

Government certifies carriers as safe to operate on the nation's roadways, affording 

regulated carriers due process and the shipping public certainty that carriers certified as 

safe by the Agency may be chosen for use based upon routes, rates and services, and 

without vicarious liability concerns under differing and inconsistent state law principles. 

ASECTI calls for a critical analysis of the FMCSA's so-called CSA 2010jSMS 

methodology prior to its implementation in accordance with the statutory requirements 

of the Administrative Procedure Act. Its members are concerned that while SMS 

methodology is a work in progress, portions of it have been released to the public 

without proper vetting, including but not limited to, the most basic scientific and 

statistical studies necessary to justify a nexus between the compliance violations 

measured in each of the so-called 7 BASICs and crash predictability. 

ASECTI questions the viability of replacing objective safety standards applied after 

compliance reviews with percentile rankings and artificial peer groups as a satisfactory 

safety rating methodology. 

ASECTI questions whether any system which arbitrarily concludes that a significant 

portion of the motor carrier industry should be labeled as marginal should be affirmed, 

particularly in light of the effect of SMS methodology on efficiency and competition and 

job creation. 

ASECTI is committed to a thoughtful and critical review of SMS methodology through 

the administrative process, in the court of public opinion and through Congressional 

oversight of the Agency's mandate under the National Transportation Policy with a view 

to ensuring that the benefits of heightened competition envisioned by deregulation of 

the motor carrier industry are not damaged as an unintended consequence of an 

unproven activist safety methodology. 
131 


Insert offset folio 90 here 75852.090

Background 

Attached hereto as Appendix A is the article which appeared in Transport Topics to 

which this official comment is directed. Therein, it is reported that the MCSAC has been 

tasked by the Agency "to make sure that the paints the Agency assigns to dozens of 

violations under the [CSA] program are fairly weighted so they are an accurate 

predictor of carriers' crash risk. The committee is expected to report back to the 

FMCSA by the end of August." 

MCSAC has been asked by the Agency "not to reinvent the wheel" but to "redefine the 

CSA's controversial carrier safety measurement system and help the agency gain 

industry support for the system that went into operation in December." 

Petitioners submit the MCSAC has been charged with an impossible task. Petitioners 

submit that SMS methodology is systemically flawed and that the MCSAC cannot be 

charged with designing an effective safety fitness determination system in two months 

simply by removing the most obvious warts in the severity weighting schema. 

Adjusting Severity Weightings 

MCSAC has been tasked with the impossible job of adjusting severity weightings to 

reflect carrier safety fitness. The long awaited University of Michigan Study which the 

Agency has touted from the outset as the basis for the alleged safety compliance/crash 

causation link has yet to be released and there is no scientific predicate or basis for 

MCSAC to make informed decisions. 

Some things are obvious, though, even to the untutored. To the Agency's credit it 

recognizes that, notwithstanding its "sophisticated" "statistical regreSSion computer 

analysis and expert review," its violation weighting system remains untethered from 

any realistic measure of safety. After working on violations and algorithms for two 

years, the Agency made 800 changes last August to its safety weighting procedures. 

Scores fluctuated wildly and upon public release of the methodology in December, the 

flaws in the weighting mechanism have become readily apparent and include: 

1. Identifying Crash Preventability. MCSAC cannot correct this glaring error. 

The Agency's attempt to use DataQ is not feasible given its budget because the obvious 

necessity of calling balls and strikes, with due process, involving hundreds of thousands 

of aCCidents yearly. How do you avoid crippling overhead and distinguish between 

preventable and non-preventable crashes while establishing due process? 

2. Measuring Paperwork Compliance, Not Fatigue. In the so-called fatigued 

driving BASIC, half of the accumulated points arise from form and manner violations in 

preparing paper logs resulting in improper comparisons of carriers with EOBRs and 

carriers with manual logs. Is MCSAC to recommend that form and manner violations be 

excluded from the Agency's algorithms with respect to fatigued driving, both 

prospectively and retroactively? 

2 
132 


Insert offset folio 91 here 75852.091

3. Enforcement Anomalies in the Unsafe Driving BASIC. In the unsafe 

driving BASIC, state enforcement anomalies and the probable cause effect results in 

improper peer group comparisons which cannot be eliminated by merely restructuring 

the pOints assigned for speeding. Ameliorating the severity of speed warnings does not 

address the inequity of grouping carriers in probable cause states with carriers in 

jurisdictions which write ten times fewer tickets. 

4. Absence of Driver Qualification Data. This BASIC presents wild swings in 

carrier peer group rankings and is predicated largely on the failure of a driver to have a 

medical card on his person - hardly an accident causing event. CVSA is scheduled to 

vote on making failure to have a medical card in a driver's possession an out of service 

event! Is failure to have a medical card in a driver's possession, if the driver is 

medically qualified, a measure of crash likelihood? 

5. Severity Weighting in Vehicle Maintenance Does Not Reflect Critical Safety 

Issues. In the vehicle maintenance BASIC, non-out of service violations are significant 

point accumulators. On what basis is MCSAC to determine whether missing light bulbs 

on trailer running lights cause crashes? 

SYstemic Flaws Which MCSAC Cannot Address 

Petitioners submit that SMS methodology is systemically flawed and cannot be 

remedied by cosmetic changes to severity ratings within artificially created BASICs. 

Among the systemic flaws in SMS methodology, MCSAC cannot address the following: 

(1) Artificial Peer Groups. Carriers are placed into arbitrarily created peer 

groups for the purposes of ranking. No correlation or justification for arbitrarily 

grouping carriers by size, number of miles, or number of incidents for purposes of 

percentile ran kings has been shown or justified. (In artificially creating five separate 

peer groups for carriers with 30% straight trucks in August, many OTR carrier scores 

were substantially reduced while regrouped OTR carriers placed in the local "non 

logging" class saw their scores jump over the limbo bars without a single additional 

infraction.) 

Petitioners submit that safety fitness determinations cannot be made by "grading 

on a curve" using a statistical system which arbitrarily assigns unsatisfactory or 

"marginal" safety ratings to carriers regardless of their individual performance or 

improvement. Petitioners submit that such a system can garner neither industry nor 

court approbation. 

(2) Artificially Constructed Limbo. Bars. SMS methodology is based upon 7 

defined BASICs, none of which has been shown to have any substantial correlation to 

safety. Furthermore, artificial enforcement thresholds based upon percentile rankings 

have been established which have no proven correlation to safety. It is capricious on 

its face to conclude that a carrier at a 66 percentile ranking in a given BASIC should be 

rated as "marginal" while a carrier rated at 64 percentile in the same BASIC is given a 

"continue to operate" rating. 

3 
133 


Insert offset folio 92 here 75852.092

(3) Due Process Concerns. SMS methodology is based upon citations, not 

convictions, and upon total number of crashes without reference to preventability. In 

order to assure data accuracy under the Data Quality Act, it is imperative that there be 

a uniform administrative adjudication process if unscrubbed violations are to ultimately 

result in determining whether a carrier can continue to operate. DataQ does not 

accomplish this result with consistency or predictability. In some instances, 

adjudication of citations are not even considered by state officials. 

(4) State Law Enforcement Anomalies. Although the harshness of state law 

enforcement anomalies may be ameliorated by downgrading warnings and citations, no 

system which assigns safety ratings based on comparing carriers which operate under 

different state regimes can be justified as equal treatment under the law. 

(5) Profiling and Peer Group Creep. In order to obtain sufficient data to rank 

more and more carriers and to selectively target carriers for increased inspections using 

SMS, the Agency has targeted carriers labeled as "bad actors" under its unproven 

methodology for additional inspections. These additional inspections of carriers shifts 

carriers from one peer group to another, resulting in wild swings in carrier percentile 

rankings which have little to do with the actual points accumulated. This systemic flaw 

cannot be ameliorated by changing point allocations. 

(6) Insufficient Data. The Agency is charged with measuring and rating 

483,000 carriers. SMS measured approximately 97,000 carriers in at least one BASIC 

when implemented in December and the numbers for March suggest that the Agency 

has sufficient data to measure at most 19% of the carriers it regulates in any BASIC 

(vehicle maintenance) and less than 5% of the carriers it regulates in 4 of the 

remaining BASICs (cargo, driver fitness, crash and substance abuse). See chart at 

Appendix B. Nothing MCSAC can suggest will address this under-reporting problem or 

result in a comprehensive safety analysis for the missing unscored and unmonitored 

motor carriers left out of the SMS system 1 

(7) The Law of L1!IflliJ'lJJmbers. An elemental principle of statistics is that 

conclusions about general performance trends can only be accurately predicted based 

upon a large number of reported incidents. No trend lines are possible under SMS 

methodology when predicting carrier performance based upon only a handful of 

inspections, violations or incidents. Over 95% of the carriers regulated by the FMCSA 

are small business enterprises operating less than 5 trucks which are inspected only a 

handful of times per year. In many of the BASICs there are simply no recorded 

violations and a single violation such as the absence of a medical card can result in 

huge percentile leaps. The Agency's own data and the absence of sufficient data to 

measure the vast majority of carriers in the BASIC areas proves that the system 

devised by the Agency is Simply statistically inadequate to perform the intended task of 

providing a safety rating, much less a statistically accurate one, of all of the half million 

carriers regulated by the FMCSA. 

1 The attached scores for John Davis Trucking Company, Inc., the 67 unit DOT authorized 

carrier who hit the train in Nevada demonstrates pOignantly the inadequacy of the Agency's 

collected data. See Appendix C. 

4 
134 


Insert offset folio 93 here 75852.093

Changing violation pOints will not result in filling in the lacuna of data necessary to 

statistically measure carriers or accurately predict performance. When a single 

additional violation in the small carrier grouping can result in 20 or 30 point jumps or 

going from unrated to marginal or unfit as the result of a single incident, the system is 

tragically flawed and cannot be remedied. 

Maybe the SMS Wheel Does Need Reinventing 

SMS methodology is not the law. Existing regulations under 49 C.F.R. 385 remain in 

place and the motor carrier industry has the enviable record of reducing highway 

fatalities to their lowest numbers in 35 years. SMS methodology has yet to be justified 

as consistent with the National Transportation Policy. No consideration to its effect on 

efficiency and competition has been offered. The correlation between compliance and 

safety has not been demonstrated with respect to the systemic structure of SMS 

methodology, much less the violation ratings. 

The MCSAC should not be used as a lobbying group to convince industry of the merits 

of SMS. 

In Executive Order 13563, President Obama put a freeze on any new rules until the 

effect upon small businesses and competition was analyzed. Moving ahead with SMS 

methodology without this analysis is improper and inconsistent with the Administrative 

Procedure Act. The angst within the shipper and broker community over the vicarious 

liability implications of SMS, although abated by the settlement in NASTC et al. v. 

FMCSA is real and has yet to be addressed by the MCSAC. 

In conclusion, Petitioners submit that adoption of SMS methodology as a new saFety 

fitness rating is not a fait accompli which can be cosmetically altered to result in a 

sound, efFicient, fair and effective safety rating methodology for 500,000 regulated 

motor carriers. Unmeasured and as yet unconsidered is the effect of the intended 

program upon competition and efFiciency within the industry, the shipping public and 

the mandates of the National Transportation Policy. The ambitious deadlines 

established by the Agency for submitting SMS methodology to OMB, and release for 

public comment strongly suggest that the Agency has not fully considered the issues 

raised in these comments or the devastating collateral damage which implementation of 

SMS methodology will have on the motor carrier industry, the shipping public, and 

small businesses in particular. Please see the attached statements by industry 

members in support of Petitioners' position. 

MCSAC cannot don judicial blinders, ignore these Fatal defects and conclude that with 

minor alterations SMS methodology is fit for its intended purpose. It is often charged 

with reflecting the concerns of the industry and aSSisting the Agency in making good 

policy. 

5 
135 


Insert offset folio 94 here 75852.094

APPENDIXD 
136 


Insert offset folio 95 here 75852.095

Comments in Response to 

"Improvements to the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) 

Motor Carrier Safety Measurement System (SMS)" 

Docket No. FMCSA 2012-0074 

Submitted by the Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck 

Transportation (ASECTT) 

July 5, 2012 

SELECTED PORTIONS 

SMS Methodology is Systemically Flawed 

Why CSA/SMS Methodology is Not a Significant Improvement Over SafeStat 

Why SMS Methodology is an Inaccurate Reflection of Carrier Safety Performance and 

Prejudices Small Carriers 

Three Studies: 

Wells Fargo, "CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions" (July 2012) 

Inam Iyoob, "BASIC Scores are Not Valid Predictors of Crash Frequency" 

James Gimpel, "Statistical Issues in the Safety Measurement and Inspection of Motor 

Carriers" 
137 


Insert offset folio 96 here 75852.096

July 5, 2012 

IV. Why SMS Methodology is Systemically Flawed 

The systemic flaws in SMS methodology and its percentile rankings of calTiers are well known 

yet nnaddressed by the Agency. At the Agency's request, comments on this methodology were 

submitted to its handpicked Motor CalTier Safety Advisory Committee last summer by numerous 

parties, including ASECTT. J At the Small Business Administration Roundtable held on 

February 14,2012, representatives from OOIDA and ASECTT identified substantial issues as 

welJ2 

These unaddressed issues beg careful, well reasoned answers the follov;ing questions: 

1. LACK OF OBJECTIVE STANDARD. Why should the Agency abandon an 

objective audit, and the due process procedures afforded carriers under CUlTent statutes, to 

embrace a safety fitness determination that grades carriers on a curve using percentile rankings -

thereby branding innocent carriers as increasingly "high safety risks" regardless of their 

objective performance? 

2. DATA NOT COMPREHENSIVE. How can SMS methodology be touted as a 

"comprehensive safety analysis" when, just as in SafeStat, the vast majority of the carriers the 

Agency oversees have too few data points (infractions or inspections) to be ranked? 

3. ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT PERCENTILES. Do the intervention threshold 

percentiles have any value in establishing whether a carrier is ultimately safe or nnsafe to operate 

on the nation's roadways? 

4. CRASH PREVENTABILITY IGNORED. \Vhether the Agency's inability or 

unwillingness to address crash preventability so taints SMS methodology and its evaluation of 

carrier performance that, absent a carrier's right to contest preventability, the direct or indirect 

use of un scrubbed crash data to measure carrier performance is statistically invalid. 

5. LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS. Whether, as Professor Gimpel suggests, the data 

available for use in SMS methodology is insufficient to permit an adequate analysis of small 

carriers. 

6. NO PROVEN PERCENTILE RANKINGS/SAFETY NEXUS. Should percentile 

rankings be used in whole or in part to decide a carrier's fitness in light of the Wells Fargo study 

and Dr. lyoob' s more comprehensive analysis of individual carrier crash ratios by percentile? 

7. GEOGRAPHICAL ANOMALIES. How can SMS possibly be touted as a 

reliable nationwide indicator of comparative safety performance when SMS data is no better than 

the widely varying enforcement practices of 50 different States plus the District of Columbia? 

(E.g., 5 states account for 43% of the violations recorded in the "Unsafe Driving" BASIC.) 

I See Exhibit 2 attached hereto, "Comments to the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee." 

'See Summary of ASECTT issues presented al that time attached as Exhibit 3. 

3 
138 


Insert offset folio 97 here 75852.097

July 5, 2012 

8. IRRELEV ANT PAPERWORK VIOLATIONS. Does the Fatigued Driving 

BASIC actually reflect driver crash susceptibility when over 50% of the points result from 

paperwork violations (form and manner and last change of duty status) which are not incurred by 

peer grouped carriers that are not required to maintain paper logbooks? 

9. NON OUT-OF-SERVICE VIOLATIONS. Does the Vehicle Maintenance 

BASIC accurately measure carrier crash susceptibility when over 50% of the accumulated points 

are assigned to non-out of service items such as trailer lights, brakes and tires? 

10. PROPOSED INCLUSION OF FLAWED DATA. Can the dubious validity of the 

Vehicle Maintenance BASIC be improved by including unscrubbed points formerly incurred in 

the securement BASIC, which even the Univcrsity of Michigan has concluded did not have any 

correlation to safety? 

II. UNTESTED NEW BASIC. Is it proper to develop and include a new seventh 

BASIC for "Hazardous Materials" without thoroughgoing analysis and rulemaking? 

12. PEER GROUP ANOMALY IN HAZMAf. Whether the proposed Hazmat 

BASIC unfairly brands general commodity and intermodal carriers as high safety risks due to 

minor paperwork infractions, without capturing the actual perfonnance of carriers transporting 

more dangerous toxic, flammable, explosive and radioactive material. 

13. LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT MINOR BASICS. Whether the failure of 

the Agency through the Volpe Center or the University of Michigan to present a study showing 

any strong compliance safety component in Vebicle Maintenance, Driver Qualification, Drug 

and Alcohol or SecurementlHazmat, destroys the marginal utility of measuring these BASICs. 

14. INSUFFICIENT DATA. Whcther the Driver Qualification and Drug and Alcohol 

BASICs measure too few carriers to be statistically relevant. 

15. ISOLATED OCCURRENCES' EFFECT ON SCORES. Whether the most often 

cited violations in Driver Qualification (no medical card in possession, driving on suspended 

license for non-safety reasons, and drug and alcohol testing of missed random test of particular 

driver due to inadvcrtence) are violations with any proven correlation to safety. 

16. SPECI.AL PEER GROUP ISSUES. Whether intermodal drayage carriers' scores 

can possibly be considered accurate in the Vehicle Maintenance BASIC due to profiling and the 

inability of the Agency to hold Intermodal Equipment Providers (IEPs) accountable for proper 

preventive maintenance. 

17. PROFILING AND PEER GROUP CREEP. Whether SMS methodology affords 

carriers due process given the effect of profiling through the targeting of carriers under 

inspection and resulting peer group creep. 

4 
139 


Insert offset folio 98 here 75852.098

July 5, 2012 

18, DUE PROCESS ISSUES, Whether carriers are denied due process when state 

enforcement officials refuse to acknowledge court dismissal of reported violations by removing 

them from records underlying the BASIC scores, 

19, CIRCUMVENTION OF RULEMAKING, Whether the Agency can ignore the 

current statutes and regulations requiring it to make a safety fitness determination under uniform 

and objective standards, and instead publish "Guidance" to shippers and brokers repudiating the 

effectiveness of the Agency's own safety fitness determination, 

20, PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF SFDs UNDER SECTION 31144~ Whether the 

Agency's safety fitness determination was intended by Congress to have preemptive effect, and 

whether the Agency can waive its statutory duties by implicitly suggesting to shippers and 

brokers that they must make independent safety fitness determinations using SMS methodology 

under peril of suits under state law for vicarious liability and negligent selection, 

21 , ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS CRITERIA. Whether the monitoring 

thresholds and peer groups established by the Agency behind closed doors are arbitrary and 

capricious, 

22, STATISTICAL FLAWS, Whether the use of "inspection values" at roadside 

targets carriers for inspections, thereby destroying any comparison of carrier performance based 

upon a random statistical analysis, 

23, WlDE MONTHLY FLUCTUATION OF SCORES, Whether wildly fluctuating 

scores due to peer group anomalies permit any meaningful use of percentile rankings by the 

Agency or shippers and brokers in making a safety fitness determination3 

24, EFFECT OF COMPLIANCE REVIEW, Whether a satisfactory safety rating 

based upon a compliance review should render any SMS score based upon prior violations 

irrelevant 

25, DATA QUALITY ACT ISSUE, Whether the Agency can release percentile 

rankings based on flawed and inaccurate data such as non preventable accidents which it knows 

are substantively inaccurate, 

26, EFFECT ON SMALL CARRIERS, Whether the Agency should be touting SMS 

as a fait accompli when it has not analyzed the compliance cost or the effect on efficiency or 

competition, 

3 ASECTI can show that a single safety event can result in a 40% increase in a BASIC for a 400 tmck fleet the 

adding or subtracting of a truck can result in a 20 point fluctuation in Unsafe Driving, and that slUall fleets with no 

SMS scores can go from unrated to 80% based upon a single inspection, 

5 
140 


Insert offset folio 99 here 75852.099

July 5, 2012 

VI. ARGUMENT - LEGAL AND FACTUAL ANALYSIS 

*** 

D. Why CSAJSMS Methodology is Not a Significant 

Improvement Over SafeStat 

On February 13,2004, the Office ofInspector General of DOT issued a report entitled 

"Improvements Needed in the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measuring System.,,4 This report, 

which identified critical flaws in the SafeStat system, was prepared at the request of 

Congressman Petri, Chair of the House Subcommittee with jurisdiction over the FMC SA, and 

resulted in Congress' directive in SAFETEA-LU that a new comprehensive safety analysis 

program for certifying safety fitness be instituted. 

Eight years in development, the unvetted CSA/SMS methodology made public by the Agency, 

while attempting to remedy the t1aws noted by the IG Study in SafeStat, is in reality no more 

comprehensive in its scope or better in accurately predicting high risk carriers. It contains the 

same systcmic problems as SafeStat. 

1. The IG Study "found material weaknesses in the SafeStat data reported by states and 

motor carriers and with the [FMCSA's] processes for collecting and disclosing data problems."s 

ASECTT has pointed out similar material weaknesses and data t1aws including geographical 

anomalies, under-reporting, profiling, peer group anomalies and inconsistent treatment by states 

of DataQ issues which has similarly not been addressed prior to release of SMS methodology. 

2. The Inspector General concluded, "While SafeStat is sufficient for internal use, its 

continued public dissemination and external use require prompt corrective action. Improvements 

in the model are important but getting better data is essential. ,,6 

In this regard, ASECTT submits that SMS methodology gets more data, but arguably less valid 

data, than SafeStat. SafeStat measured carriers in four areas Crashes, Driver, Vehicle, and 

Safety Management. 

SMS methodology has added three additional areas of measurement but its efforts to get more 

comprehensive data have proven counterproductive. Driver Qualification, Drug and Alcohol and 

the soon to be replaced Securement BASIC each measure less than 5%ofthe Agency's census 

and have no proven strong correlation to safety fitness performance. 

Moreover, the IG's directive that "getting better data is essential" has not been carried out. 

SafeStat was predicated on out-of-service violations, yet SMS methodology is based largely on 

non-out of service violations with less of a proven safety nexus. Here are other specific 

examples of ongoing data quality problems: 

'See Executive Summary of Report MH2004-034 attached as Exhibit 9. 

5 See U.S. DOT Office oflnspector General Memorandum dated February 13, 2004 attached as Exhibit 10. 

6 Exhibit 10, p. 3. 

6 
141 


Insert offset folio 100 here 75852.100

July 5, 2012 

(a) The problem of bad crash data has not been addressed - Over 60% of the reported 

crashes are not the carrier's fault, yet are included in each carrier performance data. 

(b) Unsafe Driving with the inclusion of speed warnings and the geographical 

anomaly (5 states write 46% of the violations), the data quality issue in this BASIC remains 

unaddressed. 

(c) Fatigued Driving- Under SMS methodology, over 50% of the accumulated 

points are forn1 and manner or other paperwork violations which are not out of service issues or 

evidence of exceeding the hours of service or fatigue. 

(d) Vehicle Maintenance - N on out of service issues such as tires, brakes and trailer 

lights account for 50% of the points. 

(el 

BASIC: 

Driver Fitness - An AT A white paper issued in June 20 I 2 concluded of this 

"Agency officials point to merits of identifying carriers with patterns of violations 

in the [category of Driver Fitness 1 even though these violations don't bear a 

relationship to further crash risk.,,7 

Crash 

Rate 

(JagrBlef 

fOOPU) 

Driver Fitness BASIC 

Percentile Ranking 

3. While the FMCSA did not agree with the [G's assertion as to the impact pf data quality 

problems on SafeStat, the [G has continued to maintain that data quality issues should be 

addressed before data of this type is made public: 

"The existing data quality problems should not prevent FMCSA from using 

SafeStat as an internal decision making tool. However, while the data used for 

SafeStat calculations are sufficient for internal purposes [i.e. determining who to 

7 AT A White Paper, 6/20/2012. 

7 
142 


Insert offset folio 101 here 75852.101

July 5,2012 

audit] if public dissemination of SafeSt at results are continued, the data must meet 

higher standards for completeness, accuracy and timeliness. ,,8 

The Agency has made SMS methodology publicly available and touted its efficacy even though 

shippers, brokers and carriers have shown how publication brands innocent carriers as unfit for 

use. 

In court pleadings and its settlement ofNASTC, supra, the Agency initially appeared mindful of 

the IG's position when it represented that SMS methodology would be used for its own internal 

purposes and was not a new or different safety credentialing standard intended for use by the 

shipping public. However, the Agency's May 16th guidance to shippers and brokers stands in 

stark contradiction to the IG's directive that higher standards for completeness, accuracy and 

timeliness are required. 

SMS methodology has not even been tested under the AP A to meet the standard for the 

Agency's own use. It certainly does not meet the "highest standard" set by the IG Study for 

public dissemination. 

ASECTT can demonstrate that since SMS methodology went public, 51.3% of the carriers 

branded as a high safety risk under SMS methodology have received satisfactory safety ratings 

under existing law and regulations. 

4. Issues as to completeness of the data persist with CSAlSMS. The IG study found 

645,551 active interstate carriers of record in 2003 and that the Agency had sufficient data to 

compute a value in 1 of 4 safety areas for 170,000 carriers. Thus under SafeStat the Agency 

could measure 26% of carriers in at least one of four safety evaluation areas. Eight years later, 

even after adding hundreds of new non-out of service violations as point accumulators, the 

Agency currently computes a value in one or more of the five reported BASICs on only 91,000 

carriers (or 12% of its census). 

Arguably, SMS measures fewer carriers than SafeStat using less credible violations. Yet, the 

branding of carriers is more pronounced. 

The Inspector General concluded, 

"Consequently, while SafeStat is sufficient for internal use, its continued public 

dissemination and external use require prompt corrective action." (Executive 

S=ary, p. 3.) 

"Because carrier safety data and the model's ranking are publicly disclosed, a 

higher standard of quality must be met to ensure fairness to motor carriers who 

may lose business or be placed at competitive disadvantage by inaccurate SafeStat 

results. FMCSA will need to demonstrate timely improvements ifit is to continue 

to publicly disclose carrier results across all SafeStat categories." (Executive 

Summary, IV.) 

, See Memorandum, Exhibit 1 0, p. 3. 

8 
143 


Insert offset folio 102 here 75852.102

July 5, 2012 

The Agency has repeatedly refused to consider the consequences of unfairly publicly branding 

carriers under SMS methodology even though carriers' percentile rankings are subject to wild 

fluctuations which have little or nothing to do with the carrier's safety performance. Under SMS 

methodology, carriers do not control their destiny. One member of ASECTT which operates 

over 500 trucks states: 

"Last month, the only change in om crash records resulted from a nonpreventable accident when a car ran into the back of om truck which was stopped 

at a red light. Om scores in "Unsafe Driving" went up 25 points." 

ASECTT can document numerous other examples involving large as well as small carriers where 

a single misplaced medical card, one missed child support payment, or the addition or deletion of 

a single truck from its census has resulted in radical percentile increases or branding under 

published rankings. 

Clearly, the premature publication ofunvetted CSAlSMS methodology together with the 

Agency's publication of its May 16th guidance has exacerbated the problems of SafeStat and has 

not addressed the "competitive disadvantages," "elemental fairness" and "loss of business 

issues" which in large part sank SafeStat in Congress' mind. 

SafeStat identified 7,821 carriers for potential audit on the Agency's A and B list. SMS brands 

approximately 53,000 carriers (or over half the carriers it can rank) as in need of "further 

monitoring" based on an unvetted methodology not certified under the AP A as fit for even the 

Agency's own use. 

Worst of all, the Agency has now ignored the IG expressed concerns about SafeStat and has 

doubled down on the fears of industry. By telling the shipper and broker community that SMS 

methodology has the same merit as its safety fitness determinations, the Agency has placed 

53,000, over 6 times as many carriers at a "competitive disadvantage" threatening each with 

"loss of business." The Agency "continues to publicly disclose carrier results across five SMS 

BASICs without demonstrating any improvement, Data Quality Act compliance or APA 

approval. 

It has ignored the warnings of the IG report and substituted a new standard to be enforced by 

shippers and brokers abandoning the objective safety fitness standard the Agency is required to 

issue and publish by statute.9 

In conclusion, after 8 years of development, SMS methodology is not a material improvement 

over SafeStat. It still unfairly brands carriers and its prematme publication does not answer the 

concerns noted by the Inspector General in directing that SafeStat be modified or replaced. It is 

time for the Agency to consider some objective new proposal which would meet Congress' goal 

of a "Comprehensive Safety Analysis" and allow the Agency to make an objective safety fitness 

9 See article by Paul Stewart, "A Commentary: The Perfect Storm: Schramm Decision, FMCSA, and an Impossible 

Duty for Brokers and Third Party Logistics Companies," published in the Journal of Transportation Management, 

Vol. 22 No.2 FalllWinter 2011 attached as Exhibit 11 (reprinted with permission). 

9 
144 


Insert offset folio 103 here 75852.103

July 5, 2012 

detennination of all carriers. ASECTT suggests that the alternative set forth in Section set forth 

in the Gobbell Affidavit attached as Exhibit 7, is an idea whose time has come. 

E. Why SMS Methodology is an Inaccurate Reflection of Carrier Safety 

Performance and Prejudices Small Carriers (Three Studies) 

1. SMS methodology has no proven correlation to safety 

The efficacy of SMS methodology must stand or fallon the Agency's ability to demonstrate a 

provable nexus between its intricate algorithms and imperfect measurement of roadside 

compliance and safety predictability. 

In advising shippers and brokers to use SMS methodology, the Agency concludes: 

"Internal, external, and independent (University of Michigan's Transportation 

Research Institute) evaluations have all shown that, of the six BASICs based on 

regulatory compliance (the Crash Indicator BASIC is based on actual crashes), the 

Unsafe Driving BASIC and the Fatigued Driving (HOS) BASIC have the 

strongest relationships to future crash risk." 

This conclusion has not been proven. The University of Michigan study which the Agency 

repeatedly cites (1) is based on now stale data; (2) only attempts to find a correlation to safety in 

two of the measured BASICs; and (3) is itself predicated on crash data which has a crash error 

ratio of over 60% due to the inclusion of non-preventable accidents in carrier statistics. Until the 

Agency can effectively scrub non-preventable accidents from its database, no statistical analysis 

will have any credibility. 

In a separate study by Wells Fargo, the 200 largest carriers for which there is actually sufficient 

data were measured. No perceptible correlation between safety and SMS percentiles was noted 

in Unsafe Driving or in Fatigued Driving, the two BASICs the Agency proclaims as most 

definitive. The Wells Fargo Study concluded, "Quite simply, we found very little relationship 

(i.e., not statistically significant) between Unsafe Driver or Fatigued Driver scores and actual 

Accidents per Power Unit." 

Months after release of the Wells Fargo study, the Agency attempted to re-substantiate the 

University of Michigan study in a paper devoted largely to touting the benefits ofprogressive 

intervention entitled "Review of Wells Fargo Equity Research Report on Compliance, Safety, 

Accountability." Its defense of that study is based upon two charts which average the crash 

ratios of all rated carriers at each percentile leveL Although the Agency claims the result 

contains data on all measured carriers, in fact, it shows an average trend line which is no 

predictor of the crash susceptibility of individual carriers. Conclusions about individual carrier 

perfonnance cannot be reached by percentile averaging of averages. 

10 
145 


Insert offset folio 104 here 75852.104

July 5, 2012 

2. Three recent studies challenge SMS methodology 

Whether under rulemaking, under the AP A, or in a judicial proceeding under Daubert v. Merrell 

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), a proponent of any hypothesis relying upon statistical 

data must submit the studies and design plan for peer group review and criticism. In its 

interactive program to create rulemaking by consensus, the Agency has ignored the criticism of 

its own Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee with respect to the prejudicial branding of 

carriers by SMS methodology and has not properly submitted its data and conclusions for critical 

review and assessment. 

Attached as Appendices A, B and C are three statistical analyses which call into question the 

Agency's basic premise that its complicated methodology accurately predicts carrier safety 

performance. Unlike the UMTRl, Volpe and Agency generated studies, these three documents 

focus on the effect of SMS methodology on individual carriers, not percentile averages and trend 

lines. 

Appendix A is a second Wells Fargo study released July 2, 2012 entitled "CSA - Another Look 

With Similar Conclusions" which reconfirms the findings of the earlier Wells Fargo study based 

upon a more extensive analysis of carriers measured under SMS methodology. The fact that the 

Wells Fargo studies could not verify the underlying assumptions of SMS methodology is fatal to 

any possible ratification of the program under the Administrative Procedure Act. 

Appendix B is a study performed for ASECTT by Inam Iyoob, PhD entitled "BASIC Scores are 

Not Valid Predictors of Crash Frequency" which shows the distribution of crashes per vehicle 

mile using the Agency's database for individual carriers in the two acute BASICs of "Unsafe 

Driving" and "Fatigued Driving". 

An examination of the study demonstrates that FMCSA's data cannot be used to predict the 

crash performance of individual carriers, even though the FMCSA claims SMS scores are 

correlated to the average crash frequency of hundreds of carriers at each percentile integral. 

Consumers of freight transportation do not select "average" carriers, they select individual 

carriers and the Agency study offers no proof that SMS methodology is a predictor of individual 

carrier safety performance at any percentile level. According to Dr. Iyoob: 

"I can't see any useful purpose in averaging the crash data of hundreds of carriers 

in each of 1 00 different percentiles and then calculating a regression of the 

average values. '" '" '" The purpose of regression analysis is to explain variation. 

Averaging hundreds of carriers at each percentile eliminates most of the variation 

in the data. It is not statistically accurate to say the SMS methodology and BASIC 

percentile scores are an accurate predictor of carrier safety predicated upon the 

crash data the Agency uses to justifY its conclusions. 

"Logically, unsafe driving and driver fatigue do impact crashes. However, the 

way the SMS BASICs Unsafe Driving and Fatigued Driving are captured, 

calculated and interpreted by FMCSA does not show any correlation to crashes. 

11 
146 


Insert offset folio 105 here 75852.105

July 5, 2012 

Hence usage of SMS data for carrier selection will unduly favor some and 

penalize others, and thus should be avoided." 

Appendix C is a paper entitled, "Statistical Issues in the Safety Measurement and Inspection of 

Motor Carriers" by James Gimpel, PhD, University of Maryland, which seriously challenges the 

efficacy and usefulness of SMS percentile rankings to predict carrier safety. Professor Gimpel's 

study is the first serious treatment of the structure of SMS methodology, its collection methods, 

systemic statistical errors and variables ignored in previous analyses. Importantly, the Iyoob and 

Gimpel studies substantiate and reconfirm the Wells Fargo conclusions across the broad 

population of small carriers measured under SMS methodology. These studies poignantly 

demonstrate the absence of sufficient, adequate and reliable data for the vast majority of small 

business enterprises which make up the motor carrier industry. The resulting wide variations in 

individual crash ratios at each percentile ranking for the two reported acute BASICs is fatal to 

the use of SMS methodology as anything more than a heuristic tool for monitoring by the 

Agency. It does not result in a system which either the Agency or a deputized shipper and 

broker community can or should consider in making safety fitness determinations. 

12 
147 


Insert offset folio 106 here 75852.106

THREE STUDIES 

Wells Fargo, "CSA: Another Look With Similar 

Conclusions" (July 2012) 

Inam Iyoob, "BASIC Scores are Not Valid Predictors of 

Crash Frequency" 

James Gimpel, "Statistical Issues in the Safety Measurement 

and Inspection of Motor Carriers" 
148 


Insert offset folio 107 here 75852.107

July 2, 2012 

Equity Research 

CSA; Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

An Expanded Dat'a<;et And Another Look Highlights CSA Problems 

Sector Rating: Airfreight & Logistics, Market Weight 

Sector Rating: Trucking & Intennodal, Market Weight 

Price FYEPS 

Company Name Rating 01/D'iI./12 2012E 2013E 

Airfreight & wgistics F"""'""",(FOX) 

UnitooPan:el Service, Inc. (UPS) Trucldng & Intermodal Arkansas Best Corp. (ABFS) 3 V 

C.H.RobinsonWorldwide;1nc. '2 

(CHRW) 

Con·.....ayInt..{CNW) 2V 

Heartland Express. Inc. (HT1.D) 

Hub Group, Inc. (HUBG) 

J,B.HuntTransportServiees,lnc. 

(""lIT) 

Kni,ght1hnspcrtation, Inc. (KNX) 

Landstat~Inc.(lSI'RJ 

Old Dominion Freight tine, Inc.. 

(ODFL) 

Ryder System, Inc. (R) 2 

SwiftTransportationQ),{SWF1) 1 V 

We:rJl«Enterprises,Inc.(WERN) 

$91·54 

78,6<) 

,,'" 

"'·Bs 

35·62 

35-74 "" 

59'3 

"''' 51.85 

444' 

3&,' 

, .. " "9' 

$645 A $7·24 488 5.39 

(o.oS) 0·53 

2.85 .24 

'·35 ~73 

0.85 0.94 

1.92 u, '.68 "" 0·95 L14 

'·78 SJo 

•. so 320 

'7' 4-" 0.82 1.10 

>.'" 1.8S 

FYP/E 

2013 

14.'" ~.'" 16.1X ".Ox 

NM ",.ox " . .,. IB.& 

" .. '"'' 16.Slr: 15·2:( , ... , IB.5J!; "'" 16.8x 14·m lB.7X '"'" ",,,,, 13·9'1: 

,.OX 8.'" 

~"" Sllx ,..'" ,,'" 

.5O<l=: Cbrn-""",!ld"fnnd WalIsF"'1'IIIS(J:I'rirN!..,J.LCCIlti>)IQ/£.~ J= a.rfJ'L...p,nn,~,. Mali<1 """forni, 3- 1hIJ..'I'J"'l"fo""'" 1/,. " .. ialTl<, 

.-\ .. ~J)Onll.l:,,)n d!, P,-""if~St<>ck l.W NA ~ Not ... ""tIObIo, He ~ N<>ClwI"Il"'. HE ~ No £sIbo,,,, .. NM R M>t AA."''''''W\lf 

• We continue to find the FMCSA.'s Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) safety 

progrnm problematic. Based on our research, we do not believe stakeholders 

should rely on CSA BASIC scores as an indicator of carrier safety performance or 

future crash risk. Fo1lowing our 11/4/11 report ("CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear 

Outcomes'') and a funnal response from the FMCSA (they disagree with many of 

our -findings), we have expanded our carrier dataset to the 4,600 largest North 

American (NA) trucking companies from the 200 we used in our 11/4/11 report. 

This 4,600 carrier dataset includes companies with a minimum of 25 trucks and 

those that have received a minimum of 50 inspections. In our view, this dataset 

enables us to capture both large and smaller camers as well as to ensure that the 

prescribed regulatory measures are represented and analyzed. In summary, the 

findings from the larger dataset strengthens our conviction in our earlier findings 

(i.e •• there is no meaningful statistical relationship between "poor" BASIC scores 

and accident incidence) and also demonstrates even greater dispersion in the 

intended :results and unintended consequences of the CSAmethodology, 

• -while most of the caqiers in our coverage universe are in oompliance, in our 

analysis, we identified several important inconsistencies. We found a wide and 

somewhat unexplainable range of inspection frequency among carriers. In tum~ 

because in~ction frequency affects productivity and since only one-third of 

vehicle inspections are free of violations. a potential "negative feedback loop" may 

be created. Lastly, while surveys suggest that both large and small carriers have 

applied resources towards CSA compliance, it is difficult for us to assess how 

shippers, drivers. insurance providers. etc. are treating the vast number of 

earners without a BASIC score. We are left to wonder jfnon-rated carriers will be 

"sh unned" and thereby benefitting our universe, or will stakeholders seek to avoid 

the ambiguities of the prescribed ranking methodology and punish our carriers? 

Please see page 18 for rating de:finitions~ important disclosures and 

required analyst certifications 

Wells Fargo. Securities, LLC does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. .As a result, investors should be aware that 

the finn may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of the 

report and investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making theirinvest.ment decision. 

Anthony P. Gallo, CFA. Senior Ana1yst 

(410) 625-6319 ! ant bon y.gallo@wellsfargo.com 

Michael Busche, Associate Analyst 

(704) 715-6406 ! m Ie had, busche@wellsfargo.com 

Together we'll go far 
149 


Insert offset folio 108 here 75852.108

Tl-ansportation 

Background 

WELLS FARGO SECURTI1ES, LLC 

EQUI1YRESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety .Msociation (FMCSA) introduced the nationwide CSA (Compliance, Safety, 

Accountability) safety program in December 2010. We believe the intent of the program was to reduce crashes, 

injuries and fatalities by utilizing a broader and more comprehensive data set to measure carrier and driver 

safety. In turn, this data could be used by FMCSA and carriers to take corrective action and to anow FMCSA to 

focus its resources on the more troublesome carriers and drivers. \Ve believe the idea was to identify behavioIS 

that were tllought to lead to accidents and to proactively address those behaviors before accident occurrence. 

The FMCSA collects data in order to assign a composite score in seven categories, five of which are made 

public.. Each category has numerous subcategories that are each prescribed severity weights. The aggregate of 

these weights results in a BASIC (Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories) srore for each 

category. Each BASIC has a corresponding '1imit" threshold whereby, if a carrier breaches, corrective actions 

must be taken to remedy the violations. Serious or persisteDt violations can result in enforcement actions 

against either carriers or drivers. There are as many as 695 possible violations that CSA can capture. 

In our 11/4/11 report, we examined the correlation between BASIC scores and accident incidence, which we 

measured on the basis of number of power units and million miles driven. We found no meaningful statistical 

corre1ation between BASIC scores and accident incidence. In that report we made several assertions as to why 

we beHeved BASIC scores may not be a good indicator of camer safety and why there was little correlation 

between actual accident incidences. On 3/16/12., the FMCSA issued a report directly addressing the findings in 

our report. We believe the report can b,e accessed at htto:!lcsa.fmcsa.dot.gov and we encourage readers to 

understand FMCSA's position on these important matters.. Further, now that the program has been 

implemented and running for some time, we would welcome a thorough independent statistical review of all 

the carriers in the mCSA database that goes beyond our 4,600 carrier dataset. 

Another Look And Similar Conclusions 

In an effort to ensure authenticity of our previous results and in light of some disagreement with our 

assessment, we felt it was important to broaden our dataset. Moreover, we increasingly find shippers, the legal 

and insurance professions, among others, struggling to understand how they should or could use GSA in their 

unique capacities. In our view, investors should understand the impHcations of this dynamic. 

The FMCSA grants carriers tegulatoIY authority to operate; there are no regulations that require shippers to 

utilize CSA in carrier selection. The FMCSA continues to publish Carrier Safety Ratings as "Satisfactory". 

"Conditional" or "'Unsatisfactory". In theory, therefore, it should be simple enough for a shipper to make a 

carrier safety decision based on the three FMCSA categories. Nonetheless, we find that shippers are using CSA 

in their carrier assessments even as they struggle to understand the legal implications ofthis. We note that a 

Q2 2012. Quarterly Expectations Survey by Transport Capital Partners found that 72% of their survey 

respondents reported at least some of their customers were concerned about CSA scores, which seems to 

confinn our observations. However, we find shippers and brokers struggling with the legal implications of 

using a carrier with. for example. a "'Satisfactory" carrier Safety Rating but an "Above Threshold" "Unsafe 

Driving BASIC". What are the ramifications if tha t carrier is subsequently invol .... ed in an accident? 

Overall, we find the CSAprogram and BASIC scoring methodology troubling for the following several reasons; 

1. We do not find any meaningful statistical correlation between BASIC scores and actual accident 

incidence measured on the basis of miles driven or number of power units in our 4,600 carrier 

dataset, 

2.. We find severa) aspects of data collection and BASIC scoring flawed, or potentiaUy misleading, 

3. We find it rather ambiguous of the FMCSA to assign percentile rankings and threshold maximums to 

carners in several BASIC categories but then leave open the interpretation of the carrier's overall 

safety performance to stakeholders (drivers, shippers, insurance providers. shareholders, employees). 

4. Systems such as the Inspection Selection System (ISS) prompt more frequent inspections for carriers 

with high BASIC scores but two-thirds of inspections result in violations potentially creating a 

"Regative feedback loop"'. More troubling, in our view, is the disparity betwe€n State enforcement 

protocols. 

Given the above, and because a large number of carriers are not even scored in the BASIC system or are only 

scored in one BASIC category, we are left to wonder if non-rated carriers win be "shunned" thereby benefitting 

the larger carriers in our research universe, or will the reverse occur as stakeholders seek carriers 'With no 

BASIC scores and therefore less ambiguity? 
150 


Insert offset folio 109 here 75852.109

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

No Meaningful Statistical Relationship In Our Larger Dataset 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

We increased our dataset from the 11/4/11 report to more closely aligrl with regulatory agencies demonstrated 

sample sizes, although we wanted to remain cognizant of the nature of our analysis. We are trying to assess if 

the new regulatory methodologies are, in fact, indicative of crash/safety performance. We recognize that 

investors are interested in carrier safety as it relates to costs, reputation and market share implications. 

Smaner carriers tend to be heavily represented in our 4.600 carrier dataset, which reflects the fragmented 

nature of the trucking industry. 

The FMCSA refers to attempts at identifying and resolving "systemic" safety problems, which we believe is 

most important considering our trucking coverage universe and investor profile. 'While there js a tremendous 

amount of individual driver data available because of the fragmented market, there is a much sma11er set of 

data available for carriers with 50 or greater inspections and a minimum of 25 vehicles in the fleet. We chose 

these mitigating variables to first ensure that there were enough inspections to accurately represent a carrier's 

safety and also to identify if "systemic" issues are identified (25 power units seems like a reasonable fleet size to 

incorporate "systemic" safety programs and also gave us a large enough sample set). 

In our view~ "too few" inspections (either favorable or unfavorable) attached to a single carrier represented 

insufficient data to accurately assess a methodology. Indeed, data with fewer than 20 observations is often not 

considered reliable fur statistical analysis. Limiting our data to those mitigating variables yielded a 4,600 

carrier dataset, which we feel is comprehensive enough to make broad-based market assertions, particularly as 

it pertains to our coverage universe and investor focus. 

In the FMSCA dataset as of March 2012. there were roughly 326,000 carriers of which 90,000 carriers had an 

SMS percentile score. However, there were 235,000 carriers who had zero scores and only roughly 42,000 who 

had 20 or more inspections. In other words, only approximately 13% of the carriers had the number of 

inspections (at least 20) that provide a sufficient number of observations (statistically speaking). This is a 

certain problem that stakeholders may have with CSA; only a small portion of the carrier popUlation is rated. 
151 


Insert offset folio 110 here 75852.110

Transportation 

WELlS FARGO SECURI'I1ES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

In the 3/14/12 FMCSA, report a University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRl) finding is 

cited showing a crash rate of 4.94X for carriers exceeding "any BASIC" compared to 2.09X for carriers 

exceeding "no BASIC". However, based on the chart above we have a strong suspicion that the 428.966 carriers 

with "no BASIC'" violation in the UMTRl study very likely had too few inspections to register a BASIC. In other 

words, they were not necessanly safer. It is more likely they had just not received enough inspections to 

register a BASIC score. A lack of inspection data and a statistically valid rate of inspections (i.e., at least 20) 

causes us to doubt the validity of the assertion that carriers above "Any BASIC Thresholds" were much more 

likely (4.94X vs.. 2...09x) to have accidents as compared to carriers "Exceeding No BASICs". While it may be easy 

to compare 4.94X to 2.09X. we think the conc1usion is misleading unless there were statistically sufficient 

inspection rates across the observable BASIC behaviors. 

If CSA BASIC scores were measuring the correct behaviors we would expect an identifiable relationship with 

crash rates and threshold GSA BASIC scores. We have not found those relationsbips. In the chart below we 

summarize the results of our carrier study. In the Unsafe Driving and Driver Fitness BASICs we observe only 

negJigjble differences between accident rates between «Above Threshold" and "Below Threshold" carriers. In 

the Vehicle Maintenance and Fatigued Driving BASICs we see a higher rate of accident incidences between 

"Above" and "Below" carriers. This suggests to us that the underlying components of Vehicle Maintenance and 

Fatigued Driving may have more relevance to safety than those in the Unsafe and Fitness categories. However, 

we do not believe they are meaningfully different as it relates to crash rate predictability. 

Note: Values are .statistlcal median 

Source: FMCSA, Well.s Fargo Securities, lLC 

Inspections tend to be triggered by a number of events. First, there are post·accident inspections. Second, 

enforcement agencies use systems such as ISS and the Aspen roadside inspection programs to identify carriers 

that have a violation history. Alternatively, in States such as California and New York that do not use Aspenl 

inspections are often prompted by either "obsenrable defects" or "probable cause", such as speeding or 

fonowing too close. As we discuss later in this report, "probable cause" restraints appear to prompt certain 

behaviors at the enforcement leveL 

We also ran a correlation analysis between the four BASIC categories and accident incidence on a mileage and 

per power unit basis. In the chart below we summarize our findings. We fOUJld the correlation between scores 

and crash rates to be weak or nonexistent in each of the categories. In other words, "above threshold" carrier 

rankings did not offer a statisticaHy different view on crash rates when compared to "below threshold" carriers. 
152 


Insert offset folio 111 here 75852.111

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

Note: Values are statlstfcal median 

Source: FMCSA, Wells fargo Securities, LlC 

Data Collection And Scoring 

WEUB FARGO SECURlTIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEP ARTMENf 

In the 3/14/12 FMCSA report, a UMTRI analysis is cited as showing a high statistical relationship between 

crash rates (per 1,000 power units) and Unsafe Driving BASIC (R2=0.6609) and Fatigued Driving Basic 

(R2=0.8276). We do not have access to the underlying data and we note the data was from a larger dataset than 

ours although from years 2008 and earlier. Moreover, it appears the correlation analysis was run afte.,. a 

carrier was first grouped with other carriers who had similar percentile rankings. Accordingly. the UMTru 

dataset of 42..595 carriers in the Fatigued Driver BASIC was reduced to a final dataset oftoo. Simply, a carrier 

that was close to the 1% mark was put in the "1% grouping", and so on. We could not find any statistical 

rationale for grouping carriers into percentiles. Indeed, the purpose of regression analysis is to explain 

variation. Conversely, we ran our analysis using each individual carrier's BASIC scores against each individual 

carrier's crash rates. We found very low R2 results and no meaningful relationships. A study by Inam lyoob 

(PhD in Engineering; Director of Engineering at Transplace.com) based upon the underlying data (i.e., not the 

consolidated percent:t1es) from the UM:TRl study obtained from FMCSA, was also not able to find a correlation. 

In the TranspJace study, the UMTRl correlations did not hold when the carriers were ungrouped from 

percentile rankings. 

We believe one of the main chanenges is that CSA is a Federal program but violations and inspections are 

completed at the State level. We have found that States have a wide variety of enforcement and inspection 

protocols and an individual carrier's exposure to particular States has the distinct possibility of influencing the 

BASIC scores, in our view. Moreover, the quality of State reporting on inspection data and crash reporting varies to such a degree that the FMCSA actually rates States as "Good", "Fair"' or "Poor" on the completeness, 

timeliness, accuracy and consistency of State-reported crash and roadside inspections. The UMTRl data was 

from the CSA Op-Test Model using 2008 and earlier data from four test States (Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, 

and New Jersey). Montana and Minnesota were added later. A February 2008 "snapshot" listed 26 States as 

"Good" (including the original test State of Colorado), 14 States as "Fair'" (including the original test States of 

Georgia and Missouri) and 8 States "Poor" (including the original test State of New Jersey). 

We find severnJ aspects of the crash reporting particularly troubling. First, is the admission by FMCSA that 

States have varying degrees of "completeness, timeliness, accuracy and consistency'" of crash reporting. Crash 

data seems like the most important piece of information in the entire CSA equation. Secondly, carrier crashes 

are recorded for purposes of CSA whether or not the carrier was at fault. We do not have access to the data that 

shows the large truck at-fault rate per se. However,looking at other data suggests that large trucks are often 

not at fault. According to a 2009 review of large truck crashes, the FMCSA notes that collisions with another 

transport vehicle was behind 75% offatal crashes and 67% of nonfatal crashes involving large trucks. Notably, 

in rear-end fatalities passenger vehicles struck Jarge trucks approximately four times more often than large 

trucks struck passenger vehicles. In head-on fatal crashes the passenger vehicle crossed the center line at 

Dearly five times the rate that the large trucks did. We do not mean to imply that a pHssenger vehicle is 

necessarily at fault when they rear-end a large truck. Rather, we think it is at least plausible to assume that an 
153 


Insert offset folio 112 here 75852.112

Transportation 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQID1Y RESEARCH DEP ARTII1ENT 

important percentage of the crash incidences captured in GSA are not the fault of the large truck. We note that 

the crash rates in the UMTRl study did not exclude no-fault accidents; thereby indirectly assigning 100% of the 

fault to the large truck. 

Truck driver and carrier behaviors have been assigned certain severity weights that were derived by 

quantitative analysis based on historical crash and roadside data. But the crash data is surely not the fault of 

the carrier 100% of the timet and therefore, we have to question the validity of the weighting. This may be at 

the very heart of the problem. If trucking behaviors were modeled against crashes and not an of the crashes 

were the fault of the driver or the carrier, "''6 wonder how the behavioral assessment can be accurate. This may 

explain why BASIC violations have not corresponded to crash rates. in our view. 

Passenger 

Large Truck 

Passenger Vehicle Center (Head"On) 

large Truck Striking Passenger Vehlcte (Other) 

Passenger Vehicle Striking large Truck (Other) 

other COlliSion 

Total 37. 

25.9% 

12;()9.?o,'· 

SOlJrce! National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Fatality AnalysIs Reporting System (FARS) 

As we discussed in our 11/4/11 report, we found disparity among inspection protocols and enforcement 

behaviors that vary by State and are unexplainable by measures such as traffic density or even carrier 

behaviors. For exampJe) VigiUo LLC) a leading consulting firm in the field. found that Indiana accounts fur 

35.5% of all nationwide "Unsafe Driving BASIC" violations for exceeding the posted speed by 1-5 miles per 

hour. As we understand it, Indiana requires "'probable cause" for an inspection. In another example. within the 

"'Fatigued Driving BASIC'" Arizona and Oregon captured 40.7% of the nationwide occurrences of "false 

logbook" violations. Other examples are highlighted below. We highlight the severity weights of each. 

$p".dlnog (1.5mi!.$ perb .... r) 

!V<2rRdNa!_\okWI~LII'$!rI£~B'lSC1~ 

Collateral Damage 

False Loglo .... k 

_"'t<II~ __ .... nGUEDM\lNGa<l9CT""'""'s. 

~i~ 

L~~~"-"'"~"''' _____ ._ . __ _ While we believe continuous safety improvements shou1d remain a primary focus of the freight transportation 

industry. particularly highway safety, the unintended consequences of CSA should also be addressed. We find 

commercial relationships are being affected and direct and indirect costs are increasing. We have already 

concluded that increased inspections may lead to higher BASIC scores because only one-third of all inspections 

are violation free. We worry that shippers making carrier selection decisions based on publicly available BASIC 
154 


Insert offset folio 113 here 75852.113

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

WELlS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

scores could potentially discriminate against certain carriers due to that carrier BASIC scores. We note that 

States with sea ports tend to have higher inspection rates as compared to non-port States. such that a carrier 

operating in a port area may tend to have scores that are not directly comparable to a carrier operating in a less 

inspection intensNe State. 

Further. insurance companies are using BASICs as benchmarks for risk evaluation and assigning premiums 

based on scores. Fundamentally, we support a safety monitoring system and the insurance implications one 

would bring, unfortunately we feel the GSA methodology is problematic as it stands by inaccurately assigning 

poor scores to otherwise safe carriers. 

Finally, the direct and indirect costs associated with compliance tend to favor larger more sophisticated 

carriers and appears to be somewhat inequitable to the smal1er operators. We note that in our 4,600 carrier 

dataset "'small" carriers Oess than 100 power units) tended to be inspected at twice the rate as larger carriers. 

While we do believe safety and risk management are at the forefront of trucking managers focus, the 

introduction of Pre-Screening Programs and other regulatory initiatives have both a direct donar cost and 

labor/hour commitment. Given the fixed cost nature of the programs and the much higher expense/employee 

characteristic.s of the smaner carner, a distinct advantage is offered to the large carrier as the costs and 

labor/hours can be accrued to both a largerfJeet and larger employee base. 

Lastly, we believe that the FMCSA has put significant resources behind the CSA program and substantial 

efforts have been put forth to improve highway safety. However, our analysis of the data continues to suggest 

that GSA BASIC scores may not be a reliable indicator of carrier safety or future crash risk. 

Carrier Comparison by Fleet Size 

1,500 

1,400 

t 1,200 

51,000 

'l;; 600 

~ '00 

~ 400 

200 

o+---.. ---c----.. OL----_,_~ 

lOOto249 L Above 1000 500 to 999 250 to 499 

Number of Truck$: in Fleet SO"'''"':FMCSA.Wolh:F.'lI"~ri!iM:,.L~C 

1,379 

., 

~I 

50 to ,. __ - __ ,_, •• -I 

Number of Number of Inspection per Inspection per 

Carriers Power Units mm miles Power Unit 

1.205x .589x 

1.509x .876x 

1.645x 1.026x 

1.892x 1.225x 

2.095x 1.529x 

2.930x 2.292x 

Total: 4,601 Median: 2.193x 1.587x 

Source: FMCSA. Wells Fargo Securities. LLC 
155 


Insert offset folio 114 here 75852.114

Transportation 

Supporting Charts 

WELlS FARGO SECURITIES. LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

As an example of the problems that we found with CSA BASIC scores, in the chart below we note that ODFL, 

WERN and MRTN each of similar crash rates (accidents per million miles). However. the "'Unsafe Driving 

BASIC" varies greatly by each carrier. 

i----~"~-· --::'~ide~;'~~~~iI!i~n Mlles~. Unsafe ~;~~~ BA-SI-C-------·-~"·--------; 

I f ~~·I---~---- ~ ill: 

~ :::.--. ,-,J"-,----_--c-'''-,---~. ,--_---o-'"'-r'''-,---_-,JO''--~ ~:% ~ 

/~~/'~/'/,/~/~/~,//,. I ..:?",o,~ ~ $0, #,,,,& ~iY v~.;t. 'Q.<-of.' ! _. ______ ._~_~!'~ts pEr_m_m_",_'''_~~_Un_''''_~~~~l1gsrore_______ , 

Using the same three carriers in the exampJe below. we note WERN and MRTN have relatively low "Fatigued 

Driving BASIC" scores but above-peer crash rates. ~-.-- -.-- --"_ ... 

Accident per Million Miles vs. Fatigued Driving BASIC 1 r 7D% 

.~ 60% ~ 5D% !n 

4D% ~ 

3D% 0 

___ __ 

:: II 

I In the chart below we note that JBlIT has a crash rate modestly above ABFS and KNX yet the latter two 

carriers have much higher "'Unsafe Driving BASIC" scores. 

.2~ , 

-"" 

. . 

"'" 

Top 20 N.A. Trucki"g Companies 

y. 

HOW . """ • 

• "" 

Unsafe Driving BASIC 

. 

"'" 

Stl.Q% I ______ J 
156 


Insert offset folio 115 here 75852.115

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

WEUB FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUTIYRESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

In the chart below we highlight that two of LSTR's operating companies were above the "Fatigued Driving 

BASIC" threshold but LSTR companies have among the lowest crash rates among peers. -~.-.-----.--.- --_._. __ . --

Top 20 N.A. Trucking Companies 

Top 20 N.A. Trucking Companies 

JO.O'l'o 

Unsafe Dri .... ing BASIC 

~~~~~~"--------------- ------------------

~ :: 

~ 2.51(' 

~2<~ 

~ 1.S~ 

:!i.1.01( 

.5 

0::wel:.443 

R:.f96 

Top 20 N.A. Trucking Companie$ 

. . ~ : 

80.0% 

0, 

0.0% 

-~--~~~---"- .-,..""----.~. __ .. ~~ ______ ___.__L_._. _____ _ 50.0% 60.0% 10.0% 

Fatigued Dri .... ing BASIC 
157 


Insert offset folio 116 here 75852.116

]0 

Transportation 

0nei!.024 

sO.Ox 1 R:.OO1 

.. 

;:;;:30.0>< 

" 

0% 

Carriers Above Unsafe Driver BASIC 

30" 60% 

Unsafe Driver BASIC 

carriers Above Unsafe Driver BASIC 

:. 

Carriers Above Unsafe Driver BASIC 

50% 

Unsafe Driver BASIC 

WELlS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

00" 100% 
158 


Insert offset folio 117 here 75852.117

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

~:.062 

50.0)(, ~:.004 

~'10.D)(' 

>: 

18.0. 

~ 16.0)( 

Iii 14.0:\ 

. 12.Ox ~ 

1:. 

~ • J 2.0)( 

Cbrrel:-.OO7 

R:.OOIJ 

" . 

,,% 

Carriers Below Unsafe Driver BASIC 

Carriers Below Unsafe Driver BASIC 

-. 

j " 

20% 30% 40% 50% 50"1. 

Unsafe Driver 8ASIC 

carriers Below Uns.;Jfe Driver BASIC 

40% 50% 60% 

Unsafe Driver BASIC 

WELlS FARGO SECURTI1ES, LLC 

EQllTY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

100% 

lOll% 

II 
159 


Insert offset folio 118 here 75852.118

12 

Transportation 

a:nel:.199 

fi:.04O 

Q;.m,l:.1lB2 

18.Cbc-jrf:.OO7 

~ 16,"] ~ 1<I.OX 

~ 12.OX 

§ lO.Ox! 

li. ""1 ~ 6.1))0;· 

~ MX'j 

~ 2.OX L

' .Ox. -- 00. 

QneI:.073 

7.OX R':.005 

~ 6.0x 

~ 5.0x 

~ c..4.0x 

li. 

c 3.Ox 

i200" 

~ LOx 

Carriers Above Fatigued Driver BASIC 

Carriers Above Fatigued Drlve~ BASIC 

I' 

E~ 

~ 

300/0 .0110% 50% 50% 

Fatigued Drive:r BAS1C 

Carriers AbDve Fatigued Driver BASIC 

.. 

" 

'. 

WELlS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

90% 100"Al 

'. " . " 
160 


Insert offset folio 119 here 75852.119

CSA: Another Look WIth Similar Conclusions 

G:Im!I:.202 

SO,OX: Ft;,Q41 

~ -to.Ox i E 

~30.Ox E 

~ 15.Ox 

~ 14,Qx 

~ 120>: 

§ 10.0>: 

~ '1.0x 

:t :t..Ox 

J), 

CQTeI:Jl61 

R:.OO4 

carriers Below Fatigued Driver BASIC 

''', " •. 50'" 

Drivl:r BASIC 

Ca,riecs Bel~~ FaugU~.d.~dJ BASIC 

... ., ... .. "''II- ..... ~ 

~~ :: 

0% 10% 20o/~ 30% -40% 60% 

&>",~~~~~.~~------. 

Carriers Below Fatigued Driver BASIC 

Fati!lued Driver BASIC 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUTIYRESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

._---_ .. __ ._---_ .. __ ._---' 

13 
161 


Insert offset folio 120 here 75852.120

Transportation 

Top 4600 Carriers Inspections per Million Miles 

sO.a.: 

30.0x 

Top 4600 Carriers Inspections per 100 Power Units 

18.[)x 

-- ----_. ----- TOp 4600 Carriers Accidents per 100 Power Units 

~~""'-~~~'~~'-- ._-----_._._--------_ .. -

14 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEP AR'IMENT 

Average:3,05x 

A~e:8.1Sx 

StaflO!lv! 5.71" 

j 
162 


Insert offset folio 121 here 75852.121

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

2S.DX'j 

lO.Dlt 

S.Qlt 

Ca.rrier Accidents per 100 Power Units "hove Unsafe Driver BASIC Threshold 

Median: 7,95lt 

Stan Del'; 5.97;c 

Carrier Acddents per 100 Power Units above Fatigued Driver BASIC Threshold 

Top 4600 Carriers Acdde:nts per Million Miles 

AVflT"ge:l.22x 

StaflDel';1.21l1: 

::::l.J 

0.-----------.• - _~I 

15 
163 


Insert offset folio 122 here 75852.122

16 

Transportation 

~O.OX 

6_'" 

r---

I 

15,Ox 

HI.Ox· 

5.0.11' 

WELlS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

Carrier Accidents per Million Miles above Unsafe Driver BASIC Threshold 

-------------------------- Carrier Accidents per Million MUes above Fatigued Driver BASIC Threshold 

Median: 1.0b: 

Stein Dev: 1,25x 

----j 

Median: 1.16x 

St.mD",": 1.25:.: 

! 

"_O'-li 

_,, ____ iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~;;;;;;;,;::::: 

QlfreI:.Ot9 

50.Cx fiI:.ooo 

" . 

Top 4600 N.A. Trucking Companies 

.. : . .. :~ .-: .' 
164 


Insert offset folio 123 here 75852.123

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

0:ml!:JlJ1 

so,0:<-,R':.001 

J:!40,0)<' 

" 

~ 10.0x 

~ a,o", 

~ Mx 

~ 2.0)( 

Clmri:.116 

R':.013 

UueI:.122 

IB.Ox R:.015 

~ 16.0:. 

~ 14,Ox 

~ 12.0x 

§ 10.0x 

g a.O;.: 

i 

~ 

0% 10% 

200/0 

2'" 

Top 4600 N.A. Trucking Companies 

Top 4600 N.A. Trucking com1anies 

," 

30% 

" 

so .. 

~ f ~. ~t+ 

Unsafe Driver BASIC 

50% 50% 

fatigued Driver BASIC 

7l'% 

,,% 

. ' 

" 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUTIY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

" . 

100% 

. " 

100% 

J7 
165 


Insert offset folio 124 here 75852.124

Transportation 

0:lrret:..301 

R:.OS1 

~:.290 

1.r)x i f/;.004 

'''' 

I certify that: 

Top 4600 N.A. Trucking Companies 

,', 

,,% ,,, .. Unsafe. Driver BASIC 

TOp 4600 N.A. Trucking Companies 

""' 

: 

.. 

WELlS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

.. " " 

,,% 100% 

Required Disclosures 

To view price charts for all companies rated in this document, please go to 

https:llwww.wellsfargo.com/research or write to 

7 Saint Paul Street, 1st F1oor, R.l230-01l, Baltimore, MD 21202 

ATIN: Research Publications 

Additional Information Available Upon Request 

1) All views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about any and all of the subject securities or 

issuers discussed; and 

2) No part of my compensation was. is, or win be, directly or indirectly. related to the specific recommendations or views expressed 

by me in this research report. 

J8 
166 


Insert offset folio 125 here 75852.125

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUIIT RESEARCH DEP ARTMENf 

• Wells Fargo Securities, LLC maintains a market in the common stock of Knight Transportation, Inc., Heartland Express, Inc., 

J.B. HUnt Transport Services, Inc .• Swift Transportation Co., Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., Werner Enterprises, Inc., Con-way 

Inc., Arkansas Best Corp., FedEx Corp., United Parcel Service, Inc., C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., Landstar System, Jnc., Hub 

Group, Inc. 

• Wells Fargo Securities, LLC or its affiliates managed or cofuanaged a public offering of securities for Ryder System, Inc. within 

the past 12 months. 

• Wells Fargo Securities, u.c or its affiliates intends to seek or expects to receive compensation for investment banking services in 

the next three months from Ryder System, Inc., United Parcel Service, Inc., FedEx Corp., Arkansas Best Corp., Old Dominion 

Freight Line, Inc., Swift Transportation Co. 

• Wells Fargo Securities, LLC or its affiliates received compensation for investment banking services from Ryder System, Inc. in the 

past 12 months. 

• Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and/or its affi1iates, have beneficial ownership of 1% or more of any class of the common stock of 

Lanclstar System, Inc., C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., Arkansas Best Corp., United Parcel Service. Jnc. 

• Ryder System. Inc. currently is, or during the 12-month period preceding the date of distribution of the research report was, a 

client of Wells Fargo Securities. LLC. Wens Fargo Securities, LLC provided investment banking services to Ryder System, Inc. 

• Ryder System, Inc., FedEx Corp,) Arkansas Best Corp .• Knight Transportation. Inc. currently is, or during the 12.-month period 

preceding the date of distribution of the research report was. a client of Wells Fargo Securities, LLC. Wens Fargo Securities, u.c provided noninvestment banking securities-related services to Ryder System, Inc., FedEx Corp., Arkansas Best Corp., Knight 

Transportation, Inc . 

.. Swift Transportation Co .• Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. currently is, or during the 12-montb period preceding the date of 

distribution of the research report was, a client of Wells Fargo Securities, UC. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC provided 

nonsecurities services to Swift Transportation Co., Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc . 

.. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC received compensation for products or services other than investment banking services from Old 

Dominion Freight Une, Inc., Swift Trnnsportation Co., Knjght Transportation, Inc .• Arkansas Best Corp., FedEx Corp .• Ryder 

System, Inc. in the past 12. months. 

• Wells Fargo Securities, LLC or its affiliates may have a significant financial interest in Ryder System, Inc., C.H. Robinson 

Worldwide, Inc., Landstar System, Inc., Hub Group, Inc., FedEx Corp., United Parcel Service, Inc .• Arkansas Best Corp., Con-way 

Inc., Werner Enterprises, Inc., Knight Transportation, Inc., J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc., Heartland Express, Inc .• Swift 

Transportation Co., Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. 

19 
167 


Insert offset folio 126 here 75852.126

Transportation 

WEllS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

ABFS: Our estimates are premised on a recovery in pricing in 2012. Absent an improvement in pricing our estimates will not likely 

be achieved. ABFS has a higher cost structure than union and non-union peer~ which could keep the company at a competitive 

disadvantage.. 

CHRW: Our outlook suggests that truckload pricing win continue to increase into 2012 due to persistent capacity constraints. 

Periods of tighter capacity can create challenge for brokers like CHRW in the event they can not pass along higher costs to their 

customers in a timely manner. We believe CHRWvaluation reflects above-cycle growth expectations that may not be realized. 

CNW: Our estimates are premised on a recovery in pricing in 2012.. If pricing does not improve as we expect, our earnings 

estimates would not likely be achieved. CNW appears to be at the early stages of a turnaround but further productivity 

improvements are needed to achieve our estimates. 

FDX; Our estimates are premised on yield improvement in Express and Freight, which have historically been cyclical. FOX 

volumes are susceptible to global trade and international airfreight activity. Further, broad fuel prices s\<\'ings can have a material 

effect on earnings. 

HTLD: Our estimates are premise:! on improved in pricing in 2012 and modest fleet expansion. HTLD's customer concentration 

may create hurdles to achieve pricing gains. If pricing does not improve as we expect, our earnings estimates would not likely be 

achieved. 

HUBG: Our estimates are premised on a recovery in pricing in 2012. If pricing does not improve as we expect, our earnings 

estimates would likely not be achieved. HUBG's truck brokerage margins tend to be adversely affected during periods of tightening 

capacity, which the industry appears to be now facing. HUBG's recent brokerage acquisition entails various integration risks. 

JBHT: Our estimates are premised on a pricing recovery in 2012. If pricing does not improve as expected, our estimates and 

valuation range would not likely be achieved. Our estimates are also reliant on operational progress and intennodal margins 

stabilizing, which may not occur. 

KNX: Our estimates are premised on continued price recovery in 2012. If pricing recovery does not continue. our earnings 

estimates would not likely be achieved. KNX has been making strategic investments in related business which mayor may not 

achieve desired results. 

lSTR: LSTR's relatively high exposure to the industrial sector can present a risk or an opportunity depending upon the rate of 

recovery. LSTR must continue to recruit and retain high-production agents in order to achieve our revenue and earnings growth 

forecasts. 

ODFL: Our estimates are premised on continued pricing gains in 2012. If pricing does not improve as we expect, our earnings 

estimates would not likely be achieved, placing downward. pressure on the shares. ODFL faces encroachment in its core market by a 

variety of competitors who often use price as a means to capture market share. 

R: Despite the contractual nature of the business, Ryder is stiU subject to cyclical swings in customer volumes. As such, Ryder 

would not likely achieve our estimates if cnstomer volumes tum down. Ryder must renew 16-20% of its lease fleet annually, which is 

subject to cyclical market conditions. 

SWFT: Our estimates are dependent on improved pricing in 2012. Ifindustry capacity constraints ease of if shipment demand were 

to contract our estimates would not likely be achieved. SWFf maintains above"peer financialleverage. which may place limitations 

on expansion opportunities. 

ups: Our estimates are premjsed on continued yield improvement above cost inflation. modest volume growth, and relatively 

stable fuel prices. The proposed TNT acquisition is subject to regulatory approval and various integration risks. 

"W'ERN: Our estimates are premised on a recovery in pricing in 2012. Further, recent cost-cutting efforts appear to have reduced 

cyclical exposure. If these cost-cutting efforts tum out to be unsustainable, our estimates would not likely be achieved. 

Wells Fargo Securities. LLC does not compensate its research analysts based on specific investment banking transactions. 

Wells Fargo Securities, liC's research analysts receive compensation that is based upon and impacted by the overall profitability 

and revenue of the firm, which includes, but is not limited to investment banking revenue. 

STOCK RATING 

1=Outperf'orm: The stock appears attractively valued, and We believe the stock's total return will ex.ceed that of the market over the 

next 12 months. BUY 

2::::::Market Perform: The stock appears appropriately valued, and we believe the stock's total return '.\<;11 be in line with the market 

over the next 12 months. HOLD 

3:::: Underperform: The stock appears overvalued, and we beJieve the stock's total return win be below the market over the next 12 

months. SELL 

SEcrOR RATING O=Overweight: Industry expected to outperfonn the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months. 

M=Market Weight: Industry expected to perfonn in-line with the re1evant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months. 

U= UndeMYeight: Industry expected to underperfonn the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months. 

VOLATILITY RATING 

V = A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has fluctuated by +/-20% or greater in at least 8 of the past 24 months or if the 

analyst expects significant volatility, All IPO stocks are automatically rated volatile ~'ithin the first 24 months of trading. 

10 
168 


Insert offset folio 127 here 75852.127

CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions 

As of: July 2, 20J2-

WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC 

EQUITY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 

49% of companies covered by Wells Fargo Securities, LLC Wells Fargo Securities, LLC has provided investment banking 

Equity Research are rated Outperform. services for 39% of its Equity Research Outperform-rated 

companies. 

49% of companies covered by Wens Fargo Securities, LLC Wells Fargo Securities, LLC has provided investment banking 

Equity Research are rated Market Perform" services for 31% of iw Equity Research Market Perform-rated 

companies. 

2% of companies covered by Wells Fargo Securities, LLC Wells Fargo Securities, LLC has provided investment banking 

Equity Research are rated Underperform. services for 15% of its Equity Research Underperform-rated 

companies. 

Important Information for Non-U.S. Recipients 

EEA - The securities and related financial instruments described herein may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to certain 

categories of investors. For recipients in the ERA. this report is distributed by Wells Fargo Securities International Limited 

C'WFSIL''). WFSIL is a U.K. incorporated investment finn authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. For the 

purposes of Section 21 of the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 {"the Act"}, the content of this report has been approved 

by WFSIL a regulated person under the Act. WFSIL does not deal with retail clients as defined in the Markets in Financial 

Instruments Directive 2007. The FSA rules made under the Financia1 Services and Markets Ad 2000 for the protection of retail 

clients will therefore not apply, nor win the Financial Services Compensation Scheme be available. This report is not intended for. 

and should not be relied upon by, retail clients. 

A1L'Stralia - Wells Fargo Securities, LLC is exempt from the requirements to hold an Australian financial services license in respect 

of the financial seIV'ices it provides to wholesale clients in Australia. Wens Fargo Securities. LLC is regulated under U.S. laws which 

differ from Australian laws. Any offer or documentation provided to Australian recipients by Wens Fargo Securities, LLC in the 

course of providing the financial services win be prepared in accordance with the laws of the United States and not Australian laws. 

Hong Kong - This report ic; issued and distributed in Hong Kong by Wells Fargo Securities Asia Limited ("WFSAL"), a Hong Kong 

inc.orporated investment firm licensed and regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission to carry on types 1, 4. 6 and 9 

regulated activities {as defined in the Securities and Futures Ordinance, "the SFOj. This report is not intended for, and should not 

be relied on by, any person other than professional investOIS (as defined in the SFO). Any securities and related financial 

instruments described herein are not intended for sale. nor will be sold. to any person other than professional investors (as defined 

in theSFO). 

Japan - This reJMJrt is distributed in Japan by Wells Fargo Securities (Japan) Co., Ltd, registered with the Kanto Local Finance 

Bureau to conduct broking and dealing of type 1 and type 2. financial instruments and agency or intermediary service for entry into 

investment advisory or discretionary investment contracts. This report is intended for distnbution only to professional investors 

(Tokutei Toushika) and is not intended for. and should not be relied upon by, ordinary cllstomem (Ippan Toushika). 

The ratings stated on the document are not provided by rating agencies registered with the Financial Services Agency of Japan 

(JFSA) but by group c.ompanies ofJFSA-registered rating agencies. These group companies may include Moody's Investors Services 

Inc, Standard & Poor's Rating Services and/or Fitch Ratings. Any decisions to invest in securities or transactions should be made 

after reviewing policies and methodologies used for assigning credit ratings and assumptions, significance and limitations of the credit ratings stated on the respective rating agencies' websites. 

Abcmt Wens Fargo Securities, U£ 

Wells Fargo Securities, LLC is a U.S. broker-dealer registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and a member of 

the New York Stock Exchange, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and the Securities Investor Protection Corp. 

This report is for your information only and is not an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy. the securities or instruments 

named or descn"bed in this report. Interested parties are advised to contact the entity with which they deal. or the entity that 

provided this TeJMJrt to them. if they desire further information. The information in this report has been obtained or derived from 

sources believed by Wens Fargo Securities, LLC, to be reliable, but Wens Fargo Securities, LLC. does not represent that this 

information is accurate or complete. Any opinions or estimates contained in this report represent the judgment of 

Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, at this time, and are subject to change without notice. For the purposes of the U.K.. Financial Services 

Authority's rules, this report c.onstitutes impartial investment research. Each of Wells Fargo Securities, ll.C, and 

Wells Fargo Securities International Limited is a separate legal entity and distinct from affiliated banks. Copyright © 2012 

Wells Fa rgo Securities, LLC. 

SECURlTIF.S: NOT FDIC-INSURED/NOTBANK-GUARANTEED/MAYWSEVALUE 

21 
169 


Insert offset folio 128 here 75852.128

SMS BASIC Scores are Not Valid Predictors of Crash Frequency 

Inam Iyoob, PhD 

Director of Engineering, Transplace 

I am the Director of Engineering for Transplace and am a data analyst and 

mathematical expert with a PhD in Engineering from the University of 

Arkansas and a Masters in Engineering degree from Oklahoma State 

University. I have 12 years of work experience with Transplace. 

In advising shippers and brokers to use SMS methodology, the Agency 

concludes: "Internal, external, and independent (University of Michigan's 

Transportation Research Institute) evaluations have all shown that, of the 

six BASICs based on regulatory compliance (the Crash Indicator BASIC is 

based on actual crashes), the Unsafe Driving BASIC and the Fatigued Driving 

(HaS) BASIC have the strongest relationships to future crash risk." 

In a separate study by Wells Fargo, the 200 largest carriers, for which there 

is actually sufficient data, were measured. No perceptible correlation 

between safety and SMS percentiles was noted in Unsafe Driving or in 

Fatigued Driving, the two BASICs the Agency proclaims as most definitive. 

The Wells Fargo Study concluded, "QUite simply, we found very little 

relationship (i.e., not statistically Significant) between Unsafe Driver or 

Fatigued Driver scores and actual Accidents per Power Unit." 

Months after release of the Wells Fargo study, the Agency attempted to resubstantiate the University of Michigan and Volpe National Transportation 

Systems Center studies in a paper devoted largely to touting the benefits of 

progressive intervention entitled "Review of Wells Fargo Equity Research 

Report on Compliance, Safety, Accountability" published March 16, 2102. 

At the request of ASECTT, I have reviewed the FMCSA's defense of SMS 

methodology as a valid predictor of carrier safety. 

In refutation of the Wells Fargo conclusion, the Agency has submitted the 

two graphs shown below (Figures 1 and 2) arguing that the older 2009 Volpe 

National Transportation Study is more accurate than the Wells Fargo's study 

because it effectively measures 29 and 43 thousand carriers, not just the 

largest 200. 

1 
170 


Insert offset folio 129 here 75852.129

BASIC Percentileo 

" Unsafe Driving -Trend (Uh;;afe Drrllhg) 

1-.::-.----, 

Figure 2: FMCSA Regression of Averages - Fatigued Driving 

mo 

...,.. 

UI 'lll 

:l 

n. I!!J 0 

0 

0 10 "'" ta· 

a. .0 

0 

B ~~ 

0 

I! 4Q U 

~ 

4J so 2 

.J:: ;;0 

! \ij 

U 

BASIC Percentile 

" Fatigue<] Driving -Trend (F.,tigued DrivIng} 

2 
171 


Insert offset folio 130 here 75852.130

An examination of the study demonstrates that FMCSA's data cannot be used to predict 

the crash performance of individual carriers, even though the FMCSA claims SMS 

scores are correlated to the average crash frequency of hundreds of carriers at each 

percentile integral. Consumers of freight transportation do not select "average" carriers, 

they select individual carriers and the Agency study offers no proof that SMS 

methodology is a predictor of individual carrier safety performance at any percentile 

level. 

Based upon data obtained from the FMCSA's own data bank, I was asked to 

perform a detailed study of individual carrier percentile ranklngs and crash 

frequency correlations. 

That study resulted in the graphs shown in Figures 3 and 4. The study 

clearly shows that with respect to individual carriers, percentile rankings of 

carriers both above and below the arbitrary "monitoring thresholds" 

indicated with the £ are not valid predictors of crash frequency. Regression 

analysis shows that SMS percentile scores account for less than one percent 

of the variation in crash frequency for each of these BASICs. 

Figure 3: Unsafe Driving - Plot of 26,435 Carriers 

3 
172 


Insert offset folio 131 here 75852.131

Figure 4: Fatigued Driving - Plot of 35,933 Carriers 

I can't see any useful purpose in averaging the crash data of hundreds of 

carriers in each of 100 different percentiles and then calculating a regression 

of the average values. The purpose of regression analysis is to explain 

variation. Averaging hundreds of carriers at each percentile eliminates most 

of the variation in the data. It is not statistically accurate to say the SMS 

methodology and BASIC percentile scores are an accurate predictor of 

carrier safety predicated upon the crash data the Agency uses to justify its 

conclusions. 

Logically, unsafe driving and driver fatigue do impact crashes. However, the 

way the SMS BASICs Unsafe Driving and Fatigued Driving are captured, 

calculated and interpreted by FMCSA does not show any correlation to 

crashes. Hence usage of SMS data for carrier selection will unduly favor 

some and penalize others, and thus should be avoided. 

4 
173 


Insert offset folio 132 here 75852.132

Statistical Issues in the Safety Measurement and Inspection of Motor Carriers 

James Gimpel 

University of Maryland 

The U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 

has developed a Safety Measurement System (SMS) for gauging the safety of individual motor 

carriers traveling U.S. highways. The methodology of the SMS is detailed in a January 2012 

report prepared by the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center in Cambridge, 

MA (Volpe Center 2012). The key aspect of this new measurement system is the inspection of 

motor carriers by federal and state officials using established criteria for determining the safety 

of vehicles and the fitness of drivers. 

Specifically, seven safety areas are identified by FMCSA as of critical: Unsafe Driving, 

Fatigued Driving, Driver Fitness, Controlled Substances and Alcohol, Vehicle Maintenance, 

Cargo-Related security, and Crash Indication assessment. The stated purpose ofranking carriers 

by percentile with this system is to target firms for progressive interventions to promote safety 

improvement and prevent accidents, injuries and fatalities on the national roadway network. 

The goal of the FMCSA inspection and scoring system is surely a worthy one and there is no 

constituency for more accidents. Truck operators themselves are commonly the victims of traffic 

accidents, some of them fatal. This report documents some concerns and problems with the 

methodology of the SMS, and the data on which it is founded. 

Data Generation Process 

The data on which the SMS is based originate from inspection records from on-road safety 

inspections of Level III or higher and crash records reported by state government agencies. The 

inspections data are made available for study in the Motor Carrier Management Information 

System (MCMIS) database and are accompanied with motor carrier census data containing 

information about firm location, fleet size, and number of drivers. 

From a statistical standpoint, is important to note how these inspections are carried out, and 

therefore how the data are generated. The data collection process is predisposed by design 

toward recordkeeping only on problems or violations, but not on the problem-free carriers and 

drivers. In this respect, one very significant feature of the data collection process is the decision 

to include carriers among the observations only following a violation. A firm or driver could 

have a series of clean inspections and never have these data points included, basically meaning 

that the data are badly censored, biasing any subsequent data analysis. The censoring of the data 

injects selection bias quite aside from the additional bias that results from the common complaint 

in the industry that clean inspections frequently go uncounted even after a firm has had a 

violation and is included in the MCMIS data. The data collection process by design is 

tantamount to the naIve research error of"selecting on the dependent variable" -- constraining 

variation toward high values of inspection violations and leaving out low (clean inspection) 

values. As pointed out below, this fundamental flaw has serious implications for the entire 

system. 
174 


Insert offset folio 133 here 75852.133

The bias only begins at the design stage. Other sources of bias occur as the measurement system 

is implemented. While an inspection can occur almost anywhere, historically inspections have 

most frequently occurred at roadside inspection stations throughout the 50 states. This has 

changed as states now carry out more mobile inspections at rest stops, truck stops and other 

roadside sites. The recorded data originate from where these inspections take place. The 

locations of inspection stations, their times and hours of operation, are neither random nor 

uniform across the highway system. Inspection records are not likely to be reflective of the 

traffic volume of the nationwide carrier fleet, or the geographic location of firms, but instead the 

idiosyncratic practices of state regulators. For instance, recent data are highly sensitive to the 

high number of inspections carried out in California, Arizona and Texas, and the relative dearth 

of inspections in much of the Northeast. 

What local regulators choose to focus on in terms of enforcement emphasis is also highly 

variable. Current data (Spring 2012) on BASIC percentile scores show that firms operating out 

of Montana and North Dakota exhibit far lower scores on the Unsafe Driving BASIC than firms 

physically located in Kentucky, West Virginia, New Hampshire and Massachusetts. This is an 

enforcement pattern that cannot be explained away by traffic density or road conditions. The 

Fatigued Driver BASIC scores are highest for carriers operating out of Florida, Georgia and 

Idaho, and just across the border from Idaho, considerably lower in Washington statereflecting the vagaries oflocal enforcement -- not safety attributes of carriers operating in these 

regions. Vehicle maintenance BASIC violations are highest in Florida, Texas, South Carolina 

and Connecticut, but lower on carriers based in Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Marylandvariation that cannot be explained by traffic or population density measures. From a statistical 

standpoint, the problem is the extraordinary level of heterogeneity in measurements resulting not 

from the characteristics of firms, drivers, and road conditions, but due to the application of the 

measuring instruments by data gatherers. The biases injected at the implementation stage 

prevent the BASIC indicators from assessing what they are intended to evaluate. 

Because the data generation process is a highly imperfect reflection of the nature and quality of 

operator activity, the data are not a reflection of a representative cross-section ofthe carrier 

operators who are directly responsible for fleet safety - the responsible parties. Based on 

straightforward comparisons with trucking censuses, the data vastly over-represent the firms with 

very large fleets, while vastly under-representing the impressive number of small carriers 

operating two, three, or perhaps only a single vehicle. Larger carriers are not even responsible 

for hauling the vast majority of cargo, so the data collection cannot be justified on the basis of 

representing freight quantity or miles travelled. Moreover, because it is operators who are 

subject to inspection and penalty, they should be represented in any competent study. 

Since the data are an inferior representation of the nationwide popUlation of motor carriers and 

their safety habits, it is fundamentally unsound to generalize from any of the information 

contained in the data on inspected vehicles to the broader population of all carriers. Any data 

analysis carried out by any entity based on the inspections data, including data contained in the 

remainder of this report, should be accompanied with the caveat that it represents only the 

particular cases contained in the data. Nothing can be extrapolated from it, and its external 

validity is in doubt. In summary, using data generated only by happenstance of where 

inspections occur, based on idiosyncratic local enforcement practices, introduces selection bias, 

providing a misleading picture of important statistical relationships that inform essentials ofthe 
175 


Insert offset folio 134 here 75852.134

regulatory regime. Findings based on the data are dubious due to the atypical or unusual nature 

of the sample. 

The problem of sample selection bias cannot be dismissed by FMC SA on the grounds that it is 

only interested in the carriers who are sampled in the inspection process. After all, it is not 

merely external validity, or the generalization to non-sampled carriers, that is called into question 

by the bias in data. Key statistical relationships thought to be causal are misconstrued as well 

(Heckman 1976; 1979; Goldberger 1981). For instance, regression analysis based on the partial 

data will exhibit bias in the coefficients in much the same way as excluding important 

explanatory variables produces bias. Relationships between independent and dependent 

variables are not properly represented even for those carriers that have been subject to inspection 

and are included in the MCMlS system. 

Unsafe Driving Scores and Crashes 

One example of where the present data can mislead regulators is in relationships found between 

specific inspection violations and crash risk. What is true of that relationship among the highly 

overrepresented large and frequently inspected carriers in the data may not be true of the poorly 

represented midsized and small carriers, or of the population of carriers writ large. This 

variation in safety practices across the popUlation of firms could result from a number of causes, 

including the important fact that the small carriers are frequently self-employed owner-operators, 

and confront different incentives for safety as well as costs associated with regulatory penalties 

than drivers who are employed by someone else. 

Even using the data provided by FMCSA the variability in the relationship between the BASIC 

score for unsafe driving and the score for crash rates can be made evident if we apportion it by 

the number of inspections as determined by the agency's Combo Segmentation Safety Event 

Grouping (Volpe 2012, 3-4). Such a division creates 5 groups of trucking firms by inspection 

frequency: Combo Segment 1 with between 3-8 inspections; Combo 2 with 9-21 inspections; 

Combo 3 with 22-57 inspections; Combo 4 with between 58-149 inspections; and Combo 5 with 

150 or more. The Iess'rreq'ueiitly inspected carrierS intflefirst two segments are'usually smaller 

firms, and their BASIC scores for unsafe driving are largely unrelated to crash risk. 

On the following pages appear three scatterplots (Figures 1,2 and 3) showing the nature of the 

relationship between the BASIC percentile scores for unsafe driving and the crash rate drawing 

upon data from Spring 2012. The first plot exhibits the bivariate relationship for carriers in the 

second safety event group (inspections=9-21), the second plot is for the third safety event group 

(inspections=22-57), and the third plot captures the relationship for the largest and most 

frequently inspected carriers (>150 inspections). Note that these cut points in the number of 

inspections follow the agency's specifications and are not equal sized groups. Also, the number 

of carriers with particular BASIC scores varies considerably by the type of score, and is usually 

lower for some event group segments than for others. 
176 


Insert offset folio 135 here 75852.135

Crashes per 100 PU 

Unufe Driving BASIC 0" 

Figure 1. Bivariate Relationship between Unsafe Driving Score and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Combo Group 2, N=5,564 

Crashes per 100 PU 

N 

OCJD at:o 

Unsafe Driving BASIC % 

Figure 2. Bivariate Relationship between Unsafe Driving Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Combo Group 3, N=8,998 
177 


Insert offset folio 136 here 75852.136

Due to implausibly extreme values in the crash ratings from some outlying observations in the 

right tail of the distribution ofthose values, 84 cases were deleted as inaccurate. The resulting 

regression coefficients reveal that for the second combo group, the bivariate linear relationship is 

weakly positive but explains little ofthe variation in the scatter of points. Specifically the unsafe 

driving BASIC score explains a mere 2 percent of the variation in crash risk for carriers in the 

second event safety group (r=.14). Using the unsafe driving scores as a predictor of crash risk 

for these small carriers is little better than guessing, which is surprising given what these scores 

are supposed to indicate and how the data are generated with a bias toward violations. 

For trucking operations with larger numbers ofinspections (see Figures 2 and 3), the linear 

relationship is positive but only slightly stronger. Specifically, for finns in combo segment 3 

with between 22 and 57 recorded inspections (N=8,998), the wide variation displayed in the 

plotted values suggests that many other factors are at play in detennining accident risk. The 

extent of explained variation in accident risk rises to about 3 percent (If =.028). 

Crashes per 100 PU 

Unsafe Driving BASIC % 

Figure 3. Bivariate Relationship between Unsafe Driving Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Combo Group 5, N=3,351 

Among the largest firms, experiencing high numbers of inspections (N=3,351), the relationship 

is also positive, showing an increase in the accident rate of 1.2 (p:::.OO 1) for every 10 point 

increase in the unsafe driving BASIC score (R2

=.07). Here, the positive association 

approximates that found in the Wells-Fargo Equities research study on the largest 200 firms in 

the industry (Wells-Fargo 2011, 6-7). But like the Wells-Fargo research, the errors around the 

regression line indicate that the amount of variation in accident risk explained by the unsafe 

driving score for large finns is modest at best (see Figure 3). As Wells-Fargo indicated, because 

it is intuitive that this relationship should be positive and clear-cut, there is either something 

wrong with the SMS measurement of unsafe driving, or something wrong with the sample of 

carriers in the MCMIS data. 
178 


Insert offset folio 137 here 75852.137

In summary, then, based on the infonnation provided in the MCMIS system, crash data supplied 

on individual firms reported by FMCSA, and stratifying the data by agency specified safety 

event groups, the estimated statistical relationships are quite varied across this limited sample of 

inspected vehicles. The relationship between unsafe driving scores and crash rate is almost nonexistent for the carriers with fewest inspections, and is weakly positive for carriers in the higher 

inspection categories (Figures 2 and 3) but with a great deal of remaining error. 

Driver Fatigue Scores and Crashes 

Similar data analysis for other BASIC indicators shows that their relationships with crash ratings 

are highly variable across FMCSA's inspection frequency categories (see Figures 4, 5 and 6). 

For instance, for the smallest category with 6,598 carriers, the relationship between driver fatigue 

indicators and crash risk is flat, and slightly negative, but with an unstandardized regression 

coefficient not statistically discernible from zero (see Figure 4). 

For group 2, with between II and 20 inspections, the relationship is positive, but unimpressive 

(see Figure 5). The regression coefficient suggests that for every ten point increase in the score 

for fatigued driving, the crash rating increases by 0.74 (P=.074). This is a statistically significant 

but weak association, with a wide scatter of points around the regression line (Figure 5). For this 

group, the fatigued driver BASIC score explains less than 1 percent ofthe variation in crashes 

per 100 power units (R2=.003). 

For inspection group 5 for the driver fatigue BASIC, a category containing 763 larger carriers 

with high numbers of inspections (>500), the relationship between fatigued driving and crash 

risk is more robust than for carriers with fewer inspections (see Figure 6 below). In this event 

group, fatigued driving explains about 21 percent of the variation in crash risk (R2=.2 J) and a ten 

point increase in the fatigued driving BASIC increases crash risk by slightly over I per 100 

power units (P=.I 02). This is about as close to a substantively noteworthy relationship as any of 

these measures attain. But this relationship is reflective of only a very small share of firms, and 

while based on a sizable number of inspections, it is still not very precise as predictor of crash 

risk for individual carriers. Additional examination suggests that the relationship between crash 

risk and the driver fatigue BASIC for this group offirms seems to exhibit non-linearity, rising 

more steeply at scores above 80. But there is insufficient information at hand to discern whether 

this is an artifact of the scoring methodology, or a characteristic of specific carriers with high 

scores. 
179 


Insert offset folio 138 here 75852.138

200.00 

150.0 

;l;1 

c: 

=> 

<> 

~ ~ 

ill i0a.OD Q. 

.. " 

.c: 

.. " U 50.0 

0.00 

Crashes per 100 PU 

N oflnspections: 3.'0 

o 0 roo 0 0 aD 00 OOW:OOOQ) 

o coo 

. '- '"'; 

":.-.:<- ..:'\". ~~:C>IIDOiJ),~~~~l!II .. 

40 

o. 

o o 

60 

Driver Fatigue BASIC % 

o 

R~ :Ur'1ear 1.842E~S 

.. m<I!II!l.iilli ........ ii> .. 

eo 100 

Figure 4. Bivariate Relationship between Driver Fatigue Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Group 1, N=6,598 

.. 

a. 

.. '" 

.c: 

~ '" 

u 

Crashes per 100 PU 

'1-20 

o ro .. 00 

o 

60 

Driv"r Fatigue BASIC % 

o 
180 


Insert offset folio 139 here 75852.139

Figure 5. Bivariate Relationship between Driver Fatigue Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Group 2, N=9,578 

Crashes per 100 PU 

H 500 and 

o 

Driver Fatigue BASIC ok 

Figure 6. Bivariate Relationship between Driver Fatigue Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Group 5, N=763 

Vehicle Maintenance and Crashes 

Finally, the vehicle maintenance BASIC specifies safety event groups similar to those of driver 

fatigue, except for the first one which includes carriers with 5-10 inspections rather than 3-I 0 

(Volpe 2012, 3-13). The relationship of these scores in the MCMIS data to crash risk is also 

very low for the 5-I 0 inspections category, showing virtually no linear association between the 

explanatory and dependent variables at all (Figure 7) (R2=.0004). 

What's more, for the highest inspections category (501+), the relationship between vehicle 

maintenance scores and crash risk is actually negative! Here the regression coefficient indicates 

that a ten point rise in the vehicle maintenance BASIC % is associated with a O. I 8 drop in 

crashes per 100 power units (Figure 8), although once again the variation in crashes per 100 

power units explained by vehicle maintenance BASIC scoring hovers only about I percent 

(R2=.013) (see Figure 8 below). 

In any measurement system, there will be random error. The fact that the BASIC scores do not 

perfectly predict crashes by trucking firms is not itself a flaw with the SMS methodology. Even 

highly refined measuring instruments contain at least a limited amount of random error. But the 

SMS scoring system contains far more than simply random error - there is systematic error 

introduced. There are serious problems with the design of these instruments themselves that 
181 


Insert offset folio 140 here 75852.140

render them unreliable. For many carriers in the MSMIS data, the association between crash risk 

and the BASIC scores is so low as to 

Crashes per 100 PU 

o OOOlXOOO 

4.261E-4 

Vehicle Maintenance BASIC ok 

Figure 7. Bivariate Relationship between Maintenance Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Group 1 N=17,014 

eo,oO 

SO.Oo. 

.. 

§ 40. 

~ i 30.00 

.. 

.. 

-;; 

::! 20.00 

o o 

Crashes per 100 PU 

o 

OWl..Ines ""OD1J 

40 60 ao '00 

Vehitle Maintenance BASIC % 
182 


Insert offset folio 141 here 75852.141

Figure 8. Bivariate Relationship between Maintenance Scores and Crashes per Power 

Unit, Group 5, N=503 

be irrelevant, which is peculiar given what is commonly understood about the notions of unsafe 

driving, and the other constructs that BASIC scores are supposed to indicate. Nor do the 

relationships with crash risk improve appreciably when the data are not segmented by safety 

event group but analyzed as a whole to encompass greater heterogeneity. 

The reliability of the SMS indicators is certainly questionable based on the weak and 

insignificant relationships between crash risk and BASIC scores. For the most frequently 

inspected safety event groups, the relationships are stronger for fatigued driving, but weaker for 

vehicle maintenance. Even in the case of fatigued driving, however, the association with crash 

risk is still insufficiently robust to justify generalizing to individual firm behavior and 

compliance. The straightforward evaluations presented here suggest these measures are erratic 

across the limited sample of carriers contained in the MCMIS data. Apparently, the SMS 

BASIC scores are not measuring what the FMC SA claims they are measuring. Measures that are 

unreliable cannot be depended upon to gauge true characteristics, changes and quantities. 

Small Carriers and the Law of Large Numbers 

Nowhere do we see the limitations of the BASIC scoring methodology more clearly than in that 

segment or group of carriers that have the fewest operators and are subject to fewer inspections. 

Under standard enforcement practices, the vast majority of smaller trucking firms go uninspected 

and therefore unmeasured. We have already noted that this is a major source of selection bias in 

the data, as the small number of very large carriers winds up being highly influential in 

regression specifications using the MCMIS data. The omission of small carriers is the quite 

natural result of basing data inclusion only on inspections and violations - on average smaller 

carriers have less exposure due to fewer travelled miles, and may also have fewer violations for 

reasons highlighted earlier. Consequently, the records that are included for the small carriers 

wind up having very few inspections counted in the denominator of BASIC formulae at any 

given point in time. 

Table I, below, shows the number of FMC SA SMS inspections over the previous two years as of 

March 2012. As the table indicates, a total of326,000 firms have at least one inspection that has 

been recorded. Fully 200,000 carriers, or 61 percent of the total, have 5 or fewer inspections, 

and the SMS scoring system is not triggered until there are at least 5. Another 61,177 (18.7%) 

are recorded as having between 6 and 19 inspections. According to the March SMS data, 43,555 

firms (13.3%) have had 20 or more inspections. 

The problems of ratio and rate measures when denominators are small are well-known to 

statisticians. When ratio measures are based on fewer than 20 observations in the denominator, 

they are often considered unreliable, and frequently they are not even published. Twenty is a 

common cut-off point since beyond that changes in total variation contributed by successive 

measurements diminishes. Data with fewer than 20 observations in the denominator are not 

considered to meet a sufficient level of accuracy based on calculated standard errors. A 

denominator with 5 inspections is far less reliable than one with 40 when both have the same 
183 


Insert offset folio 142 here 75852.142

numerator. In a single 24 month period, however, many firms may have only five, six or eight 

inspections. As Table I shows, many more have even fewer than that. 

Table 1. Number of Carriers with Inspections and BASIC Scores for Nationwide Carrier 

Fleet, March 2012 

Inspections Carriers N with Scores % with Scores No Scores 

I 79,713 96 0.1 79,617 

2 46,254 84 0.2 46,170 

3 32,190 815 2.5 31375 

4 23,651 1,392 5.9 22,259 

5 18,254 2,734 15.0 15,520 

6 14,488 3,560 24.6 10,928 

7 11,761 3,963 33.7 7,798 

8 9,680 4,191 43.3 5,489 

9 8,010 4,108 51.3 3902 

10 6,608 3,865 58.5 2,743 

II 5,714 3,638 63.7 2,076 

12 4,916 3,413 69.4 1,503 

13 4,416 3,249 73.6 1,167 

14 3,686 2,832 76.8 854 

15 3,396 2,695 79.4 701 

16 2,939 2,435 82.9 504 

17 2,570 2,143 83.4 427 

18 2,426 2,102 86.6 324 

19 2,113 1,868 88.4 245 

20+ 43,555 41,991 96.4 1,564 

Totals 326,340 91,174 27.9 235,166 

Source: FMCSA, httD:!lai.fincsa.dot.gov/SMSlDataiDownloads.asDx accessed May 16,2012 

Small changes in the number of violations per inspection have a substantially larger effect when 

the number of total inspections is small than they do when the number of tot a! inspections is 

larger. Suppose XYZ Freight Company moves from 200 points in violations to 260 points 

between inspection 5 and inspection 6. That moves the raw score on which the BASIC 

percentile is constructed from 40 to 43. But an identical change in violation points from 600 to 

660 for OP Corporation between inspection 39 and 40 moves the raw score from 15 to 16.5, 

having half the impact. 

Rates based on a small number of inspections are highly variable and for that reason unreliable 

as measures. When rates are unstable it is virtually impossible to distinguish random fluctuation 

from true changes in the underlying risk of crashes or accidents. Comparisons of firms based on 

unstable rates can lead to spurious conclusions about safety risks. 

By way of statistical background, the notion that high variability is associated with small 

numerators can be understood through reference to the law of large numbers. In statistical tenns, 

as the number of samples increases, the average of these samples is likely to reach the mean of 
184 


Insert offset folio 143 here 75852.143

the whole population. Or, as the number of trials increase, the difference between the expected 

and actual value moves toward O. 

This explains why typically values obtained based on large numbers of observations provide 

stable estimates of the true, underlying quantity. Conversely, values based on small numbers of 

observations may fluctuate dramatically from year to year, or differ considerably from one case 

to another, even when there is no meaningful difference between them. Binning the data by 

inspection frequency does not mitigate the high variation in successive scores for less frequently 

inspected carriers. 

In summary, then, smaller trucking firms are subject to few inspections, meaning that whatever 

BASIC scores they generate, high or low, are not reliable indicators of these firms' propensity to 

operate safely and in compliance with regulatory standards. For firms with more trucks and 

greater exposure, the higher number of inspections yields an average that will be more reflective 

of their actual rate of safety and compliance. 

The upshot of the paucity of scores for small carriers means that even slight increases in these 

scores for small carriers leads to inaccurate inferences about their safety risk. Even after binning 

the firms into peer groups or "safety event groups," certain classes of carriers labor with 

unaccounted for business routines and practices which unfairly influence the percentile grading 

system in an adverse direction. 

For example, straightforward tabulations based on the MCMIS data indicates that carriers with 

regular operations in particular states are targets for a disproportionate number of inspections 

directed at recording unsafe driving violations. Just five states: Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee, 

Texas and Pennsylvania, are responsible for 45 percent of the violations which inform the 

statistical analysis for unsafe driving. With no adjustment made for this partiality, the resulting 

comparison of carriers operating in these states with the carriers which operate in lower 

enforcement states produces completely untrustworthy conclusions from statistical analysis. 

Similarly, for the fatigued driving analysis, carriers that maintain proper logs (RODS) are peer 

grouped with carriers which are not required to log at all, and those which have electronic 

devices for logging. Over 50 percent of the violations in the Fatigued Driving BASIC are "form 

and manner" or "change of duty" violations which are incurred only by carriers required to 

maintain RODS. These carriers face an arbitrarily imposed burden and discriminatory treatment 

as a result. 

Conclusions 

A small share of the nationwide fleet of motor carriers is selected for inspection each year. Due 

to local peculiarities and pronounced biases in the selection process, the resulting data collection 

is an imperfect representation ofthe population of carriers, and especially small carriers. In 

addition, the measurements specified by federal regulators as part of the SMS inspections 

regimen are subject to wide variation in emphasis and application by geographic location. This 

is a serious problem in the SMS methodology because violations are not reflective ofthe actual 

performance and safety of firms, but are an artifact of the application ofthe measuring 
185 


Insert offset folio 144 here 75852.144

instrument. Consequently, statistical relationships detected in the MSMIS data are not only a 

cloudy reflection of the true population, but may well be flat wrong. 

The relationship between the Unsafe Driving BASIC measure and crash rates the low inspection 

safety event groups is particularly weak. This could point to a substantively significant attribute 

of small as compared to large carriers, it could also be an artifact ofthe small number of 

inspections among this group of carriers, and finally it could be the result of the censoring of the 

data by design of the data collection. Whatever the case, the absence of relationship calls the 

reliability of the BASIC scores into serious question. 

Accidents are very poorly predicted by the BASIC scores in the MCMIS data and this is 

especially astounding given that the data generation process selects specifically on carriers 

supposedly at risk for accidents, not even including carriers until they have a violation. It is 

important to ask why the relationships are so weak. Certainly it is intuitively plausible that 

unsafe driving, poor' vehicle maintenance and driver fatigue would be positively related to crash 

risk. There are a litany of systematic biases that are contaminating the SMS methodology, from 

the irregular data collection practices across geographic areas and agencies, to inappropriate 

definitions ofthe measures themselves. 

Nearly every credible study of traffic accidents involving large trucks finds them to be difficult 

to predict because mUltiple forces are involved, with the behavior of a single vehicle operator 

explaining only a small share of accident occurrences or severity (Zhu and Srinivasan 20 II; 

Khorashadia et al. 2005; Chang and Mannering 1999; Polus and MahaleI1985). Circumstances 

including traffic dynamics, weather conditions, and the geometry of roads have found to be 

relevant, and many accidents are the fault of drivers other than the truck operator. In this 

connection, economists have long known that the addition of every driver on the road increases' 

the total of other people's insurance costs. The upshot is that even truck drivers with clean 

inspection records will have accidents, but the systematic exclusion of clean inspection data by 

the SMS system eliminates these important cases from consideration in statistical modeling. 

Because accidents are usually the product of a complex interaction of human factors and 

environmental conditions, measures intended to predict and explain them have to be as free of 

noise as possible. But the SMS methodology designs noise into the BASIC scores rather than 

taking pains to eliminate il. 

Vehicle inspections may prevent accidents, but only if the appropriate aspects of driver behavior 

and vehicle maintenance are being monitored and inspected. Why the BASIC scores for unsafe 

driving are so weakly associated with crash risk across the entire MCMIS sample is most likely 

the consequence of including safety-irrelevant aspects of operator behavior in the measure. The 

measures require thorough reconsideration after their reliability is assessed. For example, 

trucking industry sources suggest that the vast majority of violations falling within the fatigued 

driver BASIC category involve minor infractions associated with record keeping, and therefore 

do not precisely capture aspects of driver disposition or vehicle roadworthiness that serve the 

interest of accident prevention, such as driving longer hours than safety standards allow. If the 

scoring for fatigued and unsafe driving were focused on those violations actually germane to 

common understandings of those concepts, the statistical relationships between measures and 

outcomes would surely be stronger. 
186 


Insert offset folio 145 here 75852.145

Increasing the number of biased observations only amplifies the magnitude of the bias. Simply 

increasing the total number of inspections carried out will not help if current tendencies in 

inspection and measurement remain in place. Large operators will continue to rack up numerous 

inspections that do little to alter their overall measure of compliance and safety while smaller 

operators will be subject to wild fluctuations in their BASIC scores, yielding relationships such 

as that found in Figure I. Binning the data by frequency of inspection does nothing to protect 

smaller carriers from the threat of being placed out of service for violations that larger carriers 

can largely ignore. 

Sources 

Berk, Richard A. 1983. "An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data." 

American Sociological Review 48: 3: 386-398. 

Chang, L-Y and F. Mannering. 1999. "Analysis ofInjury Severity and Vehicle Occupancy in 

Truck- Non-Truck-Involved Accidents." Accident Analysis and Prevention 31: 579-592. 

Goldberger, Arthur S. 1981. "Linear Regression After Selection." Journal of Econometrics. 

15: 3: 357- 366. 

Heckman, James J. 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample 

Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models. " Annals 

of Economic and Social Measurement 5: 4: 475-492. 

Heckman, James J. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error." Econometrica 45: 

1: 153-161. 

Khorashadia, Ahmad, Debbie Niemeier, Venky Shankar and Fred Mannering. 2005. 

"Differences in Rural and Urban Driver-Injury Severities in Accidents Involving Large-Trucks: 

An Exploratory Analysis." Accident Analysis and Prevention 37: 5: 910-921. 

Lord, Dominique and F. Mannering. 2010. "The Statistical Analysis of Crash-frequency Data: 

'A Review and Assessment of Methodological Alternatives." Transportation Research Part A: 

Policy and Practice 44: 5: 291-305. 

Polus, A., Mahalel, D., 1985. "Truck Impact on Roadway Safety." Transportation Research 

Record 1047: 65-71. 

The Volpe Center. 2012. "Safety Measurement System (SMS) Methodology." Report prepared 

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Version 2.2. Cambridge, MA: John A. 

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. 

Wells-Fargo Securities, LLC. 20 II. "CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear Outcomes." Baltimore, 

MD: Wells Fargo Research Publications. https://www.wellsfargo.com/research. accessed 

5/1612012 
187 


Insert offset folio 146 here 75852.146

Zhu, X. and S. Srinivasan. 2011. "A Comprehensive Analysis of Factors Influencing the Injury 

Severity of Large Truck Crashes." Accident Analysis and Prevention 43: 1: 49-57. 
188 


Insert offset folio 147 here 75852.147

APPENDIXE 
189 


Insert offset folio 148 here 75852.148

SAM GRAVES, MISSOURI 

CHflmMI\~ 

NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, NEW YORK 

RANKING M(;MllEn 

Q:ongrcss of thcllnitcd ~tatcs 

ll.~. 1.10US[' of 'Rcprrscntotiocs 

[:ommlttcf on ~moll )Susmess 

Ms. Anne S. Ferro 

Administrator 

nbl Royburn housc Q~m[C )5l11ldlllli 

'Uloahmgton. 1')(1: 20\11-611\ 

August 31, 2012 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

Dear Administrator Ferro: 

I appreciate the willingness of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to 

permit Deputy Administrator Bill Bronrott and Mr. Joseph DeLorenzo of the agency's Office of 

Enforcement Compliance to participate in the July 11. 2012 Small Business Committee hearing 

on the effects of the new Compliance, Safety and Accountability (CSA) program on small 

businesses. Because you were not able to participate in the hearing, I am writing to summarize 

the major concerns with the CSA program that were raised by the witnesses and Members of 

Congress at the hearing. 

Since the FMCSA began implementation of the CSA program, a growing number ofindustry 

stakeholders and third-party researchers have raised concerns that the program, as currently 

designed, may not only have limited utility as a crash predictive tool, but in many cases may 

identify safe carriers as a crash risk. Of particular concern to the Committee is the potential for 

the Safety Measurement System (SMS) to disproportionately assign negative Behavior Analysis 

Safety Improvement Category (BASIC) scores to small carriers based on a handful of 

inspections, citations or warnings. 

Below are the most common concerns raised by the private sector witnesses that testified on the 

second panel at the hearing. 

I. Issues with Data Quality and the SMS Methodology 

As addressed at the hearing, industry stakeholders and third-party researchers have identified a 

number of issues with the underlying data and SMS methodologies that call into question the 

system's ability to identify carriers at risk of causing a future accident and which may result in 

carriers, particularly small carriers, receiving negative safety scores. These methodological 

concerns are primarily related to: disparities in inspection frequency and emphasis between 
190 


Insert offset folio 149 here 75852.149

states; the inclusion of citations and violations that have little or no correlation with crash risk; 

the severity weights assigned violations; the sufficiency of the data FMCSA uses to calculate 

BASICs; and FMC SA's decision to base scores on a carrier's relative performance to peers, 

rather than as an absolute. 

Inspection Frequency: A number of independent studies have found that differences in 

inspection frequency could result in disproportionate and disparate outcomes for carriers 

operating in high inspection frequency states. The studies also documented that the negative 

consequences of these outcomes could be exacerbated in cases where states emphasize 

enforcement of certain regulations, particularly those that bear little relation to crash risk. 

Additionally, the studies question whether the SMS will be able to achieve its primary purpose: 

identify carriers at risk for a future crash. For example, studies by Wells Fargo Securities I found 

no positive correlation between certain high BASICs and heightened crash risk. A separate 

study by Dr. James Gimpel at the University of Maryland2 reached similar conclusions. Even 

the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) Evaluation of the Op 

Model Tesf commissioned by your agency discovered discrepancies between FMCSA's claims 

that high BASICs score in all categories are correlated with higher crash risk. 

At the hearing, Deputy Administrator Bronrotl noted that FMCSA has taken exception to the 

findings of Wells Fargo Securities 2011 study ofCSA, noting that the study examined a 

relatively small sampling of the carrier universe, some 200 of the nation's larger carriers, 

presumably those with the most SMS data. Subsequently, Wells Fargo Securities has conducted 

a new study examining 4,600 carriers - which includes a substantial number of the small carrier 

universe - that it claims verifies the results of its previous study. 

Does FMCSA plan on responding to the new Wells Fargo Securities and Gimpel studies? How 

does FMC SA account for the fact that mUltiple separate analyses of the program the Wells 

Fargo Securities studies, the Gimpel study, and the Op Model Evaluation found weak or no 

correlations between certain high BASICs scores and crash risk and still stand by the statements 

made by FMCSA that all high BASICs scores are correlated with heightened crash risk? And, 

since the Op Model Evaluation was based on older data collected prior to full CSA 

implementation, does FMCSA plan to seek an independent analysis using all individual carrier 

scores in the CSA database? 

Assignment of Severity Weights: At the hearing, a great deal of discussion involved the SMS's 

assignment of severity weights. A number of industry witnesses questioned the appropriateness 

I ANTHONY GALLO & MICHAEL BUS~lCE, WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, CSA: ANOTHER LOOK WITH SIMILAR 

CONCLUSIONS (20 12); ANTHONY GALLO & MICHAEL BUSHCE, WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, CSA: GOOD INTENTIONS 

UNCLEAR OUTCOMES 2 (20 II). 

2 JAMES GIMPEL, STATISTICAL ISSUES IN THE SAFETY MEASUR[MENT AND INSPECTION OF MOTOR CARRIt:RS, 

DRAFT 3 (undated). 

'UNIVERSITYOF MICHIGAN TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EVALUAflON OF TilE CSA 2010 

OPERATIONAL MODEL TEST ii, (2011). 

2 
191 


Insert offset folio 150 here 75852.150

of severity weights assigned to certain infractions, especially for violations that appear to have 

little, if any, correlation to crash risk. 

Even the UMTRI study, often cited by FMCSA as demonstrating the efficacy of the SMS 

program in identifying carriers with a high crash risk, questioned the appropriateness of certain 

severity weights by noting "no rationale or justification for the weights are given" in the 

documentation explaining SMS. 

Absent an explanation, the severity weights appear to be arbitrary detenninations with no 

connection to the goal sought by FMCSA - safe roads. What is FMCSA's plan to review the 

severity weights assigned to specific violations? When will FMCSA better explain and justify 

each severity weight's correlation to crash risk, and adjust these severity weights accordingly? 

In addition, the current SMS assigns the same severity weights to violations that result in a 

warning by law enforcement as it does those that result in an actual citation. In issuing a 

warning, the officer is acknowledging that the severity of the infraction is relatively minor and 

not severe enough to warrant a fonnal citation. However, the system rates all infractions equally, 

regardless of the actual severity of the infraction. I strongly encourage FMCSA to consider 

whether severity weights should acknowledge this distinction. 

Data Quality: Finally, a number of industry stakeholders and third-party researchers have 

questioned whether FMCSA has attained enough data to ensure that the SMS is accurate and 

reliable. For example, the study by Dr. J1\Illes Gimpel detennined that FMCSA has too little data 

on small firms to generate accurate BASICs scores. The study also found that your agency's 

paucity of data on small carriers could result in disparate effects on smaller carriers as small 

changes in the number of violations per inspection have a substantially larger effect when the 

total number of inspections is smaller than they do when the total number of inspections is 

higher. 

As Mr. DeLorenzo testified at the hearing, concerns about the quality ofSMS data and the 

effects this issue has on carrier BASICs scores are one of the top concerns expressed by small 

trucking company operations. These concerns have been buttressed by ample third-party 

research that also question the adequacy and reliability of the data upon which SMS will assign 

scores to carriers. Therefore, what is FMCSA's plan to address the small amount and, in some 

cases, the lack of data for the majority of carriers? Also, how many carriers currently have 

enough data in the CSA system to generate a score in each of the seven BASICs? If data 

sufficiency is a long-term challenge, will the agency modify the SMS to take into account these 

limitations? 

II. The Need for a Crash Accountability Process 

Accidents that are not the fault of a commercial motor vehicle operator should not be included in 

a carrier's BASICs score. The inclusion of such incidents not only violates the principles of 

fairness and due process, it undennines public and commercial confidence in the accuracy of the 

data SMS uses to calculate BASICs scores while contributing nothing to the goal of promoting 

3 
192 


Insert offset folio 151 here 75852.151

greater safety behavior on the part of commercial motor vehicle operators in order to reduce 

crash risk. 

I was troubled to learn at the hearing that the agency is only now beginning to study the 

appropriateness of using police reports in a crash accountability system. FMCSA had promised 

to conduct this study more than two years ago during the initial implementation of the SMS. We 

understand from stakeholders that FMCSA may have conducted prior research in this area in 

20 10. What was the outcome of that research, and why is additional research on police reports 

necessary at this juncture? 

III. Shortcomings of the DataQs System 

During his testimony, Deputy Administrator Bronrott highlighted the ability of carriers to 

challenge incorrect information in their records. However, even the FMC SA has acknowledged 

the difficulties that carriers experience in receiving timely corrections to these records. Many 

small trucking companies are concerned that the DataQs process is not working as well as it 

should. All too often DataQs Requests for Data Review are not handled consistently or in a 

timely manner and continue to include dismissed or dropped citations. 

Since the SMS uses all inspection violations the FMCSA claims include a safety component to 

calculate BASIC scores, the DataQs challenges should be handled consistently and 

expeditiously. The Administrative Procedures Act was enacted to prohibit such ad hoc and 

inconsistent decision making. 

IV. Negligent Hiring, Vicarious Liability and the Safety Fitness Determination 

Rulemaking 

The FMCSA is sending a mixed and confusing message to shippers, brokers, carriers and the 

public. The agency includes a disclaimer on the SMS website stating that the symbol for 

"exceeds intervention threshold" is not a safety fitness rating, but the agency has encouraged 

shippers, brokers and insurers to use the information in the SMS, including BASICs scores, to 

make business decisions. Brokers and shippers are concerned that the BASICs scores will be 

viewed as de facto safety ratings because the FMCSA is encouraging private industry to rely on 

them and courts may consider BASICs scores in determining the viability of vicarious liability 

and negligent hiring claims. Nevertheless, the FMCSA's continues to rollout changes to the 

SMS which indicates that the system is still a work in progress and has weaknesses. 

This is problematic for several reasons. First, the FMC SA currently has a safety fitness rating 

system. Second, the FMCSA is required to go through the rulemaking process to revise its safety 

fitness rating system. Third, the FMCSA intends to use SMS-generated scores to determine if 

carriers are unfit to operate. Finally, the proposed rulemaking to update the safety fitness rating 

system has been delayed by several years due to changes made to the SMS. 

While industry is eager to see FMCSA move forward with the Safety Fitness Determination 

rulemaking, the agency should not preempt that rule making by suggesting that shippers, brokers, 

4 
193 


Insert offset folio 152 here 75852.152

and carriers use BASICs scores for carrier selection. Furthermore, the agency should not move 

forward with the rulemaking until the concerns regarding the underlying data and SMS 

methodologies, particularly those related to the relationship between BASICs scores and crash 

risk, are addressed. 

V. Conclusion 

As I noted at the hearing, I believe the CSA program is well intentioned and has the potential to 

improve FMCSA's ability to more efficiently use and focus its resources on problem drivers and 

carriers in order to improve highway safety and reduce crashes caused by commercial motor 

vehicle operators. However, small business concerns related to the accuracy and reliability of 

the current SMS raises questions not only as to its ability to accurately identify potentially 

dangerous carriers, but also about the program's potential to misidentify those carriers who are 

not at risk of causing crashes. 

In addition, the differences between the former SafeStat system and the SMS are significant. 

While FMCSA may have been under no legal obligation to put the program up for notice and 

comment rulemaking, the scope of the changes and the concerns identified by small businesses 

suggest that the agency and public would benefit from additional stakeholder input into the 

design of SMS methodologies. I appreciate that the FMC SA announced changes that it believes 

will improve the CSA program in August, but I am troubled that the changes do not address the 

concerns summarized above. 

For these reasons, I urge the FMCSA to seriously consider what changes should be made to 

ensure that CSA portrays the safety records of small commercial motor carriers accurately and 

treats them fairly. Please provide a response to the Committee addressing the concerns raised in 

this letter by September 28, 2012 and explain what future steps you will take to ensure that small 

businesses are treated fairly under the CSA program. I look forward to your productive actions 

to remedy these issues. 

s;~.p 

~:;:~ Chairman 

5 
194 


Insert offset folio 153 here 75852.153

APPENDIXF 
195 


Insert offset folio 154 here 75852.154

10f2 

ilttP:/'\\\\'\\'·jOC.COlllprim:,[l4..JS8 

!:!Qrrl..§ > CommlOJltsry Indust!)'. Not Government, Dnws TrllCK SRfety 

Commentary: Industry, Not Government, 

Drives Truck Safety 

Aug 31, 2012 2:42PM GMT 

Tom Sanderson 

Source: 

The Journal of Commerce Online 

Anne Ferro, administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, in early August 

shared with the audience at the PeopleNet User Conference that fatalities in truck- and 

bus-related crashes fell nearly 5 percent in 2011, This is great news, but Ms, Ferro proceeded to 

attribute the reduction to the Compliance Safety Accountability program, which took effect in 

December 2010, 

"This (crash reduction) is a very solid demonstration of success in our efforts," she 

said, "CSA is a strong enforcement program, The good news is that CSA is 

working, We are seeing the results from the process change we are all 

undertaking," 

But I'd like to pose this question to Ms, Ferro: If the federal government's CSA 

program is to be credited with a 5 percent reduction in fatalities in 2011, who gets 

the credit for the 12 percent decline in 2008 and 20 percent decline in 2009 before 

CS!l:s implementation? One may be tempted to credit the recession, but although miles traveled 

declined 7,3 percent in 2009, miles were actually up 2,2 percent in 2008, Fatalities per million 

miles, which is a better measure of safety, declined 14 percent in 2008 and 15 percent in 2009, 

The government isn't responsible for the decline in truck-related fatalities, The credit rightfully 

belongs to the trucking industry and professional truck drivers who are responsible for the 

tremendous safety improvements going back to the beginning of deregulation of the trucking 

industry, The difference is evident, as noted in the following statistics drawn from the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatality Analysis Reporting System, Federal Highway 

Administration and the FMCSA: 

The trucking industry, despite operating 83 percent more trucks running 163 percent more 

miles, was involved in 43 percent fewer fatalities claiming 45 percent fewer lives and an 

astounding 79 percent fewer fatalities per million miles, Fatalities per 100 million miles declined 

by a 4,8 percent compound annual rate between 1979 and 2010, 
196 


Insert offset folio 155 here 75852.155

Commentary: Industry, Not Govemment, Drives Truck Safety hnp:!!wwwjoc.com/printJ4J4458 

20f2 

Year 1979: The last year before deregulation 

#of targeTrucks #of Miles Fatal Crashes lives Lost #of Fatalities per 100M miles. 

5.9 Million 109 Billion 5,604 6,702 6.15 

Year 2010 

it of Large Trucks # of Miles Fatal Crashes Lives lost it of Fatalities per 100M miles 

IO.SMillion 2.87 Bitlion 3,251 3,678 1.28 

Neither Ms. Ferro nor CSA saved those lives. The trucking industry and professional truck 

drivers saved those lives. and they will continue to improve highway safety with or without CSA. 

Falsely claiming credit for safety improvements to justify a highly flawed and criticized program 

is undignified, inappropriate and easily disqualified as incorrect information. 

The fact is there is no correlation between CSA-Safety Measurement System scores and 

individual carrier accident frequency. CSA's flawed methodology and data unfairly labels more 

than half of measured carriers as less-than-safe, and the publication of the SMS scores is 

hurting many safe truckers and increasing confusion and liability for shippers. SMS scores 

should not be published. They should be used as originally intended: an internal tool of the 

agency for deciding how to allocate its enforcement resources. 

Tom Sanderson is CEO of Dallas-based logistics and technology provider Transpiace. 

LTL Washington Regulation Commentary Trucking 

Regulation North America 

Government + 

United States 

Source URL: http://www.ioc.comlcomm~commentary~indllStryMnotwgovelTYllent·9riveswtruck·safety 

9/4/201210:43 AM 
197 


Insert offset folio 156 here 75852.156

APPENDIXG 
198 


Insert offset folio 157 here 75852.157

Its time, the FMCSA needs an objective alternative to 

CSAjSMS methodology to credential and certify as safe to 

operate motor carriers of property and passengers. 

June 22, 2012 

After my initial support of CSA/SMS, I can no longer support this program as being overall 

effective in identifying un-safe or high risk carriers. My opinion is based 32 Y, years' experience 

in government service in motor carrier safety compliance, performance and enforcement. And 

for the last five years I have worked as a motor carrier safety consultant. 

My government safety service includes more than twelve years as a field investigator and 20 

years in management positions at the former Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal 

Highway Administration, and at Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. I concluded my 

government service as a Division Administrator for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration responsible for insuring that motor carriers based in my assigned areas were 

conducting their operations in a safe and responsible manner. 

I will always support FMCSA and 95% of everything it does. But I can no longer support its 

CSAjSMS program. 

I believe the time has come to create a more credible, effective and efficient alternative to this 

controversial program. 

During my government service years I was both involved and managed numerous programs 

that we believed at the time to be new and exciting and developed, implemented and amended 

to red uce crashes. I was there when we man ofthese programs were scrapped after being 

determined to be ineffective. Programs with names like Commercial Accident Prevention 

Evaluation (CAPE), Essential Element Examination (EEE vehicle inspections), Selective 

Compliance and Enforcement (SCE), and Accident Countermeasures (AC). 

Of course there have been others that have worked to some degree such as the Performance 

Registration and Information Systems Management (PRISM), Commercial Vehicle Information 

System Networks (CVISN) and certainly the former SafeStat system. All of these programs are 

designed to identify high risk carriers and be able to initiate some type of intervention to 

improve their operations and compliance performance. I was at FMCSA during the early years 

of the development of CSAjSMS and believed at the time that it was an improvement in over 

the SafeStat program and was probably the most effective program that I had seen in my many 

years of service at the agency to reduce crashes. 

My loss of confidence comes after I have seen large number of carriers being publically branded 

as unsafe by CSA that are not unsafe motor carriers. 

1 
199 


Insert offset folio 158 here 75852.158

I have seen far too many good, well established motor carriers with long histories of safe 

operations identified as "High Risk" by CSA/SMS that are simply not "High Risk Carriers". 

Some recent examples are where FMCSA recently spent 5 weeks at a 60 year old motor carrier 

with 250 trucks conducting what it calls a Focused Audit. This carrier had a crash rate of .40 per 

million miles traveled and had maintained that low crash rate for many years. I was involved in 

another 11 week Focused Audit on a very old carrier, well established carrier that too had a 

very low crash rate and had maintained that low crash rate for many years. And yet one more, 

just last week a good safe 30 truck carrier that has been in business 25 years, again with a very 

low crash rate was again subjected to a long and extensive audit where no significant safety 

issues were discovered. 

All of the above carriers had at the time of FMCSA audit a crash rate below .50 recordable 

crashes (both preventable and non-preventable) per million miles traveled for many many 

years. 

FMCSA considers a motor carrier with a crash rate of 1.5 or higher to be Un-Satisfactory in the 

Safety Rating Methodology Crash factor. I see far too many carriers with crashes rates at or 

below 1/3 of what FMCSA considers unacceptable by its own rules (49 CFR 385 (Appendix B) 

tagged as High Risk Motor Carriers and prominently branded to the public as unsafe carriers. 

Carriers that are have excellent safety records and are simply not a high risk to the traveling 

public. 

CSA/SMS percentile rankings is a flawed system that is harming far too many good carriers in 

order to get to the bad ones. FMCSA seems to think that this is ok. That it is just collateral 

damage and that their means justifies their end. 

One of the serious flaws to the CSA/SMS system is that points are assigned to all violations 

whereas the old SafeStat system only measured "Out of Service" violations. Many of the 

CSA!SMS violations, in my opinion, have little if any risk of resulting in or contributing to a 

crash. Yet these violations, again and again, single out and identify good safe carriers as a 

higher risk. Motor carriers understand serious violations (Out of Service Violations) but struggle 

with small technical violations that have never been identified as a cause or contributor to 

crashes (see the only study ever conducted on crash causation by FMCSA (2006 Large Truck 

Crash Causation Study). 

The public and especially the shipping public sees CSA!SMS as a safety rating system, regardless 

of the all the disclaimers FMCSA puts out to the contrary. In fact, some at FMCSA, through its 

convoluted presentations presents CSA!SMS to the public in this manner. Perception in the 

public's eyes is that CSA!SMS is a rating system. In our world perception is reality. 

If CSA!SMS is the right thing to do it is worth doing the right way. Let's run it through 

rulemaking, let everyone have their fairly weighted and equal say. Let's consider all the 

available studies relating to this subject and include everyone's ideas and opinions as we do in 

2. 
200 


Insert offset folio 159 here 75852.159

rulemakings. This has not been the way CSA/SMS has been developed, implemented and the 

many changes made to it. 

In summary, FMCSA has expended millions of dollars in developing CSA/SMS. I know as well as 

anyone that FMCSA has limited resources and that it is both expected and required to utilize 

those resources in the most effective manner possible to reduce commercial motor vehicle 

crashes. 

I think that FMCSA is utilizing far too much of its limited resources on safe motor carriers that 

pose little if any risk to the traveling public. These are resources that not only could but should 

be utilized on unsafe carriers. Utilization of these precious resources on carriers with current 

and historically excellent safety records is simply a waste of our limited highway trust fund's 

fuel tax dollars and a risk to the traveling public. 

Alternative Program: 

I believe that there is a serious lack of confidence in the current CSAjSMS system by the motor 

carrier industry. I believe that the time has come to start over and develop some type of 

system that is effective in identifying carriers that pose a real risk to the public and intervene on 

those carriers as early as possible. 

let's develop and implement something that works. 

Suggestions: 

I believe the time has come for a Pay to Play program. A program where every motor carrier 

that has been issued a US-DOT number is required to pay an annual fee to maintain that 

number in an active status. 

The payment of such a fee which I believe could be as little as $300 for a small carrier, to keep 

its DOT number active, will create FMCSA a credible database of active carriers and sufficient 

funding to administer the program I am suggesting. 

At this time we don't know how many active motor carriers FMCSA has. This number floats 

from 780,000 to 500,000 carriers, depending on which number best serves FMCSA at the time. 

I see the need for a "Safety Screening Program" for FMCSA to that can truly identify and 

prioritize carriers that have serious safety problems for further intervention. 

I see such a program as operating somewhat similar to its 34,000 audits conducted each year 

under its New Entrant Audit Program. Or similar to its Annual Statistical Analysis Drug and 

Alcohol testing program. I see the program working similar to the US Department of Defense, 

DuPont, insurance companies and Consolidated Safety Services motor coach audit programs. 

3 
201 


Insert offset folio 160 here 75852.160

I believe that with the fees collected, either FMCSA, its State Partners or even outside 

contractors could conduct some abbreviated type of Safety Performance Evaluation on every 

motor carrier that has an active DOT number every so many years, on a random basis and or on 

a prioritization basis. 

Pre-screening Safety Evaluations audit data could be provided to FMCSA, who would then be 

able to more accurately identify carriers that pose serious safety risk and immediately initiate 

some type of intervention. 

Since my retirement from the FMCSA, my company has been conducting a variety of Safety 

Evaluation Audits including mock DOT Compliance Reviews, Focused Compliance Reviews and 

New Entrant Audits. We also conduct custom audits as requested by our clients. 

What we have learned is that we can conduct desktop type audits remotely via phone, fax and 

e-mails at a very reasonable cost to our clients. If our desktop audit identifies systemic safety 

issues, or breakdown in safety management controls, we simply relay these findings to our 

clients and recommend that a more thorough evaluation of the problems areas discovered be 

conducted, possibly on site. 

These audits are conducted using the same driver and vehicle records sampling procedures as 

FMCSA thus only reviewing a limited number of drivers and vehicle records. Most ofthe time 

we can conduct these audits in about a week and can conduct several simultaneously. 

I see a program of this nature as a very effective tool for FMCSA so that its limited resources 

can be more targeted and effectively utilized on motor carriers with possible serious problems. 

This would in my mind, clearly remove the waste of resources FMCSA is currently expending on 

safe and responsible motor carriers, provide FMCSA with a credible safety performance prescreening program where its limited resources could be much more effectively utilized. And 

more so than not, eliminating the hurting of good and safe motor carriers in the process. 

I believe that FMCSA, as we do, can conduct such screening audits for about $300 for small 

carrier (10 or less trucks). The yearly registration fee could and should be increased for larger 

carriers proportionally. 

The time has come, let's get serious about safety. let's quit the preverbal dancing around the 

hat and go to work and create a safety certification program that is credible to both the public 

and the motor carrier industry. 

let's quit hurting good carriers just to get to the bad. 

It's the right thing to do and the right time to do it. 

Submitted by Rick Gobbell, President Gobbell Transportation Safety llC June 22, 2012 

4 
202 


Insert offset folio 161 here 75852.161

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE JOHNSON 

DIRECTOR OF CARRIER SERVICES 

C. H. ROBINSON 

ON BEHALF OF THE TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARIES ASSOCIATION 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 

How FMCSA's CSA PROGRAM 

IMPACTS FREIGHT BROKERS AND 3PL'S 

1625 PRINCE STREET 

ALEXANDRIA, VA22314 
203 


Insert offset folio 162 here 75852.162

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and members of the Transportation 

and Infrastructure Committee, thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to testify at 

today's oversight hearing. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) 

Compliance, Safety, and Accountability (CSA) initiative has had a significant impact on the 

carrier eligibility process that freight brokers and shippers conduct to ensure the hiring of 

safe, legally registered, and properly insured motor carriers. As one of the nation's largest 

freight transportation brokerages, C. H. Robinson has seen the risk of negligent hiring 

lawsuits based on carrier selection grow significantly since 2004. 

Introduction of Bruce Johnson 

My name is Bruce Johnson and I am the Director of Carrier Services for C. H. 

Robinson. I am also a member ofthe Transportation Intermediaries Association (TIA), 

member of the TIA Carrier Selection Framework Committee, and a member of the TIA 

Board of Directors. As the Director of Carrier Services, I am responsible for overseeing the 

establishment and execution of Robinson's carrier eligibility process and have been asked 

many times to describe how we select and assign carriers by both customers and the 

courts. 

Introduction ofTIA 

TIA is the professional organization of the $162 billion third-party logistics industry. 

TIA is the only organization exclusively representing transportation intermediaries of all 

disciplines doing business in domestic and international commerce. TIA represents over 

1300 member companies of which over 70 percent of these companies are small family 

owned businesses. 

2 
204 


Insert offset folio 163 here 75852.163

Introduction ofC.H. Robinson 

C. H. Robinson was founded in 1905 and currently facilitates the movement of over 

10 million shipments per year. C. H. Robinson is one of the world's most innovative thirdparty logistics companies. We are the 11 th largest publicly held company headquartered in 

Minnesota. We have 165 offices across the United States with over 7,200 employees 

throughout the United States. All of our offices are networked through a common 

proprietary operating system with my department serving as our centralized carrier 

eligibility center. We monitor over 45,000 US-based motor carriers for proper authority, 

valid insurance, and other data points, including safety related data. 

C. H. Robinson has attended and participated in most of the CSA listening sessions 

and provided feedback to FMCSA on how CSA is being used in contracting and carrier 

selection. While we do not operate any commercial trucks ourselves, we hire thousands of 

trucks daily, and we are committed to hiring safe motor carriers. 

I am here to communicate to you that tremendous confusion exists in the industry 

about the risks of carrier eligibility and selection and what the BASICi data and Safety 

Ratings mean for those hiring motor carriers. This confusion has added cost to freight 

brokers, motor carriers, manufacturers, importers, exporters, and consumers. 

Furthermore, the conflicting messages from FMCSA about what constitutes a safe motor 

carrier based on the available data have added significant legal risk to any entity that hires 

a motor carrier. FMCSA's primary purpose is motor carrier safety; it is their sole 

responsibility to keep our roads safe and authorize who is legally licensed to operate on the 

nation's highways. 

3 
205 


Insert offset folio 164 here 75852.164

The Role of the Freight Broker in the Supply Chain 

Freight brokers, interchangeably referred to as "transportation intermediaries," 

third party logistics companies ("3PLs"), and non-asset based logistics companies, are 

professional businesses that act similarly to "travel agents" for freight Freight brokers 

serve hundreds of thousands of U.S. businesses and manufacturers (shippers), importers, 

exporters, and carriers, bringing together the shippers' need to move cargo, with the 

corresponding capacity and equipment offered by rail, motor carriers, air, and ocean 

carriers. 

Since we do not own and operate any power units ourselves, we must add value to 

both our customers and our carriers. By matching the right capacity to serve the shipper, 

we dramatically reduce the empty miles trucks drive between shipments, saving time and 

fuel and adding money to the bottom lines of carriers and shippers. Our industry has 

helped lower logistics costs as a percent of GDP by several percentage points since 

deregulation, to what is now estimated to be approximately 8.5 percent according to 

Rosalyn Wilson, author ofthe 23rd Annual State of the Logistics Report. 

Transportation intermediaries are primarily, non-asset based companies whose 

expertise is providing mode and carrier neutral transportation arrangements for shippers 

with the underlying asset owning and operating carriers. We get to know the details of a 

shipper's business, then tailor a package of transportation services, sometimes by various 

modes of transportation, to meet those needs. In many cases, shippers outsource the 

majority oftheir freight management to freight brokers. Shippers count on transportation 

4 
206 


Insert offset folio 165 here 75852.165

intermediaries to arrange, report, and improve on the smooth and uninterrupted flow of 

goods from origin to destination. 

Freight brokers provide carriers access to services like consistent and rapid 

payment, fuel discounts and user friendly websites to search for and manage loads, 

paperwork, and receivables. Brokers keep carriers' equipment filled and moving. There are 

more than 15,000 licensed freight brokers in operation, and they range from one-person 

shops, to family owned businesses to multi-billion dollar, publicly traded corporations like 

C. H. Robinson. The market is very open and fragmented. 

Compliance, Safety. and Accountability 

In December of 2010, FMCSA launched CSA and the Safety Measurement System 

(SMS) became comprised of the BASIC data collected. There is no question that BASIC data 

and the associated screen shots are much more user friendly than its predecessor; from the 

category descriptions of "Fatigued Driving" and "Unsafe Driving", to the triangle and 

exclamation point indicating a score exceeding an arbitrary threshold, the BASIC data is 

presented crisply. FMCSA will readily admit, however, that while the format is a 

tremendous improvement, the purpose of the data remains the same: to assist FMCSA in 

prioritizing carriers for Agency compliance reviews, interventions, and inspections. In fact, 

FMCSA has attached the following warning to the BASIC data- it reads: 

Readers should not draw conclusions about a carrier's overall safety condition 

simply based on the data displayed in this system. Unless a motor carrier in the 

SMS has received an UNSATISFACTORY safety rating pursuant to CFR Part 385, 

5 
207 


Insert offset folio 166 here 75852.166

or has otherwise been ordered to discontinue operations by the FMCSA, it is 

authorized to operate on the nation's roadways. 

While the BASIC data is used as a compass to guide enforcement actions by FMCSA, 

the Safety Fitness Determination or Safety Rating is widely seen as the safety seal of 

approval by those who hire trucks. The Safety Ratings have equally user friendly names, 

and a carrier can be labeled Satisfactory, Conditional, and Unsatisfactory, or may be listed 

as having no safety rating at all because FMCSA has not prioritized its resources to perform 

a fuJI compliance review on them. The Safety Rating, however, does not appear on the 

same screen as the BASIC data. 

Currently, the BASIC data is not directly linked to the Safety Rating, and the industry 

is waiting for a rulemaking to draw clear Jines and correlations between the two. When 

FMCSA implemented the BASIC's in December 2010, many in the industry and within 

FMCSA anticipated that a rulemaking linking BASIC data directly to the safety rating would 

occur quickly. What was supposed to be temporary, however, continues to be delayed by 

the Agency. While the industry anticipates that the SFD rulemaking will be released for 

public comments in January 2013, as we are all aware the federal rulemaking process takes 

time and a final rule may not be issued in 2013. This is due in part to legitimate concerns 

with the BASIC data accuracy and consistency by motor carriers. Every day that goes by 

without the Agency developing a fair and accurate SFD, the transportation industry will 

continue to be negatively impacted. 

With user-friendly BASIC data and the official Safety Rating both visible, but in 

completely different systems, this has led to confusion amongst shippers and attorneys on 

6 
208 


Insert offset folio 167 here 75852.167

what constitutes a safe carrier to hire. There are often cases where satisfactory rated 

carriers have one or more BASIC alerts. FMCSA has added to that confusion by occasionally 

encouraging the use of BASIC data as a part of the carrier selection process, while at the 

same time maintaining a strict warning on the BASIC data that it not be used to exclude 

carriers from operating on the nation's roadways. For example, in May 2012, FMCSA 

released CSA factsheets targeted towards shippers and brokers. This information 

highlighted the difference between the BASIC data and the Safety Rating including the 

warning label. However, the factsheet confused the industry by saying in notes, that: 

A Satisfactory or Conditional rating does not mean, however, that the public 

should ignore all other reasonably available information about the motor 

carrier's operations. CSA's SMS data ... are one of many possible resources that 

the public can use to assess a motor carrier's safety performance record. 

We encourage FMCSA to be clear and consistent with shippers and brokers 

on which carriers and which information should be used to select truckers to haul 

freight. What the industry needs is a bright line differentiation of which carriers are 

unsafe. 

How BASIC data is used in Court 

1. New Standard of Care 

Prior to 2004, freight brokers were not overly concerned that they would be 

involved in a lawsuit if a motor carrier that was fully authorized to operate on the roads by 

FMCSA was selected to haul a load, and was subsequently in a tragic accident. Would you 

7 
209 


Insert offset folio 168 here 75852.168

be concerned about being sued if you hailed a fully licensed taxi, and through the 

negligence of the taxi driver a pedestrian was injured? Similarly, it should not be the 

responsibility of the travel agency to ensure that a particular airline is safe to operate, that 

is and should be determined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Furthermore, a 

travel agency should not have to second guess the FAA, and they should not be held liable 

for millions of dollars in potential lawsuits for booking a passenger on an "unsafe" airline. 

In a series of court cases, however, some of which I provided testimony for, the 

court established a new interpretation of the responsibility, known as the duty of 

reasonable care. Subsequent court cases expanded and redefined the responsibilities of 

parties engaging independent contractors, and settlement and/or jury awards have grown 

substantially. In almost every case, the motor carrier's public liability insurance is 

exhausted, the carrier has filed bankruptcy, and those with deep pockets, like the broker or 

shipper, are sought to fill the loss and make the injured person or family whole. A common 

theme in most negligent hire cases is that brokers and shippers should second guess the 

FMCSA's decision of which carriers are safe to operate by examining the detailed safety 

record of each carrier before use. This second guessing scenario is why the conflicting 

interpretations of BASIC data and Safety Rating is of such great importance to freight 

brokers. Is a carrier with a score of 62 more dangerous than one with a score of 60? If that 

is true, then why not use only carriers with a score below 50 and shut all the other carriers 

down? The reason not to do this is that a relative safety system is fine for internal 

prioritization use, but damaging to market participants when made pUblic. Brokers and 

shippers will continue to be sued because they used a carrier with a BASIC score that solely 

prioritizes them for an internal Agency compliance review. Until FMCSA provides firm 

B 
210 


Insert offset folio 169 here 75852.169

guidance on what BASIC thresholds constitutes a safe carrier, differing opinions will 

proliferate and the courts will arbitrate those opinions. 

2. New Standard of Relatjonshjp 

In a separate and distinct type of claim from negligent hiring, in some cases, courts 

have also changed the nature of the relationship between 3PLs and carriers from 

independent contractor to that of an agency, thereby, creating a vicarious liability scenario. 

These agency cases attempt to re-interpret the arrangements between the broker and 

carrier alleging that the broker exercised enough control over the carrier to make the 

carrier a part of the broker. The travel agent does not become the agent of the airline in an 

aviation accident. The lawsuits are becoming more frequent and the verdicts vary greatly 

between federal and state courts from $1 million to more than $20 million. 

While C. H. Robinson has been successful overall at managing our risks of negligent 

hiring and vicarious liability lawsuits, we have spent considerable resources managing that 

risk. All brokers fear that they will be blind-sided someday when they think they have hired 

FMCSA authorized motor carriers. 

There can be no question that the brokerage industry seeks to promote higher 

safety standards for our nation's highways. That being said, the brokerage industry is 

displeased with the current state of affairs with courts holding 3PLs and shippers to an 

ever changing standard in carrier selection. Congress and the FMCSA can re-set this 

standard to one that is more reasonable and static. It should not be the responsibility of 

industry stakeholders and companies like C. H. Robinson to determine which carriers are 

safe to operate on American highways. It should be the sole responsibility of the Agency 

9 
211 


Insert offset folio 170 here 75852.170

charged with issuing licenses to carriers and making sure those carriers adhere to safety 

standards established by the Agency to tell the public which carriers are safe-to-use and 

which carriers are not. 

CSA and the Safety Fitness Determination (SFD) 

As an industry that is made up of both multi-national companies and thousands of 

small businesses, we need a single, clear cut safety standard from the Federal agency which 

was established to reduce the number of highway accidents. There is a great 

misunderstanding of how the BASICs within the CSA system for each carrier are 

determined, and these BASICs are relative scores with considerable doubts and questions 

about data accuracy, consistency, and direct crash risk. We feel this information is for the 

Agency's internal use, not for public consumption, which makes it difficult for the pUblic to 

understand if a carrier is safe or unsafe to operate on the nation's highways. 

There is no question that the CSA initiative is helping FMCSA and the data regarding 

roadside compliance is improving; however there is still confusion regarding what 

constitutes a safe carrier to hire. FMCSA has shifted a tremendous burden of risk, in the 

form of negligent hiring lawsuits, onto shippers and brokers. With the threat of significant 

lawsuits, the industry is often faced with the choice of second guessing the Agency. It is not 

the responsibility of shippers or the brokerage industry to make the safety fitness 

determination of motor carriers. The only way to accomplish this task is for FMCSA to 

complete the new Safety Fitness Determination (SFD) rulemaking and fully link the BASIC 

data to the Safety Rating. However, we do not want FMCSA to develop a SFD, prior to 

10 
212 


Insert offset folio 171 here 75852.171

addressing industry concerns regarding the methodology used to evaluate carriers BASIC 

scores and percentages. 

Recommendations 

Until the Safety Fitness Determination (SFD) rulemaking is developed for public 

comment and ultimately developed into a final rule, we recommend: 

1. FMCSA should immediately add the current compliance review based 

Safety Rating to all screenshots that display a carrier's BASIC data so there 

is no confusion about the two systems. 

2. FMCSA should remove any language from its website and outreach that 

encourages shippers, brokers, or the public to use the BASIC data for their 

own purposes. FMCSA should not encourage the use of unproven, relative 

data, except for internal use. 

Going forward in the middle term, we recommend the following: 

3. When the SFD rulemaking is posted in the Federal Register and open to 

public comment, the industry will seek a rating system from FMCSA that 

rates all unsafe carriers as unfit to operate, and thus eliminate any 

confusion on which motor carriers are safe to hire. FMCSA officials have 

publicly indicated that this is the direction the Agency is currently 

considering in the development of the SFD rulemaking; the brokerage 

industry would strongly support this position. 

11 
213 


Insert offset folio 172 here 75852.172

4. We ask Congress to develop a legislative fix similar to the Graves 

Amendment enacted in 200S as part of the SAFETEA-LU highway bill. The 

statute abolished the vicarious liability of companies that rent or lease 

motor vehicles based on the negligent driving of their customers. This 

amendment would create a uniform standard against liability without fault 

by preempting state vicarious liability laws imposing liability on nonnegligent transportation brokers and shippers. 

Conclusion and Legislative Fix 

In conclusion, we fully support FMCSA and its mission to improve motor carrier 

safety on the nation's roadways. TIA and C.H. Robinson will work productively with 

industry participants, FMCSA and Congress to ensure that FMCSA publishes a safety fitness 

determination for all motor carriers that is based on accurate and fair data, and that does 

not discriminate based on carrier size or type. When the SFO rulemaking process begins, 

the industry asks Congress to carefully review the Agency's actions to ensure that quality 

data is utilized and fair and impartial processes are followed, and that a clear safety fitness 

determination is established for every carrier. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee today on the concerns 

of CSA and its effects on the transportation brokerage industry. 

, Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs) 

12 
214 


Insert offset folio 173 here 75852.173

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM GENTRY 

PRESIDENT, GENTRY TRAIL WAYS 

AND ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION AND UNITED MOTORCOACH 

ASSOCIATION . 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT 

HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER l3, 2012 

My name is Bill Gentry and I am the owner and President of Genlry Traitways in Knoxville, TN. 

We furnish school bus transportation to our local school district and local and interstate charter 

and tour travel with over-the-road motorcoaches. We are take great pride in serving our 

community safely and economically for over 50 years. 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member DeFazio, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

this opportunity to testify. On behalf of the members of the American Bus Association and the 

United Motorcoach Association, we appreciate you calling this hearing today and the 

opportunity to represent the motorcoach travel and tourism industry and our perspectives 

regarding the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Compliance Safety and 

Accountability Program, better known as eSA. 

Among professionals in passenger transportation safety, hopes were high that CSA would afford 

new and improved tools to better predict the likelihood of commercial motor vehicle crashes. 

When CSA was launched, FMCSA stated: "It introduces a new enforcement and compliance 

model that allows FMCSA and its State Partners to contact a larger number of carriers earlier in 

order to address safety problems before crashes occur." Unfortunately, at this point independent 

studies and anecdotal evidence suggest eSA may fall severely short of its intended goal of 

significantly reducing commercial motor vehicle crashes. 

Like its predecessor, eSA is rooted in compliance and the associated enforcement of the most 

rudimentary rules that are decades old and may not reflect progressive risk management 

stratagems and actuarial science. In other words, we placed an old engine in a new motofcoach 

and are expecting better performance. If anything, CSA cries out for improved methods for 

passenger carrier crash prediction and tools passenger carriers can utilize to mitigate their risk. 

Instead, the enforcement community remains entrenched in tactics that more resemble a "gotcha" 

mindset that generates revenue from fines rather than employing methods that truly reduce the 

possibility of a commercial motor vehicle crash. We do not believe the CWTent data fed into CSA 

and the current prioIitization scheme will result in a significant reduction in crashes. 
215 


Insert offset folio 174 here 75852.174

Recently, Congress authorized $251,000,000 in Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 

(MAP-21) for FY 2013 to inspect commercial motor vehicles and drivers in the field. Routine 

inspections for a motorcoach include examining a driver's Licensing, medical certificate, log 

books and the vehicle's emergency exits, headJamps, tum signals, emergency flashers, 

windshield, brake components, engine compartment and air pressure. All of these items are basic 

components of safe operations and command attention. Unfortunately, compliance or 

noncompliance with these items is rarely significant as indicators of a commercial motor vehicle 

driver crash. CSA lacks useful data for passenger carriers to mitigate crashes. Moreover, the 

consumers of passenger carrier services are left with algorithms and scores that are nearly 

impossible to decipher when selecting a safe passenger carrier. 

Studies indicate that vehicle defects are responsible for less than 2% of commercial motor 

vehicle accidents. Over 95% of commercial motor vehicle accidents are caused by driver error. 

But there are stark differences in the significance of the type of driver error and its relation to 

crash causation. The American Transportation Research Institute reports that a conviction for 

"Failure to UselImproper Signal" increases the likelihood of a commercial motor vehicle crash 

by 96%. Conversely, any "out-of-service" violation normally detected at a destination or 

roadside inspection increases the likelihood of a driver's involvement in a subsequent 

commercial motor vehicle by 26%. A "Past Crash" or "Improper Passing" violation increases the 

likelihood of driver's involvement in a crash by 88% while a "Size and Weight" violation 

increases the likelihood of an accident by I 8% and a "Disqualified Driver" or "Medical 

Certificate" violation rates as "non-significant". 

All of the highest indicators of an increased propensity for an accident relate to basic traffic law 

enforcement. In July 2009, the American Bus Association's Bus Industry Safety Council (ElSC) 

implored the enforcement community at the Intel'llational Association of Chiefs of Police 

meeting to issue citations when drivers violate basic traffic laws and insist that courts avoid 

reducing or modifying the original charges. It is a common complaint of owners of passenger 

carrier companies that law enforcement seems to ignore drivers who violate speed limits or 

drivers that follow other vehicles too close, while on the other hand issuing tickets for burned-out 

tail lights that increases a carriers' Safety Measurement Scores that may eventually trigger an 

FMCSA intervention. 

CSA also fails to recognize the vast differences in the level of State participation in inspection 

activity. Many carriers' base of operation are in States lacking any formal passenger carrier 

inspection programs and therefore have very low contact with carriers while other states have 

substantial inspection activity. Make no mistake about it; the passenger carrier business is a 

national business. Tour operators routinely select passenger carriers H'om states hundreds of 

milrcs from the trip origination. It would not be surprising to find a carrier with better scores in 

Mississippi due to low enforcement contact compared to a high contact state such as New York. 

Is a passenger carrier safer that receives little or no inspection activity and therefore has 00 

violations safer than a passenger carrier whose base of operation is in a high contact state? 

Additional disparities develop when the CSA scores do not take into account carriers' urban or 

rural bases of operations, miles traveled and in what regions those miles are traveled. 
216 


Insert offset folio 175 here 75852.175

Often, when drivers incur traffic violations there are further disparities within CSA's Safety 

Measurement System. Passenger carriers with very low tolerance for traffic infractions routinely 

terminate drivers in an effort to eliminate the increased likelihood of a crash. Unfortunately, 

CSA's Safety Measurement Scores do not reflect the elimination of the risk when the driver is 

dismissed and the operator must endure the punitive scores associated with the violation for two 

years and which may subject the company to an agency intervention. Meanwhile the dismissed 

driver simply finds a carrier with more tolerance for drivers with traffic infractions; thus taking 

his increased likelihood for crashes with hiro. CSA in no way mitigates these disparities nor 

identifies the carrier with the increased propensity for an accident. Inconsistencies revolve 

around the differences in training, skill, supervision and experience of the officer inspecting the 

commercial motor vehicle. Should the inspecting officer err in some respect (e.g. wrongful 

assignment of a violation, a misinterpretation or mistake in law) the carrier's appeal process is 

arduous and time consuming. Any appeal is submitted via an online system once the violation 

appears on the carriers' safety record. Plainly stated, the system presumes the operator or driver 

at-fault on all violations. Furthermore, the appeal is reviewed by the very officer that issued the 

violation. States have various response times to the appeal and supervision over the appeal. 

Recently, FMCSA introduced an appellate process that may prove promising; but adds yet 

another layer oftime-col1suming bureaucracy. Meanwhile, as the information concerning the 

violation is public, passenger carriers must sutfer the adverse consequences of consumers and 

insurers viewing violations that are in dispute as well as the costs in time and resources of getting 

the violation removed. 

Perhaps CSA's most controversial subject is the issue of crashes. Simply stated all crashes, 

regardless of accountability, are the number one indicator that a commercial motor vehicle 

company andlor driver will incur another crash. In the past, FMCSA has collected information 

regarding all crashes. If the crashes associated with a carrier reached a certain threshold, an 

intervention occurred that evaluated the carrier's compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Regulations. Further evaluation of crashes was done to determine "preventability". We 

believe this system worked relatively well. However, the CSA system is problematic. First of 

all, consumers of commercial passenger carrier services are encouraged to evaluate a carrier's 

Safety Measurement System scores, including crash data. Unfortunately, the data contains no 

information regarding the severity or accountability of a crash. Unfiltered, the information 

cannot serve as credible consumer information upon which a carrier selection can be made. 

While ABA and UMA believe that crash data serves a critical role in predicting a carrier's 

propensity for an accident; the information in its cun-ent fonn is inappropriate for consumers and 

should be restricted to enforcement and the motor carrier's view only. Congress recently passed 

legislation that would require the FMCSA to develop an easy to understand rating system for 

consumers of passenger carrier services that would presumably reflect a carrier's propensity for a 

crash. ABA and UMA feel the development of this rating system should be prioritized by 

FMCSA leadership in order to meet the eighteen month deadline imposed by Congress. 

There is one final issue that must be raised. Current law requires that States will ensure that, 

except in the case of an imminent or obvious safety hazard, an inspection of a vehicle 

transporting passengers for a motor carrier of passengers is conducted at a station, tenninal, 

border crossing, maintenance facility, destination, or other location where motor carriers may 

make planned stops. Congress witI be disappointed to learn that FMCSA is advising States that 
217 


Insert offset folio 176 here 75852.176

they may conduct passenger carrier vehicle and driver inspections at State weigh "stations"; 

subverting the will of Congress to protect passengers from safety hazards, delayed schedules and 

interfering with passengers' ability to find proper accommodations during inspections. The 

recently passed MAP-21 not only reiterates the prohibition against weigh station inspections but 

further states under Sec.32504 (ii) "Impoundment and Immobilization of Commercial Motor 

Vehicles for Imminent Hazard"; "Enforcement shall not unreasonably interfere with the ability 

of a shipper, broker, or other party to arrange for the alternative transportation of any cargo or 

passenger being transported at the time the commercial vehicle is immobilized. In the case of a 

commercial vehicle transporting passengers, the Secretary or authorized State official shall 

provide reasonable, temporary, and secure shelter and accommodations for passengers in 

transit." It is our position that no weigh station was designed to accomodate 57 passengers, some 

of which may be very young, senior citizens or disabled. 

Anecdotal evidence exists that CSA has changed behaviors and improved compliance with the 

Federal Motor CalTier Safety Regulations as interpreted by the North American Standard Out-ofService Criteria. Our reservations with CSA concern its limited effect of reducing passenger 

carrier crashes through expensive and somewhat antiquated methods. Perhaps CSA's best feature 

is its flexibility and adaptability. The leadership at FMCSA has been responsive to 

recommendations and already CSA has evolved significantly since its entry in December 2010 

and we applaud the FMCSA leadership for its willingness to listen to the industry. 

We have two [mal recommendations for CSA. First, we recommend that the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) engage the services of the American Academy of Actuaries in an 

effort to more effectively explore the link between the most significant caliSes of commercial 

motor vehicle crashes and the CSA's Safety Measurement System. 

Second, under CSA, carriers are placed into peer groups (i.e., other can'iers with similar numbers 

ofinspections or size) and ranked according to perfonnance. The rankings determine which 

can'iers may not be complying, through inspections, with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Regulations and therefore prioritized for intervention. However, passenger carriers are included 

in the peer rating system with the much large population of tlUcks. Given the nature of passenger 

carriers whose fleets may be typically smaller, travel fewer miles, and have a variety of risk 

exposures; we recommend that passenger carriers be rated within a passenger carriers peer group 

to more readily identify passenger carriers for interventions. 

In conclusion, we believe CSA is well-intended, but has room for significant improvement and 

we look forward to working with the Committee and the FMCSA to achieve its intended goals. 

On behalf of the members of the American Bus Association and the United Motorcoach 

Association, I appreciate this opportunity to express our views regarding this important subject 

and to answer any questions you may have, 
218 


Insert offset folio 177 here 75852.177

ABA represents mototcoach and tour companies in the United States and Canada Its members 

operate charter, tour, regular route, airport express, special operations and contract services 

(commuter, school, transit). Another 2,800 member organizations represent the travel and 

tourism industry and suppliers of bus products and services who work in partnership with the 

North American motorcoach industry. 

Founded in 1971, the United Motorcoach Association (UMA) is the nation's largest association 

of bus and motorcoach companies and industry suppliers with over 1,200 members located 

across North America. Our Members represents the full spectnun of bus and motorcoach 

operations; from small family charter and tour· to nationwide scheduled and commuter service 

operations. The United States Small Business Administratioll estimates over 90% of all privately 

owned bus and motorcoach companies meet the definition of "small business." 
219 


Insert offset folio 178 here 75852.178

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL PROVIDED BY THE UNITED 

MOTOROACH ASSOCIATION 

American Transportation Research Institute, "Predicting Truck Crash Involvement: A 2011 

Update", April 2011. 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Analysis Brief, "The Bus Crash Causation Study", 

January 2010 (Publication No. FMCSA-RRA-IO-003). 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN 

BUS ASSOCIATION 

American Bus Association letter of September 10,2012 to Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administrator Re: Roadside Bus Inspections. 
220 


Insert offset folio 179 here 75852.179

Research Results 

Predicting Truck Crash Involvement: A 2011 Update 

The Problem 

Despite fatal truck crash totals reaching their lowest 

levels in U.S. DOT recorded history in 2009, both 

industry and government remain convinced there is 

room for improvement. Reacting to recent research 

which has highlighted the pivotal role that driverrelated factors play in truck crashes, it is clear that 

efforts aimed at further reducing preventable crashes 

must focus In large part on driver behaviors. 

In 2005, ATRI conducted research that idenUfied 

specific truck driver behaviors that are most predictive 

of future truck crash involvement.' Numerous factors 

could have changed these relationships over the past 

five years, however. Therefore, an updated analysiS 

was warranted to discern which truck driver behaviors 

from the original study continue to hold predictive 

value in terms of crash involvement. 

Research Goal 

The main objective of this research was the 

identification of specific types of driver behaviors 

(violations, convictions and crashes) that are most 

highly correlated with future crash involvement. The 

Research Team examined to what extent drivers with 

certain driving records in one year (2008) were more 

likely to be involved in a truck crash in the following 12 

months (2009), compared to drivers who did not have 

the same violations, convictions or prior crash history. 

Additionally, the Research Team sought to determine 

how the updated 2011 findings relate to those from 

ATRI's 2005 study. 

1 AmerIcan Transportation Res.earch Institute, PrecncUng TruCk Crash 

Involvement: Oavelopfng a Commerctal Drtver Behavior-Based Model and 

R.ecommended CDuntermeasures. Alexani1rla, VA. October 2005 

Methodology 

This research replicated a first-of-ils-kind ATRI study 

which analyzed several driver-specific databases to 

statistically relate those data to future crash probability 

at the driver level of analysis. Data sources included 

the Motor Carrier Management Information System 

(MCMIS) and the Commercial Drivers License 

Information System (COLIS). 

For the purposes of this research, crash involvement 

was used as the dependent variable. The independent 

variables were driver-specific performance indicators 

mined from the data including: specific road inspection 

violation information; driver traffic conviction 

Information; as well as past crash involvement 

information. 

Driver data were gathered from a two-year time frame 

(200B-Z009) and analyzed across those years to 

determine the future crash predictability of violations, 

convictions and crashes which occurred the previous 

year. Individual chI-square analyses were used to 

assess whether there was a significant difference in 

future crash rates for drivers based on their past 

violations, convictions andlor crash information. 

Findings 

This study's findings were based on data from 5fJ7,772 

U.S. truck drivers. The analysis shows that a "failure 

to use/improper signal" conviction was the leading 

conviction associated with an increased likelihood of a 

future crash. When a truck driver was convicted of this 

offense, Ihe driver's likelihood of a future crash 

increased 96 percent. Ten additional convictions were 

also significant crash predictors; of these, eight had an 

associated crash likelihood increase between 56 and 
221 


Insert offset folio 180 here 75852.180

84 percent, while two registered between 36 to 40 rT_'b_Ie_2 ____ '-;;;:;;:;;;;:rr;;:;;;:;;;;;-;;<, __ ..., percent. 

In relation to driver violations, an improper passing 

violation had the strongest association with crash 

involvement. Drivers with this violation were 88 

percent more likely than their peers to be involved in a 

crash. Seven additional violations had significant 

crash associations, with five ranging in magnitude 

between 38 and 45 percent and two between 1 Band 

21 percent. 

Finally, the results indicated that drivers who had a 

past crash also had a significant 8a percent Increase in 

their likelihood of a future crash. Table 1 ranks the top 

10 driver events by the percentage increase in the 

likelihood of a future crash. 

Table 1 

Increnein Crash 

Ifadriver t1ad: Ukelihood 

A Failure to Use I Improper Signal 96% 

oonvlctlon 

A Past Crash 88% 

An Improper Passing vioJatron 88% 

An Improper Tum tonviCiIon 84% 

An Improper or Erratic lane Change 80% 

comrictlon 

An Improper Lane i Location 88% 

conviction 

A Failure to Obey Traffic Sign 68% 

conviction 

A Speeding Mora Than 15 MUes over soee<iUmit conviction 67% 

Any rof'wlct!on 65% 

~=:~;i~:~sJ~n:~tentiveJ 64% 

Conclusions drawn from this 2011 updated report 

include an acknowledgement that driver behaviors, 

while still associated with crash involvement, appear to 

be less strongly related than in ATRI's original report, 

when three predictors were found to more than double 

crash risk. Moreover, while many of the 2005 

behaviors demonstrated similar patterns in the 

analysis update, a number of the most predictive 

behaviors from 2005 were replaced by new behaviors. 

Theories are proposed for these changes, with an 

emphasis on the finding that roadside inspected 

drivers generally had much safer records in the 2011 

study, as evidenced by the lower proportion of drivers 

being issued violations (see Table 2). 

Finally, the report provides recommendations for how 

the industry can apply the current study's findings to 

continue to reduce the occurrence of crashes and 

crash-related behaviors. ATRI developed a fonnula for 

identifying "top tier" enforcement states, whioh 

highlight those states that contribute proportionally 

more to the nation's traffic enforcement activity totals 

than truck crash statistic totals. 

Overall, Ihe findings In this report suggest that driver 

interventions and industry innovations are capable of 

aHering the magnitude and even the presence of the 

linkege between behaviors and Mure exposure to 

crashes. By becoming aware of problem behaviors, 

carriers and enforcement agencies are able to address 

those issues prior to them leading to serious 

consequences. The converse is also true, however, 

as lower priority behaviors. if ignored, may begin to 

play an increasing role in crash Involvement 

To receive a copy of this report and other ATRI 

stUdies, please visit: WJWV.ATRI-ONLlNE.ORG 

cAT~}~~ A TRl's primary mission is to conducland support research in the 

trBnsportation field, with an emphasis on the trucking industry's 

BSS6ntial role in the U.S. and intemational marketplace. 
222 


Insert offset folio 181 here 75852.181

ANALYSIS BRIEF Federal Motor Carrier Safety Adnilnlstration 

THE Bus CRASH CAUSATION STUDY 

Ralph Craft 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

Magdalene Skretta, Suzanne Cotty Econometrica, Inc. 

Summary 

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 mandated 1:1 study to 

determine the causes of, and factors contributing to. crashes involving 

commercial motor vehicles and directed the Secretary of Transportation 

to transmit the results of the study to Congress. In response! the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety AdministrZltion and the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration conducted a three-year study of large truckcrashes-the Large 

Truck Crash Causation Study-and a smaller study of bus crashes, the Bus Crash 

Causation Study (BCeS). This Analysfs Briefsummarizes the results of rhe BCCS. 

Approximately 50 people are killed and fewer than 1,000 are injured armually in 

cross~country and intercity bus crashes, Given those relatrvefy sma!! numbers 

Df bus-related fatalities and injuries, FMCSA decided to collect crash data in 

northeastern New Jersey, which is part of the New York City metropolitan area 

and home to large fleets of various types of buses. The BCeS was deSigned 

to colfect more than 40D data elements on each crash that included at least 

one bus and at feast one fatality or injury. Data collection included crashes 

occurring from January 1, 2005, to D€cember 31, 2006. 

The BCeS report includes information 0040 buses involved in 39fatal and injury 

crashes (Category A, crashes involving fatalities or IncapaCitating injuries; or 

Category B, crashes !nvolving non~incapacltating injuries) that occutred in 

New Jersey in 2005 and 2006. The following key variables were coded for each 

crash: critical event (the event after which a crash 15 unavoidable); critical reason 

(the 1mmediate reason for the critical event); and associated factors (all f<lctars 

selected from the current understanding of conditions: related to crash risk and 

pre-sent at the time of the crash). Human errors by bus drivers, other vehicle 

drivers, and pedestrians or blcyclists were aSSigned as the critical reasons 

for bus crashes in 90 percent of the cases tn the BCeS. Of the 19 crashes in 

which the bus was assigned the cfitiCE\1 reason for the crash, driver error was 

the specHk reason in 1 S cases, In the 20 cases for which the clitlcal reasons 

were not assigned to the bus or its driver but to another (non-bUS) v-ehlde, a 

pedestrian, or a bicyclist, the problem was human error. 
223 


Insert offset folio 182 here 75852.182

1I!E Bvs CRASH 

CAl'SAIlON STUDY 

Introduction 

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 

(MCSIA) mandated a study to determine the causes 

of, and factors contributing to, crashes involving 

commercial motor vehicles (CMVs), The MCSlA 

directed the Secretary of ~,e U.s, Department of 

Transportation (OOT) to transmit the results of 

the study to Congress. In response, DOrs Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHlSA) conducted a three-year study of large 

tntck crashes. FMCSA transmitted a report to 

Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation 

Study (LTCCS) in March 2006, This Analysi. Brief 

summarizes FMCSA's report to Congress providing 

the results of the Bus Crash Causation Study (BeeS), 

Each year in the past dEcade, more than 4,800 

people have been killed and more than 100,000 

people have been injured in crashes involving 

large trucks, For the LTCCS, FMeSA was able 

to obtain a representative sample of large truck 

crashes by employing researchers at each of 

the 24 NHTSA CrashwOIthiness Data System 

(CDS) data coUeetion sites across the Nation. rn comparison, approximately 50 people are killed 

and fewer than 1,000 injured annually in crosscountry and interdty bus crashes. Using the same 

data collection strategy for Bees as LTeCS was 

not practicaL Given the relatively small number of 

cross-country and interdty bus crashes resulting in 

fatalities or injuries and the concentration of those 

crashes in certain metropolitan areas, a nationally 

representative sample of bus crashes would have 

been prohibitively expensive to acquire and would 

have taken many years to complete. 

Faced with the challenges of acquiring a 

representative, national sample of bus crashes, 

FMCSA decided to mUm crash data in northeastem 

New Jersey,. which is part of the New York City 

metropolitan area and home to large fleets of 

various types of buses. The goal was to study 50 to 

100 crashes in a year. However,. the paucity of bus 

crashes resulting in fatalities or injuries revealed 

only 39 crashes involving fatalities or incapacitating 

injuries (Category A) or non-incapacitating injuries 

(Category B) in 2 years. Despite the small sample, 

the BCCS is the largest in-depth comprehensive 

examination of bus crashes ever conducted. 

The BCes database is available electronically to 

the public. The public copy -of the database does 

not include data from interviews that cannot be 

validated by a second source. Qualified researchers, 

academic institutions, and government agencies 

will be granted full access to the datab(lse, induding 

interview data. 

Methodology 

The Bees was conducted in New Jersey by 

FMCSA research staff and State CMV inspectors, 

in conjunctIon with New Jersey law enForcement 

and public safety agencies. The BCes was designed 

to collect more than 400 data elements on each 

crash that induded at least one bus and at least 

one fatality or injury. Generally, the shtdy did not 

include crashes involving New Jersey transit buses 

or schoo] buses transporting children from home to 

school, because most of FMCSA's safety regulations 

do not apply to those vehicle types, The only 

exception was to include transit and school buses 

if the crash involved at least one fatality. 

Data collection inc1ud('d crashes occurring from 

January 1,2005, to December 31,. 2006. Buses are 

defined as vehicles designed or used. to transport 9 

to 15 peopJe (including the driver) fm' compensation 

or more than 15 people for any purpose. New 

Jersey was selected as the dElta collection site for 

the following reasons: a high volume and wide 

variety of bus traffic; a high level of interest in bus 

crashes expressed by Federal, Statel and local New 

Jersey government officials; and a strong State bus 

safety program. To ensure data quam}) crash-site 

investigations began as soon as possible 

after the crash. 

FMCSA developed the BCCS database using 

a methodology modeled on the LTCCS and 
224 


Insert offset folio 183 here 75852.183

focused on pre-<:tash factors. State and local police 

agencies notified an FMCSA researcher when a 

crash occurred. Data collection was performed at 

each crash site by a two-person team consisting 

of a trained researcher and a New Jersey State 

bus inspector who conducted a North American 

Standard Levell inspection of the bus and bus 

driver involved in the crash. The researcher and bus 

inspector collected driver, passenger, and witness 

interviews at the crash scene. Crash forms were used 

to record extensive data, including the following: 

Location.. time,. date. and sequence of the crash 

event and collision measurements 

Bus and bus driver inspection results 

Roadway conditions, weather conditions, and 

traffic conditions 

Pre~crash events 

Driver age, sex, physical characteristics, and 

injury severity 

Drivers' use of drugs or' alcohol. 

Additional interview data were coJJected by 

telephone from the motor carrier responsible fOl: 

the bus and from the drivers of other vehicles 

involved in the crash after leaving the crash scene. 

Researchers aJso l'eviewed police crash reports, 

hospital records, and coroners' reports for fatal 

crashes, The n:!searcher often revisited a crash scene 

to refine scene diagrams and search for additional 

data. Crash case da~l were provided to FMCSA 

crash experts for coding, and difficult cases were 

reviewed by FMCSA New Jersey Division and 

Headquarters staff before being included in the 

electronic study database, 

Crash Characteristics This report includes information on 40 buses 

jnvolved in 39 fatal and Category A or Category B 

injUry crashes occurring in New Jersey in 2005 and 

2006. Nationally, during this same time span.. buses 

were involved in 5.6 percent of all large truck and 

bus fatal crashesi but in New Jersey, buses were 

involved in 145 percent of all truck and bus fatal 

crashes. Due to the small sample of 39 crashes, only 

whole numbers are used in the discussion of the 

BCes data. There were 14 crashes involving at least 

one fatality and 25 crashes involving at least one A 

or B injury. 

Eighteen of the 39 cra-shes inc1uded in this report 

involved a collision between 21 bus and a passenger 

vehicle (i.e.~ passenger car, pickup truck, van, or 

sport utility vehicle), In other crashes with motor 

vehides~ three buses col1ided with commercial 

trucks, two coUided with motorcyc1es6 one collided 

with a light rail car, and one was a crash between 

two buses. In eight cases, the bus hit a pedestrian, 

and in nYO cases the bus hit a bicyclist. There were 

four single-vehicle crashes, and in two of the crashes 

the buses caught fue. 

Table 1 presents data on the bus body type for the 40 

buses involved in the 39 crashes. More than half of 

these buses \-vere rnolorcrx'lches (intercity buses). 

Table 2 presents data on the bus operation for the 40 

buses involved in the 39 crashes. Most of the buses 

were being used in cha.rter or intercity regular route 

service, Examples of "other" operation types include 

a van carrying mental1y disabled adults to a group 

home after a day trip and a condominium complex 

operating a bus service, 

Tal:lIe.l Bus Body Type 
225 


Insert offset folio 184 here 75852.184

THE Bus CRASH 

CAUSATION 51 !JDY 

Taple 2. Bus Operation 

Coding Crash Data 

The following key variables were coded for 

each crash: 

Critical event: The event after which a crash is 

unavoidable. The critical event is the action or event 

that put the vehide or vehicles on a course that 

made the collision unavoidable, given reasonable 

driving skills and vehicle handling. One vehicle in 

each crash is coded with the critica.l event. Examples 

of critical events include "lane change! run off road" 

and "loss of contro}." 

Critical reaSOn: The immediate reason for the critical 

event. The reason is coded to the vehicle that was 

coded with the critical event. The reason can be 

assigned to the driver, vehicle,. or environmental 

conditions leadjng to the critical event. Possible 

critical reasons include: driver condition and 

decisions; vehicle failure; and environmental 

conditions, including weather and roadway 

conditions or roadway design features. 

Assodated factors; All factors seJected front the 

current understanding of conditions related to 

crash risk and present at the time of the crash. 

No judgment is made as to whether the factor is 

related to the particular crash, just whether it W(15 

present during the -crash event. Associated factors 

are considered in conjunction with the assignment 

of a critical reason to identify the range of events 

lhat lead to a crash. The associated factors provide 

sufficient information to describe comprehensively 

the ciTcumstances of the crash. Examples of 

associated factors include fatigue, making an illegal 

maneuve~ and in~ttention. 

In addition to the analysis of crash events provided 

in this report, there are narrative descriptions 

included with each of the 39 crash case files. The 

tables in the following section focus on critical 

events, critical reasons, and associated factors for 

aU cases included in the BCes. Although critical 

events, critical reasons~ and associated factors do not 

define the cause of a crash independently, when they 

are considered together, they provide researchers 

with the information needed for reasonable 

reconstruction of the crash events and assessment 

of crash causation. 

Results 

Table 3 provides a breakdown by critical event of the 

19 crashes where the critical reason was assigned to 

the bus, "Traveling too fast'f Inea;ns the driver was 

traveling too fast for the conditions at the time of 

Table~ 

Crashes by Critical Events 

Where the Bus Was Coded with 

the Critical Reason 
226 


Insert offset folio 185 here 75852.185

the crash, which mayor may not be related to the 

speed limit. Other events included a bicycle in the 

roadway and a bus crossing through an intersection. 

Table 4 shows the coding of criticaJ reasons assigned 

to a bus. In 15 of the 19 cases, the critical reason was 

assigned to the bus driver, including 10 incidents in 

which the driver was coded with either inadequate 

surveillance (failed to look; looked but did not see) 

or inattention (attention wandered from driving 

task), both of which f.1l into the category of failing 

to recognize and react to a situation to avoid a 

collision. The only critical reasons assigned to the 

buses were fires on two buses ~nd o~ incident of 

failed brakes. In one case, environmental conditions 

Table 4 

Coding of Critical Reasons to Buses 

ReMOn Number 

(e.g., roadway condition and design or adverse 

weather conditions) were coded as the crash 

critical event. 

In the remaining 20 crashes, the critica1 reasons were 

not assigned to the bus or its driver. Other vehicles 

involved in the crashes were assigned the critical 

reason in 16 of the cases, and pedestrians wE're 

assigned the critical reason in 4 of the cases. In each 

of those 20 cases, the critical reason was assigned to 

the people involved .. as opposed to vehicle failure 

or adverse environmental conditions. The drivers 

of the other vehicles were coded with traveling too 

fast or too slow (5 crashes), being unable to perform 

the driving task due to falling asleep or illness (4-

crashes), being inattentive or distracted (3 crashes); 

and other factors (4 crashes), In all 4- of the crashes 

where pedestrians were coded with the critical 

reason, the critical reason was inattention. 

Table 5 shows those associated factors that were 

coded more than once among all bus drivers in 

the study. Note that some factors coded for the 

drivers as being present before the crash were later 

judged also to be the critica1 reason for the crash. 

For exampleI inadequate surveillance was coded for 

10 of the 40 bus drivers and was judged to be the 

critical reason for 6 crashes, The associated factors 

are listed in descending order according to how 

often they were coded for the bus drivers, 

Each of the following eight associated factors 

was cited only one time: aggressive driving; 

driver distracted by conversation; driver was 

uncomfortable with passengers; driver made a false 

assumption; fatigue; illness; traveling too slow; and 

line of sight obstructed inside the bus. 

State bus inspectors conducted a driver and vehicle 

safety inspection of each bus involved in a crash. 

The inspections del-ermined whether serious safety 

probJems existed before the crashes happened. 

These safety problems, if discovered before the 

crash, would have been enough for the inspector 

to place the bus out of service until the problems 

were corrected. 
227 


Insert offset folio 186 here 75852.186

THE Bus CRASH 

CAUSAIION SllJDY 

The pre~crash out-of~service (005) violations 

identified by State bus inspectors are shown in 

Table 6. Five of the bus drivers coded with the crash 

criticaJ reason were each cited for one driver ODS 

violation. None of the drivers of the 21 buses that 

were not assigned the crash critical reason was 

cited with a driver OOS violation. Five buses coded 

with the crash criti-cal reason had 12 vehicle OOS 

violations, and on]y 2 of the 21 buses not coded 

with the critical reason for the crash had vehide 

COS violations. 

TableS 

Associated Factors Coded 

to Bus Drivers 

Of the IS bus vehicle ODS violations, 6 involved 

brakes, 3 involved l"epair and maintenance 

problems, and 3 involved lighting devices violations. 

Other bus DOS violations jnduded problems with 

the function or condition of steering, suspension, 

frame, axle, windshielcL or emergency exit. Of the 18 

bus vehide OOS violations, 12 were aSSigned to the 

buses that were coded t-vith the crash critical reason. 

Three of the 19 drivers for the buses coded with 

the critical reason either carried an expired medical 

certificate or did not have a medical certificate. 

It is worth noting that not being abJe to present a 

medical certification is not an OOS violation. For 28 

of the 40 drivers in the BeeS, dflta about medical 

certification were unknown. 

Conclusion 

Human errors by bus drivers, other vehic1e driversl 

and pedestrians or bicyclists were assigned as the 

critical reasons for bus crashes in 90 percent of the 

cases in the Bees. Of the 19 crashes in which the 

bos was assigned the critical reason for the crash, 

driver errol;' was the specific reason in 15 cases. 

In the 20 cases for which the critical reasons were 

not assigned to the bus or its driver but to another 

(non-bus) vehicle, a pedestrian, or a bicyclist, the 

problem was human error. The only cases for which 

the critical reason was not assigned to a driver, 

pedestrian, or bicyclist were two cases in which the 

buses caught fire, one case in which the bus brakes 

failed,. and one case in which ice on the roadway 

resulted in a crash. 

These results are very similar to the results in the 

LTCCS. In that study of 963 fatal and injury cr.shes 

involving large trucks, when the critical reason W£lS 

assigned to the truck, it was aSSigned to the driver 

in 88 percent of the cases. When the critical reason 

was assigned to another vehicle-almost always 

a passenger vehicle-the reason was coded to the 

driver in 92 percent of the crashes. The only major 

difference between the studies is the almost total 

lack of pedestrians and bicycliSts in the truck study. 
228 


Insert offset folio 187 here 75852.187

Although the Bees cannot be considered a 

representative sample of bus crashes (unlike the 

larger LTCCS7 which was a nationally representative 

sample of fatal and injury crashes involving large 

trucks), it stands as an important 51:1ldy that has 

yielded worthwhile insight into crash risk factors 

for buses. Many of the human errors assigned to 

bus drivers, including inattention. distraction, haste, 

and misjudgments, are not violations of Jaws or 

regulations. On th~ other hand, some of the human 

errors are chargeable offenses-such as making 

illegal maneuvers and fo1lowing too close. In many 

instances, human errors were accompanied by 

Federal OOS violations, such as violations of hoursof--servke regulations or vehicle safely standards. 

T.,ble6. 

While better enforcement can improve the safety 

climate, producing safer drivers cannot be ensured 

solely by police enforcement .actions. FinaUy, 

numerous vehicle DOS violations were found in 

BeeS post-crash inspections. The interaction of 

defective vehldes \vith driver errors cannot be 

ignored in assessing reasons for the crashes. 

Driver and Vehicle Out-of-Service Violations for All Buses in the Study 
229 


Insert offset folio 188 here 75852.188

ANALYSIS BRIEF Fedel'lll MotllrCilrrfer' ~fel:y Admlnlstrrtlcn 

Office of Analysis, Research and Technology 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

The primary mission of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration {FMCSA} is to reduce crashes, Injuries and fatalities 

involving large trucks and buses. In carrying out its safety mandate, 

FMCSA develops and enforces data-driven regulations that balance 

motor carrier (truck and bus companies) safety with industry 

effidency; harnesses safety information systems to focus on higher 

risk carriers in enforcing the safety regulations; targets educational 

messages to carriers,commercial drivers, and the public;and partners 

with stakeholders including Federal,State,and local enforcement 

agendes, the motor carrier industry, safety groups, and organized 

tabor on efforts to reduce bus and truck·related crashes. 

The mission of the Office of Analysts, Research and Technology is 

to reduce the number and severity of commercial motor vehicle 

crashes and enhance the efficiency of CMV operation by conducting 

systematic studies directed toward fuller' scientific discovery, 

knowledge,or understanding;adopting. testing, and deploying 

innovative roadside practices and teChnology; analyzing trends, costs. 

fatalities and injuries in large truck and bus crashes; monitoring data 

quality; and preparing economic and envIronmental analyses for 

FMCSA's rulemakings. 

ThiS Analysis Brief was produced by the Analysis Division In FMCSA's 

Office of Analysis, Research and Technology. The Analysis Division 

provides the transportation industry and the public with analytical 

reports on trends, costs, and fatalities and injuries in large truck 

and bus crashes.The division also monitors data quality to ensure 

an accurate measurement of safety performance, so effective 

countermeasures can be developed to reduce the occurrence 

and severity of commercial motor vehide crashes. In addition, the 

Analysis Division prepares ali the economic and environmental 

analyses for FMCSA's significant rulemakings to ensure changes to 

motor carrier regulations are based on sound analysis and data. 
230 


Insert offset folio 189 here 75852.189

AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION 

September 10,2012 

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL 

Hon. Anne Ferro 

Administrator 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Re: Roadside Bus Inspeetions 

Dear Administrator Ferro: 

The American Bus Association ("ABA") is strongly opposed to the FMC SA's 

recent policy guidance that encourages states to conduct roadside inspections of intercity 

buses at weigh stations. A copy of the June 27, 2012 Memorandum from William Quade 

setting out this policy is attached. This position clearly violates federal law and is bad 

public policy. 

As you know, this directly contravenes federal statutory and regulatory 

requirements. Section 4lO6 (a) ofSAFETEA·LU added a new requirement for state 

motor carrier safety assistance grants as rollows: 

[E]xcept in the case of an imminent or obvious safety hazard, 

ensures that an inspection of a vehicle transporting passengers for a motor 

carrier of passengers is conducted at a station, terminal, border crossing, 

maintenance facility, destination, or other location where a motor carrier 

may make a planned stop. 

Codified at 49 U .S.C. § 311 02(b)( 1 )(X). TIle FMCSA has incorporated this statutory 

requirement into its regulatory grant provisions at 49 C.F.R. § 350.201 (y). 

The FMCSA's new justification for these inspections en route is that the word 

"station" in the statute and regulation may be read broadly to include a roadside "weigh 

station." This is not consistent with either the wording or the intent ofthe provision. 
231 


Insert offset folio 190 here 75852.190

The reference to a "station" is the first item ofa list of places where a vehicle 

transpolting passengers may lawfully be stopped for an inspection, concluding with "or 

other location where a motor carrier may make a planned stop," A motor carrier never 

has a vehicle transporting passengers make a planned stop at a weigh station-such stops 

would only be at the direction of a state motor carrier safety officer. Furthermore, in the 

context of a paragraph referring solely to limitations on vehicles transporting passengers, 

the telm "station" clearly refe.rs to a bus station, or terminal, not to any location where 

state officials themselves set up scales and require an inspection protocol. None of those 

facilities provide sanitation services for passengers or reasonable accommodation for 

passengers with disabilities. The FMCSA's interpretation would allow the agency and 

the states to conduct inspections of motorcoaches not just at weigh stations but at service 

stations, fire stations, and railroad stations. That is not what Congress had in mind in 

banning state officials from conducting random roadside inspections of intercity buses. 

The prohibition exists for the same reason that the Federal Aviation 

Administration does not conduct random inspections of airplanes when they are loaded 

with passengers and ready to take off: Congress has determined that the inconvenience to 

passengers and disruption 10 travel schedules is greater than the benefits of a truly 

random inspection program. 

The FMCSA's argument that "stations" includes ''Weigh stations" collapses 

completely based on the legislative history of the most recent motor carrier safety 

authorizing legislation, Pub. L. No. 112-141. Section 32601 ofS. 1813, as passed by the 

Senate, would have amended the statutory state motor carrier safety assistance grant 

criteria in 49 U.S,C. § 311 02(b)(I)(X) to specifically provide that inspections of 

passenger vehicles may be conducted at "weigh stations, " in addition to "stations." The 

relevant section stated: 

(X) except in the case of an imminent or obvious safety hazard, ensures 

that an inspection of a vehicle transporting passengers for a motor carrier 

of passengers is conducted at a sfatio", terminal, border crossing, 

maintenance facility, destination, rest stop, turnpike service area, weigh 

station, rest stop, turnpike service area, or a location where adequate food, 

shelter. and sanitation facilities are available for passengers, and 

reasonable accommodation is available for passengers with disabilities, 

This provision was removed in its entirety by the conference committee and the 

SAFETEA-LU language I'emains unchanged. The removal of this language is a clear and 

unequivocal indication that the conferees did not intend FMCSA to expand its bus 

inspectiOlls to "weigh stations" or any of the other locations added by the Senate 

language. Furthermore, the fact that the Senate used both "station" and "weigh station" in 

that provision is compelling evidence that the Congress intended for those terms to mean 

different things, and that a weigh station was never intended by Congress to simply be 

another type of station where bus inspections may be performed. 

2 
232 


Insert offset folio 191 here 75852.191

ABA fully supports increased inspections ofmotorcoaches and the association has 

lobbied for additional programs and funding for FMCSA to address illegal and unsafe 

bus operators, including designated funding under MCSAP for increased bus inspections 

and authority for FMCSA to hire third-party inspectors to assist with the workload. 

While ABA is sympathetic to the agency's urgent need to combat unsafe bus operations, 

we cannot allow the agency to ignore the specific restrictions in the law on inspections. 

Of course, state inspectors remain authorized to stop at bus at any time and at any place 

when there is an imminent or obvious safety hazard. 

AnA asks that you rescind this policy directive immediately because it 

directly conflicts with the statutory language ofSAFETEA·LU and the clear legislntive 

history ofMAP·21. We further ask you to advise FMCSA officials, and your state 

partners, that such random bus inspections at weigh stations are not pennitted under 

federal law, and direct them to comply with those requirements immediately. 

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. 

Cc: 

Bill Brouro!t. Deputy Administrator 

Sincerely. 

~~ ~.Q~ .. Peted. Pantuso 

President and CEO 

American Bus Association 

HI K Street, NE 9th Floor 

Washington. DC 20002 

Direct: 202-218-7229 

Bill Quade. Associate Administrator for Enforcement 

Jack Van Steenburg. Assistant Administrator and Chief Safety Officer 

3 
233 


Insert offset folio 192 here 75852.192

Commercial Vehicle 

Safety Alliance 

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE 

COMMENTS FOR THE RECORD 

HIGHWAYS AND TRANSIT SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE 

HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2012 HEARING ON 

"EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DOT'S TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM" 

SUBMITTED OCTOBER 3, 2012 

6303 Ivy lane Suite 310 Greenbe'I, MD 20770·6319 

Phone: 301·830·6143 Fox: 301·B30·61d4 www.cv.a org 
234 


Insert offset folio 193 here 75852.193

Crash Risk vs. Regulatory Compliance 

One assertion that was made often by industry during the recent hearing was the idea that noncompliance with 

regulations is not directly tied to safety. Some in industry have argued that so-called 'paperwork violations' 

should not be included in a carrier's SMS scores. CVSA disagrees strongly and believes that regulatory 

compliance must be taken into account. Certainly, behaviors that can be directly linked to crash risk are 

important and should be a factor in CSA. But noncompliance with a set of regulations should not be disregarded 

simply because that regulation cannot be directly tied to crash risk. 

CSA is a data driven tool. The program tracks trends and recurring violations on a carriers record, helping to 

identify habits that could compromise safety. A motor carrier's habit of noncompliance with safety regulations, 

whether tied directly to crash risk or not, indicates either a lack of understanding or a disregard for that 

particular regulation or set of regulations. A carrier that does not understand, or actively chooses to disregard, 

certain regulations is not one with a strong safety culture. Keeping track of these trends helps inspectors and 

investigators identify where bad habits may exist and enables corrective action to bring the carrier back into 

compliance. 

Further, CVSA members would dispute the assertion that these 'paperwork violations' have no tie to safety. In 

fact, our inspectors have found that these types of violations are often masking larger safety problems. For 

example, some may say that HOS records that do not include items like location changes of duty status or list 

miles driven are simply 'paperwork' violations, with no tie to regulatory compliance or driver or carrier safety 

performance. However, to an inspector, these violations are indicators that a driver could be concealing major 

violations, such as exceeding HOS driving time or on-duty time limits. 

The safety regulations that exist are in place for a reason and a habit of noncompliance tells an inspector 

something about the carrier - either they do not understand the requirement or they don't care. Further, in my 

experience, I have found that carriers with a tendency to disregard regulations often tend to be less safe and 

experience more crashes than those with a strong safety culture. 

Monitoring a carrier's regulatory compliance helps inspectors identify problem areas and prevent a bad habit 

from forming, hopefully, preventing a crash or other unsafe condition in the process. It's possible that FMCSA 

could make improvements to the weighting of certain violations, to better highlight those tied directly or 

indirectly to crash risk, but compliance with regulations is a critical factor in terms of CMV safety and should not 

be removed from the program. 

Alternative Compliance 

FMCSA's creation and launch of the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program in 2010 will play an 

important role in making the nation's commercial motor vehicle fleets safer. Many stakeholders in the 

commercial vehicle community agree that the objectives of the CSA program are sound. However, we believe 

there are opportunities to improve the program. The CSA program, as currently operated, offers few 

mechanisms for fleets to proactively improve their scores. 

CVSA Comments for the Record - 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 2 
235 


Insert offset folio 194 here 75852.194

Research has been underway for several years to explore the concept of potential "alternative compliance" 

methods for improving safety performance within the motor carrier industry. This concept aims to facilitate nonregulatory solutions by private industry to enhance their safety performance and to have the federal 

government formally recognize and incentivize proven solutions. There are a number of proven safety solutions 

that, if managed and structured properly, FMCSA could consider for an alternative compliance program, 

including deployment of advanced active safety technologies and other solutions such as fatigue management 

programs and hair testing for controlled substances. 

Advanced safety systems, such as stability control systems, lane departure warning systems, collision mitigation 

systems and brake-stroke monitoring systems, have proven successful in preventing a number of the crash 

causes identified in the 2006 Large Truck Crash Causation Study. Independent, substantive data has 

demonstrated the success of these systems, which are being produced today and are commercially-available. 

We believe it is appropriate for FMCSA to further explore this alternative compliance concept by instituting a 

pilot program that would investigate the feasibility of a system that provides motor carriers CSA 'credits' in 

exchange for adoption of certain alternative compliance solutions, in essence improving their score(s) due to 

their voluntary investment in these life-saving technologies. Such a pilot program would involve verification, 

using the specified solutions in real world operations, along with performance data collection and monitoring. 

In order to structure and execute a successful pilot program, strong input and participation from industry is 

imperative, including the technology manufacturers, motor carriers, and enforcement communities. 

The application of safety credits through a CSA alternative compliance program would help institute a positive 

sustained behavioral change within the nation's commercial truck and bus fleets and enhance government and 

industry safety efforts. In addition, an alternative compliance program would help improve the efficacy CSA 

scores in terms of their reflection on the safety culture of the motor carrier, helping enforcement shine a 

brighter light on the 'bad actors' so they could target their efforts at those in need of further attention. This is an 

innovative approach to help incentivize improved safety performance that is both voluntary and private-sector 

driven. 

Motor Carrier Safety Ratin!: Reciprocity with Canada 

In 2008, Canada and the United States signed a letter agreeing that their respective motor carrier safety 

compliance programs are compatible and produce similar results. In signing the letter, both countries reaffirmed 

their mutual commitment to achieving reciprocal recognition of motor carrier safety ratings, as set out in a 1994 

Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Canada. To this day, work continues on both 

sides of the border to help advance this important aspect of commercial vehicle safety, harmonization, trade 

facilitation and administrative efficiency and effectiveness. In fact, in the recently passed transportation bill, 

MAP-2l, Congress instructed FMCSA to work with Canada on this important issue. 

As with any bi-Iateral agreement between countries, there are inevitable challenges that must be overcome in 

order to make this happen. Exchange of motor carrier safety data in support of reciprocity has proven to be the 

most problematic aspect and threatens to derail this critical initiative. The lack of an agreement will not only 

impact the efficiency and effectiveness of the two countries' safety measurement systems, but could ultimately 

evSA Comments for the Record - 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 3 
236 


Insert offset folio 195 here 75852.195

place more regulatory burden on US motor carriers operating in Canada. We encourage FMCSA to exhaust all 

avenues to work collaboratively with Canada to find an equitable and timely solution that works for both the 

United States and Canada .. 

Due Process 

Industry representatives also told the Committee that the CSA program lacks due process. While improvements 

could certainly be made, the Alliance disagrees that carriers are left without recourse. First, it's important to 

understand that there are two separate issues being discussed: violations that result in a legal citation and those 

that do not. Both sets are entered into the SMS, but both the appeals process for each group is different. 

Non-Citation Violations 

Violations that are recorded on an inspection report, but do not result in a citation are non-citation violations. 

FMCSA has the DataQs system in place as a process for challenging roadside inspection and crash data collected 

by the states. As the written and oral remarks offered by Assistant Chief Palmer indicate, there is certainly an 

opportunity to improve this process and provide industry with a more uniform solution. However, there IE a 

process in place and it is working, for the most part. Carriers challenge less than 1 percent of violations and 

more than 60 percent of those challenges do, in fact, result in some sort of adjustment to the record. 

However, the weaknesses with the DataQs process do not lie entirely with FMCSA, the states and the program; 

industry is responsible as well. Often, legitimate challenges are filed without the necessary supporting 

documentation. Without the appropriate supporting documentation, the inspecting agency cannot conduct a 

comprehensive evaluation. It is not enough to simply say, 'I disagree with this violation'. A carrier needs to 

provide solid, fact-based evidence supporting their claim that is should be changed. 

In addition, "I didn't know" is not an acceptable reason for dismissing a violation. As an example, one of our 

members received a DataQ request asking that a missed weigh station violation be removed from the records. 

The explanation for why the driver missed the station? The grass around the station was high and the driver 

assumed the station was closed. This is not an acceptable reason to bypass an open weigh station and the 

violation should not be removed. In the future, that driver is likely to pay closer attention when approaching a 

weigh station. 

As indicated in the Alliance's written testimony, FMCSA and industry must work together to help carriers 

understand how to submit a proper DataQ and what constitutes a legitimate basis for a DataQ change. 

Violations that Result in a Citation 

Inspection report violations that also result in a legal citation are another matter. Currently, when a CMV 

inspector conducts an inspection, he or she enters all noted violations on their inspection report. However, the 

inspector will not typically cite the driver or carrier for each and every violation, generally focusing on the most 

serious offenses. The driver or carrier can then challenge those citations in court. The citations are either upheld 

or dismissed and the carrier can then request that dismissed violations be removed from their record. 

CVSA Comments for the Record - 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 4 
237 


Insert offset folio 196 here 75852.196

With regard to citations that have been dismissed in court, CVSA members have no objection to violations that 

have been dismissed based on merit being removed from a carrier's record assuming there is supporting 

evidence. However, valid citations can be dismissed in court for a number of reasons: a sympathetic judge may 

prefer to reduce the fines or alter the conviction to a lesser violation; or perhaps the inspector or carrier is 

unable to appear on the court date. Violations dismissed for reasons other than merit should remain on a 

carrier's record. 

We are talking about two separate and distinct processes - the judicial system and CSA. The CSA program is a 

data driven tool that assists enforcement in targeting inspection and intervention activities. In order for the 

system to work effectively, we need as much data in the system as possible. 

CVSA Comments for the Record - 'Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program' 

House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee - Highways & Transit Subcommittee 

September 13, 2012 5 
238 


Insert offset folio 197 here 75852.197

Additional Material from Ruby McBride and ASECTT 

To the T&I Highways Subcommittee 

CSA Recommendations: 

Ruby McBride, a witness at the subcommittee's September 13,2012, hearing on behalf of the 

Alliance for Safe, Efficient and Competitive Truck Transportation (ASECTT), and the coalition 

have provided these additional remarks and supporting information for the record, in response to 

questions and answers of the committee members and witnesses. 

Based upon the testimony of Administrator Ferro, representatives of the American Trucking 

Association, the Transportation Intermediarics Association, and ASECTT, it is clear the SMS 

percentile rankings as published (1) havc no demonstrable nexus to safety; (2) are based upon 

flawed and inadequate data; (3) are prejudicial to small carriers, which make up over 95% of the 

motor carrier populace; and (4) adversely affect the ability of carriers the agency has certified as 

fit to obtain freight. 

The agency should be reminded that the National Transportation Policy requires it to consider 

efficiency, competition, and thc effect of any of its actions on small carriers, and to ensure that 

false and misleading material is not publicly disseminated in accordance with the Data Quality 

Act guidelines. 

Accordingly, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, with direct oversight 

responsibilities for the actions of the FMCSA, should direct the agency to cease publication of 

percentile rankings in any of the so-called BASICs until such time as SMS methodology has 

been proven in a final judicially appealable order, in accordance with the Administrative 

Procedures Act. 

In support of this request, the committee should note that the Administrator has acknowledged 

that SMS methodology remains a work in progress and has appointed a special committee to 

1 
239 


Insert offset folio 198 here 75852.198

look into the methodology over an indefinite period of time. The Administrator has further 

acknowledged that the agency cannot now use SMS methodology to make a safety fitness 

detennination under existing law - it has no statutory warrant for telling shippers and brokcrs 

that the work in progress is fit or required for their usc. The Administrator further promised that 

rulemaking would be instituted in early 2013 and that the agency would seek objective or static 

standards upon which to make its statutorily required safety fitness detennination. 

This admission demonstrates the agency's own recognition that it cannot "grade on a curve" and 

that the publishing of a percentile ranking of carriers, uncoupled as it is from any provable nexus 

to crash predictability, impinges on the rights of certified carriers to compete for freight and 

places a credentialing burden on the shipping public, contrary to the agency's existing statutory 

duty. 

The agency's refusal to afford industry the due process of rulemaking virtually guaranteed a 

flawed system. CSA is now disrupting the trucking industry. Therefore, Congress must step up 

its oversight of the agency and investigation into the CSA program and SMS. Despite numerous 

ways in which the agency has been infonned of the hann CSA is inflicting on this vital economic 

sector, FMCSA refuses to acknowledge the extent of the hann the CSA program is causing. 

Therefore, congressional oversight must go further. Specifically, the Inspector General should 

be called in to conduct an investigation into CSA itself and the manner in which the agency has 

proceeded to creatc and foist CSA upon motor carriers, shippers, and brokers. Also, the 

Government Accountability Office should be directed to examine SMS methodology, CSA data, 

the agency's underlying assumptions as to CSA's crash predictability, CSA's degree of validity 

and reliability as called into question by the Wells Fargo, Gimpel, and Iyoob studies, and the 

adverse impact that publishing CSA carrier BASICs on the Internet and urging their usagc in 

carrier selection is having on industry and the economy, as well as identify specific ways in 

which the agency has failed to comply with statutory requirements for due process, including the 

Administrative Procedures Act, the Data Quality Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 

2 
240 


Insert offset folio 199 here 75852.199

Congress should also require the agency to put CSA through full rulemaking, as it refused to do 

in late 20 I 0, affording industry the due process the law provides for such significant changes in a 

regulatory regime. 

The following recommendations expand upon this central recommendation that publishing and 

publicizing CSA scores immediately be stopped. 

1. STOP PUBLISHING C'ARRIER SCORES ON FMCSA WEBSITE. 

FMCSA has openly admitted "data quality" problems in testimony before 

Congress on multiple occasions. These admissions alone should be sufficient to 

warrant a complete cessation of any publication ofCSA's misleading data and causing 

further harm to safe motor carriers. 

Until such time that the industry can be assured the data is accurate, this data 

should only be available for use by FMCSA, law enforcement, and the motor carrier. 

FMCSA should be required to post a disclaimer admitting data quality problems 

and advising the public (including plaintiff lawyers) not to rely upon previously postcd 

data. 

2. STOP USING THE BELL CURVE METHODOLOGY TO RANK MOTOR C'ARRIERS. 

The SMS (bell curve) methodology used by CSA for ranking motor carriers is 

NOT based upon a fair and equitable system for all motor carriers. Under the current 

system, 35% of all motor carriers in each peer group will always fall below the 

threshold and be labeled "High Risk," no matter what they do. How can this be a fair 

system? If all motor carriers were perfect, which 35% would FMCSA label as "High 

Risk"? A motor carrier's score should be based upon its own performance, NOT the 

performance of others. 

The current scores are based upon the results of roadside inspections, with the 

only method for a motor carrier to improve its score being to obtain more "clean" 

roadside inspections. However, there is no guarantee that one's score will improve if 

fortunate enough to get the additional clean inspections. This is because of the ranking 

system. For example, ifthere are other carriers in one's peer group who got more elean 

inspections, one could find that its score actually declined even more. What does one 

carrier's performance being based upon the performance of another have to do with 

improving safety? 

3. ESTABLISH STATIC LINES FOR t'ACH MOTOR CARRIER. 

The FMCSA should establish a threshold or static line for eaeh motor carrier 

based upon factors pertinent to specific motor carriers. 

3 
241 


Insert offset folio 200 here 75852.200

These factors should include clean inspections based upon: 

a. Miles driven; 

b. Region of operation; 

e. Size of fleet, and 

d. Whether or not the carrier is exempt from maintaining records of duty status 

reports. 

4. STOP RANKING MOTOR CARRIERS IN PEER GROUPS. 

Peer groups are not based upon miles driven, but rather upon the size of the fleet 

and/or number of inspections for the previous month. It is not unusual for a motor 

carrier suddenly to find that it has been switched from one peer group to another. This 

sudden change from one peer group to another can cause drastic changes in the SMS 

scores. Should a carrier who runs within a IOO-mile radius (who is not required to 

maintain records of duty status) be in the same peer group as a motor carrier who runs 

cross-country? 

Should a carrier who runs in states where inspection rates are low be compared to 

a carrier who runs in states where inspection rates are higher? 

5. ESTABLISH METHODS FOR DUE PROCESS. 

There is NO due process. If a driver or motor carrier is successful in adjUdicating 

a citation and results in a dismissal, there is no current process for removing the points 

charged against the driver or the motor carrier. DataQ challenges are currently referred 

back to the same law enforcement official who issued the citation, which means the 

individual who issued the citation also acts as judge and jury. 

6. STOP ASSESSING POINTS FOR WARNING TICKEl:". 

Warning tickets are assessed as points against the motor carrier and driver in SMS 

methodology. This makes NO sense! Where is the logic in being punished for 

something that you cannot challenge? 

7. SEAT BELT VIOLATIONS SHOULD ONLY BE ASSESSED AGAINST THE DRIVER 

WHO FAILED TO WEAR HIS/HER SEAT BELT - NOT THE MOTOR CARRIER. 

All drivers should wear their seatbelts. It is fair to say that" ALL" motor carriers 

instruct their drivers to wear their seatbelts. Yet, there are still some drivers who fail to 

wear their seatbelts. If the motor carrier has a policy requiring drivers to wear their 

seatbelts, why should the motor carrier be assessed points when the driver fails to do 

so? These points should only be assessed against the driver who violated the law and 

the motor carrier's policy, NOT against the motor carrier. 

4 
242 


Insert offset folio 201 here 75852.201

8. DRIVER 'S CSA SCORES SHOULD NOT REMAIN WITH MOTOR CARRIER AFTER 

THE DRIVER LEAVES THE MOTOR CARRIER. 

Currently, a driver's high CSA score remains with the motor carrier for two ycars 

after the driver leaves the motor carrier. What message does this send to a motor 

carrier who is trying to run a safe operation? If a motor carrier terminates a driver with 

a high score, should not the driver's high score follow him and not remain with the 

motor carrier? A motor carrier who acts responsible and tenninates a driver with a high 

CSA score should be rewarded for this action and not punished by being required to 

bear the score for two years. 

However, under CSA, if one hires a driver who already has a bad score, his points 

begin at zero with the carrier. (Under the current system, a carrier is punished for 

getting rid of a bad driver, yet rewarded with zero points for hiring a bad driver.) This 

does not make sense! 

9. STOP BRANDING MOTOR CARRIERS AS "HIGH RISK' BASED UPON 

INFORMATION THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH "SAFETY". 

FATIGUED DRIVING SCORES are comprised of a significant amount of 

information that has nothing to do with safety. 

The data behind the numbers MUST be fixed before there can be any fair and 

equitable application of the CSA program. 

a. Form and Manner violations are administrative errors that have absolutely 

nothing to do with whether a driver is fatigued or unsafe, or whether or not 

the driver is likely to have a crash. 

EXAMPLES: 

Driver fails to sign log; 

Driver fails to put thc Bill of Lading number on log; or 

Driver fails to put the miles on his log. 

While we agree that these violations are also important and should be addressed, 

we do not believe that they should be in the same category as "Driver Fatigue." 

b. Failure to pay child support has nothing to do with whether a driver is 

fatigued or unsafe. Yet this has been the underlying reason for some 

carriers' CSA scores taking a hit in this category. 

Form and manner violations should be separated from hours of service violations. 

10. CRASH DATA SCORES SHOULD NOT INCLUDE ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY 

OTHER PARTIES. 

5 
243 


Insert offset folio 202 here 75852.202

Crash Data scores currently include accidents caused by other parties. Even deer 

strikes are charged against motor carriers and drivers if the vehicle requires towing. 

There is no differentiation in points between accidents caused by the motor carrier and 

accidents caused by other parties. This is patently unfair! 

Motor carriers should only be assessed points for accidents that they caused. 

II. HOURS OF SERVICE (10) HOUR BREAKS SHOULD ALLOW DRIVERS TO SPLIT 

REST TIME 8/2. 7/3 OR 6/4. 

Currently, a drivers' sleeper berth break (10 hours) can only be split into one (8) 

eight-hour break and one (2) two-hour break or the full (10) ten hours. While this may 

be couched in the name of "safety," wc do NOT believe it is "safer." This rcgulation 

is forcing drivers to drive when they are tired because they will lose their available 

hours to work if they need to take morc than a two-hour break, but less than eight. 

What this really means is a driver who needs to take a four-, five-, or six-hour break in 

the middle of his (otherwise legal) II-hour shift is now being faced with the decision 

to take only a two-hour break or drive the full eleven hours, even when he may be 

tired. This makes no "common sense." This regulation should be changed 

immediately. The Hours of Service Rule needs a simple "fix." Allow the drivers to 

split their breaks and rest when they are tired. 

As an industry, we all realize that regulations are necessary in order to protect the 

motoring public. However, they must be based upon "logic" and "common sense." 

Drivers MUST be allowed to rest when they are tired without the risk of losing their 

available time to work. I Wouldn't it be in the best interest of the motoring public to 

'Example: Driver John Doe is home all weekend in Nashville, TN. His load is going from 

Nashville, TN, to Dallas, TX, 684 miles (approximately II hours) to dclivcr Monday morning at 

9:00 a.m. CST. John has plenty of hours to begin his run. He can legally leave his homc by 

10:00 p.m. Sunday night and make the delivery on time Monday morning. However, while at 

home, John had to mow the lawn and fix the roof. By 6:00 p.m. Sunday evcning, John is a little 

tircd and decides to go ahead and leave, in order to have some extra time along the way to stop 

and rest. Under the current rules, he can only split his break (8 hours/2 hours). This means if 

John drives to Little Rock, AR, (349 miles 5 Y, hours) he will get there around II :30 p.m. Now 

John is tired and needs to stop for a nap. Under the existing rules, John either has to take a full 

8-hour break or only 2 hours. When John lies down, he actually sleeps for 4 hours. Now he's 

rested and ready to go, but because John took more than two hours, he must now either take the 

full 8 hours or lose 4 hours off his I4-hour day. If John begins to drive when he wakes up at 

4:30 a.m., he can only drive until 8:00 a.m. (due to the l4-hour rule), which puts him I hour shy 

of making his delivery on time. If John takes 4 more hours to complete his 8-hour break, then he 

cannot leave Little Rock, AR, until 7:30 a.m. John would only have 1 Y, hours to drive 335 

6 
244 


Insert offset folio 203 here 75852.203

allow drivers to split their breaks in the middle of an otherwise legal run? What makes 

more sense: A regulation that forces a driver to run straight through, so his logs will 

be legal; or a regulation that allows him to split his break in a manner that gives him 

the additional rest that he needs? 

If the regulation allows for breaks to be split by 6/4, 7/3, or 8/2, with a mandatory 

IO-hour break requirement for every 24-hour period; this would provide a safer 

environment for the motoring public and allow drivers to get the rest they need without 

being penalized for doing so. I believe all motors carriers would endorse this change to 

the regulation because it truly is about "SAFETY" and based upon "LOGIC" and 

"COMMON SENSE." 

Accompanying this statement are two items: Analysis of percentile groupings through CSA, as 

it works out in practice with respect to Panther Expedited Services, an ASECTT member, and a 

chart of actual groupings of carriers in the Unsafe Driving BASIC. These illustrate the practical 

adverse effects of SMS and CSA, as well as the objective data versus CSA's subjectivity and 

inherent unfairness. These items further substantiate the case for prohibiting the FMCSA from 

publishing carrier BASICs. 

miles. When John left his home in Nashville, he had plenty of time to make the run straight 

through. He just needed a little more than two hours rest when he took his break. However, 

because he took the extra time to rest, he is now forced with no way to make an "on time" 

delivery. On the other hand, if John could legally split his break and not lose the 4 hours off his 

14 hours available to work, he would be able to stop and rest along the way and make his 

delivery "on time." There is no logic in this rule, especially when it is couched in the name of 

"safety." 

7 
245 


Insert offset folio 204 here 75852.204

PANTHER 

EXPEDITED SERVICES, 

Position Paper On Percentile Scoring in SMS Methodology 

Overview: 

Analysis of Panther's CSA Scores over the past 18 months indicates acceptable levels of 

compliance in all areas, with one exception. The Unsafe Driving BASIC measure has exceeded the 

threshold of intervention status, with little change in the month-to-month comparison: 

512512012 412712012 312312012 212412012 

Unsafe Driving 

On-Road PenollT1ance Detail 7J.9% 75.5% 72.9% 76.7% 72.8% 72.5% 

The Concern: 

A detailed review of the SMS methodology used by the FMCSA to detennine the Unsafe Driving 

Scores, and the subsequent division of carriers into Safety Event Groups to use in comparisons to determine 

the percentile of each carrier, reveals a process that prevents carriers over the intervention threshold limit to 

show demonstrable improvement over a given period of time. 

Percentile scores and month-to-month changes: 

From the CSA Methodology Report, Version 3.0 (March 2012), all carriers being scored in the 

Unsafe Driving BASIC are split into two segments, based on the percentage of vehicles in the carrier's fteet 

that are Straight Trucks or Tractor Trailer combos. The cutoff percentage is 30170, meaning all fleets with 

more than 30% Straight Trucks are placed in the Straight Segment. 

From each segment, carriers are then split into 5 groups, based on the number of inspections over 

the last 2 years which resulted in an unsafe driving violation. The cutoff to be in the largest group (called 

the Straight-5 Group) is 50 inspections with at least one unsafe driving violation. This is the group Panther 

finds itself within. Panther's BASIC measure (shown above) is a reflection of our performance compared to 

other carriers in this group. This group features many carriers that do not engage in standard over-the-road 

operations as Panther does. Among the carriers in this group are: 

LEGAL NAME TRUCKS SCORE 

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC 97370 2.1 

RYDER TRUCK RENTAL INC 96580 0.0 

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP 30857 1.0 

FEDEX GRD PACKAGE SYSTEM 29531 19.5 

IBC TRUCKING LLC 6656 7.6 

ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT CO 7641 3.2 

SCHWANS HOME SERVICE INC 5819 21.7 

LOWE'S HOME CENTERS INC 4520 59.7 

PANTHER EXPEDITED SERVICES 1054 73.9 

Of the 8 largest fteets in the group, shown above, none of them engage in predominantly over-theroad transport. These fleets are comprised primarily of local service and delivery vehicles, meaning these 

trucks are, on the whole, inspected far less frequently than those in Panther's fleet, as well as those of the 

other expedite carriers in the group (Fed Ex Custom Critical, Tri-State Expedited Services, Load One, and 

Express-I ). 
246 


Insert offset folio 205 here 75852.205

Other fleets in the group include many of the largest nationwide movers (United, Allied, North 

American, and Mayflower), as well as the two of the largest driveaway carriers in the country (Horizon and 

Quality Driveaway.) All of these carriers have an Unsafe Driving percentile Score that exceeds the priority 

threshold for load monitoring and possible interventions. 

Straight -5 Carrier Score Comparison: 

A Freedom oflnforrnation Act request made in February 2011 resulted in the receipt of a list 

showing all the carriers in the Straight-5 Safety Group. At the time there were 110 carriers; as of Aug 2012 

that number had dropped to 93. By entering each of the carriers' DOT numbers into the FMCSA website, a 

chart was developed to monitor the Unsafe Driving measurement score and percentile ranking of each 

carrier in the group. This chart is provided at the end of this paper, in addition to the small sample provided 

below. It reveals how the measurement score for each carrier translates into a percentile score between 0 

and 100. It also reveals the problem with using percentile scores as a detennination of carrier's actual 

perfomlance in the category. 

CARRIER NAME TRKS #INSP INSPWNlOL UD MEASURE UDSCORE 

DEALERS CHOICE TRUCKAWAY 1027 960 91 0.56 67.0 

IRON MOUNTAIN INFO MGMT 1592 1302 97 0.60 68.1 

PANTHER EXPEDITED SERVICES 1054 3085 240 0.60 69.2 

GRAEBEL VAN LINES INC 821 1181 99 0.60 71.4 

This small sampling illustrates the problem of the percentile system. Three of the four carriers 

listed (including Panther) have the same measurement score, taken to two decimal places, yet there is a 

three point separation in the percentile score. This tight grouping is repeated throughout the chart, with the 

potential result being wild swings in the percentile score from one month to the next, even if the carrier's 

measurement goes up or down by just 0.0 I point. 

As all carriers strive to improve their score within the category, the other issue with percentiles 

becomes apparent. If a group of carriers are reducing their measurement score at the same rate from one 

month to the next, they will keep the same percentile score as well. This presents the false impression that 

the carrier is not making any progress in improving their score, despite evidence to the contrary: 

1.20 

1. 1.071.07 1.08 1.07 L 101.101.09 1.05 1.10 1.051.03 

1!? 1.00- LOS 1.04 

~ 0.90 co 

Q) 0.81 O.Bl 0.81 078 

::2' 0.80 . 0.760 .

74 0. 71 0.700.70 

0.70 

0.60 -

Ap' Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Ap' Jun AUg Oct Dec Feb Ape 2010 2010 2010 2010 2Ql0 2011 ZOl1 2011 2011 2Q11 2011 201Z 2012 

80.0 % 

75.0 % 

~ 

C 70.0 % 

ill 

~ ill 

(L 

60.0 % ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• t 

55.0%4-----------------------------________________________________ _ 

Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr 

2010 20lD 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 

2 
247 


Insert offset folio 206 here 75852.206

Looking at the two charts together, Panther's Unsafe Driving measurement score has dropped from 1.10 in 

December 2010 (the month the scores were first made public) to 0.67 in May 2012. This represents a 40% 

improvement in the score in 18 months. Our percentile score, however, actually went UP 0.1% over the 

same period of time, from 72.8 to 72.9. This graphically shows the most obvious flaw in the system, in its 

current form. Despite this, the FMC SA, shows this percentile score to the public, and advises shippers and 

brokers to use this score to determine which carriers are safe to use. We believe this practice must stop 

immediately. 

The Solution: 

An adjustment in the methodology, replacing the percentile score with a "hard target" score based 

solely on the measurement score, would allow carriers to convey a specific time frame, based on a monthto-month record of improvement, to reduce their score below the hard target score within a prescribed time 

frame, and could share this information with their present and future customers. 

Summary: 

The FMCSA has indicated their intention to use a hard target scoring system when they produce 

their Safety Fitness Determination (SFD) scoring system in the first quarter of2013. While this is an 

encouraging first step, it also underscores the importance of hiding the percentile scores from public view 

to prevent the potential loss of business and vicarious liability lawsuits that would result from the use of 

such biased, inaccurate scores. 

Presented by: 

Irwin Shires 

Panther Expedited Services 

Seville,OH 

September 26, 2012 

DOT # LEGAL_NAME 

16130 RYDER TRUCK RENTAL INC 

86876 FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP 

21800 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC 

101328 ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT CO 

327574 PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO 

926i50 FRITO LAY SALES LP 

342305 TRUGREEN CHEMLAWN LTD 

773524 IBC TRUCKING LLC 

1203339 CROP PRODUCTION SERVICES 

53433 UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO 

403881 RSC EQUIPMENT RENTAL 

523181 ALLIED WASTE SERVICES LLC 

242281 HERITAGE OPERATING L P 

281683 BNSF RAILWAY CO 

99905 MICHELS CORPORATION 

647378 EARTHGRAINS BAKING CO LLC 

29619 CSX TRANSPORTATION INC 

265752 FEDEX GRD PACKAGE SYSTEM 

TRKS UD UD 

MEASURE SCORE 

101317 0.02 0.0 

30857 0.04 1.0 

97370 0.07 2.1 

7641 0.08 3.2 

29644 0.09 4.3 

6199 0.09 5.4 

6432 0.10 6.5 

6656 0.12 7.6 

4637 0.14 8.7 

3444 0.17 9.8 

2335 0.17 10.9 

2373 0.18 12.0 

2475 0.19 14.2 

2704 0.20 15.3 

2677 0.20 16.4 

3645 0.20 17.5 

2614 0.21 19.7 

30057 0.22 20.8 

3 
248 


Insert offset folio 207 here 75852.207

714483 DEAN TRANSPORTATION 2023 0.23 21.9 

108029 SCHWANS HOME SERVICE INC 5819 0.23 23.0 

282018 FERGUSON ENTERPRISES INC 2010 0.24 24.1 

221707 ARAMARK UNIFORM APPAREL 3543 0.24 25.2 

500579 SUNBEL TRENT ALS INC 2134 0.25 26.3 

987199 BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE 1961 0.27 27.4 

155682 DS WATERS OF AMERICA INC 2077 0.28 28.5 

273286 HORIZON TRANSPORT INC 679 0.28 29.6 

962089 BFI WASTE SERVICES LLC 2185 0.29 30.7 

86873 HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY 1914 0.31 31.8 

400989 PROBUILD LLC 4166 0.31 32.9 

124419 CHS INC 2423 0.32 34.0 

324244 ALSCO INC 1675 0.32 35.1 

388004 AMERIGAS PROPANE LP 3997 0.32 36.2 

104165 KRAFT FOODS GLOBAL INC 1193 0.33 37.3 

180743 CLEAN HARBORS ENVIRO SERV 1962 0.33 38.4 

471318 DARLING INTERNATIONAL 926 0.33 39.5 

132504 COMPASS GROUP USA 2466 0.33 40.6 

88111 HDSUPPLYINC 1429 0.34 41.7 

899748 UNITED RENTALS N AMERICA 1129 0.37 43.9 

397962 STERICYCLE INC 1565 0.38 45.0 

420647 SOUTHERN WINE & SPIRITS 1428 0.39 46.1 

89243 FERRELLGAS L P 2986 0.41 47.2 

363 AARON RENTS INC 2322 0.42 48.3 

465185 QUALITY DRIVE AWAY INC 734 0.42 49.4 

164025 FEDEX CUSTOM CRITICAL INC 1422 0.44 50.5 

171830 KA BULK TRANSPORT LLC 577 0.45 51.6 

151288 SAFETY-KLEEN SYSTEMS INC 1632 I 0.46 52.7 

198783 DREYER'S GRAND ICE CREAM 962 I 0.49 54.9 

97235 LOWE'S HOME CENTERS INC 4550 0.51 56.0 

175882 AMERICAN TIRE DISTRIBUTORS 700 0.53 57.1 

226673 SUTTLES TRUCK LEASING INC 529 0.53 58.2 

349013 TIRE CENTERS LLC 740 0.53 59.3 

244311 TRI-ST A TE EXPEDITED _._. SERVICES 451 0.54 60.4 

50039 EXEL DIRECT INC 646 0.55 61.5 

63904 UNIFIRST CORPORATION 1693 0.55 62.6 

1278850 SPECIALIZED TRANSPORT A TION 675 0.55 63.7 

387474 FRESENJUS USA MFG INC 409 0.56 65.9 

255166 DEALERS CHOICE TRUCKAWAY 1027 0.56 67.0 

338113 IRON MOUNTAIN INFO MGMT 1592 0.60 68.1 

500737 PANTHER II TRANSPORTATION 1054 0.60 69.2 

220843 GRAEBEL V AN LINES INC 821 0.60 71.4 

104154 L & W SUPPLY CORP 827 0.62 73.6 

572263 BUILDER SERVICES GROUP INC 1612 0.63 74.7 

1719074 CEV A FREIGHT LLC 1119 0.64 75.8 

342596 H T HACKNEY CO 550 0.65 76.9 

1153892 SHRED-IT USA INC 472 0.67 77.5 

460019 EXPRESS-1 TRANSPORT 367 0.68 78.0 

4 
249 


Insert offset folio 208 here 75852.208

125563 MAYFLOWER TRANSIT LLC 3068 0.70 79.1 

251000 AMER BUILD & CONTR. SUPPLY 2371 0.70 80.2 

76029 BEKINS VAN LINES LLC 969 0.72 81.3 

76235 ALLIED VAN LINES INC 2188 0.73 82.4 

50504 FARMER BROTHERS CO 679 0.75 83.5 

17765 JOSEPH ELETTO TRANSFER INC 298 0.82 84.6 

70851 NORTH AMERICAN V AN LINES 1676 0.83 85.7 

70719 WHEATON VAN LINES INC 958 0.83 86.8 

254513 LIBERTY TRANSPORTATION INC 230 0.85 87.9 

271225 DEFFENBAUGH INDUSTRIES 548 0.90 89.0 

125550 ATLAS VAN LINES INC 3876 0.98 90.1 

49922 ARPIN V AN LINES INC 657 1.05 91.2 

72029 STEVENS VAN LINES INC 617 1.06 92.3 

256677 COV AN WORLDWIDE MOVING INC 493 1.11 93.4 

76628 NATIONAL VAN LINES INC 272 1.11 94.5 

726855 HOME CITY TRANSPORT INC 607 1.50 96.7 

941172 LKQ CORPORATION 454 2.17 98.9 

5 
250 


Insert offset folio 209 here 75852.209

IME 

institute of makers of explosives 

The safety and security institute of the commercial explosives industry since 1913 

September 10, 2012 

The Honorable John J. Duncan 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

U.S. House of Representatives U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20515 

RE: Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program 

Dear Mr. Chairman and Representative DeFazio: 

On behalf of the members of the Institute of Makers of Explosives (1M E), I am submitting a 

statement for the record of the hearing you are holding to evaluate the effectiveness of the 

truck and bus safety program administered by the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) 

Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA) on September 13, 2012. 

Interest of IME 

The IME is the safety and security institute of the U.S. commercial explosives industry. Our 

mission is to promote safety and the protection of employees, users, the public and the 

environment; and to encourage the adoption of uniform rules and regulations in the 

manufacture, transportation, storage, handling, use and disposal of explosive materials used in 

blasting and other essential operations. The Institute does not sponsor trade shows or other 

marketing events. 

Among our members are for-hire and private motor carriers that transport commercial 

explosives, blasting agents, and precursor chemicals that are used in every state of the Union. 

Virtually all ofthe over three million metric tons of explosives products and blasting agents 

consumed annually in the United States are transported by truck. These materials are 

regulated as hazardous materials and are moved in quantities requiring placards. No deaths 

have been attributed to the transportation of commercial explosives since the 1970s. 

FMCSA oversees the safety of motor carriers transporting placarded quantities of the Division 

1.1,1.2, or 1.3 explosives, and other specified hazardous materials, by requiring that these 

carriers have a "satisfactory" safety rating and obtain a Hazardous Materials Safety Permit 

(HMSP). A safety rating is determined by a compliance review. A compliance review is an onsite examination of motor carrier operations and safety controls. To obtain a HMSP, a motor 

carrier must not have a crash rate, or driver, vehicle or hazardous materials (HM) Out-of-Service 

(005) rate in the top 30 percentile of the national average. None of the witnesses scheduled to 

1120 Nineteenth Street, NW, Suite 310. Washington, DC 20036. USA, (202) 429-9280, FAX (202) 293-2420 
251 


Insert offset folio 210 here 75852.210

testify at this hearing are among the universe of motor carriers subject to these stringent 

requirements. Thus, we hope that our comments will provide yet another perspective on 

FMCSA's truck safety priorities and initiatives. 

Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) 

On-site compliance reviews are resource intensive. Given the relative ease of entry into 

trucking, FMCSA has not been able to keep up with the number of compliance reviews that 

would be required for new entrants or to consistently relook at the performance of motor 

carriers with safety ratings, some of which are over a decade old. These realities prompted the 

search for a new way to evaluate the safety performance of motor carriers that would focus 

FMSCA's limited inspection resources on the carriers presenting risks that would likely result in 

crashes, fatalities, and injuries on our nation's highways. For decades the agency has used an 

automated, data-driven analysis system known as SafeStat to identify and prioritize carriers for 

on-site compliance reviews. But, SafeStat was still identifying too many carriers to keep pace. 

CSA was launched at the end of 2010 as a more intuitive replacement for SafeStat. At this time, 

FMCSA uses CSA as a pointer to flag at risk carriers so that timely and appropriate intervention 

can be taken by the agency to address identified deficiencies. However, FMCSA envisions this 

program to be more than a pointer system. The agency intends that CSA will replace 

compliance reviews as the means to determine a carrier's safety fitness. 

This evolution of the CSA program from a pointer system to a means to determine safety fitness 

is very concerning given the consequences for less than satisfactory safety fitness ratings. 

Carriers have begun to see the results of the CSA data calculations and question whether the 

metrics and weights in fact correlate to actual crash risk. We join with others who have cited 

concerns with the accuracy of the data and the questionable methodology. Motor carriers are 

within their rights to raise concerns about inspection subjectivity, regional disparities, and being 

held accountable to crashes when the carrier is not at fault. It is not out of bounds to expect 

that the weights assigned to violations would be reflective of crash risk, or to expect agreement 

about what qualifies as an inspection and that clean inspections would be recorded. Finally, as 

long as CSA is a pointer system, FMCSA should not leave it up to third-parties to interpret the 

results. Before FMCSA even begins to contemplate turning this program into its safety fitness 

determination standard, these over-arching concerns must be addressed. 

We credit FMCSA for meeting with stakeholders and testing some changes in order to perfect 

the CSA program. However, this initiative still has a long way to go. Sometimes a step forward 

in one area may also result in a step back in another. FMCSA's approach to identifying hazmat 

carriers at risk of causing crashes highlights outstanding flaws in the CSA program. While we 

agreed with FMCSA that it makes sense to establish a separate "HM" BASIC applicable only to 

hazmat carriers, we are very troubled by exclusions from the definition of who is a hazmat 

carrier, and by the severity weightings of HM violations in the absence of research showing that 

these violations cause crashes. 
252 


Insert offset folio 211 here 75852.211

3 

FMCSA defines a hazmat carrier as any carrier with placarded hazmat activity in the prior two 

years. We agree that this should be the triggering threshold. However, the agency proposes to 

exclude from this universe of hazmat carriers those that inadvertently transport placarded 

hazmat loads or that transport only a small percentage of placarded loads. We oppose these 

exclusions. As FMCSA knows, one of the biggest hazmat safety risks is the transport of 

undeclared materials. In the last five years, 74 percent of incidents involving Class 1 materials 

were undeclared. Furthermore, whether a carrier transports one hazmat load or more, each 

shipment is subject to the same rigorous safety and security requirements. The consequences 

of non-compliance with these requirements have never been dependent on whether or not a 

carrier performed a covered hazmat transportation activity some minimum number oftimes. 

All carriers engaged in the transport of placardable quantities of hazardous materials should be 

held to the same standards. Carriers should be sufficiently motivated to train their employees 

and to follow applicable regulations or take steps, like "will-not carry" airlines, to ensure that 

they do not "inadvertently" transport placard able quantities of hazardous materials. Where 

other modal administrations provide disincentives for carriers to casually engage in the 

transportation of placardable loads of hazardous materials, FMCSA's proposed policy abets this 

practice. 

We agree with FMCSA that the greatest predictors of crash risk are found in the Unsafe Driving 

and Fatigued Driving BASICs. While the presence of hazardous materials in cargo may 

exacerbate the consequences of crashes, we do not believe that the presence of hazardous 

material is a predictor of crashes. FMCSA agrees with us. But rather than pare down the 

hundreds of violations that are now part of this metric to those few where the presence of 

hazmat may have a causal link to crash outcomes, the agency simply renamed the HM BASIC, 

the HM "Compliance" BASIC. In short, FMCSA has changed the intended purpose of CSA for 

hazmat carriers from one that predicts crashes to one that monitors regulatory compliance. 

We object to this mission creep. 

Additionally, some of the listed hazmat violations under this BASIC are arguably not even the 

carrier's responsibility. For example, hazmat violations dealing with marking or package testing 

are usually a shipper responsibility. Yet, they are respectively assigned weights of 5 and 7 on a 

scale of 1 to 10. Finally, we note that all hazmat securement violations are weighted at 10. We 

assume that the point of this ranking is that an improperly secured load can destabilize a 

vehicle, and thus contribute to a crash. Ifthis is the case, then all other load securement 

violations in the Vehicle Maintenance BASIC should be weighted at 10 as well. Instead, the 

highest weighting is 7. 

FMCSA should not be allowed to side-step the issues and concerns of hazmat carriers by simply 

changing CSA's purpose for these carriers to one assessing regulatory "compliance," rather 

crash causation. FMCSA has other means to monitor and address regulatory non-compliance. 
253 


Insert offset folio 212 here 75852.212

4 

Hazardous Materials Safety Program 

The CSA program commands the focus and attention of FMCSA to the detriment of other safety 

programs it administers. One such program is the HMSP program. Authorized by Congress in 

1990 and implemented by FMCSA in 2005, this program is what the agency hopes CSA will be -

the means to determine the fitness of covered carriers. It is nearing the end of its fourth 

permitting cycle. 

As originally envisioned, the program was only supposed to disqualify the worst 30 percent of 

carriers who transport specified hazardous materials not already in possession of a 

"satisfactory" safety rating. The premise underlying the establishment of the HMSP program 

was that it was going to prevent seven hazmat truck-related crashes per year. FMCSA stated 

that the safety benefits to be derived from the projected crash reductions would be "large 

because of the number of conventional crashes that may be prevented." This has not proved to 

be the case. Analysis of the data collected during the seven years of the HMSP and during the 

seven years immediately preceding the implementation of the HMSP shows that the HMSP 

program has had almost no effect on crash rates: 

Comparison of safety Data from the Seven Years Before and Since the HMSP 

HMSP 1998-2004 2005-2011 All Hazmat Highway Incidents 

Material 

1998-2004 2005-2011 

Crashes Fatalities Crashes Fatalities Crashes Fatalities Crashes Fatalities 

Explosives 35 0 25 0 

(25 kg. 

1.1, 1.2, 

1.3 & 

placarded 

1.5) 

RAM 4 0 1 0 

(HRCQ') 

TIH 47 0 51 0 

Methane 4 0 3 0 

TOTAL 90 0 80 0 2190 62 2156 61 

Data from the Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS), 6/14/2012 . 

• It may be that none of these crashes are highway route controlled quantities (HRCQ). From the data in HMIS, it 

was possible to eliminate some incidents that were clearly not HRCQ. Where there was doubt the incident was 

counted. 

FMCSA has realized neither the reduction in crash magnitude nor severity expected after the 

permit was established. At the same time, examination of the HMSP program and its 

regulatory history has revealed due process omissions and a program-changing clerical error 

that negates the option to obtain a HMSP based on a carrier's satisfactory safety rating. As a 
254 


Insert offset folio 213 here 75852.213

result ofthese flaws, require all carriers, even those with satisfactory safety ratings, must 

maintain a crash rate, and driver, vehicle and HM 005 rates below the 30 percentile ofthe 

national average. The cumulative effect ofthe arbitrary 30 percent disqualification thresholds 

could technically disqualify every carrier who applies. In practical terms, the collective 

thresholds raise the disqualification rate to a level higher than 30 percent. These regulatory 

defects, which expose covered carriers to the risk of being shut down by as few as two, pointin-time, non-crash causal 005 violations with no appeal, are neither justified nor equitable. 

Nor are they what Congress intended when this program was authorized. 

5 

As you know, Congress recently enacted the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act 

(MAP-21). Section 33014 of this legislation directs FMCSA to initiate a rulemaking, by July 6, 

2014, to reform the HMSP unless the agency publishes a justification in the Federal Register for 

why a rulemaking is not necessary. FMCSA has recognized that the program is in need of 

reform and accepted a petition for rulemaking in 2011. However, in accepting the petition, the 

agency stated that the rulemaking would have to wait until the CSA safety fitness 

determination rule was finalized. Meanwhile, our members and other HMSP holders continue 

to be subject to a flawed program that harms good carriers for reasons, in most cases, that are 

not causal factors in vehicle crashes. 

Given the agency's regulatory priorities, we have asked that FMCSA provide interim relief in 

advance of full HMSP reform rulemaking by providing carriers an alternative way to 

demonstrate their safety fitness other than waiting to "age out" of disqualifying 005 violations 

that are not linked to crash causation. Specifically, we have asked FMCSA to allow any carrier, 

except those presenting an imminent hazard or demonstrating a pattern of non-compliance, 

the option to request a full review of its safety management controls and an opportunity, if 

appropriate, to file a corrective action plan prior to denying the carrier its HMSP. We were 

thrilled that Congress directed FMCSA to consider providing such an additional level of review 

as an element of HMSP program reform. This remedy is necessary because the majority of 

HMSP holders are carriers whose operations generate infrequent inspections. For these 

carriers, recovering from as few as two 005 violations in the 12 months before the carrier's 

HMSP expires can be a mathematical impossibility. This is particularly troubling when the 005 

violation is not an underlying factor of vehicle crashes. As noted above, this is the case with 

many hazmat 005 violations. 

Let us explain. The HM 005 rate is now 6.82%. At the 6.82% HM rate, a carrier with two HM 

005, from three or more inspections during the final 12 months of the permit, would need to 

have at least 27 "clean" inspections to fall below 6.82%. Our members average only 14 

inspections a year. In short, two HM 005 in a 12 month period is a virtual "out-of-business" 

order for these carriers. Please consider the following: 

(1) The closer to the expiration ofthe HMSP that a carrier receives an 005 violation that puts it 

underwater in terms of clean inspections, the more difficult it is to generate the number of 

"clean" inspections needed to get above water again; there simply is not enough time. 

(2) Each additional HM 005 will require another 14 "clean" inspections. 
255 


Insert offset folio 214 here 75852.214

(3) A carrier may no longer request inspections in an effort to obtain "clean" inspections. 

(4) CVSA has been unable to reach a policy determination regarding what constitutes and 

should be recorded as a "clean" inspection. 

(5) Inspections are not random, nor should they be with limited resources. Inspections are 

targeted to vehicles/drivers that appear to have compliance issues. In short, it is harder to get 

a "clean" inspection than it is to get one with an 005 violation. 

(6) 005 violations can be subjective; for example, those involving cargo securement. 

(7) The vast majority of carriers subject to the HMSP operate specialized trucks that cannot be 

used to transport other goods while waiting to "age out" of 005 violation histories. 

(8) HMSP holders are among the safest operators on the road. 

(9) Providing an additional level of safety fitness review does not compel FMCSA to allow 

carriers to continue to hold HMSPs; it will enhance the agency's assessment capabilities. 

6 

It is uncertain when FMCSA will be able to finalize the HMSP rulemaking mandated by Congress. 

In the meantime, the agency has refused to use its discretion to ensure that "fit" carriers are 

not put out of business based on insufficient data anomalies. Regrettably, the agency argues 

that MAP-21 precludes it from providing the interim relief we seek because Congress mandated 

a study to identify HMSP program deficiencies before taking regulatory action. MAP-21 sets 

deadlines by which action to reform the HMSP must be done, but nothing in MAP-21 prevents 

the agency from acting in advance of those deadlines. Accordingly, we ask the Subcommittee 

to urge FMCSA to reconsider its position on this matter and to promptly issue an interim final 

rule or take other administrative action to allow a permit holder to request an additional level 

of review prior to denying a carrier its HMSP, except in cases presenting an imminent hazard or 

demonstrating a pattern of non-compliance. 

Again, we share FMCSA's commitment to safety. That said, inspection frequency and outcome 

do not seem to correlate to crashes or fatalities for carriers subject to the HMSP. Providing 

carriers an opportunity for additional review of their safety controls and to take corrective 

actions will still enable FMCSA to ensure that only fit carriers are allowed to transport materials 

subject to the HMSP. 

Conclusion 

Given the diversity of motor carriers, the task of FMCSA to craft a comprehensive safety 

assessment program that is reasonable, fair, and transparent is daunting. What is clear is that 

CSA is not ready for prime time. Yet, in the meantime, hazmat carriers subject to the flawed 

HMSP program have been told that reform will not be forthcoming until rules are finalized 

establishing CSA as the agency's new safety fitness determination program. The agency's 

intransigent position is destabilizing to the affected industry and should not be tolerated. 

We are encouraged that the Subcommittee is looking into the serious issues raised by 

stakeholders affected by FMCSA's administration of its safety program. As FMCSA works to 

perfect the CSA program in advance of rulemaking to recommend it as a replacement for the 

SafeStat program, Congress should ensure that the program meets the goals of the agency to 
256 


Insert offset folio 215 here 75852.215

be a predictor of crash risk and that it not repeat the mistakes of the HMSP. Finally, we ask the 

Subcommittee to urge FMCSA to provide requested interim relief to HMSP holders who are 

facing unjustified disqualification under this flawed program. 

Respectfully, 

C!I/(th,/a. /ltft(}l( 

Cynthia Hilton 

Executive Vice President 

7 
257 


Insert offset folio 216 here 75852.216

" TRUCK S. SAFETY 

COALITION --

Parents Against Tired Truckers and Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways 

October 3, 2012 

The Honorable John J. Duncan, Jr. 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

B-376 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

B-375 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member DeFazio, 

I am writing on behalf of the Truck Safety Coalition (TSC) in response to your Subcom mittee's September 

13th hearing, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program." The TSC is a 

partnership of the Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH) Foundation and Parents Against Tired 

Truckers (P.A.T.T.). We are dedicated to reducing the number of preventable deaths and injuries caused by 

truck-related crashes, providing compassionate support to truck crash survivors and families of truck crash 

victims, and educating the public, policy-makers and media on truck safety issues. The T5C would like to 

respectfully submit documentation into the official hearing transcript record. This documentation provides 

case studies in which the Police Accident Report (PAR) was missing information, contained incorrect 

information, or both. The case studies are indicative of the limitations of PARs as a determining factor of 

fault or preventability in a truck crash and support the TSC's opposition to changes being considered to the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) Program. 

During the hearing, Steve Owings testified on behalf of the Truck Safety Coalition. His testimony focused 

on changes being considered to crash data maintained within the CSA Crash BASIC, thresholds for 

intervention, and the necessity of preserving public access to information. Mr. Owings urged for caution in 

response to the changes being considered in order to preserve the high performing, CSA Program, " ... it is 

essential that the Program retains the ability to efficiently analyze data for timely intervention, that it is 

cost effective given FMCSA's limited resources, and that it remains fair to truck crash victims and their 

surviving family and friends." Of particular concern is the change to the CSA Crash BASIC data, which would 

rely on the Police Accident Report (PAR) to determine fault and preventability. Mr. Owings noted that PARs 

often lack complete and accurate information and in fact do not even include information on crash 

preventability. As he shared with Members of the Subcommittee, this was the case with the crash that 

killed his son Cullum. Had his son Pierce not survived this horrific crash, they would have never known the 

truth that the truck driver lied about the events leading up to the crash and that it was the truck driver, and 

2020 N 14'" Street Suite 710, Arlington, VA 22201. 703-294-6404. www.trucksafety.org 
258 


Insert offset folio 217 here 75852.217

not Cullum, whose actions caused the crash. Unfortunately, the truck driver's incorrect version of the crash 

is the only eyewitness account that is noted in the PAR for the Owings crash. 

Attached are five case studies which provide examples of incorrect and incomplete PARs, and demonstrate 

how they are inadequate to answer the questions of why or how a crash occurred above and beyond what 

has been reported by the conscious survivors. The studies detail how incorrect and incomplete PARs may 

also lead to erroneous charges being filed and explain why PARs should not be used as the deciding factor 

in determining fault or preventability in truck crashes. 

Thank you for your time and consideration of the case studies and our concerns with the changes being 

considered to the Crash BASIC. We look forward to continuing to work with the Subcommittee on 

Highways and Transit, as well as the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to support 

improvements to truck safety and to make America's roads safer. 

Sincerely, 

John Lannen 

Executive Director 

2020 N 14th Street Suite 710, Arlington, VA 22201. 703·294-6404. www.truck.afety.org 
259 


Insert offset folio 218 here 75852.218

Aguilar Crash 

Truck driver neglected to properly secure car on trailer. chose not to pull onto the shoulder or into an 

available driveway. stopped in a lane of traffic and then failed to use warning signs or triangles 

PAR did not note crucial information or violations and placed car driver "at fault" 

On December 13, 2007, a United Road Transport tractor-trailer hauling cars, was stopped at night, in a 

moving lane of traffic, in a 50 mph speed limit zone. The tractor-trailer had picked up its last car in 

Houston and was heading to San Antonio. As the truck turned the corner to drive onto the three lane 50 

mph service road, the driver and his assistant realized that the car they had just loaded was not chained 

down. They should have realized this during the pre-trip inspection, but they neglected to perform this 

vital safety measure after loading the last car and before beginning their trip. They proceeded to drive 

1/4 mile down the 50 mph road, choosing to stop in a lane of traffic and make the necessary repairs to 

secure the car, rather than safely pulling into one of two available driveways or off onto the side of the 

road and out of the lane of traffic. 

Sean Matthew Aguilar, was driving to pick up his girlfriend and take her to a church recital. He was 

traveling at the speed limit, approximately 50 mph, when the car in front of him qUickly changed lanes. 

Sean was suddenly confronted with a stopped tractor trailer in the right lane of traffic and was unable to 

avoid crashing into the back of the trailer. Sean suffered a traumatic head injury, a fractured pelvis, and 

a fractured wrist. 

The truck driver claimed that the trucks two rear flashers were on but that he did not use or display any 

triangles or warning signs which were readily available as part of the truck's emergency kit. The truck 

driver's excuse was that they were only going to be there for a couple of minutes and that they were not 

stopped in a moving lane of traffic. The assistant driver admitted that they were in the right lane of 

traffic. He also admitted that in the quarter mile stretch they continued driving after they realized there 

was a problem with their load, that there were multiple places that they could have safely pulled off the 

road, including two driveways and areas on the grassy shoulder, but that they did not. 

The police officer at the scene did not investigate why the truck had stopped. Thepolice officer had 

limited knowledge of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) and Commercial Driver's 

License (COL) requirements for warning triangles. The officer claimed that it was perfectly legal for an 

18 wheeler to stop in a moving lane so long as it had flashers on. The officer blamed the car, claiming 

that it "failed to control its speed" and may have been "following too closely" to the car in front of it. 

The Police Accident Report (PAR) never mentioned the truck driver's failure to place warning devices or 

to inspect and properly load the auto transport before leaving the loading facility. 

The officer in this case is wrong, and admitted that he had no Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV) training 

or experience and does not do CMV inspections. Texas law adopts the FMCSR, and it mandates that 

warning flashers be immediately turned on and that as soon as possible, the warning triangles be placed 

at 10', 100', and 200' behind the trailer (392.22 (a), (b)(l) and (v)). It is now known that the truck was 

there for over an hour before the wreck happened, but the truck driver claimed he was there only two 

to three minutes. Now that the officer has seen the relevant FMCSR's (392.1; 392.2; 392.9(a)(1), (2) and 

(b)(l); 392.22(a), (b)(l) and (v)) he agrees that this wreck would not have happened but for these 

violations. Today, he would ticket the truck driver and add the truck driver's violations to the causes of 

the crash. 
260 


Insert offset folio 219 here 75852.219

The investigating officer's failure to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding why the truck 

stopped and the officer's limited knowledge of FMCSR regulations resulted in an incomplete 

investigation and an incorrectly written PAR. Had the investigating officer known that the truck driver 

should have taken precautionary actions to warn oncoming drivers when he decided to stop in an active 

lane of traffic, he would have been obligated to note the truck driver's failure to do so on the PAR. The 

varying level of knowledge of FMCSRs required by police officers from state to state is a great hindrance 

to fully investigating and determining causation in a crash. 

"Not-at-fault" is NOT equivalent to "non-preventable." In the Aguilar crash, the tractor trailer driver 

could have taken reasonable steps to have avoided the crash, such as performing a safety inspection 

before beginning the trip, pulling off the roadway before stopping rather than stopping in a lane of 

traffic and simply putting out the triangles he admits were sitting behind his seat. These actions would 

have helped to prevent the crash, though failure to do so, would not automatically have resulted in the 

truck driver being found "at fault" in the crash. "Fault" and "preventability" are related but not identical 

concepts and it cannot be assumed that one proves the other. 

This truck driver admits to a similar crash several years earlier, at night without the warning triangles 

placed out. He claims the EI Paso Police reached the same conclusion that the officer did in this casethe car that hit him from the rear was at fault, despite there being no warning devices. 
261 


Insert offset folio 220 here 75852.220

';le;l' .. __ ---- TEXASPEAC£OFfICIR'SCllWiliRDOln' CII-lrRrf.01/1)1) ~.Cra'I~.n.~_III_*"'~~*-,,~~~,,")(""CIf __ "_1Wu.s.DEI'III,,"II&lIOf' 

Pl,.8LICIUIFm,I'OItO~_ • .waTl\l'I'X~P\OIOIM_WDP$,*"- .. ,... ... __ ~_..-........ boII,,,,"'CAI$~M~.~.~t!Irn 

o FATAl Ji:JCMVIMlWED DSCIIJOl .. Sm.vm OIWUtOADRELATEO DMEDiCN.1IIMSOfn'1KWIO 0 HlJANDAlIN D~'SU'Pl.EMOO' 

IT] 0t:= a!FmMYAM:l ~ACT _.'6 

,.,,, 

---

~ ~ ::' ~~ c~y,.....c:--=- SCB12,,,"i ~---,L.=-",O"Uc:Uc:.\;:..=-___ =,~~~~~~. 

~s !~tyt..",,"1l. f ;L"llo"\ ,'IIIA-"7"-rIl(~-;_=_=.-;;=;;._=~::-__ ~~_~_ _=-____ _ =0 

- =tD';HTIi~ 

.... mu: _______ _ ~ . .. ..-

~~ ._- ~IIUI' - ....- -

"""'" I/lf-' .- ORIftJI"slll MilE IMIMJt'S 

fnIIKWI' U =-= ..... so: CI m.u. ot!IUCI1OII j>~I\l~.c.. JQJC[,FIIEJlGtII[R.DI5,u.tfJRltfiEllCTD ~ ___ ._ 

TYPE OF ALCOHOL SP!aUEN TAKI!N 0 rEST 

1-IIAeAnt 1-8LOOO 1-UR&NE4-NONE~ "ElAA.TS 

~~ _-.. __ ._--- "..... ~~: OEXP __ e .... ~ _ I~SOMMG£ TO ~RfY OTtO TIWI\IlHtC11S 

pJons 

TYPE OF DRUG SP£CIIIEN TAKEN 0 TEST DROO 1 .-----

1-IN .. 000:a-uRNE I-NOtE ....eFUSED RUUl.T9 __ CATEGORY l- __ . ____ _ -. 

-

iIl'l£S 0'" 

, --- ___ ...;p..'-::L'l:::,,,:.:,,,-=£..:;«,-,\_~_~_'_"l,-_____ ~,c..)/" • .t. /M$. _ DWIGE 

... 
262 


Insert offset folio 221 here 75852.221
263 


Insert offset folio 222 here 75852.222

'''<-..... 1 ....... .. 

TDlASP£M(OFFIta'SCMSllRlPDIT £lB.l.or:-w.1WQ6J k",*-"",d eo.II",",-* "."fOI'.., ... ___ ..... CII$\I>W>~-.y~*lOol.oI __ iD-.. fEAA$OfPoVtNE1mlF 

f>lAII.IC....nn',f'OlIOI(~.IIUIT!N1X~""""'_ .. QH;~"'PoAo. .... _ ..... ~ __ ~ ..... qtIoakOtl,.CR:I.w....otNlp_~~ 

o FAlN. III CMVIINOlYm Cl $IXJOl M mAna Cl RAH.JIMOlIlUlttI [JABlICAl AlnASOIn'toMD 0 Ift"'_ 0 ~/9JIPI.bOT 

",,"011_ 

'""""'IJIIII!D 

DATfOE "' ... HOUR 

~.--------------

DAM 1lDAm.'..oc. [KI'II OlIlll'lGHf.30STlVi 

~ [I]5:: :::COIWYAIE! ::m¥T v*' S =:N£KIr1~:: 

~~=. hWL... .J'rv'l ~",::- -rJ!..A.\U;~ :: A-w.-ru ""~!.fo!deil...~ _ _ _ 

_ J -....... =,~-~~~~~_~~I ~~~ .. !!..=_:::-_ -:_=_=~=_:-: .. =-- -

""""[i] 0 .... 

wu ________________ ___ 

'rL\R COlO.I MODEl... I0O"I' LICINSE ..... ____ .... _______ - ________ Iml ____________ PUIt -:_:::--=_=--=_= 

"""'" 

~ ~_~-------:_=----------=_=-~-:_=~~.~== ... ~ .. =----------------~--WMO-~-----I - """"0-.......... DIII'Im 

...... ...--- --;_...--- .....-............. ""' ...... ----........... --- STATUS ~.-

.-... D~ .... DIllVEI"S 0 M.E. DIIVU"I 0IItlUTl ::-WNI SD OfDW.E cx:a.f1JlOll POUCl.fllUlliHlDlDlS,tllfJIUIiDC'f O,_.u._-

1-8f1.EA,TH TYPEDlALCOHOLlPECHllEHTAKEH l-8U)OQ3-\JRIN1t4-N0fr4E!~RlBED OnsT RESUlT9_ TYPEOFORUOIHCIIIIHTNaiIt 1.aLOOOJ.URlNl':3-NONB.t.REP-UKO 01'esT RlIULTI __ CAT£GORt~ 

Dl\lJO ':====1 LESMiIO 

~ERO-:_~~===_~~~. __ ~~==~_== __ ~ ___________ -:_~.~~~~== .. :-:~=_------------_______ 1 

UAilIJ'rY om laJUMCI O*' O£lP __ _ 

...•. ", .... iIlIID 0" 

.... ----------------"""" ______________ 0" ..... ____________ -1 __ DWIGE UTMIOU 

:'~JFlED .!.1.-'13.v1 _)~~( HOW-'I>:;JI" .. "-f .. "-'-~,,<."-tf _ _':-~!."L'n .. 0., ~~~I~~~._,>_.O_'~ __ I 

, = 
264 


Insert offset folio 223 here 75852.223
265 


Insert offset folio 224 here 75852.224

DAn Of 

CUlM 

DOJlOTWRI'Ji 

IflltlSSPAa. 

lot. 

'00f __ _ 

......", 

FAT.Mre 

DR.ftEc. __ _ 

""'",,. 

UNIT NO. 1 Business Address: _____ = ______________ Phonell: ______ _ 

UNIT NO.2 Business Address: Phone II: 

IF EMERGENCY VEHICLE: UNIT 11.===="",", , WAS IT USING SIREN? YES NO INTERMITTENTLY ___ STEADY ___ RED LIGHTS ON? __ _ 

UNIT NO.1 REMARKS UNIT NO.2 REMARKS 

~ ""'..-s LIk,-U.:',"'"'-1 ...... ~ i,),'''H.c.. of.- ~., 

~t'-I;.....,.... "-3.k ..... ftC #("1- ~ r-~ n",~,tl.o. 

I/>- ,,16'1,,: NO'( ,.-" $<-., ~e:: 

\1:./0'1'1' IJt {Y¥'IPAt,...-( ~7't."""EV""'ll"lh:;.IJ 

&.( 0 ..... "</.:-.-, .... ." .. V""uu;.s. N 

t 

__ ~_~~S~2~.~~ _ __..:_____ .1 r I> DATETI<IS 11.-· ,-'·01 SIGNATURE ~ :::,C'-,-' =' ~'=--_ SUPPU.ENTJlAD.' ____ _ 

SlGIlAMlE Of IJlYESliGATOR DEPARTMENT 
266 


Insert offset folio 225 here 75852.225

I~~~"""""SL~ 

CRASHINfOflM<TIOH lDCt _________ _ 

l.COUNT:Y t1-.... "" S 2.CllYORIOWN ''\(S-a>'' ..... _----,-___ _ 

S,NMtE 7. DRMR LJaNSE ClASS EJE 4·D 

5·11 

6-UNlt 

CARRlEJIIIIf~ 

e. VEHICl! OPfRAiroH 0 INTERSTAT£ COMMERCE 00 INTRASTAT£ ~RCE 0 NOT IN COMMERCE 0 GOYERNMaIT 0 PERSONAl 

9. CARRl£R'5·CORPORAT£NMtE~.tI.I!!!!!!!!T!I!! ... "'!!!~I!!!!III!!!!!I!!!~~ ___ _'_ ___ =_ ____ =_ __ 10. CARRIIR'S PtHi.Wi-t ADDRESS _ pi 

- ""'" 

p 

!i1us DOT OJxDOT DOTMER D NClNE 12. CAl!RIER ID_ 

7-CONGRETE MIXER 

8-AIITOT~ 

!J.GAIiBAGfJREF 

lo-GRAlN. ·CHIPS. GRA'iEI. 11.f'01.E· 

98-0THER --' ___ _ 

12-NOT APPlICABL£ 

lRAIl£R lYI'£ 

.,.UCEN$(PLAlt __________ 22. ==~==~(RGWi) 8 0== ·2'.1UTAl1lNBER or.m£S 

QJ 25.TDlAI.NlMBEAorTIRES 

~[55~oo 

l~SIl)/l: !\AN Off ROAD 1HOUlSlON I~WlGPEDESTRIAN 2 JACXKNIFE 13-COU.1S1ON tIMlLYING IMlTOR VEHIClE IN TRANSPORT 

3 ovtl!JiJRN {ROU.O\/ERJ 14-CW.1S1ON IIMlLViNG I\\IMD MOTOR VEIt!ClE 

... DDWlftlIU. RUNAWAY, 15-C01.J..1SKlN IIMlLViNG lRAIN 

5· CARGO LOSS OR 511fT 16-COWS1OH IIMlLIIIHS I'EllAlCYClf ~~0It. £lU>t.OSION OR fIRE 17.al.lJSlO!i IrMX.VING All ANIMAl 

~==kmE :==:v'W::~EQUNOO ~ION: EQUlPII!NT FAILURE zo.l:W.ISION.WJ1lj 1ITIJiR!IIlY1\8l!·~ . 1!l-NONC()U.ISIOIt. UTHI'R . 21.couJS1ON WITH lNIMJWNMOIIABUi OBJECT 

l1-HOHCOUlSlON: UNKNOWN 98-0iHER 41. ,... i>. 1>. 
267 


Insert offset folio 226 here 75852.226

Browning Crash 

PAR was missing information and contained incorrect information. and. as a result. 

PAR incorrectly assigned Michael Browning fault 

On September 14, 2007, Michael Browning was driving North in the left lane on SC 12S in North 

Augusta, SC, when his pickup truck crashed into the back of a log truck attempting to make a right hand 

turn onto Pine Log Rd. According to the Police Accident Report (PAR), both vehicles had been traveling 

in the right lane when the accident occurred. The PAR states that the pickup truck struck the log truck 

for unknown reasons, essentially placing blame on Mr. Browning. Michael Browning died as a result of 

injuries sustained in the crash. 

Eyewitness accounts, taken after the crash and after the PAR was completed, state that Mr. Browning's 

vehicle was actually traveling in the left lane when, suddenly, the log truck crossed into his path from 

the right lane. Additionally, eyewitnesses reported that the truck driver failed to use a signal light, 

neither indicating his need to cross into the left lane in order to negotiate a right turn, nor that his intent 

was to turn right on to Pine Log Road. The investigating officer, who authored the PAR, was not aware 

of this information because he failed to interview witnesses. Eyewitness accounts revealed that the log 

truck driver's actions caused the crash, place the fault on the truck driver, and should have been 

included in the PAR. 

Missing and incomplete information in PARs often result because the truck driver is the only surviving or 

conscious witness after a crash. In truck versus passenger vehicle crashes, 97 percent of the deaths are 

suffered by the occupants of the passenger vehicle who cannot speak for themselves at the scene of the 

crash. Seriously injured passenger vehicle occupants are also often unable to be interviewed at the 

crash scene. As a result, it is only when all the evidence regarding a crash is uncovered, including eye 

witness accounts and the results of accident reconstruction investigations that the information can be 

considered and the accuracy of the initial PAR can be determined. 
268 


Insert offset folio 227 here 75852.227
269 


Insert offset folio 228 here 75852.228

;Un'7l Date 01 Bflh Sex Rae INJ Seal RlS Aao e-ect LAI Tran Name Street Address Z, Cooe 

[iJ ;Yj w 'Ii 01 1 ; 7: 'di Or,"<.- 0.,;/ \ 

b 1"/ \J 4: 01 DC 'j :~ I ; i: Dr:\.:(.r 0.;/ 2-

'J 

, ! 

" '! . ! 

~A."'.""".",'''''''~ W."'_'"~'~ '·""'·'~"""""~ali loco ~(l PIldtS\llaft 00 Slef!pQ<(>fCab Reslralt'l\lSafetyOevlCe a-Ajl!(3n~ H·f!<lIpi8rlll: 0.00. "' (i.NGIInJllred )-lnc.1pao:.la!mg J£).Tr",bJ1QU,,' 7O'Rldongonun~E'ler:o< foo:tf~UU<l'--11c;;;i(1- l-Ala:sllanNillNe(}l(AmencanIflCNn U·Unk ,!,f!:,l_ _ _ 01 G2' 03 40 BIIs(}l(Vanl~lh'_OIH,ghc'l 80 t"" ·1 Shot4k1o'BelIOnly S<l'~Seal 

M De fa ment I Swltch E~1!OO G4 ~ 0Ii '5oCI on"" E~ooo.ad Ate", \. c-nt<a""'''!I1 99· lh. I!olA 11 tap a., I Only M 0".., 

ll~~ronl"'Nt,\~ \·NoIE',-c'Ied JL010809 !,1,0l""'Unerclo$e.:!Ale;llnunj'''''''''91 ·l-S/Io:U:Iet'l,1pBeIlli'iU ..... 

aJ:2~rtdSod\l1NQlApPttIl~ 2·PattE'Jllet<l(; LocallOfl arm 1 f.ee<ijrooo mech 1 a) TmM:potted 10 MedICal FaetfJly !~!~~=~~~!~~;~~-

, l7~~~£:;in;: ~::~ e:::U:='ed\a~~an$)::~ ~6;S- ~:iZSi Po~~ll.z.~u; ::-::::.~$~~(>:l;;;:t>~ ,b)'l Swold'IIIlOf'lPOl4lOf'!9<UnIoroown 9-""1< e uence 0 vents ' 

~,29 01 DS~!::';~S Sgnls EIC :~ ~~:::~ ~::'a.o- 0' ~fl\e'e I~ ~=':\t~ .. a. No" ::. ~~:t' I~: ~;a~e~:e ~a'iJ - ~~~!l i~ Gla:e 68 Qthet 69 u":~ 

I 01 O.$!raC'led/lrlill"ter.11DI1 13 Oiel·CCI"et!,ngiC.e/ s:ee",'1 132 ~1'!II::opn - '<c.1I)y,a) rt.:~ .. 'e!o V,eld ~ 0/ IN Veh!tle Defect 

!r- 01 D""~g TQC Fa~ Ill' Co·...,h!l()nI; t4 Sw~"""g!O A~Oo<I,r.g Objfcl IJJ R""d Surfate Cong·1/Q<l II e W~I) I!!: ~~,;~es!~~: ~:::"~LI; 110 era~es 16· WmoowslSh"!'ld 

JI ; 04 E'C~AIMON&a5pee'dl'fMI!! wro"9SrOe!>'WQ<lQWa1 1);1-RU1 Hor'$ " .. ~s 1~Irl"p'~Cros1R1il 171.S1unr,1; 11 Re$tra'~ISy$:em 

r=

! [)5.F8IIed 10 Y.-IdR'I1'tafWay 1&-lJndM"lhtllnIk.o«Ice l5-~rstl'lDnlll(1Ot $(I" Hogh) 56-01OMlf S8-Other W-O"Il.. 72·Poo.e<~nl 78·TNd.~ 

os.A:ilnolfROIId 19..CenPhon~ 17 VtKIIIOb&CtJfed!WrllwJUr>il) I:l8-Tr.rroeCOlllrdOornc.eue M",~rogll5-1.WrongSrOeO\RQild 173'T~eiJWl'lftl 19-Cllrl/O 

01 Fal'guecVAlla(!p 18 lmp.ape. laM U$.IIQ!(!/Ch/r.-.gtl 131. 'MIt>. Z()I'II! {Co~w Ma,n! 'Utt'ly) 1s6. Ur,<!'e'!nO Inll\.le,-.:;Q J14 l'g/lIS eo· Fuel Syslem 

OS FoII""'~dTQCCIoHIy ll1·0Utertrnpfope,ACIICn 2'i.U"k J8'Wt7n T"hfl·Pol·~Surla~e 67·0I11e,PIII'Sonundll'lnIIuet'lc:e lS-S,,¥,~I$ 8a..O:t>ei 89 U<-t 
270 


Insert offset folio 229 here 75852.229

Qfi!(;ilNAl. 

D.P .5. USE ONLY Uniform Traffic ColIl$ion Report L.-___ .i'fi»'\ L-.J I ou!:~, llfO na I 1~"'·-~~~1~rOr$'~ I I"""~ 

tFarlnvesligaUngOfficers) 

Supplemental Bus & Truck Collision Report Page I of J Pages 

County i

i Route Category 

Hn!arSl31e 4-Secorl.:!<lry 

.US Primary 5·C()unry 

3· CPrima 

Date I Time 

[~-I~-Zcc7 \'11'> I 02 

SCREENING INFORMATION Access Control 

NUMBER OF QUAliFYING VEHICLES INVOLVED '·NoAece$SC;;r.t·ol 

2-fullk;ce5i!lC~-1'~ 

A Truck HavIng a GI,fII,'R of 10,0011bs. or More For the Power Unit _~ ~3-~"::.:":=::=:':::CO:":"'-v"-e"'h;:lc;:I.;:'n:;:fo::nn"'a",;::on;::====-~ 

OR Gross Vehicle Weight Rating 

A Vehicle with a Hazardous Materials Placard 

OR 

Vehicle Configuration 

A Bus That is Designed or Used to Carry 16 or MOfe Persons, InCluding the Driver .... r-:A' 

~ 

00- PaS$ef\"~ Car {onlY ",I H>QIAAT ;.IiI~d) (lS- TI3::ltl:' wi ~I'!'I' Tr;:II!er 

01-l'\)II1 Trucl< {onIywl ~"'A.TpI&~ldl (l;'Trao:jo-",IDQvt-leTral~rs 

OR ~~:: :::~~ ~:,~I: ~!:~:; ~~ 6:r~~!:":: ~~~I:; 04- S,ngle Uc.': T .... ck(:2 B.>lesl,s. Tires) ~ Urk~'''M ;tria R..r 

A Molor Vehicle Engaged in Intersl31e Commerce thai is Designed 0( Useo -------..1:-1 05· Slf\(;Ie UM T,_o: (l or rn:we ~xl~s) I 10 Carry 9015 Persons,Inc1udJng the Driver. rOf Compensation ~ ~~ ~~~~';''1I!T~~~~J'lIY (BoCLII,lj . 0 g 

Number of Persons Involved: 

Sustaming Fatal Injuries 

Transported fOf Immediate Medica! Services 

Number of Vehicles Towed 

Towed From the Scene Due 10 Damage 

Do Not Complete This Form Unless: 

One or More Qualifying Vehicles was Involved AND 

One or More Qualifying Injuries was Sustained" OR 

One or More Vehicles (nol necr!ssarily the !.ruCk or bus) Was Towed (rem the Scene 

Total Number of Supplemental Forms Required for this Collision: I 

Unit Number FR-10 Number 

Cargo Body Type 

Trailer Length and Width 

01-less :~~'" ~eG ,n !~" F.) 

02· ·~el '" ,,~76 ," (~I! rn 

(l3·sn'n .... "",,'e 99· U~~I'<:WO"JH>I lind R~-

C!J-G'''''r\.Ch';>5.Gril'~ 

10-Pcie 

11. IMlt'<'I'I:l=a, CC<'It3;"-eH'Ha:ApoI'~bie 

~!l. O\t1e' 

~r'=;:·"·" 

Hazardous Material !n\lolvment 

Was ThIS Venicll" Carrying HUl!rdous Mllterials? 

[2::::J Name:_ ..... -, Old the Veh{clll' Halle a Hazardous Matella! Placard? 

I Address: ________ _ 

City:J. State: (i:iJ Zip: 

2 

This Vehlcle's Cargo? 

[]] 

Was a Citation Issued to this Vehicle? 
271 


Insert offset folio 230 here 75852.230

Melton Crash 

Speed incorrectlv cited as a violation and truck driver incorrectly found "at fault" on PAR 

Investigation found shipper and unbalanced load at fault and speed not a factor 

On October 27, 2006, UPS driver Samuellavance Melton was traveling southbound on Highway S9 in 

Houston, TX, when he attempted to take the 1-10 exit ramp. Upon exiting the highway, the load that the 

tractor-trailer was pulling suddenly shifted, causing Mr. Melton to hit the concrete barrier, and 

subsequently causing the tractor-trailer to roll-over. Mr. Melton suffered a traumatic brain injury, in 

addition to other physical injuries, as a result ofthe over-turned truck. 

The Police Accident Report (PAR) incorrectly charged the UPS driver with "failure to control speed" while 

attempting to exit. It was later found, over the course of the investigation, that the crash was a direct 

result of the shipper incorrectly loading the sealed load. The shipper's faulty loading caused the shift of 

the load that resulted in the roll-over when the truck attempted to turn at a low speed. The charges 

against Mr. Melton were later dismissed. 

If this crash had been reviewed, using the information contained in the PAR, and based on the police 

officer's charge, Mr. Melton would have been found "at fault" for a crash he did not cause. Additionally, 

the party at fault, in this case the shipper, would not have been held accountable for their actions. 
272 


Insert offset folio 231 here 75852.231

'-1!SZ"11:55:25AM- M

- :I. IfIAJ<IL s"",'" -,...,.... f",", ollJltr ,~~ & _ 

""""""~f 'SW$HREP'ORt c:III4lRaw.01I06)~QlCrato~n. ....,.bo~ .... au ....... PInII.~.......,'IIIlloL .. _ .... 'fEIt',S~OI' I'Ul!ltICSAI'£T't, _1,~~TX~",,,_""Df'S_,,_,,,,,,,,,""'~ ____ "~"""'Cll:IliI __ ",,~~~ 

o FATAL CIW1ffVOl.YED: D $QtOOl1US R£Wto 0 RAlLAOADREUiftO 0 MEDICAL NM$ORVBOARD 0 H1T AHDRUN [J AMElWMENff$UPPL.fMDR' 

"'--"' ..... CR.l!iliOCCURR~D .L~.·~----------

____ xy"'"CCe"'OLS"-_____ arr ....... _~~~~~<::! .. ~,J=_ ____ - ____ _ .. ,,----------1 

~' _____ -L' __ ~ _________ I IfCllA$HWASOUlSfOEtm'LNni DODO WlDlCATrF'ROM/IIENI:E$fTOMI ItLIS • 1. 1 W Of 

~o:::~~.~g~~ --- .. ; _ ~~tMS.ON~O .. ---.-_ 

TlP£OFAlCDfiOLSPlClMENTo\KaI DlUT TlPEOf"DRUOSPiC.UNTAMN 0 TBT DROO L _______ _ 

1-efleATH Hl.OOD3"URIN&+NOHEMEFU$ED RESULT9_ t-BLOOO:z..uJIJN&s-NONE4-AEFUSED Fl'ESULT9 __ CAUaORY, ____ _ 

...... 0 OW"~O~_~.~.~.~_-.. ~.~~~ ___ ~_== __ =-----------~ __ ~~~.~~.~DL~~=------______________ 1 

lrAlW1'Yom 

~B: __ _ 

OAW.G£ TO PROPam' OTlO TtWI ¥OtICl£S 

e'f/eMf! ~lt~ 

II YOUR 0I'IM0IiI. ow DftS eRASH R£Sa.T IN AT llAST $1,0lI0.110 DAMAGE TO /rIl'fONE PERSOft'SI'ftOF'£RTn .0'" 0" 

It~tfW\HOW bl<;flltrtltri> ~TM~'~_~"'-tl~"-'-Itb''''''-_~Il~,.~·",::..,,,,t'''~ =- lola',,4, TtPf[lOilPRIfITnl 

1MME00IHVEST1CiliWR 

- DlST/MU '1c,Q ~ ~s 
273 


Insert offset folio 232 here 75852.232
274 


Insert offset folio 233 here 75852.233

ii"-··~-'--"- 11:55:25AM 

D.ur:'i-wc'JLYJtOC»fOfl: 1I0111-1L:l.!. ~ ... tmltIGKf, 10 STATI! 

DOIOTwmE 

It.Jl'lSIPACE 

'0<. __ _ 

''''---

---'-' 

',UREC. __ 

DltA!:C, __ _ 

DOt..,. 

UNIT NO. 1 BUsinessAddress:_.J!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!I1!!!!!!~!'!.. _________ Phone#:,,_!!!!!!!!rl~~~~~ 

UNIT NO.2 Business Address: Phone #: 

IF EMERGENCY VEIflCLE: UNIT # WAS IT USING SIREN? YES NO I''''NTE=R::-:M~I=TTE=N'''TL''''Y ___ STEADY ___ REO LIGHTS ON? __ _ 

UNIT NO.1 REMARKS UNIT NO.2 REMARKS 

.:r """ '/l"I''''''~ ;;Ie .., 5'1. I """e 'On" 

.x-\o ~r 1:!'1.1f". A-s 1: ~ """"",,U,I'-

SIGNATURE_J_" IIILII!!'!I!!~~ ____ ==,I\i'=O,=~_ ~.m.rTtlTIL\DE: ,ola·d<IL SlGNATVREOfIlVES'OOATOR OEPARTMENT 
275 


Insert offset folio 234 here 75852.234

.. iI"lIlIiI"I"1I1·1~~~~·~-""""""""""""""""""""""""""--

I CA.~I K 

~O 001 LBS • .oR MQi:"3( (R?I 01.0» CXM.4[RC\Al.~~~MA~1 SUPPL£P,I[HTTO~:::~~k~~~~~~:fl)RlvtR INCLUOfD 

CRASH INFORMAllON ,;~ 'lOU/ 

1. COUNTY @,,&t: 2. CITY OR TOWN Nbo,fro/V ORII 

'3000 

Il'\$1" firl __ ~t !>PSI 

3. ROAD ON WHICH CRASH OCCURRED ., .. RONJWAY ACCESS , .. s1!uT0II1III»b1loWl ""'" ,{] MULL ACCESS CQrfTROl 

4. DATE OF CRASH ~~r~.t;i:..;t .2~tZ# ~::& 5. HOUR II:I~ ~.,,,, j}, 2·PARTIAL ACCESS 

\ .: .' J-NO ACCtSS 

DRlVERtNfORJ!'AllON' \ ,~ lic ~ITJC<}.-At,.". '·D 

'.NAME :S1S"",,!:1 LI'\~rS!~te fV)c. \:!2~ 7.DRfl'ERlICENSEctASS I .~~ . S-M 6-UN' 

CARRllM INfORMATION rIu 8. VEHICLE OPERATION INTERSTATE COMMERCE o INTRASTATE COMMERCE o NOT IN COMMERCE o GOVERNMENT DPERSDNAl 

9. CARRIER'S CORPORATE NAME • ~ 11\,", 

10. CARRIER'S PRJMAtN ADDRESS .. ---

'" 

I • _. , .... ?" . ....,. I'JIi(!f • ~ 

If. CARW(R ID TYPE o ICC I&USOOT DTxOOT DOMR o NONE 12. CARRIER ID NUMBER 4 I S 

MOTOR VEHICLE INfORMATION 

i1l6,OOO lJ. UNIT NUMBER ON eRa·3 0 14,llCENSEPlATE.~ .. ___ _. 15. GROSS VEHICLE WEIGHT RATING.(GVWR} REGfSTERED GROSS VEHICLE WEIGHT (RGVW) 

16. ViHJcLE lYP£ 

l-PASSENGER CAR (ONLY If VEHICLE DfSPlA'fS HM PlACAROS) 1-TRUCK TRAILER 

[SJ HIGHT TRUCK {ONlY IF VDlIClE DISPlAYS HM PlACARDS) 8·TRUCk TRACTOR (BOBTAil) l·BUS (SEATS FOR 9·15 PEOPLE. INCLUDING DRIVER) .. TRACTORISEMITRAILER 4·BUS (SEATS fOR,. 15 PEOPLE, INCLUDING DRIVER) 'O-TRACTOMJOOBlE TRAILER 5·SIHGLE UNIT TRUCJ( (2 AXLES, 6 TIRES) l1·TRACTORlTRIPlE mAILER 

6-SINGlE UNIT TRUCK {lOR MORE AXLES} ... lJNI<NO\Wf HEAVY muc, OViR:'O:OOO lBS. (CANNOT CLASSIFY) 

11. CARGO BODY STYLE 

)·CDNCRm MIxER 

.;8 ...... l·BUS (SEATS FOR 9-15 PEOPlE. INCLUDING DRIVER) 98-QTHER 

1] 2·BUS (S[ATS FOR ,'5 PEOPLE. INCLUDING DRIVER) a·AUTO TRANSPORTER 

3·VANIENClDSED BOX. .9·GARBAGEIREFUSE 

'·CARGO TANK 'O-GAAIN. CHIPS. GRAVEL , 5-FlATBED 'HOLE 

6-0UMP '2·NOT APPLICABLE 

18. HAZARDOUS MATIRIAL 

T."SpO.lING PriDABLE HA/ARDOUS MATERIAl ~ ~~~llllCl.lQl1!El_ HAZARDOUS MATERiAl RELEASED OR SPiLUD 0 fIIllO«l.( fl4l T.o,tI() 

ln~r:'TI"'.6.~';:j -4DIGlTIDI DODD· 100GITClAS$I D401GITIOI DODO 

11NfOltMATJOH TRAILER TYPE 

19. LICENSE PLATE .-.. 20. GROSS VEHIClE WEIGHT RAnNG (GVWI1) 

(~OI1)40 ~Hu\'l"RAll£R .1 l-SEMITRAILER 

REGIS'{EIlE.Il.GROSS VEHIClE W;IG.~T .!!lllVWl l-POl,[1'RAJl£R 

TRAILER NUMB£R 2 I'NfORMATJON 

21. LICENSE PLATE 22. 

REGISTERED 

GROSS VEHICLE GROSS WEIGHT VEtfCLE RATING WEIGHT (GVWR) (RGVW) 0 

0 Eni!:ti~ 23. SEQUENCES Of MNTS· tim 0 24, TOTAL NUMBfR OF AXlES GJ[iJ "'·0 GJ HIDNCOLlISION; RAN OFF ROAD 12·COUIS:lOH INVOLVING PED£$TfUAN 25. TOTAl NUMBER Of TIRES Z·NONCOLLISION: JACKKNIFE 13·COLUSION INVOlVING MOTOR VEHIClE fN TRANSPORT 0 3-NONCOLUSION: OVERTURN (RCl.LOVER) "·COUJSIOIIINVOlVlNG PARKED MOTOR VEHICLE 4-~Oi.lISIOtt OOWNHIU RUNAWAY lS-COU.ISIOIIIIfVQLVlNG TRAIN 

S·NQNCOI..USION: CARGO LOSS OR SHIrT 16·COLLISIOIIINVOlVlNG PfDAlCYClE 

6-NONCOLUS10N; £XPL05'ON OR fIRE lHOLtiSION INVOlVING AN ANiMAl 

1-NONCOlliSlON: SEPARATION OF UNITS la-COLLISION INVOLVING A RXED OIlJECT 

8·NOHCOlUS!ON: CROSS MEO!ANJCEPlf[RLlJltE 19-W1.USIOII WITlIWllRK ZONE MAlNWW<C£ EOlIIPMENT 9-NONCOlllS\QN-. EQUIPMENT FAILURE 2O-COliISION WItH OTHER MOVABLE OI\J£CT 

10-~COll1SION; OTHER 21-COlUS1ON WITH UNIW'J'WN MOVABLE OBJECT 

11·NONCOLUSlON: UNkNOYm 98..ont£R 

2& OffICER'S PRlNrr~ "!..~.ME DlP!. DATE 
276 


Insert offset folio 235 here 75852.235

Owings Crash 

Truck driver lied at the scene of the crash 

Police officer did not interview the crash survivor or eyewitnesses 

PAR, incorrectly assigned fault to the car driver 

This crash occurred on December 1, 2002, in Rockbridge County, Virginia. Cullum Owings and his 

younger brother Pierce were on their way back to Washington and Lee University after spending 

Thanksgiving at home with their family. They were stopped in traffic when a speeding tractor trailer 

came up behind them moving too fast to stop. Cullum swerved his car into the median to avoid a crash, 

but the truck followed and barreled into the driver's side of the vehicle, pinning their car against an 

embankment in the median. Pierce, survived with minor injuries and Cullum died at the scene. 

Right after the crash, Pierce was too upset to speak with the State Trooper in charge of the scene, and 

therefore, the Trooper only spoke to the truck driver. The truck driver reported that Cullum and Pierce's 

car was in the right lane and, at the very last moment, pulled in front of the truck causing the truck to hit 

their car. The truck driver reported that both vehicles then continued into the median of the highway, 

ending up between the road and the embankment in the median. Although there were many witnesses, 

the Trooper did not record their names nor did he interview any of them. The resulting Police Accident 

Report (PAR) reflected the trucker driver's statement and indicated that the car was in the right lane and 

pulled into the left lane, while the striking truck was going straight, always in the left lane. 

Based on the truck driver's statement, the Trooper in charge at the scene believed that if it had not been 

for Cullum's inattentive decision to pull into the left lane in front of the truck, there would have been no 

injuries that night, let alone a death. The Trooper did recognize that the truck driver was driving too fast 

for the conditions and charged him with reckless driving. In the end, the Trooper took the truck driver's 

word for what happened, and this is the only version of the crash reflected on the PAR. 

Cullum's parents, Steve and Susan Owings hired a private investigator to advertise and find the other 

eyewitnesses, all of whom corroborated Pierce's version of the crash. The boys were always in the left 

lane, and were stopped there, when Cullum glanced in his rearview mirror and realized that the truck 

was bearing down on them fast. Cullum had stopped with enough maneuvering room in front of him 

and when he saw that the truck was not going stop in time, he chose to flee into the median and this is 

where the crash occurred. At the last minute, the truck driver realized that he was not going to be able 

to stop and drove into the median, hitting one car instead of many. 

The PAR only reflected the truck driver's testimony and failed to include eyewitness accounts, the 

surviving crash victim's as well as other eyewitnesses, into consideration. As a result of the investigating 

officer's actions, the PAR was incomplete and incorrect. It was only through a complete investigation, 

which included eyewitness testimony, that the true chain of events was revealed and the truck driver 

was convicted of reckless driving. 
277 


Insert offset folio 236 here 75852.236
278 


Insert offset folio 237 here 75852.237

"."'" ''''' ,on<' OXl.!SOIltIlIlFIJDJdUECl' 

f------------I l:rilJll!Ia 

t~""'" Z-1O.!S.1UtS.1l.II6 

15DfTaJl1..t)JtSllCl.l.DU ."""'- '''''''''''''' 

~(JIIN/CI'I'fO«L[ 

!= ___ OJIO",~17FllSS(H(J)1S 

.~. 

EJ . 

SUmtOtJll'll~TU5lD 

I.IfJ~t~D 

21.N>8[U .-'" 4L.lP!I(lT.lMItWIN[SS 

~O<>\OIrt9"_ 

.~~ 

,,~ 

~------I 

"""""" tlUlCI~mo:JIIJSI' 

5.GUAlDIUIlOlllPllSf 

ct:IIIITPQ<tf!MI!SMCI~ 

,~~ 

'''''''''''''''''' 

, ....... """"" i~(E'fCTS 

~~~JU 
279 


Insert offset folio 238 here 75852.238

White 

Investigating officer did not interview witness. had limited knowledge of FMCSRs. and 

incorrectly assigned fault to Mr. White on the PAR 

On May 11, 2011, Jere Fergurson White was driving on S.R. 6 in Dallas, TX when his pickup truck struck 

the rear of a tractor trailer. Mr. White died as a result of the crash. 

The investigating police officer failed to speak to a key eyewitness and had little knowledge of Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). As a result, the officer failed to look for log book violations 

and treated the crash like a standard motor vehicle crash. Due to the investigating officer's lack of 

knowledge and failure to interview all key witnesses, the police accident report (PAR) indicates that Mr. 

White was in the wrong when his truck struck the rear of the stopped tractor trailer. 

An investigation into the crash discovered, and proved, that the tractor trailer Mr. White rear-ended, 

had been improperly stopped in the lane of traffic, on a 65 mph road, because he had missed his turn. 

The driver claimed that he had his rear flashers engaged but the eye witness said that no flashers were 

on. It was also established that the driver of the stopped tractor-trailer, who worked for a Canadian 

company, was a habitual hours of service (HOS) violator. The Canadian trucking company had given the 

driver four final warnings and, in spite of these, he continued his flagrant HOS violations and continued 

to drive. When the trucking company was confronted with the truck driver's history, they conceded that 

he should have been terminated long before the wreck. If the trucking company had done as they 

should have, this tractor trailer driver would not have been on the road at the time of the accident, and 

this crash could have been prevented. 

As was the case with the officer at the scene of the White crash, the varying level of required knowledge 

of FMCSR regulations from state to state, hinders the investigating officers' ability to fully and properly 

investigate commercial vehicle crashes. PARs, like the PAR for the White crash, reflect inaccuracies 

resulting from the officer's lack of knowledge and experience, and are not suitable to make a 

determination of preventability. 
280 


Insert offset folio 239 here 75852.239

I ""T.'.RO ...... NIJ ..... ,(OO HOTWlUT6!N lMS II'PACIi) 

'-OMMERGIAL VEHICI ES ONLY 

Vaflfr;l'uP*aRl1 10Y"" HazBr00U8Mari8l8? 1 DYes 20No Vl!hIdoop~ :II .Njt .HararduuI~? 1 []y", 

RII_1f? 1 [:lYe .2 DNa RMe8OlIf? 1.~ 2: O~ 

!fY~NIIfnIt"'401(l11Numba1'ft'MI~OI'Brw __ _ 1t'YES.ncu.of4~Hurllberfl'OlllDiant£)nd0l'"a....: __ _ 

f~~~~~~m~ ____ _ 1~~~m~d~ ____ _ 

HiII~_Cargoi.OM-or8N'lt_ItptftIi'.dUna 
281 


Insert offset folio 240 here 75852.240

REMARKS 

(Officer Narrative on seperate Page) 

OFFICER NAME I OFFICER NUMBER __ 

IINDICATE ON THIS DIAGRAM WHAT 

HOTTOSC'-l.E ! 

MTl~:U--J ! l i .. ------ "- ~ ---;;-- i11iiiIL .-;: 

t:::o.._" '-- - • /' /' .... , 

--:;--- ----- - --- -~-

----- , -------- -----:;~ 

~n;11 ,L 

,SI'" , "-L I C,TATION' ·V'~Cl" , 

• Yu o ", 

i Sltellhlnmor --- I ';~!H''!'''''' l T,,!,:',W') I W,,"w I"""'c,", 1 ",",Co" I ~~~~'7,::1 1"':~7~'-:~'1 .~,c,"'" I .,,'0.1. j"oom"E"'l o::,:.~,:",:::' 

11 , 1 1 1 3 1 , 1 3 . NONE 

VEH, --L- VEHe --'- SKID 0 AFTER _0 __ Wldthof Ro<id DISTANCE 

INumoo< 01 "'"",,, I 1 I , BEFORE VEH.1 VEH·l 

Ip"" 01 In,.;,1 C"." I 12 I 6 IMPACT 0 63.9 

IO,m",,, V,,,"" VEH. ;1 VEH. 

i ~"::~~~r NONE 

- JI-' TAKEN: 

'OR I ~~~~i.' I :,:~ EJeCT UlRIC. 

TREAT • 

. 0 ... '" O"""!rim' 0 WHITE. JERE 1 1 1 0 1 1 

I I: I 0 ... ,. O,"od •• "", • 0 0 2 , , LA'" AOO'''' C'TY STATE ~p ""I"" ;""i"" XXJOO( """"X """"" .xxx-< = '",,,,, 

"I M 3 3 3 , 1 3 , , 

.,'"'' 
282 


Insert offset folio 241 here 75852.241

ACCIDENT NARRATIVES FOR CASE#. a 

REMARKS OFFICER NAME OFFICER NUMBER _ 

VEHICLES NUMBER 1, 2, AND 3 WERE TRAVELLING WEST ON S.R. 6. 

VEHICLES NUMBER 1 AND 3 WERE IN THE SAME LANE BEHIND VEHICLE NUMBER 2. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 2 WAS A SLOW MOVING TRACTOR WITH A FLAT BED TRAILER. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 1 ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE LANES AND PASS VEHICLE NUMBER 2. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 1 STRUCK THE REAR OF VEHICLE NUMBER 2'S TRAILER. 

DUE TO THE IMPACT, VEHICLE NUMBER 1 ROTATED INTO THE INSIDE f LEFT LANE. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 3 ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE LANES AND STRUCK VEHICLE NUMBER 1. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 2 DROVE TO THE SIDE OF THE ROAD AND STOPPED. 

GEORGIA STATE PATROL TROOPERSIS ._ •• AND'" ASSISTED AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT. 

DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFiCER .... ASSISTED WITH ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. 
283 


Insert offset folio 242 here 75852.242

FULL PAGE DIAGRAM 

INDICATE ON THIS DIAGRAM WHAT HAPPENED 

NOT TO SCALE 1 

N 

lOOP - MT.OUVET J 

ZZ/1 

VlSTAlAKE DRM I I' 
284 


Insert offset folio 243 here 75852.243

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES ONL't 

'/tII):lIePlaca1l? 1C]YM- 2[jNO ~MIIQIrIM7 .0 .. 

lWlIIIlWd? 1 OVa 2: DNa IW..a:d"l 1 DYes :! Olkl 

"'Yf.S,~oI4DigitJMa_frotII~ ... 8t'1:1C __ _ IYm, NaInIt1f4DigttNulnblrfrMI Dl8IMCD/Jorlka:: __ _ 

1Di~lfuIrIbIrhRIBottomorDillnoncf: __ _ 1 Dlaft: NumbartnJm BDttam of DIamont: __ _ 

_RllnOfJR6I(I_DoWnItlll ... 011 .... 
285 


Insert offset folio 244 here 75852.244

I REMARKS 

I(Officer Narrative on seperate Page) 

OFFICER NAME OFFICER NUMBER" 

ilNDICATE ON THIS DIAGRAM WHAT 

1'''·'''''''''''''·'''''' "lAnD.' .. 2- I """ON'· VEH'CL"_ • y,. o •• 

S!IIINu~r! 

• 

"~,H'~'"' 1 '''!'!'.W., 1 w" .. " 1'""'"0''' I ",",OM, I ~'1,,"'" .IL":~~~::'~"I ,,,,,,m'l ''''"''r,m'''''''1 o.".::;;'~::: 11 , 1 1 1 3 1 , 1 3 NONE 

VEH, -L VEH'_ SKID __ D_ AFTER 0 Width of Road DISTANCE 

. IN,mboroIO",,,,,,, I , I VEH. J VE.H. J 

BEFORE 

• Ipo;o>o"",,,,coo,,,, I " I IMPACT 63,9 --- -_.- - -- 10,m". ~ Vohl"" 3 VEH. VEH, 

I:=~:.~~~' OWO" 

..... '~ TAKEN 

FO' EJECT I:~;,.,:, EXTFUC ::~ NONE TREAT 

10"'''' 3 o,P .... '"~.O -'- -'- -'- O<"P~"""""w" I""" .. 0''' ....... ' UlST N'.E, Fl'" N'.' 'OD'ESS C'TY "'XXX "'XXX xxxx xxx'" I~ 

J. 

.,.",. 
286 


Insert offset folio 245 here 75852.245

ACCIDENT NARRATIVES FOR CASE#" U ta REMARKS OFFICER NAME I OFFICER NUMBER .. 

VEHICLES NUMBER 1, 2, AND 3 WERE TRAVELLING WEST ON S.R. 6. 

VEHICLES NUMBER 1 AND J WERE IN THE SAME LANE BEHIND VEHICLE NUMBER 2. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 2 WAS A SLOW MOVING TRACTOR WITH A FLAT BED TRAILER. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 1 ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE LANES AND PASS VEHICLE NUMBER 2. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 1 STRUCK THE REAR OF VEHICLE NUMBER 2'S TRAILER. 

DUE TO THE IMPACT, VEHICLE NUMBER 1 ROTATED INTO THE INSIDE I LEFT LANE. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 3 ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE LANES AND STRUCK VEHICLE NUMBER 1. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 2 DROVE TO THE SIDE OF THE ROAD AND STOPPED. 

GEORGIA STATE PATROL TROOPERSiSC" •••• AND _ASSISTED AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT. 

DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFiCER ..... ASSISTED WITH ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. 

ACCIDENT NARRATIVES FOR CASE#_._ 

REMARKS OFFICER NAME • • OFFICER NUMBER • 

VEHICLES NUMBER 1, 2, AND 3 WERE TRAVELLING WEST ON S.R. 6. 

VEHICLES NUMBER 1 AND J WERE IN THE SAME LANE BEHIND VEHICLE NUMBER 2. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 2 WAS A SLOW MOVING TRACTOR WITH A FLAT BED TRAILER. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 1 ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE LANES AND PASS VEHICLE NUMBER 2. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 1 STRUCK THE REAR OF VEHICLE NUMBER 2'S TRAILER. 

DUE TO THE IMPACT, VEHICLE NUMBER 1 ROTATED INTO THE INSIDE I LEFT LANE. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 3 ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE LANES AND STRUCK VEHICLE NUMBER 1. 

VEHICLE NUMBER 2 DROVE TO THE SIDE OF THE ROAD AND STOPPED. 

GEORGIA STATE PATROL TROOPERS • AND"ASSISTED AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT. 

DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER 3 .. ASSISTED WITH ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION. 
287 


Insert offset folio 246 here 75852.246

OOT-l230ve,l&y 

ALCOHOlANO IORDRUG TEST GIVEN 

4·Sldeswlpe-Sal'wo;",oliO<'t 

5 ·S,des\l'lp~-Oppns'leD,rectiOiI 

S,NctA.Co;,.,ooW.lhallolo(",Vehicle 

Georgia Uniform Vehicle Accident Report Overlay 

CONTRlBUnltGFAC10RS 

SEA1!HGPOSmON 

POINTS OFINlnAt COIHA(:T 
288 


Insert offset folio 247 here 75852.247

COMMENTS OF LEE BROWN 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION TRUCKING ASSOCIATION & 

WESTERN TRUCKING ALLIANCE 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS AJW TRANSIT 

September 13, 2012 

EV ALUA TING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DOT's 

TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY PROGRAM 

334 NORTH EUCLID AVENUE 

UPLAND, CALIFORNIA. 91786 

(909) 982-9898 

www.CaIConTrk.org 
289 


Insert offset folio 248 here 75852.248

Chainnan Duncan and Ranking member DeFazio and members of the subcommittee, the hearing you are 

holding today concerning "Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program" 

necessitates my submission of comments to the subcommittee on behalf of the California Construction 

Trucking Association (CCTA) and our interstate conference, the Western Trucking Alliance (WT A). 

Since the launch of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrations (FMCSA) Compliance, Safety, 

Accountability (CSA) program, aspects of the initiative certainly have been the source of controversy 

within the trucking industry. While the CCTA and WTA may find some common-ground and agree with 

certain criticism of the program and a need for improvement, overall we believe the safety monitoring 

program has been wrongly characterized as unfair to small-business motor carriers. Our degree of 

confidence in the safety monitoring systems is expressed in our active support oflegislation granting the 

California Highway Patrol (CHP) the authority to emulate the CSA monitoring program on the 60,000 

plus motor carriers registered in California. 

The CCT A is a 50 J (c) (6) trade association founded in 1941 and headquartered in Upland, California. 

CCTA membership consists of over J ,I 00 member motor carriers ranging in size from one-truck 

operations to fleets with over 350 trucks. Approximately 60 percent ofCCTA members are soleproprietors - small one-truck independent owner-operators with their own authority. CCTA members 

operate in various modes of trucking from vocational to property canying in both intrastate and interstate 

commerce. 

Data from FMCSA clearly shows that comparisons of motor carrier performance under CSA to identical 

groupings from the previous SafeStat measurement system have small-business motor carriers performing 

better than their larger motor carrier counterparts. Small-business motor carriers constitute nearly 97 

percent of the regulated community. 

The following charts illustrate the comparative differences in the percentage and numbers of motor 

carrier's identified as deficient in at least one Safety Evaluation Area (SEA) of the old SafeStat system 

versus being in alert status/above the intervention threshold in the Safety Measurement System (SMS) of 

CSA - these results are not surprising to us because they are consistent with how many of our members 

safety profiles are displayed on the SMS. 

Percentage of mDtor Percentage ef mator 

~rriers rl'llhls group cerrfersln thIs group 

Group /I of Pewer Units with 1 er mere SEAs with 1 or more BASIC$ 

~defldent" under the Ilt "alen" slll1us unde, 

SakStat $yuem tile CSMS 

1 O<PU<;::S 7,1% 7.4% 

2 S<PU<=15 22.2% 20.7% 

3 1.5<PU<c:50 29.4'J.i 30.0% 

4 SO<PIj<=SOO 28.7% 39.4% - S 500<PU ! 22.l% 51.4% 

Overall perCf!ntage of 

carriers with d~fic!ent 10.1% 10.3% 

SEA or 8ASIC at "Alert" , 

.tatus 
290 


Insert offset folio 249 here 75852.249

Number of motor Number of motor 

carriers with 1 or more carriers with recent 

Group # of Power Units SEAl; IdentIfied as aC1lvlty that have 1 or 

"deficient" under the more BASICsldentlfh.d 

SafeStat system as being at "alert'" 

status under the CSMS 

1 0<PU<=5 29,488 30,553 

2 5<PU<=1S 12.162 11,338 

3 15<PU<eSO 6,071 6,184 

4 50<PU<;500 2,069 2,840 

5 SOO<PU 139 323 

Overall number of 

motor carriers with 49,929 51,238 

deficient SEA or BASIC 

at H Alert" status 

The CCT A recognizes that CSA employs an actual performance based measurement system primarily 

from roadside inspection and accident reports. Percentile ranlcings within any of the SMS Behavior 

Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs) are necessarily dependent on having a 

statistically relevant number of roadside inspections for each measurement category. 

The absence of percentile ranlcings within any BASIC for most small-business motor carriers does not 

mean FMCSA is not monitoring smaller carriers. It is either reflective of them having clean (no 

violation) inspections or an insufficient number of inspections with violations to statistically assign them 

a percentage ranking. 

We do view CSA as a work in progress. It's not perfect as the debate surrounding the absence of an 

accident accountability/fault system exemplifies. Motor carriers and drivers should not have their safety 

profiles tarnished by accidents for which they clearly bear no responsibility. We do not believe creating' 

mechanism within CSA to remove not-at fault motor carrier or driver crash data is insurmountable. 

California, a state with a population of nearly 38 million people and the 91h largest economy on the planet 

presents a relevant statistical model for FMCSA to consider when moving forward on this needed 

improvement to CSA. California does make fault determinations for injury and fatal crashes. The data il 

posted to the Statewide Integrated Traffic Records System (SWITRS) and can be viewed at: 

http://www.chp.ca.gov/switrs/index.html 

As the chart on the next page shows, trucks are determined to not be at fault in over 80 percent of crashes 

involving fatalities. For combination vehicles involved in injury crashes they are determined to be not at 

fault two thirds of the time and for straight trucks the fault rate is almost 50 percent. 
291 


Insert offset folio 250 here 75852.250

fABLE3A.O/lMRS1NFPirAl.NlDtN:IURY~ANOO!U\IEl!S\\,HO ... .mA;I'AJJLT8Y;ypeCif'vEHIa.E·2010 

ORNER IN FATAL CCWSIa6 DIiUIIER5 IN ltDURY CCUl5JONS 

~At ~At 

TOOl AtF",,1t Fd Tdal f.l Fault F<ru!t 

STA1l1WIDE VBiIa.s: Tm::* ~'e.o< 2,:ns 1,266 &t.7 2MiO:l!S %.£61 47.S 

Passenger """ Mhtrailer s 2 66.7 484 2J4 48.3 

MOtorq-d-.ISC<lOl>!r 3730 244 6$.4 9,818 S,S30 563 

Moped 44 21 61.4 

fli<:bp or p.!f'Je!I buck 606 316 52.1 34Q.1!O 16,333 51.0 

M~ or ""'* bUCkwit.b tr"iJ.I:r 1~ ., 3$..Ii m m %.l 

Truck or truck tTddnr 66- 13 1!l.1 2,Z34 l.,il9O 48.S 

Truck orbut:k trdctvr wi!h tr..;lor 147' 28 19.0 2.861 1.060 37.0 

$cIIoOIbus a 1 us 341 81 2S.s 

00.... bus 27' 6 :22.2 1.328 498 37.5 

.E'rn!!rgmcy ~ 11 :> 27'.1 1,.;6.; sst! 37.& 

>lighwo/Y~~-* 3' is 43.2 

O!her 16 10 625 401 182 45.3 

N:It~" 107 41 3M 3S,U4 17,011 ~.4 

roTA!.. 3,693 1,9)7 52.4 m.998 139,344 48.lj 

CCTA appreciates the recent FMCSA announcement about modifications to the SMS. For example, the 

removal 1-5 mph speeding violations from the SMS methodology will help truckers operating in probable 

cause states where those minor violations were used as a pretext to make a traffic stop in order to conduct 

a roadside inspection. Many of the other changes made by the agency at the request of industry will help 

to focus the program on identifying actual poor safety performance thus improving CSA as a model 

The CCT A is supportive of legislation in California that would allow the CHP to adopt a CSA style 

performance based measurement system to replace the currently mandated Biennial Inspection of 

Terminal (BIT) program. 

The California Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1988, commonly referred to as the Biennial 

Inspection of Terminals (BIT) Program was enacted by the California Legislature in an effort to alleviate 

the growing number of truck related collisions on California's highways. Primarily, the intent is to ensure 

every truck terminal throughout the state is inspected by the CHP on a regular basis, thereby creating a 

level field for all motor carriers statewide. The law requires the CHP to inspect truck terminals every 25 

months and the same requirements apply to all carriers, large and small. 

A BIT inspection is similar to the compliance review (CR) performed by FMCSA and its state partners. 

However, the terminal inspection process treats all motor carners identically regardless of their safety 

performance. It is both time consuming and expensive for CHP to administer and for motor carners who 

must take time away from productive activities. 

In an era where government must become more efficient in how it approaches safety oversight of the 

regulated motor carrier community, CSA represents a true perfonnance based measurement system that 

can render a snapshot of motor carrier safety management practices. Certainly, further improvements 

need to be made and the CCT A is optillllstic that FMCSA will continue working collaboratively with all 

stakeholders towards that goal. 
292 


Insert offset folio 251 here 75852.251

National Association of Small Trucking CI!IJlI)~nies 

Hearing on DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

National Association of Small Trucking Companies (NASTC) is an affiliate member of 

ASECTT and fully subscribes to their comments, documented under "Improvements to 

the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA), Motor Carricr Safety Measurement 

System (SMS) docket #FMCSA 2012-0074" dated July 5, 2012. 

Congressional mandate several years ago requires FMCSA to perform an onsite audit for 

new entrants within 18 months of their authority activation. Since FMCSA can only 

physically perform 11,000-12,000 such audits per year, this mandate cannot possibly be 

accomplished without a tremendous growing of the agency's inspectors and tripling the 

size of their bureaucracy and their budget. Enclosed is a description of an alternative plan 

that could address Congress's wishes without unduly burdening funding requirements or 

demanding substantial increases to FMCSA's bureaucracy, its budget, or its power base 

(See enclosure A). 

CSA's bell curve structure and peer grouping makes the ultimate suggestion that 35 

percent of all carriers need "intervention" all of the time because they are "deficient" in 

one of its BASICS. So, regardless of across-the-board industry improvements, individual 

company improvements, or widespread individual driver improvements on safety and 

compliance, there is never any diminishing workload of companies and drivers in 

FMCSA's intervention pipeline. This results in a self-fulfilled misrepresentation that 

suggests that 35 percent of the industry always falls into the "bad actor" category. This is 

simply untrue. 

Small trucking companies make up almost 95 percent of motor carriers, with fleets of 20 

or fewer vehicles. 

Small motor carriers are the lifeblood of the American economy. These carriers create 

jobs, often in less populous counties and states, which support local economies, support 

families, and support the distribution system of the marketplace. 
293 


Insert offset folio 252 here 75852.252

Small trucking companies play critical roles in the supply chain. They get products to 

market, supply suppliers, keep grocery and retail shelves stocked, and keep hospitals and 

clinics supplied with the essential medical goods they need. 

CSA misrepresents the objectively true safety status of motor carriers. This is due to 

flaws, bias, and gaps in the data CSA uses to assign carriers BASIC scores, as well as 

methodological flaws. 

CSA further jeopardizes objectively safe motor carriers by the fact carriers' BASIC 

scores fluctuate outside the control of carriers, to a certain degree, due to CSA's reliance 

on a relative scale. A relative, as opposed to an absolute, scale grades on a curve motor 

carriers that have enough roadside inspection data to get them a BASIC score. 

Third-party studies, including analysis by Wells Fargo Securities, the University of 

Maryland, and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, document 

that CSA BASI Cs do not predict carriers' risk of a future crash. There is little or no 

correlation between compliance and safety (i.e., crashes, fatalities, and injuries). 

The University of Maryland study criticizes CSA's particular potential for wrongly 

branding small carriers with its misleading ratings. The law of large numbers requires 

sufficient sample sizes, in this case inspection data, in order to rate those carriers 

accurately. Small data sets and small fleet sizes mean a small carrier's violations per 

inspection look much worse proportionately than they would for large-fleet carriers. 

Also, this system has the effect of "profiling" unrated carriers for more inspections. 

CSA scores brand objectively safe motor carriers with ratings that threaten their ability to 

secure business. 

CSA jeopardizes small carrier business and thereby jeopardizes small carrier jobs. Fewer 

trucks, fewer trucking companies, fewer jobs, less capacity all translate into economic 

disruption and economic shrinkage at all levels. This is not something that is already 

happening in large numbers. 

FMCSA claims that CSA has caused truck and bus related fatalities to fall 5 percent in 

20 II. But CSA may have actually made the industry 200 percent less efficient. 

ASECTT chainnan Tom Sanderson has noted that these fatalities dropped 12 percent in 

2009 and 20 percent in 20 I 0, prior to CSA. 

FMCSA should step up and assume its responsibility as the sole determiner of carrier 

safety fitness. To perform that duty, the agency must focus on performing objective 

safety fitness inspections, not pawn off de facto safety fitness determinations on the 

shipping public based on a relative, problem-ridden rating system. 

The agency must stop making CSA scores public. These faulty, misleading ratings have 

nothing to do with "transparency" and everything to do with misrepresentations that have 

direct, hannful effects. 
294 


Insert offset folio 253 here 75852.253

An alternative to CSA, aside from its use internally by the agency, which we would 

support, is to assess a fee that would fund an actual safety fitness inspection (See 

Enclosure A). 

Also included: Enclosure (B), a letter written to our membership on January 31, 2012, 

which includes a "NASTC Composite CSA Scorecard" that shows some real statistical 

data indicating the impact of CSA on our carriers. 
295 


Insert offset folio 254 here 75852.254

Enclosure A (ExceIpt from ASECTT comments) 

"Finally, under the Reg Flex Act, the Agency is required to defend its proposed 

regulations as cost effective. The Agency is required to consider other viable alternatives. 

In charging its handpicked Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committcc with reviewing 

SMS methodology last July, the Agency asked that the committee 'not reinvent the 

wheel,' implying that only cosmetic changes were contemplated. In light of the systemic 

flaws in SMS methodology, its compliance cost and inability to comprehensively 

measure all carriers as required by Congress, ASECTT submits that real alternatives, not 

just cosmetic changes, must be considered in the rulemaking process. 

"Recognizing Congress's directive to the Agency, to for the first time enroll private and 

exempt carriers in a comprehensive system to obtain agents and insurance, ASECTT 

submits that the Agency can expand its new carrier audit procedure to obtain an effective, 

objective evaluation of each carrier on an annual or biannual basis, targeting carriers for 

progressive intervention using objective standards. An outline of this alternative is as 

follows. 

"( I) Require all carriers to annually update the MCS-ISO confirming their 

insurance and agents and assess a $200 to $300 filing fee. Use the fee to fund state 

enforcement officials through the MCSAP program, andlor fund independent 

contractors, to prepare summary audits offering verification to the public that each 

registrant has safety procedures in effect to meet the requirements of compliance on the 

basis of objective criteria, without grading on the curve. 

"(2) Use progressive intervention methods as envisioned by CSA to manage 

and privately reprove carriers found deficient under SMS methodology, as refined and 

improved with public input through rulemaking. 

"With this proposal, the Agency could self-fund a compliance program which would 

assure an objective audit of all active carriers, internalizing an improved version of SMS 

scoring for its own use without ncedlessly disrupting the motor carrier industry or 

creating a constitutional crisis between federal and state law." 
296 


Insert offset folio 255 here 75852.255

Enclosure B 

NASTC Composite CSA Scorecard 

As of December 31, 2011, NASTC had 1,1~ member companies. 

2,673 of these companies are in CSA or 80.8% of our members. So, 635 companies are 

not in CSA for whatever reason and are unrated. 

NASTC companies had a total of 138,347 DRIVER inspections and 8,552 out of service 

citations for a 6.181 % out of service ratio. The national average for driver out of service 

citations is 5.51 %. 

NASTC companies had 71,068 truck inspections with 13,205 being placed out of service 

for a ratio of 18.580%. The national average for truck OOS citation is 20.72%. 

Of the 2,673 companies in CSA, !,S51 were not on alert in any BASICS, or 58%. 1,122 

were on alert for at least one BASIC or, 41.97%. 

There were 447 companies with multiple alerts. The additional 667 alerts bring the total 

for the NASTC group to L1!IJ total alerts. 

[fyou include the 635 nonrated companies in the data, you would have 2,186 companies 

without alerts, and that would skew the data to show that 81.78% of members were not 

on alert, leaving HI,12% ofNASTC members appearing to be very unsafe carriers. 
297 


Insert offset folio 256 here 75852.256

October 1,2012 

The Honorable John J. Duncan, Jr., Chairman 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

U.S. Housc of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Via email to Subcommittee Staff Assistant, Caryn Moore at 

Dear Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member DeFazio: 

I am writing today to strongly urge you to support the continuation of the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) Program's process 

of including all truck crashes in its Crash BASIC database, regardless of fault, as an indicator of 

future crash risk. Multiple scientific studies support this process and the ability of the whole data 

to accurately predict crash risk. [t would be a terrible mistake to engage in a process to determine 

preventability in truck crashes based solely on the police accident report (PAR) and to then, as a 

result of this determination, allow for classification and then removal of certain crash data. 

I am a board certified forensic engineer practicing in southeastern Kentucky. I have worked for 

trucking companies and for the families of truck crash victims, and depending on scientific facts 

and objective evidence, have helped to prove fault for both sides during my career. Due to my 

location, many of the cases that I have investigated involve coal trucks. I have come to see the 

common links between many of these crashes, most of them involving, among other factors, 

overweight trucks with conspicuity issues. Another commonality with these crashes is that the 

car driver is frequently, and incorrectly, assigned fault by the investigating police officer. 

I became a truck safety advocate when my son Guy was killed in a crash with a grossly 

overloaded coal truck. He was only sixteen years old when he encountered a single unit truck 

weighing 134,500 pounds on a long, steep grade, as are common in our region. The truck was 

traveling at least 35 mph below the speed limit, which violated Guy's expectations, and because 

it did not have most of the lights and reflectors required by safety regulations, he did not see it in 

time to be able to avoid running into it. 

This was not the usual case of a driver tailgating another vehicle while that vehicle comes to a 

sudden stop and the victim is not paying attention. The cases about which I write, including my 

own son's crash, occur when trailing vehicles approach from large distances with abundant sight 

distance, yet the truck cannot be detected in time. This is the cornerstone ofthe truck conspicuity 

issue, that slow moving trucks, lacking proper lighting to alert approaching drivers are not 

obvious or conspicuous until it is too late to avoid a crash. In Guy's crash, the truck had an 

extended bed to allow it to haul overweight, and because that bed had absolutely no underride 

protection, Guy was almost decapitated. 
298 


Insert offset folio 257 here 75852.257

The Kentucky Vehicle Enforcement, who are supposed to oversee commercial truck safety 

regulations, were not called out to the crash. The state police, lacking training in commercial 

vehicle investigations and forensic engineering issues, made multiple mistakes. They did not 

weigh the truck because they did not consider weight as a factor. On the PAR, the truck weight is 

listed as 80,000 pounds, the state weight limit, instead of its actual weight of 134,000 pounds. 

The police officers did not take into account the dangerously slow speed as a factor. They 

ignored the conspicuity hazard. Last, there was no penalty for not having the required underride 

protection. The trucker and his company, after creating the factors to greatly increase the 

likelihood of the crash, got off without even a warning. 

The police relied on a foregone conclusion, that when a driver runs into something, it is always 

his fault. This is true when vehicles are traveling at normal speeds and are conspicuous. I have 

disproven the common fallacy of fault using human factors and the laws of physics and had a 

peer reviewed technical paper on the topic published in the Journal ofthe National Academy of 

Forensic Engineers. (Article included in submission) 

I have reconstructed many rear coal truck crashes that occurred the same way. I have never seen 

a case of anyone running into any other kind of vehicle in this manner in my region, not even 

other trucks. This is because most other vehicles, not being overloaded and driving with lights 

and reflectors covered by coal dust, travel at normal speeds and comply with conspicuity laws. 

Yet our police assign fault to the victims, partly because they don't have the proper training with 

regards to this aspect of the PAR or the understanding ofconspicuity and partly because the 

victim is almost always dead and cannot give his or her side ofthe story. 

I have reconstructed other cases in which overloaded coal trucks have crashed because of not 

being able to stop in time traveling downhill or speeding, often both. I have worked on crashes in 

which fatalities occurred because an overloaded truck rolled over in an emergency swerve. I 

have had instances of crashes occurring because the trucker did not swerve because he was afraid 

of rolling over. Yet police often consider these simply unavoidable or as having unforeseeable 

consequences, and then fail to prosecute trucker drivers and truck owners for contributing 

violations such as overweight trucks, speeding, improper maintenance of brakes, inadequate 

steering, and the lack of compliance with other critical mechanical systems. 

These are merely a few examples of reasons why it would be a tragic mistake for the CSA 

Program to allow classification offault based solely on PARs. Few police have the training in 

physics, human factors, and other disciplines required to properly reconstruct crashes. Relying 

on police reports will likely result in a high percentage ofthe crashes being incorrectly attributed 

to the horribly injured or killed passenger vehicle victims. This will not serve to improve the 

Crash BASIC, will likely increase the time it takes to target carriers for intervention and will 

decrease the effectiveness ofthe CSA Program's crash prevention intention. Additionally, the 

process would be completely unfair to truck crash victims and their surviving family and 

unquestionably has legal ramifications that adversely affect their seeking justice for their loved 

ones through the criminal and civil court systems. 
299 


Insert offset folio 258 here 75852.258

Thank you very much for your consideration. I ask that my letter, the attached PAR, and the 

National Academy of Forensic Engineers technical paper The Reconstruction of Eastern 

Kentucky Rear Coal Truck Crashes be submitted into the Subcommittee on Highways and 

Transit's, September 13,2012, hearing "Evaluating the Effectiveness ofOOT's Truck and Bus 

Safety Program," record. I urge you to support the FMCSA's process of including all crashes in 

its Crash BASIC and do all that you can to protect the public from future truck crashes. 

Sincerely, 

Roy Crawford 

Professional Engineer and Fellow ofthe National Academy of Forensic Engineers 

Kentucky and West Virginia Volunteer Coordinator, Truck Safety Coalition 

Administrator, Underride Network 

cc: Members of the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 
300 


Insert offset folio 259 here 75852.259
301 


Insert offset folio 260 here 75852.260
302 


Insert offset folio 261 here 75852.261

NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 5:': 

The Reconstruction of Eastern Kentuckv 

'" 

Rear Coal Truck Crashes 

"'( Roy Crolt'timi, P,E. (NArE 475F) 

Introduction 

This paper propO'iC's a lll.:rhoJ inl ]'nxHhtl'tll'ting :t n:llain type u! ,:,,!lIlH:,tl, 

fnlnt-to·rcar \ehicle t'lash, Eil~k'rrl Kentucky ,illfk unit ,'Pill truck lIfllkrri,k" 

The crashes dis('u!'s,ed arc lh(1sC in whidl a folkm ing \t~hil'ie gains rapidly !r"lll 

<l long inillill di,!allCc tin a leading slowly rnoying H:hidc Ihal is no! \uffici<:rHl; 

(:(ln~picu()us for crash l1voidan(c, Th ... fe-sulh or thc,-c analyse!; provide ilhif:ht 

into lile, details of what occurs 1Il the"..: lype:o. of l:Ia~IK'~, ... how lhal inaucn(inn 

andiof sret~diJlg by Ihe vidims arc Ill)t ncccss:lrily C,III\", or the crashes. and can 

'>llppnr! (lr refule intkpcmicnt human factor:- l'\ itli'th'C. 

I )i~('lIssion 

TIlt ;luthnr has p<.'rfnrnwd reconsfructiolls oi s\:\~'ral F :l~h'rn ""!llth:k> 

l'l'ashcs Ihal tk:currcu hc .. :ausc of slll\\ ~pccd aml insuffki<.'Il! 1I,':U cnn~l'il'ui\: "I 

\ t'hidt's on high-speed highways, lblht!l) ill nij!ht and!\>! ~{lll1elimc" in dilfrcuil 

'dgh! conditions, The 111.lds jnvnh' .. ~d an' tNlaB~ hl;ld; !1i' anolh.:r ,hrk ndor, 

aI',: ;;oakd with mud and dust, and han: only two (.Ii! liHHP;, Ihat ~m.: 'I',Kcd jlN 

dghlcen indlcS apnfL See Figure 1. 11 if; lil\d) Ill .. ! the eI, 1St' spa,'in~ of lhL' \,Iil 

lamp" caw;(~:; some fi)!\owing mo(ori),js to mistake the III for \'chides with lall 

!amJls of noruml spacing hUI three or four limes f:1l1her ;1\\ ay_ When tIK'~,l' hl111P~ 

hl,'d\me ~:o\'ered \\'ilh tht' mud and dll.~t that i" ,'\)Jllnh.m hl din and p-au.~l 

F;!sh:rn K\mlucky coal mine haul roath, I hen .. ' ,'an k \ cry link If 1m)' p!:tdi,',d 

I~:;ll ~onspj\:ui[y. 1'11.:<.(' crushes t~pk<ll!y involve 0\ ~'r1n:ldt~d coal linch.:- 11'/1\ ding up and do\\ n the sleep hills of Ihis r~'gi()n PI' tlw OJlHlIf':, 

/l,iany peoph: cmislon (ht~G Iypl.'" "j n;hht" .. " OV,-'1H! illl:' \1 hc'!j d!' '!'~IIll\c'\,1 

inaHcnllvc driver suddenly secs a trock in hiS or hCf 1':1111, hilS the hr;(hl" 11'1l 

hue, and <.lides inlo and strikes Ihe truck. T!K'), an: u~u<llh ;.urplJ:;.l'd \u iurn 1lui 

while this s.:quencc happens in only a t~·\\, ,eullllb. 11K' ">chide;; llJH,ht'cl ,lit 

initially widely sepM'atL'd and ctwer !>ignilk:lnt di,lancc' bem':t'l! the heg!lHling 

tIl' pt,'n:cptiol1 of the following driver :Jnd ilnpa<.'c 

Analysis 

In thl' author's C'IX"lit:tlcl', itl.!tll'nlill!l is al\\;I)';, li~h:d a, ;\ c,w,at!\(' fador 

in Ihcs(' ~TiI~IK~. and :.peed is ofttn listed ;I', >,\dL lnallcilli(lll i~, ,:\!,~":I<:d 
303 


Insert offset folio 262 here 75852.262
304 


Insert offset folio 263 here 75852.263

NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 57 

hel.'nusc many peoph: eantl\l' ht:!ICh' thai a dti\ er l"(luld fail In S1.:C ~omcthing ;h 

kllg.;· as a Iruck, mi$undcr$t~lflding the diHi.·l\'!lI.'<:: ~1\\N'n seeing ;lnd P<::fCt'\\ inp 

as a h,vard. Speeding J:i li~tl'd when<~H'J there is ~nlll(' ('\idl'Il<.'t: of high '"1)<.;(''' 

with the understanding Ihal high speed n:dUl'C:, aqibhle pcn:cplinn. n:aclipfl. 

,Wtl i\\oidan..:c mancmcring lime$ and di;,[an~'('s, However. lh,,' :Hllhor m'.~u(·', 

that in !he"t~ ,:<1,('$ nei!h~'r (I! Ilwsc {;Kln!' i~ m.',-·c,;~ari!y C:llISatl\(', 

Studies have shown that \d~n !rud.'. trave-! :\t SPCl"!.' \\ ell '.1<.'iO\\ the n,)W 

of Iraflle. <.:rnsh rat{'os risc dramati .. :aHy. lllld unlik(' lllnst Easl~Tn f\.cllIlKkv \.'ua! 

trucks, !he lnl('b shldied !!;It! pwpcr f('ar con:-l'icuity_ S.:e FiglHC 2. The ;Ulli101 

has neve!' hnd a CHse in whkh one whidc dosed rapidly (Ill another from a 

large di~(3nCc and strud: it from hehind wlwn the lead \c'hirk was travchn)! at 

a normal ~pc:ed nor a c,\se in \\ hidl (his ha, h.lppclwd 10 J vehjdl~ erwounh:rinj:: 

another with the prnr~:r kvd of rear rnnspH:uily. lk kn()ws 01 (1\1 '>imibr l.::t. ... l~' 

in his area im'o!ving any tyPt't> of truch 01 her than cnal trucks. 

$.:e Figur~ 3 for an cxamph.· of a rc<."ons!nH:tinn of an Eas1t'rtl K(:nlud:.y 

rear ('oal tnlck crash. In Ihi, ... el of \.:akuialio!1!'. lhe inputs ncn:~~aly from the 

leconslnKtioni~t are Ji:;td undcr th.:: he.tdill,\! A~sumpljons. TI1.::"(' include 'Id 

lidenl of friction. grad(', dosing spl'cd of ih(~ "elueles :11 impad, hmkin!, til'. 

tanet', if ally, leading vchick specd, and r)(~I\;cpti()n and reaction lime.; 01 til.: 

1'ollowll),I1 drivel'. The Yaluc.~ of thc~c inpub ;\fI'; gathered hy ~lant!itnJ ml~lh(llh 

outside the ::'l'OpC of thi~ paper. 

ThL',~C t)PC;; of rccOlJ.~tJUcii,)fl" mu"t b.: caku!alcd in !l~\Cr\C chnmolo!-=i"tI 

order fmlll impa.:1 \0 Ih.' hcginninr Ill' perceptiun, Th<.'rt.' ar~' fom section" 01 

rc~m!ls (In the ~prcadsh('t~1. "I'he fir~t s('dion lks~Til1'l:5 til.;: s(e[writ) ;\! impact. ;\1 

which a time of {ero I1,J:- heen as~igncd in thi:-- ~·'j';C and the l\~ar d the k;!din!! 

H~hi,-'lc <11)(1 the fwnl of the trailing. \ehidc an: a1 tiw ~amt' poin! in SP:h'" 

The;;\: cakulatwll,; can hl: Jll'!l(lnm~d \\ itll il lc.tding \ chick ,I;. ,dcr:l1illt: \11 

JcccicrltiiIlf:, hul the kadillg \chick ;;peed in thl\ examph: 1'-. a.'~lln1Cd In he' 

(.'(lnslanl. throughollt rlw sccnari(\ SI.l II is Ihc,ame a" ori~inalf'y mplH for n!! 

four sedi()n~, 

Follin-dill! vehide Sf)('cd is the ~1ll11 of till' h:;;ding ~ I,;hidc- and do~in!, 

speeos bascd on the simplifying a~sum!,lioll that 1)(':,:a\1~c I" tile o\cnvhdlllill)! 

differenr.;: in m,lsses bel\\ccn th..: \'ehkl<.>~, u:-'lIJHy nhUlil ;j '+0: I ralio. and tlw 

lack of permanent -crush dama}!:t: to the nlal lrud .. , till: fmd; is tn:;\tcJ ~l<; a mOl, 

ing han'it'l, Because nlld: dell3·"'!' arc lhually k"" than OI)C mill.' r~~r J1Pur in 

Ihc<;c: Cf'n<;ilcs, their tlrin'r~ often ~1;Ih: thaI they did nOl led any impa<:! :md \h'j(' 

!lOI ;tV, .tle then: hlld lx'en :( <':1 .hll umil they \\1.'1',' lllltificd by S(l1!l(:,)!K d,,-, \'< h" 

saw !Ill,; \\!I.:t'kcd victim \'dlide t>chind lhe ,:oal truck in\'oh \',1 
305 


Insert offset folio 264 here 75852.264

PAGE 58 JUNE 1999 NAFE 4i5f 

lColiinear, sarne.oirecion, Frollf-iO:Rea;:Cra'&h Scenario Calculatioo$ 1 

1~~~~~t··O_7-f:=~~=~--==~ Grade . 5 ",--,-" •.• , .. ii/pOsitive 1 

lflip~(;tC:!9s.i~~r~ ., 20 I ~::~~~~~~~~~j ········~j;;~r!hour Perceptiontitrlf:l ............ j 1.75.+~!??fI<ll>.L . .l. 

!Reaction time .....•...• 0.15 I~nd$l ...................... . I

Time j.1 .. t...., 

I ........... , ......... " •. 9~~ iBQtbyehi~I~~Ua,9jJlt9f.i.roPil9t .. ".~ 

I.Leading vehicle speed 2S IMllel>pt;ll'houf 

! :f()li~9 veh~ 1 45 jMilet>J?~~~2~r 

[Time . .. ,........... I 

,................. !.. ...... .:.().72 .' !~~inQ!1\J..2f l,UU~"W'''''''''; 

lil.Lead['!~Lyeh~i!i!.~~. 25 

.,FoIIO\OJi.1'l9 vetl~ .. f>~L~tMi{es perl1~ ····f· 21 . !Feet , ... _l)i~!,':l.Il~~LI~a.1!l'l9vehiGIe frolTi.iX)il1! ~ !mpact,, __ .... , __ .. 

t ,Dtstal!Ct:0ffo,fl()wiI'l9I'i!I'\icIt) fr:()l1lpc,;~t()fim~ 50 ; Eefl! .... ~,, ___ .~~pafati()n P~~.Il~t)!!~~. . ........,",,,.,. 23 .. ,feet 

jfime . '.~~~I!-l' ~h!Jj!!!M!!~~ 

I 

I· I . Distance of following vehicl~ from pomt of lmj,)<!cl 

~ ___ i>§>aratioo between vehicleS __ .:____" 

I.. , P:!!!1.!L., .. ~"",, ___ .• 3.22" ..... ,J~tt~!t..lim~t_.....; 

! . . .J,~.§I~ioo. vehicle IM~~~ ,,~.!_hoU!,_,.1~ ... l ~ .rom- ~l~~~'1'!'--:+ 111;''''''- ~ ration between V':h~fr~po\ntof~p~~ ..... I ~~,-,:~:: -

The second results se .. 'tlon yidds !h,~ pnlt!uL'!S ()f cnlculalions of thc !imt~ 

lind di:Ham:c between impact and the beg.inning of hraking by the vklim vchi, 

ck if any, It is no! um:'.)nHl)(Hl for there !.o he no skid marks at niL The poim in 

time. the speed N'lhc follo\vin$ vehide, !lnd the loc.ations of both whidt-s 1H1d 

the separation dis\;mct: between them at the initiation of braking are all (ale-niatl.'d using ;;Iandllrd ctjlJation~. 
306 


Insert offset folio 265 here 75852.265

NAFE 47Sf COAL TRUCK CRASH 

Th~' third le~lllt;,; ;;edi\lll yidds the !,lOduL'h of Glh:uL1!HHl"< "f Ilw lmle ;md 

disLIIKe during phy~kal rca,',!.}!) of ilK' fnllnwing ychide driwl, Th" linw j, 

~'l1lply th{' previous link' pith tIll' ll'<ldi(lfl lin1l' It'.('d hy the 1"'C(\Il,lru(:tioni~! In 

this c:xamplc, the 'IWCU, of hnlh \(hid6 me ;l~,umed tl' h~' unc!1,Ul!:ed h{'!(m: 

alld ulltil iniliation of hrakinj: b) 11", h,U,)wltlg \ chkk dli, ('I. ,,0 lil(':- ,\1\: !he: 

same in Ihi, and Ih<: hilI! til rpsH!t~ St', r.ionsThJ: di,tunn'" "!I\cn~d dUrtn~ thl' 

rime interv:!! :Ir( added 10 till' pre'. IOU'" di~t~UlCl~" from imp;ld, and 11K' Ip,'aiion~ 

of "oth \'chidcs ;lr~' C,\i;:ula!(d l1 ... in,,: ,.l;md:lld llH.:thod" Finalf)_ the' "c'paLnioil 

di,tafll't' is again the dllkl'l:nn' h'/\'l'Vfl ,hv'it' two fi~ure~, 

The jflll!'l/) ;1nd !Ina! rcsuh~ 'I,',l!<ln i~ ~'ah:lllakd in Iht' ,;ml'~ m:H1IlCl ii' Ilk' 

thinl. TOlal lime /" rJ(~n:ep!i()Jl (HIll' adtkd 10 (he pn.'\'il)w, filllt', All di~l;lIll'':' and 

IOl',llioHS Jre again Glk'ulakd by sUln,J,nd !l1<::lhods, 

In thb c.\;unple. Iht~ enlire (ra,h ,equcnn' (let'HlS in k" t1hm ,~-1/2 ','CI'IHh 

At the initiation tIl' hrakinj:, the n:hi,-'ks arc only sqxlrakd h) 23 fccl ,lilt! till' 

ftllinwing \'ehid(~ is slill trawHng al ii" !ull initial ~p(',-'d of :'6 mph 

A key (estill PI' illi, ;Hl:lI~ ,is j, rh\: fina] fl,t:tHt in \cdiuli 10lll, th,-, ,,-,paLl 

linn bdw('<:n veilldes, Silk',', fnr ""ample, reilr Imd,;, lighh ;m,' rcquin:t! ill h: 

\ isihk hH ill lea;,! fhe hU!ldred l(,'et under nIHIl!;d clltHiirlOn", ;md in !'facIlc'" 

i.'an he p('rl'\~iH:d tnlf1,:h fanllc! .JI\<ty than thi" ~u,-h .1 r(~,uh indie:ah:' .. ilh,,! that 

Ihe IflIck.';;. rcar ,:on~pic\lily was grn",ly insurtkienL ;lS is 111,- ,':J"C III I!Hb! If flpi 

all r:.~1';l.t·nl I\cntm:ky .:rash.:s: rhal cn\ irot1l1wn!ai c\>ndiO('n.' 1I1"oe Hin ellll)! 

C\'t'l) ~1! !loml;]l "p.:eds hy the I'ollmdng \chick t!n~;lll' and an lHw:m,dl.\ ·,1.,\,> 

srt'cds by the !mdi: CH'n l1lnrc l!lI~ak: lhat there \\'a~ ,;>lIlt' prtlbkm wilh Ill\' 

foll{m ing \chide thai halllpt'red its dn\tT'S sillhl dL,(;mce: tlu! the ful!'H\ illf 

driwr was extremdy inallenli"c; lhal thc trailing \chide \\as ml\·ding til ;\ \'Cf) 

hif,h speed; or a l'omninarion of Ih.::sc rad{II'S It is typical jnr tilt' s<'paLl!iull di~ 

lane'!.' <It the tx'plIming tlf pcn:epliotl in these cnl,h"" to h.: hd\', ceo )7." alld 250 

left, milch k~s than the legally rcqHir('d 500 fc'el. 

The inatknlilHl i:,~Ul' j, deal; with first St'" Figure 'f, Till' '-e\.:nnd l:\;llllpk 

the", rhe ~anH' a<;~tlmptinn:- a~ rhl.' fir~l example hut with perc'cptlllll 11m,' 

in('n:a;,ed Hl yield an initi"l ~l'p:H,llion h.:l"<.',:n thl: \chid,:,. "I' lhe ;llimtlHllll 

:'ion kt.'1 that w{luld lx' eXf'(~c!('d if Ill(' ,"\l1"pkuily I~''lu.ifn! h~ b'l llmkl 1l0lnl:!! 

"'.l!ldilion:< W;I" heing md, The P('rt','p!ion linK' rc'quired i .. ;lImos! !O ",yotuk 

.m \lme;[~onably long tillll' 10 ,'xped ~\lmll{i!I~' to hI; m;lflt:nll'l' \,hl'll dll\lllJ,: ,\ 

1110101' n:hit'k, Sin,:\, -.il;ht disl:m<:t:,- nn: u,-ual1) mnpk in the,.: era,.hL"" ,hi .. j" 

nlkn (\!l1si(krl'd p.r\)(}f of !'nhS lnallcnlinn, BowneI', the arfll!11l'1l1 can be made 

tll:n :nnpk 'i.e.lll tlbHIHtX I'lI'\ cs the \ll'po~il"; th~ll VI h('!~ ,:HHI\'\ pro!,c'!i, t!llilk 

\'<:hi~'ks aion,; the HKld\\ ay, oft<:n around ":llrH'~, and kj:~p !l1I.'m centLT~'d ill 

their IHnc~ ((If this much lime and d!S\.llh.:e \\l1i);: heinf :>0 inaHcmi'.l' ,b ;'1 lln! 
307 


Insert offset folio 266 here 75852.266

PAGE 60 JUNE lB99 NAFE 475F 

bt' 'lh!e !ll \00 lrUi.:ks I.'H'Jl in their peripheral \i,illfi until it i, (no ial~> \0 ;1\oid ;1 

\..Ta>h. In other words. lha! <lmptc sight Ji5\,mc..: ,,"xi,!:o. ill lhe:;(~ <:ra.'\hcs i~ HO! 

proof of imltlentinn by the \ k'\im hut of insuffki\ml rear <..'on5pi\,.'uity and tiw 

danger \)r \'injHlit)~ the exped,llion:'> of driven; hy vehkks travellnt'- lllth:h 

~lo\,icr than 111.::0 now 1)1' lLiflic. EV(:n in c,\''ies where there me twO dimhing 

lanes, fill!: PI()\ iding a \\~ly to P"'i:i the 5lownlm'tllg trud" ,ktim \t.':hidc., have 

l('mai!lt~lt in the I'igh!mOsl !ant', indil:tlling they did ovl 1"'ITciVt~ lhl' tnlck in 

\lin\), This c,\lllnphc :;how;, Iha! gn.l~~ inaH~>nti(!Il is not only flol nc,::ci.!'>ary hut 

;\\';u vcry untlkdy to be i\ ,:aos,l1i ve faciO!' in this type ()f (~filsh, 

~~::~~'~F~~':~~~~~~~in. 

I ' f' <::~ffk;ient of fdctlon ". 0.1 ,Dimensionless ! 

[Grade 5 lperceni.~E~j!lpositjve 

I

i Impact ~ioSin9 speed 20 ;Miles per hour 

Braking (i1l>!?!1ce 50 '. TFeeti L~<ldio9 V~hjCle speed 25 :~~i~ perh\)ur '. 

Perception time 9.68 i SecondS 1< QnIY.(:Il3:n(J9 

React~O!1'tjrne 0.75 :Seconds 

;."" .. ' 

\ 

Time; ,..0.,90.. Both v~~!~lti?~t *,Qint 9fim~t 

Leading vehicle speed . 25 Mllesperh{)Uf 

: following vehicle speed ,45, . Miles per h()llf 

i ! TIm~", ......... .oj? ~"t!,nmiQt~kin~iQff91iQwit1i,~!,~, ' Ltladmgx~I1~!~~pt.'>€d . 2~,~.d~S pefh9~L.. ..! ! 

FollOWing lIell!CIe speed 56 :Mlles pet houri.. I {)i~ta~~,~!JI'l,!~i!1~Ly~t~(;J~!f?!:r:p(.\int of j!.l~P<lg!,~ .. _"L:£! IF~et. 

,.. ..DistallC)i'i!()f!()llowin9Yt!~i~r~f!pr1:point(JtIIT1Pa.~t, ... , ........ L .. _~~".;.ft}et 

.• ,"".Sepa.rati0.r!.~~~een ve!!L~~" ........ ~ ."~~. iFeet 
308 


Insert offset folio 267 here 75852.267

NAFE ·i75F COAL IHUCK CRASH PAGE 61 

Ii j .. fhe ;mlhol" S i;xpl.'ctati(\o that in nltlsl if nul :dl Il! th,"" i.:UW' gl:uc frum 

OIh:oming H'hidc:-. i~ \cry Iil-d} il rflll!rihuling faclPI, allllUtlt:b tmfOl'llm;uc!y 

r,lrdy I'f(lval">le. The dfh~r who C,Hh(;d the ghll\' will mdin;ml~ lWH'f kll\lw lhal 

hi~ !If lwr pi\ssin~~ hy \\'a" n factor. lhe InKk driH'r may 1),,1 1\'Il\,'l1lha or wish 

to (h:kl1(lWkdgl~ the olll.:oming ~dlick, and tilt; \ ldimh \ ;If,: u'lwll:. I.ilkd Of 

have hrain (\;Hl1;l,f!{; that t';1tJ~~·s 11)('11\ In be Wl1thk 10 r,,'mellitK'! .Ii,: (ra,11 or Ihe 

,~H'nls kading Ill' to if. An IllKtllning n:hidt "l>ldd ah" ' .. It!.'l' the !oH\,\\lo;.: 

dri\tr in thl.'st situ.lti,lHS In dim hi, 1>' hel h,·adli!-,hl~. f1oil~ !edu~in:: Ihl' di~, 

HilKe at \\ llich Iho,;(' headlights .. :an IHuminak ;1110111<'1 \,'hidt'. 

II i" itlso tI.~.I~onahk to ~'\rcct !11,11 in :;I'llll' .. ,N''> ihe \ i"tim ,jri\~'r !lIph 

;lway from tIll: Illghway tor at lea,,! a brit.~l amollnt (\j 11T1l\: illq bdol\' "1 upon 

~ntcring II point in lime <lnll ~pacc in regard tll the pen:cplill!l, fcacti'Hl. :md 

braking and/or slcering time _~nd distance llC(.tss;wy In Hyoid a ,'r:l,h and. b;. the 

rinK' he or she lt~\ks b;lck, it is too btc to dtl ';0,1'111'. doc, nOl !il,-C!:,,~ari!y 1Ill".W 

that the {hinT \\;1" l1qdi,!!cl1lly iualh:nthc, Ill' Of ~hc ma~ 1l1"rd) he' ,h.il!!2 \\H~' 

{llibe mnny minor tilsh lhal all dri\'l'r~ perform ,{lc/} ;lS dl:mrll1g ;} r;ulin stiltiOIl, talking will! 11 pns"ellgl~r. loob!1f in a minor. h:adln)C . .1 bdfho;!l,L 'tl !i,tht 

1rl!! .1 \'if:an:Hi:, 

iii)!' e,ampk . .::onsidcl a ,'(l;!1 twd that is p(':l(t'i\ ~Ihk .If "lli,~ .;00 fed, ;\ 

following drivcl' fIlay lake his or h~'r ey~~\ off the' 111&1)\\;J\, lor 1\\1' ~,'cond, 

beginning at a s('paralion dislan('l:' of 400 feCI. and look h;l<k 10,) blc 1(\ a\"ltl a 

cnl,h If 111(' driycr b nb\c \0 perceive a properly c' .. ,n"pict:uIllb \ .::hick al the 'iOn 

fCd or more that b ft:quircd by law anti tnnding at a Ihlnnai spl;t:d. he or Sbl~ 

wi!! have enough nOlict' to eilht'f comrkte tb\.' la-d, qukkly l'flHUgh lflill ,\ prob· 

km i~ <\\nidcd or wail llntil the situmi(lfl i!. tkal! v\ ilh bc(\l(( pcrf">lIlling it. Thc 

drivers who bC1.:ollw vil:liml> \1f UTl{il:rrilie -:rashe:> llIay in fll;tny ... ·a .. '·' ht, the 

()ne~ who h;lVI~ the mi1>lor!uflc to initiate ont' 01 tl1t'Si' l,t~ks illSl helon: (11 upon 

t'!llt:ring t!w miHllllUm di,wncc n.:quin:d \(I ,\void "tk'h ;\ "l:hh, If l'b!\' rllllll an 

onn'!!ling \Thick· ()cnu' .. at til.: "am,' tlU1l' and;of ih .. ~!\' ;Ire' c'fl\ ir< 'nm"!'I'!! proh, 

km" wi1h l>igh! 'llL'h ~l" log. rain, ('t' snow, lhe tlanyer 01 .he ,inLlliull ll~(\ dl ;1-

lH;ttl~,;tl!y, 

SCL~ FigurL' ,;, To n.n"i,it'r the p,,'.slhilHy llf hi~~h ~p~~l'd hIll.:: JHlltm in~: 

v.:-hick' N"ing ;1 wntrihlJ(!I1!! tw:tm. th~: third cxitmpk agam ,lhl\\'~ 1lI()~1 of th': 

original fadors hut with ;J hraking disl;Uh.\,' Ill,1t yidd:-. ;\ \,'1': h1Sh illll!;!! 1',,1-

lowing \Thiele speed and a fcadinp \chiL'k !hat 10' 1)('I\,\:i \ ~(l1!e fill' the I L''lllinxi 

500 fecL Closing specd !~ ~et 10/':10 It) n::fH'I." ..... '1l1 llle Ij)H\l\\jn;c \dllc'k l'oming 

;J$ do;.c ,i$ p()~;,ihl(' to tIll' Icatlill& vehide \\l!holl! :-.trikmg ll, lh,:,',e GI1C!.lhtH'!], 

~h()w thaI in rhi;, c\ampk :'iO{l kc! is ;J "uffl,'i,'111 sil:h~ di,1:;!k'\,' In al1,,\\ c\<.:r, 

m\)~l "[,(,l"ding 1i,lIowin!, dli\(~IS 10 jWI"L'ci\c Ill<: dan~':L le,h I h) bt<lkin,:.: III 

Sh:;eling, and n'dJld ... 'ra~hts with ample time. In !hi; C;lS<: any \pecd k" lh;m Ql) 
309 


Insert offset folio 268 here 75852.268

PAGE 62 JUNE 1999 NAFE 475F 

CoTiine~r! same-olrection:t:rorit10:=Rear C~Sh Scenario Cr'Cu,ations 

,Assumptions: 'Speeding quostion . 

: Coeffioen! of fflction 0.7, DllnenSloniess 

Grade 5 ,PsrcCrlt.!::'phill pOsitive 

irnpactciosII19 speeder :Mi!eS~f hOUf 

Braking d!stanc~, 4(}6 I Feet I 

,l~ .. <:li~9vehjcle~,;3ed 2S ,.l~!!~~ hOl!.f 

,1=,'~rc~f:tie01Irn~ inf ;Seconds 

Reaction time O:75]~~~~~". 

Iri~~_:' .. J~~q~_Bsi~x,fitc.!~~;&fut 0HQlRiCl .,.,~t:adlng v~bicl;3.$pe~d .... ",-L,~,~, .. ,,~~~~P~!,.h0u( . . follo".:irl9\{e~jcl~.~e~~. I. 25.!~jle~per~:2~ __ , 

i········· i< Changed 

1< Changed , 

"".,. , .... __ 1 .... _' __ . . __ . • ''' __ , 

f Iirn,!." -:-4~80 ,. j eCgiQQ!j9 of .1Sl~pJt<.?UgwID9"'t.lh~l!l 

i ,.Je'!ding V~~i~~~~'_'_r~S.IMi!~~~~~i?Ur __ "...J...." 

I:~j~i~~c;oft.:~rn;~~cf~ fr::.~~{':~~~r, ..... "'11!§ F~el I ,QistallCl: of foll~ir19~~h,icte fr?mpc>lnt?fil1l~.,,_.~~ :~::; 

I 

.. ~ Separation be!weenv~«:~., __ . __ ., 230 

,rime I···· -5.55 ·-nt~~ofrell,ti9nijmtt··~" 

1-·~11.eadin9 v~hide $~"'~ 25 '"I~ilespei'~~i , ;FoUow!Og vehicle speed 99 iMllesperhour 

Dls!ance of leadln9 vehicle from point of Impact 

Distance of following vehicle from Fint of Impact 

Separation between vehlcles '~""" ; ... -. , -7.30 ~.. • 

;teading ~ehldesp~~o.' 

ifo!!o""L~~hicie spee(j .:~!.~s peflll;>llf 

Distance of leading vehicle. from point of impact 

.. Jl:}j~,!~nce of following vehicle from rin"t of impact : 

i_~, ;Separa~~n between vehicles i ,,~__ "j 

Figun- 5 

204 1Feet 

515 I Faet 

311' :fe£:!t 

268 ;Fee! .. i 

?68'~lFee! I 

500 iFeet. ... ~.J 

mph would alln\\ Ihe j'lllO\, illg \ elli.:!\: h) ';O!llL' 10 a q"P without qriking til.: 

kat! H:hi<:k. Til.:.,,,, la;..t two examplt:s poin! up Ilw criti;:al nC'(~d tnr proper rear 

nHl~pklIllY. espt·.;!;!lIy \\11\:11 a whkk i" tra\eling bdow lhe "peed of Ihe !lnw 

Ilflmlri.:, 

TIlt' linderridt' Protection hsue 

The.: r<:'~lIh:. of lh<:~c .;ra"j;c'> :m: often made tnu.:h \\01':,<:; w!wn thc k;ld 

\l'hkk is a ,ill€t''',llli! truck with a dump body ,k~ignt:d ">I(h a large re.ll' overhang anti either IHJ Of HI~uffjcicnt Icar lwucn idc prot~:,:tion, Sec Fii~llrc (;. 
310 


Insert offset folio 269 here 75852.269

NAFE 475f COAL mUCK CRASH P,4GE 63 

fh~l:au"t' none (,f I.hc llCCltpant prott'ction Sy:-.k'lll" of ;J \ ,'hid~" "Hcll ,IS ;ur 

bags, -.(:;11 hdls. collapsing sh't'ring (:o!umns, ;lnd ,:rumpit' '!llit" ;l!,~ abk In 

pcrform as inlt'mk'd when Ihl' hlp of n n~hiL'lt' i, ,he,ll,:.! {lfi hd('ll.' th~ !toni of 

Ihc \ chii.:!c sirike:-- anything solid, r(Ont~\:at \ i,-'liHl~ \. har.tdcriQj1.'"lly ',tlfft'l 

l1lassh't' lW:HI ;lnd ':'h",,' inllima, IIsually death, and often dcc;!pilatiPrI. Inimic, 

arc hnrnlk wlwn Ihere arc no underrill.:: )!.uurds hec;tu:;.c tlie: heath "I' \ ic!im,- ,ue 

directly t-Irucl by the Ullpnltect('d \,IHhoanh of 1.!'lIl'k", "\Jmc!hin~' lhal would not 

happen if o\,'cllpant spm:e imfu,ion ,nT,' rr('\'l'1l1t'd h: ".f<' ):u:u.klhis I'; how 

th, aL'tn.:'S .byn(' Munslidd W;b kilkd in 1967, 

To he ahlc to haul 40 ton~ or !lion: ()n~r the ,:,are jilllii. Fa"lL'ITl !\.':'1l!1I1.'''-} 

singk.uni! L'oUlllUl'h l),ph:,Jlly h:nc rear O'>l.'rhan!,!" that .;rclIlc Undt'ITidL: /(lne, 

of six fcc! Of more about four Ji.:d ahn\c llw grfHHld wlwD lht' H'lh:k l\ unioil":cd. 

Til:: OH'! welghl, conspi,'uity, and nmkrri,k prok'c'lion !l'P:Ui<ltHHh lh::l! \\'I'tdd 

prCH)l1t [h.;:~c aa~hcs .HI: no! t:nforn:d. and a~ ;1 rl'~l!lt. 1111.'1',,' haH' hecn \"ell 

OVCI h\'(~nty such crasht<; in Eastern Kentucky causing O\~'.r a d(J/Cll death." 
311 


Insert offset folio 270 here 75852.270

PAGE 64 ,JUNE 1999 NAFE 47SF 

Thl.' argument i\ orren m,j,k that dosing ~pcc(b HI impad Wl'rC so high that 

,he \ il:1i1l!(::O I would han: b<:t.:11 killed by $lH.JJcn ,h;,,:.:.>it:lillinrl aiunc cn.:n h;IJ 

undL'ITitk gUalih hn:n in pbrc, This opinioll plesume" undt'rrid., pUl\h Ihal ;11',' 

rigii.l and haH~ IIbUrrkknl cncrt~ ab~()lbing ahilities, ThClI ;! \ldun wOHld han: 

bc ... :n kilkd by ucH,j-\ upon ~\('ibng all umfcrride gu;:trd i::, ;1 pwhability in MlIlH: 

ChC$, csp~daUy if the gU:tltl "cre nut suffl'.:iently ¢ner~~y :!ilsorbill¥ and/or 

\\ 11,:11 restramts \,ere not lh(:d, Bowen:!'. this has b~'en daillled c\ en , .. hell 

IroOlal nlJ~h thuJI:Il!c It1 thl~ \'j,tim \<~hich: indicated an ea~ily )urvivahh: ddta, 

\ anti Dne of the two fronr.'<"ll , .... :~'Hpafl!:- SU('\'iH'd the nash, 

Whl'n it i~ !lot pns~ihk It) make a suffiCiently ;).;:qlrale c~!lIna!ion 01 dos, 

log :,pc.:J in a Las(; in whkh al k;!sl one fir the \h.'(,ltPatH~ ~un ivcd til;.; (rash, the 

highest ddla·\ the tXl'Upanthj ,'nuld he ""1)<,('1<,<1 In sun'i\'(: may he u'>cd hi cal 

('ula!c a Wllr~t·LaSt: ~Lcll:lrio, 

Aftcr I>OHW pUblic: aH,:niwn was given 10 the unucniLic guard prohlem alk!' 

a (r;l~h in eady 1994, nearly all ::.ingkuni! c(laltruck:; in Easkrn KCnlllCk), h;1I1 

ilnderrid{' twanh imaalkd, HnWt'\,(,L !HI)sl or lht:' 1.10';$ P!I::'{'lllly being used an: 

"\) l1imsily lk:-igw:d ilnd ~'Il!JSlruded tha! tllq l'oll;lpse with n:hi!i\ely liuk 

(:f!i.xl IlIX'll impact. ('1';1,,11 t.:sh huyt;' ~hm\ n thaI mlni010111), ,'ompliam guards 

~annot PWII.'(t most viL:ti!!I'., espe-:!ally Whl'H Ill;: \'it:lim~ an: ill !hl.' !lCW,'L 

~!1!<tlkr vehi<:ks with "l')rin~ hoods, 

$afe undenidc ,?uald~ :-.houkl hi: fhll width, tnNHlIcd !1u"h V,'ilh Iht.' rcar of 

l!lt' 'ehide. c::nnstfU(,ICd a..; Illl'. Itllhe fround as po~siblc. and he ellergy-ah~nlh' 

ing, C;u;ud!> [h~lI arc !e,,~ lil,m full wiJth and not mounted nu~h "illl llw r'l'.tI 

annw fX~()pk 10 ht: hilkd \\ hell 10(' drin'r of lhe loll(\wlll~~ \ <.'hick ',WNV::,S <II tIll' 

laSl lHVlllt~nt. a ':OnlrllOll lllaneUver. cau,ing part or his (11 11\:\ vd\!dc In 1';.(:>::' 

under ;1(1 unprOlt'c;cd I~ar C\H·nl.~r flf thl' InK"-, 

Cntkrridc guard:. :.hollld be able to :>lop all ,1utomobik with a dnsing ::-.pt.'cd 

of at !cast 40 mph, over ~b lOll!! a time intcn al as possible, and withotll :lny intrusion into the occupant .:omparlm.:tlL As uf the beginning of ! 99g, improved 

ulldcffiJe Pfl.1lc<.:lion is reqlljr~d on newly built trailers, hUl c:\i!iting tmikr'> :15 

well as all ~)ngk-\lnil InI<.'b at'(~ unfortullately exempt thlll) thcs(' regut:1lion;., 
312 


Insert offset folio 271 here 75852.271

NAFE 475F COAt TRIJCK CR.AS~ 

C(mdusions 

'[lIe e\iticlllX' ifl Ihis 1"',IIx:r d,>hunJ.;s somt' 1'1' 

\ chide .:r;!shc;;., Ihal. 11111IlCllIiOIl imd 

U;]IQ('tll>l's .. II <llso "tit»\'s thai e\,~n if ~tldll:rasht~~ 

and dCltllls .,;'nuld ht' 

,HId ·m,uwtil,:!llfcd nnd\~t1'kk 
313 


Insert offset folio 272 here 75852.272

Testimony of the Snack Food Association 

before 

the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure 

on 

"Evaluating the Effectiveness of DOT's Truck and Bus Safety Program" 

September 13,2012 

The Snack Food Association (SFA) is the international trade association of the snack food 

industry representing snack manufacturers and suppliers, representing over 400 companies 

worldwide. SFA members' core business is manufacturing and distributing convenience foods to 

thousands of retail outlets such as groccry and convenience stores. In support of this activity, 

SF A member-companies collectively engage tens of thousands of professional drivers and 

operate commercial vehicles in a wide range of fleet operations. These may include in-house 

"private" fleets and/or third-party providers. 

SFA generally supports the goals and objectives of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration's Compliance, Safety Accountability program. We believe the objectives ofCSA 

and its Safety Management System (SMS) methodology represent a significant improvement 

ovcr the prior SafeStat system in its potential to more effectively identify carriers for 

cnforcement intervention. A central purposc of CSA is to make better use of the Agcncy's 

resources by focusing attention on those components of a carrier's compliance and safety record 

that have the strongest correlation with crashes. SMS quantifics compliance performance by 

percentile in each of seven categories known as "Behavioral Analysis and Safety Improvement 

Categorics" or "BASICs." If the methodology works correctly, the FMCSA will be better able to 

identify those carriers posing the greatest safcty risk. Ifit doesn't, this raises serious questions 

about the program's fundamental soundness. SFA is concerned that gaps in FMCSA's 

implementation and methodology may undermine program objcctives. 

As noted above, a central purpose of CSA is to make bettcr use of enforcement resources by 

focusing attention on those components of a carrier's compliance and safety experience that most 

closely relate to actual crashes. However, as the American Trucking Associations (A TA) has 

pointed out, this is not thc case for all seven of the SMS BASICS categories. For example, "thcre 

appears to be no difference in crash rates for carriers with scores excecding the (enforcement) 

intervention threshold in the Driver Fitness BASIC compared to carriers whose scores do not" 

according to A TA Vice President for Safety Policy, Rob Abbott. 1 In a study commissioned by 

1 Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) - Let's Not Make It An Ashtray, Rob Abbott, June 2012 

1 
314 


Insert offset folio 273 here 75852.273

FMC SA itself, the University of Michigan's Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) found 

that the Driver Fitness and Cargo-Related BASIC appear to have no relationship to crash risk. In 

fact the data actually show an inverse relationship between Driver Fitness scores and crash rates. 

The UMTRI study also questioned CSA's method for assigning severity to various violations, 

describing some of the weightings as "arbitrary". 2 A study commissioned by the Alliance for 

Safe, Efficient, and Competitive Truck Transportation (ASECTT), a group representing small 

motor carriers and freight brokers, found that with respect to individual carriers, percentile 

rankings both above and below the agency's monitoring thresholds "are not valid predictors of 

crash frequency." 3 A study by Wells Fargo of the 200 largest motor carriers for which sufficient 

data is available found "very little relationship (i.e., not statistically significant) between Unsafe 

Driver or Fatigued Driver scores and actual accidents per power unit." 4 

The validity and credibility of the BASICs are central to the success of the CSA program. If they 

need to be revised to establish a firm correlation with actual crash risk, this should be 

accomplished as quickly as possible. FMCSA should fully evaluate thc outside studies noted 

above as a first step to making necessary changes. 

Other concerns involve significant underreporting of crashes by some states and enforcement 

disparities among the states. The UMTRI researchers found that several states report fewer than 

50% of commercial motor vehicle crashcs to the FMCSA database. Significant ditferences in 

state inspections and enforcement are well known. FMCSA has worked to encourage improved 

state reporting of commercial vehicle crashes and more uniform enforcement. It is to be 

commended for this effort. However, considerable work remains to be done and SFA urges the 

Subcommittee to consider additional measures that may be necessary to ensure full state 

compliance. 

Finally, the data FMC SA use do not distinguish between preventable and non-preventable 

crashes. SFA member companies' fleet operations disproportionally involve smaller vehicles 

(under 26,000 Ibs.) engaged in urban distribution and delivery to grocery and convenience stores, 

often in areas with heavy traffic. As such they have greater exposure than do other types of 

trucking operations to crashes resulting through no fault of their own. While these crashes tend to 

be less severe than those experienced by heavy-duty over-the-road truckers, they nonetheless 

count against a company's safety record if they mcct the threshold for a DOT-reportable crash. 

The current FMCSA's safety rating methodology acknowledges this distinction in part by setting 

a higher threshold for acceptable crash rates for carriers operating within a 100-mile radius. 

Incorporating "accountability" into the SMS scoring process would take this a step further and 

represent a more effective means of ascribing risk. 

, Evaluation of the (SA 2010 Operational Model Test, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, 

August, 2011 

3 SMS BASICS Scores Are Not Valid Predictors of Crash Frequency, Inam Iyoob, June 2012 

, CSA: Another Look With Similar Conclusions, Wells Fargo, July, 2012 

2 
315 

Æ 


Insert offset folio 274 here 75852.274

Our understanding is that FMCSA has developed a means of evaluating accountability and 

intended to include it in the SMS methodology, but has now changed course for reasons 

unexplained. The Agency now says it wants to conduct additional study of the issue. SFA 

believes accountability is central to the credibility of CSA and should be incorporated into the 

SMS methodology as soon as possible. If it is not, it is critical that distinctions in fleet exposure, 

such as described above, must be fully accounted for and appropriately weighted in the ranking 

methodology. Crash severity should also be appropriately weighted. 

In August, FMCSA announced several programmatic changes designed to improve CSA. While 

these represent modest improvements to the system it is disappointing that they do not address 

the fundamental issues raised above. 

In summary, while SF A supports the objectives of CSA, the program may require revisions to 

ensure its usefi.Jlness and crcdibility as an enforcement tool and its unbiased application across 

the regulated community. Issues that must be addressed include the validity of BASICs as crash 

predictors; state under-reporting of crashes and discrepancies in state enforcement; incorporation 

of "preventability"; and appropriate weighting with respect to fleet operation and crash severity. 

SF A appreciates this opportunity to submit testimony and requests that it be included in the 

hearing record.