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i 

62–163 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–177] 

THE FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL’S ASSESSMENT OF 

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 29, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

LEONARD BOSWELL, Iowa 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 29, 2010, The Final Report of The Independent Panel’s Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review ................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 29, 2010 .......................................................................................... 35 

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 2010 

THE FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL’S ASSESSMENT 

OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Hadley, Hon. Stephen J., Co-Chairman, Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, United States Institute for Peace ............................................. 5 

Perry, Hon. William J., Co-Chairman, Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, United States Institute for Peace ............................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 42 

Perry, Hon. William J., joint with Hon. Stephen J. Hadley ......................... 45 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

THE FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL’S 

ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 29, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome to the Armed Services Committee. 

Today we meet to receive testimony from the co-chairmen of the 

Independent Panel reviewing the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. Joining us today are the Honorable William J. Perry 

and the Honorable Stephen J. Hadley. We certainly welcome you 

and thank you for another one of your great contributions to our 

country. We appreciate it. 

Today we receive the final report from the panel as required by 

last year’s defense bill. This is the fourth QDR oversight-related 

event this committee has held, and I think that reflects how important we consider the QDR to be. 

I would like to tell you right at the outset how impressed I am 

with this report. It will take several close readings to fully digest 

it, but I have to tell you, it has clearly met Congress’ intent. And 

furthermore this bipartisan panel of experts has unanimously endorsed the entire report and that, of course, is a testimony to the 

co-chairs’ wisdom and leadership. 

As I mentioned at our last hearing, the report of the QDR is an 

important input into how Congress conducts its oversight. Conducting that review is an enormous task, and I will take a moment 

to once again commend the secretary, Secretary Gates on his leadership. He, rightly in my opinion, focused his effort on winning the 

wars we are in today. 

But we cannot do that at the expense of preparing for the future, 

and there I am concerned that the QDR came up a bit short. I see 

that the independent panel has come to about the same conclusion. 

I hope to use our time today to explore those findings and hear 

your recommendations so that Congress can get on with our critical 

task of providing appropriate resources on national security. 

I see, for example, that you recommend an increase in our force 

structure in the Asia-Pacific area, and specifically highlight the 

need for a larger Navy. Of course, I have been making the very 

same point for years. 
2 

On the other hand, I was very surprised to see the report indicate that you thought the current end-strength of our active duty 

ground forces, Army and Marines, is sufficient. I respect your opinion, but I find that difficult to understand. 

Watching the toll these wars have placed on our forces, I have 

been an advocate for increasing force strength for quite a while 

now, actually beginning back in 1995. I would caution against 

being too optimistic about the demand for these forces in the future 

and would like to hear the reasoning behind your panel’s position. 

I know we will get into specifics of that recommendation and 

many others, but first I would like to say that as a longtime supporter of the professional military education [PME] system and the 

Goldwater-Nichols personnel reforms in the Department of Defense 

[DOD], I was encouraged to see how thoroughly the review panel 

treated those topics. 

You make a lot of very interesting recommendations. Establishing an interagency assignment exchange program, incentives to 

encourage civilian national security professionals to participate in 

such a program, and the creation of a consortium of schools and 

universities to develop and teach a common national security education curriculum. 

I believe such steps are the only way to create effective, longlasting cultural change in our stovepiped national security system. 

We must focus on people. 

The review panel has charged Congress to act on these important 

recommendations. I encourage my colleagues to strongly consider 

their recommendations. As the panel’s report says, our national security system was designed for a world that has long since disappeared. 

We must find a new approach to meet the dynamic and quite 

complex threats of today. These interagency national security personnel reforms recommended by the panel are, frankly, a good 

place to start. 

Now, let me turn to my ranking member and a good friend, the 

gentleman from California, Mr. McKeon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome 

back to our witnesses, our co-chairs Secretary Perry, Ambassador 

Hadley, thank you for being here this morning. I really want to 

commend you for agreeing to serve as panel co-chairs and congratulate you on delivering a nonpartisan consensus report. 

You know, in this time of so much partisanship you are really 

to be commended, you and the members of your panel for how you 

have pulled together and when I say not bipartisan, nonpartisan 

report I think you have done an outstanding job. 

Let me also take a moment to thank the other panel members, 

those who are here and those who are not able to be here. I would 

particularly like to thank my appointees to the panel, Ambassador 
3 

Edelman and Senator Talent for their hard work and dedication to 

the panel. 

Let me start by praising this report. It is a substantive, provocative, and responsible product. I anticipate the panel’s findings and 

recommendations will be studied on both sides of the river and will 

impact the work of this committee. 

Most importantly this report provides to Congress what the 2010 

QDR failed to do. It took a look at the challenges our military will 

face beyond the next five years and made recommendations free of 

budgetary constraints about the type of force and capabilities our 

military will need for tomorrow. 

The report rightly states that our Nation cannot afford business 

as usual, and warns of a potential train wreck coming in the areas 

of personnel, acquisition, and force structure. 

Significantly, the report offers a realistic view of the global security environment: that maintaining and growing our alliances will 

place an increased demand on American hard power and require 

an increase in our military’s force structure. 

The release of your panel report cannot come at a better time. 

Despite the many challenges our military faces, Washington is 

abuzz with talk of cutting the Defense budget to solve the enormous federal debt. 

Just last week, the New York Times ran a front page story saying that, ‘‘The Pentagon is facing intensifying political and economic pressures to restrain its budget, setting up the first serious 

debate since the terrorist attacks of 2001 about the size and costs 

of the armed services.’’ 

What it appears to be a serious debate on Defense spending as 

the New York Times suggests, then I think this panel’s views need 

to be front and center. 

As we consider and discuss the panel’s findings and recommendations, we must keep in mind that this report reflects the 

consensus views of a bipartisan group of 20 national security experts. 

This panel truly transcends partisan divide. In my opinion, the 

panel’s report repudiates those seeking a peace dividend and reaffirms the need to prioritize investment in our national defense. 

While the report covers a lot of ground on issues ranging from 

acquisition and contracting to whole-of-government reform, I want 

to focus on the core issues of global threats, force structure, and 

modernization. 

This panel has a number of strong statements on the military’s 

role in securing America’s interests in the world. While it has become in vogue to bemoan the militarization of foreign policy, I 

think the report gets the balance correct. 

You rightly state that the last 20 years have shown that America 

does not have the option of abandoning a leadership role in support 

of its national interests. Military decline is not an option. 

With respect to force structure, the panel echoes many of the 

views expressed by members of this committee. We share the panel’s concern that there is a growing gap between our interests and 

our military capability to protect those interests in the face of a 

complex and challenging security environment. 
4 

And while the Secretary of Defense may think the total tonnage 

of the U.S. Navy compared to the tonnage of other navies is the 

metric for assessing our ship requirement, many on this committee 

will agree with the panel’s finding that military power is a function 

of quantity as well as quality. 

If we are going to abandon the current decline and malaise and 

reassert America’s global leadership role, the United States must 

have sufficient naval forces to patrol all the world’s oceans. Numbers do matter. 

Thus, I welcome and am interested in learning more about the 

panel’s recommendation to increase the size of the Navy and Air 

Force. Moreover, I hope our witnesses will discuss why the panel 

concluded that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to assure others that the U.S. can meet its treaty commitments in the 

face of China’s military capabilities. 

I also welcome the panel’s recognition that part and parcel of 

force structure is addressing modernization. Our committee’s many 

hearings seem to validate the report’s finding that modernization 

has suffered for a long time because of the need to sustain readiness and the cost of current operations. I share your view that 

modernization is now coming due. 

Finally, this report makes significant contributions to challenges 

the department faces in acquisition and contracting. However, I 

think the report rightly puts those challenges in perspective. 

I agree with the finding that we cannot reverse the decline of 

shipbuilding, buy enough naval aircraft, recapitalize Army equipment, buy the F–35 requirement, purchase a new aerial tanker, increase deep strike capability, and recapitalize the bomber fleet just 

by saving $10 billion to $15 billion that the Department of Defense 

hopes to save through acquisition reform. 

This report highlights many challenges this committee must address. I look forward to beginning that work today. Once again, 

thank you for being here this morning, for your service, for your 

report. I look forward to your testimony, and I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank the gentleman from California. 

Dr. Perry, we understand that you have a drop-dead time at 12:30. 

We will do our very, very best. We will stand by the five-minute 

rule the very, very best we can. 

I also notice members of your panel, General Robert Scales, Professor Richard Kohn, and John Nagl are with us. He is right behind you. And staff director Paul Hughes, who helped glue all this 

together. We thank you for your service, and we are much appreciative. 

With that, Dr. Perry we will start with you then go on to Mr. 

Hadley. You will have to—— 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have divided the report between Mr. Hadley and myself and actually he is going to 

start first. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hadley, please. 
5 

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, CO-CHAIRMAN, 

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW INDEPENDENT PANEL, 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE 

Mr. HADLEY. We saved the heavy lifting for the secretary. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, we want to thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you and members of this distinguished committee to discuss the final report of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review independent panel. 

The Congress and Secretary Gates gave us a remarkable set of 

panel members, who devoted an enormous amount of time and effort to this project. It was a model of decorum and bipartisan legislative-executive branch cooperation. 

Paul Hughes as executive director of the panel ably led a talented expert staff and the result is the unanimous report you have 

before you entitled ‘‘The QDR in Perspective, Meeting America’s 

National Security Needs in the 21st Century.’’ 

Our report is divided into five parts. The first part conducts a 

brief survey of American foreign policy with special emphasis on 

the missions that America’s military has been called upon to perform since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

From the strategic habits and actual decisions of American presidents since 1945, habits and decisions that have shown a remarkable degree of bipartisan consistency, we deduce four enduring national interests which will continue to transcend political differences and animate American policy in the future. 

Those enduring national interests include the defense of the 

American homeland, assured access to the sea, air, space and 

cyberspace, the preservation of a favorable balance of power across 

Eurasia that prevents authoritarian domination of that region and 

providing for the global common good through such actions as humanitarian aid, development assistance, and disaster relief. 

We also discussed the five greatest potential threats to those interests that are likely to arise over the next generation. Those 

threats include but are not limited to radical Islamist extremism 

and the threat of terrorism, the rise of new global great powers in 

Asia, continued struggle for power in the Persian Gulf, and the 

greater Middle East and accelerating global competition for resources and persistent problems of failed and failing states. 

These five global trends have framed a range of choices for the 

United States. We talk about this in the introduction to our report. 

We note the various tools of smart power, diplomacy, engagement, 

trade, other things that will increasingly be needed to protect our 

Nation and its interests. 

We talk about the opportunity of using international institutions, 

adapting them to the new requirements of the 21st century, and 

creating new institutions as appropriate. 

But we emphasize that the current trends are likely to place an 

increased demand on American hard power to preserve regional 

balances. That while diplomacy and development have important 

roles to play, the world’s first order concerns will continue to be security concerns. 

In the next few chapters we turn to the capabilities that our government must develop and sustain in order to protect our enduring 
6 

interests. We first discuss the civilian element of national power, 

what Secretary Gates has called ‘‘the tools of soft power.’’ 

We make a number of recommendations for the structural and 

cultural changes in both the executive branch and the legislative 

branch that will be necessary if these elements of national power 

are to play their role in protecting America’s enduring interests. 

The panel notes with extreme concern that our current federal 

government structure, both executive and legislative, and in particular those related to security, were fashioned in the 1940s and 

they work at best imperfectly today. A new approach is needed, 

and we tried to describe that approach in our report. 

Let me turn to my colleague, Bill Perry, to summarize the balance of our report. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hadley and Dr. Perry can 

be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CO-CHAIRMAN, 

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW INDEPENDENT PANEL, 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Steve. And thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman and Mr. McKeon. 

For many decades during the Cold War, the primary mission of 

the Defense Department was to build a force capable of containing 

and deterring the Soviet Union. 

The Defense Department recognized that we might be faced with 

other missions, but we considered them to be lesser included cases. 

That is whatever force we had capable of doing the primary mission would automatically be capable of doing the other missions. 

In 1993, when I became the deputy secretary, the Cold War was 

over. We needed a new force structure, and we concluded then— 

we created something called the Bottom-Up Review that identified 

the primary mission of preparing for two major regional conflicts. 

And we considered there would be other missions, but they would 

be lesser included cases. 

Today, the assumptions of the Cold War in the 1990s are no 

longer valid. A major portion of the U.S. military today is involved 

in two insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, 

not surprisingly this QDR focused on success in Iraq and Afghanistan. I must say if I were the Secretary of Defense today I would 

have done the same thing. 

On the other hand, we do need to consider missions that go on 

20 years into the future. We do need to be building today the forces 

capable of dealing with these future contingencies. 

Indeed, we believed, the whole panel unanimously believed, that 

a force planning construct to deal with these futures would be a 

powerful lever to shape the Defense Department. And because of 

the absence of this in the QDR, we decided we would offer our own 

judgment as to what those missions should be and how they might 

be met. 

We concluded that the recent additions made to the ground 

forces will need to be sustained for the foreseeable future. We concluded that the Air Force has about the right structure except for 

the need to add long-range strike, more long-range strike. 
7 

We considered, however, a need, a definite need to increase the 

maritime force to sustain the ability to transit freely in the western 

Pacific. That need is at least as strong as it was during the BottomUp Review, and therefore we suggested that the force, the naval 

forces postulated in the Bottom-Up Review might be a baseline to 

consider. 

We also noted the Defense Department needs to be prepared to 

assist civil departments in the event of an attack on the homeland 

and the cyber field. And we concluded that a portion of the National Guard should be dedicated to homeland security, in fact, 

generally that we needed to rethink the contract with the Guard 

and Reserve forces. 

We observed that a major recapitalization will be required, particularly when we consider the wear and tear of our equipment 

during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, the directive of Secretary Gates for efficiencies in the acquisition field is a good start, 

but we unanimously concluded it was not sufficient. 

That is additional topline will be required to meet the needs we 

have laid out. This will be expensive, but deferring recapitalization 

will entail even greater expenses in the future. 

We looked specifically at the field of personnel. We all believe 

that the all-volunteer force has been a great success, but the dramatic increases in cost in the last few years simply cannot be sustained. 

We must seriously address this issue, and the failure to do so 

will lead either to a reduction in force, a reduction in benefits, or 

a compromised all-volunteer force, none of which are desirable outcomes. 

To do this we must reconsider longstanding personnel practices, 

considering an extended length of expected service. It is in revising 

the benefits to emphasize cash instead of future benefits, to consider a vision in the longstanding up-and-out policy in the military 

and to consider a revision of TRICARE benefits. These are big 

issues, and I don’t need to tell this panel that they are politically 

sensitive issues. 

We recommended the establishment of a new national commission on military personnel, comparable to the Gates Commission 

back in 1970. The charter of this commission would be how to implement the changes that we have laid out that need to be made 

in personnel policies. 

We looked specifically at the question of professional military 

education. I must say that I believe that the training and education 

programs in the U.S. military have played a key role in making our 

military the best in the world. It is expensive, but it is worth it. 

With that in mind, we recommended a full college program for 

reserves with summer training and a five-year service commitment. 

We recommended expanding the graduate program to include military affairs, foreign culture, and language. We recommended a program to provide officers with a sabbatical year in industry. 

As people read this report some, indeed many, may think that 

we have made a disproportionate emphasis on professional military 

education. And to which I would answer that while our military 

does an excellent job in training for doing the current mission, pro-
8 

fessional military education prepares our force for future contingencies. 

We did also look at acquisition. We recommended that we clarify 

the accountability in the acquisition force. Indeed, we devote several pages of our report to describing how to go about doing that. 

We made a very specific recommendation that the DOD set a 

limit, a limit of five to seven years for delivery of all of the new 

defined and desired programs. Five to seven years is not characteristic of what has been the history in the last decade. 

We have seen too many programs that have gone on for 10, 12, 

14 years. I have simply observed that a program that has gone 10, 

12, 14 years is guaranteed to cost too much. It is guaranteed to 

overrun. The programs that we have looked back historically that 

have been successful, the F–15, the F–16, the F–117 were all done 

in a four or five- or six-year timeframe, and that is no accident. 

We argued that we should require dual-source competition for 

production programs in all cases where it will provide real competition. We observed that there is under way right now an acquisition 

program to provide for the urgent needs in Afghanistan. 

We commend that program and suggest that we look to institutionalize how that is done because we need a regular program for 

dealing with urgent needs onto the future. 

In the field of planning, we recommend the establishment of an 

independent strategic review panel, that the legislative and executive branch would establish in the fall of a presidential election 

such a panel, much as in the same way that you established this 

panel. 

But we would recommend it be done in the fall of a presidential 

election year. That panel would convene in January as the new administration took office and would report six months later. 

Its focus would be on strategic security issues. With that input, 

the new national security advisor would then prepare a National 

Security Strategy [NSS] involved under the directorship of the national security advisor with the involvement of the key departments, certainly including the Defense Department. This new National Security Strategy plus the planning program and budgeting 

system would replace the QDR in our judgment. 

Finally, I would like to thank the Congress and the Defense Department for giving the panel such a competent and collegial group 

of people to work with. 

And also I would like to say personally it has been a privilege 

and a pleasure to work with Steve Hadley, my co-chairman. To the 

extent our report has reached a consensus and has reached significant and important conclusions, I would give Steve the primary 

credit for that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Perry and Mr. Hadley can 

be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. [Presiding.] Thank you so much, and we know that 

we have two very capable outstanding Americans with us today 

testifying before our committee. And I just have maybe a couple of 

questions for Dr. Perry and Mr. Hadley. Thank you for returning 

back to our committee today. 

With the increased activity that we see out of China and North 

Korea in the Asian-Pacific affairs, how did you factor in these po-
9 

tential threats into your overall assessment of future force structure? And on another note, how do you see the services balancing 

the cost of training and equipment with the increasing cost of manpower? 

Dr. PERRY. I will take a shot at that then give Steve a shot as 

well. The first and I think most important point I would make is 

that I consider the U.S. military forces today capable of handling 

successfully any military contingency I can contemplate in the 

western Pacific theater. 

Our recommendations for an increase in maritime forces were 

looking primarily to future contingencies, but I do not want to 

leave the suggestion that we are inadequate to deal with the 

present contingencies because I believe the forces are totally capable of doing that. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I would only add that that we obviously need to, in 

this time, use our resources very effectively, to give effective capability to our military in a way that is as efficiently done in terms 

of using the taxpayers’ money. And we propose a number of things. 

Secretary Gates has proposed a number of things to save money in 

the department. 

Acquisition reform we think will reduce costs. We think the overhead initiative Secretary Gates is an important one. We think it is 

important to get on to the increasing cost of the all-volunteer force 

if we are going to preserve that force. 

There are a number of things which we think we can do to free 

funds to go into force structure modernization and preserving and 

sustaining the all-volunteer force. 

It may be that we cannot find enough money within the defense 

budget to do what needs to be done, at which point the view of our 

commission is increases to the top line may be required, and I 

think our guess is probably will be required in order to do what we 

need to do now to be ready for the challenges over the next 20 

years. 

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one other comment 

to that. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure, go right ahead. 

Dr. PERRY. I was in Korea a week or two after the sinking of the 

South Korean ship, and I discussed in some detail with the Korean 

officials and our military officials there what I believe the proper 

response to that should be. 

I recommended then that the South Koreans take major program 

to increase their anti-submarine warfare capability and that U.S. 

Navy should work cooperatively with them in that. 

And I also strongly recommended that there be a very prompt 

anti-submarine warfare exercise conducted in that part of the 

South Korean naval waters in conjunction with the U.S. Navy. 

Those exercises, indeed, are now under way and I am very happy 

to see that outcome. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And I just have another question, short one, and then 

I am going to yield to my good friend from California. In the last 

years, we have had—I can remember when you joined the Navy, 

you stayed in the Navy. When you joined the Air Force, you stayed 
10 

in the Air Force. But now we are beginning to see a lot of boots 

on the ground from the Navy, from the Air Force. 

Was that given a consideration by your commission as to how we 

address that? Because we have problems to where sometimes we 

feel that some of these Navy ships are not manned well, and we 

have to cut corners on maintenance because we have got to put 

some of these Navy personnel on the ground. Was that ever considered? Or should it be considered? 

Mr. HADLEY. I think it should and I will try on that. I think our 

panel did not discuss what I am about to say explicitly. I believe 

they would agree with it that we think it is a good thing that the 

Navy and the Air Force contributed to winning the wars we have 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

But you are quite right. It has taken a toll on the Air Force and 

the Navy and particularly we think prospectively looking out 20 

years. That is why we think we need to make the force structure 

adjustment in the Navy that we have recommended. And that is 

one of the reasons why we think we need a fully modernized force, 

to recognize that that was the right thing to do, but it did exact 

a toll. 

And so what we have laid out is a strategy to take that into account and ensure that the Navy and the Air Force will be able to 

play over the next 20 years the wide spectrum of roles we need 

them to play in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. 

Bill. 

Dr. PERRY. I think that is well said. 

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from California, Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the panel 

recommends that the 1993 Bottom-Up Review should be the baseline for our force structure. Please explain why you recommend we 

adopt force structure that was recommended 17 years ago? 

Dr. PERRY. In the focus, particularly on the naval forces, we observed that the needs for naval forces in 1993 and that the needs 

today are at least as great as the needs in 1993 and the BottomUp Review recommended a naval force for that. 

We said the force should be no less than that. And so we used 

that as a baseline. We were not representing that as being the last 

word on what should be considered. 

That for us is the baseline in our consideration. We see the needs 

of a naval presence, a maritime presence, particularly in the western Pacific at least as great now as it was during the Bottom-Up 

Review. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I have nothing really to add to that. I think it was 

a combination of the respect for the process that was done then, 

and as Dr. Perry said, a notion that if that force was what we 

thought was required in what we projected to be a fairly benign environment and if that environment has been much more active 

than we anticipated and probably will continue to be active over 

the next 20 years, in some sense we need to at least have that 

force. And that is kind of how we backed into it. 

We were not in a position to do the kind of force planning the 

Department of Defense would do, but we thought that we could establish that as a threshold and that is how we presented it in the 
11 

report. It least needs to be that force. In the case of the Army, the 

Marine Corps, we endorsed the fact that it is actually a larger, 

slightly larger force. And we think that is appropriate. 

Mr. MCKEON. So that in 17 years, the world hasn’t gotten safer 

and the 346 ships recommended in the Bottom-Up Review would 

be a bottom line, at least needing that many. And I think we are 

looking at now we have, what, 278 and the plan was to go to 313, 

so we are way behind. 

The panel found that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to assure others that the U.S. can meet its treaty commitments in the face of China’s military capabilities. Can you develop 

this point? Which treaty commitments do you have in mind and 

which Chinese capabilities present the greatest challenge to our 

force structure, and how does this impact our allies? 

Dr. PERRY. The primary treaty responsibilities of course would be 

in Japan and Korea. And all of our contingency plans for dealing 

with any conflicts involving Korea, for example, involve a rapid reinforcement of the forces we have there, primarily naval and air 

buildup. 

Beyond that, we had to be concerned with possible contingencies 

that could arise south of there in Taiwan, the Philippines, South 

China Sea. All of those argue for a strong maritime presence in the 

region. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I think it is fair to say that our allies in the region 

are nervous about the rise of China. They want us to engage China 

positively, to work with China to the extent we can and we are. 

But they want us to be there, diplomatically, economically, and 

militarily as a hedge, if you will, and also because they think that 

contributes to the strength of our diplomacy, which I think our 

panel would agree with. And there has been a lot of press coverage 

the last day or two of Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in the 

region, and I thought that was a good approach. 

Dr. PERRY. I must say, Mr. McKeon, I do not anticipate any military conflict with China, and I think indeed if one were to happen 

it would be a huge failure on diplomacy on the part of both countries. 

But I also understand that our allies look to the United States 

for support in that region, and that if we were not to provide that 

support that they would feel obliged to build up military forces 

themselves, which would in turn lead to more military forces in 

China and would lead to an arms race in that region which would 

not only be economically disastrous for everybody, but would be 

from a security point of view, lessening our security, not increasing. 

So maintaining a consistently strong military force, particularly 

maritime force in the western Pacific, I think is the best way of 

avoiding conflict and avoiding that kind of an arms race. 

Mr. MCKEON. Peace through strength. The panel concludes that 

modernization has suffered for a long time because of the need to 

sustain readiness and the cost of current operations. However, the 

modernization is now coming due. What steps should the Defense 

Department take to address the modernization problem, and what 

should be our modernization priorities? 
12 

Dr. PERRY. I think Secretary Gates has recognized that the top 

line budget he has, given the expenses in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

are not adequate for sustaining the modernization of the force. And 

that is why he has called for a decrease in acquisition costs 

through efficiencies. 

In my opening statement, I commended him for that move, but 

I also observed I do not believe those efficiencies are likely to provide enough funds to deal with all of the modernization recapitalization that is required. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. Our report tries to make a number of additional 

suggestions. Secretary Perry talked about the capability you can 

reasonably get in five to seven years. The report mentions two 

other things I would just underscore. 

One is the need in some cases to trade off performance to maintain cost and schedule. This is not giving our troops less than what 

they need in terms of performance, but it is to say, let us not give 

our troops more than they need for performance at the cost of delivering systems too late and over cost. 

Now, we need to find a way to make technology work, not only 

to ensure our men and women in uniform have the equipment they 

need, but also to use technology to drive down costs. You know, we 

see it in the IT [information technology] industry all the time. 

We have got to find a way to make technology not only deliver 

the performance our troops need, but at increasingly lower costs so 

we can do the more than one-for-one replacement we are going to 

need to have a fully modernized, adequate force structure. 

Dr. PERRY. Mr. McKeon, I would say that of all of the recommendations we make in this area, the one that would be most 

substantial in keeping costs down is the recommendation to hold 

procurement time to five to seven years. There is a long history of 

just how much the Defense Department overpays for programs that 

go on 10 to 12 years. 

And the discipline that is needed to keep that from happening 

is to start out from the beginning with the program by holding 

them to this lesser time scale. That forces them to make the frontend decisions to keep these costs from blooming. 

Mr. MCKEON. And that problem accelerates as technology further 

accelerates. As you are moving down the line, you keep wanting to 

add the latest, latest, latest—— 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. And seeking the perfect and never 

quite reach, as you say, the delivery of something that could help 

right now. 

Dr. PERRY. Well, I am a strong advocate for the importance of 

technology and giving our military a leverage, a competitive advantage over other systems. The question is not whether to use technology, it is how to introduce it. 

And if you limit it to five to seven years, that means the new 

technology is introduced in the additional mods. For example, the 

F–16A is followed by a B, a C, a D, an E, instead of trying to do 

all that at the first stage. That is the way we think it should be 

done. 

Mr. MCKEON. And never get A delivered. 
13 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HADLEY. And the other thing, if I just might add that is in 

the report, that I know the subpanel who worked on this feels very 

strongly, we need to clarify roles and have clear authority and accountability within the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] but 

also the service chain, as who is responsible for delivering the increment of technology on time and at cost. 

It is a muddy picture with lots of layering and lots of review 

without clear lines of authority and accountability, and I think that 

is also at the heart of our recommendations. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, and my final question, on page 94 of 

the report, the panel states, ‘‘The budget process and current operational requirements are driven by the staff process and service 

priorities most likely shaped by the QDR far more than the QDR 

will now shape processes and drive future budgets and program 

agendas.’’ 

Is it then fair to say that the panel believes that the 2010 QDR 

was budget-driven rather than needs-driven? 

Dr. PERRY. I would say rather that it was driven by the overriding focus on achieving success in Afghanistan and Iraq. That 

was what was driving the QDR. 

Mr. MCKEON. That is what took it out just to the five years instead of the—— 

Dr. PERRY. Yes, and then let me repeat also that had I been the 

Secretary of Defense, I believe I would have done the same thing. 

Mr. MCKEON. This whole process, we are not trying to criticize 

the Secretary of Defense. 

Dr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. MCKEON. We are just trying to get to what our needs and 

how we—— 

Dr. PERRY. Absolutely. 

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. Get there. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see Mr. Coffman sitting down there and Mr. Boswell over here, and I am reminded 

there are some of our most extensive military experience is on the 

bottom row, and I am going to yield to Mr. Boswell who has had 

more bullet holes and helicopters in Vietnam than most of us have 

had rides on helicopters. 

I yield my five minutes to Mr. Boswell. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Snyder. I appreciate that. 

You may have overstated a little bit. I appreciate the panel and 

what you bring to us today, and thank you very much for your 

work and looking at the force behind you, I appreciate it as well. 

I see General Scales I have known for some time. We have a little 

history together as well. 

I appreciate your comments about the western Pacific. I think 

you are right on. I appreciate that. I am concerned about—it is certainly a changing world after—my goodness, you have said that 

very well on your panel. The Iraq-Afghanistan situation, what is 

next? I wonder if your panel gave any consideration to the African 

continent and what might evolve there, which I feel a little gut concern about and everything. 
14 

And the reason I am piling it all together for just one setting, 

I have got an amendment I have got to offer down the hall in 

transportation infrastructure momentarily, but the reduction in 

force. It happens. 

It has happened before and what happens in our preparation and 

continuity and experience in the officer ranks and particularly the 

noncommissioned officers, concerns me a little bit how we keep 

that interest there, very important. 

And lastly it would be to do with the—we currently, it seems to 

me like we rely and use reserve components, our Guard and reservists as part of the standing force, just a little thinking in the deployments and so on. 

And I have got about 3,400 to 3,800 going out of my state as we 

speak. And so, you know, how they are part and parcel—how do 

they fit in to this as we look ahead? 

I agree. I questioned at first back when we went all voluntary, 

but I think it works. But it is pretty costly. And I am sure you have 

had some discussions on that, so with those things, I would like to 

hear your comments, and I will have to depart, and I hope I can 

get back. Please. 

Dr. PERRY. And I will offer two comments on those very important points. And the first is that I believe, and I think our whole 

panel are strong supporters of the all-volunteer force. I, like you, 

was skeptical of it when it was started. 

But I would conclude now it has been a great success. It has led 

us to the best military in the world and that we should do everything we can to sustain it, and the report was done in that spirit. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I agree. 

Dr. PERRY. Secondly on the very important strategic planning 

issue you raised at the beginning, we apparently had neither the 

time nor the resources for doing a full stage strategic review. And 

indeed, one of the casualties of that is not sufficient attention paid 

to Africa. 

But that is one of the reasons we made a strong recommendation 

that the next time this is done, it be preceded by a strategic review 

panel and that is a very important recommendation we made in 

that regard. And I think it is responsive to the point that you were 

making. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I would add just two points. Our panel thinks we 

really need to rethink the relationship between the active force, the 

Guard and Reserve, and whether we even need some mobilization 

capability beyond the Guard and Reserve. You know, we had a mobilization strategy, and we now really have a force-in-being strategy. And the question is which role for the Guard and Reserve? 

How much of it is an operational reserve? How much is it a strategic reserve? How much should it have an enhanced role for the 

homeland issues? 

All of these need to be rethought because if there are missions 

that can be adequately or better done in the Guard and Reserve 

it is cheaper. And that would take some of the pressure off the active force. So this is one of the major agenda items for the national 

commission on military—— 
15 

Mr. BOSWELL. On that point, I appreciate what you have just 

said because, you know, we rely on the Guard as you know and we 

have floods and everything else that takes place, and I think this 

needs to be really carefully looked at and I think that is good. Appreciate that. 

Mr. HADLEY. Second thing I just want to underscore something 

that Secretary Perry said about the national security strategic 

planning process—sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and finish. 

Mr. HADLEY. We think that what the committee tried to achieve 

in the QDR Independent Review Panel can’t really get done adequately that way, and that the committee’s objectives can be better 

met with this national security strategic planning process that we 

describe. Thank you. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you and yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Forbes, Mr. Boswell raises the issue, the history of our country has 

been to increase the size of our military and drastically reduce the 

size of our military, and this has happened over centuries. 

And Les Aspin, I remember when he was chairman once upon a 

time ago commented it would be good for the country should there 

be a specific percentage of the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] to be 

assigned to the military to the national security. 

That is not going to happen. But how are we to carry, Mr. Boswell’s thought a step further, how do we ensure against the dips 

and the peaks of interest in and size of and funding of things for 

national security? Major, major problem facing us. 

Dr. PERRY. That is a very important and very fundamental question. I would not presume to try to answer it fully, but I want to 

make two points about it. The first is the investment we make in 

professional military education is a huge investment for preparing 

us for the future. 

It is a small cost that allows us when the new contingency arises 

and we need to increase the force, we need be in a new mission, 

it means we are doing it from a stronger educational and analytical 

base at least. 

A second is that we make a more effective use of our Guard and 

Reserve forces. We talked about that in the report but I really believe there is some very deep thought of bottoms up thinking is 

needed about the proper contract between our Guard and Reserves. 

They are absolutely a key, I believe, to dealing with the issue that 

you are describing. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I have nothing to add. I think that is a good answer. 

The CHAIRMAN. If history serves me correct, and I am sure the 

gentleman behind me may correct me on that, General Scales and 

Dr. Kohn, the golden era of professional military education was between the wars, between the First World War and the Second 

World War. 

It was not by design. It was by happenstance, the shrinking of 

the military and those outstanding officers that chose to stay. So 

many of them not only attended war colleges, but they taught at 

war colleges. Thirty-one of the thirty-four Army corps commanders 
16 

in the Second World War taught at one time or another in the war 

college system. 

How do we—what is bound to happen? The ups and downs in 

funding, which I don’t like, you don’t like, our committee doesn’t 

like, but it might come to pass. How do we ensure what you just 

talked about in having another era of the golden age of military, 

professional military education? So that when trouble does come, 

you will have those potential leaders, whether they be platoon leaders or corps leaders ready, willing and able. How do you do that? 

How do we recreate what happened between the wars by happenstance? How do we do that on purpose? 

Dr. PERRY. I believe the answer to that lies in an increased emphasis on professional military education. I also agree with the 

point you were making that the officers who have actually taught 

in the war colleges or taught in the academies bring a unique background and a unique capability so all of those points are important. 

They are all, by the way, discussed in our report where I think 

we pay pretty careful attention to those issues. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I think we have one, I think this committee needs 

to, as you have for the last ten years, helped show the way on professional military education to the department. Second, there is a 

terrific opportunity. 

We have got people coming back from service in Iraq and Afghanistan who are tactically superb, but they have learned the 

wide range of skills they need to do the jobs we ask them to do in 

those settings. 

I think they will have a demand for the right kind of professional 

military education, and if we afford it to them, it will help keep 

them in the force and so we don’t lose this capability. 

And lastly I think this rebalancing between active, Guard, Reserve, mobilization beyond Reserve is a way of helping manage cost 

but keeping that capability and talent available to the country. And 

that is what the national commission on military personnel needs 

to address. 

Dr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, besides our splendid academies and 

military universities, we need to make greater use, I think, of our 

regular universities. At Stanford where I teach, we had each year 

seven or eight senior officers come and spend a year at Stanford 

taking courses, meeting with the policy people there, teaching 

courses. 

And I have felt this was so successful that in the last year or two 

I have worked to expand that program and I worked at each of the 

services to send more officers to them. And each of services have 

been very forthcoming in that regard. So in a small way we are 

working at one university to try to increase that interaction. 

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed that there are two recommendations. 

One is that there be an entrance exam for war colleges. As I recall, 

the history of the German General Staff required an extensive examination before they were appointed to that position. Am I correct? 

General SCALES. Yes, sir. It is true. 

Dr. PERRY. General Scales said the answer to that is yes, and I 

am sure he knows. 
17 

The CHAIRMAN. And also there is a recommendation that an officer must serve as a professor before he or she reached the flag 

rank. Is that correct? 

General SCALES. Yes, sir, it is true. 

Dr. PERRY. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is great. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to echo what everyone has said about just the marvel 

of the great work that you have been able to accomplish. I wish we 

could bottle that up in so many different categories throughout 

Congress. And so I want to take your words and not add to them 

because I know they were well thought out, well-designed. 

And one of the words that you mention in here is a train wreck. 

To us denotes something that is not just a matter of tweaking, but 

something we better be concerned about. And then Mr. Secretary, 

you made a comment that you said that you do not anticipate any 

military conflict with China. 

And in your report, you guys basically say that—or you exactly 

say, ‘‘The risk we don’t anticipate is precisely the one most likely 

to be realized.’’ So taking those words and focusing just on China 

and us with the number of ships that we have, if you are recommending a Bottom-Up Review number that would be about 346 

ships as I understand it in our Navy. 

We know the Navy has always talked about a 313 ship number. 

Currently we are at about 283, 285 depending on the day. And for 

the first time we have had admirals sit where you are sitting telling us the Chinese have more ships in their Navy than we have 

in our Navy. Their curve is going up; ours is not. 

I would like for you talk about those numbers, am I off on those 

numbers? Am I off on your intent? But secondly, the Chairman 

mentioned these spikes and peaks and valleys we have in funding. 

One of the things we know is that we have to set priorities. 

We are looking at the Navy needing more ships, more personnel. 

There is a $28 billion in budget reduction we are looking for the 

Pentagon, $3 billion in shipyard infrastructure. They are talking 

about a billion dollar move of a carrier to Mayport, Florida. 

And when I look at that, here is our frustration, we have put in 

statute a requirement that we get a shipbuilding plan for Congress 

to look at. The Department of Defense just refused to give us that 

last year despite the fact we even had a congressional inquiry 

unanimously supported by this committee to get it. We had a requirement in statute for an aviation plan so we can set those priorities; couldn’t get it. We are due a China military power report that 

was due May 1; still haven’t gotten it. 

When we have admirals or individuals from the Pentagon sit 

where you sit and we ask them to prioritize, they refuse to do it. 

Talk to me about the numbers that I just mentioned, but also do 

you have suggestions of a mechanism that we can use to better 

partner with DOD in trying to get the information we need so we 

can help set these priorities? 

Dr. PERRY. I will comment on a few of those points, but I will 

start off my comments by saying in my opinion, the United States 

Navy today is the most powerful Navy in the world, and whoever 
18 

is second is pretty far behind. Having said that, there is no reason 

for complacency. 

First of all, the U.S. Navy as compared to the Chinese Navy has 

a worldwide responsibility. They have the responsibility well beyond the western Pacific. And in the Pacific alone, we do have to 

recognize the fact that we are declining in our force and the Chinese Navy is increasing in its force. 

So all of those things together lead me to recommend to join with 

the panel in recommending that we work to increase the size of our 

Navy. And the reason for that in my mind has to be primarily with 

the importance of maintaining a strong naval force in the western 

Pacific. 

I would emphasize again that I would not suggest that the number we used in the Bottom-Up Review Force is the last word on the 

problem. We wanted to call attention to the problem. 

We wanted to say that the Bottom-Up Review is certainly the 

baseline for us for considering this, but we are calling for a new 

strategic planning review at the time of the next presidential election. 

So roughly two years from now there would be another strategic 

planning review and would look in great detail at this problem and 

come up with a force construct appropriate for the missions that 

are described. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I don’t have anything to say. It is a good answer. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, please. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again Secretary Perry and Admiral, thank you for 

being with us. 

Mr. Secretary, I have concerns that, going back to the fleet, that 

one of our biggest vulnerabilities is fuel. Carriers can go for approximately 15 years without refueling, the submarines, some of 

the newer ones, the life of the submarine without refueling. 

But the ships that defend the carriers, DDGs and the frigates, 

the cruisers, they have to refuel every three to five days, and particularly in the Far East, the farther you get away, the burden cost 

of fuel, the vulnerability of the oilers. 

I was curious if in your review you looked at that? Obviously one 

solution would be to the greatest extent possible going to nuclearpowered surface combatants. I was curious if in your calls for a 

346-ship Navy if you also took a look at what I consider to be that 

vulnerability? 

Mr. HADLEY. We opened the door within our committee to a discussion of this issue. We thought about whether in the acquisition 

process, for example, the fuel consumption issue should play in 

some way for all the reasons you suggest. And I think a number 

of our panel members felt very strongly about it. We could not 

come up with a mechanism as to how to take into account in terms 

of the planning. 

And it is, you know, our philosophy was to do what we could and 

where issues remain to try to recommend commissions to follow it 

up. That is an issue I think this committee should pursue with the 

Department. So I would say good question. We framed the issue. 
19 

We could not come up with a recommendation on how to deal with 

it. 

Dr. PERRY. I would add to that it is not just an important question. It has to do, of course, with more than just the vulnerability 

of our ships to fuel. If we think today of gasoline at $3 a gallon at the tank in Washington, D.C., when you get that same gas delivered to a forward 

operating base [FOB] in Afghanistan or Iraq, it is $30 or $300, not 

counting the lives lost getting the fuel there. 

This is a very, very important issue, and I do not believe our 

panel gave enough depth and attention to it. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Going back to the mix of the vessels, as you know 

the LCS [littoral combat ship] program has run in late. The committee has recently followed Secretary Roughead’s lead to truncate 

the DDG–1000 program at three, restart the 51 line. A later decision was made to put our Nation’s missile defense on the DDG–51. 

Did the panel—and I have been in favor of both of those moves— 

I am curious if the panel gave much thought as to those moves and 

whether or not they think how likely we are going in the right direction? 

Mr. HADLEY. We did not try to review those specific decisions 

that you have described in terms of the DDG and all the rest. 

Clearly one of the concerns that the panel had is making sure that 

we deal with asymmetric threats, missile defense, weapons of mass 

destruction, cyber attacks and all the rest. But we did not try to 

sort of look at specific procurement decisions. We tried to set a 

broader framework. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline, please. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here, and for a really terrific report. I think the common 

thread here in this committee that I have heard both in this open 

hearing, in many conversations is a deep disappointment in the 

QDR, which we feel very strongly and I think you touch on that 

that it was in many ways budget-driven and not the product that 

we needed. 

And this is the converse or the flip-side that this is an excellent 

document, and so I want to add my voice to those of all my colleagues here in saying well done. You touch on so many things, but 

I wanted to go to two related issues. And it is sort of getting at 

the difference between the QDR and your QDR in perspective. 

You recommend, the panel recommended that the Congress and 

the executive create an independent strategic review panel, which 

based on what I am just saying sounds like a fine idea. 

And I would be interested in any comments you have on is it a 

same sort of makeup as your panel? And would it be a permanent 

standing panel or ad hoc? Or just some—you probably have addressed it, but I would like to hear what you have to say about it. 

And then an extremely important issue that gets to the point 

that General Schoomaker used to call I think the tyranny of personnel cost or something like that. When you talk about the rising 

military personnel cost and you call for a new national commission 

on military personnel, which I take it to be a sort of one-time, you 

know, the 1970 Gates Commission thing. 
20 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. KLINE. If you could just address those, too, because both of 

them are getting to some outside expertise that is out from under 

the Department and the Administration. 

Mr. HADLEY. We think the QDR did a number of good things, 

and I don’t want to be too hard on it. 

Mr. KLINE. That is okay, Mr. Hadley, I will be hard enough. I 

just want to get your solution to it. 

Mr. HADLEY. But I want to reiterate something, what I said before. We thought that what this committee was calling for we 

couldn’t really get out of the QDR and the QDR Independent Panel 

process. And that is why really we recommend shutting down that 

QDR process because the strategic out-of-the-box look, we don’t 

think you can get there from here. 

And that is why we said let us have a national security strategic 

planning process, whole-of-government, top-down and start it with 

what we have called the Independent Strategic Review Panel, 

which would get started and be formed in the fall of an election 

year, would be able to start the January after a presidential election and take six months. 

It would be a group of outsiders appointed by the Congress and 

the President to think out-of-the-box, review the strategic situation, 

suggest what changes need to be made in our National Security 

Strategy and in some sense be the front end to the national security strategic planning process we then describe. 

And it would be taken over by the National Security Advisor on 

behalf of the President for the new Presidential Administration in 

its first year. 

We think that is the way to get the unconstrained out-of-the-box 

strategic look. Because the challenges we face heavily rely on the 

Defense Department but not just only the Defense Department, 

and that way it will give you this whole-of-government look that 

we think. 

So our recommendation is what the committee wants is exactly 

right. We just think that the way we have gone about to get doesn’t 

work, and this is a better way to get what the committee is looking 

for. 

Bill. 

Dr. PERRY. Several comments, first of all, it is critical that this 

panel be appointed both by the executive and legislative branch as 

was this panel and that it be bipartisan. In fact that it be nonpartisan, be created in a bipartisan way. We tried to run our panel 

as a nonpartisan panel, not as a bipartisan panel. 

That the timing is critical; it has to be started sooner than our 

panel was started to do the job and that is why we suggested the 

fall of election year. 

This could be a continuous body or it could be appointed every 

four years but I think there is a certain merit to having it as an 

ongoing body. And I think that should be—if the Congress decides 

to move in that direction, I think you should consider it as maybe 

a standing panel. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay, thank you, gentlemen. And I guess I am out 

of time, but I hope somebody will explore that idea of the personnel 
21 

commission and in your vision how that would function. So I am 

sorry, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. PERRY. And that would be a one-shot committee modeled 

after the Gates Commission dealing with the specific issues which 

we outlined in the report. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I am going to go ahead and go into some of those issues and 

ask you for some responses. I certainly want to thank you all, all 

the panelists for this extraordinary effort. We appreciate it. 

You obviously made a recommendation to reform the military 

personnel system, and one of the focuses of that was to provide for 

longer officer careers, which would allow for more education as you 

mention and career broadening assignments and the establishment 

of a more elite career force where high quality officers could serve 

in leadership positions for longer periods of time. 

And the report does acknowledge that there are some cultural 

barriers to doing that and those cultural barriers would not lend 

themselves in your, I think, analysis to a kind of incremental approach. 

And I wondered if the panel had a chance to look at one of the 

elements in the Defense Authorization Bill in fiscal year 2011 was 

to establish a pilot program to test an alternative career track for 

officers. And it would set guidelines for an incremental approach 

to achieve many of the objectives that you cite in your report. 

And I just wondered whether—you seem to feel that using this 

incremental approach would not be the easier way to go, and that 

you felt that you needed to kind of do all of this in a more dramatic 

way perhaps. 

We wondered whether in the authorization there was really a 

knowledge that perhaps service members would need to buy into 

a new strategy over time. 

Dr. PERRY. Yes, we believe that the present system when an officer might be serving or a noncommissioned officer might be serving 

20, 25 years is a terrible waste of talent. The reason our military 

is so good is because of the great investments we make in training 

and education. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 

Dr. PERRY. So once we have trained and educated these people, 

in 20, 25 years they leave, and in fact we push them out. That system just has to be wrong. 

People are living longer now. They are living active lives longer. 

They have another 10 or 15, 20 years of good potential service 

available. And many of them, and indeed most of them, would like 

to do that if the system will permit them. So I think it is crucial 

that that part of the system be dramatically overhauled. 

And I do not suggest it is going to be easy to do that, but I think 

it is important to do that. Our military today is much greater involved with technical and specialties and with specialized knowledge where education and training is very important. 

And so we need to have a way not only of continuing the education and training of our officers, but then keeping them long 

enough to get the benefit of it. 
22 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. And we thought incrementalism is fine, but the 

need is so urgent, we thought the way to get visibility was the commission, and it would hopefully supplement and empower all the 

things you talked about. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, I appreciate that. I think Mr. Kline had raised 

the issue and of course that one of personnel, increasing costs for 

personnel per service member is obviously a very important one 

here. 

And part of the difficulty is, I think, that we see that there are 

a number of reasons why that has occurred. Certainly benefits, 

other incentive programs have increased over time due to inflation, 

a need to compete with the private sector. There are a lot of reasons why those changes have occurred. 

But it is also true that the Defense budget when we look at that 

suggests that as a percentage of the total Defense obligation authority that the military personnel accounts have actually been 

steadily decreasing since 1992 and have been under 25 percent of 

the total Defense obligation for the last 5 years. 

And so I am wondering do you think that that was something 

that everybody had looked at on the panel? And does it, you know, 

change the calculus in terms of feeling that this is a problem because we have more expensive people in the services? 

Or is it something that you felt really needed to be dealt with 

quite as you said, you know, sort of just attack it, the problem. 

Mr. HADLEY. We included in our report the numbers, which suggest it has gotten bigger and if you go forward, it would get bigger. 

And there is also concern that what we need to do to maintain the 

all-volunteer force when the economy starts coming back will go up 

as well. So it was when we say ‘‘train wreck is coming,’’ it is the 

projections that really have us concerned. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank 

the co-chairs of the panel, appreciate all the hard work that you 

put into this. It is obviously a great document, and I appreciate all 

the thought that has gone into it. 

If you look in perspective, I think you bring up some very interesting points. If you look at where the future leads us, and I like 

your point about saying that our QDR needs to reflect the long 

term needs of our military and not just that shorter-term element. 

And I think that what you point out especially in chapter three 

when you talk about force structure and personnel, and you are 

saying the QDR force structure will not provide sufficient capacity 

to respond to a catastrophe, I think that is very, very telling. 

Because as we know, it is as important for us to plan for the routine as it is for us to plan for the unexpected. And we all know that 

after the unexpected it is hard to go back and say, well, ‘‘We should 

of, could of, would have.’’ 

I like that you are looking out and saying listen the QDR’s function really is to make sure that we are properly planning for those 

future issues that we may have to deal with. 
23 

And I also wanted to get you to elaborate a little bit on how you 

believe we can best do that in planning for a future force structure? 

And you point out that we ought to be using the 1993 Bottom-Up 

Review as a good baseline. And then from there looking at what 

current elements of our current force structure should be increased. 

And I am very interested in hearing your thoughts about your efforts to put forth the alternative force structure, which I think is 

very telling when you speak about where our Navy needs to be. 

And we had discussions just yesterday about what the force structure needs to be with our Navy and your alternative force structure 

points to 346 ships. And we currently have an inventory of 288. 

I was wondering if you could give us a little more context to that 

1993 baseline and your thoughts about that 346 number and what 

we can do and what we need to do to get there and the importance 

of that effort to get there? 

Dr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. I want to emphasize that 

we do not believe we had the time or the resources to do a detailed 

force planning exercise. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Dr. PERRY. And so our recommendations need to be considered 

in two related parts. The first was the recommendation for the 

planning process that should be set up to do this—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

Dr. PERRY [continuing]. Which would begin two years from now, 

and do it with the right way. In the meantime, we felt that our 

judgment was the ground forces with the recent increases were at 

adequate levels that we ought to go up in the naval force we go 

back up to the Bottom-Up Review. That is a planning baseline to 

start from—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

Dr. PERRY [continuing]. But we need to reconsider that carefully 

in this two years from now. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. That national security strategic planning process 

our panel felt needs to provide better guidance, not only to the Department of Defense but to other agencies involved in national security as to threats and priorities so that the departments can take 

those and actually come up with a force sizing construct that can 

drive their internal planning process. That has been lacking. 

I want to mention also that that would also drive the civilian 

side. We mention the need for greater civilian capability to go overseas with our military to help build civil structures in post-conflict 

and stabilization settings. 

Indeed, we propose a national commission on the building of the 

civil force of the future to find a way to get civilian agencies able 

to deploy with our forces overseas. If we do that, then this planning 

process can also give guidance to how to size and prioritize that 

force as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And I appreciate that. I think those are great 

points, making sure that we understand where the needed capabilities must be in the future. And then from our standpoint as decision makers here on the Armed Services Committee, to make sure 

that then we know in context how to properly make resourcing decisions. 
24 

And I think your point there about and the report states, ‘‘We 

cannot reverse the decline of shipbuilding, buy enough naval aircraft, recapitalize Army equipment, buy the F–35 requirement, 

purchase a new aerial tanker, increase deep strike capability and 

recapitalize the bomber fleet by just saving the $10 billion to $15 

billion that the Department of Defense hopes to save through acquisition reform.’’ 

And we all agree acquisition reform needs to be there, but that 

proper planning, that strategic planning is really where the context 

of resource decisions need to be made here. 

And I really appreciate you all pointing it out because I think 

that is so critical to this process is knowing that in context there 

if we don’t have good planning it makes it almost impossible for us 

as decision makers to do that. So again, I thank you so much for 

that and appreciate your pointing that out. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Perry and Mr. Hadley. Thank you for coming and briefing 

us today on your evaluation of the QDR. 

My questions today revolve around training and readiness in the 

Pacific theater. Although the QDR discusses the forging of relationships to include China in order to have stable Pacific theater, it 

does not discuss any of the hurdles our military will face with regards to training and readiness. 

Currently 8,600 Marines and their families are coming to Guam 

due to the 2006 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation Plan. However, one of the biggest reasons for the 

move is due to runway encroachment and the inability to conduct 

training in the existing areas. 

Yesterday I received a copy of the final environmental impact 

study, ‘‘On the Move,’’ and a major issue still not resolved is the 

proposed Marine firing ranges at Pagat on Guam. This is a culturally important area and it needs to be approached with cooperation between the island community, the local government of Guam 

and DOD. 

More importantly, this highlights issues that surround all areas 

where we have forces stationed in the Pacific theater. And with 

that said, I would like to know if you agree with the assessment 

concerning training and acquisitions of training ranges. 

And secondly should this not be more thoroughly addressed in 

the QDR? Finally, can either of you comment on how we should approach the training issue to ensure that our forces in the Pacific 

are properly trained? 

Dr. PERRY. I have said before and I repeat again, I believe that 

training is a key to the effectiveness of the U.S. military today. I 

must say that the point you are describing I am confident is an important point, but it is not a point which our commission reviewed 

in any detail at all. 

Steve, are you aware of anything we did to shed light on that? 

Mr. HADLEY. No, it is good question, and we looked at the AsiaPacific in force structure terms. We really did not look at it in readiness and training terms, and it is an omission and you are right 

about that. 
25 

And again it is the kind of thing I think the committee needs to 

pursue with the Department. It is something we probably should 

have looked at. We had to pick and choose given our time constraints. It is a terribly important issue. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I understand it is an issue, you know, that is 

really with Guam and ‘‘On the Move,’’ but I just wondered how we 

should we approach acquiring land? You know, it has been with 

imminent domain, which is something that our people of Guam do 

not approve of. And also in the ranges this comes to the point 

where I just brought it up, how do we acquire properties for firing 

ranges? 

Mr. HADLEY. Well, you know, from the high-level, look, in terms 

of the process has gone over the last five, six years to adjust our 

force structure in Korea and Japan and the like, I think the watch 

word is to try to do it in a way that is acceptable with national governments, with local governments, and local populations because 

we want our troops and our training presence to be welcomed, not 

a source of contention. So I think the only way to do that is in this 

broad, consensual way. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, it is a contentious issue in Guam, and I certainly hope we will be able to resolve it. 

Dr. PERRY. And I regret we can’t give you more detailed answers 

because I fully agree on the emerging importance of Guam in our 

whole strategy in the Pacific, so that is a very important question. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I would like to read briefly 

from the introduction to your report. ‘‘The natural tendency of bureaucracies to plan short-term, operate from the top-down, think 

from existing parameters, and affirm the correctness of existing 

plans and programs of record.’’ That is exactly what happened to 

the QDR process. 

‘‘Instead of unconstrained long-term analysis by planners, who 

were encouraged to challenge preexisting thinking, the QDRs became explanations and justifications, often with marginal changes 

of established decisions and plans,’’ kind of the tedious repetition 

of the obvious. 

The latest QDR continues the trend of the last 15 years. I have 

three concerns of strategic importance, and I wonder how they 

were reflected in the QDR. 

The first of these is the new Chinese anti-ship missile. Some of 

its capabilities are classified, but I think in the public domain it 

is known that it is a real game changer. You can’t get within 1,200 

miles of it. 

And we have essentially no assured defense against it. If it were 

on a ship, then we couldn’t get within 1,200 miles of any ship. This 

is a real game changer. Is this reflected in the QDR? 

The second concern I have of strategic importance is electromagnetic pulse [EMP]. This is the most asymmetric of all warfare 

potentials, a non-state actor, who had a tramp steamer, a Scud 

missile, and any nuclear weapon detonated above the atmosphere 
26 

could be devastating to our military or to our country. How is this 

reflected in the QDR? 

And the third is our deep strike heavy bombers, I notice that the 

Chinese took out a satellite, and we can take out a missile with a 

missile. This new bomber will fly lower than a satellite and slower 

than a missile. 

And I know it will be stealthy and its cross-sectional area will 

be very small, but radar is also becoming very much more capable 

as are the missiles that might take out the plane. These three concerns, I wonder how they are reflected in the QDR? 

Dr. PERRY. I will comment on two of them. On the deep strike 

heavy bomber, we do recommend an increase, that the Air Force 

move forward with another deep strike and has deep strike capability. 

In my opinion, we have such capability already in the B–2, and 

that the diagram should be a follow on to the B–2 and have the 

kind of stealth capabilities that the B–2 has. That is the unique capability that the United States has today and one which will be 

very important to be incorporated in any new deep strike bomber. 

On the Chinese anti-ship capability, of course the U.S. Navy is 

very much aware of that emerging capability and is—think I would 

say in simple and unclassified terms has a serious program to try 

to deal with it. 

I am not suggesting complacency in that area, but I would suggest that it is not going to—it need not be a game changer if we 

have appropriate countermeasures. 

Steve, do you want to comment on any of those? 

Mr. HADLEY. Just two points, I think this is a priority in the 

QDR. It is one of the six mission sets: deter, defeat aggression in 

anti-access environments. It is the second of our four enduring interests: a shared access to sea, airspace and cyberspace. It is a 

function partly of hardware, but partly of tactics. 

And one of the things we pointed out in our report is the Navy 

and the Air Force are working on an AirSea Battle concept on how 

they would deal with the challenges presented by exactly the kinds 

of systems you describe in anti-access environments, and we applaud this. It requires a hardware solution, but also a strategy and 

tactics solution. 

EMP, we did not address. I don’t recall it being particularly addressed in the QDR. It is an important area. I think it is something 

we paid attention to in the days of the Cold War and have stopped 

paying attention to now, and it is a shortfall and something that 

needs to be addressed. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, but even more important now than it 

was during the Cold War, and thank you for your recognition of 

that. I yield back, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kissell, the gentleman from North Carolina. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the cochairmen of this study and to all the panelists that help put this 

together. Looking at a different kind of structure for a couple minutes, government structure, you talk about that we are still basically operating under the government structure from the 1930s and 
27 

1940s and how that hampers our ability to perhaps define and 

move forward in better ways. 

For someone who was not in Congress at the time—my first 

term—it would seem like with the government reorganizations that 

took place after 9/11 that we might have accomplished some of 

that. 

So what in particular are we looking at in terms of the panel’s 

recommendations that the government structure is not good and 

how perhaps did we not make the changes we should have after 

9/11? 

Mr. HADLEY. I would say two things. One we made a start after 

9/11, but the environment now—9/11 now it is hard to believe is 

nine years ago and the world has changed, and there is more that 

needs to be done and that is what we try to assess here. 

Secondly, there are things the executive branch needs to do, and 

we outline them in some detail in our report. There are also things 

Congress needs to do in terms of looking at its own committee 

structure. 

We say that the executive branch needs to overcome the stovepipes, and we need to have the government work in an integrated 

way to achieve national security’s challenges. That has implications 

for how Congress is organized as well, in our view. 

And therefore one of our recommendations was to reconvene the 

Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, which was established by statute in 1945, resulted in legislation in 1946 that 

changed how Congress committee structure organize. 

We think Congress needs to reconvene that committee and look 

at its own organization to support recommendations that we make 

for reorganization in executive branch. 

Mr. KISSELL. How would you assess in terms of what you talk 

about civilian structure, jointly with military structure as we go 

into different conflicts? How would you assess or did you assess the 

efforts that are being made in Afghanistan now as a model for perhaps doing this in the future or not? 

Dr. PERRY. And I approach this problem with some personal experience of having been Secretary of Defense in Bosnia, where we 

had I thought and absolutely successful first-rate military operation, but the civilian function that needed to be performed had 

great difficulty because the civilian team doing them did not have 

the right training or background or experience for doing it. 

And that problem manifests itself in spades in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so we called special attention to the importance of considering a civilian expeditionary force, a force that could along with 

the military, perform the missions. 

And we are very far behind in the training and resourcing to do 

that. We made some specific recommendations in the report about 

how to do it, but mostly what we did was call attention to the importance of doing that, and much more detailed thinking needs to 

be done about how to actually accomplish that. But it certainly requires more resources in civilian departments now and it requires, 

in my judgment, that pulling together a force capable of doing that 

expeditionary work and training that force with the military. 

Steve. 
28 

Mr. HADLEY. We learned some things in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

I think overwhelming we have learned that it is really hard, and 

we still don’t do it well, and it requires a change of culture in our 

civilian agencies. It requires a change in the personnel system, 

probably change in legislation. 

It was not designed to be deployable in the way our military is, 

and that is one of the reasons we are relying so much on contractors because they are more deployable than our civilian agencies 

and departments. 

We don’t know how to do it well. We are not organized for it, and 

that is why we think our recommendation for a national commission on building the civil force of the future is so important. We 

have got a lot of work to do on this area. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Coffman, please. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all gentlemen, 

I want to thank you for some extraordinary work here and members of the panel. 

And in particular I think the reforming the personnel system I 

think is absolutely important and extending the career out to 40 

years, as you mention, and allowing people to spend more time in 

specific billets, more time in grade. It may result in an operating 

savings as well. 

But one question I have is that I was in the Army before the Marine Corps and I was in the Army at the time where they had conscription, and in my view it didn’t work, and we had folks that 

didn’t want to be there and didn’t want to serve and yet they were 

forced to be there. 

And it seems that we have evolved to where the level of professionalism at all levels of our military is much higher than it used 

to be. And the notion that we can bring people in overnight and 

train them in short order to meet the needs of our national security 

objectives, I think is unrealistic. 

Yet in the Carter Administration, I think in 1979 or so, with the 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinstituted the selective service 

system that we have now at least in place. And I have to ask you, 

is that necessary to have the selective service system today up and 

running. Is that realistic? 

Dr. PERRY. In my judgment, no. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Yes. 

Dr. PERRY. What is necessary though is a restructuring and a rethinking of the contract with the Reserve and the Guard forces. We 

need a serious approach on how to make the best use of the Reserve and Guard force, but I do not believe a selective service system would meet any need which I can anticipate. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

Mr. HADLEY. I would just add one thing, clearly balance between 

the active Guard and Reserve exactly right. The question we asked 

ourselves is are there some capabilities that are in the civilian sector that in a time of crisis the United States would want to be able 

to call on? 

For example, in terms of cyber, we thought about a model that 

you have had some capability in the active force, some capability 
29 

in Guard and Reserve, and maybe in a place like Silicon Valley, 

you would try to have some kind of contract, if you will, that could 

bring people to the fore in the event of a national crisis. 

On the civilian side, clearly policemen and other people in law 

enforcement could and were called upon to have a role in places 

like Afghanistan. 

So we have talked about a civilian response corps, people who 

would be contracted with in the private sector that in a time of national emergency where we needed skills could come forward, have 

some training and deploy overseas in support of our military. 

So it is not the traditional conscription service. It is not the traditional Selected Reserve. But there may be a role for a mobilization of element beyond the Guard and Reserve. And that is one of 

the things that we think the national commission on military personnel needs to address. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, gentlemen, but let me be clear that 

right now we have a requirement in statute when the Carter Administration reauthorized or reinstituted the Selective Service System at least to have all the apparatus up and running. 

And we are expending dollars to do that today. And we require 

young men in this country that are age 18 to register. In your view, 

is that necessary at this point in time? 

Dr. PERRY. My personal view is no. The question is complicated 

enough that I think that it is a issue which the commission, which 

you talked about, a specific issue that should be put forward on the 

plate of this commission on military personnel. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, 

for appearing here today. In the report it talks about personnel 

costs and the rise of personnel entitlements. And I am just curious 

as to your view or the panel’s view. 

Is this a snapshot in time that because of the accelerated or the 

conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have really driven a higher than 

expected amount of health care and needs of our military personnel 

coming back that this snapshot really is an aberration? 

Dr. PERRY. I think that has certainly been a contributing factor. 

But I think more generally health care costs are rising and have 

been rising every year, and not just in the military of course but 

in the civilian area as well. 

So I think that is a real problem. But I think the problem is 

more general than that. 

Steve. 

Mr. HADLEY. I agree with that. 

Mr. CRITZ. And then in the report the panel writes that in evaluating the QDR force structure that you were hampered by the lack 

of a clearly articulated force planning construct. Can you explain 

your assessment of the construct and why you concluded that the 

construct didn’t allow you to measure the adequacy of the force 

structure? 

Mr. HADLEY. We thought the QDR was useful in that they did 

a lot of scenario work about contingencies that would arise in 

which our military would have to be engaged. And that is useful 
30 

because it is a different world and there are broad theories of 

threats. 

But it did not then try to make some judgments and give clear 

guidance in a construct that would both drive the sizing of the 

force and permit the Department to explain it to the Congress in 

an effective way. 

And that is why our report says that it was a missed opportunity. They did the good spade work, if you will, but didn’t really 

draw the consequence into sort of a clear sizing force requirement 

that could give clear guidance to the services and explanation to 

Congress. That is what we think they failed to do. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, I appreciate that. And of course as the newest 

member of the panel, I saw your recommendation for reconvening 

and looking at the structure of Congress and committees. 

And I am just curious what your thoughts are on—obviously you 

think there needs to be a reclassification of who has jurisdiction 

over what. And I would just be curious as a quick snapshot on why 

you came to that conclusion? 

Mr. HADLEY. Again, we think the problem in this new world is 

stovepiping. And the need is for all the various agencies of the government to work together to help solve national security problems 

that are now bigger than just the military. And that the real problem in the government is integration and common effort. 

Well, if you are going to have that integration in the executive, 

it raises the question of whether there is enough integration in the 

appropriations and authorization process in the Congress. 

And we have suggested the Joint Committee on the Organization 

of Congress. We make it with some trepidation because Congress 

obviously is going to have to address these itself. But we suggested 

that commission look at two things. One, establishing a single national security appropriations subcommittee for Defense, State, 

USAID [United States Agency for International Development], and 

the intelligence community. And then in parallel just considering 

whether there is a way to get enhanced coordination among and 

across the Congressional authorization committees so as to give 

more integrated guidance to the national security departments and 

agencies. 

Those are two specific things we thought ought to be looked at 

by this commission. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you. I have no further questions. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for 

being here. Just a quick question that is pretty specific. I am going 

to read really quick from your panel’s report, ‘‘During the dramatic 

post-Cold War defense cuts, most dual-sources were dropped in 

favor of sole source contracting, but as defense funding has returned and it exceeded levels of supported dual sourcing, the contracting strategy has remained sole source.’’ 

‘‘Recommendation, OSD should return to a strategy requiring 

dual-source competition for production programs in circumstances 

where this will produce real competition.’’ Probably that last little 

phrase is the most important out of that whole thing. 

But specifically then, leaving aside the implications for fighter 

force readiness, dependent on a sole source for 95 percent of U.S. 
31 

fighter engines for our next fleet of fighters, do you think that the 

F–35 engine is a candidate for that dual-source procurement requirement that you mention here in your recommendations? 

Dr. PERRY. Do we think—what is the—— 

Mr. HUNTER. The F–35 engine, having two competitive engines 

for the F–35. Do we make them? Because this committee for the 

most part supported that. The whole House supported that. And I 

am curious if that goes in line with your recommendations. 

Dr. PERRY. I would defer what Steve was saying—from in my assessment is that our committee did not specifically look at any particular system and try to make that judgment. We made a more 

general judgment. 

The general judgment we were quite unanimous on the importance of competition and keeping costs down and in particular 

dual-source is a way of competition. We did not come to a specific 

judgment about any particular system. 

Mr. HUNTER. What do you think? 

Mr. HADLEY. I think what the committee—we did not address 

that specific issue. I think the issue is is this real competition that 

is going to get prices down? Or is this simply a situation of directed 

procurement? 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. I understand. What I am asking for—I understand you didn’t come to conclusions. 

Mr. HADLEY [continuing]. For political and other reasons. 

Mr. HUNTER. What are—— 

Mr. HADLEY. And our view is dual-sourcing ought to be to enhance competition and to drive prices down, and the experts need 

to have those criteria and then look at the case by case. That would 

be our answer. 

Mr. HUNTER. What do you think about the F–35 dual engine? 

Dr. PERRY. When I were the secretary of defense and was faced 

with an issue like that, I would put considerable study on it and 

have a lot of people advising me on it. I have not had either that 

study or people advising me on that issue, so I would not—I would 

hesitate to make a judgment. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. That kind of follows though. Let me ask then 

because in order for us to make good decisions, in order for you to 

make good decisions, you have to have people telling you the truth 

in an objective way. 

And if the people testifying before us, military leaders who live 

and breathe in the Pentagon, live and breathe in the OSD, whose 

future is dependent on basically whatever Administration they are 

in, do you think that it is it even possible for us to get objective 

recommendations? 

I can cite a specific experience in this committee when a gentleman answered a question from the chairman, gave his personal 

opinion about the F–35 engine, and it wasn’t about acquisition 

even. It was operational availability. 

I remember when I was in the Marine Corps we had to ground 

every F–18 in the world because one cracked a wing or something 

in 2007. So they all got grounded, every one of them because the 

wings were all made by the same guys. So his answer was—and 

he basically got fired. I am not going to mention this gentleman’s 

name, but he got fired because that wasn’t the right answer. 
32 

So if the people we are asking questions of here or testifying to 

us live and breathe in this world and their QDR comes out of that 

world and every other recommendation comes out of that world, 

how can we make sure that we are getting the right kind of information that is basically the truth and not something that their future career depends on them answering the correct way? 

Dr. PERRY. I think you have to have a certain amount of confidence in the competence and the integrity of the people who are 

working in the issue. I and my staff have a lot of confidence, a lot 

of respect for the secretary and the undersecretary who are making 

those decisions, so I would be hesitant to second guess them without looking at the issue very, very carefully. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you think that there is any—it is hard for someone to be objective to us in testifying when they come out of that 

world? 

Dr. PERRY. Having been in that position, I can assure you it is 

a very hard decision to make, and it involves—— 

Mr. HUNTER. And the reason I am asking is because—— 

Dr. PERRY [continuing]. Personnel issues. 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. Your QDR differs greatly with the one 

that—— 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. We were given, right? 

Dr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. HUNTER. And there are obviously some reasons for that. I 

am just trying to get to those reasons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Nye, gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to note a couple 

of things in your report with which I agree strongly. I just want 

to read quickly one sentence from your introduction that says, ‘‘Instead of unconstrained long-term analysis by planners who were 

encouraged to challenge pre-existing thinking, the QDRs became 

explanations and justifications often with marginal changes of established decisions and plans. This QDR continues that trend.’’ 

I want to talk about a particular decision in the QDR, but ask 

your general thoughts on a larger topic about risk assessment. In 

agreeing with that sentence in the introduction, I quite honestly 

found that the QDR included a very oddly-placed, one-off sentence 

that suggested that the Navy ought to move a carrier from Norfolk 

to Mayport, Florida. 

I want to read a couple things that you said about risk assessments in your report with which I agree including, ‘‘With such 

large demands, the department needs guidance to prioritize risk. A 

more specific measurable strategic guidance is also required to 

make the force structure and budgetary decisions required of the 

QDR.’’ 

I continue with your quote, ‘‘Both Congress and the Department 

of Defense must base their respective prioritization investment decisions on appropriate risk guidance.’’ 

And you go further to say in the report, ‘‘Because a national security strategy with both proactive and risk acceptance guidance 
33 

does not exist, one cannot clearly assess the balance of the Department’s programs.’’ 

We have a difficult job here in trying to assess the importance 

of various projects that we would like to invest defense dollars in. 

And what it comes down to at the end of the day is making some 

trade-offs. 

In fact, just last week when I questioned Under Secretary of the 

Navy, Mr. Work, about the proposal to move a carrier to Mayport, 

Florida, he agreed with me that such a decision which carries a 

price tag in the region of a billion dollars requires some serious 

trade-offs. 

In a time when we are trying to get to 313 ships or perhaps more 

appropriately 346 to meet that risk that is out there, 150 strike 

fighters shortfall in investments and shipyards, we have got to 

make some tough decisions about where we invest our defense dollars. And the QDR ought to be a guide to help us make those types 

of decisions. 

Given what you said about risk assessment, though, and the fact 

that a GAO [Government Accountability Office] study that I asked 

for and this committee ordered last year which reported that the 

Navy is home porting decision-making approach was flawed essentially because it was not based sufficiently enough on a specific risk 

analysis that would help us make a decision about whether that 

billion dollars is better spent on that project versus something else. 

Secretary Perry, can you comment on whether you agree that a 

decision of that magnitude in the billion dollar range ought to be 

subject to some kind of specific risk assessment that would help us 

make a decision about how we balance that in the trade-off against 

those other things I mentioned? 

Dr. PERRY. Yes. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. 

Mr. Hadley, do you want to add to that? 

Mr. HADLEY. Yes, but this panel is really not a good vehicle for 

offering guidance on the kinds of specific issues you are talking 

about in terms of moving the carrier decision or the F–35. 

Mr. NYE. Sure. 

Mr. HADLEY. So it is just we are at 10,000 feet, and you are on 

a very particular issue. And we just didn’t have the capacity to get 

into those detailed issues, as important as that issue is. 

Mr. NYE. I understand that. I appreciate you saying that. And 

my question is not designed to ask you to make a judgment about 

that particular project. We have a process for those kinds of judgments. 

But my question—what I was trying to get at the heart of, and 

I think Secretary Perry, thank you for your very forthright answer 

on that, is the process with which we make these decisions, how 

difficult it is. 

And how much more helpful it would be to us to have specific 

risk assessments done on projects, especially ones that carry that 

kind of dollar price tag to help us decide whether the billion dollars 

ought to be spent there or perhaps on something else. 

And that I think is the nature of the challenge of the QDR is trying to establish whether or not this QDR tool is the appropriate 

tool or has been constructed appropriately to provide us the advice 
34 

that we need and guidance we need to make those tough decisions 

about those trade-offs. And so I appreciate your answer. 

I just want to note again for the record, we understand it is a 

tough process. These decisions are difficult. This committee has actually ordered for the coming year additional studies on that particular decision to shed more light on the risk assessment that we 

ought to be looking into to help us make a decision about whether 

that billion dollars is better spent on this than something else. 

I have made a strong case that I think we have other priorities 

that are higher. But I think a risk assessment is something that 

is absolutely essential before that type of decision can be made. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Virginia. There being 

no further questions, we certainly thank those co-chairmen today, 

Dr. Perry and Dr. Hadley, and their fantastic panel, some of whom 

are seated behind them, as well as the staff director that has been 

very, very helpful. 

And as we move from this day toward the conference with the 

Senate, it will also be very helpful, and of course next year as we 

consider anew the challenges of national security. This is serious 

business, and you have done serious work. And we are very grateful for what you have done. Thank you again. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 29, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 29, 2010 

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