IDENTITY THEFT

Total Extent of Refund 

Fraud Using Stolen 

Identities is Unknown

Statement of James R. White, Director 

Strategic Issues

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government 

Organization, Efficiency and Financial 

Management, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST

November 29, 2012

GAO-13-132T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-132T, testimony

before the Subcommittee on Government 

Organization, Efficiency and Financial 

Management, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

November 29, 2012 

IDENTITY THEFT

Total Extent of Refund Fraud Using Stolen 

Identities is Unknown

Why GAO Did This Study

Identity theft is a growing and evolving 

problem that imposes a financial and 

emotional toll on its victims. As of 

September 30, 2012, IRS had 

identified almost 642,000 incidents of 

identity theft that impacted tax 

administration in 2012 alone, a large 

increase over prior years. A taxpayer 

may have his or her tax refund delayed 

if an identity thief files a fraudulent tax 

return seeking a refund using a 

legitimate taxpayer’s identity 

information. 

GAO was asked to describe identity 

theft issues at IRS and limits to what is 

known about the extent of identity theft.

GAO updated its analysis on identity 

theft with current data on identity theft 

cases and interviewed IRS officials. 

GAO also reviewed past GAO reports 

to identify key attributes of successful 

performance measures and compare 

information provided by the Global 

Report. 

What GAO Recommends

To improve information available to 

IRS management and Congress, GAO 

recommends that IRS update the 

Global Report to provide definitions 

and data sources, where such 

information is missing; document 

procedures used to compile and 

validate the data; and describe 

limitations of the data presented. 

IRS officials agreed with our 

recommendations. Based on their 

comment, we revised language in the 

report to clarify that, like other forms of 

fraud, IRS conducts criminal 

investigations only in the most serious 

identity theft-related refund fraud 

cases. 

What GAO Found

Understanding the extent and nature of identity theft-related refund fraud is 

important to crafting a response to it, but Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

managers recognize that they do not have a complete picture. Program officials 

said that one of the challenges they face in combating this type of fraud is its 

changing nature and how it is concealed. While perfect knowledge about cases 

and who is committing the crime will never be attained, the better IRS 

understands the problem, the better it can respond and the better Congress can 

oversee IRS’s efforts. IRS officials described several areas where the extent and 

nature of identity theft is unknown.

• Total number and cost of fraudulent returns. IRS does not know the full 

extent of the occurrence of identity theft. Officials said that they count the 

refund fraud cases that IRS identifies but that they do not estimate the 

number of identity theft cases that go undetected.

• Identity of the thieves. Unless IRS pursues a criminal investigation, IRS 

generally does not know the real identity of the thieves. 

• Whether a fraudulent return is an individual attempt or part of a broader 

scheme. Identifying new schemes or significant cases, such as one thief 

using numerous taxpayer identities, depends on analysts noticing 

patterns or other indications that a few cases may be part of a larger 

scheme. As a result, some schemes or cases involving multiple 

taxpayers may go undetected. 

• Characteristics of known identity theft returns. IRS officials told us that 

the agency does not systematically track characteristics of known identity 

theft returns, including the type of return preparation (e.g., paid preparer 

or software), whether the return is filed electronically or on paper, or how 

the individual claimed a refund (e.g., check, direct deposit, or debit card).

While much remains unknown about identity theft, IRS has taken steps to 

organize what it knows in a newly developed Refund Fraud and Identity Theft 

Global Report (Global Report). The Global Report consolidates and tracks 

information about identity theft incidents and IRS detection and resolution efforts 

from multiple sources within IRS. The report provides information to IRS senior 

management and a standard source of information for responding to data 

requests from external entities. GAO’s selected review of the Global Report 

against key attributes of successful performance measures found that it had 

many of the attributes useful for program monitoring, but also had some areas 

where additional information or clarification would make the report more helpful. 

Updating the Global Report to provide information on definitions, data sources, 

and limitations such as the unknown number of undetected fraudulent returns, 

could help ensure users have a more complete picture of the data and its 

strengths and limitations. The quality of the report will also be enhanced by the 

institution of process controls to help ensure consistency in how the data in the 

report are compiled, verified and validated.

View GAO-13-132T. For more information, 

contact James R. White at (202) 512-9110 or 

whitej@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-13-132T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Platts, Ranking Member Towns, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss the growing problem of identity theft and 

the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) efforts to resolve, detect, and prevent 

identity theft-based refund fraud (identity theft).1 My testimony today will 

discuss identity theft issues at IRS and will assess limits to what is known 

about the extent of identity theft. As discussed at a previous hearing before 

this committee, identity theft imposes a financial and emotional toll on its 

victims. A taxpayer may have his or her tax refund delayed if an identity 

thief files a fraudulent tax return seeking a refund using a legitimate 

taxpayer’s identity information. As of September 30, 2012, IRS had 

identified almost 642,000 incidents of identity theft that impacted tax 

administration in 2012 alone, a large increase over prior years. This figure 

does not include incidents related to the “Operation Mass Mail” scheme in 

which identity thieves use the stolen identities of Puerto Rican citizens.2

My testimony is based in part on our previous 2009 and 2011 reports.

As 

of September 30, 2012, IRS reported around 436,000 incidents occurred in 

2012 related to this scheme. 

3

 

1

Taxpayers can also be affected by employment fraud, which occurs when an identity thief 

uses a taxpayer’s name and Social Security number to obtain a job. For additional 

information on employment fraud see GAO, Taxes and Identity Theft: Status of IRS 

Initiatives to Help Victimized Taxpayers, 

Our past work has found that IRS’s ability to detect current identity theft 

incidents is limited and the number of incidents that go undetected is not 

known. In response to our recommendation that IRS should establish 

performance measures and collect data suitable for assessing the 

effectiveness of its identity theft initiatives, IRS agreed and implemented 

data collection and reporting procedures that help IRS evaluate more 

completely the effectiveness of its programs and identity opportunities for 

GAO-11-674T (Washington, D.C.: 

May 25, 2011).

2

IRS officials told us they do not classify Operation Mass Mail incidents as impacting tax 

administration since the fraudulent return usually does not harm an innocent taxpayer, as 

most of these cases involve individuals who do not have a filing requirement. 

3

GAO, Taxes and Identity Theft: Status of IRS Initiatives to Help Victimized Taxpayers, 

GAO-11-721T (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2011); GAO-11-674T; and Tax Administration: 

IRS Has Implemented Initiatives to Prevent, Detect, and Resolve Identity Theft-Related 

Problems, but Needs to Assess Their Effectiveness, GAO-09-882 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 8, 2009). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-132T 

improvement.4

For this testimony we updated our analysis with current data on identity 

theft cases and interviewed IRS officials in the Wage and Investment 

Division (W&I); Criminal Investigation (CI); and the Office of Privacy, 

Government Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD). We also reviewed our past 

reports to identify key attributes of successful performance measures and 

compared information provided by IRS’s Refund Fraud and Identity Theft 

Global Report. To determine the reliability of IRS data on identity theft, we 

discussed data quality-control procedures with agency officials, reviewed 

relevant documentation, and tested data for obvious errors. We determined 

that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

However, there continues to be gaps in what IRS knows 

about the extent of identity theft.

Our prior reports and this November 2012 update were conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We discussed the information in this statement with IRS officials, and they 

concurred with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Identity thieves can obtain a legitimate taxpayer’s name and Social 

Security number (SSN) in a variety of ways. They can obtain identity 

information by hacking into a computer system or paper files at one of the 

many entities that use names and SSNs in their records (e.g., employers, 

schools, or financial institutions). Thieves can trick the taxpayer into 

revealing such information, or they can steal it from the taxpayer. Armed 

with the stolen identity, the thief can then file a fraudulent tax return 

seeking a refund. The thief typically files a return claiming a refund early 

in the filing season, before the legitimate taxpayer files. If IRS determines 

the name and SSN on the tax return appear valid (IRS checks all returns 

to see if filers’ names and SSNs match before issuing refunds) and it 

passes through IRS’s other filters, IRS will issue the refund to the thief. 

 

4

GAO-09-882. 

Identity Theft Issues 

at IRS
 

Page 3 GAO-13-132T 

IRS often becomes aware of a problem after the legitimate taxpayer files 

a return. At that time, IRS discovers that two returns have been filed using 

the same name and SSN, as shown in figure 1. The legitimate taxpayer’s 

refund is delayed while IRS spends time determining who is legitimate.

Figure 1: Notional Example of Identity Theft-Based Refund Fraud

As we have previously reported, IRS has taken multiple steps to detect, 

resolve, and prevent identity theft-based refund fraud.5

 

5

IRS developed 

new filtering processes in 2012 to detect identity theft based on the 

characteristics of incoming tax returns that do not rely on a duplicate filing 

or self-identification by filers. Identity theft indicators—also known as 

account flags—are a key tool used to resolve and detect identity theft. 

Identity theft indicators speed resolution by making a taxpayer’s identity 

theft problems visible to all IRS personnel with account access. In some 

cases, IRS uses its identity theft indicators to screen tax returns filed in 

the names of known identity theft victims. If a return fails the screening, it 

is subject to additional IRS manual review, including contacting 

GAO-11-721T, GAO-11-674T, and GAO-09-882. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-132T 

employers to verify that the income reported on the tax return was 

legitimate.

IRS uses the Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP 

PIN)—a single-use identification number sent to victims of identity theft 

that have validated their identities with IRS—to prevent refund fraud. 

When screening returns for possible identity theft, IRS excludes returns 

with an IP PIN, which helps avoid the possibility of a “false positive” and a 

delayed tax refund. If a taxpayer was issued an IP PIN and does not use 

it when filing electronically, IRS rejects the electronically filed return and 

prompts the taxpayer to file on paper. Taxpayers that do not use an IP 

PIN or enter an incorrect IP PIN filing on paper experience processing 

delays as IRS verifies the taxpayers’ identity. As of June 30th, IRS 

reported providing more than 251,500 IP PINs to taxpayers in 2012 and 

of those, 150,506 taxpayers filed using an IP PIN. Of filers that filed using 

an IP PIN, 8.6 percent (12,936) used an invalid IP PIN. IRS officials told 

us their review of a sample of these cases found that the majority of the 

invalid IP PINs were due to transposition or keying errors. Details on 

other IRS actions can be found in our previous reports.

Other steps taken in 2012 include temporarily reallocating hundreds of 

staff from other business units to resolve duplicate filing cases and issue 

refunds to legitimate taxpayers. Officials in IRS’s accounts management 

function told us that in October 2012 there were more than 1,700 staff 

working to resolve identity theft cases. Also, in April 2012, IRS began the 

Law Enforcement Assistance Pilot Program in Florida to help state and 

local law enforcement agencies obtain tax return data vital to local identity 

theft investigations. The pilot allows taxpayers to give their permission for 

IRS to provide state and local law enforcement with the returns submitted 

using their SSN in certain cases. IRS expanded the pilot to eight 

additional states in October 2012.6 As of September 2012, 49 state and 

local agencies participated in the pilot. We did not independently assess 

IRS’s 2012 efforts.

 

6

As discussed in more detail in our 2009 report, GAO-09-882, IRS has limited authorities 

to share identity theft information with other federal, state, and local agencies. Tax returns 

and other information submitted to, and in some cases generated by, IRS are confidential 

and protected from disclosure, except as specifically authorized by statute. 26 U.S.C. § 

6103.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-132T 

The full extent and nature of identity theft-based refund fraud is not 

known, but IRS data indicate that it is a large and growing problem. The 

data show that in the first 9 months of 2012, the number of known taxrelated identity theft incidents has already more than doubled over 2011 

(see table 1).

Table 1: Tax-Related Identity Theft Incidents Identified by IRS, 2008 to 2012

Incidents

2008 47,730

2009 165,524

2010 147,680

2011

a

242,142

2012 641,690 b

Source: IRS.

Notes: These figures include incidents affecting tax administration, where (1) a taxpayer identifies the 

identity theft and substantiates his or her identity with the IRS using documentation or (2) IRS 

identifies the identity theft. These figures do not include incidents related to the “Operation Mass Mail” 

scheme. The number of incidents in 2008, 2009, and 2010 differ from what we reported in 

GAO-11-721T and GAO-11-674T. IRS officials told us they believe the differences in 2008 and 2009 

are likely due to indicators that were reversed at a later date. Officials noted that the 2010 data they 

previously provided erroneously included some Operation Mass Mail incidents. 

a

IRS officials told us that the decline in incidents from 2009 to 2010 does not reflect a true decrease in 

the number of identity theft occurring, and that the decline is likely due to CI transitioning much of its 

identity theft work to the Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program. 

b

Understanding the extent and nature of identity theft-related refund fraud 

is important to crafting a response to it. Program officials said that one of 

the challenges they face in combating this type of fraud is its changing 

nature. The officials said that when they discover and shut down one 

vulnerability, thieves often change tactics. The hidden nature of the crime 

means it is not reasonable to expect perfect knowledge about cases and 

who is committing the crime. However, the better IRS managers’ 

understanding of the problem, the better they can respond and the better 

Congress can oversee IRS’s efforts.

The 2012 data are as of September 2012. 

IRS officials described several areas where the extent and nature of 

identity theft is unknown.

• Total number and cost of fraudulent returns. IRS does not know the 

full extent of the occurrence of identity theft. Officials said that they 

count the refund fraud cases that IRS identifies but that they do not 

estimate the number of identity theft cases that go undetected. IRS 

officials explained that “we don’t know what we don’t know,” because 

Much Remains 

Unknown about the 

Extent and Nature of 

Identity Theft
 

Page 6 GAO-13-132T 

if a fraudulent return goes through IRS’s identity theft models and 

other programs, they are unable to tell if they failed to detect the 

fraudulent return. Officials explained that it is very difficult to detect a 

fraudulent return when an identity thief uses a correct SSN and has 

enough identifying information to make the return “look” like it came 

from the legitimate tax filer. The tax return appears to be legitimate as 

it has been filed with a name and SSN that match. Detecting identity 

theft can also be challenging because some legitimate filers 

mistakenly file duplicate returns. For example, IRS officials told us that 

in some cases, taxpayers intending to amend their return are 

confused and file a second Form 1040. In such a case, IRS has to 

investigate whether the duplicate filing is due to taxpayer confusion or 

identity theft.

IRS captures data on the amount of money it recovers from all types 

of fraudulent returns, but it does not distinguish whether the type of 

fraud was identity theft or some other type of fraud. In some cases, 

external entities, such as banks or other agencies, may notify IRS of 

potential refund fraud, including suspected identity theft-based refund 

fraud. IRS reported it had received information from 116 banks and 

external leads on more than 193,000 accounts between January 1 

and September 30, 2012, for all types of refund fraud. IRS reported 

that banks and other external entities returned almost $754 million 

dollars during this period. These cases are ones where fraudulent 

returns passed through IRS processes and refunds were issued. W&I 

officials told us they analyze data from such cases to identify 

characteristics of the fraudulent returns to improve their screening for 

identity theft and other types of refund fraud. The officials told us that 

the procedure for banks to notify IRS of suspected refund fraud is not 

new, but more financial institutions have now begun doing so.

• Identity of the thieves. Unless IRS pursues a criminal investigation, 

IRS generally does not know the real identity of the thieves. An 

investigation is necessary because the only identity information IRS 

has on the fraudulent tax return is that of the identity theft victim, not 

the thief. Officials responsible for processing returns said that they do 

not have the sort of information that would be needed to even begin 

such an investigation.

CI has substantially increased efforts to criminally investigate identity

theft cases in fiscal year 2012; however, as with other forms of fraud, 

CI focuses its investigative resources on the most serious cases. The 

number of identity theft investigations opened and time spent 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-132T 

investigating identity theft cases have increased from fiscal year 2010 

to fiscal year 2012, as shown in table 2. Although identity theft is one 

of CI’s investigative priorities, the number of investigations initiated is 

substantially less than the number of identity theft incidents confirmed 

by IRS in 2012. CI officials told us that while other IRS functions share 

leads with CI, not all of these leads meet CI’s criteria for developing a 

case for prosecution. CI officials told us they generally focus their 

investigative resources on the most egregious and significant identity 

theft cases, as measured by volume and refund amounts.

Table 2: Selected Criminal Investigation Statistics for Identity Theft Cases, Fiscal 

Year 2008 to 2012

Fiscal year

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Subject criminal investigations 

initiated

108 187 224 276 898

Direct investigative time (hours) 130,800 148,900 191,700 225,100 516,400

Direct investigative time 

(percentage of total)

3% 4% 5% 6% 13%

Source: IRS.

Notes: Fiscal year 2012 data are as of October 2, 2012, and are from the Criminal Investigation 

Management Information System. Fiscal years 2008 through 2011 data are as of October 4, 2011. 

We rounded the last two rows of the table. 

• Whether a fraudulent return is an individual attempt or part of a 

broader scheme. W&I and CI officials told us the two units work 

closely to utilize the information they obtain from identity theft cases. 

They use this information to improve their measures to identify new 

identity theft-based refund attempts and to identify especially 

significant or egregious cases to consider for possible criminal 

investigations. When either W&I’s analysis of identity theft cases or CI 

investigations lead to the identification of new schemes, that 

information is reported to the Return Integrity and Correspondence 

Services unit so it can strengthen its identity theft filters. Identifying 

new schemes or significant cases, such as one identity thief using 

numerous taxpayer identities, depends on analysts noticing patterns 

or other indications that a few cases may be part of a larger scheme. 

As a result, some schemes or cases involving multiple taxpayers may 

go undetected.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-132T 

• Characteristics of known identity theft returns. IRS officials told us that 

the agency does not systematically track characteristics of known 

identity theft returns, including the type of return preparation (e.g. paid 

preparer or software), whether the return is filed electronically or on 

paper, or how the individual claimed a refund (e.g. check, direct 

deposit, or debit card). They added that the form in which a refund is 

claimed would be particularly hard to track using the current 

processes. Officials noted that they can identify the Internet protocol 

address of computers used to electronically file returns, which is 

helpful in detecting potential identity theft.

While much remains unknown about identity theft, IRS has taken steps to 

collect program data on its identity theft detection and resolution efforts. 

IRS developed the internal Refund Fraud and Identity Theft Global Report 

(Global Report) in July 2012 to consolidate and track existing information 

about identity theft incidents from multiple sources within IRS. IRS 

officials said that the information in the report is not new, but that they 

saw the need for consistency in identity theft-related information drawn 

from several data sources. The report is used to provide information to 

IRS senior management and the Identity Theft Advisory Council7

Officials also stated that because the Global Report is new, they are 

working to improve its quality. In a selective review of the Global Report, 

we found that it had many of the attributes we have previously found to be 

useful for program monitoring.

on 

identity theft metrics and to provide a standard source of information for 

responding to data requests from external entities, according to PGLD 

officials.

8

 

7

The Identity Theft Advisory Council is part of the governance process to address IRS’s 

service-wide identity theft efforts and is made up of representatives from various IRS 

functions. The primary objectives of the Identity Theft Advisory Council are to promote a 

collaborative vehicle for addressing and overseeing enterprise-wide identity theft matters 

and to monitor and report on the status of related identity theft initiatives.

For example, the report covers key 

program activities and generally provides names, definitions, and data 

sources. However, we also found some areas where additional 

8

GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002) identifies 

linkage, clarity, measurable targets, objectivity, reliability, core program activities, limited 

overlap, and government-wide priorities as key attributes of successful performance 

measures. Because of the limited time to conduct our analysis for this testimony, we 

focused on only a few of these attributes that were relevant to the Global Report.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-132T 

information or clarification of information currently in the report could 

make it more useful, as explained in table 3.

Table 3: Overview of Our Selective Assessment of the Global Report Program Data

Attribute Definition 

Potentially adverse 

consequences of not 

meeting attribute GAO assessment

Core program 

activities

Measures cover the 

activities that an entity 

is expected to perform 

to support the intent 

of the program.

Not enough information 

available in core program 

areas to managers and 

stakeholders.

Performance metrics provided in the Global Report cover key 

efforts used by IRS to resolve, detect, and prevent identity theft. 

These include identity theft filters used to screen tax returns, 

the IP PIN program, leads provided by banks, CI investigations, 

and the Law Enforcement Assistance Pilot Program. The 

Global Report also provides information on how many days 

identity theft cases remain open, on average. However, some 

key data are not included, such as the known amount of funds 

distributed to identity thieves. 

Clarity Measure is clearly 

stated and the name 

and definition are 

consistent with the 

methodology used to 

calculate it.

Data could be confusing 

and misleading to users.

IRS generally provides names, definitions, data sources, and the 

frequency of data updates in the Global Report; however, it does 

not include such information for all data elements. For example, 

the Global Report does not define its level of service 

measurement, a measure that reflects the success rate of 

taxpayers who call the toll-free lines seeking assistance. Also, 

the Global Report’s data dictionary does not list any known 

limitations in the data, such as the unknown number of 

fraudulent returns that went undetected. IRS officials noted that 

they are working to include additional information in future report 

iterations. 

Reliability Measure produces 

the same result under 

similar conditions.

a Reported performance 

data is inconsistent and 

adds uncertainty.

PGLD officials reported they manually key in data they receive

from other IRS offices into the report. Because the report is 

new, PGLD staff found inconsistencies in the report. They are 

reviewing the report to improve the report’s accuracy and 

ensure figures are not double counted. Officials told us they are 

developing documentation on how they collect and verify data. 

They are also planning on automating the report so that it will 

no longer require manual compilation. Developing process 

controls—such as documentation of procedures used to 

compile, verify, and validate the data—could reduce the risk 

that significant data mistakes occur.

Source: GAO analysis.

b

Notes: We selected three key attributes discussed in GAO-03-143 that were relevant to the Global 

Report. All attributes are not equal and failure to have a particular attribute does not necessarily 

indicate that there is a weakness in that area or that the measure is not useful; rather, it may indicate 

an opportunity for further refinement. 

a

We did not perform a full assessment of the reliability of all data presented in the Global Report. We 

limited our data reliability assessment to data presented earlier in our report and found it sufficiently 

reliable for describing the number of identity theft incidents IRS detected. 

b

Verification is the process of checking or testing performance information to assess types of errors, 

such as errors in keying data. Validation is an effort to ensure that data are free of systematic error or 

bias and that what is intended to be measured is actually measured. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-132T 

The Global Report is a useful step towards providing IRS management 

and other entities with up-to-date, consistent information about identity 

theft-based refund fraud and IRS efforts to address it. However, it could 

be improved with the inclusion of additional information about data 

limitations, definitions, data sources, and the frequency of data updates in 

some areas. With such additional information, IRS management or other 

entities that use the report would have a clearer picture of not only what is 

known about identity theft-based refund fraud, but the strengths and 

limitations of the available information. The quality of the report will also 

be enhanced by the institution of process controls to help ensure 

consistency in how the data in the report are compiled, verified, and 

validated.

Identity theft-related tax fraud is a terrible problem for the victims and a 

growing problem for tax administration. For this reason, legislators, 

government officials, and the public want to know about IRS efforts to 

address identity theft. The nature of identity theft-related tax fraud means 

that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to develop a complete picture 

of the extent and nature of the problem, which in turn makes it difficult to 

assess IRS’s progress in combating it. While not a direct attack on the 

problem itself, IRS’s new Global Report could be a useful management 

tool. It is a recognition of the fact that IRS is devoting significant 

resources to the identity theft problem and that consolidated and more 

consistent program information could assist in management oversight and 

decision making. In reading the report, we identified some improvements 

that could help users better understand the information provided.

To improve the identity theft information available to IRS management 

and Congress, we recommend that the Acting Commissioner of Internal 

Revenue update the Refund Fraud and Identity Theft Global Report to:

• provide definitions, data sources, and the frequency of data updates 

for data elements where such information is missing;

• document procedures used to compile and validate data; and

• describe limitations of the data presented.

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 11 GAO-13-132T 

IRS officials provided oral comments in response to our draft findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations. The Director of PGLD stated that she 

agreed with our recommendations and plans on implementing our 

recommendations to improve the information provided in the Global 

Report. The Director of CI, Refund Crimes said that the discussion of CI’s 

investigation of identity theft could be interpreted to suggest that CI is 

expected to work every case of identity theft. We revised language in the 

report to emphasize that, like other forms of fraud, CI focuses its identity 

theft-related refund fraud investigations on the most serious cases.

Chairman Platts, Ranking Member Towns, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

For further information on this testimony, please contact James R. White 

at (202) 512-9110 or whitej@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. In addition to the individual named above, David Lewis, 

Assistant Director; Shannon Finnegan, Analyst-in-Charge; Michele Fejfar; 

Sarah McGrath; Donna Miller; Amy Radovich; and Sabrina Streagle made 

key contributions to this report.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements

(451021)
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