GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

December 19, 2012 

Congressional Committees

Subject: Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need Additional 

Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess Equipment

In June 2011, the United States announced plans to reduce the number of U.S. troops 

in Afghanistan. The remaining U.S. forces will work to support the U.S. objective of a 

transition to Afghan-led security by December 2014. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

has begun planning for this reduction and, as part of its planning, has identified more 

than 750,000 major end items—equipment important to operational readiness to support 

the combat forces, such as weapons and vehicles—that can be returned from 

Afghanistan (to DOD inventories), transferred to another U.S. government agency or

another country, or destroyed in theater.1 According to DOD, this equipment, estimated 

to be worth more than $36 billion, has accumulated during a 10-year period. DOD 

officials also estimate that it could cost $5.7 billion to return or transfer equipment from

Afghanistan.

We initiated this review to provide Congress with information concerning DOD 

preparations for the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan, and prepared this report 

under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 

We provided a briefing of our preliminary observations to the House Armed Services 

Committee on October 10, 2012. We also provided this briefing to the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on October 24, 2012, and to the Senate and House Defense 

Appropriations Subcommittees on November 14, 2012. 

This report formally transmits the information developed for that briefing and provides 

information on the preparations for the Afghanistan drawdown, specifically the extent to

which DOD has (1) applied relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown in its 

planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan; (2) planned for the reduction of 

equipment in Afghanistan by establishing command structures and guidance, property 

accountability, and transportation processes; and (3) considered costs in its planning for 

equipment reductions in Afghanistan. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has applied relevant lessons learned from the 

Iraq drawdown to the Afghanistan drawdown preparations, we reviewed military service 

documents and GAO products identifying lessons learned in Iraq. We also reviewed 

DOD preparations for the drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan. To determine the 

 

1 DOD Manual 4160.28, vol. 1, Defense Demilitarization: Program Administration (June 7, 2011). When there is a 

risk that DOD property could be diverted into the hands of enemies of the United States, it may be necessary to 

demilitarize or destroy these items. When an item undergoes demilitarization, critical features are removed or 

destroyed and the item cannot be used for its original purpose.
2 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

extent to which DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment in Afghanistan by 

establishing command structures and guidance, property accountability, and 

transportation processes, we examined policies, orders, and processes in those three 

areas. To determine the extent to which DOD has considered costs in its planning for 

equipment reductions in Afghanistan, we examined DOD and service processes and 

documents to ascertain when and how costs were factored into decision-making 

processes. In support of all these objectives, we contacted officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Forces – 

Afghanistan (USFOR-A), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Military 

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command, 

Headquarters Department of the Army/Logistics Retrograde Team, U.S. Army Materiel 

Command, U.S. Army Sustainment Command, U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle 

Management Command, U.S. Marine Corps/Installations and Logistics, U.S. Marine 

Corps Logistics Command, Headquarters U.S. Navy/Expeditionary Readiness, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force/Lessons Learned, Headquarters U.S. Air Force/Equipment 

Management Branch, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Logistics AgencyDisposition Services. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to December 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

In summary, we found the following: 

• The military services and DOD agencies have applied some, but not all, of the 

relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown to their planning for equipment 

reductions in Afghanistan. For example, the drawdown from Iraq demonstrated 

the importance of early planning for equipment drawdown, and the military 

services have already issued guidance and orders outlining the processes and 

procedures for drawing down equipment in Afghanistan. However, not all 

relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown have been applied in 

Afghanistan. For example, during the Iraq drawdown, the Army identified that 

contractor equipment must be inventoried and entered into an automated records 

accounting system, yet inventories in Afghanistan did not include this 

equipment.2 We note, however, that USFOR-A officials told us they are 

establishing a Contractor Drawdown cell that would improve visibility of 

contractor equipment in Afghanistan.

• DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment from Afghanistan in that it has 

(a) established command structures and guidance; (b) made efforts to improve 

property accountability; and (c) established and expanded transportation options, 

but challenges still remain. Command structures and guidance, property 

accountability, and transportation options are three areas that we have previously 

 

2

For the purposes of this report, contractor equipment includes government-owned equipment that was either 

furnished to contractors by the government or acquired directly by the contractor.
3 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

identified as important for drawdown operations.3 Concerning command 

structures and guidance, CENTCOM has established USFOR-A as the 

supported command for retrograde operations, and USFOR-A has published a 

base closure and transfer guide that outlines processes for the handling of 

equipment during transition.4 Regarding planning for property accountability, in 

September 2011, USFOR-A directed an inventory of all the equipment in 

Afghanistan to identify items not previously accounted for in DOD’s systems of 

record. However, as described in Objective 1, DOD officials acknowledge that 

they lack visibility over contractor equipment. In the area of transportation 

options, DOD has established and increased the potential capacity of 

transportation routes out of Afghanistan. However, some of the transportation 

options have limited operational capability for the return of equipment due to the 

region’s complex geopolitical environment. 

• Consistent with DOD’s supply chain materiel management policy, DOD has 

issued additional guidance requiring the services to analyze the costs and 

benefits of transferring or destroying equipment. However, there is no specific 

guidance requiring the military services to assess and document the costs and 

benefits associated with the return of equipment from Afghanistan, and they have 

not done so. Some services told us that they conduct informal cost-benefit 

analyses to support the return of major end items from Afghanistan. However, 

none of the services was able to provide us with documentation of these costbenefit analyses. As a result, the extent to which these analyses are being 

performed is uncertain. Based on our analysis, this is particularly problematic 

when considering whether or not to return equipment that is excess to current

requirements.5 When an excess item is returned without consideration of the 

costs and benefits, there is increased risk of unnecessary expenditures on 

transportation and storage of unneeded items. 

In conclusion, the military services can return major end items without documentation of 

cost and benefit considerations or analyses used in the decision-making process. 

Because the services have not consistently performed and documented analyses to 

support decision making concerning the return of excess major end items from 

Afghanistan, there is a risk that the costs of returning excess items may outweigh the 

benefits of returning them.

 

3 GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment and Infrastructure Should Be Considered in 

Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, GAO-09-380T (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009); and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO-08-930 

(Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008).

4 In the context of command relationships, the supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of 

a task, such as drawdown from Afghanistan, and receives assistance from other commanders’ forces or 

capabilities as required to accomplish the assigned mission. 

5 DOD defines excess equipment as any quantity of equipment above the sum of the approved requirement, as 

well as equipment retained for economic and/or contingency purposes. 
4 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

Recommendations for Executive Action

To reduce the risk of returning excess major end items from Afghanistan without full 

consideration of costs and benefits, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

ensure that the Service Secretaries and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, 

conduct and document analyses to support the decisions to return excess major end 

items by taking the following two actions: 

1) Conduct and document analyses to compare the costs of returning excess major end 

items with the benefits of returning them. These analyses might include considerations 

of factors such as: 

• Repair;

• Transportation and storage;

• Handling;

• Condition of the item; and

• Sensitivity of the item. 

2) Use these cost-benefit analyses as a key factor in decision making concerning the 

return of excess major end items.

See the enclosure that contains the information prepared for our briefing and provides 

additional details regarding our findings.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

DOD did not provide signed written comments but did provide draft comments that we 

have used for this evaluation. DOD concurred with both of our recommendations, stating 

that our report accurately captures DOD’s and the services’ analyses and processes for 

disposition of excess major end items in compliance with DOD guidance. Our draft 

report initially recommended that DOD develop and implement policies to ensure that 

analyses are conducted, documented, and used to support decisions to return excess 

major end items. After further discussions with DOD officials, we agreed that DOD 

Instruction 4140.01, which states that DOD components shall consider all costs in 

making best-value decisions across the supply chain, sufficiently addresses the need for 

the services to conduct cost-benefit analyses and therefore, no new policies or guidance 

were required. However, as we state in this report, the services could not provide 

evidence that they complied with this instruction by conducting analyses to compare the 

costs of returning excess major end items with the benefits of returning them and using 

these analyses in their decision making. As a result, we amended our recommendation 

language to state that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the services and 

CENTCOM conduct, document, and use these analyses as a key factor in decision 

making concerning the return of excess major end items, and DOD subsequently 

concurred with these recommendations in its comments. DOD also provided technical 

comments that we have incorporated into this report where appropriate.

DOD concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense ensure that 

the services and CENTCOM conduct and document analyses to compare the costs of 

returning excess major end items with the benefits of returning them. DOD’s comments 

indicated that two of the services, the Army and Marine Corps, were conducting costbenefit analyses. DOD commented that the Army has worksheets, processes, and a 

tracking system that clearly depict cost benefit analyses. During the course of this 
5 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

engagement we reviewed and assessed these worksheets, processes, and a 

description of the tracking system. We found that none of these products weighs the 

costs and benefits of returning excess equipment from Afghanistan. Moreover, they do 

not inform decision making on this issue, because these documents relate to other 

drawdown issues—that is, the drawdown of equipment in Iraq and the transfer of 

equipment in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in meetings with officials from Headquarters 

Department of the Army, Logistics Retrograde Team; U.S. Army Materiel Command; 

U.S. Army Sustainment Command; U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management 

Command; and Headquarters Department of the Army, Director of Supply, none could 

provide documentation of a cost-benefit analysis for the return of excess equipment 

from Afghanistan. However, the cited Army documents demonstrate its ability to 

conduct, document, and use cost-benefit analyses in its decision making to reduce the 

risk of unnecessary expenditures. We believe that analyses specifically focused on 

weighing the costs and benefits of returning excess major end items from Afghanistan 

will reduce the risk of unnecessary expenditures, and DOD concurs with our 

recommendation.

DOD comments indicated that the Marine Corps currently assesses each item by 

condition, sensitivity, and enduring warfighting requirement to determine whether the 

item is economical to repair and is handled in accordance with pertinent orders and 

directives. We acknowledge that these steps may minimize the cost of drawdown. 

However, Marine Corps officials told us that they do not consider and document costs, 

such as transportation costs, against the benefits of returning equipment from 

Afghanistan. Therefore, we believe that DOD needs to take action as recommended to 

ensure that the Army, the Marine Corps and the other services conduct and document 

cost-benefit analyses to inform retrograde decision making and reduce the risk of 

unnecessary expenditures.

DOD concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of Defense ensure 

that the services and CENTCOM use these cost-benefit analyses as a key factor in 

decision making concerning the return of excess major end items. DOD commented that 

the services, in coordination with DOD, already conduct cost-benefit analyses to ensure 

cost and non-cost factors are applied and documented. However, as stated in our 

report, some services told us that they conduct informal cost-benefit analyses to support 

the return of major end items from Afghanistan. None of the services was able to 

provide us with documentation of these cost-benefit analyses. DOD comments indicate 

that it intends to continue to review its policies to reduce the risk of returning excess 

major items from Afghanistan without full consideration of costs and benefits. Until DOD 

implements our recommendations, we believe that this risk will continue to exist. As 

noted above, conducting and documenting cost-benefit analyses can help the 

department reduce this risk. 

- - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and appropriate 

congressional committees. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are Guy LoFaro, Assistant 
6 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

Director; Tara Copp; Charles Johnson; Gregory Marchand; Charles Perdue; Amie 

Steele; Jose Watkins; Cheryl Weissman; Amanda Weldon; and Steve Woods.

Cary Russell

Acting Director

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosure 
7 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John Kerry

Chairman 

The Honorable Richard Lugar

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan Collins

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chairman

The Honorable Howard Berman 

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives
8 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young

Chairman

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representative
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

9 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN PREPARATIONS: DOD 

Decision Makers Need Additional Analyses to 

Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess 

Equipment

 

DECEMBER 2012

Results of Work Prepared for Congressional 

Committees
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

10 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Briefing Overview 

• Introduction and Background

• Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

• Summary

• Findings

• Conclusions

• Recommendations

• Appendix I: Marine Corps Reset Playbook Sample

• Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process

• Related GAO Products 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

11 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Introduction 

• U.S. forces have been operating in Afghanistan since 2001. 

• In December 2009, the President ordered an additional 30,000 troops into 

Afghanistan. 

• The 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon affirmed NATO’s support for Afghan forces to 

assume full responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

• In June 2011, the United States announced plans to begin reducing the number 

of U.S. forces in Afghanistan: 

• The United States completed the reduction of 33,000 troops from 

Afghanistan in September 2012. 

• The remaining U.S. forces (approximately 68,000) will work to support the 

U.S. objective of a transition to Afghan-led security by December 2014. 

• In May 2012, the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that provided for 

continued access to Afghan facilities for U.S. forces through December 2014. It 

also provided for negotiations that would result in a bilateral security agreement 

within one year. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

12 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Background

• In fiscal year 2011, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) shipped 

over 268,000 tons (more than 42,000 containers) of supplies into 

Afghanistan through its northern surface routes.1

• The Army has said that 10 years’ inflow of equipment without corresponding 

outflow has created an abundance of equipment in Afghanistan. 

• Preparations are underway to dispose of stocks in Afghanistan, ranging from 

consumables to major end items. Major end items are equipment that is

important to operational readiness such as aircraft; boats; motorized 

wheeled, tracked, and towed vehicles; and weapons.

• The military services estimate that more than 750,000 major end items—

worth more than $36 billion—are in Afghanistan. 

• DOD officials have estimated that it could cost $5.7 billion to transfer or 

return the equipment from Afghanistan. 

 

1

A container or 20-foot equivalent unit is an inexact unit of cargo capacity often used to describe the capacity of container ships. It is based on the 

volume of a 20-foot-long standard sized metal box, which can easily be transferred between modes of transportation.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

13 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Background (cont.)

• To reduce or draw down the number of items in Afghanistan, DOD has three primary 

disposal options: transfer the equipment to another U.S. agency or another country; 

destroy the equipment in country; or retrograde (return) the equipment to other DOD 

locations. 

• Transfer: DOD plans to redistribute some equipment to either another U.S. 

agency or other country. 

• Destruction: DOD plans to destroy (demilitarize) some equipment at Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) disposition sites.2

• Return: DOD plans to prepare equipment for return through 10 Army 

Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT) yards situated throughout 

Afghanistan. These yards are operated by the 401st Army Field Support Brigade, 

which inspects and prepares equipment for transport. 

 There are currently three disposition 

sites in Afghanistan, and there are plans to add a fourth in 2012. 

 

2

DOD Manual 4160.28, vol. 1, Defense Demilitarization: Program Administration (June 7, 2011). When there is a risk that DOD property could be 

diverted into the hands of enemies of the United States, it may be necessary to demilitarize or destroy these items. When an item undergoes 

demilitarization, critical features are removed or destroyed and the item cannot be used for its original purpose.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

14 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Background (cont.)

• According to the Army Execute Order for the reduction of equipment currently in Afghanistan, the 

conditions affecting the drawdown from Afghanistan are vastly different from those in Iraq. 

• Some examples of the differing conditions are as follows: 

• Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is landlocked. In addition, U.S. forces in Afghanistan do not have 

easy ground access to a large U.S. military logistics hub, as U.S. forces in Iraq had in 

Kuwait.

• In Iraq, U.S. forces could drive equipment to Kuwait, from whose ports it could be shipped 

onward. Getting equipment out of Afghanistan by ground requires transiting routes that pass 

through Pakistan or surface routes through European and central Asian countries, from 

which the equipment can be loaded onto ships for onward movement. However, 

TRANSCOM is currently conducting tests to determine the capacity of the main ground 

routes for the return of equipment from Afghanistan. Due to geopolitical complexities in the 

region it is unknown when these ground routes will be operational for retrograde.

• According to DOD officials, DOD faces space limitations in Afghanistan. For example, U.S. 

forces cannot expand the RPAT and DLA disposition yards to their desired sizes because of 

challenges associated with de-mining, obtaining property rights, and providing additional 

security. 

• According to DOD officials, as compared with Iraq, the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan has a more limited ability to absorb and maintain transferred equipment. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

15 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objectives, Scope, Methodology

To what extent has DOD: 

1) Applied relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown in its 

planning for equipment reductions in Afghanistan? 

2) Planned for the reduction of equipment in Afghanistan by 

establishing command structures and guidance, property 

accountability, and transportation processes? 

3) Considered costs in its planning for equipment reductions in 

Afghanistan? 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

16 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont.)

To determine the extent to which DOD has identified and applied relevant lessons learned from the 

drawdown in Iraq to its efforts to reduce equipment in Afghanistan, we reviewed military service 

documents and GAO products that identify lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown. We then evaluated 

planning documents for the Afghanistan drawdown to determine whether the relevant lessons identified 

from Iraq had been applied to Afghanistan operations. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment in Afghanistan by 

establishing (a) command structures and guidance, (b) property accountability, and (c) transportation 

processes, we examined policies, orders, and processes in those three areas.

 

To determine the extent to which DOD has considered costs in its planning for equipment reductions in 

Afghanistan, we examined the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force processes and documents to 

ascertain when and how costs were factored into decision-making processes that will determine whether 

equipment should be transferred, destroyed, or returned. 

In support of all these objectives, we conducted site visits and interviewed officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, military services, combatant commands, subordinate commands, and 

other agencies. A detailed list of the organizations we visited is presented below.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

17 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont.)

Agencies Contacted

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

• Joint Staff 

• U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 

o U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A)

• U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and component commands: 

o Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 

o U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command 

• Headquarters Department of the Army / Logistics Retrograde Team 

• U.S. Army Materiel Command 

• U.S. Army Sustainment Command 

• U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command 

• U.S. Marine Corps / Installations and Logistics 

• U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Command 

• Headquarters U.S. Navy / Expeditionary Readiness 

• Headquarters U.S. Air Force / Equipment Management Branch 

• Headquarters U.S. Air Force / Lessons Learned 

• DLA 

o DLA – Disposition Services 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

18 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Summary

Objective 1: Applying Lessons Learned

The military services and DOD agencies have applied some of the relevant lessons 

learned from the Iraq drawdown to their planning for equipment reductions in 

Afghanistan. For example, the Iraq drawdown demonstrated the importance of early 

planning for equipment drawdown, and the military services have already issued 

guidance and orders outlining the processes and procedures for drawing down 

equipment in Afghanistan. However, not all relevant lessons learned from the Iraq 

drawdown have been applied in Afghanistan. For example, during the Iraq drawdown, 

the Army identified that contractor equipment must be inventoried and entered into an 

automated records accounting system, yet inventories in Afghanistan did not include 

this equipment.

3

 

3

For the purposes of this briefing, contractor equipment includes government-owned equipment that was either furnished to contractors by the 

government or acquired directly by the contractor.

We note, however, that USFOR-A officials told us they are 

establishing a Contractor Drawdown cell to improve visibility of contractor equipment 

in Afghanistan.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

19 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Summary (cont.)

Objective 2: Planning for Equipment Reduction

DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment from Afghanistan by establishing (a) 

command structures and guidance, (b) property accountability, and (c) transportation 

options—three areas we have previously identified as important for drawdown 

operations.4 Concerning command structures and guidance, CENTCOM has 

established USFOR-A as the supported command for retrograde operations, and 

USFOR-A has published a base closure and transfer guide that outlines processes for 

the handling of equipment during transition.5

 

4

GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment and Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and Plans, 

GAO-09-380T (Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009); and Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing 

of U.S. Forces from Iraq, GAO-08-930 (Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008).

Regarding property accountability, in 

September 2011 USFOR-A directed an inventory of all the equipment in Afghanistan 

to identify items not previously accounted for in DOD’s systems of record. In the area 

of transportation options, DOD has established and increased the potential capacity of 

transportation routes out of Afghanistan. However, some of the transportation options 

have limited operational capability for the return of equipment due to the region’s 

complex geopolitical environment.

5

In the context of command relationships, the supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task, such as drawdown from 

Afghanistan, and receives assistance from other commanders’ forces or capabilities as required to accomplish the assigned mission. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

20 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Summary (cont.)

Objective 3: Consideration of Costs

Consistent with DOD’s supply chain materiel management policy, DOD has issued 

additional guidance requiring the services to analyze the costs and benefits of 

transferring or destroying equipment. However, there is no specific guidance requiring 

the military services to assess and document the costs and benefits associated with 

the return of equipment from Afghanistan, and they have not done so. Some services 

told us that they conduct informal cost-benefit analyses to support the return of major 

end items from Afghanistan. However, none of the services was able to provide us 

with documentation of these cost-benefit analyses. As a result, the extent to which 

these analyses are being performed is uncertain. Based on our analysis, this is 

particularly problematic when considering whether or not to return equipment that is 

excess to current requirements. When an excess item is returned without 

consideration of the costs and benefits, there is increased risk of unnecessary 

expenditures on transportation and storage of unneeded items.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

21 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 1: Applying Lessons Learned

A DOD-wide program gathers lessons learned to enhance the combatant 

commander’s ability to prepare, integrate, and synchronize combat and 

support forces.6 In addition, the military services and major commands 

have identified specific lessons learned from Iraq for application in 

Afghanistan.

 

6

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) is a DOD-wide effort to enhance the joint operator’s ability to learn from the conduct of operations 

across all levels of engagement and improve mission effectiveness. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

22 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 1: Applying Lessons Learned (cont.)

 

• DOD lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown that have been applied in 

Afghanistan include the following:

o The early initiation of planning for the drawdown. An example of this is 

the Marine Corps effort initiated in 2009 to review its requirements, 

which led to the Marine Corps Equipment Reset Strategy and a detailed 

Reset Playbook in 2011. We have highlighted the Marine Corps Reset 

Playbook in appendixes I and II as an example of a detailed planning 

tool for the drawdown that could be useful if adopted by other services 

and DOD.

o The early establishment of disposition instructions. The Navy, for 

example, issued instructions to units in March 2009 to determine 

disposition for equipment in Afghanistan. In September 2010, the Army 

issued disposition instructions for the return of serviceable equipment 

from Afghanistan. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

23 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 1: Applying Lessons Learned (cont.)

o The reduction of equipment through early identification, screening, and 

disposition. USFOR-A and DLA began early processing of some vehicles 

and other equipment for transfer, destruction, or return. 

o Setting monthly targets for the reduction of equipment. USFOR-A 

established equipment reduction goals for vehicles and containers; its goal 

is to eventually achieve the sustained monthly reduction of 1,200 vehicles 

and 1,000 containers of materiel. USFOR-A has identified more than 50,000 

vehicles and more than 90,000 containers of materiel in Afghanistan 

requiring disposition, and has begun keeping metrics on the reduction of this 

equipment. Specifically, in July 2012 the Army: 

 Processed and TRANSCOM shipped 579 vehicles out of Afghanistan;

 Delivered 183 vehicles to DLA-Disposition Services yards for 

destruction;

 Identified 9 vehicles for foreign military sales.7

 

7

The quantities listed for the July 2012 reduction of equipment in Afghanistan reflect quantities reduced up to July 26, 2012. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

24 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 1: Applying Lessons Learned (cont.)

Not all relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown have been applied in Afghanistan. For example, 

DOD still has limited visibility over contractor equipment:

• In the Iraq drawdown, the Army determined that contractor equipment should be inventoried and 

entered into an automated records accounting system; however, inventories in Afghanistan did not 

include contractor equipment.

• In September 2011, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and 

the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to approve and implement a process, as appropriate, to 

include associated policy and training, for acquiring and maintaining real-time visibility of contractor 

equipment before it is delivered to the U.S. government that meets the needs of operational forces 

while retaining oversight features inherent to DOD’s current processes.8

• USFOR-A and Army officials told us that full inventory of contractor equipment has not yet been 

attained in Afghanistan. We note, however, Army officials also told us they are increasing automation 

and publishing guidance to improve visibility of contractor equipment in Afghanistan. In addition, 

USFOR-A officials told us they are establishing a Contractor Drawdown cell that would improve 

visibility of contractor equipment in Afghanistan. 

At that time, DOD agreed with 

our recommendation. 

 

8

GAO, Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, GAO11-774 (Washington, D.C.: September16, 2011). 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

25 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 2: Planning for Equipment Reduction –

Command Structures and Guidance 

DOD has planned for the reduction of equipment from Afghanistan by establishing (a) 

command structures and guidance, (b) property accountability, and (c) transportation 

options. 

A) Command structures and guidance. According to Joint Doctrine, supported 

commanders must identify an organizational structure to control and execute the 

redeployment of forces. Additionally, the supported commander is to establish priorities and 

provide guidance to accomplish redeployment tasks. We found that command structures 

and guidance for the reduction of equipment in Afghanistan have been established. 

Specifically: 

• DOD has issued guidance establishing who can approve the transfer of 

equipment (by cost threshold) to the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan. 

• CENTCOM has established USFOR-A as the supported command for retrograde 

operations. 

• USFOR-A has published a base closure and transfer guide that outlines 

processes for the handling and disposition of equipment during transition. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

26 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 2: Planning for Equipment Reduction – 

Property Accountability 

B) Property accountability. To efficiently and effectively plan for the reduction 

of equipment, planners must know what and how much must be moved. 

According to the Army Execute Order for the reduction of equipment in 

Afghanistan, 10 years of inflow without corresponding outflow has led to the 

accumulation of equipment in Afghanistan. 

• DOD officials said Operation Clean Sweep improved equipment 

accountability and has provided planners with a more accurate picture 

of the amount of equipment they will ultimately need to process in 

Afghanistan. However, as described in Objective 1, DOD officials 

acknowledge that they lack visibility over contractor equipment. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

27 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 2: Planning for Equipment Reduction – 

Transportation

C) Transportation Options: Joint Doctrine emphasizes the need to adjust or reprioritize transportation assets to meet 

operational requirements. To this end, DOD has established and increased the potential capacity of transportation routes 

out of Afghanistan. However, an assumption on which DOD has based its drawdown planning is the availability of ground 

routes: the Pakistan ground routes (PakGLOC) and the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a surface route through 

European and central Asian countries.9

• To date, the NDN is operational for inbound sustainment, but not fully operational for outbound equipment. 

At present, these routes have limited operational capability for the return of 

equipment due to the complex geopolitical environment in the region. Specifically: 

o TRANSCOM officials stated that DOD faces challenges in converting the NDN routes to support 

outbound flow due to customs and diplomatic clearance issues. 

o U.S. forces still rely on the NDN for inbound sustainment, limiting its capacity to support the return of 

equipment. A number of NDN routes are approved for the return of equipment and TRANSCOM is 

currently conducting tests to determine route capacity. 

• Since November 2011, the PakGLOC has not been operational for the return of equipment. While the United 

States and Pakistan agreed to open the PakGLOC in July 2012, the route is still in the test phase for the 

return of equipment. As a result, DOD has had to rely on multi-modal (air and sea) transport, a more costly 

transportation option. 

The next two slides depict projections for the outbound flow of equipment by route and mode of transportation, and the 

costs associated with moving equipment over each route.

 

9

According to military doctrine, an assumption is a supposition about a current military situation or future course of events assumed to be true in 

the absence of facts. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. Assumptions must be 

continually reviewed to ensure validity.
28 

GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations

Objective 2: Planning for Equipment Reduction – 

Transportation (cont.)

• This graphic shows TRANSCOM 

projections that 14.2 percent of 

all returning equipment will be 

transported via the NDN, 19.9 

percent via the PakGLOC, and 

65.8 percent via multi-modal. 

• However, as the previous slide 

notes, use of the NDN and 

PakGLOC may have limitations, 

and a greater dependence on 

multi-modal transportation may 

become necessary.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

29 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 2: Planning for Equipment Reduction – 

Transportation (cont.)

• This graphic depicts the routes and 

estimated associated costs for the 

return of equipment from Afghanistan. 

• The costs vary, depending on such 

factors as type of equipment being 

shipped, customs, and shipping 

standards. For example, according to 

DOD data, transportation costs for the 

return of a single vehicle or container 

can range from $8,000 to $153,000. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

30 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 3: Consideration of Costs in Equipment 

Reduction – Transfer, Destroy, or Return

• According to DOD guidance, DOD components shall consider all costs associated with materiel management 

in making best value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain. 10

• Consistent with DOD’s supply chain materiel management policy, DOD has issued additional guidance 

requiring an assessment and documentation of the costs and benefits of transferring or destroying 

equipment. Specifically: 

The guidance further states that best 

value decisions should be determined through the use of a business case analysis methodology that 

evaluates both cost and non-cost factors. Examples of cost factors could include transportation, repair, 

handling, and storage costs; non-cost factors could include the condition of the item, existing requirements for 

the item, and the sensitivity of an item (which may dictate its return even if the item is no longer required). 

o Transfer – In order to transfer equipment, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness requires the military services to provide analyses and documentation 

demonstrating that the benefit to the United States will be commensurate with the value of the 

property transferred. 

o Destroy – If an item is to be destroyed, USFOR-A requires certification that the item has been 

vetted through a service process and that all avenues for reutilization/transfer have been 

exhausted, or that a cost-benefit analysis was conducted and destruction found to be the 

most cost-effective option. 

 

10 DOD Instruction 4140.01, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy (Dec. 14, 2011).
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

31 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 3: Consideration of Costs in Equipment 

Reduction – Transfer, Destroy, or Return (cont.)

Return – Unlike transfer or destruction of equipment in Afghanistan, there is no specific guidance 

requiring the military services to assess and document the costs and benefits for the return of 

equipment. The services have not fully considered the costs and benefits of returning major end 

items from Afghanistan. While some service officials stated that they conduct informal cost-benefit 

analyses, none of the services was able to provide documentation of these cost-benefit analyses, 

and so the extent to which these analyses are being performed is uncertain.

• Army officials said that cost-benefit analyses for the return of equipment from Afghanistan are 

being conducted informally. However, because the Army could not provide documentation of 

these cost benefit analyses, the extent to which these analyses are being performed is 

uncertain.

• The Air Force is not currently performing such cost-benefit analyses. 

• Marine Corps officials said that in their decisions to return equipment they give consideration to 

whether the repair of the equipment is more cost-effective than new procurement, but do not 

consider transportation costs. However, the Marine Corps could not provide documentation of 

cost-benefit analyses. Also, the Marine Corps has developed a tool that decision makers could 

use to analyze the possible costs and benefits of returning major end items (see appendix II). 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

32 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Objective 3: Consideration of Costs in Equipment 

Reduction – Transfer, Destroy, or Return (cont.)

• Navy officials told us that they use an economic analysis that considers transportation 

costs concerning the return of equipment from Afghanistan. The Navy has issued 

guidance stating that, in general, the return of equipment must be more cost-effective 

than new procurement, adding that units should return only those pieces for which a 

clear business case can be made. Navy officials said that such assessments include 

transportation costs and the condition of the equipment. However, the Navy could not 

provide documentation of these analyses, so the extent to which they are being 

performed is uncertain. 

Based on our analysis, the return of major end items without consideration of the costs and 

benefits is particularly problematic for returning equipment that is excess to current 

requirements. When an excess item is returned without consideration of costs and benefits, 

there is increased risk of transportation and storage expenditures on unneeded items. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

33 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Conclusions

• DOD has applied some relevant lessons learned from the Iraq drawdown to its plans 

for the reduction of equipment in Afghanistan. DOD has also planned for the reduction 

of equipment in Afghanistan by establishing (a) command structures and guidance, (b) 

property accountability, and (c) transportation options. However, DOD decision 

makers do not have cost-benefit information concerning the return of equipment from 

Afghanistan. 

• The military services can return major end items without documentation of cost and 

benefit considerations or analyses used in the decision-making process.

• Because the services have not consistently performed and documented analyses to 

support decision making concerning the return of excess major end items from 

Afghanistan, there is a risk that the cost of returning excess items may outweigh the 

benefits of returning them. 

• Decision makers cannot make fully informed decisions concerning costs and benefits 

associated with the return of excess equipment without documented supporting 

analyses. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

34 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Recommendations

To reduce the risk of returning excess major end items from Afghanistan without full 

consideration of costs and benefits, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

ensure that the Service Secretaries and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, 

conduct and document analyses to support the decisions to return excess major end 

items by taking the following two actions:

1) Conduct and document analyses to compare the costs of returning excess major 

end items with the benefits of returning them. These analyses might include 

considerations of factors such as: 

• Repair; 

• Transportation and storage;

• Handling; 

• Condition of the item; and

• Sensitivity of the item. 

2) Use these cost-benefit analyses as a key factor in decision making concerning the 

return of excess major end items.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

35 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix I: Marine Corps Reset Playbook Sample

• As early as 2009 the Marine Corps began a review of its requirements that led to 

the Marine Corps Equipment Reset Strategy.11

• As a result of its requirements review the Marine Corps also developed a Reset 

Playbook—a single, detailed accounting of each of its 78,168 major end items in 

Afghanistan— that contains the following information for each item: 

 

o current and future requirements data;

o on-hand inventories in Afghanistan and service-wide;

o the initially forecast disposition instructions (return, transfer, or destroy) for 

each item; and

o the information used to determine the best mode of transportation for return. 

• The information contained in the Playbook is updated periodically based on inputs 

from Afghanistan and Marine Corps inventory managers. Excerpts from this 

playbook are contained in the following slides.

 

11 The Marine Corps broadly defines reset as the repair, recapitalization, and replacement actions taken to restore unit equipment to a desired 

level of combat capability commensurate with the unit’s future mission.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

36 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix I: Marine Corps Reset Playbook Sample

(Cont.)
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

37 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process 

Source: GAO analysis of Marine Corps data

• Using the Playbook, decision makers can identify equipment in Afghanistan that is forecast to return, but is 

excess to their requirements. The Marine Corps currently plans to return 61,996 major end items from 

Afghanistan. Of the 61,996 items forecast to be returned, 11,191 (18%) do not have a fiscal year 2012 

requirement or other documented justification for return; 16,106 (26%) do not have a fiscal year 2017 

requirement or other documented justification for return.

Fiscal Year 2012 Requirements Fiscal Year 2017 Requirements
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

38 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process (cont.)

• Using the Playbook, decision makers could determine possible costs and 

benefits of returning major end items. 

• The items that follow are examples of major end items that are forecast to be 

returned, but may be excess to requirements. The wide disparity in

transportation costs for returning equipment could be a deciding factor in the 

determination of whether to return an item. 

• Even if the items are excess, there may be a rationale for returning them, 

rather than transferring or destroying the items. 

• A documented analysis that considers both cost (e.g., transportation) and 

non-cost (e.g., sensitivity of the item) factors would validate the decision to 

return excess items or to dispose of them in country (transfer or destroy). 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

39 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process (cont.)

Van, Z Backscatter 

(July 2012 Playbook, p. 268)

There are a total of 33 Marine Corps 

Backscatter Vans in Afghanistan, all of 

which are forecast to be returned via 

multimodal transportation. Based on the 

Playbook requirement, the return of 28 

could meet Marine Corps-wide 

requirements. 

If the remaining 5 vans are determined to 

be excess when the disposition 

instructions are issued, the transportation 

cost for the return of these vans could 

range from $150,000 to $765,000, 

underscoring the importance of a costbenefit analysis. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

40 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process (cont.)

Loader, Scoop Type

(July 2012 Playbook, p. 292) 

There are155 Marine Corps Scoop Type 

Loaders in Afghanistan, all of which are 

forecast to be returned. Based on the 

Playbook requirement, the return of 59 

could meet Marine Corps-wide 

requirements. 

If the remaining 96 loaders are determined 

to be excess when the disposition 

instructions are issued, the transportation 

cost for the return of these loaders could 

range from $1.8 million to $14.7 million, 

underscoring the importance of a costbenefit analysis. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

41 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process (cont.)

Small Field Refrigerator

(July 2012 Playbook, p. 299)

There are 217 Marine Corps Small Field 

Refrigerators in Afghanistan. Depending 

on when disposition occurs, all 217 of 

these refrigerators in Afghanistan could be 

excess to Marine Corps-wide 

requirements. However, all of them are 

forecast to be returned from Afghanistan if 

serviceable. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

42 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Playbook Process (cont.)

• Marine Corps officials told us that they are preparing an interim 

policy regarding cost-benefit analysis for the return of excess 

equipment from Afghanistan. This analysis would be used to

determine disposition instructions for excess equipment that is 

forecast for return. 

• Marine Corps processes and the use of cost-benefit analyses could 

be applied to all the military services. 

o Marine Corps equipment has more than 70,000 major end items 

in Afghanistan. The Army has the most major end items in 

Afghanistan—more than 640,000. 

o Transportation costs could be reduced if items are moved from 

the return option to the transfer or destroy options. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides

43 GAO-13-185R Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations 

Related GAO Products

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO-08-

930. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.

Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment and Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. 

Strategy and Plans. GAO-09-380T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq. GAO10-179. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2009.

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq.

GAO-10-376. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2010. 

Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment 

to Afghanistan. GAO-10-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2010. 

Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address Challenges in Supply Chain Management. GAO-11-

569. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011. 

Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 

DOD Role. GAO-11-774. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2011. 

Warfighter Support: DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and Distribution Challenges Remain In Afghanistan. GAO-12-

138. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2011.

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