PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-1957

___________

JEFFREY W. BLETZ, personally, and as the guardian of 

DJF, a minor; LINDSEY J. BLETZ

Appellants

v.

JEREMY W. CORRIE

_________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00717)

District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

____________________________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 31, 2020

Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit 

Judges

(Filed: September 9, 2020)

_____________
2

Devon M. Jacob

Jacob Litigation

P.O. Box 837

Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

Counsel for Appellants

Sean A. Kirkpatrick

J. Bart DeLone

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

15th Floor, Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Counsel for Appellee

___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

This civil rights action stems from the shooting of a 

family’s pet dog by a law enforcement officer as he served an 

arrest warrant at their home. The District Court granted 

summary judgment to Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeremy W. 

Corrie on the Bletzes’ two claims, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 

for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and an

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under 

Pennsylvania law. The Bletzes appeal the District Court’s 

Fourth Amendment ruling. For the reasons set forth in this 

opinion, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
3

I

On May 1, 2014, Jeffrey W. Bletz was living in York 

County, Pennsylvania with his daughter, Lindsey J. Bletz, and 

young grandson, DJF. That morning, they were all at home

with their pet dog, Ace, a Rottweiler/Labrador Retriever mix 

who was then seven years old. Jeffrey opened the back door 

to let Ace outside. He was unaware that, at that moment,

Trooper Corrie and other officers from multiple law 

enforcement agencies were swarming his property to serve an 

arrest warrant on an armed robbery suspect believed to be 

living there.

Trooper Corrie approached the house from the left side 

(facing the front), along with Trooper Richard T. Drum. As 

they approached, Trooper Corrie heard Trooper Drum yell 

“whoa” several times from behind, his voice becoming

increasingly “more excited,” prompting Trooper Corrie “to 

turn around.” App. 506. As he turned, he saw a large dog 

coming toward him, “already mid-leap, within an arm’s reach,” 

at about chest height. App. 506. Ace “was showing [his] teeth, 

and growling in an aggressive manner,” making a low-pitched 

noise, like a combination of a “growl and a bark.” App. 506, 

124. 

Trooper Corrie says he “backpedaled to create 

distance,” and Ace circled around him to his right, 

“attempt[ing] to attack [him] from that direction.” App. 507. 

Trooper Corrie “believe[s] there was another snarl,” and then 

he fired a shot. App. 125–26. Ace “began to come after [him] 

again from [his] right side,” then “abruptly changed directions,

. . . turned its body and charged [him] again.” App. 126. The 

dog did not jump a second time before Trooper Corrie fired a 

second shot—and then a third. The third shot struck Ace on 
4

his right side. The dog yelped, ran to Jeffrey, who was then

near the garage, laid down at his feet, and died within minutes. 

A necropsy of Ace showed that the bullet entered through the

“right upper chest” and exited through the “left lower chest,”

which “indicat[es] that the bullet travelled from right to left 

across the chest and slightly downward.” App. 446. 

Trooper Drum, who was with Trooper Corrie during the 

encounter, recounted the incident to the State Police on May 

27, 2014. He explained that Ace had behaved aggressively 

toward him before changing directions and running toward 

Trooper Corrie. Trooper Drum recounted that Trooper Corrie 

fired three shots when Ace was “right at the base of [Corrie’s] 

feet” and “still in the aggressive manner.” App. 497. The

Bletzes did not witness the incident.

On April 29, 2016, the Bletzes initiated this action 

against Trooper Corrie claiming unlawful seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress under Pennsylvania law. After discovery, Trooper 

Corrie moved for summary judgment on both counts, and on 

March 26, 2019, the District Court granted his motion. The 

Bletzes now timely appeal the District Court’s ruling on the 

Fourth Amendment claim; they do not challenge its conclusion

on the state law claim.

1

1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5

II

A

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant 

of summary judgment, and we apply the same standard as the 

district court. Adams v. Zimmer US, Inc., 943 F.3d 159, 163 

n.4 (3d Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment is appropriate where, 

construing all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.’” Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87, 

90 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and 

citing Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d 

Cir. 2015)). A genuine issue of material fact is one that could 

lead a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 

643 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of 

demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Id. The

court must review the record as a whole, draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and must not 

“weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” 

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Armour v. Cty. of Beaver, Pa., 271 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 

2001)). 

B

We must determine whether the District Court properly 

granted summary judgment in favor of Trooper Corrie on the 

Bletzes’ Fourth Amendment claim. Based on the analysis that 

follows, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling. 
6

1

The Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure 

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” In Brown v. Muhlenberg 

Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2001), this Court held that 

people have a possessory interest in their pets, and “the killing 

of a person’s dog by a law enforcement officer constitutes a 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Thus, to be 

constitutionally permissible, an officer’s conduct in fatally 

shooting a pet “must have been reasonable.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). 

To assess the reasonableness of a seizure, a court must 

“balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 

importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 

intrusion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 

703 (1983)). A “disproportionately intrusive” seizure would 

be unreasonable. Id. As always, in Fourth Amendment cases, 

a court must be mindful to judge reasonableness “from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 

U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The calculus of reasonableness 

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 

often forced to make split-second judgments—in 

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—

about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 

situation.”). 

Our precedent in Brown serves as an example of when 

a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the shooting of a pet 
7

should proceed to trial. In that case, a pet Rottweiler wearing 

a bright pink collar with tags had wandered outside the yard 

and into an adjacent parking lot. 269 F.3d at 208–09. An 

officer saw the dog, and as he approached her, the dog “barked 

several times and then withdrew.” Id. at 209. The officer 

walked toward her and stood about ten to twelve feet from her, 

at which time the dog stayed still, not barking or growling. Id. 

A bystander stated that the dog “did not display any aggressive 

behavior” toward the officer. Id. The dog’s owner looked out 

her window and saw the officer and her dog facing each other 

in the parking lot—then she saw the officer reach for his gun. 

Id. She screamed, “That’s my dog, don’t shoot!” Id. The 

officer hesitated for a few seconds, pointed his gun at the dog, 

and shot the dog five times. Id. The officer had “intentionally 

and repeatedly shot a pet without any provocation and with 

knowledge that it belonged to the family who lived in the 

adjacent house and was available to take custody.” Id. 

Weighing this conduct against the state’s “interest in 

restraining [a dog] so that it will pose no danger to the person 

or property of others,” we concluded that there was a triable 

issue as to whether the officer’s shooting of the dog constituted 

an unlawful seizure. Id. at 210–11.

We noted, however, that “the state’s interest in 

protecting life and property may be implicated when there is 

reason to believe the pet poses an imminent danger.” Id. at 

210. In such a case, “the state’s interest may even justify the 

extreme intrusion occasioned by the destruction of the pet in 

the owner’s presence.” Id. at 210–11. This hypothetical 

proves prescient here. 

While Brown serves as an example of when the 

reasonableness of an officer’s conduct presents a triable issue, 

we look to our sister circuits for examples of when an officer’s 
8

conduct has been deemed reasonable as a matter of law. The 

Sixth Circuit has held that officers acted reasonably when they 

fatally shot two pit bulls that “either lunged or were barking 

aggressively” at them, while the dogs were “unleashed and 

loose in a small residence.” Brown v. Battle Creek Police 

Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556, 570–72 (6th Cir. 2016). At the time, the 

officers were searching the home of a suspect who had a 

criminal history and gang affiliations. Id. at 568. In another 

case where an officer was executing a search warrant inside a 

home, the D.C. Circuit held that an officer acted reasonably in 

shooting a dog that had bit a fellow officer’s leather boot hard 

enough to puncture it only seconds earlier. Robinson v. Pezzat, 

818 F.3d 1, 5, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016). And in a case where 

officers responded to separate incidents of dogs roaming in 

public places, the Fourth Circuit held that officers acted 

reasonably in using lethal force to protect the public when the 

dogs had either attacked someone that day or were known to 

be aggressive. Altman v. City of High Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 

194, 197–99, 204–05 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[w]hen a 

dog leaves the control of his owner and runs at large in a public 

space, the government interest in controlling the animal . . . 

waxes dramatically, while the private interest correspondingly 

wanes”). 

In line with our precedent in Brown and the persuasive 

rulings of our sister circuits, we hold that the use of deadly 

force against a household pet is reasonable if the pet poses an 

imminent threat to the law enforcement officer’s safety, 

viewed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable 

officer. See, e.g., Brown, 269 F.3d at 210–11 (stating that “the 

state’s interest in protecting life and property . . . may even 

justify the extreme intrusion occasioned by the destruction of 

the pet in the owner’s presence”); Battle Creek, 844 F.3d at 568
9

(“[A] police officer’s use of deadly force against a dog while 

executing a warrant to search a home for illegal drug activity 

is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when, given the 

totality of the circumstances and viewed from the perspective 

of an objectively reasonable officer, the dog poses an imminent 

threat to the officer’s safety.”).

2

Here, the state had an important interest in protecting 

the safety of its officers while they undertook a coordinated 

effort to serve an arrest warrant on an armed robbery suspect. 

To be sure, it was an “extreme intrusion” for Trooper Corrie to 

fatally shoot the Bletzes’ pet dog. Brown, 269 F.3d at 211; see 

also Altman, 330 F.3d at 205 (stressing the “appreciable” 

private interests involved, as “[d]ogs have aptly been labeled 

‘Man’s Best Friend,’ and certainly the bond between a dog 

owner and his pet can be strong and enduring”). We must 

balance these considerations to determine whether Trooper

Corrie’s actions were objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703. This requires us to 

assess whether Ace posed an imminent threat to Trooper 

Corrie’s safety.

Trooper Corrie bears the burden of demonstrating that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact that could cause a 

reasonable jury to find that he unlawfully seized the Bletzes’ 

dog. See Willis, 808 F.3d at 643. Both people who witnessed 

the incident, Trooper Corrie and Trooper Drum, testified that 

Ace aggressively charged at Trooper Corrie, growling and 

showing his teeth, as though about to attack—and that he did 

not relent until subdued by the third bullet. Trooper Corrie 

reasonably interpreted Ace’s behavior as a threat of imminent 

attack. Considering that he had to make a split-second decision 
10

while participating in a coordinated effort to arrest an armedrobbery suspect, he acted reasonably in shooting Ace.

The Bletzes argue that material facts are disputed

because Trooper Corrie’s testimony that he shot Ace on his

right side conflicts with his testimony that he shot because the 

dog charged at him. In support of this argument, the Bletzes

cite the testimony of their expert, James W. Crosby, who 

opined that because the dog was “positioned laterally to 

Corrie,” it “was not engaged with Corrie in any way when 

Corrie’s third round was fired.” App. 458. 

Even though Ace happened to be moving laterally

relative to Trooper Corrie when he was struck, this does not 

rule out the dog’s continued aggression, and plaintiffs do not 

cite any admissible evidence tending to show that Ace 

displayed no signs of aggression signaling an imminent attack. 

The Bletzes were not present to witness the incident. Rule 

56(c)(1)(A) requires that parties “asserting that a fact . . . is 

genuinely disputed” support that claim “by citing to particular 

parts of materials in the record.” Here, the evidence cited does 

not suggest Ace refrained from acting aggressively at every 

stage of the altercation.

Further, Ace approached the officers in the context of a 

coordinated effort to serve an arrest warrant on an armed 

robbery suspect. Considering all of this, Trooper Corrie acted 

reasonably in shooting Ace, whose behaviors presented an 

imminent threat to his physical safety.

The Bletzes further argue that Trooper Corrie acted 

unreasonably because he was not provided and did not pursue 

training regarding the “safe handling of dogs” and neglected to 

attempt nonlethal means of subduing Ace. Appellants’ Br. 10. 
11

However, the touchstone of a Fourth Amendment analysis is

whether the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances. 

See Brown, 269 F.3d at 210 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 703). It 

is not whether the officer received or could have pursued a 

certain level of training. We offer no opinion on Trooper 

Corrie’s training or potential alternatives to lethal force—and 

this opinion should not be read as endorsing his reaction or

stating that he implemented “the best possible response[].” 

Altman, 330 F.3d at 207. “We are only saying that, under the 

circumstances existing at the time the officer[] took the actions 

and in light of the facts known by the officer[], [his] actions 

were objectively reasonable.” Id.; see also Graham, 490 U.S. 

at 396 (stating that we must not view the situation with “the 

20/20 vision of hindsight”).

In conclusion, Trooper Corrie, while participating in a 

coordinated effort to serve an arrest warrant on an armed 

robbery suspect, reasonably used lethal force against a dog 

who, unrebutted testimony shows, aggressively charged at 

him, growled, and showed his teeth, as though about to attack.

2

 

We will thus affirm the District Court’s order granting 

summary judgment.

2

 Given our conclusion that the shooting of Ace did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment, we will not address whether 

the law was “clearly established” for purposes of qualified 

immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If 

no constitutional right would have been violated were the 

allegations established, there is no necessity for further 

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”).